CENTRE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

UN photo by Stuart Price

The pervasiveness and absence of 'the political'? A consideration of the varied role of politics in peacebuilding

Jen Peterson

The role of politics in current modes of peacebuilding is complex and fraught with contradictory concerns. On one hand are critiques that the peacebuilding agenda has become 'politicized' and is primarily used as a tool to promote western foreign policy and ideological goals, an argument well substantiated by critics of the liberal peace. Related to the politicization critique are concerns regarding the impact of aid and peacebuilding programs on local politics—with a fear that programmes may actually be fuelling as opposed to extinguishing conflict. On the other side are those who argue that politics is in fact absent from peacebuilding, that there has been a 'depoliticization' of aid and reconstruction. In this sense, students of peacebuilding are presented with apparently contradictory arguments. This paper will argue that these arguments are in fact congruent. Concerns over the politicization of aid paradoxically co-exist with the concerns over the depoliticization of aid. In response, this paper calls for a re-engagement with politics, arguing that political differences, realities and antagonisms should be openly addressed and integrated into peacebuilding programs. Concerns over politicization should not lead to an abandonment of the political and a distinction needs to be made between the practice of being apolitical and of being neutral. An argument for political peacebuilding will be based on the premise that political engagement is not an absolute requirement and may take many forms. As such, this paper seeks to clarify what 'political engagement' might entail in different policies, for different actors and at different times in peacebuilding processes. In sum, engagement with 'the political' should not be feared by the aid industry, but rather should be seen as a means to promoting the negotiated and thus just forms of socio-political interaction needed to create long term, positive forms of peace.

Ignorance, fear and removal of 'the political': current modes of peacebuilding

While the definitions of peacebuilding are many and varied, it is useful to differentiate between those which lean more towards the promotion of a 'negative' peace and those which aim for the creation of a deeper and broader 'positive' peace (Galtung, 1969). The former is characterized by the basic pronunciations of the work to be completed by the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission whose mandate is to '"marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery' [through] reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development, in countries emerging from conflict" (UN, ND). This mode of peacebuilding focuses primarily on preventing the return to violent conflict, and addresses the destruction of physical infrastructure and formal institutions. Alternatively, definitions of peacebuilding can focus more on the socio-economic and informal impacts of conflict. Take for example the definition proposed by Abiew and Keating who view peacebuilding as a process of "transforming hostile and violent relationships into a peace system characterized by just and interdependent relationships... it addresses structural issues dividing parties, the social dynamics of building relationships, and the development of supportive structures and institutions" (1999/2000: 81-2). This latter definition is not simply concerned with the *re-*construction of societies but rather their *transformation*, recognizing that a return to the dynamics which caused the conflict is undesirable if not impossible. Conflict transformation, as opposed to conflict management or resolution, seeks to address the root causes of conflict which are often structural and relational. As such, peacebuilding defined as positive transformation, seeks to address the injustices and power imbalances that cause or result from conflict.

Conflict transformation, requires an engagement with the deep rooted range of social, economic and political issues from which the conflict stemmed. In order for a positive peace to be created, peacebuilding must address issues of injustice and power dynamics which initiated, sustained and resulted from conflict. However, peacebuilding in practice is often considered to neglect such issues, taking the form of apolitical, technocratic programming, more in tune with notions of rebuilding a negative peace. A range of reviews and assessments lament the depoliticized modes of peacebuilding currently utilized. For example, Schuurman argues that interventions have shifted from "politico-military to the techno-financial (2000: 17) as is evidenced by the primacy of economic goals such as growth and efficiency over political issues in post war environments (Bojicić-Dzelilović, 2002; De Zeeuw, 2001). David Chandler likewise warns of an assumption that "problems of politics can be resolved outside the realm of the political, in the realms of law, social policy and administration....[and a] growing consensus that international experts and bureaucrats can better govern a country than politicians" (2005: 311-314). Others support this assessment (Belloni, 2001; Devic, 2006; Donais, 2005; Pouligny, 2006; Pugh, 2005, Richmond, 2004), with some research concluding that the international community, are led by "'a-political' economic technicians who arrive in war-torn societies armed with mathematical and algebraic formulas for recovery" (Pugh, 2006: 270) who "pretend to help rebuild a society or even a 'civil society', while continually reducing this process to highly technical dimensions, depriving it of all political substance" (Pouligny, 2005: 505).

In sum, depoliticized peacebuilding can be defined as attempts to transform conflict affected societies without integrating political context or engaging in the political sphere and its inherent antagonisms. For example, at the local level, projects are implemented *as if there were peace* despite ongoing political

and security issues. Wider, geo-political disputes (for example the determination of statehood) may also be left unresolved, again, with programming being implemented regardless. This entails conceiving of peacebuilding as if it occurred in a sanitized environment, free from any power imbalances or potentially debilitating disagreements between actors. Accompanying this is an assumption that politics is only a problem as opposed to a potential mechanism for change and that solutions to society's problems are found in the technical processes of 'good governance' and 'regulation'.

The charge of depoliticized peacebuilding might be refuted by the international community's emphasis on building or strengthening civil society. In theory, civil society programs are a means through which one can increase local capacity to hold the state accountable and empower disadvantaged sectors of society. However, evidence suggests that even civil society programming, while rhetorically supported by the international community to facilitate local engagement with 'the political', has likewise been stripped of political substance. Many civil society projects, while heralded for being examples of the integration of local knowledge and skills, do little to address the fundamental inequalities and political schisms which are central to conflict dynamics. Like other elements of the peacebuilding agenda, civil society has been depoliticized, often taking the form of highly formalized institutions with narrow, technical mandates (Belloni, 2001; Orjuela, 2003). Even whilst making the claim of engagement with the political, there is a watering down of politics—treating the political as 'governance' or 'service provision' as opposed to an arena for dispute and struggle. This is in part due to the fact that their mandates are largely based on international aims and desires, and that only those civil society groups who possess the skills and values of international actors flourish (Jeffrey, 2007). As such, its role in transforming or even managing deep rooted

political and structural problems has been minimal (Devic, 2006: 257).

The reasons for such depoliticization are varied, but also interconnected. At a very pragmatic level, many institutions lack the capacity or resources to fully research, analyze or integrate political realities and antagonisms into their programming (Schlomes, 2003). For example, Devic notes that part of the answer to the question of why internationally funded civil society projects in Kosovo have had limited success in terms of helping transform ethno-political relationships in the territory is the "incomplete analysis and knowledge on the part of Western aid organizations of the local civil society in Kosovo before 1999.... [who] operated in the context of enforced ethnic apartheid and a growing no-dissent-considered consensus about the goal of Kosovo independence" (2006: 258-160). The ability of Kosovo's civil society to bridge or transform relationships between Albanian, Serbs and other ethnic minorities has been inhibited by the history of Kosovo's civil society *vis a vis* politics. An inability to have a functional relationship with the Serbian government since the 1990s due to political pressures *from both Albanian and Serbian actors*, has hindered the capacity of Kosovo's civil society actors to perform the transformative functions assigned to it by the international community. It was assumed that civil society groups in Kosovo could easily alter their abilities to further the goal of a multi-ethnic state as envisioned by the international community. A more effective analysis of this reality may have forced the international community to alter its strategy regarding ethnic reconciliation and refugee/IDP returns.

This does not represent a purposeful *ignorance* of politics, but rather an issue of not having the tools to undertake the research and analysis that would allow for political engagement. Time constraints, due to having to respond to an immediate crisis or because of short term contracts, limits the ability of staff and institutions to gather and analyse the complex political situation with which they are faced. This problem may be augmented by a lack of capacity in term of the knowledge of staff, or the financial resources available that would permit organizations to have a dedicated staff members researching and analyzing 'the political'—finite financial resources privilege the hiring of staff engaged in more 'hands on' or practical work. In an increasingly privatized aid industry based on contracts, economic efficiency and tangible results, the ability for organizations to build up the requisite capacity for political engagement is limited.

Beyond the above issues of practicality, there remain more abstract explanations for the apparent depoliticization of responses to insecurity. Primarily, this concern relates to a *fear* of politics by aid and development workers generally, and more acutely, by humanitarian actors. For the latter of these groups, engaging with the political in the context of any humanitarian missions, threatens the very foundations of their mandates. A fear of losing neutrality and independence is seen as threatening their ability to deliver aid and services across zones of crisis (see for further discussion Barnett, 2001; Stoddard and Harmer, 2006; Tan-Mullins, Rigg, Law and Grundy War, 2007). Concerns that aid workers themselves may become targets also flows from this concern over neutrality. This is accompanied by a more generalized fear that political engagement is synonymous with aid (development or humanitarian) being used as a political tool to further the narrow interests of governments and institutions (Abiew and Keating, 1999/2000; Atmar and Goodhand, 2002; Aall, 2000; Yannis, 2004). For example, increased political engagement by the UNHCR was an unwelcomed development in some quarters given the possibility that it was supporting a policy of 'containment' as opposed to promoting refugee rights (Barnett, 2001). External actors are also keen to avoid accusation of 'neo-colonial behaviour and attitudes' which might

stem from attempting to intervene in local politics. Given that international actors are often criticized for imposing what are seen as 'western models' (Ramsbotham, 2000), or for engaging in ethically questionable forms of 'social engineering' (Schwarz, 2005; Ramsbotham, 2000), a distancing from the political is perhaps understandable—avoiding 'the political' and engaging in technocratic projects, shelters actors from such accusations.   An avoidance or fear of the political also stems from concerns by organizations over becoming part of the conflict dynamic.   The mantra of 'Do No Harm' (Anderson,1999), rings loudly in the minds of many actors, following the attention given to the role of aid in fuelling many violent conflicts. With engaging with 'the political' becoming too closely associated with a loss of independence and neutrality, accusations of neo-colonialism, political bias and the possibility of fuelling as opposed to diminishing conflict, the logic of political disengagement and a policy of technocratic programming becomes easier to comprehend.

The trend of ignoring and fearing the political are furthered, and welcomed by the overarching ideological foundation of current modes of peacebuilding. An explanation as to why there has not been greater effort to deal systematically with the limited capacity of organizations to engage politically or to address the fear of the political which has developed can be found in the liberal paradigm which dominates peacebuilding theory and practice[i]. Liberalism, although a political project, paradoxically achieves its aims through an active depoliticisation of social and economic life. As a hegemonic discourse *and* process, the 'liberal peace' can be likened to other great powers. Chandler notes how historically, powerful actors are prone to "bypass the political sphere" (2005: 309). Quoting Huntington, Chandler reflects on attempts by modern peacebuilders to depoliticize their mission by looking at historical patterns:

Inevitably a ruling monarch tends to view political parties as divisive forces which either challenge his authority or greatly complicate his efforts to unify and modernize his country. . . The modernizing monarch necessarily sees himself as the 'Patriot King' who is 'to espouse no party, but to govern like the common father of his people' (2005: 309, quoting Huntington, 1968)

In the modern era, liberal peacebuilders can be equated with the monarchs of the past, who see alternative modes of politics and antagonisms as disruptive and threatening to their political aims.   Positioning itself as a modern day 'common fathers of the people' through the pacifying rhetoric of universal human rights, rule of law and global civil society *cum* cosmopolitanism, liberal peacebuilding masks is broader intentions— in this case the expansion of liberal modes of economic and political governance—the spread of global capitalism and the institutions which are required for its functioning.   Dominating the international peace missions since the end of the Cold War, liberal peacebuilding seeks to remove mechanism which would allow others to question the status quo and the logic of liberalism—these mechanisms constitute and can be defined as 'the political'. Liberal peacebuilding and liberalism in general, "depends on evacuating the dimension of the political and conceiving the well ordered society as exempt from politics....All controversial issues are taken off the agenda in order to create the conditions for a 'rational' consensus" (Mouffe, 1993: 139-140). Those who attempt to reinject the political by questioning the status quo are punished— "Actors which fail to accept [the liberal peacebuilding consensus] become economically and politically excluded" (Richmond, 2004: 144).   Thus, it is not accidental that organizations lack the capacity to integrate politics, or have grown to fear and evade politics. Actors who engage in peacebuilding operate in a system in which questioning the status quo and the

ideological foundations on which it exists is neither encouraged nor tolerated. Opening up channels of political debate or creating mechanisms which would increase the scope for alternative or perhaps antagonistic ideals leads to exclusion from the current peacebuilding agenda. Allowing for alternative political realities to inform peacebuilding would threaten the stability of the liberal institutionalism which has grown in strength throughout the 1990s and early 20th century and is quickly becoming entrenched as the only legitimate system.

The implications of depoliticized peacebuilding

Understanding the reasons for the depoliticisation of peacebuilding, the question becomes one of the implications. If, as liberalism suggests, the current liberal peacebuilding agenda is the surest way to prevent violence, suffering and injustice, is an apolitical/technocratic approach not a welcome development? Perhaps yes, but the liberal model as presented in its current mode represents not only a false utopia, but also a narrow understanding of peace, and a fundamentally flawed conception of how 'zones of peace' have been and thus can be created. Notions of a liberal peace present neo-liberal modes of economic and political governance as a pacifying force—if all nations and peoples were to adopt these institutions and processes, violent conflict and its concomitant ills could be eradicated. Such a utopian vision (falsely) assumes that a clear line can be drawn between liberal institutions or processes and the causes of violent conflict. This position suggests that neither global capital, nor the political institutions and interests on which it rests have contributed to the outbreak of violent conflict. Only internal causes of conflict are considered, with external causes overlooked. Such an analysis wrongly portrays third parties as neutral interveners, peacebuilders (Ramsbotham, 2000) and masks the need to reform the global economic and political

practices that also contribute to localized conflict (Pugh, 2006).

Further, while ignoring wider structural drivers of conflict that need to be resolved in order to bring peace, the current liberal mode of peacebuilding may also be increasing levels of conflict and violence. Again, there is an assumption that creating or consolidating liberal institutions and mechanisms to war affected societies will have an automatic pacifying effect. Empirical evidence counters this supposition, with studies revealing how the benefits of peacebuilding are often 'captured'—creating new opportunities for power and wealth, or entrenching and consolidating dysfunctional relationships and thereby fuelling rather than eliminating conflict. This appears especially salient in regards to democratic elections which are often more divisive than pacifying, creating new arenas for conflict and institutionalizing violent and dysfunctional political relationships (Aitken, 2007; Belloni, 2001; Pugh and Cobble, 2001;Keating and Abiew, 1999/2000; Suhrke, Harpviken and Strand, 2002; Wimmer and Schetter, 2003; Wolpe and McDonald, 2008). Furthermore, as it is often the more violent and powerful groups which benefit (as internationals attempt to bring potential spoilers into the peace process) the non-powerful are ignored, confirming the rationality of and institutionalizing the use of violence (Turton 1997).

The liberal peace model also offers a very narrow version of peace. Stability, or an absence of war is the general benchmark and the individual and a focus on their finite needs and incentives is privileged over other motivations for peace and action and is given greater credence than notions of either altruism or the public good (Pugh, 2006). Atomizing peace in such a way is indicative of a rational choice approach to conflict and peace which fails to address the need for "structural and relational change" (Cramer, 2002: 1850). Such structural and relational change can only occur if the key, underlying causes of the conflict are understood and

integrated, a task which is rarely completed, leading to the failure of many peace mission (Paris, 2002). What is needed is a reformation or transformation of a social contract (Schwarz, 2005), not only between official state structures and citizens but between all groups and factions within society—a task that can not be achieved by a liberal approach based on methodological individualism and a neglect of the collective economic and political factors.

Finally, the current model of liberal peacebuilding, presents a flawed and ahistoric view regarding how 'zones of peace' have been created. While it is true that liberal democracies do not fight violent wars against each other and are much less likely to suffer from violent civil wars, this should not be equated to a causal relationship between liberal institutions and peace. Current peace in the regions of western Europe and north America were not 'won' via a series of technocratic externally funded projects, but through fraught and difficult political processes. The so called 'bastions' of liberal peace, the majority of the permanent members of the security council and nearly all of the G8 nations, have undergone intense (and often violent) periods of political deliberation which divided (and in some cases still do) society, created new lines of fragmentation and identity, and often opened up old wounds in an attempt to create a more peaceful future.[ii] Herein lies the most fundamental problem with an evasion of the political—it ignores the "constitutive role of antagonism in social life... This belief is fraught with danger, since it leaves us unprepared in the face of unrecognized manifestations of antagonism" (Mouffe, 1993: 2). Arguing this point further, Mouffe argues that to "negate the political does not make it disappear, it only leads to bewilderment in the face of its manifestations and to impotence in dealing with them" (Mouffe, 1993: 140). Efforts to remove politics and the tensions or disputes with which it is associated are problematic, not only because politics can not simply be wished away and will continue to

affect policies and programs, but also because in doing so, the ability to manage or contain political conflict is diminished. In environments sanitized from the political, the inevitable tensions and disputes that arise appear more unfamiliar and society will lack the tools to internalize and manage them more effectively.

Re-inserting 'the political': creating space for context, antagonism and power

Phrases such as 'political' or 'politicisation' need not be used pejoratively. Where politicisation can become problematic is when narrow political-economic interests, international or local, override the goals of conflict resolution and achieving a positive peace. Actors need to consider the fundamental difference between being used as a *political tool* and being *politically aware and engaged*. The political can be used constructively as a way of creating stable and just peace:

> a political focus for peace-building does not mean that the international community should promote or even prescribe certain political institutions. Instead it should try and identify 'those relationships, processes, mechanisms and institutions that hold the greatest promise for ongoing conflict resolution, which may not always look like those in Western states' (adapted from Cousens and Kumar, as quoted in de Zeeuw, 2001:17).

Accepting the politics of peacebuilding requires actors to be more aware of the power relations which led to conflict, sustained the war, and which continue to effect post conflict power arrangements. Without denying the reality that individuals and groups do formulate decisions based on potential risks and payoffs, choices are also shaped and constrained by surrounding forces such as history, politics and socio-

cultural dynamics. Policies and programmes should be designed and implemented with the knowledge that both narrow individualistic politics, and broader collective politics shape the growth of conflict and therefore can also shape the growth of peace.

Peacebuilding that engages with the political would entail two concomitant processes. First, it would find ways and channels for effectively integrating political realities (as they *are* and not as the international community would *want them to be*). For example, a political approach to peacebuilding would require "An openness to different models of modern statehood and a readiness for tolerance with respect, for example, to a different public role for religion" (Wimmer and Schetter, 2003: 537). Ultimately, peacebuilding projects need to be designed and embedded in politics realities from the local to the international levels. This entails a consideration of "local social networks, historical legitimacy, cultural coherence and economic reciprocity" (Tan-Mullins, Rigg, Law and Grundy-Warr, 2007: 342). Second, it would require actors to work towards creating the political space[iii] and supporting mechanisms which would allow political issues and disputes to be aired effectively and peacefully. Political struggle and difference is inevitable and needs to be confronted, not masked. As mentioned above, this might entail the creation of space and modes of interaction that do not necessarily mirror the formal institutions with which peacebuilders are most comfortable. It would require flexibility in regards to alternative modes of the political which may challenge the status quo. In this sense it is worth considering that in terms of creating structures which support peace, the solution is to be found in part by "negotiating greater space for counter-hegemonic politics" (Pugh and Cobble, 2001: 43). Ultimately, a re-insertion of the political entails the acceptance and integration of the political towards the aim of engaging with the dominant or dysfunctional political structures

that lead to violence—both physical and structural.

Both of these changes would require an acceptance of alternative conceptions of power and politics, which when viewed as 'negative' sees political activity and the power dynamics associated with it as destructive (Schwebel, 2006). Instead, power and politics can be viewed as positive and transformative mechanisms. Creating the space for these mechanisms should not equated with building civil society or other such tangible 'projects'—these are two different processes. A new politicized mode of peacebuilding is fundamentally about understanding and facilitating non-violent interaction and debate between actors, even when such interaction entails competing and antagonistic views and voices. Given an alternative view of politics, which sees the political as something to be neither ignored, feared or actively removed, but rather as a realm and set of processes to be integrated and actively expanded, what are the opportunities for policy alternatives? Arguably, the opportunity for the effective re-insertion of politics into peacebuilding can be considered by examining specific policies, the potential role for different actors, and the variable times in the peacebuilding process in which political engagement may be possible and desirable. An introduction to role of the political in these three areas is considered below, using both case studies from other published works, and the authors own experiences while researching post conflict reform in Kosovo.

Policies: Identifying different approaches to politics
Political engagement and transformation does not occur spontaneously, but rather through planned and constructed actions-- "Deliberation occurs not in the abstract, but rather over specific public policies" (Barnett, 2006: 100). The opportunity for creating political space for peacebuilding rests not only in distinctly political processes such as elections—but also in the policies and

projects which impact the lives of citizens more immediate including public finance, security sector reform and judicial reform. Understanding the role that the political does or does not play in peacebuilding processes is the first step to promoting a more politically integrated and engaged process.

The interaction between formal institutions and peacebuilding policies and informal structures and politics can be understood from various points of view, one of which is an assessment of the role of politics, both formal and informal, in the creation and implementation of specific peacebuilding projects. As noted, the practice of peacebuilding has become apolitical with political context often being ignored or evaded and political engagement, which would challenge the status quo a rarity. In general four types of policies can be identified. First, *policy paralysis*, represents instances where actors fail to act, due to what are seen as political obstacles. For example, the international administration in Kosovo failed to create ministries of justice of ministries of the interior until 2006 as these were seen as treading too overtly on Serbia's sovereignty, this has created short, medium and long term problems in terms of the legitimacy and thus efficacy of many rule of law reforms (Peterson, 2009). Second, *policies of denial* can be observed when policies are put in place despite obvious political obstacles. Ironically, the creation of UNMIK customs and the privatization of Kosovo's Socially Owned Enterprises were quickly and rather abruptly instigated despite fairly strong and prevalent views that this infringed on Serbia's sovereignty—the economic nature of these reforms may explain the willingness of the international community to push through these reforms. In these cases , the political is ignored meaning that policies are potentially considered illegitimate by key actors, and could increase levels of conflict and violence as they fail to take into account the impact of peacebuilding projects on conflict dynamics and *vice* versa. Alternatively, *policies of functionality* describe

cases where actors recognize the politics involved in a project and manoeuvre through the political hurdles, with acceptance, but without integration or engagement. In Kosovo, the ability of the UN's Customs Service (UCS) to coordinate with regional counterparts, including Serbia, despite political minefields in order to achieve limited ends acts as an example of this type of policy. The political issues that affect the work of the UCS are not directly challenged, however, are integrated to a minimal degree in order to allow basic, technical work to move ahead. Finally, one can identify *policies of engagement*, which are the types of policies which refute the depoliticisation hypothesis and actually integrate and engage with political realities which the aim of engaging in conflict transforming post conflict societies. Pilot projects on 'community based approaches to organized crime' and attempts to alter citizens views on smuggled or illicit goods (instead of top down enforcement mechanism) offer interesting case studies of policies of engagement.

It is in this latter form of policy that this paper sees the solution to apolitical peacebuilding and the problems with which it is associated. Context is integrated and discussion of alternatives is encouraged and prevalent. When creating or implementing policies, actors may want to consider under which heading their project currently operates and if there may be an opportunity for altering the project in such a way that it falls under a more ideal heading. In order for a policy to move towards the more ideal category of *engagement*, actors should consider the degree to which the policy includes the concerns of or addresses the needs of 'outgroups'—be they regional, ethnic, national or even economic (Aitken, 2007)— how might the dominant groups be encouraged to open up space to these groups and allow for counter-hegemonic discourses to be heard (ibid)? Actors could consider which processes or hurdles are preventing a move towards integration and engagement and how such blockages could

be removed or overcome. Identifying the weaknesses of paralysis, denial, and functionality could be used to convince other actors of the need for actors to overcome the ignorance, fear or removal of the political. Understanding whose interests the three less desirable forms of policies serve could also provide the ethical legitimization for engaging in the political.

Actors: Identifying the potential role of various actors for political engagement

With the acceptance that dichotomies are dangerous in their oversimplification of issues, the dramatic asymmetries of power and wealth make the distinction between international and local actors a useful starting point in terms of identifying the role that various institutions and groups could play in promoting and creating a more political form of peacebuilding. Beginning with local actors, one can further differentiate between the formal and the informal. Peacebuilding programming has tended to focus on the formal institutions often overlooking the abilities and power of informal structures and groups within society (Hemmer, Garb, Phillips and Graham, 2006; Pouligny, 2005). The aforementioned focus and reliance on formal civil society groups must be reconsidered as "the often undemocratic nature of such organizations, ultimately means that a western understanding of civil society often excludes more traditional elements of society" (Schwarz, 2005: 442). The promotion of formal civil society organization, modelled after western visions of what this sector should look like can be dangerous, increasing political tension as opposed to acting as a valve for peaceful political deliberation. For example, Wimmer and Schetter (2003), note how the promotion of civil society in Afghanistan is problematic, as the policies and discourses which surround it evoke memories of communist era projects and the power of a small well educated urban elite over the entire country. As such, peacebuilding should focus on the engaging with or integrating both formal and informal local actors. Given that it is often the informal

structures within society that become most functional during times of conflict and often into the post conflict phase (Pouligny, 2005), effective peacebuilding would address the space occupied by both sets of local actors, attempt to understand the dynamic between them, and seek out ways to consider how the role of each independently and the interaction amongst them can add to the spaces and mechanisms through which transformation can occur. Failure to address the importance of many informal or 'parallel' structures, in Kosovo, including the ongoing importance of families and clans, as well as less 'accepted' structures such as organized crime networks, informal economic relationships and ongoing parallel Serbian security and judicial structures have led to ongoing and in some cases increased tensions between all actors—the internationals, as well as Serbian and Albanian actors have seen their efforts hampered by poor integration or acceptance of the informal.

'Formal' local actors also have a role to play in the integration and engagement of politics. Although the limitations of formal, externally driven civil society projects have already been highlighted, formal actors can still prove to be a bridge or a facilitator of creating dialogue with other actors (including the informal) and promoting action. However, there remains a problem regarding which formal actors are granted legitimacy by the international community For example, the pro-independence group in Kosovo, Vetenvenjodjse employs neither a discourse nor practice favoured by the international administration in Kosovo, leaving many to label them a 'security threat'. Such acts of delegitimization are problematic for reasons already argued, but also illustrate the need to widen and reconsider our definitions of formal, informal, legitimate and illegitimate. A group such as Vetenvenjodjse, while problematic on some fronts, also represents not only an alternative voice that needs to made in order for the peace process to progress, but also acts as an example for how other groups might form, organize and

contribute to a counter-hegemonic argument. Even those who disagree with the final aim of Vetenvenjodjse, need to recognize the need and desirability for the existence of such groups, as they counter the problem raised earlier by Mouffe—that an absence of political antagonisms leaves society ill prepared for dealing with the eruption of more destructive forms of political dissent and violence. In other words, if conflict affected countries are not allowed to build up systems to engage with and integrate the voices of counter-hegemonic views, they will not progress and gains towards peace could actually be reversed as the mechanisms for dealing with inevitable dissent disappear.

Having considered the variable role and interaction of formal and informal local groups might and should play in peacebuilding processes, the question of whether there is a role for external, international actors in peacebuilding arises. Should local actors be left alone to create local solutions for local problems? One view regarding the role of internationals is quite minimalist: "Peacebuilding and reconciliation must be viewed increasingly as internal matters in which the primary role of outside agents should be directed, first and foremost, at not impeding local activities and towards supporting processes and institutions that emerge within societies" (Abiew and Keating, 1999/2000: 105-106). There are both practical and ethical arguments which would mitigate against such a view. Given the already mentioned fact that external forces and actors also contribute to 'localized' violence, disengagement would be problematic if not unethical. That the ongoing conflict between Kosovo and Serbia is partly a function of the decision of NATO to intervene in the territory and the way in which the UN and the EU have administered the area for the past nine years, it is clear that external actors have both the right and the responsibility to address the political side of peacebuilding. Any external actions which are creating hurdles to positive transformation may be a legitimate forum for international

actors to challenge. For example, it would be both effective and legitimate for a group such as Transparency International to question the international justice mission in the territory. Even in regards to barriers to peace that exist largely within the local realm, or are caused by local power imbalances, international actors may still have a role to play. A call for greater inclusion of local actors and knowledge should not be taken to imply that local actors can or should "pull themselves up by their own bootstraps" (Enberg-Pedersen and Webster, 2002a: 4). Given that many actors will find themselves bound to varied degrees by external forces and circumstance, external actors should not simply disengage. Fears of neo-colonialism should not be met with policies of isolation. Not only is it sometimes the responsibility of international actors to address and engage in political peacebuilding, but often, these actors may be better placed to create the space for or engage in political peacebuilding on the behalf of local actors.

These situations may arise when local actors are unable to act in an overtly political manner. For several reasons, local actors may not be in a position to take part in the type of counter-hegemonic process which this paper has been encouraging. For example, as Orjuela notes in her study of Sri Lanka, "Fear and violence in war zones discourage the taking up of leadership roles in civic organizations [and]....showing support for peace can have dangerous consequences (2003: 199-200)— Similar assessments have been made in relation to political engagement between conflicting sides in Cyprus (Broome, 2004) and between citizens and the state in Tajikistan, where citizens and NGOs maintain a purposeful aversion to the political (Heathershaw, 2007). In Kosovo, one assessment regarding reasons why local NGOs have been reluctant to put too much pressure on political elites is that there exist "fears of appearing too political and too positive towards ethnic minorities, which may be read as jeopardizing the struggle for Kosovo independence [and] fears about

openly siding with one or another political party" (Devic, 200: 262). Groups in Kosovo may also be concerned about political reprisals or even a violent backlash from more 'militant' groups in the territory (Devic, 2006). In these cases, international actors may find themselves in a more opportune position to engage in political peacebuilding. While strong, outright and long term control by international actors, similar to what has been used in Kosovo and Bosnia, is neither sustainable nor desirable, international assistance can play a positive role in terms of increasing the ability to integrate politics and even for creating space for political engagement.

Internationals could also alter their funding apparatus to support the types of research that would be needed in order for more contextually appropriate programming to occur. They can facilitate arrange meetings and provide assistance with logistics and the technology needed to run such projects (Broome, 2004). The task of creating space for political peacebuilding and engagement could be furthered by internationals who are often in stronger positions to challenge global power structures and imbalances. Internationals could lend prestige and thus legitimacy for groups struggling to have their voice hears, and apply political pressure in situations where local groups are unable or unwilling do so (Hemmer, Garb, Phillips and Graham, 2006: 132). Local politics and power relationships can be constricting and destructive—the local does not equate to 'good'. Thus, there is still a role to play for internationals in identifying and acting upon local or 'foreign' politics. What needs to be recognized, however, is the difference between attempting to control or obliterate these forms of politics and creating a space in which these political antagonisms can be worked out peacefully. In sum, internationals can facilitate the more technical goals of helping groups integrate context, but can also be key facilitators in creating the requisite space for counter hegemonic voices.

This being said, it must also be recognized that not all actors should become politically engaged (Hemmer, Garb, Phillips and Graham, 2006: 150). While an understanding and integration of political context into peacebuilding programming could be universal, there are times and instances where political engagement is neither an option nor desirable and could in fact lead to increased conflict. The danger of local actors being involved in the political has already been discussed, and likewise, there are international actors who while accepting political context, will not be in a position to, nor be effective in political engagement. For example, there still remains a need for impartial and neutral dispersal of aid in times of crisis. Not all aid can support peace, and in order to organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to fulfill their mandate and provide aid to all those suffering the effects of conflict, political engagement is not an option. Still, actors should not hide behind a shield of impartiality and neutrality unless both necessary and achievable. Impartial mandates are often fulfilled through partial techniques, which undermines the operation as a whole—claiming to be impartial in theory when practice isn't is particularly self destructive and can increase political tension rather than prevent or resolve such issues (Boulden, 2005: 156-7). Claiming to act impartially or neutrally when one can not only threatens one's own mandate, as the legitimacy of one's actions are called into question but also threatens those who do indeed depend on and act according to policies of neutrality.

Timing and sequencing: Identifying turning points for changes in strategy
The ability of different actors to engage in the political may change over the course of a peacebuilding mission. Several issues regarding politics in peacebuilding may be time sensitive and thus peacebuilders must consider at what phases integrating political context or attempting to create new political spaces and counter-hegemonic projects

might be most appropriate. For example, as noted earlier, it is often former belligerents which benefit from the peace missions. This is often seen as a necessity by peacebuilders in order to bring potential spoilers into the process. Allowing this form of 'capture' at the beginning of the mission may be necessary, however, as the situation stabilizes actors should seek out moments whereby this status quo can be negotiated—at what moments can actors take the risk that former belligerents may attempt to disrupt the peace process, in order to allow counter-arguments or more moderate actors to gain prominence in the political arena? Likewise, at what points will it be safe for peacebuilders to deny outright the disruptive or dysfunctional power held by dominant groups?

While the sequencing of alternative strategies for dealing with the dominance of certain groups in post conflict periods will be dependent on the political context of each conflict zone[iv], an example from Kosovo is illustrative of how over time, the opportunity to engage in more politically transformative activity becomes possible. The demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was, and remains one of the most problematic elements of the international mission in Kosovo. On one side, the majority of Kosovo-Albanians viewed the KLA as war heroes, who had helped liberate the territory from Serbia. Alternatively, the majority of Kosovo's Serbian population, along with some governments in the region, saw the KLA as illegitimate armed insurgents who had committed many atrocities against civilians. Internationals were under pressure by sectors of the Albanian population to transform the KLA into Kosovo's new army, while other actors were keen to have the KLA completely demobilized. This issue has been made worse by accusations that some within the transformed KLA, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), have connections to organized crime, and were involved in the armed uprising against Macedonia in 2001. Tracing the international response to the KLA thus far, one can recognize changes in

international strategy that have arguably allowed for more transformative strategies to be adopted as political context has mutated. At the beginning of the mission, one could argue that internationals adopted a strategy of acceptance—making allowances for the KLA to 'capture' many benefits of the DDR process; the KPC was initially made up almost entirely from members of the KLA. Furthermore, in order to appease the higher ranks of the former KLA the new KPC was artificially 'top heavy' meaning an unrealistically high number of upper ranks were created in order to keep former commanders in well paid and prestigious positions. This status quo remained, until 2001 when one can see the local and external political environment changing. At this point, the international actors involved in the managing of the KPC identified opportunities that allowed them to both *negotiate* and *deny* the outright control of the KPC by a small section of the Albanian population. Since 2001 the KPC has come to be less dominated by the former KLA, with the organization recognizing the need to accept both non-KLA affiliated Albanians and minority groups into its ranks. By 2006 all new hires for the KPC were reserved for Serbs and other minorities. It was in 2001 as well that one can identify a strategy of denial, in which the international administrators in Kosovo fired five senior staff from the KPC for their connection with the 2001 uprising in Macedonia.

Such a bold move would have been politically untenable in the immediate post conflict era, however, by 2001 changes in both the internal and external political environments allowed for changes in strategy. The creation of the Provisional Institutions of Self Governance (PISG), created a power sharing agreement between Kosovo's predominant, competing political actors, appeasing many Albanian actors by ensuring that there would be no 'winner takes all' post-conflict power arrangement. Again, the 2001 uprising in Macedonia likely embolden the international community to take a stronger position against

certain actors, as the prospect that their policies of acceptance were allowing for regional instability was realized. In relation to this, Albanians likely recognized that any contribution they made to other episodes of violence in the region would reverse the support they had gained from the international community for their goal of independence. Fear of a loss of international support likely lessened the degree to which they would want to shield their 'war heroes'. This trend continued with time, and was deepened after the March 2004 riots. The rapid descent into violence across the territory not only surprised the international community, but also shocked many of Kosovo's citizens, and again weakened support for 'hardliners' who might be putting the goal of independence at risk. In terms of the external context, the beginning of high profile prosecutions of former KLA members at the ICTY (including the indictment of the former prime minister Ramush Haradinaj), likely aided in diminishing international concerns that the KPC is little more than the KLA by another name. As a signal that the international administrators are not allowing the Kosovo to be ruled by 'war criminals', more room to manoeuvre has been created, again altering the environment in which strategies are chosen. While imperfect and flawed, and clearly an example of the international administration's eventual preference for Kosovan independence over a negotiated solution with Serbia, changes in both the make up and governance of the KPC illustrate that the nature of an engagement with the political changes along key policy moment during the post conflict phase. What this points to is the possibility that careful and timely analysis of changes in the local, national, regional and international political environments can allow actors to alter their strategy and adopt more transformative approaches.

Political peacebuilding will not always be possible or desirable. From a pragmatic point of view, the in depth analysis needed to fully and appropriately integrate politics and work towards transformative political engagement will be impossible in the immediate short term crisis response phase. Although arguing strongly for increasing the role of public deliberation in peacebuilding processes, Barnett is forced to resign to the fact that "it may be best to remove some issues from public discussion, especially early in a post conflict process. For instance, trying to settle deeply personal issues in divided societies, including the role of religion in public life, might very well derail any reconciliation or reconstruction process" (2006: 101). However, as Pantuliano notes, "while rapid external aid delivery remains essential in the event of a major crisis, there is definitely room to test new models in environments where such emergencies have become chronic and where there are political questions that need to be resolved in order to move things forward" (2005: S65). And while some are resistant to the conception of 'sequencing' believing that it could further push the need for political integration to the background (Chandler, 2005), in practice, short term, strict apolitical controls may be necessary to create a negative peace—but these short term strategies should be seen as 'holding' policies and a move towards transformative processes should be sought.

What the above review of the varied role of the political across policies, actors and time illustrates is that the call to political peacebuilding should not be seen as an absolute. Different policies will require a different form or degree of political activity than others—for example, the dangers related to a politicized police force will require a differential integration with the political than programs which aim to develop a country's media. Likewise, not all actors will be able to or will desire to engage in the political. In fact, for local groups or individuals, such engagement could put them at risk for persecution. The issue of sequencing adds another layer of complexity, as in some cases, addressing the status quo directly in the short term may inhibit long term peacebuilding prospects. Nonetheless,

despite a discussion of the problems associated with integrating and engaging with the political, opportunities can and do present themselves. While the underlying premise of liberal peacebuilding strongly mitigates against politicized peacebuilding, the movement towards such policies continues as an ideal to which actors can and do work.

The inevitability and desirability of politics: identifying possibilities for transformation

The need to reverse the trend of depoliticizing peacebuilding is necessary, as despite either a lack of awareness, fear or removal of the 'the political', it remains an inevitable part of human and institutional relationships. Political realities, antagonisms and thus systems will continuously evolve and an ideal equilibrium is an illusion. The negative impacts of disequilibrium can be mitigated against, but never extinguished. The absence of politics, whether accidental or intentional, threatens not only finite peacebuilding projects by ignoring context, but also overall progress in transforming damaged relationships by alienating individuals and groups from channels and mechanisms of power. Not only does this lead to greater discontent in the short term, but in the long term leaves society ill prepared for confronting violent or unfamiliar forms of the political. Accepting the inevitability of politics, however, remains as only a preliminary phase of political peacebuilding: "Once we accept the necessity of the political and the impossibility of a world without antagonism, what needs to be envisioned is how it is possible *under those conditions* to maintain a pluralistic democratic order" (Mouffe, 1993: 4 emphasis original). This paper has presented a discussion about how a pluralistic and non-violent order can be worked towards given the reality of inherent and enduring political difference.

Here it is useful to consider Fetherston's integration of Foucault:

Foucault's analysis of micro-power opens spaces for transformative activity... Resistance is not formulated, in Foucault's mind, as an inconceivable process of organizing against - and overthrowing, all at once - state power. It is rather understood as diverse, dispersed multiple forms of activity which can change relations of power at their locality (2000: 200).

Small changes, conceived of and implemented by various actors, across a variety of reform processes and at various points in time make the notion of a 'counter hegemonic process' appear less abstract, and while still promoting radical change in the long term represent action that can be taken without posing direct threats institutions and individuals in places of power. It is a way of engaging with the hegemon as opposed to polarizing groups against it. These small changes, over time will accumulate, allowing for conflict transformation and the continued integration of political difference through non-violent mechanisms. But even recognizing that opportunities for political integration and engagement are varied and reliant of the type of program, nature of the actor and the timing of the policy is not enough to complete the goal of political peacebuilding. More research is needed to help actors identify the policy moments that will help them manoeuvre the political effectively. In which ways, by whom and at what points is it desirable and plausible to be political? In depth research in conflict affected areas points to informative examples of where we might begin to answer the question of where positive micro power can create and make use of political space to counter the reigning apolitical status quo. For example, Pugh and Cobble's research on voting patterns in Bosnia revealed "pockets of resistance...where non-nationalist manifestations could exist" (2001: 42). In these cases, local populations countered the trends that saw the new democratic system consolidating and legitimizing ethnic

divisions, creating space for alternative political voices and actions to emerge. Likewise, the example of the NMPACT project in Sudan, reveals how in depth research and analysis of the local food economy allowed organizations to identify "points of entry" (Pantauliano, 2005: S61), allowing for a more successful response in terms of aid work in the Nuba mountains. Importantly, at the time this project was implemented, it was the only endeavour to which both parties to the conflict subscribed (ibid). Success in Guatemala via the PROPAZ program has also been attributed to sound conflict analysis on the part of peacebuilding actors, who recognized and integrated the socio-political root causes of the conflict (Shamsie, 2007).

These 'entry points' which represent opportunities for engaging with politics and progressing towards more transformative programming firstly requires "actors to be more forensic in targeting their intervention" (Pugh and Cobble, 2001: 43). However, not only are there operational barriers to 'forensic targeting', but the aforementioned liberal paradigm under which current peacebuilding practices operates severely limits the space in which a more politically aware and engaged mode of peacebuilding could emerge. Despite some of the positive progress at the local level, the politically engaged PROPAZ program arguably never reached its full potential as actors were unable to expand upon or nationalize their engaged mode of programming. This was due to the limited political space to challenge the dominant apolitical approach to peacebuilding. As the author of the case study notes, adaptive and politically engaged peacebuilding through PROPAZ was at odds with the overall strategy of the OAS, which has adopted the liberal focus on markets mechanisms and technical assistance; "PROPAZ sits uncomfortably within the overall peacebuilding framework employed by the OAS because a conflict transformation approach (with its focus on social justice and structural change) is unlikely to thrive within a liberal internationalism paradigm" (Shamsie, 2007:410). As such, while there remains an important role for the integration of political context and localized challenges to injustice and power imbalances, this must be complimented by another facet of political peacebuilding—creating political space for counter-hegemonic or counter-liberal peacebuilding. The call is not for an 'anti hegemonic' or 'anti liberal' response. Creating spaces for political peacebuilding does not involve an outright rejection or attempt to overthrow liberal institutionalism, but rather is an issue of not accepting its apolitical foundations nor its 'end of history' mentality.

---

[i] For a good description and critique of the 'liberal peace' and 'liberal peacebuilding' see Duffield, 2001; Pugh, 2005; Pugh, 2006; Richmond, 2004.

[ii] For example, Canada continues to address its historic conflicts with Native Canadians, constantly asking Canada to reconsider its identity and its relationship with this minority group as it seeks to resolve this ongoing conflict. The creation of a new territory Nunavut and a recent parliamentary apology to Native Canadian's on Canada's former policy on residential schooling represent and an ongoing (though still imperfect) political engagement between conflicting parties. A similar discussion could be had in relation to Australia's recent political statements regarding its own interactions and history with its Aboriginal peoples.

[iii] For a good discussion of the use of the 'political space' in reference to poverty reduction, see Enberg-Pederson and Webster, 2002a and 2002b.

Bibliography

Aall, Pamela. (2000). "NGOs, Conflict Management and Peacekeeping." *International Peacekeeping*, 7(1), 121-141.

Abiew, Francis Kofi. (2003). "NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations." *International Peacekeeping*, 10(1), 24-39.

Abiew, Francis Kofi and Keating, Tom. (1999/2000). "Outside Agents and the politics of peacebuilding and reconciliation." *International Journal*, 55(1), 80-106.

Aitken, Rob. (2007). "Cementing Division? An assessment of the impact of international interventions and peace-building policies on ethnic identities and divisions." *Policy Studies*, 28(3), 247-267.

Anderson, Mary. (1999). *Do No Harm*: *How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Atmar, Haneef and Goodhand, Jonathan. (2002). *Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: What Lessons Can Be Learned?* London: International Alert.

Barnett, Michael. (2001). "Humanitarianism with a Sovereign Face: UNHCR in the Global Undertow." *International Migration Review*, 35(1), 244-277.

Barnett, Michael. (2006). "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War." *International Security*, 30(4), 87-112.

Belloni, Roberto. (2001). "Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(2), 163-180.

Bojicić-Dzelilović, Vesna. (2002). "World Bank, NGOs and the Private Sector in Post-War Reconstruction." *International Peacekeeping*, 9(2), 81-98.

Boulden, Jane. (2005). "Mandates Matter: An Exploration of Impartiality in United Nations Operations." *Global Governance*, 11, 147-160.

Broome, Benjamin J. (2004). "Reaching Across the Dividing Line: Building a Collective Vision for Peace in Cyprus." *Journal of Peace Research*, 41(2), 191-209.

Chandler, David. (2005). "Introduction: Peace without Politics?" *International Peacekeeping*, 12(3), 307-321.

Cramer, C. (2002). "*Homo Economicus* Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political-economy of War." *World Development*, 30(11), 1845-1864.

de Zeeuw, Jeroen. (2001). "Building Peace in War-Torn Societies: From Concept to Strategy." *Netherlands Institute of International Relations Conflict Research Unit*, The Hague.

Devic, Ana. (2006). "Transnationalization of Civil Society in Kosovo: International and Local Limits of Peace and Multiculturalism." *Ethnopolitics*, 5(3), 257-273.

Donais, Timothy. (2005). "Back to Square One: The Politics of Police Reform in Haiti." *Civil Wars*, 7(3), 270-287.

Duffield, Mark. (2001). *Global Governance and the New Wars: The   Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books.

Enberg-Pedersen, Lars and Webster, Neil. (2002a). "Chapter 1: Introduction to Political Space." In Enberg-Pedersen, Lars and Webster (eds), *In the Name of the Poor: Contesting Political Space for Poverty Reduction*. Zed Books: London. pp 1-29.

Enberg-Pedersen, Lars and Webster, Neil. (2002b). "Chapter 11: Political Agencies and Spaces." In Enberg-Pedersen, Lars and Webster (eds), *In the Name of the Poor: Contesting Political Space for Poverty Reduction*. Zed Books: London. pp 255-271.

Fetherston, A.B. (2000). "Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks." *International Peacekeeping*, 7(1), 190-218.

Foucault, M. (1984) 'What is Enlightenment?' in P. Rabinow (ed.). *The Foucault Reader,* London: Penguin, 1984, p.46.

Foucault, M. (1980). *Power and Knowledge, Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (trans. C. Gordon *et al.*), New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Foucault, M. (1997). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (trans. A. Sheridan), London: Penguin.

Foucault, M. (1990) *The History of Sexuality, Vol.1* (trans. R. Hurley), London: Penguin.

Galtung, Johan. (1969). "Violence, peace and peace research." *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 167-191.

Heathershaw, John. (2007). "Peacebuilding as Practice: Discourses from Post-conflict Tajikistan." *International Peacekeeping*, 14(2), 219-236.

Hemmer, Bruce, Garb, Paula, Phillips, Marlett and Graham, John L. (2006). "Putting the 'Up' in Bottom-up Peacebuilding: Broadening the Concept of Peace Negotiations." *International Negotiation*, 11, 129-162.

Huntington S. (1968) *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Jeffrey, Alex. (2007). "The Geopolitical Framing of Localized Struggles: NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Development and Change*, 38(2), 251-274.

Kaufman, Stuart J. (2006). "Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Ethnic Wars." *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(2), 201-208.

Manning, Carrie. (2007). "Party-building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique." *Democratization*, 14(2), 253-272.

Mouffe, Chantal. (1993). *The Return of the Political*. Verso: New York.

Orjuela, Camilla. (2003). "Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 40(2), 195-212.

Pantuliano, Sara. (2005). "A 'principled' approach to complex emergencies: testing a new aid delivery model in the Nuba Mountains." *Disasters*, 29(S1), S52-S66.

Paris, Roland. (2002). "Peacebuilding in Central America: Reproducing the Sources of Conflict?" *International Peacekeeping*, 9(4), 39-68.

Peterson, J. (2009). "'Rule of Law' initiatives and the liberal peace" currently under review for special issue on the politicization of aid for *Disasters*, due out June 2009.

Ponzio, Richard J. (2007). "Transforming Political Authority: UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan." *Global Governance*, 13, 255-275.

Pouligny, Béatrice. (2005). "Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at 'New' Societies." *Security Dialogue*, 36(4), 495-510.

Pugh, Michael. (2005). "The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective." *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 10(2), 23-42.

Pugh, Michael. (2006). "Post-war economies and the New York dissensus." *Conflict, Security and Development*, 6(3), 269-289.

Pugh, Michael and Cobble, Margaret. (2001). "Non-Nationalist Voting in Bosnian Municipal Elections: Implications for Democracy and Peacebuilding." *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(1), 27-47.

Ramsbotham, Oliver. (2000). "Reflections on Post-Settlement Peacebuilding." *International Peacekeeping*, 7(1), 169-189.

Richmond, Oliver. (2004). "The Globalization of Responses to Conflict and the Peacebuilding Consensus." *Cooperation and Conflict*, 39(2), 129-150.

Schloms, Michael. (2003). "Humanitarian NGOs in Peace Processes." *International Peacekeeping*, 10(1), 40-55.

Schuurman, Frans J. (2000). "Paradigms lost, paradigms regained? Development studies in the twenty-first century." *Third World Quarterly*, 21(1), 7-20.

Schwarz, Rolf. (2005). "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and Representation." *Security Dialogue*, 36(4), 429-446.

Schwebel, Milton. (2006). "Realistic Empathy and Active Nonviolence Confront Political Reality." *Journal of Social Issues*, 62(1), 191-208.

Shamsie, Yasmine. (2007). "Moving Beyond Mediation: The OAS Transforming Conflict in Guatemala." *Global Governance*, 13, 409-425.

Simonsen, Sven Gunnner. (2005). "Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: Lessons from Recent Cases." *Security Dialogue*, 36(3), 297-318.

Stoddard, Abby and Harmer, Adele. (2006). "Little Room to Manoeuvre: The Challenges to Humanitarian Action in the New Global Security Environment." *Journal of Human Development*, 7(1), 23-41.

Suhrke, Astri, Harpviken, Kristian Berg and Strand, Arne. (2002). "After Bonn: conflictual peace building." *Third World Quarterly*, 23(5), 8775-891.

Tan-Mullins, May, Rigg, Jonathan, Law, Lisa, and Grundy-Warr, Carl. (2007). "Re-mapping the politics of aid: the changing structures and networks of humanitarian assistance in post-tsunami Thailand." *Progress in Development Studies*, 7(4), 327-344.

Turton, David. (1997). "War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence in North East Africa and Former Yugoslavia." *Oxford Development Studies*, 25(1), 77-95.

UN (ND). "Questions and Answers: What does the Peacebuilding Commission do?" *United Nations Peacebuilding Commission Website*, http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/qanda.shtml [June 5, 2007].

Wimmer, Andreas, and Schetter, Conrad. (2003). "Putting State Formation First: Some Recommendations for Reconstruction and Peacemaking in Afghanistan." *Journal of International Development*, 15, 525-539.

Wolpe, Howard and McDonald, Steve. (2008). "Democracy and Peace-building: Re-thinking the Conventional Wisdom." *The Round Table*, 97(394), 137-145.

Yannis, Alexandros. (2004). "The UN as Government in Kosovo." *Global Governance*, 10(1), 67-81.