

Shaping U.S. Policy on Africa: Pillars of a New Strategy

by Johnnie Carson

Key Points

Africa is in danger of slipping further on the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities because of Washington's preoccupation with Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, and the war on terrorism. Yet Africa is a growing source of petroleum and raw materials, an important trading partner, and an enormous untapped market for American investment.

The continent faces some serious problems and remains outside the mainstream of economic globalization and wide digital connectivity. Failure to address these problems will only increase the need for American assistance and involvement. With more focused U.S. engagement, Africa can become a stronger partner in addressing costly regional crises and mitigating global terrorism.

The next administration has an opportunity to refocus U.S. engagement in Africa and articulate a policy that reflects American interests, values, and priorities. Such policy can leverage U.S. influence and enhance its image in Africa while boosting the continent's economic development and political stability. This policy should rest on seven pillars:

- strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law
- encouraging economic reform and growth
- building partnerships in the global war on terrorism
- combating the HIV/AIDS epidemic
- expanding American trade and investment
- helping to prevent and resolve conflicts
- fostering regional integration.

It is also critical that Washington's relationship with various African states and leaders not be viewed narrowly or exclusively through the prism of the growing U.S. concern with combating global terrorism.

In the four decades since most African states achieved independence, the continent has never been a foreign policy priority for the United States. During the early years of American engagement with Africa, Washington focused its attention on preventing communist countries from gaining major military bases or monopolistic concessions over any of the continent's important strategic minerals. Although the United States provided large amounts of development assistance and food aid to a number of African states, most American interest and support was directed toward African countries and leaders who were regarded as Cold War allies. In those countries still struggling for independence, the United States usually supported African insurgents who were pro-Western and anticommunist in their orientation. In South Africa and Namibia, Washington generally professed great sympathy for eventual majority rule and independence but largely supported the status quo out of fear that liberation groups allied with the Soviet Union or China would win power in any political transition.

Throughout much of this era, scant attention was paid to promoting multiparty democracy, encouraging good human rights practices, or fighting corruption. With the appointment of Congressman Andrew Young as United Nations (UN) Ambassador, President Jimmy Carter energized America's engagement on the continent. With the British government, the Carter administration pushed for a UN-sponsored solution to Namibia's independence struggle and a diplomatic settlement of Rhodesia's 15-year-long unilateral declaration of independence. President Carter's creation of a new Department of State Bureau of Human Rights also gave greater prominence to the

issue of torture and physical abuses in Africa. However, notwithstanding these positive developments, protecting America's pro-Western partners in Africa (such as Mobutu Sese Seko in the Congo, Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, and William Tolbert in Liberia) remained far more important than promoting democratic values, good governance, and improved human rights around the continent.

During the Reagan administration, State Department officials spent substantial time on Africa, but the widely contested administration policy of constructive engagement concentrated largely on achieving independence for Namibia and resolving the problems of apartheid in South Africa in a manner that would limit Soviet advances in southern Africa. Outside of southern Africa, Reagan and his successor, George H.W. Bush, continued to support pro-Western states and leaders while giving relatively short shrift to the rest of the continent and to issues such as democracy, human rights, and corruption.

In 1992, Bill Clinton came into office with a commitment to elevate U.S. involvement and interest in Africa. With two successful Presidential visits and numerous Cabinet-level trips to the continent, President Clinton inaugurated a new focus on Africa and elevated official U.S. involvement with the continent to a historically high level. In 8 years, the Clinton administration launched dozens of new programs and initiatives on the continent, including:

- creation of the African Crisis Response Initiative to help train African peacekeepers
- passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act
 - a major program for the education of girls
 - implementation of a "Safe Skies for Africa" aviation and security program

- expansion of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) prevention programs
- establishment of bilateral commissions with South Africa (led by Vice President Al Gore), the South African Development Coordination Conference, and the Economic Community of West African States.

Despite its activism, the Clinton State Department team was frequently accused of abandoning its principles in favor of a new breed of young African leaders, even if these leaders did not pursue policies of good governance and human rights.

During the past 3 years, the George W. Bush administration has retreated from the activism and engagement of the Clinton years. Although both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell have visited Africa and met with dozens of African leaders in Washington,¹ the Bush administration has concentrated on implementing two ambitious programs: one on the prevention and spread of HIV/AIDS, and the other on the establishment of a new mechanism for channeling foreign assistance to some of the poorest nations in Africa—the Millennium Challenge Account. As the Bush administration concludes its term, the evolution and development of these programs are being watched, and it is too soon to predict whether they will be successful or enduring.

Today, we have moved into a new global paradigm, and the need for an overarching set of principles that focuses U.S. engagement in Africa is essential to advance key American strategic priorities. As the United States approaches the 2004 Presidential election, public officials and policy thinkers across the political spectrum have an opportunity to think seriously about reshaping policy and building it around seven core values.

Democracy and Law

Africa's democratic track record has been spotty throughout much of its postcolonial history. The absence of democracy and the rule of law has been a primary reason for the civil strife, military conflict, and appalling human rights abuses that have plagued the continent.

In the last decade, Africa has made impressive strides in establishing more responsible

and representative governments. Military coups and extralegal changes of government have decreased in frequency, especially in the larger African states. More than half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa now have democratic governments, and in the last 5 years, 6 major countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Senegal) have held successful multiparty elections that have resulted in peaceful and orderly changes of government. The African Union, the continent-wide organization that represents most African states, has made democracy and good governance a higher priority and passed a resolution prohibiting the seating of any government that comes to power through a military coup or extralegal transfer of power.

Nevertheless, several large holes remain in the democratic canvas of Africa, and much remains to be done to promote and strengthen democracy on the continent. Far too many major countries remain outside of the demo-

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cratic framework. Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, two of the largest and most populous states, are not yet democratic and are struggling to emerge from long periods of authoritarian rule, civil war, and serious human rights abuses. In other parts of Africa—the Republic of Guinea, Togo, Zimbabwe—aging and autocratic leaders hang on to power. Democratic institutions in Madagascar, Malawi, and Zambia remain fragile and subject to destructive political manipulation and coercion. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and its largest democracy, is also confronted with deep cleavages between north and south, Christian and Muslim, a relatively small and politically corrupt elite and a growing number of impoverished and alienated citizens. Any one of these issues could boil over and bring Nigerian democracy to the breaking point. In the pivotal Central African state of Uganda, a return to full democracy has been

stalled for the last decade because of the reluctance of President Yoweri Museveni to permit a rapid and complete return to genuine multiparty politics.

Strengthening democratic institutions is vital. The United States has spent a great deal of time promoting elections, which, although essential to the democratic process, are not as important as a strong and robust judicial system. The pivotal role of the judiciary in creating an enabling environment for the development of democracy can no longer be ignored or minimized in efforts to promote democracy in Africa. An effective judiciary protects the civil liberties and human rights of individuals and interprets the constitution and laws. More needs to be done in this area. To fortify Africa's democratic gains, additional money and attention should be directed to strengthening its weak judicial systems, expanding the training of magistrates and judges, encouraging professional legal associations, and promoting legal aid societies.


The promotion of democracy, the rule of law, good human rights practices, and free and impartial elections should be cornerstones of what the United States does in Africa, regardless of other American interests and concerns.

The Economy

Africa is a continent of great mineral wealth and agricultural potential, but economic growth and prosperity have proven extremely elusive for most states. According to the World Bank, Africa remains the poorest continent and the least integrated into the world economy—with slow growth rates, declining levels of per capita income, limited capital markets, and relatively small international and interregional trade flows. Many of these deficiencies are the result of bad economic and financial policies, bloated and inefficient government bureaucracies, and an overreliance on state-run marketing boards and cooperatives. In addition, many of the countries blessed with great mineral and oil wealth have squandered it. Substantial mineral earnings have frequently resulted in massive corruption and have often sparked political conflicts and civil war rather than economic growth and national prosperity. Diamonds, for example, have fueled civil wars in Angola, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sierra Leone. Great oil wealth has resulted in violent

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Continent of Africa



Oil Production

	Barrels per day
Nigeria	2,256,000
Algeria	1,520,000
Libya	1,429,000
Angola	742,400
Congo (Brazzaville)	275,000
Sudan	209,100
South Africa	196,200
Equatorial Guinea	181,400
Democratic Republic of the Congo	24,000
Ghana	7,000

Source: *The World Factbook 2004* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004); available online at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>. Production numbers based on 2001 estimates.

conflict and recurring political tensions in Angola, Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria.

In the last decade, many African countries have started to change, and some critical reforms have been undertaken. A growing number of governments have adopted World Bank and International Monetary Fund reforms, privatized inefficient state-owned industries, floated currencies, and allowed the market to play a greater role in the economies of their countries. Governments have also become more aggressive in seeking better terms of trade, creating better conditions for their business

communities, and courting foreign investment. If African countries are to realize long-term economic objectives, the United States must continue to encourage their governments to eliminate corruption and pursue economic policy reforms while using donor assistance more effectively.

In a bold and widely applauded move, the Bush administration in March 2002 announced a new initiative to double the foreign aid budget by 2006 and to channel the additional funds through a new organization called the Millennium Challenge Account (since renamed the

Millennium Challenge Corporation [MCC]). MCC funds would be directed toward countries that are governing justly, investing in people, and encouraging economic freedom. The Millennium Challenge Corporation announced the first 16 countries eligible for grants in May 2004. Eight of the 16 countries were in Africa, which surprised many people given the stiff criteria that had been put in place. (According to outside researchers and knowledgeable officials in the State Department, only 3 African countries came close to qualifying under the 16

Gross Domestic Product

	In billions \$US
South Africa	456.70
Nigeria	110.80
Sudan	70.75
Ethiopia	48.47
Ghana	44.49
Uganda	36.10
Democratic Republic of the Congo	35.62
Kenya	33.09
Tanzania	21.58
Mozambique	21.23
Angola	20.59
Namibia	13.72
Chad	10.86
Rwanda	10.11
Liberia	3.26

Source: *The World Factbook 2004* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004); available online at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

specific performance indicators that MCC identified in the first year of the program.)

The Millennium Challenge Corporation is a valuable new tool, but it is evolving slowly and will affect only a limited number of countries. Many development experts are deeply concerned that its growth and success will mean the decline of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), its funding, and its direct involvement on the ground in Africa in promoting critical aid programs. Others are concerned that the Bush administration may never fulfill its multiyear, multibillion-dollar financial commitments to the MCC.

To help the majority of African states, MCC resources should not become a substitute for USAID and its work. Traditional funding for that agency must remain in place and not decline. To accelerate African growth and development, the United States should also extend the benefits of the successful African Growth and Opportunity Act, expand debt forgiveness programs, and introduce more regional investment funds to encourage the growth of the private sector. The United States also needs to encourage greater trilateral private-public partnerships through the creation of endowed U.S.-host country development foundations, especially in those states where

mineral and petroleum companies have a major stake and can play a vital role.

The road to sustained and long-term economic growth in Africa will not be found in donor assistance and development aid alone. A robust, free market economy, based on equitable trading relationships and foreign investment, and coupled with the strategic use of foreign assistance, is the best way to achieve sustained economic growth and stability. The United States should redouble its efforts to encourage African governments to follow this path.

Terrorism

Global terrorism is the most serious national security threat to the United States and is one of the problems shared with Africans. The same terrorist group that destroyed the World Trade Center struck with equally deadly force in East Africa 3 years earlier. On August 7, 1998, U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were severely damaged in well-orchestrated al Qaeda attacks. The Nairobi bombing resulted in over 200 deaths and more than 5,000 wounded. Since the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, new attacks and terrorist actions have been perpetrated in Africa against Israeli and other Western interests.

Future terrorism in Africa is almost certain. Africa is a soft target, and most African states lack the security necessary to prevent well-coordinated terrorist attacks. This fact—coupled with the existence of several failed or weakened

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states in various parts of the continent with significant Muslim populations, the rise of conservative Islam in northern Nigeria (the most populous state in Africa and the eighth largest Muslim state in the world), and the continued growth and spread of Islam throughout much of west, central, and northeastern Africa—could see Africa emerge in the months and years ahead as a new regional battleground in the war on terrorism. Conservative and sometimes radical Islamic organizations have been

able to make enormous headway among Muslim populations in some African states affected by poverty, economic deprivation, and political alienation. This has happened outside of Africa, and it can also happen on the continent. It is in the interest of both Africa and the United States to prevent this, but it can only be stopped through strong collaborative efforts, not through unilateral action.

The United States has introduced two new antiterrorism programs in Africa—the Pan Sahel Initiative (to help Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger deal with terrorism in West Africa) and the East African Counter Terrorism program (aimed largely at helping Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania). These programs are primarily intended to strengthen the security forces and border control in the recipient countries. However, preventing and detecting terrorism in Africa will require robust and successful economic and social programs, not only new military security initiatives. If the United States is going to make headway against emerging terrorism in Africa, it will have to spend more money to strengthen its development assistance programs, diplomatic representation, and public diplomacy in those states where radical fundamentalism may take root.

HIV/AIDS

The most serious challenge facing Africa is AIDS. If the syndrome is allowed to go unchecked, Africa will never realize its dream of economic prosperity and democratic stability. The magnitude of the AIDS problem is without precedent in the era of modern medicine, and Africa has been hit hardest. With roughly 700 million people, Africa has only 10 percent of the global population, but it has nearly two-thirds of the world's 40 million AIDS cases. Most of the top 15 countries in the world affected by HIV/AIDS are African. In Botswana and Swaziland, HIV infection rates hover close to 40 percent, and in South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, 20 percent or more of the people are infected.

The situation in Kenya is not untypical of many other African countries. As a result of the AIDS epidemic, it is estimated that 36 Kenyans die every hour, 864 every day, 6,048 every week, 24,192 every month, and 290,304 every year.² The situation throughout Africa is equally grim. On the continent as a whole, nearly 3,000 people die every day because of this disease, and in some African countries, the

sheer size of the problem defies imagination. The dying frequently leave behind another burgeoning problem: orphans. More than 11 million orphans live in sub-Saharan Africa, and that number is expected to double by the end of this decade.

The United States has taken the lead among Western governments in providing funding and assistance to fight AIDS in Africa. Working through the Centers for Disease Control, USAID, the National Institutes of Health, and the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit, the U.S. Government has established a number of prevention programs built around information, education, counseling, and voluntary testing. The Bush administration has launched an initiative that would provide \$15 billion in additional funding over 5 years to some of the most severely impacted African and Caribbean states. This program includes a significant amount of funding for the purchase of anti-retrovirals. It is critical that this program be fully funded and implemented and that conservative American religious beliefs and moral attitudes do not limit the fight to stop AIDS.

Focusing on abstinence alone will not succeed. Organizations promoting condom use as a responsible behavior should be financed as well. Moreover, while it is extremely important to make antiretroviral drugs more readily available at affordable prices, it must be remembered that those countries that have made progress to date in reducing HIV infection rates have relied on four principles to do so: strong leadership from the president, the cabinet, and other influential national leaders; a broad-based and sustained information and education campaign; the availability of counseling and testing centers where people can find out their HIV status; and a willingness to talk openly about, and change, fundamental cultural traditions and habits that may unwittingly foster HIV/AIDS. The United States can help African leaders pursue these four principles by the provision of more antiretrovirals and expanded financing for the global fund for AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. But most importantly, America must remain a strong and unrelenting partner to all those fighting HIV/AIDS.

American Trade

The importance of Africa as a critical economic partner is often denigrated; however, nothing could be further from the truth,

especially in the oil and gas sector. Africa supplies just over 15 percent of U.S. fuel imports and the majority of its low sulfur "sweet" crude. African production is expected to rise dramatically over the next 10 years, and African petroleum exports to the United States will increase from 15 to 25 percent.

Output in Nigeria, the largest oil-producing country on the continent, is continuing to expand, but production in other parts of West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea are on the threshold of enormous growth. Angola, for example, is slated to increase its production from 750,000 barrels a day to nearly 2 million in the next 5 years, and Equatorial Guinea, which produced no petroleum a few years ago, will shortly become one of the most significant producers in the region. Many experts argue that Africa is the hottest oil region in the world and that with the increasing turbulence in the Middle East, African crude will become an even more prized commodity.

While Africa is not one of the largest U.S. trading partners, commerce with sub-Saharan Africa is consistently greater than it is with Russia and the other 14 states of the former Soviet Union. For American companies that manufacture products such as airplanes, diesel locomotives, electric generators, computers, and high-tech medical equipment, Africa has been a larger export market than many in Eastern Europe or some other parts of the developing world. Approximately 100,000 American jobs are directly linked to exports to Africa. If Africa continues to grow and prosper economically, American exports to that continent are also likely to expand. It is important to ensure that American companies and products are able to get into the market and have a level playing field when they do.

To promote greater trade and investment in Africa, U.S. institutions concerned with trade and commercial finance should increase activities there. The Department of Commerce, Export Import Bank, and Overseas Private Investment Corporation must look for more ways to encourage and support American commerce through the expansion of trade missions, commercial offices, and information and support for American businesses. Despite the dedicated work of a few individuals in each of these agencies, none have developed coherent strategies or developed consistent programs that remain in place from one administration to the next. The United States should extend and expand the legislative life of the African

The HIV/AIDS Epidemic

	Percentage of Population Living with HIV/AIDS
Botswana	33.8
Zimbabwe	33.7
Swaziland	33.4
Lesotho	31.0
Namibia	22.5
Zambia	21.5
South Africa	20.1
Malawi	15.0
Kenya	15.0
Mozambique	13.0
Central African Republic	12.9
Cameroon	11.8
Djibouti	11.7
Côte d'Ivoire	9.7
Liberia	9.0

Source: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), *Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic* (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2002).

Growth and Opportunity Act and create several regional investment funds to encourage entrepreneurial activity. An aggressive business partnership with Africa should go hand in hand with a meaningful development assistance program.

Conflict

As demonstrated tragically in the Darfur region of Sudan, political strife and civil conflict continue to plague a number of African countries, setting back economic development and causing enormous loss of life and destruction. While the sources of these conflicts are most often local, the United States and other members of the international community are frequently drawn in to provide emergency assistance, peacekeepers, or conflict mediation when events spin out of control. Experience has shown that when early and decisive action is not taken to help resolve a dispute, the problem can turn destructive, resulting in the loss of hundreds and thousands of lives and the expenditure of millions of dollars.

Islam in Africa

	Population	Number of Muslims	Percentage Muslim
Nigeria	137,253,133	66,940,852	50
Ethiopia	67,851,281	33,278,777	50
Democratic Republic of the Congo	58,317,930	5,662,504	10
South Africa	42,718,530	885,374	2
Sudan	39,148,162	26,679,912	70
Tanzania	36,588,225	12,572,859	35
Kenya	32,021,856	3,163,909	10
Uganda	26,404,543	4,101,247	16
Ghana	20,757,032	3,321,125	16
Mozambique	18,811,731	3,762,346	20
Mali	11,956,788	10,761,109	90
Senegal	10,852,147	10,201,018	94
Chad	9,538,544	4,719,281	51
Sierra Leone	5,883,889	3,439,609	60
Liberia	3,390,653	678,127	20

Sources: *The World Factbook 2004* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004), available online at <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>>; and *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 1 (January–February 2004), 80.

Rwanda is a case in point. On April 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda, an ethnic Hutu, was killed when a missile shot down his plane shortly before landing at Kigali airport. Government officials and military leaders immediately accused the rival Tutsi ethnic group of perpetrating the crime. Over the next several days, senior government officials and the national radio station fanned the flames of ethnic hatred, and within weeks, organized armed gangs swept across Rwanda, killing Tutsis and moderate Hutus by the thousands. By mid-June, 800,000 Tutsis had been killed, and thousands of others injured and displaced.

As Rwanda descended into anarchy, the United States and the rest of the international community watched—until the tragedy became so great that the Cable News Network and British Broadcasting Corporation made it impossible to ignore any longer. In late July 1994, the United States launched the largest humanitarian relief operation ever undertaken in Central Africa. But the damage had already been done.

An aggressive policy of conflict mitigation could have stopped the genocide in Rwanda. When the president's plane was shot

down, a UN peacekeeping force was in Rwanda monitoring a fragile cease-fire between rebel Tutsi forces and government troops. However, when the Canadian UN force commander asked for reinforcements of several hundred men and approximately 15 armored personnel carriers, the UN Security

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Council balked and delayed, largely because of American maneuvering and reluctance. In Washington, senior officials, operating in the shadow of the flawed UN operation in Somalia and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, held numerous meetings to discuss the financial implications to the United States of a new UN operation in Central Africa and to argue, somewhat bizarrely, whether the events occurring in Rwanda were actually genocide. In New York, the United States and other Security Council members delayed the

requests for equipment and reinforcements while engaging in interminable debates about “exit strategies” that would limit UN involvement and U.S. engagement.

By the time the United Nations agreed to send American-made armored personnel carriers to Rwanda, nearly one million people, close to a tenth of Rwanda's population, had been killed. Another two and a half million people had become refugees in the eastern Congo and western Tanzania. The genocide also sparked a regional humanitarian and political crisis. The movement into the eastern Congo of Rwanda's Hutu-dominated military, which had been responsible for overseeing much of the bloodletting, created a chaotic situation throughout the Congo and resulted in a massive civil war involving the armies of over a half a dozen neighboring or near neighboring states.

The genocide in Rwanda and its aftermath should serve as a constant reminder of why conflict mitigation should remain at the center of the U.S. policy focus in Africa. American leadership can often make a difference in saving lives, mobilizing resources, and galvanizing international support to deal with some of the most intractable problems on the continent.

The Bush administration has led the effort to find a peaceful resolution to the long-running conflict between Khartoum and southern secessionists in the Sudan, backing up a strong diplomatic campaign with critical financial and political support. Unfortunately, the spread of fighting and the emergence of ethnic cleansing have forced the eviction of tens of thousands of local villagers throughout the Darfur region in western Sudan. The upsurge in violence in Darfur also threatens to imperil progress along the North-South divide of Sudan and raises the specter of escalating confrontation between the United States, Khartoum, and the larger international community. Elsewhere, the United States engaged tepidly and with great reluctance in Liberia in 2003, helping to shore up critical African support for that country and preventing the situation from spinning totally out of control.

Those are not the only flash points on the continent today where a trilateral U.S., African, and UN partnership is required. In Central Africa, armed conflicts continue to a varying degree in Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, and northern Uganda. In west

Africa, Côte d'Ivoire has been torn apart by ethnic clashes that remain unresolved. In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe has singlehandedly destroyed his country and brought it to the edge of civil war. The United States needs to follow through on its professed commitment to help prevent or mitigate regional conflicts. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (September 2002) commits the Nation to working with European allies, capable countries in Africa, and regional organizations to address instability and transnational threats. In most of these situations, however, Washington has remained largely on the sidelines—watching rather than employing its diplomatic muscle or working aggressively in concert with others to mitigate these disputes. If the United States chooses to remain on the periphery of these conflicts, the prospects for future Rwandas, Liberias, and Sierra Leones are high. New American initiatives and aggressive support for the creation of the African Union's standby force and the establishment of robust (and mobile) sub-regional peacekeeping units would enhance African stability and help deter serious conflict.

Integration

Many African states are too small or geographically disadvantaged to be economically viable. But by establishing broader regional linkages, many of them can reduce artificial trade barriers, expand financial and commercial markets, and improve economic prospects. They also can foster stronger political links and reduce cross-border frictions with neighbors. This type of integration has been effective in Eastern and Central Europe in paving the way for the expansion of the European Union and in linking countries more closely economically and politically.

The United States is strong politically, economically, and militarily because 50 states of various sizes and wealth have been molded into a single unit. Europe has learned that lesson and is now fashioning a new, stronger, and more peaceful continent with over 25 states. At the root of regional integration is the belief that if nations communicate regularly in an established forum, they will settle their differences peacefully and will also look for mutually beneficial ways to improve their countries and the

lives of citizens. The value of regional integration is a useful lesson for Africa to learn and a good one for the United States to promote.

A number of regional organizations exist in Africa, such as the Southern African Development Community, the Economic Community of West African States, the Economic Community of East and Southern Africa, and the East African Community. The United States

it is in U.S. interests to encourage and support African states that are moving toward greater democracy

needs to nurture and encourage these and other regional institutions throughout Africa to help them achieve the economic, social, and political advantages that have been achieved in the European community, Canada, and the United States.

To promote and protect long-term U.S. interests in Africa and to help encourage a stronger and more vibrant partnership with Africa as a whole, Washington must put in place effective strategies that simultaneously advance its interests and those of Africa. Equally important, the mistakes of the past must not be repeated. No matter how critical the war on terrorism is, that issue cannot become a litmus test for the U.S. relationship with key African states. Nor should leaders who support the United States in this war be allowed to use that support to blackmail Washington into overlooking egregious violations of civil liberties, major shortfalls in good governance, or serious bouts of corruption. In the war on terrorism, as in the

war on poverty, it is in U.S. interests to encourage and support African states that are moving toward greater democracy, the rule of law, and economic growth and openness. Development assistance programs and funding must be expanded significantly throughout Africa, embracing new programmatic models and partnerships such as foundations and public-private partnerships. Support for sound political principles, robust economic assistance, and more open markets can help generate political stability, economic growth and reform, and better partners in combating transnational threats, including terrorism. These goals can be achieved only by establishing a consistent and comprehensive policy based on both sound principles and a strong partnership. The seven pillars presented above do that—for Africans as well as Americans.

Notes

¹ The White House reports that George W. Bush has actually met with more African leaders than President Clinton over a comparable period of time.

² *The Daily Nation* (Nairobi, Kenya), November 30, 2003.

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(No. 197, April 2003)

Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept

Richard L. Kugler

(No. 196, December 2002)

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