

The Causes of Politicization of Ethnicity: A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Tanzania

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Abstract: Recent literature establishes that ethnicity needs to be politically relevant to have a negative effect on a country's development process. Yet, an understanding of the factors that cause ethnicity to be a political salient factor is still limited. This paper compares the development of the high politicization of ethnicity in Kenya to the low politicization in Tanzania by tracing the impact of ethnic structures, colonial administration, land distribution, and nation building policies on the politicization of ethnicity. Evidence from extensive archival material, historical secondary sources and expert interviews rejects the ethnic structure argument but supports the negative impact of colonial rule and land distribution, and the positive impact of nation building policies on the politicization of ethnicity. Indeed, fully implemented nation building policies, such as the promotion of Swahili and the intermingling of secondary school students, have the potential to lastingly mitigate the political salience of ethnicity.

Keywords: Politicized ethnicity, colonial rule, land distribution, nation building policies, Africa

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1. Introduction

Ethnic diversity is widely seen as an impediment to development. Ethnically diverse countries seem to exhibit low macroeconomic stability (Alesina & Drazen, 1991), diminished growth rates (Easterly & Levine, 1997), high corruption (Mauro, 1995), and decreased public good provision (Alesina *et al.*, 1999; Easterly, 2001; and Habyarimana *et al.*, 2007). This literature fails, however, to account for a large number of ethnically heterogeneous countries that do *not* experience negative effects from ethnic diversity. Recent studies suggest that it is not ethnicity per se but the role of ethnicity in the political process, i.e., the politicization of ethnicity, which explains social conflict and democratic breakdowns (Gagnon, 1994-1995; Miguel, 2004; Chandra, 2004; and Posner, 2005). Political salience of ethnicity is linked to increased ethnic favoritism (Posner, 2005; and Chandra, 2004) and to low inter-ethnic cooperation at the local level (Miguel, 2004). Yet, the question remains which factors lead to the politicization of ethnicity.

While an extensive literature exists that links ethnicity to the emergence of civil conflicts (cf. Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; and Cederman & Girardin, 2007), few authors have focused exclusively on the question under which circumstances ethnicity emerges as a political salient identity. Indeed, factors increasing the likelihood of an ethnic conflict may differ substantially from factors increasing the political salience of ethnicity.

Evidence on the causes of the politicization of ethnicity is scarce and focuses often on a country's ethnic structure, i.e., the number and size of ethnic groups (cf. Barkan, 1994; and Posner, 2005). Countries with few and large ethnic groups are seen to be naturally endowed with support groups large enough to win a majority in elections. Hence, these countries are expected to mobilize voters along ethnic lines, and thereby, ethnicity emerges as a salient political identity. On the contrary, in countries with a multitude of small ethnic groups, political parties seem in need to promote national programs to attract sizable amounts of voters. The ethnic structure argument is, however, challenged by the political ethnographic literature emphasizing the ambiguity and contextual character of ethnic identity and thereby repudiating a direct link between ethnic structures and the usefulness of ethnicity for political mobilization (cf. Schultz, 1984; Widlok, 1996; and Elwert, 2002).

Besides the ethnic structure argument, some evidence exists on the importance of nation building policies to mitigate the political salience of ethnicity (cf. Miguel, 2004). Yet, a

comprehensive discussion of other relevant explanatory factors of the politicization of ethnicity and the interrelation between these factors is, so far, lacking.

This paper, therefore, poses the question; which factors influence the political salience of ethnicity. In particular, the often voiced notion of the role of ethnic structure for the political salience of ethnicity is reassessed using detailed information on ethnic support bases of politicians. In addition, this paper explores other factors that might have influenced the politicization of ethnicity, namely the colonial administrative approach, land distribution, and nation building policies. More precisely, the study compares the case of a highly politicized country, Kenya, to a country with low politicized ethnicity, Tanzania. In these two cases, the evolution of the politicization of ethnicity is traced through the colonial period and the post-independence period by drawing on extensive archival material on ethnic groups, historical secondary sources and expert interviews.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the case selection, and the methodological approach of process tracing and comparative case study used to analyze the politicization of ethnicity. The reassessment of the ethnic structure argument and the examination of colonial rule, land distribution and nation building policies are presented in section 3. In particular, evidence from Kenya and Tanzania challenges the role of the structure of ethnic groups and confirms the importance of the endogenous factors. More precisely, colonial rule, land distribution and nation building policies are found to strongly influence the politicization of ethnicity. In addition, two critical moments when actors had the opportunity to shape the politicization of ethnicity are identified in section 4. Conclusions are provided in section 5.

2. Case selection and methodology

To assess the causal factors leading to politicization of ethnicity, this paper uses comparative case studies and process tracing. Using in-depth case studies helps to explore in greater detail the underlying causes of politicization of ethnicity. Relying on Przeworski and Teune's (1982) "most similar design", Kenya and Tanzania were selected as two cases with similar characteristics on the independent variable but different values for the dependent variables. More precisely, both countries are former British colonies, became independent in the 1960s, formed single-party independence governments and transformed to multiparty systems in mid 1990s. In

addition, the two countries are both presidential republics with proportional vote, and have a similar geography.

At the same time, these two countries differ strikingly on the dependent variable of the analysis, namely the politicization of ethnicity. While Kenyan politics is strongly divided along ethnic lines, ethnicity seems invisible in Tanzanian politics. An analysis of the 2007 general election in Kenya describes the voting pattern as a mere 'ethnic census' (Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008). Parties are found to draw their support from distinct and separated ethnic groups.¹ President Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) was mainly supported by the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru ethnic group. The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which combined several opposition groups and was headed by Raila Odinga, was supported by Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin ethnic group.

In contrast, ethnic identity seems largely absent from the political sphere in Tanzania. Widely cited evidence emphasizes that the majority of Tanzanians identify themselves in occupational categories (76 percent) rather than in ethnic categories (3 percent) (Afro-Barometer Network, 2002; p.38). Furthermore, closer examination of foundation bases of parties and party manifestos reveals that parties in Tanzania do not instrument ethnic symbols or ethnic language to attract specific groups of voters (NCCR MAGEUZI, 2000; Tanzanian Labour Party (TLP), 2000; Civic United Front (CUF), 2000; and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), 2000).

The causes for this strikingly different politicization of ethnicity in Kenya and Tanzania are assessed by using the approach of process tracing (cf. George & Bennett, 2005; pp. 205-232). This research method is particularly suitable to identify underlying causal paths through which specific outcomes were generated. This paper traces the evolution of politicization of ethnicity in Kenya and Tanzania by using detailed historical narratives accompanied with case-specific causal arguments to contribute to a more general understanding of the causes of politicization of ethnicity and to postulate future research avenues based on the factors identified in the comparative case studies (George & Bennett, 2005; p.211). In particular, the case studies assess the development of the politicization of ethnicity starting when Kenya and Tanzania (by that

¹ The unfortunate eruption of ethnic clashes after the 2007 general election provides additional evidence for the ethnic support bases of political parties. An overview over the support base of parties can be found in Makolo (2005, p.25) and Chweya (2002, p.96-97).

time called British East Africa and German East Africa, later Tanganyika)² came into existence as geographical and political entities at the turn of the 20th century. The analysis focuses primarily on the colonial period and the post-independence government in both countries, since these decades are considered to have laid the foundation of the perception of ethnic identification and to have influenced the course that politics took after these decades.

To include all relevant aspects of politicization, this study draws on a variety of sources. Extensive archival material was combined with historical secondary sources and results were corroborated with interviews conducted with local experts. In a first step, the study relies on government reports, population census data, party manifestos and historical accounts of the colonial history, the independence movement and the post-independence government period in Kenya and Tanzania. From these documents, three different potential factors of the politicization of ethnicity were identified, namely the role of colonial rule, land distribution, and nation building policies.

In a second step, experts in Kenya and Tanzania were questioned on their opinion on the potential causes of politicization of ethnicity and on suggestions for further sources of information. Complementing the existing information from compiled archival material and historical secondary sources with experts' knowledge seems particularly important in an environment where documentation on important political events is limited or inaccessible. Hence, the expert interviews served three critical goals. First, interviewees helped to review the list of potential causes of politicization of ethnicity derived in the first step. Second, through the interviews, information established from the archival material and historical sources could be corroborated and underlying causal path understood more clearly. Third, the interviews helped to prioritize the collected archival and historical material and to access hitherto unknown sources.

Sampling of the local experts was designed to include persons with access to knowledge about the historical factors causing the politicization of ethnicity in Kenya and Tanzania. In particular, this analysis followed a purposive sampling method (cf. Judd *et al.*, 1991) and in later stages used a chain-referral sampling method to identify further potential experts (cf. Babbie, 1992). In the first step, relevant experts were selected according to their expertise. In a second

² Note that the United Republic of Tanzania came only into existence in 1964 when the mainland of Tanzania (then called Tanganyika) formed a union with Zanzibar.

round, these experts were asked to identify individuals that may contribute to the research but have not been included in round one of the sampling process. In particular, this sampling method helped to collect information from a complete set of relevant experts and to mitigate the problem of omitted variables in the study. The interviewees' field of expert included history, cultural anthropology, political science, conflict studies, and development economics, and interviews were carried out between October 2008 and June 2009 by the author. In Tanzania, interviews were conducted with five senior researchers at the university, two senior government officers and one representative of a local NGO. In Kenya, questions were directed at four representatives of local NGOs, one senior researcher at the university, one senior government officer and one representative of an international development organization. Appendix A1 depicts the organization and area of expertise of the interviewees. Open questions were posed on experts' opinions on possible causes of politicization of ethnicity in today's politics in Kenya and Tanzania and interviews were transcribed into memory minutes.³ The interviews were analysed separately for Kenya and Tanzania employing Gläser and Laudel's (2009a) methodology and their "collection of macros for qualitative content analysis" (MIA) program.⁴ In a first step, statements from the memory minutes were extracted and categorized using the four different factors: ethnic structure, colonial rule, land distribution, and nation building policies. This information was then compiled in four extraction tables retaining the source (not shown).⁵ In a second step, experts' statements were categorized into various sub-topics of the four different factors in thematic summary tables (see Appendices B1-B4). In the last step, the arguments depicted in the thematic summary tables were compared to the results drawn from the archival material and the historical sources, and information from the interviews was included in the analysis of the paper.

³ The interviewer decided to take notes while interviewing and to transcribe these notes into complete memory minutes immediately after the interview. While recording of interviews and transcription of the recordings might be superior to memory minutes in studies interested in "how" things were said, this analysis is particularly concerned with the collection of information on potential factors of politicization. In addition, taping interviews is hardly practicable when posing questions on politically sensitive issues such as ethnicity and political relevance of ethnicity. Interviewees might feel intimidated when their answers are recorded and might decide to leave out critical or deviating information (cf. Gläser & Laudel, 2009a; p.157).

⁴ MIA is an open source program provided by Gläser and Laudel (2009b). For a detailed description of content analysis of interviews and extraction tables see Gläser and Laudel (2009a; p.197-260).

⁵ Available from the author upon request.

3. Tracing the causes of politicization of ethnicity

The following sections trace the causes of politicization of ethnicity by examining the impact of the four identified potential factors, namely (1) ethnic structures, (2) colonial history, (3) land distribution, and (4) nation building policies.

3.1 Revising the ethnic structure argument

The most often voiced argument why ethnicity is a politically salient factor in a country refers to the country's ethnic structure, i.e. the number and size of ethnic groups (cf. Posner, 2005; and Barkan, 1994). A politician is seen to build his support base from specific ethnic groups and to distribute resources that he accessed through his political position to his co-ethnics. The ethnic group that forms the support base must, therefore, be large enough to constitute a winning majority. More precisely, Bates (1983; p.164-165) describes ethnic groups as "a form of minimum winning coalition, large enough to secure benefits in the competition for spoils but also small enough to maximize the per capita value of these benefits". The argument of a minimum winning coalition seems to link a country's ethnic structure to its politicization of ethnicity. In countries inhabited by few and large ethnic groups, politicians might attract a winning majority by focussing exclusively on one ethnic group. However, in countries with a high number of small ethnic groups, politicians are unable to mobilize supporters on the bases of ethnicity and might, therefore, decide to focus on broader national programs to form a winning majority.

This simple rule of thumb, however, relies on static ethnic structures and well defined ethnic grouping characteristics. It thereby neglects the ambiguity and formability of the structure of ethnic groups (cf. Schultz, 1984; Widlok, 1996; and Elwert, 2002). While ethnic groups seem like homogenous and distinct entities within a greater nation state, most ethnic groups might be deliberately re-grouped both into smaller sub-tribes and also into a larger super-tribe.

The following paragraphs will trace the impact of ethnic structure on the politicization of ethnicity in Kenya and Tanzania. It seems particularly relevant not only to consider the overall ethnic structure and the ethnic support bases chosen by politicians but also the potential for ethnic mobilization in a country.

The overall ethnic structure in Kenya and Tanzania seems indeed to differ substantially with Kenya being populated by a few large ethnic groups and Tanzania by a multitude of small ethnic groups (cf. Barkan, 1994; p.10). However, a closer look at the ethnic support bases in Kenya and Tanzania challenges the relevance of ethnic structure for the political salience of ethnicity.

Some Kenyans seem convinced that if their first president, Jomo Kenyatta, had come from a small ethnic group, like Tanzania's President Nyerere, instead of coming from the large ethnic group (Kikuyu), the politicization of ethnicity in Kenya would have been substantially lower (Appendix B1, Kenya, 1.1 and 2.; and Tanzania, 1.1). President Nyerere is argued to have pursued programmatic politics since his own ethnic group – the Zanzaki – were too small to build a minimum winning coalition. While it is argued that the Zanzaki ethnic group was too marginal to be used as an ethnic support base, evidence from Kenya challenges this view. In particular, the ethnic group of Kenya's President arap Moi – the Tugen - is of similar size as the Zanaki. Both ethnic groups are negligible with population shares below 1.5 percent.⁶ Most interestingly, President Moi used his ethnic group to mobilize voters by constructing the super-tribe Kalenjin out of Tugen's cousin ethnic groups. After President Kenyatta's era in 1987, President arap Moi came to power supported by the Kalenjin ethnic group. However, before the electoral campaigning of President Moi, the Kalenjin ethnic group was non-existent. To build up a strong support base, Moi deliberately united several smaller ethnic groups and created what is now called the Kalenjin tribe (Kiondo, 2001; p.260-261). Five distinct ethnic groups, the Nandi, Kipsigis, Elgeyo, Marakwet, and Pokot, were united with Moi's Tugen ethnic group to form the greater Kalenjin ethnic group (Ogot, 2005; p.290). Evidence on the re-grouping of smaller tribes into the larger Kalenjin tribe is also supported by the expert interviews (Appendix B1, Kenya, 1.2). In particular, experts argue that Moi combined the tribes in the greater Kalenjin super-group starting in the 1930s when he was Member of Parliament in the Riftvalley and tried to mobilize voters. Moreover, experts explain the use of the five groups by pointing to the similar language of these groups. In addition, referring to the population census, it can be shown that in the earliest censuses (1962 and 1969), the six Kalenjin sub-groups appeared separately and with none exceeding five percent of the total population (Kenya, 1964; and Republic of Kenya, 1970). While the 1962 census lists some 0.05 percent of Kenyans identifying themselves as Kalenjin,

⁶ The Tugen constitute around 1.3 percent of the Kenyan population and the Zanaki constitute around 0.3 percent of the Tanzanian population (United Republic of Tanzania, 1971; and Kenya, 1964).

this ethnic category does not even appear in the 1969 census. However, the census which preceded President Moi's election records a jump from zero to 10.77 percent of Kalenjin membership, while the Nandi, Kipsigis, Elgeyo and Marakwet disappeared from the list of ethnic groups in Kenya. In the most recent available census, the Kalenjin ethnic groups appear as the third largest ethnic group in Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 1994).⁷

A second example for a deliberate re-grouping of ethnic subgroups comes from Kenya's first and third president, Kenyatta and Kibaki. These Presidents are members of the Kikuyu ethnic group. However, the Kikuyu are not sufficiently large to constitute a winning majority by themselves. Census data on ethnic groups shows that only 21 percent of the Kenyan population identify themselves as being Kikuyu (Republic of Kenya, 1994). To attract a winning majority, the Kikuyu politicians used various Kikuyu's cousin ethnic groups, namely the Embu and Meru to form a greater support base (the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA); Ogot, 2005; p.338)⁸ ⁹. Only after the inclusion of the Embu and Meru into the wider super-tribe GEMA, did this ethnic support base add up to around 27 percent of the total population (Republic of Kenya, 1994).

Besides the described examples of the construction of the Kalenjin and GEMA, other large ethnic groups in Kenya, such as the Luhya and the Mijikenda were artificially created by combining several smaller groups in the population censuses (Makoloo, 2005; p.11). In addition, researchers argue that even more ethnic groups, such as the Maasai and Samburu (both Maa speakers) have the potential to unite to become politically noticeable (Ogot, 2005; p.291).

Examining Tanzania, the potential for regrouping various smaller ethnic groups and thereby creating a minimum winning majority seem similar to the situation in Kenya. In particular, the Tanzanian expert in the field of cultural anthropology reports that there exists an ethnic identity in Tanzania that is large enough to build a large political support base (Appendix B1, Tanzania, 1.2). More precisely, he explains that the Sukuma and Nyamwezi, which are reported as distinct

⁷ The most recent population census data from 1999 (Republic of Kenya, 2001) could not be used since the shares of the ethnic groups were not published due to the argument that information on ethnic groups has been repeatedly misused (Makoloo, 2005; p.11).

⁸ More insights into the working and the political ambitions of GEMA can be found in Karimi and Ochieng (1980; chapter 5).

⁹ Note that also the smaller cousin ethnic groups have been reorganized by the colonial powers from smaller sub-tribes. The British government created an Embu district comprising the sub-tribes Embu and Mbeere (Ogot, 2005; p.279-280). Through this administrative demarcation new tribe, Embu, was 'invented'.

ethnic groups, are in fact cousin ethnic groups speaking a common language (called Sukuma and Nyamwezi respectively). Hence, the expert argues, these two groups could be mobilized on the bases of their common language and united into a larger super-tribe that would constitute about one fourth of the total population. Most interestingly, this group would be as large as the Kikuyu in Kenya – who have been repeatedly declared the largest group in Africa.¹⁰ In addition, the Tanzanian expert provides a multitude of examples in which the ethnic grouping labels employed in the population census are distorted. The Chagga are reported as one ethnic group, but consists, indeed, of different ethnic tribes, such as the Rombo. In addition, the Maasai subsumes approximately 10 different tribes and the Zaramo consist of three different tribes. Moreover, the Pare group, which is listed in the census as one group, subsumes two groups with distinct languages. Last, the Rufiji and Ndengereko, which are listed separately in the census, can, in fact, be considered as one group.

The presented evidence from Kenya and Tanzania challenges the argument that the potential use of ethnic groups for political support bases is different in Kenya and Tanzania. In particular, the evidence on the similar size of Kenya President Moi's and Tanzania President Nyerere's ethnic group and the potential to build a minimum winning ethnic coalition from the Nyamwezi and Sukuma group in Tanzania demonstrates that ethnic groups can be deliberately regrouped into sufficient support bases. Hence, one can conclude that the ethnic structure in Kenya and Tanzania is not sufficient by itself to determine the politicization of ethnicity.

This leaves the question which factors trigger the use of ethnicity in politics. The following paragraphs will, therefore, explore various other factors that might have contributed to the divergent politicization of ethnicity in Kenya and Tanzania, namely the colonial administration (3.2), land distribution (3.3) and nation building policies (3.4).

3.2 The colonialist's burden: divide and rule

The degree of ethnic animosities existing in Tanzania and Kenya can be traced back to the administrative approach used by the colonial rules to govern these two countries. Although these two countries share a common period of colonization by the British, colonialist's attention was

¹⁰ The Kikuyu constitute 20 percent of the total Kenyan population (Republic of Kenya, 1994) and the Nyamwezi plus Sukuma constitute 17 percent of the total Tanzanian population (United Republic of Tanzania, 1971).

focused primarily on Kenya as the center of the East African development (Barkan, 1994; p.12). Therefore, measures were taken to build up a strong agricultural export sector which involved the expropriation of Kenyan farmers (discussed in section 3.3) and the prevention of the Kenyan population to unite against the colonial rules. Tanzania, on the other hand side, received only little colonial attention and was merely governed as a byproduct of the major project in Kenya.

British administration in Kenya followed the 'divide and rule' policy. To facilitate administration, the British rulers set out to divide the population and create ethnically homogenous entities. Through this policy, formerly fluid and contextual ethnic identities were frozen and tribes were deliberately 'invented'. The aim was to create "self-sufficient, closed, static and homogenous linguistic and ethnic units" (Ogot, 2005; p.267). For example, by deliberately combining the settlement area of the culturally and physically distinct Tigania, Igembe, Imenti, Miutini, Igoji, Mwimbi and Muthambi tribes into a greater district, the British administration invented the Meru ethnic group (Ogot, 2005; p.280).

In addition to the clear demarcation between ethnic entities, the British colonialists settled Europeans in between neighboring ethnic entities to effectively prevent inter-ethnic cooperation. As Ogot (2005; p.268) argues this policy increased ethnic consciousness through the feeling of exclusiveness. The creation of closed and cut off ethnic units enabled the British colonialists to effectively rule the Kenyan population without having to fear a united resistance. Attempts of Kenyans to organize a cross-ethnic resistance, for example in the East African Association, were immediately banned by the colonial rulers stating that they would only allow an association with members from one ethnic group (Voll, 1995; p.279). Through the prohibition to organize nationally, the Kenyan population was left with the option to develop locally restricted ethnic associations (Chweya, 2002; p.91). Thereby, ethnic nationalism was encouraged and the foundation for today's ethnic representation in politics sowed by the British administration.

Experts' opinions on the colonial approach support the critical role of the colonial ruler on the political salience of ethnicity (Appendix B2, Kenya, 1. and 2.). While some experts qualify the colonialist's relevance by referring to pre-colonial ethnic clashes, there is strong agreement by the experts that the colonial rulers instrumented ethnicity for their purposes and intentionally segregated ethnic groups to prevent them from uniting against the colonial ruler.

In Tanzania, however, the colonial ruler used a different administrative approach. The country came under British colonial administration only after the end of the First World War, and until then, was ruled by the German colonial administration. While the Germans attempted to classify the Tanzanian population into different ethnic groups, their approach was less vigorous than Britain's approach in Kenya. Information on different tribes was collected and German administration strove to maintain relatively homogenous ethnic entities (Jerman, 1997; p.188). However, these ethnic entities were not governed by a local ethnic leaders but by African agents, the so-called *maakida*, mostly well-educated Muslims from the coastal area who spoke Swahili (Tripp, 1999; p.38). The imposition of these foreign Tanzanian leaders governing population entities that spoke a different vernacular hindered the development of strong ethnic consciousness as arisen in Kenya. After World War I, the mandate to administer today's Tanzania was conferred on the United Kingdom. As Jerman (1997; p.262) describes the following phase in the Tanzanian colonial history, the British colonial rule sought to replace the *maakida* by local ethnic leaders because the *maakida* were seen to have "accelerated the disintegration of 'tribal customs'". In addition, the fight by the Tanzanian population against the German colonial oppression (including the Maji Maji rebellion in 1905-1907) was seen to have increased national instead of distinct ethnic feelings. The British colonial rule, therefore, tried to reverse this trend by creating distinct ethnic entities and imposing local ethnic leaders. However, even within the British administration, several opposing opinions existed about how administrative structures should be implemented. In this respect, Tanzania benefited from the experience of British colonial rulers in Kenya. For example, Charles Dundas, the Secretary for Native Affairs, advocated regional instead of ethnic-based administrative boundaries. With reference to Graham (1976; p.5), Jerman (1997; p.227) explains Dundas' behavior by "his long experience in East Africa". In addition, "Dundas called for the development of village and regional policies rather than the scientifically advocated creation of 'tribes'" (ibid).

Besides the longer and more intense colonial experience in Kenya than in Tanzania, the two countries also differed in their strategic importance for Britain. Kenya was meant to develop as the economic center of East Africa, and policies were implemented to guarantee that white settlers were granted access to land and provided with sufficient infrastructure. Since the Kenyan population had to bear the costs of these policies, the British administration undertook measures to ensure that they would not unite and rebel against the colonialists. Conversely, Tanzania was

home to only few European settlers demanding relatively little infrastructure. Since the Tanzanian population was not burdened with heavy costs, there was less need to oppress them systematically. This led to the formation of regional and national associations comprising various ethnic groups, such as the Mbeya District Original Tribes Association and the Kuria Union emerged (Tripp, 1999; p.39). Most importantly, the roots of the nationalist movement in Tanzania lay in the Tanganyika African Association, a truly national association uniting all ethnic groups.

Tanzanian experts only rarely mentioned the relevance of the colonial rule on political salience of ethnicity (Appendix B2, Tanzania, 1). This might in itself provide evidence for the negligible impact of colonial administration on politicization of ethnicity in Tanzania. Information derived from an interview with a Kenyan expert, indeed, supports the relatively low strategic role of Tanzania for the British colonial rulers, which translated in less fierce administrative measures and more freedom to mobilize across ethnic identities.

Comparing the colonial history and the administrative policies enacted in Kenya and Tanzania, it seems that colonial rulers laid the foundation of strong ethnic consciousness in Kenya and reduced ethnic consciousness in Tanzania.

3.3 Ethnic grievance over unequal land distribution

Much of the grievance that is at present felt in Kenya against the Kikuyu, President Kibaki's ethnic group, stems from the deep-rooted conviction that after independence the Kikuyus were unrightfully allocated land to. The majority of the ethnic violence after the election in 2007 broke off precisely in the areas where Kikuyus were resettled after the independence (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Dialogue Africa Foundation Trust, 2009; p.58-65). Scholars support the notion that ethnic tensions stem from unequal wealth distribution (cf. Gurr, 1970). In particular, consumption of wealth by one ethnic group and exclusion from prosperity of other tribes is viewed to increase the consciousness of one's own ethnic identity. In agricultural societies, such as Kenya and Tanzania in the 20th century, access to wealth is mainly achieved through access to land and farming. Hence, unequal distribution of land is seen to increase the likelihood of ethnic conflicts and the pronouncement of ethnic identities (Amisi, 2009; p.23).

The two countries, Kenya and Tanzania, exhibit very divergent patterns concerning land distribution. While Tanzania followed a socialist approach resulting in equal access to land, Kenya experienced a period of expropriation and redistribution of land.

Kenya became British protectorate in 1895. Shortly after the establishment of the protectorate and the readjustment of the borders between Kenya and Uganda, British colonialists started expropriating the Kenyan population of the most fertile lands and distributing this land to white settlers. Land was distributed to European settlers to build up economic prosperity through a strong export sector of agricultural products (Low, 1965; p.22). The then called ‘white highlands’ were traditionally inhabited by the Kikuyu ethnic group but also populated by nomadic groups, such as the Kalenjin, Maasai, and Turkana (Wamwere, 2008; p.20).¹¹ After Kenya became independent, white settlers left the country and sold their farms to the Kenyan state. Many of the Kikuyu, who were originally chased off their land, took this opportunity and bought former white farms. Unfortunately, some of the farmland the Kikuyus bought was formerly property of the Kalenjin or the Maasai, especially farmland in the Riftvalley.¹² As a consequence of the Kikuyu dominance of land buyers and the resulting re-settlement in formerly predominantly Kalenjin areas, ethnic animosities between the Kikuyu and other ethnic groups increased (Barkan, 1994, p.11). In addition, through the possession of fertile farm land, the Kikuyus had the means for political mobilization and consolidated their domination in the political sphere.

Information derived from expert interviews supports the critical role of land distribution on the politicization of ethnicity (Appendix B3, Kenya). In particular, President Kenyatta is seen

¹¹ Other sources state that the land taken amounted to only 10 percent of the total land owned by the Kikuyu (cf. Middleton, 1965; p.340). However, these 10 percent were the most fertile and suitable for coffee production. Furthermore, Middleton (1965) points to another explanation of Kikuyu’s land grievance. He argues that “the drawing of a boundary round the land occupied by the Kikuyu at the turn of the century, and calling it a reserve meant that there was no room to expand into the many almost unused areas to the west and south” (Middleton, 1965; p.340). In addition, local experts report that the Maasai were relocated from Riftvalley to Lakipia and that former pastoralist areas were transformed into national parks in the post-independence period (Appendix B3, Kenya, 1. and 2.)

¹² The debate whether Kikuyus rightfully bought land is still prevailing in today’s Kenyan discourse. Some see pure ethnic favoritism by Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta in the dominance of Kikuyu buyers of white farmland. Others argue that only a small elite of Kikuyus was provided with farm land and that the vast majority of Kikuyus struggled hard to raise funds to buy the land (Wamwere, 2008; p. 15). However, the dominance of Kikuyus buyers might be explained by a combination of several factors. First, Kikuyus have traditionally been farmers and hence strove to own farm land (cf. Middleton, 1965; p.339). Second, the proximity of Kikuyus to missionaries and their work on white farms exposed them earlier than other African tribes to capitalist values. According to the Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists (2008; p.90), this early exposure to capitalism led to the founding of unions which supported the land purchases of the Kikuyu.

as having supported the settlement of Kikuyu after the independence in former Kalenjin areas (the Riftvalley) and experts relate the ethnic clashes that erupted after the election in 2007 to this settlement pattern (Appendix B3, Kenya, 2 and 3.). In general, the experts argue that unequal access to resources is strongly related to increased politicization of ethnicity (Appendix B4, Kenya, 5.b)).

The development in Tanzania followed a very different path. The first factor contributing to the divergent development is that British colonialists had only a minor interest in the Tanzanian agricultural production (Brett, 1973). In sharp contrast to the expropriation of Kenyan population and the redistribution of land to white settlers, the British administration in Tanzania felt that “the first duty of the Government was to the native” (Brett, 1973; p.224). While Kenyans were not allowed to grow cash crops, but urged to work on Europeans farms to be able to pay heavy taxes, Tanzanian farmers were explicitly encouraged to cultivate cash crops. Through the existence of the Tanzanian farmers who were supported by the British administration, Tanzania was less interesting for European farmers than Kenya. Therefore, compared to Kenya, only few Europeans settled in Tanzania. This freed the Tanzanian post-independence government of the need to re-distribute land to the population.

A second important factor to the equal land distribution was President Nyerere’s quest for ujamaa (Swahili for familyhood). Julius Nyerere formulated a socialist vision for Tanzania, which comprised the much disputed villagization policy of establishing ujamaa villages (Nyerere, 1966a). Formerly the Tanzanian population lived in relatively scattered clusters, which made it difficult for the government to provide these clusters with basic infrastructures (such as education and health facilities). Nyerere’s administration set out to build villages with appropriate infrastructure and communal farm land and then to regroup the population into these larger villages. Nyerere’s intention was to create self-supporting entities. The majority of the population resisted this policy, since they didn’t want to leave their own farms. However, through forced resettlements, by 1976 almost 80 percent of the Tanzanian population was living in ujamaa villages (Barkan, 1994; p.20). Although almost all scholars agree that the policy of ujamaa set the wrong incentives for economic growth, its effects on equal land distribution seem favorable. No ethnic group was favored in the redistribution of land. In addition, areas that

produced cash crops, such coffee and tea, where heavily taxed and these revenues were used to support areas with lower production outputs (Barkan, 1994; p.23).

The Tanzanian experts made repeated reference to Nyerere's policies, especially his focus on national unity (discussed at length in section 3.4.) and the introduction of socialism but did not make direct statements on the relevance of land distribution policies on political salience (Appendix B3, Tanzania). This might again confirm the evidence that redistribution of land after the colonial rule was widely perceived as being of minor importance.

Furthermore, the differing colonial land distribution in Kenya and Tanzania had important consequences for the independence movement in the two countries. Due to the numerous expropriations of the Kikuyus in Kenya, this ethnic group was the first to rebel against colonial authority. Kenya's independence movement started off as a primarily Kikuyu nationalist movement with the Kikuyu organization, the Mau-Mau. This organization initially demanded a change of the land laws that favored the white settlers but soon fought for liberalizing Kenya from the colonial rulers (Krabbe & Mayer, 1991). This firmly set apart the Kikuyu from other ethnic groups and contributed to the ethnic nationalism in Kenya. In Tanzania, however where the oppression by the colonial rulers was felt evenly by the population, the independence movement was supported by all ethnic groups. The Tanganyika African Association (TAA) was founded as a nationalist movement with cross-ethnic members (Tripp, 1999; p.40).

Comparing the land distribution in Kenya and Tanzania provides evidence that unequal access to land in Kenya increased ethnic animosity whereas equal access to resources in Tanzania promoted peaceful co-existence of ethnic groups.

3.4 Nation building policies

Besides the colonial history and the land distribution, specific nation building policies envisioned primarily by Tanzania's first President Julius Nyerere, and the lack of such policies in Kenya influenced the politicization of ethnicity in the two countries. This section will present arguments on the impact of the two most important nation building policies on the politicization of ethnicity, namely (1) the promotion of Swahili and (2) the quota system in the education sector.

(1) The promotion of Swahili

The national language of Kenya is Swahili. However, compared to its neighboring country Tanzania, Swahili is used to a lesser degree. In Kenya, Swahili is competing with the official language English and a multitude of vernacular languages, such as Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Dholuo, and Kikamba. The weak promotion of Swahili in Kenya might be rooted in the colonial history and the post-independence language policies. Education policies during the colonial period insisted on the use of local vernaculars as the language of instruction. Thereby, the Kenyan population was effectively denied a common language to communicate and organize nationally (which was part of the 'divide and rule' policy of the British colonials, see section 3.2) (Ochieng', 1972; p.258, cited in Voll, 1995; p.263). In the post-independence period, the Kenyan government placed more emphasis on the use of local vernaculars and English than of Swahili. Kenyan experts provide further evidence for the use of vernaculars in the education system (Appendix B4, Kenya, 2.). The Kenyan education policy foresaw that teachers use local vernaculars for instruction in primary schools and Swahili and English in secondary schools (Appendix B4, Kenya, 2.). Although Swahili was taught in primary schools as a subject it was not considered important enough to be included as an examinable subject for the primary school leaving exam until the late 1980s (Appendix B4, Kenya, 2.). Since the majority of Kenyan school children receive only primary education this education policy lead to a very low understanding of Swahili throughout the country.¹³

Another consequence of the language policy voiced by the experts is the need for local teachers to speak the vernacular of the particular area where they teach primary school students. Thereby, teachers were effectively restricted to work in their home provinces, since otherwise they would have to learn another vernacular to be able to teach (Appendix B4, Kenya, 2. and 3.).¹⁴

The severe consequences of the use of vernaculars for the national unity have been also identified in the so-called Ominde Report (Republic of Kenya, 1964; p.29): "We believe that the secret of a national feeling which over-rides tribal and local loyalties lies in bringing about much more consciousness mixing within our educational system than is at present practised." In

¹³ In 2000, only 33 percent of children attended secondary schools (World Bank, 2008).

¹⁴ Note that this poses a tight constraint on areas with only few schools. To increase their student numbers, these areas are required to produce disproportionately high numbers of school leavers that might then become teachers and return to their home areas.

particular, the Ominde Report suggests that teachers work two years in a foreign province before starting their work in their home area. To facilitate this, English should be promoted as a national language.

In addition, vernaculars seem to be frequently used in offices and in the political sphere (Appendix B4, Kenya, 2.). In particular, experts stress that Kenya's first President Kenyatta sometimes addressed the population in his mother tongue Kikuyu even if people did not belong to the Kikuyu ethnic group and hence were not able to understand him (Appendix B4, Kenya, 2.). In addition, the liberalization of the media in 2002 and the spread of vernacular radio stations, such as Inooro FM and Kameme FM (Kikuyu ethnic group), and Kass FM (Kalenjin ethnic group), is seen to pronounce the use of vernaculars and thereby to increase ethnic consciousness and animosity (Wamwere, 2008; p.41). In the post-election period, these radio stations provided a platform for hate-speeches and thereby crucially contributed to the ethnic violence experienced in 2008 (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Dialogue Africa Foundation Trust, 2009).

Tanzania, on the contrary, is widely cited for its universal use of Swahili, which led to a more united population according to local experts (Appendix B4, Tanzania, 1).¹⁵ The first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, stressed that "we need to break up [the] tribal consciousness among the people and [...] build up a national consciousness" (Nyerere, 1966b; p.39). The most important factor for the realization of national consciousness was the promotion of Swahili throughout Tanzania. In particular, the use of a Bantu¹⁶-rooted language instead of the language inherited by the former colonial rulers (English) to create a national language is seen by researchers and local experts as having enhanced its acceptance in the country (Laitin, 1992; p.8; Appendix B4, Tanzania, 2.). Over the years, Swahili "has evolved in its own political idiom, nurturing the development of a national political culture" (Barkan, 1994; p.10).

After Tanzania became independent and embarked on the socialist way envisioned by Julius Nyerere, the government pushed for a quick promotion of Swahili throughout the

¹⁵ This is also supported by Laitin (1992), Barkan (1994), and Miguel (2004).

¹⁶ Bantu languages originate from central and southern Africa.

country.¹⁷ Education policies clearly targeted the use of Swahili as a national language. More precisely, while vernaculars and English were used as the language of instruction under British colonial rule, Tanzania adopted Swahili as the common language of instruction in all primary schools (Jerman, 1997; p.251, and Laitin, 1992; p.139). In secondary schools, Swahili continued to be an examinable subject and teaching was carried out in English (Kessler, 2006; p.49).

Moreover, the use of ethnic vernaculars was abandoned from the political and professional sphere and restricted to the social and personal sphere (Appendix B4, Tanzania, 2.). Local ethnic languages were strongly discouraged to be spoken in government offices and national businesses (Whiteley, 1969; p.111 cited in Tripp, 1999; p.54). People were expected to communicate and work together using Swahili as their common language. The necessity of communicating in Swahili was also increased by the *ujamaa* villagization policy (described in section 3.3). People from various ethnic groups were drawn together in the *ujamaa* villages and hence the need for a common language significantly increased (Kessler, 2006; p.49).

Another factor contributing to the national identity developed in Tanzania is the use of the school curriculum to teach national values. Today, Kenyan experts strongly advocate the implementation of new education policies that include conflict studies in the curriculum (Appendix B4, Kenya, 5.a).¹⁸

(2) The quota system

“Abolish quota system, says Kalonzo” titled the Standard on March 27th, 2009 (The Standard, 2009). Kenya’s Vice-President Kalonzo Musyoka was reported to have pledged for an abolishment of the quota system because of its adverse effects on inter-ethnic cooperation: “We must revert to the old system in which students were admitted to schools away from their homes to enable them mingle at an early age. This is a way of fighting negative ethnicity.” (The Standard, 2009).

¹⁷ The effectiveness of the implementation of Swahili by Nyerere was supported by other factors, such as the use of Swahili for administrative purposes during the German and British colonial period (cf. Tripp, 1999; Jerman, 1997; Laitin, 1992; and Appendix B4, Tanzania, 2.).

¹⁸ The importance of school curricula is supported by Miguel (2004; p.336). He argues that the Tanzanian government employed the school curriculum to stress nation values and to promote national unity. On the contrary, the the Kenyan government failed to pursue similarly approaches

The quota system was enacted by President Moi in 1978 to regulate the admission of students to Kenya's secondary school. It foresaw that 85 percent of a schools' students come from the school's local area and only 15 percent of the students admitted are allowed to come from outside the local area (Appendix B4, Kenya, 3.).¹⁹ This policy was enacted to "strengthen local interest and commitment towards development and maintenance of their schools" (Republic of Kenya, 1988; p.29). However, the main reason for the introduction of the quota system is widely perceived to be President Moi's wish to increase secondary education for his people – the Kalenjin (Amutabi, 2003). Under President Kenyatta, the majority of schools were built in Central Province – home to the Kikuyu²⁰. Once Moi came to power, he re-allocated education resources away from Central province to other provinces and especially to his ethnic group. The new schools built in the homeland of the Kalenjin, however, were then equally populated by other ethnic groups, who formerly went to schools in Central province. To increase access of his own people to secondary schools in their own province, Moi enacted the quota system. He thereby effectively prohibited that large numbers of people from other ethnic groups attended these secondary schools. As some scholars argue, an immediate consequence of the quota system was its reinforcement of ethnic identity and regionalism: "Good or bad performance of a school is not longer viewed as that of the individual school but rather as a school from a particular ethnicity"(Amutabi, 2003; p.135).

In addition, the quota system had consequences on the use of English as the language of instruction in secondary schools. The quota system produced fairly ethnically homogenous classes in secondary schools. Therefore, as Kenyan experts argue, instead of teaching in English, lectures could be held in the local vernaculars (Appendix B4, Kenya, 2.). Thus, vernacular were even spoken and promoted during secondary education and increased in importance.

Tanzania also introduced a quota system. However, this system was not designed to separate different ethnic groups and to guarantee access to education to specific ethnic groups, but to

¹⁹ Kenya's secondary education system comprises three different types of schools, namely national, provincial and district secondary schools. The best students are admitted to the few national schools. Students with slightly lower test scores can attend provincial secondary schools and students with very low grades are confined to district secondary schools. For provincial schools 85 percent of the students come from the province and 15 percent from outside the province. For national schools, 85 percent of students are admitted from their respective district and 15 percent from outside the district. (Republic of Kenya, 1988; p.29)

²⁰ Whether this was a consequence of Kenyatta's favoring his own ethnic group, or the Kikuyu's greater efforts to access education is debatable.

equalize educational attainment across ethnic groups (Cooksey *et al.*, 1994; p.216). In addition, the majority Tanzania experts pointed to the government policy to mix secondary school students (Appendix B4, Tanzania, 3.). In particular, they state that the government forced secondary school students to study in provinces far away from their home areas. Thereby, Tanzania took the exact opposite direction as Kenya. While Kenya restricted students to study in their home area, Tanzanian students were sent far away to communities that spoke a different vernacular language. The forced commingling of students from different ethnic groups strongly promoted the use of Swahili to communicate, and provided the future elite of the country with a truly national perspective. Another factor increasing inter-ethnic cooperation and the use of Swahili was the regulation to post civil servants outside of their home region (Tripp, 1999; p.45).

From the above discussion one can conclude that nation building policies, such as promotion of a national language and fostering inter-ethnic cooperation through the education system seem to have reduced the perceived role of ethnicity and thereby lessen the politicization of ethnicity.

4. Discussion

The analysis of the ethnic structure, colonial history, land distribution, and nation building policies permits to draw interesting lessons for the development of politicization of ethnicity. In a first step the paper analyzes the relevance of ethnic structure for the politicization of ethnicity. A country's ethnic structure has been repeatedly stated to influence the role of ethnicity in the political process. However, examining the structure of ethnic groups in Kenya and Tanzania reveals that the potential for mobilizing an ethnic majority is similar in the two countries. Examples of deliberate re-grouping of ethnic tribes into larger entities demonstrates that ethnic structures are far from being static, but ethnicity is instrumented by politicians to form minimum winning coalitions. This challenges the repeatedly voiced intuition that a country's ethnic structure determines in itself ethnicity's usefulness for political mobilization.

In a second step, the paper explores other factors, which might have influenced the politicization of ethnicity in Kenya and Tanzania. In particular, the colonial administration, land distribution policies by the colonial ruler and the post-independence government, and nation building policies by the first presidents in Kenya and Tanzania are found to have substantially influence the political salience of ethnicity in the two countries.

More precisely, Britain's aim to transform Kenya into the center of East Africa and its strategy to develop a strong Kenyan export sector led to the widespread settlement of Europeans in the most fertile areas in Kenya. The settlement policies of the British government could only be implemented by expropriating several ethnic groups living in these areas. The ethnic groups which bore the major burden of this policy were Kalenjin, Maasai and in particular the Kikuyu. The strong grievance over the expropriation of their land led to the Kikuyu's pioneering role in the independence movement and impeded a cross-ethnic national resistance. In addition, the large-scale expropriations by the British obligated the post-independence government to redistribute the former settlers' land. At this point the government led by Kenyatta had the opportunity to redistribute this land equally. However, the major beneficiaries from the land distribution were the Kikuyus, who settled primarily in areas formerly occupied by other ethnic groups, such as the Kalenjin. These ethnic groups felt grievance over the land lost to the Kikuyu that still persists today and contributes to an increased politicization of ethnicity. Further policies implemented by the post-independence governments, such as the quota system in the education sector and the promotion of local vernaculars, additionally spurred ethnic consciousness and thereby increased political salience of ethnicity.

In contrast, the development in Tanzania led to a low level of political salience of ethnicity. The British colonial ruler showed only little interest in the occupation of Tanzania due to its focus on Kenya as the strategic center of East Africa. This resulted in a low influx of European settlers and, as a consequence, in little need to expropriate and systematically oppress the Tanzanian population by the colonial administration. In addition, the experience made in Kenya in combination with administrative personnel sympathetic to the African population led to a more lenient administrative approach in Tanzania which did not rely on a systematic separation of ethnic groups. This was a favorable environment for cross-ethnic resistance which resulted in a cross-ethnic national independence movement and provided the first post-independence president Nyerere with an opportunity to pursue his vision of a united Tanzania. Furthermore, through the low influx of white settlers in Tanzania, President Nyerere was freed from the need to redistribute land after the independence. Moreover, he pursued the ujamaa policy, which granted equal access to land to the Tanzanian population regardless of their ethnic identity. In addition to the equal resource distribution, Nyerere implemented strong nation building policies

focusing on the promotion of Swahili and fostering inter-ethnic cooperation. Thereby, ethnic identity was effectively barred from the political sphere.

From the discussion of the development of the politicization of ethnicity one can identify two critical moments in the history of Kenya and Tanzania when actors had the opportunity to shape the political salience of ethnicity. The first critical moment was the approach British colonial rulers took to govern the two colonies, and the second was the approach pursued by the first independence government to distribute land and to unite the country.

In particular, the oppressive colonial approach in Kenya including land expropriation and the demarcation policy critically increased the ethnic consciousness. More precisely, the colonial approach led to a Kikuyu-driven independence movement and burdened the post-independence government to re-distribute the former white highlands. In contrast, Britain's low interest in Tanzania and the absence of strong colonial oppression and expropriation of land led to a cross-ethnic nationalist movement and provided the first independence government with a favorable environment to pursue nation building policies.

The second decisive moment in the history of Kenya and Tanzania were the actions taken by the independence government. In Kenya, President Kenyatta's government was left with the task to redistribute the white highlands once the European settlers left the country. This could have been an opportunity to provide all ethnic groups with an equal access to resources. However, distribution of land was heavily skewed towards the Kikuyu, which caused persistent grievance by the other ethnic groups and substantially increased the political salience of ethnicity. In addition, education policies implemented by the government increased ethnic tensions further by hindering inter-ethnic cooperation and emphasizing local ethnic identities.

Tanzania, on the contrary, was less burdened by the colonial period and therefore able to grant equal access to land and to pursue long-lasting nation building policies. The question, however, remains whether President Nyerere could have implemented these nation building policies successfully in an environment less favorable such as in Kenya.

5. Conclusion

The comparative analysis of the historical events leading to the differing degree of politicization of ethnicity in Kenya and Tanzania offers interesting lessons on the causes of politicization.

Most interestingly, the analysis challenges the long standing notion that politicization is determined by the number and size of ethnic groups in a country. Evidence from the two cases demonstrates that ethnic groups were deliberately re-grouped into larger entities by politicians to form a political support base. This finding may provide support to redirect scholarly attention to endogenous factors that influence the politicization of ethnicity. A first effort is provided in this paper by assessing the impact of colonial rule, land distribution and nation building policies on the political salience of ethnicity. All three factors are found to have substantially influenced the politicization of ethnicity in Kenya and Tanzania. The specific colonial rule and the policies to distribute land are found to have increased ethnic tensions in Kenya, but decreased ethnic consciousness in Tanzania. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that fully implemented nation building policies have the potential to lastingly mitigate the political salience of ethnicity. In particular, the promotion of a national language throughout the country and the intermingling of secondary school students emerge as favorable factors to create a united country.

Yet, the question remains under which circumstances can nation building policies be fully implemented. Evidence from the low politicized case, Tanzania, points to an interrelation between colonial approach and feasibility of implementation of nation building policies. The colonial approach in Tanzania induced lower ethnic consciousness than in Kenya and thereby provided a more favorable environment for the post-independence government to launch policies to unite the country. In Kenya, on the contrary, the first post-independence government was heavily burdened with increased ethnic consciousness through colonial demarcation and land distribution policies. The question to which extent Kenya's post-independence policies directly resulted from the colonial burden is, however, left to further research.

The discussion of the interrelation between colonial rule and post-independence governments' actions suggest promise for a more in-depth analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the politicization of ethnicity. Further research might expand the historical comparative case studies presented in this paper by assessing the impact of colonial rule, land distribution and nation building policies in complementary cases. This information could, then, be used to perform a more rigorous test of the necessary and sufficient conditions leading to the politicization of ethnicity. In addition, including further cases on the range of politicization of ethnicity might serve to corroborate the results derived from the benchmark cases of a highly politicized country, Kenya, and a low politicized country, Tanzania.

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Appendix A1: Expert interviewees

| Organization of interviewee | Field of expertise | Date of interview | Coding for Appendices B1-B4 |
|---|---|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| Tanzania, Dar es Salaam | | | |
| Friedrich Ebert Foundation | Nationalism process in Tanzania | 10/08/08 | TN1 |
| Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University Dar es Salaam | Ethnic conflicts, Tanzanian history | 10/07/08 | TP3 |
| Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University Dar es Salaam | Agricultural development, income distribution | 10/06/08 | TP2 |
| National Electoral Commission, Election Management Department | Organization of political parties in Tanzania, the role of ethnicity in political campaigning | 10/12/08 | TG4 |
| National Electoral Commission; Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) | Elections in Tanzania | 10/16/08 | TP5 |
| Prime Minister's Office, Registrar of Political Parties | Organization of political parties in Tanzania | 12/01/08 | TG6 |
| University of Dar es Salaam, Political Science and Public Administration | Political parties in Tanzania | 10/29/08 | TP7 |
| University of Dar es Salaam, Sociology and Anthropology Department | Ethnic groups in Tanzania | 10/25/08 and 10/30/08 | TP8-1 and TP8-2 |
| Kenya, Nairobi | | | |
| Ecumenical Centre for Justice and Peace (ECJP) | Civic education, peace building | 05/27/09 | KN7 |
| Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Nairobi | Economic cooperation and development | 05/05/09 | KD5 |
| Hans Seidel Foundation | Civic education, conflict prevention, political dialogue | 05/15/09 | KN2 |
| Konrad Adenauer Foundation | International cooperation | 05/06/09 | KN1 |
| Konrad Adenauer Foundation | Political parties in Kenya | 05/06/09 | KN4 |
| Member of Parliament | Pastoralist ethnic groups | 06/18/09 | KM3 |
| University of Nairobi, Education Communication and Technology | Civic education | 05/18/09 | KP6 |

Note: Names of interviewees are not disclosed to maintain confidentiality.

Appendices B1-B4

The first three letters of the code of the source identify the interviewee and the number following the hyphen identifies the paragraph in the interview protocol.

Appendix B1: Thematic summary of extraction table ethnic structures

| Kenya | Source | Tanzania | Source |
|--|-------------|--|------------------------|
| 1. Description of the ethnic structure | | 1. Description of the ethnic structure | |
| 1.1. General | | 1.1. General | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kenyan's presidents always came from large ethnic groups | \KP6.-13\ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tanzanian's presidents always came from small ethnic groups | \KP6.-13\, \TP8-1.-19\ |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kikuyu are not the largest ethnic group in Africa → Sukuma + Nyamwezi in Tanzania are larger | \TP8-2.-14\ | | |
| 1.2. Re-grouping of ethnic groups | | 1.2. Re-grouping of ethnic groups | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> President Moi came from a small tribe (Tugen), a subtribe of the Kalenjin. When he was MP in the Riftvalley (1930s) and looking for votes he created the Kalenjin group to have a larger support political base. He combined the following tribes into the Kalenjin ethnic group: Nandi, Kipsigis, Elgeyo (Keyo), Marakwet, and Tugen, since these ethnic groups have similar languages. | \KP6.-15\ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sukuma and Nyamwezi are together the largest ethnic group in Tanzania, about 25-30 percent of the total population and are larger than Kikuyu in Kenya (see \TP8-2.-14\) | \TP8-1.-4\, \TP8-2.-2\ |
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chagga is not one ethnic group but consist of different ethnic tribes, such as the Rombo etc. | \TP8-1.-5\ |
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maasai includes 10 different tribes | \TP8-1.-6\ |
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Zaramo comprise three different tribes | \TP8-1.-9\ |
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pare counted as one ethnic group in the census is actually two distinct languages. Rufiji and Ndengereko are one group and Arusha and Maasai are one group | \TP8-2.-14\ |
| 2. Consequences of ethnic structure | | 2. Consequences of ethnic structure | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> If President comes from smaller ethnic group → decreased political relevance of ethnicity | \KP6.-23\ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> More than 130 ethnic groups in Tanzania but no tribalism | \TN1.-5\ |

Appendix B2: Thematic summary of extraction table colonialism

| Kenya | Source | Tanzania | Source |
|---|------------------------|---|----------------------|
| 1. General impact of colonialism | | 1. General impact of colonialism | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Colonialist increased ethnic tensions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> they did not want that ethnic groups unite against them they instrumented ethnicity for their purposes | \KN1.-6\ \KD5.-4\ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Colonialists were less interested in Tanzania, since there were no white farms → no need to hinder ethnic groups from uniting (see Kenya, \KN1.-6\) | \KN1.-6\ |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Low impact of colonialist on ethnicity: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Missionaries have been everywhere in country Even before colonialist there were ethnic clashes | \KN2.-13\ \KN7.-24\ | | |
| 2. Colonialist impact on education | | 2. Colonialist impact on education | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Schools were built in Highlands (best climate) and ethnic group there (Kikuyu) were first to attend school | \KN1.-2\ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Missionaries caused different education levels of ethnic groups | \TP3.-2\, \TP8-1.-2\ |

Appendix B3: Thematic summary of extraction table land distribution

| Kenya | Source | Tanzania | Source |
|---|-----------------------|----------------------------------|--------|
| 1. Colonial land policy | | 1. Colonial land policy | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Settlers in Highlands, because the area was cool and fertile | \KP6.-8\ | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maasai were removed from Riftvalley and placed in Lkipia | \KM3.-16\ | | |
| 2. Post-independence land policy | | 2. Post-independence land policy | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supported by Kenyatta, the Kikuyu settled in Riftvalley (former Kalenjin country) | \KD5.-13\ \KP6.-8\ | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Former pastoralist areas were transformed into national parks | \KM3.-17\ | | |
| 3. Consequences of land policies | | 3. Consequences of land policies | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Settlement of Kikuyu in traditional Kalenjin areas caused ethnic clashes after the election in 2007 | \KP6.-8\ | | |

Appendix B4: Thematic summary of extraction table nation building

| Kenya | Source | Tanzania | Source |
|---|-----------------------------|--|---|
| 1. General | | 1. General | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> no nation building policies in Kenya | \KD5.-25\ \KP6.-32\ \ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nyerere implemented political system and introduced socialism → Tanzania is united Tanzania focused on national unity → different role of ethnicity in Kenya and Tanzania | \KN7.-4\ \KP6.-17\ \TG4.-35\ \ |
| 2. Language policies | | 2. Language policies | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kenyatta used vernaculars to communicate | \KP6.-17\ \ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Germans implemented Swahili as a lingua franca | \KN1.-1\ \ |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> vernaculars are used at least until P4 as instruction language, but even used in higher grades because students and teachers come from the same district (see quota system) | \KN4.-12\ \ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Swahili as a national language and a national culture → adopting a foreign/colonial language, e.g. English, does not work to create a united culture and to build a nation | \TN1.-9\ \ |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Until late 1980s, Kiswahili was used and taught in primary schools but it was not a subject to be examined | \KN4.-14\ \ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Swahili: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mitigates relevance of ethnicity Language not an explanation for united country → counter-evidence from Zanzibar, where people speak one language but are not more united than the mainland | \TN1.-10\ \TP8-1.-13\ \ |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> vernaculars are allowed to be used in offices and in political campaigns | \KD5.-34\ \KN4.-15\ \ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> vernaculars not allowed to be spoken in offices, schools, or political campaigning | \TP2.-3\ \TP5.-17\ \ |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> preventing people to speak vernacular is not an option to de-ethnicize politics, since people would refuse this | \KN7.-15\ \ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> minimum requirement for candidates for MP was to be able to read and write in Swahili | \TP5.-18\ \ |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kiswahili and English are used in secondary schools | \KN4.-13\ \ | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kiswahili is easily learned by everyone, since it is a Bantu language | \KN7.-16\ \ | | |
| 3. Cross-ethnic interaction & quota system | | 3. Cross-ethnic interaction & quota system | |

| | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> System was introduced by Moi | \KN4.-4\ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nyerere's policy: students finishing primary school had to go to a secondary school in a different district → people employed in the education sector (ministers and teachers) come from various ethnic groups | \TP2.-2\, \TN1.-10\, \TP5.-15\, \TG6.-31\ |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> students must attend secondary school in their home district, only one quarter is allowed to go to a different district | \KN4.-7\, \KN4.-8\ | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> teachers were posted to their home region and not regions with different ethnic groups | \KN4.-10\ | | |
| 4. Other policies & facts | | 4. Other policies & facts | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ethnic identity/home region depicted in ID | \KN1.-21\, \KD5.-35\ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nyerere nationalized the schools to close the education gap between religious and certain ethnic groups | \TN1.-14\, \TP3.-4\ |
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nyerere abolished local chiefs → mitigate role of ethnicity | \TP5.-14\, \TP8-1.-1\ |
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Balancing Act" by the government → ministers come from different ethnic groups | \TP5.-26\ |
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> code of conduct → make sure that ethnicity will not become more important | \TG6.-5\ |
| 5. Future policies to de-ethnicize politics | | 5. Future policies to de-ethnicize politics | |
| a) education policies: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> educate the leaders/MPs include conflict studies in the school curriculum | \KM3.-57\, \KM3.-57\, \KN4.-34\ | | |
| b) Make people feel less disadvantaged/provide equal access to resources | \KN1.-17\, \KP6.-27\, \KN7.-14\ | | |
| c) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Let people live segregated Do common projects together and talk to each other | \KN4.-34\, \KN7.-17\ | | |
| d) Religion | \KP6.-22\ | | |