


WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER



THIS ISSUE'S THEME:
THINK-THANKS
AND SECURITY POLICY

The European Policy
on the Management
of Migration Flows
and Serbia role's within it

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Belgrade

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The **Centre for Civil-Military Relations** promotes the open and responsible participation of civil society towards increasing the security of both citizens and the state, based on the principles of modern democracy, The Centre also endeavours to support security cooperation with neighbouring countries and Serbia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

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Editor's Note



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Independent research of security policies outside of the governmental institutions is underdeveloped in the countries of Western Balkans. The main reason for that is the legacy of communism. During that time, the research of different security policy options was primarily conducted at research institutes and academic departments affiliated with military and intelligence services or Ministry of Defence. The majority of educational programmes on security related topics were conducted within a closed school subsystem of the governmental security institutions, and independent research and advocacy of reforms were discouraged. This is one of the reasons why new political elites, civil society and the media lack expertise in security issues.

The conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia during the 1990s provided substantial material for research on security policies, but the climate of nationalism and illiberal democracy was not conducive for critical inquires. Courageous journalists and peace activists were initiators of the first research on the role of security forces in war conflicts. This activist-driven research contributed to the process of democratization but it did not provide concrete political solutions for the period after the conflict and during the beginning of the democratization process.

Reforms of the security sector and integration into international security organizations, which were initiated during the period of transition, increased the demand for independent security policy research and development of alternative suggestions for a practical policy. In almost all Western Balkan countries, civil society organizations (CSOs) that have a special focus on security research were established. Some of the existing organizations identify themselves as independent research centres (*think-tanks*) regardless of their formal or legal status (CSOs, public or private institutes, academic departments, etc.). Peter M. Haas had defined *think-tanks* as “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area” (Haas, 1992).¹

The idea for this issue arose during the conference on the role of independent research centres (IRC) in the security policy, which was organized by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations in November 2008. During that conference, we realized that it was still early to analyze the influence of IRC on the security policy in the region, because the number of organizations whose primary activity was research within this field was very small. We have therefore decided to analyze the scope of a wider involvement of the civil society organizations in the creation, implementation and evaluation of the security policies. Papers based on the results of empirical research

¹ Haas, P. M. (1992), Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, *International Organizations*, 46 (1).

conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia deal with this subject. The review of the new handbook on public oversight over the security sector offers models for inclusion of CSOs in the oversight over the security sector, as well as a large number of illustrative examples from the practice of those organizations from different parts of the world. In their papers, Goran Buldioski and Židas Daskalovski explain the *think-thank* concept or the IRC concept to the readers. They analyze the development of IRCs in the Western Balkans and the characteristics that separate them from similar organizations from other parts of the Europe. Both authors critically examine the biggest challenges that organizations that want to work as IRC encounter, and they suggest the ways in which they can work more effectively. Buldioski's recommendations are first and foremost intended for the potential donors, while Daskalovski's recommendations are aimed at organizations from the region. Review paper on IRCs in the USA introduces us to the developed tradition of inclusion of independent centres of knowledge in the creation of the security policy of this superpower. Although presented experiences cannot be directly compared to the social context of the Western Balkans, this paper still indicates the common challenges that lie before all IRCs: how to remain independent from the political decision-makers, and yet influence the contents of the policies and secure continuous funding.

Apart from this issue's topic, we have also tried to critically follow current developments regarding security in the Western Balkans. In this issue, we have published an informative review of the National Security Strategy of Montenegro, which primarily focuses on approaching of Montenegro to the NATO Alliance. Biljana Đorđević examines the concept of security and human rights in the EU by analyzing the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, as well as the so-called Return Directive. Those two documents are important for Serbia as well, because what is imminent is the adoption of the National Strategy for Migration Management and the adjustment of that strategy to the current European priorities in order to fulfil the conditions set forth in the White Schengen Road Map. In conclusion, we have published a review of the book on European Defence and Security Policy, in which the scope of EU peace operations in Bosnia and Macedonia has been analyzed.

Sonja Stojanović



Civil society organizations interested in security in Serbia

Zorana Atanasović

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Summary

This text examines the role and participation of civil society organizations as actors in the security sector in Serbia. The text begins with an overview of the development of civil society organizations interested in security issues. The results of the research conducted by the CCMR, with the goal to assess those organizations' capacity for competent participation as actors in the security sector on the basis of the perception of the organizations themselves, are also presented here. The biggest successes and the most important challenges set before civil society organizations are also presented here. At the end, the recommendations for the governmental institutions and civil society organizations that can contribute to a better cooperation between those actors have been formulated.

Key words: *civil society organizations, security sector reform, Serbia*

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Civil society organizations constitute an important group of actors in the security sector because of the necessity for their contribution to the good and responsible governance of the security sector. The effective enforcement of governmental authority in the fields of economics, politics and administration is only a first step towards good and responsible governance; good governance goes beyond the monopoly of governmental institutions by including non-governmental actors, the private sector and civil society (Caparini, 2004). Dialogue between the state and its citizens is of great importance because it strengthens public trust in governmental institutions. In this paper we shall try to

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draw up a profile of the civil society organizations in Serbia which are interested in security. For that purpose we shall offer answers to the following questions: when did civil society become interested in security issues, what characterizes civil society organizations interested in security, and what are the biggest successes and the biggest challenges set before those organizations. The findings presented stem from the research conducted by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations under the project 'Mapping and Monitoring of the Security Sector in Serbia' (2007-2009) and 'Communicating Security: Increasing Citizens' Participation in the Security Policy' (2007-2008).

When did civil society organizations in Serbia become interested in security?

The first instances of civil society formation in Serbia after the fall of communism were connected to security issues. Organization into civil initiatives was an expression of protest against war and of disagreement with government policy. The first initiatives were initially informal, and the first organizations developed on their bases (e.g. Peace Action Subotica was founded in 1990, Centre for Anti-War Action and Peace Movement Vojvodina in 1991, Peace and Crisis Management Foundation in 1992). The organizations from that period are significant because they introduced the topics of war, violence and militarization of society into the public debate, developed an autonomous sphere for public debate and for the expression of civil disobedience that was in opposition to government policy, and raised awareness about the importance of citizens' participation in the process of solving issues of relevance to them (Paunović, 2008). The prevailing opinion among the political elite of the time was that civil society organizations should not be involved in the creation or implementation of security policy, and their right to conduct the monitoring of governmental actors' actions in the security sector was not even discussed.

During the second half of the 1990s, the first civil society organizations specializing in security issues were established. They introduced the concepts of protection of human and minority rights, and peaceful conflict resolution into the political discourse. Issues that were almost exclusively under the remit of the security sector institutions until then, such as civil democratic control of armed forces, civil-military relations and civil-police relations, have, thanks to civil society organizations, become the subject of general public debate. The



main change since the removal of the regime in 2000 is that civil society organizations have started to build partnerships with governmental institutions in the security sector.

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The Roles of CSOs in security sector reform

Civil society organizations in Serbia perform several functions in the security sector:

- Their first role is to support governmental institutions in developing and implementing security sector reform, which includes participating in the creation of constitutional-system and strategic-conceptual documents, and in the public debates around those documents, as well as organizing research and educational activities.
- Their second role is the public monitoring of security policy implementation, i.e. following developments in the security sector and participating in public debates on key activities in the security sector.
- Their third and equally important role is to carry out public advocacy for security sector reform; this has characterized the work of civil society organizations since their inception to this date.

Profile of civil society organizations interested in security

According to some estimates there are over 30 000 registered civil society organizations in Serbia (Paunović, 2007). The majority of those organizations are not active. According to the Non-Governmental Organizations Directory of the Centre for the Development of the Non-Profit Sector, which is considered to be the most representative database of CSOs because organizations voluntarily register in that directory, at present there are 2041 registered CSOs (more details: www.crnps.org). Of that number, 286 organizations mention subjects connected to the concept of human security in their name or mission, including organizations which focus on the protection of human rights. This number does not include organizations which deal with socio-humanitarian problems; there are 586 such organizations and some of them are trying to respond to those security challenges through their activities. On the basis of a detailed analysis of the missions and activities descriptions, the researchers at

the Centre for Civil-Military Relations have identified 44 organizations which deal with security. A questionnaire was sent to those organizations in late 2007 for the purpose of gathering information about interests, activities, challenges and successes in their work with security issues. After analysis of the questionnaire, representatives of several organizations were interviewed in mid 2008. The results of the research are based on the self-assessment of the organizations which participated in the research.

Almost a third of the total number of organizations, i.e. 13 of them, answered that security was their main field of interest. More than a half (out of a total of 23 organizations) stated that security was one of their fields of interest, i.e. one of the constant elements in their work. Eight organizations which occasionally conduct activities that involve security issues also participated in the research. The organizations cover a variety of security issues. The most represented activities are those in the field of human rights (86%) and minority rights (61%), which indicates that a large number of organizations were founded owing to citizens' need to organize themselves in order to improve the protection of their rights. More than one third of those organizations are interested in traditional security issues such as monitoring the work of the military (36%), police (41%) and security-intelligence community (34%), which constitutes a good starting point for the development of monitoring capacities. Those organizations are also interested in specialized matters such as organized crime (36%), energy security (16%), terrorism (23%) and security cooperation and integration (18%), and that is a good starting point for further specialization.

	f	%
Security is the main focus of activities	13	29,5
Security is one of the fields of interest	23	52,5
Security – ad hoc interest	8	18,2
Total	44	100

How big a place does security have in the activities of civil society organizations?

The structure of the employees in CSOs interested in security constitutes a good starting point for the competent participation of civil society organizations as actors in the security sector. The majority of employees of civil society organizations are highly educated associates, whose only employment is working for a particular civil society



organization; teachers and/or researchers employed at universities or institutes constitute more than a half of the external associates of those organizations. Five organizations have former members of the armed forces as associates; their “insider” understanding of the security sector additionally contributes to the development of those organizations’ competencies.

The majority of those organizations have realized the importance of networking, and consequently as much as 80% of the organizations that were contacted are members of various, mostly informal, networks. Networks and coalitions are most often used for public representation activities. Networking is probably also the result of prevailing trends, since donors support joint activities. Joint projects in which organizations equally share responsibilities are still rare, which indicates that trust between the organizations is still not fully developed.

Civil society organizations have not achieved financial sustainability for their activities - they remain mainly dependent on foreign funding sources. The financial resources of the institutions of the Republic of Serbia are used by less than a third of all organizations. Exclusive reliance on foreign donors’ resources can influence organizations to adjust their activities to externally imposed priorities, which might lead the domestic public into seeing them as “foreign mercenaries” and fighters for causes which are counter to national interests. The majority of organizations which participated in the research stated that they had neither a strategic development plan nor a business plan for the following five years, which means that the financial sources, and probably the issues also, that the organizations work with are conditioned by situation. That represents a key weakness of those organizations which are interested in security because continuity in work is essential for them to gain the trust of the security sector.

What are the biggest successes of civil society organizations in Serbia?

During the 1990s civil society organizations developed and raised awareness about the importance of citizens’ and their organizations’ participation in debates on issues of social importance (Paunović, 2008). They played an important role in the fight for democratic change. Apart from motivating citizens (especially the youth) to vote in the elections, a partnership was also established with the political parties which fought for political change and which constituted the

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opposition at that time. During more than a decade of their existence, these organizations have developed expertise in several fields of activity.

Informal education is a field in which civil society organizations have developed numerous programmes that offer citizens, the media, but also the governmental sector representatives, the possibility to gain additional knowledge about security sector reform. Since 2000, several organizations have set up postgraduate education programmes at Belgrade University¹. These organizations have developed independent research. An example of academic research is the research 'Mapping and Monitoring of the Security Sector' which was conducted in 2007-2008 by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations with the aim of developing methods and instruments for the assessment and monitoring of the level and dynamics of the security sector reform and its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Out of all the research projects aiming to improve public policy, a good example is the research conducted by the European Movement in Serbia and KIPRED in 2005 – 'A Joint European Vision: Free Movement of Goods and People in Kosovo and Serbia', in order to encourage debate and serve as a basis for a joint vision of the ways to meet European standards and achieve integration of the region (more details: www.emins.org). The Victimology Society of Serbia publishes an academic magazine on victimization (suffering), human rights and gender – *Temida*, which is issued on a regular basis - four times a year (more details: www.vds.org.yu/temida.htm).

In Serbia, there are several examples of good practice in terms of civil society organization participation in the drafting of legislative solutions and other documents. Civil society organizations have tried to fill the legal gaps in the normative organization of the security sector by drafting a model law. For example, civil society organizations have identified that the private provision of physical-technical security in Serbia is an area that is not regulated by law and that there is a need to pass a law to regulate the activities of companies that offer such services in Serbia. Two organizations have contributed to the realization of that goal – the Centre for Civil-Military Relations from Belgrade drafted a Model law on the provision of private security-related activities in 2005 (more details: www.ccmr-bg.org), and the League of Experts from Belgrade drafted a Model law on performing private security-related activities aimed at the protection of persons and property and detective activity in 2006 (more details: www.lex.org.yu). The expertise of civil society organizations in Serbia is also expressed through their active participation in public debates

¹ For example, the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights organized a specialist course of studies on Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in cooperation with the Faculty of Political Sciences at Belgrade University which started in 2005/2006, and the specialist course on Global and National Security at the same faculty was organized by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations in 2004/2005 and 2005/2006, and associates of the Centre are involved in planning and delivering the postgraduate and master programme of study.



on existing legislative solutions. For example, on the initiative of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, the Law on the Armed Forces of the Republic of Serbia was amended (passed in December 2007) so that, apart from the National Assembly, the Ombudsman and other governmental bodies according to their authority, citizens and the public could participate in the civilian democratic control of Serbia's Armed Forces (Popović, 2008).

Systematic public oversight of the security sector in Serbia is still underdeveloped for two reasons. The first reason is that none of the civil society organizations have the capacity to independently monitor the entire security sector. An example of public oversight of the security policy implementation in a wider sense is the report by the Centre for Politics and Euro-Atlantic Partnership from 2007 – “Overview of the state of human security in Serbia” (more details: www.atlantic-partnership.org.yu). Another example is the monitoring of the implementation of the National Strategy for Combating Corruption in the work of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia conducted by the organization Transparency Serbia (more details: www.transparentnost.org.yu).

The organizations have achieved their biggest success by publicly advocating for individual reforms in the security sector. One of the examples is successful advocating of CSOs for the recognition of conscientious objection. Following public pressure on governmental institutions, the right to conscientious objection was regulated by law (actually, only by a by-law) by passing the Act on military service obligation on August 27, 2003. With that Act (Act on military service obligation “Službeni list SRJ”, No. 36/94 and 7/98 and “Službeni list SRJ”, No. 37/2003 and 4/2005), the category of civil service was officially introduced, and representatives from the European Bureau for Conscientious Objection (EBCO) Balkan from Belgrade and civil society organizations participated in drafting that document. In the field of public advocacy since 2000, there have been examples of good cooperation between civil society organizations and the security sector, such as the educational promotional campaign titled “November – the Month of Security”, which was organized in November 2007 by the Zaječar Initiative for cooperation with the Zaječar Police Administration. Coalitions of organizations are common in the field of public advocacy, and a successful example is the Coalition for Free Access to Information which was established in 2005 due to the need to, through joint action, pressure the government in Serbia – the Government and the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, to pass a Law on free access to information as soon as possible. The fol-

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lowing organizations are members of the coalition: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Centre for Anti-War Action, Centre for Advanced Legal Studies, Fund for an Open Society, Civic Initiatives, Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights – Yucom, Transparency Serbia; other organizations from cities all across Serbia have gradually been joining them. After the implementation of the Act CSOs have contributed to a more responsible enforcement of the Law since its adoption and to the recognition of this topic's importance for the democratic process by conducting the following activities: drafting a Guide on Law Enforcement (the Guide can be downloaded at: http://www.spikoalija.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24&Itemid=48), drafting recommendations for amendment of the existing law, drafting a proposition of law on the classification of information and the protection of personal data which would make the existing law more efficient, and a proposition for public policy on improving of the availability of information, organizing discussions and informing the general public about that subject. Joint action is still very important for the success of such activities. An example is a joint initiative of 29 civil society organizations and members of the academic community who in late 2008 requested the Ministry of Defence prolong the pre-set timeframe for the public consultation on the drafts of the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy from 15 days, which would not have been enough time for comments, to 45 days. The joint action of a large number of actors was crucial for the Ministry's decision to accept that initiative.

What are the biggest challenges that lie before civil society organizations in Serbia?

The challenges which civil society organizations face today in Serbia arise from the environment in which the organizations work, but also from the characteristics of the organizations themselves.

The challenges, which derive from the environment in which the organizations operate, are a poor legal framework to regulate the work of civil society organizations, the poor integration of civil society organizations into the security sector and the insufficient legitimacy of those organizations.

Firstly, the legal framework that regulates the work of civil society organizations is inadequate, obsolete and not linked to the current Constitution, nor to the legislation that applies to business in general. The last law regarding that field was passed in 1982 and it was the



Law on Civil Organizations and Citizens' Associations. Since 2000, several draft laws have been formulated which would provide adequate regulation for the work of those organizations; the latest one was the Proposition of Law on Associations, drafted by the Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self-Government and prepared in cooperation with civil society organizations, which was adopted by the Government of the Republic of Serbia at the session held on May 28, 2009. That proposition of law should be on the agenda of a session of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia scheduled for June 2009. That draft has yet to undergo the parliamentary procedure. Legal regulations on the funding and taxation of civil society organizations in Serbia also apply to all other legal persons. Legislative solutions by which investment in civil society organizations' projects would be stimulated and regulated do not exist.

Secondly, the laws that regulate the security sector do not bind the armed forces to take into account recommendations from civil society when creating and implementing security policy, it is only optional. In interviews with the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia we learned that there are no internal regulations that bind representatives of the Ministry of Defence to consult civil society organizations in the process of developing new policies and that cooperation usually depends only on informal contacts. Institutionalized cooperation through permanent bodies that bring together representatives of civil society organizations and the government is not in place in all governmental institutions across the security sector. The impetus and initiatives for cooperation almost always come from civil society organizations and their fate usually depends on the current political situation. The inclusion of citizens in the implementation of security policy and monitoring of the security sector is stipulated by the Law on Armed Forces (Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije 116–07, article 29), Law on Defence (Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije 116–07, član 76) and Law on Police (Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, 101–2005, članovi 6, 180 i 188), but even then their provisions are only basic.

Thirdly, the trust of the citizens of Serbia in civil society organizations is very low. Levels of mistrust were greater than those of trust across all periods, as revealed in research conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences in 2009 (For more information visit the website of the Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research : www.cpijm.org.yu). Citizens do not have a clear picture of what civil society organizations actually do, while their attitudes towards those organizations are ambivalent (Javno mnjenje o organizacijama civilnog društva u Srbiji (Public opinion on civil society organizations

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in Serbia), Beograd: Smart kolektiv, Strateški marketing, 2006, <http://www.smartkolektiv.org>). Hardly more than half of all interviewed citizens (54%) knew what the term civil society organization refers to, while almost half of all interviewed citizens (47%) had negative associations with that term. According to this research, citizens believe that civil society organizations do not have an important influence over society and they do not recognize them as actors in the security sector, which is also indicated by the findings that citizens recognize only human rights and aid to vulnerable groups as areas belonging to the civil society organizations' field of work.




Chart: trust in civil society organizations

These organizations' characteristics also represent a source of challenges to the success of their work. In interviews with the representatives of civil society organizations interested in security, the interviewees stated that there were not enough civil society organizations in Serbia that are interested in relevant security issues, especially on the local level. As a result, the prevailing opinion is that the "Belgradization" and "Novi Sad-ization" of security issues prevails in Serbia, i.e. that the activities of civil society only take place in the main centres. Instead of that, initiatives arising from local communities must be encouraged and supported.

With regard to these organizations' activities, monitoring of the security sector remains underdeveloped. Some civil society organizations specialize in monitoring specific areas. For example, the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights has been publishing a synthetic report on the observance of human rights since 1997, and several organizations have been following the war crimes trials², but what is missing is the consistent monitoring of the security sector as a whole.

Civil society organizations are not transparent enough. It might be that a large number of civil society organizations in Serbia have web-

² Monitoring of the trials is conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (for more information visit: http://bgcentar.place-bo.co.yu/page_sr?tag=47@sr), Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights (for more information visit: <http://www.yucom.org.yu>) and Humanitarian Law Centre (for more information visit: <http://www.hlc-rdc.org/>)



sites where information on their mission, authorities and field of work is available. However, only two of the 44 organizations that were included in our research actually have websites. The organizations might thus be open about their activities, but there is still a definite lack of will to be publicly transparent about their funding sources, so information on the organizations' budgets is most often not publicly available.

Recommendations

On the basis of the research findings, recommendations can be made both to governmental institutions and civil society organizations.

It is necessary to pass the Law on Associations in order to regulate the work of civil society organizations by law. Cooperation between the governmental institutions and civil society should be additionally supported by new laws, especially by by-laws and the necessary strategic documents. Governmental bodies in the security sector should accept the reality that civil society organizations are important actors in the security sector in democratic societies and that they have the legitimacy to participate in the development of security policy. Civil society organizations should take into account that the security sector, due to its organization, needs time to adjust to the demands set by civil society. Regarding financial activities, it is necessary to introduce measures to facilitate non-profit activities for civil society organizations.

Civil society organizations should develop additional expertise in security sector monitoring; by doing so, they will also increase the credibility of their activities. Apart from legal obligations that bind these organizations to be responsible for their activities, good practice - which should be established by the organizations themselves - should include transparency towards the general public. Information on their activities and funding sources would surely contribute to the strengthening of trust in civil society organizations and it would certainly demystify the work of those organizations. These organizations should develop strategies to become self-sustainable by developing forward-looking plans for their activities and expenses. Apart from increasing their effectiveness, this would also send out the message to governmental institutions that they are a credible partner that can be relied on in the long run. This is particularly important for organizations interested in security since their activities are often related to sensitive issues.

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8. Zakon o odbrani, *Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije* 116–07, član 76.
9. Zakon o odbrani, *Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije*, 101–2005, članovi 6, 180 i 188.

Useful links:

1. Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, www.ccmr-bg.org
2. Centar za razvoj neprofitnog sektora, www.crnps.org.rs
3. Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno mnjenje, www.cpijm.org.yu
4. Centar za politiku i evroatlantsko partnerstvo, www.atlanticpartnership.org.rs
5. Evropski pokret u Srbiji, www.emins.org
6. Koalicija za slobodu pristupa informacijama, www.spikoalicija.org
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Translated from Serbian to English language by Teodora Borić



Supporting Civil Society Engagement in the State Ministries of Justice and Security, Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Category: Review article

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Abstract

In 2008 the United Kingdom's Conflict Prevention Pool initiated a project to support the engagement of civil society organisations (CSOs) in the State Ministry of Justice (BiH MoJ) and the State Ministry of Security (BiH MoS) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). This article presents the results of the assessment done within this project. Research was undertaken in the first phase of the project to provide a baseline for the current state of engagement between relevant actors and then a capability assessment was developed to identify key factors that shape successful engagement. The project acknowledges that engagement of CSOs in the state level security and justice sectors in BiH has been limited to date but that the outlook for increased engagement is positive.

Key Words: Bosnia and Herzegovina, civil society, justice, security, public administration

Introduction

In the justice and security sectors in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), engagement of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) is currently limited and sporadic. The Ministry of Justice (BiH MoJ) and the Ministry of Security (BiH MoS) at State level are relatively young institutions that are going

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through a process of capability development. Compared with other institutions in their sectors, the BiH MoS and the BiH MoJ are still relatively weak. Neither institution has a strong track record in CSO engagement. Furthermore, little is known about the CSOs that operate at the State level in the justice and security fields, or that are active in issues that come under the policy remits of the State Ministries. In this context, the United Kingdom's Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP)¹ contracted Atos Consulting to deliver a project to support the engagement of CSOs in the State Ministries of Justice and Security.

Background to the project

The project goal was to contribute to greater participation of civil society in the development, delivery and accountability of justice and security services in BiH. To that end, the project had three objectives:

- to develop an improved understanding of Civil Society engagement in the justice and security sectors in BiH at the State level;
- to develop a capability building plan for improved engagement in the State Ministries of Justice and Security; and
- to implement pilot engagements in selected areas of the Ministries' responsibilities, working in parallel with Ministry officials and CSOs to achieve incremental and sustainable improvements in the Ministries' capability to engage over the medium term.

This paper reflects knowledge that arose from the first (research) phase of the project. This phase sought to: understand the current state of engagement between civil society and the BiH MoJ and BiH MoS; to identify capability, needs, barriers and opportunities for engagement; and to make suggestions about how to progress engagement between Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the BiH MoJ and MoS. The research phase included desk research, questionnaires with representatives from CSOs, the BiH MoJ and the BiH MoS, and interviews with key stakeholders including international donors and agencies.

¹ The CPP is run jointly by the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Department for International Development (DFID).



Definition of CSOs

The UK's Department for International Development's Practice Paper on Civil Society and Good Governance defines civil society as the "multitude of associations, movements and groups where citizens organise to pursue shared objectives or common interests." These can include: "highly institutionalised groups such as religious organisations, trade unions, business associations, international NGOs, think tanks; local organisations such as community associations, farmers' associations, disabled people's organisations, local sports clubs, cultural groups, business groups, local NGOs, credit societies, community media outlets; and looser forms of association such as social movements, academia, networks, virtual groups, and citizen groups outside national borders such as diaspora (UK Department for International Development, 2007)".

In literature, the term Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) and CSO are often used interchangeably. Yet in the above definition, NGOs are defined as a subset of CSOs. The project applied the definition used above and viewed NGOs as a subset of CSOs on the understanding that the term NGO covers non-profit, voluntary citizens' groups which are organised on a local, national or international level. The project viewed the term CSO as broader and included the media, professional bodies, business organisations and academia as well. It is important to note that in English translations of BiH laws and regulations, the term NGO rather than CSO is often used, for example in the "Agreement on Cooperation between the Council of Ministers of BiH (CoM) and the NGO Sector of BiH" which was signed in 2007. Having reviewed, the legislation, we concluded that the intent of the translation is to cover CSOs rather than merely NGOs, and that the use of the term NGO should be considered to mean CSOs.

Findings

The State of current engagement, barriers and benefits

The first phase of the project found that little engagement has taken place between CSOs and the BiH MoJ and BiH MoS to date. The engagement that has taken place has been spo-

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radic, and often driven by the influence of the international community. Representatives from the BiH MoJ and BiH MoS demonstrate little understanding of CSOs that exist in their areas of responsibility or how to engage with them. Likewise, representatives from CSOs have little understanding of the role and activities of the BiH MoJ/ BiH MoS and have little positive experience in engaging with them.

In comparison with CSO engagement at Entity or local level, the extent of CSO engagement at State level is restricted by the mandates of the BiH MoJ and the BiH MoS. Many of the Ministries' functions are related to sectoral coordination and harmonisation, or focused on international cooperation. As a result, only a limited number of sectors in the BiH MoJ and the BiH MoS will find natural partners in BiH civil society, and vice versa. By their nature, most BiH CSOs focus on issues that are of concern in the everyday life of citizens within BiH. These are more often found within the jurisdiction of the entity, cantonal or municipal governments. For example, there is little scope for the engagement of current BiH CSOs in BiH MoJ's responsibilities for international cooperation.

Despite the restricted scope for engagement, dictated by the mandates of BiH MoJ and BiH MoS, there are nevertheless some existing examples of successful CSO engagement within the ministries. For example, cooperation between the BiH MoS Sector for Immigration and local CSOs started in 2005 when the Sector asked local organisations to assist with accommodating victims of trafficking in safe houses, pending repatriation support. Five organisations responded and a cooperation agreement was signed on 10 March 2005. In 2007, a further cooperation agreement was signed with an additional CSO. These CSOs also provide confidential psycho-social and medical assistance to victims. The Ministry of Security also works with a legal services provider, Vasa Prava, to provide standardised legal aid to those sheltered in safe houses.

Representatives of both the BiH MoJ and the BiH MoS identified that the main benefits of increasing their engagement with CSOs would be better compliance with the EU



Accession agenda and benchmarks, and increased public confidence in the work of their Ministry. The majority of CSOs identified that they, and BiH society in general, would benefit from improving CSO engagement with the BiH MoJ and BiH MoS. Like BiH MoJ and BiH MoS representatives, the most significant benefit of engagement identified by CSO representatives was improved compliance with the EU Accession agenda and benchmarks, a benefit which they reported was likely to be realised in the next five years.

On the other hand, CSO representatives and representatives of both the BiH MoJ and BiH MoS had completely opposing views about the effectiveness of the Ministries' external communication and the ease with which CSOs can obtain information about the Ministries' activities. CSOs identified a major barrier in engaging with the Ministries in the difficulty that they face in getting information about the Ministries' activities. Yet the BiH MoJ and BiH MoS representatives thought that CSOs were easily able to access all the information that they needed about the Ministries' activities through Ministry spokespersons and websites. They perceived their Ministries to be open, accessible and transparent.

There is an obvious need to improve the external communication of the BiH MoJ and MoS. The BiH MoJ launched its new website towards the end of the period in which interviews for the project took place. It represents a significant improvement in the way in which the BiH MoJ presents itself and its activities online, and the BiH MoS could benefit from a similar initiative. However, CSOs also identified other ways of improving the Ministries' external communication, including designating CSO contact points within the Ministries, regular coordination meetings, bulletins and newsletters, quicker responses to information requests, and other types of events.

Representatives from the BiH MoJ, the BiH MoS, and CSOs identified the Ministries' lack of manpower and technical capacity to engage with CSOs as a major blockage. When asked about possible barriers faced by CSOs in engaging with the Ministries, ministry and CSO representatives identified similar issues: lack of manpower, funds and technical capaci-

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ty. Both CSOs and the Ministries need to develop greater technical capacity to engage with each other (which is, of course, closely linked to the awareness raising and external communication issues discussed above). Unfortunately, lack of resources is not easily addressed, although improved management of available funding and appropriate focusing of staff time can mitigate this barrier to some extent.

Key factors that impact upon engagement

Based upon international standards and the findings from phase one, the project went on to develop a capability assessment framework to identified key factors that shape successful CSO engagement with BiH MoJ/BiH MoS. A capability framework was developed for both the BiH MoJ/BiH MoS and for CSO organisations. It was designed as a way of: identifying factors which underpin successful CSO engagement. It also allowed benchmarking of BiH MoJ/MoS and relevant BiH CSOs; and identified areas where capability needs to be strengthened to assist future CSO engagement.

The key factors that shape BiH MoJ/BiH MoS capability for CSO engagement were identified as:

1. Legal and regulatory framework namely: awareness and implementation of the Council of Ministers (CoM)/NGO agreement; awareness and implementation of CoM rules on consultation; and awareness and implementation of the Free Access to Information Act;
2. Operational Activities namely: perception of CSOs; understanding of what CSOs are and identification of relevant CSOs; understanding of the benefits and risks of engaging with CSOs; involvement of CSOs in policy making; involvement of CSOs in monitoring and evaluation; involvement of CSOs in service delivery; the presence of a CSO engagement strategy; and existence of guidelines for CSO engagement;
3. People/Human Capability namely: training in CSO engagement; and staff understanding of responsibilities in CSO engagement;



4. Communications namely: accessibility of information for CSOs.

The key factors that shape CSO capability for engagement with BiH MoJ/BiH MoS were identified as:

1. Mission and Strategy namely: wide internal understanding of organisational Mission; strategic direction; and coherence of programmes and services;
2. Operational Framework namely: funding; communication with government; representation; commitment to engage with government;
3. People/Human Capability namely: effective leadership; staff capability;
4. Governance and Coordination namely: accountability; alliances and networks; and identification of common areas of interest with government.

In addition to using the capability assessment framework to determine the current level of BiH MoJ and BiH MoS capability for CSO engagement, the capability assessment framework can be used in the future as:

- a diagnostic tool that allows the BiH MoJ/BiH MoS to re-assess its capability in CSO engagement perhaps in 18 months or two years after the initial assessment;
- a planning tool that provides senior management with an understanding of what the priorities are for advancing CSO engagement;
- a capability development tool that allows providers of technical assistance or training to determine the priorities for capability development;
- a monitoring and evaluation tool that allows the BiH MoJ/BiH MoS or providers of technical assistance to assess progress in building capability in CSO engagement.

Recommendations to increase future engagement between CSOs and BiH MoJ/BiH MoS

In order to advance CSO engagement with BiH MoJ and BiH MoS, there is a need to:

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- **Build awareness of each other.** Currently, the CSOs which operate in the security and justice sectors have very little understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the BiH MoJ or MoS. Likewise, BiH MoJ and MoS generally have little knowledge of the CSOs operating in their sectors, what these CSOs do, or how these CSOs could contribute to the work of the BiH MoJ or the BiH MoS. There is a need to improve the understanding that CSOs and BiH MoJ/BiH MoS have of each other.
- **Identify areas of common interest.** Once CSOs and BiH MoJ and BiH MoS have a better understanding of each others roles and responsibilities it is essential for engagement that they are able to identify areas of common interest.
- **Identify and fill the gaps in CSO presence.** Currently very few CSOs operate in the core areas of interest of the BiH MoJ or BiH MoS. For effective CSO engagement to take place, BiH MoJ and BiH MoS must have relevant CSOs to engage with. Where there are core areas of BiH MoJ and BiH MoS work that are not covered by a CSO, steps should be take to fill that gap. Ways to fill these gaps include widening the remit of existing CSOs operating in the area and, where necessary, assisting CSOs to secure sustainable funding streams that support these new areas of work, or assisting to establish new CSOs.
- **Improve communication / access to information at the ministries.** It is essential that CSOs and the BiH public have better access to information about the activities of the BiH MoJ and BiH MoS. BiH MoJ and BiH MoS can improve communication with stakeholders through a number of actions including: improved usage of ministry websites, more proactive provision of information (rather than only providing information in response to Free Access to Information Act requests), having a CSO contact point within the Ministry, and holding meetings with CSOs to share knowledge and information.



- **Improve ministry awareness of relevant legislation.** Knowledge of legislation that assists CSO engagement was variable within the BiH MoJ and BiH MoS. It is essential that ministry staff, especially Sector Heads, are aware of this legislation and are ensuring its appropriate application in the work of the sectors.
- **Build positive experience within the ministries of working with CSOs (pilot activities).** Successful CSO/ BiH MoJ or BiH MoS interaction dramatically improves both the understanding that CSOs and ministry staff have of each others interests and activities, but also dramatically increases the likelihood of further engagement. Pilot activities should be initiated to increase the experience of ministry staff and CSO representatives in engagement activities and serve as valuable lesson learning experiences for other CSOs and ministry staff.
- **Build capacities of ministry staff.** Staff at the BiH MoJ and BiH MoS do not currently have the skills and experience to undertake effective CSO engagement. Capacities of BiH MoJ and BiH MoS staff must be increased so that improved CSO engagement can take place.
- **Build capability of CSOs so that they are equipped to add value to the Ministry/ CSO engagement experience.** It is essential that CSOs contribute to ensuring the CSO/ Ministry engagement is a positive experience by having the capability to engage with BiH MoJ and MoS appropriately. To do so, CSOs must understand what value they can add to the work of the BiH MoJ/BiH MoS and have the skills and capability to contribute value to the work of the ministry. CSOs need capability building, in areas such as policy making, to ensure they can engage effectively with BiH MoJ and BiH MoS.
- **Work on engagement from both sides simultaneously.** Best practice research indicates that most improvement can be made to CSO/ ministry engagement when engagement is addressed simultaneously from both the perspective of CSOs and ministries. It is recommended that capability building activities which seek to improve CSO/ ministry engagement take place with CSOs and BiH MoJ and BiH MoS at the same time.

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- **Learn by doing rather than theory.** CSO engagement will improve more quickly where CSOs and ministry staff have positive experiences of engagement based upon real interaction rather than merely theoretical learning.
- **Develop toolkits and guidelines for engagement.** Toolkits and guidelines for engagement will provide a valuable resource for both CSOs and BiH MoJ and BiH MoS and should be developed to underpin engagement. Toolkits and guidelines that are developed should be based upon lessons learnt from existing CSO/ BiH MoJ or BiH MoS engagement.
- **Ensure the International Community actively transitions out of BiH by handing over to CSOs where appropriate.** To date, the international community has often played the role of civil society in its interaction with the BiH government. By playing the role of civil society, the international community has inadvertently weakened BiH civil society by inhibiting the development of CSOs in certain sectors or by limiting its growth. As the role of the international community matures in BiH, it is essential that the International Community proactively transition the roles they have played in lieu of BiH CSOs to BiH civil society. The International Community must develop strategies for how it will hand over relevant activities and responsibilities to civil society.

Conclusion

To date, engagement of CSOs in the state level security and justice sectors in BiH has been limited and sporadic. However, the outlook for increased CSO engagement with the BiH MoJ and BiH MoS is positive. There are a number of CSOs in the justice and security sectors in BiH, that score well on the CSO capability assessment framework and already have the capability to engage with the BiH MoJ/ MoS. Likewise, the BiH MoJ and BiH MoS demonstrate good platforms for increased CSO engagement either because of their existing engagement experiences (BiH MoS) or because of the extent to which they are already implementing legislation that is conducive to the oper-



ation of CSOs (BiH MoJ). Representatives from CSOs, BiH MoJ and BiH MOS recognise that there are potential benefits from CSO engagement, particularly increased compliance with the EU accession agenda and benchmarks and increased transparency and accountability of the BiH MoJ/MoS.

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The Interaction between Security Politics and Science in Croatia

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Category: Original scientific paper

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Abstract

The author analyses the quality of cooperation between the academic institutes and statutory actors in Croatian security sector since the post-Tudjman transition. In this article he examines four case studies of (lack of) cooperation: the study titled “Croatian Military 2000 – National Security, Armed Forces and Democracy commissioned by Social Democratic Party in 1999, “the National Security Study” developed within the SDP government’s project “Croatia in the 21st Century”, third the changes in regards to cooperation due to the post 9/11 developments and lastly implementation of Government’s Communication Strategy for Accession to NATO’. The author highlights the difficulties in maintaining independence of scientific work, as well as the challenges to carrying out good quality research of security policies in a transition country.

***Keywords:** national security, defence, science, strategic documents, accession to NATO, communication strategies, role of the civil society*

Introduction

Relations between politics and science represent, it could be argued, a history of misunderstanding and mismanagement from both sides. In the following article we will try to explore this relation in the case of Croatia’s eighteen years of independence. During that time we have had war on our soil, three



different Governments, have made serious - or sometimes not so serious - attempts to become more involved in European political and security affairs by attempting to join the EU and NATO, and gone through a series of reform processes - some of which were undertaken only half-heartedly. In all of these undertakings politics has had the upper hand while science or scientists stood in the background, playing a secondary role, under an occasionally watchful public eye. Scientific and expert endeavours should mostly focus on helping political institutions and individual citizens make decisions which are not going to stand in stark opposition to one another but which will be as close and fitting as possible in order to preserve or even improve national consensus and the level of understanding within society on matters of national security and defence.

There have been numerous events and activities not only in Croatia, but all around the world, that can give us an insight and help formulate conclusions about the topic of this article. However, we will focus our attention and try to extract some conclusions from four specific documents and/or events. These documents are: the study titled "Croatian Military 2000. – National Security, Armed Forces and Democracy" commissioned by Social Democratic Party in 1999, a "National Security Study" developed within the SDP government's the project "Croatia in the 21st Century", a post 9/11 adoption of key defence legislation and Government's 'Communication strategy for accession to NATO'.

In the year preceding the parliamentary elections that brought the coalition of the six centre-left wing opposition parties led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) to power, the Study titled "Croatian Military 2000. – National Security, Armed Forces and Democracy" (Žunec, 1999) was prepared in order to enable the SDP better acquaint itself with the needs of the security and defence sector, and of its long-awaited reform. This attempt was even more significant because the then Government officials did not once stigmatise opposition as unfit for dealing with the national security and defence of the country. A great number of scientists, and security and defence professional experts took part in the preparation of the SDP Study.

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After the SDP-led coalition won the elections, the Government launched the project “Croatia in the 21st Century”. This project aimed to provide a firm ground and the necessary long-term visionary concepts for the forthcoming strategic documents. Within the framework of this project, a “National Security Study” (Mahečić, 2001) was also prepared. It not only elicited the strategic documents that would be needed but also explained the need for thorough reform and made recommendations about what the most important elements of this reform should be. Alongside the core team, made up of up to fifteen scientists or professional experts, over one hundred contributors from a broad range of state and societal institutions took part in the preparation of the Study.

Post 9/11 changes in the security environment constituted another key factor in shaping the relations between politics and science in the last seven years. Before and shortly after the attack the most prominent social and political scientists in Croatia stood as strong supporters of the protection of civil rights against intrusions by the security and intelligence agencies. This was important because at that time a new set of security and defence laws and strategic documents were being drafted, and the nation was trying to forget about the frequent abuses which had been carried out by counterintelligence agencies during the first nine years of Croatia’s existence as an independent state.

Finally, an important role in understanding the above-mentioned relation and interaction is played by the so-called ‘Communication strategy for accession to NATO’, allegedly designed and implemented by the Government. Strangely enough though, although Government officials claimed this document existed and shaped official procedures in promoting the necessity of accession to NATO, nobody actually ever read it. When finally pushed, with his back up against the wall, one mid-level state official admitted this document could not be disclosed to the public because it was secret! (Pavelić, 2007) Despite all of this, official institutions did manage to raise the level of public support for accession to NATO.¹ What was worrying during this process was not so much the public’s position towards, and general lack of knowledge about, this

¹ Results of the polls undertaken during March 2008. by:
- Accent Agency showing 59% support for accession,
- GFK Agency showing 61% support for accession,
- Puls Agency showing 67% support for accession.



issue, but rather the very obvious restraint displayed by the majority of scientific circles in expressing their opinion or taking sides in discussions.

Overwhelming Dilemmas

There are quite a lot of dilemmas that can distract scientists and politicians when searching for the best solutions to problems emerging from the security sector. One of them is seemingly firmly rooted in the clash between politics and policy. Policy involves and represents the result of a thorough analytical process, while politics denotes a strong irrational element. As such politics has little in common with science, as opposed to policy-making whose methods and endeavours are firmly rooted in scientific and hard professional principles.

The next issue looks at the position of the state versus that of non-state institutions in dealing with the security of the nation. Unfortunately, while for many reasons non-state societal institutions and actors should have more than a marginal say in security matters – after all they are the prime beneficiaries of increased security in society – they are not on an equal footing with state-based agents. Non-state actors in the field of security are much too often really hampered by a lack of access to sensitive data and information.

Among non-state actors, organizations commonly known as ‘think-tanks’ should play a very important role in decision-making and in taking part in analytical processes. However, they seem to sometimes develop serious cases of multiple personality. This has most probably something to do with the fact that think-tanks are made of people with their own agendas and differing interests.

‘Security Sector Reform’ was the buzzword most often called upon in recent years in most of the transitional Central, South and East European countries. How many of them actually managed to push for and undertake a serious reform process with tangible and irreversible results is open for discussion. It could be argued that in many cases reforms were not as thorough as they were supposed to be and that too many political structures

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had taken the path of reform for the sake of reform, in order to impress their own citizens and/or relevant international organizations.

The role of Science and Scientists in the Security sector's affairs

The only specific difference between scientists involved in the security matters of the nation, and those who aren't, resides in the vested importance of national security for the well-being, and even existence, of the nation and society as a whole. The key question is: Who is or should be considered a scientist? Is it:

- a question of having scientific qualifications, or
- about being affiliated to an established and recognized scientific institution, or
- about being involved in some crucial scientific projects and research, or something else?

There are many people with science degrees who are not employed by scientific institutions. It is also the case that sometimes even scientists employed by scientific institutions are not really involved in any full-time scientific work of any importance or significance. For a small country like Croatia, with roughly four and a half million citizens and only about 7,8% of population educated to university level², sticking to very strict criteria about who can and who cannot be considered a scientist might in practice result in only a handful of people legitimately being considered as scientists.

Extending the definition to include four key elements - professionalism, expertise, domain and knowledge (Haas, 1992) - is crucial in order to recognize the scientific, or at least the expert credibility and legitimacy of the work undertaken by many people working for state and non-state institutions and organizations in the field of security and defence. We find that applying these four elements is sufficient in order not to undermine the scientific and professional position of all the holders of scientific titles working in state administration, independent institutes and think-tanks, NGOs, media, etc.

Ever since Croatia was admitted into joining the 'Partnership for Peace', the process of Security Sector Reform has been pursued by state institutions. In some cases SSR was too inclined

² Results of the last popular census undertaken during 2001.



towards centralizing decision-making; while in other cases it was obvious that there was a power struggle between various political institutions running after the so-called reform processes. 9/11 provided a new boost to those political institutions and security agencies intent on extending their rights for repression. Strangely enough though, these were not vehemently opposed by political and social scientists who only few years before had been active advocates of human and civilian rights within society. Whatever happened to civil rights? Whatever happened to their objections to centralized intelligence/counterintelligence structures? And for what reason did they change their minds? All these remain quite puzzling questions. Despite many problems, the Security Sector Reform process has had a positive impact on the security and defence structures and society as a whole.

Interestingly, during NATO accession discussions, Ministry of Defence representatives and their political advisors and analysts expressed the view that defence costs would be significantly lowered as a consequence of accession to NATO. What in reality has happened is that defence costs for 2008, along with projections for military spending up to 2011 show a significant increase compared to levels in preceding years. When announcing a decrease in defence costs MoD professionals, as well as some of the scientists, who in the meantime had become very politically involved, failed to mention the necessary rise in financial and other resources for Croatian extended “out of area” commitments and also failed to mention the need to increase Croatian “in area” capabilities in order to compensate for almost ten years of neglect in terms of military acquisition and modernization since the end of the War (Institute for International Relations, 2008).

Politics and Science or Politics vs. Science?

Overall management of scientific-like endeavours beneficial to the development of security policy can take different forms, shapes, and results with differing outcomes. The case of the Croatian National Security Study might be a good example. Throughout the project the Government representatives did not try once to intervene or influence the final outcomes and conclusions of the paper. However, this almost idyllic situation suffered

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a complete twist of fate at the end of the project. Government officials did not like a few paragraphs and one diagram representing institutional authorities within National Security structures, so they tried to persuade the team to change them. The project team refused to modify its findings. So at the end, eighteen months worth of work involving more than one hundred experts was replaced by a paper which had been hastily prepared in two weeks by five state officials.

Also, there is very often a very wide gap in access to information between the two sides. Politicians often have access to sensitive and/or confidential data that are inaccessible to scientists. This sacrosanct and carefully protected advantage gives politicians the ability to misuse such data, against common interest. Nonetheless, the bottom line is that the most important factor in determining the far from optimal influence of scientists on the development of security policies is not down to politicians' wrongdoing but rather the result of problems within scientists' own ranks.

Politics is usually characterized by values and irrationality. Science, on the other hand, is characterized by facts (Pielke, 2006) and rationality, and should represent critical mass and the result of rational thought processes, based on hard evidence and framed by established verifiable methods. If that is the case, one can not but ask the following question: How come so many fraudulent/poor policies manage to win the support of at least part of the scientific community all around the world?

Furthermore, there is an obvious lack of educated individuals on both sides of the fence, in both state and non-state institutions and organizations. NGOs, media, enterprises and political structures suffer equally from a lack of available suitably qualified professionals and scientists. Governmental institutions and education systems have failed to produce the needed number of adequately educated and trained civilians for all sorts of scientific activities within the security and defence fields. Once they complete their education and training, their target destinations should include the Parliament, the Government, ministries, media, print and electronic alike, scientific institutes and think-tanks, NGOs, universities and the academic community as a whole, etc.



Croatian societal and public life has very clearly and vividly experienced in the last 10 to 15 years a tendency on the part of scientists to 'join the flock'. There have been many ways to do so. One particularly damaging trend is that of relatively well-established scientists joining the ranks of politicians. This very often results in a loose-loose scenario with the very simple and yet dramatic consequence that a good scientist becomes a poor political appointee, and over the course of time science effectively loses a good scientist, while the country's political life fails to gain a good politician!

This finally brings us to the crucial question: Is there such a thing as independent science or an independent scientist? To offer an at least partially satisfactory answer we first have to recognize the fact that security and defence in great part belong to the realm of socio-political sciences and not to the so-called hard sciences.

If we look at the position of science within society one quickly notices that it is always more or less dependent. First, there is the issue of financing scientific activities, and that issue alone is enough to recognize the reality that science, as any other activity is more or less, openly or tacitly, dependent on its financiers. Then there is the issue of social recognition which becomes important once we understand that scientists are only humans with all their good and bad characteristics. Lastly, as already explained, scientists are also receptive to the sirens' call of political might, power and influence, which makes them susceptible to become dependent for inner motifs, if not already forced to become so by outside forces.

The bottom line is: scientific independence – at least if understood rigidly – might look like a pink elephant! Everybody is talking about it but nobody has ever seen it. Because, at the end of the day, if scientists manage to avoid all the Scylla's and Kharybdis' in their social, political and economic environment there is still a danger of becoming dependent on one's own scientifically-reinforced prejudice. It became clear during the talks on Croatian accession to NATO. Some of the alleged professionals and scientists on both sides could not be dissuaded of their beliefs and opinions whatever argument was put before them.

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Of course, even if the scientists did complete their task to the best of their ability, provide ample scientific findings and enable politics to use these findings in order to reach optimal decisions within the framework of the political decision-making process, the question still remains: how much does the political realm, in earnest, want to be “framed” by scientific advice? With this question we are back to the starting issue of rationality of science vs. irrationality of politics. In such a scenario science can not be held responsible for political shortcuts and distorted interests. Scientists are very important in providing “ammunition”, ideas, arguments, concepts, visions, analysis and synthesis for decision-makers, but they are not decision-makers themselves.

However, one can not overlook the reality that many scientists, for reasons outlined above, take firm scientific rules and proceedings as an excuse and some kind of hideout for not daring to promote a fresh scientific vision which might offer cures for many of the problems troubling the present civilization (or civilizations). By seeking refuge in sticking to rigid scientific rules they in fact desert science and their credibility as scientists.

Scientific involvement in the matters of National Security - Success or Failure?

Understanding what set of criteria is applicable, represents the first issue that might decide the outcome of the above mentioned dilemma. The successfulness of scientific involvement in the National Security matters depends on how much scientists are actually involved in any specific proceeding, who the end users of their work are and whether there are any users at all, what the underlying arrangements between official and scientific sides are, what represents the scientific agenda for involvement, etc.

In the above-mentioned case of the Communication strategy for accession to NATO, scientific involvement and their influence was highly inconclusive. A very small number of scientists was involved on both sides and they were in most cases rigidly divided into 2 camps. The end user of the whole communication



campaign should have been the general public but it turned out that only official structures benefited from the public discussion.

In the case of the SDP study there was a clear intention at the top of the party structures not only to use the study as a proof of credibility but also to use it after the elections had been won. However, when the coalition led by the SDP got to power the problems of reconciling the interests of six different political parties, coupled with the primordial battle for power between the Government and the President, and a fairly rigid opposition that was still politically very strong and influential, undermined all attempts to undertake any serious Security Sector Reform; and so, the study fell into oblivion. The National Security Study, a project that was run by the Government, took almost two years from drafting the project to the final stages and finalization of documents. At the end replacement strategic documents were hastily drafted and any other reform issues mentioned in the National Security Study were distorted or changed on the basis of mostly particular interests.

On the basis of these and other examples it could be concluded that any successful cooperation between politics and science should ensure:

- thoroughness of the undertaking on both sides,
- a sufficient level of expertise and political will, as well as the ability to recognize that expertise,
- that the widest possible outlook is taken towards framing future solutions to suit the whole of society,
- inclusion of a reasonable and acceptable level of independence on the part of science,
- a sufficient level of rights to access institutions and sensitive data, and
- constant feedback between politics and science.

Moving around the Corner – Short-term Solution

If scientific and professional expertise can not get an adequate profile in national endeavours aimed at raising the level of security for the whole of society, there are still some useful things scientists can do to provide citizens with information and share their knowledge and vision with them. This back-up option should include informing the public as much and as often as pos-

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sible about assorted national security matters. Good relations with the media, but also the existence of knowledgeable and national-security-sensitive reporters could help in disseminating information and raising awareness among the citizens. Also it would be helpful to establish formal and/or informal professional/scientific networks domestically and on the international level in searching for better ways to communicate scientists' findings. Finally, good relations with the political opposition might be also one of the ways to make the public aware of certain security issues.

Logically, there might be the issue of leaking sensitive information for which all the scientists and professional experts might be held responsible for observing under domestic laws. Still, a careful look would show that in many cases key information necessary to change the course of official undertakings and inform the public about specific security issues would not necessarily require the use of protected information.

Towards improvement - Long Term Solution

It has often been said in Croatia that the insufficient number of scientists dealing with social, political, security and defence issues is the legacy of communism! However, we have to note that eighteen years have passed since the recognition of the independent state of Croatia and the change of socio-political system. There has been plenty enough time to recognize and redress some of the negative trends, one of which is the lack of security and defence experts.

By establishing programmes to develop civilian expertise in the fields of social and political studies aimed at the specific field of security we should and could have been able to produce satisfactory numbers of experts and scientists to fill the institutional and social needs, despite the fact that social sciences are much more fluid than hard sciences.

Their beneficiaries of such programmes would have been institutes and think-tanks, media and NGOs/CSOs, political parties, Parliament, Government, ministries, state agencies, etc. In many of those institutions or organizations adequately trained security and defence experts could take the role of staffers advising decision-making officials.



The second issue which is often made to be the reason why there are so few scientists and experts working in or for security and defence organizations, especially within civil society, is inadequate financing. And as soon as there is enough money to cover the needs of specific projects then immediately arises the issue of scientific independence. By carefully promoting the immensely important work of scientific institutes, think tanks and NGOs in the field of security and defence it might be possible to diversify the nature and number of sponsors while at the same placing lower demands on them. It is one thing to finance 40% of a specific project, and a completely different thing to finance 10 or 15% of it. By doing so it would be possible to strengthen the independence of scientific and expert work because of the absence of a majority or predominant sponsor.

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What is a good think tank in the Western Balkans?- State of Affairs and Prospects for the Future

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Abstract

Using a policy research methodology Western Balkan think tanks gather evidence and knowledge, analyze and offer policy options to national governments, local governments, civil and private sector on all current national, regional and European developments. The article examines the activities and the roles of think tanks in Western Balkan. Yet there are problems and challenges ahead: the quality of their work that rests on the ability to sustain independence from political party influences and image problem as the general public tends to perceive them as yet another politicized or manipulated NGO. Funding and sustainability are crucial challenges for all Balkan think tanks.

Key words: think tanks in the Western Balkans, role in policy making, relations with the media, political influence

What are think tanks?

A think tank is an organization which generates policy-oriented research, analysis and advice on domestic and international issues that enables policy-makers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy issues (MacGann & Weaver, 2000). They “play a mediating function between



the government & the public, transform ideas and problems into policy issues, identify, articulate, and evaluate current or emerging issues, problems or proposals, and provide a constructive forum & facilitate the process of exchange of ideas” (MacGann & Weaver, 2000: 3). Also referred to as policy institutes, think tanks put the emphasis on research and analysis. Think tanks around the world function like research departments at a university, promoting a greater understanding of important social, economic, and political issues confronting society. Unlike universities, however, “the seminars and workshops they offer and the studies produced are generally intended for policymakers, not students” (Abelson, 2002: 19).

What we do on day-to-day basis

As elsewhere Western Balkan enthusiasts who work in think tanks spent that much of their time thinking. We read, we write, we argue, we debate, and we produce all manner of publications on public policy issues. As think tanks, we are different from the university research departments and the various state-funded research institutes in that we are not just doing the research for the sake of research only. We are reformists, earnest reformists who want to improve life in the Western Balkans. We want to have influence, as much as possible, over the policy process, where there are often many elements to take into consideration, and we try to write things that are interesting, accessible; and we promote our work. We try to get our message across in the media, in key television shows, in newspaper op-ed pages, radio programmes and news. It is much harder work than most might think. Western Balkan universities, public and private, have no financial worries while local think tanks often lead a ‘hand-to-mouth’ existence. It is a very hard work creating an institution where people can produce top-class research on difficult policy problems and come up with solutions that actually have some appeal to people in the world of practical politics. For think tanks in the

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Balkans it is particularly difficult to attract funding to support their independent research agenda.

The biggest policy institutes in the region, such as the Centre for Research and Policy Making (CRPM) in Macedonia, the Centre for Liberal Democratic Studies and the Centre for Civil Military Relations in Serbia, Agenda, and the European Institute in Albania, GAP and KIPRED in Kosovo, ACEPS in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and CEDEM in Montenegro all play the following important roles in relation to policy formulation:

- they carry out “basic research on policy problems and policy solutions”;
- they gather evidence for responsive policy-making and
- they provide “advice on immediate policy concerns that are being considered by government officials”;
- they evaluate government and international donors programmes;
- they “serve as facilitators of issue networks and the exchange of ideas”;
- they “open up the policy process to other state and non-state actors not principally engaged in policy-making”
- they help interpret “policies and current events for the electronic and print media” (McGann, Weaver, 2000: 7).

Using a policy research methodology Western Balkan think tanks gather evidence and knowledge, analyze and offer policy options to national governments, local governments, civil and private sector on all current national, regional and European developments.

Think Tank Methodology

Unlike traditional academia which focuses on building knowledge within a group of peers, policy science must address real-world problems, and therefore provide recommendations and a framework for their application within the targeted society. For example, it is not enough to analyse the causes and patterns of unemployment in a particular society in



order to contribute to its understanding as a social phenomenon; a policy study must apply this knowledge to the real situation on the ground by understanding the causes, showing that it is a problem within the community in question and suggesting a course of action to address the problem. Hence, the problem-solution relationship must be seen at the heart of the discipline, which means that any analysis undertaken must be driven and targeted on the search for a practical, implementable and comprehensive outcome.

The study of public policy is necessarily an interdisciplinary endeavour. Most policies cannot pride themselves with a clear-cut belonging to one or the other field, but rather they include a mix of economic, administrative and social aspects. As a consequence, in order to perform an effective and comprehensive analysis of a particular policy, the researcher must focus on a multitude of aspects, and draw on the findings of a variety of disciplines. This state of facts does not mean that the analyst has to be an expert in all of the relevant fields, but rather that he or she must be able to understand and integrate the various results and points of view in a logical and productive manner.

The prerequisites described above make way for the emergence of a two-fold danger. On the one hand, insufficient knowledge of one or more of the aspects involved may render the analyst too dependent on specialists, diminishing his or her flexibility and creativity. On the other hand, excessively specialist knowledge may affect the quality of the final product of analysis, in that it may lose the needed overview perspective and instead be an exclusive aggregate of the multitude of relevant aspects mentioned above. These limitations can be avoided once the analyst agrees to view a problem from multiple points of view and accepts that the various results are not always reconcilable. In other words, policy studies represent a discipline based upon the interactivity of diverse paradigms, each of them legitimate and useful, even if their full integration is not always achieved. As a result of its interdisciplinary nature the field of policy studies in the Balkans is characterized by methodological pluralism. In other words, a great diversity of methods, problems, and research techniques can

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be used. Analyses can be narrative, quantitative, and comparative across nations, across sectors, between single sectors across nations, and so on. As a consequence, no ideal model or theory for studying policy can be identified. What is important to note is that Western Balkan think tank projects result in policy studies which synthesize the findings of research and offer practical policy recommendations. Most of their policy products are available on the organizations' internet sites, and are promoted at public events, roundtables and press conferences.

Relations with the Stakeholders and the Public

The greatest challenge for a think tank is to reach their main "customers," i.e. policy-makers such as parliamentarians and employees in the state administration. The main reason for this is that they are usually working to full capacity and therefore often lack the time and energy to consult us on policies. Sometimes they might also not be aware of the value added that policy analysis and advice can provide. Therefore, think tanks in the Balkans are constantly thinking about formats and instruments to reach out to them. One obvious instrument to reach policy makers is the media. Policy institutes in the region are well aware that "think tanks are in the business of developing and promoting ideas and, like corporations in the private sector, they devote considerable attention to *marketing their product*" (Abelson, 2002: 74). Ideas can be "marketed like products and think tanks could market themselves like a business enterprise" (Goodman, 2005: 4).

Clearly, "there is little point to conducting fine policy analysis if it only collects dust on the analyst's shelf (Struyk, 2006: 63) and only "securing access to the media on a regular basis provides think tanks with a valuable opportunity to shape public opinion and public policy" (Abelson, 2002: 85). Media relations are the key to the development of an high-quality think tank. In the Balkans, think tanks aim to change policies, not merely comment on them, so they have to pay



special attention to building relations with the media. Think tanks in the region cannot simply write a good piece of analysis and hope that the media or the policy-makers will find it. In principle, only “by ensuring that they are regularly quoted in the print and broadcast media, think tanks seek to create the perception that they play a critical role in shaping public policy” (Abelson, 2002:78).

CRPM and other Balkan policy institutes see media relations as an element of what one could call ‘giving policy advice to the public.’ Media relations also constitute an important part of policy advice because analyses and ideas often only get the attention of policy-makers when they are publicized in the media or reproduced in the media. Quite often, visibility in the media triggers a concrete demand for consultation by decision-makers. It can therefore have an influence on agenda setting. Think tanks’ media relations in the Balkans typically comprise four main elements:

- 1) interviews, background talks with journalists, as well as analytical pieces and op-ends by researchers;
- 2) presentation of various policy studies on the think tank’s website;
- 3) a newsletter to disseminate information about new publications as well as think tank staff and relevant internal developments.
- 4) several formats of events to which think tanks invite journalists, such as think tank conferences, round-tables, as well as policy debates, which might operate as closed sessions
- 5) publishing a journal with own and other experts’ analyses.

Besides the traditional media, Balkan think tanks use other means to interact with stakeholders. For example, CRPM and other regional think tanks engage in what could be called ‘interactive policy advising’, in which we include decision-makers in the consultation process from the beginning to the end of our projects and allow them to play an active part in brainstorming sessions and workshops during the process of analysis (estimating the size of the problem, weighing up different policy options, thinking jointly about their consequences and developing recommendations), in roundtables discussing our draft papers (through which we gather their feedback), and at final presentations of our studies. Thus,

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they are not only passive recipients of our work but rather become part of it and as a result, are much more engaged and interested.

The institutes' website serves as a tool for contact with policy-makers and stakeholders. In this age of globalization, the website also acts as an instrument to interact with other think tanks and the academic community. The website, of course, is a tool for displaying policy analysis research not only to decision-makers, but also to the interested public. On the websites of leading Balkan think tanks you will find comments on current issues, in-depth research papers, as well as articles or pieces published externally by the policy institute's research fellows. You will also find dossiers on current issues consisting of relevant documents, information and analysis. At the same time, media relations are tricky. Western Balkan researchers need to be aware that the work of the media is characterized by extreme time constraints, a tendency for simplification and exaggeration or dramatization in order to attract the consumer's attention. They favour strong statements over nuanced and complex arguments.

The Question of Independence

In general, experts classify think tanks around the world into the following types:

- Political Party Affiliated (such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation)
- Government Affiliated (such as the China Development Institute)
- Quasi-Governmental (funded exclusively by government grants and contracts but not a part of the formal structure of government; such as the Woodrow International Centre for Scholars, and the German SWP.)
- Autonomous & Independent (significant independence from any one interest group or donor and autonomous in its operation and funding from government)



- Quasi-Independent (autonomous from government but controlled by an interest group, donor, or contracting agency that provides the majority of the funding and has significant influence over the think tank's operations, such as the Bertelsmann Foundation)
- University Affiliated (such as the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, or the Centre for Applied Policy Research - CAP)

Analysts believe that think tanks *should be as independent as possible* and this idea is taken seriously by leading Balkan think tanks. Andrew Rich defines think tanks as “independent, non-interest-based, non-profit organizations that produce and principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influence the policy-making process” (Rich, 2004: 12). He highlights the fact that in order to achieve credibility, think tanks seek to maximize their independence. The seriousness with which think tank research is taken depends on its being viewed as independent from specific financial interests. A similar understanding of the working of think tanks can be found in Diane Stone and Heidi Ullrich's *Policy Research Institutes and Think Tanks in Western Europe: Development Trends and Perspectives* (Rich, 2004: 5).

To what degree do ideological preferences influence the output of independent think tanks? Among first-rate research organizations, ideology has no effect on findings of fact. If the economists at “the NCPA, Urban Institute, Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute calculate the government's unfunded liabilities under Social Security and Medicare, they are all likely to arrive at similar numbers. Where ideology matters is in deciding what problems to research and what solutions to investigate” (Goodman, 2005: 6). Ideology matters in the Balkans where some think tanks have publicly declared their ideology (Centre for Liberal Democratic Studies in Serbia). Yet in the end, it is the quality of the work of the think tank that makes it credible. The quality of the work in the Western Balkans ultimately rests on the ability to sustain independence from political party influences.

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Issues Facing Balkan Think Tanks

In the Western Balkan countries there is a lack of capacity to design, adopt and implement public policies, irrespective of their nature. Poor institutional arrangements, lack of political will and of implementation skills have affected the processes of democratization and modernization of our societies. Yet, governments are not particularly interested in reaching out to think tanks for expert policy advice. In fact, often they see local policy institutes as competitors, or even as political enemies. Often, sound policy analyses of think tanks, especially those that are critical of the government, are ignored or questioned for a variety of reasons. While governments in the Balkans hardly like outsiders' recommendations on what should they do, part of the blame rests on the think tanks themselves. Having sound ideas and backing them with good research is only half the job of a policy centre. The other half should be the hard work of popularizing and marketing the results. Yet think tanks in the region rarely put as much emphasis on the advocacy and dissemination of their policy products, as they do on actually preparing the analysis.

In shying away from direct confrontation with government on policy issues, many Western Balkan think tanks have simply focused on conducting and discussing opinion polls (CESID in Serbia, CEMI in Montenegro, or Institute for Democracy in Macedonia). Polling gives the policy institutes instant media coverage and popularity. Yet the effects on policy processes are minimal, if not negative. This is the case because "the over-reliance on polls reinforces the false impression in politicians that the governing process is only about positioning and massaging the public opinion" (Sorin, 2003:175). Using data from opinion polls the ruling parties spin public perception about their work rather than actually attempting any reforms.

Balkan think tanks also suffer from an image problem as the general public tends to perceive them as yet another politicized or manipulated NGO. For many years international donors and agencies have flooded the arena of local civil society organizations with aid money. Although most of it was



rightly spent, there have been a few cases of corruption and nepotism, which have negatively influenced public perceptions of the NGO sector. As a result, the civil society sector in the Balkans still carries a somewhat negative reputation. Since think tanks in the region are typically registered as NGOs, their reputation is easily blemished when linking them with “the NGOs.” This negative image, which think tanks have to fight might be stronger in some particular Balkan countries (Albania, Macedonia), but it is prevalent across the region.

The Main Constraint - Think Tank Funding

There are many other issues facing Balkan think tanks. The most important one remains the question of financing. With its direct impact on the operations and the level of independence of any think tank, the issue of financing will remain the key question for regional think tanks for the near future. Running a think tank is an expensive operation. “Full-service” think-tanks need lots of cash, the best examples of which are all in America (Economist, 1992). Most think tanks face a situation in which they are required to compete for limited funding. Like any other independent organization, think tanks operate in a market. Discussions about think tanks tend to focus on the aspect of this market that deals with ideas and policies: Which are the policy problems and issues critical to society and decision-makers? Which are the topics in vogue with sponsors? There is however also an economic aspect to this market: How much funding is available for research? What are the costs of carrying out that research? With the exception of those organizations with substantial endowments, most think tanks face a situation where they are required to compete for limited funding.

Funding for think tanks is a permanent problem around the world. As McGann comments “many policymakers and members of the public look to think tanks as a resource to gauge current problems and as providers of sound analysis of issues, many of which are long-term and complex. Failure on the part of donors to enable institutions to carry out this role results in

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negative consequences for society” (McGann, 2004: 12). In fact, the ability of “think tanks in parliamentary systems to convey their ideas effectively is constrained less by their political environment and more by their limited funding and staff” (Abelson, 2002: 5). Moreover, “the generous tradition of philanthropic support has not taken root in Canada where the majority of think tanks struggle to keep afloat. For most think tanks in Canada and in the USA achieving financial independence is the most significant obstacle they must overcome to ensure a strong presence in the policy-making community.”

While the biggest American think tanks can rely on endowments to fund their activities, EU think tanks rely on corporate finance. This is illustrated by data from some of the think tanks that do disclose a degree of information: in 2005, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) declared a revenue income of 5.9 million, of which 39% came from membership fees; “essentially corporate sponsorships” and a further 14% from the private sector. In 2005, Friends of Europe’s total income of just over 1 million, included over 60% (649.625) from “...membership and/or sponsorships by a variety of some 170 companies or trade associations in various sectors.”

Much of the funding for think tanks in developing and transitional countries has been in the form of start-up grants from international public and private donors that were followed by a series of project-specific grants which made it difficult for institutions to develop a strong institutional capacity. In Eastern Europe in the early years “most think tanks are dependent on grants from international foundations and contracts from bilateral or international donors....It is important however, to diversify their funding to include a significant share of support from local sources.”ⁱ Yet, in many countries of the world the development of indigenous NGO sources of funding is limited and underdeveloped. In Russia, for example the decline in Western financial support for think tanks is having a negative impact on the younger and more independent thinking policy research organizations. NGO indigenous support is not rising at rate fast enough to make up for the loss of public and private support from the West (McGann, 2007).



Similar is the situation in the Western Balkans. Indigenous support for think tanks is weak, philanthropic support for think tanks or for any civil society organizations is minimally developed (ISC and CIRa, 2006). Moreover, no Balkan think tank has any endowment to fund its activities. Typically, funding for regional think tanks derives from grants by foundations and aid agencies (SIDA, USAID, OSI) and income generated through providing intellectual services to contractors on the basis of public competition (World Bank, UNDP, IOM, Pact tenders) or direct agreements with international institutes (FES, KAS, East West Institute). Tenders by the European Union constitute an important part of the budgets of Western Balkan think tanks. Grants from different embassies in a specific country (Dutch, Norwegian, American or British) are another important source of income for some Balkan think tanks.

Yet, in general, competing for tenders is a difficult job, while getting a grant from a foundation or a donor requires quite an effort on our part to convince the beneficiary that our research or project idea holds merit not only for the specific Balkan society, but also under the specific programme interests of the donor. Balkan think tanks are not always able to convince donors that their policy work is relevant to donors' programmes and mission. The idea of supporting think tanks in the Balkans has hardly taken root among the donor community.

Funding and sustainability are crucial challenges for all Balkan think tanks. Our difficulties are not isolated in the region. As James McGann argues, Eastern European think tanks have emerged recently "often with the assistance of outside organizations - primarily with the aim to institutionalize economic and political reforms at home... Issues of independence, capacity and sustainability are challenging these institutions as political tides shift and they develop from start-up organizations to established institutions in post-communist societies" (McGann, 2007). CRPM and the other mentioned think tanks face similar challenges in their respective contexts.

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Balkan Think Tanks as Excellent, Next Generation, Idea-Factory Think Tanks?

High-quality think tanks rely on their analysts to provide new and challenging ideas. Almost all important political change starts with an idea. Indeed, it's hard to point "to any major public policy in the modern era that did not originate in the academic world. Think tanks are idea factories" (Goodman, 2005: 1). The availability of human capital is key to the success of the 'next generation' think tanks. The better educated and knowledgeable individuals a think tank has, the more chances it has of succeeding. The availability of human capital and knowledge has become the most important factor in economic life. Knowledge is the "chief ingredient of what we buy and sell, the raw material with which we work. Intellectual capital - not natural resources, machinery, or even financial capital - has become the one indispensable asset of corporations" (Kourdi, 2003). Indeed, human capital is the dynamic guide to the new economy. Today's "scarce resource is human capital, so it follows that this is where all the innovative ideas will be" (Blur, 1998: 5).

Many Balkan think tanks have an exceptional team of policy analysts that provide various challenging policy ideas and advice, a very well-educated team with in-depth knowledge of the way in which the local policy process works. Regional policy institutes have team members that are specialized in project management and policy research and analysis, training and capacity building, and policy advice. They are able to coordinate the planning of activities and inputs in a flexible and effective manner, provide relevant and timely analyses anchored in political and economic realities, paying particular attention to the timely mobilization of resources and the monitoring of project progress.

The *Economist* described the best think tanks as those organizations that are able to "combine intellectual depth, policy influence, and flair for publicity, comfortable surroundings, and a streak of eccentricity." Those who fail to organize and integrate these qualities into their think tank will become known for their pedantry, irrelevance, obscurity, poverty, and



conventionality.” In fact, the grandest think-tanks are the ones “whose concerns cover many disciplines; the organizations whose directors grab you by the elbow and murmur excitedly about the “synergy” between their various boffins (Economist, 1992).

Although some organisations, such as the Centre for Civil and Military Relations, specialize in a given policy area, Balkan think tanks cover many disciplines and policy issues. Many, such as the European Institute in Albania or CRPM have a flair for publicity. Although a ‘streak of eccentricity’ is intangible to measure, Balkan think tanks have quite a bit of it, doing policy analyses on topical yet original matters, which are very different from the established research norms in the country.

High-quality, ‘next generation’ think tanks have the ability to quickly get out first and seed the debate on emerging issues. By getting out “strong and getting out first, it is able to define and mould the issues in the media” (Hepner, 2004: 3). ‘Next generation’ think tanks “seed issues well ahead of competitors; provide a wide variety of products; have an especially effective internet presence; generate a significant amount of earned media; establish a nationwide network of experts; and partner with think-tank peers from both sides of the political aisle” (Hepner, 2004: 4). Many think tanks in the Balkans have already successfully met these challenges and are now playing a critical role in bridging the divide between the academic and policy communities, policy-makers and the public. The leading think tanks in the region can already be considered as progressive, idea-factory think tanks. Whether they will remain as such is difficult to judge, mostly because of the problem of funding.

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Think Tanks: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Policy Research in the Western Balkans

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Category: Review Article

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Summary

Think tanks represent a viable approach to improving distorted policy processes in the Western Balkans. Though no cure-all, these independent centres of knowledge are helpful agents in promoting and monitoring the needed reforms, and empowering these organizations is crucial. Think tanks, with some help, can become leaders in providing quality control over and analyzing government data, envisioning the future of their societies; providing ad hoc accurate in-depth analysis; monitoring policy implementation and educating politicians and civil servants – their future customers. The article offers recommendations to international donors and Governments how to help the development of such organizations. Supporting independent think-tanks is not a shortcut to immediate progress, but a strategic move for long-term improvement of policy processes in Western Balkans.

Key words: *think-thanks, international donors, policy process, research, Western Balkans*

* * *

A certain amount of opposition is a great help to a man. Kites rise against and not with the wind. Even a headwind is better than none. No man ever worked his passage anywhere in a dead calm.

-John Neal

To win one's joy through struggle is better than to yield to melancholy.

-Andre Gide

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People in the Western Balkans¹ today have many reasons to be melancholic. Their prospects for a better future—i.e. the promise of accession to the European Union— has never seemed so distant. After almost two decades of bloody conflict and painful transition, they are still stuck with the same old leaders or their direct disciples. The market economy has slowly inched forward, but the vast majority of the population is yet to see even a hint of its benefits. Beset by decrepit infrastructure and low productivity, and without a common vision, citizens' hope for a brighter future mostly translates into long queues outside foreign embassies.

Against this backdrop, the shrinking domestic elites and their foreign supporters still devoted to liberal democracy and a market economy face no shortage of proposed solutions—the question is how to put these into practice. The incoherence and fragmentation of current policy is dramatic. The issues of proper policy solutions and legislation have been superseded. With so many laws adopted and strategies drafted, the need for a common vision and/or societal and political consensus on key issues becomes ever more pressing. With no imminent EU accession process on the horizon, efforts at building democracies in these countries are losing momentum. Dreams of joining NATO and the EU have no meaning without first defining an overarching vision that both embraces the various integration processes and remains based on endogenous drivers and goals.

Without talking about what the region's governments should do to improve their internal mechanisms and management, external actors can take the initiative and gain a more meaningful role. Domestic progressives and their international supporters must adapt and improve their strategies. By reducing expectations for immediate impact and fostering a better vision, competent local actors can claim ownership of these processes. There are very few actors who could improve the fallible policy processes in the region. Civil society organizations —empowered from outside—have only been successful in galvanizing activist zeal around a few issues, but they have failed to become recognized governmental partners in policy processes. With no aim to replace civil society, a new

¹ Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia belong to the geo-political construct known as the West Balkans. Croatia, although geographically part of the region enjoys different political and economic prospects than the rest of the region, and therefore is exempted from this analysis.



generation of local policy research centres is breaking new ground and growing into a promising means to address current and future policy issues.

1. Think-tanks²

1.1 *Think-tanks in their homeland: powerhouses*

The independent policy research centres we call think-tanks are an Anglo-Saxon phenomena. Founded in places where rational thought prevails, these organizations require the same environment to operate to their fullest capacity. In the US, with its relatively open policy-making process, fragmented executive and legislative powers, weak political parties and strong political entrepreneurship, these organizations have thrived in the last 20 years. Studies have revealed five critical conditions that have allowed this blossoming to take place. First, the public has well-regulated and effective access to data concerning legislation, and a liberal tax law allows for multiple funding sources for non-profit organizations, including think-tanks. Second, the political process is open to the kind of competition that builds a 'market of ideas'. Third, there is a firm belief that ideas, innovation and reform lead to economic development. Under such circumstances, think-tanks have come to form a specialized niche with quality human resources. Mobility between think-tanks, universities and administration makes the entire field all the more dynamic. Fourth, philanthropic resources and a culture of philanthropy provide these organizations with a degree of financial stability. Finally, there are media outlets demanding in-depth policy analysis and thus bringing the issues to a larger audience.

1.2 *West Balkans think-tanks: fighting the odds*

Albania and the countries created after the demise of Yugoslavia show exactly the opposite conditions. Despite adopting freedom of information acts, public access to infor-

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² "Think-tank" is a commonly used phrase that refers to independent research centers that study and/or advocate social, economic and political policies. Some people make a distinction between think-tanks and research institutes, with institutes being more academically focused and think-tanks having a particular advocacy agenda. This distinction does not always hold true, so when doing research on think-tanks, both terms should be explored. Taken from the *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*.

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mation is still erratic. Government data is scarce and often corrupted, as political deals tend to be made in a murky world of connections and deal making. Consultations with stakeholders are cursory at best and do not galvanize public interest. The rush to introduce, adapt or approximate EU regulation into / to national legislation has supplanted any urge for innovation in policy development. Good governance is a mantra repeated in every ministry, but it is hardly given a second thought in practice. Implementation is not usually the point, as administrations may not even understand the laws the legislator has passed.

With a true market for policy still a distant prospect, all the countries in the region are plagued with low human capital. The few who work in the field are professors in the morning, government consultants in the afternoon and political advisors in the evening. While some of these individuals are excellent, we can hardly talk about mobility of human resources in the region. Philanthropy is limited to the provision of social services and there is no money for research entities. Finally, few media outlets engage in any serious investigative journalism or research. The few of those who do are often confined to the liberal elites—a dwindling minority in each of these countries. In such a situation, who would believe that think-tanks could influence policy?

1.3 Think-tanks: Success stories in the neighbourhood

A quick look into the think-tank scene of the new EU member states that acceded after 2004 raises the hope that those in the Western Balkans stand a good chance of success. Romanian and Bulgarian independent policy research centres played an important role in bringing their countries into the EU. Loved or hated, these policy research centres are recognized as legitimate policy actors by both policy makers and the public. However, explaining their successful contribution to the reform processes is far from straightforward. Ivan Krastev, a reputable Bulgarian policy analyst, reveals that



there is no correlation between the success of policy reforms and the existence of a strong think-tank sector in Central and Eastern Europe. He argues convincingly that the type of the constitutional regime and type of party systems do not explain why some East European countries benefited more from think-tanks than others. Despite their different political systems, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Slovakia were greatly assisted by the think-tank community, whereas in Estonia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic successful reforms were implemented with almost no input from such organizations. In Bulgaria and Romania, the weakness of “competitors” in the semi-developed ‘market for policy ideas’ allowed think-tanks to step in.

2. The non-competitors

Similarly to Bulgaria and Romania, government-supported research institutes, political parties, universities, consultants, the business community—all are less skilled than think tanks in tackling matters of policy in the Western Balkans. Government administrations are incompetent; policy development capacities within political parties are weak; universities are unwilling and ill-prepared to engage in applied policy research. All this means that think-tanks are in a good position to fill the gap and provide badly needed policy research.

2.1. *Government research units*

Research units and institutes formed integral parts of many ministries at the federal and republic level in socialist Yugoslavia.³ There was a strong tradition, especially in Belgrade - the capital, of internal research and counsel. During the early 1990s, these structures were either shut down or downsized. Drastic cuts in funding, the new political elites’ lack of trust in these structures, and the irrelevance of their expertise in the ‘planned economy’ left these institutes with no legitimate place in the policy process. Of the remaining institutes in Zagreb, Sarajevo and Belgrade, the handful

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³The situation in Albania was different given that it was the most closed country in Europe during the fifty years of communism.

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who have had some success limit their work to the fields of economic policy, security or foreign affairs. With the support of certain ministries, the last decade saw increased capacity-building for civil servants engaged in various stages of the policy process, including analysis. These exceptions notwithstanding, there has been no effort—not even sporadically—to create comprehensive government policy research centres.

2.2. Political party think-tanks

When German and other political foundations started their activities in the Balkans there was an expectation that some political parties would emulate their more developed cousins and create partisan think-tanks. This has not been the case. Two notable exceptions are G-17 in Serbia, where a group of liberal-minded people created a research centre-cum-political movement, and the Ohrid Institute, a relatively new think-tank created by the Macedonian right⁴. Other attempts have never come to fruition. Political parties did not sufficiently invest in developing internal research capacities, opting instead to create “analytical units”. While these units have an important role in shaping political party positions, their analysis is mostly confined to interpreting opinion polls (which they usually commission themselves). This “analysis” usually results in pamphlets wrought with party ideology and lofty political programmes during the lead-up to elections. Often enough, political parties hire domestic or foreign experts to draft their real political programmes. In parallel, populist, anti-intellectual parties find significant support in most of these countries. Given their anti-intellectual orientation, these parties show little or no interest in investing in policy research.

2.3. University-based research centres

Universities and their few research centres produce virtually no policy advice—the only exception being the innovative alumni research centre at the University of Sarajevo.

⁴ Shortly after, the Macedonian Social Democratic Union responded by creating ‘Progress’ - their own think tank. However, neither have the Ohrid Institute nor Progress produced any analysis for use beyond their ideological and partisan colleagues.



Governments across the board give few incentives to these centres to engage in research. Every state capital has a university with an economic institute and there are a couple of multidisciplinary research institutes, but they focus on teaching graduate courses and carrying out academic research. Some of their professors sometimes work as consultants or policy analysts, but always in processes led either by the government or international organizations. Researchers interested in policy have entered the world of politics, joined think-tanks, or left the country. Given the paranoia among the political elite that state universities could become strongholds of opposition or cradles of emerging social movements, governments usually exercise their influence and power on the (nominally independent) state-financed universities. This leaves very little hope for an opening-up in the near future. Private universities, although increasing in number and attracting more students every day, are still focused on the lucrative business of offering higher education. The founders of Ri-Invest in Kosovo are among the few in the Western Balkans to have founded both a think-tank and a university under the same umbrella (though their work and management are kept separate).

2.4. The business community and consulting firms

In Western societies, the policy market would be unthinkable without an army of business lobbyists and research institutes. While advice from businesses is interest-bound, it nevertheless leads to new data and new policy alternatives. During the first years of transition in the Western Balkans, it was widely believed that businesses did not have the capacity to engage in such activities and would need to grow and consolidate first. Now, however, businessmen have learned that “non-intellectual arguments” bring immediate returns, especially when backed by subtle or not-so-subtle bribes to local policy makers. At best, they hire “experts” who sit on governmental commissions to secure the interest of a particular

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business community. Instead of developing lobbying practices and a market for business-related policy advice, companies have developed strategies for giving kickbacks.

With the arrival of funds from the EU and similar contract-offering intergovernmental organizations, consulting agencies have mushroomed. They mainly serve as local partners to international organizations or foreign firms that win international contracts. These firms, like individual specialists, do not set any policy agenda on their own. They engage in specific stages of a policy cycle by drafting identification studies, providing technical analysis or by evaluating a given policy, government programme or law. Though churning out products with policy relevance, most of the specialists' intervention to the policy processes is short-term and limited to the narrow scope of their expertise. The UNDP and the World Bank typically hire such specialists to produce a specific study they require. The European Commission has an even more elaborate apparatus to approach policy development in the region. Advocacy and distribution of findings lie almost exclusively within those institutions, leaving little space for local ownership.

3. Think-tanks in the Western Balkans: areas to intervene

While several excellent think-tanks have emerged in the Western Balkans, these organizations are yet to earn such a reputation as those in neighbouring countries. Think-tanks are not omnipotent organizations that can mitigate all the maladies of the distorted policy process in the Western Balkans. Moreover, both in size and volume of work they can only cover a few areas. Still they are an untapped resource for improving policy making on several accounts.

Reliable data. The entire region needs reliable data. Furthermore, existing data has to be objectively interpreted and checked for signs of tweaking (by politically controlled and sometimes manipulated bureaus of statistics). While think-tanks do not lead this process, by focusing on evidence-



based research and good governance they can become important gatekeepers in securing reliable data.

Vision. The Forum 2025 in Kosovo and Albania 2020 are two initiatives led by think-tanks that look beyond the current issues. Such bold and unconventional thinking should transcend the political bickering and embedded interests of the local elites with their short-term plans. Each country in the region, to some extent, needs better long-term planning and a vision for its societal development. With the increasing fatigue over European integration, the need for a new vision would inevitably grow in importance among policy makers.

Quick, ad hoc accurate analysis. In the Western Balkans, many analysts and donors alike have devised their analytical instruments to follow a heuristic model of policy making. However, most legislative steps have been achieved in discrete, often erratic steps. The entire process of initial study and consultation with stakeholders (if done at all), debate in parliament and voting on a law sometimes takes less than a month from start to finish. Such a situation requires a different approach and different analytical tools. Responding to this trend requires permanent independent research centres that are able to provide immediate analysis and advice.

Local ownership of policy processes. There is strong foreign pressure for a myriad of policy changes. However national governments tend to cold-shoulder the substance of international efforts, and are mostly only interested primarily in getting funds and scoring political points. Lamentably, international organizations and donors alike are neither consistent nor strategic in their efforts and demands. Their performance needs to be monitored in order to better inform their programmatic development. Because policy changes and reforms will remain donors' priorities, a local critical voice is needed.

Continuous monitoring of policy implementation. This is the Achilles heel of the Western Balkans policy process. With most energy spent in putting issues on the policy agenda and adopting laws, governments – all of them coalitions – miserably fail to follow up their own legislation. Monitoring budgets and interpreting how much of the declared programmes

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and adopted laws have translated into concrete budget allocations is an area where think tanks already thrive. By forging coalitions with NGOs and receiving support from government and international donors alike, think tanks would become the main driving force in monitoring implementation of government policies.

Grooming future ‘customers’. There is a lot of fear of and little will amongst politicians and civil servants to engage “outsiders” in policy processes. Their many excuses for opacity notwithstanding, this group must be groomed to become future users of quality policy products—a dual process that requires simultaneously producing quality analysis and creating a culture of its use.

4. Western Balkans think-tanks: competitive advantages

Fresh blood. The region has witnessed the return of many Western-educated graduates. Equipped with rigorous academic knowledge, these young and talented people understand and utilize modern research methods; produce quality briefs, studies and reports; and complement their analysis with comprehensive communication and advocacy strategies. There is growing evidence in Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia of these people creating a new generation of think-tanks in the region. Embedded in evidence-based policy analysis, their recommendations are gaining in importance even in the declining democratic environment of the region.

New media. The internet has proven to be a levelling tool by providing an alternative space for debate in the rest of the world. In the Western Balkans, its influence is slowly growing and challenging conventional media. Serbia, with its vibrant blogosphere, is probably the best example of online politically engaged analysis that matches or exceeds the quality of print media. Albeit shyly new think-tankers are both supporting and making the most of this trend.

International think-tanks as groundbreakers. Some local politicians already follow and listen to the analysis and policy recommendations produced by international policy cen-



tres. International voices have acted as groundbreakers by getting local politicians to pay attention to evidence-based research. Given that the internationals mainly analyze foreign policy, security issues and EU accession, they take on the role of partners rather than competitors to local centres.

‘Brussels factor’. Although the carrot of EU accession is disappearing beyond the horizon, civil society and think-tanks could still effectively use the European Commission to leverage national reforms in the region. When embedded in evidence-based policy analysis, the recommendations of the think tanks are gaining importance even in the declining democratic environment of the region.

5. WG think-tanks: their Achilles foot

Think tanks in the region are underdeveloped. Their potential is greater than what they are able to deliver now. However, their first and most important drawback is their great financial and programmatic dependence on foreign donors and international institutions. Second, their attempts to emulate their Western European peers have had limited success owing to the different policy environment in which they operate. Finally, their capacity to carry out quality research and analytical work needs to be improved.

What is the think-tanks *raison d’etre*? Many think tanks in the region, regardless of their past achievements, leave this question unanswered. Others offer hazy answers such as “our centre exists for the benefit of the country” and for the “advancement of the policy agendas and inclusion of all stakeholders”. A far better answer would help differentiate between a public policy think tank with a clear vision and a consultancy firm, thus clarifying the blurred line which many policy makers do not draw.

Who are their primary constituencies for each and single policy product: politicians, media, other experts, public, state institutions, international donors or political parties? Think tanks in the Western Balkans face a dual reality in terms of potential clients. On the one hand, international organizations and donors understand and underwrite policy work according to certain standards. On the other hand, policy

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centres have to provide their policy products to local politicians who often are neither interested nor usually qualified to understand high quality policy papers. This duality calls for centres to develop products to cater for both needs. If possible this would necessitate production of two sets of policy products with the same aim.

Undertaking policy research with in-house capacity or managing policy research and processes. This is the ongoing question of many think-tanks, given they operate in a small policy market. It is a double-edged sword. Some centres, aware of the limited expertise available in their countries on many subjects and the impossibility to hire established experts on a permanent basis, have specialized in managing policy processes.⁵

6. Recommendations⁶

There is an evident trend of think-tank consolidation in West Balkans. Those who offer relevant analysis are becoming increasingly sought after and are starting, albeit painfully slowly, to find a market for their policy ideas among the local elites. The international community, while aware of the need to develop local ownership, has failed to employ these organizations. Although no cure-all, they could help to channel better some top-down messages from the elites but also to counteract some claims of the populists in the region. Here is a non-exhaustive list of measures that could help facilitate such processes and unleash this potential.

6.1 Specific recommendations to donors financing think-tanks:

- Ensure greater ownership over the policy agenda by local think-tanks by involving them in the programmatic planning process or by awarding multi-year core and institutional grants. These grants should:
 - secure mid-term stability, ensure capacity for ad-hoc analysis and support internal capacity development
 - foster quality control

⁵ Managing policy research refers to the process where for instance a think tank would organize an entire process of policy development from needs assessment to organizing public participation, to delivering the final product. In this process, the think tank does not possess the in-house technical expertise but it commissions it from an outside expert. What the think tank possesses is the skill to organize the process and present the technical expertise in a form that is accessible and acceptable to the different stakeholders in the process.

⁶ Within the governments, primary recipients of these recommendations are the units in charge of governmental coordination and of the regulation of legislative processes.



- Put a stronger emphasis on monitoring the implementation of laws and budgets rather than developing new policies
- Support transformation successfully—each underwritten policy project should contain a clear strategy for change, not only a strong research component
- Acknowledge that public policy research is pricey by Western Balkans standards (compared to supporting civil activism).

6.2 Specific recommendations to governments:

Ministry by ministry, sector by sector, governments need to engage stakeholders beyond their current one-way consultancy in policy processes. While there is no doubt that a government is held accountable for its policies, they should design policy processes as a two-way consultation process and in partnership with citizens. This would allow greater inclusion of think-tanks along with other organizations.

- Institute a mandatory cost-benefit analysis for each proposed law and a monitoring system for implementation
- Increase funds in each ministry for evidence-based research in its sector; allow for independent monitoring of awarded contracts
- Sign up to or encourage the use of available EU funds for research such as Framework Programme VII
- Send government officials to Bulgaria and Romania so they may learn from the positive experiences of working with think-tanks there
- As part of the state regulation for due policy process (already the case in all countries except Kosovo and Montenegro) introduce state funding for government research institutes.

6.3 Specific recommendations to think tanks

- Develop their own long-term vision and use international standards for quality of research
- Implement all the advice and recommendations given to government and/or other clients (being transparent, accountable etc.), i.e. practice what you preach!

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- Shift from opinion-driven to evidence-based policy analysis
- Clearly make a distinction (in terms of image, as well as type of work undertaken) between being a think tank and a consultancy firm
- Develop in-house research capacity as much as the local market allows but also specialize in managing policy processes
- Make a clear distinction between activism by civil society organizations and targeted advocacy. A think tank should strive for the later.
- Network with other think tanks to build up common ground and increase legitimacy, quality control, and influence
- No matter how trivial it may sound, regional cooperation has to be the priority of these think tanks. The local policy markets are too small to provide sufficient evidence and learning examples.

7. Conclusion

Think-tanks are already helpful agents in promoting and analyzing some of the reforms, but their role and importance could be multiplied. In addition to the recommendations outlined here for governments and international donors, local think-tanks need to improve the quality of their work and devise strategies for greater impact on the policy process. International donors have tried to impose the introduction of many reforms and managed to reach the implementation phase where most of those have miserably failed. However there is a now need to review the entire system and culture of policy making in the region. Strengthening evidence-based policy research and promoting a culture of its active use is an important starting point. Some governments in the region have been using analysis by think tanks sporadically. Unfortunately, this was mainly restricted to those areas where analysis supported the government's opinions. The governments also have to accept the more critical views that come



out of the research. Unlike campaigning NGOs, think-tanks usually engage in constructive criticism by suggesting alternative solutions. Supporting them is a means to improving policy processes in the Western Balkans that both international donors and governments cannot afford to overlook.

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Think tanks in the USA

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Abstract

The concept of think tanks over time became an important link in the process of security and foreign policy development in the USA. There are conflicting opinions with regard to their importance and influence, starting from those who emphasize the importance of think tanks' independent thinking in decision-making processes, all the way to those who see these institutions as merely providing intellectual support to the ruling elites and interest groups. Although think tanks' credibility rests on their ability to promote unbiased and critical thinking, these institutions nonetheless usually have a clearly defined orientation both in terms of values and ideology when it comes to fundamental issues regarding the development of American society and the role of the state.

Key words: Think tanks, Policy, Security Policy, Research, Analysis, Influence, Decision-making process

Development of "think tank" concept

The concept of think tanks (or *policy institutes*) was developed between the two world wars, when the first organizations dealing with research and analysis were developed, primarily focusing on military strategies and international relations. The UK Institute for Defence and Security Studies (Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, <http://www.rusi.org/about/>) was established in 1831, whereas the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment in the USA were established in 1916 and in 1910 respectively. During the World War II these institutions had a prominent role in providing support to the federal institutions, and they were also



involved in informal diplomacy and obtaining public support. The name *Think Tank* becomes more widely used in post-war period as a synonym for independent research institutions in the area of defence and national security.

In the post-war period the number of think tanks around the world has been constantly growing. First envisaged as independent institutional 'brain trusts', over the time they have grown into institutions which act and are financed independently from the state apparatus. During the course of time the name has extended its meaning, including a wide range of organizations which are involved in interdisciplinary research and analysis in different fields, as well as with provision of recommendations in the policy domain. According to the recent research conducted at the University of Pennsylvania in the USA, nowadays there are at least 5,465 institutions of this kind in the world, out of which 1,777 are located in the USA (McGann, 2008: 11-12).

In practice the concept of think tanks is not easy to distinguish from the academic institutes, state research centres or non-governmental organizations which are involved in public advocacy. Lack of clear definition is further supported by the fact that the think tanks among themselves differ in profile, budget, size and influence. To give an example, the annual budgets of think tanks in the USA vary from several hundreds of thousands to two hundred million US dollars. Some of these institutions are defined as non-partisan and they are engaged in independent research, whereas the others are focused on supporting the decision makers and political parties. Some of the think tanks employ numerous experts from different areas, while the activities of the others depend on the enthusiasm of a few. Smaller, the so called 'single issue' centres, whose scope of work comes down to one field, are similar to citizens' pressure groups. Almost half of think tanks are within the universities, and a number of them have contracts with clients, including corporations and the state (McGann, 2005, 6-8).

Out of numerous institutions of this kind in the USA those which have good reputation stand out and matching their reputation is their influence on development of internal and foreign policies. These are, above all, the centres in Washington, DC (one in five of these organizations are located in the capital). These institutions have the role of a kind of an advisory and corrective mechanism which serves the decision makers in the White House and at the Capitol Hill. It is a common practice to have

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the state institutions engage think tanks in research and analysis, and it is common for their experts to testify before the Congress committees or take part in the briefings provided to the representatives of the judicial or executive power.

Positioning at the market of ideas

Although they are essentially multidisciplinary, the leading American think tanks have the reputation of institutions specialized in certain areas. *The Brookings* is considered to be the authority in the areas of economic policy and international relations, whereas in the fields of defence, security and foreign affairs *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, *The Heritage Foundation* and *The Center for Strategic and International Studies* – CSIS are the most prominent ones. In the area of internal social policy, health care and civil society the leading think tanks are *the AEI* and *The Urban Institute*. The only think tank outside of the capital which is within the leading five (second-ranking according to the research of the *Foreign Policy* magazine) is *The Council on Foreign Relations* from New York, established in 1921. It is the leading non-governmental organization in the field of foreign relations (McGann, 2009). When it comes to their presence in the media, according to the research done by the *Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR)*, between 2006 and 2007 the most cited ones in the media were *The Brookings*, *the CFR*, *the AEI*, *The Heritage Foundation* and *the CSIS*. (Dolny, 2008)

By the definition, the credibility of the think tanks resides in their ability to promote unbiased and critical views, which are outside of the political and ideological frameworks. *The Center for Strategic and International Studies*, for example, has clearly declared itself as a non-partisan organization, that “actively unites leaders from both parties to join in shared problem solving”. However, it is impossible to avoid positioning of the think tanks in the spectrum of values and ideology when it concerns crucial issues of American society’s development and the role of the state. Tentatively speaking, the American think tank scene can be divided into conservative, libertarian (minimal role and influence of the state on the free market and social policy), centrist (synthesize conservative and progressive elements) and progressive institutions (state interventionism in the fields of econo-



my and social policy). They are positioned according to their treatment of certain issues in the domains of national security and foreign policy, which are largely interconnected. When it comes to foreign policy, there is a principle in Washington that beyond the American coasts all the party divisions cease to exist. Therefore the think tanks are the ideal non-institutional forum for reaching certain consensus on foreign policy priorities.

Among the leading centres, *The Heritage* is considered to be conservative, *the AEI* neo-conservative, *The Cato Institute* libertarian, *The Center for Strategic and International Studies – CSIS* and *RAND* close to the right centre, *The Brookings* left centre, whereas *The Economic Policy Institute* is considered to be close to the political left (McGann, 2005).

When ranking these institutes, several parameters are taken into consideration – reputation of their experts, available resources, presence in the media, number of publications, relevance of recommendations translated into laws or official documents, number of references in peer-reviewed and scientific publications, engagements of their staff in the state administration... (McGann, 2005)

It is interesting to point out that among the leading centres specialized in the issues of defence and security there are none associated with the political left or left centre. According to most criteria, such as resources and influence on American policy, the centres closer to the political right are the more influential ones.

Private foundations, corporations, interest groups and the state are the most common sources of donations to the American think tanks. *The Cato institute*, considered to be the harshest critic of the establishment, states in its rules that it does not accept donations from the state and that it relies entirely on the private donors. The other centres are partly (*RAND*) or completely (*US Institute for Peace*) funded from the budget. The think tanks in the US are largely non-profit organizations, unlike the European ones which are, as a rule, established or financed by the state institutions or parties (Germany). Being non-profit, the think tanks in Canada and the US are exempted from taxation, but they are also limited by law to lobbying or influencing the law making in any other visible way. The way of financing

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these institutions is a common argument used to question their integrity, in the context of tailoring their research and analysis to the promotion of the donors' interests (the so-called *Third Party* marketing technique).

Research centres established by the oil and tobacco companies with the aim of promoting the research that undermines the negative effects of the climate changes or the link between the cigarette consumption and cancerous diseases, are the blatant examples of such a practice. Less obvious influence is seen in the example of *The Heritage*, which publicly criticized the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in the time when most of their donations were coming from the oil company *Exxon Mobile* (Greenpeace USA Research Department, 2007).

Think tanks in the decision making process

There are opposing opinions on the influence that the think tanks have on the decision making process and development of the state policies, including those that mystify their roles considering them the American "shadow government", given that there are some prominent names in the leading think tanks and that their staff and the staff in state administration are rotated from time to time. When the power changes and the influence in the Congress shifts from one side to another, the members of the state administration find engagements in the civil sector, only to continue their careers in the state institutions after a while. Such practice of "spillover" of staff led some commentators to tab this phenomenon "the government in waiting". For example, it is well known that during the Democratic power, the Republican staff are mobilized in the *AEI (American Enterprise Institute)*. Besides, the members of the Congress are often in the governing bodies of think tanks. Over the past decades *The Council on Foreign Relations* has been a leader in number of state officials who worked for them, which is the reason why the *CFR* is seen as the most influential non-governmental institution in the American politics.

Excessive involvement in politics and affiliation with the government can undermine the independent position and reputation of the think tanks. Since they do not hide their ambitions to influence the decision makers, the think tanks face the risk of



being seen as an extended hand of the government or as the lobby groups. This is particularly obvious with those institutions whose influence and publicity vary depending on the political party in power. Still, it would be unfair to say that the think tanks define the US policy, given the complexity of decision making process in Washington. Their importance is most obvious in their influence on shaping of the strategic discourse.

Given that there is no clear methodological framework based on which it would be possible to establish precisely the participation of the civil sector in the process of formulation of security and defence policy of the USA, the influence of think tanks is indirectly visible in several different aspects. The recommendations coming from the analyses and studies done by these institutions can be identified in the draft strategies of national security and defence (Ranquet, 1997), and the presidential campaign is an ideal opportunity to promote new ideas and concepts. On the other hand, the presidential candidates, as a rule, use think tanks support and expertise free of charge, which enhances the credibility of their political programmes and opens the possibility to hire their experts in the state administration.

During Jimmy Carter's presidency, members of the presidential team came from *The Brookings* and *The Council on Foreign Relations*. During the two terms in office, Reagan's administration relied on around 200 experts who came from *The Hoover Institution*, *The Heritage*, *the AEI* and *the CSIS*. *The Heritage* had a prominent role in policy making and their study "Mandate for Change" became the basis of Reagan's programme in 1980 (Abelson, 2002: 142).

It is considered that while the Democrats were in power in the 1990s, *The Progressive Policy Institute* had a great influence on Clinton's administration and for some time he even presided over this institute. Influenced by the *Carnegie Endowment's* recommendations on the need to establish the council for economic security, Clinton's government founded the National Economic Council (Haas, 2002).

When the Republicans came into power, the conservative think tanks come into the limelight again. More than one hundred experts were engaged in the presidential campaign of George W. Bush, and most of them came from *The Hoover Institute*. The members of this institute played a prominent role

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during Bush's term in office (Condoleezza Rice, George Shultz) (Abelson, 2002: 140–141). The preventive war doctrine of Bush's administration, which was part of the national security strategy from 2002, is credited to the influence of the group of neo-conservative centres, led by *The Project for New American Century* – PNAC and *The Center for Security Policy*. *The Project for New American Century*, whose co-founder is Richard Cheney, Vice president of the USA during President Bush's term in office, is considered to be one of the master minds behind the invasion of Iraq (Project for New American Century, 1998), and several members of this centre were appointed to key positions in Bush's administration after the Republicans took over the power. Among the proponents of the invasion of Iraq was the AEI as well. In his speech to the AEI audience just before the military intervention in Iraq, the former US president Bush said: "You do such good work that my administration has borrowed twenty such minds" (Christian Science Monitor).

The role of the think tanks became prominent during making of strategic decisions such as those made during the NATO enlargement during the first half of the 1990s (prominent role of RAND in promotion of enlargement during the series of analytical briefings) (Asmus, 2002). The conservative *Heritage* points out that the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 was a result of their recommendations given to the administration (Spring, 2002).

One of the most obvious examples of the think tanks' influence on policy making is seen in the campaign of 14 conservative centres between 1990 and 1997. The campaign was to dispute the scientific evidence on negative effects of global warming through organizational support provided to some representatives from the academic sphere, by mobilizing the public through a series of public forums and press conferences, as well as evidence giving in the Congress and series of publications (during this period as many as 224 papers were written and published on this topic). These institutes, behind whom were the interests of large corporations, successfully redefined the problem of climate changes and influenced the policies of the Republican administration. In spite of public support to the Kyoto Protocol, the Senate voted for *Resolution 98* in 1997. It dismisses any agreement that would impose the limit of greenhouse gas emission, and the USA has still not accepted the Kyoto Agreement to this



day (McCright and Dunlap, 2003). Recent initiative of *The Center for Strategic and International Studies* and *The Center for New American Security – CNAS*, tends to put the climate changes on the top of the list of the US national security challenges, and similar recommendations come from the *CFR* (Ignatius, 2009).

It is said that in the current administration, Lee Hamilton, the president of the *Woodrow Wilson International Center*, influences President Obama's more flexible attitude towards Iran (Ignatius, 2009). Prominent role in defining the policies of the new administration is taken by the *Center for American Progress – CAP*, which in a very short period of time (established in 2003) gained the status of the most influential "progressive" think tank. *The Center for American Progress*, similarly to the pro-Republican *Heritage*, provides intellectual support to the development of Obama's political platform, which swept the victory at the recent elections, and the leading people of the *Center* are heading the President's "transition team". Among the *CAP*'s initiatives which became the part of the President's agenda, there is the strategy for gradual withdrawal of the troops from Iraq and strengthening of military presence in Afghanistan, as well as the plan for military budget rationalization and levelling in upcoming years (Center for American Progress, 2009). Several representatives of *The Brookings* are in Obama's team as well.

Since think tanks themselves tend to publicly promote their own importance with the aim of attracting donors, their participation in the US defence and security policy making is left to subjective assessment. However, it can be said, with relative certainty, that the American establishment recognizes the importance of independent research and analyses in the process of policy and decision making.

Regarding the development of Western Balkans think-tanks, their role and impact on the social processes is in the context of the development of civil society as a whole and its relations with the establishment. As opposed to their Western counterparts, regional think tanks are still struggling to establish their credibility and reputation, while their activities are often quite limited due to the lack of financial resources. Their ability to provide expertise and promote genuine, independent ideas will determine their role as indispensable resources in the process of policy development.

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The European Policy on the Management of Migration Flows and Serbia role's within it

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Abstract

This text critically researches the nature of policy solutions adopted as a part of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum which was adopted under the French Presidency of the EU in 2008. The aim of this document was giving a strategic push forward to common immigration policy-making. It is still early to say whether the Pact is to be successful and whether the Member States are ready for this. It is much more likely for them to be ready and willing to combat irregular migration as proven by the controversial Return Directive. Serbia wants to become a member of the European Union, but, even before that, the liberalization of the visa regime for its citizens travelling to the EU. Therefore, Serbia must harmonize its migration policy in line with European standards.

Key words: *irregular migration, illegal migration, visa liberalization, European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, Return Directive, mass regularisation of irregular migrants, integration contracts, concept of semi-compliance*

Why should Serbia care where the European migration policy is going?

Serbia has self-willingly defined and undertaken a number of obligations relating to migration management which need to be harmonized with the relevant EU policies in this area. The National Programme for Integration with the European Union



(NPI) in the section which refers to migration management says that “*migrations represent global phenomenon [sic] whose impacts and consequences go beyond national frameworks*” and that “*the Republic of Serbia is committed to be [sic] part of the European policies and migration flows management in its segment*”. (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2008) Some of the short term priorities of the NPI are the development and adoption of the Migration Management Strategy, the establishment of a governmental working body for migration management, the conclusion of Readmission Agreements with Norway, Denmark, Iceland, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, and the conclusion of the implementation protocol for the Readmission Agreements based on the obligations stemming from the Community Readmission Agreement.

The Roadmap towards a Visa Free Regime stipulates, among other issues, that Serbia must fulfil the condition of ensuring the efficient expulsion of illegally staying third-country nationals. In terms of migration management, this document emphasises combating illegal migration through the development of mechanisms for migration monitoring, and for the prevention and investigation of organized illegal migration. (Cabinet of Deputy Prime Minister, 2008)

It is thus particularly important for Serbia to monitor the development of EU policy in this area and of new EU regulations through the relevant political and legal documents. Two documents adopted in 2008 constituted the core of the European migration and asylum policy. Those are the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum and the Directive on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. While the so-called Return Directive has been on the European agenda since September 2005, when it was initiated by the European Commission, the Pact is a French project – in spring 2008 the French Immigration minister, Brice Hortefeux, started touring the EU capitals in order to obtain agreement on the draft of the Pact.

How the choice of words can influence the level of human rights protection: illegal or irregular?

In the Pact and in the Directive the term “illegal migration” is used to denote the presence on the territory of a Member State of a third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils

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the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code¹ or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State. In certain international organizations, research institutes and academic circles the term “illegal immigration” is looked upon unfavourably and the terms “irregular migration”, “undocumented migration” or “unauthorized migration” are used instead. These organizations are of the opinion that immigrants should not be considered illegal visitors, but people without valid documents, i.e. people whose status in a foreign country has not been resolved. It is an issue of conceptual disagreement, not just a mere terminological dispute. Can a human being be illegal? Can the criminalization of people be justified only because they arrived where they were not wanted? The fault of “illegal” migrants is that they do not have a visa or a permit to stay on the territory of a country, a fault for which they are liable to be detained in special detention units until deportation. The implicit criminalization of people by using the term “illegal migrant” is now materialized with criminal law being brought into the field of migration. In Italy, for example, they adopted a law which considers illegal migration as a crime. The Italian government was criticized by the European Parliament, the UN, the Vatican, human rights groups and the Italian left-wing opposition. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Franco Frattini, responded to these attacks by saying that Italy was in good company, since illegal immigration had already been criminalized in France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. (EurActiv, 2008)

Criminal law is a defining element of the relation between the government’s authority and the citizens’ rights within a state, and finding a balance between civil freedoms and the duty to protect public order is in essence a constitutional issue. However, aliens are not guaranteed the same civil rights as those from which benefit country nationals: the state therefore has greater freedom to decide what to do with them (Bogusz, B, Cholewinski, R. & Cygan, A, 2004) Border control, control of entry and duration of stay on its territory and approval of citizenship applications are the sovereign rights of a state. Maybe only some of the few it has left.

I am of the opinion that the terminology “illegal migration” and “illegal migrants” serves the purpose of making the resident population used to the idea of the illegality of aliens and preparing us to look at them as criminals. All the EU countries use these terms, and “only” the largest immigration countries in Europe

¹ According to article 5 of Schengen Border Code, persons enjoying the Community right of free movement are Union citizens, third-country nationals who are members of the family of a Union citizen. Third-country nationals and their family members, whatever their nationality, under agreements between the Community and its Member States on the one hand, and those third countries on the other hand, also enjoy rights of free movement equivalent to those of Union citizens.



have laws which criminalize “illegal immigration”. The illegality implies that the borders are everywhere (in the city centre, at the bus station, in the ambulance) where those who are condemned to illegality could be recognized as such, apprehended, detained and then deported. In the way we label them, the people become categorized as illegal not only in their encounter with state bodies, but with any of us.

In this paper the term “illegal migration” is used where the decisions from the Pact and the Directive are quoted, as well as the priorities of the Serbian government in the NIP and in the Roadmap towards a Visa-Free Regime, which are understandably aligned with EU terminology. In all other cases the alternative and more acceptable term on which there is the largest consensus among the actors who deal with migration issues – “irregular migration”- will be used.²

A significant number of migrants who nowadays have leave to remain in the EU have been, at some point, in an irregular position by violating, in one way or another, the immigration laws. The greatest number of illegal migrants did not get to Europe through smuggling, but with a regular visa upon whose expiration they did not return to their country of origin. There is a need to differentiate between irregular entry (smuggling of people, irregular border-crossings or entry using false documents) and irregular stay (overstaying visa or residence permit, stay after rejection of asylum claims of asylum-seekers, illegal work). A migrant can swing between regularity and irregularity, going in and out of grey zones. The legal-illegal or regular-irregular dichotomy is a simplification of reality and it negates the existence of numerous contested spaces of (il)legality. The rights and responsibilities of different types of “legal” migrants on the territory of a state are not equal. For example, a student and a worker have different immigration statuses, which imply in particular differences in the number of hours they are allowed to work. If the limit for a student is 20 hours per week, is there a difference if he/she violates the rule and works 22 or 40 hours? Should he/she be denied hospitality because of this? Bridget Anderson and Martin Ruhs, researchers under the project “Changing Status, Changing Lives?” of the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society – COMPAS, University of Oxford (More on this project at: <http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/reports/changing-status/>) have introduced a new concept of “*semi-compliance*”. The concept has been developed to cover the space between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’, which concerns the

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²This term has been officially acknowledged by the UN General Assembly Resolution 3349 (XXX) on 9 December 1975

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employment of migrants who have a residence permit, but who violate the employment restrictions under their immigration status package (Ruhs, M. and Anderson, B, 2006). In the United Kingdom any violation of the conditions linked to a migrants' immigration status entails the possibility of expulsion of the migrant and sanctions being inflicted on the employer. Anderson and Ruhs consider that the line between 'legal' and 'semi-compliant', as well as between 'semi-compliant' and 'illegal/irregular' can be drawn differently every time - it is politicized and arbitrary, and that illegality is socially construed.

The International Organization for Migration promotes this concept of three levels of compliance (regular, semi-compliant and irregular) in its World Migration Report 2008 (International Organization for Migration, 2008)

What is and what is not in the Immigration and Asylum Pact?

The Pact was adopted in October 2008, under the French EU Presidency, thereby acknowledging that the issue of migration was one of France's priorities. President Nicolas Sarkozy endorsed this Pact during his presidential campaign in spring 2007. There are even serious reasons to believe that the Pact itself is a Europeanized version of France's migration policy (Carrera, S and Guild, E, 2008) and the result of a desire to have a decisive impact on the priorities of the so-called new Stockholm Programme in the area of justice, freedom and security, which is to be adopted for the period 2010 – 2014. The European Commission initiated public consultation³ on this programme right around the time when the Pact was adopted. The Stockholm Programme is due to be adopted in the second half of 2009 under the Swedish Presidency and it should present new priorities in the so-called 'third pillar' of the EU. It bears mentioning that this one was preceded by two similar programmes; the first one was adopted at the Tampere European Council for the period 1999 – 2004, setting the foundations for a common EU policy in the area of migration, asylum, visas and integrated border management; and the second one – the Hague Programme - for the period 2004 – 2009, which is soon to expire and which was adopted as a response to the events of 11 September 2001.

³ Public consultations lasted from 25.09.2008 till 04.12.2008. More on this at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0001_en.htm (11.1.2009)



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The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum is a political document; it is not legally binding and doesn't contain anything radically new. At first glance it seems that its greatest significance is in the mere act of adoption and in the issues which are cause for disagreement. One of such issues is the ban on the mass regularisation (amnesty) of irregular migrants – during the informal consultations of the Justice and Home Affairs Council in Cannes this ban was withdrawn from the Pact draft in order to obtain Spain's support. Namely, at the beginning of 2005, half of all the immigrants in Spain were irregular, so the Spanish Government opted for amnesty through which around 700,000 people regularized their status. Zapatero's socialists spoke about a humane approach to integration and new citizens who would pay contributions to the social security system. However, only two years after the amnesty there were one million new irregular immigrants who had apparently understood the amnesty as encouragement to come (Kern, S, 2007). Nicolas Sarkozy, in his capacity as French Minister of Interior, strongly criticized the Spanish authorities' decision, reminding that the French legalisation of 80,000 people in 1997 had led to the quadrupling of asylum claims in 1998. "If the European leaders fail to react, our democracies would face an increase in xenophobia that they would no longer be able to prevent", said Sarkozy (The Associated Press, 2006). This method of solving the problem of irregular migrants does not only affect the country which has implemented the blanket regularisation, but all the EU countries, since the nationals who do not have EU citizenship, but who are the residents of one of the Member States, have the right of free movement and residence within all the Schengen states for up to 3 months.

Italy has also made many similar attempts at resolving the status of irregular migrants. In 2002 just over 600,000 people obtained resident permits. Of course, when Silvio Berlusconi became Prime Minister again, Italy's position changed – one severely criticized action was a six-month decree which enabled the military to assist the police on the streets of the big Italian cities in the fight against criminals, irregular migrants and terrorists in August 2008. One third of the 4,000 soldiers were tasked with guarding irregular immigrants' detention camps. The Council of Europe requested Italy put an end to this battle with immigrants and to cease fingerprinting all the Roma in the country, in order to stop the wave of racism and xenophobia (Danas, 2008).

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⁴ The idea of “integration contracts”, which would regulate the rights and responsibilities of both the immigrants and the authorities of the recipient country, originates from the Netherlands 20 years ago. The contract is an expressed agreement of wills by two parties, but in this case the migrants do not have the possibility to negotiate or influence the contents of the contract. Since this is about the relationship between an individual and the state, and not between the group or the community and the state, there are those who consider this to be a negation of multiculturalism and a return to assimilation. Virginie Guiraudon, Integration Contracts for Immigrants: Common Trends and Differences in the European Experience (ARI), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/Demography+Population/AR143-2008#sdfootnote5sym

⁵ When it comes to Estonia integration contracts primarily concern the Russian minority, i.e. the “old migrants”.

⁶ The Directive was adopted on 25 May 2009. More information on: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0637:FIN:EN:HTML>

One Spanish “no” prevented the *ban* of such mass regularisations, but the Pact has retained the agreement that these issues should be resolved on a case by case basis, and not by mass regularisation. The other Spanish “no”, alongside the objection of other EU countries as well, rejected the idea of binding “*immigration contracts*”, which Brice Hortefeux, French Immigration Minister, tried to slip into the initial drafts. The immigration or “integration contracts”⁴ for migrants would mean that those who want to settle within the EU for a longer period of time would have to learn the language and accept the values and culture of the host country. Instead of these contracts, Members States are invited to promote the integration of migrants “in a way... they deem suitable”, which grants the freedom to states to have such contracts with immigrants if they so wish. Ten EU Members States already have integration courses and contracts and citizenship tests. They were first introduced by Sweden, Denmark and Finland, and later on by the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, France, the UK, Germany and Estonia.⁵ Hungary is considering introducing these contracts, and in Spain the People’s Party endorsed them prior to the 2008 elections.

Although the ban on mass regularisation and binding integration contracts have not been accepted in their original form, these ideas are certainly present in the Pact. The key points of agreement as the five basic commitments for the development of a common EU policy on migration and asylum are as follow:

(1) To organize legal immigration to take account of the priorities, needs and reception capabilities determined by each Member State, and to encourage integration

The development of an economic migration policy is deemed necessary to respond to EU labour market needs and to attract highly qualified workers into the EU, to facilitate the reception of students and researchers, to favour temporary and circular migration. The approval of such an approach of selective immigration policy is visible in the Blue Card initiative – the proposed Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, which was adopted recently.⁶ One of the pitfalls of a selective migration policy is that it contributes to ‘brain drain’ in the countries of migrants’ origin. The European Council was declaratively against it in the Pact, although it is clear that this is not consistent with the agreed policies of attracting the most quali-



fied migrants from these countries. If the most qualified citizens leave, the developmental prospects for developing countries will only worsen, thereby reinforcing the pattern of irregular migration to the EU. In other words, if the EU wants to tackle the problem of irregular immigration seriously, it has to open more channels for regular migration, given that people are prepared to die trying to reach a better life, and unfortunately they are dying every day in the Mediterranean waters.⁷ With regard to the more effective implementation of family reunion, the Pact invites each Member State to assess its capabilities to receive migrants and the capacity of the family to integrate. There will be no integration contracts at the EU level, and each Member State should establish ambitious plans on methods for the integration of immigrants who would reside in the state permanently and methods for combating discrimination. Integration should be based on creating a balance between the rights and responsibilities of migrants.

(2) To control illegal immigration by ensuring the return of illegal immigrants to their country of origin or a country of transit

The controversial Return Directive is tackling this issue and the reactions it prompted will be described in more detail further on. One of the instruments for its implementation is the conclusion of readmission agreements whether on a bilateral level or on the level of the EU. Member States can voluntarily participate in joint deportations, but they are invited to develop support and assistance systems for those who opt for voluntary repatriation. However, states should inform each other in order to prevent frauds by those who benefited from the financial assistance during repatriation and then returned to the EU. Finally, the Pact is calling for steadfast actions and proportional sanctions for those who exploit illegal migrants.

(3) To make border controls more effective

The EU will start issuing biometric visas on 1 January 2012 and gradually establishing joint consulates, of course on a voluntary basis. The Pact promotes the allocation of appropriate resources to the Frontex⁸ agency for it to fulfil its mission in regular and in crisis situations alike. If needed, Frontex's role will be strengthened; there is even the possibility of opening specialized offices for the eastern land border and for the southern marine

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⁷ At least 1,502 irregular immigrants died during 2008 trying to reach the EU borders, as published by the association "Fortress Europe". More at: <http://www.marri-rc.org/Default.aspx?Language=EN&mid=30&eid=532>

⁸ Frontex is an EU agency with its seat in Warsaw, Poland; it was established in 2005 with the mission to manage the external borders of the EU. Mutual cooperation of the Serbian Ministry of Interior and Frontex in terms of operational cooperation in the area of border policing is stipulated in the Working Agreement signed in February 2009. More on Frontex at: <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/>

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border of the EU, with a focus on developing electronic systems for registering the entries and departures of EU citizens and other travellers.

(4) To build a Europe of asylum

The Hague Programme in the area of justice, freedom and security envisages the establishment of a common European asylum system. The measures undertaken for building a Europe of asylum consist in opening the Europe Support Office in 2009, the establishment of a single asylum procedure if possible during 2010 and no later than 2012, financial and staff support to Member States facing a crisis situation of mass influx of asylum-seekers, and the strengthening of cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

(5) To create a comprehensive partnership with the countries of origin and of transit in order to encourage the synergy between migration and development

Migration should become an important component of the foreign policy of the EU and its Member States. The Pact refers to the Global Approach to Migration document from 2005, which focuses on Africa and the Mediterranean and promotes an approach that would be beneficial to the countries of origin and destination and to the migrants alike. This kind of approach is significant for Eastern and Southern Europe, and a ministerial conference on building migration partnerships was held in Prague in April 2009. Migration agreements are needed with the countries of origin or transit at the bilateral or at the EU level. The citizens of Eastern and Southern Europe should be given the opportunity to develop a framework for legal migration which would be adapted and contribute to the needs of their labour market, favouring temporary and circular migration.

Monitoring of the implementation of the Pact is envisaged through annual debates on immigration and asylum policy. The Council and the Commission should prepare annual reports on the implementation of these commitments, and the Member States should develop indicators which to be used to assess impact and effectiveness of the policies. Furthermore, the states are encouraged to inform each other on any new measures and legal reforms which they are planning.



Return Directive or Directive of Shame

The EU Ministers of Interior adopted at the beginning of June 2008 the text of the Directive, the preamble of which says that it is legitimate for Members State to expel illegal immigrants (towards their countries of origin, countries of transit or any other country they may voluntarily choose to return to). The Pact says that all illegal immigrants must leave the Member State's territory. Apart from their expulsion, the only other method of resolving the issue of illegal migration is aforementioned legalisation, i.e. regularisation; neither is 'blanket regularisation' banned by the Pact, but there is the desire to avoid it. Both documents give priority to voluntary departure over deportation. According to the Directive, after the decision on deportation, an individual has 7 to 30 days to prepare for their voluntary departure. This period can be further extended if it is deemed necessary, e.g. because of children attending school. If upon the expiration of the period given for voluntary departure the person does not leave the country, i.e. the EU, a removal order is issued, which may include an entry ban into the country in question for up to 5 years.

The Directive has been severely criticized for its Article 15, to the point that in its public interpretation it is reduced to this Article only. The article allows Member States to keep immigrants in illegal migrant detention camps for *up to 18 months*, if they believe that there is a risk of absconding, i.e. if the person in question avoids or disrupts the process of deportation. In fact, it is stipulated that individuals can be detained in these camps for no longer than 6 months before deportation, but in certain situations, such as lack of cooperation by the individual in determining his/her country of origin, the detention period could be extended by additional 12 months. The immigrant detention camps in which migrants await deportation could without doubt easily be turned into classic prisons. The readmission agreements – bilateral and at the level of the Community – are very important for the EU, because the state that signed the agreement is obliged to readmit those returnees who are its citizens.

In case of a decision on the deportation of unaccompanied minors, the assistance of the relevant social services is to be sought and it must be ensured that the children are returned to members of their families, guardians or appropriate admission centres. The detention of families with minor children and of unaccompanied

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minors is only a last resort option, and it should be done for the shortest possible period of time.

Amnesty International, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles⁹ and the European Association for the Defense of Human Rights¹⁰ were disappointed when the European Parliament voted in favour of the Directive in a co-decision procedure with 360 votes for, 197 against and 106 abstained. Many MEPs from the Socialist Group (PES), the Greens and the Left (GUE/NGL) refused to support it, believing that it violated human rights. The reaction of the Latin American countries was particularly harsh, when they called the Return Directive the 'Directive of Shame', since it criminalized people and legalized xenophobia.

Scope of the Directive

Estimates show that there are around ten million irregular migrants in the EU – poor workers, women and children from undeveloped countries. They are the main target of this Directive.

The Directive refers to all Members States apart from the UK, Ireland and Denmark, but it applies to Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein (because of their accession to the Schengen *acquis*). It is a legally binding instrument in terms of its aim, which means that the Member States have 24 months¹¹ upon publication of the Directive in the official gazette to adopt the corresponding national legislation for its implementation.

Conclusion

Although it took them three years, the EU Members States still managed to agree on common standards and principles for the expulsion of irregular migrants. When it comes to common rules on conditions of entry and stay, the situation is very different. The Commission's attempt in 1999 to initiate the adoption of a directive that would regulate the issue of economic immigration failed. The idea of enacting a comprehensive directive for all the categories of economic activities of migrants was abandoned – simply because the states did not want all immigrants on their territory, but they did want the highly qualified ones and this is something on which they could all

⁹ ECRE - European Council on Refugees and Exiles

¹⁰ AEDH - Association Européenne pour la défense des Droits de l'Homme

¹¹ When it comes to the laws referring to legal aid and the representation of illegal migrants, states have a 36-month deadline (Art. 13 of the Directive).



agree more easily. The motives are clear – the EU wants to be competitive on the global market by, among other things, attracting the best qualified migrants to the EU instead of them going to the USA or Canada.

Such a pragmatic approach is understandable from the perspective of EU interests. Its political priorities are the reduction of irregular migration flows both at the national and at the EU level, as well as attracting highly qualified migrants. Integration contracts, in countries that have them, do not apply to the citizens of the EU, the USA, Canada or Australia. EU citizens have the right to reside and work, as well as vote in local elections, anywhere in the EU, but this does not apply to Americans, for example. Still, they would not have to pass the Dutch language test in their country of origin in order to get a residence permit. That means that some must but others do not have to integrate.

There are politicians who say that it is not true that Europe wants to exclude a category of migrants from the welfare society, but that in fact it wants to protect everyone from the phenomenon of irregular migration, which does not benefit anyone. Furthermore, Europe is trying to prove that it is not an “EU Fortress” and to prevent new Schengen iron curtains from forming, by holding negotiations on visa liberalization with neighbouring countries (with the previous conclusion of readmission agreements). With the latest enlargement, EU now borders with Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Moldova, the Western Balkans, North Africa, and in its wider scope, the Caucasus and the Middle East. During the process of accession to the EU, the Central and Eastern European countries changed their immigration laws by making them more restrictive in terms of conditions of entry, issuance of residence permits, border control and readmission. By becoming the so-called “New Europe” they are no longer just countries of transit but rather have increasingly become destination countries (Ricci, 2005). The same awaits the Western Balkans countries if they want their citizens to travel freely. In this way the candidate and potential candidate countries would act as a buffer zone for uncontrolled migration flows towards the EU via its southern border. Readmission agreements signed by the EU create the need for the buffer-zone countries to sign such agreements with countries of high migration risk. As an example, according to the readmission agreement with the EU, Serbia is obliged to readmit not only its own citizens, but all third-country citizens if they had entered the EU through Serbia. This is why it is important for Serbia that, when an EU Member State sends a readmission request, it can initiate the readmission to the country of

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origin or transit, through which these nationals entered Serbia. Therefore Serbia has in turn initiated the conclusion of bilateral readmission agreements with high migration risk countries, primarily with those who do not have readmission agreements with the EU (Turkey, Moldova, Ukraine and China).¹²

EU migration policy is restrictive, but since Serbia has opted for being a part of the EU migration management strategy, it does not have much choice in deciding in which direction its migration policy should develop. Of course, the building of a country's migration management system should rely on that country's migration profile, trends, needs and circumstances, for it to meet future challenges efficiently, use some of its facets in the best possible way and finally enable its citizens to travel freely within the EU.

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*Translated from Serbian to English language by
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The new National Security Strategy of Montenegro is accession to NATO

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Category: Review Article

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Summary

This paper analyses the new National Security Strategy adopted by the Parliament of Montenegro in late 2008. This paper presents both the positive changes introduced in that document and its weaknesses. The author also outlines the reactions of the main political parties in the Parliament of Montenegro to the priorities set out in the security policy.

Key words: *National Security Strategy, NATO Alliance, security challenges, risks and threats*

* * *

On November 27, 2008 Montenegro adopted a new National Security Strategy (Government of Montenegro, 2008). This is a strategic document which defines the future development and operation of the national security system of the state. The previous Strategy, which was adopted in 2006 (Government of Montenegro, 2006), suffered much criticism. It was criticized both by members of the domestic public and foreign experts who work in the field of security. Their main criticism was aimed at the fact that there had been no public debate prior to the passing of that document and that it was adopted by the Government of Montenegro instead of the Parliament. The legitimacy of that important document was thus put in question by it being passed in that way. Criticism also targeted the document's vague terminology, which meant that an uninformed reader would neither be able to clearly locate the geographical position of Montenegro, nor to put the threats, which are outlined in that document, into context. The many flaws of the previous document were overcome in the new one, but shortcomings still remain in some sections.



We shall begin this paper by giving an overview of the positive changes. Hence, the first thing that catches the reader's attention is the fact that the security challenges, risks and threats to Montenegro's security, as well as the goals of the Strategy, are more specifically identified. Furthermore, Montenegro is geographically defined, i.e. clearly geographically positioned. Such determinants were not given in the previous Strategy, but the new one clearly states: "Montenegro belongs both to the Balkan and Mediterranean area..." Another positive change in that the document is that the European Union is clearly recognized as a security factor, which was not the case in the previous Strategy. That is clearly evident in the section of the Strategy that reads: "Since the process of joining the EU is a strategic priority of Montenegro, harmonization with the European Union's *Common Foreign and Security Policy*, as well as with the *European Security and Defence Policy* as its integral part will constitute the framework for the development of our attitudes towards regional, European and global issues."

Priorities of the Security Policy

After a quick read-through of the Strategy, it very soon becomes clear to the reader that Montenegro evidently defines and positions its defence policy in relation to the NATO Alliance. In other words, all hopes for ensuring its future national security are based on its prospective accession to NATO. Despite the indisputable fact that the EU is also recognized as a security subject, NATO is still given priority in the Strategy. Whether it is justified, bearing in mind that Montenegro's accession to NATO received a very low level of support during the last few years (CEDEM (2006-2008)), remains to be seen (charts 1 and 1A).




Chart 1: Should Montenegro become a member of the NATO Alliance?

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


Chart 1A: Should Montenegro become a member of the NATO Alliance?

“The Strategy confirms the commitment of Montenegro to undertake all necessary activities so as to meet the conditions for its integration into the European, Euro-Atlantic and other international security structures. In that context, the strategic goal of Montenegro is to become a fully-fledged NATO and EU member as soon as possible. With that goal in mind, Montenegro has joined NATO Partnership for Peace Programme and signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU” (Government of Montenegro, 2008).

“Montenegro believes that small countries can best provide and ensure their own security by accessing the system of collective security.” (Government of Montenegro, 2008).

“On the basis of recent economic progress, as well as progress in the broad reforms, which have already been undertaken, and in integration processes, Montenegro wishes to establish new, quality relations with NATO, which should strengthen our role and responsibility in ensuring the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic space. The enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance to the region of the Western Balkans will support and further strengthen the area where joint values shared by NATO (democracy, rule of law and, human and minority rights) reign. This will also further stabilize and unite the region which shares common goals and integration processes.” (Government of Montenegro, 2008).



Analysis of security challenges, risks and threats

Those aspirations regarding accession to the NATO Alliance are also evident in the section of the document which defines the potential security challenges, risks and threats, and includes, instead of threats specific to the region where Montenegro is located, certain definitions that have been directly copied from NATO strategic documents. This is reinforced by the fact that potential security challenges, risks and threats that could emerge from the Western Balkans, i.e. from the neighbouring countries, are simply not mentioned in the Strategy. Instead only the regions that are characterized as sources of potential secondary threat to the national security of Montenegro are listed in that section of the Strategy. Those regions are the Middle East, the Caucasus and Northern Africa, and are also NATO's priorities.

Another shortcoming of the Strategy is its claim that organized crime in Montenegro is solely an external threat, i.e. that it exists only in Montenegro's surroundings, while organized crime and corruption are not even mentioned as internal threats.

Elements of the security system

In the section of the Strategy where the composition of the Defence and Security Council is specified, it is made clear that the Prime Minister of Montenegro, the Head of the Government and the Chairman of the Parliament all take part in the work of the Council. Given the importance of that body, it seems that the Defence, and Internal Affairs and Public Administration Ministers, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Head of the General Staff, should also participate in the work of the Council.

As a conclusion, we should add that the Strategy is inadequate in the section which should emphasize the importance of the protection of human and minority rights, both in itself and in contributing to the security of the state. Moreover, the Strategy does not stress enough that, in accordance with the country's size and its economic strength, greater attention should be paid to the efficient management of financial resources of the security sector. That is particularly important if we bear in mind that the governmental actors in the security sector spend one tenth of the total budget of Montenegro (Ministry of Interior Affairs and Public Administration: 13.071.432,71 ; Police Administration: 82.580.768,50 ; Ministry of Defence: 49.937.122,31 ; National Security Agency (ANB): 8.789.432,00 of the total budget for 2009 which amounts to 1.623.684.943,65)(The Parliament of Montenegro, 2008).

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The main political parties' positions on the new Strategy

The Strategy was passed by majority vote by the members of the Parliament. The Minister of Defence declared that the Strategy supports the policy of the government of Montenegro to undertake all necessary actions in order to meet the conditions for its integration into the European, Euro-Atlantic and other international security structures.

On the other hand, opposition parties have predominantly criticized the Strategy. The Serb People's Party (SNS) believes that the Strategy is a poorly written document which offers incomplete and vague solutions to the challenges set before the security sector of Montenegro. Furthermore, the SNS believes that, through the Strategy, Montenegro wishes to "merge" into NATO, without putting the issue to a referendum. The Movement for Changes was slightly less critical of the Strategy and estimated that many things need to change in Montenegro in order for that document to be enforced. The Socialist People's Party mainly objected to the section of the Strategy in which its goals are defined, and it also criticized its "insistence" on seeking accession to NATO, i.e. prioritizing accession to the Alliance over joining the European Union.

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*Translated from Serbian to English language by
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Civil Society Organizations and Public Oversight over the Security Sector

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
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Book Review

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have published a practical guide for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in order to inform CSOs on the best ways to improving democratic security sector governance. As stated by Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, the report brings together experiences from all over the world and provides practical guidance for civil society on how to help make state security institutions not only law-abiding but also transparent and accountable to society. Therefore, it is specifically written for CSO's and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

This handbook is divided into three parts. The first part of the report mainly focuses on the roles that civil society can play in security sector reform and tries to explain why democratic



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oversight of the security sector is so important. In the second part the focus lies on the strategies and methodologies which organizations can use to achieve their goal. Finally, the third part of the report looks at the most common challenges and opportunities for current security sector reform at the national level. Based on this analysis, the report concludes with recommendations on how to strengthen the relations between state security institutions and human rights organizations.

The authors of the handbook put forward a few key messages. First, it is stated that domestic CSOs should be the main actors involved in security sector reform, since they are more aware of local needs and conditions than their respective governments. It is therefore essential for them not to bow down to the dominance of external experts in security sector reform processes as is, unfortunately, often the case. Second, in order to shape society in a way that it can influence security sector reform, CSOs should develop their own institutional capacity. Thirdly and in parallel to this, it is important for CSOs to invest time in advocacy, awareness-raising and lobbying, which are all useful means of expanding society's influence on state security institutions. Finally, the authors also argue that CSOs could benefit from the fact that they are independent and impartial. This should enable them to ask critical questions about the shortcomings or positive points of the security sector.

Moreover, credibility is crucial for effective security sector oversight. Therefore, CSOs must be even more accountable than the actors and institutions they are controlling. The authors point to the problem of the so-called 'accountability gap', since people tend to believe that CSOs are generally not accountable to anyone. Therefore, it is important for CSOs to create basic governance structures and practices, for instance by setting up an accountability framework. By giving the good example to the governmental institutions, CSOs could convince the government to change their policies. Basically, the accountability framework implies using the 'carrot and stick' method. In this way CSOs can gain legitimacy for their watchdog functions. Another issue that seems to have priority in the report is human security. Human security and national security are mutually reinforcing. But policy that leads to a secure state, does not automatically create security for individual citizens. Therefore, CSOs should pay great attention to the prevention of human rights violations and to the protection of human rights during a state of emer-



gency. So, a great challenge in security sector reform lies in building trust and confidence between human rights groups and state security institutions.

This report provides a very good overview of the current literature and constitutes a detailed guide for CSOs dealing with security sector reform. However, since this report was issued in 2008, I would expect more attention to be paid to terrorism, both as an issue to be taken into account in the field of security sector reform and for CSOs to explore ways in which they could address this on a local level, which is an aspect of counter-terrorism policy that has not much been dealt with. On the other hand, the authors do focus on the 'responsibility to protect', which is also a concept developed in the last decade. But since the 'responsibility to protect' is mostly linked to international humanitarian interventions, this seems to be too broad a topic to address in a report that mainly tackles local civil society needs. It puts the protection of human rights on a par with the humanitarians obligation of the international community to act to prevent human rights violations, which is not that much of a local necessity, but more a general and international duty. Besides that, the concept has been the topic of debate for years, and it still is not clear whether this responsibility exists and if so, whether it is accepted in international law as a justification to be override the UN Charter.

At first sight, the report seems well-structured and it appears that the right topics are discussed to reach the goal stated in the preface. I would argue however that the detailed description of the strategies and methodologies is simply too long and partly unnecessary. Most CSOs and NGOs are familiar with research strategies and methodologies, which is why this chapter could have been shortened to allow more space for discussion on ways to improve the credibility and accountability of CSOs. On the other side, the content is highly specific and useful for CSOs that are not yet so familiar with security sector reform and the involvement of civil society in this process. For CSOs which already operate in this field, some of the material in the report might seem superfluous. Overall, the handbook is quite long, in content and size, and therefore it might discourage potential readers.

The strength of this handbook lies in the great number of examples used to illustrate the problems that arise when the role of civil society is ignored in the security sector reform process.

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Also, a lot of the sources used correspond to highly respected organizations that are known to be competent authorities in these matters. Among these sources are the United Nations, DCAF itself, international human rights organizations or international law authorities.

After reading this report, it is obvious that CSOs have, and should make use of, the opportunity to act as a bridge between civil society and the security sector. It gives a good overview of what the necessary steps are to give civil society a greater voice in the process of security sector reform. Therefore, this report is very suitable to use for all kinds of CSOs. However, expectations should not be too high if you are looking for fresh insights or an update about the latest developments in terms of security policies. This publication constitutes a good synopsis of the changes that security sector institutions should implement and a decent handbook for CSOs that are less specialized in security issues.



Analysis of the Scope of the Missions of the European Security and Defence Policy

Marija Đelić

During the second half of 2008 the author was an intern at CCMR.

Merlingen, M. and Ostrauskaite, R. (eds.) (2008) *European Security and Defence Policy*. London and New York: Routledge.

Hadžović, D. (2007) *ESDP i Bosna i Hercegovina*. Sarajevo: Centar za sigurnosne studije.

Book Reviews

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) constitutes a relatively new orientation in EU policy. Its improvement is a work in progress and many attempts and mistakes have been made, but it is playing an increasingly important role in the cooperation between EU countries and the rest of the world. Since the ESDP is a field that still has not been fully explored, the efforts by the authors of this book to draw conclusions from the most important missions undertaken within the ESDP is worthy of praise. The added value of this publication is that most authors have based their analysis on practical experiences which they gained through direct involvement in ESDP operations.

The book is divided into several chapters which cover the historical development of this policy and the analysis of the missions in different countries. In the opening chapter, apart from an overview of the chronological development of this policy, the authors highlight the factors which have had a crucial influence on the development of the ESDP, from its inception to the present day. The causes behind the development of the instruments under the ESDP are explained in the wider context of common foreign and security policies. In the following chapters, the authors introduce the reader to the missions and operations that were launched under the auspices of the ESDP in Bosnia, Macedonia, Congo, Georgia and Indonesia. Each one of the authors of those findings has made noticeable efforts to present the full life-cycle of an operation and to assess both the limits of and the scope of

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

BOOK REVIEWS

the practical implementation of the ESDP. The last chapters of this publication offer an overview of the reactions to ESDP operations, more specifically reactions from both the local public from the regions in which the missions were active and the international institutions.

One important contribution of this book is the attempt by the participants in the various missions to make a self-assessment of their own

achievements, with the necessary amount of self-criticism and without censorship. Convincingly and based on a wealth of data (some empirical, some taken from official reports), the authors have presented the problems which some missions experienced. The unpopular effect of freezing projects which were running their course due to the expiry of the missions' mandate is particularly emphasized. Most authors underline the rivalry between the main EU bodies – the Council and the Commission – in the battle for assuming direct authority and control over the activities of the ESDP missions, as the ESDP's key weakness. In spite of the fact that these bodies have found temporary and compromise solutions for each one of those missions, these solutions cannot be regarded as rules, because they are valid for specific cases only and differ from mission to mission.

The ESDP missions that were or still are present in the Balkans are seen in the countries of the region as a potential opportunity for accelerated progress towards joining the EU or at least as an encouraging sign from the EU in so doing. Although these missions' contribution to creating stability in the Balkan countries cannot be ignored, this book overlooks other factors that have contributed to the cumulative improvement in those countries' development. The assessment of the missions' efficiency and effectiveness presented in this section of the book is incomplete because it lacks evaluations made by local institutions, i.e. "the users" and those sections of society which are particularly interested in these subjects.





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One of the rare, and therefore brave, attempts to present the cooperation between the ESDP and the countries to which its missions are connected is the publication “ESDP and Bosnia and Herzegovina” by Denis Hadžović, from the Centre for Security Studies from Sarajevo. This publication introduces the subject of relations between the local countries and the EU through an informative presentation of the EU missions in Bosnia. However, the largest part of the book is dedicated to a descriptive presentation of the ESDP’s development from an idea to a gigantic instrument of the EU. The author also leaves room for addressing the evaluation of the ESDP missions’ results in this region in future publications. This shortcoming, which is present in both books, highlights some of the weaknesses of the ESDP missions, such as the insufficient openness of the bureaucracy that governs the missions towards the local media and institutions of civil society of the country where the mission is based. Greater openness and availability of information is necessary in order to provide a meaningful analysis of the missions’ results. In the first book, success is primarily analyzed from the perspective of contributions to the development of ESDP policy. Each successful or unsuccessful mission represents a test for the EU and the ESDP and generates their progress, and the conclusions about the missions are based on that progress.

To conclude, we commend the first book for openly presenting the obstacles that the ESDP missions have faced in their work so far, and also for the overview of the way in which they have overcome them. The readers might be glad to know that the authors chose to include information about the missions that are still active and which they were able to collect up until the date of publication in the book. What deserves special praise are the suggestions on how to better analyze the situation in the regions where a mission is to be set up and the ways in which the mission can adapt to present needs. In addition to that, the new instruments of the ESDP which result from the changes that occurred in the development of the ESDP, are supported by examples of events which caused their establishment. The analysis of the scope of the ESDP presented in this publication however lacks reference to the co-dependency between the ESDP institutions and distinction between their authorities. It also fails to provide a full analysis of EU member countries’ different attitudes towards the results of the ESDP and the importance of its existence.

*Translated from Serbian to English language by
Teodora Borić*

Instructions for the authors

Western Balkans Security Observer is a magazine established by the academic community of the Belgrade School of Security Studies. The papers that we publish in this magazine deal with regional security issues, but they also focus on national and global security problems. The editors especially encourage papers which question the security transformations from an interdisciplinary perspective and which combine different theoretical starting points. A special column is dedicated to reviews of the newest sources from the fields of security studies, political sciences, international relations and other related scientific disciplines.

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
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