

Studien zu Zeitgeschichte
und Sicherheitspolitik

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14

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**6th International
Security Forum**

Proceedings of the Conference

Peter Lang

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Preface

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is pleased to present the proceedings of the 6th International Security Forum (ISF). The 6th ISF was held from 4–6 October 2004 at the Convention Centre in Montreux.

The ISF, which is sponsored by the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, is an official Swiss government contribution to the Partnership for Peace Programme. The conference is biennial and held alternately in Zurich and Geneva.

The International Security Forum, which was originally launched as the Institutes and Security Dialogue in Zurich in 1994, has since then become a key event in Swiss co-operation within the Partnership for Peace framework and beyond. Designed as a platform for discussion among the 500 international security professionals, civil servants, diplomats, military, academics, and representatives of non-governmental organizations, the ISF searched to increase communication and collaboration in research related to international security.

Though not having an overarching topic in 2004, the ISF closely matched the issues discussed to the current security political developments, most of all to the enlargement of the European Union and NATO as well as to the results of the NATO Summit in Istanbul. Moreover, the focus will be put on the future of international and transatlantic security co-operation, above all of the Partnership for Peace, as well as on Human Security, combating terrorism and the future of modern information technologies in the international security co-operation.

The ISF consisted of two plenary sessions and six topic sessions covering the issues pointed out above. In addition, the second day of the conference convened six sessions of parallel workshops, twenty four over 150 speakers. Overall 150 speakers were invited to express their views on the numerous aspects of today's international security challenges.

More than 500 participants from all over the world attended these different sessions, and the organizers had to turn down a lot of other interested people. Within the framework of these workshops, the main

partner institutions to the ISF, next to DCAF, were the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva (HEI), the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETHZ) and the International Relations and Security Network (ISN). They all held panel discussions dealing with the areas of their expertise. With the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, two new partners came in to organise panels in their own names.

Theodor H. Winkler
Anja H. Ebnöther
Ernst M. Felberbauer

Welcome Address

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Participants at the 6th ISF,

I would like to welcome you most cordially to Montreux and to Switzerland.

The setting of security policy has changed rapidly over the last years. As we face new challenges and even threats, the debate on policies and strategy is not only particularly lively but also especially important.

Switzerland continues its efforts in favour of security, stability and peace with a wide range of instruments, including inter alia contributions to peace support operations, good offices, development cooperation and disaster relief, as well as by supporting the work of the three Geneva Centres.

This International Security Forum is among the largest conferences in Europe covering a broad spectrum of issues of security policy. The Forum offers a unique platform for international security collaboration for experts from all over the world.

This year's International Security Forum focuses on human security, the democratization of the security sector and the fight against terrorism. The participation of well-known experts from government, international organizations, think tanks, universities, defence academies and non-governmental organizations promises an outstanding level of discussion and deliberation over the coming days.

The Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports has requested the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces to organize the 6th ISF. DCAF is ideally positioned to stimulate the exchange of knowledge and improve networking between the participants.

I thank you for coming to Montreux and for your efforts toward finding solutions to the challenges of the 21st century, involving the most diverse branches of security policy, and I wish you a most successful – and also enjoyable – 6th International Security Forum.



Samuel Schmid
Federal Councillor

Head of the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports

Introduction

Dear Participants,

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is proud to host the 6th International Security Forum (ISF) on behalf of the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

The end of the Cold War, the enlargement of both the European Union and NATO, 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have profoundly transformed the threats and challenges with which the international community has to cope. In Europe, old dividing lines have faded away. Transatlantic relations remain, though uneasy, if not strained. Not only the world economy, but also terrorism and organized international crime have become globalized. Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations is haunting us and needs to be replaced by the enemy from within. Human security has decreased in many quarters of the world. Migration is on the rise. Never before have there been so many refugees.

In this new strategic environment, national security and foreign policy strategies have to be redefined everywhere. Flexibility, transformation, and the ability to find integrated answers to the multifaceted new threats are the watchwords of the day. Yet such a reshaping of policies requires a close look at the challenges we are faced with – and even more so at those that may lie around the corner.

The 6th International Security Forum offers to do just that. The conference brings together experts from all relevant disciplines and quarters – from governments and international organizations to the academic world and NGOs. The topics discussed cover a broad range of security relevant issues; from global order to Euro-Atlantic relations, from the relationship of security and development to international humanitarian law, from the global war on terrorism to critical infrastructure protection, from security sector reform and governance to human security, from information technologies to the manifold other Driving forces for globalization, from mine action to small arms. The ISF offers, thus, a platform for comparing notes, for discussion, and for debate that is both unique and crucially important. It is meant to assist the international community in shaping long-term, integrated, and sustainable answers to the new perplexities we all face.

Created in 1994, the ISF has become part of the Swiss contribution to

Partnership for Peace in 1996. It is organized every second year, alternating between Zurich and the region of Lake Geneva.

At each ISF the number of people who would like to attend is growing. This year's meeting brings together some 500 government officials and experts from several hundred institutions and 56 countries. Many more applied, but had – to our great regret – to be turned down because of the logistic and financial limits within which the ISF must operate.

We have, as organizers, tried to offer you a programme that permits you to benefit as much as possible from the rich menu of the 6th ISF. The conference starts and closes with Plenary Sessions in which some of the world's leading experts will provide you with food for thought. Both on the first and the third day, Topic Sessions will permit you to get an integrated picture of the challenges we face in six areas of relevance. The second day, which tables no less than 24 specialized Workshop Sessions, offers you in-depth analysis in the areas and fields of particular interest to you.


You will not be able to profit from all offers, but must make your choice according to your priorities and interests. But: all summaries, reports and speeches will be published on the ISF-website and in the conference proceedings published after the conference. Moreover, a CDROM with all plenary speeches and much of the conference's intellectual harvest will be sent to every conference participant.

Let me thank most warmly our partners in preparing this conference: the Swiss government; the Center for Security Studies and the International Relations and Security Network at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich; the Geneva Centre for Security Policy; the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining; the Graduate Institute for International Studies in Geneva, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Many thanks go also to the outstanding organizing team under Anja H. Ebnöther of DCAF and Major Ernst M. Felberbauer, seconded by the Austrian government. Above all, however, I would like to thank you, the participants for your interest, for the time you have taken to come here to Montreux and for your expertise, insight and wisdom you are going to share with us over the next three days.

It is your input that will make this conference a success.

Welcome to Switzerland, to Montreux, and the 6th International Security Forum.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Theodor H. Winkler". The script is cursive and fluid.

Ambassador Dr. Theodor H. Winkler
Director

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Keynote Addresses

Security Challenges – A Swiss Perspective

Lieutenant General Christophe Keckeis
Chief of the Swiss Armed Forces

It is a great pleasure to be here in Montreux, in the area of the beautiful Lake of Geneva (“Swiss Riviera”). Thank you very much for the invitation. It is an honour to speak to you as the first key-note speaker of the 6th International Security Forum.

The ISF has become a highly reputed platform for the exchange of views among a broad variety of experts and perspectives. You – the participants – are an indication of this. Please accept my sincere appreciation and congratulations – let us hope that this institution will continue to prosper. On this occasion let me also convey the greetings of our Defense Minister, Mr. Samuel Schmid, to you all. He regrets very much not being able to attend the ISF this time.

This leads me to my topic “Security Challenges – a Swiss Perspective”.

The world is rapidly transforming, economically, politically, culturally – and also militarily. Governments, administrations, private companies, societies and their armed forces are struggling with these challenges. The terrible World Wars of the 20th century were followed over many decades by a more or less stable, but tense world and by coexistence. Still, the world was not always peaceful. But somehow we grew accustomed to that situation. Now, the single-dimensional threat of the Cold War has vanished. 1989, and indeed the years before, have brought dramatic changes. The mostly peaceful revolutions all over the globe have radically changed our life. Many people have recognised the chances of this new situation, but there are also some who still do not understand and accept these new challenges.

What are these major changes and challenges we face?

First, the number of players has dramatically increased. There are more countries and international or regional organizations, multinational companies have gained influence, non-government organizations or groups

became more important players and many other non-political factions are part of the overall interaction.

Secondly, the never-ending revolution in information technology facilitates and intensifies these interactions. Thus, views and opinions gain instant access to almost everybody and almost everywhere. All kinds of groups have much more and better means to articulate their objectives, for better or for worse. This, combined with increasing wealth in many parts of the world, has changed societies. As one negative consequence, national egoisms, ego-centric interests and intolerance reign.

Thirdly – and this may sound paradoxical - despite the information revolution, the gap within and between continents, between and among religions and cultures is widening. Standards of living are drifting apart. Despite or because of numerous high-tech developments, societies have become more vulnerable and - I am afraid - will remain so for the foreseeable future. All this enables and encourages extremist groupings to pursue the road of violence instead of dialogue. There are few limits on their ability to destroy or paralyse high-tech societies with low-tech means. Asymmetric conflict is the well known buzz word which has become so familiar in our daily vocabulary and which causes so much concern. The reality of our life is: Terror has become a weapon of politics. Even the threat of use of nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, is an ever “clear and present” danger.

We are not yet prepared – neither mentally, nor administratively, nor organizationally – to deal with or fight those immense and terrible challenges. We all are working hard on these issues – but there is still a long way to go. Societies, ours included, tend to ignore or forget modern threats. Our memories are forgetful and our views become clouded – until events such as New York 9–11 2001 or Madrid 3–11 2004 happen.

Whereas political systems, policies and people’s awareness of security challenges may differ from country to country, some of my concerns are presumably representative for many other armed forces as well.

Armed forces are not operating in an isolated world. They are very often driven – mostly against their will – into those conflicts. More than ever before, soldiers are deployed on Peace Support Operations, often times far abroad and far away from home. This is a new dimension of security applied by governments as well as by international organizations. The Balkans, Afghanistan and many others are examples for this.

At the same time, however, governments demand from their armed forces to be prepared for the at present unlikely, but in the long term still relevant defense tasks at home as well as for all kinds of support to civilian authorities (what we call subsidiary missions). The Swiss Armed Forces are tasked by exactly these three types of mission.

Declining defense budgets and the natural human tendency of down-playing military threats in times of relative peace further complicate the life of a Chief of the Armed Forces. The gap between means and ends widens. This makes it increasingly difficult to fulfill our missions, missions given by the political leadership and by our Constitution (and in the case of Switzerland, I might add, also granted by a public referendum in May 2003 with a 75% plus margin, in favour of the new Armed Forces).

We have to set priorities.

What is our mission in preparing for these future tasks? We have to make clear, understood and transparent to our people that there might be no more threats at the borders of our countries but – at the same time – that there are no more borders to threats. Risks and dangers have become as globalised as our economy and common life.

I observe that many people – not just in Switzerland – still believe that the job of the military is exclusively to fight enemy tanks and aircraft. This is simply not true. The military has always changed and adapted to new developments of potential enemies. New weapons have been answered by newer counter-weapons.

The idea that armed forces should only fight armed forces betrays an old mindset. Why should today armies not adapt to the challenges caused by terrorism? This could be done in cooperation with police forces. Armed forces are well equipped with tools to fight terrorist forces – on their own or in a subsidiary role with police forces.

Take the example of military forces standing guard during the recent Summer Olympics in and around Greece. Who else should have guarded the skies with AWACS surveillance aircraft and the seas with air, surface and subsurface forces? Last year, not far from here and across the Lake of Geneva, French and Swiss armed forces successfully stood watch and guarded the G8 summit, including with fighter aircraft. During the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, we provide protection in a similar mission. This too, are other new types of mission which can only be

accomplished by the military, even though – and rightly so – the forces were and are under civilian democratic control.

Some opponents here and elsewhere assert that the armed forces seek new missions abroad and at home only to gain legitimacy. They suggest that the world has become more secure. This, again, is wrong. Current events prove how mistaken these arguments are. The truth is: We are simply doing the jobs assigned by the political authorities.

It is evident: To be prepared for the traditional defense of one's borders remains an important mission for most of our countries despite the fact that such threats are not likely at present time. But today the term defense has to be seen in a much broader sense. German defense minister Struck once said that the defense of Germany could commence at the Hindukush. This may be an exaggeration by Swiss standards, but the message is clear and – by the way – we, too, have a few of our soldiers working in Afghanistan.

Fighting the threats where they emerge is an option for growth. The more we succeed in containment and prevention of conflict at the origin, the less devastation will reach our countries and our people. And the return on this investment will also be fewer conflicts, fewer wars and less suffering. And it will be a most welcome contribution of solidarity to the international community. This is just one reason why we plan to double our PSO forces within the next 4 years.

The International Security Forum is an excellent platform to exchange such and many other, also divergent, views, on current and future conflicts, on conflict prevention and on nation-building or nation-rebuilding measures. I wish that during the coming hours those issues can be discussed in depth. We can be proud and the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces – through which we make some of our more important PfP contributions – will deserve a sincere “well done”; you all in this audience of course, too.

One last remark. We who represent the military, politicians, think tanks and security experts around the globe assembled in Montreux today tend to understand each other fairly well. Yet, we still have one additional important mission to accomplish. The majority of our citizens do not have that same level of knowledge or experience. They have other backgrounds, other views and a different experience, perhaps other interests as well. It is essential to raise awareness, interest and understanding of the new risks and dangers among these people. Only then will they politically

support those measures that need to be taken and accept that they cost a lot of money.

It is you and me who have to permanently work on this by providing honest and correct information, by using the appropriate language, not propaganda, and by convincing. Our primary audience must be the politicians, the political parties and the press. Because they are the most important transmitters to the public. This must be the essence of our work.

I wish you a rewarding three days of discussions. May there also be sufficient time left to renew old friendships, to establish new ones and to complement your existing networks. This will be a cornerstone of tomorrow's security.

Thank you for your attention and for your warm welcome. A Thank you to DCAF for your hospitality, for your immense preparations and for the excellent organization of the International Security Forum.

Globalization, Human Security and Iraq¹

Jody Williams

Peace Nobel Price Laureate, 1997

For many, globalization immediately brings to mind issues related to the movement of capital and business around the world with little apparent regard for “sovereign borders.” But, as we all know, globalization is not just about economics. Other global linkages seem to be increasing exponentially.

The rapid, mass movements of people, the possibilities of 24-hour access to information from almost limitless sources and points of view, help fuel a global marketplace of ideas, values and ideologies. The lines between issues that have been traditionally seen as domestic (and therefore considered to be of proper concern to the citizens of a nation) and international (and therefore the purview of the nation state) are increasingly blurred.

The spread of knowledge and information, along with the proliferation of advanced technologies, including that of weapons, has serious global implications. As people, ideas and images move with lightening speed around the world, the challenges grow for states to try to predict and manage the outcomes of such interactions.

Because of these linkages, what happens in any one sphere can have an impact on the others – both positive and negative. The implications of political decisions seem more complex than not that long ago. Adapting to these changes is a challenge to us all. Yet in this globalized world, the tendency persists for individuals, institutions and states to try to pick and choose which aspects of globalization are to their liking and ignore the others. Of particular concern are the implications of such decisions for national – and perhaps more importantly – global security. As the world becomes more interconnected, traditional concepts of national security may not work.

1 Some of the core ideas for this speech are from an article entitled “Challenges to the State in the 21st Century: Globalization, Security and the Example of the Invasion of Iraq,” written by Williams for the Spanish magazine *Politica Exterior* (Foreign Policy), #100, July/August 2004.

For example, here I would ask us to consider only a tiny handful of the ramifications of the decision to invade Iraq, in the context of the decision to name actions taken against terrorism and terrorist networks a “war.” For some, these policy decisions demonstrate that relying on traditional national security concepts and discounting other possible international reactions to the exercise can be fraught with peril. Perhaps more serious discussions of a more globalized concept of human security need to be explored.

Security in the Globalized World

With the fall of the Soviet Union and the world no longer divided into two competing camps, some envisioned positive benefits from the unfettered advance of market economies, bringing in their wake global democratization. There were hopes that new attempts to define national security would take place, the number of nuclear weapons would be reduced, and measures to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction enhanced. Standing armies, military budgets, and the global arms trade might be reduced. A “peace dividend” could be applied to resolving some of the intractable problems facing humankind, which would, in turn, make the globe as a whole more secure.

Others took a much more pessimistic view, recognizing that without a deliberate and concerted effort to take a new approach to a changed and changing world, not much would really be different, and any vacuum of power left by the collapse of the Soviet Union would be quickly filled.

During this brief window of high expectations some bold initiatives provided examples of collective solutions to issues of global scope. One was the movement to ban antipersonnel landmines. The landmine campaign has been seen as important not only because it led to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, but also because it provided a successful model of civil society-international institution-government partnership that offered a concrete example of how the global community could work together to resolve common problems. The establishment of the International Criminal Court is another example of such cooperative efforts. Both exemplified the important role civil society can – and in the view of many of us – must play in international issues.

These efforts also highlighted the thinking of some that global security is advanced not by increasing the number of weapons being developed, produced and traded in an already over-weaponized world, but by addressing “human security” needs as a fundamental linchpin upon which the security of us all ultimately rests. We will all be more secure if even the most basic needs of the majority of the planet are met. By providing that majority with a stake in and hope for their own future, the root causes of conflict can be diminished. In this globalized world, many actors can have an impact on outcomes, so addressing issues of concern must be as broadly multilateral as possible. Multilateralism, dialogue, and conflict resolution enhance human security. The use of force is not scorned, but it is recognized as the absolute last resort, employed only if all other methods to resolve conflict have failed.

The human security agenda, however, is seen by others as wishy-washy efforts by “lesser powers” – read perhaps irrelevant – who do not have the military might or the “spine” to deal with “real” security issues. And the model of civil society-government partnership was met with immediate – and ongoing – pressure for states to think and act in more traditional ways, with a reassertion of the view that determining security rests solely with the state.

Against this backdrop, Al Qaeda began to be increasingly recognized as a serious threat. Employing various asymmetrical tools of terror, it has sought to advance its political goals of a changed Middle East free of Western influence. It remained largely unknown to the general public until its willingness to use terror tactics was most horrifically displayed in the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington. Its stated goal of attaining WMD re-focused attention on the problem of the proliferation of such weapons.

Stunned by the carnage on September 11, people around the world were united in their sorrow and disgust at the acts of terror. Support for the people of the United States was at an all-time high. Many hoped the global unity in the aftermath of the attacks would result in a different type of leadership in response. We hoped that governments would work together not only to bring the perpetrators of the attacks to justice and dismantle the terrorist network, but also that there would be serious attempts to begin to address the root causes of the problems that made recruiting for such networks possible.

Old Responses to New Threats and a Few Examples of the Consequences

But the war on terror was launched. And the decision made to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan because of its open support for Al-Qaeda. The result was to be not only their removal and the possible capture of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda leadership, dealing a possibly lethal blow to the terror network, but also the establishment of a stable government in Afghanistan. The country would no longer be a failed state, and breeding ground for terrorism, but set firmly on the road to democracy.

But in the eyes of much of the world, Afghanistan has since been placed on the back burner, and with it the hunt for Bin Laden, as attention turned to Iraq. Afghanistan's future now seems uncertain.

Much of the international community could accept the direct link between military operations against Afghanistan and the attacks in the US on September 11. It is more than fair to say that is not the case with the subsequent decision to invade Iraq. And what are some of the possible consequences arising from that decision?

As we all know, the justification for a pre-emptive strike against Iraq was said to be the immediate threats posed by its WMD, as well as its links to terrorism, and thus the attacks in the US. Even though much of the world – as expressed both by actions in the United Nations as well as the millions who marched in the streets around the globe in opposition to the impending military action – was extremely skeptical of the stated reasons for an invasion and called for more time for UN weapons inspections in Iraq, which had begun to show results, albeit grudging, – the invasion was launched. No WMD have been found. And recently, the US bi-partisan 9/11 Commission confirmed what many had already believed to be true – that there were no links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda.

The justifications for preemption have not panned out. A skeptical world may feel vindicated somehow by the lack of evidence for the primary claims advanced to justify the invasion. But the more important concern for us all should be the consequences.

I am no supporter of the concept of pre-emption. Perhaps others might honestly hold it to be a reasonable security option. But if one does hold that point of view, it would seem the arguments put forth to support pre-emption would have to be open to little doubt or controversy. That

was not the case in Iraq. What precedent has now been set for others to argue preemption – based on flimsy evidence or none at all? And what happens now when there are real and immediate security threats? How much harder will it be to rally support, if and when support is really needed? How hard has it already been to try find support to cope with post-invasion Iraq?

What impact have these policy decisions had on attempts to deal with terrorism? As many have said – if Iraq was not a magnet for terrorists before, it certainly is one now. And who can predict its future? Is the world really a more secure place as a result of the invasion? Is Iraq itself a more secure country? On my way here yesterday from Turkey, I read a columnist who wrote, “With its policies, America has isolated itself, not the terrorists.”

The tremendous support around the world for the people of the United States in response to September 11 has been replaced by unprecedented levels of anti-Americanism. What impact will this have on US security as well as other US policy initiatives? What is its standing now, for much of the world, as a government credibly able to advocate the advancement of democracy and promotion of human rights around the world?

As I just noted, I have come to Montreux from Turkey, where I participated in a four-day international conference on human rights. The conference was opened by the Foreign Minister of the country, and closed by its Prime Minister. It was addressed by representatives of the European Union as well as the US Ambassador to the country.

The response to the US Ambassador was perhaps predictable. When he took the podium, some people stood holding small signs in silent protest. Of the war in Iraq. Of Guantanamo. Of Abu Ghraib. Of the negative impact of the “war on terror” on their work in their own countries to protect human rights. Instead of bringing dignity to Iraqis after years of oppression, the photos of abused and humiliated prisoners have fueled resentment in the region and around the world. Was it unreasonable for people to question the ambassador’s standing to address a conference on human rights at this time? Given the situation, is it unreasonable to wonder how US expressions of concern for human rights anywhere can be taken very seriously? And of course, US military lawyers who have spoken out in defense of the rights of prisoners in Guantanamo have done so in part because of their expressed concern about how US soldiers taken prisoner might be treated in retaliation.

Conclusion

In conclusion I would note, that with our increasingly interconnected world, some of us believe that the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq demonstrate that relying on traditional national security concepts can be fraught with peril and that a more globalized concept of human security needs to be explored. Terrorism is a threat that must be countered – whether it is terrorism practiced by an individual, a group or a state. The proliferation of WMD is a serious challenge to our collective security. But perhaps new and visionary responses to these threats need to be explored.

In the globalized world, I believe we must change the way we think, the way we talk and the way we approach the problems of the world – including the global threat of terrorism. Understanding the terrorist threat does not mean simply being able to identify the countries from which the terrorists come or where they operate. We must understand the underlying inequalities and competing political forces that result in people being willing to die and take innocents with them to make a political and ideological point. We must be willing to honestly assess what a “war” on terrorism really means. And if the extremely difficult task of dealing with terrorism has really been done any service at all by naming it a “war.”

In a world increasingly dominated by the few, who give the perception of not caring much for the needs of the many, asymmetrical responses will likely seem to be the only way for the desperate and disenfranchised to try to equalize the playing field. Until we work together as a global community to address the common threats to human security posed by gross political, social and economic inequalities we will not live in a secure world.

But if we are indeed a global community, I believe that new coalitions must seek new solutions to seemingly intractable problems. We cannot not abdicate our individual and collective responsibilities to participate in developing new strategies and policies to ensure our collective security. Just as we did in the landmine ban movement or in the creation of the International Criminal Court, governments, international institutions and civil society must accept the challenges of working together to seek new ways to address threats to our common security. No one government, no one institution, can possibly provide for the needs of us all.

The call to challenge accepted thinking about how to address violence or the myriad challenges to human security must not be dismissed as

a “weak response” to security threats in the globalized world. Change will not happen over night. But that should not be an excuse to not seek change. It is possible to reverse the slide to further ideologically driven division and increased violence.

Almost anything is possible when there is sufficient will. Some would contend that in these difficult and uncertain times, building such will is impossible. I believe we need to challenge ourselves to specialize in the impossible. Often, it only takes a handful of people to be catalysts to real and meaningful change that makes the world a little bit better place for us all.

Ways of Countering WMDs: Pre-emptive War and Counter-Proliferation, or International Co-operation and Disarmament

Hans Blix

*Chairman of the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Former Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC*

Introduction

I am heading an independent international commission on weapons of mass destruction. We are currently in the midst of our discussions on how to reduce the threats posed by these weapons. We are eager to listen to the views and conclusions that emerge at this conference, which represents so much knowledge and experience. What I am presenting today are, of course, my personal views, not the Commission's. Its report will be ready after the end of next year.

No more world wars, but regional conflicts and civil wars. WMDs

Let me begin on an optimistic note and say that I think humanity has put the era of world wars behind itself. For the long run I am more worried about the global environmental threats, notably global warming. For centuries the world's nations demonstrated their talent for destroying each other. They now seem to join hands and talent to destroy the environment we have been adapted to.

I think the gradual global integration that is being brought about by the modern technical, economic, and information evolution glues us together and will push the relations between blocs and continents toward peace. The future controversies between the great powers are likely, I think, to play out in the areas of trade and finance rather than in the battle fields.

The optimism one can feel regarding great powers and blocs obviously does not apply to a number of volatile regions. There will certainly also

be armed conflicts within states. Concerns are particularly great about weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and on the Indian and Korean peninsulas and about such weapons in the hands of reckless governments and non-state actors using terrorist methods.

The war in Iraq was undertaken, the world was told, precisely to eliminate ready and real WMDs and to eliminate the risk that WMDs be transferred to terrorists. We have witnessed how swift military action by the world's only superpower removed a murderous dictator but we have also witnessed how the counter-proliferation surgery failed – because there were no WMDs in Iraq. Moreover, acting through a limited alliance against the will of the majority of the UN Security Council has proved to be a much greater problem than foreseen by those who proclaimed the irrelevance of the UN.

I shall return to the question of pre-emptive armed action a little later but let me say already at this point that in my view the best chance to contain and solve regional conflicts and the risks of WMDs is through international cooperation, including joint pressures of diplomatic, economic and military nature, through international agreements, international organizations and international human and economic development. I am not suggesting that the UN is the only multilateral church in town but it is one not to be lightly ignored. I would hope that the next US administration – whether headed by Bush or Kerry – will resume the responsibility of the lead wolf, which it was, and only in truly exceptional circumstances act as a lone wolf.

Having said where I think and hope we are going, let me briefly discuss where we are coming from.

The traditional causes of war. The UN security system. The harvest of *détente*

As far back as we can see in history kings' and people's quests for territory have been one of the main causes of war. How many armed conflicts have not taken place over the Rhine and Amur rivers? Ideological aims have been behind many other armed campaigns, e.g. Christian crusades, colonial campaigns for the conversion of people to Christianity or Islamic jihads against infidels. I think these two main causes of armed conflicts between states are disappearing. Perhaps Saddam Hussein's war against

Iran and effort to seize space in the Shatt-el-Arab and his occupation of Kuwait were among the last cases of inter-state aggression for the old fashioned purpose of grabbing territory.

During the many years of the Cold War the Communist camp sought to expand in the name of ideology. The security system of the UN Charter, which is based on the idea that the Security Council may intervene against breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, was on the whole inoperative. Any one of the five permanent members could prevent action by casting a veto. The states of the world had to find their security through their own defence, through alliances or neutrality. The great territorial changes that did occur – mostly peacefully – were the emancipation of colonies.

Article 51 of the Charter confirmed the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence against armed attacks. However, during the Cold War the Communist side mostly avoided direct “armed attacks” and preferred wars by proxy or subversion. Similarly, to avoid direct armed confrontation, President Truman and his successors in the US pursued a policy of containment, which sought to resist attempted Communist expansion without direct armed action but with a readiness, in the last resort, to use force.

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism the security situation has changed drastically in the world. There is continued détente between all big powers and blocs – if, indeed, one can speak of blocs any more. There are no significant territorial or ideological conflicts between them. All pursue the market economy of various shapes and shades as their economic model. All are bent on pragmatism and none on ideological conquest. Many states in Europe are reorienting their armed forces from defence of their own territory to use in joint international peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operations.

The détente helped to strengthen security globally and in several regions in Africa and Central America tensions and conflicts disappeared.

During the Cold War nuclear capability had spread beyond the P 5 of the Security Council to Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa. After the end of the Cold War the Ukraine and Kazakstan transferred their nuclear weapons to Russia and Argentina, Brazil, Algeria committed themselves legally to non-proliferation. South Africa became the first country to roll back from a nuclear weapon status.

At the United Nations and in international organizations détente made it possible to achieve many things together, which earlier had been im-

possible. A great many peace-keeping missions were authorized by the Security Council, where the use of the veto became rare. Even after the divisive proceedings in the Iraq affair, there were last year about 15 ongoing UN led peace-keeping missions, comprising some 50.000 soldiers costing about \$ 4 billion per year. It does not sound cheap, but it is a bargain compared to war.

The most important joint UN action made possible by the new climate of détente was, of course, the authorization given to the broad alliance created by President Bush the elder to intervene in 1991 to stop Iraq's naked aggression against and occupation of Kuwait. For some time the action gave hope to the world that a new will of governments to cooperate would at long last bring the security provisions of the Charter to life.

In the field of arms control and disarmament the global détente brought several welcome results, above all the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the expectation that agreement would be reached to stop all production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for more nuclear weapons (FMCT).

The peace dividends of the early détente were, indeed, great. Many strait-jackets imposed in a bipolar world were shed. Some have in recent years looked back with nostalgia to the stability of the cold war period. Looking at the situation today I, for one, feel nostalgia for the period when détente gave rich harvest.

The post 9/11 post Iraq war security philosophies.

A fork in the road

Not so long ago President Bush declared that 9/11 was the Pearl Harbour of World War III and Vice-President Cheney said that the war against terrorism could last for generations and require the US to have military bases all over the world. A recent news article even specified where such future bases were to be placed in Iraq.

A full page article in the Financial Times (7 Aug. 04) by Mr. Bolton, Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security in the US State Department, is another straw in the post-détente wind. Mr. Bolton describes how “robust” co-operation between the US and its allies rather than reliance on “cumbersome treaty-based bureaucracies” can produce “real results”.

Mr. Bolton does not discuss how successful such alliance cooperation was in 2003 to identify WMDs in Iraq and the difficulty it has had to eradicate them – because they did not exist. Curiously, he does not refer to the undeniable value of the perfectly legitimate negotiating alliances, which are active in the cases of the DPRK and Iran, nor does he explain why the US has been seeking to move the Iran issue to that “reluctant international body”, which is called the Security Council. Rather, he extols various arrangements initiated by the US, like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the securing of nuclear material and equipment, because they are “activities”, not organizations.

How are we to understand this apparent allergy to precise treaty commitments, which was also visible in the latest nuclear verification free disarmament accord with Russia? Is it a new attitude prompted by a wish to shake off any external restraints and to retain full freedom of action together with those who, in any given case, “are with us” and to ignore those who “are against us”? If so, one would think that the Iraq war should give some food for thought.

Today, we find ourselves in a post 9/11 and post Iraq war fork of the road.

The US agenda seems to emphasize counter-proliferation, confrontation and pre-emption, if need be through unilateral military action. Although use of international organizations like the UN or the IAEA continues, the reliance on and cooperation through formal treaty alliances and instruments and agreements seems to be deemphasized. The agenda seems to have emerged from the feeling that the US military power is so great that time consuming and tedious talk in international fora can be dispensed with. Activity, not agreement, is seen as important. What are the alternatives?

How is the world to meet the threats and actions of terrorist groups? The first point to make, I think, is that terrorists do not live on clouds but must have their feet on the territory of states. It is important that the international community upholds the principle that each government is obliged to ensure that its territory is not used as a base for attacks on other states. It is legally correct and practically and politically sound. If there is a failure in this duty, then the world will endorse forcible intervention – as it did with the Taleban government in Afghanistan.

Second, the broad international efforts described by Mr. Bolton to ensure the safe keeping of nuclear and other dangerous material and

equipment everywhere in the world are important to reduce the availability of such material and equipment. If the Pakistan government had exercised better control of its nuclear sector, Mr. Khan's Wal-Mart for nuclear weapon designs and centrifuges would not have been in its dangerous business.

Third, what is mostly needed is intensified international cooperation in the day-to-day field work of the national intelligence, police and financial institutions of states to trace persons, resources, weapons and dangerous material. There seems to be a somewhat futile debate whether the combating of terrorism is a task for law enforcement organizations or the military. In most cases using military means would be like shooting at mosquitos with cannons.

One of the purposes claimed for the military invasion of Iraq was to prevent the promotion of Al Qaeda and other terrorists groups, allegedly supported by Iraq. If this was really an aim, it was one that failed singularly. It is evident that the occupation has prompted and stimulated terrorism and that harsh and illegal response measures, in this case as in similar cases, breed further terrorism and risks Driving large numbers of civilians, otherwise not favourable to the extremists, to support them.

Although there is not much basis for the alarm about a 'war of civilizations' it is bad enough if the battle against Islamic jihadists were to be pursued in such a way as to further strengthen anti-American and anti-Western attitudes among the vast number of Islamic moderates and vice versa. It would then stimulate the very terrorism it seeks to stop.

Military operations may, of course, be inevitable to crush or flush out armed terrorist units where they have been identified as based in a particular area, e.g, in parts of Afghanistan or Pakistan. Such operations need be based on reliable evidence. After the Al Qaeda inspired attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam the Clinton administration sent cruise missiles on a chemical factory, which was located outside Khartoum and which had been erroneously identified as linked to Al Qaeda. Such military actions – whether for the purpose of punishment or counter-proliferation – are unacceptable. They cannot be just shrugged off with a "Sorry about that, we shoot first and ask questions after..."

After a 9/11 or a Beslan massacre the mood is simply to punish the perpetrators and to eradicate the responsible group. Yet, for the longer term it is not 'sissy sensitivity' but rational to ask why the terrorists commit such atrocities. To be sure, their motives vary and many will be

muddled or absurd. However, if reasonable non-armed measures can be taken, which reduce incentives to terrorism, they should be on the agenda, whether they are in the fields of economic or social development or greater autonomy for particular groups or regions. It is not pandering to terrorism but simply rational.

It was refreshing to hear Tony Blair recently saying that nothing would be more important to reduce terrorism in the Middle East than a solution to the Israeli – Palestinian problem and that he would devote himself to this issue.

States and WMDs

Even though there is concern that terrorist groups may get hold of and employ nuclear weapons, the concern is much more acute and indicated by recent experience about nuclear weapons in the hands of states. I have mentioned the success cases of Ukraine, Kazakstan and South Africa. Regrettably the story is not complete without mention of the de facto proliferation to the non NPT-parties Israel, India and Pakistan, the attempted violations by the NPT-parties DPRK, Iraq and Libya and a suspected but denied violation by Iran, which is also a party to the NPT.

How should the world community tackle these questions?

It is Iran and the North Korea (DPRK) that today make us hold our breath and that raise a host of difficult questions and fears of domino effects should either acquire nuclear weapons. Both countries have acted in disregard of their safeguards obligation but the DPRK, which has renounced the NPT, claims that it wishes to deter foreign attacks by developing a nuclear weapon capacity, while Iran declares that it intends only to use its legal right to enrich uranium to make fuel for power reactors.

In both cases a number of states are at the present time seeking solutions through negotiations. This is welcome. The full scale war that was waged in Iraq to stop a nuclear program, of which highly intrusive IAEA inspection had seen no trace and which turned out to be non-existent, is not a model that many want to see followed.

After 9/11 the world would probably show understanding for a unilateral pre-emptive action that was undertaken to prevent an attack that was nearly certain and near in time. It would probably also accept President Bush's view that when an attack is "imminent" it is too late. However,

acceptance of pre-emptive action against an uncertain “growing danger” is unlikely. The action in Iraq on the basis of “nearly certain” evidence that proved wrong and against stocks of WMDs that would be ready for delivery in 45 minutes, except that they did not exist, has done nothing to strengthen the doctrine of pre-emptive action.

Solutions for the DPRK and IRAN must aim at ensuring that both states renounce all nuclear activities through which bomb grade material could be produced and accept far-reaching verification. To induce them to make such commitments will require some attractive quid pro quo.

As regards the DPRK it would seem wise to make the economic part of the package attractive by constructing it in a way that would help the country to gradually exit from the system that has brought it to misery and starvation. The economic part of an agreement with Iran will need to cover trade and investment relations and a multilateral assurance of supply of uranium fuel for the country’s power reactors.

It is my belief that both in the case of Iran and the case of the DPRK guarantees will need to be given about security against attacks from the outside. While the DPRK has talked explicitly about a “non-aggression pact” the substance is more important than the form. However, I think Mr. Bolton would have to overcome his allergy to binding commitments.

As in the case of the DPRK the potential consequences of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons are very serious. Indeed, although the political situation in the Middle East looks rather dismal, one might ask whether the risk of an added nuclear dimension does not cry for dynamic political efforts by Mr. Blair and others to ease and solve the central Israeli-Palestinian question. A new initiative could and should start all the states in the region on a path away from arms races, dangerous to all of them, to a zone of cooperation free from all WMDs.

The way forward

This brings me back to the fork in the road, which we have followed to eliminate WMDs. I see dangers on the road now travelled by the US administration. Further exploration of new types of nuclear weapons, will not, I think, induce others to disarm and to renounce weapons options that are technically open to them. There may be more weapons and conflicts on this road rather than less.

By contrast, a resumption of the kind of leadership that the US used to exercise in the arms control and disarmament fields would, I think, be greeted with enthusiasm by the whole world and could lead all away from WMDs and toward greater security.

- In such efforts more attention should be devoted to solving the political, security and social problems that almost invariably underlie the development or acquisition of WMDs;
- US ratification of a comprehensive test ban treaty would be likely have a domino effect, including China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Israel. It would make the development of new types of nuclear weapons much more difficult.
- A conclusion of a verified cut off of the production of fissionable material for weapons combined with agreements on reductions in the number of weapons would gradually reduce the deadly arsenals.
- A greater reliance on independent and professional international inspection with broad rights to access on the ground and with some intelligence supplied by national authorities, would give governments unbiassed assessments. In foreign affairs as in medicine successful operations require correct diagnoses.

What Approaches for Developing a New Security Agenda for Europe and the Balkans?

Vlado Buchkovski

Minister of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia

It gives me great pleasure to be here with you today and address this distinguished gathering. I must praise the organizers, for they have once again done an exceptional job, not only in bringing together the right people, but also in putting the right issues in front of them.

I believe that most of you will join me in thinking that we are at one of the turning points in defining the future security architecture. In the past year, we experienced some testing times for the transatlantic relations, NATO has gone out of area and EU pledged to launch its first major military mission in Bosnia. At the same time, we faced a myriad of security challenges, ranging from fighting terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to pacifying Kosovo and managing the turmoil in the Middle East and Central Asia. At times like these we are compelled to reflect upon the lessons from the past and the perspectives for the future.

I see no better way for me to contribute to this debate than to share with you some of my country's experiences and perspectives on security. For this purpose, I will briefly focus on what I believe are the two pillars of security: defense and security reforms, and regional cooperation.

In June of last year, I launched the start of Macedonia's first Strategic Defense Review. It was an ambitious, no-holds-bared review and one that has fundamentally altered our perspective and approach to defense. The SDR has helped us understand the current state of our defense system, define its future role, structure and capabilities and develop articulate and realistic plans on how to use our resources and turn vision into reality. It confirmed that the future of our defense lies in building small, mobile and efficient forces, capable of working alongside NATO abroad and meeting the new threats at home. But most importantly, the transformation of our defense system has taught us that the first and main pillar of security lies in building security from within the country – in confronting problems at face value, strengthening institutions, democracy and civil society as well as reforming defense and security.

Changing the mindset is just as significant as organizational restructuring. When we first started the SDR about a year ago, there were worries about the public reaction to the downsizing and we were confronted with skepticism in parts of the military. Currently, almost 80 percent of the public supports Macedonia's bid for NATO membership. The effect on the MoD was a creation of a new, harmonized and integrated defense culture; the SDR itself is result of an integrated effort of military personnel and Ministry of Defense civil servants. Through the SDR, we managed to build a sense that defense and security are a responsibility shared by all government ministries and agencies, and our long term vision is to replicate the success of defense reforms across government. To this end, the MoD is already assisting other ministries that plan to adopt the defense reform methodology, particularly the Planning Programming and Budgeting System – the PPBS.

We are certainly not the only country in the region undergoing this kind of transformation. But, in many respects, the Macedonian experience has been positively unique and valuable. It has taught us that achieving genuine security is only possible by means of full involvement of all ethnic groups that live in our country. In 2002, the starting point of our reforms, the share of ethnic minorities the Army and MoD personnel was only two percent. Today, it constitutes more than 10 percent of the total Army and MoD personnel. This progress shows that building mutual trust and security reforms are complementary, realistic and achievable objectives.

The key lesson learned from the first decade after the Cold War is that security is indivisible. The international community took a while to realize that security and stability in Europe cannot function properly without incorporating the Balkan region within the broader Euro-Atlantic security framework. The accession of Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia in NATO was a major milestone in the endeavor to round off the Euro-Atlantic geostrategic space and has significantly improved the security prospects of the region.

But, we have to remember that the Balkan nations themselves are the key actors in this process. They need to accept that security is about trust, dialogue and mutual cooperation within the region, as it is about transforming their respective security systems. To cross the threshold of stability and become reliable members in the greater Euro-Atlantic

security system, the countries in the region first need to build an effective regional collective security framework.

In this sense, we can say that regional security cooperation is the second pillar of our future security. On the Balkans, the ADriatic Charter countries, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia committed to make the first steps in this direction. We have found that our efforts to reform our defense sectors and meet our MAP goals and NATO interoperability criteria will be much easier if we exchange experiences and cooperate with our neighbors. We also found that the “cultural interoperability” that exists among our nations is an advantage we can use to integrate more effectively together in NATO’s missions abroad. As a first step towards this goal, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are preparing to deploy a joint medical team that will serve alongside NATO forces in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. We are confident that this will be the first of many projects that will unite the region in the quest contribute to our common security. Our desire is to take these initiatives both further and wider to involve other nations from the region and beyond.

The key is to ensure that Balkan countries will not be the enduring beneficiary of security guarantees and financial aid, but that they can transform themselves to a significant contributor of defense, economic and political potential and fresh thinking on some matters of Euro-Atlantic and global security. To be effective members of European and global security community, we must contribute niche capabilities and share the burden of fighting with our allies at all levels. In today’s world, these capabilities need both sustained investment and mutual support.

The beginning of 2004 marked the end of a decade of foreign military presence to look after the security of Macedonia. Today, the fourth consecutive contingent of Macedonian soldiers is serving alongside NATO forces in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and a second contingent participates in the Operation “Iraqi Freedom”. Our experience of working together with Euro-Atlantic partners to bring stability to Macedonia and its neighborhood was extremely positive. Today, we are working together again to repeat this experience in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The challenges Macedonia has faced in its recent past have reaffirmed our commitment to strengthen these two pillars of security. Macedonia’s experience proved that this is the way forward. As a small country that

has experienced the consequences of instability, we cannot take security for granted. We are determined to invest in this area, work through the collective security mechanisms, and cooperate with our partners to ensure we are ready to face our common threats.

Topics: First Part

The End of – or a New Start for a Multilateral International Order?

Yury Korobovsky

Abstract

The need for an effective multilateral institution, dedicated to the service of humanity as a whole, has never been more acutely felt than in the era of globalization. Growing interdependence and integration offer many opportunities to all peoples of the world, but also pose many dangers.

In December 2003 the UN Secretary General appointed a High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Its task is to examine the landscape of peace and security, broadly defined; identify the contribution of collective action in addressing the major challenges and threats, both hard and soft; and recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective action, especially, but not exclusively, by the United Nations.

Summary

The past years have shaken the foundations of collective security and undermined confidence in the possibility of collective responses to common problems and challenges.

The Panel discussed today's global threats and the challenges to international peace and security. It addressed the most significant problems the UN is facing and what changes the international system has to undertake in order to keep its ability to act, its legitimacy and finally, its credibility.

*Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, United Nations Under-Secretary-General,
Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva*

The world is going through a difficult period of establishing a new system of international relations. Following the high point of multilateralism of the 1980s and 1990s, characterised by an expansion in scope of United Nations (UN) peace operations and other initiatives in different parts of the world, threats of a new type have tested the United Nations system of collective security. These threats include inter-ethnic conflicts, international terrorism, transnational crime, drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illicit arms trade, man-made and natural disasters and infectious diseases.

In the age of globalization, such problems quickly become universal. However, the international community has not so far agreed on a coherent, collective strategy for responding to these new threats and often addresses them in an ad hoc manner.

The need for effective and dynamic United Nations actions – specifically of the Security Council – has never been greater. It is high time for the world community to formulate new approaches to global problems, to determine what mechanisms are needed to implement them, and to take specific action to establish a more predictable, just and stable world.

Dr. Elisabeth Cousens, Programme Director, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, Social Science and Research Council, New York

A commitment to multilateral cooperation is an expression of states' national interests rather than of universal values or noble motives. Multilateral institutions, including the UN Security Council, are used by states as vehicles to pursue their national interests.

However effective it proved to be in the post-cold war/pre-9/11 world, multilateralism has its limits, even under the best of circumstances. There were whole categories of peace and security issues which the UN did not address, including proliferation, internal instability in strategically pivotal states (Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia, etc), new internal conflicts (Chechnya) and old internal conflicts (Kashmir, Northern Ireland).

The UN needs to assess critically where it may never be able to act but where it could instead contribute in a secondary way to a more productive management of certain issues by others.

The UN needs to focus more on its core competencies which, in this speaker's view, are mediation, preventive diplomacy, peace keeping, and post-conflict recovery.

The UN needs to improve dramatically its effectiveness and to make a much stronger commitment to performance. It needs particularly to improve its ability to formulate strategy and to alter its course as conditions change, to de-bureaucratise its decision-making processes, and to invest in developing a cadre of professional mediators, peace keepers and managers. The UN needs to improve how it learns its lessons, especially context-specific lessons insofar as foreseeing the consequences of their application to other situations.

The UN cannot work alone. It is most likely to be effective in formal or informal coalitions with other actors having different comparative advantages.

The UN cannot rely on appealing to virtue and aspiration in making its case or making multilateralism's case. Instead, it has to show effectiveness and commitment to skill and performance.

If the UN can become more effective in its peace activities, this would contribute greatly to shrinking the credibility gap that the UN has with certain member states. A stronger track record will make multilateralism more attractive to powerful states, at the same time as it makes the UN more effective in assisting others, and helps it to face the severe political challenges that lie ahead.

Dr. Bruce Jones, Deputy Research Director with the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

The UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change was established in November 2003 against the backdrop of sharp divisions within the UN Security Council around the issue of pre-emptive use of force against Iraq – what the Secretary-General believed was a serious threat to the multilateral order in general, and to the UN itself and to the Security Council in particular.

The Panel was asked to undertake three tasks:

- to identify existing and emerging threats to international peace and security;

- to evaluate the capacity of existing international institutions to meet these threats and
- to recommend reforms necessary to ensure effective functioning of the mechanisms of collective security.

The Panel identified six clusters of threats that it believes are the core challenges confronting the international system:

1. interstate war
2. civil violence, including state failure, civil war and genocide
3. international terrorism
4. organised crime
5. the possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
6. social threats such as poverty, the spread of infectious diseases, etc.

The Panel takes a broad, non-hierarchical approach to threats, recognising that 1) different states and different regions face different challenges and have the right to expect that the UN and other instruments of collective security will address their threats, that 2) linkages exist among the threats, and also 3) the need for extensive international cooperation in coping with them.

Virtually all states have an interest in effective collective security. The Panel identified 3 sets (levels) of challenges confronting collective security:

At the political level, the Panel believes that the threats cannot be addressed successfully unless states reforge political consensus on a basic framework for collective security.

At the institutional level, the challenge lies in redefining the role and relevance of old institutions (Security Council, Trusteeship Committee), new institutions, and in identifying new links among institutions allowing for the connection of security issues on one hand, and economic, social, health issues, on the other.

Finally, at the security policy level, core challenges are :

- to build effective state capacity: a collective security mechanism that rests on weak states will fail;
- to strengthen the capacity of the UN and other multilateral institutions to undertake peace keeping tasks and mediation;
- to develop a normative framework for tackling terrorism both in terms of confronting the phenomenon itself and in terms of placing anti-terrorist efforts within the framework of the rule of law;
- to prevent further erosion of the non-proliferation treaty and regime;
- to develop more effective global surveillance of infectious disease;
- to reach a new consensus on the rules for the use of force in self-defence, in pre-emption and prevention, as well as on the issue of protecting civilians.

What Agendas for Europe?

Alan C. Bryden

Abstract

The 21st century begins with unprecedented challenges for Europe, but at the same time also offers unprecedented opportunities. Europe is becoming unified, democratic, free and prosperous, in dimensions never seen before. This progress, however, masks the challenges and threats that the old continent is facing. Ghosts haunt Europe again: terrorism, extreme nationalism and religious intolerance, as well as the dangers of erecting a new wall between NATO/EU Europe and the rest of the continent. Transatlantic relations are also poor. Under these circumstances the need for an open-minded, substantive debate is greater than ever.

This panel analyses enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic institutions, the rivalry and/or cooperation between NATO and EU, and relationships with Russia, Ukraine and other areas not included in the respective enlargements.

Summary

Ms. Alyson Bailes, Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Alyson Bailes addressed the interrelated issues of threat and response in Europe, in particular questioning whether Europe is currently in a state of security balance, deficit or surplus. In contrast to the strategic balance of the Cold War period, there seemed to be a subsequent security surplus given the expansion of the EU and NATO as well as an increasing number of military interventions by members of those organizations. However, a weakening of political and institutional relationships in Europe, a dimin-

ished US territorial commitment to Europe and the emphasis of NATO on out of area activities in the face of ongoing security challenges in the Western Balkans and a Russia which has yet to define its place in Europe suggests a potential security deficit.

The EU is not a replacement for NATO but has competences and resources to deal with challenges within the broader human security framework. A major challenge is how broader security governance challenges can be reconciled with defence and, in particular, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). There is also a lack of engagement between the public and private sectors on security issues. The way forward lies in delineating and prioritizing the security spectrum and distinguishing between national, European and global priorities. Ms. Bailes also stressed that although perceived threats may seem to be international in character, their seeds often reside in our own societies.

Dr. Nicole Gnesotto, Director, European Union Institute for Security Studies

Nicole Gnesotto focussed her remarks on the EU's global role in managing security, reflecting both on structural trends and the potential of the organization as an actor for international stability. Increasing violence around the world has raised the profile of the EU as a political actor in the context of international security. The need for an integrated EU strategy in this area is necessitated by a combination of the interlinkages between economic and political security, the disintegration of the South and the growing ambiguity of US power from a European perspective.

The strategic context has resulted in increasing demands on the EU to be involved in international security issues with the attendant pressures of operational overstretch, and tensions between those member states who are more or less involved in such roles. A commensurately greater external political role for the EU requires a more integrated European security strategy which exercises more leverage than bilateral influence alone – as made evident by France and the UK's inability, in different ways, to shape US policy over Iraq. However, Dr. Gnesotto cautioned against EU priorities being threat Driven; the Balkans then Africa are the key regions for the EU with complementarity – rather than duplication – with NATO being paramount. A much improved EU/US dialogue would be essential to furthering these goals.

Dr. Sergei Rogov, Director, The Institute of the USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences

Sergei Rogov began his presentation by stressing that Russia is part of Europe and that it is unhelpful to characterise it as an external actor. He noted five challenges to be faced by Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union: creating the necessary democratic checks and balances in a federated Russia; building a viable market economy; military reform and modernisation in order to better reflect available resources and key priorities; addressing Russia's strategic isolation vis à vis the international community; and, re-establishing Russia's national identity.

For Russians the EU is synonymous with Europe in a way that NATO is not. The outsider status of Russia is felt at its borders – the Kaliningrad issue – and most strongly by its citizens through, for example, the constraints imposed on international travel. A strategy of integration with Russia is required if the current situation is not to persist and Russia is to be drawn more closely into the realities, if not the institutions, of European cooperation.

Mr. David Spence, First Counsellor, Delegation of the European Commission, Geneva

David Spence began by emphasising the difficulties in coordinating security policy among an EU of 25 sovereign states. He characterised the European Security Strategy (ESS) as prevention based on multilateralism in direct contrast to the current US national security strategy founded on pre-emption. The ESS adopts a multi-faceted approach which attempts to mainstream security in all aspects of policy making.

It is hoped that the EU Constitution will lead to a more coordinated EU approach to security. In structural terms, additional clarity is being achieved through the elimination of the three pillar-structure but additional efforts are required. Mr. Spence also emphasized the central policy challenge posed by the reality that the interests of the EU are not necessarily the same as the combined interests of its member states. On specifics, he noted that the European Commission has provided an important contribution in the fight against anti-personnel landmines but much remains to be done on other issues such as explosive remnants of war and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Discussion

Questions from the floor focused on the boundaries of 'Europe', Russia's identity, policy priorities for the EU and the implications of US foreign policy under the Bush Administration. Alyson Bailes hoped that one lesson states will draw from Iraq is on the need to avoid splits within Europe. On the ESS, she emphasized that it is not just about military force but linking economic and other aspects of security in its broader sense. Nicole Gnesotto also found encouragement in the fact that states managed to agree the ESS but agrees that the EU needs to be more internally consistent and externally effective. On Russia, Professor Rogov argued that re-defining a national identity has to be a natural process in order to deal with sensitive issues such as Russia's ethnic diversity. Similar sensitivities should be shown in Western policy making towards Russia.

Conclusion

Key issues for Europe relate to internal policy coordination and external priority-setting. Interpreting security in its broadest sense, including its economic and political dimensions, means that tasks need to be distributed in a complementary and reinforcing manner among the different European institutions. Avoiding duplication between the EU and NATO is particularly important. Rebuilding frayed Transatlantic relations is a key requirement highlighted by all the speakers. The need for engaging more effectively with Russia is another key message to emerge from the discussion.

Human Security – A New Measure of Global Security or a New Agenda for Global Action?

Stefan M. Brem

Abstract

Human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives. It has become both a new measure of global security and a new agenda for global action.

Human security as a global concept makes it possible to open the way to new and interdependent approaches. According to this approach, there can be no international security when civil peace is uncertain. International security today must be able to build international solidarity against the combined effect of the risks and threats in order to establish a prevention of the source of conflicts. Therefore, it is necessary to multiply the partnerships with intra-state actors by integrating scientific expertise in these partnerships and by establishing direct dialogue with the societies concerned.

Peace is increasingly dependent on development, security of and access to resources and protection of the environment, but also of human rights, whose violation gives rise not only to injustice and tensions but also to unpredictability and unsteadiness and hence to international instability. The re-building of security, which includes nowadays more and more the human aspect and not just the inter-state component, imposes new directions for reflection and action – a task that has been tackled by this panel.

Summary

Introduction by the Chair, Amb. Blaise Godet, (former) Head of the Political Directorate, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Godet noted that human security is less a new policy than a broader view taken on security issues. It remains to be seen whether this approach will replace the traditional, state-driven view on national and international security. This concept opens a dialogue with a more comprehensive and inclusive understanding of the interdependencies of peace, development and environment.

François Fouinat, Senior Advisor, Advisory Board on Human Security, Geneva: Human Security Now – A New Agenda for Global Action

Mr. Fouinat emphasised that security has been historically considered to be both a prerogative and responsibility of States. This understanding has been considerably altered during the last decade. After the end of the Cold War and the advent of the 9/11 terrorist attacks the security environment has become more complex. Menaces against the environment, transmittable diseases (e.g. SARS), instability provoked by massive population movements and displacements, trans-national organised crime and the proliferation of small arms and weapons of mass destruction have broadened the traditional threat spectrum.

With this shift the object to be protected is no longer just the State but the individual human being. The focus is on the protection and empowerment of the people. With this approach Fouinat sees an added value by complementing the State's security. By promoting the people's right the nation building process can also be strengthened. In essence, by addressing education, health, human rights, development human security provides the necessary conditions to provide security for the people and by the people.

Prof. Andrew Mack, Director of the Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia: Key Findings of the 2004 Human Security Report: Explaining the Decline in Global Political Violence

Prof. Mack uses a rather narrow approach of human security. By doing so a more stringent methodology can be applied to analysis causal relationships. He has analysed several factors as causes for political violence (used as dependent variable in his model). Various trends can be seen with regards to causes and consequences of conflicts.

Measured by violent conflicts, the data suggests that we actually live – rather counter-intuitively – in a less violent world today. While internal conflicts have increased in the period from 1946–1990, they have increased again since the end of the Cold War – with the exception of the peak in the mid-90s. Also the battle deaths have gone down, while civilians have increasingly become a target of war. A trend that is especially worrisome in the context of human security.

What are the reasons for the decline in armed conflict? The end of the Cold War has also brought an end to external resources to foster proxy wars. We have also seen increased activities by the international community whereby the UN has especially played a crucial role by deploying peace support operations and applying sanctions against warring parties.

The change from autocratic to democratic systems, rather astonishingly, produces more conflict and instability in the short term. The effect of poverty on war propensity is rather ambiguous: While in some areas this results in a lack of capacity to fight wars and support insurgency, it can also reduce the capacity to pay off dissatisfied and economically weak people who can act out their frustration in violent acts.

Amb. Maurizio Massari, Head of Mission, OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, Belgrade: Human Rights Standards and Security in the Balkans: The Experience of Serbia and Montenegro

Ambassador Massari highlighted the role of international institutions as major catalysts in democratic change and stabilisers of the security environment. A close cooperation between the United States and the European States is key for successful peace support operations and (humanitarian) interventions.

In a second step, he analysed the nature of threat in the Balkans. The process of democratisation is still incomplete, organised crime and corruption is blooming. There are still pockets of national extremism hindering the return of refugees and consolidation of the peace process. The lines between organised crime and terrorism – especially regarding their ‘economic’ activities – get more and more blurred.

To tackle these problems a true multidimensional response is needed. Border security and management can play a crucial part in this endeavour as well as a comprehensive reform of the security sectors (not just focusing on the military service).

Michel Nourredine Kassa, Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA, Geneva: Humanitarian Action in the Age of Weapons of Light Destruction

Undoubtedly, human security is deeply connected to the easy availability of small arms. Their very existence make it very difficult for humanitarian actors, such as OCHA, to provide humanitarian aid to the most needy persons. Mr. Kassa outlined how the humanitarian community reacted to this challenge – mainly focusing on the situation in Africa. While the community has remained silent for a long time, it has recently called for armed, yet humanitarian interventions to save civilians under siege (in Rwanda 1994, in Ituri from 1999 to 2003, in Darfur and other places more recently). To fulfil its humanitarian task it is crucial for the humanitarian community not to mix the various roles of the actors involved during and after the interventions. Humanitarian agencies are also dealing with more interlocutors. They not only have contacts with governmental institutions, but more and more with the people actually affected by the crisis.

Discussion

The Chair opened the discussion by highlighting the increased access of conflict parties to revenues stemming from illegal activities such as trafficking of drugs, small arms, but also people. Mack confirmed the increase of illicit activities in conflict areas where real war economies came into existence: A complex system of mutual dependencies where illicit activities nourish war activities and access to precious goods (dia-

monds, gold, oil, etc.) can further inflict conflicts. The reliability of the data presented by Mack was put into question by a participant from the audience. Mack confirmed that there are reliability problems, but stressed that even with the possibility of underreporting of incidents of violence and number of casualties the trends can be confirmed since underreporting has not changed over time. Another question was related to the provision of foreign aid to countries with good governance record. Fouinat mentioned that good governance countries already have the necessary resources and knowledge to promote sustainable policies. Actually, fragile states with insufficient state capacities need support and incentives for good performance. Mack mentioned that up to 80% of the current recipient countries would not qualify for humanitarian aid if good governance standard were applied.

Conclusion

As mentioned in Roland Paris' seminal article in *International Security* (2001) it remains to be seen whether human security signifies a real "paradigm shift" or whether it is producing just "hot air." Currently, the whole concept is still too broad and over-determinate to provide clear answers about the added value of this approach. However, it has certainly opened new ways to see things and also provided real solutions to protracted problems such as the Ottawa convention covering anti-personnel mines.

Workshops

Workshop 1

Biological Weapons – Easy to Develop, Difficult to Deploy?

Reto Wollenmann

Workshop hosted by the Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETHZ), in co-operation with the Swiss Federal Office for Public Health (SFOPH)

Abstract

Since the Anthrax incidents in the United States in autumn 2001 and the subsequent hoaxes and copycats in many countries, biological terrorism has become a major national and international security policy concern. The non-specific nature of the threat regarding actors, agents, the mode of the attack, and the resulting consequences for the population and the economic system has led to differing threat perceptions among scientists and practitioners. As a consequence, some countries invest amply in biodefense research and development and strengthen their first responder's preparedness for bioterrorist attacks. Other countries, accounting budgetary constraints or different national security concerns, take slower steps or remain reluctant and have insufficient laboratory capabilities to quickly differentiate between real attacks and hoaxes.

The workshop aimed to assess, on the one hand, the threat regarding the access to pathogens, the production of biological weapons, the means to deploy and the motivation of actors. On the other hand, the panelists tried to analyze different approaches of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The panel, which covered a government perspective, the view of the United Nations, of a think tank, and of the private sector, agreed on the eminence of the biological threat and noted the challenges for homeland security. In particular, the experts pointed to a long term risk emerging

from the spread of biotechnology, identified new approaches to prevent the proliferation, called for a better preparation of first responders, and argued for a clear and concise crisis communication.

Summary

John Parachini, Policy Analyst for Weapons of Mass Destruction, RAND Corporation, Washington D.C. (USA)

Terrorist use of biological weapons (BW) is an enduring danger with potentially high consequences. While the potential danger is considerable, the probability of such an attack reaching catastrophic proportions is low. While states are not likely to perpetrate clandestine attacks with weapons of mass destruction against the United States, terrorists' motivations and capabilities are more difficult to assess. The empirical record of terrorists and biological weapons points to a conundrum. Despite the potential of biological weapons, terrorists have rarely sought to acquire and use these weapons. A critical security task is to determine the changes that might increase the likelihood of terrorists acquiring and using biological weapons. Mr. Parachini explained that Al Qaeda followed a portfolio approach and kept track on different paths of both conventional and, at the same time, CBRN weapons. In their perspective, the outcome, the safety and security, and the simplicity of the attack was much more important than the nature of the means they were using. John Parachini stressed that it was not only crucial to analyze agents, capabilities and motivations, but also the context in which the terrorist organization operated. He suggested that Al Qaeda would, if they could, attack with weapons of mass destruction and that they would, if they could, use biological agents.

Melissa Hersh, Political Officer with the Department of Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, 2004 Biological Weapons Convention Secretariat, Geneva (Switzerland)

The collapse of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Protocol negotiations prior to the Fifth Review Conference in 2001 has given way to an interim Review Conference "follow-up process". This

new process aims to strengthen the implementation of the Convention. Whilst the BTWC is both a disarmament and non-proliferation treaty, the follow-up process strongly emphasizes non-proliferation measures and the mitigation of risk specific to pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins. In particular, the mandate of the follow-up process contains the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation, the establishment of national mechanisms to maintain Biosecurity, the improvement of international capabilities to investigate suspicious outbreaks, and the strengthening of national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases. Ms. Hersh stressed that a common understanding of risks and a code of conduct for research was needed and that the legislative framework should contain legal, regulatory and administrative issues, prohibitions, restrictions, criminalization and law enforcement. Ms Hersh emphasized that both national and international measures on the bilateral or the multilateral level were needed.

Mark Maskow, Senior lecturer, German Federal Agency for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief, Ahrweiler (Germany)

As in all western societies, the high population density, the infrastructure density, and the extreme mobility make western democracies, and Germany in particular, vulnerable to biological attacks. The speaker laid out the German response to the biological threat and identified key challenges for homeland security resulting from the characteristics of biological attacks. Pointing to differences between chemical and biological weapons and to historical occurrences of WMD terrorism in the 1990's, Mr. Maskow stressed the importance to detect an attack at an early stage and to identify the specific nature of the attack. He explained why local healthcare personnel must be capable of recognizing unusual diseases or patterns of disease early in their course and called for expertise and resources to respond promptly to the massive challenge posed by large outbreaks of unusual or unexplained illnesses. As other speakers, he called for an appropriate crisis communication both to the public and the press, and warned that hoaxes could bind resources needed for real attacks. Stressing that effective planning and response to a biological terrorist incident required collaboration with federal, state, and local groups

and agencies, the speaker noted that the variety of actors from different fields such as security policy, law enforcement, public health, and first responders make crisis management a complex task.

Martin Kuster, Head of Occupational Health, Novartis International, Basle (Switzerland)

Two weeks after the occurrence of an anthrax victim in Florida, Novartis was confronted with the first anthrax letter in Switzerland, at a time when one could not expect that this was a hoax and not a real attack. As the corporate medical director, being involved in the crisis management, Dr. Kuster presented the private sector's experiences with the anthrax crisis in 2001. Based on a classical management cycle embracing situation analysis, strategy, action, and consequences, Novartis has developed crisis management plans for different contingencies. Regarding the experiences in 2001, Dr. Kuster stressed the importance to achieve an intelligible and distinct situation at an early stage, even as the initial emergency situation usually creates chaos and uncertainty. The experience with the suspected anthrax letters showed that it was important to establish a fast diagnostic method and to set up a coherent communication strategy to the employees, the public, and the media. In particular, it was essential to communicate the noncontiguous nature of the suspected incident and to go back to operational business. Dr. Kuster also stressed the importance of generous, unconditional support of affected employees and their immediate relatives and provide the direct access to physicians, psychologists or even clerics.

Discussion

The panelists agreed that the biological threat was a serious, emerging risk with typical characteristics of a low probability, high consequences risk. One panelist noted that a better threat assessment and more knowledge about limited attacks was needed. The discussion about capabilities of terrorists showed that hoaxes and failed attempts dominated in recent years. Several panelists stated that hoaxes pose an indirect threat as they cultivate constant fears among the population as well as a direct threat because analyzing them exhausts limited laboratory resources. One of the

panelists remarked, that the current bioterrorism debate and the discussion in the panel had scaled down in recent time. He argued that experts were talking about hoaxes, while worst-case scenarios with large scale attacks were considered to be less likely. Another panelist, however, did not agree on that and denied the existence of an overall reduction of the threat. The same panelist regarded the downscaling of the threat as being a policy decision which was not based on a serious threat assessment. The panel agreed that elevation and diminution of threats should not become a policy decision.

Conclusion

One of the most important challenges in the future will be to prevent of the spread of pathogens and weapons. If the national or international framework failed to avoid the transfer of biological weapons into terrorist hands, we could be confronted with catastrophic attacks in the near future. However, as recent years have clearly demonstrated, hoaxes and copycats seem to be the most probable kind of event at the moment. Both a terrorist bluff and a real attack require fast reaction and a sound crisis management. In particular, a professional crisis communication is needed to help limiting the “weapons of mass disruption”- effect and to confront the insecurities related to a bioterrorism incident. Besides, even in case of a hoax, a quick identification of the suspected pathogen is the crucial first step for the situation analysis and for the further response. For local, national, and international authorities as well as for the public sector, it will be important to get better prepared for attacks in order to react with the necessary efficiency.

Information Risks and Countermeasures: Problems, Prospects, and Challenges of Securing the Information Infrastructure

Myriam Dunn

Organised by the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich in cooperation with the General Staff, Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports

Abstract

Today, everything from the delivery of energy to homes and businesses to the effectiveness of health care and government services is tied to the reliability of information systems and networks. The distinguishing characteristic of the so-called information infrastructure is that it is all embracing and links other infrastructure systems together – and that it is prone to failures and a supposedly easy target for malicious attacks.

Governments abilities to estimate risks to their infrastructures has traditionally been dependent on the ability to evaluate the intent of potentially malicious actors, coupled with their capability to carry out a deliberate action. This was significantly easier when dealing purely with securing the physical realm. Today, society's thorough dependence on information systems and networks has created a new set of "information risks" with specific traits that make them both difficult to predict and detect – for example, the threat is not restricted by political or geographical boundaries, the capacity to inflict significant damage is readily available and relatively easy to use by those with even a cursory knowledge of, and ability with, computer technologies, maintaining anonymity is easy, and costs for attacks are low and falling.

In this workshop, four speakers addressed the issue from various perspectives: After a detailed overview over key issues in critical infrastructure protection (CIP) with a focus on the special role of industrial control systems, the United Kingdom's experience with critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) provided a concrete example of protection efforts against information risks. Further, the implications of the open Internet society in a post 9/11 world were addressed, with specific emphasis on the challenges of Internet governance and regulation. The concluding speech focused on suitable extensions of concepts and methods of safety risk analysis and assessment to problems of IT security risk management.

Summary

Dr. Gustav Lindström, senior researcher at the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, set the stage by addressing the link between CIP and CIIP on the one hand and by pointing to the fact that the potential costs of an attack against critical infrastructures could be so substantial as to make CIP/CIIP an issue of high urgency on the other, especially in the view of the fact that potentially high-impact attacks are not unprecedented. Lindström distinguished at least four types of attacks:

- 1) direct infrastructure attacks on critical nodes, systems, or functions;
- 2) indirect infrastructure attacks or disruptions causing cascading effects;
- 3) indirect infrastructure attacks through a proxy, causing the disruption of a particular infrastructure through another; and
- 4) combined attacks, meaning digital intrusion combined with a physical attack.

He further identified industrial control systems (ICS) as the Achilles heel of critical infrastructures, as they are the vulnerable intersection between cyber and physical worlds. ICS digitise and automate tasks previously handled by individuals, are increasingly connected to corporate networks where they are susceptible to hacking, and they are unfortunately

designed for efficiency and reliability, not security, showing a variety of inherent vulnerabilities, due to old equipment, and the false training of operators.

Ted Barry, manager of the private sector outreach at the National Infra-structure Security Coordination Centre (NISCC), London, addressed the past, present, and future of the UK's efforts in critical infrastructure protection. He first concentrated on how past terrorist incidents have shaped the UK's view and definition of critical assets and then described NISCC's role in present day protection with its specific focus on that part of the critical national infrastructure vulnerable to electronic attack. Barry described the Centres three main functions: the response to disruptions and incidents, outreach to organizations responsible for critical services, and research and development in connection with threats.

When looking at the present day threat, he identified a whole range of possible perpetrators, including insiders, script kiddies and other sort of hackers, elements of organised crime, terrorists, and foreign states. Due to prevalent activity and targeting of much of the population, organised crime is currently one of the main worries of his Centre. With respect to the future, Barry sees the major challenge as one of increasing focus on critical global information infrastructure because of the nature of globe spanning information networks and a threat that is little restricted by boundaries. This focus will need a big effort towards international cooperation and coordination.

Professor Sai-Felicia Krishna-Hensel, Director at the Center for Business and Economic Development, Auburn University Montgomery and President of the Comparative Interdisciplinary Studies Section of ISA (International Studies Association), addressed public policy implications of governance and technological advances in communication with particular emphasis on the Internet. She stressed the fact that public policy requires not only an understanding of the technology to be regulated, but also concerns itself with content supervision giving rise to issues of freedom, privacy, and censorship. In the post 9/11 world, the question of public policy and the Internet has assumed a more grave aspect, as the Internet has increasingly emerged as an important source of information that can be used by terrorists and other anti-social elements.

Krishna-Hensel argued that the main challenge for analysts was to separate legitimate efforts to protect civilian privacy from the need to monitor potentially threatening communication and information outflows

that might impact national security. A second challenge is to understand dichotomies between national (state based) security concerns and international (global) concerns, which can be economic, public health and disease. The approaches to this issue will vary according to the level of freedom of expression characteristic of the states involved.

Dr. phil. habil. Dr. rer. nat. Gebhard Geiger, research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin and University Lecturer in Methodology of Science at the Technological University of Munich, outlined the difference between safety and security and the implications of this for methodological approaches to information risks. Traditionally, risk and vulnerability analyses of complex systems have largely focused on problems of technological safety. Safety means a low probability of technical or human failure, or damage arising from natural hazards, whereas security implies a low probability that a given threat or attack, thus an intentional act, will be successful.

Geiger demonstrated that research on IT systems security must cope with problems that do not usually arise in technological risk and safety analyses, such as the narrow and still highly uncertain statistical data basis of computer crime and Internet misuse; lack of information about potential attackers and their aims, plans, abilities, strategies and resources; large potential time delays of the deleterious effects after an attack has been launched and, consequently, futility of causal analysis of computer and network incidents after a successful attack. Due to these points, IT security risks are hard to assess in probabilistic terms. However, public policy implications of IT security management often require quantitative risk assessments. Geiger offered a solution to this dilemma by suggesting the use of recently developed approaches to economic decision making under risk.

Discussion

The discussion revolved around three main issues: First, methodological questions in connection with the specific traits of information risks were raised. In addition to Geiger's proposal to use approaches from economics for the study of information security risks, the use of game theory was advocated. It was stressed that the specific nature of security risks calls for strategic approaches.

Second, organizational issues were discussed, particularly in light of the fact that the protection of information infrastructures increasingly calls for international cooperation. Specifically, activity at the EU-level was addressed. Apart from the eEurope 2005 action plan or common guidelines and documents addressing critical infrastructures, it was stressed that the EU's main agency for information infrastructure protection is the newly established European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA).

Third, the point was made that information risks are by no means solely a technical issue. As the example of setting technical standards shows, the work of technical experts is crucial, but always involves major political and economic issues.

Conclusion

In this workshop, the most relevant future challenges for the protection of critical infrastructures against information risks were discussed: the need for international cooperation and coordination, the need to develop and use new analytical tools for a qualitatively different kind of threat, and the necessity to take into account a comprehensive set of issues, including technical, political, economic, and strategic ones.

After 9/11: Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism

Michel Hess

Organized by the Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich in cooperation with the Service for Strategic Analysis and Prevention, Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police

Abstract

Against the backdrop of the sustained use of terrorism in international relations since long before the end of the Cold War, governments have been compelled to further develop their counter-terrorism strategies, methods and capabilities. Different priorities in the fight against national and international terrorism resulting from varying experiences have uniquely shaped counter-terrorism policy.

This workshop investigated the nature, commonalities and differences of various aspects of counter-terrorism policies after 9/11 by convoking competent academics and professionals in order to establish a cross-cutting dialogue on the subject. The workshop also served as a forum for exchange, comparison and analysis and synthesized some of the key-findings of the “International Expert Conference on National Counter-Terrorism Policy” held at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH in the spring of 2004.

Summary

Effective national counter-terrorism policies are transparent and aware about the level of threats to public safety, and the concomitant dilemmas security services face in dealing with the spectrum of threats. They are

also adamant about the urgency of sustained counter-terrorism efforts. Terrorism has a long phenomenological track record. What has changed since 9/11 is the unprecedented degree of the threat posed by well-organized and well-funded global terrorist networks. Encouraged by the putative mercenary successes in the early 1980s against the Soviet occupation forces, Afghanistan's mujaheddins returned to their homelands or applied for political asylum in Western countries. The recruitment of Islamic radical mercenaries by Bin Laden and his group occurred gradually in the aftermath of this large-scale terrorist resettlement.

In addition to the networked – as opposed to hierarchical – nature of the first level of threat, terrorism post-9/11 features an extreme ideology in the form of an alleged “divine command”, leaving practically no space for governments to manoeuvre around a negotiating level playing field. Third, and perhaps most notable, is the professionalism of full-time terrorist actors. These are individuals whose sole mission is to prepare for, organize and implement terrorist acts, and they have acquired the best training and experience available on the battlefields and in the trenches of Afghanistan. A fourth dimension of the level of threat posed is also one of the most cynical and effective tactic seen to date: suicide attacks. Finally, the level of threat includes all forms of non-conventional terrorism and forms of combat, and (non)-rational decision-making which presents law enforcement with one of the most complicated and complex tasks for prevention, repression and preemption against offensive and defensive jihad.

This spectrum of the level of threat is tested each time law enforcement seeks to weaken the motivation and operational capabilities of terrorist networks and actors. Essentially, the test involves a delicate and often difficult trade-off between safety efficiency and democratic values. Also, the test calls for a change in the national prerogatives of particularistic and unilateral notions of national security and national interest. While unilateral assessments of terrorist threats to national interests differ considerably, no sovereign entity can withdraw itself from a global responsibility to combat terrorism at all preparatory initial stages on its own territory.

The urgency for international cooperation in preemptive and preventive information sharing renders the need for a commonly accepted definition of terrorism redundant. Terrorism is an illegitimate tactic for the deliberate use of violence for political goals. The pyramid of international

cooperation involves agencies and actors, starting with the international academic community, research and development, international military and police units (negotiating teams), intelligence databases, and ending with international counter-motivation funds, an International Terrorism Court, and a broadly-based international alliance against terrorism.

A solid indication that the post-9/11 counter-terrorism measures have been working is the evolving nature of threats. Terrorism as a dynamic phenomenon marked by a determination, adaptation and flexibility of its actors changes according to adjusted countermeasures which themselves have to be renewed constantly in response to shifting *modi operandi*. Will this epic struggle last as long as the Cold War? Will a war of attrition wear down the resistance of global terrorism eventually?

Al Qaeda and its operative groups have revealed a considerable flexibility, given that they have been largely unaffected by the “loss” of Afghanistan. Detailed multi-year planning, reconnaissance of targets, and the transnational nature of the movement have shown the threat potential in a reconfiguration as an ideology that cannot be defeated militarily on the battlefield.

From a US perspective, a successful termination of the War on Terror would incorporate six elements: a stabilization of Iraq, the elimination of a tempting, but fatalistic sense of complacency in public policy with regards to counter-terrorism, a more positive image of the US (and the Western world) in Muslim and Arab countries, and a strengthened communication system that would balance out Al-Jazeera. Most obvious is the corrosive and damaging impact that Guantanamo has had on global public opinion. Finally, it is doubtful whether or not a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute would fundamentally lift the scourge of terrorism at a global scale. One lesson drawn from the Cold War is precisely that Containment incorporated a multifaceted strategy, including hard and soft power instruments.

After the surveys of levels of threat (Boaz Ganor) and US policy (Bruce Hoffmann), the workshop then concluded with a paper on the multilateral response by the United Nations (UN), including UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1319, and a paper focusing specifically on the terrorist threat to Europe. The successful forging of a multilateral response through UN mechanisms is closely tied to the political will of member states, a common recognition of the threat posed by Al Qaeda, and a consensus on listing and the specific measures taken against the Taliban.

The paper by Rohan Gunaratna on the current terrorist threats to Europe traced the evolution of Al Qaeda, the shift from Al Qaeda to splitter groups in South Asia and the North Caucasus, the Al Zakhawi groups, and the post-Al Qaeda generation which seems to demonstrate an exponentially growing willingness to kill human being in even greater numbers. Iraq is indeed the new land for the jihad, and the paper argued that more terrorist attacks would occur in Europe in the future once Iraq is stabilized and the groups leave the country. A significant number of European governments have neglected Al Qaeda-related groups in the past; however, most governments have moved from a simple monitoring to active disruption of terrorist preparations. Also, there is a heightened public vigilance and an unprecedented degree of international cooperation leading to successful disruptions. A key concluding argument presented by the paper was that conflict zones harbour and generate terrorism. Any long term, comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy would therefore also attempt to address the frozen and hot conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

Conclusion

The ISF Workshop on 9/11 counter-terrorism policy provided a timely inventory and sketch of the track record of measures taken at both national and international levels. It furthermore delivered a powerful message to the audience: complacency is dangerous. While a number of attempted attacks have been and continue to be disrupted, the ever evolving nature of the fluid phenomenon will continue to demand the highest levels of innovation and creativity for devising security and safety strategies. A global, multiagency, multifaceted and multidimensional, but single minded search for policies and measures against terrorism has begun and will last for years to come. In an age of digital communications, websites, video cassettes for instruction and training and other types of message carriers not only generate the motivation and operational capabilities of terrorist networks, but also provide for sophisticated counter-motivation and counter-capabilities instruments – in the words of Boaz Ganor, a “counter-terrorism cook book”. The ISF Workshop outlined successfully the broad parameters and ingredients for such a cook book.

Bridging the Transatlantic Divide – Perspectives on Homeland Security and CIP

Jan Metzger

Organized by the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich in cooperation with the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University and the Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm

Abstract

The challenges Americans are encountering since September 11 in crafting effective homeland security responses – due to the broad nature of the threat, the multiplicity of actors, and overlapping federal-state competencies – are even more daunting across the Atlantic, given Europe’s multi-jurisdictional setting.

Americans and Europeans approach this issue, of course, as they do others, from different perspectives. We must work to align, or at least get a better understanding of, these perspectives. Unless there is systematic trans-European and transatlantic coordination in the area of societal preparedness and protection, each side of the Atlantic is at greater risk of attack.

The protection of critical infrastructures – physical and cyber systems so vital that their incapacity or destruction will seriously weaken national security, economic stability, or public safety is a first-order strategic task for the Euro-Atlantic community. Addressing these threats to and the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures will necessarily require flexible approaches that span both the public and private sectors, and protect both domestic and international security.

At the workshop the transatlantic “Homeland Security Study Group” established in February 2004 in Washington DC presented its first findings.

The transatlantic study group and the workshop discussed problems, prospects, issues and strategies of societal protection (or homeland security) in general and critical infrastructure protection in particular.

Summary

Dr. Jan Metzger, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, chairman of the workshop, introduced the topic with the information that the build-up of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the US is the biggest governmental reorganization process since fifty years.

Professor Bengt Sundelius, Head of the Research Department at the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) addressed the new security landscape in his presentation “European Societal Security in the Making”:

“During the Cold War the world was primarily focused on state threats – an armed attack by another state. However, since the end of the Cold War the spectrum of risks has widened. Two different types of threats can be distinguished: actor focused threats and structural threats.

Actor focused threats: An actor can be a state or an individual. Threats by a state can be “traditional” threats, i.e. threats of an armed attack. However, threats can also be pursued through in the trade, finance, and energy sectors. Cyber warfare is an example of an actor focused threat, which has received a lot of attention, but for which interest is declining – this does not mean, however, that it became obsolete.

Structural threats: Structural threats are non-military threats, e.g. threats arising from the collapse of a neighboring system. Such a collapse does not necessarily have to be of ill will but can also be an “Act of God”, a pure accident. A collapse could, e.g., be caused by an explosion in a nuclear power plant, which would have severe consequences for a whole region.

State security (law and order) and human safety (rescue services) operate in very different ways. There are barriers between the two; they have separate cultures, competencies, and thus often difficulties working together.

Societal security is the new dimension being constructed – it is meant to bridge the gap between state security and human safety. There have

been various reforms, in Sweden and elsewhere, where new systems for crisis management/societal security are emerging. There is also an international dimension to this as experts recognize that it is important to build security through international missions. But the example of the EU shows that it is difficult to link the domestic and external security and safety at an international level. One is a priority problem: What should be safeguarded and protected and why? What are the vulnerabilities? You also need to have recovery capacity and one should not only focus on prevention and protection but also on the management and recovery from crises.

Dr. Daniel S. Hamilton, Richard von Weizsacker Professor and Executive Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, spoke about “Reconciling European and American Approaches to Homeland Security”:

“The Transatlantic Link must be stronger than it is today. Together, the EU and the US can win. Divided, both sides will lose! On September 12, 2001, Article 5, the “Mutual Defense Clause,” of the North Atlantic Treaty was invoked. This treat was not only symbolic, but also an active expression of a very basic point: we share a common security space and an attack against one shall be considered an attack against all (NATO, PFP, EU...). We need, then, to think GLOBALLY and to find a way to get from the local space to the global space. The Transatlantic link is the only way to link the local/national/regional with the global, with a global perspective on the challenges facing us. We must have a transatlantic consensus in order to build and protect on a global level.

Given the current state of affairs in a post-9/11 world, we must ask ourselves the following questions:

Are we going to come together or not? Are we going to focus on similarities or differences between Europe and the US? We must remember, too, that both sides are in fact extremely polarized within and not simply between entities.

The use of war metaphors has a long and esteemed tradition in U.S. policy-making and in periods of ideological shift (war on drugs, war on poverty, war on Communism, etc.). In this case, we are looking at a “war on terrorism.” In this case, however, the “war” is far more than metaphorical. The Bush Administration truly believes it – we – are at war and is trying to rally international support around this war. Can countries

in Europe accept this war analogy, particularly since Europe often thinks in terms of “systems” analogies (i.e. the analogy with crime) rather than war-related analogies? Europe and the US are, in a sense, approaching the issue of terrorism from different viewpoints and this must somehow be addressed

Should an attack occur, do we in fact have a transatlantic homeland today, either as regards prevention or protection?

What has the US been doing wrong thus far in terms of civil security?

Answer: the US has been far too focused on the domestic sphere and has then attempted to export this domestic model. The US model of civil security is still not transatlantic enough.

What has the EU been doing wrong thus far in terms of civil security?

Answer: the EU is very confusing jurisdictionally. There are far too many unresolved jurisdictional issues between the EU Member States and the pillars. This makes it difficult, if impossible to know whom to contact for what. In short, whom should the U.S. call?

The US should think seriously about adopting total defence concepts along the lines already developed and pursued in certain European countries (e.g. Sweden and Switzerland) – the idea of societal security and mobilising ALL sectors of society to protect society. The US does not yet have this sort of “psychology,” although Homeland Security is a step in this direction. This would mean listening to US partners and not just US allies.

Stein Henriksen, Senior Adviser, Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB), Norway addressed in his speech “From Total Defence to Societal Security – New Challenges, New Paradigms” the security paradigm shift in Norway:

“The Total Defence Concept that was in force in many European countries during the Cold War is now for various reasons increasingly obsolete. New security challenges based on the threat of terrorism and other types of violence short of Major War has contributed to the development of the Societal Security Concept. In addition, major trends in the development of our societies, such as the increasing ubiquity of information technologies and globalisation, have contributed to the development of entirely new security challenges. This developing Societal Security Concept in its turn contains the challenges of delearning previous pre-

paredness measures and replacing them with new or modified measures, and reorganising ingrained bureaucracies so that they are better adapted to the new security challenges. These changes are, however, based on the legacy of decades of experience with developing and managing the Total Defence Concept. This legacy is much less in evidence in the USA and Canada. There, the emerging issue of Critical Infrastructure Protection, with the realisation that neither national borders nor distance were relevant to the cyber dimension, provoked critical reappraisals of national vulnerabilities. The events of 9/11 brought the same lesson home in the physical world and triggered the development of the Homeland Security concept. Previously, this realisation appeared to be almost exclusively limited to the field of nuclear exchange. On one hand, the relative lack of a previous concept is a disadvantage, as many measures have had to be invented for the first time. On the other hand, there is a golden opportunity to think afresh, as the conceptual and institutional dead weight is possibly less prominent.

Jan Lundberg, Principal Administrative Officer, Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) called in his speech “From reactive to proactive” for a comprehensive approach to emergency planning and critical infrastructure protection:

“It takes a Network to beat a Network! We are witnessing the consequences of acts from international terrorist networks. It was not long ago that innocent commuters lost their life in Madrid. Acts like that are not acceptable in our societies. Governments have an obligation to protect its citizens and innocent civilians. It must be done while preserving our core values as democracy, an open society, the rule of law, transparency, accountability, etc. In order to achieve that goal we have to co-operate within our countries, bilaterally and in international fora. We must create and maintain good networks to meet the challenges of societal security in the 21st century. Networks are structures where cooperation between different groups is fostered. The network we are working in aims at coping with security and safety challenges.

‘Societal security’ or ‘homeland security’ as it is called in the US is the umbrella term that comprises the efforts to cope with modern security threats to society. We need a better understanding of two of these objectives society security focuses on: one concerns the field of resources, investment, and risk management, the other the field of organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination.”

Proactive and Reactive measures for a Secure and Safe Society need clear support from the Policy level and should be based on the firm foundation of knowledge. They must be in time and therefore use appropriate threat, risk and vulnerability analysis.

Dr. Jan Metzger ended the workshop recommending a book on the subject of Homeland Security: Marcus J. Ranum, *The Myth of Homeland Security* (Indianapolis: Wiley Publishing, 2004).

Conclusion

The reassurance of security issues usually creates new concepts and organizations. One such example is the concept of Homeland Security in the USA, which is a reaction to the threats faced during and after the attacks of September 11, 2001.

The battle space has changed. Alliances no longer fight for supremacy in Europe. Although today's battle space embraces conflicts outside of Europe, it also touches on the values and concepts at the core of modern Western democratic societies: stability, security, and trust.

The workshop attempted to plot these changes in national security concepts, and find models and concepts for the redistribution of responsibilities, including power and funding, in order to face the challenges of the 21st century.

Workshop 5

Content and Data Management in E-Learning – Current Issues in Reusability, Privacy and Security

Elke Mittendorf

Workshop organized by the Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in co-operation with the Advanced Distributed Learning Working Group of the Partnership for Peace Consortium.

Abstract

Thanks to the ADL Initiative and the success of the Shareable Content Object Reference Model (SCORM), more and more learning object repositories are emerging. As a result, the proliferation and reuse of interesting learning content has significantly increased, and new issues come to the fore:

There is a conflict between the goal of creating reusable content and the urge to heavily contextualize learning content. Currently, many ideas, methods, and tools for coping with this conflict are maturing. Other issues that may be caused by extensive reuse of content objects are the privacy, integrity, and security needs of content authors, researchers, and individual thinkers. SCORM content facilitates the collection of data about learners in order to improve online learning. Online assessment tools collect data about users. These data collections may be in conflict with the privacy needs of individuals, and they place demands regarding integrity and security on e-learning providers and educational institutions.

We believe that these topics have not yet been addressed sufficiently in e-learning literature. This workshop acts as a platform for these increasingly important topics.

Summary

Samuel Schluep, Institut für Hygiene und Arbeitspsychologie, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH)

Dynamic Learning Content Management System (dLCMS) – Enhancing Reusability of Learning Content

The production of learning content for computer-based training is demanding and expensive. Learning objects (LOs) should enhance the reusability of learning content. LOs are small modular building blocks that can easily be assembled into lessons. Today, LOs come in a variety of formats and styles, making it hard to coherently aggregate them into lessons. The proposed solution is the separation of content and presentation using structured content. In our project, called the dynamic Learning Content Management System (dLCMS), we implement a platform for the handling of LOs. The platform offers a centralized repository for the collaborative use of LOs, flexible search and retrieval functions, XML-based content structuring and easy-to-use tools for LO assembly. An online LO editor enables users to create learning content without them needing XML skills, and thus enables users to concentrate on content rather than on programming. Export packaging facilities allow the use of lessons created in the dLCMS in other systems, such as static web servers or traditional learning management systems. The dLCMS software is a prototype extension of the Zope-based Silva CMS.

Jeffrey A. Krinock, Mountain Top Technologies, Jamestown, PA, USA

Privacy, Integrity, and Creativity: Considerations Related to Digital Repositories

The widespread creation and dissemination of digital content destined for storage and retrieval in digital content repositories create obvious advantages. Content authors can store, find, and reuse learning content from other content creators with a fraction of the effort required with traditionally printed and bound materials. Less obvious are the problems and issues arising from the use of digital repositories; since digital content is often “sold” to organizations with the primary motivation of saving

development costs (based on ease of reuse), unforeseen interferences with creativity, integrity, and privacy may emerge.

Instructors may, for example, be encouraged to reuse – for the sake of saving money – existing content that does not specifically address learning objectives in the manner desired. Also, since newly created content destined for digital repositories will typically be exposed to a broad and unknown audience for an undetermined period of time, organizations may pressure authors to limit what they say in the interest of liability and security concerns.

Finally, as the recent work of Lawrence Lessig and others confirms, digital storage and dissemination of learning content broadly changes the architecture of personal privacy, since our content viewing selections, habits, and tendencies can be observed and catalogued in a digital environment in a manner not possible with other more traditional learning media. Organizations embracing digital repositories should analyze the impact of their use on creativity, integrity, and privacy, since these impacts are currently poorly understood, but have the potential to deeply impact the learning culture and learning success of an organization.

Dr. Edgar R. Weippl, Vienna University of Technology

Security and Privacy in E-Learning: Expectations, Mechanisms, and Challenges

E-learning can be considered a special form of e-business. The product is digital content that has to be distributed, maintained, and updated. The value of this product has to be adequately protected from unauthorized use and modification in such a way that students are not prevented from using it in a flexible way.

In addition, interaction among students and teachers needs to be se-cured. Clearly, ‘privacy expectations’ depend on what an e-learning platform is used for. For instance, during exams or drill and practice applications, users normally expect very little privacy. However, when discussing sensitive topics, the minimum requirement may be a guarantee that the discussions and any backups are not archived.

The second focus of this talk is ‘online testing’ or certification. The demand for online testing has increased to minimize cost and effort and maximize fairness (i.e. standardization) of examinations. Concerning

security, it is essential to reliably establish a person's identity (= authentication) and prevent forgery of identities. In addition, non-repudiation is a central requirement that is usually implemented using auditing (non-repudiation – an important security requirement – means that users are not able to plausibly deny having carried out operations).

Overview of the discussions:

- The fact that courses can be assembled by using reusable chunks from a repository of learning objects impressed the audience.
- The difficulties in making content reusable and the authors' willingness to do this were discussed.
- The dLCMS is not (yet?) open to everyone, but it is open to a community within an institution that is willing to share. Aspects of reuse are being investigated within that community but not yet with an open system.
- The danger of reusing content out of context (“Hitler built the autobahn”) was addressed and led to a discussion about the granularity of information, among other topics (issues were also addressed in the ISF workshop Learning Without Teaching? – E-Learning in International Relations and Security Policy).
- Intelligent tutoring systems were mentioned as a solution to adapting learning content to context.
- The danger of the “misuse” of content out of context was addressed with regard to online discussion forums, as well as to learning content.
- Intellectual property rights in all their complexity are an important aspect of writers' creativity even more with regard to “learning object reuse” scenarios than with regard to conventional content creation.
- Another discussion was based on the claim that the Internet makes borders between individuals and between nations vanish. The concern was expressed that this had to be “managed” in order to prevent chaos. The impact of the Internet on knowledge and on the global community were compared to the impact of Gutenberg's movable

type printing press. In a follow-up statement, participants were told that the Inquisition and book burning succeeded Gutenberg and that there are current analogies.

- The following was addressed briefly: should people participate in discussion forums using pseudonyms or their real names? Are the contributions to forums to be stored forever or for a limited time; are they accessible to everyone or to a limited group? What if the discussion contributions are mandatory in your course, if some topics are sensitive, or if students make indecent remarks?
- The mechanisms for providing IT security in e-learning have been implemented partially in projects of Dr. Edgar R. Weippl.

Conclusion

The objective of the workshop was to address issues in reusability, privacy, and security that have not yet been addressed sufficiently in e-learning literature.

We can conclude that the technology is prepared for the reuse of learning content (first presentation). We were also shown some examples of how and in what way creativity might be affected and how privacy and integrity needs might arise (second presentation). We were shown mechanisms and technologies for coping with the privacy and integrity needs in e-learning environments (third presentation).

The discussion made clear how complex the topics are. It showed that these topics are indeed very important for the future of effective e-learning, but that there are conflicting opinions on them. We hope that in the future the importance of reusability, privacy, and security will be reflected in e-learning projects and literature.

Learning Without Teaching? – E-Learning in International Relations and Security Policy

Michael A. Reimann

Organized by the Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH) in cooperation with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and the Advanced Distributed Learning working group of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes.

Abstract

The concept of “security through cooperation” relies largely on education and training: Educational programs enable and enhance cooperation between people and states, they allow for a better understanding of other people and cultures, and they therefore contribute to international security and stability. E-learning can advance such long-term strategies, because it facilitates learning any time and anywhere; it provides for the exchange and re-use of learning content; it allows for the import of learning content from other nations or cultures; and it makes use of all the advantages of information technologies and of the Internet (for example, availability and affordability). However, some new questions need to be addressed: Does learning “any time, anywhere” require a new kind of didactics? Will e-learning eventually lead to learning without teaching, i.e. without teachers? Would that be feasible? What would such a learning environment look like? What are the drawbacks?

E-learning activities and programs can be divided into two different types: The first is distance learning, which most often refers to courses where a virtual classroom is set up on the Internet – human teachers are still involved but through the Web. The second type is advanced distributed learning (ADL), typically transmitted via “learning objects” that

tend to replace schoolbooks but not the classroom – this model permits self-study learning without a human teacher. Most educational programs developed so far in the fields of international relations and security policy, however, use the distance learning paradigm. They have been developed by academic or other educational institutions, they are offered as online courses and they are “blended” with other teaching methods, including, in particular, discussion forums and on-site, face-to-face learning.

In this conference track, three distance learning projects from the field of international relations will be presented, and first conclusions from them will be drawn. Further, we will discuss whether and to what extent advanced distributed learning is suitable for topics like European security and defense policy, international security risks and other international relations and security policy related topics. The workshop will touch upon ADL didactics, asking, for example: What should ADL content look like, and how should students work with it? What kind of knowledge should be published through ADL? How should this knowledge be packaged into different learning objects? What is the best way to mix media and interactive features?

Summary

Patrick Lehmann, Director Services and Relations at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), presented a new e-learning course on European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), jointly developed by the GCSP and the International Relations and Security Network (ISN). The course, produced for the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, is designed as a two-hour introduction to ESDP and targeted at a broad audience (policy makers, academics and students). It consists of a series of self-contained modules (learning objects) that are meant to be reusable in various learning contexts.

Lehmann described some challenges in the development of the course: First of all, it was necessary to keep the learning objects short and concise, while at the same time including enough context information to reflect the complexity of the subject; in order to tackle this problem, an accompanying website was developed (<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/esdp-course>) that provides links, documents, and other contextual information, as well as general information on the course. Second, the modules were written in

such a way that only the last module (on future challenges) would need updating, since it alone deals with current ESDP issues. And third, it was decided to develop interactive learning objects with exercises, links, pictures and graphics to make best use of the e-learning features. Thus, the course can be used for self-learning, but it might best be embedded into a broader teaching environment.

Cornelius Friesendorf, political scientist and distance learning specialist at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, gave a critical overview of e-Learning in International Relations. The increased use and importance of e-Learning is obvious, and e-Learning actually embodies well-known advantages. For instance, e-Learning allows for learner-centric scenarios, and is therefore conducive to putting constructivist learning theories into practice. However, there are challenges to e-Learning in International Relations, too. Foremost among these are the following: until today, computers can not engage in a meaningful dialog with the learner; there is a dilemma between the need to avoid context-free information, and the requirement for brevity of texts; and there is the danger that students' language skills might deteriorate. Relating to Neil Postman's critical perspective on education via television programs, Friesendorf has proposed a hierarchy of learning objectives (context-free information, information, knowledge). The didactical method to be used depends on the respective learning objective. For instance, increasing students' knowledge requires a different approach than providing students with information. Practical guidelines for developers of e-Learning scenarios can be derived from these assumptions. Finally, Friesendorf presented an example of an e-Learning project at the ETH Zurich, the course on "International Security Risks" (<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/intlsecrisks>). This course can be used in blended or distance learning scenarios within educational institutions (DL), and also for self-learning (ADL).

Niklas Schörnig, political scientist at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF, <http://www.hsfk.de>), talked about experiences with PRIF's online teaching unit Arms Dynamics and Arms Control. Professor Harald Müller and his team developed the unit as PRIF's contribution to PolitikON, a major e-learning project in Germany. In PolitikON, approximately 100 political science professors and faculties exchange e-learning material, including courses, teaching units and links lists. The arms dynamics unit allows for self-learning (ADL) but has also been used in a distance learning (DL) scenario with undergraduate students

at the University of Frankfurt. Positive reactions of the students include the “anytime, anywhere” availability of the material, the high quality and reliability of the content in contrast to information freely available on the Internet and the chance to interact in a discussion forum. Students criticised the unit for being too text-centred (“online book”). They also said it didn’t match “fancy” Internet sites (e.g., no animations), and it didn’t allow them to store information in the long term. The overall assessment focused on the need of development teams to acquire specific e-learning expertise, particularly in the field of instructional and pedagogic design; further, there has to be a clear idea about whether or not the material would be used in ADL or DL scenarios. Other issues include copyright matters, the danger of reducing highly complex subjects to triviality and the best number of students in discussion forums.

Discussion

The discussion started out from the general observation that there has been considerable progress in the field of e-learning in international relations, compared to, for example, the 3rd ISF in 1998. At that time, presentations had focused on general issues about e-learning. There had been some declarations of intent but no finished projects, and, technologically, CD-ROMs were state of the art. In 2004, the discussion refers to real-life experiences in academic and educational institutions and to finished projects and existing e-learning courses, and technology has moved from CD-ROMs to online courses and on to single learning objects. However, the presentations showed that there are still many problems. The discussion raised more questions, like the delicate problem of social control of learners, the high development costs of e-learning and, consequently, the difficulties of getting appropriate funding. However, all three projects were very well received, and asked about their desire and motivation to continue working in the field of e-learning, all three speakers affirmed their general support of e-learning and emphasized its potential in the field of international relations.

Conclusion

In the workshop, concrete e-learning projects at high-profile academic and educational institutions (GCSP, ETH Zurich, PRIF) were presented. Conclusions were drawn for the development and the use of e-learning courses in international relations. In spite of some remaining problems (amount of context, danger of triviality), the benefits (learning anytime, anywhere, discussion forums, quality and reliability) still prevail.

Quel Avenir? The European Security and Defence Policy of the European Union

Victor Mauer

Organised by the Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH), in co-operation with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Abstract

The Iraq War of 2003 and the bitter controversies between the leading European powers related to it have led many observers to conclude that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) will take a long time to materialise. Some commentators have even gone as far as to suggest that it is unlikely to ever take off, given the seemingly growing divergence in the strategic outlook of the two driving forces behind the ESDP, Great Britain and France. Such observations, however, tend to overlook the current reality of the European Union (EU) actively at work in the field of European security.

The aim of the workshop is to critically assess the rationale, the shifting parameters and the future perspectives of the ESDP within the framework of the EU. The workshop will review the extent to which the stated objective of the ESDP – the development of an autonomous European security and defence capability – has been achieved, since the crucial European Council of Cologne in June 1999. In this regard, it will seek to address several issues that are likely to have a considerable impact on the future of the ESDP. Notable amongst these is the question of where and how ESDP fits into the wider framework of international (security) organizations; the EU's ongoing civilian and military engagement in the Balkans; the question of whether there exists any divergence in national strategic outlook; the enlargement process, especially given the pro-US stance of

the new members; the all-too-often forgotten Russian dimension of the ESDP; and the decisive role of the US – which remains an “European power” (Richard Holbrooke) – in the European security project.

Summary

Dr. Nicole Gnesotto, Director, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris

Common vision, common strategies?

Gnesotto emphasised eight points:

1. ESDP should be seen as a means to an end, not an end in itself. Military tools are only one aspect in a wide range of security tools.
2. Multilateralism is the order of the day, unilateral solutions are no longer feasible.
3. The EU is likely to concentrate on consolidation in the field of ESDP in the coming years rather than take new initiatives.
4. The centre of attention will likely revolve around the civilian and military operations. Althea, the forthcoming mission in Bosnia, represents a qualitative as well as a quantitative leap.
5. EU member states will have to make the recently established Defence Agency a success.
6. Internal and external security are part of the same package.
7. The EU will have to get its priorities right. The Union should concentrate on the Balkans and Africa, the forgotten continent.
8. The transatlantic relationship has to be rebuilt. There is a need for a strategic dialogue between the EU and the USA rather than between the EU and NATO.

Heinz-Dieter Jopp, Captain (Navy), Head, Security Policy and Strategy, General Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Hamburg

The Helsinki Headline Goal and the Headline Goal 2010

Jopp recalled that it was still early days for ESDP and that it was, therefore, unrealistic to expect the EU to have solved in five years a whole range of problems that had remained latent but unaddressed for the past half century. He mentioned the major issues confronting ESDP, especially in the military field (the Capabilities Commitment Conference of 2000, the ECAP process, the Berlin-Plus-Agreement between NATO and the EU), and called for an approach that brings the different existing national security cultures together into a practical synthesis. The European Security Strategy agreed upon in December 2003 was the first step in the right direction. However, EU Heads of State and Government should clearly define their level of ambition. In addition, Jopp said that the coherence between civilian and military tools needed to be increased. While emphasising the transformation processes of the French, British, Dutch and Swedish armed forces over the past years, he recalled that a major transformation of the German Bundeswehr was only now under way.

Dr. Anne Deighton, Faculty Member, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), and University of Oxford

The Hierarchy of Institutions and ESDP

The presentation examined the extent to which institutions are cooperating, or competing, and the changing position of the EU within this security architecture. The guiding questions were: Is the EU now the lead European security institution, and how do non-members perceive it? How does the EU manage its inter-institutional relations? Does a rich European and international institutional framework enhance or complicate the formulation of security in Brussels, and the delivery of security in the field? Does the temptation of ‘ad hocery’ by states weaken the capacity of the EU to act?

Deighton recalled that institutions can acquire a life of their own, as institutional interests are factored into bargaining. Institutions can shape each other, and they can shape member, and non-member states.

‘Unintended consequences’, she suggested, were a well-known phenomenon of such relations. With the EU establishing itself as a security actor, a new pattern of institutions had evolved. The EU, for example, served as a legitimising lever for the United Nations (UN); NATO and the EU found themselves increasingly in a learning partnership, unheard of in the 1980s and 1990s; and the relationship between the EU and the OSCE remained a difficult one. Deighton finished with two conclusions: first, ESDP gave a formidable boost to the role of the EU in international relations; and secondly, inter-institutional relations still depend ultimately upon state support.

Dr. Nadia Arbatova, Head, Department of European Studies, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow

Left out in the Cold? Russia and ESDP

Arbatova stressed that the basis of the security cooperation between the EU and Russia was a sound one. Russia, she argued, had contributed more than other post-Communist countries to the enhancement of European security. There existed no conflicting security interests between Russia and the EU. On the contrary, both faced the same security challenges: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflicts, organised crime, illegal immigration, arms smuggling and drug trafficking. Russia could add particular value to EU military capabilities through military technology, strategic mobility, and space support. Arbatova also pointed out that Russia and the EU had converged politically on an unprecedented scale through shared concerns about US unilateralism. ESDP, she argued, was not regarded as a threat in Moscow. However, in a security context Russia still concentrated on bilateral rather than on EU-Russia relations.

The existing level of cooperation, Arbatova suggested, was not appropriate. In order to make the relationship work, the EU should develop a new neighbourhood strategy towards Russia as well as forge a new treaty-based relationship between the EU and Russia. She concluded that future cooperation between the two depended not least on both the successful democratic transformation of Russia’s political system and the further development of the Union’s security dimension.

Discussion

The discussion revolved around four themes: first, the relationship between NATO and the EU. Some suggested that NATO should be regarded as the security organization of first choice, while others observed that the debate about competition between the two organizations was an issue that belonged firmly to the past. Both organizations were likely to complement each other. The set-up of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), including the Battle Groups, clearly showed that NATO and the EU were doomed to cooperate.

Secondly, there was some speculation about the concept of structured cooperation provided for in the draft treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. For the time being, it was suggested, the establishment of an inner ESDP core was unlikely to materialise since almost all member states were eager to participate in all aspects of the project.

Thirdly, the question was raised as to how the EU actually benefited the world. One of the answers given was that unlike the US, the EU did not intend nor was likely to spread democracy and market economy through coercive means.

Fourthly, the future relationship between Russia and the EU provoked a number of questions that clearly indicated the need for the development of a new framework in order to accommodate the various aspects of the relationship.

Conclusion

The workshop touched upon some of the most relevant issues currently discussed amongst security experts: To what extent are the EU countries speaking with one voice? Should we expect them to? What is the impact of the latest round of enlargement on ESDP? How can we improve the EU's response in the field of security? What is the EU's place in the hierarchy of security organizations? How is the transatlantic relationship likely to develop? Whatever the answers to these questions were, one thing seemed to unite the participants, and that is that politicians on the ESDP and the transatlantic relationship have a bumpy road ahead of them.

Caught in a Quagmire: Terrorism in Russia and Government Responses

Jeronim Perović

Workshop organized by the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, in co-operation with the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University.

Abstract

The series of terrorist attacks in Russia in summer and autumn of 2004, culminating in the horror of the Beslan-tragedy, reminds the world once again of Russia's unsettled conflict in Chechnya. This conflict has the potential to plunge the entire Northern Caucasus into chaos. Beslan has also demonstrated the Russian government's failure to effectively deal with an emergency crisis of this kind. Instead of learning lessons and elaborating a comprehensive, long-term strategy to deal with the crises in Chechnya and other parts of Russia's troubled Northern Caucasus, the Kremlin has exploited the window of opportunity after Beslan to push through long-discussed, but still problematic, measures such as establishing Moscow's right to directly appoint governors in Russia's 89 federal regions. With this and other measures, Putin tries to radically restructure the political system and to significantly increase executive authority.

The goals of this workshop are to assess the current security situation in Russia's Northern Caucasus and to evaluate the risks of intensification and spreading of the Chechen conflict. This workshop also examines Russian government responses to terror, and touches in particular upon the problems related to corruption in Russia's law-enforcement agencies.

Summary

Russia and the Northern Caucasus: Confronting the Security Challenges*

In his presentation, Russian Islam-specialist Dr. Aleksei Malashenko from the Moscow Carnegie Center predicts greater instability in the North Caucasus for the future. Chechnya is clearly the source for the terrorist threat that Russia faces. Both Yeltsin and Putin have so far managed to live with the war in this region, and sought to portray their campaigns there as short and successful operations. Nevertheless, Russia has effectively been engaged in a civil war since 1994, a strange situation for a country that wants to be considered part of Europe. The on-going conflict has not seriously dented Putin's popularity standing and, in fact, he used the violence following the hostage attack on Beslan in September 2004 to strengthen his executive authority.

Following the murder of Chechnya's Kremlin-backed President Akhmed Kadyrov on 9 May 2004, the situation has become more fluid. Malashenko argues that there is likely to be a flare up in violence between the North Ossetians and Ingush, in the wake of the attack on Beslan, a city in North Ossetia, in which Ingush fighters participated. Former Ingush President Ruslan Aushev had set up armed groups numbering approximately 500 individuals. Since Putin forced him out of office and replaced him with Federal Security Service general Murat Zyazikov, it is not clear who controls these groups now. An outbreak of violence among the Ingush and Ossetians could provoke further instability across the region, but particularly in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria.

For Malashenko, it is difficult to say whether Putin is right in arguing that the Chechen fighters have international support or how extensive this support is. Islam was not a motivator for conflict originally because the Chechens were seeking independence from Russia on the grounds of secular ethnic and national distinctions. Former Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudaev argued that the Russians drove them into Islam. Beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Chechen fighters began to identify

* The synopsis of Aleksei Malashenko's presentation is a slightly revised version of Robert Ortung's summary published in: Russian Regional Report 9, no. 19 (8 October 2004). The Rapporteur would like to thank Robert for letting him Draw from his article.

themselves with the global jihad. These people began to see themselves like Osama bin Laden, who was advocating that Islamists engaging in local conflicts should focus their attention on the main enemy, the US and its allies. Likewise, the Chechens began to conclude that they could attack Moscow directly.

The further destabilization of the North Caucasus will work to highlight the weak underpinnings of the Putin government and its inability to deal with the problems in the North Caucasus. Putin has sent Dmitrii Kozak, one of his most trusted and capable lieutenants, to deal with the region, but his success is far from assured. The Kremlin does not seem to have a plan on how to address problems in Russia's predominantly Muslim areas.

What happens in the Northern Caucasus will have important consequences for the rest of the former Soviet space. The leaders of Central Asia currently have great respect for Putin and see him as the head of a post-Soviet superpower. However, his inability to bring the North Caucasus under control greatly undermines his standing with them.

Terrorism in Russia: Government Responses

Dr. Robert Ortung from the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at American University in Washington, DC, argues in his presentation that one of the key constraints Russia faces in fighting terrorism is the rampant corruption among Russia's law enforcement agencies. An effective state must monopolize the use of force on its territory. Until it has a reliable police force, Russia will be an easy target for those who seek to promote instability.

Unfortunately, President Vladimir Putin's announced plans to reorganize the country's political system do not address this problem and, in fact, make solving it even more difficult. Weakening civil society, as Putin has done, reduces state capacity rather than increasing it. Curtailing freedom of speech and the activities of independent social groups deprives Russia of the free flow of information necessary to generate innovative solutions to complex problems. At the same time that Russia is poorly equipped to defend its homeland, the Russian leader continues to pursue a policy of violence in Chechnya that only guarantees more terrorist attacks.

Corruption in Russia's law enforcement agencies facilitated the attack on the Beslan school this summer, the downing of two flights, and the

theater hostage crisis in 2002 in Moscow. The problem is not simply a few bad apples in the police force who allowed the terrorists to implement their plans.

Corruption pervades Russian law enforcement agencies, creating what amounts to a pyramid of bribery. Street cops take small bribes but feed them into a system in which every officer at every rank knows how much he should get. The higher the official, the more he benefits.

In Russia police earn extremely low salaries and must hunt for other sources of income to survive. Since police officers are in constant contact with the criminal world they come across numerous opportunities to enrich themselves. Such temptations are all the more attractive since crooked officers face little chance of being caught or prosecuted.

The quality of Russia's law enforcement personnel has dropped dramatically during the last decade of turmoil. In the 1980s, new recruits to the police force were required to have a higher education in the legal sphere. Now many police forces simply cannot fill all of their vacancies and hire essentially anyone willing to take the job. The best officers leave to find more lucrative jobs in private industry.

While Russia's pervasive corruption is well known to the country's citizens, most feel that the problem is so all encompassing that there is nothing they can do to improve the situation. Lacking a vibrant media and NGO community, Putin has little access to the kind of investigative reporting and analysis that could generate potential solutions to the problems. He expects to learn about what is happening across Russia's vast expanse largely by monitoring citizen complaints that come into the country's public officials. In the Kremlin, Putin is surrounded by aides who provide advice that serve their narrow personal or corporate goals.

The West has a strong interest in preserving Russian state capacity in order to protect the country's large nuclear stockpiles. Beyond pressing for a peaceful solution to the Chechen war, Western governments must help improve the professionalism of Russia's police forces. Despite the tightening of the Kremlin's grip, there are still groups in Russia studying the problem and proposing solutions, so hope remains.

Unfortunately, the only thing the experts agree on is that rooting corruption out of the Russian police will not be easy, particularly since there are many other corrupt institutions in society. Possible solutions include raising salaries, stepping up transparency of police operations and coverage of them in the press, improving internal oversight, strengthening

laws against corruption, upgrading professional training, imposing “zero tolerance” policies, and giving Russian police forces greater access to international contacts. Latin American countries have had limited success fighting police corruption by reducing the size of their police forces, making it possible to train and pay the remaining officers at a more professional level. Such reforms have been widely discussed for the Russian military, but little progress has been made in implementing them.

Most likely Russia will have to pursue all of these possibilities simultaneously if it hopes to have any success. In addition to criticizing Putin’s undemocratic moves, the West should provide support in crucial areas like police reform that have a global impact on security issues.

From the discussion: Reflections on the situation in Chechnya

The greatest part of the discussion was devoted to the ongoing war in Chechnya, and to the finding of ways out of the current predicament. It was pointed out that though this conflict has an Islamic dimension, Moscow would do well to separate the issue of its Chechen problem from the broader war on terror when thinking about solutions. In spite of Moscow’s rhetoric depicting the Chechen conflict as a part of the global war on terrorism, there is not much evidence of a broad-based Islamist threat in Russia or elsewhere in the Caucasus. What Russia has is a Chechen problem rather than an Islamist problem. The war is still a national insurgency even though some rebels have adopted the methods and ideology of international Islamic terror. By branding the entire Chechen resistance as an international terrorist movement, Putin lumps together moderate Chechen leaders (such as Aslan Maskhadov, Chechnya’s elected president of 1997) with militant warlords (such as Shamil Basayev, who claimed responsibility for the Beslan attack). This is counterproductive since the Kremlin is systematically closing exist routes with no one left on the Chechen side to negotiate with.

A solution to the conflict is further complicated by the fact that the Chechen conflict is a multiple war. The focus on the “Islamic dimension” of the war diverts from the more important fact that Chechnya is today, after years of continued warfare and destruction, engaged in a self-perpetuating civil war with fragmented forces, including – next to the so-called jihadists – mercenaries from various parts of the Islamic world, criminal opportunists, nationalists, and some groups simply seeking revenge.

But neither is the Russian military a homogenous body. There are roughly some 40,000 soldiers from the Ministry of Defense plus 40,000 from other armies – mainly from the Ministry of the Interior, the Border Guard Service, and the Federal Security Service (FSB) – stationed in Chechnya. Parts of these forces do not as much advocate the adherence of constitutional order as favoring the preservation of the criminal situation from which they profit. Illegal oil production and smuggling, trafficking in humans, or arms trade, are those forms of activity, which connect business partners on both sides of the frontline, Russians and Chechens alike.

Control over the military and security forces is not only important in order to erase this economy of violence and thus create better conditions for a settlement of the conflict, but also to contain the terror committed by Russian troops on a daily basis against the civilian population. Russian forces are still to a large extent operating on their own initiative, carrying out missions they have defined for themselves. War crimes committed by Russian soldiers are hardly ever prosecuted, and war criminals seldom brought to justice.

Workshop 9

The Wider Middle East: After Iraq and the War on Terror

Shahram Chubin

Organised by the Geneva Centre of Security Policy

Abstract

This region has become the principal arena of geopolitics (analogous to Europe in the Cold War) and is likely to remain so in coming years. The panel examined how the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and their messy aftermaths continue to affect the politics of the broadly defined region. Apart from the implications for Western interests and the need for avoiding failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, there are the stakes for the regional states themselves. The entire region is under considerable pressure from the forces of radical political Islam and terrorism as well as the growing demand for domestic political reforms. The impact of the twin crises and the presence of outside forces in the region interact with the already existing pressures on these states.

Summary

The chairman of the workshop set the stage for discussion by noting the importance of the Middle East to Europe due to geographic proximity, historical interaction, the Muslim population in Europe, the energy connection and Europe's interest in limiting conflict and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He characterized The Middle East as a "failed region" in the sense of having missed the boat on globalization and having failed to produce to date a single democratic state (Turkey excluded). In addition, he argued that the questions of radical Islamism

and Middle Eastern related-terrorism, are linked to reform and economic opportunity, and concern Europe. The question of political reform has been on the agenda for some time, especially in the oil rich states which have been under demographic pressure well before it was raised by the United States. How to do this now, while maintaining control and not empowering radical forces who might benefit from it, would not be easy. While there are aspects of a “clash of civilizations” at work in the current Middle East, there are also aspects of a “civil war within Islam” as well, witness events in Saudi Arabia. In addition there are other factors that complicate the picture; a tight energy market which has seen increased oil revenues for governments, which might now seek to buy their way out of political problems; and the looming issue of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, which casts its shadow over the region. Ironically the US’ current low standing in the region favours Iran, which is applauded in the region as a state willing to defy the US. Yet an Iranian nuclear weapon would be more destabilizing than that of Israel which is ritually and habitually denounced.

The first panelist addressed the question of ‘Islam and Islamism after Iraq’. He argued that Islamism despite widespread alarm had not, 1) withered away; 2) come to dominate politics, or 3) been superseded by democracy. Islamism is still the strongest challenger to social reformers.

The debacle in Iraq has provided Islamists with the issue and occasion to challenge governments and to build coalitions across states (in unlikely pairings linking Arab Nationalists with Islamists) even to the extent of Arab Socialists adopting the language of radicalism. The panelist saw no danger of an immediate domino effect from Iraq in the Arab world. However Islamism itself has become a significant force within Iraq itself. Islamists are acquiring an ability to exercise a veto on policy within states more generally.

As for reform, the paths to power for the discontented are relatively clear: assassination; coup; elections; upheaval and transformation from below. In general the roads to power are and remain blocked. In some countries with large numbers of unemployed in urban centres this poses a security threat. It is in this context of stability (and terrorism) that one must examine the issue of reform. Where the choice for governments is between reform and stability, stability is chosen. As for the United States initiative on reform in the region, it is clear that there is a difference between

reform having its impulse from “within” and that coming from “without”. Reforms cannot be thus imposed. Where it comes from the region, and is coordinated among the Arabs (Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia) it stands more chance of acceptance by governments and eventual success

The second panelist focused on security issue affecting the Persian Gulf. He noted that the Gulf region could be seen from different perspectives; geographically, culturally or from the standpoint of economy (i.e energy). The region has no security architecture or collective institution to reflect its interdependence and unity. Focus on the military side of cooperation is not enough. The s remains the region’s ‘security manager.’ Regarding reform there are several perspectives, which are not coordinated or reconciled especially as to time-frame. One is how the people see reform; another is how governments or Royal families approach it and a third is the view of external actors.

Terrorism, which was earlier unthinkable on the Arabian peninsula, is now a new insecurity. There are both specific and general reasons for the “new terrorism.” Clearly the US use of force in Iraq has increased the ranks of the “resistance”. More general causes stem for trends in the region: high birth rates, unemployment, the ‘rentier state’ and its limitations. There is also the fact that the US military presence in the region remains significant, and is often resented. In this connection the US sponsorship of reform in the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) was ill-judged. Its connection with the US doomed it, whereas a European initiative on these lines might have been preferable.

The panelist suggested three scenarios through which to look at the future of the region:

1. The US leaves Iraq in disorder, Sunni – Shi’i violence follows with the possibility of spillover of turmoil into the wider region. The US will need to reconstitute the Iraqi security forces, but this, like the handover of political authority, presupposes agreement on the nature of the future Iraqi state.
2. Radical change in the region including large scale violence between Sunni’s and Shi’i. This could happen if the Shi’i gain preponderant power in Iraq and the arc of Shi’i populations in the Gulf becomes emboldened to seek political power quickly.

3. A tight energy markets generating large oil revenues, postpones necessary political adjustments and reforms and creates pressures for subsequent disturbances.

Without reforms social and political explosions may be inevitable. But these reforms must appear to be a local initiative (e.g the Arab Reform Charter), should deal with structural issues (and not be sidelined by revenue windfalls), and finally need to reconcile the need for change with the need for stability (or control).

Conclusion

The panelists concluded it was difficult to predict events with the situation in Iraq so unclear. None were optimistic about its likely outcome and the attendant repercussions for the region. At the same time it was noted that Israel's continued war with the Palestinians poisoned the region in respect to relations with the US, increased the supply of volunteers for jihadist and suicide operations and endangered the regimes in the area. Finally it is clear that the shadow of the Iranian nuclear weapons programme and the possible military responses to it by the US and/or Israel created further pressures on the region.

Post 9/11: Strategic Consequence in the Mediterranean

Derek Lutterbeck

Organised by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Abstract

The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent international ‘war on terror’ have had a profound impact on the security policies pursued by the countries both north and south of the Mediterranean. Moreover, the US intervention in Iraq has become a profoundly dividing issue between the Arab and ‘Western’ world, and the devastating attacks on trains in Madrid by terrorists with Islamist connections have further exacerbated the sense of vulnerability on both sides of the Mediterranean.

The aim of this workshop was to examine some of the strategic implications of the ‘war on terror’ in the Mediterranean, as well as possible ways of improving security co-operation between the EU, the US and southern Mediterranean countries. A particular emphasis was put on the question of how political reform and democracy promotion are feasible in a period marked by counter-terrorism.

Summary

The first panellist, Daniel Neep, began with a discussion of the EU’s Barcelona Process and of some of the reasons why it has thus far not achieved any significant results. One main reason for the lack of progress so far has been that the countries south of the Mediterranean do not draw a clear distinction between the EU’s Mediterranean Partnership and the Middle East peace process, and that the breakdown of the latter has also

adversely affected the former. A widespread perception among southern Mediterranean countries is also that the EU is generally not interested in the Middle East peace process. Moreover, progress is hampered by the issue of Israel's (alleged) nuclear weapons, and the fact that such hard security issues are not addressed by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The focus of the Mediterranean Partnership is rather on soft security issues, but these tend to be perceived differently by the countries north and south of the Mediterranean. For example, illegal immigration and drug trafficking are core security concerns for the countries north of the Mediterranean, while this is not the case for the countries of the south. A further problem in achieving political reform in the southern Mediterranean is that the governments in the south are interested primarily in regime security, and efforts of EU countries often help to sustain autocratic and illegitimate regimes in the region.

The second panellist, Martin Ortega, highlighted the need to distinguish between the EU's approach towards the countries of East and Central Europe and those of North Africa and the Middle East: while vis-à-vis the former the EU has sought stability through integration, vis-à-vis the latter the approach has been stabilization through partnership. However, it remains unclear whether such a partnership would actually lead to political transformation in the region. The panellist also pointed to the incoherence in the EU's search for partnerships with authoritarian regimes in the southern Mediterranean. A further problem of the EU's new Neighbourhood Policy was also that it was not related to the Barcelona process. Moreover, within the framework of the Neighbourhood Policy, all countries are put in the same basket – an approach which is problematic given the considerable differences between individual countries. According to the panellist, the main common denominator between the US, the EU and southern Mediterranean countries at the moment is the fight against terror, but it remains unclear in which direction this fight will develop.

The third panellist, Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, began by pointing out that terrorism is a strategy and not just a threat. The main response to international terrorism in the 'west' thus far has been to increase cooperation between security forces on land and in the air. However, enhanced cooperation at sea was equally necessary. Such action is now being taken in the Mediterranean in the form of Operation Active Endeavour, which is aimed not only at deterring terrorism but

also at combating trafficking and transnational crime at sea, phenomena which are intimately connected to international terrorism.

Since the events of 11 September 2001, there has been growing awareness among western nations that ensuring legality at sea is an essential element in the fight against terrorism. In general, there has been a mushrooming of so-called 'flags of convenience'. To more effectively combat terrorism, it is necessary to improve cooperation and exchange of information between different security agencies. The panellist also pointed to the emergence of a new relationship between western countries and Middle Eastern and North African countries. As terrorism is perceived as a threat by the countries both north and south of the Mediterranean it has also led to increased cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. In conclusion, the panellist emphasised that NATO was adopting a balanced approach in this area, in that the 'war on terror' was fought on several fronts: diplomatic, military, economic etc.

The fourth panellist, Bechir Chourou, began with some remarks on the definition of 'security'. If insecurity has to do with the uncertainty of the future, Arabs might be qualified as very 'secure' as their regimes are characterised by long-term stability. However, Arabs feel insecure about the present and the immediate future. While also in the Arab world, there has been growing concern with terrorism, there is an even larger fear that these countries might become the 'collateral damage' in the war against terror. The panellist discussed two main types of threats facing people in Arab countries today: physical violence, and a general deterioration of living conditions or in what can be called 'human security'.

The main sources of these threats were other states and these countries' own regimes. The panellist also raised the question where fundamentalist movements in the region came from. He pointed out that the fundamentalists started as opposition movements against their own governments. It is only because the 'west' was perceived as supporting illegitimate and corrupt governments in the Arab world, that western countries have increasingly been targeted by fundamentalist movements. The panellist also highlighted the growing cynicism in the Arab world about the west's efforts to promote democracy in the region. These efforts are perceived as driven by narrow self-interests in securing access to the oil and gas resources in North African and the Middle East.

Discussion

During the subsequent discussion one panellist argued that in the fight against terror, it was crucial to find the right balance between the US' 'energy', the EU's 'wisdom' and Arab 'ownership'. Another panellist highlighted the close connection between terrorism and human trafficking, in that the latter was one of the main sources of revenue for organizations such as Al Quaida. A further panellist pointed out that the political leaders in the south were generally not interested in economic development, nor in regional integration, nor in political reform. Rather, their primary interest was to remain in power and to suppress political dissent.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the panellists argued that enhancing international cooperation across the Mediterranean was a key element in the fight against terror. However, while there has been some progress in this area, not least due to the fact that international terrorism was perceived as a security challenge by the countries on both sides of the Mediterranean, a core problem remains that western countries are pursuing their narrow self-interests and short-sighted policies vis-à-vis Arab countries. Achieving genuine political reform in the southern Mediterranean would require going beyond this short-term perspective and addressing the deeper, structural causes of insecurity and instability in the region.

Security Sector Governance in the Middle East: Opportunities and Constraints for Reform

Joe Apostolidis

Organised by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Abstract

The Arab Human Development Report 2003 has illustrated that conservative political and social values limit the production, flow and renewal of all knowledge in the Arab world and have an impact on economic growth. Absolutist governance throughout the Arab world is perceived as a main cause for the comparative underperformance in human development of the region. The lack of transparency and accountability is particularly felt in the governance of the security sector. It comes therefore as no surprise that many call for radical changes to security sector governance and see in it a measurement for future political reforms.

In response to such criticism and as a result of domestic and international political pressure, various governments in the Middle East have announced political reforms.

This workshop focuses on current practice of security sector governance in the Middle East and asks whether the announced reform plans will bring changes to security sector governance. It also discusses opportunities for and constraints on reform in security sector governance in the Middle East.

Summary

The workshop focused on the current status of security sector governance in the Middle East. It was organized in response to criticism stemming from international and domestic political pressure that have prompted various governments in the region to start a reform process, for example the Arab Human Development report of 2003 which concluded that conservative political and social values limit the production, flow and renewal of knowledge in the Arab world and impacts economic growth. The lack of transparency and accountability is also a major problem. During the introduction, it was mentioned the workshop was meant to build on the earlier discussion during the workshop on “The Wider Middle East: Iraq and the War on Terror” as well as the subsequent workshop on Security Sector Reform in Africa. It was recalled that security sector reform as practiced by DCAF is very broad, encompassing all security organs including police and paramilitary and concentrating on management and political control.

The first presentation dealt with reform of military forces in the region. With the exception of the Gulf States, the majority of the states in the region are poor in resources. These states also face security threats, as well as conventional threats such as border disputes, there is the growing threat of asymmetric war in the form of ideological extremism and terrorism. Poor programming, planning and budgeting (PPB) accounts for considerable waste of resources. Conscript armies are still common. Little progress has been made in regional cooperation and arms control. There has been a growing awareness of the need of interoperability in and combined arms operations, but response has so far been insufficient. Furthermore the necessity of long term reform based on sound tactical doctrine and “C3” (Command, Control and Communications) or “net centric” war and information rather than new toys.

The following expose dealt with a different aspect of SSR, the human security aspect. Human security is an essential element of freedom, as in the sense of ‘eradication of all forms of curtailment of human dignity’, which is currently lacking in the Middle East due to bad governance practices. The point was made that freedom is an essential public good demanded in less developed countries. Besides effective popular participation and fully representative institutions which operate efficiently and with complete transparency, the rule of law should be applied equally to

all. Following from this, security is a derived public good that ought to be provided to all citizens, yet it is poorly provided to citizens of Arab countries due to bad governance at the national, regional, and global levels. At the national level the executive dominates all state institutions and serves the interests of the few. The state has perverted the role of the security sector from provision of security to all citizens to ensuring the security of the ruling clique (regime).

At the regional level, the point was made that co-operation arrangements have failed to capitalize on the immense potential of Arab integration by virtue of the common culture, history and language not to mention grave regional and global challenges that Arab countries would be able to better manage united. On the global level two main events were mentioned to illustrate the deficiencies in the global governance regime that affect Arab countries. First are the continued occupation of Palestinian lands and the flagrant violation of legitimate Palestinian rights that has continued for more than half a century. The second mentioned was the invasion and occupation of Iraq, in breach of international legitimacy, which has provoked infringements of human security in the region. It was stated that deep reforms were needed at all three levels to promote freedom and security.

The next subject for discussion was the reform process in Jordan under the rule of H.M. King Abdullah. While in theory the Jordanian constitution and legal system indicates that the Jordanian security organizations (the Armed Forces, the Police Force, and the Intelligence Department) are under the direction, supervision, and are held accountable by the civilian executive authority, who on their part are responsible to the parliament, actual practice is quite different. For example, it was mentioned that Jordan has not had a Ministry of Defense for over three decades, and the duties of the Ministry of Defence have been assumed by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and the King. While the Police Force legally is linked to the Minister of Interior, in reality, the Chief of Police report directly to the King, and the King is directly involved with the intelligence service. Several main problem areas were identified: an ineffective parliamentary system, the dominant role of the King, military involvement in political affairs, and Jordanian nationalism. Currently Jordan has begun a process of reform, the King has replaced old faces with new ones, and has commenced reforms that aim to further political participation and empower the legislative authority. It was commented that within this process of

political development, the reactivation and the full utilization of the legal and constitutional principles, that may take a symbolic nature in the beginning i.e. the revalorisation of the post of Minister of Defense, security committee, and the national security council, may provide an opportunity to achieve significant steps in security sector reform in Jordan.

During the question period several points were raised. In response to a question on the role of NATO in training a new Iraqi army and what ought to be done, the point was made that the former Iraqi army had two to three times the number of officers the US Army had. The further point was made that foreign assistance helped maintain regimes. A response tried to state the nuance that training and equipping the military had rarely involved internal security forces and was not directly responsible for human rights violations. As to the question of possible Arab involvement in the occupation and rebuilding of Iraq, while some governments might be tempted they probably should not undertake such a course of action. As to other course of action, besides reforming the military and security structures, external pressure should be brought on regimes to bring about basic democratic reforms, but that also it would depend in the final analysis on local populations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the main points were reiterated and all the participants and the audience were thanked for their interest and participation. Various publications were offered to the participants and it was noted that Security Sector Reform will continue to be an important area of discussion and action in the region in the future.

Security Sector Governance in West Africa: The Sub-Regional Parliamentary Dimension

Joe Apostolidis

Organized by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Abstract

In West Africa, military rule has largely given way to civilian governments based on Western models, a fundamental component of which is a representative and functioning legislature which checks and balances the powers of the executive. Control of the armed and security forces by the legislature is one of the fundamental characteristics of such a democratic system.

Therein, a major means of control/oversight is the parliamentary committee system through which elected representatives ensure that the security sector is operated and governed according to democratic norms and principles. This panel focuses on the ECOWAS Parliament as a sub-regional instrument for democratic control of the armed and security forces in West Africa. It addressed and accounted for the unique challenges facing the ECOWAS Parliament as a sub-regional oversight instrument and assessed its future prospects.

Summary

The first presentation dealt with the ECOWAS parliament and its development and history. The ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) was founded in Nigeria in 1975, and comprises the states of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,

Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Cape Verde.² It was started with a view to encouraging and implementing an economic common market among West African states and promoting integration and Pan-African growth. As well as developing more and more specialized agencies, the organization has recently been involved in regional peacekeeping efforts. The ECOWAS parliament, only in existence since 2002, was mentioned as being in a state of transition, with only an advisory capacity at present as the main power in ECOWAS remains the Council of Ministers. While it does not have the capacity for effective oversight of the security sector, the ECOWAS Parliament has been contributing to the management and resolution of conflicts in the West African sub region through diplomatic efforts.

The second presentation focused on the subject of the ECOWAS parliament as an instrument of creating a capacity building agenda. The fact the parliament is in a transition stage was reiterated, and the point made that security is important but cannot be addressed in isolation from other problems such as poverty, and economic crisis, as events in Ivory Coast and Guinea show. While the powers of parliament are limited until such time as it receives enhanced authority, issues discussed in the ECOWAS parliament can be taken back to the national parliaments for implementation. Furthermore, ECOWAS members of parliament are often important members of national parliamentary committees and can be effective in solving problems at the national level. Among improvements suggested were enhancing the parliament's powers and building committees to handle functions. It was suggested that the relevant Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security would propose the adoption to the ECOWAS Parliament of the Draft Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in Africa. The ECOWAS Parliament could then advise its adoption to the ECOWAS Council of Ministers.

The workshop continued with critical assessment of the ECOWAS parliament and security sector governance in the region. ECOWAS is a supranational organization subject to executive control over its functions. However, if the parliament is to become a critical actor in the regional political process, executive influence over the parliament would need to be curtailed. It was noted that the ECOWAS parliament has been

2 Mauritania withdrew its membership of ECOWAS in 2002.

successful in bringing parliamentarians of many different backgrounds and traditions, such as anglophone, lusophone, and francophone. It was further noted that the weakness of many states (which need stronger national parliaments with effective oversight functions, and suffering from fragmented loyalty in the armed forces), and the perception by the executive of parliament as a threat, would slow down the process of reform for the ECOWAS parliament. Some ideas for improvements, were immunity for MPs for opinions, more efficient use of funds, change in the perception that peacekeeping diverts money from development, and enhanced accountability within the executive.

Conclusion

During the question period, the issue of what added-value the parliament had for the ECOWAS organization was raised. It was opined that the parliament had the function of creating norm setting values for the member states. There was a consensus that the ECOWAS Parliament is still at early stages of evolution, and on the need to avoid the danger of pushing too far too fast. Furthermore, it does provide a means for parliamentarians coming from states where the national parliament is a “rubberstamp” for the executive, to meet and work with members who come from states (Nigeria and Senégál were mentioned as examples) where the parliament has an effective role. Regarding a query on what purpose enhanced powers to the Parliament would serve, it was offered that enhanced powers would have a positive impact on the process of regional integration, and cooperation with other regional associations would be facilitated. It was emphasized that regional cooperation was the only way to deal with security issues and that while there was a problem with lack of accountability and corruption at the national level, the parliament could help in the area of “soft law” such as the Draft Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in Africa, and in house training for parliamentarians. It was also suggested that more publicity needed to be made to the public of value of the ECOWAS parliament.

Challenges to International Humanitarian Law

Jean-Philippe Lavoyer

Workshop organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Abstract

This workshop addressed some main challenges to international humanitarian law (IHL) in contemporary armed conflicts.

New or aggravated features of contemporary armed violence present huge challenges in terms of protection of civilians and IHL application. Armed conflicts seem to have grown more complex and permanent peace settlements more difficult to reach. The instrumentalization of ethnic and religious differences appears to have become a permanent feature of many conflicts. New actors capable of engaging in violence (such as terrorist networks) have emerged. The fragmented nature of conflicts in weak or failed states gives rise to a multiplication of armed actors. The overlap between political and private aims has contributed to a blurring of the distinction between armed conflict and criminal activities. Ever more sophisticated technology is employed in the pursuance of war by those who possess it. In addition to that a privatization of security and traditionally military functions such as organization of prison camps or detention facilities can be witnessed.

Against this background, the workshop will discuss inter alia challenges to IHL in the fight against terrorism, how to enhance the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, IHL concerns in relation to the privatization of warfare.

Summary

Jelena Pejic, Legal Adviser, Legal Division, ICRC

The focus of the presentation was on some of the current challenges to international humanitarian law (IHL), in particular the legal qualification of the so-called global “war on terrorism”. Ms. Pejic emphasized that IHL becomes applicable when a situation of violence reaches armed conflict level, which may be international or non-international. Having that in mind, only certain situations associated with the “war on terrorism” may be said to be an armed conflict in the legal sense. That was the case in Afghanistan, which was initially an international armed conflict, and may be re-qualified as a non-international armed conflict after the establishment of the current, internationally recognized Government of Afghanistan in June 2002. A similar qualification may be said to apply to the situation in Iraq, to the extent that that conflict was ever waged as part of the “war on terrorism”.

Outside of specific armed conflict contexts such as these, where IHL is undoubtedly applicable, it cannot be said that acts of terrorism and the responses thereto taking place in other parts of the world (i.e. globally) constitute an armed conflict covered by IHL. These events are regulated by criminal law – domestic and international – as well as by human rights law.

The legal qualification of a situation as armed conflict or not has important consequences for the status and rights of persons arrested or detained. In international armed conflicts, the vast majority of persons in enemy hands are protected by either the Third or Fourth Geneva Convention. In non-international armed conflicts, the safeguards provided for by IHL, human rights and domestic law must be applied in a complementary manner. Outside of armed conflict situations, it is domestic and human rights law that govern the rights of persons in custody. Whatever the situation, no one may ever be deprived of the protection of the law.

Marco Sassòli, Professor of International Law at the University of Geneva

Most contemporary armed conflicts are of a non-international character. International humanitarian law (IHL) applicable to those conflicts is

more rudimentary and less protective than that of international armed conflicts. It may be that these less detailed rules are better adapted to such less structured and more volatile situations. The laws applicable to the two categories of conflicts become however more and more similar, in particular according to the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals.

IHL of non-international armed conflicts is equally binding for non-State armed groups. The legal mechanisms for its implementation are, however, still mainly geared toward States. The speaker first explored how armed groups could be involved into the development, interpretation and operationalization of the law. Rather than merely ignore armed groups or allow states to deal with them, non-state armed groups should be directly engaged by the international community, and should have a role to play in developing the norms and rules that they are expected to respect. The speaker also argued that armed groups should be allowed to accept international humanitarian law formally, inter alia to create a certain sense of ownership. The respect of the law should also be rewarded. Second, possible methods to encourage, monitor and control the respect of those laws by armed groups were described. The speaker suggested in particular that armed groups be allowed and encouraged to report on their implementation of international humanitarian law to an existing or newly created institution. Finally, if violations occur, ways to apply criminal, civil and international responsibility, including sanctions, were described.

Gilles Carbonnier, Head, Private Sector Unit, General Directorate, ICRC

The turnover of the private military sector is said to surpass \$100bn and there are over 20'000 private security contractors active in Iraq today. The emergence of this sector raises various challenges to humanitarian organizations and to international humanitarian law:

- What is the status of private security contractors under international humanitarian law (IHL)? They are either civilians or combatants as they do generally not qualify as mercenaries.

- What accountability mechanism or sanction system does exist, if any, to deal with private security contractors (PSCs) in case of violations of IHL? PSCs may de facto benefit from legal immunity and escape prosecution. The States have a particular responsibility in this regard: As signatories to the Geneva Conventions, they are responsible to ensure respect for IHL by such private security contractors that they have entrusted with military tasks.
- How to make sure that the emergence of PSCs does not result in increased violations of IHL? It is crucial to ensure that PSCs know the rules to be upheld in armed conflict and respect them.
- How to make sure that the presence of private military firms on the battlefield does not restrict the access enjoyed by humanitarian organizations nor endanger their security?

The ICRC has started addressing these issues in a systematic manner.

Dr. Daniele Ganser, Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich

The presence of so-called “Private Military Companies” (PMCs) on the battlefields across the globe is a comparatively new phenomenon. “Executive Outcomes”, by many considered the first PMC in history, was created a bit more than a decade ago following the collapse of the Apartheid regime in South Africa at the end of the Cold War. The company had been set up by jobless and discredited South African elite soldiers who had turned entrepreneurs after the regime change offering the service of war across the continent and beyond.

Still today many people are not aware that some states rely on privatized warfare, and that more than hundred companies exist in numerous countries offering war and security services to clients on a profit basis. This “business of war” first attracted global media attention only following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent involvement of PMCs like “Blackwater” in combat operations. For more than in any other conflict in United States history the Pentagon is relying on some 20,000 operatives of PMCs in Iraq to carry out sensitive missions once entrusted to the military. When it was discovered that the PMC “Caci” had been involved in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal, international observers stressed that

large problems exist with PMCs, among which that their legal status in national and international wars has to be clarified.

Conclusion

In the discussion questions were raised as to the ability of IHL to act as a check on the behaviour of parties to armed conflicts given the weaknesses of existing IHL implementation mechanisms. It was noted in response that this problem is inherent not only to international humanitarian law, but to international law in general, due to the state consent-based nature of the rule-making and rule-enforcement process. A few participants questioned the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia not to investigate alleged violations of the laws of war that had been committed by NATO forces in the 1999 Yugoslavia bombing campaign.

In the discussion on private security companies, the question was posed whether the ICRC's policy of engaging with all parties to an armed conflict did not have the effect of "legitimizing" non-state armed groups. It was noted in response that the ICRC's policy is based on its main operational goal, which is access to victims of armed conflicts, no matter whose control they happen to be under. It was explained that as a matter of reality, access was dependent on contacts with all sides and that, moreover, Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions provided that any special agreements that may be concluded between parties to a non-international armed conflict in no way changed their legal status.

Security Challenges in Carrying out Humanitarian Activities

Jean-Philippe Lavoyer

Workshop organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Abstract

The focus of this workshop was to debate on the challenges the changing global environment creates to humanitarian organizations as they are carrying out their activities. Many questions related to access to victims of armed conflicts and the security of the humanitarian personnel are arising in the area of humanitarian relief operations:

The present environment of humanitarian assistance is widely characterized by the fact that armed forces have become actors of relief operations with different mandates, including the use of armed force. Humanitarian actors and its personnel are often at risk when states assume that humanitarian action can be used as part of the military campaign and thus be instrumentalized for military or political purposes. Military action and presence claimed to be humanitarian and any other activity blurring the distinction between the role and objectives of political and military actors on the one hand and humanitarian actors on the other creates serious perception and operational problems.

Recent years, especially 2003, have exposed the ICRC, but also the International Federation and the national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies to new types of situations. The new polarisation of the world is taking place between the states engaged in the “fight against terrorism” and a number of radical non-state actors determined to oppose them. There are expectations in the polarised environment that all the actors, humanitarian organizations included, should take sides – ‘with

us or against us'. The space for humanitarian and neutral activities is narrowing. Indeed the ICRC and other components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement have increasing difficulties in carrying out humanitarian activities based on their Fundamental Principles of independence and neutrality.

Humanitarian action is increasingly at the risk of being rejected by some radical groups as associated with the West and its allies. Some of the groups are deliberately increasing chaos and opposing stabilising aid to the population.

The security approach has to be developed to respond to the challenge of local risks and global threats. This also means that a proper dialogue is established or strengthened with all different actors in conflict and disaster situations.

Summary

Walter Füllemann, Deputy Director of Operations, ICRC

The speaker described the impartial, neutral and independent action of the ICRC and examined those aspects of the “integrated” approach that pose problems to such humanitarian action. How are these terms to be defined? Impartiality means to respond to needs and suffering in a non-discriminatory way; independence means without any link with political decision making processes; neutrality means not taking sides in the political/ideological dimension. Neutrality does not mean indifference to violations of IHL, on the contrary.

The speaker gave a few concrete examples of ICRC activities that rely on neutrality and independence. In Darfur: cross-line operations involving all armed groups. In Liberia: running of surgery in Monrovia's JFK hospital in the midst of battle, with patients from all sides admitted and treated. In Ethiopia/Eritrea: release and repatriation of POWs. In the Philippines: evacuation/transfer of wounded and/or prisoners across frontlines. In Iraq: support to medical and water structures in midst of battle (March/April 03) in Baghdad. In Colombia: presence and activities across the country.

The military's contribution to humanitarian action is very important: they have a positive role on the environment in which humanitarian action

takes place. They secure roads and airports and clear mine and UXOs. They also have a positive role in the political process (disarmament, demobilisation, training of the military).

However, the military should carry out a humanitarian role only in exceptional circumstances, when no other actors can do it, in particular in order to save lives.

Humanitarian action by the military leads to the blurring of roles and objectives. It leads to the association of humanitarian action to political and military goals and actors. The speaker concluded by saying that the “integrated approach” is not a concept ICRC can associate itself with. It cannot be subordinated to a military or political leadership. The ICRC’s approach is characterized by proximity with the victims, interaction and dialogue with ALL actors, including of course the military.

Jonas Gahr Store, Secretary General, Norwegian Red Cross

The humanitarian space is not only narrowing. It is being actively and intentionally encroached upon. States are moving deliberately and strategically into the use of humanitarian assistance as both a conflict-management tool and military tool in war.

The challenge is that this vision is so politically attractive. The core of the assumption is that the humanitarian dimension may help win wars, determine political futures, win new allies and buy the support of the civilian population. But this is a strategy with terribly high stakes.

If the humanitarian mission is absorbed by the political mission, then its fate is sealed because political winds may shift, military missions may fail, the just defeated may rise to become tomorrow’s winner. If such integrated conflict management and state building projects fail, who will then be present and able to assist and protect the population in need, regardless of which side in the conflict they belong to?

Humanitarian assistance does not necessarily become more efficient if it becomes one of the components in a complex political coordination. Ultimately, it may even become inefficient.

We must reaffirm the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality. Humanitarian organizations too, need to critically reflect on the responsibilities and limits that ensue from the humanitarian principles.

NATO conducts operations under legal mandates, which can be further refined by principles of international agreements and national law. In Peace Support Operations, the primary military task is the provision of a safe and secure environment. Commanders have moral and legal obligations and may have to provide military assistance to humanitarian emergencies when requested by international/national authorities. Any support will be limited and handed over to the appropriate civilian organization at the earliest opportunity.

In Peace Support Operations, CIMIC is concerned with co-operation, ensuring that the military activities support the needs of the local population and compliment the work of the international community. NATO is not in competition with the humanitarian organizations, but see sense in co-operating between the various agencies to ensure that aid and support gets to those most in need.

Security affects all actors and each actor has a part to play in ensuring a safe and secure environment. Combating insurrection, provision of basic civil amenities, convoy protection, force protection, will all contribute to improving the security situation. Compromising of principles is not required, so long as each actor understands the other's position. With dialogue and co-operation, actors will achieve success sooner and more efficiently to help end a crisis.

Conclusion

There were many questions from the floor about a wide variety of issues. One question was related to the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems, and it was asked if they were still relevant, or should possibly be changed. A participant felt that humanitarians may be interested to prolong an armed conflict in order to obtain funding, and thus "survive". Still concerning funding, it was asked whether humanitarians were not too dependent on government funds, and thus on "war dividends". Aren't humanitarians sometimes pawns on a political chessboard?

A distinction was made by one participant between conflict and post-conflict situations, in the sense that in post-conflict situations, the integration of humanitarians into a political/military frame could be seen as realistic and pose fewer problems than during an armed conflict.

Taking Stock of the Fight Against Landmines and the Way Ahead

Davide Orifici

Organised by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

Abstract

The 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Convention) aims to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines. It does so by obliging States Parties never to use, develop, produce, stockpile and transfer anti-personnel mines, and by requiring that they destroy existing stocks of anti-personnel mines, clear mined areas, and assist victims.

By 2004, more than two-thirds of the world's States had already become parties to it. These States include almost every country in the Americas and Sub-Saharan Africa, a vast majority of countries that at one time were producers of anti-personnel landmines and the world's most mine-affected countries. The cooperative efforts of these countries have resulted in the destruction of more than 37 million stockpiled anti-personnel landmines.

In November – December 2004 the States Parties will convene in Nairobi for the First Review Conference under the United Nations umbrella. They will finalize a comprehensive review that will assess the general status of progress in the pursuit of the Convention's core aims. Moreover, States Parties will draft a plan of action in the pursuit of the Convention's humanitarian aims for the time frame 2005–2009 together with a document containing conclusions and observations on various Articles of the Convention. Finally, a concise, powerful and high level political declaration should guide the work for the years to come.

Summary

Major Achievements of the Ottawa Convention: Five Years after Entry into Force

The representative of Thailand, Ambassador Chaiyong Satjipanon, whose country is presiding the Ottawa Convention in 2004, underlined that Thailand attaches great importance to advancing the core humanitarian objectives of Convention, namely universalisation, clearing mine-contaminated lands, victim assistance and stockpile destruction. The Convention has reached several successes since its entry into force.

The Convention has a very high rate of acceptance, with 144 States Parties having adhere to it as of 1st October 2004. Efforts are ongoing, in particular by Canada and Thailand, to approach those countries which have unofficially declared their intention to adhere soon to the Convention. Moreover, both countries have engaged countries that are not yet ready to become States Parties, such as China and Vietnam. The aim of these demarches is to promote a wider reception of the Convention as well as to bring to their attention the benefits of joining the Convention.

The Convention has been genuinely adhered to by States Parties. On clearing mined lands, of the 50 States that have reported mined areas or which are known to be mine-affected, two have reported that they have completed implementation of their obligations. The challenge ahead is enormous, much needs to be done and assistance is needed to ensure that mine-affected states meet their obligations. On stockpile destruction, we can report that to date States Parties have destroyed about thirty-seven million anti-personnel mines. On victim assistance, States Parties have increasingly made efforts to support care, rehabilitation and reintegration of landmines survivors, within the context of the national development.

The Convention's norms have been accepted even by States not parties to the Convention. These States openly stated that they share the core humanitarian aims of the Convention. There have been even reports of declining use of anti-personnel landmines. Finally, the Convention is an exemplary model of partnership between States and civil society. The Ottawa Convention owes greatly to the work of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a coalition of 1,400 organizations and members in 90 countries.

Challenges Ahead after the First Review Conference of the Ottawa Convention

Despite a high level of success, a number of daunting challenges remain to be addressed. The President-Designate of the Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World, Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, underlined six major challenges.

First, for many States affected by mines 2009 a first deadline for mine clearance will be difficult to be met without international assistance. Second, those States which face a clear deadline for destroying stockpiled mines should learn from past experiences and call for external support, if needed. There are 18 countries that need to destroy approximately 10 millions stockpiled mines in the coming five years. Third, States Parties in a position to do so should assist others in meeting their obligations. States Parties should renew their commitment to ensure sustainability of resources, while at the same time it's a duty of mine-affected States-Parties to clearly identify the key steps: assess the problem, start the planning, monitor the progress and define priority for assistance.

Four, States Parties should ensure that the United Nations, the World Bank and other regional and international organizations integrate mine action into their programmes. States Parties have recognised over the years that the issue of anti-personnel landmines is not simply a humanitarian issue, but also a development issue with tremendous socio-economic implications for the affected communities and regions. Five, addressing the needs of landmine survivors is still an enormous challenge for many States Parties. This challenge often competes with other plague, such as malaria, HIV-AIDS, etc. Finally, all these challenges would be better faced by promoting regional initiatives and synergies between regions, as it has happened over the last couple of years. Regional exchange of views and experiences have been of practical use.

In Nairobi, late 2004, the States Parties will discuss of all these challenges. All States will renew their commitments, political and financial, by subscribing a strong political declaration reaffirming that anti-personnel mines are a global crisis, but which can be solved. In order to guide the future endeavours, an Action Plan with 67 different commitments will define the concrete actions and measures to be undertaken by 2009.

The Contribution of the United Nations in the Fight against Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War

The Director of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), Mr. Martin Barber, underlined that the United Nations (UN) are committed to the humanitarian and development objectives of the Ottawa Convention. The UN Mine Action Team consist of thirteen UN agencies and Department, as well as of UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF. Their key partners are the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ICBL, GICHD as well as international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academic institutions. The UN manages and supports mine action programmes in thirty-five countries.

Currently, the UN is redefining its Mine Action policy of 1998-vision, normative framework, policy positions, as well as roles and responsibilities will be reviewed. The policy will also give guidance on thematic issues: gender, sexual exploitation, cease-fire and peace agreements, advocacy, information management and victim assistance. A Programming Handbook will soon be issued, giving practical guidance to UN operators in the field in order to make mine action more efficient and predictable.

In the next five years to come, the UN will continue work on improving a framework of guidelines and standards for mine action implementation (International Mine Action Standards – IMAS). This framework comprises affected countries, practitioners (UN and NGOs), donors, commercial companies and specialists. By 2009, the UN will increase field level coordination and emergency response, by better coordination aimed at maximum efficiency and integrated approach, and by developing effective early warning mechanisms, contingency planning and rapid response to emergencies. For the UN it will be important to continue to integrate mine action into peace-keeping, development and humanitarian programmes. Finally, the UN will widen the focus from anti-personnel mines to include all landmines (anti-vehicle and anti-tank mines), as well as explosive remnants of war and sub-munitions.

The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Meeting the Aims of the Ottawa Convention

The representative of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) recalled the topical role plaid by the civil society and ICBL with

its 1,400 organizations and members in the successful adoption of the 1997 Convention banning anti-personnel landmines. The ICBL role since the entry into force of the Convention is to monitor compliance and to advocate for the full implementation and universalisation of the Convention, that mine fields are cleared and landmine survivors and affected communities receive assistance. The ICBL does this through the ongoing advocacy efforts or their global network and with the annual production of the Landmine Monitor Report, an unprecedented civil society monitoring tool.

For ICBL, the Nairobi Summit will be the most significant gathering of world leaders to discuss the global landmine problem since the Convention entered into force. They expect that States Parties will unequivocally reaffirm their commitment to finish the job started five years ago. The Final Declaration of the Nairobi Summit should be a concise, powerful statement reaffirming the collective political will and commitment to provide the required resources to ensure full implementation of the Convention. The 2005–2009 Action Plan should include concrete, time-bound and binding commitments by States, which will directly have an impact on mine-affected communities and landmine survivors. By strengthening this emerging international norm, States Parties will also support the work of NGOs aimed at engaging armed Non-State Actors (NSAs) to commit to the total ban on anti-personnel landmines and agree to implement mine action activities including victim assistance in areas where they operate.

Conclusion

The various speakers from the diplomatic, international and non-governmental realm agreed on their expectations and forecasted outcomes of the 2004 Nairobi Summit for a Mine Free World.

Although the Nairobi Summit is not an amendment conference, participants agreed that discussions should continue with a view of developing common understandings on article 1, 2 and 3 of the Ottawa Treaty. States Parties should reach clarity on what is prohibited or not by the Convention as regards combined operations with States not parties to the Convention, including transit, transfer or stockpiling of foreign anti-personnel landmines (Art. 1). Moreover, for some States Parties, the ICBL

and the ICRC, States Parties should reach a common understanding that mines fitted with break wires, tripwires, tilt rods and sensitive pressures fuses, capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person, meet the definition retained in article 2 of the Ottawa Treaty and should therefore be prohibited. As for article 3, States Parties should conclude that, if they chooses to retain antipersonnel landmines for training and technological research, they must be numbered only in the hunDreds or thousands, or less, and not in the tens of thousands.

Finally, during discussion, speakers and audience shared the view that apart from anti-personnel landmines, other types of mines (anti-vehicle and anti-tank), as well as cluster munitions will need to be addressed in the relevant multilateral framework. A control in production and use of these weapons, and eventually their total ban, would reduce the civilian casualties during and in particular after the end of a conflict.

The 'Brahimi Report' on Peace Operations: Four Years on

Thierry Tardy

Organized by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Abstract

The objective of the workshop was to look at where the UN stands four years after the release of the Brahimi report on Peace operations. Such an analysis was initially conducted by the GCSP through a seminar that was held in Geneva in June 2004. The two presentations of the workshop reflected the debates of the Geneva seminar.

The UN is currently conducting 16 operations, with more than 55,000 troops, military observers, and civilian police being deployed, in operations that are in most cases complex operations. It is in this context that the implementation of the Brahimi Report is looked at, with four levels of analysis: the political context, the reform of the UN Secretariat, peace operations in Africa, and key challenges for future UN operations.

Summary

The United Nations has reached, in 2003/04, a level of commitment in peace operations that has not been seen since the mid-1990s with, as of June 2004, 16 operations and over 55,000 military personnel and civilian police being deployed in operations which include a wide variety of activities. In this context, the implementation of the Brahimi Report on Peace Operations is examined on four levels of analysis.

The Political Context

In 2004, the international environment is no doubt slightly different from the 2000 environment, when the Brahimi Report was released. The current situation combines grounds for optimism and worrying trends for the United Nations.

The events of 11 September 2001 have fundamentally altered threat perceptions – at least in the West – which in turn further weakened Western countries’ eagerness to support the United Nations as the main peacekeeping implementer. Besides, the Iraq crisis and then war once again raised the question of the “relevance” of the United Nations as the organization in charge of international peace. Those events have indeed further weakened the centrality of the United Nations, both as a normative and as an operational actor.

Yet, in this critical environment, the United Nations displays an astonishing ability to continually rise from its ashes. Besides its key role as a legitimizing body, the United Nations has remained extremely active on the peacekeeping front, with the creation and conduct of four major operations since the spring 2003 “relevance crisis” (Liberia, Ivory Coast, Haiti, and Burundi). At the same time, the Dramatic growth in UN operations pushes the Organization to the limits of its capacities. Besides, UN operations continue to suffer from a lack of support from Western states, which persistently refuse to place their military under UN command. The “commitment gap” between developing and developed states is a matter of great concern, as it questions the ability of the United Nations to conduct “robust peacekeeping”, one of the key objectives of the Brahimi Report.

The UN Reform

The reform of the UN structure mainly concerns its rapid deployment capacity and its planning and support structure. Progress has been observed on both levels.

As for rapid deployment capacities, the authorization given to the Secretary-General to commit funds prior to the creation of a mission (“pre-mandate commitment authority”), the creation of the Strategic Deployment Stocks, aimed at facilitating the rapid deployment of materials

to the field, and the establishment of groups of pre-identified personnel which are supposed to support an operation in its first 90 days (Rapid Deployment Teams) have all been valuable implementations of the Brahimi Report, despite the remaining difficulties to deploy a complex operation within 90 days.

Concerning headquarters resources, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been significantly strengthened, while communication between headquarters and the field has been improved. Yet persistent difficulties remain for the United Nations to plan and conduct peace operations in a strategic and integrated way. More generally, the question centered around whether a reinforced DPKO is in a better position to plan and run peace operations today than it was four years ago. Some doubts about the link between structure and performance were expressed. While it was acknowledged that the improvements observed are valuable, they may not be sufficient to enable the United Nations to perform at the upper-level of the peacekeeping spectrum (robust peacekeeping).

Peacekeeping in Africa

Seven out of sixteen UN operations take place in Africa, with 85.3% of UN personnel in peace operations being deployed on that continent.

As far as the implementation of the Brahimi Report is concerned, two levels of analysis can be distinguished: a strategic level, dealing with the UN role in Africa and the place of the Brahimi Report in this context; and a more practical level, dealing with the implementation, specifically within operations deployed in Africa, of the technical recommendations of the Report.

Insofar as the practical level is concerned, most of the recommendations of the Brahimi panel that have been implemented have found applications in Africa. The already mentioned Rapid Deployment Teams mechanism, pre-mandate commitment authority, Strategic Deployment Stocks, and Integrated Mission Task Force were all somehow implemented in the case of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which was the first major UN operation since the release of the Brahimi Report.

Concerning the strategic level, the main issue was the linkage between the implementation of the Brahimi Report (in particular its technical aspects) and an increased ability of the United Nations to do peacekeeping

in Africa. Indeed, in many cases, as in the DRC for example, addressing the conflict at the political level may prove to be more cost-effective than focusing on the technical aspects of the peace operation.

Furthermore, the already discussed “commitment gap” is particularly acute in Africa, where the Western reluctance to intervene creates some resentment. At the same time, Western military involvement in Africa, especially on the part of France or the UK, is often suspected of resulting from self-interest. However, it seems that what is feared in Africa is Western indifference rather than Western self-interest. This ambivalence is also reflected in the debate on the extent to which African conflicts should be handled by Africans rather than by external actors. This, in turn, leads to the issue of the role of regional powers (Nigeria and South Africa) in conflict management. While their involvement conditions the strength of regional organizations, it also implies regional power politics that may have counter-productive effects.

Key Challenges for Future Peace Operations

The demand for peacekeeping will continue. The persisting existence of UN peace operations as a way to deal with conflicts was widely acknowledged. This was however challenged by two kinds of arguments. First, it was contended that through peace operations, the international community was spending too much energy on the management of the consequences of the conflict, while overlooking the politics of it. Second, one might witness a decrease in the number of peacekeeping operations in the near future, as the number of conflicts is also decreasing.

UN reform is a limited reality. It was clear during the workshop that the reform of the United Nations had become a reality, and that the United Nations is today better able to conduct peacekeeping operations. However, the ability of the United Nations to manage “robust peacekeeping” is still questioned, and will remain so. Furthermore, the reform process is only one element of a coherent UN peacekeeping policy. State support is another determining factor that is unlikely to be much stronger in the near future. The position of the United States was here particularly stressed.

Strategies / Integration of Operations.

The need for the United Nations to look at peacekeeping in a strategic way was presented as a generally overlooked topic, but one of key importance. In particular, the need for an integrated approach to peace operations at the UN level was stressed. The very nature of contemporary peace operations that combine a wide range of interrelated civilian and military activities makes an integrated and coordinated approach a condition of coherence and success.

Division of Labour and Regional Cooperation.

The question concerning the function of the United Nations in peace operations raises the issue of the role of other actors involved in peacekeeping. In Africa in particular, the issue of the division of labour between the United Nations and regional organizations needs to be clarified. This clarification has to deal with legal issues (mandates, use of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter), operational issues (which organization is in charge of which activities?), as well as sequencing (which organization should go first?). Simultaneously, the fact that a regional approach to conflicts should be favoured whenever possible was widely accepted. Two issues are to be distinguished here: one is the need to empower regional organizations so as to enable them to deal by themselves with the conflicts of their region; the other is to adopt a regional approach to conflicts that are closely inter-related, and the resolution of which cannot be completed individually (case of West African conflicts).

Armed Groups and Small Arms in West Africa: Misuse and Engagement

Christina Wille

Organised by the Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute for International Studies

Abstract

Armed groups, both non-state and paramilitary, rely heavily on small arms and light weapons. Most are well enough resourced that they can afford firearms, but few have access to heavy weapons, artillery and air supported weaponry. Many armed groups are also known for misusing weapons, either against civilians, opponents or by equipping minors with arms. It is relatively difficult to engage armed groups in negotiations, but changes in technology provide new opportunities to make conduct of these groups. Risks and opportunities for negotiating with armed groups have to be carefully considered.

Summary

The workshop presented preliminary results from ongoing research work by the Small Arms Survey into armed groups in the ECOWAS region in West Africa. Nicolas Florquin, Researcher at the Small Arms Survey, provided an overview of the main findings on armed groups in the region. The proliferation and misuse of small arms has devastated West Africa. An estimated eight million such weapons are circulating in the fifteen ECOWAS member states. The vast majority of these weapons remain outside state control, making them easily available to the many insurgent, militia, paramilitary, terrorist and other armed groups that continue to

destabilise the region. Recent research conducted by the Small Arms Survey identifies at least 25 such groups present in nine West African countries.

Attempts to prevent additional weapons from entering the region, such as the 1998 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa, should be commended. However, the wide variety of armed conflicts the region faces, and the different actors they involve, call for a better understanding of the complex ways in which small arms and light weapons ultimately end up in the hands of those who use them in conflict. Armed groups do not always have the means to acquire weapons from foreign suppliers on a large scale. Rather, they tend to collect weapons in small numbers by seizing existing stocks. Some groups obtain weapons from retired military officers and corrupt policemen. Local production of small arms is another source of weapons for armed groups in the region.

Christina Wille, Senior Researcher at the Small Arms Survey, presented preliminary findings from an ongoing data collection process on children associated with fighting forces in the West African region. West African societies show a great diversity with respect to the use of children in armed conflicts. In some countries, like Mali and Niger, minors have never been part of the armed struggle. In Guinea, young people were recruited by the state administration at times of emergencies when local communities were under rebel attack. They are now included in an official demobilisation process. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the use of young children was widespread. The recruitment of children in Sierra Leone and Liberia has been documented as having occurred forcefully through abductions and kidnappings, but also voluntarily because children see a reason to be engaged in fighting either to revenge incidents that have happened to them or their families or as a preventive measure because armed groups will protect them and their families. A number of children were also kidnapped by older children who sought to improve their own life within the fighting forces. Activities carried out by children within the armed forces were wide ranging from portering and cleaning activities to participation in combat and abuses. Children involved in armed groups are both victims and perpetrators.

David Petrasek from the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue provided an overview of ways in which representatives from armed groups can

be engaged in constructive dialogue on humanitarian issues and peace negotiations. In certain ways, contacting armed groups has become more difficult: the war on terror has resulted in an increasing number of armed groups being declared as terrorist organizations making it morally less justifiable to seek a dialogue with these groups. Weakened state sponsorship since the end of the cold war, and a growth in what has been called 'unstructured' conflicts, has also meant that fewer armed groups can be influenced through their sponsors in foreign capitals. On the other hand, new communication technologies, such as satellite phones and internet addresses makes groups using these technologies more reachable. There are also moves underway to make non-state armed groups accountable under international law. An essential dilemma that recurs repeatedly is the problem of engaging armed groups without legitimising in unwarranted ways their behaviour or enhancing their status. There are also dangers of being manipulated by armed groups for their own ends and the loss of impartiality of mediators who develop contacts with a particular armed group. Any engagement with armed groups thus has to be planned carefully by weighing up the risks and opportunities before engaging.

Conclusion

The discussion covered methodologies employed to obtain information on armed groups and child soldiers. Some participants pointed out that armed groups had to be understood from the socio-economic context in which they operate. In order to be effective programmes aimed at reintegration must consider issues such as the dynamics of labour markets.

Private Guns – Collective Responses: Attempts at Weapons Collection in the Western Balkans

Shukuko Koyama

Graduate Institute for International Studies, Small Arms Survey

Abstract

During the conflicts in the Western Balkans, small arms were distributed to relatively large swaths of the population. To this date, many of these remain in the hands of what are now mostly civilians (although the distinction is notoriously hard to make during and after interethnic wars). According to SAS estimates, there are between 330,000 to 460,000 guns held by civilians in Kosovo and 250,000 to 600,000 in Macedonia.

Post-conflict weapons collections measures in the region have also often focuses on civilian weapons. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has undertaken various collection approaches in the last few years. Entire communities have been targeted with so-called weapons in exchange for development programmes. This approach differs considerably from weapons collection programmes in other parts of the world where programmes mostly target ex-combatants. Yet, in purely quantitative terms, the number of weapons collected were not very substantial.

Summary

This workshop looked at a number of issues surrounding civilian gun ownership rates and collective weapons collection programmes. By citing examples from a number of countries in the Western Balkans, the role of guns in post-conflict societies were explored. In addition, the workshop

looked at the different collective weapons collection programmes and explored their strengths and weaknesses.

The session had an interactive discussion, examining practical issues of weapons collection programmes. The audience raised questions on the issues namely:

- 1) the role of SEESAC in relation to donors and recipient countries;
- 2) donor fatigues in weapons collection assistance;
- 3) the need of systematic evaluation strategy in a phrased manner;
- 4) resource mobilization strategy; and
- 5) the supply issue of small arms.

Through the discussion, two points raised as major issues for the further weapons collection enterprise. Firstly, it was pointed out that weapons for development programmes need a longer term strategy for its resource mobilization and programming. On this point, it was suggested to shift financial source of weapons collection assistance from the ministries of foreign affairs to development ministries. Secondly, several panelists emphasized the importance of more systematic evaluation of weapons collection to measure impacts of weapons collection. At the same time, it was noted that such an evaluation should be practical oriented, so that it could be built upon a time limited programme cycle.

Conclusion

The session had a constructively critical discussion on the practice of weapons collection in the Western Balkans. Although the examples were merely taken from the region, it was pointed out that most of the lessons could be well applied to weapons collection programmes in other regions of the world.

Co-operative Threat Reduction in a Changing Security Environment: Achievements and Prospects

Derek Lutterbeck

Organised by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Abstract

Over recent years, Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) has emerged as an increasingly important issue on the international security and arms control agenda. CTR programmes have their origins in the immediate aftermath of the cold war, when the so-called Nunn-Lugar threat reduction programme was launched to safeguard weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the territory of the collapsing Soviet Union. Recently, however, such threat reduction efforts have gained much in salience with the emergence of international terrorism as a prime security concern among 'western' countries, subsequent to the terrorists attacks on the US on 11 September 2001.

Arguably the most telling sign of the growing importance attributed to CTR in this regard has been the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, an initiative which was launched by the G8 in June 2002, and which was subsequently joined by a number of other countries as well, such as Sweden, Norway or Switzerland. Under the Global Partnership, the participating states have pledged a total of 20 billion USD for threat reduction and WMD disposal projects to be carried out in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. The objective of this workshop was to explore different aspects of the G8 Global Partnership and CTR and its utility as a tool for disarmament.

Summary

Derek Lutterbeck began with some introductory remarks on the history and current relevance of cooperative threat reduction. Since the launching of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme in the early 1990s, threat reduction projects have focused on three main areas: dismantlement and destruction of WMDs; enhancement of the security and safety of WMDs as well as weapons-related technology and materials to prevent their diversion; and conversion of WMD facilities and expertise to non-military purposes. While cooperative threat reduction programmes seemed to be losing momentum towards the end of the 1990s, as the main challenges they were intended to address seemed less pressing, the decline of CTR has been rapidly reversed with the events of 11 September 2001 and the emergence of international terrorism as a core security concern among western countries. One implication of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington has been that two threats have been increasingly merged in western security discourse: the threat of international terrorism on the one hand, and that of WMD proliferation on the other. As a consequence, a core objective in the fight against terror, at least among western countries, has become to prevent terrorist organization from gaining access not only to WMDs and weapons-related material and expertise, but also to radiological material out of which a so-called dirty bomb could be constructed. The chairman also pointed to the relationship between cooperative threat reduction or WMD disarmament assistance and other recent instruments adopted in the context of the fight against terror, such as critical infrastructure protection or homeland security.

The first panellist, Vladimir Orlov, discussed the background and evolution of the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction, which was launched by the G8 at their 2002 summit in Kananaskis. Vladimir Orlov discussed the development of the Global Partnership since its inception, the main areas of activities, as well as the financial pledges made by individual member countries. He also presented the results from a survey conducted on the occasion of a conference organised by the PIR Centre in Moscow, which focused on different aspects of the Global Partnership. The main problems and challenges currently facing the Global Partnership include the following: considerable gaps between the financial pledges made and actual assis-

tance provided; a lack of efficiency in carrying out assistance projects; taxation issues; issues of access; and liability protection. In conclusion, the panellist set out the following priorities for future threat reduction efforts to be carried within the framework of the Global Partnership: stricter supervision and control of projects is necessary so as to enhance their efficiency; there is a need to increase contributions from the Russian budget to the Global Partnership; the commercialisation of disarmament assistance and conversion project should be promoted; disarmament assistance efforts should seek to attract more media attention; civil society should be given a stronger role in threat reduction projects; and more efforts should be made to foster and strengthen a non-proliferation culture in Russia, as well as elsewhere.

The second panellist, Ian Anthony, provided an overview of the disarmament assistance activities of the EU. He outlined threat reduction activities of EU countries both prior and after 2002. The main changes after 2001 have included an increase in the number of assistance programmes carried out by EU countries, an increase in the financial scope of assistance, and the carrying out of programmes in new functional areas. The panellist then turned to a discussion of the background processes affecting the EU's threat reduction activities. The most important of these include the EU's security strategy, which highlights the importance of WMDs to EU security; the EU Strategy Against WMD, which identifies non-proliferation and disarmament assistance as important foreign policy instruments; and the Action Plan, which establishes specific short-term activities and a medium term programme in this area. The main factors behind the EU's increasingly prominent role in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament assistance can be seen in its aspirations to become a global actor, its efforts to respond to new external threats, and its desire to repair trans-Atlantic relations after the crisis over Iraq. Looking into the future, Ian Anthony concluded with an overview of the next steps to be taken by the EU and its members states in this field. These include a discussion within EU governments to establish national programmes on non-proliferation and disarmament assistance; a dialogue among EU Member States to establish common priorities and identify synergies in this area; and the creation of Community assistance programmes, including a specific non-proliferation budget line.

The third panellist, Stephan Robinson, focused on chemical weapons demilitarisation in Russia and the role of the Green Cross in this field. He

began with a discussion the nature of the Green Cross, characterising it as a mixture between an environmental and a humanitarian organization. He then turned to an overview of the Green Cross Legacy Programme whose main goals are the conversion and clean-up of military facilities and the reduction of environmental impact of military practices. In the framework of the Legacy Programme, the Green Cross engages in a variety of public outreach and information activities, aimed at enhancing the transparency of and public involvement in chemical weapons disposal activities. The panellist also provided an overview of the Russian chemical weapons arsenal and of the state of the Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Programme. This was followed by a discussion of the relationship between 'hard' and 'soft' tools in the context of demilitarisation projects: while demilitarisation projects (i.e. the hard tools) need a favourable environment, the objective of soft tools is to create such an environment. Lastly, Stephan Robison provided an overview of different community perspectives on chemical weapons disposal activities and the responses needed to address community concerns. Such responses included inter alia the establishment of a credible public health programme, the creation of environmental monitoring capabilities, and assisting the local population in transforming agricultural production from foodstuff to non-food products, which often becomes necessary due to difficulties in selling foodstuffs from potentially affected areas on regional market.

Discussion

The following discussion revolved largely around the question of biological weapons disposal and coordination issues within the Global Partnership. In the area of biological weapons disposal in the Russian Federation, the panellist argued, progress was still lacking. Due to Russian sensitivities, one efforts in this field should begin with confidence-building measures aimed at allaying fears on the part of the Russian military establishment.

Conclusion

The main conclusion emerging from this workshop was that CTR or disarmament assistance are likely to become increasingly important foreign policy tools in the future. More countries will become involved in this area, they are likely to devote growing financial resources to disarmament assistance and non-proliferation projects, and projects will be carried in new functional areas. Progress in this field, however, will depend crucially on the ability of the growing number of donor countries to effectively coordinate their projects, as well as on the resolution of the more 'traditional' problems in this area, such as issues of access, taxation and liability protection.

The Politico-Military Dimension of the OSCE: Arms Control and Conflict Management Issues

Alexandre Lambert

Organized by the Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI),
Program for the Study of International Organization(s) (PSIO)

Abstract

The workshop addressed two series of issues related to the OSCE: conflict management by means of Field Missions (structural problems, achievements, future developments, etc.); and disarmament, arms control and CSBM's (CFE Treaty, Open Skies, Vienna Document 1999 and Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition).

Summary

Prof. Victor-Yves Ghébalí, Professor of International Relations, HEI

OSCE Field Missions: An Overview

Professor V.-Y. Ghébalí presented a comprehensive assessment of the experience developed so far, after more than a decade (1992–2004), by OSCE 'Long-Term Missions' (LTMs) assuming pre-conflict, conflict resolution or post-conflict functions. Starting with a reminder of the parameters of conflict management in the OSCE area, he discussed the issues related to the operating modalities of LTMs, with special emphasis on the termination of mandates, before addressing the stakes (associated to Russian repeated criticisms) that such a creative tool presently represent in the ongoing process of OSCE reform.

*Dr. Wolfgang Zellner, Acting Head, Centre for OSCE Research,
University of Hamburg*

The Future Development of the OSCE Field Missions

Dr. Zellner emphasized that – aside from the Vienna-based security dialogue – the OSCE’s field operations are its most important asset and its most decisive comparative advantage over other international organizations (IOs). OSCE field operations actually constitute the Organization’s core activity for which it spends about 80 % of its budget. However, the OSCE’s field operations are confronted with a number of political challenges. The first is connected with EU Enlargement and the development of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU has started to develop its own capacities and instruments for civilian crisis prevention and management. The 25 EU member states plus the associated states represent a specific weight within the OSCE itself. About three quarters of the organization’s financial and personnel resources are firmly linked to the EU process and only partly balanced by the OSCE’s consensus rule. EU enlargement will further change the geopolitical landscape of the Eurasian continent. This will have a direct impact also on the OSCE’s freedom of action and for its field operations.

The Russian criticisms directed against the OSCE and its field operations concern geographic and substantive asymmetries. The geographic asymmetry involves OSCE field missions that are exclusively established in countries of the former Soviet Union and in the Western Balkans. Moreover, Russia was especially angered by the closure of the OSCE Field Missions in the Baltic States. Substantially, the asymmetry has to do with the fact that the OSCE field operations are focused on the human dimension and democratization issues. Another asymmetry is related to complaints from some CIS countries about alleged interference by OSCE field missions into their internal affairs. Dr. Zellner concluded that the OSCE’s “wild years”, when several missions opened almost every year, are now over. Time has come for the Organization to transform into a “normal IO” in order to be better prepared to compete with other IOs. The reform and strengthening of OSCE field missions would be an important element of such a strategy.

Col Henning Spies, Permanent Mission of Germany to the OSCE

Vienna Document 1999; Review, Status, Perspectives

Col Spies presented the 1999 Vienna Document (VD) on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) as one of the OSCE's most original and successful normative documents in the politico-military dimension of security. He argued that the OSCE region now needs a "new generation" and philosophy of confidence-building measures to address new security challenges. New tools are necessary especially with respect to intra-state problems and for dealing with non-state actors and cross-dimensional security challenges.

Dr. Heinz Vetschera, Professor, Austria National Defense Academy

The OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition

Within the politico-military dimension of the OSCE, the Document on Stockpiles constitutes a new type of commitment. The Document is not revolutionary; it partly builds on earlier patterns already established by the 2000 Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). He underscored that its novelty has to do with the almost exclusive concentration on co-operation between and assistance by the participating States to solve a problem which until recently would have been mostly regarded as an internal matter.

DDr. Vetschera mentioned that the OSCE Document on Stockpiles, which does not provide for any obligatory measures, came into use shortly after its adoption. The first state to positively react was Switzerland, with respect to the request from Ukraine. Although a number of requests for assistance have been submitted and followed-up so far, he has regretted that one particular case has been notoriously absent: Bosnia and Herzegovina. DDr. Vetschera concluded that although the Document on Stockpiles complements earlier OSCE instruments such as the SALW-Document, its actual impact has remained rather limited. The OSCE's opportunity to build upon the previous acquis of its politico-military dimension and to provide an additional contribution to security within the Eurasian space has therefore been missed.

Dr. Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Senior Research Associate, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

The Future of the CFE between the Istanbul Commitments and NATO Enlargement

Mr. Schmidt argued that beside the stabilizing effects of NATO and EU enlargements, the adapted Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-Treaty) can still be regarded as a cornerstone of cooperative security in Europe. However, the ratification of that Treaty is doubtful. The reasons are that Russia has not fully complied with its Istanbul Commitments, a linkage on which NATO is particularly insistent and which also represents a complicating factor for the resolution of the so-called “frozen” conflicts in Georgia, Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh. The non ratification of the adapted Treaty entails the danger of devaluating the Treaty in force – with retro-effects on the Vienna Document on CSBMs and the Open Skies Treaty. Dr. Schmidt outlined some possible ways for ending the deadlock. First, European state parties to the CFE Treaty should increase their political pressure for a cooperative solution. Second, common efforts based on more political flexibility by all parties should be enhanced regardless of the question whether this may have certain effects also on the sovereignty of Georgia and Moldova. Thirdly, and as concerns Georgia and Moldova, their current overbidding of the CFE-instrument can only have negative retro-effects on their integration in Europe. A US-Russian compromise should be achieved in order to provide security guarantees for these two states.

Col Ernst Britting, Former Chief Open Skies Division, German Armed Forces

The Concept of the Open Skies Treaty and its Potential for the Support of the Verification Regimes

Col Britting reminded us that there are no guarantees against new steps backward in inter-state tensions in Europe. Accordingly, and if sufficient political will is reached, a more active and regular use of the Open Skies Treaty can effectively and efficiently support existing verification regimes in the politico-military field and thus enhance inter-state transparency

on an equal basis. Moreover, this would contribute to the cooperative security approach in Europe while technically complementing the satellite screenings of national territories.

Conclusion

Despite its non-legal status, the OSCE has significantly contributed to the building of security and stability in post-Cold War Europe. Conventional arms control has progressively led to genuine disarmament cooperation. At present, we must look forward to addressing non-traditional security threats including those stemming from terrorist activities and criminal groups. IOs, including the OSCE must readjust their agendas, structures and capacities to better react to new security needs and more actively coordinate their respective activities.

Beyond Command and Control: Democratic Accountability of Nuclear Weapons

Ingrid A. Thorburn

Organised by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Abstract

It is generally accepted that in a democracy no field of government activity which affects the lives of citizens severely can be exempted from democratic accountability. It is equally generally accepted that nuclear weapons and their policy have the capacity to affect the way of our lives tremendously, for better or for worse. However, to what extent do democratic nuclear weapon states (let alone non-democratic nuclear weapon states) have democratic accountability and civilian control mechanisms over nuclear weapons in place? Do democratic actors outside the small circle of top civilian and military decision-makers, such as the parliament and civil society, have the ability to influence nuclear weapons policy? The panel reported on the preliminary results of an on-going DCAF research project which aims at contributing to an informed debate on the issue concerned. The panel identified good practices, procedures and mechanisms of democratic accountability as applied in NPT (China, France, Russia, UK, USA) and non-NPT (India, Israel, Pakistan) nuclear weapon states. The research project does not include border cases countries, i.e. North Korea and Iran as well as countries which have abolished or renounced the development of nuclear weapons.

Summary

Dr. Alexei Arbatov, Director, Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Moscow

The Case of Russia

There is no general consensus as to what constitutes democratic control of nuclear weapons. The question must be posed whether democratic and civilian control over nuclear weapons is possible and necessary. The answer to both these questions is yes, for the consequences of the deployment of nuclear weapons is more dire, devastating and rapid than the deployment of conventional forces.

In Russia, the decision to use and the actual launch of nuclear weapons involves at most a few hundred people compared with the decision to launch conventional weapons that requires the large support of many. Therefore, society must have the ability to control nuclear weapons. Civilian control is an integral part of democratic control. The ultimate state power is the individual with their finger on the nuclear button. Civilian and democratic control are affected by the characteristics of the state, with notions of democratic control over nuclear weapons being part of the process. Issues of nuclear control are freely discussed in today's Russia. With regard to development and deployment of nuclear weapons, civilian control is better than it was in the Soviet Union, but it is lagging far behind developed countries.

In the United States, the idea of civilian control led to concept of arms control and negotiations. The formulation of the concept of arms control negotiations led to agreements that shaped the future Russian agreements. However, in the Soviet Union, the process was different, with first the concept of arms control being introduced before civilian control. The arms control treaties were breakthrough treaties, for example, on medium range missiles. The second period, from 1997–1998 was a time of extensive negotiations with the United States on strategic missiles, START III framework.

With civilian control over strategic force development and deployment in the Soviet Union and in Russia being closely related to the negotiating process in the United States, it is hoped that this will change sooner or later. Civilian control over nuclear weapons will probably be the last

element of democratisation in Russia although it is possible to accelerate the process. The policy of the United States may change, then the broader the negotiation is, the better the possibility for civilian control.

Mr. Walter Slocombe, Partner, Caplin and Drysdale Attorneys; Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.

The Case of the United States of America

The Governing Nuclear Weapons project has the potential to greatly increase the knowledge base on the subject of the governance of nuclear weapons, encouraging greater openness among those who have nuclear weapons and a gradual opening of records. Many differences exist between those states who possess nuclear weapons. This is particularly evident in the distinction between civilian and democratic control, for example, the existence and influence of a nuclear 'mafia'. The impetus for nuclear weapons has not come from the traditional military or defence ministries, but rather out of a political decision or autonomous decision by the nuclear scientific community. Actual production of nuclear weapons is generally not in the hands of the military but a government controlled group, governed by a small group of 'applied' scientists. The argument exists that control by a democratically elected president constitutes democratic control. The research looks into the degree outsiders, namely civilians who are not part of the military or closed scientific nuclear weapons community, impact on nuclear policy making.

Under the US system, Congress plays an active role in control of the budget and that the domestic law must be changed before nuclear tests can be made. Laws were specifically designed by the Conservatives to ensure that enthusiasm for arms control does not get out of hand. Therefore, Congress imposed an organizational structure, with a specialised part that was to ensure a pro-defence view on the issue.

With regard to strategy and doctrine, the US has much internal debate. However, there are practical problems of translating more general principles into targeting plans, because of the surrounding secrecy. Only a small number of civilians have access to the details. The targeting plan is revised annually and reviewed in considerable detail. This plan is briefed annually to the Secretary of Defence.

In principal, only the president can authorise use. This stance was initially taken because the military do not have physical possession of the weapons. However, over time, physical possession has shifted to the military. Today, no US nuclear weapon will detonate without an externally controlled code. Such measures are meant to be a physical control. Furthermore, there is also a system for authentication of the order.

The US has relatively open debates on most things. However broad democratic discussion does not automatically translate into moderation, for example, in Pakistan and India. In the US there is a strong right-wing public lobby on nuclear issues. There is strong parliamentary involvement, with Congress holding the line much in common with parliamentary decision. However, there are also weaknesses, with a great deal of secrecy and often a gap between inside and outside terms of the debate.

Dr. Hans Born, Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Governing Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities and Constraints

This research study covers five NPT nuclear weapon states – China, France, Russia, UK, US – and three non-NPT Nuclear weapon states – India, Israel, Pakistan. The objectives of the study are to broaden the debate not only of ‘command and control’ issues, but also to democratic accountability and civilian control; to explore how nuclear weapon countries balance the need for effectiveness of weapons programme with the need for democratic accountability and transparency; and to provide information on good practices and procedures related to democratic accountability and civilian control of nuclear weapons.

The main research questions to be addressed, which requires an opening of the ‘Black Box’ of the state, include: governance structures and processes, roles of institutional and political actors, and inherent limits on such civilian control (in the broad sense). The key elements of nuclear weapons that are relevant for accountability include the historical dimension: history of country and phases of the nuclear weapon cycle (strategy, force structure, operations); that there is only a small group of decision-makers; that there are three key-actors: civilians, scientific-industrial complex, and the military; and the never/always dilemma.

Particular constraints on democratic accountability have been identified as including secrecy; censorship; technicality of nuclear weapons; and possible use. Alongside these constraints are the roles played by the various branches of the state which have important influence and possible constraints on the amount of democratic accountability within the state. This includes the role of the executive, legislature, judiciary, civil society and the international community.

Assessing the level of democratic accountability and civilian control must consider the following possible variables:

1. Nuclear weapons are subject to democratic accountability and civilian control;
2. Nuclear weapons are subject to civilian control only;
3. Nuclear weapons are neither subject to democratic accountability and civilian control, but are controlled by the military or industrial-scientific complex only;
4. The worst situation would be if even the military and industrial-complex is not in charge due to lack of discipline and a break-down of command and control.

The question of whether nuclear weapons and liberal democracy are reconcilable must take into account the inevitable and essential tension between the prudential requirements of nuclear weapons and the ideals, values and norms of liberal democracy: 'No decisions can be more fateful for Americans, and for the world, than decisions about nuclear weapons. Yet, these decisions have largely escaped the control of democratic process' (Dahl, 1985).

Summary

This research project was recognised as being very timely and important. The rationale of the project is that it increases transparency in the nuclear debate, providing more knowledge about how these issues are tackled and emphasising the importance of nuclear learning. The purpose of the project is to delve deeper into the issue of democratic control over nuclear

weapon policy. The resulting publication will not directly relate to non-proliferation but rather how public input occurs within the state.

Many people are interested in democratic theory. However, as expressed by Dahl, nuclear theory escapes the normative deliberations of a normative process. There exists a tragic paradox between democratic theory and practice which is most evident with nuclear policy which poses a very unique problem. Of the eight nuclear weapon states in this study, Israel is the only country with unacknowledged nuclear weapons. From the late 1980s, polls were taken but the public did not want to talk of the issue posing an interesting sociological norm. It is accepted that democratic accountability of nuclear weapon states is very important, yet this is alongside the importance of state control of nuclear weapons with the greatest fear being that the state would not be able to control nuclear (especially tactical) weapons.

Although efforts are taken to preserve state control, the role of civil society remains an increasingly important matter when considering this issue. The key thing is that there is expertise in the society, outside of government, who are able to provide the government with a second opinion. Questions were posed as to the role of society in nuclear planning, deployment and use. In many states the influence of public opinion is very limited, with nuclear weapons remaining a closed area, subject to limited democratic accountability.

Conclusion

The CivNuc research project takes a descriptive and empirical-analytical (not normative) research perspective on the important issue of 'Governing Nuclear Weapons'. It consists of a collection of single country studies guided by a comparative framework (developed by the editors in close cooperation with a group of experts acting as a review committee) and synthesised in a concluding chapter. The objectives of the study were clearly presented through a more detailed discussion of the US and Russia cases as contributing to a broadening of the debate, not only of 'command and control' issues, but also the political control and oversight, including the specific issues of democratic accountability. The importance of exploring how nuclear weapon countries balance the need for usability and security of nuclear weapons systems with the need for democratic

accountability and civilian control was emphasised, as was the aim to provide information on good practices and procedures related to democratic accountability and civilian control of nuclear weapons (in view of strengthening non-proliferation regimes).

Indivisible Security: Combating Violence Against Women and Children

Lea L. Biason

Organised by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Abstract

Current threats and risks have prompted attempts to revise the traditional meaning of national security as primarily the protection of states and to introduce a broader concept of 'security', recognising security not in terms of the performance of the security sector, but as an indivisible value all people have the right to enjoy. Such a concept goes beyond state-centred military security and focuses on the ability or inability of state institutions to ensure the protection of its citizens, especially the weak and the powerless. This broader concept of security enables the definition of vulnerable groups bearing the brunt of poverty, armed conflict, malfunctioning of the security sector and inefficient legal protection. Women and children represent the major vulnerable groups suffering violence in various forms all over the world.

Summary

The panel dealt primarily with violence against women as a serious form of threat to human security examining its roots and causes as well as strategies and measures different actors (the international community, national governments, state security institutions, NGOs, etc.) undertake for its eradication. It also advanced the theme of engendering security

that is the difference women make in security processes and decision making and advanced women's essential roles in peace building and community building.

The presentation entitled 'Violence against women and children: magnitude, agendas and concepts – a critical stocktaking' by Lea Biason questioned the meaning of human security in a world where women all throughout their life cycle are prone to violence, a practice firmly embedded into norms, values and attitudes in society and persistent through time and cultures. The magnitude of insecurity was illustrated by record levels of violence such as domestic violence in Europe considered as the major source of death and disability by the Council of Europe in 2002, the increasing scale of trafficking of women across international borders estimated to be 700,000 to 2 million annually by the United Nations Population Fund. Sexual violence against women is also pervasive in armed conflict demonstrated for example by 250,000–500,000 in Rwanda between 1990–1994, not to mention 35 million uprooted people worldwide with 80% of which are women and children. Selective abortion and neglect of girl infants and children have also led to 100 million missing women today. An assessment of several political agendas combating violence against women in the spheres of development, human rights, as well as, peace and conflict resolution was outlined.

Though achievements have been reached with landmark international documents as the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1980), the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993), and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000), many challenges remain, for example, the feminisation of poverty, the question of the universality of rights and the practical inclusion of women in all peace negotiations and peace maintenance. Women's movements have long since pursued two goals that is the enhancement of women's position in society but much needs to be done in the second aspiration, that is the transformation of gender roles for a more just, equal and secure world for women.

Within the thematic of violence against women, a trailer was shown for the documentary film which is in preparation within DCAF's project on "Women in an Insecure World". The film aims to explain the roots and causes of violence against women and expose and denounce all its forms in various regions of the world. The film intends to reach out to all

audience and increase global awareness about the magnitude and gravity of women's rights violations.

The presentation entitled 'Women's contribution to peace-building in theory and practice' by Sonja Licht focused on the rich experience of women in society which proves that they need to be given the opportunity to play an important role in building a new security agenda. Most often a serious misunderstanding leads to the stereotype of women as victims and humanitarian aid recipients, yet numerous examples illustrate women's multiple roles as active actors for peace. First of all, women are accomplished community builders exemplified by movements in Africa and Latin America. They are also important vehicles of reconciliation coming from the civil society, such as the Balkans and the Caucasus. In other parts of the world, instances showed that it is women activists from adversary groups who were able to succeed in crossing borders and starting dialogues for peace. In addition, as journalists and teachers, women are seriously engaged in political life exercising their influence for tolerance and harmony. And lastly, they have played a vital role in post-conflict reconstruction as demonstrated by women in Northern Ireland, Southeastern Europe, Israel and Palestine.

Though a rich theoretical and practical thinking has developed for decades under the theme of violence against women these issues must be sensitised within the broad public and not be limited within specific groups. Many security forums today prove possibilities to break through constraints and to reach new dimensions in discourse and practice of engendering security. For example, a report within the Barcelona Forum by Mary Kaldor on the human security doctrine for Europe attributed a prominent position to women's involvement in peace-building, their participation in the human security task force, as well as, the consultation of women's organizations in formulating needs and concerns of the domestic population. Moreover, the increased discussion of women's concerns within security agendas brought the need for improved sensitisation programmes in peacekeeping operations notably on various forms of violence against women with special attention in the prevention of trafficking and prostitution of women. Despite such actions, gender sensitivity and the general awareness of women's role in security and violence against women as a problem among decision-makers is still very low. More often a shock therapy is needed to raise consciousness of the magnitude of women's insecurity.

Sonja Licht stressed that now is the proper time to act and to raise that awareness.

The presentation entitled ‘Engendering security: do women make a difference?’ given by Nancy Walker stated a need for a broader definition of security that included the gender dimension. Within this framework, she examined the distinctive characteristics women brought to the security agenda through their various functions in society particularly as parents, citizens, voters, decision-makers and leaders. Women as parents have an important concern for the security of their children. To this effect, women have a special interest to security, in its definition and implications in everyday life for her family, for the community and for the country. Women as citizens and voters voice their opinions and exercise their right to live in a secure environment. As such, women have accomplished important actions for peace in different arenas. As NGO leaders women have made tremendous impact on campaigning against landmines and building bridges between warring parties. Women’s very presence in certain dialogues often led to an atmosphere of trust, which could not easily be achieved with their male counterparts. In addition, their ability to articulate in such dialogues have often been pivotal for peace. As government decision-makers, when women reach a critical mass, they can make a difference by changing the nature of the debate. It is therefore important to bring in their experience as corroborated by the African Union who has committed to a 50% quota of female representation. Nancy Walker concluded with the statement that women in society in various parts of the world have already made a difference from their own homes, to the communities and countries they live in as mothers, voters, decision-makers and peace-builders.

Conclusion

The discussion brought up the complexity of the issues related to gender and the relations between women and men in society and their socially constructed identities illustrating deeply engrained and enduring gender stereotypes. First of all the importance of the inclusion of men as allies and partners was stressed in combating violence against women, as well as, in all fora discussing gender. In this, it is important to establish dialogue between women and men in all levels of policy-making. Second, the na-

ture of debates centring on only the positive characteristics women could bring to peace and security was questioned in the light of the involvement of women in violent acts such as torture and terrorism. Women indeed do not represent a homogeneous group but form an amalgam of identities that need to be taken into account in any gender analysis. Women's actions and reactions depend on compound factors such as lack of general gender awareness and education, need for survival, and a basic and profound human yearning for liberation and freedom from oppression. A significant observation asserted the need to tackle and change mindsets of women's and men's roles in the present world. Age old traditions have to be addressed in order to find adequate strategies. It was stated that there is a pressing need to act by mainstreaming gender, as well as, providing programmes for gender equality and equity. Thematic questions were also raised in the framework of trafficking and prostitution, a form of violence on the rise globally, specifically drawing attention to the groundbreaking legislation in Sweden wherein consumers were penalised thereby striking at the core of the sex industry providing new hope for those ensnared in it.

Private Military Companies – The Business of War

Michael C. Jaxa-Chamiec

Organised by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Abstract

The privatisation of security entails the provision of security for private gain or profit. Private Military Companies (PMCs) are corporate entities providing military skills, which may include combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence collection, operational support, logistics, training, procurement, and maintenance of arms and equipment. They are generally contracted by governments, and increasingly work alongside Private Security Companies (PSCs). The latter are corporate entities that specialise in providing protection to individuals and property, and are frequently used by multinational companies, especially those working in the extractive sector, humanitarian agencies, and individuals in situations of conflict or instability.

Both phenomena are now enjoying booming growth, in part a function of the downsizing of armed forces, but also the greater variety of roles performed by militaries in their overseas commitments, and the push to outsource more and more non-essential tasks to enable militaries such as that of the U.S. to concentrate on their core competencies. Private contractors make up well over ten thousand of the coalition forces currently stationed in Iraq. This makes PMC personnel the second largest security contingent in the country after US forces. In Israel, PMCs are the single largest employer in the country with over one hundred thousand employees. These statistics are a testimony to the influence of such organizations, stretching far beyond the ‘traditional’ perception of PMCs as mercenaries and agents of instability in conflict zones. PMCs are blur-

ring the line between public and private sectors, military and civilian. Regulation and control of PMCs and PSCs, however, has been ad hoc and inadequate. The widespread emergence of private contractors on the international stage in a wide range of conflict and post-conflict activities, and their expanding influence in rebuilding not only infrastructure but also state institutions such as armies and police forces in many developing countries, makes clear the need for accurate and policy-relevant analysis of this phenomenon.

Summary

Professor Wulf introduced the topic through general observations concerning two forms of privatisation of warfare, namely the privatisation of violence – exemplified by warlords and armed militias, and the privatisation of the military functions of the state. He went on to locate the latter point within the broader trend of disruption and erosion of state functions, in particular the hitherto unchallenged monopoly over violence that is now threatened by the emergence of the PMCs.

Peter W. Singer

Following an introductory examination of the factors conducive to the emergence and development of PMCs, which included changes in the security market, nature of warfare, general economic ideology and the tendency to outsource domestic security functions now spilling over to the military sphere, Dr. Singer moved on to the discussion of Iraq – where the scope of the PMC phenomenon is by far the largest – and outlined a set of key problems and implications, including:

- Contractual dilemmas: are the PMCs billing correctly and fulfilling their tasks as agreed?
- Exclusion from the central chain of command, which allows both the firm and its individual employees a large degree of autonomy
- An unregulated market, where, the best trained and most professional military staff are technically as likely to find employment in

PMCs as men with poor training and, in some cases, poor criminal record (35% of Abu Ghraib interrogators were private, under-trained contractors).

- Carrying out public policy through private means, which opens the possibility of moderating the political rather than economic costs of policy implementation to the advantage of particular political actors.
- Legal jurisdiction: analogy between the status of PMC personnel and the Guantanamo Bay prisoners. The PMC staffers fall within a legal grey area, equally problematic in cases of their criminality and victimisation, as demonstrated in the events of Abu Ghraib abuses and Falluja killings.
- Impact on the military itself, in terms of affecting professional identity as well as depriving the state military of its best personnel by offering them incomparably more lucrative contracts.

Dr. Singer concluded with a set of core recommendations for improvements in control and quality of PMC services:

- Adequate accounting;
- Definition of appropriate roles and core activities that should not be outsourced;
- Verification of the economic viability – the money-saving presumption is yet to be verified.

Rt. Hon. Clare Short MP

Clare Short spoke about PMCs in the development context. She commenced with an examination of the involvement of the pioneering PMC Executive Outcomes (EO) in Angola and Sierra Leone during the 1990s, which illustrates the problematic nature of dealing with PMCs. In both cases, the PMC in question supported the legitimate government, duly performed its functions, worked towards conflict resolution and control over national resources, and withdrew as one of the provisions of peace plan – a record that cautions against an excessively one-sided perspective of PMCs as inherently negative forces. She further reinforced that point

by juxtaposing the high cost efficiency of the EO operations with UN peacekeeping missions that are notoriously inefficient.

Mrs. Short then examined the Sandline scandal. It stemmed from the conflict in Sierra Leone whose legitimate government – following EO withdrawal – was forced into exile in Guinea, where its representatives met with Sandline International staff (seen as a successor to EO) regarding arms transfers to the government-supporting factions in Sierra Leone. The meeting took place in presence of UK state officials, which sparked vigorous public debate regarding the government’s role in the affair, and ultimately produced the celebrated FCO 2002 Green Paper on “Options for Regulation” of PMCs.

Mrs Short mentioned that mercenarism has a long history in modern armies and is often synonymous with discipline, tradition and commitment, as is exemplified by the Ghurkas and the Swiss Guard. She also listed the successes of PMCs in training of the regional security forces, supporting peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and monitoring ceasefires in volatile regions such as the mountains of Dafur.

Mrs. Short concluded by re-emphasising the need for regulation – particularly in the light of hitherto dubious results – while keeping in mind that legitimate companies offer a viable utility of being able to succeed where official state forces are reluctant or unwilling to intervene.

Marina Caparini

Ms. Caparini and Mr. Schreier held a joint presentation focused on the challenges of regulating PMCs. Ms. Caparini addressed the problematique of PMCs that derives in part from recent trends in both internal and external privatisation of state functions, including the outsourcing of some core government activities such as nation-building, intelligence gathering, budgeting and policy planning. This pervasive ideology of privatisation is rooted in the underlying assumption of inefficiency of the big (centralised) government. The claim that privatisation or outsourcing provides cost-savings, however, has yet to be supported by definitive empirical evidence.

She pointed to the pervasive under-regulation of the private military and security firms, particularly lack of employment regulations, mechanisms verifying claimed expertise of security personnel, vetting procedures, transparency, and ambiguous legal status under international law alto-

gether, combined with inadequacy of rules ensuring fair competition for the outsourcing contracts.

Questions stemming from this problematique include: Has outsourcing gone too far, and should be restrained by governments? Should this be mainly the case in the countries where outsourcing has gone the furthest? In developing international approaches to regulation, how can we deal with fundamental ideological differences between the Anglo-American countries who traditionally are more open to privatising tendencies, and the rest (mainly continental Europe) whose tendencies to privatise and outsource state functions are more limited?

Ms. Caparini concluded by saying that there should first and foremost be a wide debate aiming at delineating which functions are inherently governmental and should be restricted to governments (such as control of the state's legitimate monopoly over coercion). Some 'governmental' functions could be conceivably outsourced as long as the relevant accountability mechanisms are installed: for instance, privatising prison services may be acceptable if the private providers are accountable to the same extent a state-operated service would be.

Fred Schreier

Mr. Schreier's presentation focused specifically on the issues of both international and national regulation of PMCs, and avenues for improvement.

The prescriptions for governmental action in this regard comprised of several main points:

- Governments must license both the companies (with a precise definition of their service capabilities and notification of contract before bidding), and the individuals working for them, in ways analogical to and coordinated with the processes of arms exports, export controls, and control of dual-use goods;
- They must prohibit certain activities, such as combat and 'mission critical' services, and arms brokering;
- They must define minimum requirements for the employment of personnel, and characteristics of the companies;

- Governments ought to be under obligation of vetting and screening the PMCs active in their countries. To this end, a centralised database could be established, and cooperative declarations signed by all parties involved;
- There should be provisions for parliamentary oversight of the contracting of PMCs by governments;
- Finally, there ought to be rules to make contracting competitive (excluding ‘no-bid’ or ‘sole-source’ contracting and ‘revolving door’ practices).

In discussing efforts to regulate PMCs, Mr Schreier was critical of the several UN Conventions on mercenaries, which largely failed to grapple with the problem of PMCs and which require more definitional clarity and a shift of focus from actor towards activity.

Despite the inadequacy of international law, few states have developed domestic legislation to regulate PMCs. In Europe, an adequate and legally binding legislation on PSCs has yet to be achieved, although increasing pressures for legal harmonisation are promising. Under the Arms Export Act of 1968, American companies are required to register with, and obtain a license from, the State Department, but there is no formal oversight once a license has been granted, nor are there transparency mechanisms for contracts under \$50 million, i.e., the threshold amount requiring Congressional notification. The strict 1998 South African Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (FMA) includes extraterritorial application and punitive powers, but it is nonetheless problematic as it induces government responsibility for PMC actions thereby enabling an escape route from international legal controls, while bringing in too extensive a realm of actors and activity. In practice, it is thus rendered nearly irrelevant. In addition, it is demonstrably weak on parliamentary – in favour of executive – oversight.

Discussion

One participant suggested that states are likely to want to maintain a margin of legal grey area in order to be able to conduct covert action, and therefore any rigorous regulation of PMCs is not in their interest. Mrs Short agreed with that statement.

To a question concerning competition in PMC markets, Fred Schreier responded that it varies by nature of function. There will be little competition in complex military functions that few service providers are able to offer, whereas the competition in the sphere of less demanding functions is likely to be fiercer.

Several questions from the floor addressed the constitutional differentiation between state and no-state soldiers, and the motivational strategies serving to prevent regular soldiers from drifting away towards more lucrative private contracts. In response, Peter Singer stressed that no civilians (thus non-state soldiers) were subordinate to the military law. As one way of incorporating the grey-area militaries into the jurisdiction of military law, he cited the current Australian practice of allocating the status of ‘sponsored reserves’, which extends the jurisdiction of military law to include private staffers. On retaining the high quality personnel within the state forces, Dr. Singer suggested that – aside from sabbatical schemes – there should be increases in pay for the regulars, as well as abandonment of the practice of ‘bidding against ourselves’.

Conclusion

Prof. Wulf concluded by stating that the problem of PMCs must be tackled head-on despite the mounting complications. He re-emphasised the importance of regulation, and allocated the chief responsibility for it to the state, which in his mind should also bear a portion of legal responsibility for the actions of its PMCs, both on national and international level. Finally he postulated that, in absence of other things, at least a post factum transparency of PMCs and their activities ought to be ensured.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) of the Security Sector: Comparing Country Experiences

David M. Law

Organized by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Bonn International Centre for Conversion

Abstract

The workshop was devoted to a joint BICC-DCAF research and publication project on a comparative analysis of the course of security sector reform in a selection of countries that had undergone severe conflicts and where there had been strong international involvement, namely, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Haiti, East Timor and Afghanistan. Michael Brzoska of BICC introduced the project, defined critical factors for success or failure of security sector reform in post-conflict situations. David Law then drew some preliminary conclusions about Security Sector Reform (SSR) in PCR based on the six country studies produced for the study and offered some thoughts on the lessons learned, or learnable, from the way security sector reform had been approached in these settings. To conclude, Mark Sedra addressed how post-conflict reconstruction was being approached in Afghanistan. The publication is intended to provide useful insights into the process and parameters of security sector reform in post-conflict environments and, as such, to support the efforts of policy analysts and decision-makers in dealing with future post-conflict contingencies.

Summary

The chairman of the workshop, Dr. Heiner Hänggi, Assistant Director and Head of Think Tank, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, briefly presented the project and the three speakers on the panel.

Dr. Michael Brzoska, Research Director, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, who together with Mr. Andreas Heinemann-Grüder from BICC contributed an introductory chapter to the publication project, presented a theoretical framework for conceptualizing SSR in PCR. He proposed the following factors as being critical for success or failure of security sector reform in post-conflict situations: capacity of external authors, local ownership, enabling factors, sequencing, cost-benefit and project evaluation. In addition, he identified the following criteria as key evaluating success: resurgence of violence, politicization of security forces, economic sustainability, ethnicization (or other forms of clientelism), emergence of formal “Rule of Law” as opposed to informalism, corruption, professionalization of the security forces, and their degree of societal integration.

David Law, Senior Fellow, Think Tank, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, who will be contributing a final chapter to the publication, presented some preliminary conclusions based on the six case studies. He compared the six cases in terms of conflict duration, confessionalism/ethnicization, number of casualties, impact on GDP and strategic relevance. He observed that although the history, causes and evolution of these conflict situations and their geostrategic settings have differed greatly, they had also shown similarities, ie particular in the sense that they had been intensive and drawn out and had been characterized by different kinds and degrees of external SSR intervention. The next step in David Law’s analysis was to focus on the nature of the various SSR interventions – whether the interventions had been timely, well-resourced, long-term, legitimate and well-organized. Using the conceptual framework worked out by Michael Brzoska, he then compared the ways the SSR process had unfolded in the six country cases.

Mr. Mark Sedra, Research Associate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Canada, presented the case of how security sector reform has been approached in Afghanistan. He gave an overview of the SSR efforts undertaken by different international actors that were being carried out along

with the decisions of what is often called ‘Geneva process’ – multi-donor involvement of the USA, German, Japanese and the UK governments in the efforts of military, police, security sector, and judicial reforms in Afghanistan. Sedra observed that the success of security sector reform would ultimately be dependent on such conditions as whether there was a minimum degree of security and institutional capacity, both of which were not present in the Afghan context.

His main conclusion was that Afghanistan’s SSR experience exemplified the dangers of advancing SSR under adverse security conditions without a peace support mission robust enough to suffocate internal threats and challenges to the process of reform. In his case, the case of Afghanistan had demonstrated that the conventional SSR model is not suited for a post-conflict country’s that was still struggling to contain residual violence.

Discussion

The importance of the holistic approach to SSR in PCR situations was underlined. It was noted that usually it was very difficult to apply the holistic approach in practice since available resources are very limited and the security situation is quite precarious, neither of which facilitate a fully-fledged international presence. The importance of distinguishing between short and long term SSR efforts was then discussed. Everyone agreed that the improvement of the security situation is central to efforts to launch other dimensions of reform - economic, social, development, etc. The importance was noted to look at the long-term sustainability of SSR. And finally the issue of local ownership was discussed.

Conclusion

Three main conclusions emerged from the debates. First, more work would have to be done to identify key variables allowing for useful comparability of the different conflict situations. Second, notwithstanding the substantial differences that exist between post-conflict situations, and those of transition and developing countries that have not been through conflict, there remain a number of core principles of SSR that are generally applicable.

Third, while the conflict settings examined in the DCAF-BICC study have differed greatly, there may be a sufficient degree of comparability to allow for the drawing of generally valid conclusions about SSR in PCR.

Topics: Second Part

Terrorism – The New Global Challenge in the 21st Century

Michel Hess

Abstract

The “Terrorism: the new Global Challenge in the 21st Century” panel presented cutting-edge views of terrorist threats highlighting the most current trends and assessed future developments. Both academically and operationally focused, the panel used Al Qaeda, Iraq, and advanced science in a terrorism context. Four distinguished panellists highlighted central questions about evolving terrorist threats and the challenges the changing threat presents to the Global War on Terror from a variety of perspectives that focus on the following questions:

- How has the threat changed, what is the current threat and what can we expect tomorrow?
- What challenges does the advance of genomic science create for counter-terrorism policy?
- What are the effects of the war in Iraq on the Al Qaeda network and what are the ramifications of these effects on the war on terrorism?
- In counter-insurgency terms, how has the US fared in Iraq and what is the impact the counter-insurgency in Iraq had on the war on terrorism?

Summary

The terrorism panel revolved around two main themes: Al Qaeda and Iraq. These specific operational and policy themes then opened up with a broader view of the potential development of the terrorist threat scenarios in an age of rapid technological and scientific advances and discoveries.

Al Qaeda emerged roughly one year before the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. From the outset, Al Qaeda was devised by its mastermind as the “pioneering vanguard” in order to spearhead the entire Islamic movement. Al Qaeda would indeed fulfil this ambitious mission by “showing the way” to entire generations and a wide array of other groups, one of which orchestrated and staged more than twenty years later the 9/11 operations. Al Qaeda’s major accomplishment was to galvanize other movements and the wider Muslim community globally. Since 9/11, Rohan Gunaratna argued, Al Qaeda is dying and with only 4,000 operatives it has become operationally weak, but ideologically strong. This ideological upsurge instigates other groups and local jihads; training capabilities and funding for these groups are still channelled through Al Qaeda. In addition, the ideological strength manifests itself in shifting effectively operational targets: while in the 1980s the US was the primary target, Al Qaeda has reoriented the terrorist activities against allies and friends of the US, including countries such as Turkey, the United Kingdom, Australia and Spain. The operational threat has moved as a result from Al Qaeda to its associated groups which have networks in over ten European countries. Also, the threat has moved geographically from the wider Middle East to Asia and Afghanistan for training around 1993 and on to Iraq in 2003, where the next generation of terrorists are trained.

With regards to the general counter-Al Qaeda response, Gunaratna outlined four key elements. First, the response to these threats has shown the need for a multi-pronged strategy, focusing on both targets and operational cells (“Rumsfeld approach”), and at the same time the limitations of the criminal justice system which has only been able to apprehend 90 suspects as opposed to the 70,000 terrorists that are trained world-wide annually. Second, the response has given law enforcement agencies a sense of the importance, but also difficulties encountered with penetration capabilities. Third, the response has elevated terrorism from a public nuisance, and therefore primarily police task, to the most important national security item involving a multiplicity of actors, institutions and

agencies. Finally, while terrorism has the global south as its origin in which case the logistical preparations were conducted in the global north (support network), today, both target and host countries are threatened to an equal extent.

On the preventive side, Rohan Gunaratna submitted two recommendations. First, it is important to expose the fact that Al Qaeda misinterprets the Quran with his political agenda. For this reason, Muslim scholars and Imams need to be made aware of their ethical responsibilities with regards to Islamic texts. Authorities are also called upon to work with Muslims world-wide to expose this political misinterpretation and abuse. Finally, the resolution of regional conflicts and the elimination of human rights violations would go a long way in taking away the recruitment power of terrorist groups.

The Al Qaeda dimension of the panel further included more specific elements on the situation in Egypt and the Egyptian dimension within Al Qaeda. Key elements on Al Qaeda were confirmed by the Egyptian perspective: Al Qaeda functions as a model or a diffuse idea rather than an organization. Egypt has successfully managed the early emergence of extremist Islamic groups. While numerous arrests of individuals linked to Jamal-al-Islamia were made, none of the 1992–1997 terrorist acts and violence in Egypt was linked to Al Qaeda. By 1997, a radical political change occurred within Muslim brotherhoods (Egyptian Islamic Group) who renounced any links with Al Qaeda. For this reason, the threats to Egyptian security due to Egyptian nationals linked to Al Qaeda have been low. Externally, Egypt may have “exported” some of the more militant individuals to other conflict zones in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

The paper on insurgency and counterinsurgency in Iraq by Bruce Hoffmann reminded the audience of the imperative to resolve the Iraq problem. The paper outlined seven key shortcomings of the recent policies in Iraq. First, a numerical disparity has emerged rather quickly in the stabilization phase as insufficient number of troops had been made available. Second, the political-military disconnect has been at the core of post-invasion instability as military operations had been overemphasized. Third, the level and degree of unrest (rioting, looting, lawlessness) has taken everyone by surprise. Fourth, there is a general proclivity to dismiss the escalating violence as can be seen in many pathologies of emergence of insurgencies. The more insurgents succeed, the less they are considered as criminals and the more they become a political force with a

following. Fifth, the time frame for building up a police force was reduced to an unrealistic nine months. Sixth, the military is generally not adept in training civilian police. Finally, there has been a belated recognition that a full-scale insurgency existed. The classic model for insurgencies, including the phases of pre-insurgency leadership, guerrilla warfare, the political apparatus, and conventional warfare, never happened in Iraq. In a fluid and complex insurgency environment where there is no center of gravity, no unified ideology, no effort to take ground, and not one, but many loosely and ad hoc organized actors (network insurgency, or NetWar), the key questions has become whether conventional organized militaries can indeed cope with the task. The Iraq case, according to Bruce Hoffmann, suggests a restructuring of how knowledge is passed on within the armed forces. A tradition top-down approach may well have to be replaced by a bottom-up model when it comes to retraining, an urban environment, and working with police authorities.

Iraq and Al Qaeda shape the contemporary global terrorism agenda. Scientific and technological advances may well signal a future in which terrorism will also try to take advantage of the mass destruction potential inherent in an abuse of genomic science. The anthrax genome has been published and made widely known and accessible to interested researchers. Current vaccines would become unworkable if used against a genetically modified anthrax substance. Not only will mankind have a reduced ability to control its own evolution, but will also be subject potentially to genetically modified viruses. With the dawn of the genomic age, mankind has a loose chemical and biological weapons problem, and a loose nuclear problem. Perhaps the contemporary terrorism challenge will strengthen the arguments in favour of “fencing in” the genomic age today in the form of various types of multilateral regimes for the benefit of mankind’s security tomorrow.

Conclusion

The terrorism panel synthesized and integrated a number of terrorism-related workshops at the ISF. While the workshop identified the main pillars of the contemporary terrorism challenge, it also encouraged the audience to examine broader long-term problems, notably the pressing need for structural reforms of conventional militaries in an age of asymmetric warfare and complex insurgencies, and the security-related implications of gene banks and genomic research concentrated in a handful of corporations. Terrorism will continue to require a constant adjustment of solution-oriented countermeasures. As a dynamic phenomenon with a changing face, it will need patience and steadfastness to be contained effectively.

Sustainable Development and Good Governance – Providing the Conditions for Security and Stability

Alan C. Bryden

Abstract

Development is fundamental for good governance, but development programmes cannot be successful in an environment where armed conflict compromises basic requirements for day-to-day security. Security and development must be regarded as an integrated and multidimensional concept which shapes policy research and programme development. The negative social, economic and humanitarian effects of armed conflict represent a global problem to be addressed by the full array of international actors including states, international governmental organizations, non-governmental actors, and the private sector.

Taking a holistic view of security, this panel traces the evolution of the concept of security from a strict territorial definition to a broader understanding, embracing individual and societal as well as state security. It also considers the implications of this development for policy making in different areas of the security sector governance agenda.

Summary

Dr. Nicole Ball, Senior Fellow, Center for International Policy, Washington

Nicole Ball situated security as a key issue for sustainable development and an essential precursor to investment, growth and social cohesion. In contrast, conflict undermines the quality of governance, encourages corruption and leads to the decomposition of institutions and, ultimately, of the state itself. The results of a poorly governed security sector can be

actors that foster insecurity, form part of the black economy, get involved in political repression and misuse resources. A functioning security sector, therefore, needs to be both well-governed and operationally effective.

Dr. Ball emphasized the range of actors playing a crucial role in security sector governance beyond the security forces themselves: parliaments; the judiciary; civil management and oversight bodies as well as civil society organizations. She noted that much progress has been made in this area over recent years with the international community becoming more coordinated in its approach to security sector reform and good governance. An obvious danger, however, lies in the emphasis on ‘hard’ security that has stemmed from US foreign policy post 9/11 which risks to push security sector governance off the international agenda. More work is needed from the development community to address a number of key challenges: security issues are still seen by many as being apart from development work; the root causes of insecurity and instability are seldom understood; certain activities which should be supported by the international development community cannot be classified as development assistance and consequently are not funded.

Dr. Michael Roeskau, Director, Development Co-operation Directorate, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Michael Roeskau introduced the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD as a framework for bilateral donors and multilateral organizations to harmonise and peer review development assistance as well as to develop policy guidance and produce statistics on overseas development assistance (ODA). Meetings have recently been held in the DAC framework on Iraq (2003), Afghanistan (2002) and Eastern Congo (2004) while the DAC was also responsible for producing a new set of Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance – Policy and Good Practices.

Dr. Roeskau argued that SSR is important because corrupt systems are a source of insecurity while the costs of reform are considerably less than dealing with the consequences of instability. International interventions have to adopt a ‘whole of government’ approach and must be based on the principle of local ownership otherwise reform will not take root. Looking forward, he foresaw the DAC as gaining an increasing role in

the identification and promulgation of lessons learned, providing practical advice and facilitating cooperation within the international development community.

Dr. Funmi Olonisakin, Senior Research Fellow, Director, Conflict, Security and Development Group, King's College, London

Funmi Olonisakin emphasized the sheer scale and breadth of the security and development agendas. Consequently it is impossible to adopt a homogenous approach to these issues. Security has moved closer to development by expanding beyond the military field to take account of such issues as inequalities and social exclusion. However, the two fields remain too far apart, particularly in the African context where a greater emphasis on effective security sector governance (SSG) is required on the ground.

Dr. Olonisakin echoed the warnings made by other speakers over reform efforts founded on externally generated concepts and cautioned against the erroneous view held by some states that SSR was simply a means of modernizing the military. Citing the particular problems of failed or failing states, she emphasized the importance of reintegration in the post-conflict context in order to give local people a stake in their communities. In such cases, external assistance that focuses only on short term objectives lack sustainability. A multi-disciplinary, holistic approach to the interrelated goals of security and development is required.

Dr. Frans Röselaers, Director, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), International Labour Organization

Frans Röselaers began his presentation with the statistic that 250 million children around the world work, often in hazardous conditions. These children do not receive schooling, suffer various forms of abuse and become deeply traumatized thus leading to long term societal problems. A particularly sensitive category are those minors who become child soldiers. There is a fundamental need to prevent their recruitment, provide reintegration and counseling services for former child soldiers and to address underlying issues of poverty and education.

There is clearly no 'one size fits all' solution to the challenges of child labour. Results take time and the work is resource-intensive. However,

there is a positive and growing conviction in the international community that this issue can be dealt with and is not simply accepted as a fait accompli. Cooperation between the World Bank, UNICEF and the ILO, linking poverty reduction and education, provide encouraging examples for the future. However, much more needs to be done to address such a deeply engrained, multi-faceted and culturally distinct issue as child labour.

Discussion

Discussion emphasized the importance of increasing cooperation in the security and development fields in order to better understand the root causes of conflict. In particular, developing a better understanding of the right balance of responsibilities between civilian and military authorities emerged as a key issue. Actors need to be brought closer together and institutional cultures harmonized if weakened or destroyed governance systems are to be reconstituted. In the economic sphere, the case of Afghanistan illustrates that the military are ill-equipped to transfer from a war to a peace economy. The importance of treating security as a global common good was also emphasized, taking into account such essential issues as poverty reduction and the threats posed by diseases such as AIDS or malaria as key components within the framework of human security.

Conclusion

The key message to emerge from this session is that security and development are intrinsically linked. Without a basic level of security at individual and societal levels there is no scope for development. The costs associated with transforming the security sectors of developing countries are minor compared to the much greater costs of instability that frequently has regional, cross-border dynamics. Enfolding these efforts within a governance framework goes beyond 'hard' security to deal with the root causes of conflict. Key principles of such efforts must include a 'whole of government' approach by external development actors, engendering local ownership of reform efforts and applying a long term approach to programming in this field.

Knowledge Portals in Support of Security Co-operation

Walter L. Christman

Organised by the Centre for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology.

Abstract

This panel discussed the use and development of knowledge portals in support of security co-operation. At the strategic level is the important role of multi-sector partnerships in which government, industry and civil society collaborate in the development of systems. In the emerging net-centric vision of information and communications technologies this helps maintain focus on the needs of the user community through a customized interface called a knowledge portal. The panel examined different examples in the usage of a knowledge portal by a diplomat, military officer, defence official, and non-governmental actor. The panel included a discussion of the US-Swiss MOU efforts in the development of a knowledge portal. The Chairman concluded the panel with agreement that the 6th ISF final proceedings should formally recommend the development of a wide-ranging action plan to move steadily toward a Euro-Atlantic Virtual Defence University for the 21st Century, beginning with the development of a Euro-Atlantic knowledge portal for security cooperation.

Summary

Dr. Linton Wells II, opened the session with a discussion on the importance of multi-sector partnerships in the development of systems. He noted that “security” and “development” go hand-in-hand. At the World Summit on

the Information Society in Geneva, December 2003, the world community successfully defined a common vision for a global information society of the future, both in terms of a technological and societal approach. Priority is to address the “digital divide” and issues of sustainability and development on a global level. The Geneva Summit favoured of the “Multi-Sector Partnership Approach” of promoting effective cooperation between Government, Industry, and Civil Society.

Thus, a knowledge portal for security cooperation would inherently be a Multi-Sector Partnership among those in the “Security Sector Community. Such a portal should help address real world challenges, perhaps with reference to the “conflict cycle.” An elementary “conflict cycle” might include:

- Conflict Prevention and Early Warning;
- Conflict mediation, resolution and management;
- Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance;
- Immediate post-conflict reconstruction activities.

These themes fall along a continuum, and a knowledge portal for security cooperation would need to be sensitive to interconnected elements. For example, consideration would need to be given to differences between different types of actors, such as military forces, diplomatic representatives, and civilian aid organizations and their information needs. Joining the capabilities and best practices of each major sector in mutual support could be an important step toward a “Knowledge Portal for Security Cooperation.”

Mr. John Berry’s presentation examined how a Military or Defence representative would profit from a knowledge portal. He focused on the opportunities facing the Euro-Atlantic defence community and cited the initial steps underway to develop a knowledge portal to enhance multinational collaboration by linking defence practitioners, scholars, and experts into activity-based networks that facilitate information sharing. The road is long, but the journey has begun.

Mr. Berry argued that if we are to proceed in developing such a knowledge portal for the Euro-Atlantic Defence community, Dr. Well’s recommendation on the need to foster multi-sector partnerships between

government, industry, and civil society is a critically important step. Deliberate planning must be involved to avoid missed opportunities and to galvanize scarce resources. A true visionary end state is the call for a Euro-Atlantic Virtual Defence University. While perhaps well off in the future, it is a point on the horizon to guide work in the near term. The goal should be the development of a wide-ranging action plan to move steadily toward a Euro-Atlantic Virtual Defence University for the 21st Century that begins with development of a Euro-Atlantic knowledge portal for security cooperation. Mr. Berry welcomed audience discussion as to whether such an effort might even begin with the 6th International Security Forum, and if so whether a mandate for action might be included in the final recommendations of its overall proceedings.

Mr. Jovan Kurbalija followed with insights from the diplomatic community and how an e-diplomat would use a knowledge portal. In the post Cold War environment, the “diplomatic kaleidoscope” has been rapidly changing. Often called upon to deal with situations for which they cannot prepare in advance, diplomats are also faced with new actors, who have been empowered by the Internet. Diplomatic services have to deal with these challenges as well as budget cuts and pressure “to do more with less.” ICT is often cited as a tool capable of helping diplomats to achieve better results. Can it?

Mr. Kurbalija noted that crisis situations accelerate the need for enhanced communication and understanding. A knowledge portal for security cooperation could allow practitioners to obtain in-depth information and cope with the day-to-day coverage of complex issues. Moreover, it would permit diplomats to cooperate with colleagues from other ministries, journalists, NGOs, activists, etc. Another possibility of “just-in-time” learning involves preparation for major international conferences and similar events. “Just-in-time” learning can permit better focus on the underlying concepts, the specific discourse, the language, the scientific background, and the other aspects of particular events. Kurbalija concluded in support of the multi-stakeholder approach, noting that diplomacy is not the monopoly of diplomats. The multi-stakeholder approach can help train various sectors in better communicating with each other.

Mr. Joseph Camacho and Mr. Ulrich Gysel concluded with a short presentation on the status of efforts carried out through the US-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding to develop a knowledge portal in support of security cooperation.

Discussion

The concept of a knowledge portal for security cooperation that emerged from this panel centred on the need for integration of effort and the of the multi-sector cooperation approach. It was agreed that emerging security challenges increasingly confront military, diplomats, and civilian NGO's with the need for enhanced information sharing, which could be aided by an online knowledge portal. It was agreed such an effort would join practitioners and scholars into activity based networks, and require new approaches in the managing the logistics of knowledge. The pace of events in modern crisis situations makes a "just-in-time" understanding an imperative for success. Further discussion centred on the need for an action plan to begin developing the concept of a Euro-Atlantic Virtual Defence University. Both the panellists and participants supported the concept as an essential component of any coherent end-state vision and agreed that John Berry's call to form a "community of practice" by joining together a cooperative network of security institutions to begin the planning process was the next step.

Conclusion

In Dr. Wenger's closing remarks, he underscored the agreement that the real test of a knowledge portal for cooperation must be its practical relevance. It must be an essential tool in promoting a broadly shared understanding of the security challenges and necessary approaches to address them, particularly in the areas of peace building and peace support operations. He affirmed the agreement of the panellists and participants that building a Euro-Atlantic Virtual Defence University for the 21st century, beginning with the development of a Euro-Atlantic knowledge portal for security cooperation should be a formal part of the final recommendations of the 6th International Security Forum. Such an effort holds great promise in helping future security studies scholars and practitioners to work together to create the best configurations of strategy, structure, and technology in support of international security cooperation in the years ahead.

Keynote Addresses

Making Sustainable Development Work for Children

Carol Bellamy, Executive Director, United Nations Children's Fund

Two years ago, at an unprecedented Special Session on Children, the nations of the UN General Assembly took stock of the growing threats to humanity's most precious natural resource – our children – and vowed to join forces to transform the global environment in ways that would ensure the right of every child to grow to adulthood in health, dignity and peace.

Their stated goal was to create what they called A World Fit for Children – a world whose citizens are unshakeably committed to sustainable human development, where political and economic policy serves the best interests of every child – and where daily life is informed by the bedrock universal principles of democracy, equality, non-discrimination, peace and social justice – and a shared belief in the universality, indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights, including the right to development.

A world, in short, distinct from the one we find ourselves in today, where children are targets and pawns, murdered in Iraq by car bombs one day and smart bombs another, where Russian schoolchildren are gunned down in their own classrooms, and where the slaughter of Palestinian and Israeli children is itself a time-honoured rationale for still more slaughter.

The international community's agenda for creating "A World Fit for Children" prioritised the protection of children from harm and exploitation, with special emphasis on the horrific effects of armed conflict. Yet every week, new atrocities point to the hollowness of that commitment. From Sudan and Chad and northern Uganda, to Colombia and Sri Lanka and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, children are under siege.

Threats to a community's leaders – to its health care workers, teachers, parents, and religious leaders – are threats to the community's children as well. And this linkage runs both ways, because children represent the future of any society. Unless children are guaranteed health, education and protection, a community can never prosper. It will remain profoundly insecure – locked in a cycle of poverty and deprivation, vulnerable to outbreaks of violence.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the need to break this cycle has never been more pressing. At the same time, the obstacles to doing so have never been more complex. The political and security landscape is changing, and the consequences of this change are far-reaching. The suffering of civilians at the hands of armed groups is certainly not new. But the scale and scope of this suffering goes far beyond anything we have seen in the past. And the sheer brutality of those who inflict harm on civilian populations has shocked even the most hardened observers. In this environment, egregious violations of children's rights are occurring on a scale that was inconceivable as little as a decade ago.

Yet I am absolutely certain that we can succeed in building a secure world for our children. It is a conviction that grows less out of faith than from the hard lessons on the ground that UNICEF and its humanitarian partners have learned over the years – some of them at great cost. How can we begin to protect our children?

First, by assessing their needs. Every emergency is different, with its own unique priorities and challenges. We must be prepared at the field level to respond to these challenges as they arise, and to do so in a timely and efficient manner. In its Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies, UNICEF undertakes to assess, within hours of arrival in a crisis area, programmatic needs in health and nutrition, education, child protection, water supply and sanitation, and HIV/AIDS, as well as any other child's rights issues that present themselves. Once these programmes are in place, we need to establish monitoring and reporting mechanisms that allow us to evaluate the success of existing programmes and to identify gaps that may exist.

One important lesson we've learned over the years is that it is absolutely vital to involve children, especially girls, as much as possible in order to ensure that their concerns are being addressed. For example, consultations between UNICEF child protection advisers and adolescent girls living in IDP camps in northern Uganda recently revealed that many problems in the camps, ranging from violence against women to low school attendance for girls, were simply a result of a lack of proper sanitation supplies.

A second way we can protect children is by ensuring that they remain with, or are re-united with, their care-givers. Separated children are especially vulnerable in emergency situations. They find it difficult to provide for themselves, and are susceptible to all forms of abuse. Even

where their basic needs are provided for, they face an uncertain future. Lacking parental guidance, these children are less likely to attend school or to see to their health. As one Liberian child put it, “I’ve got no Ma, I’ve got no Pa. I have no books and no learning. Now what am I supposed to do?” Children like this are especially at risk of sexual exploitation or recruitment into armed groups.

Humanitarian organizations must prevent the separation of children from their caregivers wherever possible. When this is not possible, we should facilitate the identification, registration and medical screening of separated children, especially those under five years of age and adolescent girls. UNICEF has incorporated these imperatives into its Core Commitments. But we cannot meet them alone. Close cooperation between humanitarian agencies is essential to identifying separated children and to establishing effective family-tracing mechanisms.

A third way we can protect children is by preventing the recruitment of child soldiers, and by working to secure the release, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of those who were formerly abducted. In the UNICEF Report titled *Adult Wars, Child Soldiers*, a Timorese boy recounts how he was forced to join a local militia. “They came armed with guns when I was at home...I obeyed their instructions because I was afraid to die.”

Distinguished Delegates, it is critical to monitor, report on and advocate against forcible recruitment wherever it occurs. New international instruments, such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, have come into force, and we should flex this new-found legal muscle wherever we can, including by “naming and shaming” those actors, whether State or non-State, who violate their commitments to end the recruitment of child soldiers.

Organizations with operations in the field should seek commitments from parties to refrain from recruiting and using children, and should negotiate the release of children who have already been recruited. The UNICEF-supported SPLA/SPLM Child Soldier Task Force, for example, has demobilised some 12,000 children in Southern Sudan since 2000, including the release in January of this year of 94 children from SPLA ranks. In April, UNICEF facilitated the release of nearly 150 former child soldiers by the LTTE, or Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, in Sri Lanka. And in August, UNICEF and other partners supported the release of 47 children from the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda.

But release is only the beginning. Demobilisation, reintegration, and rehabilitation are crucial to ensure children are not simply re-recruited. These programmes merit special attention, and I want to address these in more detail in a few minutes. For the moment, I will emphasise only that children, especially young girls, must not be left out of demobilisation and reintegration programmes; indeed there should be measures in place to account specifically for their distinctive needs.

Fourth, we can protect children by improving mechanisms to prevent, report on, and advocate against sexual violence against women and children, and by providing health and psychosocial support for victims.

A fifth way we can protect children, and closely related to the previous two, is by including a child protection component in the training of peacekeepers. The protection involves a series of very specific challenges, and therefore requires special training. Peacekeepers need to be sensitised to children's needs and how best to meet them, and wherever possible this should be done prior to deployment. Just as humanitarian organizations have a responsibility to foster safe environments for children, so too must peacekeepers be aware of the special vulnerabilities of children and what they can do to mitigate them.

A sixth way to protect children is by ensuring access to education at all times, including during emergencies. Children's right to education is a matter of international law. Emergencies do not strip young people of this right. Though it may be immensely challenging to ensure access to education in the midst of armed conflict that does not absolve us of the responsibility to do so.

Education can promote respect for human rights and teach methods of non-violent dispute resolution. Schools also act as a nexus around which a community rallies. They're a kind of social glue, providing common goals for children, teachers and parents. In times of conflict, schools provide a sense of normalcy and stability. They give children hope for the future.

Finally, we can protect children by working to stem the flow of small arms and light weapons, and by advocating against the use of indiscriminate weapons such as landmines. In terms of human cost, small arms are the true weapons of mass destruction. Two million children have been killed and another six million injured or maimed by small arms and light weapons over the past decade alone. Similarly, despite an increase in international attention, landmines and other explosive remnants of war

continue to kill and maim children all over the world. There were between 15,000 and 20,000 landmine casualties last year alone.

These seven goals are fundamental to the protection of children, and need to be advanced in every way we can. In order to be successful, however, we also need to help create an environment in which we can maintain these programmes. This means working towards an operational and normative climate that will allow us to pursue our protection goals unfettered.

Finally, let me turn to the security of humanitarian staff in the field. Since the murder of 22 UN staff in the truck bombing of the UN's Iraq offices in August 2003, the issue of staff security has weighed heavily on the minds of UN and other international humanitarian personnel. Following this and similar incidents, the UN has initiated steps designed to reduce the exposure of its staff in situations where the risk is extremely high. UNICEF fully supports these measures.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we all know that the concept of security, as traditionally understood, is changing. Those of you gathered here will be instrumental in deciding what security will mean for us all in the decades to come. I urge you to remain conscious of the special needs of children, and of the central role they play in the future of humanity. To quote 14 year-old Alhaji of Sierra Leone, "I hope that in all countries the government and the UN will listen to children and take our words into account. We want a better life. We want peace. We are counting on your continued support for this."

Science, Information Society and Security

*Hans F. Hoffmann, Director, CERN*³

Introduction

As a scientist I am qualified to discuss science and information society. However, issues of security bring me to unsafe grounds where you will get personal opinions based to some degree on my past scientific work.

I would like to dedicate the talk to the Pugwash process which is a prominent example of useful interaction between fundamental physics and the security sector after the Manhattan- and the other projects which have given nuclear bombs to several governments.

My talk therefore begins with a “trivial” statement by Albert Einstein, initiator together with Bertrand Russell and Joseph Rotblat of the Pugwash conferences: “Problems cannot be solved at the same level of awareness that created them”, meaning that there are more than just the obvious things to be considered and put right if a major problem needs to be solved. Additional or different means may be needed and require detailed study and finally a comprehensive approach. This applies certainly to Security items.

Using CERN, the European Centre for Particle Physics in Geneva as example, I shall present (fundamental-) science with its openness, trust, peer reviews, partnerships, training and education and its global nature. Science is often the neutral ground where contacts and collaboration are still possible when other activities have ended.

State of the art Science today is enhanced and empowered by Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and this will lead me to the information society, to the WSIS summit event “Role of Science in the Information Society”, CERN, TWAS, ICSU and UNESCO organized last December. I shall mention the needs of countries expressed there concerning health, education, environment, digital divide and basic development and how ICT can be of help there.

3 The talk was accompanied by transparencies which can be found under <http://cern.ch/Hans.Hoffmann/ISF2004.ppt>.

The evidence given there will show that marginal living conditions together with little, strongly biased or no education are fertile environments for slow development and also for the emergence of security problems.

ICT based development and close partnerships between Universities of developed and less developed countries and common scientific ventures towards non-controversial, common objectives concerning education, health, environment and other important will be shown to be important ingredients towards faster development and consequently a more peaceful world.

Global Science

The foundation of CERN under the auspices of UNESCO in 1954 had political and scientific origins and two objectives emerged which are best expressed in the words of Isidor Isaac Rabi, one of the scientists Driving the process towards a centre of fundamental physics in Europe after world-war II and delivered at the occasion of CERN's 30th anniversary in 1984:

“CERN was founded less then ten years after the bomb was made. I feel that the existence of the bomb ...had a large part in making CERN possible. Europe had been the scene of violent wars... for 200 years. Now we have something new in the founding of CERN”

“I hope that the scientists at CERN will also remember that they have other duties than exploring further into particle physics. They represent the combination of centuries of investigation and study... to show the power of human spirit. So I appeal to them not to consider themselves as technicians ... but ... as guardians of this flame of European unity so that Europe can help preserve the peace of the world.” In other words the objectives, still valid today for CERN are to do state of the art science and to bring nations together peacefully. Consequently the CERN Convention demands of its scientists:

“The Organization shall provide for collaboration among European States in nuclear research of a pure scientific and fundamental character, and in research essentially related thereto.

The Organization shall have no concern with work for military requirements and the results of its experimental and theoretical work shall be published...”

CERN became soon became a model for other organizations:

- In Europe: ESO, the European Southern Observatory and EMBL, the European Molecular Biology Laboratory and others.
- In the Soviet Union: the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research JINR, established for Warsaw pact states in March 1956. It was the first organization following CERN. There has always been a close cooperation with CERN and it has served as an important bridge between West and East during cold war.
- In Jordan very recently: SESAME, the Synchrotron Radiation Laboratory, near Amman, an intergovernmental organization like CERN, established by UNESCO in April 2004 according to the CERN model. Presently there are 9 Members (Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestinian Authority, Turkey, and UAE). It is gratifying that scientists, administrators and politicians of these countries are prepared to sit around the same table to discuss common scientific projects.

The successes of the CERN approach have been recognised by two Nobel Prizes, (C. Rubbia, Simon van der Meer, 1984 and Georges Charpak, 1992) and the Finnish Millennium Price, (Tim Berners Lee, 2004), covering research results, the discovery of the W and Z particles, the carriers of the weak force and breaking technologies, such as novel imaging devices, stochastic cooling of particle beams and the World Wide Web.

Let us now look at the interest of CERN's scientific objectives to the scientists. The very early stages of development of the universe are not accessible to astronomical observations since its density rendered the Universe opaque to light. CERN's very high energy accelerators create matter in collisions between elementary particles approaching the conditions as they existed minute fractions of a second after the big bang to provide insight into what happened then, how and why.

Accelerators of the highest energies are the infrastructure, CERN provides to its 6500 scientific users from now more than 80 countries in Europe and around the world. The LHC, the Large Hadron Collider, CERN's latest programme is in construction at this time and will advance the present energy frontier by more than an order of magnitude with respect to the actually highest energy accelerator at FNAL near Chicago/US.

The observation of matter at these extreme conditions is the task of the scientific users of CERN and requires complex experimental setups and detailed studies of the high energy collisions since the events of interest happen at random with very low probability. Therefore the detection devices need to be able to observe many billions of collisions, requiring well beyond 100 Million active detection elements, millions of parts, millions of lines of code of sophisticated software to handle the extreme data flows and the complex data analysis. Their size is that of a large building, they cost each in the order of 700 Million €, personnel and material and need ~15 years from R&D to the finished, installed device. Experimental devices such as ATLAS or CMS⁴ are imagined, constructed, operated and exploited by collaborations formed in the CERN user community “from home” and using their local industries. CERN provides guidance and participation at a level of 20% of the resources, typically for systems engineering and coordination as well as technologically difficult parts which beyond the reach of participating institutes. Each of these collaborations contains today ~2000 scientists from ~150 scientific institutes in 30–40 countries.

Another example of international collaboration is the recent CERN LCG⁵ project, the LHC global Grid Computing infrastructure. The objective of LCG is to enable all scientists to participate “from home” to LHC data analysis, operation and exploitation. The project hardware is entirely based on cheap, generally available commodity, off the shelf computing equipment and widely uses open source software.

The project carries CERN’s original idea of the World Wide Web beyond the Web’s capabilities, keeping the open source, open standard notion that was one of the reasons to make the web a great success. The Grid relies on advanced distributed software, called middleware, which ensures seamless communication between different computers, data repositories, data sources and application programs and other digital resources located in different parts of the world.

After launching the project in 2001 CERN now has the first globally operating prototype (24*7 hours/week), connecting more than 80 computer centres around the world and offering seamless access to such resources.

4 <http://cern.ch/atlas>; <http://cern.ch/cms>.

5 <http://cern.ch/lcg>; <http://cern.ch/egee>.

CERN is an advanced user of the internet and superbly connected to it. CERN has extended several times, in competition with other more dedicated organizations, the internet land speed record for bulk data transmission.

Around the globe there are more than 800 (computer-) scientists working on LHC computing and software efforts today.

The LCG infrastructure is the most advanced prototype of computing infrastructures that will enable “e-Science”, that is science significantly enhanced or empowered by a dedicated worldwide ICT- infrastructure on top of the internet. It is also, together with the Web the prototype infrastructure that will enable other ICT enhanced or empowered activities such as e-Health, e-Government, e-Education, e- Knowledge and other distributed activities that profit from state of the art ICT.

The described, ICT-, web- and grid- enabled collaborations basically aggregate freely during the R&D process, elect their leadership, give themselves a constitution and prepare proposals of what they intend to do. They aggregate until they have critical mass to solve all problems posed. Their intentions undergo detailed peer reviews, followed by modifications until collaborating institutes, funding agencies, CERN and its 20 member states are satisfied with the capabilities of the collaboration and agree to the desirability of the objectives. The internal working mode is bottom-up with entirely free exchange of all available knowledge and based on common interest and trust.

The collaborations are based on Memoranda of Understanding, signed by the funding agencies and requiring their best efforts (no legal obligation) to contribute well defined “deliverables” for the construction and later the operation of the device over a decade or two.

In ad hoc cumulated capabilities they have the power of “big science” laboratories, capable to solve difficult problems in a consensual manner. They are regarded as “virtual” laboratories since they are composed from persons from many distributed institutes; they have no legal entity but exist to obtain a set of objectives desired by the participants. The collaborations are legally represented by CERN and will cease to exist entirely when their tasks are finished, their objectives reached and the results published.

Such virtual organizations described above and formed by the universities of the world lead to the experience of a global, virtual neighbourhood for the participants where distant people know each other and communicate

with each other more and more closely than in their actual neighbourhoods. ICT allow distant scientists to work and live as close colleagues. They will also enable the citizens of the world to experience neighbourhood and closeness with its positive and negative consequences.

With a yearly turnover in excess of 1000 young scientists working in such collaborations CERN provides for a formidable “hands-on” high level education facility for many young scientists, who will become the decision makers and experts in their respective countries of origin. The international collaboration also provides these people with a global appreciation and hands-on experience of fruitful international, inter-cultural collaboration.

In summary such “virtual” organizations of highly motivated collaborators can be immensely powerful in solving complex problems as has been demonstrated in Particle Physics and more recently in the understanding of the human genome. Multi-stakeholder, virtual organizations based on an ICT infrastructure for all will be key ingredients of the Information Society.

Information Society

In March 2003 Kofi Annan presented a challenge to world scientists⁶, stating: “Recent advances in information technology, genetics, and biotechnology hold extraordinary prospects for individual well-being and that of humankind as a whole.

At the same time, the way in which scientific endeavours are pursued around the world is marked by clear inequalities.

The idea of two worlds of science is anathema to the scientific spirit. It will require the commitment of scientists and scientific institutions throughout the world to change that portrait to bring the benefits of science to all ...”

The declaration of principles agreed at the Geneva World Summit of the Information Society, WSIS⁷, declares “Our common desire and commitment to build a people-centred, inclusive and development oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and

6 Editorial, Science 299, 1485 (2003).

7 <http://www.itu.int/wsis/>

share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve their full potential, in promoting their sustainable development and improving their quality of life”.

CERN, together with UNESCO, ICSU and TWAS organised the WSIS summit event named “Role of Science in the Information Society (RSIS)”.⁸

The late Pakistani Nobel Laureate, Abdus Salam, believed that the gap between rich and poor nations was one of science and technology, and much of his life was devoted to closing that gap. In 1988, he wrote that “in the final analysis, creation, mastery and utilisation of modern science and technology are basically what distinguish the South from the North. On science and technology depend the standards of living of a nation.”

Adama Samassékou, President of WSIS I Preparatory Committee, at RSIS stated: “Science is a collective and global enterprise. It knows no frontiers and relies on constant cooperation among all concerned. . . . Another characteristic of science . . . is the spirit of competition. A third characteristic of science also deserves thoughtful consideration: science operates in networks.”

H.R.H Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, Princess of Thailand said at RSIS: “It is apparent that development must start with the empowerment of people. When I learned about IT and what it could do, I saw that it could be a potential solution for the purpose. My greatest goal was to enable the under-privileged Thais such as rural school children and people with physical disabilities, to benefit from an increased use of IT so that they can have full participation in shaping political, economic, and social development.”

Another important ingredient seen in responding to Kofi Annan’s challenge is the move towards a Web (Grid) of Science, Culture and Education as best expressed by the Director of the MPI “History of Science” in his presentation on a “Web of science and culture” at RSIS, asking for a systematic and coordinated move towards making scientific and cultural content openly and freely available on the web.

Steps towards such intentions are existing digital libraries such as CERN’s digital library, open to everybody, based on “Open Archive Initiative” standards and containing almost a million digital records, used by more than 100,000 clients, performing more than 120,000

8 CERN yellow report CERN/2000-006, <http://cern.ch/rsis>.

searches/month. The library also contains CERN “Open Courseware”, an expression borrowed from MIT, namely hundreds of lectures, training courses, schools, . . . openly available on the CERN-Web.

A number of scientific organizations, including CERN, work together today to connect such existing electronic libraries to a transparent whole using web services and grid technologies, following initiatives such as the Bethesda and Budapest statements and the Berlin Declaration⁹ aimed at making publicly funded research results openly and freely available and to provide for a global repository of all validated human knowledge.

Let me now summarise action items of priority to the scientific community derived from WSIS and RSIS as follows:

Education and Knowledge are the keys to development.

ICT are the essential means to store and access content in science and education; Further, ICT make us all virtual neighbours and enable close collaboration of distant partners.

Therefore governments together with the scientific community should endeavour three priority actions:

- To make contents of publicly funded education and research freely accessible on the Web for the critical use by everybody. The “Open Access” and “Open Archiving” initiatives of the Scientific Community provide already practical emerging standards on how to make validated, certified content generally available.
- Open Access is a point of eminent interest since validated, freely accessible knowledge will make the Internet to the distributed, but universal repository of human knowledge of science, culture, indigenous heritage, education, . . . , the library of Alexandria of today!
- Of course there are other data of relevance to humanity such as environmental data, data on bio-diversity, local maps of landmines after conflict, maps of disaster areas, clean water recipes, . . . any other useful digital records that can be made accessible under agreed conditions.
- To connect all universities, and therefore the corresponding major cities, to the global networks at sufficient bandwidth, to provide

9 <http://www.zim.mpg.de/openaccess-berlin/berlindeclaration.html>.

them with the necessary ICT infrastructure and affordable software to use the internet.

- Exponential change in performance of ICT means that the Digital Divide will increase for some years. However, there are encouraging examples: The provision of national optical fibre infrastructures have permitted a number of the new EU countries to “leap-frog” from Mb/s to Gb/s, multipurpose, digital networks within two years. This demonstrates that rapid change is possible.
- Implementation plans for such essential infrastructure can be worked out anywhere. International tenders in a de-regulated environment and a maximum of local effort will provide for the best value for money. Based on concrete plans we can possibly convince the developed countries to help implement such networks.
- Capacity Building, e-inclusion: Internet is not enough, we need to encourage and actively support partnerships between Universities, and also schools, in particular professional schools everywhere, based on a maximum use of ICT but including fellowships and training to educate the required specialists and to narrow the not only digital divide in science and education

The scientific community is eager to engage into expanding science and education to all countries, making full use of ICT, however within the limits of their available resources.

Concrete progress in these three points will be one of the quantitative measures of success of the WSIS process and some achievements should be demonstrated before the next round in Tunis, 2005.

The RSIS event finally treated some aspects of Science plus Information Society in more detail. I shall start mentioning health aspects where the international community should assist to bring about important changes.

To proceed with the right definitions let me start with the WHO/OMS Mission, namely “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health”, where “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well being and not only the absence of disease or infirmity”.

The problem is best introduced by H.E. Lidia M. R. A. Brito, Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology, Mozambique, talking

at RSIS about the needs of developing countries, saying: “Let me start by reminding ourselves what our major challenges and problems are. Developing countries have high incidences of poverty, which in turn brings a high incidence of diseases, such as HIV/AIDS that is robbing our babies of their parents, our schools of their teachers and our health centres of their nurses and doctors, of child malnutrition and of death of women in childbirth. Poverty is also in many ways the result of the high illiteracy rates and the low scientific and technological capacity that we see in the developing countries.”

The more precise world status of lack of health is described in the WHO publication “Global Burden of Disease”. The paper quotes almost 57 M deaths in 2002 of which 10.5 million, 29,000/day (or nearly 20%) were children of less than 5 years of age. Of these child deaths, 98% occurred in developing countries.

Over 60% of deaths in developed countries occur beyond age 70, compared to about 30% in developing countries. A key point is the comparatively high number of deaths in developing countries at young adult ages (15–59 years) where AIDS/HIV prominently contributes. This vast premature children and adult mortality in developing countries is a major public health concern, a major concern for the security and stability of the developing countries.

It is also a shame for the rich (virtual-) neighbours for whom lack of interest or return on investment competes with humanitarian aspects. Many examples were given of the South being left out in the global biomedical scientific enterprises. South-North-South collaboration will be mandatory.

There are actually very encouraging signs of collaboration between scientific institutions and pharmaceutical companies intending to attack together (not so-) rare diseases such as Dengue fever or finding new remedies to Malaria, etc, making ample use of novel communication technologies and collaboration between companies.

South and North should engage in common efforts aimed at enabling the developing countries to overcome the “Burden of Disease”. ICT will play a major role in the burning Health Issues and progress there will provide a measure of success of development efforts and the maturity of mankind to tackle its real problems.

Other issues of interest were the environment and disaster recovery. The task of monitoring the Earth’s status is a global issue. Earth science

research should be encouraged on a global scale. Earth science is of concern for every citizen's immediate environment and condition of life and thus different from other sciences.

Life on Earth depends on biodiversity and the living environment. Biodiversity studies are rather marginally funded and not (-yet) organized globally.

Geo-hazards require early warning, rapid intervention and need fast information to permit proper actions as well as detailed data on left-over hazards after conflict to enable the local civil society to overcome the consequences of the conflict rapidly.

For most of these items, maybe with the exception of biodiversity, a considerable amount of detailed data and technology exist. Global and individual accessibility is hampered by lack of open standards, lack of interoperability, secrecy and other impediments of non-fundamental nature. The EU-ESA initiative for GMES – Global Monitoring for Environment and Security is an excellent start and should become a global activity adapted to and supported by all players in the field.

“Education, education, education” . . . finally was the common denominator of all contributions to the role of science in the information society and the request to make validated educational content freely available.

30% of the world-population is between 0–14 years old and many of those young people know little beyond what is going on in their immediate environment of poverty, violence and illness and possibly television channels from the developed world showing rich people, living in abundance and involved in activities that are mostly meaningless to the spectators in the less developed countries, except possibly for displays of violence.

There is eagerness in the less developed countries to have their educational needs analysed and there is eagerness to learn from the best examples of the developed world. Participants also insisted that education is not a one way road and that exchange in good (virtual-) neighbourhood may be of mutual interest.

The Pisa study of the OECD has demonstrated deficiencies in many national education systems. From the surprises of some governments involved we can conclude that much more openness and discussions are required even in developed countries.

Can we share this openness and these efforts more globally and much more freely, from primary education contents to university, following the mission statement of the UN University “to contribute, through research

and capacity building, to efforts to resolve the pressing global problems that are the concern of the United Nations, its Peoples and Member States”?

Real progress in this area will depend on educational content made available in developed and less developed countries as well as the basic internet infrastructure requested above, i.e. the connection of all universities to the internet at high bandwidth.

Security

The vulnerability of the civil society, its people and belongings is visible in every day's headlines since 9/11 as well as the response of the countries concerned and the impact of this response on the civil society. At ISF here in Montreux most contributions addressed these important subjects during the past days.

This presentation tries to show the potential of the civil society, with the support of the governments of the developed and less developed world, to engage in world-wide, bottom-up scientific and other peaceful and urgent development endeavours across boundaries of nations, religion, gender and culture where ambitious missions and objectives can be formulated in ways acceptable and desirable to all participants.

I am convinced that in the fields of education of basic human skills and scientific knowledge (UNESCO), in the fields of health (WHO), environment, sustainable energy, natural disasters and recovery from conflict common objectives and common interests can be identified. The powerful virtual organizations described before empower and enable the participants to activate available a maximum of local resources under local guidance to the common goals. Such goals can be as diverse as open standards, interoperability, open access after conflicts for geographical maps to be used for clearing minefields, identifying access to disaster areas or environmental information concerning crops, bio-diversity, oil spills on the sea and more importantly health issues, education and all other subjects of development.

The reasons to engage in such efforts in a much more significant fashion have been expressed in his usual straightforward manner by Bertrand Russell, the third person mentioned as instrumental initiating the Pugwash process: “All who are not lunatics agree about certain things. That it is

better to be alive than dead, better to be adequately fed than starved, better to be free than a slave. Many people desire those things only for themselves and their friends; they are quite content that their enemies should suffer. These people can be refuted by science: Humankind has become so much one family that we cannot insure our own prosperity except by insuring that of everyone else. If you wish to be happy yourself, you must resign yourself to seeing others also happy.”

It will be important to explore the application of the described scientific model and methods to development projects where requirements of developing countries and experience and know how from developed countries are combined to address development needs in “bottom-up” fashion bringing together civil society, namely science and industry, and also relevant government programs to efficient and effective joint ventures.

To make such dedicated common development ventures in appropriate fields possible we should

- make scientific and educational content freely available,
- connect universities and later schools to the internet at sufficient bandwidth and
- engage in active partnerships between universities and schools
- to learn to live together decently on our planet.

Closing Remarks

Your Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

We have, over the last three days, been offered some two plenary meetings, 30 experts panels and some 150 presentations. We benefited from your combined expertise, insights and wisdom in excellent discussion periods.

It would be futile to try to sum up our debate. This cannot be the role of my concluding remarks.

Let me rather use these few minutes to focus on one point which represented in many respects the red line that linked all our work together:

The need to respond to the complex new challenges of the post Cold War world with an integrated, multilateral, and interdisciplinary approach. There is an urgent need for cooperation – cooperation that bridges the old dividing lines of the cold war (and that does not permit the emergence of a new and dangerous Atlantic divide), cooperation between the architectural pillars of the European and international security structures, cooperation between international organizations, the academic world, and non-governmental organizations.

The list of topics we have been addressing these last three days reflects the complexity of the challenge.

Human security has not increased after the end of the Cold War. In many parts of the world it has, quite to the contrary, been declining dangerously.

Let us just recall the tragedies of the Western Balkans, Western Africa or the Great Lakes region.

When the wall was coming tumbling down, it was not the end of history, but its return – and with a vengeance. Borders were redrawn, all too often in blood. Countries fell apart. Some went down in utter and bloody chaos. Something we euphemistically describe with the term of becoming a failed state (as if a country had simply failed an exam).

Warlords have reappeared – and with them the terrible words of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Child soldiers in their hundreds of thousands and children whose limbs have been chopped off in order to place a humanitarian burden on the adversary have become an apocalyptic reality.

Some of the warlords have become entrepreneurs – adding to the list of horrors the illicit trafficking in women, children, human beings and

organs, in small arms and nuclear source materials, in blood diamonds and tropical woods, in drugs and cigarettes.

Globalization was not restricted to the economy, but describes also new realities in international terrorism and organized international crime.

Man, most of the time civilians, particularly women and children have been the victim of this disastrous development.

The international community has reacted. The UN, no longer blocked by quasi automatic vetoes, has multiplied its Peace Support Operations. The role and contribution of NGOs has been mushrooming. New initiatives have been launched – such as, among many other examples, the three Geneva Centres.

But this is clearly not enough.

New tensions between the Atlantic partners have hampered cooperation. 9/11 has given both new urgency for international cooperation and at the same time triggered vivid disagreements on priorities and the best ways and means to move forward.

What is needed in this situation are though not simple answers. What is needed is a comprehensive approach addressing all the threats to human security and their root causes. What is needed is a broad international coalition to respond to the new challenges to human security with an integrated, interdisciplinary and multilateral strategy, with an action plan that includes all the key facets:

- The fight for human rights and human dignity and against hunger and illiteracy;
- The efforts to strengthen international law and international humanitarian law;
- Demining and the fight against the proliferation of small arms as well as the proliferation of WMD;
- Security sector reform and good governance of the security sector;
- The fight against international terrorism organized crime;
- The urgent need to improve the situation of women and children in an insecure world

The organizers of the 6th ISF sincerely hope that this conference has made a modest contribution on that road. We have addressed all these issues. You are the world's leading experts on them. We hope to have offered you however not simple yet another venue in your area of specialization. We wanted to offer you the full picture, to encourage you to look into workshops and panels that addressed issues related to your own area of specialization. We wanted to create an environment where you would be able to significantly broaden your personal networks. We wanted to encourage you to integrate your knowledge in joint answers to the burning problems we all face.

I hope that we have succeeded in this ambitious objective. You will be the jury on this one.

We from our side will do the utmost to get into your hands as much information as we can – also in the weeks and months to come. All papers will be published on the ISF website that will stay open also after the conference. You will all receive a CD-Rom containing all plenary speeches, many of the papers and much additional material, kindly offered by the Austrian Defence Ministry, our ISF partner. Finally there will, as always, be the book with all plenary speeches and abstracts of all other events.

Let me conclude these remarks and thus also this conference. But let me, before I do so, thank most warmly and most cordially those who made this event possible:

- The Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the main financial sponsors
- The Austrian National Ministry of Defence that has seconded an outstanding officer, Major Ernst Felberbauer, for 15 months to DCAF to reinforce our ISF team;
- Our Partners in the organising team: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy, The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich with its Center for Security Policy and its International Relations and Security Network, the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

- Let me thank, above all, the team under DCAF Assistant Director Anja Ebnöther that made it all happen – so well, so pleasantly and so flawlessly: Anja herself, Ernst Felberbauer, Sylvia Hyka, Karin Grimm, the Mission Support team under Claude Gosteli, the soldiers and drivers of the Swiss Army and all the others that have in the background tried to do their utmost to make your stay here in Montreux as pleasant and productive as ever possible.

Join me in giving them the warm applause they deserve.

Background Information

The International Security Forum (ISF) was launched as the Institutes and Security Dialogue in Zurich in 1994 and has since been at the forefront of co-operation among international security professionals in East and West within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace Framework and beyond.

The 6th International Security Forum is sponsored and co-organized by the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS) and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as an official Swiss government contribution to the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has been tasked by the DDPS to organise the 6th International Security Forum (ISF) from 4–6 October 2004 at the Convention Centre in Montreux, Switzerland.

The three Geneva Centres, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) have played a key role in that process, together with the Center for Security Studies (CSS) and the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) at the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology Zurich (ETHZ). Since then, the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva (IUHEI) as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have joined to become actors in the ISF. The main financial contribution to the International Security Forum comes from the Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

The ISF is designed as a forum for discussing ways to increase communication and co-operation between institutions engaged in research related to international security in Europe and North America. Over the years, the ISF has brought together hundreds of researchers, academics, civil servants, military officers, representatives of non-governmental organizations and media representatives from some 50 countries. The conference is biennial and is held alternately in Zurich and the Geneva area. Due to the success of the ISF, the Swiss government continues

to support the conference cycle with its international co-sponsors and partners. The ISF cycle has the following specific objectives:

- To create a platform for discussion and discourse on past, current and future security issues with relevance on the global and regional dimension
- To exchange views on academic, military, and practical aspects of security policy
- To discuss humanitarian aspects of security policy and to encourage dialogue with humanitarian organizations
- To promote practical co-operation between the different actors of international security (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations as well as nation states)
- To encourage professional education and the free flow of information on issues relating to international security
- To foster an international and multidisciplinary dialogue that will identify future key issues and trends in international security
- The objective is to create a platform for discussion and the conference will consist of two plenary sessions, six topic sessions and twenty four workshop sessions.

The past International Security Forums were held at

- 1st Institutes and Security Dialogue from 26–28 April 1994 in Zurich
- 2nd Institutes and Security Dialogue from 12–14 September 1996 in Geneva
- 3rd International Security Forum from 19–21 October 1998 in Zurich
- 4th International Security Forum from 15–17 November 2000 in Geneva
- 5th International Security Forum from 14–16 October 2002 in Zurich

Abbreviations

ADL	Advanced Distributed Learning
BICC	Bonn International Centre for Conversion
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIIP	Critical Information Infrastructure Protection
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CMS	Content Management System
CSBM's	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CTR	Co-operative Threat Reduction
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDPS	Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports
DFA	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DPKO	(UN) Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DPKR	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENISA	European Network and Information Security Agency
EO	Executive Outcomes
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
ETHZ	Swiss Federal Institute for Technology
EU	European Union
FMA	Foreign Military Assistance Act
GCSP	Geneva Centre for Security Policy
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GMEI	Greater Middle East Initiative
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS	Industrial Control System
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMEMO	Institute for World Economy and International Relations

IPEC	International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (ILO)
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
ISF	International Security Forum
ISN	International Relations and Security Network
IT	Information Technology
IUHEI	Graduate Institute of International Studies
LO	Learning Object
LTM	Long-term missions
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NISCC	National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRF	NATO Response Force
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organisations for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCR	Post-Conflict Reconstruction
PMCs	Private Military Companies

POW	Prisoners of War
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
PRIF	Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
PSCs	Private Security Companies
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SC	Center for Security Studies
SCORM	Sharable Content Object Reference Model
SDR	Strategic Review Process
SEESAC	South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SEMA	Swedish Emergency Management Agency
SFOPH	Swiss Federal Office for Public Health
SPLA/SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SSG	Security Sector Governance
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
US	United States of America
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WMDS	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WSIS	World Summit on the Information Society

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