WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

Contents

NORWEGIAN EMBASSY

The **Centre for Civil-Military Relations** promotes the open and responsible participation of civil society towards increasing the security of both citizens and the state, based on the principles of modern democracy, The Centre also endeavours to support security cooperation with neighbouring countries and Serbia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

The **Belgrade School of Security Studies** is a special division of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations which seeks to carry out systematic research and promote the academic advancement of young researchers, thus contributing to the development of Security Studies in Serbia.

Contact
Centre for Civil-Military Relations
Gundulićev venac 48, 11000 Beograd

phone/fax: +381 (0) 32 87 226
                +381 (0) 32 87 334
                www.ccmr-bg.org
                office@ccmr-bg.org

Editor's Word

Security sector reform is one of the central preconditions for any democratic transition. It pertains above all to an institutional transformation towards democratic control, as well as security cooperation and harmonization of the national security policy with other democratic societies. However, both in theory and in practice the security sector reform has thus far largely ignored a very important issue of cultural heritage. Having in mind that culture, whether political, strategic, military, administrative or otherwise, undoubtedly shapes institutions and the behaviour of people, that oversight has often resulted in problems regarding the development and implementation of the security sector reform. With the very idea to get a clearer view of this problem, the Centre for Civil-Military Relations organized an international conference "Culture and Security Sector Reform: Political, Strategic and Military Culture in Transitional States", which was held in Sremski Karlovci from May 7-10, 2009.

The goal of this issue of Western Balkans Security Observer, where some of the papers are inspired by the discussion at the above-mentioned conference are published, is to open a discussion in a wider academic community about the relationship between culture and security sector reform. We begin this issue with the paper written by Asle Toje where he presents strategic culture as an analytical tool. Toje's paper is particularly interesting because it represents a rare example of realistic analysis which successfully deals with the concept of strategic culture. He offers an explanation of origins and problems of the current strategic culture of the EU and points out the reasons why the EU «is not succeeding in realizing the system potential of a great power». Steven Ekovich focuses his attention on the relationship between democracy, culture and security policy. Although the military is a hierarchical organisation, Ekovich shows that it is not immune to democratic values of society such as «the belief in essential equality of all people, high level of trust in other people, respect of basic human rights, as well as observance of laws and the right to a fair trial». He ends his essay with courageous words, saying that "a certain amount of liberalization of defence is necessary for the defence of liberal democracy".

The following paper, written by Stojan Slaveski, deals to a lesser extent with the conceptual discussion, but it applies the

concept of strategic culture to the concrete case of Macedonia. He shows the way in which the strategic culture of that country has experienced a transformation and from "the culture of dependence" from the early 1990s grew into "the culture of an active participant". For its cultural specificities, Turkey has always represented an interesting case for the researchers of civil-military relations. In this issue of Western Balkans Security Observer Nilufer Narli confirms this statement once again by showing how, under the influence of Europeanization, "a new security culture is being born where the citizens do not see the military as a privileged and untouchable institution". Dag Ole Huseby and Zvonimir Mahečić show how Europeanization influences another candidate for the EU membership – Croatia. Finally, we conclude this issue with the paper by Nebojša Nikolić who analyses the administrative culture of the military and its influence on the advancement of the officers of the Serbian Armed Forces. I hope that the presented papers will inspire the conquest of new meeting grounds for cultural and security studies.

Filip Ejdus and Jelena Radoman

Strategic Culture as an Analytical Tool History, capabilities, geopolitics and values: the EU example

Asle Toje

The author is a Lecturer Visiting Fellow at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, Oslo

Abstract

This article disputes the notion that the European Union is unfit to develop a strategic culture for cultural or structural reasons or that it must change in order to facilitate the development of such a culture. Instead, it posits a counter-intuitive hypothesis: a EU strategic culture has already emerged and that its tenets are not those of a great power. In this article the EU strategic culture is traced in the Union's history, in its power resources, its geopolitical setting and in the attitudes of its leaders. The paper shows how the concepts of "strategic culture" potentially has much to offer in terms of insights to the foreign policy outlook of also complex actors.

Key words: European security, strategic culture, history, capabilities, geopolitics, values.

Introduction

Since first being introduced by Jack Snyder in a 1977 research report on Soviet and American nuclear strategies, the term "strategic culture" has grown to become an integral part of the international relations vocabulary. Snyder defined strategic culture as 'the sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to [nuclear] strategy'.[1] Some three decades later Kerry Longhurst, the last in the line of notable schol-

[1] See: Snyder, J. (1977) 'The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options', a project Air Force report prepared for the United States, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation R-2154-AF: 5.

3

ars, has sought to apply the concept as an analytical tool. She defines strategic culture more broadly than Snyder -- as a 'distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original conception. It is not a permanent or static feature. Rather, a strategic culture is shaped by formative experiences and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective's experiences (Longhurst, 2000: 200).

Generated at the crossroads of history, capabilities, geopolitics and values, strategic culture is an aggregate level of the most influential voices in terms of attitudes and behaviours. It indicates but does not determine what is expected of an actor, what the alternatives are or what courses of action are deemed possible. A pliable term, strategic culture straddles seemingly irreconcilable entities. Traditionally, "strategy" refers to how hard power can be applied to reach political ends. The stress on politics as the source of the objectives of strategy indicates that we are not talking about indulging in strategic acts for their own sake. The aim of this paper is relatively simple. It is on the one hand to give students an introduction to the pros ad cons of strategic culture as a tool of analysis, second to outline the key elements that serve to shape a strategic culture, and finally to illustrate how this framework might be applied in the case of the European Union. This set of goals also serves to give the paper its outwards structure.

Behaviour and culture

Most scholars seem to agree that strategic culture consists of a behavioural factor that can be traced in actual policy conduct, and a more subtle cultural factor that comprises stated and implicit expressions of ideas, expectations, values and attitudes. The question is: How are the two inter-related? Ann Swindler sees culture as the "tool kit" that enables actors to form strategies of action (Swindler, 1986: 273-286). She sees the significance of culture not in the defining of ends of action, but in providing the cultural components that are used to construct strategies of action (Swindler, 1986: 273).

The cultural and behavioural elements of the term have been the topic of some debate (Johnston, 1995I: 33-64). John March

Nº 14 · JULY - SEPTEMBER 2009

and Johan P. Olsen point out how the 'resurgence of sub-state and supranational identities have renewed interest in concepts like culture and identity as fundamental to the understanding of international relations' (March, Olsen, 1998: 946). Ronald Jefferson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein see culture as 'a set of evaluative standards, such as norms or values, and cognitive standards, such as rules or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and interrelate' (Jefferson, Wendt, Katzenstein, 1996: 33-75). Of course, strategic culture does not exist isolated from the real-world capabilities. After all, without credible capabilities any talk of strategy would be a largely theoretical exercise. Capabilities need not be used or even mentioned, but they must be credible. That said, in the presence of similar capabilities, different actors can act differently. Geopolitics, values and historical experience clearly play important roles in shaping strategic culture (Kincade, 1990: 16).

As Colin S. Gray argues, 'all strategic behaviour is affected by humans who cannot help but be cultural agents' (Gray, 1999: 49–69). If people share world-views and values, they are more likely to cooperate effectively. Culture is a context that, if integrated and coordinated, can help actors overcome even serious obstacles in cooperation; conversely, culture can be the determining source of strategic incoherence. Strategic culture is often used to explain what constrains strategic actors from making certain types of decisions. Studying action as well as discourse makes it possible to take account of the issues to which the actors are reacting, as well as the impact of experience on their policies. One might argue that the formation process begins when policy élites accept that using hard power is nothing but "a continuation of politics by other means", to re-phrase von Clausewitz' adage. By this, it is understood that military and economic rewards and coercion are means of pursuing political goals. David Vital rightly emphasises that an important criterion for measuring the strength or weakness of an actor is 'the capacity […] to withstand stress on the one hand and its ability to pursue a policy of its own devising, on the other' (Vital, 1967: 4).

We will now go on to trace some of the main milestones in the tradition. As strategic culture entered the international relations vocabulary, Snyder's definition drew criticism for mixing the dependent and independent variables by taking behavioural elements into the concept (Johnston, 1995I: 37).[2] According to Alistair Iain Johnston, the conceptual debate on strategic culture

[2] See also: Johnston, A. I. (1995II) *Cultural realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History,* Princeton university press, NJ: 4-21.

STRATEGIC CULTURE AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

has arrived in three sets, separated in time and emphasis. The introduction of the term was part of the reaction seen in the late 1970s against the primacy of game theory and rational actor models in strategic studies. The critique brought about a shift towards a diachronic, narrative-orientated approach where the past is seen to influence the present and the future. Early strategic culture scholars were for the most part narrowly concerned with the superpower–nuclear strategy nexus. To Johnston, the strength of the first generation lies in their predictive and explanatory power. If strategic cultures evolve gradually and permeate all levels of security policy from war and peace issues to geopolitics, then strategic culture is clearly a helpful concept for scholars and decision-makers when analysing strategic behaviour. Johnston saw the main weakness of the first generation to be 'a mechanical determinism' concerning the relation between culture and behaviour (Johnston, 1995I: 36-39).

During the 1980s, focus of the debate shifted from cultural predispositions and restraints to the analysis of manifest, communicated security doctrine, seeking to decipher "coded messages" in the strategic studies discourse. What Johnston calls the 'second generation' of strategic culture theories made a clear distinction between strategic culture and behaviour, as well as between declaratory and uncommunicated doctrine. Bradley Klein, for one, focused on a perceived gap between rhetoric and intent, claiming that the defensive nature of the US military doctrine was a decoy, aimed at providing a rationale for America's strategic posture, while the "real" strategy was far more sinister and concerned with willingness to employ force in defence of hegemony (Klein, 1988: 133-148). While the distinction between declaratory and real doctrine arguably helps avoid some of the pitfalls of the first-generation theories, it again raised questions about the nature of the relationship between culture and behaviour, which had been left ambiguous so far. How to avoid chasing the red herring of declaratory doctrine as opposed to the "genuine" implicit doctrine – how to avoid the tendency of the scientist to "discover" whatever he or she presupposes?

A new batch of strategic culture studies began in the early 1990s. The third wave sought a more "rigorous" approach to the topic by tightening the definition. Alastair Iain Johnston sees himself as part of this third generation, which has attempted to make the concept of strategic culture "falsifiable" in a near-positivist sense. Johnston argues that strategic culture consists of assump-

tions about 'the role of war in human affairs' and 'the efficacy of the use of force' and appears in the form of a 'limited, ranked set of grand-strategic preferences over actions that are consistent across the objects of analysis and persistent across time' (Johnston, 1995II: 37-38). This is achieved by cordoning off behaviour from "strategic culture" and treating the former as the dependent variable and the latter as the independent variable. This essentially cultural explanation of behaviour was sought to be rigorously tested by pitting it against alternative explanations, such as realist and liberal accounts. Jeffrey Legro is one example of those who use this approach (Legro, 1995). Johnston's persistent and consistent ranked set of strategic preferences are not seen to be responsive to changes in non-cultural variables, such as technology, threat or organisation (Johnston, 1995I: 38). By making the assertion that culture appears in the form of measurable preference ranking and behaviour, Johnston argues that this makes his definition falsifiable: in the sense that strategic culture is persistent if preference ranking is persistent; and that the strength of a strategic culture is indicated by the degree of correlation between ranked strategic preferences and displayed strategic behaviour.

At the turn of the century questions with regard to the durability of a unipolar order and the emergence of new actors, notably the European Union and China, led to renewed interest in the concept.[3] A "fourth generation" – to continue with in Johnston's terminology – has cultivated a rich flora of "strategic culture" research. Different academics often apply very different conceptions of the term. This is one reason why, despite the steady flow of papers and articles, there is little cumulative research tradition to speak of. Colin S. Gray warned that invoking cultural differences should be an explanation of last resort in social science (Grey, 1986). Culture can be used to black-box phenomena that can be explained in reference to measurable variables. For example, that a militarily weak European Union takes a defensive posture, while the militarily strong United States chooses a more offensive approach, can be spun into a near-mystical connection under the label of strategic culture.[4] Differences in internal circumstances can help explain the event-driven, post-ante policy approach of the European "weak federation", while the US "strong federation" allows for initiatives to be forced from the top.

The decidedly unenthusiastic father of the term, Jack Snyder has come out against explaining doctrine in terms of political or national culture (Snyder, 1990: 4). He warns against reducing

[3] See: Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. (2001) 'Beyond the EU / NATO Dichotomy: the beginning of a European Strategic Culture.' *International Affairs,* 77(3), pp. 587-603; Rynning, S. (2003) 'The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?' *Security Dialogue,* 34(4), pp. 479-496; van Staden, A., Homan, K., Kreemers, B., Pijpers, A. & de Wijk, R. (2000) *Towards a European Strategic Concept.* The Hague: Clingendael Institute. A selection of key contributors of the fourth generation strategic culture scholars are found in: Toje, A. Ed. (2005a) 'The EU Strategic Culture.' *Oxford Journal on Good Governance,* 2(1), 3-11.

[4] Robert Kagan's (2002) 'Power and Weakness.' *Policy Review,* 113, pp. 3-28, which was written in explicit reference to differences in US and EU strategic cultures, arguably falls into this trap.

social science to pointing out inter-actor differences and slapping a cultural explanation on them. According to Snyder, the abstract game theory's stripped-down assumption of a universal strategic rationality delivers more in terms of predictive quality than the check for ethno-centrism and size sought by introducing strategic culture. Snyder argues that although structural variables such as capability constraints clearly must be taken into consideration, it is also certain that there are distinctive ways of strategic thinking and behaviour that cannot be explained by rational actor-models, comparative advantage, technological imperatives and so on. Kenneth Booth asserts that decision-making cannot exist independently of cultural context since past experience shapes strategic behaviour. Booth also offers a timely reminder that cultural explanations do not exclude other explanations. Rather, time-tested models can be improved upon by taking on a cultural dimension (Booth, 1990: 123-124). As Sun Tzu Wu famously observed two and a half millennia ago, good anthropology is the basis of good strategy. As Ken Booth points out, a primary strength of the concept is that it can help make sense of the frequent misinterpretations among actors based on cultural differences and prejudice.

In the choice to focus on a combination of observable behaviour and discourse this work falls within the broad scope of Johnston's "first generation" as applied in the work of contemporary scholars such as Kerry Longhurst and Arthur Hoffmann (1999: 31-32). In doing so I concur with P. M. Martinsen who suggests envisioning culture as the product of the dynamic interplay between the two elements that rely on, and affect each other in a continuous process (Martinsen, 2003: 61-66). Needless to say, perhaps, this study is concerned not only with the attitudes and beliefs that flow from a distinctive European experience, but also with the EU style in terms of behaviour. While much of the Cold War strategic culture research concerned itself narrowly with the use of force, this study will understand strategy as the endeavour to reconcile the ends and means by powers with extensive interests and obligations, and will be concerned with the exercise of the "hard power" that stems from military and economic means (Kennedy, 1991: 5). The strategic culture approach focuses on how decision-makers understand and interpret the main attributes of the international system in which they operate and how these assessments influence their views on security policy. The approach is based on the assumption that concepts are tools to be applied, not declarations of faith. In the present context the concept is perhaps best under-

stood in the sense given by Russell Ackoff: 'an idealised research model for answering questions concerning the concept defined' (Ackoff, 1953: 8). Concepts in international relations are valuable heuristic tools that can be deployed to yield explanations for real-world outcomes. Rather than attempting to falsify or indeed verify the EU strategic culture, an inherently fruitless activity, the concept will be applied in a genuine attempt to illuminate the case studies.

The EU strategic culture

I see, broadly speaking, four reasons why it makes sense to introduce strategic culture in the context of the security policies of the European Union. First, the concept is non-deterministic and dynamic, and can be readily applied to non-state actors. The methodological individualist perspective can help clarify a field of study muddled by the redefinition of terms and replete with "invisible hands" acting as intermediaries between cause and effect. Second, the concept differentiates between words and action. This is useful when dealing with an actor prone to promising more than it delivers and delivering things other than it promised. The focus on stated ideals and outcomes also makes it easier to bypass the difficult question of the relative importance of the European Council, the Commission, the EU Presidency and informal groupings such as the EU-3. Third, the term is not exclusive. A number of strategic cultures can co-exist, embedded, for example, in the EU, NATO and the nation-state at any given time. And fourth, the term provides an effective link between strategic means and pre-defined political ends. The degree to which ideas and expectations are reflected in patterns of behaviour and vice versa is a yardstick by which the effectiveness of a strategic culture can be measured.

The European Union clearly possesses the prerequisites to form a strategic culture in terms of having extensive interests and obligations, and capabilities. There are, somewhat simplified, three approaches to the analysis of the EU strategic culture. One approach is teleological – assessing developments in the light of the goals to be achieved. This is the approach of the most important EU strategic document to date, the 2003 EU Security Strategy, which calls for the Union to develop a specific type of strategic culture, one 'that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention' (Solana, 2003).[5] From this perspective, a strategic culture

[5] See: Cornish & Edwards (2001): 597.

is seen as a tool – a means to an end. The second approach is to trace the EU strategic culture through historical experience, capabilities, geopolitical setting and values.

Identity and Strategy, the European Example

The European Union clearly meets the preconditions to gain strategic culture in terms of having extensive interests and obligations and the ability to coerce, induce or resist attempts at such. However, the EU lacks clear identity, self-contained decision-making system and practical capabilities to effect policy that is usually associated with strategic actors (Eriksen and Fossum, 2004). Actors do not start with a tabula rasa when they are faced with a challenge or an opportunity to act, but rather draw on the preexisting patterns, derived from situational factors that help determine what is seen as appropriate behaviour. Some of the most helpful contributions to date have contrived European strategic identity as the area of overlap between national strategic culture and the supranational/institutional element as discussed in Paper one (Giegerich, 2006). As Christopher Hill and William Wallace noted in 1996:

> Effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state's place in the world, its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal developments reshape them. Debates about foreign policy take place within the constraints this conventional wisdom about national interests sets upon acceptable choices, the symbols and reference points they provide enabling ministers to related current decisions to familiar ideas (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 8)

Building on that approach, this paper seeking the roots of the EU strategic identity at the crossroads of history, capabilities and geopolitics, as well as in the values of Europe as a whole. In the choice of variables, some readers will note the deference to Stein Rokkan's "law, economy, culture, force-model" (Flora *et al.*, 1990, pp. 135-39). Such an approach would clearly be of value in a detailed study of the EU strategic culture from the vantage point

advocated here, but it is a task for a more comprehensive study than the present one. The following analysis is not an attempt at a complete outline of all the factors shaping the EU approach to strategy, but rather an indicator of how the EU strategic identity – and thereby strategic culture – might be explained. Keeping in mind that the application and validation of strategic culture will always be art rather than science, let us have a look at four factors that are likely to have impacted the European strategic culture.

History

Ernest Renan (1882) famously pointed out that getting history wrong is an indispensable part of being a nation.[6] Although certain traits can run through the history of regions, most historical memories reflect the individual experiences of European nations and are too tightly woven into the fabric of the individual nation-state to serve as basis for a common European strategic identity. So, if one were to view Europe as a whole, what would be the defining historical experiences? Among shared pan-European historical memories, Christianity, the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution would all surely be important. The role of war in the unmaking and making of modern Europe should also not be underestimated (Tilly, 1985: 169-186). In Europe, the system-determining powers of the nineteenth century ended up as dependencies in the twentieth century through consecutive feats of vivisection. It is therefore to be expected that a desire to prevent the repetition of the past has influenced the view of power politics and the legitimacy of the use of force. The destructiveness of the world wars has helped drive and legitimise European integration. The integration project is also the manifestation of the EU security bargain delegitimizing coercive foreign policy behaviour in the region.

The experience of the Second World War convinced most states in Europe to opt for alliance over self-reliance as security policy (Reiter, 1996). While the Cold War brought foreign dominance to EU members on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the United States' (US's) primacy in Western Europe was by invitation (Lundestad, 2003). For five decades the US has guarded the status quo in Europe, effectively underwriting the European order. During the Cold War, the drawbacks of dependence were outweighed by the American commitment to the defence of its allies. The need for the EU strategic culture arose in the tension of three interconnected

[6] From his lecture, *'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?'*, delivered on 11 March 1882 at the Sorbonne, Paris.

changes. First, changes in the strategic environment raised questions as to how long the US could be relied upon as a guarantor of the European security order. The bargain, in which the US shouldered an unequal share of the defence burden in return for an unequal share of leadership, came under increasing pressure. Second, experiences such as the 1999 Kosovo war and the 2003 Iraq crisis deflated the intellectually fashionable belief that "soft power" was somehow replacing hard power in the post-Cold War world affairs. Third, once it was decided that the economic communities were to become a political union, security policy was an obvious field with great potential for integration. The EU has always been the most likely venue for a self-sustained European security order.

The historical experience of Europe has had a significant impact on its strategic culture, notably in the deep-seated scepticism towards reintroducing realpolitik into intra-European politics. The EU shares strategic space with 27 nation–states – and the regional hegemon, the United States. There are obvious reasons why the EU chooses seduction over coercion. The American guarantees help make the altruistic foreign policy approach of the EU possible. The Europeans are not unwilling to intervene militarily as long as the humanitarian rewards are high, the costs in blood and treasure are low – and 27 states are able to agree that this is the case. The experiences of the world wars have left a lasting dread of uncontrolled escalation that leads, on the one hand, to a deep reluctance to consider the use of force to achieve non-altruistic policy objectives and, on the other, to an emphasis on exit strategies. It is in this context that one must understand why the EU seemingly makes its own use of force dependent on the United Nations (UN) mandate. The EU preference for treating ESDP forces as the trans-border police force rather than the servants of raison d'état must also be understood as a product of Europe's history.

Capabilities

Although capabilities do not determine behaviour, they do limit it – especially when they are absent. The EU goal in terms of capabilities is a "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military force" for crisis management (Joint Declaration on European Defence, 1998). There is a gap between what the EU had been talked up to do and what it was able to deliver in terms of its

resources, the instruments at its disposal but above all in the ability to agree. The EU has gained an increasingly central place in the European security, not least because medium and small member states, unable or unwilling to maintain a full spectrum defence and look for collective arrangements. The EU also finds itself in the unenviable situation of mustering a new force amidst a general decline in military spending (SIPRI, 2004: 340).[7] The military capabilities that the EU can call up on a short notice are feeble in terms of numbers, weaponry and logistics. They are overall unsuited for deterring or compelling other actors.

Although the EU has made some headway towards assembling institutional frameworks to govern the ESDP, the Union still lacks an integrated command structure. In real terms, this means that military operations are likely to be carried out through framework nations, of which Britain and France are the most credible candidates. A more detrimental shortcoming is the flawed decision-making procedure governing the initiative. The EU is a weak federation with a fragmented centre. This significantly impacts its ability to make strategic decisions under pressure. The Council's unanimity requirement for foreign policy-making is an inherently conservative factor in the EU strategic behaviour. The lack of an effective policy-making procedure curbs the EU's ability to mobilise economic or armed force for political purposes. When time constraints prevent carefully crafted ambiguities and consensus building, European unity tends to crumble under the conflicting short-term interests of the member states. As the *CFSP Forum* list of operations illustrate, the EU is more apt in dealing with trivial issues low on the international agenda. The cumbersome formal procedures destine the EU to rely largely on the ad hoc foreign policy-making by the informal trilateral directorate of Germany, France and Britain and the agenda-setting of the rotating EU Presidency, which helps explain the apparent lack of focus in the EU security policy.

Despite declaring the capabilities "operational" on several occasions, in 2007, the EU could still not be said to have the capacity for autonomous action in any real sense of the term, because of persistent shortfalls in core areas (Cornish and Edwards, 2005: 801-804). This has limited the geographical and mission scope of the EU operations to primarily mitigating instability in the European periphery, supplemented by small-scale operations farther afield. If the EU formations were to become fully operational, their "light and mobile" focus could make them a highly effective

[7] Overall European military spending fell from $200 billion in 1994 to $195 billion in 2003. In 2005 Europe was the only region in the world with a decrease in military spending, by 1.7 percent, especially due to Western European spending cuts

force. Such a force could shift the transatlantic power–burden sharing equation and allow for a more proactive EU foreign policy approach. The ability to issue credible threats can open the possibility of deterring or coercing where the EU now is wired to rely primarily on positive incentives and persuasion. This, of course, would depend on the EU states being able to agree on measures. By 2008 the much-discussed capability–expectations gap has been replaced by a narrower consensus–expectations gap. The capabilities and frameworks are in place but remain largely unused as a result of a decision-making mechanism that relies on a 27-state consensus. Due to the decision-making mode that trades efficiency for legitimacy, the EU's capacity to respond effectively in times of crisis is limited and will remain so in the foreseeable future (Toje, 2008b: 17-33).

Geopolitical setting

Christopher Hill has pointed out that "students of the European Union have for too long neglected geopolitics, either because they could not see its relevance to a "civilian power" or because they were uneasy with that kind of discourse for normative reasons" (Hill, 2002: 99). Unless the EU embraces structural determinism, it remains clear that a number of constant variables will curb its strategic legroom. One such factor is geopolitics. The most important geopolitical function of the EU is its very existence, which has helped take the sting out of the great power rivalry among Germany, France and Britain. Although the EU is not a vehicle for the territorial defence of its members, this does not mean that the Union is entirely free from territoriality. The natural barriers of the EU are the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, while no similar barriers exist in the east.

In strategic terms, the EU has an exposed eastern flank. In the absence of hostile neighbours in the east, the EU has enjoyed a degree of success in furthering stability along its borders through positive measures, notably the prospect of the EU membership. Yet the current unwillingness or inability of the EU to agree on when enlargement is no longer an option has strategic implications. To indicate rewards such as membership and then fail to deliver is risky strategic behaviour, especially

when the EU pretends that this is a bureaucratic question and not a strategic one. A similar situation is also arising in the east with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO's) failure to extend frontline defences to the new members, which has encouraged fringe states to actively seek further enlargement in order to escape their buffer status.[8] The overlap between Russian and EU spheres of influence along the length of the EU's outer borders carries an inherent potential for conflict. The EU non-policy towards Turkey and Russia is indicative of a more important point: the EU persistently fails to interact strategically with large powers. It also illustrates the dangers of over-promising and under-delivering in terms of strategy. The EU runs the risks of alienating not only Turkey, but also Russia.

More than any other area, Africa has been singled out as the "natural theatre" for EU exercise of hard power.[9] The strategic importance of Africa is far from self-evident. A more likely reasoning is geopolitical: Africa is one of the few regions where the EU can practice using hard power without trespassing on the interest spheres of more powerful actors, although the rise of China as an African power is rapidly closing this window of opportunity. A third region of strategic significance to the EU is North America. American primacy in Europe is the main constraining factor for the EU as a strategic actor. Although strategic self-reliance, as we have seen, is a relative term, the EU is more dependent than most. The territorial integrity of most EU states is underwritten by the American security guarantees through the NATO, an organisation based on individual, not collective, memberships, and where the EU does not act as a bloc.

The past decade has witnessed a historically novel situation in which the EU is assembling a security framework that apparently duplicates the US-sponsored security architecture in Europe, while continuing to rely on the US for defence guarantees and strategic leadership. A series of hard-fought compromises aimed at bringing together the EU and the US security architectures have guaranteed that the NATO is to remain the primary security organisation in Europe and that the US is to retain primacy in the NATO (Betts, 2005). The EU persistently fails to interact strategically with the US, but rather waits for Washington to decide. Since the NATO and the EU draw essentially on the same resources, participation in ventures such as the International Stabilisation Force in Afghanistan will signif-

[8] The "*Drang nach Osten*" of the exposed states was apparent in the role played by the EU in the 2005 "Orange Revolution" in the Ukraine when, on Poland's bequest, the EU was launched headlong into the Russian sphere of interest with little apparent forethought.

[9] Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the CFSP, speaking at Pembroke College, Cambridge, England, November 2005.

**STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM**

icantly limit the EU's capacity for its own operations. The threats facing Europe are latent, and deciding whether or not to address them is voluntary as opposed to the imperatives of the Cold War. American security guarantees coupled with an absence of clear territorial threats translates into an overall sense of security that is bound to have an impact on the EU's strategic culture, leaving greater room for the importance of values.

Values

As Henry Kissinger has noted, values are the unspoken assumptions on which our behaviour is ultimately based. The EU is not a federation, but a grouping of states. In the absence of any defined raison d'état, the stability, coherence and endurance of the EU is to an uncommon degree rooted in shared cultural and ideological experiences as well as values. For the EU as an actor, values occupy the same space usually occupied by the national interest in state actors. While the link between public opinion and strategy is tenuous, the prevalent beliefs held by the strategic elite are unquestionably of key importance. Many of Europe's political leaders attended universities in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the turbulent decades in European history. Frustration over the Vietnam War and the Prague Spring was mixed with the impact of economic stagnation and decreased attentiveness to European concerns by the increasingly bilateral US–Soviet partnership (Sloan, 2003: 79–80). A widespread sense of powerlessness and disillusionment gave impetus to a host of counter-cultures spanning a broad array of reformist causes, from ecology movements to New Age religion, multiculturalism, internationalism and peace movements. These movements were united in the belief that the world could be, or already had been, fundamentally changed by new ideas and new assumptions. This spawned a rejection of national interests and national identity among the intellectual elite. Although practices such as peace marches may seem naďve today, many at the time believed that they were in fact changing the world.[10] These years were formative for the deeply politicised generation that made up much of the European political elite during the formative years of the

[10] As it later turned out, the Soviet Union was manipulating the pacifist instincts of many Europeans, as illustrated by Andrew, C. (2000) *The Mitrokhin archive*. London: Penguin, pp. 80–87.

CFSP/ESDP nexus. As a result, the EU as a whole has been more profoundly influenced by liberal internationalism.

Values are essential to understanding the EU approach to strategy, where the raison d'ętre of the ESDP is often framed in idealist terms. Abstracts such as Europeanization – with its disputed definition, uncertain effects and unclear instructions on how it is encouraged or indeed reversed – are too wobbly to put to strategic use. The EU is instead furthering liberal democracy, that is, the blend of rule of law, human rights, protection of minorities and the merits of the market economy (Copenhagen Criteria for joining the European Union, 1993). The strength of belief in the rightness of these values is reflected in the enthusiasm with which the EU imposes them on others, notably prospective members and third world countries. The EU leaders simply assume that all the EU members have the same interests. This assumption may well be idealistic, but also very naive. The result is that the EU attempts in formulating strategic beliefs rarely rise above platitudes and stating the obvious. The "values" driving the European integration are, on the whole, unsuited for calculating power politics. Acquiring hard power capabilities has not weakened the EU's self-image as a civilian, rather than military, power. As the EU insider Steven Everts notes, the EU is, above all, willing to defend its values by offering diplomatic discourse and huge sums of money (Everts, 2001: 39–51).

Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, speaking in London in 2002, said that "the EU must not develop into a military superpower but must become a great power that will not take up arms at any occasion in order to defend its own interests." The elite perception is often cast in terms of the EU being the supranational successor to the nation–state – a linear perspective where not only the nation–state, but also the security concerns of the nation–state are passé.[11] "Multilateralism" and "Europeanization" have a central place in the EU founding myth. Multilateralism is presupposed to bring about outcomes that are "fair" and "just", which is assumed to be the opposite of power politics and unilateralism (European Security Strategy, 2003: 11). Europeanization is seen as making states so interdependent that armed coercion is no longer an option. According to this narrative, the EU, not the US, is given the credit for securing peace in the region. The underlying point is that the historical mission of the Union is to deliver Europe

[11] While such sentiments are regularly expressed by leading figures, the extent to which the world–federalist thoughts have influenced thinking on European integration remains an under-researched topic.

STRATEGIC CULTURE AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

from realpolitik, not be the vehicle for it. The federalist undercurrent also helps explain the high esteem reserved for the United Nations in the EU lore (Ibid). In the core assumption that the international system is experiencing essentially the same transformation that most human societies have undergone, from violent anarchy to a law-governed society, the EU strategic approach can be dubbed "doctrinal idealism".

The EU Strategic Culture

Having been forged in the tension of intra-European sovereignty, interdependence and transatlantic reliance, the strategic behaviour of the EU is above all characterised by dependence. The EU's multilateralist mantra and pro-UN sentiments show the EU to be as an actor whose leaders consider that it can never make a significant impact on the system when acting alone. The EU depends on the US for political leadership and military support. The European experience vis-ŕ-vis the US after the Cold War has been to avoid direct strategic interaction. As noted initially, the Union has failed to display the traits usually associated with emerging powers in the international system.

The EU's predicament is that the amount of resources available for allocation is relatively small. If the test of a great power is the test of strength for war, then the EU surely is not a great power. The EU is economically strong and militarily weak. The limited ability to project hard power, both in terms of hardware and policy-making procedures, predisposes the EU to a strategic culture that places less value on power and military strength and more value on such soft power tools as constructive engagement, critical dialogue and commercial ties. The Europeans frequently invoke moral and normative policy positions to justify policies and reduce foreign policy costs through multilateralism. The result is a union of 27 democracies that effectively defers authority for when to act militarily to the United Nations (Ibid). The EU strategic culture is inclined towards cooperative damage-limitation strategies, as illustrated by the eagerness to limit strategic possibilities by self-imposed rules of restraint. This is, of course, the reflection of belief (or hope) that other actors are equally committed to the supposedly universal rules of restraint.

The operational nature of the institutional structures is illustrated by the noted EU pre-and post-conflict missions, spanning from Caucasus to Central Africa, from Hindu Kush to Kosovo. The EU military operations to date have all been limited operations in the areas of little significance to other great powers and where the chances of uncontrolled escalation are remote. Rather than simply slapping a "lowest common denominator" label on the EU approach to strategy, it would be more accurate to say that by seeking the middle ground, the member states have agreed upon a community interest and upgraded it into a strategy. The increasing rate of operations indicates that the EU strategic culture is getting firmer, if we accept Vital's claim that the capacity to pursue a policy of its own devising is one indicator of strategic strength, although the Union still has a long way to go, especially when it comes to coherence in the face of American pressure.

So if these are the traits of the European strategic culture, then what are the implications for the EU policies? While the factors listed above certainly restrict the EU strategic culture, this does not mean that the EU is powerless. The enlargements of the EU have shown that the Union has few qualms about imposing its values on others and that it can mobilise its economic power to a measurable strategic effect, provided the others are not what Stephen Walt calls "states that matter" (Walt, 1987: 18). In its apparent lack of will or power, the Union is continuously furthering its common values, both internally and externally, without the threat or use of force. The EU strategic approach is to mitigate instability on the European periphery by integrating potential adversaries and making them a part of a greater whole. Europe absorbs problems and conflicts instead of directly confronting them. The EU strategic culture is most apparent when dealing bilaterally with inconsequential powers.

The problem is that the CFSP/ESDP has proclaimed itself to be much more than that. The 2010 Headline Goal states: "The European Union is a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security." This is clearly misleading. The EU may dabble in issues on the international agenda, but cannot, in its present shape, purport to be an upholder of the international order. That cannot be achieved without embracing the great power potential inherent in the 27-state bloc. One must not forget that Europe is declining in terms of global share of population and world economy. Behind the talk of how the

**STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM**

world has changed, Europe is slipping. In the medium term, Europe's great powers are likely to be relegated to the third-power division by the rise of new great powers such as China and India. The EU is the only realistic alternative for the European resurgence. Seen collectively, Europe has the tools – the capabilities, the technology, the finances and the population – of a great power, but lacks the consensus.

Why has the EU developed this distinct strategic culture? The obvious answer to this question lies in the way that EU foreign policy decisions are made. It is perhaps to be expected that a Union based on equal membership that is, for the most part, made up of small states, would be influenced by their strategic outlook. The ease with which four neutral states have joined the CFSP/ESDP is a testimony to distinct nature of the EU strategic culture. The second answer is revealed in the case of Germany. Europe's largest state is currently the only great power apparently willing to channel its strategic ambitions through the EU. Eager not to repeat past mistakes, Germany embraces the EU's "play small" approach.[12] Finally, there is what Rothstein (1968) calls "the temptations of appearing insignificant." (p. 27). Considering the high stakes of great power politics, this sort of strategic culture can be seen as insulating the EU against costly foreign policy adventures. There is no direct link between our intentions and the outcomes that our actions produce (Merton, 1936: 894-904). The law of unintended consequences is sometimes harsh on those who favour hard power. Perhaps the EU's reluctance to "go looking for monsters to destroy" should be lauded, not lamented.[13]

The counterargument was summed up by Raymond Aron in 1976: "Yesterday, Europe only just avoided perishing from imperial follies and frenzied ideologies, she could perish tomorrow through historical abdication'. Although it is somewhat disheartening to discover that the pooled power of 27 states does not amount to more, this does not mean that the EU is stuck in the status quo. The four dimensions discussed in this paper are inter-wired and mutually influence each other. The geopolitical setting with a lack of threats and with the US guarantees, the historical memories of the dangers of power politics, the capability–expectations gap and doctrinal idealism all help to explain why the EU falls short of the system-determining potential of a great power. Strategic culture changes when a shift occurs in any of the variables (for instance, the US disen-

[12] According to a 1991 RAND Corporation survey, a majority of Germans saw Switzerland as an appropriate model for the new Germany's role in international affairs.

[13] To paraphrase the title of the 4th of July address given by US Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in 1821, "America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy."

gagement, a new existential threat arising, the arrival of new defence technologies or an ideological shift towards doctrinal realism), thus instigating change in the other variables. The placement of states in a system accounts for a good deal of their behaviour. The choice, however, is a constraining one. Because of the extent of the interests, larger units existing in a larger arena tend to take on system-wide tasks; with its looming presence in the system, the EU may well find that it has global interests to mind and global tasks to perform.

References:

1. Ackoff, R. (1953) *The Design of Social Research*. Chicago, Chicago University Press.

2. Andrew, C. (2000) *The Mitrokhin archive*. London: Penguin; pp. 80–87.

3. Aron, R. (1976) 'The crisis of European idea.' *Government and Opposition*, 11(1), pp. 5–19.

4. Betts, R. (2005) 'The political support system for American primacy.' *International Affairs*, 81(1), pp. 1–14.

5. Booth, K. (1990) 'The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed.' In *Strategic Power USA / USSR,* ed. C. G. Jacobsen, pp. 123-124. London, Macmillan.

6. Cornish, P., and Edwards, G. (2005) 'The strategic strategic culture of the European Union: A progress report.' *International Affairs*, 81(4), pp. 801–804.

7. Database of ESDP missions. (2007) *CFSP Forum*, 5(1), pp. 17–22. Accessed 21 September 2008. Available from: 222.fornet.info/CFSPforum.html

8. Eriksen, E. O. and Fossum, J. E. (2004) 'Europe in search of legitimacy: Strategies of legitimation assessed.' *International Political Science Review*, *25*(4), pp. 435–459.

9. European Council. (1993a) '*Copenhagen Criteria for joining the European Union.*' Presidency Conclusions, *SN 180/93*, Copenhagen, 21–22 June; pp. 10–15.

10. European Council. (2004a) '*2010 Headline Goal.*' Decided by the Council on 17 May 2004 and endorsed by the European Council on 17/18 June 2004. Accessed 18 January 2009 from: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf

11. European Council. (2004a) *2010 Headline Goal*. Available from: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf

12. Everts, S. (2001) 'A question of norms: Transatlantic divergences in foreign policy.' *International Spectator,* 36(2), pp. 39–51.

13. Flora, P., Kuhnle, S., and Urwin, D. (eds.) (1999) *State formation, nation-building, and mass politics in Europe: The theory of Stein Rokkan*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

14. Giegerich, B. (2006) *European security and strategic culture: National responses to the EU's security and defence policy.* Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos and Meyer, C.O.

15. Giegerich, B. (2006) *The quest for a European strategic strategic culture: Changing norms on security and defence in the European Union.* Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

16. Gray, C. S (1999) 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back.' *Review of International Studies,* 25(1), pp. 49–69.

17. Gray, C. S. (1986). *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*. Lanham, Hamilton Press.

18. Hill, C. (2002). The geopolitical implications of enlargement. In *Europe unbound: Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union,* ed. J. Zielonka, pp. 95–116. London: Stoughton.

19. Hoffmann, A. and Longhurst, K. (1999) 'German Strategic Culture in Action.' *Contemporary Security Policy,* 20(2), 31-32.

20. Jefferson, R. L., Wendt, A. and Katzenstein, P. J. (1996) 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security Policy.' In *The Culture of National Security*, ed. P. J. Kazenstain, pp. 33-75. New York: Columbia University Press.

21. Johnston, A. I. (1995) 'Thinking about Strategic Culture.' *International Security,* 19(4), pp. 33-64.

22. Johnston, A. I. (1995) *Cultural realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History.* New York: Princeton university press.

23. Joint Declaration on European Defence. (1998) British French Summit. Saint Malo, France**.** Accessed 12 January, 2005. Available from: www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2002/02/joint-declaration-on-eu-new01795

24. Kincade, W. (1990) 'American National Style and Strategic Culture.' In *Strategic Power USA / USSR,* ed. C. G. Jacobsen, pp. 16. London, Macmillan.

25. Klein, B. (1988) 'Hegemony and Strategic Culture.' *Review of International Studies,* 14(2), pp. 133-148.

26. Legro, J. W. (1995) *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

27. Longhurst, K. (2000) 'The Concept of strategic Culture.' In *Military Sociology,* ed. G. Kummel and D. P. Andreas. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

28. Longhurst, K. (2000) 'The Concept of Strategic Culture.' In *Military Sociology: The Richness of a Discipline*, ed. G. Kuemmel, EdNomos: Baden Baden.

29. Lundestad, G. (2003) *The United States and Western Europe: From empire by invitation to transatlantic drift.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

30. March, J. and Olsen, J. P. (1998) 'The institutional dynamics of international political orders.' *International Organization,* 52(4), pp. 946.

31. Martinsen, P. M. (2003) 'Forging a Strategic Culture – Putting Policy into the ESDP.' *Oxford Journal on Good Governance,* 1(1), pp. 61-66.

32. Merton, R. K. (1936) 'The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action.' *American Sociological Review*, 1(6), pp. 894–904.

33. Sloan, S. R. (2003) *NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic community*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

34. Snyder, J. (1990) 'The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor.' In *Strategic Power USA / USSR,* ed. C. G. Jacobsen, pp. 4. London, Macmillan.

35. Solana, J. (2003) *'A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy.'* The ESS was presented at the European Council meeting on 12 December 2003 in Brussels (15895/03, PESC787).

36. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2004) '*SIPRI yearpaper 2004: Armaments, disarmament and international security*.' Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

37. Swindler, A. (1986) 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.' *American Sociological Review,* 51, pp. 273-286.

38. Tilly, C. (1985) 'War making and state making as organized crime.' In *Bringing the state back,* eds. P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol, pp. 169–191. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

39. Toje, A. (2008b) 'The consensus–expectations gap: Explaining Europe's ineffective foreign policy.' *Security Dialogue*, 39(1), pp. 17–33.

40. Vital, D. (1967) *The inequality of States. A study of Small Power in International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

41. Walt, S. M. (1987) *The origins of alliances*. *Cornell studies in security affairs*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

STEVEN EKOVICH

The Culture of Democratic Public Administration and Military Culture

Steven Ekovich

The author is a professor in the Department of International and Comparative Politics at the American University

Abstract

This article is about the intrinsic tension between democracy and military. It presents that relation by providing an overview of relations between military establishment and key features of a democratic political system – rule of law, power sharing, role of civil society and good governance. Though military organizations are not democracies in democratic societies they operate with democratic military culture which shares features of respect of rule of law, rights of an individual, tolerance and compromise. Demands for responsive management, political, economic, financial and legal accountability are applicable at military as at any other part of a public administration.

Key words: military, democracy, rule of law, military culture, public administration.

***

Military establishments are not democracies, but the militaries of democratic regimes possess characteristics that do not threaten democracy, and even support it. The specific nature of military organizations in democracies is shaped by their relations to liberal government, to an open civil society and to a market economy. Military establishments in democracies are imbued with the ambient democratic culture, shaping a democratic military culture. Military cultures are closely related to public administration cultures. The culture of public administration is in turn related to regime type. Democratic regimes transmit to public administrations fundamental values which

usually include a belief in the intrinsic equality of each individual, a significant level of trust in the other, a respect for basic human rights, and respect for law and due process. Democratic culture also includes tolerance and the ability to compromise based on a shared national consensus. This in turn implies a culture of political neutrality in public sector and security sector management. Not only citizens and their representatives, but also military establishments must accept that in politics there may be more than one truth, and therefore accept legitimate political defeat and the peaceful transfer of power. This is why civilian authorities, both executive and legislative together, must have the last word in the use of military force. It is also why civilian authorities in democracies have the final word on the grand strategic decisions that influence the destiny of the nation. These strategic decisions, however, are necessarily made in consultation with the professionals of the military services. The democratic values that shape good governance in public administration also must shape governance in the security sector. The principles of democratic good governance include responsive public sector management, political, economic, financial and legal accountability, and as much transparency as the necessary secrecy in the security sector will permit. But here, also, in a democracy responsible and prudent civilian authorities must have oversight of secrecy. In older democracies this oversight includes a special committee in the legislature whose elected members and staff handle secrecy responsibly while maintaining the commitment of the security sector to democratic values and institutions. For example, the US Congress requires the CIA to inform relevant congressional committees of current and anticipated covert operations.

The Military and the Judicial System

It is a commonplace to say that democracies are more than elections, even free, fair and competitive elections. They also embody the rule of law – and the law applies to everyone, equally and no matter how powerful. However, it is obvious that even though soldiers have rights, they cannot be the same as the rights that are enjoyed by their civilian compatriots. This is due to the special requirement for discipline and obedience in

the military. On the other hand this does not mean that a soldier may be ordered to do anything, commit any violent act. In the last 300 years armed conflict among sovereign and civilized states has been codified and restrained by international law (Grenier, 2005). Soldiers are not only limited in their behavior by the domestic laws of their own governments, but also by an increasingly complex and extensive body of international law and custom. Even more than this, in today's world the enemy also has rights. Armies in democracies are especially sensitized to the rights of enemy combatants. Abuses are punished and the careers of responsible officers in the hierarchy are jeopardized even though they may not have been directly implicated. It is obvious that non-combatants, all civilians in a war zone, have even more extensive rights. On the other hand, illegal combatants have less, even though in today's world of conflict we still expect that they retain some basic guarantees of life and physical and psychological integrity. It is true that military justice has its own sphere of application, but militaries in democracies may also be constrained by civilian courts in some instances.

The soldiers in the army of a democracy have been raised in a democratic culture and therefore have a relation to authority that renders them less susceptible to the abuse of power by their superiors than combatants in other cultures. While a democratic culture in the ranks limits soldiers straying from the codification of war, obliging them to respect the exigencies of international humanitarian aw, this does not undermine the combat effectiveness of democratic armies. On the contrary, the armies of democracies are generally very effective in combat. The military historian Victor Davis Hanson argues that the military dominance of Western Civilization, beginning with the ancient Greeks, is the result of certain fundamental aspects of Western culture, such as consensual government and individualism. According to Hanson, Western values such as political freedom, capitalism, individualism, democracy, scientific inquiry, rationalism, and open debate form an especially lethal combination when applied to warfare. Non-Western societies can win the occasional victory when warring against a society with these Western values, writes Hanson, but the "Western way of war" will prevail in the long run (Hanson, 2001).

The Military and the Legislative Branch

Besides elections and the rule of law, democracies are also systems of shared powers. The most fundamental sharing of powers is between the executive and legislative branches. Of course, militaries are institutionally situated in the executive branch, but are nevertheless subject to several legislative controls that constrain all executive agencies, and not just the military. In instances where armed intervention is considered necessary, the executive requires the approval and support of the legislative branch. For large-scale operations this usually demands either a formal constitutional declaration of war or some sort of legislative resolution that is the functional legal and political equivalent of a declaration of war. But since in democracies the president, the highest civilian leader, is the commander in chief of the armed forces he or she is esteemed to have some limited discretion, some constitutional leeway, in the use of a nation's armed forces. The political and constitutional boundaries of this leeway are not clear, and a constant source of democratic debate and judicial interpretation. In some instances, the legislative branch delegates to the president a relatively free hand in the use of force, in others the President takes it based on his interpretation of the constitutional authority given to the commander in chief. It is clear, however, that even limited military interventions for short time periods must not be done in total secrecy, without some oversight by the legislature. But once again, the boundary between covert operations that employ force and small-scale military interventions is not always easy to determine. This means that the level of legislative oversight and the secrecy required are not always easy to establish. Nevertheless, democracies tend to err on the side of transparency. This does not mean that there have not been lively disputes between the executive and legislature over the appropriate secrecy required. It is essential, however, that these debates take place because excessive secrecy is a threat to democracy.

Decisions to use force are therefore conditioned by the balanced relations between executive and legislative, with the judicial also engaged from time to time. The military in a democracy understands and respects this. However, not only specific decisions to deploy forces come out of a system of shared pow-

**STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM**

ers, defense policy in general is a product of the democratic mechanisms of balanced and shared powers. Policy in democracies emerges from the tugging and pulling of legislative, executive and civil society – or more precisely the agencies of the executive branch, the committees of the legislature and the organized interest groups of civil society. These are the active agents of policy, with public opinion defining the realistic background limits in the struggle for policy preferences.

Military Culture, Government, and Civil Society

Policy in democracies comes out of the interaction of ministries and agencies in the executive branch, committees and staff in the legislative branch, and organized interest groups in civil society. In American political science this is called the "policy triangle". Societies and their institutions are commonly divided into three sectors: public or governmental, for-profit or corporate, and nonprofit or independent. This number is sometimes reduced to two— public and private. The public sector includes governmental institutions, while the private includes both for-profit and nonprofit organizations. Institutions within the nonprofit or independent sector are often referred to as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This term is somewhat misleading, since it suggests a broader scope—that is, everything outside the governmental sector—than is usually intended. In general, the term refers only to nonprofits and does not include any organizations in the corporate sector.

The actors in each corner of the policy triangle form a policy community: elected representative and their staffs; civil servants in the public administration; and experts and advocates in interest groups and think tanks, as well as those in business enterprises (especially large corporations). When the policy concerned is national security, the individuals found at each of the poles of the triangle form a security community. They have similar expertise, have been to the same universities and professional schools and share a devotion to the national security – even if they differ over how to achieve it. The security community forms the bedrock of the democratic relations between the military, government and civil society. Research institutes, often called think tanks, play a very important, even essential role in

the elaboration of national strategy – even in the elaboration of military tactics. Research institutes may represent a particular ideology or general policy orientation, but when civil society is given the opportunity to organize itself the diversity of preferences is represented and in competition with each other. This furnishes healthy debate and policy competition. Think tanks organize this intellectual activity much as research universities do – some even believe they do this better (Hanson, 2001).[1]

Foreign governments also take advantage of the openness of civil society in democracies. They hire lobbyists, or create institutes that present their government's point of view to the Congress and the executive branch. And since the population of the United States is made up of immigrants and the descendants of immigrants, diasporas also play a role in trying to influence government policy. The best-known organization is that of the Jewish diaspora which has organized, among other groups, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). But AIPAC is only one of a whole constellation of organizations created by diasporas to influence American foreign policy. To cite just a very miniscule number, there is the Arab American Institute (AAI) which conducts policy research and engages in political advocacy for the Arab American community, the American Lebanese Public Affairs Committee (ALPAC), the Greek American Hellenic Institute of Public Affairs (AHIPAC), and Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) (Ekovich, 2006/2007). Of course in order to maintain the appropriate democratic transparency, American law requires that all individuals who lobby on behalf of a foreign country (except for diplomatic personnel) register with the Department of Justice.

Governance and Military Culture

An analysis of the concept of good governance necessarily leads us to define "governance" before trying to determine what might constitute "good" governance. Governance may be seen as embracing four dimensions. These dimensions of governance cover: a) administration or management, b) policymaking and implementation, c) government functions, and d)

[1] See for example DeMuth, C. (2007) 'Think Tank Confidential.' *The Wall Street Journal*, October 11, 2007. Available from: http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110010718. For the role of *think tanks* in American politics see Abelson, D.E. (2006) *A Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy*. McGill-Queen's University Press; Abelson, D. E. *Do Think Tanks Matter?* McGill-Queen's University Press.

regime type. Building on the definition of good governance proposed by the World Bank, we can say that governance is good when it includes sound public sector management. Such management includes accountability, a legal framework that provides predictability, and transparency of information that is adequate and reliable. Furthermore, the literature on accountability includes several types: financial, legal, economic, public, professional, political, and democratic.[2] An analysis of this relationship leads us to investigate the state's relation to society. This then leads us to ask to what extent a democratic state is necessary to good governance and good public sector as well as security sector management. Since a democracy also requires a solid democratic political culture, it is useful to speculate to what extent a democratic political culture is necessary to a public administration culture that resists corruption.

An institution does not need to be democratic in order to exercise good governance, but there is however a strong correlation between good governance in public administration and a democratic political regime. Of course the military is not a democratic institution, but may nevertheless adopt the practices of good governance – where good governance is seen as good administration or good management, without reference to the politics or the political system in which it is embedded. It still remains to define what is considered "good" when evoking governance in public administration. In World Bank studies, good public sector management has been analyzed into several dimensions. These dimensions can be applied specifically here to the military. For the World Bank good governance includes: 1) accountability, 2) a legal framework that provides predictability and stability, and 3) information transparency. There are, furthermore, several types of accountability. Four types have already been touched upon: democratic accountability, political accountability, public accountability and legal accountability.

Democratic accountability is the responsiveness of the political system, its institutions, its elected leaders and it administrators to all citizens. It is sometimes said that in a democracy citizens have "voice" – influence on policymaking. It also includes the right of citizens to participate in institutions and to change them peacefully. Military cultures in democracies are embedded

[2] The World Bank literature on good governance is now quite extensive. For some brief examples see: The World Bank. 'What is Governance?' available at http://go.worldbank.org/G2CHLX X0Q0; and 'What Are the Main Dimensions of Governance?' at http://go.worldbank.org/WA0I2A 8VS0; or 'The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project', at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.

in this value system. *Political accountability* requires the leaders and actors of government to respect the constitutional and political balance of institutions. This includes the branches of government with each other as well as with the neutral and professional career public administration. We have already seen how in democracies the military interacts with the legislative, executive and judicial branches – and respects their boundaries of power. *Public accountability* is the satisfactory delivery of goods and services to the public as well as the responsiveness of public administration and public enterprises. It is true that the military can have an important presence in economic and social life; this is the case in the United States. The military is a powerful interest group not only because it controls a large budget, but also because it has an enormous constituency which votes, and not just soldiers in uniform, but also the vast numbers of civilian employees and their families. In some congressional districts military spending and employment are vital to the local economy. However in general the military presence in the economy is limited, except in time of war. Today military spending in the US does not much exceed 6% of gross domestic product, even while two extensive military interventions are being carried out in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military spending in democracies should be devoted exclusively to military matters. The military should not own and direct civilian sectors of the economy, but only draw on them. And the military should certainly not own or control communications and transportation networks, or other logistical infrastructure. *Legal accountability* requires compliance with the law and administrative regulations. For the military, this means in the first instance respect for the constitution. It also means complying with statutory laws and all of the rules and regulations relevant to the defense establishment.

There are other kinds of accountability that should be taken into consideration when evaluating a military culture, as well as the culture of all public administration. *Financial accountability,* for example, requires compliance with accepted accounting and audit rules and procedures. Spending abuses and opaque accounting are unacceptable in all public administration, including in the security sector. However, the need for secrecy in the national security establishment may mean that

only a limited number of elected representatives and their staffs will have access to detailed budget lines. *Economic accountability* is the achievement of announced economic goals, and the successful development of projects. Wasteful military spending is open to sanction, either legally or politically, or both. It is also expected in democracies that defense spending will not put an undue burden on the rest of the economy, undermining prosperity. *Professional accountability* is the respect of the standards and code of conduct of professional groups. These standards are learned at professional schools. In the case of the military they are inculcated at military academies and other institutions that prepare the national security establishment.

Transparency and Information

Adequate and reliable information refers to the availability of and access to information from public and private sources. Transparency refers to an open decision-making process. Transparency and the amount of adequate and reliable information and its relatively unhindered flow help determine the extent of good governance. However, information and transparency may, even in a democracy, be limited only to decision makers when the overall national interest is at stake. Of course the transparency of information in regards to the defense establishment is a particular case. Military operations demand secrecy so as not to give the enemy any advantages. It is clear that even in a democracy this kind of tactical, operational information required for combat cannot be widely shared. This is why militaries restrict information to the media during combat operations – and of course responsible media understand. But at the same time the media must remain vigilant so that the military is not hiding information that is not of immediate tactical use and that would be necessary in order for civilians to understand an ongoing military intervention. Even in warfare, the military must remain sufficiently responsive to the public. It is, however, not always easy to draw the line between tactical battlefield information and the more general information that citizens in a democracy need to keep informed. Obviously, some types of strategic information must also be closely held by the

military. This includes codes, the technical capabilities of some military hardware, and other types of information necessary to maintaining the advantage over adversaries. However, it is clear that the strategic doctrines of the military in a democracy must be shared with all citizens. Citizens should have the right to inform themselves of the general orientations of their government when it comes to national security.

For example, in the United States the Congress mandates that the executive branch will periodically provide and publish *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* which outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to deal with them. The document is necessarily general in content, its implementation relies on more detailed guidance provided in supporting documents, many of which are also made public. One of these is the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, a study by the United States Department of Defense that analyzes strategic objectives and potential military threats. The *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* is the main public document describing the United States' military doctrine. The congressionally mandated *Quadrennial Defense Review* directs the Department of Defense to undertake a wide-ranging review of strategy, programs, and resources. Specifically, the *QDR* is expected to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent *National Security Strategy* by defining force structure, modernization plans, and a budget plan allowing the military to successfully execute the full range of missions within that strategy. At a more operational and detailed level is the public document *The National Military Strategy of the United States* (NMS). It is issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and delivered to the Secretary of Defense. It outlines the strategic aims of the armed services which conform to the most recent National Security Strategy. The NMS Report must provide a description of the strategic environment and the opportunities and challenges that affect United States national interests and United States national security. Nowadays, the Report must describe the most significant regional threats to US national interests and security as well as the international threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and asymmetric challenges. These documents in turn shape the

more specific operational documents like *The Joint Planning Document*, *Strategic Planning Guidance*, *Joint Operations Concepts*, and others. In a democracy, the access to military information may be viewed as the availability of wider and wider circles of information to wider and wider circles of individuals who may have a need to know. Some information must be carefully and responsibly restricted. The publication of doctrine does not compromise operational capability. It must be made public in order to sustain democratic debate and deliberation and to keep the military attached to democratic institutions and values.

Finally, good public sector management – and of course security sector management – requires a sound legal framework. Such a framework embodies objective and legitimate rules and functioning institutions which insure their appropriate application. It also leads to predictability. Predictability implies standard operating procedures, institutionalized rules, non-personalized decision-making and modest levels of discretion and regularized procedures for establishing and implementing policies. Conflicts must be resolved through binding decisions of an independent judicial body or through arbitration. There should be known procedures for amending rules when they no longer serve their purpose. When this principle is applied to a political regime it implies the rule of law, one of the foundations of democracy.

The Case of American Military Culture

A review of American military culture may prove instructive as it is part of one of the oldest liberal democracies. This is not a claim that the relationship between the military in the United States and the rest of society and government has been ideal. But as an older democracy it may serve as a guide. One of the fundamental characteristics of American society is that it has been liberal for nearly all of its history. One striking characteristic of historic liberalism, especially its American variant, was a deep suspicion, even hostility to the military profession. Most of the American founders believed that standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican gov-

ernment, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, a threat to economic prosperity, and generally transformed into tools of despotism and therefore a threat to peace. Permanent, professional armies only served the sport of kings, not the interests of the citizen. War was viewed as a regal atavism. The American founders, borrowing from Adam Smith and the Scottish enlightenment, believed that "civilized nations" were those that engaged in trade, not war. In 1776 members of the Continental Congress attempted to embody these enlightenment principles in a model treaty that would be applied to France and eventually to other nations. This model treaty, drafted mainly by John Adams, promised the greatest possible commercial freedom and equality between nations.

If the principles of the model treaty were "once really established and honestly observed," John Adams claimed, "it would put an end forever to all maritime war, and render all military navies useless." But even in wartime, trade was to be kept flowing. Neutral nations were to have the rights to trade and carry the goods of the belligerents. Ultimately the Americans did not get much of what they wanted in their "model treaties," to begin with the one they signed with France in 1778. Although the commercial treaty they made with France did contain the principles of free trade, the Patriots also in the end had to accept a traditional political and military alliance – a necessary pragmatic concession to *realpolitik*.[3]

In the United States the fear of a professional army led to the creation of institutions which still influence civil-military relations. First of all, defense was to be assured in the first resort by local, state militias composed of citizen soldiers. The military ideal in the American mind is the legend of Cincinattus, who put down his plow to save the Roman republic, and once that job was done put down his sword and returned to his plowshare. Military defense, like suffrage, was to be the responsibility of every citizen. The ethic of the citizen-soldier helps to explain why, despite the traditional American antipathy to the professional soldier, several military heroes have become president. These military heroes have either not been professional soldiers, or if they were they left aside their direct military links. Presidents who were formerly high-ranking officers do not wear the paraphernalia of their former rank and

[3] The historiography on this early phase of American diplomatic and military history is enormous. A good brief presentation is Dull, J.R. (1985) *Diplomatic History of the American Revolution.* Yale: Yale University Press.

military accomplishments. In fact, when they visit the troops and put on military garb, they wear it without any insignia of rank -- bringing the president of the United States full circle to below the lowest ranking soldier in terms of military dress.

The tradition of local militias has been transformed into today's institution of the National Guard -- a part-time citizens' army which is under dual state-national control in peace and can be put under exclusive national control in time of war. Just as American federalism keeps government close to the people, the National Guard keeps defense and the military establishment close to the people. Of course, since the eighteenth century, and especially since World War II, the U.S. has created a large, highly professional permanent national military, while attempting to maintain the long-standing previous traditions. Keeping the military establishment close to the people is meant to "civilianize" the military – and not militarize civil society.

A second enduring consequence of the fear of a professional military is the primacy of civilian control over the military and the sharing of the war power in the Constitution between the President and the Congress. The legislature raises the army and declares war, the executive branch makes war. The war power is further shared within the executive between the President, his civilian department secretaries, and the professional military leadership. But the power-sharing game is even more complex.

The Framers of the Constitution made Congress and the President independent of each other, drawing authority from separate clauses of the Constitution and acquiring power and influence from separate constituencies through different systems of election. The Constitution, however, also provides for a sharing of functions. The Congress is given some executive functions and the President some legislative ones. The Congress carries out its responsibilities in its committees. As Woodrow Wilson put it in his study of government before becoming president: "The Congress at work is Congress in its committees." All interest groups hoping to advance their agendas must have good relations with committees and their professional staffs. This is certainly the case for one of the most powerful interest groups in American, the military establishment. Most contact between the military and both houses of Congress is via the

committees specifically charged with defense, foreign policy, intelligence and appropriations (the military budget is the most important annual contact between the military and the Congress). However, because of the complexity of today's military affairs and their imbrications with all other economic and social activities, the military must engage with other committees that may have only an indirect relation to military affairs, bringing the military into democratic politics in general, although largely in a nonpartisan fashion.

Conclusion

Liberal democracies frame and control their military establishments so that they do not threaten democratic institutions – in fact they protect and defend democracy even though the military as an institution is not itself a democracy. The military cultures of armies in democracies share the surrounding democratic culture. This implies adhering to the democratic sharing of power, the rule of law, and openness to the participation of civil society. Public administration must also be professional and neutral, a neutrality that is required particularly of the military in a liberal democracy. The principles of professional democratic good governance in the public sector include responsive management, political, economic, financial and legal accountability, as well as other kinds of accountability. For the national security establishment and the military it includes as much transparency as the necessary secrecy will allow. To a very significant degree, the defense of liberal democracy requires a certain liberalization of defense.

References:

1. Abelson, D. E. (2002) *Do Think Tanks Matter?* McGill-Queen's University Press.
2. Abelson, D. E. (2006) *A Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy.* McGill-Queen's University Press.
3. DeMuth, C. (2007) 'Think Tank Confidential.' *The Wall Street Journal,* October 11, 2007. Available from: http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110010718.

WBSO

4. Dull, J. R. (1985) *Diplomatic History of the American Revolution.* Yale: Yale University Press.

5. Ekovich, S. (2006) 'La géosociologie de la diaspora arménienne.' *Géostratégiques*, 12, avril 2006. Available from: http://www.strategicsinternational.com/12_article_14.pdf.

6. Ekovich, S. (2007) 'Les ONG et la Politique Étrangčre des États-Unis.' *Géostratégiques,* 16, avril 2007. Available from: http://www.strategicsinternational.com/16_06.pdf.

7. Grenier, J. (2005) *The First Way of War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

8. Hanson, D. V. (2001) *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power.* Doubleday.

Macedonian Strategic Culture and Institutional Choice: Integration or Isolation?

Stojan Slaveski

The author is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Detectives and Criminology, European University of the Republic of Macedonia

Abstract

Whereas political culture affects political behaviour as such, Strategic Culture works in the realm of security policy. It helps identify a frame of decision-options held by a country's decision-makers. In Macedonian case, having obtained independence by peaceful means, the political leadership started the process of building its security policy to cover all the aspects of complex approach to security. According to the National Security and Defence Concept, a lasting interest of the Republic of Macedonia is "the maintenance and upgrading of the national identity" while the vital interests by which the security situation in the country is improved and conditions are created for better life of the citizens, are "political and economic integration in the European Union, as well as political-defence integration in the NATO". Hence, the EU and the NATO membership rank among the few projects around which both majority and minority communities come together. However, "the name issue" has been plaguing the country's relations with Greece (and, consequently, with the EU and the NATO) since the early 1990s. Decisions taken at Bucharest Summit to block Macedonian integration into the NATO caused a huge disappointment among the Macedonian citizens of all ethnic groups. The failure to join the NATO was a particular disappointment for the Albanians, for whom the American-led alliance holds both a security and emotive attraction. Many now do not like having to pay the cost to protect the name of the country that means "nothing to them, but means everything to the country's majority". A

**STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM**

disappointment in the NATO accession has an immediate impact on the credibility of the EU perspective as well, leading to the "disintegration of the Euro-Atlantic integration myth" that has sustained shaky Ohrid peace. There is a real danger that nationalism and ethnocentrism will be on the rise. In this situation Macedonia is facing strategic choice to compromise on the name issue and integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures or to continue its hard policy on the "name issue" that can lead to isolation of the country from the Euro-Atlantic flows.

***Key words:** Macedonia, strategic culture, EU, NATO, security policies.*

The concept of strategic culture

Culture or political culture consists of shared assumptions and decision rules held by the collective. These cultural patterns are distributed in society through a socialization process of the individual that goes back to anthropological origins (e.g. language, religion, customs) or shared experiences from history (Lantis, 2002: 91). This process places a 'mind-set' upon each individual. It will act as a guide within society, as it will help the individual to behave as its environment expects it to. Subsequently, the individual's 'mind-set' will not be identical, but at least similar to the 'mind-sets' held by the others. Behaviour is affected but not determined by the 'mind-sets' or cultural patterns of the society (Johnston, 1995: 45). However, the decision options for behaviour are limited by the cultural patterns to a quantity less than all available decision-options. This fact allows prediction for future action to a certain degree.

This notion of political culture will help define the Strategic Culture: Whereas political culture affects political behaviour as such, the Strategic Culture works in the realm of security policy. It helps identify a frame of decision-options held by a country's decision-makers that is limited to a quantity less than all logically available decision-options. Once the Strategic Culture is identified it allows inferences from the identified frame of decision-options and predictions of future state behaviour. Thus, the Strategic Culture helps understand why states act differently in similar situations.

The Strategic Culture is composed of two levels, which connect the 'mind-set' of shared assumptions or *norms* held by the collectives with possible and appropriate decision-options for *behaviour*. The mind-set's structure can be characterized as follows: On the

first level there are the *foundational elements*. They consist of norms that are basic beliefs about security policy, which have their roots in the formative phase of the Strategic Culture (Longhurst, 2000: 58). These foundational norms inform the process through which abstract goals in security matters are defined. The foundational elements are connected to the *security policy standpoints* on the second level. They represent the widely accepted readings and interpretations of the norms on level one by the political elite of a collective. The security policy standpoints, in turn, inform the process of defining the strategies and instruments by which security policy goals should be achieved. The standpoints thus select "culturally appropriate options" out of the quantity of all available decision-options. Moreover, the security policy standpoints provide information on how the political elite value certain foundational elements and how they put them into an order of priority.

The context, defined as the external expectations of other actors on behaviour, is also a factor that can shape the Strategic Culture. In a settled period, when the behaviour of a nation state is equivalent to the external expectations on behaviour, the influence of the Strategic Culture on behaviour may not be visible because the decisions taken will seem to be related to the expectations of the context. Strategic Culture gets more obvious in an unsettled period when the decisions demanded by the external actors differ from those emanating from the security policy standpoints of the given Strategic Culture. Then, the environment puts pressure on the decision-makers to adjust the Strategic Culture to external expectations. Before adjustment and change occur, the given Strategic Culture will guide behaviour almost as an ideology (Longhurst, 2000: 65), because political elites are not able to consider alternative decision options beyond their current 'mind-sets'. Accordingly, the Strategic Culture is perceived as resistant to change and only after prolonged debates and close examination alternative decision options will be pursued that in turn inform new experiences that change the make-up of a given Strategic Culture.

Now, how does change occur? We posit that it comes in two different modes: *Fine tuning or fundamental change*. The former emerges when there is a contradiction between the external expectations on security policies and the Strategic Culture, which can be reconciled through adaptation in the realm of security policy standpoints. These changes will have to match the persistent foundational elements. Subsequently, the core norms of the Strategic

Culture need to be reinterpreted by the elites. During the period of change there is a great ambiguity about which standpoints will be adopted. Several diverging propositions of how external and internal realities can be reconciled with the foundational elements are competing in public debates. While fine-tuning leaves the core values of the Strategic Culture integral, it may change their order of priority depending on the value of the security policy standpoints assigned by the elites. In turn, a fundamental change causes a collapse or redefinition of the existing Strategic Culture. An abrupt change of external realities strongly contradicts foundational elements of the Strategic Culture in the way that a re-interpretation of the core values would not be sufficient to reconcile contradictions. Hence, a new Strategic Culture will be formed that corresponds to the new external demands. Subsequently, the policy standpoints below the foundational elements will be changed too. However, the fundamental change occurs far less than fine-tuning.

In this paper I will focus on two security institutions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), as goals of the Macedonian security policy. The paper identifies the roles which the NATO and the EU had for the Republic of Macedonia. However, veto at Bucharest Summit and delay in starting the accession talks with the country can impose changes in the Macedonian Strategic Culture. Whether it will be "fine tuning" or "fundamental change" is still uncertain.

Broadening the community of values – the EU and the NATO enlargement

Before this study begins to outline particular functions it needs to define the notion of security functions with regard to security institutions, which are objects of the analysis. Usually, a security institution comes into existence when a group of states shares the same norms on how to tackle a security problem. Thus, states of this group discover that they all want to reach the same goal and now need to address a cooperation problem. As a consequence, a *general function* of an institution is to solve the cooperation problem by selecting and coordinating the measures taken to reach the common goal. The collective response will have greater effect than the sum of measures taken by a single nation state. A *specific function* of an institution is to actually reach a certain goal for which the institution has been implicitly or explicitly set up. As the

objects of analysis are security institutions, this study focuses on specific functions that provide for territorial integrity, political self determination and economical welfare of the member states of these institutions.

Both the NATO and the EU see themselves as communities of values, which means that their cooperative endeavor is based on a common set of values: democracy, market economy, the rule of law and the commitment to human rights. To promote and strengthen these values in the context of the NATO and the EU is not only to be seen as instrumental to assuring security, but also as the purpose of itself, because the successful promotion of such values abroad may increase their legitimacy at home. Nevertheless, the security implication of these values regarding stability, predictability and reliability of an actor proved to be very strong.

The end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to build improved security in Europe through enlarging this community of values. The European Union as well as the NATO understood this opportunity and reacted in a very similar way, namely by making the decision to enlarge their respective institutions by offering membership to various Central East European (CEE) countries.

Due to the resemblance between the NATO and the EU enlargement approach and purpose, the question has to be raised if the two institutions act as competitors or allies. The EU enlargement addressed fifteen candidates, mostly states of Central and Eastern Europe. In order to access the EU, these states had to meet a set of requirements, which obviously included the mentioned core values. In addition to that, the set of requirements comprised the existence of an operational market economy defined by various economic indicators and benchmarks. Concerning the EU enlargement, these socio-economic issues have a clear priority compared to the questions of military integration mainly because ESDP has not reached the level of development to provide an appropriate framework to integrate into. But military integration is the top priority of the NATO enlargement, which combines the prerequisite of meeting the main values with a set of military requirements, including the issues such as a civilian and democratic control over military forces. Through the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme and the Membership Action Plan, accession candidates are guided and assisted in their efforts to adjust their military capabilities to the requirements of integration into the NATO.

In contrast to the question of crisis management, the issue of the NATO and the EU enlargement therefore can be characterized by a distinction of priorities within a community of purpose. This could be seen as an ideal situation for interlocking institutions, since the NATO is balancing the deficit of the EU in providing the military framework to integrate into, while the EU levels out the NATO's deficit in addressing the socio-economic components of security and stability. The combination of both institutions' efforts is the reason for the success of stability transfer into CEE-states.

Framework of the Macedonia's Strategic Culture: Integration into Euro-Atlantic Structures

The Strategic Culture of a nation consists of a set of values, the foundational elements, as well as their prioritization and finally their translation into the security policy standpoints, including the strategy and goals of the national security policy.

Having obtained the independence by peaceful means, the Republic of Macedonia (ROM) started the process of building its security policy to cover all the aspects of complex approach to security. It was building its security policy without the historic heritage from the membership in the Eastern European structures – such as the Warsaw Treaty. On the other hand, that process progressed with serious problems caused by the instability in the immediate surroundings.

The Republic of Macedonia had the following alternatives, each with its positive and negative effects, in building up of its security policy: to build its own armed force and depend on the United Nations collective security system; to proclaim a policy of "neutrality" and request from the great powers and neighbours respect of its neutrality; to sign defence agreements with other countries; to enter into the Euro-Atlantic integration process; or a combination of several of the mentioned alternatives.

The political leadership of the Republic of Macedonia decided to opt for a combination of the above alternatives, thus striving to make use of the positive effects of each of them. It was decided to establish own armed force and to apply the preventive mechanisms of the world organization. With regards to the war in the former Yugoslavia, "neutrality" was proclaimed, while in state security policy, equal readiness for cooperation was announced with all the neighbours as well as the wish to enter in the Euro-Atlantic inte-

gration process, with highlighted clear steps for the EU[1] and the NATO[2] membership.

The reasons for these commitments were the following: to avoid the spillover of the conflict from the territory of the former Yugoslavia into the country; the military inferiority of the Republic of Macedonia; joining into the new European security architecture for the possibility of economic integration, and also to have an immediate influence in the decision-making process, as well as the understanding that only the NATO can successfully provide defence for the state from the external threats.

The National Security and Defence Concept (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2003) is the basic document of the Republic of Macedonia in the area of security and defence. It has its roots in the "national values and the ensuing interests" of the ROM. According to the Constitution, the democratic foundations of the state are: the rule of law, the respect of human rights and freedoms, market economy, social justice and respect of the international law and the international agreements and accords. Strategic objective of the ROM and its National Security and Defence Concept is its "future as a part of the European family and as a member of the NATO and the EU".

The membership in the NATO, with the vocabulary of the Macedonian national concept of security and defence, provides conditions "to preserve and strengthen the democracy, to protect the independence, as well as unlimited opportunities for economic advancement". The advantage of the membership in the NATO could be seen through the experiences and achievements of the "new" members. On the foundations of the successfulness of the countries in transition, regardless of the fact whether it is a question of the indicators of economic growth, respect of human rights and freedoms, or development and stability of democratic practice and democratic institutions, all the "new" countries, as a rule, have significant positions in the Alliance.

The benefits from the NATO membership will be great for the Republic of Macedonia. Besides the guarantees for the national security, support to the democratic and economic development and reinforcement of the capabilities and capacities of the national security system, the membership to the Alliance nowadays also represents a privilege and brings great respect in the international community, i.e. strengthening of the position of the Republic of Macedonia in the international community and the international

STRATEGIC CULTURE AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

[1] In order to accelerate its integration in EU, the Republic of Macedonia applied for the EU membership on March 22, 2004 thus expressing its readiness to cross over from the stabilization process into the association process. Subsequently, the Republic of Macedonia answered the Questionnaire of the Commission and received a positive response with a recommendation of the Commission to the EU Council to grant the country the "candidate status". In the early hours of December 17, 2005, following an intense debate over budgetary and enlargement issues, the heads of states and governments of the EU member nations made the decision in Brussels and granted the "candidate status" to the Republic of Macedonia. The date for the accession negotiations is yet to be defined and that is related to the achievement of sufficient progress in line with the membership criteria. Along with the Opinion, the country also received a new European Partnership where the priorities are identified that the country is required to meet before the procedure is opened for the initiation of the negotiations. The accession negotiations usually last three to four years and after that a decision is made on extending an invitation for accession, i.e. the accession date is defined, which practically means two additional years until reaching the full-fledged membership status. This period may be longer or shorter, which depends on the candidate's capacities. However, three years later, Macedonia is still a "candidate country" and has not started accession negotiations.

[2] The journey to the NATO started in December 1993 when the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia brought a Decision for joining the NATO. As an aspirant country for the NATO membership, the Republic of Macedonia joined the Partnership for Peace initiative on December 15, 1995 thus officially becoming the 27th member of the initiative. Furthermore, Macedonia is a member of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) since its establishing in 1997 and a part of the MAP process since 1999. So far, the Republic of Macedonia has prepared nine annual national programs for the NATO membership and has received eight progress reports related to the reforms made on the way to achieving membership in the Alliance. Macedonia expected to be invited to join the Alliance at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, however Greece blocked this process because of the "name issue".

**STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM**

institutions, as well as the possibility to take part in decision making, and, thus, influence the regional or wider international politics.

Among ordinary people, the European Union remains widely associated with ideas of a better life and higher living standards. For those Macedonians who knew Bulgaria and Romania in the early 1990s and have recently travelled to these countries, the drastic economic and social changes that have taken place and the modernisation of infrastructure prove that the EU accession does matter.[3] At the same time, the EU's appeals for greater commitment to the economic reforms, the rule of law and equality regardless of ethnicity will only be credible if the local actors are given a strong motivation to move ahead with socially painful and politically delicate changes. Giving a date to start the membership negotiations, and moving from the visa facilitation to full liberalisation of the visa regime, would demonstrate that the EU is willing and able to improve people's life in Macedonia and that every Macedonian government should rank the EU accession as its topmost priority. In the country where social issues continue to represent a major challenge to stability, allowing Macedonia to benefit from the increased EU pre-accession funds would also do much to increase its domestic social and ethnic cohesion.

On the other side, it is clear that the EU demands on democratization and human rights protection in Macedonia are very important and that, in fact, the EU membership is seen as the only incentive for reforms. The country has formally adopted the new legislation, introduced national strategies in order to synchronize the different institutions' responsibilities and roles towards the protection of certain vulnerable groups or sets of rights; however, the judiciary still responds with inefficiency leading to limited implementation. Overall, the country lacks human rights culture, where the civil society should play a significant role. The civic sector is mostly concerned with following the trends in international donations, without in fact initiating the forum for public debate and with no capacity to bring about social changes. If the EU is to guide Macedonia on its way towards consolidation of democracy and system providing human rights protection, it would finally need to assist the creation of a lively and coherent civic sector, which would certainly shift the process from formal meeting of the EU criteria to Europeanization of Macedonian society (Novakova, 2006: 102-131).

[3] By confirming that all Western Balkan states would join the European Union once they meet the established criteria, the Thessalonica European Council (June 2003) gave Macedonian ruling parties a major incentive to maintain the internal reform momentum. Macedonia was the first Western Balkan country to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in April 2001, and submitted its application for EU membership on 22 March 2004. In December 2005, the country was granted candidate status, mostly in recognition of the courageous implementation of the Ohrid reforms. But no date for opening negotiations on EU entry was set. The EU insists on a strict compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria (set out in June 1993), and further progress in implementation of the provisions of the SAA.

International Community and Macedonian Conflict: Development of Culture of Dependency

Generally, while external actors engage in the solutions to what they see as the problem, the group insecurities stemming from the conflict may remain unchanged and even gain in importance during the post-conflict period. So, instead of leading to the intended self-sustainability, they may cement the existing ethnic national insecurities and leave the whole country languish in the "no war, no peace" limbo. In Macedonian case, the early international involvement had prevented the armed confrontation from turning into a full-scale civil war. According to the Framework Agreement (FA) "the parties invite the international community to monitor and assist in the implementation of the provisions of the signed agreement" and request such efforts to be coordinated by the EU in cooperation with the Stabilization and Association Council.[4] In other words, implementation of the Ohrid Agreement has been set up as a precondition for integration of the country into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Hence, under close international supervision, Macedonia's ruling elites were obliged to devote most of their energy to minority rights and interethnic relations. However, the negative side of this international involvement is that all the issues concerning the implementation of the FA are discussed and agreements are reached under the auspices and direct involvement of the international guarantors of the Agreement, representatives of the USA and the EU. This contributes to development of "the culture of dependency" on the third site, international actors. What is more, there is no space for other actors in the society (NGO's, citizens, academics, experts, etc.) to take part in or influence the decisions made by the political elites.

Under these circumstances, the EU integration and the NATO membership appear all the more important as they rank among the few projects on which members of the majority and the other communities agree. To various degrees, ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians are persuaded that only the Atlantic Alliance can protect Macedonia from external as well as domestic threats, thereby guaranteeing peace in the country. Consensus on membership in the European Union is even stronger. Most citizens of Macedonia feel it holds the key to a significant improvement in socio-economic standards and to a better future. In Europe without borders the Albanians will be closer to their fellows in other states and ethnic

[4] Hence EU regularly gives assessment concerning the level of implementation of Framework Agreement in the context of Progress Report for the country.

**STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM**

Macedonians will establish closer relations with the Macedonians that live in the neighbouring countries. So, in the long run, the European option will make less important the demands of ethnic collectivity.

Regardless of their cultural background, the citizens in Macedonia feel the need to be part of a larger security organisation in order to preserve peace and stability in the country. The Alliance's efficient management of the post-conflict situation has also convinced members of the Macedonian political elite that the NATO was a reliable and efficient partner, whose leaders knew what they wanted to achieve and how to get there. In this context, a credible EU and NATO commitment remains the best guarantee that Macedonia will look into the future rather than allow itself to be pulled back into the past.

Fine tuning in Macedonian Security Culture – From "Culture of Dependency" to "Culture of a Role Player"

There has been an emphasized interest at macro level of all the actors at the international scene (UN, NATO, EU, OSCE and USA) in the security in the Republic of Macedonia since its very independence and it still continues. That interest has been manifested through the UN preventive mission and the engagement of the NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the USA in the resolution of the 2001 conflict.[5] In the post-conflict period and the implementation of the Framework Agreement, the EU has a particular role through the Stabilization and Association Agreement and the advisory missions in the police reforms. The NATO presence and its interest in the security sector reforms have been manifested through the NATO Advisory Team and the liaisons with the KFOR on the issues concerning border security. On the other hand, the USA has been actively involved through the "Booz-Alen-Hamilton" advisory team in the army reforms. Furthermore, after the stabilization of its security situation because of the 2001 conflict, the Republic of Macedonia has steadily transformed itself from "a security consumer" to its "provider". By participating in the NATO-led mission ISAF and the EU mission ALTHEA, it is acquiring the experience required for participation in crisis management operations that will be its responsibility as a future NATO and EU member. Moreover, the strategic partnership with the USA was built and confirmed through its participation in the mission in Iraq. The

[5] For more details see: Slaveski, S. (2003) *The National Security of the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro Atlantic Integrations.* Skopje: Digiprint, str. 206–226.

mosaic was completed with Macedonian participation in the UN mission UNIFIL in Lebanon.

At middle level, it is interesting that during the first years of its independence, the Republic of Macedonia was showing "scepticism" towards the regional approaches of the NATO and the EU, primarily due to "historical reasons", but also, because it believed that it had advanced more in the reform processes than the other countries, that is, that it would get integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community more easily if it "went independently". Eventually, the Republic of Macedonia has realized that the "regional cooperation" in the South East Europe (SEE) was complementary to its efforts for joining the Union and the Alliance and that instead of "apple of discord" in the new security environment it could be the "bridge of cooperation" among the countries in the region. Therefore, it has appeared as an initiator and promoter of many activities within regional cooperation and has received the epithet of a "leader" of this type of cooperation.

In short, if in the first years of its independence the Republic of Macedonia was a place where the global actors at the international scene tested their capacities for preventive diplomacy and crisis management, later it grew into the leader of the regional cooperation and a contributor to peace maintaining. In other words, it was the transformation from "Culture of Dependency" to "Culture of a Role Player".

"Name Issue" and Strategic Choice

However, the name issue has been plaguing the country's relations with Greece (and, consequently, with the EU and the NATO) since the early 1990s.[6] Macedonia has already made it clear that it agrees to join the NATO under the provisional name of "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" as it was settled in the Interim Agreement. Moreover, in the run-up to Bucharest, under the US pressure to come to solution, Macedonia agreed for the first time to a different name for its international use. It accepted the UN mediator Matthew Nimetz's "final proposal": "the Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)" as its reference for international use. But Greece flatly rejected it and broke down the Interim Agreement. The setback is damaging to all the parties and undermines the Alliance's stated objective: "to enhance peace and stability in Europe" (Washington Summit, 1999). Thus the NATO unwitting-

[6] For further details, see: Roudo-mentof, V. (2002) *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict*. London: Praeger.

STRATEGIC CULTURE AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

ly strengthened the Greek position in Bucharest (Edward, 2008: 78-81).

Supporting the Greek nationalism and telling Macedonia that it should find a solution to the "name dispute" means, among other things, telling Macedonians to accept changes in its name and identity and there is a danger that the public opinion will turn against the EU and the NATO. There is a real danger that nationalism and ethnocentrism will be on the rise. In this situation the ethnic Macedonians and the ethnic Albanians have a diametrically opposite views on crucial question for the future of the country.[7]

Decisions taken at Bucharest Summit brought a huge disappointment to Macedonian citizens of all ethnic groups. The failure to joint the NATO was a special disappointment for the Albanians, for whom the American-led alliance holds both a security and emotive attraction. Many now do not like having to pay the cost to protect the name of the country that means "nothing to them, but means everything to the country's majority" (Edward, 2008: 83-85). A disappointment in the NATO accession has an immediate impact on the credibility of the EU perspective as well, leading to the "disintegration of the Euro-Atlantic integration myth" that has sustained shaky Ohrid peace.

The problem is that with its support to the Greek objections to the Macedonian name the influence of the EU on Macedonian politics is decreasing and the possibilities for further soft mediation of the Macedonian-Albanian political disputes will diminish. There is a risk that both the Macedonian and the Albanian nationalism will grow. The radicals among the Albanians have anyhow been encouraged by the recent declaration and recognition of Kosovo's independence. Supporting the Greek position signals to nationalists around the Balkans that Macedonia is still not a "normal" country, a state that has a secure and prosperous future in the EU.

Owing to the severely degenerated security situation over the past year, additional measures aiming at redressing the polarization in Macedonian society would be needed. These would have to centre on coining the strategies for strengthening of Macedonia's fundamental attributes of statehood, on concentrating the international donor efforts on development cooperation (rather than on humanitarian assistance to boost the country's industrial capacities), and on realistically engaging the country's political élites from both ethnic groups in the grand European integration processes. It is necessary to underline the fact that redressing the current core instabilities in the Balkans, namely those in Kosovo and

[7] Answering the question "what is the level of your confidence in NATO today after the NATO Summit in Bucharest " 30% answered that it is bigger, 23% answered it is smaller, while 28% said that it remains the same (9% gave no answer). What is important to notice is that among the Macedonians the confidence has decreased among 30% of the surveyed, increased among 6%, remained the same among 37%, while 27% did not answer the question. The attitude of the ethnic Albanians is quite uniform, as 96% of them have increased level of confidence in NATO after the Summit in Bucharest. (Source: www.crpm.org.mk, accessed on 20 May 2008).

Macedonia, is in the vital interests of the European Union, the NATO and the United States.

In other words, it is not merely unfortunate that Macedonia did not get an invitation to join the NATO in Bucharest, but it rather questions the entire basis for Macedonia's internal cohesion. In short, any trend toward disintegration in Macedonia would have direct and unavoidable consequences for Kosovo. Should Macedonia again descend into conflict, it would almost certainly not remain confined to its current borders.

With Kosovo's independence and Serbia's objections already complicating the Balkan realities, the EU does not need another crisis. Macedonian stability is crucial as any new conflict there could cause a wider conflict including Bulgaria, Turkey, and Albania. At the moment the US seems to understand this and pledges support to Macedonia. The times are such that they are seeking to do more. Denying the existence of the Macedonians and their country as such did not help solve the Macedonian problem and did not contribute to the Balkans stability in the past, and it will not do so in the future. Only a settlement that recognizes the Macedonians and respects their national rights will be of the lasting value and will contribute to stability in South-Eastern Europe.

There is a genuine convergence of interests in the region, but also a danger of destabilization if a solution to the dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece is not found rapidly. Since many NATO member countries are now advocating a pause in enlargement, Macedonia must not miss the membership boat. So the question is: does the Republic of Macedonia have realistic prospects of joining the NATO any time soon? (Kosanic, 2009: 5)

Strengthening National Pride:
New Government's Policy

When ethnic nationalism is on the rise in response to a perceived external threat in a particular state, the ethnic identity of the groups in that state will also rise to counteract the "loss" of identity space. The greater the intensity of the external threat, the greater the intensity of ethnic nationalism and the stronger the mobilization of ethnic groups will be. The Framework Agreement lacks devices for "societal peace-building", in particular for addressing the society security needs of the ethnic Macedonians. In

addition, at the international arena identity of the ethnic Macedonians is also challenged.

So far, both Macedonia and Greece have behaved irresponsibly, with Athens resorting to what the Greek scholar Anna Triandafyllidou calls "the strategic manipulation of nationalist feelings by the Greek politicians" (Triandafyllidou, Calloni and Mikrakis, 1997). Clinging to a narrow majority and cautiously eyeing the far right, the conservative government led by Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis has been highly vocal about the name issue. However, the record shows that no matter which government is in power in Athens, its position is remarkably constant. In Macedonia, the centre-right government of Nikola Gruevski has blatantly exploited nationalist sentiment, taking the provocative step of re-naming the airport and highway after Alexander. But there is a fundamental difference in approaches in the two countries: Greece objects to the Macedonian claims to the legacy of Alexander the Great, but Macedonia does not object to corresponding Greek claims (Edward, 2008: 78-81).

What is more, Greece requires change of the name of the country even for domestic practice and challenges the existence of the Macedonian nation and its societal security requirements (such as the Macedonian language, Macedonian culture, etc.). For the ethnic Macedonians this is unacceptable. Name of the country is considered by many ethnic Macedonians essential for preserving their national identity. In addition, the regional context regarding the Albanian question (Kosovo's independence and invitation to Albania to join the NATO) is making the Albanians impatient and more demanding. In total, the name dispute is largely asymmetrical, with Greece laying exclusive claim to the Macedonian identity. Exacerbating the problem is another asymmetry: the EU and the NATO member Greece is substantially richer and more powerful than Macedonia.[8]

In theory of ethnic relations, if an identity is under threat, logical response is to strengthen its societal capacity. This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce social cohesion and distinctiveness among the group and to ensure that society reproduces itself effectively. In this sense, consequently, culture becomes security policy. This is exactly the point of departure of the new Macedonian strategy to preserve the endangered national identity of the ethnic Macedonians. This policy can be summarised in the speech of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski given in Rome: "We cannot give up our identity, culture and lit-

[8] The problem is asymmetrical, both in terms of the Greek objection to the Macedonian identity, and Greece's power relative to Macedonia. Only by introducing the full dimension of the problem, including the question of the Macedonian minority in Greece, will Athens have a motivation to compromise—and will more instability be prevented.

eracy as they are among crucial prerequisites for prosperous, lasting future of each nation… there is no administrative mechanism for erasing the memory about who and what we are… there is no substitute for the identity …therefore we shall join Europe in no other way but as the Macedonians…although one EU and NATO member state has been making attempts to prevent our Euro-Atlantic integration by denying our national identity and uniqueness, we are firmly committed to join these institutions in a dignified manner, as a nation whose culture and language are one of the pillars of the European culture." (Gruevski, 2008)

In such situation, "the Macedonian nationalism grows not so much from the pride, but from desperation to survive" (Loomis, Davis and Broughton, 2001). The Albanian insurgency of 2001 could not but intensify the feeling among the Macedonians that their national existence was threatened. This feeling is enhanced among the Macedonians by the Greek's obstruction of the integration of the country into the NATO.

The Framework Agreement addressed most of the identity-related grievances of the Albanian minority, but little compensation was offered to the Macedonian majority beyond a (promised) peace they feared might not last. In the dominant Macedonian perception, Albanians had enjoyed extensive rights in the 1990s, and most average citizens did not accept that minorities had suffered from discrimination or segregation. Few had ever engaged in an open debate on Macedonian identity and Macedonian nationalism. Under these circumstances, some kind of repercussion was to be expected, as it is now a renewed search for self-confidence and pride. However, the real question is how long can Macedonians stay at this position? And what consequences can this policy produce, integration or isolation of the country? Macedonia is facing to strategic choice and changes in the Strategic Culture. Whether it will be "fine tuning", compromise and integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures or "fundamental change" in security policy goals is still tentative. Aware of this fact, the Macedonian parliament passed a resolution on 3 November 2008, calling on the government to define the strategy on the name dispute, warning that it must not "endanger the Macedonian nation and its language, history, culture and identity". This document is not endorsed yet.

Way Ahead: A Fair Compromise
with International Involvement

There are only three possible outcomes for the dispute: continued deadlock; Macedonian capitulation; or Greek willingness to compromise. Continued stalemate is the most likely outcome because Greece faces no external cost to maintaining its position. Athens' approach suggests that it sees little incompatibility with its substantial private investment in Macedonia and the country's continued limbo status. Macedonian capitulation to the Greek position would mean negating the Macedonian identity. As described above, this would pose serious complications to advancing the peace arrangement with the Albanians. It would also only encourage other assaults from neighbouring countries on the Macedonian identity, further damaging the cohesion of the country. Only a fair compromise[9], one that protects the Macedonian identity while addressing the Greek demand for a name for international use serves the cause of European stability. Given the inequality in power between Macedonia and Greece, the UN mediation alone is unlikely to achieve this. And given the unwillingness of the European capitals to take on the burden of confronting Athens, the American leadership is once again essential. In other words, the solution of the name dispute is to recognize both the seriousness of the problem and its root causes, and urgently devise a transatlantic strategy that addresses them.

The urgent task for Europe and the United States is to devise a strategy to deal with the name dispute. Hence, many experts urge for "close EU involvement, including mediation between the parties" (Batt, 2008). Some even argue that "Macedonia's future is essential to the European security architecture… Macedonia may represent the greatest challenge as well as the last best hope for the Balkans" (Liotta and Jebb, 2002: 96-112). The answer to whether the future Europe will be characterized as one of constant security dilemmas or palace of integrating security identity ties, may well lie with the fate of Macedonia.

There is a pressing need to link the Macedonian identity with other European identities and organizations. Membership in the NATO, for example, now appears to be a cultural marker of inclusion end economic attractiveness as much as a security guarantee (Stefanova, 2003: 181). Macedonia cannot achieve success on its own. If the major players who will most affect the outcomes in the Balkan region (the EU, the NATO and the US) cannot find some means of mutual accommodation and agree to strategy to help the country, than the future of Macedonia will be uncertain.

[9] The citizens' perspectives on this question are drastically changed compared to the views they expressed before NATO Summit at Bucharest, when 83% of the citizens were against changes to the name of the country in order to get NATO membership. The latest survey reveals that the Macedonian Albanians have changed their opinion. While a month ago 52% of the ethnic Albanians agreed to changes of the name of the country so that Macedonia gets NATO membership, now 94% of them agree to such a change. In fact two thirds of the respondents that would change the name of the country for Macedonia's NATO membership are ethnic Albanians. Meanwhile, the number of ethnic Macedonians that are against changing the name in return for NATO membership decreased from 95% to 80%. (Source: www.crpm.org.mk accessed on 20 May 2008).

References:

1. 'Culture, literacy - prerequisites for lasting, prosperous future.' (2008) Speech by Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski at the Italian Ministry of Culture as the patron of the Year of Macedonian Language, Rome, 25 May 2008. Available from: http://www.vlada.mk/english/Speeches/May2008/Obrakan-je%20na%20PVRM%20-%20 (accessed on 5 June 2008).

2. Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (2003) *National Security and Defence Concept of the Republic of Macedonia*.' Skopje: Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia.

3. Batt, J. (2008) 'Is the EU losing the Western Balkans?' Paper presented at the seminar held at the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 17 March 2008. Available from: www.iss.europa.eu (accessed on 16 May 2008).

4. Edward, J. (2008) 'Averting the Next Balkan War.' *Internationale Politik*, pp. 78–81. Available from: http://www.ip-global.org/archiv/2008/summer2008/averting-the-next-balkan-war.html (accessed on 1 January 2009).

5. Johnston, A. I. (1995) *Cultural realism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

6. Kosanic, Z. (2009) 'Obstacles to FYROM's membership of NATO: a tougher agenda than expected.' *NATO Defence College Research Paper*, 44, 5.

7. Lantis, J. S. (2002) 'Strategic Culture and National Policy.' *International Studies Review*, 3, pp. 91.

8. Liotta, P. N. and Jebb, R. C. (2002) 'Macedonia: End of the beginning or Beginning of the End?' *Parameters*, pp. 96–112.

9. Longhurst, K. A. (2000) *Strategic Culture: The Key to Understanding German Security Policy?* Birmingham: University of Birmingham.

10. Loomis A., Davis L. and Broughton, S. (2001) *Politics & Identity in Macedonia. Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Understandings,* Paper presented at the conference 'Macedonia–Macedonians: Changing Contexts in the Changing Balkans', London, 14-16 June, 2001, p. 12. Cited by Brunnbauer, U. (2002) 'The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement: Ethnic Macedonian Resentments.' *Centre for the Studies of the Balkan Societies and Cultures*, 1, University of Graz, pp. 9.

11. NATO. (1999) '*The Alliance's Strategic Concept*.' Washington Summit, April 1999. Available from: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065f.htm .

12. Novakova, K. (2006) 'EU integrations of Macedonia: the Human Rights Perspective and the Role of the Civil Society.' U *EU Accession and Human Rights – Consequences, Tendencies and the Role of Civil Society.* Yearbook of the Balkan Human Rights Network, pp. 102–131.

13. Roudomentof, V. (2002) *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict.* London: Praeger.

14. Slaveski, S. (2003) *The National Security of the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro Atlantic Integrations.* Skopje: Digiprint.

15. Stefanova, R. (2003) 'New Security Challenges in the Balkans.' *Security Dialogue,* 34 (2), pp. 181.

16. Triandafyllidou, A., Calloni, M. and Mikrakis, A. (1997) 'New Greek Nationalism.' *Sociological Research Online*, 2(1). Available from: http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/2/1/7.html (accessed on 16 May 2008).

STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM

Changes in the Turkish Security Culture and in the Civil-Military Relations

Nilufer Narli

The author is a professor at the Bahcesehir University

Abstract

This paper analyzes dynamics of Turkish civil – military relations starting from the year 2001. It aims at explaining both institutional and cultural changes in the field. Analytical model applied assumes four main variables which are not deterministic: the EU - harmonization process as a major variable, the Turkish security culture, the civil-military related political culture and the US security policy. The author claims an analysis of the political culture to be fundamental in understanding civil-military relations in any context, while the EU harmonization process is taken as a main variable which explains changes in the conventional military related political culture in the Turkey. That process contributed to the curbing of the formal influence of the military till the year of 2005 when the setbacks took place due to the US intervention in Iraq. US security policy led to the partial revitalization of Turkish traditional security culture which highlights military supremacy. Despite that the new political culture which rejects the idea of the coup or any type of military intervention in civilian politics emerged in Turkey.

Key words: *civil-military relations, political culture, security culture, Turkey, EU- harmonization.*

1. Introduction and Conceptual Framework

The paper[1] analyzes the changes in the civil-military relations which have been taking place since the year 2001 by locating the civil-military relationship in a context where two external factors

[1] Some of the ideas on the concordance model and the Turkish civil-military relations, and EU harmonization were already discussed in the paper by Nilufer Narli, presented at International Sociological Association Research Committee 01,"Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution"& Seoul National University, Korea Military Academy and Korea National Defense University, *International Conference on "Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution in a Globalized World"* July 14 ~ 17, 2008, Seoul, Korea.

affect the changes: the EU harmonization process, a major variable that affects the institutional and cultural foundations of the civil-military relations since the year 2001, and the US security policy regarding Iraq, which has both directly and indirectly influenced Turkish security culture and security policy since the year 2003.

Conceptually, the paper borrows from Rebecca Shifts' concordance theory (Schiff, 1995: 7-24) and Luckhams's conceptualization of the civil-military "interaction" (Luckham, 1971: 3-35) in order to analyze the civil-military relations in Turkey where there is an imperfect concordance and complicated interaction amongst the military, civilian political decision making and the society. The concordance is imperfect. It can be fragile as Turkey experienced three major coups (1960, 1971, and 1980) and a soft coup in 1997. The concordance model is highly useful in analyzing the complicated "interaction between the civilian and military institutions" in a political setting, like Turkey, where the civilian institutions were not occasionally strong compared to the military institutions. This has begun to change with the EU harmonization reforms which have empowered the civilian authorities vis-ŕ-vis the military authorities. The civil-military interaction is complicated in that the functions of the civilian and military institutions often converge. This convergence is based on a consensus that could not be always strong, depending on changes in the political culture and the security culture, the two cultural factors that affect the changes in the civil-military interaction and the sustainability of the concordance. These cultural variables have been affected by the EU harmonization process since Turkey became a candidate and by the US security policy in Iraq since the year 2003.

The conceptual model (Figure 1), which is developed to analyze the dynamics of the change in the civil-military relations, assumes that there are four variables affecting the civil-military relations in Turkey. The variables are non-deterministic. They are dynamic processes. The explanation in the paper is not a causal explanation.

The first variable is the EU harmonization process, a major variable, which has been transforming the civil-military relations in three directions: increased civilian influence in the civilian-military balance of power; improved transparency in defence budgeting and in defence policy formation; and improved parliamentary oversight. The second variable is the Turkish security culture. It is a dependent variable, which is affected by the EU harmonization reforms that have also created a change in the political mindset of

**STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM**

the citizens and in their security-related perceptions. On the other hand, Turkish security culture is a variable, which affects security policy as much as the material structural factors affect security policy (Karaosmanoglu, 2008); and it has direct and indirect impact on the increased or decreased civilian democratic control. The third variable is the civil-military related political culture. The fourth variable is the US security policy that directly or indirectly influences the security environment in Turkey. Here the analysis focuses on the specific question: what have been the consequences of the Iraq War, which began in 2003, on the changes in Turkish security culture, and in turn, on the democratization of the Turkish civil-military relations?

The civil-military related political culture is a complex set of shared ideas, beliefs, convictions, perceptions, symbols, and expectations of the citizens defining the civil-military relations. It also includes the norms of operation. Turkish security culture, which does not only refer to the elite's culture, is the totality of the security related ideas, values, beliefs, perceptions, emotions and opinions shared by the society. It shapes the public opinion which has become important consideration in the formation of policies in recent years.

The security culture and political culture interact with each other and create an impact on the security policy (Figure 1). In turn, changes in the security culture are more likely to bring changes in the democratization of civil-military relations.

The analysis strategy focuses on the institutional and cultural changes. At the institutional level, it describes the constitutional and structural changes in the organization of the civil-military relations under the EU harmonization process by explicating the changes in the level of the military's formal influence on civilian politics. At cultural level, first, it analyzes the observable changes in the military- related political culture and in the security culture. Second, it looks at whether the US security policy in Iraq, following the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, intervenes in the dynamics of change at institutional and cultural levels. Third, the paper examines the changes in the use of informal influence mechanisms by the military, that is the influence exercised by means of press statements and public speeches whereby the military communicates its security views to the public and "educates" the public about internal and external treats. The informal influence mechanisms of the military are functional in the construction and re-con-

struction of the security culture, which in turn, constructs their military-related political culture.

Based on these analyses, the paper aims to develop the hypotheses on the likely influence of the new security cultural context for further alignment of the Turkish civil-military relations with the EU.

Figure 1: Model Explaining the Dynamics of the EU Harmonization on the Security Culture, Political Culture and on the Civil-Military Relations.

1.1. Methodology

The paper is based on the interview and documentary data which were collected from various sources. The documentary data were collected from the white books published by the Turkish military and from other relevant documents in order to examine the issues of transparency building, defence budgeting and spending. Secondly, the speeches, made by the leading members of the Turkish armed forces in the years between 2007 and 2009, were analyzed for examining: (i) the construction of security culture and military-related political culture; (ii) the military's response to political developments and security issues; and (iii) the military's perception of the EU Harmonization reforms with respect to Turkish security policy. The third source of the data was the minutes of the parliamentary committee and the full house hearings debating the budget bills for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,

**STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM**

2007.These data were used to investigate the extent to which the parliamentary oversight has grown. Finally, the data were collected from the columns and articles, published in Turkish daily and weekly papers, which debate the transparency, accountability and oversight.

2. Turkish Political Culture and Security Culture Prior to the EU Harmonization

An analysis of political culture[2] is fundamental for understanding civil-military relations in any context. This may especially apply to Turkey for two major reasons: it provides context for the construction of the security culture; and it gives meaning to the political processes and underlying assumptions, values and rules that affect political behavior. The pillars of the civil-military relationship are rooted in the largely shared Turkish political culture.

2. 1. The Ottoman Legacy and Political Culture

Historical past is important in analyzing any political culture. In order to understand Turkish security culture in the context of national historical experience, it is fundamental to understand the Ottoman legacy in the construction of Turkish political culture. The impact of Ottoman heritage on Turkish republican political institutions and personalities is still visible. In the early days of the republic, founded in 1923, despite modernization, many fundamental attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments inculcated by Ottoman state were tenacious and fortifying the political tradition, which was hierarchical and bureaucratic-patrimonial. Both the civilians and the military share this political legacy. The military of the Ottoman state was the military of orders, and special privileges that gave the military the status of a fundamental corporate pillar of the state. The Sultan, the military and the bureaucracy formed the center, while the rest of the society was on the periphery. The center had the privilege of financial and intellectual investment, while the periphery was ignored.

Although Turkey was modernized considerably with Ataturk's reforms and adopted Western values and institutions, the political culture remained paternalistic, hierarchical, authoritarian, corporate, and elitist to its core until the mid 1980s when the liberal economic policy began to transform the social structure. Liberal polit-

[2] For the definition of political culture Verba and Pye are important references. Political culture is a "system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values, which defines the situation in which political action takes place" according to Verba's definition. Pye defines it as "the sum of the fundamental values, sentiments and knowledge that give form and substance to political process".

ical ideas of Turgut Ozal, who became a Prime Minister in 1983, led to expansion of the civil society and brought new political values that were in dissonance with the paternalistic, statistic, hierarchical, authoritarian, corporate political culture. These structural and cultural changes shattered the fundamentals of the center-periphery type of social and political organization, which did not disappear during the Republican era till the mid 1980s. The traditional center began to be fragmented as a result of the emergence of Anatolian business elite, originating from humble provincial background and with the rise of a newly urbanized middle classes in 1990s. The traditional center has been seriously challenged with the new elites that have begun to confront the established political elite, business elite and their state values since the year 2000.

2.2. The Traditional Civil-Military Related Political Culture Patterns and Changes under the EU Harmonization

In order to analyze the civil-military related political culture, the paper de-constructs the meaning of the convictions and beliefs, symbols, and certain school ceremonies that were instrumental in constructing militarism in Turkey. The paper conceptualizes militarism as a general outlook that views the military as the foundation of a society's security, and thereby claims to be its most important institution. It also comprises a set of social practices that feed a strong military spirit. In the context of Turkey there are certain beliefs and convictions that express a strong military spirit and deference to the army. Amongst them, "every Turk is a born soldier" (Altýnay, 2001) and Turkish nation is the military nation express the patterns of heroism and a sense of subordination. The belief that "being a martyr is the highest level of exaltation" fortifies the patterns of heroism and readiness to sacrifice. [3]

Added to the militarist beliefs referred to above, traditional deference to the military and the belief that "the military protects us against the internal and external enemies" made the military a type of mystical and unquestionable institution. The sacredness of the military was fortified by describing the military, "the home of the Prophet Mohammed" (Peygamber Ocagi"), which has its roots in the Ottoman political culture. In his recent speech (April 14, 2009), Mr. Baţbuđ, the Chief of General Staff, expressed his view that the Turkish military was "the home of the Prophet Mohammed". The reason Baţbuđ gave for this statement was to

[3] Aysegul Altýnay deconstructs the myth of "Turkish nation as military nation".

diffuse the "biases portraying the Armed Forces as anti-religion institution".[4]

Militarist political culture prevails in the formal school socialization. One of the examples of this type of militarism is the military style marching by school students at national day celebrations, a ritual that constructs militarist tendencies. The second one is the Turkish textbooks' emphasis on being a soldier. The History Foundation of Turkey[5] research report on the militarist culture in the textbooks shows that such a culture exists and it "restricts the sphere and boundaries of civilian thinking". The report listed "militarist statements found in Turkish textbooks":

- You elect and are elected as deputy; but you should also be a soldier (primary school textbook on the Turkish language for the sixth grade).
- We are called Turks; we are the greatest (Elementary school textbook on traffic and first aid).

Publishing such a critical report on the militarist culture in Turkey is a breakaway from the conventional military-related political culture. The report was made available to the larger public by quoting its several paragraphs in daily newspapers in March 2009, which was an important step to create awareness of militarism. In addition, just before the 23 April National Sovereignty and Children's Day celebrations, on April 19, 2009, the dailies reported abolishing the ritual of the military style marching at school ceremonies.[6] Some columnists commented on the issue by writing articles entitled "Demilitarization of Education" in April and May, 2009, at a time when the debate on abolishing the pledge of allegiance recited by school children created controversy. Turkish primary school students have had to repeat the national pledge of allegiance (Andýmýz) since 1933, every morning. They say: I am a Turk, I am honest, I am a hard worker and my principle is to love the elderly, protect those younger than me and love my country more than myself. I offer my existence to the Turkish nation as a gift." The civil society associations, such as Human Rights Association, endorse abolishing "militarist" traditions in the schools. The debate on abolishing the daily reciting of the national pledge of allegiance can be seen as an indicator of the change in the military-related political culture.

All the above-mentioned changes in the conventional military-related political culture can be related to the EU harmonization reforms, which have brought institutional changes that have also seemingly created changes in the mindset of the citizens. The EU

[4] Addressing the "Annual Assessment Speech" held in War Academies Command in Istanbul, General Basbug, covered several issues, including the civil-military relations, terrorism, combating terrorism, democracy, secularism and religious issues. He stated that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) have never been "against religion". He also added: "the armed forces are the target of a smear campaign by certain groups bent on portraying them as anti-religion". See Turkish dailies: *Today's Zaman, Turkish Daily News, Hurriyet, Milliyet, and Radikal of* April 15, 2009.

[5] See *'Human Rights in Textbooks Report.'* (2009), published by the History Foundation of Turkey and the Turkish Human Rights Foundation.

[6] See 'Uygun Adým Kalktý.' ('Marching was abolished'), *Hurriyet,* April 19. 2009. Yet the next day a circular was sent to schools to reverse the abolishment of military style marching to celebrate national days.

harmonization has also brought free debate of civil-military issues. The increasing number of articles questioning militarism and the growing number of anti-militarist web pages[7]are all observable signs of the change in the military- related political culture.

2.2 Turkish Security Culture

Sociology's new institutionalism suggests a new focus for cultural studies of military actions and military organizations. Peter J. Katzenstein (Katzenstein, 1996) conceives the military as operating in national environments that shape national security culture; and therefore he places organizational culture in the context of national historical experience. Likewise, Ali Karaosmaonoglu (2008) who analyzed Turkish security culture, looks at culture and identity as important determinants of the national security policy.

Conceptually, security culture is treated as variable that determines the action and readiness of people and the political elite to get involved in the security behavior. As such, it is an important variable that shapes public opinion, which in recent years has become an important consideration in the formation of all types of policies, including security policy. Any change in the security culture is important, as it is assumed to influence the level of public support for the EU reforms bringing institutional changes in the organization of civil-military relations in Turkey.

What are the main qualities of Turkish security culture? Since the republic was established, conservative realism has largely shaped the security culture and has been shared by the military –bureaucratic elite and the citizens. Conservative realism, as a rational mindset of the Turkish military professionals, motivated them to be preoccupied with the state and to focus on threats coming from other nations. As such, it largely ignored the non-state actors and trans-national or asymmetric threats until the beginning of the 21st century. The focus on the threats might have blocked the inculcation of the mindset necessary to consider the possibilities of cooperation and dialogue until the first decade of the 21st century.

Turkish focus on the threats has its historical precedents. Turkey's perceived geo-strategic position has always been precarious in that its security culture has portraid Turkey as surrounded by hostile states that hated Turkey. Moreover, the distrust of the West, largely due to Sevres Treaty (signed following the demise of

[7] For example www.savaskarsit-lari.org.

the Ottoman Empire, which divided Turkey between the West-European states) perpetuates fear that Western European states still have same plans for dividing the country. In this situation, Turkey has had to take the external and internal security threats of its neighbors seriously by embarking on the expansion of its military forces. The citizens are supposed to be brave and self-sacrificing to take any task to prevent a security threat that is identified by the military.

The rhetoric of external and internal threats against the territorial integrity of Turkey and against its secular and unitary foundations has prevailed in the political culture since the foundation of the republic. Hakan Yilmaz (2008) observed that "Eurosceptisicsm has been growing since 2005" when the accession negotiations with the EU began. The indicator of this tendency was the decrease of the public support for the EU membership: it fell from 70-75% in 2003 to 55-60% in 2006. In this political environment, the Sevres syndrome, Europe's 'hidden' agenda to divide and rule Turkey, has again become more important as a driver in the construction of the Turkish political culture and security culture since 2005.

Such a security culture, which keeps the public emotion vivid against external and internal threats, is important in constructing a "very popular and unique image" of the military. It fortifies the conviction that the military does not only protect Turkey against internal and external enemies, but it also ensures secularism and democracy in Turkey. Turkish experts, Aydinli, Ozcan and Akyaz, explain the "unique and popular public image" of the military by noting: "Turkish armed forces have an unusual relationship with both the country's civilian leadership and Turkish society. Despite its record of tampering with civilian politics and ousting democratically elected governments, the military remains extremely popular." The relationship between Turkish military and Turkey's civilian authorities may be an "exception to the 'standardized' civil-military relationship", as Chief of the General Staff of the Army Hilmi Özkök said in a speech in August 2005, but every country has "different needs, conditions, values, histories, societal concerns, and dynamics" (Quoted in Aydinli, Ozcan and Akyaz, 2006).

An open debate on national security was rare until the early2000s, as it was the prime concern for the military, yet a taboo subject for any civilian debate. It was primarily from the military elite perspective of tough neighborhood and preserving secular unitary state that the security policy has been defined. Gökhan Yücel, in 2002, argued that national security was a "taboo that everyone

more or less knows about, yet which nobody dares to deal with because it is a 'hear no evil, see no evil, and speak no evil' subject". Given such a security cultural environment, civilian politicians and public input have been largely excluded in the formulation of the security policy, largely due to the "involvement of the military in day-to-day politics in various fashions" which Yücel argues, "gives no room for civilian solutions" for security issues. Despite having no civilian input into the security policy formation, formal and informal socialization agents encourage an ordinary civilian to learn and internalize the security culture identifying major security threats and concerns (Altinay, 2001).

2.3 Turkish Political Culture and Security Culture as the Pillars of Guardianship Model

It was against such military-related political culture and against such national security cultural ethos that the military acted as the guardian of the republic and enjoyed autonomy in conducting its own affairs. The organizational strength of the military and the military's institutional ability to participate in and influence the civilian decision-making institutions (influence over parliamentary agenda and civilian boards as explained below) created Luckham's "covert guardianship"[8] model of the civil-military relations. A particular security culture that legitimizes the military's involvement in civilian politics "in the pursuit of national security" (Luckham says) and a peculiar political culture (described below) that sustains the military's strength have become the pillars of the Turkish "guardianship" model.

It was such political culture that enabled the military, in the pre-EU harmonization period, to have legally-enshrined institutionalized ability to exercise formal influence on civilian politics.

3. The EU Harmonization and the Institutional Change in the Civil-Military Interaction

3.1 Pre-EU Harmonization Modality and Civil-Military Interaction

Despite their formal separation, military and civilian authorities have forged a partnership based on an imperfect concordance and on a complicated interaction among the military, political elites,

[8] Luckham defines "covert guardianship" model: "More indirect still, the military may act in such a way as to support over the long run a political order that it considers capable of following the national interest and providing with adequate support in the pursuit of national security. The military may submerge itself politically for a considerable time and yet retain the capacity for direct political action when so required."

and the citizenry (Schiff, 1995: 7-24) (illustrated in Figure 2). This ruling style was the product of Turkey's specific historical, social, and institutional context, featuring a stratified society and political culture as well as historical conflicts with neighboring states and the constant fear of losing territorial integrity, which is deeply rooted in the security culture, as explained above.

Figure 2. The Pre-EU Harmonization Turkish Concordance Model.

In this military membership dominated NSC model, "perceptual" refers to the totality of the convictions of the citizens that shape their attitude towards the military; contextual refers to all types of legal and constitutional rules.

In the pre-EU harmonization period, the military had institutionalized ability to exercise formal influence on civilian politics, operating via the National Security Council (NSC or MGK in Turkish). The military played its guardianship role in a system where the NSC[9], headed by a general, was able to make recommendations to the parliament by means of Article 118 prior to its amendment in 2001 (explained below). Another legal tool is Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law (Law No. 211, Article 35) of 1961 and the 1982 constitution. It has not been amended yet (by June 2009) and it

[9] Established after the 1960 coup, the NSC had the right to "recommend to the cabinet the necessary basic guidelines regarding decisions related to national security." Following the 1980 coup, the 1982 Constitution expanded the mandates of the NSC. Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution established the NSC as a body with 10 members, evenly divided between civilians (the president, prime minister, and ministers of defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs), and military officers (the chief of the general staff, the commanders of the army, navy, and air force, and the general commander of the gendarmerie).

entrusts the military to guard and defend the Turkish Republic as defined by the constitution.

Prior to amending the Article 118, the Council of Ministers had to consider, "with priority, the decisions of the National Security Council concerning necessary measures for the protection and independence of the state, the unity and indivisibility of the country as well as peace and security of the society". The NSC's decisions were had the power of decrees, as they were more than recommendations to civilian parliamentarians and to the executive. The military had enhanced institutional ability to directly influence the executive decisions, as the NSC's General Secretariat managed the Council's affairs in monthly meetings, which were called by the President in consultation with the Chief of General Staff. It was a military–dominated body with 350 permanent staff that were mostly active-duty or retired military. A flag officer, appointed by the Chief of General Staff, led the NSC's General Secretariat. The NSC and its General Secretariat were empowered to obtain any classified or unclassified materials from all departments of state. The General Secretary often set the agenda of NSC meetings and it had the right to oversee the revision of the NSC's National Security Policy Document every five years.

The pre-EU Harmonization modality enabled the military, among its security functions, to have other functions, including the formulation of defense policy without much civilian input; and the military helped to carry it out, since the military- dominated National Security Council General Secretariat functioned as an executive body. Empowered by the Article 118, the Council assumed the lead in defining national security priorities, internal and external threats, in formulating the national security policy and preparing national security policy document (discussed below) without much consultation with the civilian politicians. The political influence of the military, in turn, raised its high degree of autonomy (Sakallioğlu, 1997: 151-166). Under the current constitution, the Chief of Staff, who acts as wartime commander-in-chief, does not fall under the aegis of the minister of defense, but reports to the prime minister. [10] He could conduct military affairs independent of the Council of Ministers.

Moreover, the military also maintained autonomy vis-á-vis the civilian control in planning defence resources, the budget and procurement. The pre-EU harmonization model of defence budgeting lacked adequate parliamentary oversight and auditing, since the Court of Audit was subject to certain restrictions in auditing and scrutinizing military expenses. The defense budgeting and procurement

[10] Article 117 of the Constitution stipulates that the office of the Commander-in-Chief is inseparable from the Turkish Grand National Assembly and that the President of the Republic holds it. According to the same article of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers are responsible to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for national security and for preparing the Armed Forces for the defence of the country. The article says, "The Chief of the General Staff is the commander of the Armed Forces, and, in time of war, exercises the duties of the Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the President of the Republic". Refer to *www.mfa.gov.tr/b6.htm*.

was largely exempt from accountability to the elected representatives. This was to change with the reforms of the Law of Court of Audit, the Law on Public Financial Management and Control and the constitutional amendments explained below.

The political culture, which was much more at home with the idea of the military guarding the constitution and "correcting the civilian wrong-doings", sustained the pre-EU concordance model. It has begun to change with the EU harmonization, which will be discussed in further text.

3.2 Changes in the Civil-Military Institutional Interaction with the EU Harmonization

The following changes, which were envisaged in the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) of 2001, led to far-reaching reforms listed below. The amended Article 118 was the first achievement of the EU harmonization process, which emasculated the military's institutionalized capacity to make recommendations to the parliament with the 3 October 2001 Constitutional Amendments. The second one was the revision in the composition of the NSC to change the balance of the civilians to military members by removing the force commanders from the NSC. The only remaining permanent military member of the NSC is the Chief of General Staff. The 7th Harmonization package (7 August 2003) [11] brought amendments to the Law on the National Security Council (Law No. 2945, 1983). It brought the following changes:

- Redefining the functions of the NSC in an amendment to Article 4; and abrogating articles 9 and 14 of the Law on the NSC and the Secretariat General of the NSC which empowered the Secretariat General to follow up, on behalf of the President and the PM, the implementation of any recommendation made by the NSC.
- Amending Article 13 for limiting the competencies of the Secretariat General to the functions of a secretariat of the NSC.
- Amending Article 5 and increasing the time period between regular NSC meetings from one to two months.
- Canceling the prerogative of the Chief of General Staff to convene a meeting.
- Amending Article 15 to revise the appointment procedure of the Secretary General of the NSC; the Secretariat General is to be appointed upon the proposal of the PM and the approval of the President, allowing a civilian to serve in this office.

[11] For more information on the 7th Harmonisation Package and changes in the Law defining the function of the NSC, see http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/ab_uyum7-1.html.

- Removing Article 19, which provided that 'the Ministries, public institutions and organizations and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or when requested, non-classified and classified information and documents needed by the Secretariat General of the NSC.
- Abrogating the confidentiality of the staff of the Secretariat General of the NSC. Accordingly, the scope of the NSC's involvement in political affairs is now confined to the national security issues: the NSC is to determine the national security concept, develop ideas about security in accordance with the state's security approach and submit these views to the Council of Ministers (Narli, 2008).

The result was an emergence of a new concordance model (Figure 3), where the military has very limited institutional tools to influence civilian authorities. Moreover, the society has begun to disapprove of the idea of the military intervening in civilian politics and functioning as the only protector of the Constitution. This is explained in illustrating the indicators of the change in the civil-military related political culture.

**Figure 3. The New Concordance Model in the
EU Harmonization Period.**

In this model, the NSC is purely an advisory body, dominated by the civilians.

The further alignment job has not been finished. The EU progress reports bring three issues for further alignment: the amendment to Internal Service Law of Article 35; and the 1997 EMASYA secret protocol that is in force; the lack of progress in "ensuring full civilian supervisory functions over the military" and in improving parliamentary oversight of defence expenditure (Turkey Progress Report, 2008). The 2008 EU Turkey report gave special attention to the three issues: Internal Service Law, the 1997 EMASYA secret protocol, and transparency of the defense budget and spending. It wrote:

- No change has been made to the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law and the Law on the National Security Council.
- The 1997 *EMASYA* secret protocol on security, public order and assistance units remains in force unchanged. The protocol allows military operations to be carried out for internal security matters under certain conditions without a request from the civilian authorities.
- No progress has been made on strengthening the parliamentary oversight of the military budget and expenditure. The Parliamentary Planning and Budget Committee reviews the budget of the Ministry of National Defence. However, extra-budgetary funds are excluded from parliamentary scrutiny. The Defence Industry Support Fund (SSDF), from which most procurement projects are funded, is still an extra-budgetary fund. As for auditing, under the Constitution, the Court of Auditors can carry out external *expos* audits of military expenditure. In 2007, some 25% of all military accountancy offices were audited. In July 2008, the Court of Auditors ruled that it had a mandate to audit the SSDF. However, the Court remains unable to audit assets belonging to the military until revised legislation on the Court of Auditors is adopted. Furthermore, the 2003 Law on Public Financial Management and Control, which provides for internal audits of security institutions, has yet to be properly implemented. Overall, no progress has been made in ensuring a full civilian supervisory function over the military and parliamentary oversight of defence expenditure. Senior members of the armed forces have made statements on issues going beyond their remit (Ibid).

The EU harmonization reforms, which reduced the formal influence of the military and increased the transparency building measures, led to certain developments, such as opening an investigation on the financial transactions of the retired admirals and generals.[12] This produced diverse and conflicting feelings and opinions in the military and civilian circles in 2004. Then in 2008, retired generals were arrested on the grounds that they had allegedly planned staging a coup against the AKP government. All these developments took place in a cultural context where political culture and security culture were changing, as it will be explained in further text.

4. Changes in the Political Culture and Security Culture under the EU Harmonization and the Decrease in the Military's Informal Influence Mechanisms

With the far-reaching EU harmonization institutional reforms (mentioned below), the change is not only institutional. At the cultural dimension, there are three sets of changes: (i) changes in the civil-military related political culture and security culture, both sustained the pre-EU harmonization concordance model; (ii) a change in the mindset and socialization of the officer corps; and (iii) a change in the informal military influence mechanism in the direction of the lower influence. The media and the general public have considerably supported the EU harmonization reforms, which in turn, has created a new security cultural environment in Turkey, where the military is not seen as the sole protector of the democracy and secularism.

4.1 Changes in the Political Culture

Four indicators of change in the political culture have been noticed. First, frequent complaints in the media about the lack of transparency (see below[13]) and the increased number of academic studies on the civil-military relations as well as on the military budgeting within the last five years. The second one was the decreasing citizens' approval of the military involvement in the civilian politics. A survey showed that 58 percent of the respondents, in November 2006, did not approve of the military intervening in civilian politics, while 13.8 percent approved of it. Several columnists, including Sahin Alpay, Ali Bayramoglu, Hasan Cemal,

[12] The former Commander of Naval Forces Admiral Ilhami Erdil, and the 3rd Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Ethem Erdagi, were prosecuted for corruption. The then Chief of Staff General Hilmi Özkök initiated the investigation of former Admiral Erdil for abuse of power and extra spending from the budget, for himself and his family on September 15, 2003. See *Hurriyet*, October 12, 2004. He was found guilty of the charges.

[13] A number of columnists have brought this issue: Ali Bayramoglu, Hasan Cemal, Sedat Ergin. In 2007, Alper Gormus from *Nokta* weekly published articles on the alleged coup plans. In 2008 *Taraf* daily published numerous articles on the lack of transparency in defense policy formation and lack pf civilian input in the formation of defense policies.

wrote articles in a disapproval of the military's direct and indirect intervention in 2007. The most critical ones were Can Dundar and Hasan Cemal from *Milliyet* who underlined the importance of the civilianization of Turkish politics and criticized the military acting as "a state within the state", on March 10, 2007 before the e-memorandum of 27 April. Third, the idea of being a conscientious objector, a person who, on the grounds of conscience, resists the authority of the state to impose military service, has been more and more pronounced. It is a challenge to the idea that every male Turk is born a soldier.[14] The issue of conscientious objector has increasingly taken public attention and there are web sites (Anti-war Group, "savaț-karțýtlarý")[15] that keep the issue alive. Fourth, a new conviction is evolving -time has come for regular civilian institutions to assume the responsibility of protecting democracy and secularism rather than calling the military to put domestic affairs in order. This is why the e-memorandum of April 27 did not create the planned impact and did not lead to government resigning, as it had been the case in the previous years. Some civil society associations and journalists reacted against the military issuing a memorandum, in April 2007.

4.2 Changes in the Security Culture

Related to the fourth change in the civil-military related political culture, one of the apparent changes in the security culture is the increasing civilian interest in security. Security is becoming an academic topic. Civilian input into security issues is encouraged by international organizations and local academic institutions. There has been a growing number of studies on the parliamentary oversight of the defence sector, the civil-military relations and the security culture since the early 2000s. Moreover, parliamentarians have become more vocal in the security-related issues and they demand a voice in the formation of the national security policy.

Manifestations of the change in the mindset of the officer corps are not directly observable. However, the increased number of officers attending graduate study programmes at various universities implies a type of change that calls for further research. There could be a change in their perception of the role of the military, a critical change for the military to resolve its own paradox - the dilemma of being at the same time the pioneer of westernization and modernization since the 18th century and the occasional opponent of

[14] Mehmet Bal is one of the conscientious objectors in Turkey. For information on Bal and the trial he went through in 2002 see, *www.ainfos.ca/02/nov/ainfos00067.html*. In 2005, the press gave larger coverage to Mehmet Tarhan who is an "anarchist total" conscientious objector – against all wars and any alternative to military service. He was sentenced to four years by a military court for "refusing orders". However, in March 2006, the Military Court of Appeal ruled out this order and released Mehmet Tarhan. Osman Murat Ülke, who is a conscientious objector applied to the European Court of Human Rights. The Court has passed judgments on January 24, 2006. The ruling concurs that the trying, arresting, conviction and prosecution of persons using their right to conscientious objection that has turned into a vicious cycle in domestic law, is "degrading treatment" under article 3 of the Convention. With the same ruling, it is noted that there is no law regarding the use of the right to conscientious objection. For information on Mehmet Tarhan and Osman Murat Ülke, see http://www.wri-irg.org/pubs/upd-0602.htm.

[15] Refer to http://www.savaskarsitlari.org.

any change in the organization of civil-military relations that would bring them in line with the contemporary standards of the European countries.

Between 2001 and 2004, the military was more co-operative in executing the EU harmonization reforms in re-structuring civil-military relations. However, the military became reluctant to support these reforms with the alarming security conditions in Northern Iraq and with the revitalization of the PKK in 2005, discussed below.

With the emergence of de facto Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq, following the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, the fear of territorial disintegration rose in Turkey. The Sevres syndrome has prevailed and the re-constructing of the security culture amidst increasing questioning of the conventional security culture has been taking place in the media[16] since the late 2000s.

The military top leadership kept the territorial disintegration fear vivid in the years of 2006 and 2007, when Yasar Buyukanit was the chief of General Staff, the top military leadership. In the inauguration speech of August 2006, Buyukanit covered the events of Turkish history from the early 20th century till today: the last years of the Ottoman State, the Sevres Treaty, Cyprus, separatism, the new tactics of the PKK, and the role of the military. In this inaugural speech, the distrust of the West, one of the major driving forces of Turkish security culture, was a dominant theme. Buyukanit recommended: "My colleagues carefully study the Ottoman history from 1830 to 1918". At the same time, he referred to the Sevres Treaty 'within the context of security'. Buyukanit added: "I would like to bring to your attention a very important issue. Although it is in good faith, some argue that Turkish Republic will have to confront the Treaty of Sevres. I would like to state clearly that although some circles may have such an endeavor and others may have such expectations (to confront Turkey with the Sevres Treaty), I do not think that there is any power that can force Turkey to confront the Treaty of Sevres once again". Buyukanit's speech left European analysts with an impression that the military shared EU-skepticism and "anti-Western stance" commented on by Onder Aytac and Emre Uslu.

There was less remembering of the Sevres Treaty in the top military leaders' speeches, with the low military profile, consolidated throughout 2008. Then in 2009, rather than emphasizing the fears regarding territorial integrity, the Chief of General Staff, General Baţbuđ, mentioned the importance of democratic measures[17] in

[16] *Taraf* daily has been publishing articles that challenge the conventional security culture and direct the public attention to the "conspiracies of the deep-state" since the year 2008.

[17] Baţbuđ said: "Security forces have to take all necessary measures under the law by placing more importance on coordinated intelligence activities." Stressing the importance of separating terrorists from innocents, Baţbuđ said that necessary measures should be taken to prevent people from joining terrorist groups". Qouted in http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/chr/ing2009/04/09x04x15.htm#1.

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

[18] Baţbuđ said: "TSK is committed to and respects democracy, one of the pillars of the republic". Refer to http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/chr/ing2009/04/09x04x15.htm#1. Also See the speech of General Baţbuđ on April 14, 2009 and April 29, 2009. See the Turkish dailies of April 15-16 and April 29-30., 2009.

[19] Hilmi Özkök became a Chief of General Staff in 2002 August and his ended in August 2006.

[20] In 2003 May, Hilmi Özkök made statements supporting Turkey's EU membership and showed his opposition to the military's intervention. According to the reporters and editors present, "General Özkök reacting angrily to attempt at a military coup rumors, said he did not even want to hear the word "coup" mentioned again. "Although Özkök conceded that the military had certain sensitivities to the Islamist-oriented AKP government, he vehemently denied media reports that some younger army officers were "uneasy" with the government. "Any differences the military has with the government would be solved through democratic methods," the top general reportedly added. On the other hand, Özkök also voiced concern at the government's appointment of Islamists to certain key administrative posts. He also spoke in favor of Turkey joining the European Union, with the proviso that Turkey's national unity not be open to negotiation. ". Quoted in http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING2003/05/03x05x27.HTM#%202. Also see dailies of May 26-27, 2003.

[21] The data is available at: http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_2_Basin_Duyurulari/Basin_Duyurulari_Arsiv_2007.htm.

combating terrorism. Baţbuđ also emphasized the support for the EU membership and the military's commitment to democratic principles. [18]

4.3 Decrease in the Informal Influence Mechanisms of the Military

Informal influence mechanisms have been utilized by the military to "educate" the public in security matters, that is, educating them about the internal and external threats and the ways of fighting them. The change in the level of informal influence mechanisms has implications for the construction and re-construction of the security culture.

There is a progressive decline in the informal military influence, as shown in the Table 4.1. Yet, the decline is not perfectly linear. The trajectory of the military's informal influence shows fluctuations in the level of the informal influence with the changing political and security conditions between the years of 2005 and 2009. With the rise of nationalism, starting in 2004 and peaking in 2006, as a response to the increased perceived threat from the Northern Iraq and with the mounting pressure from the hardline secularists turning to the military to take action, Hilmi Özkök[19], the then Chief of General Staff, was able to maintain a low military profile. General Özkök was very committed to the civilianization under the EU harmonization.[20]

The year 2006 became an example of the high military profile with Buyukanit. In his inauguration speech of August 2006, Buyukanit already showed muscles mentioned above. In his speech at the commencement of the academic year at the Turkish Military Academy on 20 October 2006, Büyükanýt outlined a hard stance against the PKK, underlined the anti-secularist threat and asserted that certain EU and NATO countries were supporting the terrorist groups fighting against the Turkish state. The year 2006 was also an example of significant informal influence on country's political and security issues, including "the danger of weakening laicism", "Kurdish separatism" and "Cyprus issue", which marked the speeches of the top military leaders in September 2006. The rise of military influence with Buyukanit continued in the year 2007 when the military released 42 press statements and 73 press announcements[21]; the Chief of the General Staff Buyukanit gave six public speeches and issued 10 messages on the web page of the

Turkish Armed Forces. Significantly, in August 2007, the military issued its 30 August National Victory Day Speech, which contained concerns about protecting the republic against 'evil forces', three days earlier (on August 27, 2007). This statement warned against Islamic radicalism "posing a threat to the secular Republican nature of the Turkish state". Some perceived this early speech as a warning against electing Abdullah Gul the president of the republic.·[22]

In 2008, there was a decline in the use of informal influence mechanisms. In 2008, when Buyukanit was still a Chief of General Staff until September, the military issued 64 press statements.[23] After Baţbuđ assumed the post in September 2008, he gave six speeches until May 2009. Although the number of the speeches and press statements of Baţbuđ was not very low compared to that of Buyukanit, the military's informal influence on public political opinion has become weaker through 2009. The military top leadership has also become very cautious of making comments on domestic political issues.

Table 1. Changes at Informal Level: Reduced Influence of the Military.

Requirement by the EU	Reduction in the number of the speeches and press statements of the Chief of General Staff and top military leaders	Year
Reduced informal influence mechanisms of the military	Moderate military profile and informal influence	2005
	Very high military profile and informal influence	2006
	27 April e-memorandum. Declining informal military influence after the July 22 Elections	2007 2007July
	Low military profile and informal influence despite alleged coup plans Seeming rise of military profile with General Başbuğ. Low military profile and the manifestation of commitment to the democratic norms and the civilian control.	2008 2008 September 2009 January→

The trend of 2009 is a low military profile despite maintaining intense interaction with the press and communicating the military's opinions on domestic political issues to the public. The two speeches of Basbug in April, one on April 14, 2009 and another on April 29, were examples of intense interaction with the press. These

[22] For the perceptions of Buyukanit's early speech, see *Hurriyet,* August 27 and 28, 2007. In the speech, General Yasar Buyukanit said in a note on the military's Web site, that "our nation has been watching the behaviour of centres of evil who systematically try to corrode the secular nature of the Turkish Republic." Buyukanit's speech of August 27, 2007 is available at http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/1 0_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyet-leri/10_1_8_Mesajlar/2007/30ag ustos_zafer_bayrami_mesaji_27 082007.html.

[23] For the press announcement refer to

speeches marked the political agenda and they were widely debated in the press without creating a significant impact on the civilian politics. Since September 2008, Basbug held 25 press conferences by the end of May 2009.

5. Turkish Security Culture, Parliament, Media and Civil-Military Relations

Amidst the changes in the formal and informal influence of the military, there have been changes in the military-related attitudes and opinions of the parliamentarians. Traditionally, the parliamentarians, like the citizens, internalized the security conviction that national security was the concern of the military. There was no idea of civilian input in the formation of national security policy until the beginning of the 21st century, as shown in the further text.

Given the militarist culture and the outlook that national security is a taboo, the "National Security Political Document" (NSPD), (Milli Guvenlik Siyaset Belgesi) has been drafted and passed by the NSC since its foundation by the 1961 Constitution.[24] Opinions of the Presidency, Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs and of the National Intelligence are gathered in developing the document by the NSC. It is subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers. The parliamentary input into its preparation is an important question of the integrated defence planning, which was not yet raised until the early 2003 when Baskin Oran brought the issue of the modest parliamentary control and check over the formation of the national security policy. Responding to Fikret Bila's article on the Northern Iraq policy and the important role of the military in shaping it as a security policy, Prof. Oran pointed out that in a democratic state, civilians should have the upper hand in formulating regional security policies, hinting at the importance of civilian input into the formulation of defence policy. Otherwise, Oran argues, "there would be no transparency in the foreign policy formation". This was a significant statement indicating a change in the security culture, that is, a strong motivation to discuss the Turkish security issues publicly.

Later, the security policy issue surfaced in the press again in November 2004 when Sedat Ergin reported in *Hurriyet* that the Armed Forces were planning to update the national security assessment document, ("National Security Political Document") in the light of the new global and local political developments. Ergin's

[24] The definition of threats identified in "National Security Political Document" alters with the changes in the international, national and domestic political conditions. The number one item in "National Security Political Document" (*Milli Guvenlik Siyaset Belgesi*) that listed the threats and risks to national security was "communism and a potential aggression from the USSR" during the Cold War. An analysis explains the change: "With the outbreak of the "low intensity war" as from the end of the Sixties and especially after the ASALA attacks on Turkish diplomats abroad along with the American arms embargo on Turkey in the Seventies, these priorities of "threats and risks to national security" began to change. Especially after the PKK's replacement of ASALA as from the mid-1980s, "separatist terrorism and religious fundamentalism" occupied the first item in the NSPD."

article raised the issue of the parliamentary control over the preparation of such security documents. It created awareness for asking why this document was drafted without the input of the Ministry of the Interior and parliamentarians at ex ante stage. Opinion makers and parliamentarians responded to this question. Hasan Cemal from *Milliyet*, who had already written articles on the necessity of transparency building (in 2002-2003), responded to the issue by questioning the predominant role of the military in drafting the NSPD until today and the incompatibility of such practice with the EU norms of democratic control of armed forces. The debate spread to other papers and electronic media in the late 2004 and in the early 2005, indicating a stronger urge to debate security issues. Similar to the variations in the responses of the opinion-makers to the question of parliamentary oversight of the formation of the NSPD, the responses of the parliamentarians were diverse. For some parliamentarians, the lack of parliamentary input in and oversight of the formation of the NSPD did not seemingly pose a serious problem. For example, Mr. Ilyas Sezai Onder from the People's Republican Party (CHP), who was also a member of the TBMM's Constitution Committee (2004), said: "since there is a constitutional provision and the NSPD is a legal document, it is not necessary to discuss the NSPD in the parliament."[25]

The analysis of the minutes of the parliament for 22nd Period, which began in November 2002 and ended in June 2007, revealed a divergence between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the People's Republican Party (CHP) regarding the question of reforms altering the conventional pattern of civil-military relations where the military had an autonomy in the formation of defence policy and budgeting. The AKP government, declaring their commitment to Turkey's EU membership and EU friendly reforms, tended to bring up issues related to transparency, parliamentary oversight, the military's position in relation to the government, military expenses and public spending. The CHP, on the other hand, frequently depicted threats against Turkey with particular reference to Iraq, Northern Iraq, and brought up the issue of the US inaction against the PKK. The CHP was downplaying the issue of reforms in the civil-military relations almost throughout the 22nd Period. In the parliamentary debates, the CHP deputies, including Sükrü Elekdağ and Onur Öymen highlighted security threats coming from Northern Iraq and Iraq in general whenever the defence budget was debated or a security issue was raised in the parliament in years 2004-2007. Compared to AKP deputies, the CHP deputies

[25] A CHP deputy, Mr. Ilyas Sezai Onder, talking to BIANET on November 24, 2004 made critical remarks on "the secretness of the NSPD" and lack of parliamentary monitoring in the formulation of the NSPD. See "Milli Guvenlik Milletvekillerinden Saklaniyor!" (National Security Kept Secret from the Parliamentarians!'). Refer to http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/49622-milli-guvenlik-milletvekilinden-saklaniyor.

[26] Sukru Elekdag made speech on the PKK in Iraq, sending troops to Northern Iraq and the US position vis-r-vis the PKK. Then Faruk Koca and Sulyman Saribas from ANAP talked about it. At the same session Suleyman Saribas made a comment, saying: 'if Turkish nation (millet) saw the treat against the motherland, they could fight against the treat even though there is no order coming from the military". He gave the example of uprising of the Turks against Damat Ferit government and their joining of war for Independence. Saribas also said" Turkish people are soldier nation". *Proceedings of the TBMM, 22nd Period, 5th Legislative Year, Session:50, date: January 16, 2007,* p. 26.

[27] Hasan Oren from CHP made a speech and talked about the PKK and the US inaction against the PKK although "Turkey and the US signed bilateral agreement for strategic cooperation and security". Mehmet Kesinoglu and Onur Oymen from CHP made speeches endorsing Hasan Oren. See *Proceedings of the TBMM, 22nd Period, 5th Legislative Year, Session 54, date: January 24, 2007,* p. pp.36-45.

[28] On July 4 2003, U.S. troops arrested 11 members of Turkey's special forces in the northern Iraqi city of Al-Sulaymaniyah on suspicion of plotting to assassinate the Kurdish governor of Kirkuk. The detainees were brought to Baghdad for questioning and released after 60 hours. They were handcuffed and their heads were covered by bags. The heavy-handed treatment of Turkish soldiers was generally seen as humiliating in Turkey; and it created outrage in the public.

[29] For example, in the second term of the 22nd government, Yasar Nuri Ozturk from CHP made a speech about the heroism of the Turkish soldiers at Gelipoly war and the humiliation of Turkish soldiers in Suleymania in 2003 by putting bags on their heads. He also criticized the Great Middle East Project. *Proceedings of the TBMM, 22nd Period, 3rd Legislative Year, Session: 73, date: March 22, 2005,* p. 15.

[30] I argue that the US policy becomes closers to the EU policy on the basis of the interview data collected in the 2007 summer in Washington DC. The author interviewed the leading American experts, including Alan Makowski, Morton Abramowitz, Bulent Ali Rÿza and Mark Parris in 2007 summer to obtain their opinion on the EU harmonization reforms and the civil-military relations. I am grateful to the Maryland University, Office of International Program, for hosting me as a guest scholar in the summer of 2007. This enabled me to conduct my research on the US security culture and Turkish Civil-Military relations.

more frequently depicted threats against Turkey with particular reference to Northern Iraq in those years.[26] They also brought the issue of the US inaction against the PKK.[27] Moreover, the incident of Turkish soldiers arrested by the US troops in Northern Iraq in 2003[28] was often referred to by the CHP deputies since it took place.[29] It further aggravated the territorial disintegration fear of Turkish people. Not only in the media and in the parliament, but also in the military leaders' speeches, the threat coming from Northern Iraq and the US inaction against the PKK issues were the frequent topics in the years of 2005-2007, as mentioned above.

While the security threats were the dominant topics in the parliamentary debates, there were no strong parliamentary voices demanding the curtailing of the military's formal and informal political influence, although such demands have been occasionally heard from the intelligentsia since the year 2000. The boldest parliamentary voice came from a DTP deputy, Hasip Kaplan, who submitted a proposal demanding an amendment to the Article 35 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Law at the Parliamentary session held on May 15, 2008. This created a debate in the year 2008 but did not lead to the amendment of the article.

6. US Security Policy of Iraq and Turkish Civil-military Relations

The US policy regarding Turkey is worth comparing with the EU security policy. The democratic control of armed forces is an integral part of the EU security policy. Therefore, the EU demands that Turkey comply with democratic conditionality and align its civil-military relationship model with the EU standards. The US security policy, which did not give any particular attention to the reforms of the civil-military relations until shortly after the year 2000, has become more akin to the Brussels' policy regarding Turkey from the year 2007 onwards. Washington is currently supporting the EU harmonization process and is motivating Turkey to accelerate the reforms towards the civilian democratic control of armed forces. [30]

The US policy is significantly different from the days of the former US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who, in 2003, criticized the Turkish military for not taking a leadership

role in passing the motion which would permit the deployment of the US troops in Turkey. In an interview to the news channel CNN Turk, on May 6, 2003, Wolfowitz said that the Bush administration had been disappointed by the Turkish military's failure to convince the nation's Parliament to support the US during the Iraq war. For Wolfowitz, the fact that the Turkish military showed respect for democracy and did not seek to put pressure on an elected government was a startling betrayal of what ought to be an American effort to support this sort of development. The critics of Wolfowitz emphasized the importance of civilian influence and democratization in Turkey, while commenting on Wolfowitz's undermining of democratic principles.

The EU harmonization reforms slowed down in 2005 when there was a rise of Euro-scepticism. What was changed in 2005 was the direct product of the PKK becoming an issue between the US and Turkey following the US occupation of Iraq in 2003. Resuming its activities in 2004, the terrorist Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) has resorted to armed violence against Turkey from the positions in Northern Iraq. Stopping that threat became a top priority on the Turkey's parliamentary agenda as the PKK killing progressively increased throughout 2006 and peaked in September-October 2007.

The issue of PKK in Iraq progressively engulfed the US and Turkish security policies from 2005 onwards and became a major source of tension in the year 2007. Contrary to the divergence between the US and Turkish security policies, there was a convergence between Turkey, Iran and Syria with regard to Kurdish issue in 2007. That was a major shift, given the fact that Syria had sheltered the PKK to use it against Turkey until the year 1999. Apart from the issue of the PKK in Iraq, the question of cross-border operation created further tensions in the US-Turkish bilateral relations in 2007 and it marked the Turkish political agenda before the general elections in July 2007. Considering the complexities of the issue, the AKP skillfully postponed the parliamentary approval for the operation until October 17, 2007. In October, Turkish parliament passed a motion submitted by the Prime Minister to send soldiers into Northern Iraq in response to the large number of killings by the PKK at a time when the increased public pressure for cross-border operation and the military's insistence on that issue pres-

sured the government. The US worried about the mounting tension in Turkey and the rise of anti-American sentiments.

The US-Turkish security tension largely eased when the Prime Minister Erdogan met President Bush, in November 2007, to discuss security issues, mainly the PKK in Iraq and the cross-border operation. The Turkish press reported "green light" for the operation. It was reported that US was to provide intelligence on the PKK for the operation. The US endorsement of the cross-border operation in the early 2008 and the success of it restored the bilateral ties that had been seriously strained when Turkish parliament, in 2003, rejected the motion permitting the deployment of the US troops in Turkey.

The US security policy in Iraq resulted in insecurity in Turkey with the emergence of Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq. It re-activated the Sevres Treaty syndrome and augmented the anti-US sentiments, indirectly feeding the Euro-scepticism. The general public was shaken by the territorial disintegration anxiety in 2004 and the fear is still present. Consequently, starting in 2005, the ultra-nationalism rose, people lost their enthusiasm for the EU harmonization; the military became more reluctant to endorse the EU harmonization. This led to the stagnation of the EU harmonization and hindered the further alignment of the civil-military relations in 2005. The stagnation is still felt, though weaker than before, while Turkish society has begun to pay more attention to the transparency of the defence budgeting and the defence policy formation.

7. The EU Harmonization, the US and Turkish Security Concerns in Iraq and the Institutional and Cultural Changes in Turkish Civil-Military Relations

The EU harmonization reforms, which started in 2001, have advanced in curbing the formal influence of the military. They have altered the guardianship type of civil-military concordance based on fragile consensus. The EU policy makers were contended with further alignment of civil-military relations until the year 2005 when the stagnation in the reforms and the rise of Euro-scepticism in Turkey created worries about Turkey's commitment to the EU harmonization. This is why the EU Turkey Progress reports of 2006, 2007 and 2008 underlined the importance of accelerating the EU harmonization

reforms and the necessity for further alignment in transparency of defence expenditure and domestic transparency.

The US occupation of Iraq and its security policy in Iraq indirectly affected the EU harmonization-led changes in the Turkish civil-military relations. First, at the cultural dimension, by reigniting the Sevres Treaty syndrome, the US security policy in Iraq reconstructed the largely shared Turkish conventional security culture, particularly those convictions highlightening the military's supremacy against the threats to national security in the years 2005-2008. Consequently, the threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey, coming from Northern Iraq, became a security issue in the media and in the parliamentary debates particularly in the years of 2004 and 2008. The reconstructed fears of territorial integrity and Euro-scepticism discouraged the government to accelerate the institutional reforms that came to a halt in 2005. This suggests that any national security concern, perceived or real, could have implications for the further alignment.

Despite the setbacks in the further alignment reforms since the year 2005 and the return of the conventional national security beliefs, a new security cultural climate evolves in Turkey where citizens do not perceive the military as a privileged and untouchable institution any more. The new political culture rejects the idea of the coup or any type of military intervention in civilian politics. The new security culture has encouraged the parliamentarians and citizens to have more interest and voice in the security policy formation.

These changes have created discordance in the civil-military relations. The discordance is more pronounced in "the new political decision-making process", which is one of the indicators in Schiff's Concordance theory. The new decision making modality, where the military largely lost its formal influence over the civilian politics and became more accountable to the civilians, has created unease among some members of the military. A new concordance could emerge if Turkey overcomes the crisis of democracy created by the polarization of the society along the following lines: Islamist versus secularist; Kurdish separatism versus Turkish ultra-nationalism; and liberals against statist nationalists. The new concordance could be more stable if there were no strong national security threat, perceived or real; and if democratic control were as important as civilian control for political stability.

References:

1. 'Anket: Asker siyasete karýṭmasýn.' ('Survey: Military should not Intervene') *Hurriyet,* November, 15, 2006. Available from: http://www.gazeteoku.com/go.php?link=http://www.hurriyet.com.tr.

2. 'Baṭbakanlýk'tan Washington açýklamasi.' ('Note of the Prime Minister to Washington'), *Hurriyet,* November 6, 2007.

3. Altýnay, A. (2004) *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey.* New York: Palgrave Mcmillian.

4. Altinay, A. G. (2001) *Making Citizens, Making Soldiers: Military Service, Gender and National Identity in Turkey.* PhD Dissertation, Department of Cultural Anthropology, Graduate School of Duke University.

5. Ardýç, E. (2009) 'Turk deđilim, eđriyim, tembelim.'('I am not Turkish, I am not right and I am lazy') *Sabah,* May 22, 2009.

6. Aydinli, E., Özcan, A. N. i Akyaz, D. (2006) 'The Turkish Military's March Toward Europe.' *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2006.

7. Aytac, O. i Uslu, E. (2006) 'The Analysis of the General Buyukanit's Inaugural Speech", New *Anatolian*, September 7, 2006.

8. Burak, K. (2009) 'Students exposed to militarism in early education, report shows.' *Today's Zaman,* March 19, 2009.

9. Cemal, H. (2004) 'Milli Piyango, Milli Guvenlik.' ('National Lottery, National Security) *Milliyet,* December 12, 2004.

10. Cemal, H. i Kemal da Andýnclanirdi , M. (2007) 'Asker Devlet icinde devlet olmamali.' *Milliyet*, 10. mart 2007.

11. European Commission. (2008) '*Turkey 2008 Progress Report.'* Brussels: European Commission. Avaiable from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/keydocuments/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf.

12. Karabat, A. (2009) 'Demilitarization of education has begun, but still has a long way to go.' *Today's Zaman*, April 21, 2009.

13. Karaosmanoglu, A. (2008) 'Turkish Security Culture: Evolutionary or Carved in Stone.' Paper presented at the conference on *Perceptions and Misperceptions in the EU and Turkey: Stumbling blocks on the road accession*, organized by the Center for European Security Studies (CESS) and Turkey Institute, 26-27 June 2008, Amsterdam.

14. Katzenstein, P. J. (1996) *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

15. Katzenstein, P. J. (1996) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Colombia University Press.

16. Lucian W. P. and Verba, S. (1965) *Political Culture and Political Development.* Princetown, New York: Princetown University Press.

17. Lucien, P. (1968) 'Political Culture.' *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 12. New York: Macmillan.

18. Luckham, A R. (1971) 'A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations.' *Government and Opposition*, 6(1), pp. 5-35.

19. Narlý, N. (2000) 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey.' *Turkish Studies,* 1(1), pp. 107–127.

20. Narli, N. (2008) 'EU harmonization Reforms, Democratization and a new Modality of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey.' Paper presented at the International Sociological Association Research Committee 01,"Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution"& Seoul National University, Korea Military Academy and Korea National Defense University, International Conference on *Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution in a Globalized World,* July 14-17, 2008, Seoul, Korea.

21. Oðuz, S. (2006) 'Büyükanýt da 'irtica tehdidi var' dedi' ('Buyukanit Warned against Islamic Radicalism') *Milliyet,* October 3, 2006.

22. Oran, B. (2003) 'Dis Politika Karanlik.' ('Foreign Policy is in the Dark'), *Radikal* August 6, 2003.

23. Sakallioðlu U. C. (1997) 'The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy.' *Comparative Politics*, 29 (2), pp. 151–166.

24. Schiff, R. (1995) 'Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance.' *Armed Forces and Society,* 22 (1), pp. 7–24.

25. Yilmaz, H. (2008) 'Turkish Populism and anti-EU rhetoric.' Paper presented at the conference on *Perceptions and Misperceptions in the EU and Turkey: Stumbling blocks on the road accession*, organized by the Center for European Security Studies (CESS) and Turkey Institute, 26-27 June, 2008, Amsterdam.

26. Yücel, G. (2002) 'New Dilemmas of Turkish National Security Politics: Old and New Security Concerns and National Development in the Post-1980 Era.' Paper prepared for presentation at the Fourth Kokkalis Graduate Student Workshop at JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 8-9 February, 2002, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM

№ 14 · JULY - SEPTEMBER 2009

WBSO

ZVONIMIR MAHEČIĆ

STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM

Prevailing Cultural Aspects in Croatian Security Sector Reform

Zvonimir Mahečić

*The author is retired Colonel of the Croatian Armed Forces.
At the present he is working as an external expert
with the Institute for International Relations (IMO) in Zagreb.*

Abstract

The impact of a variety of cultural influences and social values on the process of the Croatian Security Sector Reform will be reviewed. It is too often considered as being a tool of downsizing so that neither nation wide nor intra-institutional dialogue takes place about what in reality does constitute professionalized armed forces today. As a result of this, quite a few soldiers started to feel certain emotional detachment from their military organization and profession. Security and defence structures should accept the precedence of the civilians in the security and defence matters, but elected civilians should at the same time present themselves as the guardians of the security and military profession and position of their people in the society. It is necessary to first make strategic decisions and then shape criteria for downsizing in order to ensure the best people for future military needs remain within the ranks. Our society, politics, and science failed to address this issue convincingly which, perhaps, also shows some predetermined cultural prejudices leaving all these issues to be resolved more convincingly some time in the future.

Key words: cultural aspects, cultural differences, defence structures, downsizing, military profession, professionalisation, security sector reform.

Introduction

This article will try to recognize and describe the impact of a variety of cultural influences and social values on the process of Security Sector Reform as one of the dominant components of democratic transition. In doing so, this article will try to offer answers about how much undertaking and outcome of the Security Sector Reform really proves there has been successful and irreversible change in the security and military culture; are democratic norms somehow distorted to fit the needs of certain particular cultural views, and is there really firmly established democratic civilian control or we still have some sort of political party control in democratic disguise; how much security and defence related legal and institutional framework is stillborn without having a real chance to reach maturity and necessary level of self-sustainability; what was the impact of the Euro-Atlantic integration processes to the cultural changes and vice versa; what was the role of military education and security and defence related civilian education; *et alia*.

Downsizing

Ever since the beginning of the Security Sector Reform the processes in the transitional countries reform, transition, and reorganization were looked upon, in some of them more and in some less, as a tool of downsizing. This sometimes went so far that some of the countries stated openly and in writing that objective No. 1 was to downsize the military effectives, personnel and material alike, while question of effectiveness was at best of secondary importance. (We can recognize this trend for example in Bera, 2003 as well as in some other sources). This approach was sold to and at the same time effectively requested by political institutions, military structures, independent organizations, and the public alike. It was very hard to discern which one of these structures was pushing and which one pulling the process, while at the same time voices to the contrary were few and far between. The net result of this process was that, for instance, Croatian Armed Forces, like in many other transitional countries, experienced shrinkage of roughly 60 to 70 %, while at the same time the process of building its

capabilities was either completely neglected or despite the best political intentions faced with a lack of resources, predominantly but not exclusively of the financial kind. This was unfortunately coupled with meddling regarding the proper organizational structure, overlapping functional responsibilities (or attempts to avoid responsibilities), and lack of clear vision regarding the clear, unambiguous set of military missions, roles, and tasks.

Practically, downsizing was looked upon as panacea that would solve all our problems regarding the political and military issues of integration to the international organizations like NATO and solve all domestic problems born from the years of misuse of the military structures for the political rationale and growing scarcity of resources.

Conscripts, Volunteers on the Payroll
and Profession(alisation)

Attempts to downsize Croatian armed forces were coupled with political decision to pursue abolition of the conscript service. Reasons put forward by the then Minister of Defence mostly revolved around attempting to save money, because conscript service was being considered as expensive. But there was more to it. This was one of numerous situations when political elite decided to put the weight of NATO behind its undertakings. Consequently, not just this once was this move presented to the public as something NATO expects us to do and something that would bring us within the NATO standards. No one really cared too much to explain what NATO standard places a requirement for transitional countries to abolish their conscript services, especially at such time when at least half of the NATO member states still had their conscript services intact.

More importantly, however, neither nationwide nor intra-institutional dialogue took place about what is it that really constitutes professionalized armed forces. Significantly, scientific institutions and independent institutes didn't feel it was necessary to encourage such a discussion. Perhaps a neutral observer could come to a conclusion that just the sheer fact that the Armed Forces would be built by the body of the volunteer soldiers on the government payroll was sufficient for the top political and military leaders to ascer-

tain the existence of the professional army. Of course, military profession and professionalized armed forces are much more than that. Professional ethics, expert knowledge, proper mix of individual values and skills with reasonably and adequately up-to-date equipment fitting within the latest requirements influencing organizational structure and functionality of the security and defence structures represent some, if not definitely all the elements whose presence or lack thereof would prove, at the end of the day, the existence of the professionalized military.

Significant importance among these elements should have the relation of the security and defence structures with the civilian part of the society. Not too many people dared or felt the need to ask the question, let alone answer it, what if the abolition of the conscript service meant loosing one contact too many with the civil society? If armed forces are robbed of the civilian conscripts among their ranks to what extent is that going to influence professional soldiers' feeling of having common ground with the civilian community and the way they will support, and at the same time be influenced by the civilian values and civilian way of life. As some say, abolition of the conscript service usually comes as a mixed blessing (Dandeker, 2002) bringing some good and some bad consequences with it. The way in which this radical change was introduced in Croatian Armed Forces certainly left no time at all to reconsider and review all the pros and cons of such a move.

Question of recruitment of the new personnel, levels of their retention, unavoidable overstretching due to the commitment to out-of-area operations, quality of the Armed Forces already harmed as a result of willful building of the so-called niche capabilities, influence of such undertakings on the military culture, and necessary adjustments to the need of never ending strategic change, and last but not least, a realistic answer to the question of preserving and stimulating combat capabilities and capacities while at the same time combat is less and less possible and likely activity, were all such questions that nobody really wanted to address.

Transformation and Emotional Detachment

As a result of transformational processes and heavy emphasis – at least as far as diagram charts were involved – on the organizational restructuring and downsizing of the military,

**STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM**

which was imposed top-down, many soldiers started to feel certain emotional detachment from their military organization and profession as such. It was especially true in the aftermath of high emotional charge, having grown as a result of the need to defend the country and the nation, and evaporating in the following years.

Many soldiers found themselves confined within a very uneasy dilemma box. They felt the pressure of patriotism, demands of the institutionalized ethics (in whichever way and scope it did exist), smaller groups appealed to honor and duty, which was sometimes at odds with the patriotism and institutional ethics, and individual personal ethics, which was sometimes very hard to reconcile with the first three aforementioned elements.

As these forces, which were shaping the way of thinking and behaviour of the common member of the military were producing consequences at the same time, and he or she was faced with the consequences of the reform, transformation and downsizing, it might be very easy to understand the level of their individual dissolution and disillusion. All of this resulted in some sort of emotional detachment from the military service, which took different forms, but it could be argued none or very few of them produced positive results.

Role of the Security Sector Reform

Security Sector Reform process was mostly looked at as a tool for adapting the military structures to the Western European and/or NATO standards. In order to pursue successful reform domestic top political and military structures, not only in Croatia, usually employ and hire services of a variety of foreign institutions or organizations. They range from solid state players, more or less independent institutes and think-tanks, all the way to the private security organizations.

Having the chance to work, talk, and exchange opinions with some foreign experts representing all three aforementioned categories, the author of this article had a chance to witness first-hand that many of the personnel employed by these institutions and organizations produced serious shortages and deficiencies. Firstly, sometimes it was clear that their knowl-

edge about the issue was not sufficient. Secondly, and more importantly, they showed very often a serious lack of knowledge and understanding of domestic social and political framework, and even bigger misunderstanding of historical and traditional factors influencing prospects for successful reform and transformation.

In such an environment, it is hardly surprising that strange things should happen on the way to the self proclaimed paradise! When, in 1997, new organization of the Ministry of Defence and General Staff were passed by the then President of Croatia, they represented a clear Xerox copy of the Pentagon itself. This fact was used by one of the then leading figures in the Ministry of Defence, an active service general, to proclaim that this fact clearly confirmed and guaranteed our interoperability with the armed forces of the NATO countries. Conversely, when the conference dealing with the issue of the protection and responsibility of the sensitive national security data and information was organized in cooperation with NATO, some foreign attendants, when asked about the responsibility of the Members of Parliament, pushed strongly for the case that MPs could not be held responsible for the security breech of the sensitive information!

Whatever the importance and the outcome of the Security Sector Reform, one cannot help thinking about certain peculiarities connected with this process. When considering the official standpoint, a side observer can very often get the feeling that top politicians and military officials count Security Sector Reform as a success by simply starting to commit to this process, without waiting to see the results. Secondly, Security Sector Reform should be important but still only a part of the overall societal and institutional capacity building and could not be in any way separated from an urgent need to develop the whole society. By committing to the Security Sector Reform without sufficient and serious planning for the overall societal and institutional capacities, the state structures seem to unmistakably send a signal that Security Sector Reform is here less to build social awareness, readiness and capabilities, and much more to serve particular interests of the leading political and professional elite.

Civilian Control Issue

One of the buzzwords in the last ten to fifteen years in most of the transitional countries has been the civilian control over the military forces. Many foreign advisors, participating in attempts at leading our armed forces alongside a proper and correct path, were keen on emphasizing that we would, as a result of the Security Sector Reform processes, finally be blessed by the emergence and establishment of the civilian control over our security structures and military forces. What they failed to appreciate, due to a lack of knowledge or putting in effort or both was that all of the countries in the region did have civilian control over the security structures and military forces even when the Communist Party's Central Committee was running the show. What we were looking for was not civilian control but democratic control of the military and intelligence community.

This misconception took another form before the Parliamentary elections in the year 2000 when many a member of foreign diplomatic community expressed concern that generals could decide to seize the power after the death of the President Tudjman. Again, they failed to understand and appreciate the fact that top military leadership was never the political issue of its own. It was true that the top military brass was very much connected with the strongest political party, taking prominent role in almost all party public activities. However, this was not to prove their political ambition but simply the result of their misuse by the ruling party and the lack of knowledge within top military ranks regarding an appropriate conduct of armed forces in a democratic society, and (mostly) generals' unwillingness to risk their position by expressing any kind of discontent with the requests coming from the top of the political nomenclature.

Quite appropriately, all of the political leaderships in the past twenty years tended to forget, more or less covertly, that civilian control of the security structures and armed forces is not a one way street. If civilian structures insist the security and defence structures should wholeheartedly accept the precedence of the civilians in the security and defence matters, they should at the same time present themselves as the guardians of the

security and military profession and position of their people in the society. This is even more true if having in mind soldiers and spies cannot form unions and organize strikes and marches in order to fight for their social position. Above all, while politicians are entitled to pass all the decisions regarding security and defence structures, they should refrain from doing so without serious previous consultations with top security and military leadership. When the then Croatian Minister of Defence publicly announced abolition of the conscript service is due to happen in a few months (!?), he did it without previously discussing this issue with the then Chief of the General Staff or asking for any kind of the military analysis, yet he was very upset when the Chief of Staff afterwords expressed his discontent in public.

Minority Issue

One of the elements taken into account when considering if specific armed forces fulfil criteria to be considered as being post-modern is their position towards minorities. Croatian Armed Forces in the last twenty years or so roughly went through three phases. First, from the beginning of the 90s, it was marked by pretty wild and indiscriminate acquisition of the personnel (being predominantly a consequence of the situation they themselves, state, and the whole society faced at the moment). Secondly, starting with a year or two after the end of the war, emerged what could be called a great stagnation, when there was no significant rejuvenation of the personnel structure. Finally, the period starting after the year 2000 was marked by the process of downsizing.

This last phase was very significant for the future of the Croatian Armed Forces but there are concerns it has not been run in a proper and systematic manner. It was at that time one of the top military leaders made a remark: first we will downsize and then build strategy around what is left of the personnel (!?). If there was a proper understanding of the situation and so much needed vision, based on understanding of the shift of the cultural framework in which military will operate in the years to come, then logical outcome would be first to make necessary strategic decisions and then shape criteria for downsiz-

ing in order to ensure the best people for future military needs remain within the ranks.

So, how did the minorities fare in this process? For a long time women represented around 15% of the personnel, but mostly occupying low ranked positions and responsibilities. As could be expected, there is no 15% of women in the ranks of the generals, neither in the ranks of the high ranking, so called flag officers (major to colonel). While taking above average representation among the civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence, within the military rank and file closest they come to the average representation is within the NCOs where they make up almost 10% of this category. (All the data mentioned are referring to the period of a few years ago.)

Speaking about the ethnic structure, around 2% of the personnel considered themselves as belonging to ethnicities other then Croat. Interestingly, the highest representation of other ethnic groups was among the ranks of general and high ranking officers.

Finally, two thirds of the personnel considered themselves as being Catholics and one third the rest of other confessions and atheists. Again, proportionally the biggest number of members of other religions and atheists were among the Ministry of Defence officials, around 70%, and among generals and high ranking officers, around 45%.

Very early in the development of the Croatian Armed Forces special facilities were provided for pursuing the religious needs of the soldiers within the barracks, but of course first it was done for the Catholics, being the biggest group in terms of numbers, and then after some persuasion and administrative zigzagging finally it became available to the members of other confessions.

Participation in the International Military Missions and Operations

Apart from all other operational issues, connected with participation in international military missions and operations, a widespread sensitivity to casualties stands out as a common denominator in most of the societies. During discussions preceding Croatian membership in NATO, certain parts of the

public, media and some NGOs showed great concern for the lives of Croatian soldiers.

Official representatives of the Government and the Ministry of Defence tried to persuade the public that it was the soldier's job and duty to take part in such operations on behalf of the state. Even more, it was reiterated that soldiers chose danger on their own free will as part of their duty and life from day one when they decided to join Armed Forces.

While there is something to this line of thinking, it has to be recognized that, at least in Croatian case, most of the soldiers in the past joined the Armed Forces in order to defend the country, or to put it more bluntly, their priority was to take part in the so called in-area operations. Situation is reversed today. Many newcomers to the military services emphasize they want to become a part of some international military mission or operation once they finish their education and training. So, what lies in the background and how can this be explained?

Crisis within the economy coupled with scarce possibility to find a job elsewhere makes soldier's job, like everywhere else, more attractive, offering more secure jobs in the long-term then the economy. On the other hand. salaries in the state administration, armed forces included, are not that high as in some branches of the economy. Faced with the reality of living and a dwindling standard of living of their families, the soldiers and those who aim to become members of the military, recognized pretty fast that significant per diem payments received during the service in international military operations, along with regular salaries, enable soldiers to raise their own and their families' standard of living. In order to do so, they accept putting their life at risk to a greater extent.

There are other issues left mostly answered, not only in Croatia. Are the common, ordinary people going to such missions hand-in-hand with the sons of wealthy and powerful politicians and managers? We can also find opinions that loosing a soldier's life in the military peace-keeping mission or operation could be seen hardly as anything else but a waste (Langston, 2000). The ultimate question that should have been answered beforehand by the security and defence structures is: are we loosing the edge when it comes to in-area operation by committing too much of our resources, units, and personnel to

out-of-area operations. Finally, is there any sense in this sort of operations at all, because (as Caforio says) armed forces all around the world are committed to solve the problem that is not theirs to solve.

Unfortunately, Croatian top politicians and military leaders failed even to put such questions on the table, let alone to answer them.

Security Perception

In trying to persuade the public that joining NATO is necessary and unavoidable next step, political elite in many of the transitional countries argues that as a consequence of the full membership in NATO the society gets higher level of security. However, security can be regarded as a distinctly diversified term. For the citizens, what counts the most is their individual security, security of their existence and well-being, public order, and all the elements that help them to plan for their future and the future of their families with relative confidence. Economic security partly overlaps with the aforementioned individual security, but has a much wider meaning, because it is the element that crucially affects the well being of the whole society. Economic development and growth are top priority elements for every society while, at the same time, they are elements sensitive in too many ways within fragile societies of the transitional countries. National as well as international security represents the third and ultimate layer of the security as a whole, a layer too often abused and misused by the political elites (Institute for International Relations, 2008).

Croatia's accession to NATO was expected to increase security and to-date it has been clearly recognized as the most important benefit of the Croatia's accession to NATO, not only among the politicians but also among the citizens. Same as many other elements, security perception of the Croatia's accession to NATO is almost impossible to quantify, but if the security really increases or, at least, if the general population retains the same perception, then this is something that will, in a positive way, indirectly influence other fields of the state activities as much as the whole society, at least for some time.

On the other hand, it is dubious if is it really so, and if the increase of the security could be given such a sacrosanct status at all. Official structures and some scientists like to emphasize that accession to NATO means widening of the security area in Europe. But security, as a sum total of all concerns, cannot be looked at only within the boundaries of the NATO member countries. If they themselves, their institutions, and citizens feel more secure it is only logical to expect that someone else on the receiving end of such political move would feel more insecure. And if there is someone in the so-called Euro-Atlantic area who feels more insecure, and there are ample evidence this is exactly the case, than the author of this article is not the only one who believes that, in reality, accession to NATO is not going to change or dramatically improve security within the Euro-Asian area. Again, our society, politics, and science failed to address this issue convincingly which, we are afraid, also shows some predetermined cultural prejudices.

Role of the Cultural Differences in Creating or Allowing Crisis and Conflicts

Risk analysis and assessment based on the undisputed data and pursued according to certain predefined procedures should have the crucial role in establishing national security framework of every country. This in effect means rationality should be recognized, established, and accepted as a driving force of all decisions. But in order to achieve this ideal, the people on the civilian, intelligence, and military side should be prepared to get over their cultural, preconceived, prejudicial biases and judgments.

In reality we can see too often irrationality is in the driver's seat, precisely at the high political and professional levels where there should be so little room for it. It is nowhere to be seen better then in the area which is recognized as industry of hate (Ingrao, 2003), and I will dare say that in a little bit less dramatic form it becomes industry of differences. Instead of looking for common ground, the politicians, political scientists and security analysts much too often copy positive or negative characteristics of one element of the assessed subject (usually neighbour across the fence, or some other minority group) to the

subject as a whole. The trouble with such an approach is it can severely influence our strategic decisions and choices (Fischerkeller, 1998).

This is all resulting in ethnicity or any other particularism winning over democratic and/or good management procedure, not only in the troubled Balkans or South East Europe area but worldwide. There is a question: are these trends or possibility for their re-emergence irreversibly eradicated as a result of the democratic transition and Security Sector Reform process in our countries? And the answer, for the time being, based on everyday experience and insider view, has to remain negative.

These cultural prejudices and judgments do not have only one form of existence and influence, naturally. Referring to the future international military operations and our involvement, it seems plausible that understanding cultural differences (Peters, 1995-96) and using them to one's benefit might have stronger impact on the outcome of the clash/war/insurgency then most of the strictly military elements. This is, for instance, expressed and can be easily recognised on the European soil in the commonly accepted feelings of threat coming from the South/East and boosting fears on the North/West (Richter Malabotta, 1998). This has almost become a mantra for most of the European politicians and citizens, something that is considered so firm and proven that it does not need to be analysed and reviewed further. But a heretic question must be asked: is the North or the West uniquely entitled to feel insecure and threaten these days? Especially in the light of ample evidence that South and East throughout the history suffered more from the North and West then the opposite.

Post-modern Military and Cultural Aspects

When talking about cultural aspects influencing behaviour and operations of the modern armies' institutionalised ethics, or lack thereof, has to be balanced with personal morale of any given soldier (Brinsfield, 1998). Connection between the two is not so clear-cut and vague at best. While military structures are responsible for the former they can be hardly held responsible for the latter. Yet, any misbehaviour, misdemeanour or criminal

act committed by a single soldier undermines credibility of the entire security and defence structure, even the state itself.

So the question faced by all modern armed forces is how to ensure implementation of social values and beliefs in order to secure proper behaviour of the soldiers in any given circumstances. One way is to adhere to the force of state and military power structure to impose certain behaviour on soldiers. Another option is to encourage soldiers to base their actions on explanation of cause, predetermined ethical training, and ensure maintenance of high standards through leading-by-example concept.

The trouble with military structures is that they tend to be pretty conservative in changing fundamental values and adhering to new ways of doing things. Most of the armies or even units comprising them have their own *espirit de corps* which is almost sanctified by their members. What they represent often does not have to have any connection with the socially accepted values and beliefs. This problem is going to become even greater in the future because of the necessary rejuvenation of the armed forces. How to reconcile new people and old values? How effective and successful can the so-called character building program be within the military, who and with what means is to ensure its compatibility with the social system of values? These things don't seem to work fully in other institutions much closer to the civilian way of life either. Why should they work in the military?

Every society has to answer the question: what should represent the foundation of military life and operations? Is it the sacrosanct leader in democratic disguise, father figure of the nation, the Constitution, flag and anthem, *espirit de corps*, nation, individual human and civil rights, something else? Talking about the civil rights, what about the fundamental clash between the civil – some would say even human – rights and obedience imposed sometimes cruelly through the military hierarchy. What about limiting freedom of speech in the military as a result of the culture of obedience and where is the line when free speech jeopardizes the fulfillment of obligations stemming from armed forces' missions and tasks (Kiel, 2007.)? On the other hand, is in the future every company or battalion to have its lawyer and ethics/religious/spiritual fitness chap-

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

lain/officer? Answers to these questions might depend strongly on the answer to one crucial dilemma we have to resolve in our societies. We should decide if we are to take the path of further militarization of the society resulting from the real or prefabricated threats of terrorism or should we focus our attention and resources on further civilianization of the military structure. In both cases, we should undertake society wide discussion about what are the effects of these paths before deciding to choose any one of them.

Ideological Obstacles Followed by Self-imposed Single Mindedness

All the changes taking place in the last twenty years or so left military profession and soldiers pretty much in the open. Being rigid structures, relying very much on the firm hierarchy, armed forces generally do not support and stimulate dissenting views, free thinking, and opposition within the rank and file. In a society which has accepted democratic values and ways of doing things and making decisions, the army represents in essence a non-democratic island.

In anything close to ideal world, individual ethics should reign supreme over politics, but in practical life the politics seems to define ethics, thus setting the stage for all sorts of single-mindedness, because ideological views deter any possibility for individual ethics to shape and influence politics. At least to some extent this influences the execution of the professional soldiers' tasks, too.

The relation between the society and the security structures is to a large extent shaped by the rules emerging from the security versus right-to-know concept. Unfortunately, in Croatia, these rules are very much mutually conflicting. The Law on right to access information sets forth the right of any individual to be granted the right to see and review any information he or she considers important and can present valid legal ground for that, unless special law foresees some restrictions of that right. So the Law on protection of personal data says no data can be granted if it is referring to the specific individual without his or her consent. Theoretically, the citizens have all the rights to

access any information relating to the ways how, for instance, the Government, Ministry of Defence or General Staff are doing business, but practically most of the data can be withheld because in most cases it will refer to certain persons without whose consent no data can be presented to the parties requesting them.

Changes in the security environment in the last decades strongly suggest that armed forces around the world should stimulate thinking and expression of views and ideas in order to enable them to fight more effectively against modern, translational, and asymmetric threats. For the purpose of this article, we could distinguish at least two parts of the process. While during the execution of decisions and orders anything less then swift and resolute execution without hesitation could be considered as harmful and breaching professional ethics, during the planning, preparatory, and consultation phase all good ideas should be heard and discussed in order to raise possibilities for the most effective decision making process. Unfortunately we can witness less then optimal approach to this issue because lower ranks are too often afraid to offend their superiors and are trying to guess what they would like to hear. Years of ideological influence either openly or in disguise left their mark on many members of the defence structures, making them revert to self-imposed barriers and bans, even if and when they are not directly asked to do so, rather then risk clashing with the political and military hierarchy.

Conclusion

Failure of the political and military leadership to address the aforementioned issues seems to prove that Security Sector Reform was understood at best as a way to change the organizational charts and to a lesser degree the functions of the security services and military forces, and to appease the would-be allies. Both aimed at raising the profile of the political military elite without worrying too much about the long term benefit for the society. Definitely, Security Sector Reform is very seldom looked upon as a way to change complete cultural image of the administration and the nation itself, as its proponents are

**STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM**

very often stressing. Even if and where sincere intentions to do so exist, they are usually blocked by the realities of the bureaucratic and political interests merged with inherited traditional ways of dong things and thinking.

Croatia started in earnest the process of Security Sector Reform nine years ago. Judging this process from the point of view of institutional vs. cultural change it is obvious the brunt has been directed at changing the organizational diagrams and boxes on the paper while cultural impact and influence were seriously neglected. Security and defence transformation was shaped along the lines of copying western models and examples while fundamental social, political and cultural relations that should have been serving as a foundation for this change were mostly overlooked. The role of women, minority groups, introduction of the equal opportunity system, recognition and application for basic social values, linkage and overlapping of the politics and (security and defence) professionals, among other issues, all were revolving, and were subjugated, to the political power and interests. Particular interest of the close-knit groups arguably had much greater influence on the outcome of the Security Sector Reform then would be healthy for the benefit of the whole society.

Linkage between political, strategic, and military culture and operational activities on the path of pursuing Security Sector Reform were hardly recognized and given thorough consideration. Factors influencing the dominating culture(s) were neglected or hidden while transformation of the security and military structure culture followed some ill conceived aims or politically induced myths. The media, NGOs, independent experts and institutes should have had specific impact on development of the widest possible social role in shaping security and defence policies and adopting them in the accepted cultural framework, social values and ethics, but they were mostly left out of the picture.

All of the elements mentioned should have found a way to be implemented in the education and training process within the Armed Forces, with the emphasis being put to the regular, periodic, systematic education and training, which should not be looked at as an impediment to the soldier's duties. Sadly, this is the task still left for the future.

References:

1. Bera, R. W. (2003) 'Social Changes in the Polish Army.' *Slavic Military Studies*, 16(4), pp. 33-45.

2. Brinsfield, J. W. (1998) 'Army Values and Ethics: A Search for Consistency and Relevance.' *Parameters*, 28 (3), pp. 69-84.

3. Dandeker, C. (2002) *Military and Society: The Problems, Challenges and Possible Answers.* London: King's College.

4. Fischerkeller, M. P. (1998) 'David versus Goliath: Cultural Judgements in Asymmetric Wars.' *Security Studies*, 7 (4), pp. 1-43.

5. Ingrao, C. (2003) 'Delegitimazing Multiculturalism: The Role of Cultural Elites in Ethnic Conflict.' *Polemos*, 11-12, pp. 87-95.

6. Institute for International Relations. (2008) *Costs and Benefits of Croatia's Accession to NATO.* Zagreb: Institute for International Relations.

7. Kiel, J. L. Jr. (2007) 'When Soldiers Speak Out: A Survey of Provisions Limiting Freedom of Speech in the Military.' *Parameters*.

8. Langston, T. S. (2000) 'The Civilian Side of Military Culture.' *Parameters*, 30 (3), pp. 21-29.

9. Mahečić, Z. (2001) *Hrvatska u 21. stoljeću – Nacionalna sigurnost.* Zagreb: Ured za strategiju razvitka Republike Hrvatske.

10. Moskos, C. C., Williams, J. A., Segal, D. R. (eds.) (2000) *The Postmodern Military.* New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.

11. Peters, R. (1995-96). 'The Culture of Future Conflict.' *Parameters,* 25 (4), 18-27.

12. Pielke, R. Jr. (2006) The Honest Broker - Facts, Values, and Scientists in Policy Debates. [online]. Available from: <http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archives/the_honest_broker/000958facts_values_and_s.html> [Accessed 15 December 2009].

13. Richter, M. M. (1998) 'Prijetnje s Juga, strahovi sa Sjevera.' *Erasmus*, 25, pp. 13-18.

The Catholic Church and the Europeanization of Anti-Discrimination Protection – The Cases of Post-Communist Poland and Croatia[1]

Dag Ole Huseby

The author is a student of master studies at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) and Research Associate at the Centre for Civil-Military Relations

Abstract

This article will analyse the Europeanization process of anti-discrimination protection in post-communist Poland and Croatia, and assess the influence of the Catholic Church as a potential veto player in this process. This article will therefore contribute by exploring the much disputed nature of the Europeanization process, as well as give an indication on how the European integration process is influencing the fundamental normative framework in the European area for justice, security and freedom sought created by the EU. It concludes that traditional patterns of discrimination are still widespread in both Poland and Croatia, and that EU still has some way to go before its area of freedom, security and justice is fully realized.

Key words: Europeanization, European Union, Catholic Church, post-communist, Poland, Croatia

1. Introduction

The Europeanization process is a contested area of research, and there is much debate on the exact nature of the European Union's (EU) influence on certain national reform processes (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Olsen, 2002). The domestic

[1] This article is based on the author's Master's Thesis (Huseby, 2009). For a more thorough analysis on this topic, please consult this thesis, as this article only functions as a summary of the main findings. The thesis can be provided by sending an inquiry to the Institute for Sociology and Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), or to the author himself.

reform processes in post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and South Eastern Europe (SEE) countries which aspires EU membership therefore pose an excellent opportunity to research this process to a further extent. Furthermore, within one of these policy areas subject to reform, anti-discrimination protection, one domestic actor in particular has been fiercely reluctant to accept EU influence, namely the Catholic Church (Ramet, 2006; Bremer, 2008). This article will thus explore the Europeanization process within one policy area subject to such reform; that of anti-discrimination protection, as well as making an attempt at analyzing the Catholic Church's position as a potential *veto player*[2] in the Europeanization process of anti-discrimination protection in the two post-communist countries Poland and Croatia.

Research on this topic is also important for another reason. The EU is promoting certain anti-discrimination standards based on the liberal democratic values of tolerance. These values are essential for the purpose of strengthening the European area of freedom, security, and justice (Townsend, 2003). Thus, if undermined in the individual EU member states, it might also pose a threat to the overall normative framework of the European Union, as well as to certain groups of people within it.

2. The Europeanization Process and Anti-Discrimination Protection

The countries aspiring EU membership are subject to EU conditionality. Consequently, they commit to adopt a uniform set of legal standards on a variety of policy areas corresponding to EU law. The basic rationale is that a non-member state that is sufficiently tempted by the financial and/or institutional rewards provided by the EU will comply with the EU requirements and thus also go through an Europeanization process of institutional reform and normative change (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).

However, the level of EU influence or Europeanization on the domestic reform processes in the former communist states of the CEE and the SEE are highly disputed among the Europeanization scholars.[3] The main contention is that

[2] A veto player is defined as "(…) actors whose agreement is necessary for change in the status quo" (Tsebelis, 2002: 17)

[3] This article will only analyze one strand of this debate, namely EU-influenced Europeanization. See Featherstone and Radaelli (2003); Goetz and Hix (2001); Olsen (2002); Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001) for further information on the Europeanization debate.

between two approaches to EU-influenced Europeanization. The first approach assumes a *top-down* approach and sees EU pressure or the conditionality as a direct source of the political and economic reform processes that took/take place at the domestic level in the former communist states of the CEE and SEE. The second approach assumes a *bottom-up* approach, and appropriate EU little direct influence on these post-communist domestic reform processes. It merely sees EU standards as ideals a country can choose to implement at will during a self-initiated domestic reform process (Ibid).

Furthermore, three theoretical models accounting for the two aforementioned approaches to Europeanization can be posed. Two of these theoretical models fit into the *top-down* approach, while the third fits into the *bottom-up* approach. The first model, the *external incentive model*, is a rational choice approach which assumes that domestic actors respond in a cost-benefit calculating manner to EU conditionality, weighing costs against benefits for EU rule adoption. The second model, the *social learning model*, is a social constructivist approach and assumes that domestic actors responds to EU conditionality on basis of the EU rules' correspondence with national ideals and identity. The third model, the *lesson-drawing model*, accounts for both the rationalist choice and the social constructivist approaches, but is essentially different from the two aforementioned theoretical models, as domestic reform is initiated from the post-communist country itself and is not contingent on EU pressure or conditionality (Ibid).

Common to all of the theoretical models mentioned above is that the interests of a *veto player*, which in this context is a domestic actor(s) that is potentially influential enough to change the political status quo if challenged, might have to be taken into consideration when making decisions on the national EU policies (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Tsebelis, 2002: 17). A political party in opposition, strong organizations, or the Catholic Church are examples of such veto players.

The EU anti-discrimination values, relevant for this article, can mainly be found in two EU sources. First, in the European Council declaration, the 1994 *Copenhagen Criteria*, which elaborate the criteria of "(…) guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minori-

ties, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union" (European Council, 1993: 13) as a prerequisite for being considered eligible for EU membership. The second source is the more comprehensive and technical EU body of law, the *aquis communautaire*, which also contains provisions for the protection against discrimination, most notably in the EU standards for labor rights (e.g. the Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC), but also through the basic human rights provisions in the EU Treaty framework (Schwellnus, 2005: 55; Toggenburg, 2006: 6; European Council, 2000b).

The EU anti-discrimination standards are not just "silent" legislation, as the EU is also actively working to promote these values through its institutions, especially after the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty[4] which established provisions addressing new potential victims of discrimination, as well as giving the EU institutions the power to enforce compliance with these provisions among the EU members (Official Journal, 1997; Moraes, 2006: 31). Tolerance and liberal democratic values are, in other words, seen as an essential part of the European area of freedom, security and justice.[5]

3. The Catholic Church in the Era of Europeanization

In spite of the contemporary *Zeitgeist* where religion seems to lose to other more material and secular values, most countries in the post-communist CEE and SEE experienced a religious revival in the 1990's (Katzenstein, 2006: 7f; Lambert, 2004). During communism religious institutions such as the Catholic Church was seen as a hazard to the stability of the authoritarian regime, not only because of ideological reasons, but also because the Church had a strong influence in the society as a "value-generating" and "value-sustaining" institution. This was a force the communists wanted to utilize; preferably controlled or manipulated to serve the communist regime. The alternative was outright abolishment (Lytle, 1998: 304f). Often being an suppressed and/or opposing force during communism, one can therefore look at the Catholic Church's contemporary

[4] After which the EU members committed themselves to construct an area of freedom, security and justice (Townsend, 2003).

[5] Another important step is the *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* which came into force with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty on the 1 of December 2009 (EurActiv, 2009). For the first time in the history of the EU, an EU Charter combines "(…) in a single text the civil, political, economic, social and societal rights hitherto laid down in a variety of international, European or national sources" (European Council, 2000a).

**STRATEGIC CULTURE
AND SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM**

status from an *historical institutional* approach (Warner, 2000: 5), as a Church's strength in a post-communist state today is often reinforced if it took a strong stand defending human rights in the communist era, now being referred to as a legitimate moral authority securing the newfound freedom (Ramet, 2006; Bremer, 2008).

This is exactly the case for the Catholic Church in post-communist Poland and Croatia. Catholicism is the largest denomination in both of these two societies (Poland: 89.8% of the population [CIA The World Fact Book, 2009a], and Croatia: 87.8% of the population [CIA The World Fact Book, 2009b]), and even though state and church is constitutionally separated, it gives the Church a huge potential for influence. Institutionally, in Poland and Croatia, the Catholic Church managed to use its moral legitimacy and the unstable political situation in the early state building phase to consolidate its legal position in these societies. It influenced the educational system by introducing religious instructions in schools; helped the implementation of a strict anti-abortion law in Poland; gained influence over the media (especially in Poland); was granted financial support for Catholic kindergartens in Croatia; committing the state to provide financial contributions for the Catholic Church; and reserved for itself a prominent legal position both through the constitutional framework, and through concordats (Bremer, 2008: 259f; Eberts, 1998; Ramet, 2006; Ramet, 2008: 177f).

Regarding the Catholic Church's stand toward European integration, the Vatican did as early as before the Second World War recognized the necessity of the establishment of a "European Union" as a means to provide for peace and stability on the European Continent. However the official stance of the Catholic Church in the later years has been one of caution, and are only positive toward the European integration project as long as it is allowed to play the role as moral guide for the further Europeanization process, securing the moral foundation of the Union (Philpott and Shah, 2006: 53; Hehir, 2006: 107ff).

This stance is reflected by the Catholic Church in Poland. After a visit to Brussels in 2002 by a delegation of Polish Bishops, the Polish Episcopate issued an official document stat-

ing the Catholic Church in Poland's official position on the integration process. Here they, among others, emphasized the sovereign right of Poland to preserve its national identity, and reserved for itself the right to be able to determine its own political, cultural and religious values even when included in the European Union. The Church would, however, not commingle in the process of deciding on specific solutions when it came to the integration process; this was up to the civil authorities. The Catholic Church would rather help secure the moral aspects of this Europeanization process by preventing the secular culture of materialism, consumer mentality and religious indifference from taking root in Poland, and thus stand guard over the fundamental Christian values of the Polish nation (Konferencja Episkopatu Polski 2002, English Translation; Eberts 2004: 5).

4. The Polish and Croatian Anti-Discrimination Conduct

Poland was one of the "EU frontrunners" who managed to reform its state institutions in the early 1990's and worked hard to adapt to the new political and economic reality. It also started early to build ties with the EU, as the Polish political elite saw EU membership as imperative for the future economic prosperity and political stability in Poland (European Commission, 2009; Gower, 1999: 4f; Avery, 2004: 36). Furthermore, the Polish population supported Polish EU membership (77% supported EU membership in 1994, rising to 80% in 1996), even though no real debate on EU membership took place. Public support originated more in the instinctive desire to join the prosperous and politically safe Western Europe so as to draw domestic economic and social benefits (Schimmelfennig, 2005; Millard, 1999: 203).

However, the early post-communist democratization process in Poland was also a turbulent time which was characterized by economic shock therapy, social hardship, massive institutional changes, unstable governments and many coalition changes. The political fragmentation and the unstable coalition governments it created, undermined the EU friendly liberal forces, often provoked domestic EU debates of a nationalistic character where also the Catholic Church could gain influence by

appealing to the Poles' moral obligations as a Christian Polish nation, and therefore prevented a clear EU focus in Poland. This again had serious repercussions for the integration process as Poland fell far behind in its obligations to EU in the late 1990s and early 2000. Poland's relationship with the European Commission was therefore also rather strained at times during the accession process (Ibid).

In the area of anti-discrimination protection, Poland has constitutionally secured a general provision that prohibits *any* form of discrimination in the political, social and economic areas, both in private and public spheres. The Constitution also establish freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the right to public services for all Polish citizens, including members of national and ethnic minorities. Gender equality is also secured in the family, society, economic life, education, employment, social benefits etc (Filipek and Pamula, 2005: 2). However, the Constitution does only recognize heterosexual marriage, and even though short of promising protection of life from conception until death, it does declare the protection of life (Eberts, 1998: 835; Byrnes, 2002: 31f; Daniel, 1995). The issue of protection of life i.e. abortion, has, however, since been urged debated by the Catholic Church on several occasions, and been thrown back and forth according to which type (secular-left/traditional-right) of government that has been in power, and the character of the law likewise (from liberal to strict) (Eberts, 1998: 832f).

Furthermore, through the Europe Agreements (signed in 1991), Poland had committed to "(…) use its best endeavours to ensure that future legislation is compatible with Community legislation" (Official Journal, 1993), and was therefore obliged to transpose the existing EU Directives in relations to anti-discrimination at the workplace as part of this economic transition. The Polish Labor Code was therefore, in 1996, for the first time amended in an effort to enhance this legislation, securing equal treatment of employees at the workplace after EU standards (Zielinska, 2005: 7). The Polish Labor Code has since been amended several times to comply with EU Directives (Filipek and Pamula, 2005: 2f; Schwellnus, 2005: 61). In addition, several smaller institutions that had a partial mandate to deal with specific cases of discrimination such as a

Government's Plenipotentiary for Disabled Persons (Filipek and Pamula, 2005: 5) and a Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of Men and Women, was established during the early 2000s (Czerwinski, 2006).

However, in practice these above mentioned provisions have tended not to prevent the discrimination of groups in Poland which traditionally have been discriminated against, such as, for example, women and homosexuals. Strangely enough in this context, when reviewing the Commission's annual Progress Reports on Poland from 1998 until 2003 little was mentioned about anti-discrimination legislation, nor practice, except for some short remarks in relation to the Labor Code (European Commission 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), which Poland responded to.

Illustratively enough, Poland temporarily regressed some-how in complying with the EU anti-discrimination norms after EU membership was granted. The national and foreign policy conducted by the Law and Justice (PiS) government during the mid-2000 can easily be characterized as chauvinistic, homo-phobic and xenophobic (Filipek and Pamula, 2005; Vermeersch, 2007). Furthermore, during the re-negotiations of the Constitutional Treaty at the Lisbon Summit in October 2007, Poland chose to opt-out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as the conservative PiS government disagreed on the provisions protecting gay rights and banning death penalty (Spiegel, 2007; EurActiv 2007). In addition, in June 2007, the European Commission issued a formal request to Poland (among 14 other EU countries) urging Poland to implement the Race Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) sufficiently (European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field, 2008: 53f), thus putting pressure on Poland to fall into line. Interestingly enough, as a response to the EU liberal abortion promotion, the European Parliament MP, the League of Polish Families affiliate, Maciej Giertych, even stated at one point that "(…) we want to see Europe based on a Christian ethic (…) We accept the teachings of the Catholic Church on all moral issues. If you want to know our opinions, read the opinions of the Catholic Church" (Bowley, 2005).

The current center-right The Civic Platform (PO) govern-ment has, however, taken actions to distance itself from these

policies in an effort to try to mend Poland's relations with the EU and its members, but the Polish government is still immobilized to a certain extent by the conservative Euro-skeptic forces on a variety of issues (European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field, 2008: 107f).

Croatia, on its side, experienced a destructive post-Yugoslav conflict from 1991 which undermined the democratization process initiated in the late 1980's, and led to a decade of nationalistic and isolationistic policies in a semi-authoritarian HDZ-regime led by President Franjo Tudjman. Notwithstanding, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) managed to form a new centre-left coalition government in the 2000 Parliamentary elections after the death of Tudjman the year before, starting a massive democratization project where integration into both the international and the European community was of essence. A Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) was signed with the EU in October 2001 (not ratified before February 2005) (Fischer 2006: 185ff; Søberg 2007: 50ff), and financial assistance was provided through the CARDS program, an equivalent to PHARE, by the end of the same year (EurActiv, 2008).

The Račan government reform process nonetheless met with difficulties. At the same time as it was trying to comply with international demands, the government had to balance its policies against the still rather powerful nationalistic sentiments at home, and especially the HDZ opposition in the *Sabor* (Søberg, 2007: 51; Zakošek and Čular, 2004: 482), as well as the Catholic Church who was afraid of losing its privileges granted by the HDZ-regime the past decade, calling the government "(...) anti-Croatian, traitorous and communist" (Hedl 2001).

However, a reformed HDZ which now had moved toward the political centre and pushed out its far-right radicals formed a minority coalition government led by Ivo Sanader as Prime Minister in November 2003. The now pro-EU HDZ government managed to traverse several difficult national problems preventing it from moving forward, such as improving the conditions for the Serb refugees and handing over several ICTY indicted Croatian war criminals. Croatia was therefore granted EU candidate status in April 2004 (Søberg, 2007: 52; Fischer, 2006: 185ff).

The EU has also argued heavily for Croatia to implement sufficient anti-discrimination legislation, and more so in the case of Croatia than in Poland, taken the violent Croatian past into consideration. Croatia has therefore also made great progress in the anti-discrimination sector; a Constitutional Law on Minorities was adopted in 2002 (Fischer, 2006: 194); in 2003 a new Law on gender equality was implemented and an Act on Same-Sex Union recognizing so-called unregistered co-habitation rights for same-sex couples was also adopted (homosexuality has however been legal in Croatia since 1977) (IGLHRC, 2003; European Parliament, 2006; European Commission, 2005: 89; United Nations Information Service, 2005). Later in 2006, the Croatian Criminal Code was amended to also cover sexual orientation; the Labor Code was amended to protect against discrimination of grounds of gender and sexual orientation; and several institutions has been established for the purpose of combating discrimination, such as an Ombudsman for the equality between women and men (IGLHRC, 2003; European Parliament, 2006; OSCE, 2009).

The progress reports published by the European Commission on Croatia had since 2005 urged for Croatia to adopt a more comprehensive anti-discrimination framework to meet the still evident discrimination, especially in relations to ethnic and sexual minority rights. An Anti-Discrimination Act was therefore passed by a large majority in the *Sabor* in the late summer of 2008 (Swedish Helsinki Committee, 2008), thus implementing anti-discrimination legislation for the purpose of meeting EU demands (EUbusiness, 2008), but not without sparking fierce opposition for the Croatian Catholic Church (Swedish Helsinki Committee, 2008).

In comparison to Poland, Croatia has made great progress in the area of anti-discrimination by implementing more comprehensive legislation in a relatively shorter period of time, this might be due to the fact that the reformed HDZ government still held power after in the November 2007 Parliamentary elections, and having a broad mandate today it can still conduct a firm EU policy for Croatia, even though this strategy has not been without problems either (Ramet 2008: 213f; Economist 2007). Among others, support for EU in the Croat population has fluctuated widely from 79% support in the early 2000 to

51% in 2004, as many Croats has felt discriminated against by the strict EU conditionality (Samardzija 2006). Mind you, one should also be aware that discrimination is still a problem in Croatia today as well, especially for women, Serbs, Roma and sexual minorities (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2009).

5. The Catholic Church's Influence on the Europeanization Process

To what extent has the Catholic Church managed to influence the Europeanization process of anti-discrimination protection in post-communist Poland and Croatia? It is clear that the EU has faced two radically different cases of aspiring EU members which has demanded different EU strategies in Poland and Croatia, and both have also experienced substantial difficulties during their respective reform processes. When having a closer look on the implementation process of anti-discrimination legislation, however, it seems that the EU conditionality in relation to anti-discrimination did not have any effect in the early reform processes in neither Poland (1990-1996) nor Croatia (1989-2000). This was rather a period where a self-initiated national reform process, spurred by the fall of communism, set a democratization process in motion. The EU conditionality, which at this point can be said to be a democratic conditionality, was weak and of a passive character (Vachudova, 2001: 4), and the EU was at best just one of many alternative models of inspiration.

The EU has thus only been influential in Poland from around 1996, when the first specific EU standards in relation to the Europe Agreements forced the Poles to implement EU anti-discrimination standardized in the Polish Labor Code, and then later during the accession negotiations and accession period from 1997 and onwards (Official Journal, 1993; Millard, 1999). In Croatia, the EU has only been influential from around 2000, after the semi-authoritarian and Euro-skeptic HDZ-regime was voted out of office, and the democratization process and the aspirations for EU membership finally could be embraced by a Croatian government (e.g. a SAA was signed already in October 2001 [Fischer, 2006: 185ff]). The EU could

now also present a set of clear conditions toward Croatia, with a heavy emphasis on anti-discrimination and minority rights (Fischer, 2006; Ramet, 2002; Søberg, 2007).

In this phase of Europeanization, little evidence is found to support the *lesson-drawing* or the *social learning* models. For the governments in post-communist Poland and Croatia, the implementation of EU standardized anti-discrimination protection seems to generally just be a bi-effect of the greater economic and political benefits an EU membership can provide. There is no strong and genuine domestic demand for more anti-discrimination protection in neither country, as traditionalist values are still accepted in these societies.[6] In addition, the civil society is too weak to make a significant impact on the decisions-makers in the area of anti-discrimination.[7] The governments did therefore not initiate reform of their legal anti-discrimination framework to solve pressing domestic problems and did not look toward the EU for solutions, which is the premise for the *lesson-drawing model*. It is rather the EU that has posed such pressure for change. Most Poles and Croats have been more interested in the material benefits and political freedom of European integration, and at large seems to be satisfied with their traditionalist concept of tolerance. The additional anti-discrimination legislation therefore seems to be only implemented as a necessity for being granted these other benefits, and not out of their appropriateness, which is the premise for the *social learning model*.[8] This thus suggests a national strategy in Poland and Croatia where their governments has had to make cost-benefit calculations to best meet both domestic demands for material benefits and political freedom, and EU requirements like implementing anti-discrimination protection, giving support to the *external incentive* model.

This suggestion is supported when analyzing the Catholic Church's role in this context. Common to the Catholic Church in Poland and Croatia is that it strongly connects Catholic religious values with national identity, and thus seeks to strengthen its position within the state by gaining privileges from it. It is as such dependent on a stable state structure to be able to draw assets from this, and therefore tends to argue against any compromise of national sovereignty lest it lose privileges secured under national law, e.g. the introduction of EU stan-

[6] Renata Siemienska (2006: 216) found, for example, that 70.6% of the Polish respondents in a World Value Survey from 1997 were of the opinion that homosexuality could not be justified, while 56.8% opposed the right to divorce, and 38.6 % rejected abortion, thus suggesting a rather high level of traditionalist sentiment in the Polish population. However, even though these levels of traditionalism have decreased somewhat since 1997, Poles are still highly traditionalistic. In Croatia in 2004, gays as a group was accepted by only 10% of the Croatian adults, and only 22% of the Croatian youth, same-sex marriage was accepted by 20% of the Croatian adults and 33% of the Croatian youth, and the right to divorce accepted by 52% of the Croatian adults and 66% of the Croatian youth (Ilišin, 2007: 111ff). Croatia is also lagging behind when it comes to the acceptance of gender equality, rather supporting traditional patriarchal patterns than increasing women rights and liberation (Bijelić, 2007: 276ff). Croatia is in other words still highly traditionalist as well.

[7] The Polish civil society still is rather weak with a low level of political participation or civic engagement (Siemienska, 2006), the organizations trying to promote anti-discrimination rights get little attention from the governmental institutions as the Polish pro-EU politicians fear they will lose support by debating such sensitive issues (Holzhacker, 2008: 22). Croatia is somewhat better of in relation to civil society development, but the civil society at large, other than certain human rights NGO's, has not demanded additional protection (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2009; University of Vienna).

[8] No significant evidence for any elite socialization on this issue in these two countries was found either. However, a more interview-based research should be done to clarify this question more sufficiently.

dardized anti-discrimination legislation at odds with the Catholic social teachings. Furthermore, because it managed to consolidate its legal position in the early democratization process in both countries and created numerous channels of societal influence, it has become the strongest moral authority in these countries which no other national actors has managed to compete with (Eberts, 1998; Ramet, 2006).

The Catholic Church has therefore tried to influence the decision-making by rallying for certain political candidates at elections, used its media outlets to spread its views on political decisions, and generally appealed to the voters, politicians and its parishioners' moral foundation when these has had to make decisions on certain important moral issues (Ibid).

However, when tracing the EU standardized anti-discrimination legislation that has been implemented in Poland and Croatia, and identifying the character of this legislation it becomes clear that the Church's interests in both countries is undermined to fulfill EU demands, and it is evident that the Polish and Croatian government has been conducting cost-benefit calculations when the EU policy has been converted into political decision-making. Still, this is more so in Croatia than in Poland. As the external incentive model hypothesizes, during such cost-benefit calculations, the Catholic Church's veto power is only as strong as the government's political weakness. Thus, in Croatia where the government has a broad mandate at the moment, the Catholic Church and the traditional values can be disregarded to some extent for the purpose of fulfilling EU demands. This has not been the case in Poland where unstable governments consisting of ideological divergent coalition partners or strong opposition in the *Sejm* have made government compromise and collapse the rule, and forced liberal pro-EU parties to compromise with the conservative traditionalist forces either in government or in the *Sejm*, undermining the governments' power to push trough EU demands.

6. Conclusion

EU pressure has influenced the transition process in the area of anti-discrimination in Poland and Croatia, but the motives for implementing EU standardized anti-discrimination legisla-

tion is more influenced by the external incentives such as economic prosperity, political freedom and the ability to travel freely which an EU membership provides, rather than creating a more tolerant society. There is therefore a great difference between the formal implementation of EU legislation and the actual practice in the area of anti-discrimination. Domestic factors are still influential and the traditional patterns of discrimination are still widespread in both Poland and Croatia. EU thus still has some way to go before its area of freedom, security and justice is fully realized.

References:

1. Avery, G. (2004) 'The Enlargement Negotiations.' In *The Future of Europe Integration and Enlargement*, ed. F. Cameron, pp. 35–62. New York: Routledge.

2. Bijelić, B. (2007) 'Women on the Edge of Gender Equality.' In *Democratic Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education & Media*, eds. S. P. Ramet and D. Matić, pp. 276–299. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

3. Bowley, G. (2005) 'Conservative Poland Roils European Union.' *The New York Times*, December 4. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/04/international/europe/04brussels.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (accessed on 8 May 2009).

4. Bremer, T. (2008) 'The Catholic Church and its Role in Politics and Society.' In *Croatia since Independence: War, Politics, Society, Foreign Relations*, eds. S. P. Ramet, K. Clewing and R. Lukić, pp. 251–268. München: R. Oldenburg Verlag GmbH München.

5. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. (2009) '*2008 Human Rights Report: Croatia.*' 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. U. S. Department of State.

6. Byrnes, T. A. (2002) 'The Challenge of Pluralism, The Catholic Church in Democratic Poland.' In *Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, the Few, and the Many*, eds. T. G. Jelen and C. Wilcox, pp. 27–44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

7. CIA The World Fact Book. (2009a) 'Poland.' *CIA The World Fact Book*. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html (accessed on 8 May 2009).

8. CIA The World Fact Book. (2009b) 'Croatia.' *CIA The World Fact Book*. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hr.html (accessed on 8 May 2009).

9. Daniel, K. (1995) 'The Church-State Situation in Poland after the Collapse of Communism.' *Brigham Young University Law Review,* 2, pp. 401–419.

10. Eberts, M. W. (1998) 'The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland.' *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50 (5), pp. 817–842.

11. Economist (2007) Country Briefings: Croatia, Political Forces. *The Economist*. http://www.economist.com/countries/Croatia/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Political%20Forces (accessed on 16 June 2009).

12. EUbusiness (2008) 'Croatia adopts anti-discrimination law despite Church protests.' *EUbusiness*, 2 July 2008. http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1215616623.9/ (accessed on 13 June 2009).

13. EurActiv (2007) 'Reform Treaty Leaves Unions with Mixed Feelings.' *EurActiv.com*. http://www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/reform-treaty-leaves-unions-mixed-feelings/article-167784 (accessed on 10 June 2009).

14. EurActiv (2008) 'EU–Croatian Relations.' *EurActiv.com*. http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-croatia-relations/article-129605 (accessed on 21 March 2009).

15. EurActiv (2009) 'New EU Treaty Enter Into Force, Sparking Reform.' *EurActiv.com*. http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/new-eu-treaty-enters-force-sparking-reform/article-187848 (accessed on 1 December 2009).

16. European Commission. (1998) *'Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's Progress Towards Accession.'* Brussels: The European Commission.

17. European Commission. (1999) *'1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's Progress Towards Accession.'* Brussels: The European Commission.

18. European Commission. (2000) *'2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's Progress Towards Accession.'* Brussels: The European Commission, 8 November 2000.

19. European Commission. (2001) *'2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's Progress Towards Accession.'* Brussels: The European Commission, 13 November 2001.

20. European Commission. (2002) *'2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's Progress Towards Accession.'* Brussels: The European Commission, 9 October 2002.

21. European Commission. (2003) *'Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland's Preparations for Membership.'* Brussels: The European Commission.

22. European Commission. (2005) *'Croatia 2005 Progress Report.'* Brussels, 9 November 2005. SEC (2005) 1424 {COM (2005) 561 final}.

23. European Commission. (2009) *'PHARE.'* Brussels: The European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financial-assistance/phare/index_en.htm (accessed on 24 February 2009).

24. European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance. (2009) *'Country Monitoring Work: Croatia.'* The Council Of Europe. Available from: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Croatia/Croatia_CBC_en.asp (accessed on 16 June 2009).

25. European Council. (1993) 'Conclusions of the Presidency.' *Bulletin of the European Communities* no. 6/1993.

26. European Council. (2000a) 'Conclusions of the Presidency.' European Council – Nice, 7–10 December 2000. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/nice1_en.htm (accessed on 21 June 2009).

27. European Council. (2000b) 'Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.' *Official Journal of the European Union,* L 303 , 02/12/2000.

28. European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field. (2008) *European Anti-Discrimination Law Review,*6/7, October 2008.

29. European Parliament. (2006) *'Conclusions by the Chairperson.'* The European Parliament, Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality, Delegation to Zagreb, Croatia, 20–21 April 2006.

30. Filipek, P. and Pamula, M. (2005) 'Executive summary Poland.' Employment and Social Affairs, Action against discrimination, Civil Society, The European Commission.

31. Fischer, S. (2006) *Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to Europeanist*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

32. Goetz, K. H. and Hix, S. (2001) *Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems*. London: Frank Cass.

33. Gower, J. (1999) 'EU Policy to Central and Eastern Europe.' In *Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union*, ed. K. Henderson, pp. 3–19. London: UCL Press.

34. Hedl, D. (2001) 'Croatia: Clerics Attack Government.' Institute for Women's Policy Research (IWPR), The Centre for Peace in the Balkans. Available from: http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=13917 (accessed on 19 March 2009).

35. Hehir, J. B. (2006) 'The Old Church and the New Europe: Charting the Changes.' In *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, eds. T. A. Byrnes and P. J. Katzenstein, pp. 93–116. New York: Cambridge University Press.

36. Huseby, D. O. (2009) *The Catholic Church and the Europeanization Process – An Empirical Analysis of EU Democratic Conditionality and Anti-Discrimination Protection in Post-Communist Poland and Croatia*. Master's Thesis in Political Science. Institute for Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU).

37. IGLHRC (2003) *Croatia: Same Sex Civil Union Law and Anti-Discrimination Protections Passed*. International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC). http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/takeaction/globalactionalerts/582.html (accessed on 15 June 2009).

38. Ilišin, V. (2007) 'Political Values and Attitude.' In *Democratic Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education & Media*, eds. S. P. Ramet and D Matić, pp. 109–162. Texas: Texas A&M University Press.

39. Katzenstein, P. J. (2006) 'Multiple Modernities as Limits to Secular Europeanization?' In *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, eds. T. A. Byrnes and P. J. Katzenstein, pp. 1–33. New York: Cambridge University Press.

40. Konferencja Episkopatu Polski (2002) 'Polish Bishops on European Integration.' English Translation by Katarzyna Łazarz-Górska, Konferencja Episkopatu Polski-The Polish Bishop's Conference. www.episkopat.pl/?a=dokumentyKEP&doc=biskupi_eng-21032002 (accessed on 23 February 2009).

41. Lambert, Y. (2004) 'A Turning Point in Religious Evolution in Europe.' *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 19 (1), pp. 29–45.

42. Lytle, P. F. (1998) 'Religion and Politics in Eastern Europe.' In *Eastern Europe: Politics, Culture, and Society since 1939*, ed. S. P. Ramet, pp. 304–329. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

43. Millard, F. (1999) 'Polish Domestic Politics and Accession to the European Union.' In *Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union*, ed. K. Henderson, pp. 203–219. London: UCL Press.

44. Moraes, C. (2006) 'Challenges for Anti-discrimination Law and Policy for the 2007 Year of Equal Ostrortunities.' *European Anti-Discrimination Law Review*, 4, November 2006.

45. Official Journal (1993) 'Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part.' *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 348, 31 December 1993.

46. Official Journal (1997) 'Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Related Treaties.' *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 340, 10 November 1997.

47. Olsen, J. P. (2002) 'The Many Faces of Europeanization.' *ARENA Working Paper* WP 01/02.

48. OSCE (2009) *'Croatia: Hate Crimes, Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code.'* Legislationline, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. http://www.legislationline.org/topics/topic/4/country/37 (accessed on 15 June 2009).

49. Philpott, D. and Shah, T. S. (2006) 'Faith, Freedom, and Federation: the Role of Religious Ideas and Institutions in European Political Convergence.' In *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, eds. T. A. Byrnes and P. J. Katzenstein, pp. 34–64. New York: Cambridge University Press.

50. Ramet, S. P. (2002) *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic.* 4th ed. Boulder: Westview Press.

51. Ramet, S. P. (2006) 'Thy Will Be Done: the Catholic Church and Politics in Poland Since 1989.' In *Religion in an Expanding Europe,* eds. T. A. Byrnes and P. J. Katzenstein, pp. 117–147. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

52. Ramet, S. P. (2008) *Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia at Peace and at War, Selected Writings, 1983–2007*. Wien: LIT Verlag GmbH & Co. KG Wien.

53. Samardžija, V. (2006) 'EU Relations with Croatia in 2005.' *Mediterranean Politics Turkey-Balkans,* pp. 138–140.

54. Schimmelfennig, F. (2005) 'Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe.' *International Organization* 59, Fall 2005, pp. 827–860.

55. Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2005) 'Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe.' In *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, pp. 1–28. New York: Cornell University Press.

56. Schwellnus, G. (2005) 'The Adoption of Nondiscrimination and Minority Protection Rules in Romania, Hungary and Poland.' In *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, pp. 51–70. New York: Cornell University Press.

57. Siemienska, R. (2006) 'Poland: Citizens and Democratic Politics.' In *Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe*, eds. H. Klingemann, D. Fuchs and J. Zielonka, pp. 203–234. London and New York: Routledge.

58. Soberg, M. (2007) 'Croatia since 1989.' In *Democratic Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education & Media*, eds. S. P. Ramet and D. Matić, pp. 31–62. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

59. Spiegel (2007) Donald Tusk in Brussels: New Era for EU-Polish Relations. *Spiegel Online International,* 12. maj 2007. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,521499,00.html (accessed on 10 June 2009).

Culture of Career Development and Ranking and Selection of Military Officers

Nebojša Nikolić

The author is a member of the Strategic Research Institute, Belgrade

Abstract

Few years ago the Serbian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has launched a system for the ranking of military officers. That was called the Criteria for military service. The idea was to comprise a set of different capability estimates of military personnel and to make a ranking list of individuals. The trigger for this undertaking was a personnel reduction process, and the goal was to make an objective methodology for dismissing the people. From the institutional point of view, a ranking list is a very good thing –it makes possible to retain a good employee and to dismiss a bad one. From the individual point of view – it depends: it is bad if you are at the bottom of the list; it is good if you are at the top of the list. However, there are some additional benefits of ranking lists. Firstly, it gives information about the capabilities of human resources in an organization. The possibilities and limitations of an organization are in direct relation with the possibilities and limitations of its employees. Secondly, while the end of the list is of use for the personnel reduction process, the top of the list could and should be used for processes of appointments, promotions and selections for additional education and training. The defined criteria for military service are not perfect and could be analyzed, criticized and improved. But even in their existing form, the criteria set produces ranking results that show some inconsistencies with real personnel data. Why do anomalies happen? The answer could be identified as a result

of the organizational culture which characterizes a processes of ongoing career development in a military organization. The number and intensity of those anomalies deserve research attention.

Key words: *career, Military, ranking, decision making, culture.*

Introduction

The main hypothesis of the paper is as follows: inconsistencies in career development related to the ranking list of military officers could be explained as a consequence of a dominant culture in human resources management. Indicators for the hypothesis arise from the data analysis of ranking lists.

Besides the existence of relatively strong rules, procedures and criteria in various processes of human resources management (assignments, promotions, educational and training investments in particular individuals, etc.), some peculiar results could be registered. Then, the question arises: why do those anomalies happen? The logical answer could be that there are some additional criteria which are not given in advance or that are not officially declared as criteria. These fuzzy factors are rather elements of culture[1] then real criteria. However, the influence of this culture dominates over the officially defined and declared criteria and even the rule of law. Almost everybody could agree that it is better to have "good relations than good qualifications" , if you want prosperity in career development. For the sake of truth, this view characterizes a much broader population than only military officers. It is simply immanent to the whole Serbian society, and not only today, but at least in the last hundred years.

Possible Benefits of the Analysis

What could be of interest or potential benefit for the general public in a studying the problem of ranking and selecting of military officers? The percentage portion of military officers' population in the overall population is very small (about 0,1%). The military profession is very specific by way of its nature, comprising a set of sub-specializations with relatively narrow scopes of applicability. Also, any kind of "out of the wire" engagement (working, social, etc.) of military individuals is strictly limited by law. So, the

[1] Culture is seen as the behaviors, beliefs and customs characteristic for or dominant in a particular social, ethnic, organizational, professional or age group.

problem of ranking and selection of military officers seems important only to this small population and to their families.

However, there are many aspects of this problem. The population of military officers is a core part of human resources in defense sector. Almost every question of the defense sector reform includes, directly or indirectly, consideration of human resources. The organizational and human resource management mantra, "employees are our most important asset," is widely recognized, declared and paraphrased. The problem is how to put it into work in practice.

In a transitional environment, a defense reform usually includes personnel reduction, changes in the roles of the military and new demands on values, knowledge and equipment. Personnel reduction places a question about the selection procedure: who can stay in the military service, and who will be dismissed.

The spectrum of defense reform activities is wide and demanding. The success of a reform is directly proportional to the capabilities of main the managers at various levels of the military pyramid. Again, the problem of personnel selection appears in the processes of promotions and assignments for higher positions in the organization.

The defense sector reform, new security challenges and trends in international security environment place demands for new kinds of knowledge, expertise and qualifications of military men. This opens a broad set of questions related to the system of military education and training.

The problem of ranking and selection of military officers could be treated as a pure methodological question. How to define the criteria for the ranking and selection process and what methodological procedure to apply are some important questions which have to be answered in a consistent way. Operational research and decision theory as scientific disciplines could help in this task.

Finally, if we succeed in this and find a consistent way for multi-attribute ranking and selection of military officers, then the applied methodology could be used for other similar problems in public sector reforms, but also in other organizations and companies. The current global economic crisis forces many companies to reduce the number of employees. Local and state governments have the similar problem and similar orientation for action: personnel reduction.

Of course, personnel cuts could be executed in different ways. However, companies and organizations, particularly those that tend to present themselves as socially responsible, have to make

personnel reductions in an objective, nonbiased and transparent way. This is especially true for organizations in the public sector, which could not call for "the will or the decision of the private owner" as an excuse. On the other hand, ranking list should serve in processes of promotions and assignments of employees to higher positions in organizations in the public sector. This is possibly the only efficient way, besides that it is indirect, because usually there is no "market verification" of performances for organizations in the public sector.

Short History of Changes in Military Profession

In the last few years the traditional picture of military profession in Serbia as a "secure job, a viewable career, etc." has waned. Several personnel cuts have been undertaken in a short time period. Sometimes, the criterion was a "unit-organization termination" approach (when some unit or organizational department is terminated, than everybody in that unit lost their job). Sometimes, the principle of age was in charge (that is a case when everybody who is born before some specified year must go out of military service). A lucky circumstance in a second case was that it had been applied to more senior people who have at least minimal conditions to get some pensions.

The possibility to suddenly lose a job without any of their fault became reality from the perspective of a common employee. Except damaging the image and creating uncertainty for the individual employee, the organization itself lost a significant human resources capital. The main burden has been carried by the senior officer's population (particularly lieutenant-colonels and colonels). It was a kind of "culture shock", because the great majority of Serbian military officers have entered the service after graduation at military academy, and without thoughts about a "reserve career".

Up to now, our military has obtained some level of "transferable" skills through education, which could be useable for a civilian career. However, formal military qualifications are usually not recognized in the civil society. The military education system is currently trying to find its place as a part of the overall education system in the country. An additional challenge to this effort is the fact that all universities (civilian and military), which want to stay in the business, have to fulfill requirements defined by the EU

Bologna declaration. If it succeeds, this attempt could be an effective solution for the future, however the problem of personnel reduction is actual now and it desperately needs a solution.

In the past, nobody worried too much about the "compatibility" of military education with a civilian one, nor about a "career after (military) career". The military profession in Serbia used to be a "life calling". This organizational culture, as well as some other aspects like the poor offer of adequate opportunities on the job market, moral and formal obligations "to the country" (applications of former military officers for the jobs to the foreign companies and organizations were publicly condemned), and psychological reasons ("am I not good enough to hold my job?"), makes questions pointed out above very important and actual.

The exposed problem is taken as a starting point for the further analysis. Besides many aspects of the problem (social, financial, political, other categories of military personnel, etc.), the paper is focused on the questions: who must go, and who can stay in the service, and how to make this decision and which criteria to chose?

The next aspect of the problem is from the point of view of the "company" (the military organization): an organization that tends to be vital and successful will certainly try to keep its better personnel. Again, a similar question arise: who is a better officer, and according to what criteria?

Also, the military organization should take into account the long-term influence of the current decision. The defined "dismissing" criteria will be a clear message for processing of personnel matters, for future applicants for military officers, for the military education system and for the current and future image of the military organization. At least because of these reasons, personnel reduction is qualified as a hard task and the most sensitive and crucial part of the whole military reform according to many defense officials.

The Military and Other Professions and Occupations: Are We Alone in This Today?

Personnel reduction and huge changes related on professional career are widely spread phenomena. Many professions suffer of the same problems: unsecure job, unsecure career develop-

ment, transitions in careers, need for life-long learning, need for re-education, self-responsibility for own career, etc. Reitman and Schneer showed that very well in their comprehensive article (Reitman and Schneer, 2008: 17-28). It seems that the military profession could not be an exception in the future.

Is the military profession of the same kind as any other profession? Is it just a job, like any other job or occupation? What is the difference? How to explain the potential difference? The traditional view suggests that the military profession is very specific compared with other professions and particularly with other kinds of occupations and jobs. It is rather a life calling then only a profession, and definitely it is not a job or an occupation. The ethic context of the military profession as a life calling could be well described in only few words: "Duty, Honor, Country" – the famous motto of the West Point Military Academy in the USA. It takes a lot of time to make a military officer in the real meaning of that word, and there are many books about the military profession and its "differentia specifica" in relation to other professions. Character and spirit, as well as loyalty, particularly the one immanent to soldiers, could not be contracted and taken to the labor market in a day. Those things have to be built, developed and sustained in a long-term process. In the case of the military profession, switching from one to the other perception of working engagement (life calling – profession – occupation or job) is simply not possible. The character is one of the main reasons for that.

The dynamic and challenging nature of the military profession could be recognized as a continual learning process. An officer learns: for new appointments, about a new garrison (region, country, culture, etc.), about new technologies and equipment, about new procedures (organizational changes, new FM, etc.); new languages, at different courses, postgraduate studies, etc., about people (subordinates, superiors and colleagues). So much learning increases the levels of education and skills of an officer. For readers to whom this could sound a little odd in the case of the military profession, I would recommend a well-written essay (Wither, 2006) where this phenomenon is pointed out.

This learning dynamic could be recognized through the description of a typical military career. A young officer usually starts as platoon commander. After a few years he reaches company commander position. Then, he goes through positions at battalion level (staff duties, deputy and battalion commander).

The next level are brigade staff positions (there is a set of various duties related to it: personnel management, intelligence, operations, training, logistics, etc.). In small armies, the next level is duties in the general staff. Besides vertical progress in the career path, there is a possibility for horizontal movement. Every new duty is more or less different from the previous one. Thus an officer has to learn new things every time he changes his assignment.

The Military Ranks Pyramid

The "ranks pyramid" presents the logical dispersion and the relations among military ranks in an army seen as a hierarchically organization. At the bottom of the pyramid there are a lot of low ranking officers (for example lieutenants). In the middle of the pyramid are majors, whose number is lower than the number of low ranking officers. At the top are, of course, high ranks (generals), and their number is small. A similar shape of employee's dispersion could be found in many other hierarchical organizations and companies.

However, the problem appears when some deformations of a typical hierarchical organizational structure become massive. When the number of senior ranks (colonels and lieutenant-colonels) which are logically near the top of the pyramid, becomes disproportionally large in relation to other ranks then the normal shape of the "ranks pyramid" gets some distortion. In the extreme case, to underline this strange phenomenon, that shape is called "inverse pyramid of ranks". Table 1 presents the state of the art of the pyramids of ranks in 2006 in Serbia, and some NATO recommendations for easier comparison.

**Table 1. Ranks ratios, 2006, Serbia's state-of the art;
NATO-recommendations.**

2006	Serbia	NATO
Generals	0.30	0.60
Colonels	14.50	1.70
Lieutenant-colonels	24.40	8.30
Majors	13.10	19.80
Lieutenants, Captains	47.70	69.60
sum	100.00 %	100.00 %

This situation has become much better today, especially in the army units under General-staff, and to a less extent in organizations inside MoD where reorganization is announced for 2009.

The Spectra of Military Jobs

The typical perception of an officer career assumes a set of different appointments: from the starting positions of young officers (like the platoon commander duty) up to the highest ranks and positions. Through a long period of time, accumulation of professional experience appears as a logical product and precondition for higher appointments. However, that is not the only condition, another and maybe an even more important one is additional education and training (a kind of postgraduate military studies).

Surfing from one to another appointment is practically a change of a job. Sometimes, the duty change happens in the same unit or garrison, sometimes in a different unit and garrison and with more of less different people (colleagues, subordinates, superiors). In all cases the change of a duty assumes different obligations and working schedule, which actually means constant learning. Here follows a list of general duties or kinds of internal jobs for a military officer:

- **Command duties** (unit commander: platoon, company, battalion, brigade, etc.).
- **Staff duties.** The areas of responsibility in the typical military organization assume the following: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics doctrine and development, communications and computers, training and civil-military relations.
- **Managerial and administrative duties:** various appointments in a Ministry of Defense mainly.
- **Educational and training jobs.** Positions of instructors, lecturers, assistants and professors at military academies, training centers, etc.
- **Research jobs.** Positions in institutes of various kinds (technical, military art and strategy, etc.) which belong to the Ministry of Defense.

In cases of command and staff duties it is possible to keep a suitable shape of the ranking pyramid. However, that is not so easy for cases of managerial, educational and research duties. The logical precondition for these duties is relevant experience. And that

takes years on different command and staff duties in early years of military career. As a consequence we have a natural aggregation of senior rank officers in managerial, educational and research institutions in the MoD.

The new wave of international defense cooperation and integrations has produced a set of new demands for military professionals. First of them is foreign language proficiency. Knowledge of foreign language becomes logical and unavoidable precondition for many officers, particularly those who want and expects something more in theirs careers.

Another modern requirement presents the need for familiarity of an officer with portions of knowledge related to the questions of interoperability and standardization in the fields of defense integrations and cooperations. Besides this, there is a need to be professionally updated and well-informed about all relevant trends, challenges and novelties in the defense branch.

Downsizing as a Part of Defense Transformation

Downsizing of armed forces is an actual and challenging trend today, and this is widely recognized. De Wijk wrote: "Force restructuring encompasses force reduction, transition, modernization and transformation of armed forces; each factor has important financial, organizational and doctrinal consequences. It is ongoing process and an enormous challenge for small countries. Difficult choices must be made. Priorities must be set" (De Wijk, 2004: 115-146).

There are many reasons which have caused downsizing processes in many countries. "Peace dividend" (not only after the Cold war, but also after regional conflicts), is one of those reasons particularly actual in last two decades; it simply says the more the peace, the less the military. "Revolution in military affairs" is also a very strong reason; here, downsizing of the armed forces appears as a consequence of transformation and huge changes in a way of dealing with military business. Modernization: new equipment, new weapon system, etc., usually implies a lower number of crew, a smaller number of units, etc. Social and political changes can also produce a downsizing of the military; such case is the canceling of the conscript system and transition to a professional army.

There are more factors that contribute to the actual process of downsizing in Serbian armed forces. Some of these reasons are:

- Great changes in the security environment: peace has come to the region.
- Almost all countries in the region direct their security and defense policy towards Euro-Atlantic integrations, partnership, or at least standards.
- Revolution in military affairs produces the rethinking of massive mobilization armies, in favor of smaller but more efficient armed forces.
- Adapting to international standards and agreements related to the level of defense spending, manning and armament, etc. (a prescribed percentage portion of GDP for the defense budget; a prescribed percentage part of population for armed forces; limited number of main weaponry (aircraft, tanks, etc.).
- Social changes produce a redirection from conscripts to the professional manning of the armies.
- The democratic style in public policy life and behavior becomes dominant.

Additionally, the new approach in dealing with national strategy and security sector reform contributes to this business becoming more transparent (wherever it is possible) and consistent in the sense that "what is said that should be done". Rhodes mentions phenomenon of that kind as "the disciplining effect of 'putting it in writing' pushed the top leadership of a country or ministry to clarify key assumptions, priorities, and trade-offs concerning their objectives and the measures to achieve them" (Rhodes, 2007). This novelty makes that this phase of downsizing becomes known to the military public (people need to be informed), and probably it creates and declares the Criteria set (people can see what they can expect and what performance measures are important to the employer).

The downsizing of armed forces is a legitimate process. Decision-making stakeholders on defense matters are mandated to undertake this activity. The reasons for downsizing could be different (political decision, lack of financial resources, change of strategical environment, new military doctrine, technical modernization, etc.) however, they are not subject of this analysis.

Downsizing as a Management Problem

The downsizing of military professionals have triggered a decision making problem, which is: who to dismiss from the military service? In order to make this in an objective and neutral way,

some criteria were defined and declared. However, in view of many people, those criteria didn't fulfill their mission.

This "dismissing problem" could be put in a different view: how to determine the better people and hold them in service? It is obvious that these two questions are complementary to each other. The first question has a passive tone: because of some external pressure hard decisions have to be made, and the question is how.

The second question sounds more active, and implies the existence of some vision and perception of the current and future requirements related to the profile of the 21st century military officer. But having this perception it is logical to have a vision of a wider picture of the whole military and a comprehensive understanding of national and defense strategy issues, knowledge on modern trends in military affairs, new technologies and modern warfare.

From the organizational point of view, employees present a human capital. The situation when there is a sufficiency in human capital is a kind of a "luxury". A wrong decision could lead to a larger loss of valuable human capital. Also, poor decision making could damage the image of the organization, show lack of wisdom and irrational management. Considering future recruitments, all of this will have a negative impact: an employer with a lack of responsibility towards his employees could not expect a response of good candidates.

There are opposite opinions among experts in human resource management on the problem of measuring performances of people. Some of them are skeptical about how successful and ethical that could be. Here, we agree that it is at least an uncomfortable task. However, at the same time there is no better solution.

Additionally, in this context the unique difference between an army on one hand, and organizations of other types and private companies on the other hand, makes it a simple fact that there is no "market verification" of an army. The military can really verify its quality if and only if it really works. However, such situation calls for a war! And almost every war is unique and non-repeatable. In the best case, when you realize the real quality of the military than is usually too late to change or improve something. Because of the uniqueness of a war, there are possibilities for weak and biased estimations of the military work quality level.

When trying to define a set of measures or criteria how to make a distinction among employees, a logical question arises about the description and characteristics of those measures or criteria.

Andrew Mayo has named the following characteristics that any performance measure should have in order to be useful and effective (Mayo, 2001):
- Simple (easy to understand).
- Clear (not of twofold meaning or interpretation).
- Available (easy to be collected).
- Reliable (confident measurement process).
- Unbiased (not the result of one person's judgment).
- Relevant (connected-related-placed-important to the context of the workplace).
- Comprehensive (comprise all key outputs).
- Adequate resolution (right level of details).
- Clear origin (related to a specific person).
- Comparable (of right frequency).

The second approach in criteria definitions is related to Decision making theory, which underlines the crucial importance of criteria and their characteristics. A criteria set should be, according to Keeney and Raiffa, who are two prominent professors in this theory, as follows (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976):
- Complete (Comprehensive).
- Operational (Simple, Clear, Available).
- Decomposable (Adequate resolution)
- Non-redundant.
- Minimal.

The third approach to the problem of criteria definition could be extracted from the analyses of possibilities for "Measuring Transformation Progress and Value", a chapter in David Albert's book (Alberts, 2003). The book is dedicated to the transformation of the military in the 21st century, and as such is in very close relation with our subject of study. The author underlines "Agility" as a crucial feature of military organizations and individuals for the Information age and the future which are both characterized by uncertainty. But what is "Agility"? Instead of retelling, here follows the original view of the author: "Agility is a property of an individual or organization that has synergistic combination of the following attributes: robustness, flexibility, innovativeness, adaptiveness, and responsiveness." (Alberts, 2003)

Particularly interesting in this definition, is the phrase *synergistic combination*. The root of the phrase is the word *synergism*. *Synergism* by itself presents a situation when the appropriate combination of more elements produce such result which is bigger, stronger or better then the simple sum of the separate values, util-

ities or influences of those same elements taken alone and without inter-reactions.

The synergetic effect sounds very adequate indeed. However, the question is how to present and calculate the synergism, particularly in the context of our general problem: measuring, presenting, and comparing the comprehensive qualities of individual military officers? As a possible answer to this question, or at least a proposal, there is a conference paper on this of the author (Nikolic, 2007: 731-734).

Critical Analysis of Ranking Criteria

The Criteria for professional military service were declared and published in May 2006 (Serbian MoD, 2006). Those criteria are:

1. Qualification level (maximum 24 points),
2. Service grade - official evaluation (maximum 10 points),
3. Military or civilian education (0 or 5 points),
4. Age (maximum 7.5 points),
5. Actual duty and removals (maximum 5 points),
6. Foreign language (maximum 2 points),
7. Time spent on command or managerial job positions (not considered currently).

Many objections to the Criteria appeared after the declaration. That is not strange because the evaluation of the criteria is probably the most important and challenging task in the decision analysis (Cupic and Tummala, 1991). "The decision theory should be a science of scaling based on mathematics, philosophy and psychology. ... Perhaps the most creative task in making a decision is to chose the factors that are important for that decision" (Saaty, 1990: 9-26). This sentence fits adequately with the main problem in the personnel reduction process.

The practical application of the ranking list, as well as the additional subtask (the application of the ranking list for officer's appointments and promotions) still waits for its realization.

The first criterion is "divided" into three sub-criteria:
- Success at the Military Academy or at a civilian faculty (Grade Point Average[2], GPA): minimum 5 points (GPA: 6.00); maximum 8 points (GPA: above 8.50).

[2] The Grade Point Average (GPA) is the average value of final marks for all subjects (exams) that the student-cadet performed at the Military Academy. The lowest positive value is 6,00 (poor), and the highest value is 10,00 (the best, excellent).

- Success at first level of postgraduate studies: Command-Staff Academy (CSA), specialization, or Master studies; minimum 12, maximum 18 points. However, in this case that is the sum of points without calculating the success at the Military Academy.

- Success at the second postgraduate level: General-Staff Academy (GSA) or PhD: minimum 21, maximum 24 points. Again, that is the sum of points without calculating the success at the Military Academy and at the first level of postgraduate studies.

The point is that information about success/un-success on lower level is not visible if one has finished some higher level of education. So, this criterion gives only the last "picture" of your success, and not a cumulative one. This is not logical. The GPA from basic studies at Military Academy or civilian faculty offers important, objective and comprehensive information and should be presented separately, with higher level of significance (more points in the scale used), and with greater distinction between poor success (from GPA 6.00) and excellent success (GPA up to 10.00). If GPA valorization in the ranking process would stay at this low level, then a serious question could be declared: what is the purpose of grading in the whole education process (Nikolic, 2006: 240-243)? Also, the principle of "non-accumulation" used in this criterion is not used in considering the second criterion: the "official evaluation -service grade".

It is evidently a strong preference of postgraduate studies. It is a good orientation generally. However, there is a danger that good officers could be lost, simply because they did not get opportunity to attend postgraduate studies. This phenomenon exists in other armies too (Clemmesen, 2001: 7-11) , and similarly is described: "They are in their late 30s or 40s, are senior majors, lieutenant-colonels or colonels. They have learnt – or taught themselves – to work in the English language. ... However, they have typically been in the same position for a long time, as there was nobody to replace them. They have not been candidates for advanced education in the supporting states, because they could not be replaced, and because they might be considered too old to play any significant role in the future" (Clemmesen, 2001: 8).

The second criterion presents the average value of all "official evaluations - service grades" in the officer's entire career. These grades are given to an officer by his superior officer, according to his impression and perception of the evaluated officer, in some

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

period (usually it is 4 years). It is clear that this is an almost completely subjective estimation. Spanning the whole career, the average value of all service grades include the grades given according to old regulations (a change was made with new regulations in 1994 (Official Military Gazette, 1994)). The old regulations contain elements for grading based on "political (read communist) activity." Without further comments on this aspect of the old grades it should be clear. This circumstance is of particular importance for the most critical population of officers: lieutenant-colonels and colonels, because all of them have service grades from before 1994, and at the same time from this group will come the majority of discharged people. As a matter of fact, the previously mentioned principle of "non-accumulation" should be used here, and not in the case of the first criterion.

Also, there are two additional observations. First, too much importance is given to the service grades (maximum 10 points), especially when compared to the GPA from the Military Academy (maximum 8 points): behind the GPA, there are 50 to 100 professors and exams with clear testing and transparency, but behind the average service grade there are only a few people with their subjective impressions and without transparency. Second, the scale for transformation of service grades to points is arbitrary, confused and it is not linear (there is no rule, the same increment on the grade scale fits various increments on the points scale: 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1). It could be concluded that it was the intention to make a big difference (in points) among the numerous very similar and very close service grades. If so, then it is one proof more against the preference of service grades: those are not objective and not exact, or all the officers are very similar to each other, or the whole service grading system is not effective enough.

The third criterion considers a question of if an officer finished the Military Academy (5 points) or a civilian faculty (0 points). This logic contains at least three inconsistencies. First, it goes the opposite to the current trends to incorporate military academies to civilian university (and the Bologna process). Second, it goes opposite to the projected future of obtaining officers from the civilian faculties. And third, it potentially prefers officers with lower official grades and/or GPA but with a Military Academy background.

The forth criterion presents an arbitrary relation established among the age of an officer, his military rank and his time in military service. In summary, this criterion strongly prefers those officers who have "high-speed" careers. It practically eliminates oth-

ers with ordinary promotions (there some negative points are used: up to minus 27 points!). Elementary logic says that one can have "high-speed" career only if he earns that by extraordinary and undoubted contribution to the military organization (but this is very hard to objectively measure, particularly in peace). But such things should be incorporated in the service grade (the second criterion), and/or a better post (next criterion: actual duty) in the organization. Therefore, this criterion is redundant, apart from that it is very prioritized (a lot of points).

The fifth criterion tries to measure the relative importance of actual duty and removals from one to another garrison during the military career of an officer. In spite of the small number of points associated to a removal, this criterion is questionable: it can be redundant in the case when an officer accepts a higher post but in another garrison, and it could be of wrong or even reverse usefulness if an officer "earns " removal because of his poor results in the actual garrison. This criterion should be incorporated in the seventh criterion which deals with the number and kind of all jobs that an officer has done in his career.

The sixth criterion tends to presents knowledge of foreign languages. The importance of this criterion is on the lowest level (1 point for a language, without any details), but with a projection to be more important after two years. Almost half of that period has passed, but still there is no equal opportunity for all officers to learn foreign languages (mainly English). The importance of this criterion is clear and actual. One of the best ways, in the sense of objectively measuring, could be taking into account marks in foreign language from the Military Academy. Also, it is clear that all officers cannot go to language courses abroad, but a logical, simple and useful rule could be established: "if you spend 3 months (or even a year) abroad, then you earn at least STANAG 3333 (or STANAG 4444), if not, than you get some negative points for this criteria". The point of this judgment is to try to obtain some equality among the three categories: very lucky officers chosen for education abroad, lucky officers at the language courses in the country, and the majority whose jobs (or superiors) do not allow them to travel and improve their language (and other) skills and status.

The seventh criterion presents the time (and probably the number) of various command or managerial job positions. This criterion is delayed for future because of the lack of administrative capabilities for processing the related data. This is one of the most important criteria, which contains information about professional

background and experience. The real value of service grades arise only connected with this criterion. Roughly speaking, it is much better to have an officer with a lot of various duties and with a very good service grades, than one with only a few kinds of jobs in his CV, even if he has excellent grades.

Analysis of Ranking Results

In addition to critique of the criteria, a short case study analysis follows. This is based on analysis of a part of a real ranking list (sample) for one category of officer's population. The data, presented in Table 2, are published in the Serbian military journal "Defense" (15 April 2006, page 23), but without names and units. This ranking list was created according to the Criteria.

A good start of a detailed analysis of this sample ranking list could be to consider the top of the list. The officer who is on the first place of the list has 0 (zero, null, nothing) points for criterion "foreign language"! He has very high service grade (4,83) and very high success at CSA (9,61). How is this situation even possible?! Foreign language is mandatory subject at Military Academy and also at CSA (Command-Staff Academy). He finished those schools but there is no evidence of knowledge of any foreign language. How can he get an excellent average grade at CSA without a good mark in foreign language? Sending him to CSA means that he had the potential to be senior military officer, as he now actually is, but how is it possible without knowledge of foreign language?

The first comment on a sample ranking list is the critique of the preference of military education (Military Academy) over civilian education (civilian faculties). Suppose that a major under number 20 of the sample list (who has in sum 30 points and an extraordinary service grade of 4, 83 - which is one of three best service grades!), would not have finished Military Academy, but a civilian faculty. In that case he would have five points less than he does. So, in summary it would be 25 points, however, on the ranking list he would fall from the 20th position even below the 34th position which is the end of this sample.

The same conclusion is valid for a major in a 9th position, who would fall to the 25th position. So, in both hypothetical cases (civilian instead of military education) there is no benefit or safe heaven even in a case of extraordinary service grades.

Table 2. Sample of ranking list for infantry majors.

	Age		YoW		Q		OE/SG		Duty	NoG	FL	C/M	Sum
	1		*2*		*3*		*4*		*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*
1.	36	5	19	0	CSA 9,61	18	4,83	10	2	0,5	0	5	40,5
2.	36	5	18	0	CSA 7,89	17	4,32	7	2	3	1	5	40,00
3.	37	3,75	17	0	CSA 8,61	18	4,51	9	2	0,5	1	5	39,25
4.	38	2,5	20	0	CSA 9,0	18	4,62	9	2	0,5	2	5	39,00
5.	38	2,5	17	0	CSA 9,06	18	4,75	9	2	0,5	1	5	38,00
6.	38	2,5	19	0	CSA 9,11	18	4,47	7	2	0	1	5	35,50
7.	34	7,5	15	0	MA 9,03	8	4,60	9	2	1	2	5	34,50
8.	36	5	18	0	Spec.	12	4,62	9	2	0	1	5	34,00
9.	34	7,5	16	0	MA 8,22	7	4,76	10	2	1	1	5	33,50
10.	37	3,75	18	0	Spec.	12	4,42	7	2	2,5	1	5	33,25
11.	34	7,5	16	0	MA 7,6	7	4,6	9	2	1,5	1	5	33,00
12.	34	7,5	14	0	MA 7,19	6	4,74	9	2	2	1	5	32,50
13.	36	5	19	0	MA 8,77	8	4,53	9	2	1,5	1	5	31,50
14.	39	1,25	21	0	Spec.	12	4,27	7	2	3	1	5	31,25
15.	38	2,5	17	0	CSA 7,94	17	3,59	2	2	1,5	1	5	31,00
16.	38	2,5	25	0	Spec.	12	4,43	7	2	1,5	1	5	31,00
17.	35	6,25	17	0	MA 8,47	7	4,61	9	2	0,5	1	5	30,75
18.	37	3,75	19	0	Spec.	12	4,33	7	0	0,5	2	5	30,25
19.	36	5	16	0	MA 8,29	7	4,70	9	2	0	2	5	30,00
20.	36	5	18	0	MA 7,26	6	4,83	10	2	1	1	5	30,00
21.	39	1,25	23	0	Master Sc.	18	3,38	1	2	1,5	1	5	29,75
22.	36	5	17	0	MA 8,89	8	4,46	7	2	1,5	1	5	29,50
23.	35	6,25	15	0	MA 7,84	7	4,47	7	2	0	2	5	29,25
24.	37	3,75	18	0	MA 7,5	6	4,58	9	2	1,5	2	5	29,25
25.	36	5	16	0	MA 7,82	7	4,26	7	2	1,5	1	5	28,50
26.	36	5	19	0	MA 6,0	5	4,51	9	2	1,5	1	5	28,50
27.	37	3,75	22	0	MA 8,0	7	4,50	7	2	1,5	2	5	28,25
28.	35	6,25	17	0	MA 7,4	6	4,40	7	2	1	1	5	28,25
29.	36	3,75	17	0	MA 8,87	8	4,50	7	0	1	2	5	28,00
30.	37	6,25	18	0	MA 7,81	7	4,44	7	2	1	2	5	27,75
31.	35	3,75	17	0	MA 7,0	6	4,39	7	2	0,5	1	5	27,75
32.	37	3,75	23	0	MA 7,84	7	4,36	7	2	1,5	1	5	27,25
33.	37	3,75	19	0	MA 8,46	7	4,45	7	2	1,5	1	5	27,25
34.	38	2,5	20	0	MA 7,23	6	4,70	9	2	1,5	1	5	27,00

The second comment to this list is related to the underestimated GPA (grade point average) as a measure of success at the Military Academy. The major in position 7 of the list has excellent GPA: 9,03 and in sum 34,5 points. If he would have the poorest possible GPA at the Military Academy (which is 6.00), than he would have only 3 points less and it would not put him to a much lower position: he would be on the 13th position of the list. However, the difference between GPA 6.00 (poor mark) and 9.03 (excellent) is tremendous! In the case of excellent students it is hard to find what they do not know, but in the case of poor students it is a vice versa.

The third comment underlines two obvious cases of non-consistency of human resources management. The first case is a non-consistent selection of officers for post-graduate military education (which becomes today a filter for higher officers' ranks). In constellation with the declared criteria (and common sense, too) and data for a major in the 15th position on the list, a simple question arises:

- How it is possible that an officer with a service grade of only 3.59 (which is one of the two worst service grades in this sample!) attends postgraduate military studies? It is worth to repeat that the service grade is cumulative data, which means that this man is very poor in his whole career!

In this sample rank list there are 7 (seven) officers with CSA. However, 4 (four) of them have smaller service grades than 10 (ten) other officers without CSA on the list! This situation should not exist, but this is a fact!

A similar conclusion is valid in the case of the specialization, as one of the easiest ways to finish postgraduate studies and get a title. In this sample rank list there are 5 (five) officers with specialization. However, even 4 (four) of them have smaller service grades than 18 (eighteen) other officers without CSA on the list!

The second case of non-consistency is similar to the previous one. The major who is a Master of Science in the 21st position has the worst service grade in this sample: only 3.38! As we have no additional information about this case, all logically possible scenarios will be considered:

- The first scenario: situation like in the previous example – in spite of poor service grade this officer has been sent to a military Master of Science studies.
- The second scenario: this officer has finished his MSc studies at a civilian faculty (that is legitimate and acceptable), but the military organization was the one that paid the bill (that is not logical, because an investment in a poor employee is a poor investment).
- The third scenario: similar as the second one, but without any paying by a military organization. However, one important question arises here: a finished MSc study allows for a conclusion that this officer is smart and capable to carry out complex tasks. But this conclusion is antagonistic with his service grade. Does his poor service grade present his real service work and behavior, or does his superior not like him too much?

In general, strong preference of a service grade against GPA is completely opposite to the law provisions related to the context of selection of candidates for military post-graduate studies (Official Military Gazette, No.05/95, article 16). There it is said that the GPA is three times more important than the service grade! Actually, this relation was softened a few years later and in 2000, the relation was set to (and it is still is valid) 3 pieces for GPA, 2 pieces for service grade (Official Military Gazette, No.12/00). That means that even after the correction the preference is strongly (with 50 % more) on the side of GPA! This fact was definitely forgotten in the ranking Criteria building process.

From the standpoint of the decision theory related to desirable properties (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) of a set of attributes (complete, operational, decomposable, non-redundancy, and minimum size), it could be summarized that the main objection is that there is a strong redundancy among all criteria except the third and part of the first criterion (GPA from the Military Academy). This redundancy can be identified as "influence of a superior officer", which means that an officer could not attend postgraduate studies (particularly CSA and GSA) without the official approval of his superior officer; service grade is clearly the domain of the superior officer; promotion to higher rank, as well as posting to a better post/job could not be done without the consent of the superior officer; sending to language (and all other) courses could not be done without the permission of the superior officer; and so on.

Conclusion

From time to time, many large organizations and companies are faced with a need to make a large personnel reduction campaign. In transitional countries this problem is very actual for many public sectors. This paper presented the situation in the defense sector with short analysis limited on the officers' population. The main purpose of the analysis is to give a critical view on the current set of criteria, with concrete proposals on what should be changed or improved.

However, the application of the ranking list in the processes of human resource management (above all, appointments to higher posts and duties, as well as promotions to higher ranks), if it will ever be applied in a positive sense ("the best people to the best positions"), it would make a tremendous change with both short- and long-term positive implications.

Future research could be directed to the next logical step: finding the appropriate method for the ranking and selecting of personnel in hierarchical organizations. The author believes that this approach can be useful for human resource management in other large organizations, particularly those which are in public or governmental service.

The ranks pyramid implies a selection process which produces a consequence that many officers will not stay forever in the military service. Military organizations, as socially responsible stakeholders, have to participate in officers' preparation for their second career. And the precondition for "career after career" is that qualifications earned in military educational system are accepted and recognized in the civil society. To achieve that, the system of military education has to be changed, improved and above all recognized and accepted in the society. The only way for the validation and verification of military education is formal accreditation according to the rules valid in the whole society. This is a time-consuming process but it has to be done. Only then future military officers will have credible diplomas with which they could have a "career after the military career", and potential future personnel reductions and career transitions will be much easier than they are today.

References:

1. 'Criteria for professional military service.' Special appendix of journal *Defense*, Serbian MoD, 16, May 15, 2006.

2. 'Regulation on grading of military personnel.' *Official Military Gazette*, 14, April 1994.

3. Alberts, D. (2003) *Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st Century Military* [online]. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, Command and Control Research Program. Available from: http://www.dodc-crp.org/files/Alberts_IAT.pdf (accessed 18 July 2008).

4. Clemmesen, M. H. (2001) 'The Colonel's Course – a Shortcut to Defence Development.' *Baltic Defence Review*, 5, pp. 7–11.

5. Cupic M. and Tummala R. (1991) *Modern decision making – methods and applications*. Belgrade: Naucna knjiga.

6. Keeney, R. and Raiffa, H. (1976) *Decisions with multiple objectives: Preferences and tradeoffs*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

7. Mayo, A. (2001) *The Human Value of the Enterprise*. London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing.

8. Nikolic, N. (2006) 'Purpose of grading in education and training in defense branch', Proceedings of *Education and training in defense system –Euro Atlantic aspect* conference (SIOMO-2006), Belgrade, November 29–30, 2006, pp. 240–243.

9. Nikolic, N. (2007) 'Multiplicative Utility Function in Ranking Processes for Human Resource Reduction', *XXXIV Symposium on Operations Research* (SYMOPIS), Zlatibor, Serbia, pp. 731–734.

10. Reitman, F. and Schneer, J. A. (2008) 'Enabling the new careers of the 21st century.' *Organization Management Journal,* 5, pp. 17–28.

11. Rhodes, M. (2007) 'National Strategy and Security Sector Reform in Southeast Europe.' In *Security Sector Reform in South East Europe – from a Necessary Remedy to a Global Concept*, Study Group on Regional Stability in Southeast Europe of the Partnership for Peace Consortium.

12. Saaty, T. L. (1990) 'How to make a decision: The analytic hierarchy process.' *European Journal of Operational Research*, 48 (1), pp. 9–26.

13. Wijk, R. (2004) 'The implication for Force Transformation: The Small Country Perspective.' In *Transatlantic transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century*, ed. Daniel S. Hamilton, pp. 115–146. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations.

14. Wither, J. (2006) 'What is an 'Educated Officer' in the Early 21st Century', invited talk, *Education and training in defense system –Euro Atlantic aspect* conference (SIOMO-2006), Belgrade, November 29–30, (2006).

America, the EU and Strategic Culture – Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain

Vuk Vuksanović

The author is the intern at the Centre for Civil- Military Relations

Toje, A. (2008) *America, the EU and Strategic Culture – Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain.* London and New York: Routledge.

Book Review

In the recent period, quite a large number of books, by American authors, addressed, either completely or to a certain extent, the issue of transatlantic relations or, more precisely, relations between EU and USA. Probably the best example is the international bestseller made by neoconservative scholar, Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America Vs. Europe in the New World Order*. However, what we now have in front of us is a book by an author not coming from the United States but rather from Europe. Asle Toye, who got his Ph.D. degree at Cambridge, approaches the issue of the relationship between Euro Atlantic allies from the perspective of the concept of strategic culture. Strategy is most often perceived in military context, being defined as: the employment of battles to gain the end of war (Klauzevic, 1951: 141). Contrary to this, Toye presents to us a concept of strategic culture, starting from the inseparable connection between the way we conceptualise and apply the strategy and the cultural values and patterns adopted by man or society (Toje, 2008). The author's analysis focuses on the impact that US had in shaping the EU security policy, techniques used by US to influence EU, and the very process of creating the EU strategic culture.

This study would not have been complete had it not addressed key events which, according to the author, had decisively influenced creation of the EU strategic culture, namely NATO 1999 intervention in Kosovo, EU and NATO enlargement in the period 1998–2004, and, finally, Bush Administration's decision on the Iraq war in 2003.

The title of Chapter 1 of the book is "Understanding the transatlantic bargain". In this Chapter the author points out the consistency of American support for NATO as a crucial security architecture institution in Europe. Even more importantly, the author examines the question of the extent to which European Union can be considered a strategic actor, or an actor in international relations in general, by taking the example of EU to analyse the difference between power and influence, the concept of strategic culture and the authors who promoted that concept, ending the analysis by the overviews of different approaches to EU strategic culture.

In Chapter 2, entitled "Transatlantic bargain", Toye compares intra-European bargain (between the states within Europe) and Euro-American bargain, providing a quite extensive historical overview of the latter, particularly in the course of the Cold War, only to have the focus of the analysis subsequently shifted to the security in post-bipolar Europe. On this occasion, the reader is presented the highlights of the period, the most significant among them being the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 introducing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the establishment of European Defence and Security Policy (EDSP) within the CFSP, and the French-British summit in Saint Malo in 1998. But this is not where Asle Toye ended this Chapter; he went on to offer an insight into the overturn that Clinton Administration made with regard to their relations with European allies, or, as Kagan said: "Today many Europeans view the Clinton years as a time of transatlantic harmony, but it was during those years that Europeans begun complaining about American power and arrogance in the post-Cold War world" (Kejgan, 2003: 62).

Chapter 3, "The Kosovo war" addresses the first event which triggered the creation of European strategic culture, Kosovo crisis and decision of NATO, led by USA, to instigate military campaign against FRY. Toye informs us that the first differences in opinion arose with regard to the stance that should be taken on Belgrade. In this regard, Brussels endeavoured to influence Belgrade through diplomatic persuasion and economic sanctions, whereas Washington was from the very start getting ready for possible use of military force, believing that atrocities of Bosnia and Herzegovina would recur otherwise. The role of EU, as we can see from this book, was reduced to the political support offset, which was missing in the Russian and Chinese case. This Chapter is crucial considering that it explains to us the range of differences that

appeared between the European states, and, what is even more important, between America and Europe. An interesting example to illustrate this is the unwillingness of Clinton Administration to employ ground forces, despite being pressed to do so by its closest ally, Great Britain. In Kagan's words: "A greater American propensity to use military force did not always mean a greater willingness to risk casualties (Kejgan, 2003: 33)." Chapter 3 informs us about some morals that Europeans learnt in Kosovo, as well as about their aspiration to play a stronger role in future, which is a topic of Chapter 4.

Chapter 4, "EU and NATO enlargement" addresses the issue of these two organisations' extension, primarily in the Central Europe. This enlargement was planned in the period 1989-1998 and was implemented between 1998 and 2004. The author joined the group of authors who analyse the enlargement of these two organisations jointly, rather than separately. The importance of these events in respect of the creation of EU strategic culture reflected by the fact that the enlargement opened up a question of what is the future of these two institutions and what is their institutional architecture. Even more important, however, is that here for the first time we saw strategic cooperation between two actors on an equal footing. Main difference compared with Kosovo is that, this time, USA did not have the same degree of influence on EU to which they were used to. The reasons for this should be sought in the fact that USA were not able to influence the decision-making process in EU institutions, and that EU was skilfully managing the enlargement process the character of which was not exclusively political. In this part of the book, the following questions are mentioned as being essential: Who will be the first to enlarge? What countries and when? How to distribute the economic burden imposed by the enlargement? Who will dominate in the European security architecture? The outcome of these processes was a stronger position of EU while NATO weakened, partly because new members joined in, partly because of bad blood caused by the US decision to shrink conventional troops in Europe and put the accent on building a missile shield, which further deepened the differences that were already there. Toye warned that, in enlarged NATO, the US primacy will be extending beyond its highest level during the Cold War, which would be particularly obvious during the war in Iraq, which is the topic of Chapter 6.

Chapter "The Iraqi crisis" examines the measure in which Bush Administration's decision to use armed forces to overthrow the

Saddam Husein's regime influenced the overall transatlantic relations. Toye opts for the position arguing that the war in Iraq has produced the fiercest crisis in the history of transatlantic or Euro Atlantic relations. Major feature of the author's analysis is the comparison between the US National Security Strategy of 2002 and European Security Strategy of 2003. Comparison between these two strategic documents comes down to the difference in these two actors' perception of the threats presented by "failed states" (in European interpretation) or "outcast states" in American interpretation, terrorism and proliferation of weapons for mass destruction. This comparison is not only about how the threats are perceived; it is also about how to respond to them. While Europeans insisted on multilateralism, Americans held that unilateralism provides best opportunity for further action. Unilateralism kept its presence in US foreign policy all the way to the end of Bush's second term of office. The spirit of American unilateralism is best illustrated by the statement of former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, who said that American response to the absence of international support for Iraq invasion was to punish France, ignore Germany, and forgive Russia (Bžezinski, 2009: 91). Second major difference is the difference in perception of the concept of prevention. US National Security Strategy of 2002 introduced the imperative of preventive and pre-emptive action against enemies of USA. It should be noted, however, that neither the doctrine of preventive and pre-emptive wars, nor unilateralism, is new to the American strategic thinking. On the contrary, together with unilateralism and hegemonism, they have been the predominant elements of American national security ever since 19th century and John Quincy Adams. The most concise overview of American Grand Strategy and its historical development was provided by John Lewis Gaddis in his book "Surprise, Security and American Experience". The problem was how to look at such actions from the perspective of international law and how to find 'fitting' grounds to, at least seemingly, justify the instigation of such action. Another essential difference is that, in European Strategy, prevention did not imply military means but was rather reduced to economic assistance, social reforms, and building of political institutions and civil society so as to pull out the "failed states" from the situation in which they are deemed to be suitable ground for terrorism, organised crime, ethnic conflicts and proliferation of weapons for mass destruction. It is now being proven that Iraq crisis had adversely affected the "intra-European

bargain", which the author corroborates with the statement of the Secretary of Defence of the time, Donald Rumsfeld, who distinguished between the "Old Europe" embodied by France and Germany, and the "New Europe", consisting of former Soviet Union's satellites which were ready to support American actions. It should be noted that the difference between "Old" and "New" Europe was not produced by Bush and neoconservative foreign policy, although Bush, Rumsfeld and Rice have further complicated these relations. In 1994 Henri Kissinger in his "Diplomacy" stressed the need of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe to, being afraid of awakened Russia and united Germany, seek salvation in NATO and US. Specifically, Kissinger said: "Aware that the two European giants (Russia and Germany) have historically either carved up their neighbours or fought battles on their territories, the countries located between them dread the emerging security vacuum; hence their intense desire for American protection – as expressed in NATO membership" (Kisindžer, 2008: 729). In the end, Toye deduces that, in the case of Iraq, Europe endorsed US goals but not of their methods.

Conclusive chapter is entitled "Towards the bipolar West" and discusses the process which can be considered to be a trend, but also a need. Today we are witnessing fundamental changes related to the establishment of multipolar order, while the other transformation concerns the change in distribution of, primarily economic, power from West to East. This is best confirmed by Zbigniew Brzezinski who said "The 500-year long global dominance of Atlantic powers – Portugal, Spain, France, Netherlands, Britain and, more recently, United States of America, is coming to an end with the new political and global pre-eminence of China and Japan (out of which the latter is second-largest economy in the world)" (Brzezinski, 2008). This transformation bolsters the need, on both sides of the Atlantic, to consolidate the transatlantic alliance. The author further says that this process is not only desirable but also unavoidable. The process of West bipolarisation as such started in the enlargement process which was discussed earlier. Toye says that this process is not produced by anti-Americanism or anti-Europeanism, but rather that it is a natural consequence of the fact that the Cold War ended a long time ago and that, in the absence of common threat such as presented by USSR, we cannot count on the same degree of unity. Further details of Toye's description of the role of NATO and EU in New Europe will not be presented here so as to leave room for the curious reader to discover them.

What can be said in the very end is that what we have here is a discerning analysis which will be a valuable reading matter for all those who are interested in the history of European integrations, European defence and security issues, the nature of relations between EU and USA which are now at the crossroads, but also for all those interested in how these issues will be resolved in future. All in all, this book can also be recommended to the experts in the field of international relations, international law, international security, and European integrations, but also to those coming from the fields of "practical" and "everyday" politics, namely political decision makers, activists of political parties, and any person asking the question about who is and who will be in charge of security in the 21st century Europe.

References:

1. Toje, A. (2008) *America, the EU and Strategic Culture – Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain*. London and New York: Routledge.

2. Brzezinski, Z. (2009) 'Major foreign policy challenges for the next US president.' *International Affairs*, 85, pp. 53–60.

3. Bžežinski, Z. (2009) *Druga šansa Amerike – Tri predsednika i kriza američke supersile*. Beograd: Službeni glasnik, Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerziteta u Beogradu.

4. Gedis, Dž. L. (2008) *Iznenađenje, bezbednost i iskustvo Amerike.* Beograd: Klub plus.

5. Kejgan, R. (2003) *O raju i moći – Amerika i Evropa u novom svetskom poretku.* Beograd: Čarobna knjiga.

6. Kisindžer, H. (2008) *Diplomatija*. Beograd: Klub plus.

7. Klauzevic, K. (1951) *O ratu.* Beograd: Vojno delo.

Instructions for the authors

Western Balkans Security Observer is a magazine established by the academic community of the Belgrade School of Security Studies. The papers that we publish in this magazine deal with regional security issues, but they also focus on national and global security problems. The editors especially encourage papers which question the security transformations from an interdisciplinary perspective and which combine different theoretical starting points. A special column is dedicated to reviews of the newest sources from the fields of security studies, political sciences, international relations and other related scientific disciplines.

When writing the papers, the following criteria must be observed:
- Desirable text length: from 1.500 to 3.000 words
- Font: Times New Roman, spacing: 1,5
- he article should include the following:
    1. Title page that contains the title of the paper, first and last name(s) of the author(s), name of the institution(s) where the author(s) is/are employed, occupation, address and telephone number for the purpose of possible contact. Below the title of the paper, first and last name of the author should be written (and optionally his/her title), name of the institution where the author is employed and its address. The summary should be up to 120 words long and in it the author should point out the most important hypothesis on which the paper is based. Below the summary, the author should specify 4-5 key words.
    2. The text should be prepared in accordance with the following technical instructions:
        2.1 Use the Harvard citation system. At the end of the citation write the last name of the author, year of publication and the page number in brackets. Example: (Pichel, 1994: 28).
        2.2 In the footnotes, write only the accompanying comments.
        2.3 Leave the original spelling of foreign names.
    3. All used sources should be cited in the paper and stated as Bibliography at the end of the text in the Harvard style and in accordance with the instructions given here:

http://library.leeds.ac.uk/info/200201/training/218/references_and_citations_explained/4

- **For books:** last name and the first letter of the first name of the author, year of publication in brackets, title of the book (in italic), place of publication, name of the publisher.
  Example: Adams, A.D. (1906) Electric transmission of water power. New York: McGraw.
- **For chapters of a book:** last name and the first letter of the first name of the author, year of publication in brackets, title of the chapter, In: the first letter of the first name (of the editor), last name (of the editor), abbreviation of the editorial board (in brackets), title of the book (in italic), place of publication, name of the publisher, numbers of the first and the last pages of the chapter.
  Example: Coffin, J.M. (1999) Molecular Biology of HIV. In: K.A. Crandell, (ed.) The Evolution of HIV, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, pp.3-40.
- **For articles in magazines:** last name and the first letter of the first name of the author, year of publication in brackets, title of the article, title of the magazine (in italic), numbers of the first and the last pages of the article.
  Example: Waever, R. Ken (1989) 'The Changing World of Think Tanks'. Political Science and Politics 22, No. 3, pp.563-78.

4. If the author wishes to point out to the readers that certain opinions stated in the article are his/her personal opinions, and not the opinions of the institution where the author is employed, it is necessary to include a separate footnote at the end of the text with the symbol * where that will be particularly stated.

5. Latin, Ancient Greek and other non-English words and phrases must be written in *italic* in the text (e.g. *status quo, a priori, de facto*, *acquis communautaire*, etc.).

6. The summary of the paper, key words and a short resume should be sent to: office@ccmr-bg.org with the subject: *For WBSO*. All papers will be reviewed and after that the editorial board will make a decision about publishing.

WBSO

Editorial Board

№ 14

The Western Balkans Security Observer is a journal emerged in the academic community of the Belgrade School of Security Studies. The School is a special unit of the Centre for Civil- Military Relations set up to carry out systematic research and promote academic advancement of civilian researchers thus contributing to the development of Security Studies in the region. Articles published in the Western Balkans Security Observer are focusing on regional security issues but also deal with national and global security problems. The journal welcomes papers that explore security transformations from an interdisciplinary approach and which manage to use the strong points of different schools of thoughts. Both theoretical and empirical accounts are welcomed. A review section introduces relevant resources in Security Studies, Political Science, International Relations and related fields.