

PERSPECTIVES

**TOWARD A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE
WORLD: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE**

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**Toward a nuclear weapons free world:
A Chinese perspective**

Shen Dingli

This paper is published by the Lowy Institute under its partnership with the Nuclear Security Project, to raise awareness about how the security debate in China considers questions of the future of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament.

Introduction

The past year has brought renewed international focus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including with initiatives by President Barack Obama and a UN Security Council Summit on the subject. But this seemingly new global debate is in fact bringing much of the world more closely into accordance with arguments long presented by some other countries, notably China, which has openly advocated nuclear abolition from the very day of its first nuclear weapons test in 1964.¹

A major test of the seriousness of the current round of international attention on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation will be the extent to which it addresses such concerns as ‘de-emphasising’ nuclear weapons; that is, reducing their role in national security thinking and policy, and removing threats to use them first in a conflict. Without movement on this front, it will be even more difficult to persuade such countries as North Korea and Iran that it is not in their security interests to acquire nuclear weapons.

There is pressure and expectation on China from some quarters to be more transparent about its nuclear arsenal and to engage in a nuclear disarmament process. Given, however, the

¹ For recent official statements on Chinese nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy, including in response to President Obama’s proposal, see: Statement by President Hu Jintao at the United Nations Security Council Summit on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, New York, 24 September 2009. <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/hyyfy/t606550.htm> ; Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Expounds on China's Policy on Nuclear Disarmament at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, 12 August 2009. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t578645.htm>.

very small size of the Chinese arsenal alongside those of the United States and Russia, and given that China already has a policy of de-emphasising the role of nuclear weapons in its national security, it would be reasonable to expect Beijing to participate in nuclear disarmament only if Washington and Moscow have reached much lower force levels. In the meantime, however, China can contribute as a responsible stakeholder, including in addressing proliferation cases on its periphery and in other regions of concern. China's stance on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) are also indications of its intentions in contributing to a nuclear weapons free world.

The rising irrelevance of nuclear weapons to nuclear weapons states

For nuclear weapons states, nuclear weapons used to be the core of their national defence capabilities, and nuclear weapons policy the core of their respective national security policy. This was due to the deterrent role of such weapons. The formidable power of armaments far larger than the bombs dropped on Japan in 1945 served to deter inter-state hostility among nuclear weapons states.² No country was willing to withstand the destructiveness of a nuclear strike, be it a first strike or a retaliatory one. The deterrent value of nuclear weapons might have therefore avoided a third world war from happening during the Cold War.

Today nuclear weapons themselves are far more advanced and destructive than half a century ago, and they exist in large quantities, even if the number has dropped since its peak in the 1980s. Nuclear weapons have been developed and accumulated to an extent that poses an unparalleled threat to humankind.

There has been strong opposition to the existence of such weaponry ever since their invention. Many people even believe that the sheer existence of such weapons, not to mention their use, is essentially a crime against humanity. There have been unofficial efforts to work out a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC),³ similar to the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) or BWC (Biological Weapons Convention), to ban the possession, development, test, manufacturing, stockpiling, transportation and use of these armaments. A nuclear first strike or pre-emptive strike was held to be illegal and immoral by the International Court of Justice, due to its indiscriminate nature.⁴ It is hard to argue that a second strike would be any more

² See, Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Doran, eds., *The effects of nuclear weapons*, United States Department of Defense and Energy Research and Development Administration, Washington, DC, 1977 (3rd edition).

³ See, *Nuclear Weapons Convention*, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/nwc/index.html> (last accessed on August 30, 2009).

⁴ *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, July 8, 1996, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=e1&p3=4&case=95>.

morally acceptable than a first attack, as it involves the same indiscriminate destructiveness, although the International Court of Justice was not able to determine the legality of a retaliatory nuclear strike.

Despite the effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a deterrent during the Cold War, their actual use is not only morally impermissible, but its prospect has become increasingly irrelevant in the national security strategies of nuclear weapons states. These states spend far more resources on advanced conventional weapons than nuclear weapons, as conventional weapons are considered more 'useable'. It is advanced conventional weaponry, not nuclear weaponry, that has been employed in post-Cold War inter-state conflict, as well as combat against non-state actors.

Beyond basic deterrence, nuclear weapons appear to have little utility in protecting the interests of possessor states or in their dealings with each other, typified by the China-US relationship. For example, China sees US weapons sales to Taiwan as undercutting its core national security interests, yet Beijing's possession of nuclear arms has not served to deter this threat. In China-US relations more broadly, the United States appears to calculate that Beijing's overall interests in international security would override its concerns over Taiwan and that China would thus be unlikely to initiate a nuclear conflict, even though Washington might not trust China's nuclear no-first-use pledge. For its part, Beijing has repeatedly reassured that it will stick to an unconditional no-first-use policy under whatever circumstances, thus playing down the importance of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy.

Recent media reports suggest that the United States is considering movement in the direction of no-first-use in its current Nuclear Posture Review. Regardless of whether such a shift is likely, proper scrutiny of US policy and its history would suggest that the US doctrine of ambiguity or conditional first-use of nuclear weapons is virtually a conditional no-first-use.⁵ Despite the fact that some members of the American government have made nuclear threats since the end of WWII, the government did not carry out those threats. For instance, the US government threatened the Chinese time and time again in the 1950s – during the Korean War, the 1954 crisis between Chinese mainland and Kinmen/Matsu, and during China's assistance to the Vietcong's military offensive against the French colonialists.⁶ It needs to be noted,

⁵ Ambassador Stephen J. Ledogar, US Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, made the following declaratory statement of negative security assurances, on April 6, 1995: 'The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.'

⁶ See McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and survival: choices about the bomb in the first fifty years*, Random House, New York, 1988.

though, that China considered it prudent to acquire nuclear weapons in response to these fears, and even though by its actions, or lack of them, the United States showed itself unwilling to follow through on its threats.⁷

Nuclear proliferation as a security hedge

Though nuclear weapons are increasingly irrelevant to nuclear weapons states, this may not be true yet for some non-nuclear weapons states. When China was coerced by America in 1950s, Beijing responded by acquiring its own nuclear weapons. The United States seems not to have learned the lesson that coercion prompts proliferation: it has continued to be hostile to the DPRK, and Pyongyang has sought to justify its nuclear testing by adopting the self-defence argument for nuclear weapons formerly used by China. Though the DPRK has obvious room to improve its statecraft on this issue, the hermit kingdom's perception of American hostility helps to explain its nuclear weapons development.⁸

The improvement in US-DPRK relations near the end of George W Bush's presidency can be explained, ironically, as a realist response by Washington to Pyongyang's hardline position on the nuclear issue. The US logic on nuclear proliferation has turned out to be rather contradictory and pragmatic. Its approach to the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, prior to its first nuclear test, was unrealistic and high-handed. After the DPRK's October 2006 nuclear test, however, the United States swiftly shifted its policy toward Pyongyang, employing a new strategy of dialogue. This confirmed the DPRK's perception that only nuclear weapons of its own could temper American hostility. Thus, in negotiating with America to disable Pyongyang's nuclear program, the DPRK will clearly demand a maximalist pay-off while retaining the core of its nuclear weapons program, for fear of unfavorable future circumstances in which this bargaining chip may again prove useful. Until recently Pyongyang has maintained a tough stance vis-à-vis the Obama Administration, both for defensive purposes and to gain a high price for any future trade-off.

The DPRK case reinforces the argument that the main reason non-nuclear weapons states go nuclear is out of fear. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed a number of serious proliferation episodes, including nuclear testing by the DPRK, India and Pakistan; Libya's secret nuclear weapons program; Iran's clandestine nuclear program prior to 2003,

⁷ John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China builds the bomb*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1988, pp 11-34.

⁸ See Dingli Shen, Cooperative denuclearization toward North Korea, *The Washington Quarterly*, 32 (4) October 2009, pp 175-188.

whose extent is yet to be clarified; and Iraq's persistent pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the 1980s and 1990s.⁹

None of the aforementioned states aspired to acquire WMD primarily for prestige and national pride reasons, but rather for deterrence. India and Pakistan developed their nuclear weapons for deterrence, and India has a no-first-use pledge. Pakistan has not reciprocated, so as to counter India's superiority in conventional forces. Saddam's chemical and biological weapons were developed for military reasons, including against Iran and a potential US attack, although in the event Iraq was deterred by the then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney's threat of nuclear retaliation, should Iraq's chemical or biological weapons be used in the 1991 Gulf War. (This is despite the fact that, technically, Cheney's threat could have constituted a violation of an earlier US commitment to conditional no-first-use of nuclear weapons issued in 1978.) There is thus plenty of reason to assume that, drawing on the experience of other countries, Pyongyang views its nuclear weapons as useful primarily for the purpose of deterrence.

These states, falling under the definition of non-nuclear weapons states according to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), would justify their acquisition of nuclear weapon as driven by national security imperatives, similar to the justification of the acknowledged nuclear weapons states.

The 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) continues to be the best international institution to specifically control nuclear proliferation. But the NPT is premised on a bargain between the nuclear haves and have-nots: all nuclear weapons state parties to the NPT shall join to 'undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament' (Article VI). The continued success of nuclear non-proliferation clearly depends on progress in nuclear disarmament.

The idea of nuclear non-proliferation is conducive to world stability, but it is also discriminatory. Its promotion, therefore, demands serious policy shifts by all nuclear weapons states, NPT-defined or *de facto*: they must not only make their own efforts towards nuclear disarmament, but also must avoid offensive military gestures in their foreign policies. These countries need to uphold the NPT bargain and relieve non-nuclear weapon states of the need to hedge their security interests by seeking nuclear weapons. Effective

⁹ Such pursuit has led to the UNSCR 687 on April 3, 1991, whose Article 12 stating that 'Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable materials.'

non-proliferation thus needs a visionary attitude in two regards: reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, and minimising the role of power politics.

The need to de-emphasise nuclear weapons

On 14 October 1964, China first tested its nuclear weapons and proposed to convene a world summit to address ‘the complete elimination and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons’. Forty-five years later, on 4 April 2009, US President Barack Obama delivered a speech in Prague, echoing the earlier Chinese proposal for a nuclear weapons free world, in which he has committed to further cutting the US and Russian strategic arsenals through a START follow-on bilateral treaty, and a package of measures including entry into force of the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty), negotiation of an FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty), and a world summit on nuclear security in 2010.

While such an objective of global zero is commendable, it will not be effective unless coupled with reductions in conventional threats and an improvement in global security that obviates the need for deterrence. This author accordingly proposes a program of nuclear threat reduction to enhance both nuclear non-proliferation and global security. The program entails two key components: it applies to all nuclear weapons states, with a vision to go to zero; and it de-emphasises the role of nuclear weapons in national security and international politics, ending threatening nuclear postures in order to promote non-proliferation.

First, to cut the total number of nuclear arms in the world, the major nuclear weapons states must take the lead by irreversibly and verifiably dismantling a substantial part of their forces. Ideally, the United States and Russia would each cut their respective nuclear arsenals to fewer than 1,000 warheads (even as low as 500), bilaterally or unilaterally, and verifiably and irreversibly, to lay the foundation for multilateral nuclear disarmament. This means that Washington and Moscow will need to make further deep cuts after completing the START follow-on treaty being negotiated this year, which reportedly may permit a ceiling around 2,000 nuclear warheads each for the U.S. and Russia. If the START follow-on can be implemented by 2018-2020, the further cuts to 1,000 warheads or fewer on each side might be completed by 2025-2030.

All other nuclear-armed states, NPT acknowledged or otherwise, would then need to act either unilaterally or multilaterally to offer a phased program of global reduction of nuclear arms, in parallel to the nuclear superpowers’ deep cuts. At that stage, the United Kingdom, France and China, as well Israel, India, Pakistan, and the DPRK (if it has not completely dismantled

its nuclear weapons program by then), would need to join the United States and Russia to come to a consensus on arrangements for deeper global nuclear disarmament. This process might aim in a first phase for a global total of 1,000 or even fewer, before a second phase of efforts to reach the more revolutionary goal of nuclear zero, which most likely would require a different global security regime.¹⁰

A nuclear-weapons-free world is a visionary idea, but should not be regarded as impossible. Fundamentally, its realisation depends upon the nuclear weapons states' calculation of the costs and benefits to their security of giving up their nuclear arms. Only when the nuclear weapons states are convinced that their net security will increase without nuclear weapons will they not only accept but genuinely advocate a nuclear-free world. Many factors – the inertia of the traditional security mentality, interests of bureaucratic institutions, uncertainty about conventional deterrence, and fear of clandestine development of nuclear weapons inside a nuclear-weapons-free world – could all contribute to hesitation about ridding the world of nuclear weapons.¹¹ Visionary leadership, the ability to shape consensus, adequate public debate and participation, technical preparedness for security without nuclear weapons, and the ability to handle potential breaches of a nuclear weapon-free order: all of these factors will be instrumental in moving towards global zero.

Second, even before such an ideal world could be reached, nuclear weapons states could do a lot more to move toward global zero, both in their nuclear doctrines and in practical matters. While working on a scheme of phased nuclear weapons reduction, the nuclear haves will need to align their nuclear doctrines such that the only role of any nuclear weapon in any arsenal will be to deter the first use of other nuclear weapons: that is, a nuclear doctrine exclusively about deterrence. Though policies could shift depending upon the circumstances, a global no-first-use pledge by all nuclear weapons states would serve as a collective negative security assurance conducive to nuclear non-proliferation.

More would need to be done in other ways to reduce nuclear threats before a nuclear weapons free world could be reached. Globally, all nuclear weapons should be taken off hair-trigger alert status. The warheads and the launch vehicles of at least a large portion of each national arsenal should be kept separate, including to reflect a no-first-use doctrine, to reduce the vulnerability of such weapons to a first attack, and to lower the incentive to target such weapons with a pre-emptive strike. In the meantime, while reducing the quantity of nuclear arsenals, states should refrain from developing more advanced nuclear weapons. While

¹⁰ See, Regina Cowen Karp ed., *Security without nuclear weapons? Different perspectives on non-nuclear security*, SIPRI/Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992.

¹¹ See, Regina Cowen Karp ed., *Security with nuclear weapons? Different perspectives on national security*, SIPRI/Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991.

progressing toward a nuclear-weapons-free world, measures to assure the safety and security of existing arsenals should be permitted, but nations should not allow research and development for new types of nuclear weapons, or nuclear weapons testing, either by explosion or simulation.

To reinforce restraint in nuclear doctrine, nations would need to minimise the perceived threatening character of their overall national security strategies, including conventional force postures.¹² The DPRK's relations with the United States provide a good example of why conventional as well as nuclear threats must be tempered in order to achieve a nuclear weapons free world. The DPRK's development of a nuclear weapon program can be explained as a response to perceived US hostility, and not necessarily only nuclear hostility. Bringing about DPRK nuclear disarmament might therefore need to be conditioned upon the reversal of such overall hostility, and the United States – both towards the end of the Bush Administration and under the Obama Administration so far – has appeared to start recognising this.

Given that nuclear proliferation is essentially a response to threat perceptions, a successful non-proliferation regime will need to be able to deliver national security without nuclear weaponry. Measures to curb threatening postures, to provide robust collective security guarantees to dispel the perceptions of insecurity, and to dissolve the need to build national nuclear deterrence as a hedge, are all fundamental to further the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. This will require the international community to work in concert, forging a credible collective international security institution in which inter-state relations would be peaceful, the need for nuclear deterrence would diminish, and the breach of the prohibition on nuclear weapons would be unacceptable and bring penalties, not benefits, to the violators.

China's vision towards global zero

China has advocated a world free of nuclear weapons for decades. When it tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, Beijing immediately made a no-first-use pledge, and invited heads of nuclear weapons states to China for a summit to achieve a nuclear weapons free world.

In the forty-five years since then, China's nuclear discourse has evolved considerably. It has changed its position from being against a nuclear monopoly to supporting nonproliferation. It has also modified its defence of the absolute sovereignty of states, and now condemns

¹² The NPT requires that all parties 'undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control'.

nuclear and missile proliferation by the DPRK and Iran. Admittedly, China has backed off from an earlier statement about commencing its own nuclear disarmament when the US and Soviet cut their strategic arsenals in half from their Cold War peak. The United States and Russia have attained more than a 50 per cent cut in the deployed systems since that era, and China's position has become less committal in the quantitative sense.

With regard to doctrine, China's 1995 statement on negative security assurances was extended to include a positive assurance component as well. Although in that statement China undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, there appears some nuance as to whether its no-first-use commitment applies to all states or to NPT states only.¹³

China's evolution of its nuclear stance reflects its perception of the changing international security environment, and its own evolving position therein. As a recognised nuclear weapons state, China has become less tolerant of any proliferation. As a rising global power, it has to act more responsibly. As a potential world leader, it must be concerned about its own interests worldwide, for now and the future, and take into account its likely position in the world in the next few decades when formulating its nuclear policies.

While China still supports the notion of a nuclear weapons free world, it recognises the need to maintain the credibility of its own nuclear deterrent for as long as it possesses nuclear weapons. Therefore, at present China should be concerned about the following issues, in this order of priority:

- Sustaining the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent;
- Mitigating the threat posed by nuclear proliferation along China's periphery, and other areas key to China's interests;
- The timing of participation in multilateral nuclear disarmament.

Sustaining nuclear deterrence

Even though nuclear weapons are becoming increasingly irrelevant to the national security of nuclear weapons states, none of them would accept any erosion of the effectiveness of their nuclear deterrent for as long as they possess nuclear weapons. This could be seen as China's view of its nuclear weapons in the framework of global zero. It is true that China's security is increasingly defined by its comprehensive strength, especially in the conventional defence capabilities which its economic development increasingly allows it to afford. On the other

¹³ *China's National Statement on Security Assurances*, April 5, 1995, <http://www.nti.org/db/China/engdocs/npt0495a.htm>.

hand, it would be reasonable to expect China to want to sustain the effectiveness of its strategic deterrence until global nuclear disarmament is eventually achieved.

Beijing is reportedly keen to preserve the effectiveness of its strategic deterrence in the face of challenges posed by technological advances. Offensive nuclear strike capabilities of other nuclear weapons states aside, one of the major threats to the effectiveness of China's nuclear deterrent is wide-area missile defence, including space-based missile defence capabilities, such as kinetic energy or beam weapons systems. China perceives that the development of such systems would seriously jeopardise the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. An additional threat is posed by ever-improving precision-strike capabilities, including precision-guided conventional weaponry that increases the vulnerability of China's strategic nuclear forces.

The existence of these threats and Chinese efforts to counter them make it hard to foresee that China will participate in any multilateral nuclear disarmament initiative soon, given its small though opaque nuclear arsenal. Indeed, China might be expected to improve both its nuclear basing modes and force penetration capability in order to increase the survivability of its arsenal against a nuclear first strike or precision conventional strike, thus ensuring a capability for effective retaliation. To this end, China might feel compelled to modernise its mobile strategic platforms – the land-based mobile systems, and the next generation of its sea-based systems of submarines equipped with ballistic missiles.

In the meantime, China would do well to push for an international arrangement to restrict the deployment of wide-area ballistic missile defenses, and extend such restrictions into space, as part of its broader effort to prevent the weaponisation of space. Although China may have de-linked its requirement of such negotiations on a treaty on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) from another negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, this does not mean that Beijing has given up on seeking a ban on space weaponisation.

Promoting nuclear nonproliferation

In allowing the FMCT negotiations to take off, Beijing is presumably taking into account the increasing challenges of nuclear proliferation in regions of strategic importance. In both South Asia and Northeast Asia, China is surrounded by countries that either possess or are developing nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan first demonstrated their nuclear explosive capabilities over a decade ago. The DPRK has been moving along its nuclear trajectory, developing and testing nuclear devices, despite the Six-Party Talks that China has been pushing hard for more than six years.

Moreover, there is the latent risk of nuclear proliferation in Middle East, where China's interests are increasing due to its energy needs. Israel is a *de facto* nuclear-armed state, and the region has been plagued by Iraq's persistent quest for WMD in the 1980s-1990s. Presently, Iran still has yet to comply fully with the UNSC's demand on suspending its uranium enrichment arising from Tehran's past clandestine nuclear activities. Syria has also faced suspicions of clandestine nuclear activity.

China increasingly sees WMD nonproliferation as important to its near- and long-term interests, and aspires to establish itself as a responsible stakeholder. It has launched the Six-Party Talks to divert North Korea from its nuclear weapons course, and has worked with a different set of six countries (the P5 plus Germany) to temper Iran's nuclear ambitions. In both cases, China has employed both rhetorical and practical strategies, publicly condemning Iran and North Korea as well as supporting and implementing tangible sanctions – largely in areas of nuclear and missiles development only – as appropriate punitive measures. More broadly, China tends to understand the 95-nation Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), provided that the PSI complies with existing international law.

Nuclear arms control and disarmament

China is a participant in an increasing number of the global mechanisms to combat nuclear challenges, and is likely to be ready to join more still: it signed the CTBT in 1996 and is pondering its ratification of the treaty; and seems to have delinked its demand for PAROS talks to allow FMCT negotiations to go ahead.

Along with the United States and another seven countries, China's ratification of the CTBT is required in order for the treaty's entry into force, as demanded by the treaty's Annex II. Given President Obama's leadership and that the Democrats presently control both chambers of the US Congress, the chance of another attempt at the American Senate's ratifying the CTBT is on the rise. Meanwhile, after more than a decade of maintaining the Chinese nuclear arsenal without physical testing, China is likely to be able to maintain an effective deterrent under the CTBT regime through its own version of science-based stewardship program, and on technical considerations would seem to be increasingly prepared to ratify the treaty.

The call for a nuclear weapons free world has been renewed of late.¹⁴ Obviously, it will take time for the United States and Russia to negotiate and implement a START follow-on treaty after which they could meaningfully engage medium nuclear weapons states, China included.

¹⁴ George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, A world free of nuclear weapons, *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 2007, p A15; Toward a nuclear-free world, *The Wall Street Journal*, January 15, 2008, p A13.

Nevertheless, there has been persistent pressure on China to increase its transparency on nuclear weapons program and policy in the near term. While China is largely uninterested in unveiling its nuclear secrets until the United States and Russia make much deeper cuts to their arsenals, it has also offered some openness in engaging the rest of the world on its nuclear facilities and doctrine.¹⁵ It would be reasonable to expect that China would offer more such openness in the course of the next decade as its part of contribution to ensure that US-Russian cuts continue.

¹⁵ For an historical account of China's nuclear transparency during and after the end of the Cold War, see Chapter 14: China's decade of nuclear transparency, in Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman, *The nuclear express: a political history of the bomb and its proliferation*, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2009, pp 220-235.

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