

# The State's response to crime and public security in South Africa

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# 1 Introduction

In November 2007, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) entered into an agreement with the South African civil rights organisation AfriForum to conduct research on whether and to what extent the Government of the Republic of South Africa, as the executive organ of the State, has been fulfilling its constitutional obligation to combat crime. In terms of the agreement, the ISS undertook to conduct field research in at least four police station areas in various provinces and to supplement this with a literature review of policies and official statements relating to the fight against crime. The researchers would use these findings to form an expert opinion on these policies and the extent to which they had been implemented. Although the study would consider the national security situation, particular attention would be given to the phasing out of the commandos and the introduction of alternative systems the South African Police Service (SAPS) had undertaken to put in their place.

AfriForum was established as an independent initiative of the trade union Solidarity and campaigns for the protection and consolidation of civil rights as contained in the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and international conventions to which the Government is party. One of the problem areas that AfriForum has identified as impacting on these civil rights is crime. AfriForum questions the extent to which the Government has fulfilled its constitutional responsibilities. It does this specifically with regard to sections 7, 11, 12 and 25 (Bill of Rights), as well as section 205 (Police Service), of the Constitution. According to section 7(2), the State [represented by Government as its executive organ], must 'respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights'. Subsequently, section 11 provides for the '*right*

*to life*', section 12 for the '*right to freedom and security of the person*', and section 25 for the '*right not to be deprived of property*' (except in terms of law of general application). According to section 205(3) the 'objects' of the police service are, *inter alia*, 'to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law'.

The ISS agreed to undertake the research by analysing South Africa's overall crime situation (with a focus on violent crime); by considering Government's overall response to this; by looking at the general state of policing in the country in terms of force size, structure and budget; and by carrying out four case studies in identified geographical areas. It was decided to focus primarily on case studies because of the complexity and scale that would be entailed by a more general review of the Government's efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of safety and security. The researchers decided that case studies would be manageable and would allow them to focus on specific occurrences in the field of safety and security that would be relatively easy to demonstrate. It was decided to investigate accusations against Government that the closing down of the commandos in affected areas created a 'vacuum' in the state's ability to perform its constitutional obligation to provide a safe and secure environment.

The report commences with a brief discussion of the methodology used in the research, followed by an overview of South Africa's crime situation, a discussion of the status of policing in South Africa, and a case study discussion on the impact of the closing of the commandos. It ends with concluding findings.

## 2 Methodology

The researchers adopted a qualitative research method for this study mainly because qualitative research involves a study of selected cases and other sources of information but, unlike quantitative research, makes little use of numerical data or statistics (Vermeulen 1998:10). Qualitative research also enables the researcher to understand and explain, by making use of evidence from collected data and literature, the phenomenon that is being studied (Henning et al 2004:3). In line with this approach, the qualitative data for this report comprise a literature review and local case studies, including personal interviews conducted in the various geographical areas that were visited.

It was decided to select four geographical areas, located in at least three provinces, for case studies. The primary criterion for selecting an area was whether a commando unit had existed there previously and whether it was closed down as a consequence of the announcement on 14 February 2003 by President Thabo Mbeki to the South African Parliament that the commando system would be phased out. The researchers had no prior knowledge about the extent to which the police had taken over the functions of the commandos in any particular area before or after the latter were closed down. Later in the report there is a discussion of the joint exit/entry strategy worked out between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) (the strategy is explained in detail in section 6 below).

The four areas selected for case studies were:

- Clocolan and neighbouring Marquard (Free State)
- Dundee (KwaZulu-Natal)
- Cullinan (Gauteng)
- Krugersdorp (Gauteng)

During visits to these areas, the researchers met important role-players representing the police, members of community police forums, former commando members, local farmers, and representatives of organised agriculture and of private security companies (not all of these role-players were available in every location visited, however). The interviews were unstructured but consistent with the quest to obtain specific information, such as the dates on which specific commandos were closed down, what their responsibilities were, their effectiveness, and what systems, if any, the police had put in place to fill the gap.

A literature review was also undertaken. This enabled the researchers to compare crime figures for the target areas before and since the phasing out of the commandos, as well as access policies, strategies, speeches and statements relating to disbandment, and to build on previous research in this regard.

The objective of this study may be described as comparative and interpretive. The authors were able to conclude that, despite the geographical limitations, it is very probable that their findings are representative of the situation across much of the country. This opinion is supported by the findings of two other studies referred to below (in section 7). The study is also limited as far as the number and representivity of interviewees are concerned (the number of interviewees are indicated in the discussion in section 7): some individuals were either unwilling or unavailable to be interviewed, and there were also time constraints. Most interviewees were also prepared to talk to the researchers only on the basis of anonymity. However, the researchers are satisfied that the collected data are sufficient to substantiate their findings.

Finally, the researchers believe that it is only necessary to prove whether Government was (is) grossly negligent

in performing its constitutional obligations to protect the above rights – as espoused by the Bill of Rights – **to prove whether they are indeed failing in this regard**. The ultimate aim of this study is therefore to determine whether

and to what extent Government's response to crime and public security is in keeping with its constitutional obligation to *'respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights'*.

### 3 An overview of crime in South Africa<sup>1</sup>

From South Africa's crime figures for the fourteen-year period between 1994/95 and 2007/08 (figure 1) it is evident that the country's worst levels of crime were experienced in 2002/03. These figures, incidentally, refer only to crimes reported to the police. In 2002/03 a total of 2 629 137 crimes (in the category of most serious crimes) were reported to the police, compared to 2 048 788 in 2007/08. This represents a decrease of approximately 22%. The graph in figure 1 shows that the overall crime rate dropped steadily by some 6% per year between 2002/03 and 2005/06. In 2006/07 the decrease slowed to 2%, but in 2007/08 the decrease improved to just over 4%.

Judging from the overall picture – at least as far as reported crime is concerned – crime is still on the decrease, albeit at a slower rate than in the 2002/03 – 2005/06

period. This raises legitimate questions about why the rate of decrease has slowed. Indeed, although the crime statistics provided by the SAPS are generally regarded as fairly accurate and credible, the question of the extent to which reported crime is a true reflection of the 'real' crime situation remains relevant.

The violence associated with crime in South Africa has had the most negative impact on public perceptions of crime and the vulnerability expressed by many people. Accordingly, six violent crimes and crime tendencies (murder and five types of aggravated robbery: house robbery, business robbery, bank robbery, cash-in-transit robbery and car-hijackings), as well as 'acts of violence against the farming community', will be discussed briefly.

**Figure 1** Overall crime in South Africa (21 most serious crimes)







Figure 2 Murder rate



Murder and aggravated robbery are the two categories of violent crime that, after consecutive years in which the statistics reflected a steady decrease in the incidence rate, showed an upward curve in the 2006/07 period. According to the police, much of the increase – in robbery in particular – could be linked to the strike by security guards in April–June 2006 ‘which left a void for robbers ... to commit crime’ (South Africa 2007a:11). In turn, aggravated robbery would have an impact on the murder rate, because such robberies are often accompanied by murder and attempted murder.

## MURDER

In the eleven-year period between 1994/95 and 2005/06 the murder rate decreased by some 41% – from 67 per 100 000 to 39,5 per 100 000 (figure 2). Twice before, in 1995/96 and 1998/99, the murder rate showed slight increases, followed by consecutive years of decline. In 2006/07 the rate increased once again, to 40,5 per 100 000, to be followed by another decrease (4,7%) in 2007/08. The overall trend for murder, therefore, is downward, although it is important to note that the international ‘norm’ for murder is about 5 per 100 000 (compared to South Africa’s 38,6 in 2007/08). For example, in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand the murder rate is about 1 per 100 000 (or less). The seriousness of the local situation is perhaps best illustrated by comparing the real figures for murder – for example in the period 2007/08 South Africa recorded a total of **18 487** murders while England and Wales recorded **784** homicides (including murder, manslaughter and infanticide).

Claims by the police that most murders and other ‘social contact crimes’ are committed by people who are known to the victims are often met with disbelief and regarded as an excuse for not providing the public with the security they believe they are entitled to. For example, in its 2006/07 crime report the SAPS indicated that a docket analysis showed that in 81,5% of murder cases the perpetrators were known to their victims; in 61,9% of cases the perpetrators were either relatives, friends or acquaintances of the victims; and in 20,1% of cases the perpetrators were relatives (South Africa 2007a:28). According to the police the relatively high number of contact crimes mainly occurred in social environments such as residences, which are normally beyond the reach of conventional policing (South Africa 2007a:4). This implies that the police can do little, if anything, to prevent these particular types of crime.

This is not a uniquely South African phenomenon; a study in Australia found a clear family or social relationship between victims and offenders in many homicide cases (Australian Institute of Criminology 2006:20). It found that 38% of male and 10% of female victims were likely to be killed by a friend or an acquaintance; 59% of female and 9% of male victims were likely to be killed by an intimate partner; 17% and 18% of male and female victims respectively were likely to be killed by a family member; and only 2% of female victims were killed by an unknown person, compared to 25% of male victims.

This supports the argument that the ability of the police to impact on ‘social contact crimes’ such as murder is more limited than the public generally realises. The only real proactive *contribution* the police can make in this regard

is by creating a credible deterrent through effective and efficient investigations and the likely conviction of offenders.

### AGGRAVATED ROBBERY

Apart from murder and rape, aggravated robbery – because of its nature and the violence or threat of violence associated with it – currently seems to be the most feared crime in this country. As shown in figure 3, the aggravated robbery rate peaked in 2003/04 at 288 per 100 000, after consecutive annual increases from 164 in 1996/97. In real terms this amounted to almost 134 000 robberies compared to ‘only’ 76 000 seven years previously. In 2004/05 and 2005/06 the aggravated robbery rate (per 100 000) decreased to 272,2 and 255,3 respectively. Although the rate was still much higher than in 1996/97, the decreases were promising and raised expectations that aggravated robberies were on the decline. However, in 2006/07 the rate of aggravated robberies increased again (by 4,6%), to 267,1 per 100 000 or, in real terms, to 126 558 incidents. This was followed by a promising decrease of 7,4% in 2007/08. The real figure for 2007/08 was 118 312 (or 247,3 per 100 000).


The real, or perceived, threat of aggravated robbery is better understood when it is disaggregated into some of its sub-categories. The following serve as examples:

- Residential or house robberies increased by 13,5% in 2007/08, from 12 761 to 14 481 incidents. Indeed, these incidents have been increasing every year since they

were first listed statistically as a separate crime category in 2002/03. This type of crime has a very negative impact on an individual’s feeling of safety and the public’s perception of crime. While all of us would like to believe that our homes are sanctuaries where we and our families are safe, the crime figures show that the risk of having these sanctuaries invaded by criminals is increasing. This ‘invasion’ is often accompanied by assault and even torture, rape and murder. Criminals use torture as a means to achieve compliance, extort the victims’ safe and PIN numbers, etc.

- Car-hijackings have increased from 12 434 incidents in 2004/05 to 14 201 in 2007/08, a rise of more than 14%. This type of crime exacerbates the fear experienced by most people. Fear is becoming the common denominator in the public perception of crime in this country. There is a growing perception that not only are people no longer safe in their own homes, but they face a constant threat of being hijacked on the roads.
- To make matters worse, business robberies increased by 47,4% in the last year: from 6 689 incidents in 2006/07 to 9 862 in 2007/08. This, too, had a negative impact on the public’s perception of crime, for many of these crimes occurred at shopping centres and restaurants.
- Bank robberies increased by 11,6%, from 129 to 144 incidents. This type of crime has again been on the increase since 2003/04, after impressive decreases from the 561 incidents recorded in 1996/97.
- Cash-in-transit robberies decreased by 15,4% – from 467 incidents in 2006/07 to 395 in 2007/08. However,

Figure 3 Aggravated robbery rate



this figure is still more than 100% up from the 192 incidents recorded in 2003/04.

The reason why criminals shoot and kill their victims after perpetrating the initial crime (such as robbery) remains a contentious and unexplained phenomenon. This kind of behaviour is not unique to South Africa, however. In a report by the Police Executive Research Forum (2006:6-7) that was based on crime figures for the United States, it was found that not only was robbery becoming more prevalent, but also more deadly. As one of the police chiefs observed: ‘[A] disturbing aspect in a number of robberies was that upon completion of the robbery the victim was shot anyway.’

### ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE FARMING COMMUNITY ('FARM ATTACKS')

According to the Report by the Committee of Inquiry into Farm Attacks that was published in July 2003 the following definition for farm attacks, which is applied by the police and the rest of the security forces, was approved by the National Operational Co-ordinating Committee (NOCOC)<sup>2</sup> in 1997 (South Africa 2003a:8):


Attacks on farms and smallholdings refer to acts aimed at the person of residents, workers and visitors to farms and smallholdings, whether with the intent to murder,

rape, rob or inflict bodily harm. In addition, all actions aimed at disrupting farming activities as a commercial concern, whether for motives related to ideology, labour disputes, land issues, revenge, grievances, racist concerns or intimidation, should be included. Cases related to domestic violence, drunkenness, or resulting from commonplace social interaction between people—often where victims and offenders are known to one another – are excluded from this definition. Specific crimes that are included in the definition are murder, attempted murder, rape, assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm, robbery, vehicle hijacking, malicious damage to property where the damage exceeds R10 000, and arson.


This is also the definition used by the Crime Information Analysis Centre (CIAC) of the SAPS, which collects statistics on farm attacks, although the security forces currently prefer to use the term ‘acts of violence against the farming community’.

There is a disturbing similarity in the incidence of ‘house robberies’ and ‘farm attacks’. Indeed, if the logic behind the definition of farm attacks is accepted, there is no reason why house robberies cannot be referred to as ‘house attacks’. The *modus operandi* and the types of crime committed during these attacks are the same. The only difference may be in the location (rural/urban) of the place (house) that is ‘attacked’ and the fact that commercial farms, unlike most urban homes, are generally regarded as independent economic units. Commercial

Figure 4 Farm attacks<sup>3</sup>



**Figure 5** House and business robberies



farms are business entities that contribute a variety of products to the internal and external markets and provide employment to a relatively large number of people. It is normally argued, therefore, that an attack on a farm has a much greater economic impact and affects more people. However, the trauma remains the same.

Figure 4 represents the number of attacks against farms and murders committed during these incidents in the period 2001/02 – 2006/07 (South Africa 2007a:50). It should be pointed out that although only murder (as a crime) is reflected in this graph, a variety of other crimes are often committed, such as attempted murder, serious assault (including torture), rape, and aggravated robbery – as indicated in the above definition. Robbery is regarded as the primary motive for most of these attacks. This was also the opinion of the Committee of Inquiry into Farm Attacks, which found that in 89,3% of the attacks ‘the motive was clearly robbery’ (South Africa 2003a:36).

In the 2006/07 reporting period South Africa experienced a particularly bad time as far as violent crime was concerned and farm attacks were no exception (as illustrated by figure 4). According to the police’s annual crime report (South Africa 2007a:50), in the 2005/06 and 2006/07 financial years, farm attacks in North West Province increased from 68 to 132 cases

(94,1%) respectively; in the Free State from 30 to 49 cases (63,3%); in Gauteng from 215 to 338 cases (57,2%); and in KwaZulu-Natal from 59 to 82 cases (39%). Murders increased by 12 in Mpumalanga, 10 in the Free State, 7 in KwaZulu-Natal, and 2 in North West. The increase in farm attacks was similar to the increase in ‘attacks’ experienced at urban residences (house robberies) and businesses (business robberies) (figure 5).

From the above analysis of the incidence of serious and violent crimes, it is obvious that South Africa continues to experience a serious threat to its national security in this regard.

It is important to note that the Government supports the modern view of national security as comprising something broader than the narrow and exclusively military-strategic approaches of the past (South Africa 1994:7; South Africa 1999:5). In an advertisement in 2002 the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) explained this view in the following succinct terms (Mavimbela 2002):

... the determinants of national security today ... is [sic] therefore the private citizenry that should be the foremost stakeholder in this equation [and] [i]t is the overall safety and quality of life that constitutes our view of national security.

## 4 The State's response to the crime problem

It is difficult to determine whether and to what extent the South African Government is acting in terms of the above conceptual framework (of national security) and the constitutional obligations it entails. In addition to case studies and questions in relation to the closing of the commandos, it is necessary to discuss broader policies and strategies relating to the fight against crime in order to consider the Government's commitment in this regard.

### THE NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY

In May 1996 the Government launched its National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) as a direct response to the high levels of crime in the country (South Africa 1996a:4; Rauch 2002:9-10). In addition to its primary objective (to reduce crime levels in South Africa) the strategy went on to list, among its ten supporting objectives, the following two that are particularly relevant (South Africa 1996 a:5-6):

- To establish a comprehensive policy framework which addresses all the policy areas which impact on crime, as part of the greater initiative to improve economic growth and development
- To generate a shared understanding among South Africans of what crime prevention involves

The NCPS acknowledged that the criminal justice system (CJS) largely dealt with crimes that had already been committed and that the CJS was primarily of a reactive nature. Accordingly, South Africa needed 'a new way of looking at crime'. This included a shift away from crime control – essentially a reactive concept – to crime prevention, which was regarded as essentially proactive (South Africa 1996a:5-6). The NCPS went on to identify the

need for a single or special national agency or structure to coordinate the planning and implementation of crime prevention policies and activities. These policies and activities, in addition to interventions to strengthen the CJS, were expected to address the social, economic, political and psychological causes of crime (South Africa 1996a:9).

According to Burger (2007a:78), in March 1996 the South African Cabinet approved a 'Coordinating Mechanism' for the National Crime Prevention Strategy. The Coordinating Mechanism was accountable, and acted as a secretariat, to the NCPS Directors-General Committee. In 1997 a new security operational structure, the Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (JOINTS), developed as an extension of the NCPS Coordinating Mechanism. All JOINTS representatives were senior officials at the level of deputy director-general. Soon after establishment of JOINTS, a National Operational Coordinating Committee (NOCOC) was created for purposes of joint planning and execution of all NCPS-initiated crime prevention and security operations under the guidance and supervision of JOINTS. NOCOC was subsequently duplicated at provincial as well as police area and station (precinct) level.

However, by 2002 it was clear that the NCPS, in spite of being regarded as an excellent strategy, had failed. Burger (2007:79) identified two primary reasons for this failure – 'a lack of understanding and insight of the intricate relationship between crime and its underlying causes (socio-economic and other risk factors) by political leaders and other principals' and 'as a result, a lack of conviction, commitment and support to implement the NCPS'.

Burger (Ibid) believed that, unlike the individuals who developed the NCPS, the political leaders and other government principals failed to grasp not only

the undeniable (dual) relationship between crime and its causes and therefore the necessity to think and act accordingly, but also the strategic implications of their failure to do so. Janine Rauch, a senior consultant on criminal justice issues and a former member of the Secretariat for Safety and Security, identified some of the reasons for the failure of the NCPS (Rauch 2002:12–18):

- The NCPS contained little detail on how the proposed programmes were to be developed and implemented.
- It was a mistake to assume that cooperation between government departments would arise naturally and spontaneously.
- The NCPS did not fully conceptualise or explain the relationship between the four 'pillars' or categories of crime prevention (the criminal justice system; community values and education; environmental design; and transnational crime – South Africa 1996a:50–80).
- No government funding was dedicated to the implementation of the NCPS. Instead, government departments were encouraged to rationalise their existing resources to accommodate the NCPS.
- In the absence of detailed guidance and dedicated funding, the Secretariat for Safety and Security approached Business Against Crime (BAC) for support. Once again the focus was limited to the criminal justice system. BAC identified the first 'pillar' of the NCPS, the 're-engineering' of the criminal justice system, as its immediate focus area.
- In the 1997 review of the NCPS, which became necessary when it was realised that the implementation of the strategy was less than successful, there was an even greater focus on short-term criminal justice issues rather than the longer-term preventative approach. Rauch (2002:18) argued that, on the positive side, the review did succeed in making a conceptual link between law enforcement and crime prevention, and between short-term actions and long-term approaches.

Rauch (2002:13, 15, 18) referred to another important factor in terms of the implementation of the NCPS: that the implementation of the strategy rested with the Secretariat for Safety and Security. Giving the Department of Safety and Security the responsibility for the implementation and coordination of a strategy with a long-term focus on socio-economic causes of crime demonstrated an inability to think of crime prevention in strategic terms. Strategically, it would have made much more sense to place primary responsibility for such a strategy with those government departments primarily responsible for these matters. According to Burger (2007a:80) it would have made even more sense to establish a separate coordinating

structure to guide the implementation of a national strategy of this magnitude.

## THE WHITE PAPER ON SAFETY AND SECURITY OF 1998

In his foreword to the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998), the then Minister of Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi, set the tone for policy direction. He made it clear that the white paper was '[i]n keeping with the approach outlined in the National Crime Prevention Strategy' and that it advocated a *dual approach* to safety and security through 'effective and efficient law enforcement and the provision of crime prevention programmes' (South Africa 1998a:ii). This dual approach was also propagated in the mission statement of the white paper, which stated that '[r]eal reductions in crime will be attained through, firstly, more effective and efficient policing as part of an effective justice system and, secondly, through a greater ability to prevent crime' (South Africa 1998a:iv).

The white paper applied the terms 'policing' and 'law enforcement' as interchangeable concepts and consequently subdivided law enforcement (and by implication also policing) into three focus areas (South Africa 1998a:6, 15), namely criminal investigations, active visible policing, and service to victims of crime.

Crime prevention was defined in the white paper as follows (South Africa 1998a:14):

... [a]ll activities which reduce, deter or prevent the occurrence of specific crimes firstly, by altering the environment in which they occur, secondly by changing the conditions which are thought to cause them, and thirdly by providing a strong deterrent in the form of an effective justice system.

Of the three types of activities mentioned in this definition, the police were involved only in the third: the justice system, which it shared with the departments of Justice and Correctional Services. The police had little, if anything, to do with the first two activities: altering the environment and changing the conditions that cause crime. The only contribution the police could make towards these activities was to bring the relevant information to the attention of the institutions that were responsible for addressing them.

The white paper expanded on its definition of crime prevention by making a distinction between crime prevention through effective criminal justice and social crime prevention (South Africa 1998a:14). According to the white paper, effective criminal justice contributed to crime prevention because it reduced the opportunity for crime by making it more difficult to commit crime and

by making crime more risky and less rewarding. In other words, it acted as a deterrent. Social crime prevention, on the other hand, was aimed at reducing the socio-economic and environmental factors that induced people to commit crimes. Therefore the white paper recognised that crime prevention required a ‘multi-departmental or multi-sectoral’ approach as well as the ‘institutionalised’ management of the various planning and implementation efforts relating to crime prevention (South Africa 1998a:20–21).

Following this reasoning, the white paper recommended the establishment of a National Crime Prevention Strategy Centre (NCPSC) to ‘initiate, coordinate and facilitate crime prevention programmes’ (South Africa 1998a:21). The NCPSC was to be situated within the Secretariat for Safety and Security and was to take an overarching responsibility for both social crime prevention and the criminal justice system (Rauch 2002:19; Pelser & Louw 2002:141). According to the white paper (South Africa 1998a:22) the NCPSC was to be responsible for:

- Establishing a national vision and the identification of priorities
- Mobilising other government departments that could contribute to crime prevention initiatives
- Assisting provincial and local government in preventing crime by, *inter alia*, providing research, technical guidance, training and the sharing of best practices
- Providing ‘seed’ funding for certain social crime prevention programmes
- Providing continuous improvements to the criminal justice system
- Assisting in the coordination and management of initiatives to prevent certain priority crimes

A year later, in 1999, the new Minister of Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete, closed down the NCPSC and transferred its ‘social crime prevention’ functions to the Crime Prevention Division of the SAPS (Rauch 2002:23; Pelser & Louw 2002:139). This decision amounted to the relegation of a strategic capability that should have been elevated to a higher and more authoritative level from which it would have been better positioned to direct and manage the implementation of the NCPS. It also demonstrated a complete lack of understanding that crime prevention, as explained in both the NCPS and the white paper (and approved by Government), was a multi-dimensional and shared responsibility. Strategically speaking it made no sense to expect the police to co-ordinate those activities aimed at crime prevention – as understood in the above official documents – when the police’s role in this regard was largely indirect and complementary. The decision meant that one of the most

positive recommendations of the white paper – the establishment of a national coordinating structure to manage the process of crime prevention – came to naught.

In their analysis of the approaches to crime prevention in South Africa, Pelser and Louw (2002:140–141) argued that allocating the duty of crime prevention to the police not only added to their burden, but also allowed departments such as those responsible for social welfare, health and education to evade their responsibilities. It also meant that the concept of ‘safety and security’, which implied an active role for players other than the police, was being largely disregarded.

The core problem, therefore, was that despite the progressive policy directions in the National Crime Prevention Strategy of 1996 and the White Paper on Safety and Security of 1998, public safety was still commonly viewed as solely a security issue and consequently as the responsibility of the criminal justice system – specifically of the police.

## THE RURAL PROTECTION PLAN<sup>4</sup>

The Rural Protection Plan (RPP) was implemented in October 1997 in reaction to claims by AgriSA’s forerunner, the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU), that ‘something needs to be done to address the increases in violent crime on farms and smallholdings’ (Schönteich & Steinberg 2000:11). The plan was developed by a task team comprising members of the SAPS, SANDF and organised agriculture who visited all the provinces and consulted with a large and diverse group of people. The main objective of the RPP was to integrate and coordinate the activities of all the role-players and to ensure effective cooperation in joint planning, action and the combating of crime in rural areas (Schönteich & Steinberg 2000:19).

This task team formed the basis of what eventually developed into the Priority Committee on Rural Safety. This committee, which is still functioning, represents a number of government departments and organised agriculture. Government departments include the SAPS, SANDF, Justice, Land Affairs and Agriculture, although the latter two seemed to have lost interest over time. Agricultural organisations include AgriSA, the Transvaal Agricultural Union of South Africa (TAUSA), the African Farmers Union (AFU) and Action Stop Farm Attacks. The Priority Committee reports directly to the inter-departmental Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (JOINTS), which, in turn, reports to the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS) at director-general and cabinet levels.

The responsibilities of the priority committee include the management of the RPP, attending to reports or

complaints by any group, investigating serious allegations, consulting with all role-players on a regular basis, and compiling regular reports to JOINTS. The committee meets at least once a month but has the operational capacity to monitor the rural safety situation on a daily basis.

The RPP itself was structured primarily around the commando system. It was based on two concepts: area-bound reaction forces and home-and-hearth protection forces (Schönteich & Steinberg 2000:20-22). The area-bound reaction forces were staffed by local commando members who were called up regularly or in times of crises for paid duty and issued with the necessary uniforms and other equipment to perform their commando responsibilities. They were also trained jointly with the police and police reservists to conduct patrols, roadblocks, follow-up operations, cordon-and-search operations and farm visits.

The home-and-hearth protection forces comprised two sub-groups: the home-and-hearth protection reaction force commando members and the house-and-hearth protection commando members (Schönteich & Steinberg 2000:21). The first sub-group was staffed by farmers, smallholders and their workers, who were responsible for assisting other farmers and smallholders in the event of a farm attack. They would be the first to react to an attack or call for help and remain in action until they could hand over to the area-bound reaction force. The second sub-group was also staffed by farmers, smallholders and their workers, but they were responsible only for their own protection.

Given the structure and staffing of the RPP, closing down the commandos would obviously mean the death knell for this particular plan. There has been no indication that this plan was or is to be substituted by another, other than the announcement by the South African president on 14 February 2003 that with the phasing out of the commandos a 'new system' was to be created 'whose composition and ethos accord with the requirements of all rural communities'.

## THE NATIONAL CRIME COMBATING STRATEGY

The 'strategic focus' of the police in 2000 resulted in what was initially known as the 'SAPS Crime Combating Strategy', and which was subsequently renamed the 'National Crime Combating Strategy' (NCCS) (South Africa 2000:4; South Africa 2002:24). The NCCS was intended to be implemented in three phases: a short-term stabilisation phase (2000–2003); a medium-term normalisation phase (2000–2005); and a long-term socio-economic development phase (2000–2020) (South Africa 2000:2–3; South Africa 2002:15). In the first two

phases the strategy would focus on four operational and two organisational priorities (which were clearly police oriented) (South Africa 2000:1). The operational priorities were organised crime; serious and violent crime; combating crimes against women and children, and improving basic service delivery to all communities. Organisational priorities comprised budget and resource management, and human resource management.

Although the first two phases were regarded as the primary responsibility of the police, in cooperation with other role-players, the third was regarded as the primary responsibility of the government departments in the Social and Economic clusters (South Africa 2002:15). The aim of the NCCS was that the police, in the first two phases, should reduce crime and the fear of crime and then create a climate conducive to socio-economic development in the third phase (South Africa 2000:3).

Based on an analysis of the prevailing incidence of crime and violence, a policing operation with a so-called 'geographic approach' and 'organised crime approach' was subsequently developed under the operational codename 'Crackdown' (South Africa 2000:2). The two approaches of 'Operation Crackdown' were informed by a CTA (crime threat analysis) and an OCTA (organised crime threat analysis) respectively. Out of almost 1 200 police station areas (precincts) nationally, 145 were identified for 'Operation Crackdown' on the grounds that they were responsible for the areas in which 50% or more of all serious, violent and organised crime in the country occurred. Once identified, these station areas were clustered into 32 'crime combating zones' or geographical areas.

A 'crime combating task group' composed of police officials from various operational branches, together with members from the Metropolitan Police Services and the South African National Defence Force, was deployed for each zone (South Africa 2000:2). Similarly, as part of the organised crime approach, a number of 'organised crime task teams' were appointed. These were not allocated to, or restricted to, specific geographical areas, because of the nature of organised crime.

Apparently the police set in motion a 'joint cooperative venture' with other government departments – including Justice, Correctional Services, Health and Water Affairs, and departments in the Social Cluster – *inter alia* to address 'social instabilities' in the identified high crime areas (South Africa 2000:3). However, there is no indication that this initiative ever got under way or that it has produced any results beyond the initiatives by the Social Crime Prevention Unit of the police, as listed in the annual report of the SAPS for 2006/07 (South Africa 2007a:42–50). Indeed, the police appear to have been critical of some of the above departments in this regard (South Africa 2004:11).



From the police's annual reports since 2003/04 it is obvious that they realise a focus only on operations will not solve the crime problem. For example, according to the 2003/04 Annual Report (South Africa 2004:11):

Crime prevention is a complex issue given the nature of the concept of prevention ... Internationally, there is a move from reactive policing towards a more proactive policing approach to crime by increasing involvement of communities and other government agencies in a partnership relationship ...

and:

Taking this trend into consideration, the SAPS no longer focuses solely on practical crime prevention through roadblocks and high-density search and seizure operations ... [but now] suggest initiatives to combat serious and violent crime, which involve proactive measures such as partnerships and sector policing.

At a conference on strategic challenges facing South Africa that was held at the University of Pretoria on 12 August 2003 Charles Nqakula, Minister of Safety and Security, pronounced the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) a success and claimed that it had 'stabilised' crime, 'particularly in the 145 police stations accounting for 50% of all crime in South Africa' (2003:7). Nqakula expressed disappointment, however, with the implementation of the 'social crime prevention' elements of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). According to Nqakula (2003:7), because of the failures of the NCPS, Government had been faced with the 'twin challenges' of sustaining the NCCS and 'vigorously' implementing social crime prevention initiatives.

## RELEVANT POLICE ORGANISATIONAL AND METHODOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The 'new system' that was to replace the commando system was not properly announced or explained, but in the months following the President's State of the Nation address of 14 February 2003, the police (and subsequently also the Minister of Safety and Security), in a clear attempt to give content to the President's announcement, gave some indication of how the police would replace the commandos. In short, the 'new system' would consist of a combination of three principal components: sector policing; Category 'D' reservists (rural and urban sector police reservists); and area crime combating units (ACCUs). To this would be added more personnel for

the police (a figure of 30 000 was mentioned) to enable police stations to implement sector policing. In the discussion below the 'elements' of the 'new system' will be considered briefly.

## Sector policing

Sector policing as a policing concept was first mentioned in the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy, but implementation only started in 1998 with the launch of 'Operation Johannesburg' as a pilot project. To guide the implementation process the police developed what became the Guidelines on Sector Policing (South Africa 1998b).

According to these guidelines (South Africa 1998b:2) there were many interpretations of the concept of 'sector policing' but, as far as could be established, few agreed definitions. In the British model, sector policing formed an integral part of community policing with the main aim of rendering police services as close as possible to the community. This meant the division of a police station area (precinct) into smaller, manageable sub-areas (sectors) and the assignment of police members to these sectors on a full-time basis. Within each of these sectors, closer contact between the police and local inhabitants became possible and was even encouraged.

In terms of the Guidelines on Sector Policing (South Africa 1998b:2), police members assigned to sectors should patrol their own sectors regularly or may be posted or stationed there permanently, depending on the size of the police agency, demographic and geographic factors, and resources. Through regular contact with their communities, police members in these sectors would be able to identify problem areas and, in consultation with the community, community organisations and other role-players such as local authorities, find solutions before a situation develops into a policing problem.

In 2003 the South African Police Service issued a Draft National Instruction on Sector Policing (South Africa 2003b). The stated purpose of the instruction included the provision of 'a national, uniform framework and guidelines for the implementation of the methodology of sector policing'. According to the introduction of the instruction the focus of sector policing was very much community policing 'as the official policing philosophy of the South African Police Service since 1994'. It went on to explain this statement (South Africa 2003b:1):

As such sector policing is not only a practical manifestation of community policing but also a step towards the development of a modern, democratic policing style for

the present century and thus to address the safety and security needs of every inhabitant of South Africa.

The draft national instruction also slightly changed the definition of sector policing proposed by the aforementioned Guidelines on Sector Policing to mean (South Africa 2003b:2):

... a method of policing used in a smaller, manageable geographical sector in a police station area; the appointment of a police official as a sector commander who, by acting as a crime prevention official will involve all role-players in identifying the particular policing needs in each sector and in addressing the root causes of crime, as well as the enabling and contributing factors, in order to bring about effective crime prevention. This is to be achieved through the launching of informed, intelligence-driven crime prevention projects in collaboration with the local community.

The draft National Instruction on Sector Policing was never finally approved and in 2005 was replaced by a (draft) Policy Document on Sector Policing (South Africa 2005a). In the policy document, sector policing was defined simply as 'policing through the division of police station precincts into smaller sectors in terms of this policy'. On the whole the policy document provided much more clarity and direction than anything previously as far as sector policing, its implementation and management were concerned.

The policy document clearly set out the responsibilities of commanders from national, provincial, area and station level, and eventually also those of the crime prevention commander (station) and the sector commander (South Africa 2005a:2–5). Among the responsibilities of the crime prevention commander at the station was the 'recruitment, training and effective management of reservists in each particular sector'. In addition, the document covered the duties of the sector team, detectives, area crime combating units and Crime Information Analysis Centre.

Unfortunately the Policy Document on Sector Policing was also never finally approved and remains a draft to this day.

In spite of the apparent inability of the police to provide an approved policy or national instruction on sector policing, the strategic plan for the South African Police Service 2005-2010 (South Africa 2005b:36) described sector policing as 'the main focus area of the SAPS's approach to the normalising of crime'. In the strategic plan, sector policing was considered to be based on four pillars:

- The geographical demarcation of a police station area into smaller, more manageable, sub-areas or sectors

- The appointment of permanent members of the police as sector commanders and as part of sector policing teams
- The active involvement of communities as sector policing reservists and in the form of partnerships and support groups
- The joint implementation of strategies and projects by the police and the community

The strategic plan went on to explain that each sector would be responsible for the following policing activities (South Africa 2005b:36): visibility, crime deterrence, quick response to crimes, partnerships with communities, and problem-solving projects.

According to the annual report of the SAPS for 2004/05 (South Africa 2005c:49) the implementation of sector policing was to comprise five phases:

- *Phase 1:* Demarcation of geographical sectors within a police station area
- *Phase 2:* Appointment of a sector manager and a deputy sector manager for every sector, and the recruitment of (Category D) reservists to assist in sector policing
- *Phase 3:* Drawing up of a sector profile, taking account of population size, demographics and crime trends
- *Phase 4:* Establishment of a sector crime forum (SCF), which can be linked to the community police forum (CPF)
- *Phase 5:* Management of the sector, including participation in meetings with the station, sharing of information and the building of partnerships with stakeholders

As will be shown in section 5 below, an assessment carried out by the Policy Advisory Council of the police between November 2006 and October 2007 referred to the absence of an approved policy on sector policing as a 'policy vacuum' that created unnecessary uncertainty and confusion at police station level.

## Police reservists

In addition to guidelines on the practical implementation of sector policing, the Draft Policy Document on Sector Policing explicitly linked sector policing to the involvement of 'rural and urban sector police reservists' in terms of National Instruction 1 of 2002 (South Africa 2005a:1–4). Sector policing is a personnel-intensive policing approach and the above provision clearly enhanced the prospects of sector policing, at least from a staffing perspective.

The main objectives with this new category of police reservists were as follows:

- To create a human resource pool that would provide sufficient trained staff for each sector
- To allow for the recruitment of more black police reservists, especially in the rural areas (the new reservist policy waived recruitment criteria such as minimum educational qualifications and psychometric testing)
- To enable sector reservists to provide their services in the sectors where they were recruited
- To create a system for the reporting on and of duty that would not require a reservist to travel long distances purely for reporting purposes

When the phasing out of the commandos was announced, the new category of reservists seemed ideally suited for members of the commandos who wished to continue their involvement with the formal security services. This proved a mistaken assumption, however. In the areas visited by the research team there was a strong resistance on the part of former commando members to the idea of becoming police reservists. The unavailability of sufficient budgets for remuneration, especially for black former commando members with no other source of income, exacerbated the problem.

### Area crime combating units

The area crime combating units (ACCUs) were established in 2002 and developed from the earlier public order police units. During the period of the formation of the ACCUs their primary focus changed from crowd management, which became a secondary function, to combating crime (Omar 2007:25). As part of their responsibility for combating crime, and in view of their specialised training and equipment, these units were expected to act as a reaction force in case of farm attacks, bank robberies and cash-in-transit robberies. It was this ability of the ACCUs that led the police to include them in the 'new system' that would replace the commandos. In this sense they would become the sharp end of the 'new system', much like the reaction forces of the commandos.

In 2006, only three years after the 'new system' had been announced, the SAPS embarked on a new restructuring of the ACCUs that led to the formation of crime combating units (CCUs). This restructuring had a severe impact on the numbers and the ability of these units to perform effectively in the way envisaged in 2002 and 2003. In Gauteng, for example, only three of the original seven units remained in place while the total number of operational personnel in Gauteng was reduced from 1 383 to 614 (Omar 2007:25).

This raised serious questions about the continued value of government assurances about the 'new system' and that a 'security vacuum' would not be allowed to develop.

### Police reorganisation and expansion

In 2000/01 the SAPS embarked on an expansion programme to increase police numbers from some 120 000 to 201 000 by 2011. According to the police's annual report for 2006/07 (South Africa 2007b:IX), by March 2007 police numbers had already risen to 163 000 (some 33 000 of these being civilian employees). The additional police members created an already favourable police/public ratio of 1:365, which should grow further with the 2011 target in mind. The United Nations guideline in this regard is 1:400.

The police's budget also increased, from R17 billion in 2000/01 to R40 billion in the 2007/08 financial year. The annual budgetary increases were in line with the growth in police spending on additional personnel and equipment. To a large extent this growth could be explained by South Africa's huge crime problems and security needs, but there was also an anticipation of the police's responsibility for the safeguarding of major events such as the FIFA World Cup in 2010.

In 2006, when the police embarked upon the current reorganisation process, police management justified its actions partly on the grounds that there was an ineffective allocation and utilisation of human and physical resources within the SAPS, and that specialised skills were concentrated mainly at provincial and area levels. Yet the ACCUs were now being replaced by CCUs, involving the phasing out of the area level of policing. In addition, specialised units such as the Serious and Violent Crimes Units and the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Units were decentralised to identified and accounting stations (though not to all stations). Other police members, such as those who became supernumery in their old units or at other offices, were 'migrated' to selected police stations.

It would seem reasonable to expect that the reorganisation process of 2006 would lead to an increase in staffing at police station level. This is obviously the result Government desired (given the huge increases in the police's budget over a relatively short period) and also the intended result of police management. However, after analysing the state of sector policing and related policing issues in the areas visited by the research team, the question remains why some stations apparently did not benefit from the addition and redeployment of staff. This will be discussed in section 7.

## 5 Recent official audits

Recently there have been two important official audits regarding the work of the police. The first of these was undertaken by the Auditor-General in relation to border control and the second by the SAPS Policy Advisory Council with regard to the standard of policing at local level (at police stations). The Auditor-General's findings were published on 17 January 2008 in the report by the Auditor-General on a performance audit of border control. The report by the SAPS's Policy Advisory Council remains unpublished but has been reported on extensively in the media. The most important findings in these two reports will now be examined briefly.

### FINDINGS OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL ON BORDER CONTROL

The Auditor-General's office performs its functions in terms of the Public Audit Act, 2004 (Act 25 of 2004). Its task is to strengthen democracy by enabling oversight, accountability and governance in the public sector. Its function is not to question policy, but to determine the effect of policy and the management measures that led to policy decisions. Accordingly, the purpose of the Auditor-General's report on border control was 'to facilitate public accountability by bringing to the attention of Parliament the findings of the performance audit conducted at the South African Police Service (SAPS)'.

The report began by referring to a Cabinet *lekgotla* decision in 2003 to transfer responsibility for borderline control from the SANDF to the SAPS; it also made reference to the subsequent exit-entry strategy (South Africa 2008:2). According to the report, included in the mandate for 'borderline operations' were 'to prevent, detect and combat the illegal cross-border movement of persons and goods'. The report outlined the legal obligations of the

police, in particular the provisions of section 13(6) of the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995), and, based on this, derived the following directives for border control (South Africa 2008:3):

- Borderline control actions are to be operationally driven, in line with the directives and procedures specifically referring to operations.
- All operational actions should be driven by information and intelligence and should be executed according to an integrated approach.

Borderline control is executed on the borderline between the RSA and a neighbouring country. It should, however, be executed from a holistic national perspective to ensure an integrated and focused approach to borderline control in the Republic; deliver an effective service with national uniform national standards and procedures, executed against a clearly defined crime combating strategy; and ensure an effective cross-border crime prevention and detection capacity.

With reference to these directives, the report identified a number of shortcomings in the way border control was being managed, some of which are listed below (South Africa 2008:5–10):

- No borderline-specific intelligence needs analysis had yet been performed and therefore no specialised operational support structure for borderline-specific crime intelligence was in place.
- There was a lack of interdepartmental training and no all-inclusive borderline-specific training curriculum in operation.
- There was a personnel deficiency of 71% (the proposed structure envisaged 970 members, but the actual

strength was only 283). This meant that the primary function of borderline control could not be carried out effectively.<sup>5</sup>

- The SANDF had not adhered to the exit-entry strategy, which required it to hand over to the police all functional equipment utilised for borderline control.
- A security analysis of South Africa's borderline fences had not been performed. In places border fences were inadequate or even non-existent.
- There were no 'compensating' patrols or monitoring processes in place in areas where there were either no or inadequate border fences.

## THE SAPS'S POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL<sup>6</sup>

On 26 October 2006 the National Commissioner of the SAPS appointed a 'Policy Advisory Council' to advise him on crime and service delivery issues. The council was made up of two retired deputy national commissioners and fifteen retired divisional and provincial commissioners. In the periods November 2006 – February 2007 and March–October 2007 council members visited police stations, offices and units to 'confirm/negate' concerns and to identify issues that required attention.

The council subsequently compiled a report on their findings and presented it to police management. Because of their accumulated experience these officers were able to identify weaknesses and deficiencies in a way that would have been difficult – if not impossible – for outsiders, but for the purposes of this study, attention will only be given to findings that are considered relevant to our subject.

The council identified aggravated robberies (specifically house, business and street robberies) and commercial crime as the two crime categories that 'stand out at national level' (South Africa 2007c:9).

The council also requested that the current approach to 'social crime prevention' be reviewed, because it was involving the police in issues that were the responsibility of other departments and institutions. The council made the following important recommendation about crime prevention (South Africa 2007c:8):

It is therefore recommended that a proposal to review Government's approach to Crime Prevention be tabled at the JCPS cluster. The review should amongst others address clear definitions of the various forms of crime prevention and the concurrent roles and responsibilities at the various levels of government and within society.

In the rest of this section, attention is given to the relevant findings of the council on issues such as crime combating,

crime prevention, crime investigations, sector policing, police reservists, and the reorganisation of the police.

## Crime combating at national level

There was no structured plan – or actions – at the SAPS Head Office that served to empower police stations to manage and reduce crime; where such initiatives did exist, they were 'piecemeal'. Crime combating interventions from Head Office were sporadic and unsustainable.

The focus of the Operational Support Centre at SAPS Head Office that previously managed (coordinated) crime combating and security operations had shifted to interdepartmental operations aimed at providing security at big events, in particular the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Divisional and provincial commissioners consequently issued their own operational instructions, for example relating to dealing with armed robberies. As a result, ill-considered operational instructions were occasionally issued. For example, the council found that the provinces had tasked some stations to conduct certain operations without considering whether such operations would in fact contribute to fighting local crime.

## Crime combating at police station level

At local level, the council found that not all stations were in possession of the SAPS strategic plan and related documentation. Some stations could not produce a station plan and – even worse – some members (including station commissioners) had no idea how to compile such a plan. In addition, the council discovered that most of the staff at police stations did not understand the National Crime Combating Strategy.

The council also found serious shortcomings in the ability of crime information analysis centres (CIACs) and crime intelligence gathering units (CIGs) to provide stations with accurate crime pictures that would enable them to develop effective crime combating strategies. This contributed to the inability of many stations not only to plan properly, but also to conduct 'intelligence-driven operations'.

## Sector policing

According to the council, sector policing had failed to achieve the results envisaged by police management, mainly because of a lack of clear policy and resources. Council members were of the opinion that a 'policy vacuum' existed. For example, in December 2006 a divisional instruction with contradictory instructions was issued. At some stations there did exist a model on paper for sector policing, but it had never been implemented.

## Crime prevention

It was found that the crime prevention units at many police stations consisted merely of patrol vehicles that were used to attend to complaints. The same situation prevailed in sector policing. The simple truth was that many station commissioners had insufficient resources to establish crime prevention units or implement sector policing measures.

## Crime investigation

At many police stations the Detective Service was being neglected by the station commissioners, and at many detective branches there were no proper command and control structures. Many of the branch commanders were described as 'incompetent', while group commanders and supervisors – in the words of the council – 'lack skills, experience, commitment, dedication and discipline'. An assessment of the effectiveness of the detectives revealed a poor quality of investigation and a low conviction rate. The council found that there was a shortage of 3 343 detectives nationally.

## Crime combating units

The council found that the capacity of the crime combating units for the policing of public order incidents and for crowd management was being neglected to such an extent that these units were being totally 'disempowered'.

## Police reservists

The council raised a number of concerns as far as police reservists were concerned, including:

- The budgets for reservists were inadequate and most stations lacked the funds to call up reservists for duty.
- In some provinces, reservists were called up for duty in 'hot spots' instead of being deployed in the areas for which they had been recruited.
- Farmers were reluctant to become reservists because they could be called up for duty in periods when their occupation demanded their full attention.
- Reservists were insufficiently trained for the tasks they had to perform.

## Reorganisation of the police

The council did not refer directly to the reorganisation of the police, but did mention a few problem areas in this regard. For example, when area offices were phased out, a number of 'accounting stations' were created. These accounting stations were surrounded by smaller stations that were linked to them for support, but some of them lacked the resources to operate as accounting stations. Guidelines for financial services did exist, but there were no guidelines or delegation of authority that enabled accounting stations to operate as such.

The council also encountered concerns about the way in which the decentralisation of the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Units was managed. Recommendations were made on how to improve or correct the situation in this regard, as well as in relation to other problem areas identified by the council.

## 6 Phasing out of the commando system

### BACKGROUND

The matter of the commandos was a point of serious debate during the development of new South African defence policy through the white paper and Defence Review processes in 1995 and 1998. The African National Congress (ANC) had been opposed to the continuation of the commando system all along, partly because of the role these units had played in support of the apartheid system, but also because the commandos were perceived to represent the security interests of the white farming community only. In chapter 11 of the Defence Review (South Africa 1998c:45) it is stated that:

Special mention needs to be made of the commandos, which now form part of the territorial units, in view of the sensitivity surrounding their name and perceived role. This sensitivity derives from the perception in certain quarters that the commandos were politicised during the apartheid era through frequent deployment in the support of the police.

Despite this acknowledgement, Parliament approved the inclusion of 183 area protection units (commandos) within the force design of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). There were two main reasons for this.

First, a viable part-time component – both conventional and territorial – was essential to support the national defence posture. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 200, determines that the SANDF should have a primarily defensive orientation and posture. In the Defence Review (chapter 2) this provision was extrapolated to derive the force design of the SANDF (South Africa 1998c:7). The latter design

included that ‘the emphasis [of defence strategy] will be on confidence-building defence in the regional context’, which required that ‘great reliance will be placed on the PTC [part-time component]’. The landward defence strategy (chapter 8) further determined that ‘Landward Defence is conceptualised in terms of Conventional Defence (mobile operations) and Area Defence’ and that ‘Area Defence comprises border safeguarding and area protection’. It was argued that ‘Area Protection provides defence in depth against military incursions by external military forces as well as a firm base from where mobile operations can be conducted’ (South Africa 1998c:34). The Defence Review concluded that the main purpose of the area protection units (commandos) was ‘the protection of landward borders and interior assets against enemy mobile, airborne and special forces’ and stated that ‘during peace-time they form the backbone of SANDF participation in border protection and the maintenance of law and order tasks’ (South Africa 1998c:45).

Second, the part-time component (including the commandos) was included for economic reasons. The White Paper on Defence (South Africa 1996b:17) stated that:

This core force approach takes account of government spending priorities and the fact that the self-defence problem is likely to be limited in the short-to-medium term. It does not require a large standing force. Instead, the SANDF will comprise a relatively small Regular Force and a sufficiently large Part-Time Component.

The Defence Review (chapter 11) argued that ‘[t]he territorial units are usually tasked to secure their local or home areas’ and that ‘these units are very cost effective. They are lightly armed and do not use expensive equipment’ (South Africa 1998c:91).

These arguments led to the acceptance of the area protection units (commandos) in the SANDF's force design, but with the clear caveat that they had to be transformed to represent and serve all the people of South Africa. The perception that this had not been achieved probably contributed towards the decision to phase out the commandos.

The white paper and Defence Review also provided for a gradual withdrawal of the SANDF from the 'ongoing policing function' and for strategies and plans to be made to build the capacity of the police (South Africa 1998c:18). This downscaling of SANDF support to the SAPS in the policing function was envisaged because of expectations that internal stability and safety in South Africa would improve markedly.

## CLOSING OF THE COMMANDOS

On 14 February 2003 the President of the Republic of South Africa, in his State of the Nation address at the opening of Parliament, announced that the commando system would be phased out. In his address he said (Steinberg 2005:1):

Measures will be taken to ensure that the structures meant to support the security agencies such as the Commandos ... are properly regulated to do what they were set up for. In this regard, in order to ensure security for all in the rural areas, including the farmers, government will start in the near future to phase out the SANDF Commandos, at the same time as we create in their place a new system whose composition and ethos accord with the requirements of all rural communities.

The President gave no clear indication regarding replacement systems or time scales, but in his budget vote speech in Parliament on 10 June 2003, the Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, stated that the commandos would be replaced by:

... a revised SAPS reservist system based on the amended National Instruction for Reservists. This system is linked to various initiatives which form part of the National Crime Combating Strategy normalisation phase, such as the drastic increase in the SAPS personnel figures over the next three years, the restructuring of specialised investigation units, the implementation of sector policing and the establishment of crime combating units for each police area.

At a parliamentary media briefing on 15 February 2005, the Minister confirmed both his own and earlier statements by senior SAPS officers, namely that the

commandos would be replaced by a combination of police approaches.<sup>7</sup> These would entail the implementation of the sector policing concept; the area crime combating units; the recruitment and utilisation of police reservists (for purposes of sector policing a new category of reservists was created, namely urban and rural sector police reservists); and an increase in police numbers.

At a meeting on 26 August 2003 between AgriSA and the ministers of Defence and of Safety and Security, AgriSA emphasised that in the process of the SAPS replacing the commandos, 'they should ensure that a *security vacuum* does not develop as a result of the changes' (own emphasis). In reply, the Minister of Defence, Mr Mosiuoa Lekota, 'assured AgriSA that *no commando would be withdrawn before the police are able to take over completely* the security responsibility in a particular area' (AgriSA 2003:3, own emphasis). In his media briefing on 15 February 2005, the Minister of Safety and Security reiterated that 'the SANDF Exit/SAPS Entry strategy will be executed in a well-planned fashion so as to avoid a *security vacuum*' (own emphasis).

In a follow-up meeting on 10 February 2006 with the Minister of Safety and Security, AgriSA pointed out that, according to its information, limited progress had been made in rural areas with the introduction of sector policing in most localities where commandos had been closed down (AgriSA 2006:1). Unfortunately AgriSA's minutes fail to reflect the Minister's response.

## SANDF EXIT AND SAPS ENTRY STRATEGY<sup>8</sup>

The departments of Defence and of Safety and Security established a joint SANDF-SAPS exit-entry strategy steering committee that was later replaced by a dedicated JOINTS task team to plan, coordinate and monitor the implementation of the exit-entry strategy at national and provincial level. The task team was co-chaired by a major-general (SANDF) and an assistant commissioner (SAPS).

### Exit criteria for the SANDF

The following were identified as exit criteria for the SANDF:

- The SAPS would have filled every possible vacuum that the SANDF had left as a result of the withdrawal from continuous support in ensuring urban, rural and borderline safety.
- The SANDF would sustain the capacity, in accordance with an approved inter-departmental agreement, to support the SAPS in joint crime combating operations where the SAPS alone were unable to contain the situation.



- The SANDF would sustain their command and control capacity as part of JOINTS (command and control mechanism) to ensure joint command and control in support of the people of the RSA.
- The SANDF would maintain support to the SAPS regarding maritime and air borderline control function.

## Entry criteria for the SAPS

The following were identified as the entry criteria for the SAPS:

- The SAPS would develop their capacity to the extent that they would be able to take full responsibility for fighting crime in urban and rural areas, as well as for the control of the landward borderline of the RSA.
- The SAPS would maintain their system of command and control through JOINTS to coordinate all operational activities in support of the people of the RSA.

## SAPS focus areas and approaches as part of the exit-entry strategy

The SAPS national intervention units would act as force multiplier across provincial boundaries whenever their support was requested.

- Forty-three area crime combating units would be established. They would be capable of performing borderline duties and would be deployed across police station boundaries in support of stations.
- Personnel levels would be increased.
- Sector policing would be implemented. Some 30 000 members would be deployed, depending on the number of sectors at station level. They would be active in urban as well as rural areas, while permanent SAPS members or reservists would be appointed as sector commanders and to sector policing teams.

## Implementation of the strategy

The following guidelines were agreed upon for the implementation of the exit-entry strategy:

### *Borderline control*

The SAPS were to take over the following borderlines from the SANDF:

- 2004/05: The Namibia and Botswana borderlines, including Rooibokkraal and Swartwater operational bases
- 2006/07: The Lesotho borderline, including the Ladybrand and Fouriesburg operational bases
- 2007/08: The Mozambique and Swaziland borderlines, including Ndumu, Pongola, Zonstraal, Sandrivier and Macadamia operational bases
- 2008/09: The Zimbabwe borderline, including Pondrifi and Madimbo bases

SANDF units were to withdraw from all borders except the Zimbabwe border.

### *Rural safety*

The timescales for the closing of commando units were to be as follows:

- 2004/05: 17 commandos to be closed
- 2005/06: 53 commandos to be closed
- 2007/08: Final closing of the rest of the commandos

The SANDF closed the last of the commandos at the end of May 2008; henceforth no commando members would be available to provide support to the SAPS.

### *Human resources*

It was suggested that commando members follow one of the following options:

- Join the SAPS reservist system (Category D – Rural and Urban Sector Police Reservists)
- Be transferred to the conventional reserve
- Be placed on the controlled national reserve list
- Not be accommodated

## Observation

The exact status of the exit-entry strategy has yet to be announced officially. However, it became clear from feedback received from communities in the rural and border areas that were visited by the research team that the criteria for the exit of the SANDF and the entry of the SAPS had not been met. The biggest concern in these areas was that the SAPS did not appear to have the human capacity or the equipment to man and resource the sector policing concept in either rural or urban communities, or to perform borderline control duties.

## 7 Case studies

As indicated earlier, the researchers chose four geographical areas in three provinces for their field research. These were areas where active commandos were closed down as a direct consequence of the announcement of 14 February 2003. The reason for this approach was simply to determine whether and to what extent the police had replaced the commandos in accordance with the political assurances that had been given; whether the change had had any impact on crime and on the security situation in general; and whether a 'vacuum' could be said to have developed in any of these areas. The assumption was that if a vacuum had developed in any of these areas, there was a strong likelihood that it existed in many other areas where there had been active commandos, too.

### **CLOCOLAN AND MARQUARD (FREE STATE)**

Interviews were conducted with former members of the Caledon River Commando, farmers and the local police. When the commando was closed down in April 2006, it comprised 143 members, including 33 members of a reaction force. Typical tasks performed by the commando included deployment (the reaction force) along the RSA–Lesotho border, a borderline stretching some 51 km; joint crime prevention operations with the police; performing interception operations based on intelligence reports; and acting as a reaction force during farm attacks.

Although assessing the level of border control along the RSA–Lesotho border was not part of the research design, it soon became apparent during the interviews that one of the most visible gaps in the local security network was the apparent absence of borderline control. The border police unit (44 members) stationed at Ladybrand was responsible for the borderline between

Ficksburg/Clocolan and Hobhouse/Wepener, a distance of about 120 km (with the border road, closer to 240 km). However, according to the locals this unit seldom, if ever, patrolled the border roads. This was confirmed by the local police, who referred to the unit as the 'highway patrol' because of its propensity to keep to the main roads.

The situation was exacerbated by the total absence of any physical barrier on the borderline. This was also observed by the researchers who travelled the full distance of the Clocolan border (some 51 km). Local farmers claimed that they suffered regular incursions from across the border that involved theft of cattle and other property and the grazing of their lands by stock farmers from Lesotho. In view of the lack of security in the border areas, the farming community also felt increasingly vulnerable and unsafe.

SAPS crime reports have not yet reflected a dramatic change in the crime situation (Annexure A). According to the crime report for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2006/07 the most notable increase in Clocolan was in burglaries. Between 2004/05 and 2006/07 the number of burglaries increased from 121 to 165. In the neighbouring station area of Marquard (Annexure B) there were relatively small increases in crimes such as robbery, assault and malicious damage to property, and more serious increases in crimes such as rape (from 12 in 2005/06 to 25 in 2006/07) and stock-theft (from 26 in 2005/2006 to 47 in 2006/07). The locals believed that actual crime levels were much higher, but that crimes such as stock theft were under-reported because of a lack of confidence in the police.

According to the police in Clocolan they had a functioning community police forum (CPF), but the farming community was neither involved nor interested. The CPF consisted of one white and a number of black persons. The police station area was divided into one rural and seven urban sectors, which included Hlohlowane township. The

rural sector was not particularly active and in only four of the seven urban sectors was there some activity.

The closest crime combating units or CCUs – as they are popularly referred to – were in Bethlehem and Welkom, a distance of some 140 km and 200 km respectively. They were available for crime combating operations in a particular area when their services were required and crime levels justified their deployment. Taking into account the distances and realistic response times, however, and compared to the capability of the commandos, they might not be particularly effective as a reaction force in cases of farm attacks or other serious armed robberies.

In Marquard the situation was slightly better. They also had an active community police forum in which the farming community chose not to be involved but, unlike Clocolan, twelve black and one white former commando members had joined the Category D reservists (rural and urban sector police reservists). These reservists were generally deployed with functional police members for crime prevention duties, especially over weekends. The police station area was divided into nine sectors. The activation of these sectors stood at Phase 3: the drawing up of a sector profile. Two phases remained before full activation, but a lack of personnel and other resources remained a major obstacle. As far as the CCUs were concerned, Marquard and Clocolan were in exactly the same position.

The researchers asked the farmers and former commando members<sup>9</sup> about their apathy towards the CPF structures, sector policing and the Category D reservist system. The response was that border control and general crime prevention was not their responsibility, but that of the police. Some of the former commando members also expressed their reservations, after serving in the military for many years, about exchanging a brown uniform for a blue one, suggesting a conflict of organisational sub-cultures.

## DUNDEE (KWAZULU-NATAL)

Interviews were conducted with former members of the Dundee-Glencoe commando and the Dundee police. The commando was closed down in March 2006. It served a huge geographical area (864 square kilometres) and included the police station areas of Dundee (the accounting station), Nqutu, Msinga, Helpmekaar, Pomeroy, Ekuvukeni, Wasbank, Glencoe, Hattingspruit and Dannhauser. At the time of its closure the commando was 128 members strong. Its functions included rural safety, visible patrolling, a reaction capability, joint operations with the police, and disaster management support. Interviewees claimed that the commando was highly

successful in combating stock theft, especially in the traditionally black areas, which often experienced higher levels of stock theft than the white areas.

With the closing of the commando, 72 of its black members joined the Category D reservists at the above police stations (11 at Dundee). The understanding was that they would continue to be paid for their services, as had been the case in the commando. The initial arrangement was that they would work the first sixteen hours of each month on a voluntary basis and thereafter be paid for their hours of actual service. This arrangement soon failed, however, because of an inadequate budget, and these reservists subsequently resigned. Two white farmers joined the Category D reservists but were not very active (the local police could not explain why).

According to the police at Dundee there existed five sectors on paper (phase 1), but they lacked the human and other resources to develop the concept towards full implementation. The same applied to the above police stations within Dundee's sphere of control. There was an active community police forum in Dundee, but again the farming community was not involved. Mostly black members of the community attended CPF meetings, while most white farmers preferred to attend the more operationally focused Local JOINTS (or LOCJOINTS) meetings.

Since the closing of the commando, farmers had organised themselves into a farm watch system. They did their own patrolling and acted as a first reaction force whenever there were incidents.

The area crime combating unit (ACCU) that had been stationed at Newcastle, about 65 km from Dundee, had been closed towards the end of 2006. The closest crime combating unit was situated at Ulundi, some 180 km away, so distance and realistic reaction time rendered this unit almost useless as a reaction force, compared to the capabilities of the commando.

The SAP's crime reports for Dundee and the nine police stations (listed above) in its area of accountability are attached as Annexures C1–C10. According to these reports, covering the period 2001/02 to 2006/07, there were no major changes in crime patterns, although stock theft seemed to have increased in most places in the last two years. In some places crimes such as robbery and assault were also showing increases.

## CULLINAN (GAUTENG)

Interviews were conducted with the local police, the chairperson of the Cullinan Agricultural Union and three sector policing coordinators (community members) who worked with the sector commanders. These sector commanders were Category D police reservists.

According to the Cullinan police, their station area was divided into four sectors. One sector (Rayton) was inactive because of a lack of community interest. Originally there had been twelve sectors, but insufficient human and other resources (such as vehicles) caused these to be reduced to four. Cullinan was also served by an active and well-represented community police forum.

Its closest crime combating unit was in Pretoria and was available for occasional crime combating operations in the Cullinan area if so requested and if crime levels or crime intelligence justified its deployment. Cullinan also had a crime prevention unit comprising four functional police officials and eight police reservists.

The Bronkhorstspuit commando was closed in March 2006; it had served the police station areas of Bronkhorstspuit, Cullinan and Welbekend. Its effective or real strength was 120 members who were involved in rural safety, maintaining a reaction force and in joint crime combating operations with the police. None of its members joined the police reservists, although one black member joined the police on a full-time basis.

According to the police's crime reports there was a visible increase in aggravated robbery in Cullinan between 2005/06 and 2006/07, from 50 to 75 cases. In 2004/05 'only' 41 cases had been recorded. General aggravated robbery, a sub-category of aggravated robbery, more than doubled, from 27 cases in 2004/05 to 56 in 2006/07. Aggravated robbery also increased in Welbekend, from 53 in 2004/2005 to 86 in 2006/07. Increases in stock theft were also recorded in Bronkhorstspuit and Welbekend (Annexures D1–D3). It was perhaps a little early to conclude that these increases had anything to do with the closing of the commando, but some of the locals interviewed held that view.

## KRUGERSDORP (GAUTENG)

Interviews were first conducted with members of Sector 10 (Kromdraai), including the chairperson of the sector crime forum (SCF). Sector 10 was established in February 2006 as one of the ten sectors in the Krugersdorp area but, according to the interviewees, by 2007 it had virtually ceased operations and was considered dormant. Some of the reasons for its decline had to do with a lack of resources and poor management by the police. The police, however, ascribed the difficulties in the sector to personality differences and the prominence of a security company with the potential conflict of interest. The police claimed that they continued to patrol the sector despite

the SCF not functioning. They also claimed that they had the resources to keep this sector active and that plans were under way to re-establish the SCF.

According to the Krugersdorp police there was a well-functioning community police forum in place and the SCF chairpersons of the other nine sectors (apart from sector 10) were represented on it. However, the rapid rate of economic development on the West Rand and the rapid influx of people into the area – in Tarlton alone seven informal settlements had developed within a short space of time – had placed police resources under growing pressure.

The Krugersdorp commando, which had been responsible for the geographical area served by the police stations at Krugersdorp, Muldersdrift, Hekpoort, Tarlton, Kagiso and Magaliesburg, had been closed down towards the end of 2004 or early 2005. It had performed all of the normal commando functions: rural protection, rapid response, and crime combating operations in support of the police. When the commando was closed, it was understood that sector policing would fill the gap, along with the new police reservist system and the area crime combating unit based in Krugersdorp. In September 2007, as part of the SAPS's organisational restructuring, the Krugersdorp area crime combating unit was closed down and its members (or some of them) integrated with the Johannesburg crime combating unit.

As far as the police reservists were concerned, the situation also did not work out as planned. During October 2006 some 20 persons, mostly former commando members, registered as Category D reservists and completed their training. But, according to the former chairperson of the sector crime forum in Kromdraai, they had not yet been called up for duty. The end result – at least in this sector – was that very little of what had been promised to replace the commandos appeared to be in place.

Of the six police stations mentioned above, only the crime reports for Krugersdorp, Muldersdrift and Magaliesburg could be accessed (Annexures E1–E3). According to these, in the last two years Krugersdorp had experienced increases in a number of crimes: aggravated robbery increased from 338 cases in 2005/06 to 486 in 2006/07; house robberies from 55 to 77; business robberies from 19 to 42; and burglaries at business premises from 183 to 245. Muldersdrift similarly experienced increases in a number of crimes, although these were not as high as in Krugersdorp. In Magaliesburg the situation remained much the same, apart from a visible increase in ordinary theft from 245 to 268 incidents.

## 8 Findings

The findings of this research are organised around the following main themes: crime as a national security threat; Government's response; and the impact of the closing of the commandos.

### CRIME AS A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT

Overall crime levels have fallen by about 20% since 2002/03, when they stood at their highest level since 1994/95. The most visible decrease has been seen in the crime of murder, the incidence of which decreased by some 40%. It needs to be pointed out, however, that these decreases have started from extremely high levels; it will take several positive years before South Africa could claim that crime is at 'acceptable' levels. For example, South Africa's murder rate in 2006/07, in spite of years of declining figures, still stood at 40,5 per 100 000 of the population, compared with the international average of approximately 5,5. Another issue of concern is that in recent years other serious and violent crimes, such as aggravated robbery, have been increasing in frequency. Violent crimes in particular affect people's lives in locations where they would normally expect to be safe and secure, such as their homes; these have the most negative impact on their perceptions of crime and how they rate Government's efforts to protect them.

Government recognises that crime and the socio-economic causes of crime are the biggest threat to South Africa's national security and that the overall safety and quality of life of people stand at the heart of national security. Given this understanding, it follows that Government ought to have a national strategy in place to combat this threat in all its dimensions, not just in terms of the criminal justice system, as now appears to be the case. In other words, national security needs

to be understood in a wider context, to represent all the dimensions of the State's activities – military, social, economic, international, cultural and political. This would include addressing chronic conditions such as unemployment, poverty, poor education and training, lack of housing, and lack of social services.

### GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE

If we accept this broad understanding of national security, and that crime and the causes of crime constitute the biggest threat to South Africa's people and their quality of life, we would expect to see an overall strategy in place to fight this threat in all of its aspects, and an authoritative and active structure to manage the implementation of this strategy.

In 1996 Government approved its National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) and although this may have failed to cover all the dimensions mentioned here, it did recognise that in addition to short-term actions in the criminal justice field, longer-term interventions were necessary to address the social, economic and other causes and conditions of crime. Apart from certain initiatives in relation to the criminal justice system, not much came of the NCPS and by the end of the 1990s it was little more than an impressive document.

The White Paper on Safety and Security was approved in 1998 and encapsulated a number of excellent decisions on how to improve the fight against crime. One of the outstanding decisions was to create a coordinating structure (National Crime Prevention Strategy Centre, NCPSC) within the Secretariat for Safety and Security to coordinate not only activities aimed at the criminal justice system but, even more importantly, social crime prevention initiatives. Once again, however, a sound

policy decision was undone in 1999, when it was decided to close the NCPSC and to move the responsibility for social crime prevention to the Crime Prevention Division of the SAPS. In effect, that was also the last impact of the white paper, although officially its implementation period expired only in 2004.

The National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) was launched in 2000 and initially, in addition to its policing or law enforcement approach, also had a socio-economic or 'root causes' of crime focus. Nothing came of the latter and eventually this strategy was reduced to a concern with policing. In this narrower sense it produced enormous results, but it was always going to have a limited impact on crime if the causal factors were not addressed. Even considering the huge problems that exist within the criminal justice system, it is fair to say that the failure to deal simultaneously with the other responsibilities of the State (such as the social, economic and other aspects) in an integrated and well-coordinated way, lies at the root of our continuing high level of serious and violent crime.

## IMPACT OF THE CLOSING OF THE COMMANDOS

For purposes of this study the impact of the closing of the commandos is considered on the basis of what Government promised in their place, the readiness and ability of the police to provide that replacement, and changes that their abolition had upon the incidence of crime (particularly in the geographic areas visited by the research team).

In the statements of the South African President, in his announcement that the commandos would be phased out over a six-year period, and those of ministers in his Cabinet, there are explicit promises that a security vacuum would not be allowed to develop. The Government's promise was that no commando would be closed down unless and until the police were capable of filling the gap; this included border security. The undertaking was that the police would replace the commandos by putting in place sector policing, a special category of rural and urban sector policing reservists, area crime combating units, and more personnel.

This research showed that in the areas visited by the authors, the extent to which the police have filled this gap varies from virtually nothing to only partial implementation. It is also apparent that a feasibility study was not done prior to the phasing out of the commandos to determine whether the police would be capable of taking over their responsibilities. The most worrying aspect is that the commandos were closed down even in places where almost no substitute was in place. Rural

areas were left particularly vulnerable in view of the importance of the commandos for their security and the Rural Protection Plan, built around the commandos, was for all practical purposes defunct. There are no indications that the police have put a similar plan in its place and, given the police's poor performance in replacing the commandos, it is unlikely that a new plan will be in place before the exit-entry strategy is properly implemented.

As far as increased personnel levels are concerned, Government has kept its promise and was able to expand police numbers by about 30 000 over the last five years. As far as the other aspects of the replacement promise is concerned, however, Government directly and indirectly (in the form of commitments made on behalf of the police) failed to keep its promises. Sector policing is clearly not in place everywhere and even the policy directives in this regard are still to be finalised, five years after it was announced that this concept would be part of the replacement strategy. Category D reservists were intended to strengthen sector policing, but in most areas they are absent and the prospects of this situation being remedied in the foreseeable future are bleak. A change in budgetary allocations may, of course, convince more people to join the reservists, though this is a moot point.

To be fair to Government, many of the obstacles in the implementation of the exit-entry strategy, such as the attitudes of local people, are not of their doing and they should carry no blame in this regard. There is a counter-argument, however: that the closing of the commandos should have been postponed until the above obstacles were removed and the police structures in place. It can also be argued that it was Government that initiated the process and that it remains responsible for its actions, even when it is officials that carry out or are expected to carry out these actions.

The restructuring of the crime combating units is perhaps an indication of the shortcomings that have emerged in the replacement strategy. A mere three years after the announcement that the crime combating units would be part of the 'new system' to replace the commandos, these units were restructured and their numbers halved. In some cases, as was seen in Dundee, the closest CCU is now three times further away than the original unit and, in effect, useless for quick reaction purposes.

Border control is another example of complete failure on the part of Government, either directly or indirectly through the inefficiencies of its departments. This finding is borne out by the Auditor-General's report. This failure has contributed to tensions in border areas and to increased feelings of insecurity in these areas. It also has

created real or potential security risks and the likelihood of crime and violence.

Finally, although an analysis of the crime reports for the areas visited by the research team does not yet show dramatic increases in levels of crime, in some areas and

in some crime categories there are increases. For example, in the Clocolan area, burglaries have increased noticeably and Krugersdorp has experienced alarming increases in its aggravated robbery rate. In most of the other area there were increases in crimes such as theft and stock theft.

## 9 Conclusion

Although it would be an exaggeration to say that Government has been grossly negligent in terms of fulfilling *all* its constitutional obligations in respect of safety and security, indeed, scarcely any government in the world could claim to be doing this, it is possible from this research, to conclude that Government has failed in at least two areas:

- ***To develop and implement an overarching national security strategy that would effectively address the security threat against the people of South Africa.***

As argued in this report, the security threat concerns much more than just crime and the criminal justice system; it involves a number of other aspects of a social, economic, cultural and infrastructural nature that lie outside the reach of the criminal justice system.

- ***To fulfil the promise that the closing of the commandos would not create a 'security vacuum'.*** It is

obvious that a security vacuum exists in the areas visited by the research team. This conclusion is based principally on the observation that in none of these areas had all the measures announced by Government been fully implemented and in some areas almost nothing had been done. And despite government assurances that this would not happen, the process of closing down the commandos was carried through.

The Auditor-General and the SAPS's Policy Advisory Council, in their reports, give many more examples of failures by Government or its institutions that support the findings in this research. None of these failures are irrevocable, but a reversal will require strong political will, firm leadership and effective control.



# Annexures

## Annexure A

CRIME FIGURES FOR CLOCOLAN

## Annexure B

CRIME FIGURES FOR MARQUARD

## Annexures C1–C10

CRIME FIGURES FOR DUNDEE, HATTINGSPRUIT, DANNHAUSER,  
POMEROY, MSINGA, HELPMEKAAR, GLENCOE, EKUVUKENI,  
NQUTU AND WASBANK

## Annexures D1–D3

CRIME FIGURES FOR CULLINAN, BRONKHORSTSPRUIT  
AND WELBEKEND

## Annexures E1–E3

CRIME FIGURES FOR KRUGERSDORP, MULDERSDRIF  
AND MAGALIESBURG

**Annexure A Crime for the Clocolan Police Precinct in the Free State for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	5	3	9	7	9	6	4
Attempted murder	7	4	6	4	2	7	6
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	26	22	26	31	16	13	12
Indecent assault (April to December)	1	3	2	9	6	5	0
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	142	151	150	94	118	125	150
Common assault	138	167	136	159	164	85	91
Common robbery	9	17	13	10	9	11	11
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	2	9	2	4	9	6	6
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	1	0	0	0	0	1
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	0	0	0	0	0	2
Arson	5	4	5	5	5	6	5
Malicious damage to property	59	64	82	68	69	64	50
Burglary at residential premises	151	202	179	121	141	165	113
Burglary at business premises	53	47	25	22	34	28	15
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	9	12	2	11	7	6	15
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	32	32	15	17	21	12	11
Stock theft	82	77	75	53	46	42	35
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	5	4	3	7	5	3	1
Drug-related crime	53	46	55	82	76	60	58
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	3	1	4	9	1	5	3
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	185	211	239	164	175	136	92
Commercial crime	19	13	7	12	5	12	6
Shoplifting	19	9	14	21	5	6	12
Culpable homicide	4	6	4	7	4	5	12
Kidnapping	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abduction	1	1	3	1	0	2	2
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	3	1	2	9	4	6	3
Public violence	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
Crimen injuria	38	43	30	72	52	35	13

**Annexure B Crime for the Marquard Police Precinct in the Free State for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	1	3	3	3	1	2	5
Attempted murder	1	3	1	4	4	0	1
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	18	10	9	22	11	18	10
Indecent assault (April to December)	3	1	2	2	7	3	2
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	57	53	47	96	75	62	65
Common assault	72	82	76	65	49	69	50
Common robbery	2	1	3	7	10	9	11
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	6	0	2	1	1	5	5
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	0	0	0	0	0	2
Arson	0	0	2	2	0	2	2
Malicious damage to property	33	22	21	37	35	46	26
Burglary at residential premises	42	75	61	74	69	72	78
Burglary at business premises	25	19	9	23	43	30	31
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	4	3	12	10	4	6	6
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	10	7	10	3	2	5	8
Stock theft	37	53	42	35	26	47	36
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	3	3	1	4	2	0	0
Drug-related crime	71	38	38	32	26	49	21
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	8	3	2	6	4	2	2
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	97	103	92	97	72	80	70
Commercial crime	6	4	5	3	2	6	2
Shoplifting	1	0	2	5	4	1	1
Culpable homicide	1	8	3	11	3	7	7
Kidnapping	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abduction	2	0	1	0	2	2	0
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Public violence	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Crimen injuria	10	5	2	6	16	11	10

**Annexure C1 Crime for the Dundee Police Precinct in KwaZulu-Natal for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	15	19	16	11	14	15	14
Attempted murder	17	23	22	20	14	15	14
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	23	27	27	34	41	44	30
Indecent assault (April to December)	4	4	7	3	8	1	1
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	192	208	188	221	196	181	172
Common assault	266	260	257	207	148	132	145
Common robbery	89	105	75	93	63	56	55
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	52	57	43	47	31	54	43
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	5	1	2	8	0	8	4
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	2	2	0	3	3	2
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	4	0	0	1	4	7
Arson	8	11	15	6	7	9	15
Malicious damage to property	106	116	111	117	98	92	69
Burglary at residential premises	337	321	256	277	251	187	158
Burglary at business premises	123	68	75	93	80	44	70
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	63	47	62	66	64	71	59
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	158	138	121	157	73	57	61
Stock theft	67	55	70	54	40	100	89
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	14	13	26	11	9	19	8
Drug-related crime	158	103	113	161	172	169	225
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	41	25	38	69	55	55	109
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	659	559	520	466	356	323	310
Commercial crime	63	57	66	96	190	85	65
Shoplifting	111	136	106	91	86	46	74
Culpable homicide	10	12	8	8	8	15	19
Kidnapping	4	1	1	4	3	1	2
Abduction	4	7	0	3	1	3	3
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	1	2	2	2	3	1	3
Public violence	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
Crimen injuria	64	62	65	55	48	38	23

**Annexure C2 Crime for the Hattingspruit Police Precinct in KwaZulu-Natal for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	4	2	6	1	4	4	3
Attempted murder	6	3	6	0	3	2	3
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	0	6	3	7	11	4	5
Indecent assault (April to December)	4	0	0	2	3	1	0
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	50	39	39	40	37	40	43
Common assault	41	56	44	46	53	20	24
Common robbery	4	4	9	4	3	5	3
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	1	4	4	3	1	2	3
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	0	0	0	0	0	1
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arson	1	2	3	1	4	3	2
Malicious damage to property	20	17	26	21	22	12	23
Burglary at residential premises	37	36	37	25	20	17	21
Burglary at business premises	6	10	9	7	4	7	16
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	3	2	3	2	0	1	4
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	7	11	12	3	10	3	5
Stock theft	40	46	23	17	20	27	19
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	3	0	4	2	0	0	3
Drug-related crime	8	0	2	7	15	2	8
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	4	3	3	0	5	15	21
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	53	86	62	58	57	34	35
Commercial crime	0	0	1	2	3	3	1
Shoplifting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Culpable homicide	1	4	6	2	2	4	4
Kidnapping	2	0	0	0	1	0	0
Abduction	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Public violence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Crimen injuria	7	13	11	14	17	4	3

**Annexure C3 Crime for the Dannhauser Police Precinct in KwaZulu-Natal for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	16	14	12	17	14	13	15
Attempted murder	20	24	17	21	16	18	18
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	50	44	39	45	39	39	37
Indecent assault (April to December)	5	3	4	6	9	11	4
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	248	261	253	261	219	167	178
Common assault	133	157	185	188	182	164	162
Common robbery	50	38	30	32	48	33	35
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	35	44	25	20	22	16	54
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	5	3	4	5	3	0	7
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	1	2	0	0	0	0	1
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	2	1	1	2	0	9
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	2	0	1	1	0	12
Arson	12	10	6	4	2	6	9
Malicious damage to property	71	85	73	76	89	73	70
Burglary at residential premises	195	236	188	207	229	193	202
Burglary at business premises	46	39	40	41	69	53	51
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	7	3	11	15	9	14	13
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	30	45	21	29	29	17	17
Stock theft	199	198	147	124	212	172	154
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	9	11	7	7	4	8	9
Drug-related crime	28	22	13	18	31	29	24
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	6	6	2	9	6	24	34
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	261	307	274	221	191	189	176
Commercial crime	16	17	8	11	15	20	20
Shoplifting	11	1	1	1	0	1	0
Culpable homicide	17	12	10	16	28	19	13
Kidnapping	3	1	0	4	2	1	4
Abduction	2	4	0	1	4	3	3
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	3	3	1	2	13	2	4
Public violence	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Crimen injuria	60	61	41	29	27	36	23

**Annexure C4 Crime for the Promeroy Police Precinct in KwaZulu-Natal for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	58	43	42	36	33	27	21
Attempted murder	54	47	35	51	41	24	14
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	15	16	17	16	15	22	14
Indecent assault (April to December)	1	0	0	1	1	4	0
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	85	86	77	95	92	66	77
Common assault	49	23	35	53	35	23	19
Common robbery	5	5	14	12	3	4	1
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	47	37	28	26	22	18	16
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	3	2	4	3	3	3	3
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	1	0	1	0	0	2
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	2	0	0	0	0	3
Arson	7	8	12	11	20	3	11
Malicious damage to property	16	21	12	21	23	14	18
Burglary at residential premises	49	51	41	33	29	30	21
Burglary at business premises	18	20	22	21	15	10	14
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	3	1	1	5	7	0	2
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	8	14	4	8	3	2	1
Stock theft	107	147	127	150	156	140	138
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	30	44	35	44	38	23	120
Drug-related crime	4	14	11	9	24	6	11
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	0	1	1	2	2	6	11
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	54	76	55	51	51	27	18
Commercial crime	4	0	2	1	3	3	1
Shoplifting	2	1	0	1	0	0	1
Culpable homicide	7	3	5	4	8	7	9
Kidnapping	1	0	0	1	1	3	2
Abduction	0	1	4	3	2	1	0
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Public violence	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Crimen injuria	0	4	3	5	1	1	4

**Annexure C5 Crime for the Msinga Police Precinct in KwaZulu-Natal for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	91	72	84	81	49	67	58
Attempted murder	83	79	56	43	42	44	43
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	41	30	50	33	46	41	59
Indecent assault (April to December)	1	2	0	3	2	1	0
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	152	168	162	191	188	142	110
Common assault	60	43	52	108	84	76	36
Common robbery	27	25	22	19	9	25	17
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	54	62	65	58	33	34	25
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	6	9	11	19	7	6	7
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	2	1	0	1	0	0	0
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	1	0	0	1	0	0
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	1	0	0	0	1	0
Arson	20	25	35	55	21	20	18
Malicious damage to property	60	36	34	49	43	67	31
Burglary at residential premises	131	147	136	107	99	134	87
Burglary at business premises	28	36	30	19	27	30	24
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	17	22	10	17	7	8	4
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	40	36	28	21	23	37	21
Stock theft	111	105	173	178	115	128	93
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	41	63	35	66	36	62	112
Drug-related crime	10	7	8	27	18	47	44
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	4	4	8	8	10	11	13
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	134	146	154	107	59	52	38
Commercial crime	4	8	5	7	10	15	10
Shoplifting	13	5	6	1	2	2	0
Culpable homicide	7	7	13	15	10	4	13
Kidnapping	3	0	2	2	3	5	1
Abduction	0	6	2	5	5	0	3
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
Public violence	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Crimen injuria	2	3	1	0	3	2	1



**Annexure C6 Crime for the Helpmekaar Police Precinct in KwaZulu-Natal for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	11	5	4	2	5	2	3
Attempted murder	24	18	10	5	5	0	2
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	7	9	3	3	2	5	1
Indecent assault (April to December)	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	46	12	14	21	19	11	9
Common assault	38	20	10	23	9	9	14
Common robbery	8	5	2	0	1	1	1
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	29	14	17	10	7	4	6
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	3	0	2	2	1	2	0
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arson	2	3	5	1	2	2	0
Malicious damage to property	33	18	11	15	12	4	11
Burglary at residential premises	46	28	12	22	18	15	3
Burglary at business premises	9	3	5	0	3	0	0
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	5	1	2	0	3	1	3
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	3	4	1	2	2	8	3
Stock theft	113	87	54	51	73	63	55
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	5	10	4	2	9	3	5
Drug-related crime	19	14	1	11	16	3	7
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	0	0	1	0	1	0	3
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	55	66	40	40	35	34	15
Commercial crime	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shoplifting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Culpable homicide	4	4	3	6	2	3	6
Kidnapping	2	0	1	0	0	1	0
Abduction	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Public violence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Crimen injuria	3	1	0	1	1	0	1

**Annexure C7 Crime for the Glencoe Police Precinct in KwaZulu-Natal for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	9	8	2	8	5	7	7
Attempted murder	15	14	5	7	4	3	5
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	14	12	22	17	8	20	23
Indecent assault (April to December)	3	9	8	2	3	4	4
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	128	123	126	102	88	115	85
Common assault	224	277	245	236	227	182	180
Common robbery	17	25	31	29	29	28	36
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	25	17	10	7	10	11	15
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	2	2	1	1	1	0	1
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	2	0	0	0	0	1
Arson	4	3	2	1	0	2	1
Malicious damage to property	85	93	67	75	71	64	77
Burglary at residential premises	127	154	142	123	127	111	125
Burglary at business premises	53	24	33	21	22	16	47
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	4	22	27	13	10	18	8
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	38	63	60	34	74	35	10
Stock theft	41	44	28	17	22	22	31
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	9	10	3	0	0	0	1
Drug-related crime	28	37	18	44	25	29	9
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	17	11	9	14	19	16	37
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	257	279	192	194	130	132	131
Commercial crime	7	15	8	13	5	10	10
Shoplifting	13	13	7	8	3	2	5
Culpable homicide	5	3	6	5	8	6	2
Kidnapping	3	2	3	0	0	2	4
Abduction	1	4	5	0	1	2	1
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	0	1	0	3	0	2	0
Public violence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Crimen injuria	90	118	129	99	71	41	48

**Annexure C8 Crime for the Ekuvukeni Police Precinct in KwaZulu-Natal for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	30	64	43	30	34	32	28
Attempted murder	50	57	39	32	24	27	20
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	46	31	42	50	53	43	44
Indecent assault (April to December)	4	3	10	3	3	2	0
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	95	124	170	176	111	130	141
Common assault	153	155	143	96	68	84	36
Common robbery	20	25	45	39	18	28	26
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	72	129	101	74	28	47	45
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	1	6	1	10	0	0	1
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	39	19	0	0	0	0
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	3	1	0	0	0	3
Arson	7	11	6	6	4	3	7
Malicious damage to property	50	57	75	55	40	53	52
Burglary at residential premises	149	204	216	146	112	85	98
Burglary at business premises	28	34	27	18	19	21	20
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	7	3	3	12	8	6	7
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	8	18	14	15	6	5	3
Stock theft	150	161	215	158	124	163	158
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	37	38	36	36	31	21	17
Drug-related crime	4	16	15	36	26	35	27
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	2	0	0	5	5	2	7
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	101	149	131	105	68	132	45
Commercial crime	2	2	0	1	0	0	0
Shoplifting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Culpable homicide	5	9	21	5	14	7	10
Kidnapping	2	3	4	3	1	0	2
Abduction	2	1	2	2	0	1	2
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	0	0	1	3	1	1	0
Public violence	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Crimen injuria	11	11	9	5	1	2	4

**Annexure C9 Crime for the Nqutu Police Precinct in KwaZulu-Natal for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	57	59	57	46	52	60	40
Attempted murder	55	68	64	42	43	41	50
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	48	36	48	61	34	52	38
Indecent assault (April to December)	1	3	3	1	1	4	3
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	287	361	287	315	269	302	268
Common assault	69	54	70	81	65	54	27
Common robbery	51	48	44	54	41	47	40
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	61	73	89	73	63	61	59
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	3	0	2	4	4	2	5
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	2	2	1	0	0	5
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	3	0	0	0	1	1
Arson	16	26	15	17	6	7	12
Malicious damage to property	77	108	65	66	77	62	54
Burglary at residential premises	216	295	232	161	144	118	94
Burglary at business premises	70	68	60	39	32	60	54
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	13	16	10	14	14	7	11
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	33	30	25	26	20	19	9
Stock theft	247	332	226	348	294	223	135
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	29	33	50	61	50	35	42
Drug-related crime	45	30	47	44	77	289	117
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	8	11	11	2	21	25	46
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	615	443	178	133	70	120	118
Commercial crime	27	12	12	18	10	40	29
Shoplifting	39	42	36	27	28	28	23
Culpable homicide	22	18	18	29	18	15	20
Kidnapping	5	8	2	2	6	4	5
Abduction	3	6	7	7	1	1	2
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	0	1	4	1	7	2	2
Public violence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Crimen injuria	7	5	4	7	4	3	2

**Annexure C10 Crime for the Wasbank Police Precinct in KwaZulu-Natal for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	7	3	4	1	0	1	1
Attempted murder	9	10	6	2	2	2	1
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	5	7	1	3	1	9	3
Indecent assault (April to December)	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	36	30	21	29	15	22	17
Common assault	31	46	45	31	16	30	23
Common robbery	11	4	8	5	1	3	5
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	8	8	8	10	5	6	8
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	1	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	1	0	0	0	0	1
Arson	4	3	0	0	1	1	0
Malicious damage to property	22	26	13	18	6	15	10
Burglary at residential premises	24	29	22	15	15	13	26
Burglary at business premises	12	7	6	10	4	7	6
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	1	0	3	3	3	3	2
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	6	6	6	11	7	5	6
Stock theft	40	48	42	29	21	36	31
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	9	7	6	5	6	0	2
Drug-related crime	9	17	13	25	15	15	12
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	3	1	1	5	4	5	0
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	59	89	42	42	20	35	29
Commercial crime	1	1	1	3	0	1	1
Shoplifting	2	1	1	3	0	0	0
Culpable homicide	4	2	0	8	2	1	2
Kidnapping	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abduction	1	1	0	2	0	1	0
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Public violence	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Crimen injuria	5	3	4	4	1	4	7

**Annexure D1 Crime for the Cullinan Police Precinct in Gauteng for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	12	11	12	9	9	9	10
Attempted murder	13	18	18	12	11	19	19
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	39	41	32	23	34	37	28
Indecent assault (April to December)	10	15	13	13	14	11	19
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	220	240	243	213	219	228	244
Common assault	519	534	514	386	431	386	408
Common robbery	62	61	66	69	59	51	74
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	43	55	50	41	50	75	89
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	7	12	9	5	3	4	6
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	1	1	1	2	1	4	2
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	11	5	3	10	9	12
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	3	1	4	0	0	5
Arson	13	9	8	6	10	7	11
Malicious damage to property	216	209	220	222	223	194	196
Burglary at residential premises	414	376	266	321	390	255	405
Burglary at business premises	102	88	93	106	115	71	75
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	68	85	47	54	100	89	117
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	64	80	77	80	84	72	112
Stock theft	47	50	32	39	18	18	22
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	6	3	6	7	7	11	8
Drug-related crime	101	91	81	91	129	104	99
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	21	20	27	21	10	17	23
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	542	634	741	502	486	468	597
Commercial crime	55	42	43	63	38	36	51
Shoplifting	9	8	10	4	8	10	16
Culpable homicide	29	19	18	26	33	29	25
Kidnapping	3	2	1	0	1	2	0
Abduction	1	4	2	3	2	4	4
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	1	4	4	1	7	2	2
Public violence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Crimen injuria	107	166	145	133	159	133	120

**Annexure D2 Crime for the Bronkhorstspuit Police Precinct in Gauteng for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	21	13	13	12	14	16	10
Attempted murder	37	39	49	24	31	29	17
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	49	48	47	59	47	49	41
Indecent assault (April to December)	4	9	7	6	4	6	7
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	378	322	360	326	295	358	317
Common assault	469	536	578	392	471	385	395
Common robbery	121	149	159	159	146	147	172
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	128	145	166	127	140	135	157
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	36	16	5	15	25	19	12
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	5	0	1	4	8	6	14
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	12	9	12	16	28	24
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	2	2	0	0	5	13
Arson	11	13	13	15	14	13	24
Malicious damage to property	205	206	250	299	284	262	249
Burglary at residential premises	468	433	508	550	575	501	542
Burglary at business premises	148	129	136	95	117	74	147
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	117	108	89	163	90	89	83
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	191	229	302	283	138	118	114
Stock theft	60	70	71	51	47	62	36
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	16	9	16	11	9	15	4
Drug-related crime	41	35	25	49	56	58	27
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	56	65	70	35	27	16	14
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	1 006	1 038	1 080	876	726	648	650
Commercial crime	84	100	101	113	93	97	131
Shoplifting	60	69	51	55	47	47	118
Culpable homicide	24	24	24	22	34	28	29
Kidnapping	10	1	3	0	2	3	5
Abduction	15	11	15	10	9	7	11
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	4	16	12	7	6	4	3
Public violence	1	3	1	2	4	1	0
Crimen injuria	48	54	74	47	49	49	48

**Annexure D3 Crime for the Welbekend Police Precinct in Gauteng for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	12	4	9	5	5	9	9
Attempted murder	15	14	21	10	13	15	12
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	9	8	21	14	12	16	16
Indecent assault (April to December)	0	3	2	3	2	1	1
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	83	105	121	153	126	118	109
Common assault	71	98	101	122	77	85	87
Common robbery	9	18	30	23	31	30	34
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	76	68	43	53	57	86	88
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	19	11	6	8	9	10	9
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	9	5	5	10	6	17	10
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	13	7	5	21	21	18
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	3	0	0	3	11	11
Arson	1	3	6	3	7	6	6
Malicious damage to property	22	50	88	99	86	81	82
Burglary at residential premises	130	250	287	329	239	209	204
Burglary at business premises	30	31	15	7	9	14	15
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	40	30	75	60	65	61	27
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	17	28	31	63	60	39	56
Stock theft	22	31	49	28	33	43	19
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	0	6	3	11	5	6	4
Drug-related crime	24	11	5	4	17	15	7
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	10	1	8	6	6	7	11
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	192	302	346	275	248	361	274
Commercial crime	15	5	13	13	11	19	13
Shoplifting	3	0	2	3	2	4	0
Culpable homicide	18	17	17	26	32	17	32
Kidnapping	2	1	2	0	1	0	1
Abduction	2	1	2	6	1	2	2
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	2	2	3	2	0	1	2
Public violence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Crimen injuria	6	14	6	7	14	14	17



**Annexure E1 Crime for the Krugersdrift Police Precinct in Gauteng for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	44	47	43	39	33	58	35
Attempted murder	52	55	83	57	54	58	82
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	116	117	98	95	118	101	90
Indecent assault (April to December)	37	46	37	34	40	33	39
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	722	821	751	855	663	698	604
Common assault	676	664	615	624	717	736	987
Common robbery	418	378	430	462	388	321	359
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	343	285	368	383	338	486	509
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	28	36	41	34	31	56	57
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	10	3	5	9	13	10	18
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	22	29	37	55	77	110
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	10	4	6	19	42	66
Arson	25	30	29	34	33	44	29
Malicious damage to property	614	789	762	708	747	911	1 088
Burglary at residential premises	1 315	1 635	1 649	1 391	1 233	1 191	1 298
Burglary at business premises	323	358	242	173	183	245	308
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	1 103	1 070	804	644	743	782	943
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	825	1 069	1 083	739	806	644	663
Stock theft	24	18	2	3	2	9	9
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	46	22	22	30	30	36	24
Drug-related crime	106	104	100	100	136	119	180
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	192	147	115	158	148	138	180
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	2 647	2 707	2 652	2 573	2 125	2 042	2 022
Commercial crime	371	347	355	351	374	506	329
Shoplifting	153	156	184	179	154	163	211
Culpable homicide	46	45	60	30	42	61	42
Kidnapping	16	2	4	3	0	2	0
Abduction	12	17	11	19	23	17	14
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	4	13	14	17	11	9	7
Public violence	1	1	1	0	2	4	2
Crimen injuria	183	186	159	128	131	113	213

**Annexure E2 Crime for the Muldersdrift Police Precinct in Gauteng for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	15	25	18	17	23	18	17
Attempted murder	33	33	44	39	35	29	38
Due to a changed definition of sexually motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	34	29	35	25	23	30	41
Indecent assault (April to December)	5	2	5	3	4	4	4
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	114	146	141	127	132	136	169
Common assault	158	174	193	174	155	48	153
Common robbery	37	44	52	56	53	62	59
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	144	110	167	203	207	200	168
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	13	12	15	23	20	22	14
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	3	5	0	1	1	10	14
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	7	11	54	70	57	41
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	4	2	2	11	17	19
Arson	10	7	6	11	11	12	10
Malicious damage to property	96	132	99	116	136	160	153
Burglary at residential premises	407	485	473	470	329	354	308
Burglary at business premises	36	5	1	4	9	21	24
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	54	49	42	51	54	39	42
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	105	119	111	112	87	106	81
Stock theft	13	1	20	12	3	6	10
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	8	9	7	9	8	9	7
Drug-related crime	16	25	15	4	13	11	7
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	24	40	40	37	26	54	53
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	470	559	541	496	426	439	557
Commercial crime	22	36	39	29	34	48	53
Shoplifting	0	2	0	1	4	3	3
Culpable homicide	28	23	33	27	38	44	44
Kidnapping	5	1	2	0	0	0	0
Abduction	4	3	1	2	5	2	5
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	0	0	3	0	1	0	0
Public violence	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Crimen injuria	17	10	13	10	13	12	5

**Annexure E3 Crime for the Magaliesburg Police Precinct\* in Gauteng for the period April to March 2001/02 to 2007/08**

Crime category	April 2001 to March 2002	April 2002 to March 2003	April 2003 to March 2004	April 2004 to March 2005	April 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to March 2007	April 2007 to March 2008
Murder	7	6	5	7	9	3	4
Attempted murder	3	9	10	11	5	6	3
Due to a changed definition of sexually-motivated crime resulting from the implementation of Act 32 of 2007 on 16 December 2007, rape and indecent assault figures are only provided for the period April to December							
Rape (April to December)	25	35	13	29	20	13	8
Indecent assault (April to December)	2	5	5	3	2	3	2
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	144	149	121	170	181	164	69
Common assault	118	116	124	112	102	80	45
Common robbery	17	14	21	30	17	14	12
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	32	24	24	33	24	29	20
Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	7	6	4	1	2	3	9
Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	14	3	3	6	4	5	5
Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	2	3	5	5	1	0
Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery)	–	0	0	0	0	0	1
Arson	4	12	4	1	9	5	4
Malicious damage to property	45	87	84	56	75	74	32
Burglary at residential premises	140	174	199	210	213	170	62
Burglary at business premises	33	21	29	31	38	20	22
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	44	30	32	42	34	31	9
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	30	33	46	24	31	22	13
Stock theft	36	47	49	45	33	22	15
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	2	1	8	1	5	5	4
Drug-related crime	12	7	10	20	13	13	2
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	13	8	8	10	9	20	8
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	227	320	270	246	245	268	199
Commercial crime	7	15	11	12	13	13	16
Shoplifting	9	3	2	8	0	2	3
Culpable homicide	15	14	15	18	17	15	7
Kidnapping	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abduction	4	2	0	2	2	2	0
Neglect and ill-treatment of children	0	0	4	1	0	2	2
Public violence	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Crimen injuria	17	17	17	14	13	7	3

\* Magaliesburg Police Precinct ceded Hekpoort in May 2007.

# Notes

- 1 The discussion on South Africa's crime situation is based largely on Burger 2007b. Information on 'Acts of violence against the farming community' was added from the SAPS report 'Crime in South Africa during 2006/2007' (South Africa 2007a:50). Crime figures for the first six months of the 2007/08 financial year come from the SAPS report 'Crime situation in South Africa: April–September 2007' (South Africa 2007d).
- 2 The National Operational Coordinating Committee (NOCOC) was the joint operational structure at the time between the South African Police Service, the South African National Defence Force, Correctional Services, and the departments of Welfare and Justice. In 2000 NOCOC was replaced by the Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (JOINTS). JOINTS is representative of the above departments and the other (nine) departments of the Justice Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS).
- 3 Unfortunately the SAPS did not include the 2007/08 figures for farm attacks and farm murders in their latest crime report.
- 4 Both authors – who, at the time, were members of the SANDF and SAPS respectively – were directly involved in the development and implementation of the Rural Protection Plan (RPP). Therefore parts of this short exposition of the RPP are based on their personal knowledge.
- 5 According to a report in *Beeld* of 18 May 2008, Deputy National Commissioner André Pruis, during a parliamentary briefing, responded to these criticisms by saying that the situation had already improved substantially since the audit and that by 2009 the SAPS will deploy the same force levels for borderline control as those deployed by the SANDF when they performed this responsibility.
- 6 The status of the report by the SAPS's Policy Advisory Council is uncertain, but because the media reported on it extensively, parts of it will be used in this report.
- 7 One of the authors of this report, Johan Burger, was an assistant commissioner in the SAPS at the time and chairperson of the JOINTS Rural Safety Priority Committee, as well as co-chairperson of the Exit-Entry Strategy Committee. He confirms that this was indeed what the SAPS management decided would replace the commandos.
- 8 The contents of the exit-entry strategy are not publicly available. However, the researchers relied to some extent on their own knowledge about the development of the strategy, as well as on information provided by individual members of the task team (who prefer not to be named).
- 9 Not all the farmers are former members of the commandos and not all former commando members are farmers.

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# List of acronyms and initialisms

ACCU	Area Crime Combating Unit
BAC	Business Against Crime
CCU	Crime Combating Unit
CIAC	Crime Information Analysis Centre
CIG	Crime Intelligence Gathering Unit
CJS	Criminal Justice System
CPF	Community Police Forum
CTA	Crime Threat Analysis
JCPS	Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster
JOINTS	Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure
LOCJOINTS	Local Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure
NCCS	National Crime Combating Strategy
NCPS	National Crime Prevention Strategy
NCPSC	National Crime Prevention Strategy Centre
NIA	National Intelligence Agency
NOCOC	National Operational Co-ordinating Committee
OCTA	Organised Crime Threat Analysis
RPP	Rural Protection Plan
SAAU	South African Agricultural Union
SAPS	South African Police Service
SCF	Sector Crime Forum

