

It's One Climate Policy World Out There—Almost

Nancy Birdsall and Jan von der Goltz

Abstract

In the run-up to the December 2009 Copenhagen climate conference, the authors surveyed members of the international development community with a special interest in climate change on three sets of detailed questions: (1) what action different country groups should take to limit climate change; (2) how much non-market funding there should be for emissions reductions and adaptation in developing countries, and how it should be allocated; and (3) which institutions should be involved in delivering climate assistance, and how the system should be governed. About 500 respondents from 88 countries completed the survey between November 19–24, 2009. About a third of the respondents grew up in developing countries, although some of them now live in developed countries. A broad majority of respondents from both developing and developed countries held very similar views on the responsibilities of the two different country groups, including on issues that have been very controversial in the negotiations. Most favored binding commitments now by developed countries, and commitments by 2020 by 'advanced developing countries' (Brazil, China, India, South Africa and others), limited use of offsets by developed countries, strict monitoring of compliance with commitments, and the use of trade measures (e.g. carbon-related tariffs) only in very narrow circumstances. Respondents from developing countries favored larger international transfers than those from developed countries, but the two groups share core ideas on how transfers should be allocated. Among institutional options for managing climate programs, a plurality of respondents from developed (48 percent) and developing (56 percent) countries preferred a UN-managed world climate fund, while many from both groups also embraced the UN Adaptation Fund's approach, which is to accredit national institutions within countries which are eligible to manage implementation of projects that the Fund finances. Among approaches to governance, the most support went to the Climate Investment Fund model—of equal representation of developing and developed countries on the board.

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Summary

In the run-up to the Copenhagen climate conference, CGD sought the views of members of the development community with a special interest in climate change on three sets of detailed questions relating to: (1) action to limit climate change; (2) international financial transfers and their allocation; and (3) institutions and governance in delivering climate assistance. A total of 479 respondents from 88 countries completed the survey between November 19 and 24, 2009. About 28% of the respondents grew up in developing countries; respondents were highly educated, and came from diverse professional backgrounds.

The survey analysis focuses on differences and similarities in the views of developing and developed-country respondents.

(1) Action and responsibilities: There was consensus among developing and developed-country participants on the responsibilities of the two different country groups in limiting climate change, including on issues that are very controversial in the negotiations. Regardless of country of origin or residence, respondents generally favored: differentiated but strong action to reduce emissions from all major emitters; limited offset use; strict monitoring of compliance with promised emissions reductions; and the use of trade measures (e.g. carbon-related tariffs) only in very narrow circumstances. Respondents from both country groupings showed similar willingness to pay for a hypothetical guarantee that there would never be 'dangerous' climate change (5% of household income p.a. at the median).

(2) International transfers and their allocation: Nearly all respondents favored some international support for emissions reductions (94%) and adaptation (98%) in developing countries. Developing-country respondents consistently favored higher funding levels: 71% of them thought that developed countries should cover more than 40% of (non-market) investment for emissions reductions, as opposed to slightly more than half among developed-country respondents. Views similarly diverged on adaptation funding. Yet, respondents agreed on the key criteria in allocating funds: cost efficiency and pioneering new opportunities for emissions reductions funds; and vulnerability to climate impacts for adaptation funds. Perhaps surprisingly, developing-country respondents placed greater emphasis than developed-country respondents on potential recipient governments having a good track record and proven capacity to implement projects.

(3) Institutions and governance: All respondents tended to favor having multiple channels for delivering climate assistance. They generally were more favorable to innovative approaches by

multiple possible actors than to reliance primarily on existing institutions. The idea of a new UNFCCC-managed world climate fund had the most support (50% thought it should take on “very broad responsibilities”) and the most detractors (17% thought the institution “should not play any role”), the latter primarily from developed countries. All participant groups liked the approach of delegating implementation to accredited domestic institutions in developing countries. Involving bilateral aid agencies met with little support among either group. Their opinions of current multilateral organizations diverged: developing-country respondents felt much more positive toward the UN and regional development banks than towards the World Bank; in contrast, developed country respondents preferred the World Bank over the UN and the regional banks.

Attitudes toward governance arrangements were generally skeptical, with broad approval from both regional groups only for the approach taken by the Climate Investment Funds, where developing and developed countries hold equal numbers of board seats, and decision-making is by consensus. Developing-country respondents in particular favored this idea, over and above a ‘one country, one vote’ approach. Many respondents commented on the need to transcend the dichotomy between ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ countries, and to forge compromise on governance.

In summary, the survey showed consensus among a diverse group of respondents in agreement on what actions to take. Preferences on burden-sharing varied across the two main country groups, but respondents shared common views on the use of funds. Respondents were not unanimous in their views of institutions and governance arrangements, but they tended to favor reform and compromise proposals.

Introduction: a diverse, highly educated group of respondents, with a focus on development and the environment

Overall, 479 respondents from 88 countries completed the survey between November 19-24, 2009. About 28% of the respondents identified themselves as having grown up in a developing country, and 27% percent currently live in a developing country (this includes some who were born in a developed country).¹ (Numbers of respondents by country of origin and country of residence are shown in Annex 1.) More than a third of respondents (36%) now live in a country different from their country of birth.

The survey was targeted to recipients of CGD's climate newsletter, although it was open to all, and was advertized on CGD's website. As intended, the sample consisted primarily of professionals interested in or active in the development community,² and with a special awareness of climate change. Indeed, 35% of respondents work professionally on climate issues, and 44% on other environmental issues – a higher share among developing-country respondents in both cases.³ Nearly all respondents follow Copenhagen-related news either regularly (55%) or occasionally (41%).

Respondents were highly educated, with about half holding Masters degrees as their highest qualification, and a quarter holding PhDs. A plurality was trained in economics (28%), and somewhat fewer in the sciences or engineering (23%) or other social sciences (22%). These profiles were very similar among developing and developed-country respondents. More than two-thirds work in public or quasi-public jobs, a larger share among those who grew up in developing countries. Respondents of all ages (19-87 years) took the survey; the median age was 45, with far fewer respondents above the age

¹ We use the terms 'developed countries' and 'developing countries' in the sense in which they are used in the climate negotiations. Thus, 'developed countries' refers to the countries included in Annex I of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, i.e., those that are obliged to reduce emissions. Annex I countries include all OECD members with the exception of Korea and Mexico, as well as other high-income countries and most transition economies. Since we find that the country where respondents grew up proved generally a more consistent predictor of attitudes than country of residence, we refer to respondents who grew up in developing countries as "developing-country respondents," regardless of current residence (and correspondingly for "developed-country respondents").

² In addition to statistics presented here, consult Annex 2 for a list of professional affiliations to further illustrate this claim.

³ Where this summary makes positive statements on whether distributions are similar or different over sample groups, it means to imply statistically significant relationships that were significant at the 0.1 level, in normal-based or distribution-free tests, as appropriate in the relevant context. Given the limited sample size, the summary does not distinguish between different significance levels. Where the analysis makes conditional statements on relationships, it means to imply that the relationship could not be disproven, but was not entirely robust to different specifications. See section two for details.

of 65 among developing-country respondents (1.7%) than in developed countries (10%). About 35% of participants were women, fewer among developing-country respondents (26%).

The survey allowed participants to self-select, and did not intend to gather a sample that would be representative of any larger population group. It sought to elicit views on detailed questions of implementation, rather than general attitudes. Hence, David Wheeler's (2007) observation in the context of a survey using a similar approach is relevant that "random sampling on such a specialized topic in large, diffuse populations would confront validity problems because many respondents would lack the requisite information."⁴

In giving voice to the opinions of its respondent group, the survey aims to supplement the findings of more extensive recent surveys, including internationally representative public attitudes polls conducted by PIPA/World Bank and HSBC, and GlobeScan's key respondent surveys. By comparison to the former, the present survey asked more complex questions relating to implementation and governance. By comparison to the latter, it sought to elicit the views of respondents who work professionally on, or have a pronounced interest in development. Unlike the respondents to previous surveys, this group of respondents appears well-positioned to draw upon specialized knowledge of the lessons of development assistance and apply it when considering alternative approaches for delivering potentially large amounts of climate-related funding from the rich world to the developing world.

The remainder of this paper is organized in two sections. Section one discusses the main results qualitatively. Section 2 provides detailed results and a technical note. The analysis focuses on differences and similarities in the views of developing and developed-country respondents, as well as among somewhat more disaggregated regional groups (U.S. respondents, respondents from other developed countries, from the 'advanced developing countries'⁵, from Sub-Saharan Africa, and from other developing countries). It occasionally discusses how other respondent characteristics correlate with views.

⁴ David Wheeler (2007), "It's One World out There: The Global Consensus in Selecting the World Bank's next President." Working Paper Number 123, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development.

⁵ As the survey noted, "The term 'advanced developing countries' intends to distinguish between countries with relatively high and relatively low emissions and capacity. For instance, Japan mentions "Parties which have a substantial contribution to the global emissions of greenhouse gases and have appropriate response capacities." The EU suggests that "OECD members and candidates for membership thereof" should take more action. This would include Korea and Mexico as OECD members, and countries with "enhanced engagement, with a view to possible membership," namely Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa. This is probably the list of countries that those who want to make a distinction among developing countries have in mind."

1. Main results

1.1 *Broad consensus on what action should be taken*

There was consensus among developing and developed-country participants on the kind of responsibilities that different country groups should take on in limiting climate change. Large majorities favored, without distinction between developing and developed country background:

- Binding targets for developed countries were appropriate, rather than a bottom-up catalogue of commitments (89%);
- Binding targets for 'advanced developing countries' no later than 2020 (88%);
- Permitting limited use of offsets (70%) – i.e., developed countries can temporarily fulfill some of their commitments by funding emissions reductions in developing countries;
- Tighter emissions reporting requirements (95%) and independent third-party review of actions to reduce emissions growth (81%);



A majority (56%) favored permitting trade measures (e.g. carbon-related tariffs) only in narrowly defined circumstances, such as to enforce compliance with previous commitments. While overall opinion varies more widely overall on this question, it does not vary much between developing and developed-country respondents.

Given the amount of acrimony over these issues in the negotiations, it is surprising how few differences in opinion emerged among respondents. Consensus extends also to what respondents are willing to do privately, as expressed by willingness to pay for a (hypothetical) guarantee that there would never be climate change that respondents would consider 'dangerous'. Median willingness to pay (5% of household income p.a.) was higher than most projections of the cost of effective action. A large majority (86%) felt that they were willing to pay as much or more than they expected effective action to limit climate change to cost. Developing-country respondents were less optimistic that this would be enough to cover the cost of effective action.

1.2 *Developed-country funding: disagreement on amounts, consensus on key allocation criteria, and strong developing-country support for rewarding performance*

While the respondents' national background had little influence over their views on what actions different countries should take, it mattered for their opinion on how much funding developed

countries should provide (in addition to any carbon-market funds) to reduce emissions in developing countries, and how it should be managed. Almost all respondents (94%) favored some level of non-market funding, and less than half (42%) thought that developed countries should cover no more than 40% of the investment needs. Yet, developing-country participants consistently favored higher values, while U.S. respondents in particular supported comparatively low levels. Thus, for example, nearly a third of developing country respondents thought that developed countries should pay more than 70 percent of these costs, while only about 18 percent of respondents from developed countries favored this view.



Regarding adaptation funding, the survey phrased its question as a matter not only of fairness, but also of effectiveness. It stressed that adaptation funding might encounter problems similar to those that bedevil development assistance, such as so-called 'absorptive capacity' constraints, and thus asked respondents how much funding could be *effectively* used. Nearly all respondents (98%) felt that some additional adaptation funding would be useful. Yet, the majority of respondents (60%) cautioned that funding in excess of \$50bn p.a. was more than could be effectively deployed. Some developing countries have sought funds in this range: for instance, the African

Group has called for \$67bn p.a. Developing-country participants were more likely to advocate very high amounts of funding, over \$100bn, and less likely to think that only less than \$25bn could be used effectively. Those trained in the sciences and engineering tended to favor more funding than economists.

Respondents from all backgrounds thought that the most important criteria in allocating funds were cost efficiency and pioneering new opportunities (for the allocation of emissions reductions funds), and the vulnerability of recipients to climate impacts (for allocation of adaptation funds). Developing-country respondents were somewhat more likely to prefer an equal distribution by country of funds for emissions reductions (they often commented on the need to overcome the bias of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)⁶ toward China and other large developing countries). Developing country respondents also gave greater weight to need (in terms of low income) for the allocation of adaptation funds.

Yet, they also placed greater emphasis than developed-country respondents on a good track record, and on the implementing capacity of recipient governments. For instance, 41% of developing-country respondents thought that a “very considerable” role in allocating adaptation funds should be accorded to a good past performance record (such as measurable improvements in water management or health system capacity) and high implementing capacity (measured, e.g., in governance indicators), as opposed to 22% of developed-country respondents.

How big a role should the following criteria play in allocating funds for emissions reductions?

| | <i>Region</i> | <i>No role</i> | <i>Limited</i> | <i>Considerable</i> | <i>Very considerable</i> | <i>Respondents</i> |
|-------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| Cost efficiency | Developed | 2% | 9% | 41% | 48% | 340 |
| | Developing | 4% | 9% | 35% | 53% | 133 |
| Even distribution | Developed | 20% | 54% | 22% | 5% | 338 |
| | Developing | 22% | 31% | 30% | 17% | 132 |
| Past performance | Developed | 6% | 23% | 42% | 29% | 341 |
| | Developing | 3% | 13% | 43% | 41% | 132 |
| Capacity | Developed | 3% | 23% | 47% | 27% | 341 |
| | Developing | 3% | 19% | 35% | 43% | 132 |
| New opportunities | Developed | 3% | 19% | 47% | 31% | 338 |
| | Developing | 2% | 11% | 30% | 58% | 132 |

⁶ http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php

How big a role should the following criteria play in allocating adaptation funds?

| | <i>Region</i> | <i>No role</i> | <i>Limited</i> | <i>Considerable</i> | <i>Very considerable</i> | <i>Respondents</i> |
|------------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| Vulnerability | Developed | 3% | 9% | 38% | 50% | 328 |
| | Developing | 3% | 3% | 38% | 56% | 131 |
| Need | Developed | 5% | 27% | 51% | 17% | 326 |
| | Developing | 3% | 17% | 41% | 39% | 130 |
| Cost efficiency | Developed | 3% | 27% | 46% | 24% | 327 |
| | Developing | 5% | 19% | 45% | 32% | 128 |
| Even distribution | Developed | 37% | 45% | 14% | 4% | 327 |
| | Developing | 28% | 32% | 23% | 18% | 130 |
| Performance & capacity | Developed | 4% | 27% | 47% | 22% | 329 |
| | Developing | 4% | 17% | 38% | 41% | 129 |

The survey invited respondents to provide additional comments on the questions asked.⁷ On adaptation, many comments highlighted that the chief challenge was that “absorptive capacity is high in some countries, ... but these are not likely to be the hot-spots of vulnerability, like Sub-Saharan Africa or small islands.” Therefore, “effective spending of short-term finance is contingent on major capacity building,” and there is a premium on strengthening accountability. Additional allocation criteria proposed included funding shovel-ready projects and co-benefits in job creation or ecosystem services.

In allocating funds for emissions reductions, many respondents considered cost-effectiveness to be the most important factor, but noted that it can be “at odds with developing new technologies, which will likely be inefficient at first – so balance will have to be the goal.” They considered that the relative weight of these criteria might have to shift over time. Respondents thought that in addition to characteristics measured in governance indicators, important dimensions of ‘capacity’ included monitoring capacity and the track record in implementing national development plans and PRSPs⁸. Possible additional allocation criteria included: development co-benefits; recipient ownership of plans; and supporting countries ready to systematically integrate low-carbon growth into their development plans.

⁷ See section two for details on the number of comments received, etc.

⁸ <http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp>

1.3 *Building an international architecture for implementation: appetite for innovation*

The survey asked which institutions should manage international cooperation and especially financial transfers. It also considered which governance arrangements should be used in overseeing their work. The need to find effective mechanisms for these tasks will loom large in delivering the emissions reduction and adaptation investment the world needs. Due to slow overall progress in the negotiations, however, ideas about institutional roles and the governance options for implementation remain poorly defined.

All participants, and in particularly those from developing countries, generally had more positive views on the prospect of involving a given institution in delivering climate assistance than on current and possible future governance arrangements. Respondents' comments suggested that this trend might be consistent with immediate concern to ensure effective delivery of enough assistance, along with disenchantment with the current governance of international institutions.

Average share of options given top two ratings

| | <i>Institution should play considerable/very considerable role</i> | <i>Governance approach is good/excellent</i> |
|------------|--|--|
| Developed | 61% | 37% |
| Developing | 73% | 46% |

1.3.1 Institutions: broad involvement, reform, and a new coordination function?

Despite their generally supportive attitude toward most institutions, respondents tended to feel more favorable toward new and innovative mechanisms for delivering assistance than toward existing institutions. Among institutional options, the idea of a new UNFCCC "World Climate Fund"⁹ had the most support (the only proposal where "very broad responsibilities" was the modal choice – 50%) and the most detractors (the largest share to think the UN institution should not play any role – 17%) – with opponents coming primarily from developed countries. All participants viewed favorably the approach of delegating implementation responsibilities to accredited domestic institutions in developing countries. Involving bilateral agencies met with little support among both groups, while their attitudes toward current multilateral organizations diverged. Developing-country respondents felt much more positive toward the UN and regional development banks than their developed-country peers and less favorable towards the World Bank, while developed country respondents favored the World Bank over the UN and the regional banks. Developed-country participants felt positively about

⁹ This is the wording that was used in the survey question.

hybrid instruments like the World Bank-managed Climate Investment Funds (CIF) or the UNFCCC-overseen Adaptation Fund. Developing-country respondents viewed them similarly as they did the UN or regional banks.

Which institutions should play a "considerable" or "very considerable" role in managing climate-related financial flows?

| <i>Developed countries</i> | | <i>Developing countries</i> | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1 | New World Climate Fund | 1 | New World Climate Fund |
| 2 | Hybrid instruments | 2 | Accredited domestic institutions |
| 3 | Accredited domestic institutions | 3 | Hybrid instruments |
| 4 | Other MDBs | 4 | Other MDBs |
| 5 | World Bank | 5 | UN |
| 6 | UN | 6 | World Bank |
| 7 | Bilaterals | 7 | Bilaterals |

Comments mostly circled around the question of whether a new World Climate Fund should be established. Strikingly, most respondents, regardless of their opinion on a new fund, evaluated the idea against the alternative of a system largely administered by the World Bank. Thus, those in favor of a new organization often felt that the scale of action needed required dedicated capacity, but also tended to argue that "due to the mistrust to the Bretton Woods institutions in developing

countries ... a new fund with its own secretariat is needed." Some were particularly concerned that the Bank's role in funding coal power undermined its credibility in delivering climate funds. Yet, others worried whether "we can spare the time to build a new World Climate Fund," noted that setting it up might require "a great amount of resources that could be used to improve the climate change effects," and feared lack of buy-in from contributors.

Many comments sought middle ground. A number focused on the need to establish a coordination function. Indeed, many who favored a new climate organization viewed its role primarily in overseeing the efforts of diverse players "involved in implementation according to their comparative advantages." In addition, many emphasized the need to reform existing institutions. Thus, one respondent thought that "overlaying new institutions on existing ones because of lack of trust or control is the wrong idea." Rather, "existing mechanisms, like the World Bank, which have the resources and capacity to be helpful need to be retooled so that they are making better decisions (i.e., not funding new coal fired thermal generation)." Others noted that such reform could complement the approach of giving a larger role to UNFCCC-accredited domestic institutions. While comments were universally positive on this approach, some cautioned that "the UNFCCC has got to be holier than the Pope in accrediting domestic institutions in developing countries. This is no time for a wishy-washy UN to pander to politics."

1.3.2 Governance: need for compromise.

Divergences between developing and developed-country respondents in their attitudes toward different governance models were considerable. It is striking that, when pooling observations from both groups, a plurality thought that all but one possible arrangement should “not be considered at all.” By far the most popular arrangement, and the only one to meet with approval from both groups, was a CIF-like approach, where developing and developed countries hold equal numbers of board seats, and decision-making is by consensus. Developing-country respondents in particular favored this idea. Indeed, more developing-country respondents felt that a CIF-like arrangement was at least “good” (62%) than held this view on a UN-like arrangement (57%), and fewer felt it “should not be considered at all.”

Respondents were nearly unanimous in their rejection of shareholder voting and in viewing weighted shareholder voting (by the inverse of per-capita emissions) skeptically. A ‘one country, one vote’ approach was quite popular with developing-country respondents, but not with developed-country participants. Disagreement was somewhat less sharp on an arrangement like the Adaptation Fund Board, where developing countries hold a majority of board seats, but fewer than are required for decision-making. (The survey’s description of this approach as a “blocking minority” was regrettable in retrospect, and may well have unduly biased the answers.)

In their comments, respondents generally noted that the key challenge of making governance arrangements legitimate in the eyes of both contributors and recipients was well-known from the aid debate. However, an interesting common reaction was that respondents did not necessarily discuss the issue along the familiar battle lines of ‘one country, one vote’ versus shareholder voting. Rather, much attention focused on designing governance arrangements appropriate for the *specific* task of governing climate funds. This reasoning led many to support a CIF-like compromise. Some commented favorably on the idea of weighted shareholder voting, noting that the approach would reward developing countries for their actions to keep per-capita emissions low. Others proposed that weighting could also be carried out by vulnerability to climate impacts, (giving those with the most to lose a larger say), or a country’s potential for emission reductions (making sure countries where most progress is possible consider themselves well-represented). Yet, others cautioned that weighted shareholder voting was “too complex and susceptible to political influence. If used we would spend more time arguing over the ratios than working on climate change.”

How favorably do you view the following governance arrangements?

| | | <i>Excellent</i> | <i>Good</i> | <i>Adequate</i> | <i>Do not consider</i> | <i>Respondents</i> |
|-------------------------------|------------|------------------|-------------|-----------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| One country, one vote | Developed | 12% | 23% | 25% | 40% | 295 |
| | Developing | 34% | 23% | 23% | 21% | 120 |
| Adaptation Fund-like | Developed | 7% | 33% | 31% | 28% | 286 |
| | Developing | 15% | 25% | 22% | 37% | 118 |
| Climate Investment Funds-like | Developed | 18% | 36% | 30% | 16% | 294 |
| | Developing | 34% | 29% | 24% | 14% | 119 |
| Shareholder voting | Developed | 7% | 17% | 27% | 49% | 290 |
| | Developing | 9% | 13% | 22% | 56% | 116 |
| Weighted shareholder | Developed | 11% | 22% | 24% | 43% | 290 |
| | Developing | 24% | 24% | 20% | 31% | 119 |

2. Technical discussion and data

2.0 Sample collection and incomplete responses

The survey was posted on CGD's website on November 19, 2009, when invitations to participate were sent to 4,321 subscribers to CGD's climate newsletter. About 60% of all responses were received over the next two days. An additional invitation to take the survey was sent to 16,782 subscribers to the Center's weekly newsletter on November 24, 2009. Data was retrieved for analysis at 1am EST on November 28, at which time there were 479 completed surveys and 72 partly completed surveys. The survey remains [on line](#) at time of publication of this paper as an educational tool.¹⁰ However, responses are no longer being analyzed. (The survey questions are listed at the end of this paper.)

A certain share of those who began taking the survey (13%) abandoned it after answering the questions on the first page (Action and Burden Sharing). This is not surprising: the survey was more technical and time-consuming than many other online surveys. Developing-country respondents were significantly more likely to abandon the survey after the first page (19%) than respondents born or resident in developed countries (10%). Those who exited the survey provided no demographic information beyond the countries where they were born and now live. Hence, it is not possible to investigate bias in incomplete answers beyond country of origin and residency.

We find very little evidence that those who abandoned the survey after filling in the first page answered the initial questions differently than respondents who submitted a more complete set of answers. Only on offsets is there very limited evidence that those who abandoned the survey may have

¹⁰ http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=LQK6CTZ1Bf6RnNcqYijK0w_3d_3d

been less likely than others to favor limiting offset use. In particular, there is no evidence that respondents who would soon abandon the survey simply picked the first option (this is a concern because options were not randomized in the survey – although of course no default choice was suggested). We therefore include all respondents who have answered a given question in summary statistics. Excluding them commonly changes mean values by about 1%. We do not include the observations in models explaining choices, since no complete set of demographic variables is available for them.

A total of 124 respondents (26% of respondents) used one or more of the open fields to provide comments, and the number of comments per open field ranged from 31 to 69. In total, 362 comments were received, for an average of about three comments per person who commented. A larger share of developing-country respondents (32%) than developed-country respondents commented. Two respondents used the open fields to state their belief that climate change was not in fact happening, or to otherwise dispute the scientific consensus on global warming.

2.1 Analytical strategy

Where survey choices were binary, we used probit models to estimate how demographic variables influenced the likelihood of choices; where the survey offered more than two categorical choices, we used (maximum likelihood) multinomial logit models to estimate how demographics influenced the likelihood that respondents chose a given alternative to the modal response. Where there were more than two choices with a natural ordinal meaning (for instance, increasing levels of funding), we present results from ordered logistic regressions. We coded all dependent variables so that higher values (and in the attached tables, greater coefficients) indicate stronger preference for the proposition at issue. We tested robustness of ordered logit results by estimating a probit model, coding the dependent variable 0 and 1 for the two most adverse and most positive choices, respectively, as well as by estimating GLS over imputed values. We omit results from robustness checks for conciseness.

We explored the association between demographics and choice in two model specifications. An extended model included country groups, academic training, discipline trained in, employer type, gender, age, and information on whether respondents work professionally on the climate change or the environment. Given the limited sample size, we also considered a sparser model that includes only country groups, discipline trained in, gender, and information on professional work on climate or the environment. Both specifications were tested with a simple breakdown of respondents into developing

and developed country groups, and in five regional groups (U.S.; other developed countries; BRICS plus Mexico and Korea; other developing countries; Africa.).

In the present analysis, where we made positive statements on relationships between choices and demographic background, we wanted to imply that the hypothesis stated was significant at least at the 90% level, in the two models, as well as in a univariate context and in simple distribution-free tests (Chi-square tests and rank-sum or sign-rank tests, as appropriate). Where we stated that there *may be* a relationship, we wanted to indicate that the association whose statistical significance was not entirely robust.

2.2 What kind of action from which countries?

Tables 1.1-1.5 present regression results for the survey questions on action to limit climate change. Significance patterns were generally thin. We leave it to the reader to peruse the tables, and note here only some results that strike us as interesting.

Economists were more likely than scientists and engineers to favor binding portfolios of actions from advanced developing countries over non-binding goals. Those working on the environment may have been more likely than others to favor intensity targets or soft caps over binding targets.

| | Developed | Developing | |
|---|-----------|------------|--|
| No offsets | 19% | 21% | On offsets, BRICS+ respondents may have been more likely than U.S. respondents to oppose any offset use. Developing countries show up in the sparse model (using fewer variables) as being more likely to oppose any offsets. We acknowledge this result to avoid confusing readers who consult the table, but do not put much stake in it: it was not |
| Unlimited amounts of offsets | 11% | 12% | |
| Offsets up to a certain percentage of developed-country commitments | 42% | 35% | |
| Offsets are permitted, but a discount factor is applied. | 28% | 33% | |

significant under any other specification, or in distribution-free tests. The inset table illustrates that there is reason to believe that the result is driven by lower enthusiasm for capping offsets, rather than purely by enthusiasm for prohibiting them entirely.

As regards willingness to pay for a hypothetical guarantee that there would never be dangerous climate change, developing and developed-country respondents showed similar values at the mean and at the median (quantile regression results omitted for conciseness), although those from Africa and BRICS+ may have had lower median willingness to pay. Developing-country respondents overall were more

pessimistic than others about the cost of avoiding dangerous climate change, as were those who professionally work on the environment. Scientists and engineers, as well as social scientists other than economists showed considerably higher willingness to pay than other professional groups.

2.2 Funding allocation, governance and institutions

Ordered logit results immediately reflect the divergence between developing and developed-country respondents on the question of what amounts of funding would be equitable and useful. (Table 2) Interestingly, those trained in the sciences and engineering (and to a lesser degree, social scientists other than economists) were consistently more likely to favor high adaptation funding than economists, perhaps reflecting different relative importance these two professional groups attached to climate impacts and to capacity constraints.

Developing-country respondents were more likely to think that past performance and opening up new opportunities should play a role. These results largely held across more disaggregated country groups. On adaptation funding, developed-country respondents were less likely to favor need, an even distribution of funds, but also past performance. (Tables 3.1-3.2)

In addition to the main results presented above, we find (Table 4.2) that among regional groups, U.S. respondents tended to feel most adversely toward the UN, African respondents were the most likely to view a CIF-like arrangement positively, and African and BRICS+ respondents tended to take an interest in weighted shareholder voting. Scientists tended to favor, a CIF approach; climate professionals tended to disfavor it. Concerning institutions, (Table 4.1) all regional groups favored the UN, a new climate fund, and accrediting domestic institutions more than U.S. respondents did. African respondents consistently thought of *all* institutions, including bilaterals, more highly than other respondents.

Annex 1: Respondents by country of origin and country of residence.

| | <i>Country of residence</i> | <i>Number of respondents</i> | <i>Four or fewer respondents:</i> | | | | |
|----|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1 | USA | 219 | Argentina | Japan | Belarus | Finland | Singapore |
| 2 | India | 24 | Denmark | Morocco | Bolivia | Ghana | Slovakia |
| 3 | Canada | 22 | New Zealand | Netherlands | Bosnia and Herzegovina | Guatemala | Taiwan |
| 4 | Australia | 19 | Senegal | Norway | Botswana | Guyana | Trinidad and Tobago |
| 5 | UK | 19 | Sweden | Pakistan | Brazil | Kenya | Ukraine |
| 6 | Germany | 8 | Bangladesh | Portugal | Burundi | Liberia | Uruguay |
| 7 | Indonesia | 8 | Cameroon | Republic of Korea | Cambodia | Malawi | |
| 8 | France | 7 | Hungary | Spain | China | Malaysia | |
| 9 | Philippines | 7 | Iran | Switzerland | Colombia | Mexico | |
| 10 | Belgium | 6 | Nepal | Turkey | Congo | Mozambique | |
| 11 | Ireland | 6 | South Africa | Uganda | Cuba | Namibia | |
| 12 | Peru | 6 | Tanzania | United Arab Emirates | Dominican Republic | Nicaragua | |
| 13 | Ethiopia | 5 | Viet Nam | Zambia | Ecuador | Papua New Guinea | |
| 14 | Italy | 5 | Greece | Algeria | Egypt | Romania | |
| 15 | Nigeria | 5 | Hong Kong | Austria | Estonia | Rwanda | |

| | <i>Country of origin</i> | <i>Number of respondents</i> | <i>Four or fewer respondents:</i> | | | | |
|----|--------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------|
| 1 | USA | 174 | Argentina | Denmark | Ireland | Saint Lucia | Zambia |
| 2 | UK | 33 | Armenia | Dominican Republic | Jamaica | Senegal | Zimbabwe |
| 3 | Canada | 24 | Austria | Ecuador | Japan | Singapore | |
| 4 | India | 24 | Bangladesh | Egypt | Kenya | Slovakia | |
| 5 | Australia | 20 | Belarus | El Salvador | Malawi | Somalia | |
| 6 | Germany | 13 | Bermuda | Estonia | Malaysia | South Africa | |
| 7 | France | 12 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | Finland | Mexico | Spain | |
| 8 | Belgium | 8 | Brazil | Ghana | Morocco | Sri Lanka | |
| 9 | Netherlands | 6 | Bulgaria | Greece | Mozambique | Sudan | |
| 10 | Nigeria | 6 | Burundi | Guatemala | New Caledonia | Sweden | |
| 11 | Ethiopia | 5 | Cambodia | Guyana | Nicaragua | Taiwan | |
| 12 | Indonesia | 5 | Cameroon | Haiti | Norway | Turkey | |
| 13 | Italy | 5 | China | Honduras | Pakistan | Uganda | |
| 14 | Nepal | 5 | Congo | Hong Kong | Peru | Tanzania | |
| 15 | New Zealand | 5 | Costa Rica | Hungary | Portugal | U.S. Virgin Islands | |
| 16 | Philippines | 5 | Cuba | Iceland | Republic of Korea | Uruguay | |
| 17 | Switzerland | 5 | DR Congo | Iran | Romania | Venezuela | |

Annex 2: Sub-sample of professional affiliations.

At the end of the survey, participants were invited to voluntarily state their professional affiliation (the survey explicitly stated that this was not a required field). Of the 479 respondents, 117 followed the invitation.

| | | |
|--|--|---|
| A ready-to-wear factory | gtz | Investment fund supporting non-bankable projects |
| ACDI/VOCA | Harvard University | RAKIYA HOSPITAL |
| AEI | HDFC Bank | Retired |
| Africa Center for Strategic Studies | Helen Keller International (2) | Retired Environmental Scientist from Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai |
| Agrarian Research Foundation, Bangladesh | Himalayan Institute of Development | Retired natural resources scientist |
| Agricultural and Natural resources Research centre of Kurdistan, Iran | ICRISAT | Retired part time consulting |
| American Institutes for Research | IFAD | Retired PhD chemist |
| AusAID | Independent Consultant | Retired, active member many boards. Active on geoen지니어ing with a global scientific academy. |
| Belgian Technical Cooperation | Instructor | Rural Education and Environment Development Service(REEDS) |
| Bengal Enterprises,LLC | International Development Research Centre | Self (3) |
| Bread for the World | IOM | Solar company |
| CARE Peru | John Swire & Sons (HK) Ltd | State of Alaska |
| CEIP | La Trobe University School of Public Health | Student, Clinton School of Public Service |
| Center for Health Policy and Innovation | McGill University | Student, Harvard College |
| Centre analyse stratégique | Mercosur Consulting Group, Ltd | The University of Zambia |
| CGD | Millennium Challenge Corporation | Think tank |
| CNRS (France) | Ministry of Development Co-operation | Trade association |
| Commonwealth Associaton-Uganda | Ministry of Education Jamaica | Transparency International Bangladesh |
| Corporate Council on Africa | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) |
| CSR and sustainable development | Ministry of Health | Universidad Politécnica de Nicaragua |
| Department of Agrarian Reform | Ministry of Local Development, Nepal | University of Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria |
| Droits Humains Sans Frontières | MIT Sloan | University of Guelph |
| EBRD | National Agricultural Innovation Project, Government of India | University of Guyana |
| Emory University | National Ombudsman | University of Maryland - College Park |
| Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory | National University of Rwanda | University of Maryland - Student |
| Finnish bilateral aid | National Wildlife Federation | University of Montana |
| FOMICRES - Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation and Social Reinsertion | NGO Hygie-Enwerem Foundation | University of South Australia |
| Foreign Ministry | Northwestern Oklahoma State University | US |
| Founder and MD of an NGO working on Brain-Gain | Nottingham University | US Department of State |
| Frontier Economics | Own a business developing green energy projects in Indonesia (PT GA Listrik) | VSA-COSCTAS |
| Gandhigram Trust, Tamilnadu, India | Oxford Instruments PLC | WFP |
| Geonuclear, Inc | Oxygen Marketing Agency | Wolaita Development Association |
| Global Washington | Planning Commission of Pakistan | World Bank (4) |
| Google | Private School | |

Table 1.1: Preferences on setting targets

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | (6) |
|----------------------------|---|---|--|-----------------------|--|-----------------------|---|---|
| | | | Targets for advanced developing countries (base: binding caps today) | | Targets for advanced developing countries (base: binding caps today) | | | |
| VARIABLES | No binding targets in developed countries | No binding targets in developed countries | Intensity targets or soft caps | Portfolio of actions | Intensity targets or soft caps | Portfolio of actions | Binding targets for advanced developing countries by 2020, if not today | Binding targets for advanced developing countries by 2020, if not today |
| | Probit | Probit | Multinomial logit | | Multinomial Logit | | Probit | Probit |
| Developing | 0.0165 (0.0839) | | -0.121 (-0.499) | -0.306 (-0.540) | | | 0.0750 (0.310) | |
| other developed | | -0.372* (-1.749) | | | -0.0489 (-0.192) | -0.533 (-0.912) | | 0.995*** (3.601) |
| BRICS+ | | -0.300 (-0.845) | | | 0.460 (1.053) | 0.657 (0.835) | | 0.239 (0.685) |
| other developing | | -0.191 (-0.657) | | | -0.218 (-0.612) | -1.407 (-1.270) | | 0.638* (1.747) |
| Africa | | 0.00817 (0.0252) | | | -0.666 (-1.517) | -1.309 (-1.159) | | 1.002 (1.612) |
| Science/engineering | -0.195 (-0.791) | -0.191 (-0.766) | 0.138 (0.460) | -1.552* (-1.912) | 0.142 (0.470) | -1.562* (-1.911) | 0.260 (0.897) | 0.304 (0.997) |
| Other soc. Science | -0.205 (-0.800) | -0.250 (-0.957) | -0.0559 (-0.182) | -0.669 (-1.048) | -0.0335 (-0.108) | -0.640 (-0.988) | 0.0204 (0.0671) | 0.00680 (0.0217) |
| Management | 0.150 (0.581) | 0.126 (0.484) | 0.0760 (0.224) | -1.026 (-1.253) | 0.0579 (0.169) | -1.107 (-1.340) | 0.168 (0.491) | 0.230 (0.643) |
| Other | -0.147 (-0.460) | -0.175 (-0.547) | -0.0216 (-0.0570) | -1.338 (-1.230) | -0.0106 (-0.0276) | -1.406 (-1.281) | 0.389 (0.935) | 0.469 (1.044) |
| Male | 0.563*** (2.692) | 0.568*** (2.702) | -0.0981 (-0.432) | 0.625 (1.048) | -0.0635 (-0.277) | 0.765 (1.268) | 0.0721 (0.315) | -0.0964 (-0.395) |
| Climate professional | -0.0850 (-0.405) | -0.0874 (-0.409) | -0.0583 (-0.234) | 0.528 (0.966) | -0.134 (-0.530) | 0.339 (0.605) | -0.428* (-1.831) | -0.401 (-1.632) |
| Environmental professional | -0.0688 (-0.341) | -0.0884 (-0.429) | 0.501** (2.073) | 0.485 (0.876) | 0.592** (2.387) | 0.709 (1.258) | 0.0917 (0.394) | 0.0688 (0.281) |
| Constant | -1.505*** (-6.252) | -1.308*** (-4.994) | -0.176 (-0.639) | -2.420*** (-3.734) | -0.186 (-0.605) | -2.284*** (-3.211) | 0.652** (2.296) | 0.307 (0.993) |
| Observations | 380 | 380 | 380 | 380 | 380 | 380 | 175 | 175 |

Table 1.2: Preferences on offset use

| VARIABLES | (7) | | | (8) | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| | Offsets (base: permitted but capped) | | | Offsets (base: permitted but capped) | | |
| | No offsets | Unlimited offsets | Offsets with discount factor | No offsets | Unlimited offsets | Offsets with discount factor |
| | Multinomial logit | | | Multinomial logit | | |
| Developing | 0.607* | 0.314 | 0.465 | | | |
| | (1.823) | (0.782) | (1.609) | | | |
| other developed | | | | 0.165 | -0.165 | -0.249 |
| | | | | (0.453) | (-0.388) | (-0.821) |
| BRICS+ | | | | 1.595*** | 0.533 | 1.081* |
| | | | | (2.655) | (0.668) | (1.948) |
| other developing | | | | 0.619 | 0.102 | 0.246 |
| | | | | (1.255) | (0.167) | (0.584) |
| Africa | | | | -0.289 | 0.207 | -0.149 |
| | | | | (-0.405) | (0.324) | (-0.292) |
| Science/engineering | 0.526 | -0.535 | -0.236 | 0.540 | -0.517 | -0.224 |
| | (1.286) | (-1.129) | (-0.632) | (1.310) | (-1.089) | (-0.598) |
| Other soc. Science | -0.0310 | -0.490 | 0.134 | 0.0211 | -0.485 | 0.146 |
| | (-0.0693) | (-0.995) | (0.376) | (0.0467) | (-0.978) | (0.408) |
| Management | 1.018** | 0.253 | 0.849** | 1.043** | 0.256 | 0.828** |
| | (2.108) | (0.460) | (2.049) | (2.134) | (0.464) | (1.983) |
| Other | -0.908 | -2.294** | -0.474 | -0.883 | -2.306** | -0.487 |
| | (-1.467) | (-2.152) | (-1.084) | (-1.414) | (-2.161) | (-1.101) |
| Male | -0.229 | 1.626*** | -0.289 | -0.201 | 1.644*** | -0.239 |
| | (-0.728) | (2.912) | (-1.088) | (-0.631) | (2.932) | (-0.888) |
| Climate professional | 0.457 | 0.323 | 0.285 | 0.330 | 0.286 | 0.201 |
| | (1.313) | (0.770) | (0.969) | (0.933) | (0.675) | (0.671) |
| Environmental professional | -0.570* | -0.499 | -0.0114 | -0.438 | -0.492 | 0.0600 |
| | (-1.645) | (-1.206) | (-0.0399) | (-1.246) | (-1.167) | (0.206) |
| Constant | -1.026*** | -2.239*** | -0.492 | -1.161*** | -2.159*** | -0.402 |
| | (-2.653) | (-3.787) | (-1.527) | (-2.656) | (-3.434) | (-1.123) |
| Observations | 380 | 380 | 380 | 380 | 380 | 380 |

Table 1.3: Preferences on reporting and verification

| VARIABLES | (9) | (10) | (11) | | (12) | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|-----------------------|---|-------------------------|
| | More regular reporting Probit | More regular reporting Probit | Verification for emissions reductions (base: international third-party) Recipient government Funding institution Multinomial logit | | Verification for emissions reductions (base: international third-party) Recipient government Funding institution Multinomial logit | |
| Developing | 0.234 (0.732) | | 0.307 (0.471) | 0.0417 (0.128) | | |
| other developed | | 0.282 (0.888) | | | 0.432 (0.571) | -0.340 (-0.968) |
| BRICS+ | | 0.0123 (0.0285) | | | -33.35 (-1.41e-06) | -0.0240 (-0.0433) |
| other developing | | 0.522 (1.024) | | | 0.564 (0.592) | -0.604 (-1.125) |
| Africa | | (dropped) | | | 1.261 (1.260) | 0.358 (0.697) |
| Science/engineering | -0.446 (-1.087) | -0.486 (-1.135) | 0.698 (0.747) | -0.132 (-0.315) | 0.718 (0.766) | -0.125 (-0.297) |
| Other soc. Science | -0.231 (-0.542) | -0.273 (-0.621) | 1.069 (1.196) | 0.212 (0.520) | 1.110 (1.225) | 0.201 (0.488) |
| Management | -0.826* (-1.959) | -0.849* (-1.923) | -0.0687 (-0.0551) | 0.0372 (0.0809) | 0.106 (0.0842) | -0.000584 (-0.00126) |
| Other | (dropped) | (dropped) | 1.039 (1.002) | 0.0323 (0.0613) | 1.009 (0.966) | -0.0119 (-0.0225) |
| Male | -0.0776 (-0.263) | -0.124 (-0.415) | 0.774 (1.106) | 0.638* (1.890) | 0.715 (1.013) | 0.642* (1.886) |
| Climate professional | -0.800** (-2.534) | -0.835** (-2.498) | -1.066 (-1.269) | -0.0350 (-0.104) | -0.930 (-1.107) | -0.0305 (-0.0890) |
| Environmental professional | 0.531 (1.620) | 0.502 (1.444) | -0.0894 (-0.130) | 0.0124 (0.0376) | -0.250 (-0.354) | -0.00462 (-0.0137) |
| Constant | 2.299*** (5.686) | 2.258*** (5.234) | -4.186*** (-4.451) | -2.173*** (-5.404) | -4.398*** (-4.140) | -1.994*** (-4.562) |
| Observations | 339 | 313 | 380 | 380 | 380 | 380 |

Table 1.4: Preferences on trade measures

| VARIABLES | (13) | | (14) | |
|----------------------------|---|-----------------------|---|-----------------------|
| | Trade measures (base: only allowed in narrow circumstances) | | Trade measures (base: only allowed in narrow circumstances) | |
| | Always permitted | Never permitted | Always permitted | Never permitted |
| Developing | 0.167 (0.645) | 0.423 (1.140) | | |
| other developed | | | 0.253 (0.928) | 0.355 (0.816) |
| BRICS+ | | | 0.219 (0.472) | 0.941 (1.587) |
| other developing | | | 0.348 (0.924) | 0.126 (0.198) |
| Africa | | | 0.303 (0.646) | 0.801 (1.273) |
| Science/engineering | 0.241 (0.759) | -0.352 (-0.719) | 0.239 (0.753) | -0.353 (-0.718) |
| Other soc. Science | -0.532 (-1.582) | -0.882* (-1.667) | -0.515 (-1.523) | -0.818 (-1.532) |
| Management | 0.240 (0.664) | -0.0613 (-0.117) | 0.278 (0.763) | -0.0200 (-0.0380) |
| Other | -0.0608 (-0.149) | 0.0277 (0.0500) | -0.0452 (-0.111) | 0.0292 (0.0524) |
| Male | 0.110 (0.449) | 0.000548 (0.00148) | 0.0963 (0.389) | -0.0233 (-0.0621) |
| Climate professional | -0.150 (-0.548) | 0.106 (0.266) | -0.145 (-0.523) | 0.0800 (0.197) |
| Environmental professional | -0.335 (-1.270) | 0.0197 (0.0501) | -0.341 (-1.272) | 0.0451 (0.113) |
| Constant | -0.395 (-1.335) | -1.544*** (-3.557) | -0.528 (-1.600) | -1.737*** (-3.442) |
| Observations | 376 | 376 | 376 | 376 |

Table 1.5: Willingness to pay and expected cost

| VARIABLES | (15) | (16) | (19) | (20) | (23) | (24) |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------|--|----------------------|
| | Willingness to pay | | Expected cost of effective action | | Expect cost greater than willingness to pay? | |
| | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | Probit | Probit |
| Developing | -1.867 (-0.945) | | 5.150*** (3.011) | | -0.564*** (-3.312) | |
| other developed | | 2.012 (0.960) | | 2.747* (1.902) | | 0.181 (0.948) |
| BRICS+ | | -2.856 (-0.896) | | 2.928 (1.369) | | -0.322 (-1.096) |
| other developing | | -2.353 (-1.075) | | 5.492** (2.587) | | -0.568** (-2.314) |
| Africa | | 3.753 (0.768) | | 13.03*** (3.316) | | -0.482 (-1.571) |
| Science/engineering | 7.398*** (2.733) | 7.467*** (2.764) | 1.232 (0.629) | 1.243 (0.646) | -0.0196 (-0.0905) | -0.0251 (-0.116) |
| Other soc. Science | 1.961 (1.269) | 2.132 (1.349) | 2.069 (1.015) | 2.211 (1.087) | -0.147 (-0.663) | -0.117 (-0.522) |
| Management | 3.513 (1.338) | 3.813 (1.461) | -2.033 (-1.104) | -1.715 (-0.952) | 0.245 (0.966) | 0.263 (1.032) |
| Other | 7.601** (2.046) | 7.649** (2.060) | 2.851 (1.097) | 2.873 (1.153) | -0.0857 (-0.305) | -0.0899 (-0.319) |
| Male | -1.439 (-0.752) | -1.741 (-0.910) | -2.748 (-1.571) | -3.183* (-1.822) | 0.00107 (0.00636) | 0.00262 (0.0156) |
| Climate professional | 3.351 (1.446) | 3.792 (1.606) | -2.237 (-1.451) | -1.534 (-1.034) | 0.344* (1.855) | 0.337* (1.779) |
| Environmental professional | 1.378 (0.651) | 0.936 (0.428) | 3.866** (2.388) | 3.179* (1.959) | -0.383** (-2.131) | -0.370** (-2.025) |
| Constant | 8.717*** (4.588) | 7.758*** (3.219) | 7.853*** (3.588) | 6.673*** (3.306) | 0.894*** (4.402) | 0.792*** (3.424) |
| Observations | 355 | 355 | 330 | 330 | 321 | 321 |

Table 2: Funding action

| VARIABLES | (1) Funding for emissions reductions Ordered logit | (2) Funding for emissions reductions Ordered logit | (3) Funding for adaptation Ordered logit | (4) Funding for adaptation Ordered logit |
|-------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| Developing | 0.678*** (3.173) | | 0.505** (2.248) | |
| other developed | | 0.776*** (3.323) | | 0.486** (2.063) |
| BRICS+ | | 1.078** (2.762) | | 0.232 (0.579) |
| other developing | | 1.145*** (3.665) | | 0.646* (1.952) |
| Africa | | 1.033*** (2.711) | | 1.459*** (3.699) |
| Science/engineering | 0.0806 (0.300) | 0.0782 (0.290) | 0.954*** (3.350) | 0.953*** (3.338) |
| Other soc. Science | 0.153 (0.569) | 0.225 (0.827) | 0.927*** (3.243) | 0.980*** (3.401) |
| Management | 0.0338 (0.110) | 0.106 (0.344) | 0.455 (1.487) | 0.493 (1.594) |
| Other | -0.290 (-0.874) | -0.250 (-0.743) | 0.444 (1.298) | 0.480 (1.400) |
| Male | -0.0721 (-0.359) | -0.136 (-0.672) | -0.189 (-0.903) | -0.260 (-1.231) |
| Climate professional | 0.347 (1.537) | 0.368 (1.608) | 0.231 (0.997) | 0.311 (1.320) |
| Environmental professional | -0.104 (-0.480) | -0.110 (-0.497) | -0.0550 (-0.243) | -0.156 (-0.674) |
| Constant | (cut omitted) | (cut omitted) | (cut omitted) | |
| Observations | 376 | 376 | 352 | 352 |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.1: Allocating funds to support emissions reductions (ordered logit estimates)

| VARIABLES | Cost efficiency | | Even distribution | | Past performance | | Capacity | | New opportunities | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------|----------|------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|-----------|
| Developing | 0.0394 | | 0.312** | | 0.422*** | | 0.254** | | 0.587*** | |
| | (0.294) | | (2.441) | | (3.238) | | (1.964) | | (4.365) | |
| other developed | | -0.214 | | 0.495*** | | 0.127 | | -0.0791 | | 0.175 |
| | | (-1.519) | | (3.659) | | (0.955) | | (-0.594) | | (1.307) |
| BRICS+ | | -0.508** | | 0.994*** | | 0.422* | | 0.425* | | 0.731*** |
| | | (-2.190) | | (4.398) | | (1.865) | | (1.841) | | (3.078) |
| other developing | | 0.128 | | 0.339* | | 0.403** | | -0.0975 | | 0.461** |
| | | (0.633) | | (1.806) | | (2.118) | | (-0.525) | | (2.413) |
| Africa | | 0.0850 | | 0.521** | | 0.713*** | | 0.570** | | 1.057*** |
| | | (0.351) | | (2.271) | | (3.002) | | (2.340) | | (4.102) |
| Science/engineering | 0.0789 | 0.0746 | 0.384** | 0.397** | 0.474*** | 0.473*** | 0.0415 | 0.0508 | 0.343** | 0.349** |
| | (0.464) | (0.437) | (2.427) | (2.495) | (2.966) | (2.955) | (0.263) | (0.321) | (2.130) | (2.163) |
| Other soc. Science | -0.117 | -0.166 | 0.306* | 0.388** | 0.140 | 0.153 | 0.00623 | 0.0209 | 0.257 | 0.289* |
| | (-0.686) | (-0.964) | (1.911) | (2.392) | (0.881) | (0.954) | (0.0388) | (0.129) | (1.576) | (1.758) |
| Management | -0.514*** | -0.549*** | 0.374** | 0.448** | 0.103 | 0.116 | -0.0794 | -0.0896 | 0.0966 | 0.115 |
| | (-2.768) | (-2.937) | (2.075) | (2.459) | (0.580) | (0.651) | (-0.443) | (-0.497) | (0.532) | (0.631) |
| Other | -0.253 | -0.263 | 0.689*** | 0.739*** | 0.238 | 0.246 | 0.122 | 0.115 | 0.259 | 0.267 |
| | (-1.218) | (-1.257) | (3.442) | (3.663) | (1.186) | (1.222) | (0.605) | (0.568) | (1.266) | (1.298) |
| Male | 0.257** | 0.264** | -0.230* | -0.254** | -0.246** | -0.266** | -0.0394 | -0.0458 | -0.252** | -0.280** |
| | (2.040) | (2.071) | (-1.926) | (-2.105) | (-2.035) | (-2.190) | (-0.328) | (-0.378) | (-2.050) | (-2.255) |
| Climate professional | -0.00624 | 0.0332 | 0.0788 | 0.0400 | -0.143 | -0.131 | -0.247* | -0.259* | -0.0844 | -0.0786 |
| | (-0.0454) | (0.240) | (0.606) | (0.302) | (-1.102) | (-0.995) | (-1.888) | (-1.951) | (-0.638) | (-0.587) |
| Environmental professional | -0.261* | -0.307** | -0.0189 | 0.0252 | 0.0503 | 0.0357 | 0.213* | 0.218* | -0.00376 | -0.0118 |
| | (-1.947) | (-2.262) | (-0.149) | (0.195) | (0.396) | (0.278) | (1.667) | (1.676) | (-0.0292) | (-0.0901) |
| Observations | 380 | 380 | 377 | 377 | 380 | 380 | 381 | 381 | 379 | 379 |

Cuts omitted.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.2: Allocating funds to support emissions reductions (ordered logit estimates)

| VARIABLES | Vulnerability | | Need | | Cost efficiency | | Even distribution | | Past performance | |
|----------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------|----------|----------|-----------------|----------|-------------------|----------|------------------|----------|
| Developing | 0.124 | | 0.583*** | | 0.242* | | 0.601*** | | 0.434*** | |
| | (0.919) | | (4.489) | | (1.886) | | (4.668) | | (3.348) | |
| other developed | | 0.306** | | 0.272** | | -0.326** | | 0.304** | | -0.109 |
| | | (2.162) | | (2.026) | | (-2.426) | | (2.222) | | (-0.818) |
| BRICS+ | | -0.0856 | | 0.862*** | | -0.0559 | | 1.092*** | | 0.339 |
| | | (-0.374) | | (3.766) | | (-0.254) | | (4.881) | | (1.501) |
| other developing | | 0.671*** | | 0.541*** | | 0.328* | | 0.522*** | | 0.344* |
| | | (3.195) | | (2.882) | | (1.713) | | (2.764) | | (1.818) |
| Africa | | 0.117 | | 0.920*** | | -0.198 | | 0.827*** | | 0.477** |
| | | (0.496) | | (3.864) | | (-0.853) | | (3.567) | | (2.036) |
| Science/engineering | -0.328** | -0.347** | 0.206 | 0.207 | 0.0705 | 0.0724 | 0.338** | 0.346** | 0.113 | 0.116 |
| | (-1.963) | (-2.063) | (1.291) | (1.299) | (0.446) | (0.456) | (2.109) | (2.158) | (0.715) | (0.732) |
| Other soc. Science | 0.00192 | -0.00538 | 0.144 | 0.183 | 0.0212 | -0.0212 | 0.212 | 0.262 | 0.0703 | 0.0604 |
| | (0.0111) | (-0.0308) | (0.894) | (1.130) | (0.132) | (-0.131) | (1.289) | (1.586) | (0.439) | (0.375) |
| Management | -0.204 | -0.174 | 0.0333 | 0.0620 | 0.0341 | 0.00264 | 0.238 | 0.270 | 0.0717 | 0.0607 |
| | (-1.079) | (-0.911) | (0.187) | (0.346) | (0.191) | (0.0147) | (1.317) | (1.479) | (0.404) | (0.341) |
| Other | -0.246 | -0.223 | 0.124 | 0.137 | -0.0742 | -0.0852 | 0.491** | 0.508** | 0.276 | 0.270 |
| | (-1.173) | (-1.058) | (0.616) | (0.682) | (-0.365) | (-0.417) | (2.437) | (2.511) | (1.364) | (1.336) |
| Male | -0.0875 | -0.116 | -0.197 | -0.226* | 0.182 | 0.222* | -0.0519 | -0.0721 | -0.0876 | -0.0846 |
| | (-0.687) | (-0.900) | (-1.626) | (-1.853) | (1.514) | (1.825) | (-0.427) | (-0.588) | (-0.727) | (-0.698) |
| Climate professional | 0.302** | 0.338** | 0.0546 | 0.0548 | -0.292** | -0.297** | 0.0450 | 0.0197 | -0.344*** | -0.339** |
| | (2.136) | (2.357) | (0.417) | (0.413) | (-2.239) | (-2.250) | (0.341) | (0.147) | (-2.633) | (-2.569) |
| Environmental professional | 0.0728 | 0.0560 | -0.131 | -0.126 | -0.186 | -0.192 | -0.185 | -0.157 | 0.0717 | 0.0632 |
| | (0.537) | (0.407) | (-1.025) | (-0.977) | (-1.461) | (-1.479) | (-1.425) | (-1.193) | (0.565) | (0.492) |
| Observations | 381 | 381 | 378 | 378 | 377 | 377 | 378 | 378 | 379 | 379 |
| Cuts omitted. | | *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | | | | | | | | |

Table 4.1: Preferences on governance (ordered logit)

| VARIABLES | (1) UN-like | (2) UN-like | (3) AF-like | (4) AF-like | (5) CIF-like | (6) CIF-like | (7) Shareholder | (8) Shareholder | (9) Weighted shareholder | (10) Weighted shareholder |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Developing | 0.682*** (5.227) | | 0.0457 (0.354) | | 0.325** (2.556) | | -0.183 (-1.327) | | 0.427*** (3.288) | |
| other developed | | 0.339** (2.433) | | -0.0277 (-0.201) | | -0.00522 (-0.0389) | | -0.417*** (-2.858) | | 0.230 (1.639) |
| BRICS+ | | 0.732*** (3.230) | | 0.293 (1.315) | | 0.360 (1.642) | | -0.446* (-1.786) | | 0.997*** (4.390) |
| other developing | | 0.725*** (3.764) | | -0.112 (-0.590) | | 0.137 (0.729) | | -0.378* (-1.879) | | 0.190 (0.986) |
| Africa | | 1.250*** (5.327) | | -0.0264 (-0.113) | | 0.593** (2.554) | | -0.369 (-1.516) | | 0.665*** (2.822) |
| Science/engineering | 0.226 (1.396) | 0.230 (1.418) | 0.178 (1.116) | 0.179 (1.119) | 0.313** (1.981) | 0.315** (1.996) | -0.178 (-1.059) | -0.170 (-1.010) | -0.167 (-1.033) | -0.176 (-1.079) |
| Other soc. Science | -0.0116 (-0.0697) | 0.0289 (0.172) | 0.116 (0.693) | 0.128 (0.760) | 0.122 (0.758) | 0.132 (0.813) | -0.286 (-1.607) | -0.348* (-1.929) | -0.108 (-0.651) | -0.0527 (-0.314) |
| Management | 0.0576 (0.317) | 0.0987 (0.539) | 0.211 (1.168) | 0.204 (1.118) | 0.134 (0.760) | 0.140 (0.788) | -0.0402 (-0.215) | -0.0856 (-0.454) | -0.266 (-1.426) | -0.252 (-1.340) |
| Other | 0.308 (1.504) | 0.328 (1.589) | 0.514** (2.496) | 0.502** (2.426) | 0.311 (1.521) | 0.304 (1.483) | -0.0603 (-0.275) | -0.103 (-0.466) | 0.0549 (0.269) | 0.0543 (0.264) |
| Male | -0.253** (-2.043) | -0.295** (-2.361) | -0.114 (-0.923) | -0.110 (-0.883) | -0.178 (-1.466) | -0.193 (-1.579) | 0.476*** (3.523) | 0.508*** (3.709) | 0.0369 (0.295) | 0.0236 (0.188) |
| Climate professional | -0.0602 (-0.445) | -0.0346 (-0.252) | 0.0980 (0.737) | 0.0689 (0.512) | -0.350*** (-2.674) | -0.348*** (-2.625) | -0.291** (-2.030) | -0.301** (-2.071) | -0.00918 (-0.0684) | -0.0587 (-0.431) |
| Environmental professional | -0.146 (-1.100) | -0.188 (-1.392) | -0.107 (-0.817) | -0.0819 (-0.617) | -0.0431 (-0.340) | -0.0552 (-0.429) | 0.278** (2.014) | 0.285** (2.028) | -0.0533 (-0.404) | -0.0257 (-0.192) |
| Observations | 366 | 366 | 356 | 356 | 365 | 365 | 359 | 359 | 361 | 361 |
| Cuts omitted. | *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | | | | | | | | | |

Table 4.2: Preferences on involving institutions in delivering climate funds (ordered logit).

| VARIABLES | (1) World Bank | (2) World Bank | (3) Regional development banks | (4) Regional development banks | (5) Hybrid | (6) Hybrid | (7) UN | (8) UN | (9) New climate fund | (10) New climate fund | (11) Bilaterals | (12) Bilaterals | (13) Domestic institutions | (14) Domestic institutions |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|---|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Developing | 0.131 (1.038) | | 0.453*** (3.496) | | 0.298** (2.323) | | 0.482*** (3.759) | | 0.365*** (2.676) | | 0.435*** (3.395) | | 0.620*** (4.647) | |
| other developed | | -0.284** (-2.122) | | -0.107 (-0.802) | | -0.201 (-1.500) | | 0.233* (1.735) | | 0.529*** (3.683) | | -0.0858 (-0.648) | | 0.297** (2.210) |
| BRICS+ | | -0.277 (-1.252) | | 0.264 (1.162) | | -0.101 (-0.455) | | 0.512** (2.292) | | 0.765*** (3.168) | | 0.0462 (0.205) | | 0.785*** (3.340) |
| other developing | | -0.155 (-0.842) | | 0.113 (0.608) | | 0.162 (0.868) | | 0.407** (2.184) | | 0.432** (2.202) | | 0.243 (1.322) | | 0.527*** (2.756) |
| Africa | | 0.525** (2.265) | | 1.132*** (4.553) | | 0.618** (2.560) | | 1.088*** (4.547) | | 0.898*** (3.509) | | 1.123*** (4.593) | | 1.270*** (5.027) |
| Science/engineering | -0.293* (-1.872) | -0.292* (-1.860) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.008 (0.051) | -0.0145 (-0.0923) | -0.0178 (-0.113) | 0.426*** (2.702) | 0.434*** (2.748) | 0.354** (2.123) | 0.375** (2.236) | 0.116 (0.745) | 0.120 (0.769) | 0.297* (1.880) | 0.293* (1.852) |
| Other soc. Science | -0.178 (-1.108) | -0.212 (-1.310) | 0.156 (0.966) | 0.155 (0.955) | -0.0392 (-0.240) | -0.0781 (-0.475) | 0.406** (2.491) | 0.438*** (2.671) | 0.177 (1.035) | 0.257 (1.484) | 0.403** (2.523) | 0.386** (2.399) | 0.695*** (4.209) | 0.748*** (4.464) |
| Management | -0.122 (-0.685) | -0.149 (-0.833) | 0.231 (1.295) | 0.230 (1.281) | -0.0719 (-0.405) | -0.0969 (-0.542) | 0.262 (1.471) | 0.297* (1.658) | 0.214 (1.148) | 0.284 (1.511) | 0.160 (0.899) | 0.144 (0.802) | 0.350* (1.950) | 0.383** (2.116) |
| Other | -0.132 (-0.664) | -0.171 (-0.859) | -0.141 (-0.702) | -0.156 (-0.767) | -0.129 (-0.649) | -0.150 (-0.751) | 0.626*** (3.077) | 0.653*** (3.189) | 0.502** (2.310) | 0.595*** (2.677) | 0.451** (2.236) | 0.437** (2.155) | 0.507** (2.493) | 0.520** (2.548) |
| Male | 0.281** (2.345) | 0.285** (2.352) | 0.112 (0.932) | 0.0863 (0.708) | -0.0704 (-0.583) | -0.0786 (-0.646) | 0.341*** (-2.795) | 0.385*** (-3.126) | 0.438*** (3.327) | 0.489*** (-3.668) | -0.00451 (-0.0379) | -0.0361 (-0.301) | -0.185 (-1.519) | -0.234* (-1.892) |
| Climate professional | -0.486*** (-3.724) | -0.458*** (-3.469) | -0.258** (-1.961) | -0.229* (-1.724) | -0.135 (-1.031) | -0.0978 (-0.739) | 0.116 (0.879) | 0.153 (1.143) | 0.159 (1.147) | 0.168 (1.193) | 0.0296 (0.229) | 0.0863 (0.656) | 0.0490 (0.370) | 0.0778 (0.581) |
| Environmental professional | 0.254** (2.005) | 0.206 (1.601) | 0.201 (1.576) | 0.162 (1.249) | 0.0756 (0.592) | 0.0271 (0.209) | 0.0238 (0.186) | -0.0118 (-0.0907) | -0.146 (-1.082) | -0.154 (-1.117) | 0.0851 (0.671) | 0.0194 (0.151) | -0.0142 (-0.110) | -0.0385 (-0.294) |
| Observations | 375 | 375 | 375 | 375 | 372 | 372 | 370 | 370 | 372 | 372 | 373 | 373 | 369 | 369 |

Cuts omitted.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Climate Policy Choices Survey - Center for Global Development

1. Before We Start...

Most opinion surveys on climate change ask participants about their beliefs about the scientific evidence, or their feelings about specific domestic legislation. This survey goes beyond these narrow questions. We ask you to spend about 15 minutes to give us your views on what an efficient, effective, and equitable climate agreement could look like. The 15 questions about climate policy in this survey present you with some of the same choices that climate negotiators are weighing, and that global leaders will tackle at Copenhagen and beyond.

An important goal of the survey is to discover on which aspects of a climate agreement people from different backgrounds agree, and on which they disagree. We begin this survey by inviting you to tell us:

1. The country where you grew up

2. Your country of residence

2. Sharing the Costs of Action

1. Parties agree that today's developed countries must lead in emission reductions, given their historical responsibility. Yet, there is disagreement not just over how much action they should take, but also over how definitive their commitments should be.

Which proposal do you favor?

- There should be a binding goal for developed countries as a group to reduce their emissions by a certain percentage of 1990 levels.
- The climate agreement should simply list voluntary emission cuts that developed countries have proposed or enacted in domestic law. (Currently amounting to reductions of about 15% below 1990.)

2. There is no hope of limiting climate change without action in some developing countries such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa where emissions are growing very rapidly. (Some negotiators think of these as 'advanced developing countries'.) Many of them are already launching vigorous measures. Yet, negotiators disagree on what actions can be fairly expected from them.

What should be expected of advanced developing countries in terms of action?

- Make binding commitments to reduce emission growth from the current trend (though not necessarily to the point of reducing absolute emissions below 1990 levels).
- Take on emission intensity targets (reductions in emissions per unit of GDP) or 'soft caps', with no penalty for failure but rewards for strong performance.
- No commitment to any target, but pledge a portfolio of actions.
- If you answered the second or third choice, do you believe advanced developed countries should promise now to take on binding reductions targets by 2020, conditional on developed countries having reduced their emissions considerably by then?

3. The current negotiating text includes a wide range of options on the controversial question of whether developing countries should be allowed to sell credits for their emissions reductions. This in turn would allow developed countries to meet their emissions reductions commitments by paying developing countries to slow emissions growth. If offsets were permitted, developing countries could sell emissions credits, e.g., for successfully decreasing the emission intensity of production, or protecting forests.

Should offsets be permitted?

- No offsets.
- Unlimited amounts of offsets.
- Offsets up to a certain percentage of developed-country commitments (perhaps 10%).
- Offsets are permitted, but a discount factor is applied: an estimated emission reduction by 1t CO₂ in a developing country is credited as less than 1t CO₂ to the developed country buying the offset.

Please include any additional comments

3. Funding Global Action to Reduce Emissions Growth

1. The investment needed in developing countries to limit warming to two degrees is thought to be roughly several hundred billion dollars annually, some of which may be channeled through carbon markets (if for example private polluters offset their obligations by financing

forest preservation). But additional funding is likely to be needed. Of developing country needs that are NOT covered through the carbon markets, what percentage should developed countries provide?

- None
- Up to 40 percent
- 40-70 percent
- More than 70 percent

2. Some public money (government contributions; fees from auctions of permits) will likely be available to help developing countries reduce emissions growth. Climate negotiators will have to define a formula for allocating these funds to emission reduction actions that different developing countries propose.

How important should the following criteria be? (Should not be a factor at all — Should play a limited role — Should play a considerable role — Should play a very considerable role)

- Funding the most cost-efficient emission reduction projects.
- Even distribution of funds among countries (e.g., equal amounts per capita).
- Rewarding a good past performance record (e.g., a reduction in deforestation rates or decrease in emissions over the past years).
- High implementing capacity (e.g., good performance in governance indicators).
- Supporting projects that open up new opportunities to reduce emissions. (e.g., a first project in a certain sector, or a demonstration projects for a new technology).

3. Developed country funding for emissions reductions in developing countries is unlikely to be significant and sustained without some form of mutually agreed measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) at the international level. Developed countries want developing countries to submit frequent and internationally verified reports (as developed countries do already) to the United Nations. Some developing countries argue that they should not be obliged to do so, consistent with their lesser obligations and responsibilities in general.

Should major developing country emitters commit to submit internationally verified national emission reports at least every other year?

- Yes
- No

Please include any additional comments

4. If there is international financial support for emissions reductions in a developing country, who should verify recipient government reports on actions taken and emissions reductions achieved?

- The institution that provided the funds.
- The UN, other international organization, or some other third party.

4. Adaptation

1. Developed countries acknowledge a moral obligation to help low-income developing countries adapt to climate change. As with funding for emission reductions, negotiators are at odds over how adaptation funds should be allocated.

How important should the following criteria be? (Should not be a factor at all — Should play a limited role — Should play a considerable role — Should play a very considerable role)

- Vulnerability (e.g., a combination of predicted climate impacts and importance of exposed sectors)
- Need measured in terms of per capita income (lower income greater need) and total population.
- Overall cost efficiency of each country's proposed actions.
- Good past performance record (e.g., improvements in water management or health system capacity) and high implementing capacity (e.g., good performance in governance indicators)

2. Estimates of the amount of money needed for adaptation to climate change in the developing world range from \$30 billion to upwards of \$100 billion dollars a year. Parties agree that these funds should be additional to development assistance (now about \$120 billion a year). But because it is hard to distinguish between development and adaptation projects (e.g., water management or disaster response planning), it is likely that funding for adaptation will face problems similar those that characterize development assistance, including, for example, so-called "absorptive capacity."

How much adaptation funding per year do you think can be effectively used in the short run, in addition to current development assistance? (Assume that funds are managed in the way you prefer.)

- None
- Less than \$25 billion
- \$25 to \$50 billion
- \$50 to \$100 billion
- More than \$100 billion

Please include any additional comments

5. Governance of Climate Related Financial Flows

1. Implementing an effective climate agreement will require new arrangements for managing climate-related financial flows. Some countries favor a limited carbon market, and would like to see most investment managed by international institutions. Even if world leaders put in place a strong carbon market, there will be a role for public institutions, for instance, in investing where the market cannot reach, or in ensuring the quality of carbon credits.

Should the following public institutions be involved in these tasks? (Should not be involved at all – Should take on only very limited responsibilities – Should take on some responsibilities – Should take on very broad responsibilities)

- The World Bank Group.
- Regional development banks.
- Hybrid instruments like the Adaptation Fund (overseen by UNFCCC, with World Bank trusteeship and GEF secretariat services), or the Clean Investment Funds (administered by the World Bank together with regional development banks, and with a separate board).
- UN organizations.
- A new World Climate Fund, under UNFCCC governance, with a full support structure, including a permanent secretariat.
- Bilateral donor agencies.
- UNFCCC-accredited domestic institutions in developing countries.

Please include any additional comments

2. Developing countries insist that climate finance is different from development assistance: it is not a voluntary gift, but a payment as part of a global compact to reduce emissions. Developed countries hope to retain some control over the use of funds. Therefore, negotiators have struggled to compromise on the balance between recipients and contributors in governing funds.

How favorably do you view the following governance arrangements in overseeing climate funding? (Excellent – Good – Adequate – Should not be considered at all)

- One country, one vote (as in UN organizations).
- A majority of Board seats for developing countries, but with a blocking minority of developed-country seats. (as in the Adaptation Fund).
- Equal numbers of Board seats for developed and developing countries, with consensus decision-making (as in the Clean Investment Funds).
- Shareholder voting (as in the World Bank).
- Shareholder voting, but weighted inversely to a country's emissions (i.e., for each \$ contributed, India receives 14 times more votes than the U.S., and three times more than China.)

Please include any additional comments

6. Trade

1. Countries worry that they might become less competitive if they impose strict emission reduction rules while others do not. Many want to reserve the right to impose tariffs on imports from countries with less stringent rules. Yet, developing countries worry that these trade measures would imperil market access, and want to prohibit them in the climate agreement.

Assuming that countries are only willing to take meaningful action on climate change if they can impose trade measures, would you permit them to do so?

- Yes. Parties may levy border adjustments that impose a burden on foreign producers equal to the burden emission control legislation imposes on domestic producers.
- No, trade measures should not be permitted at all.
- No, but parties may use trade measures against countries that persistently fail to comply with their treaty commitments, or refuse to join the agreement.

Please include any additional comments

7. Finally: How Much Action Would You Take Personally?

1. What is the *maximum* you would be ready to pay each year for a guarantee that the world will never experience a degree of climate change that you would consider dangerous?

The following percentage (%) of my household's net income:

2. If the international community agrees on action that is sufficient to avoid dangerous climate change, how much do you think it will *actually* cost your household per year?

The following percentage (%) of my household's net income:

8. Please Tell Us About Yourself

1. Your Age

2. Your Gender

3. Employment

If you would like, please identify your employer

4. Do you work professionally on climate change?

5. Do you work professionally on other environmental issues?

6. How knowledgeable do you consider yourself on climate change?

7. How closely are you following the Copenhagen negotiations?

8. Do you believe the outcome of the Copenhagen negotiations matters in whether the world succeeds in limiting climate change?

9. What is your highest academic degree?

10. Which discipline were you trained in?

Thank you for taking your time and sharing your views!