

# THE AFRICAN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 2020

## CHALLENGES FOR THE SA ARMY

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### CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF ARMED CONFLICT

In 2005, the Human Security Centre, based at the University of British Columbia, published the first Human Security Report. This report, largely complementary to the well-known Human Development Report, contained a number of interesting findings. Amongst these it argued that: "Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic and sustained decline in the number of armed conflicts. And an uneven but equally dramatic decline in battle-deaths has been under way for more than half a century." The report tracked the post-World War II rise in the number of armed conflicts and the subsequent decline following the end of the Cold War. It found that the overwhelming majority of today's armed conflicts (95% in the last decade) are fought within, and not between, states and that the most take place in the poorest parts of the world, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>i</sup> At the turn of the century, the Report noted, more people were being killed in wars in sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world combined.<sup>ii</sup>

"Almost every country across the broad middle belt of the [African] continent – from Somalia in the east to Sierra Leone in the west, from Sudan in the north to Angola in the south – remains trapped in a volatile mix of poverty, crime, unstable and inequitable political institutions, ethnic discrimination, low state capacity and the 'bad neighbourhood' of other crisis-ridden states – all factors associated with increased risk of armed conflict."<sup>iii</sup>

Equitable development, good governance, inclusive democracy and the risk of war are strongly related. Indeed, a review of the position that African countries occupy on the human development index is sobering. The index focuses on three measurable dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life, being educated and having a decent standard of living. Thus it combines measures of life expectancy, school enrolment, literacy and income to allow a broader view of a country's development than does income alone. With Norway at first position - indicating a country where life expectancy is long, literacy and education levels high, and the people all generally well off - Seychelles is the African country that scores the highest of at 51, followed by Libya at 58. With few exceptions African countries occupy the bottom part of the HDI index as from Egypt and South Africa at numbers 119 and 120 respectively and the rest of the continent scoring lower scores concluding with Niger at number 177.

There is, simply then, a clear relationship between conflict and poverty. Most wars take place in poor countries and since most poor countries are in sub Saharan Africa, this is where conflict is most pervasive.

As per capita income increases, the risk of war declines. An important factor in this calculation is that of state capacity. Higher per capita income means more state capacity – a stronger and more capable government. This in turn means more state resources to crush rebels and to address grievances. But while the risk of civil war is low in stable and inclusive democracies, the reverse holds true for those countries in transition from autocracy to democracy or stuck somewhere between the two. So the countries most at risk are those countries in transition from authoritarianism towards higher levels of growth, democracy and better governance. And as we know, the most dangerous period for countries is in the immediate period of post-conflict reconstruction. This will be the case for the DR Congo and is currently evident in Burundi. Ironically, democracy often appears to be a hindrance rather than a contributor to the restoration of long-term stability during periods such as this.

At the same time the Human Security Report noted signs of hope – declines in the number of conflicts where a government was one of the warring parties, in the number of massacres and in reported fatalities. One of the reasons cited for this decline was not a change in the underlying risk factors or the structural propensity towards violence, but the increased involvement of the international community and African regional organizations in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

The SA Army is at the vanguard of the contribution by South Africa, the richest, most powerful state on the African continent and one from which others expect leadership and (military) resources. Without any doubt, and despite the establishment of the African Standby Force and its standby brigade in SADC, the SA Army will have many more demands made upon it than it could possibly meet – operating at maximum capacity within a challenging environment, placing tremendous stress on man, woman and machine. Demands for engagement in the region will consistently outrun capacity and resources and the tempo of operations will increase rather than decrease. We should plan accordingly.

Different to the huge, externally supported conventional wars of the previous century, today's wars are predominantly low-intensity conflicts. This is true of Iraq and Afghanistan as well as of the much-vaunted 'war on terror' which has seen quite modest casualty figures. Perhaps only the USA has the luxury to plan and equip for wars it will never fight. For the rest of us we need to train, equip and structure our forces overwhelmingly for counter-insurgency and peace enforcement operations for these are the type of operations that we will be engaged in.

In terms of battle-deaths, the 1990s was the least violent decade since the end of World War II. Warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is far less deadly than it was half a century ago with steep declines in battle-deaths beginning early in the 1950s. By the beginning of the 21st century, the probability of any country being embroiled in an armed conflict was lower than at any time since the early 1950s.<sup>iv</sup>

But while wars have become dramatically less deadly in recent decades, genocide and other cases of mass murder has increased steadily in number from the 1960s until the end of the 1980s, but have since declined dramatically, notwithstanding the

atrocities in Rwanda and the Balkans.<sup>v</sup> Generally people are more worried by violent crime than by warfare, and more scared of terrorism than they should be. This is acutely reflected in South Africa where the fear of crime is disproportionate to the actual incidence of crime, high as the latter may be.

Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end. Very few of these endings were widely reported. Second, new conflicts broke out in a number of post-communist states in the 1990s, especially in the Balkans and the Caucasus. They attracted widespread media attention because they were associated with the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union, and because the fighting took place on the borders of Western Europe.

Other conflicts - Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan - involved the United States, a fact that alone ensured massive coverage by the US-dominated global media. In short, the media inevitably focus on the new wars - largely ignoring those that were ending. And as we know, good news is no news. Third, and most important, official statistics on global armed conflict trends do not exist.<sup>vi</sup>

Further changes include a greatly increased reliance on child soldiers, and a growth in paramilitary organizations and private military firms. These trends are particularly evident in Africa.

So this brief review would indicate an important departure point for defence planning purposes. While South Africa itself is still engaged in a transition from an authoritarian past to a stable democracy, the chances of major inter-state war in the region that could directly embroil this country is quite slim. The chance of internal conflict in a number of countries to our north is very high. At the same time, as the strongest and most military capable state in its immediate region, indeed in the entire Africa, conventional military threats to South Africa are remote.

So if there is little likelihood of a traditional external threat to the country, implying that preparation for conventional military defence should not take precedence, what would the typical operational environment for the SANDF look like?

## **THE FUTURE SA ARMY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN AFRICA**

During September 2006 the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank revised their list of countries at risk of collapse. The result was that the number of fragile states rose to 26 in 2006, up from 17 three years ago. Of these, 16 are in Africa and now include Burundi, the Central African Republic, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Zimbabwe. Clearly, if one wants to review the future operational environment of the SA Army in Africa, an overview of some of the key characteristics of these 16 countries would be insightful. It is in situations such as these that armed forces are requested to intervene, generally as part of either UN or African Union peacekeeping missions - and increasingly with a mandate that extends well beyond the tradition of monitoring

of a ceasefire - first to help build a comprehensive peace agreement and second to provide the security for subsequent implementation of that peace.

Table 1: Characteristics of Key Countries at Risk (see end of paper)

Nine of these countries are former French colonies (namely Burundi, CAR, Comoros, DRC, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Republic of Congo, Togo) pointing to the requirement for a sustained effort at enhanced language skills for effective South African deployment.

Generally these countries are at the bottom of the Human Development Index: Guinea-Bissau is near the bottom of the list at 172, Central African Republic at 171, Burundi at 169, the Democratic Republic of Congo at 167, Cote d'Ivoire at 163, Eritrea at 161, Nigeria at 158, Guinea at 156, Zimbabwe at 145, Togo at 143, the Republic of Congo at 142, Sudan at 141, and Comoros at 132.<sup>vii</sup> Somalia and Liberia are not ranked.

The rest of our immediate neighbourhood does not look too good either with: Mozambique at 168; Zambia at 166; Malawi at 165; Tanzania at 164; Angola at 160; Lesotho at 149; Swaziland at 147; and Madagascar at 146.

Underlying the large number of fragile states in Africa is the tragic but inescapable fact that recent studies show no tendency for the poorest countries to converge towards the rich ones. On the contrary, the data appears to show a strong tendency for the gap to widen, as rich countries have grown rapidly while most of the poorest have, in terms of economic growth, stood still or even lost ground. This is not a story of economic convergence, but of massive and increasing divergence. South Africa is part of the developing world, both internally where massive disparities of wealth continue to characterize our country, as well as regionally through our location on the southernmost tip of the poorest and most destitute continent. There are, of course, two important exceptions to the global trend towards divergence – India and China – where dramatic economic growth have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

Violence is a key reason for the broadening chasm between developed and developing countries. It has created fundamentally different expectations of social and political life in North and South. Young people in several poor countries are now being socialized in social systems created by violence and often war. These systems give rise to even greater poverty and inequality, which in turn increase crime and violence. As a result, we have witnessed the tripling of homicides in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s. During the 1990s civilian war-related deaths as a percentage of all war-related deaths increased to 90% (as opposed to only 50% in the 18th century). In the 1990s, violence created approximately 13 million refugees and 38 million internally displaced persons world-wide.

It has become increasingly clear to economists that large-scale political and criminal violence threatens to relegate several countries and regions of the developing world

to a perpetual trap of poverty and slow or negative economic growth. Hence the importance of South African leadership, NEPAD and institutions such as SADC and the AU.

In most of Africa, but most prominently in mineral rich countries such as Angola and the DR Congo, economic investment and hence prosperity is concentrated in secured enclaves, often with little impact on the wider society or the great expanse of African terrain that stretches out around these small areas. The clearest case (and no doubt the most attractive for the foreign investor) is provided by the off-shore oil extraction in Angola – what I have elsewhere referred to as the creation of an ‘off shore, enclave economy’. These capital-intensive enclaves are substantially insulated from the local economy, often protected by private armies and security forces. They are secured, policed, and in a minimal sense, governed through private or semiprivate means. These enclaves are increasingly linked up, not in a national grid, but in transnational networks that connect economically valued spaces dispersed around the world in a point-to-point fashion. Whereas the copper mining development that occurred in Zambia during colonialism and shortly thereafter, for example, provided housing, schools, and hospitals, recreational facilities and the like – benefits to the wider community - nowadays, mining and oil production provides little of these broader social benefits.

Enclave economic development in much of Africa is what James Ferguson refers to as ‘socially thin’. Much more capital intensive and relying on much smaller groups of highly skilled workers (often foreign workers on short-term contracts) with little wider social investment – competing in a global economy where cost is king. “Today, enclaves of mineral-extracting investment in Africa are usually tightly integrated with the head office of multinational corporations and metropolitan centres but sharply walled off from their own national societies (often literally walled off with bricks, razor wire, and security guards).”<sup>viii</sup>

As for the rest – the vast terrain of ‘useless Africa’ – it is increasingly serviced and ‘governed’ by NGO’s, traditional authority, to open banditry and warlordism. This state of affairs is often violent and disorderly. Here we see a second type of globalization – that of government by NGOs. “Like the privately secured mineral extraction enclave, the humanitarian emergency zone is subject to a form of government that cannot be located within a national grid, but is instead spread across a patchwork of transnationally networked, non-contiguous bits.”<sup>ix</sup> An interesting feature of wildlife conservation, humanitarian and relief agencies on the continent is that they have increasingly adopted pragmatic solutions such as the use of private security companies and guard services to provide political order where the state does not. Common to all of this is the absence of formal government structures and systems – and where the government does intrude, it does so as exploiter rather than service provider.

Such an environment presents complex challenges. On the one side even peacekeeping forces under a UN mandate are subject to intensive and intrusive media scrutiny from international civil society actors over which it may have no

control or influence. The power of the media and the impact that negative reportage can have on public perceptions and indeed on international sympathy is massive. We are back, in many senses, to what was referred to in the previous century as the corporal's war. Junior leaders will require exceptional insight, maturity and training in excess of their traditional command responsibility. They will not only have to confront and deal with complex humanitarian and social challenges, but be expected to act with judgement that is far beyond the traditional vision of soldiers as cannon fodder for frontal assault.

## **YOUTH, URBANIZATION AND URBAN POVERTY**

I now want to add an additional factor to the picture that I have sketched above, that of youth, urbanization and the fact that Africa will shortly have more people in urban than rural areas.

In 1950 (the start of the independence period) around 15% of Africa's inhabitants were urban, in 2000 had it risen to about 37% and it is expected to rise to 45% in 2015 and 54% in 2025. While urbanization is a familiar phenomenon – even in Latin America and the Caribbean where 75% of their populations residing in urban areas, this is not the case yet in Africa and Asia, both still predominantly rural. But this situation is changing rapidly.

Africa's population will cease to be a predominantly rural in 2030. Africa's urban population is increasing at above three per cent, and in just a decade, 40 per cent of Africa's people will live in urban areas, most condemned to slums and shanties. While the urbanization rate in Africa is slowing, so is the population growth rate, much because of HIV/AIDS. Between 2000 and 2010 urban Africa will have to absorb an additional 100 million people. By 2010 there will be 50 cities in Africa with populations of between one and five million people. By way of example, between 1996 and 2001 Gauteng's population grew by 20% - an increase of 1 488 755 people, which represents 35% of the total increase of 4 236 205 people in the whole of South Africa over this period.

Urban poverty is one of the biggest challenges facing African countries. According to UN-Habitat, currently two-thirds of Africa's urban population live in informal settlements without adequate sanitation, water, transport or health services.<sup>x</sup> Slums are places where hunger prevails, and where young people are drawn into anti-social behaviour, including crime and gangsterism, for lack of better alternatives. Lagos is already one of the world's mega-cities - a crime-ridden, seething mass of some 15 million people crammed into the steamy lagoons of southwest Nigeria. Two out of three Lagos residents live in a slum with no reliable access to clean drinking water, electricity, waste disposal - even roads. Only 30 percent of houses in the city have an approved building plan. As the city population swells by up to eight percent every year, the slums and their associated problems are growing. Policing is absent and security forces rarely venture into a slum such as Makoko outside Nairobi except perhaps for the occasional demolition of shanty houses. Instead, security is

provided by "Area Boys", self-styled vigilante groups made up of unemployed young men that defend their territory with threats and often violence.<sup>xi</sup>

The Nigerian government estimates that Lagos will have expanded to 25 million residents by 2015. Other estimates are much lower, reflected in the fact that we are still awaiting the results of the first census in Nigeria in some decades.

I trust that the picture I am painting will be sufficient to indicate to you that the future operational environment for the SA Army in sub-Saharan Africa can still traditionally be divided into urban and rural but that the importance of the former is increasing. The essential characteristic of the urban operational environment will largely be inaccessible slums and an environment that is dangerous for the health and well-being of our soldiers. The essential characteristic of the latter will be the absence of any level of infrastructure, services and governance. Food insecurity is common to both. All supplies will have to be flown in and forces will be faced by tremendous demands for medical services, protection and general humanitarian action. Both environments will require a tremendous capacity on engineers, medical services, aerial surveillance, communications, logistics and generally on self-sufficiency. The mainstay of operations will be motorized (or wheeled mechanized) infantry and the type of training required essentially counter-insurgency instruction.

Our soldiers will also have to protect themselves against disease, HIV/AIDS and malaria in particular. Worldwide HIV/AIDS has become the leading cause of death among adults aged 15-59 years (followed by heart disease and tuberculosis). Beyond the youthful, urbanizing and poorly educated nature of the people of sub-Saharan Africa, the region is also disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS. Seventy percent of the millions of people infected with HIV/AIDS live in Africa and 25 million of these in sub-Saharan Africa. Eighty-five percent of the world's children living with AIDS are from sub-Saharan Africa. Twelve million children orphaned by AIDS live in sub-Saharan Africa – and UNICEF estimates that 18 million children in the region will have lost at least one parent to AIDS by 2020.<sup>xii</sup> More than 3,000 SADC citizens died of AIDS every day in 2003 – equivalent to a daily 9/11 attack. Despite the unpopularity of the notion, many adolescents under 18 are sexually active. Recent studies have shown that 46% of girls and 37% of boys between the age of 15 and 19 in sub-Saharan Africa have had sex and that the incidence of HIV/AIDS amongst girls is much higher than amongst boys.<sup>xiii</sup>

Inevitably many of these children would be recruited by rebel groups, warlords and criminal gangs and in the absence of social delivery in much of rural and urban Africa, few norms would restrain such behaviour. According to IRIN, brain drain and HIV/AIDS have had a tremendous impact on the skills pool of a region with a population of 180 million people, that has been weighed down by food insecurity and widening poverty.

Zambia's reportedly loses 1,000 teachers to HIV/AIDS each year; Malawi has only 13 doctors in its 27 district hospitals because many have left for better-paid jobs in other countries. According to the International Organisation for Migration, a third to a

half the graduates of South African medical schools immigrate to the developed world every year.<sup>xiv</sup> Extreme poverty, hunger, infectious disease and social dislocation present many challenges for peacekeepers that will be looked upon with massive expectations to deliver not only safety and protection, but also health and medical care, foodstuffs, safe drinking water, community dispute resolution and much, much more.

Country	Adults & children w AIDS	HIV prev rate in adults aged 15-49 %	Number of AIDS orphans	AIDS deaths in 2003
Angola	240,000	3.9	110,000	21,000
Botswana	350,000	37.3	120,000	33,000
DRC	1,100,000	4.2	770,000	100,000
Lesotho	320,000	28.9	100,000	29,000
Madagascar	140,000	1.7	30,000	7,500
Malawi	900,000	14.2	500,000	84,000
Mozambique	1,300,000	12.2	470,000	110,000
Namibia	210,000	21.3	57,000	16,000
South Africa	5,300,000	21.5	1,100,000	370,000
Swaziland	220,000	38.8	65,000	17,000
Tanzania	1,600,000	8.8	980,000	160,000
Zambia	920,000	16.5	630,000	89,000
Zimbabwe	1,800,000	24.6	980,000	170,000
<b>Total/Average</b>	<b>14,400,000</b>	<b>17.9</b>	<b>5,912,000</b>	<b>1,206,500</b>

Table 2: Incidence of HIV/AIDS in SADC member states, 2003<sup>xv</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The introductory section to this paper argued that the nature of war has changed from inter-state to internal conflict and that formal war is seldom declared – and seldom fought. In fact much more has changed. The very nature of security has undergone an extraordinary shift – and armed forces need to be part of that shift if they are to remain relevant to the security challenges of the decades that lie ahead. Future conflict will be driven by the impact of climate change, competition for resources, the marginalization of the majority world from the centre of politics and global militarization around areas such as the Middle East. Less so than in any period before, the military and the application of force is deeply political. In his classical, if misleading study on the soldier and the state, Samuel Huntington makes a sharp and clear distinction (in his preferred model of objective control of the military) on the relationship between civilian control of the military, where political decisions are made on the purpose for the application of military capacity, and the military domain where the application of force is discussed and finalized. Civilian control and the development of strategy is, in effect, a dialogue – not a series of instructions. It consists of discussions on the capabilities and use of armed forces within which agreement is reached on who, what and where – and subsequent to which the execution is characterized by consistent and ongoing dialogue, correction and adjustment. South Africa evidences little of this. Such security strategy and



policy, to the extent that it exists, is generally hidden from public view. Our security is presented to us through announcements about decisions, without debate, consultation or any of the benefits that should accompany public accountability in a democracy. There was a brief moment, immediately after the 1994 elections, when many of us thought that transparency in security policy making had arrived. Alas, today there is less difference to the previous period than we had hoped for. That is a tragedy. It is in this context that I welcome this opportunity to engage with the SA Army at this seminar and hope that this will contribute to the opening up of the defence debate in South Africa.

The future tasks of the SANDF are not going to be participation in conventional conflict in the classical sense of the word. I believe that the nature of operations are going to be low intensity and of a counter-insurgency type within a multilateral environment where South Africa is often going to serve as a lead or framework nation. Sometimes the intensity of combat may escalate to limited conventional warfare, conducted at the end of a very long logistical line where extreme levels of self-sufficiency will be required.

According to the South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) *“The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force”*.<sup>xvi</sup> The Constitution does not name any secondary objects or functions of the Defence Force but, through Schedule 6; Transitional Arrangements; Section 24 (1) provides for the retention of Section 227 (1) of the Interim Constitution Act No. 200 of 1993 which provides that *“The Defence Force may be employed;*

- a. *for service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;*
- b. *for service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states;*
- c. *for service in the preservation of life, health or property;*
- d. *for service in the provision or maintenance of essential services;*
- e. *for service in upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in law where the Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own; and*
- f. *for service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment”*.<sup>xvii</sup>

In a submission that the Institute made to Portfolio Committee on Defence in 2004, we argued that the SANDF force design for the primary function only, combined with an incorrect interpretation of the primary function, skewed the SANDF force design. The use of military force is often simplistically perceived as a last resort to be exercised when no other peaceful and reasonable option remains. That may have been the situation some decades ago. The reality is more complex and the clear distinction between war and peace is long gone. The threat of conventional war has

declined for South Africa. We are not threatened by another country in the region and our strategic orientation is that of collaboration rather than confrontation. South Africa is located outside the strategic concerns of the major powers and is regionally dominant in every aspect, economically and militarily. I have often argued, and continue to believe, that the core orientation of the SANDF should be to serve as “a force for crisis prevention and crisis intervention”, not conventional defence. Given the size and strength of South Africa within a regional context, the SANDF is able to provide for its primary function – defence of the territorial integrity of the country - by the collateral utility from force design and preparation for its secondary functions. The fundamental dilemma no longer lies with the use of **force**, but rather with the use of the **forces**.

This view must not be misconstrued as one that undermines the requirement for the maintenance of core conventional capabilities, reflected in much of the current public documents that have guided post-apartheid defence development. It is a call for the expansion of significant capabilities as part of a much larger standing force and a reversal of trends that see the SA Army too dependent upon part-time forces for its expeditionary functions.

For the SA Army the challenge is to make the transition to focus on your actual tasks and not to engage in wishful thinking to fight the wars of a previous generation. My paper has tried to argue that the demand on and tempo of operations will not decrease, but increase as the requirement for participation in operations under a UN or AU mandate remain high, and the expectations upon South Africa massive. The future for which the SA Army should prepare in 2020 is participation in peacekeeping missions of various types (ASF, UN, etc), the provision of disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and ability to project force beyond its borders when required. Traditional Chapter 6 mandates are something of the past and generally the SA Army would have to operate within an environment that includes the requirement to forcefully protect civilians, disarm combatants, act against smaller groups of insurgents and bandits, help with the organization and conduct of elections, provide security during these elections, protect key political leaders, support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration projects, train the armed forces of a new government, assist with smaller reconstruction projects, provide basic services, etc.

Although this is not a theme that I have developed in my paper, I would also caution against preparing for or trying to become a partner in the US's war on terror. Declaring war on a strategy instead of an enemy has never been advisable. International terrorism is a threat to Africa, but it is arguably the way in which the US has chosen to respond to the attacks on it rather than the threat itself that is the cause of the extent of stark divisions and the rise in terrorism that we see today. This was not the case when the international community supported coalition engagement in Afghanistan leading to the overthrow of the Taliban - until the US decided to invade Iraq on a pretext. Terrorism is one of many concerns that confront Africa but it is a low priority in most of sub-Saharan Africa. As such it

necessarily should compete for attention and resources within the criminal justice system.

The key uncertainty facing the SA Army is not the external operational environment, but internal, relating to developments inside South Africa. The current trend towards the removal of the military from internal and border duties will, in the near future, be reversed if there is no dramatic change in the domestic situation as regards crime and social disorder. Considerable research by the Institute has indicated the deterioration of border security in South Africa as the role of the SA Army has been scaled down, and the gap in rural safety and security left by the effective dissolution of commando system. With the world cup scheduled for 2010 the demand for practical solutions will inevitably focus the minds of those in the Union Buildings and in Parliament, whilst the clamour of the general public will increasingly demand a domestic return for their investment in the Department of Defence.<sup>xviii</sup>

Table 1: Characteristics of Key Countries at Risk<sup>xix</sup>

Country	HDI ranking	Population stats 2005			Gross Nat Income	Life expec at birth		Poverty	Adult Liter	HIV
		Million	People per sq km	% Age 0-14	\$ per capita	% Male	% Female	% pop below \$1 a day	% older than 15	HIV prev % pop 15-49
Guinea-Bissau	172	1.5*		47.2*				na	39.6*	na
CAR	171	3.9*	na	43.2*		na	na	66.6	49	10.7
Burundi	169	8	294	45	100	43	45	54.6	59	3.3
DRC	167	58	25	47	120	43	45		67	3.2
Cote d Ivoire	163	18	57	42	840	45	47	<2	49	7.1
Eritrea	161	4	44	45	220	53	56	na	56.7*	2.4
Nigeria	158	132	144	44	560	43	44	70.8	66.8*	3.9
Guinea	156	9	38	44	370	54	54	na	29	1.5
Zimbabwe	145	13	34	40	340	38	37	56.1	90*	20.1
Togo	143	6	113	43	350	53	57	na	53	3.2
Republic of Congo	142	4	12	47	950	51	54	na	82.8	5.3
Sudan	141	36	15	39	640	55	58	na	61	1.6
Comoros	132	0.8*	na	42.4*	na	na	na	na	56.3*	na
Liberia	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Somalia	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
South Africa	120	45	37	33	4,960	44	45	10.7	82	18.8
sub-Sah Af		741	31	44	745	46	47	na	na	6.2

\* for 2003

Table 3: Africa in the Human Development Index

HDI rank	Country	Life expectancy at birth (years) 2003	Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and above) 2003 <sup>b</sup>	Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools (%) 2002/03 <sup>c</sup>	GDP per capita (PPP US\$) 2003
51	Seychelles	72.70	91.90	<b>85</b>	10,232
58	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	73.60	81.70	96	..
65	Mauritius	72.20	84.30	71	11,287
103	Algeria	71.10	69.80	74	6,107
119	Egypt	69.80	55.60	74	3,950
120	South Africa	48.40	82.40	78	10,346
121	Equatorial Guinea	43.30	84.20	65	19,780
123	Gabon	54.50	71.00	74	6,397
124	Morocco	69.70	50.70	58	4,004
125	Namibia	48.30	85.00	71	6,180
126	São Tomé and Príncipe	63.00	83.10	62	1,231
131	Botswana	36.30	78.90	70	8,714
132	Comoros	63.20	56.20	47	1,714
138	Ghana	56.80	54.10	46	2,238
141	Sudan	56.40	59.00	38	1,910
142	Congo	52.00	82.80	47	965
143	Togo	54.30	53.00	66	1,696
144	Uganda	47.30	68.90	74	1,457
145	Zimbabwe	36.90	90.00	55	2,443
146	Madagascar	55.40	70.60	51	809
147	Swaziland	32.50	79.20	60	4,726
148	Cameroon	45.80	67.90	55	2,118
149	Lesotho	36.30	81.40	66	2,561
150	Djibouti	52.80	65.50	24	2,086
152	Mauritania	52.70	51.20	45	1,766
154	Kenya	47.20	73.60	52	1,037
155	Gambia	55.70	37.80	48	1,859
156	Guinea	53.70	41.00	41	2,097
157	Senegal	55.70	39.30	40	1,648
158	Nigeria	43.40	66.80	64	1,050
159	Rwanda	43.90	64.00	55	1,268
160	Angola	40.80	66.80	30	2,344
161	Eritrea	53.80	56.70	35	849
162	Benin	54.00	33.60	55	1,115
163	Côte d'Ivoire	45.90	48.10	42	1,476
164	Tanzania, U. Rep. of	46.00	69.40	41	621
165	Malawi	39.70	64.10	72	605
166	Zambia	37.50	67.90	48	877

167	Congo, Dem. Rep. of the	43.10	65.30	28	697
168	Mozambique	41.90	46.50	43	1,117
169	Burundi	43.60	58.90	35	648
170	Ethiopia	47.60	41.50	36	711
171	Central African Republic	39.30	48.60	31	1,089
172	Guinea-Bissau	44.70	39.60	37	711
173	Chad	43.60	25.50	38	1,210
174	Mali	47.90	19.00	32	994
175	Burkina Faso	47.50	12.80	24	1,174
176	Sierra Leone	40.80	29.60	45	548
177	Niger	44.40	14.40	21	835

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<sup>i</sup> War and Peace in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Human Security Report 2005, The University of British Columbia, Canada, Oxford University Press, 2005, p 15

<sup>ii</sup> Ibid, p 4

<sup>iii</sup> Ibid

<sup>iv</sup> Ibid, p 17

<sup>v</sup> Ibid, p 16

<sup>vi</sup> Ibid, p 17

<sup>vii</sup> <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators.cfm?x=1&y=1&z=1>, accessed on 1 October 2006.

<sup>viii</sup> Ferguson, p 36

<sup>ix</sup> Ferguson, p 40

<sup>x</sup> To the African Ministerial Conference on Housing and Urban Development, which was held in February 2005 in Durban (South Africa).

<sup>xi</sup> IRIN, Lagos, the mega-city of slums, 5 September 2006

<sup>xii</sup> Oxford Research Group, Global Responses to Global Threats – sustainable security for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Briefing paper, Oxford, June 2006, p 17

<sup>xiii</sup> Bankole et al 2004

<sup>xiv</sup> UN initiative speeds up service delivery, 9 October 2006

<sup>xv</sup> Pieter Fourie, Three AIDS scenarios in Africa, and the politics of hope, in Global Dialogue, vol 11, no 1, May 2006, p 14. Data from UNAIDS

<sup>xvi</sup> Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Act No. 108 of 1996, Chapter 11, Section 200 (2)

<sup>xvii</sup> Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, Act No. 200 of 1993, Chapter 14, Section 227 (1)

<sup>xviii</sup> According to the SAPS annual report for 2005/6, one of the four key capacity needs for 2005/06 is to take over border-line policing and 1 000 entry level personnel has been allocated to Borderline Law Enforcement in the provinces. SAPS have taken over the

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border functions of the SANDF at a number of bases, including Swartwater, Rooibokkraal and Pontdrif in Limpopo. Ladybrand and Fouriesburg in the Free State are still being jointly policed with the SANDF. Additional bases at borders were established in the Northern Cape (5), North West (4), Eastern Cape (3) and Kwazulu-Natal (1). The Western Cape sea border control was launched in January 2006. Air border control was established in December 2005, with Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

<sup>xix</sup> Extracted from the World Development Report 2007 – Development and the Next Generation, The World Bank, Washington, CS, 2006, Table 1 Key Indicators of development, Table 2 Poverty, Table 3 Millennium Development Goals: eradication of poverty and improving lives, pp 288- 293. Augmented with figures from the UNDP statistics database at [hdr.undp.org/statistics/data](http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data) accessed on 1 October 2006.