


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**THE CONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY:
THE ROLE OF CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONS
IN STATE AND NATION-BUILDING
IN WEST GERMANY AND SOUTH AFRICA**

Jack J. Porter

April 2010

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FOREWORD

Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan remind U.S. policymakers of the tremendous obstacles and challenges that confront states as they attempt to install liberal, democratic political institutions. The multifaceted transition process involves a host of overlapping and interrelated political, economic, and social innovations that often must be tailored to the specific historical, demographic, and regional needs of each community. While it would be presumptuous to suggest any rigid schedule or set of priorities, most scholars and policymakers agree that restructuring the security and civil-military institutions is vital to the transition. West Germany's and South Africa's experiences illustrate the intricate complexities and numerous considerations that factor into this process and provide some important lessons for the future.

This monograph analyzes the decisionmaking process behind the construction of German and South African armed forces in their transition to democracy. Dr. Jack Porter begins the study by outlining the central theoretical and practical challenges associated with designing democratic armed forces and civil-military institutions. In essence, the overriding goal for these communities is two-fold: the creation of military institutions that are capable of both defending the fledgling democracy from internal and external threats, while also proactively contributing to the consolidation of liberal democracy. Building on the civil-military classics of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, Dr. Porter then reviews recent case studies that focus on the efforts of post-communist states to democratize their armed forces. A brief discussion of the relatively new policy field of security sector reform (SSR) concludes the introduction.

When West German political leaders decided to remilitarize the former fascist state in the late 1940s, they were confronted by the twin objectives identified above. Initially, the primary obstacle centered on designing a new military in a manner best suited to contribute to the defensive needs associated with the emerging Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union. If this were not complicated enough, defense planners understood that any effort to rearm had to be done in a way that assuaged the justifiable fears of domestic critics and suspicious neighbors. The solution involved a complex set of civil-military institutions whose purpose also included the consolidation and transmission of democratic, liberal ideals first to members of the *Bundeswehr*, and later to the rest of the newly free political community.

Emerging from decades of authoritarian rule and increased domestic violence, South Africa found itself facing very similar ordeals in the early 1990s. As Dr. Porter demonstrates, both white and black leaders sought to create new democratic armed forces that were professional and accountable to civilian authorities. Furthermore, in order to assure South Africans of all backgrounds that these forces would not disrupt the fragile transition, numerous military, legal, and political institutions were developed. For example, recruitment and promotion policies emphasized the formation of a representative armed forces composed of all racial groups. Also, in an effort to enhance transparency and trust, defense planning was made accessible to a wide spectrum of government and nongovernmental organizations.

Finally, the monograph concludes with a brief list of policy recommendations for future efforts geared at democratizing formerly authoritarian armed forces.

While Dr. Porter acknowledges the limitations of his comparative analysis, he nonetheless argues that important lessons can be gleaned from the experiences of West Germany and the Republic of South Africa. Perhaps most significant, the analysis demonstrates the tremendous contribution that the armed forces can provide for communities as they struggle towards security and freedom.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr." in a cursive script.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JACK J. PORTER is an assistant professor of political science at The Citadel where he teaches courses on international relations, comparative politics, U.S. national security, theories of peace and war, and international law. Currently, Dr. Porter is working on several projects that include: civil-military relations in the transition to democracy, counterinsurgency strategies and power, notions of legitimacy in the emerging Afghan national armed forces, and religion in democratic militaries. Over the past few years, Dr. Porter has spent time in South Africa, Germany, Belgium, and France conducting research related to the above projects. He previously was a Presidential Management Intern (PMI) with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DoD (1991-93). Dr. Porter holds a B.A. from Colgate University, a master's of international affairs (MIA) from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.

SUMMARY

“Rogue” and “failed” states present numerous security challenges to the United States and the rest of the international community. Not only do these states offer refuge and at times assistance to violent nonstate actors such as terrorist organizations and pirate syndicates, their continued inability to respond to citizens’ needs and unwillingness to respect human dignity establish the foundations for ongoing regional and global instability. With this challenge in mind, current U.S. and international foreign and security policy is directed at assisting these fragile communities in their efforts at democratic state and nation-building. The primary focus of this analysis is a detailed examination of two earlier and successful efforts at democratization—the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa—paying particular attention to the role of civil-military institutions. After outlining the substantial theoretical and practical obstacles confronting these states, the monograph highlights the potential roles that the new armed forces can play in the democratic transition and consolidation phases. The analysis concludes with a number of policy recommendations and suggestions for those involved in these formidable and critical efforts.

**THE CONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY:
THE ROLE OF CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONS
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INTRODUCTION

With their first apparently successful democratic elections behind them, the future Afghan and Iraqi governments must now refocus their attention on the construction and consolidation of legitimate political, economic, and social institutions. Both the short-term authority and effectiveness of the representative government hinge directly on the development of these institutions and the extent to which they are regarded as reasonably efficient in satisfying the core needs of Afghan and Iraqi citizens.

Long-term authority, however, is another matter altogether; one that depends, in part, on the formation of a robust civil society. This is a tall order to say the least. Nonetheless, the challenge of state-building is not new to post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) Afghanistan or post-2003 Iraq. Significantly, these and other fledgling liberal democracies will not be forced to approach these formidable challenges on their own and instead can count on varying levels of assistance from the United States and the international community.

If the development of representative political institutions and free market economic structures and the formation of a sense of nationhood (“we-feeling”) were not demanding enough, both nascent democracies must confront significant internal and external threats to their states’ security. Certainly, much has been written recently about the creation,

training, and expansion of the Iraqi security forces and their proposed vital role in combating the increasingly violent insurgency. Although less publicized (at least until recently), similar efforts are also underway in Afghanistan.

With this in mind, the objective of this monograph is to briefly analyze how civil-military institutions were designed in post-World War II Germany and post-Apartheid South Africa, with particular attention to their contribution to state and nation-building. Clearly, numerous international and unit level differences preclude drawing too many direct conclusions from this analysis. Nonetheless, I argue that important similarities exist and may assist policymakers in their efforts, as well as advance our understanding of the complicated and multifaceted decisionmaking process behind the creation of civil-military institutions.

This monograph is organized as follows. First is a brief introduction of a theoretical approach to civil-military relations. Second, the post-apartheid restructuring of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), 1994-2000, and the creation of the Bundeswehr, 1949-56, are analyzed. Following these case studies, some of the implications of these two experiences for the current efforts at reconstruction in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere are discussed. Finally, a short conclusion on some of the unfinished business and possible pitfalls of these efforts is presented.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

The purpose of the previous introduction is to remind us of the ongoing efforts to combat and address the potentially violent consequences of “failed” or “rogue” states. The first step was clearly the removal of

the outlaw regimes and the stabilization of the political, economic, and social conditions in each country. Following this admittedly enormous and unfinished task, plans called for select indigenous political actors to write a new constitution and craft a comprehensive set of domestic institutions based on the principles of representative democracy.

With reference to Afghanistan, a constitutional conference was held in January 2004, followed by democratic elections on October 9, 2004. In Iraq, a transitional government was elected in January 2005. Subsequently, Iraq's constitution was approved by public referendum in October 2005, followed by democratic elections in December. By May 2006, elected Iraqi officials had formed a unified government under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki.

While future schedules inevitably remain tentative and subject to a host of domestic and international factors, it is critical to investigate how these democratizing states might organize their civil-military relations. In fact, American and coalition military advisors are currently organizing and training core groups of Afghans and Iraqis for service in their countries' new national armed forces.

To date, the primary focus of the training has understandably been geared toward assistance with the stabilization operations.¹ Much less attention, however, has been paid to how the national military will be organized after the bulk of the coalition troops depart.²

Furthermore, since liberal democracy is new to both of these countries, one cannot underestimate the importance of designing robust and legitimate civil-military institutions. At a minimum, constitutional provisions, as well as governmental and military

procedures, must be established so that the new national military is incapable and unwilling to attempt to impose its will on the fledgling government.

In addition, the national military must be capable of managing the country's core security needs. For much of the civil-military literature, these two goals, a military force capable of responding to internal and external threats, yet unwilling or unable to disproportionately influence the civilian leadership, remain the core requirements of democratic civil-military relations.

Yet as the subsequent analysis will demonstrate, civil-military relations and military institutions have been designed with more proactive objectives in mind. More specifically, as West Germany and South Africa emerged from pariah status, both states' decision-makers explicitly designed their national militaries to satisfy the concerns outlined above, as well as promote democratic values and new conceptions of nationhood.

James Burk recently argued that current theories on civil-military relations might, in fact, be inadequate, particularly with reference to mature democracies.³ In an explicitly normative approach, Burk returns to two of the classical theoretical treatments of civil-military relations: Samuel P. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*⁴ and Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier*.⁵ His objective is to elaborate, "a normative theory that helps us understand how civil-military relations sustain and protect democratic values."⁶ While a number of other theorists are discussed in his article, Burk asserts that it is important to revisit these two seminal works to underscore a few, yet critical, shortcomings in the civil-military literature. According to Burk, despite the fact that these books were written over 40 years ago, they continue to frame much of the scholarship

to date. For the purposes of this analysis, I too believe that it is helpful to reflect on Huntington and Janowitz. Although my subject is the investigation of civil-military institutions in newly emerging democratic states, I intend to demonstrate that the theoretical approaches continue to be relevant.

Running the risk of oversimplification, the primary focus of Huntington's analysis is to generate a theory that explains the capacity of states, including liberal democracies such as the United States, to structure their civil-military relations in a manner that most effectively enables the armed forces to defend the state from external (and internal) threats and enemies. Obviously, in democracies the military must be subject to the control of legitimate civilian authorities. According to Huntington, the solution lies in the establishment of "objective civilian control." Civilian authorities are responsible for devising national security goals and objectives, while the military, as an apolitical professional organization, has the responsibility for determining the specific details required for their realization.

Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state. Subjective civilian control exists in a variety of forms, objective civilian control in only one. The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian control decreases as the military become progressively involved in institutional, class, and constitutional politics.⁷

Beyond the importance of the professional ethic, however, Huntington pays little attention to how officers and soldiers develop and maintain their ideological beliefs under a system of objective civilian control. To be fair, he does stress that civilian control

depends on the extent to which the political ideology of a state is consistent with the military ethic. Some ideologies, for example fascism, Marxism, and liberalism, are not compatible with the military ethic. Thus, “(t)he realization of objective civilian control thus depends upon the achievement of an appropriate equilibrium between the power of the military and the ideology of society.”⁸ With reference to the United States (the only mature democracy in Huntington’s study), the liberal ideology, a conservative constitution, and geographic isolation are factors that have inhibited the development of objective civilian control. Furthermore, the military was able to develop a professional ethic only when it was virtually excluded from political power.⁹ Once again, Huntington’s concern is the defense of democracy through a robust military profession and objective civilian control, not the ideological inclinations of officers and soldiers.

Janowitz addresses this last point. More interested in the social and ideological character of American officers, his analysis is primarily concerned with how recent changes in technology and warfare have eroded the distinction between soldier and civilian. The division of labor between military leaders and political leaders has also become much more obscure. Military traditionalism is increasingly influenced by the flow of civilians into military organization. Simultaneously, military leaders are engaging in a widening array of political or nonmilitary functions; including diplomatic missions, foreign assistance and advisory roles, and domestic political responsibilities.

Responding to these changes, Janowitz discusses in great detail a new direction for the U.S. Armed Forces. The key to his plan—a constabulary force—is to make sure that there is an appropriate balance

between three types of officers: military managers, technical specialists, and heroic fighters. As warfare becomes more specialized and complex, old patterns of command based on authoritarianism and strict hierarchy are being replaced by command techniques of manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus. In contemporary circumstances, soldiers need to know whom they are fighting for and why. They cannot simply be commanded to fulfill some basic function. Instead, initiative at all levels of command becomes vital to success.

Due to the increased reliance on initiative and morale, Janowitz emphasized the importance of the changing social composition, political inclinations, and education of the American officer corps. As he put it, "The politics of the professional soldier has become the politics of an organization—of a pressure group—rather than the mere expression of the interest of a social stratum."¹⁰ Unlike Huntington, Janowitz is skeptical that democracy can be defended and sustained solely through the professionalization of the military and objective civilian control. In fact, much more is required. In addition to his idea of organizing the American Armed Forces as a constabulary force, a thorough reorganization must be pursued, particularly regarding the formal and informal ties between the military and civilian policymakers and Congress. Of importance is Janowitz's sociological argument in favor of continuous political and civic education for military personnel.

Bold experimentation in the political education of the officer corps is also required. It is impossible to isolate the professional soldier from domestic political life, and it is undesirable to leave the tasks of political education completely to the professionals themselves,

even though they have been highly responsible in this assignment. **The goal of political education is to develop a commitment to the democratic system and an understanding of how it works** (emphasis added). Even though this task must rest within the profession itself, it is possible to conceive of a bipartisan contribution of the political parties.¹¹

Janowitz's remarks bring us back to Burk's assertion that while the literature on civil-military relations is vast, it remains limited and fails to take into account significant changes in the international system and how military forces are deployed. For the most part, this literature focuses predominantly on the relationship of the military to civilian authorities. While Huntington lays out the core idea of civil-military relations as a means by which states, including democracies, can protect themselves from external threats, Janowitz emphasizes the other side of civil-military institutions, a means by which democracies and their militaries can maintain themselves. According to Burk,

They treat different parts of the problem that a democratic theory of civil-military relations must confront, either how to protect or how to sustain democratic values. Notice that to protect democratic values the military needs to be subordinate to civilian power, but not necessarily to enact democratic values as it goes about its work. To sustain democratic values, the military must in crucial respects identify substantively with and so embody the values of the society it defends. Ideally, one theory would explain how to do both.¹²

As indicated earlier, my analysis seeks to address Burk's concern. Although it is premature to claim that I have a well-developed theory that satisfactorily explains how democracies address these twin challenges,

I do hope that the forthcoming investigation will help us think more systematically about these issues. Also, I recognize that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan is anywhere close to being categorized as a mature democracy, let alone a stable political system. Both countries are in the reconstruction phase; political and military institutions are in their infancy. Nonetheless, I believe that this is all the more reason to pay detailed attention to how these vital structures are initially designed. Also, I am conscious of the immediate security and economic demands on both of these countries, (not to mention persistent ethnic, religious, and regional divisions) and certainly do not argue that these challenges and factors can be ignored or slighted.

With this in mind, what the following two cases, post-Nazi West Germany and post-Apartheid South Africa, will demonstrate is that civil-military institutions have been designed to simultaneously accomplish the two objectives—defending the emerging liberal, democratic state from internal and external threats, and concomitantly promoting a new democratic political culture, civilian control of military institutions, and national unity.¹³

Domestically, military institutions contribute to political legitimacy, expose and educate new generations to the new political ideas and values, and act as a signal to important domestic constituencies as to the democratic, pluralistic character of the new political regime and community. Internationally, the particular institutional design of the military demonstrates that the state will be able to defend itself (while not threatening its neighbors), credibly contribute to regional security, and also act as an important signaling mechanism to its neighbors of its character or type (trustworthy, democratic, and responsible). In this way, the decisions

on civil-military institutions are vital mechanisms for joining the regional multilateral institutions and the international community of democratic states. I will return to these ideas after the detailed case studies.

Before turning to the case studies, it is worth noting that some very important efforts have been made in addressing the theoretical and practical challenges associated with the construction of democratic civil-military institutions. In particular, scholars and policymakers have offered detailed analysis of the transition of former communist militaries after the end of the Cold War. Among other subjects, the investigations focused broadly on the development of professional soldiers, their relationship to the emerging pluralist societies, and the institutional and legal relationship to civilian authority. In addition to this regional focus, a policy-oriented area of interest called "security sector reform" has been created that addresses many of the concerns associated with the field of civil-military relations.

Regarding the transition of post-communist militaries, the three-volume study edited by Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, provides perhaps the most thorough investigation of these countries' defense policies.¹⁴ Each of the volumes deals with a different aspect of the development of professional armed forces: the establishment and maintenance of civilian control of the military, the definition of professionalism and progress made by the various post-communist countries towards this ideal, and finally the multifaceted relationship between the armed forces and society at large, with special attention to the establishment of long-term legitimacy for these states' militaries. Whereas time and space considerations preclude an exhaustive treatment of

these extremely insightful studies, they nonetheless make important conceptual contributions towards the field of civil-military relations by providing clarity on such diverse topics as to why certain states design certain types of armed forces, the potential functions these institutions are expected to perform (both internally and externally), and the many variables that influence these tough policy choices.

The first of the three volumes, *Democratic Control of the Military in Post-communist Europe: Guarding the Guards*,¹⁵ begins with an outline of the communist legacies facing the countries in this region. In most cases, the militaries were highly politicized and had a certain degree of autonomy when it came to the development and implementation of defense policy. In exchange for this independence, the armed forces were subject to “strong and direct” civilian control and were not directly involved in domestic politics.¹⁶ Interestingly, these factors both facilitated and confounded subsequent efforts at establishing democratic civilian control. The authors also provide a three-part definition of civilian control: the military should be an apolitical servant of the democratic government, defense policy should be under the control and direction of civilian authorities, and decisions regarding the use and deployment of the armed forces also resides with the civilian leadership. Finally, the volume discusses the relative progress made to date in the various countries and the numerous factors (historical legacies; political, economic, and social factors; international considerations; and institutional and military cultural conditions) that influence the development of civil-military relations.

The second volume, *The Challenge of Military Reform in Post-communist Europe: Building Professional Armed*

Forces,¹⁷ addresses issues related to the development of professional soldiers in this region. According to the authors, professionalism should be seen as a normative concept involving a dynamic process rather than a static description. Further, professional armed forces display four core characteristics: clearly defined roles that are understood by soldiers and societies, expertise in their areas of responsibility, clear rules regarding their institution and responsibilities, and promotions based on merit and achievement.¹⁸ Also, there are four professional military types consistent with the above criteria but involving different roles – power projection, territorial defense (capable of participation in multinational missions), post-neutral (national defense, lightly armed and reliant on mass mobilization), and neutral (same as post-neutral but NO capability for international peacekeeping, etc.).¹⁹ The choice of professional military type and progress made towards professionalism in the various post-communist countries are a function of both international and domestic level variables. Relevant to the following case studies on West Germany and South Africa, the volume concludes that the patterns of professionalism are driven by both military and political imperatives, not just the logic of the security environment.²⁰ The last of the volumes, *Soldiers and Societies in Post-communist Europe: Legitimacy and Change*,²¹ deals with the sociological aspects of the transition to democratic civil-military control. More specifically, the editors and authors of the case studies attempt to analyze various relationships between the state, society, and the armed forces. Ultimately, the goal is the creation and maintenance of armed forces that are regarded as legitimate by members of society. Furthermore, legitimacy is a product of the functional and socio-political imperatives that

the institutions are expected to perform.²² Five ideal types of military roles are identified: national security, nation-builder, regime defense, domestic military assistance, and military diplomacy. Certainly these roles are not mutually exclusive; in fact, many of the post-communist militaries perform a number of these tasks, and “there are inevitable and obvious links and cross-overs between certain functions within these categories.”²³ As will be demonstrated in the following case studies, a variety of international factors (threat perception, international assistance, and technological development) as well as domestic conditions (history, domestic politics, and economic constraints) influences each country’s policy choices.

In addition to these there works on post-communist armed forces, a policy-related discipline called “security sector reform” (SSR) has emerged, within which the field of civil-military relations plays a prominent role. SSR is multidisciplinary. Its focus goes beyond purely defense and military considerations and, instead, SSR is intended to develop theoretical and practical solutions to the (re)construction of legal, social, and military institutions accompanying the transition to democracy and rule of law. In addition to more peaceful transitions, the field is concerned with the construction of new security institutions in post-conflict societies, particularly those that involve multilateral peacebuilding operations.²⁴ Succinctly, SSR is primarily concerned with establishing the rule of law and includes,

actors directly involved in protecting civilians and the state from violent harm (e.g., police and military forces and internal intelligence agencies), institutions that govern these actors (ministries of interior,

defense, and justice; and national security councils), and oversight bodies.²⁵

While extremely useful, particularly in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, SSR focuses on a much more extensive set of issues than is covered in this analysis.

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1994-2000

In 1948, the Afrikaner National Party assumed power in South Africa and embarked on a political, legal, economic, and social project designed at its core to perpetuate White rule and privilege. While antithetical to emerging (nascent) international norms of racial equality, the racist system of Apartheid was not initially the target of international condemnation. Furthermore, for at least 2 decades, the system functioned relatively efficiently for the vast majority of Whites in South Africa, and an omnipresent and increasingly repressive internal security apparatus ensured that domestic opposition would remain unproductive.

Nonetheless, as domestic resistance and international antagonism mounted and increasingly apparent economic inefficiencies led more and more Whites to question the logic of the system, Apartheid's cracks grew.²⁶ By the early 1990s, many prominent White South African leaders realized that the system was ready to collapse. Fearing internal and regional chaos and perhaps an expanded, more violent civil war, the ruling government of F. W. de Klerk decided to make peace with the African National Congress (ANC) and other enemies and negotiate a nonviolent end to Apartheid. The White South African monopoly on political power would have to come to

an end. After detailed negotiations, free elections were held for the first time in April 1994. Nelson Mandela was elected president, ushering in a new era in South African politics.

Although avoiding civil war, South Africa remained a divided and extremely unequal society. During Apartheid, South African society was officially divided into four racial groups: White, Colored, Indian, and African. The extensive tangle of laws and restrictions were designed to keep the various groups “apart” – socially, politically, and economically. In many respects, the system was quite successful. Not only did Whites maintain a virtual monopoly of political power; economically and educationally, Whites also benefited disproportionately.

In 1994, the United Nations Human Development Program ranked South Africa 90th out of 175 countries.²⁷ Of significance,

The judiciary, bureaucracy, army, police force, and municipal administrations were all dominated by white men who had been brought up in a racist milieu and had been trained to serve the Apartheid state. The country had one of the greatest gaps in the world between rich and poor, and although new multiracial classes were forming, the gap marked primarily a division between races.²⁸

These lamentable conditions were what awaited Nelson Mandela and his Government of National Unity (GNU) when he took the presidential oath on May 10, 1994. In addition to improving the living standards of the majority of South Africans, the Mandela government also had to address the fact that the country remained a fractured and suspicious nation. Formulating a new constitution, coming to terms with past human rights abuses through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and economic

redevelopment and redistribution were only a few of the strategies employed for the purposes of democratic transition. Another part of the transformation agenda was the creation of a new South African military.

Negotiations between leaders of the Apartheid-era South African Defence Force (SADF) and the Umkhonto we Sizwe or MK (the “Spear of the Nation,” the military wing of the ANC) began in 1991. Both sides had a common interest in trying to manage this aspect of the transition process. In addition to these two groups, there were at least six other nonstatutory military organizations involved in the struggle.

Nonstatutory Forces (NSF) included the Homeland Defence Forces of Transkei, Ciskei, Bophutatswana, and Venda (*Bantustans*), and two other liberation armies, the Azanian National Liberation Army (AZANLA) and the APLA (the military wing of the Azanian Peoples Organization [AZAPO] and the Pan African Congress [PAC]). In initiating both informal, and later formal, talks, the SADF and MK negotiators’ primary goal was to manage the growing internal violence and prevent the eruption of a more extensive civil war. By excluding the other forces from the negotiations, the two also hoped to avoid complications and ensure that their concerns dominated the process, even at the expense of the other groups.²⁹

As noted, negotiations commenced at approximately the same time as the more celebrated political discussions between de Klerk and Mandela. Yet the two sets of negotiations were clearly linked. As the civilian leaders devised the blueprint for the political transition to democracy, military experts initially dealt with the role of the various armed forces leading up to the election. Three issues dominated the first set of

formal talks held in March 1993: the establishment of some joint military mechanism to facilitate governance in a climate of continued political violence, ending the guerrilla training of the liberation armies in neighboring countries, and the creation of a transitional National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) to assist the peace process.³⁰ Meetings later that year turned to the critical issues of integration and the future arrangement of the country's armed forces.

Needless to say, the numerous bilateral discussions were not always smooth or without controversy. Nevertheless, they produced a number of extremely important results. First, they established the framework for the integration of the various formations following the April 1994 elections. Second, a number of decisions were reached regarding the future national military, e.g., that it would adopt an essentially defensive strategic posture and would be comprised of a relatively small professional core force with a larger part-time reserve force. Of note, the SADF was able to insist that the future armed forces would maintain a high degree of performance (professional) standards and technology and that pre-1994 military regulations would remain in effect during the transition, thus guaranteeing a certain degree of continuity and institutional hegemony. Third, both sides agreed to a general amnesty for all military forces for past acts and human rights violations.³¹ Fourth, these series of talks granted considerable domestic and international legitimacy to the subsequent military. Obviously, the MK's participation and concurrence with the arrangements were critical in this regard. Finally, the face-to-face interactions encouraged trust between the former enemies. This spirit of cooperation and relative good will would facilitate future efforts at working out the more specific organizational details. I now turn

to the post-1994 election evolution of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

As argued earlier, the pre-1994 negotiations played a vital role in establishing the very rough outline of the new SANDF. While coming to agreement on certain aspects of the armed forces, military and civilian decisionmakers still had to determine the more exact institutional details of the transformation after the election. Questions regarding the integration process, future personnel policies, budgetary commitments, and the fate of the South African arms industry all needed to be answered.

Unfortunately, time and space considerations preclude an exhaustive treatment of the initial post-election period. Instead, I will focus on four components of the SANDF institutional design to demonstrate how policymakers sought to balance the dual challenges of defending the fledgling democracy from internal and external threats, and promoting a new conception of the political system and national community.

The four elements are: constitutional civil-military relations, military doctrine and operational strategy, force design and structure, (including policies of integration and rationalization), and “representativeness,” educational, and training programs. This is by no means an exhaustive list of the organizational features that would require clarification. Nonetheless, they are important measures of the armed forces and certainly influence both combat effectiveness and future trajectory of the military in South Africa.

Before focusing on issues of institutional design, a few words about the decisionmaking process are warranted. By all accounts, the post-1994 restructuring process was extremely open or transparent. Conscious of the Apartheid-era secrecy and the

militaristic total strategy that shaped decisionmaking during that period, former SADF and ANC/MK leaders opened up the policy process to academics, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other civil society associations, in part, to enhance the new defense establishment's legitimacy. The solicitation of outside input also helped to incorporate wider intellectual ideas and social viewpoints. Working groups were convened, and public comments on draft White Papers were welcomed and in some cases incorporated into the final draft. Obviously, while NGOs and other groups offered important contributions to broader, more macro-level aspects of defense policy, the former members of the SADF were able to dominate the more technical level questions of tactics, weapons systems, etc., due to their expertise. However,

The most notable feature of the (Defence) Review process was the extent of civil society participation. The Working Group deliberately went beyond the narrow concept of NGOs as those organisations which are geared to political and policy interventions, to involve organisations such as religious and sporting groups, and to get out to the provinces... What is clear, however, is that the DoD found a successful formula for incorporating civil society into the defence policymaking process without compromising its own interests and professionalism.³²

This transparency not only helped to enhance the nascent military's legitimacy, it was also a significant indicator of the character of the new South Africa. Finally, two core documents were the product of these extensive deliberations—The *White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa*³³ and the *South African Defence Review*.³⁴

Constitutional Civil-Military Relations.

After the Constitutional Court rejected a first draft of the permanent constitution in 1996 on the ground that it did not fully comply with the 34 principles outlined in the Interim Constitution, a revised version was submitted by the Constituent Assembly and subsequently certified by the court as valid.³⁵ The new Constitution “outlines the principles, structure, responsibilities and relationships which are necessary to secure democratic civil-military relations. Civil-military relations refer to the hierarchy of authority between the Executive, Parliament and the armed forces, and to civil supremacy over these forces.”³⁶

This fairly generic assertion of civilian control highlights a dramatic shift in the relationship between civilians and the military in South Africa. During the Apartheid-era, the exigencies of White rule led to the expansion and increased autonomy of the security apparatus—including the SADF. This institution determined internal and external security operations, planning, budgeting, and strategic decisions, just to name a few.

According to the new Constitution, the Parliament, through the Minister of Defence, is the ultimate authority for all military matters during peacetime. The Chief of the SANDF, appointed by the President, is responsible for executive command of the armed forces subject to the direction of the Minister of Defence. In the case of hostilities (war) or internal emergencies, the President may declare a state of “national defence” and, thus, direct the SANDF in accordance with the Constitution. In these instances, the President must immediately inform the Parliament of the reasons

for the use of the SANDF. Three broad criteria justify this action: defense of the Republic, compliance with international obligations, or the maintenance of internal law and order.³⁷

A second feature of the Constitution involves the establishment of Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (JPSCD). Modeled on the Committee on Defense of the German Bundestag, this Parliamentary organ has the authority to investigate “the functioning, finance, armaments, and preparedness” of the SANDF.³⁸ Made up of 36 permanent and alternative members, the JPSCD has increasingly influenced the direction and policies of the military. As might be expected, the members of the committee are hampered by a lack of expertise and knowledge with regard to security issues. The national government has invested considerable resources and energy to augment their proficiency through overseas trips for committee members, as well as visits and briefings at local defense industries. However, despite this handicap and the military’s continued cultural legacy of independence,

Civil society as reflected in the JPSCD has registered a number of victories in the tussle over turf that mirrors the wider struggles to define civil-military relations in the new democracy. The JPSCD, despite its various liabilities, has established credentials in a manner inconceivable during the years of total strategy, and the armed forces have accepted that they are required to explain their behavior along a range of previously sacrosanct issues.³⁹

Finally, a civilian Secretary of Defence was established within the Ministry of Defence to provide policy guidance to the Chief of the SANDF and his staff in

determining the policy direction, budgeting, and management of the armed forces.

Military Doctrine and Operational Strategy.

The primary function of a state's military is to defend its territory, citizens, and institutions from external threats. Often this may include operations against internal enemies. Increasingly, the SADF was employed against such enemies, most notably the ANC and the MK. In their struggle against the White regime, however, the various liberation armies were based and operated mostly out of foreign territories (Angola, Botswana, or Mozambique), and in response, the SADF engaged in numerous attacks and border incursions against these bases, as well as destabilization efforts aimed at coercing the foreign governments into withdrawing their support for the insurgents.

Justified in large part by the claim that they alone were fighting to keep Sub-Saharan Africa from becoming communist, the SADF adopted an offensive military doctrine. With the end of the Cold War and the death of Apartheid, the official conception of a capitalist South Africa surrounded by hostile communist actors evaporated. To use academic jargon, South Africa's "strategic environment," changed dramatically; and in many observers' opinions, the change was overwhelmingly positive.

Consistent with both the pre-1994 negotiations and the *White Paper*,⁴⁰ the *Defence Review*⁴¹ states that the SANDF shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture.⁴² Although not currently confronted with any conventional threats, the first and most important mission for the SANDF is the protection of the state and its people against external military

threats. Relying on the doctrine of conventional deterrence, the *Defence Review* declares that South Africa will maintain a defense capability sufficiently credible to deter potential aggressors. However, in the absence of existential threats, exactly what constitutes a credible capability remains vague. Nonetheless, two crucial dimensions of the new military strategy were particularly noteworthy. First, the very conception of national security has been expanded beyond more traditional conceptions to now embrace political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions. Second, South African security will be pursued through multilateral mechanisms such as regional security institutions.

Partly due to the persuasive influence of academics and NGOs, South Africa adopted an extremely broad definition of national security. In addition to external military threats, the SANDF recognizes that a panoply of nonmilitary risks jeopardize South Africans. According to the *White Paper*,

In the new South Africa national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters . . . Security is an all-encompassing condition in which citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being.⁴³

While not automatically affecting the SANDF, the emphasis on “human security” demonstrates the commitment of the government to increased transparency of defense policymaking. In broad conceptual terms, South Africa was on a different track.

As the various points in the *White Paper* were fleshed out during the Defence Review process, South African military leaders were able to reintroduce a certain level of “realist” thinking. This can be seen in the *Defence Review’s* insistence that the SANDF stick to its core function of territorial defense and its advocacy for offensive tactics after being attacked.

Although acknowledging such secondary and tertiary duties as medical services, maritime services, disaster relief, and election support, defense policy-makers insisted that the SANDF not be utilized in such a fashion unless absolutely necessary.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the size, structure, weaponry, equipment, and funding of the SANDF are to be determined mainly on the basis of its primary function. A tension, therefore, exists between the new conception of human security and the traditional thinking of military experts. To date, this has not created insurmountable problems.⁴⁵ Yet,

That two contradictory narratives can cohabit the official defence documents of the post-apartheid era can partly be attributed to the open, transparent and consultative nature of the defence review process, which has allowed all interested parties to contribute their thoughts and views. Intrinsically, however, it is a reflection of the fact that the South African transition process has emerged through a process of negotiation and reconciliation that has brought opposing political cultures and identities together in a process of accommodation.⁴⁶

Concomitant with the conceptual shift towards human security is a new reliance on regional cooperation and multilateral institutions. If national security is truly influenced by a range of issues such as economic underdevelopment, environmental degradation, and the influx of illegal refugees, then adequate solutions require cooperative actions.

Chaos and instability threaten not only the country of origin but also its neighbors. In contrast to the Apartheid-era, South Africa intends to contribute to regional stability and prosperity. In fact, Pretoria may be uniquely qualified to lead many of these missions due to the existence of the most highly trained and well-equipped military in Southern Africa. Also, since one of the main objectives of post-apartheid South African defense policy was to break out of its past isolation and rejoin its regional community, regional cooperation and peacekeeping, etc., offered a significant means for South Africa's political rehabilitation. Significantly, peacekeeping efforts remain a primary mission for the South African armed forces.

Force Design: Structure, Policies of Integration, and Rationalization.

As touched upon earlier, the first significant organizational challenge was the integration of the Statutory and Non-Statutory Forces into a single corporate body. Following this logistical headache, the second step was to downsize or rationalize the armed forces into a more cost-effective configuration. Finally, politicians and policymakers outlined the explicit goal of making this institution representative of South Africa through a variety of personnel policies including affirmative action, equal opportunity, and the management of diversity (issues that will be addressed in the next section).

A thorough examination of the dynamics of the integration process is beyond the scope of this monograph. Succinctly, in the course of the pre-1994 election negotiations, SADF and MK leaders agreed to set up assembly areas (AAs) into which the scattered,

unconventional soldiers of the liberation armies would relocate. There, they would be disarmed and registered.

Subsequently, decisions regarding appropriate rank, skill level, required training, new posts, etc., would be made in anticipation of the pending fusion. Former SADF leaders were justifiably apprehensive as this process got underway. Most importantly, they were adamant that there not be a drop-off in the professional standards of the future armed forces. This position dominated the negotiations and ensured that White officers and soldiers would retain, at least initially, a privileged position. A commitment to professionalism was also a vital element of their organizational culture.

As a result, a program of bridging training was designed to help overcome the gap in technical and skill levels between the professional SADF and the more egalitarian culture and guerrilla tactics of the liberation armies. Other issues that confounded the process were incomplete and/or inaccurate rosters of the various NSF units, delays in reporting by soldiers, and confusion as to rank equivalence.

Despite the invaluable assistance of a British Military Advisory and Technical Training Team (BMATT), considerable resentment between White and Black South Africans and numerous logistical problems plagued the process. Nonetheless, the integration phase of the restructuring odyssey was declared essentially complete in March 2003, almost 5 years behind schedule.⁴⁷ With far more soldiers than actually needed, a rationalization process through which unskilled, unmotivated, and redundant soldiers would be demobilized followed the integration of forces.

In terms of force configuration, South Africa has adopted a plan that calls for the creation and maintenance of a small, professional “core” force accompanied by a much larger part-time or reserve force.⁴⁸ Referred to in the *Defence Review* as the “one force concept,”⁴⁹ the goal is to ensure sufficient active duty forces readily deployable, with a larger reserve capable of rapid mustering if and when a more substantial threat arises.

Despite the fact that southern Africa is a “region of allies” and the absence of any conventional threats in the short- and medium-term, the core force is expected to respond to the following defensive contingencies: invasions (seen as unlikely); limited neutralizing attacks (seen as unlikely); internal military threats to the constitutional order (seen as a low probability); raids (seen as a low probability); blockades; attacks on embassies, ships, and aircraft (seen as a moderate-high probability); and law enforcement of marine resources and maritime zone (seen as a low probability).⁵⁰ Based on this “threat-independent” analysis, the SANDF must take advantage of its favorable geography, be balanced and flexible, maintain a relatively high level of technological sophistication, and emphasize jointness between the services.

Not listed above, the deployment of SANDF units for peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and peacekeeping duties is acknowledged as a much more likely scenario. South Africa, all its integration and rationalization pains notwithstanding, is still the predominant military power in the region. Also, South African leaders have explicitly recognized their country’s obligation to participate in regional cooperative defense systems.

In keeping with the expanded definition of security, policymakers emphasize the importance of combating the consequences of underdevelopment, illiteracy, disease, and environmental degradation. Coupled with the destabilizing effects of internal chaos (civil war), these issues are currently the most proximate threat to South Africa's national security. Regional political and security institutions, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with its Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security (OPDS) and the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), are the most effective mechanisms for countering these risks.

“Representativeness,” Educational and Training Programs.

In addition to the more traditional aspects of military institutional design, South Africa has embraced a number of very important personnel policies. Reiterated in almost all official documents and by governmental spokesmen, the policies focus on the objective of creating a representative and democratic armed force.⁵¹ As will be argued below, South African political and military leaders recognize that the new SANDF must distance itself from its racial, exclusive past in order to encourage the organization's legitimacy. Also, because the pursuit of these policies involves significant trade-offs in terms of combat and cost effectiveness, the motivations behind them are worth considering in detail.

The promotion of “representativeness” was one of the fundamental principles upon which the new South African military would be constructed. According to Philip Frankel,

From the beginning of negotiations over the military pact, all the military formations agreed (in principle, if not detail) that if the new SANDF were to become a functional component of the new political dispensation it would have to be reengineered on different social foundations. The membership and internal power relations of the new armed forces, the participants concurred, would have to represent the multicultural diversity of the Republic, . . .⁵²

If South Africans were to regard the military as a legitimate governmental institution, considerable demographic and social changes were required. The military's prior identification with Apartheid casts a long shadow. Hence, one understands the vital importance of the SADF-MK negotiations and the plans for integration.

However, there was a distinct fear that former SADF soldiers would monopolize the most influential positions within the armed forces; perhaps even undermining the democratic transition process. Furthermore, if the armed forces are to be combat effective, a certain level of internal cohesion is necessary.

In addition, it is hoped that restructuring the National Defence Forces (NDF) in a more socially comprehensive manner would enable the institution to participate meaningfully in the vast economic and social reconstruction projects. In the early stages of the transition, South Africa would have to rely on military units to assist in a variety of internal tasks, such as crime prevention and border control. Finally, a fully representative military would demonstrate (signal) and promote the idea of a new pluralistic, multicultural South Africa.

At least three policies were adopted to reach the goal of representativeness. First, specific racial targets were established. As integration and downsizing reduced the size of the military, bridging training and supplemental training programs were created to ensure that the SANDF was able to retain enough qualified Black soldiers and officers to counterbalance the more highly trained White soldiers. Second, both the *White Paper* and the *Defence Review* explicitly mandated that affirmative action policies should be pursued.⁵³ Unfortunately, there has been considerable resistance among White officers to this program, even though efforts have been made to learn from the experience of the U.S. Department of Defense.⁵⁴

Finally, equal opportunity is enshrined as a core tenet of the new armed forces. In harmony with the new Constitution, discrimination is absolutely prohibited. In many respects, South Africa's equal protection clause exceeds that of other militaries in that linguistic, religious, gender, and sexual orientation differences are all legally guaranteed and protected.

The role of the SANDF in the democratization process, however, is not limited solely to the policies of representativeness. There has been a conscious decision to use the armed forces to educate both officers and soldiers in civics, the ideals of representative democracy and the primacy of civilian control over the military.

Currently, the Defence College in Pretoria offers a 4-month course on new civic-democratic values. This promotes the transmission of these ideas into the "military heartland – where the military is less cautious in exposing its top leadership to ostensibly subversive civilian influence."⁵⁵ Political education is not limited to the officer class. Both full-time and part-time soldiers

are required to take courses on this subject. Obviously, the crux of their training is in combat-related duties and responsibilities. However, to encourage both military professionalism and civic skills, the *Defense Review* states that a six-module curriculum on Civic Education was to be phased in beginning in 1998 (in addition to classes on International Humanitarian Law).⁵⁶

The six modules are: key features of the democratic political process, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, civil-military relations, the law of armed conflict, multicultural diversity, and military professionalism.⁵⁷ Although a topic of intense interest, the ramifications of these education programs have yet to manifest themselves.

Summing up the efforts made by South African political and military leaders, one sees the central influence of both political and military imperatives in the post-1994 design of civil-military institutions. Decisionmakers were compelled to construct a set of institutions that satisfied both concerns of security and the needs of democratic civil control. Furthermore, planners sought to utilize the armed forces for purposes that exceeded these more limited objectives (and functions) associated with defense in order to support the wider transition towards multiracial democracy. Consistent with the observations made of the post-communist militaries, historical legacies, political considerations, and social factors played a crucial role in the decisionmaking process.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 1949-56

Few would disagree with the claim that Nazi Germany represented one of the 20th century's most notorious rogue states. Beginning with his legal assumption of political power in 1933, Adolph

Hitler and the National Socialist Party embarked on a domestic and international project that would culminate 12 years later in the complete destruction of the German Nazi state, the almost total devastation of the German economy, and a military occupation by four former enemy powers of all German territory.

Massive round-ups of Nazi officials coincided with international efforts geared towards the economic and social stabilization of the country. Various forms of retribution, most prominently war tribunals, awaited many of the perpetrators. Previously exiled, imprisoned, and/or complicit Germans also began to cooperate with the occupiers in the formidable process of rebuilding what was left of Germany. Certainly, time and space considerations prohibit an exhaustive treatment of these endeavors.

Following detailed and exhaustive deliberations by the Parliamentary Council throughout the winter 1948-49, the Basic Law was signed on May 23, 1949, and the first free elections to the national parliament in 16 years were held on August 14, 1949. While still under partial control of the three occupying powers (France, Great Britain, and the United States), the Federal Republic of Germany was created. Of significance, the Basic Law made no provisions for a German military beyond the banal claim that Germany, like all states, had the rights of self-defense. Few were willing to raise the prospect of new German armed forces, let alone outline a timetable for their creation or detail the specifics of civil-military relations. It would take another 6 years before most of these details would get resolved.

During this period (1949-56), German military and political planners struggled with the dual challenges of designing a military force and civil-military institutions capable of both satisfying Germany's core security

needs and contributing to and encouraging the nascent democratic transition process. Similar to the earlier case study on South Africa, I will focus on four components of the intended design to demonstrate the importance of these twin challenges. The four critical elements of the organizational structure are: (1) constitutional civil-military relations, (2) military doctrine and operational strategy, (3) force design-troop configuration and operational command and control, and (4) internal regulations or *Innere Führung*.

Constitutional Civil-Military Relations.

As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the initial deliberations on German rearmament took place at an international level (in the context to the proposed European Defense Community [EDC]) and dealt primarily with the structure of the military units. In Germany, attention turned to the problematic issue of civilian control of the military. Konrad Adenauer and his military experts had designed the various elements of the Bundeswehr structure with one eye on the domestic and one on the international level. With reference to civilian control, however, domestic actors were to exclusively settle the matter.

Three important decisions serve to demonstrate the extent to which Adenauer's plans would require the input and consent of domestic opposition, most notably the Social Democratic Party (SPD): the debate on who should control the armed forces in peace and war, the institutionalization of the Bundestag Security Committee as a permanent constitutional organ with full investigative powers, and the establishment of the *Wehrbeauftragter* (parliamentary defense ombudsman).

With reference to control of the army, Adenauer understandably preferred that the Chancellor retain

control of the military during both peace and war. The SPD was adamant that the Ministry of Defense be under the permanent control of the Bundestag. Finally, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) advocated that the President control the armed forces. Without going into the details, the final outcome was a “historic” compromise solution that not only settled the debate on control, but also on the *Wehrbeauftragter* and the Bundestag Security Committee. It was agreed that the Defense Minister would be commander in chief during peacetime, but answerable to the Bundestag. During war or national emergency (to be declared by the President), the Chancellor would assume the position of commander in chief. The SPD backed off its demand for parliamentary control of the Defense Ministry in exchange for the creation of the *Wehrbeauftragter* and the incorporation of the Bundestag Security Committee as a permanent constitutional office.

The SPD had been calling for the establishment of the *Wehrbeauftragter* for a number of years. In essence, the office acted as an ombudsman before whom soldiers could bring complaints and grievances. It was also in charge of overseeing the implementation of *Innere Führung* at the unit level.⁵⁸

The Bundestag Security Committee was not new, however, and had been in existence since 1952. During the early years of remilitarization, both the governing parties and important SPD leaders recognized the need to involve the opposition in the creation of a German army. Memories of Weimar, during which the Social Democrats abstained from active participation in military matters, weighed heavily on the decision to create a mechanism for informing the opposition of government positions and soliciting their ideas on various details of the rearmament process.

Certainly some within the government did not welcome the unnecessary meddling of the socialists. Nonetheless, SPD military experts were to play a critical role in these early years, and “they made an enormous contribution to the success of the Federal German civil-military relations through their work on the political basis of the new army.”⁵⁹ With the compromise of 1955-56, the Bundestag Security Committee became a permanent constitutional organ with full investigative powers.

Military Doctrine and Operational Strategy.

German defense planners, as much as the other allies, struggled with crafting a meaningful warfighting strategy in the new and revolutionary nuclear age. With so many uncertainties, it is hardly surprising that German decisionmakers would rely on the traditional operational concepts developed prior to and during World War II. In addition, the potential, and increasingly likely, use of tactical nuclear weapons presented both a political and military dilemma for Bonn, Germany. With the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy progressively more reliant on tactical nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional weakness relative to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, German leaders had to devise a way to prevent German territory from becoming a nuclear battlefield. Few were willing to accept the argument that their, and Western Europe’s, security was enhanced by a strategy that almost certainly guaranteed the nuclear devastation of the better part of the Federal Republic’s population and homeland.

Operational planning began in earnest in October 1950 at the *Himmerod* cloister. As was the case with

other aspects of German remilitarization, numerous questions were raised as to how much of the German military past should be retained. The *Himmeroder Denkschrift*, in terms of operations and tactics, was very traditional. One must keep in mind that most of the military planners present had been educated in a very conventional, conservative manner.

“The operational planning in *Himmerod* envisioned a classical concept of a stable central front with the possibility of a flanking counteroffensive out of its defensive position.”⁶⁰ Self-contained German units up to the corps level would be heavily mechanized and extremely mobile. Expectedly, little consideration was given to the role of nuclear weapons. When they were addressed, most military planners simply viewed them as “stronger artillery.” Part of the problem or inability to comprehend their revolutionary implications rested in the traditional strong separation between politics and the military.

Herein rested the problem for the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons, also weapons of shorter range, in the first place they must be understood politically as a means of deterrence and this possibility was not examined, as “stronger artillery,” however, they could act as a compensation for conventional inferiority and with them make a military victory possible despite this (conventional) disadvantage.⁶¹

These early ideas were set aside as negotiations began in February 1951 over the EDC. During these meetings, little attention was devoted towards developing an integrated operational strategy. Clearly, political considerations had to be worked out; once again postponing complicated technical issues to a future date.

In October 1953, with U.S. nuclear superiority still intact, President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved National Security Council (NSC) directive 162/2. In essence, NSC-162/2 laid out the policy of “massive retaliation” in which the United States promised to respond to a Soviet invasion by any means necessary. Officially titled the “New Look,” the policy of reliance on nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic, had profound implications for NATO allies, including the Federal Republic of Germany.

With the adoption of the 1954 New Look, the United States was not only increasing the reliance on the deterrent effect of U.S. nuclear power, but was also forcing its allies to associate themselves with nuclear strategy...So the timing of the New Look meant that it turned into a means not only for shifting the balance of American forces from the conventional to the nuclear but also for instituting a nuclear bias into the basic structure of NATO forces that thereafter became extremely difficult to dislodge.⁶²

The timing of the announcement coincided with the early phases of the German rearmament. In 1953, and the first half of 1954, genuine efforts were still underway to rearm Germany within the confines of the EDC. One of the concessions the German government made to obtain approval for its military contribution was the willingness to forgo the development of nuclear weapons. Devising operational strategies and tactics during this time, therefore, involved primarily conventional weapons and maneuvers. As indicated above, German military planners emphasized mobility and heavy armaments. In fact, at the February 1952 NATO Conference in Lisbon, Portugal, German military experts tried, unsuccessfully, to change the operational ideas of its allies. General Adolf Heusinger

argued that U.S. and United Kingdom (UK) strategies were too static and not mobile enough. These ideas were rejected on the grounds that conventional forces were not sufficient to support such an offensive orientation.⁶³

With the failure of the French parliament to ratify the EDC Treaty at the end of August 1954, the idea of a European army was officially laid to rest. In an effort to determine how to approach German rearmament outside the EDC framework, a Nine-Power Summit was held in London, UK, in September 1954, culminating in the London Agreement. The agreement included the following provisions: the Federal Republic would be admitted to NATO and the Western European Union (WEU); Bonn promised to abstain from the production of nuclear, biological, or chemical (ABC) weapons, strategic aircraft, and long-range artillery; and Britain agreed to maintain four army divisions on the Continent. These conditions were formally drafted into the Paris (France) Treaty of 1954, and after significant early opposition from France, Britain, and the German SPD; all nine countries ratified the Treaty. The German Bundestag ratified the Treaty on February 27, 1955, and the President signed it into law on March 24, 1955.

The practical consequences of this sudden shift from potential EDC participation to actual NATO membership for German military planning were significant. Not only did it free policymakers from numerous constraints on organizational design, it directly linked German conceptions of operational strategy to those of the United States. By the end of 1954, the Supreme Allied Commander - Europe (SACEUR) anticipated that the role of the 12 German divisions in the atomic age should be to act as “an

organic component of the allied defense wall," behind which the troop concentrations of the aggressor would be destroyed with "new weapons."⁶⁴ This role, however, was not exactly what the Germans had in mind.

German political and military leaders were, for obvious reasons, concerned with the defense of German territory as far east as possible. Even the very early opposition by the Social Democrats was based, in part, on the fact that allied defense of German territory would only begin in earnest at the Rhine River. Mirroring the criticism of the SPD, one German ex-general and member of a veterans' organization that opposed rearmament within a Western alliance, the *Militärpolitische Forum* (MPF), wrote:

The main burden of the battles would be carried by the Germans, who naturally would also have the most interest in the defense, while the French, English and American generals' first priority would be to bring their troops undamaged back behind the Rhine.⁶⁵

Partly in response to these domestic criticisms but primarily out of military logic, military planners early and stridently promoted the strategy of "forward defense."

Therefore, it was to be expected that on becoming a member of NATO, German military experts in charge of operational development were preoccupied with two issues: the role of tactical nuclear weapons, and line of defense. The question of tactical nuclear weapons and their place in German and NATO strategy was to be decided by the United States, with the Germans exerting little successful influence.

The line of defense, however, depended directly on the German armed forces. In the opinion of the United States and NATO, a forward strategy required

a significant number of German ground forces. NATO planners determined that a total of 30 divisions (of which 12 were to be German) would be required to implement the forward strategy. In their absence, or until they were deployed en masse, Germany would remain susceptible to a conventional offensive invasion. NATO forces, only capable of presenting a thin line of defense approximately in the middle of West Germany, would have to fall back as the invading Soviet (Warsaw Pact) forces were attacked with tactical nuclear weapons.

Therein rested the crux of the problem for German leaders. Although they understood the probable chaos and destruction that tactical nuclear weapons would entail, they were also finally convinced that a defense of Western Europe and Germany was impossible without such weaponry. Ironically, the security of the *Bundesrepublik* rested on the assumption that most of it would probably be destroyed before it could be saved.

Furthermore, German security relied on weapons that German politicians and military personnel had no control over. Forward defense, thus, offered two benefits to Bonn: it increased the relevance of German armed forces and offered a solution, albeit partial, to the dilemma associated with tactical weapons. While skepticism remained as to the feasibility of a forward defense strategy, it was officially adopted essentially for public consumption.⁶⁶

Once coming to terms with the inevitable dependence on tactical weapons, German military planners struggled to develop operational tactics for combat during their use. Here again, their ideas were not in concert with those of their allies. For the United States and the UK, conventional combat during a nuclear exchange would be most efficiently carried out on foot,

thus the emphasis on infantry divisions as opposed to tank divisions. German military planners, however, argued in favor of the opposite—highly mobile, mechanized operations. This disagreement would not be decided until years later. In the meantime, the role approved for conventional forces remained one of reaction.

At a conference of NATO Defense Ministers in October 1955, the SACEUR reaffirmed the importance of conventional forces. Their responsibilities were,

. . . to prevent or defend that part of the Treaty area that would be “overrun,” “occupied,” or “isolated.” If a temporary occupation perhaps still takes place, the subsequent “liberation” with the help of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons was to be expected with such great damage, the question of the necessary “so called conventional armed forces” would answer itself.⁶⁷

In the end, the operational strategy was partially consistent with the ideas espoused by German military planners. NATO was willing to publicly adopt the policy of forward defense. However, pending a significant conventional build-up, this strategy was to remain on paper. German efforts to promote mobile, heavily mechanized operational tactics were less successful. NATO forces were assumed to be too few and the environmental and social conditions too chaotic to allow for such maneuvers. With regard to this aspect of structuring, military necessity seems to be the driving force behind the outcome. It was obviously important to the German military itself that they were allowed to push their preferred strategy and tactics in intra-alliance negotiations.

Force Design: Troop Configuration and Command and Control.

As early as 1948, German military experts began to consider the security requirements for a future democratic Germany. Even then, these planners were adamant that German troops not lose vital cohesiveness and morale by being deployed in national units below the division level. German participation in any future defense scheme must be on equal terms (*Gleichberechtigung*) to those of other countries' units, and Germany must have full participation in the associated political framework.⁶⁸

A secret conference of German military experts in October 1951 produced the *Himmeroder Denkschrift*. This memo, heavily influenced by the traditional Prussian-German thinking of its participants, advocated that the main fighting unit remain the nationally homogeneous division. Furthermore, "German units should be integrated on equal terms with German officers receiving a corresponding (equal) position in an integrated command-staff."⁶⁹ National divisions were necessary to ensure maximum cohesiveness and morale, both essential to military effectiveness. In fact, the memo argued that Germany create nationally homogeneous units up to the corps level, accompanied by both tactical air and naval units.⁷⁰

With the onset of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 and the mounting support of the United States, France's adamant opposition to German rearmament started to wane. Realizing that the process may advance without their involvement, French premier René Pleven announced his plan for a European army on October 24, 1950. In essence the European Defence

Community (EDC) plan called for an integrated European military formation;

The armed forces of participating countries should not constitute a coalition army, something on the model of NATO, instead the personnel and material would be integrated "as completely as possible" into the smallest possible units. There should be neither a national German army nor a German general staff.⁷¹

While many high-ranking defense experts throughout the West raised serious doubts about the plan, U.S. and other Western leaders were anxious to rearm Germany as quickly as possible and thus accepted the idea. While Paris was less concerned with the Soviet menace than were the Americans, French politicians viewed the EDC as an opportunity to control German remilitarization in a way that did not threaten French security.

Recognizing that the Pleven Plan, as initially laid out, was militarily suspect and unacceptable to German negotiators, allied planners at the December 1950 NATO Brussels conference advanced the concept of a national self-standing *Kampfgruppen* or "combat teams."⁷² Simply, the combat group was a brigade in strength capable of independent action, roughly 5,000-6,000 soldiers. The French were still skeptical and responded with the idea of a smaller regimental combat group. In any case, France succumbed to U.S. and British pressure, and the French Council of Ministers approved the compromise on December 6, 1950.

Despite Anglo-American support for the EDC and France's acquiescence on the size of national units, Germany reacted negatively to the compromise plan for combat teams, regimental or otherwise. Besides

the considerable opposition among German and Allied military experts as to the functional utility of these units, German public opinion was increasingly critical of the Pleven Plan and its discriminatory treatment of the Federal Republic of Germany. In November 1950, the Adenauer government and the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) had suffered electoral losses, and many within the ruling coalition viewed this as a rejection of the rearmament plan. Significantly, SPD chief Kurt Schumacher also spoke out forcefully against the Plan, capturing the two primary concerns:

Denouncing it as “the murder of the European idea,” Schumacher said it would make a German contingent little more than a “foreign legion.” He argued that it made no sense militarily because the integration of units at the battalion level was inefficient. Even worse, it would mean that the Germans were giving up their own national interests to serve the Allies. “Nothing could be more foolhardy,” he revealingly declared, “than sacrificing the defense of one’s own country to the interests of others.”⁷³

As a result of these factors, Adenauer rejected the compromise. However, rather than give up on the plan completely, the Chancellor agreed to two sets of negotiations: one, to commence in January 1951 in Petersberg (a suburb outside of Bonn), with the Allied High Commissioners to discuss possible political changes that may accompany a German contribution to Western defense; and the other, beginning in February 1951, in Paris, to work out the more specific military details of the EDC.

While negotiations in Paris were proceeding, German military planners themselves were actively engaged in designing a new organizational outline

for the German division. At first they developed a design for a national division to be deployed within an integrated military called Division 51. This plan had to be scrapped, however, as a result of French objections and the EDC negotiations.

As the EDC talks became bogged down over the issue of unit size, etc., negotiators decided to postpone technical matters until the more general political questions of the EDC treaty had been decided. With France's refusal to ratify the EDC Treaty in August 1954, German military planners were freed from these constraints and once again developed a detailed design for a national division—Division 54. Division 54 was a heavily mechanized and mobile unit configured to operate in a nuclear battlefield.

Thus by late 1954, the debate shifted away from the appropriate size of a national unit to the question of type. German planners advocated that German ground forces, to consist of approximately 500,000 men in 12 divisions, be almost exclusively heavy mechanized panzer divisions. Allied planners, especially from the United States and the UK, disagreed, arguing that combat operations under conditions of nuclear war would most effectively be carried out on foot. They, therefore, insisted that German soldiers be deployed primarily in infantry divisions.

The debate went back and forth and ultimately became moot when German planners acknowledged extensive logistical and financial problems and postponed full mobilization for a number of years. Of note, the extensive negotiations in the Bundeswehr's formative phase demonstrate that German military leaders were adamant that German units be combat effective. In this regard, they were successful on the question of size—the nationally homogeneous division.

***Innere Führung* or Internal Guidance and Regulations.**

Work on the internal regulations of the Bundeswehr began almost as early as the initial decision to rearm. *Innere Führung*, loosely defined as internal guidance or inner leadership, is one of the most novel aspects of the post-World War II German armed forces. Succinctly, *Innere Führung* was designed to assure the domestic population that the new armed forces would not become a state within a state and, instead, foster the ideals of democracy, respect for human and individual rights, and rule of constitutional law.

These policies were designed, in part, so that the armed forces could act as a quasi-civil society for the nascent German democracy. Military veterans of the past totalitarian state, as well as young conscripts, would be trained and educated within a military organization fundamentally different from those of the past (as well as most other contemporary militaries.) Not only did its design and implementation have little to do with combat efficiency, a number of Germany's top military leaders and allied defense experts openly questioned its utility and possible consequences.

At its core, the goal of *Innere Führung* was to create or promote the ideal of "*Staatsbürger im Uniform*" or "citizen in uniform."

Innere Führung is time and time again very contentious. It has been so from the beginning. It has the goal of reforming the military from within with the assistance of the ideals of civilian citizens in military service, in order to adequately/appropriately integrate it in a democratic-parliamentary state structure and to maintain it finally in fundamental accordance with the pluralistic diversity of an open

society...The military should no longer stand against the citizenry. Citizens in uniform (should) want to conquer or give up the military mind, the subservient spirit, the oppression, the injustice and create a civil constitution within the military.⁷⁴

In what was explicitly designed to be a revolutionary break with the Prussian-German militaristic past, the reforms associated with this goal were aimed at preventing a repetition of past abuses and creating a military that mirrored the society it was to defend. (Interestingly, this objective mirrors later efforts in post-Apartheid South Africa).

In the past, the strict separation and isolation of the military from both the German state and society had created what many referred to as a state within a state. As the German political community struggled throughout its history with the transition to a stable democracy, the military often acted in ways that either retarded or outright reversed the intermittent gains by pro-democratic forces. In the post-World War II period, a number of important military and political leaders recognized that drastic reforms were necessary to assure the domestic population that a new German military would not return to such behavior.

Foremost among those committed to this radical departure from the past was Count Wolf von Baudissin. Baudissin's influence on the inner structure of the new German military began at the *Himmerod* Conference during the second half of 1950 when he was appointed to work on the committee responsible for matters related to the "*Innere Gefüge*" (inner structure) of the new army. In May 1951, Baudissin officially joined the *Dienststelle Blank*.⁷⁵ Placed in charge of the *Wehrwesen* office, he and his department were to assist in the

drafting of new military legislation and plan the inner structure of the German contribution to the EDC.

In terms of mission, Baudissin's reform effort was not necessarily unprecedented. Attempts to reform the German military were proposed numerous times; with Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August von Gneisenau's reforms of the Prussian military in the wake of its defeat at the hands of Napoleon Bonaparte perhaps the most famous. Realizing that a new military had to be acceptable (legitimate) both domestically and internationally, Baudissin and other reformers argued that future German soldiers must be thoroughly integrated within the society they were being asked to defend (the most effective means would be the subject of considerable debate). Due to drastic changes both in the nature of technology and warfare, and political and social conditions of 20th century society, soldiers must receive new types of military training as well as a new sense of purpose.

In regards to the second matter, a new emphasis on political and ideological education was necessary. Abandoning the barracks training and endless drilling of the past, military education was to be designed around the core objective of preparing Germans to become "political soldiers." Deterring war and conflict was first and foremost. "Indeed, the reformer argued that nuclear-era soldiers were faced with the paradox that they would have failed in their mission if forced to implement their deadly skills."⁷⁶

Furthermore, soldiers must be educated in the basics of the new West German political and social system. Utilizing both internal regulations and military universities, both conscripts and professional soldiers would constantly be exposed to the primacy of parliamentary control, the importance of legal rights,

and the fact that the Bundeswehr was to reflect the political and cultural diversity present in the Federal Republic. In addition, soldiers were to possess the same democratic rights and obligations as their fellow civilians. Beyond the soldiers themselves, the reforms of *Innere Führung* had an added importance.

The future army would also have an important educational role in society. Baudissin hoped that the armed forces would win young people for a united Europe and “lead them to the new state (the Federal Republic).” Such purposes reflected his self-proclaimed kinship with the Prussian reformers of the early nineteenth century and their belief that the army should make the subjects of the sovereign into citizens of the nation. The new army would be a school of Europe.⁷⁷

As might be expected, the plans for reforming the German armed forces were met with considerable internal and external opposition. Domestically, numerous opponents to military reforms, including both experts within the government and ex-officers in veterans’ organizations, expressed considerable skepticism as to the utility of reforms and their prospects for success. Criticism seemed to center on two areas of concern: first, the reformers were unwilling to acknowledge the progressive nature of the past which was, in part, responsible for the high quality of past performance, and/or second, that the military reforms would threaten combat effectiveness and morale.⁷⁸

The reforms envisioned in *Innere Führung* were not only revolutionary for the German military, in many respects, these changes were far more progressive than any of the internal rules and regulations in the allied armed forces. With membership in NATO, the most meaningful criticism would come increasingly from

the United States. Of note, the U.S. military's primary concern was with military efficacy. Baudissin visited the United States in 1955 and was disappointed to find out that the United States had little use for *Innere Führung*. "They simply wanted German soldiers—as numerous, competent, and rapidly mobilized as possible," he complained. "The last thing they wanted to hear was how radically 'new' their German partners would look and behave."⁷⁹

Similar to subsequent developments in the future democratic South Africa, political and military imperatives were crucial factors for German political and defense planners in the design of their armed forces. Whereas considerably more attention was paid to the military aspects of the Bundeswehr due to the heightened threat level accompanying the emerging Cold War, decisionmakers were also conscious of the need to guarantee civilian control and respect for the democratic constitution. Finally, the German armed forces were seen as an essential mechanism for the construction and maintenance of a democratic society.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STATE AND NATION-BUILDING EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, AND ELSEWHERE

While it has been over 8 years since the initial military defeat of the Taliban, the reconstruction of Afghanistan is still in its very early stages. That has not prevented a flurry of ideas, plans, agreements, and criticisms. Unfortunately, early optimism has given way to grave concern as counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban and efforts to develop the Afghan national armed forces have proven far more complicated than initially planned. It is therefore far beyond the scope of this analysis (and perhaps premature) to

present an exhaustive list of the successes and failures to date. Also, the situation in Iraq, although increasingly hopeful, remains tentative. Therefore, the purpose of this brief section is to highlight a few, very important aspects of the military restructuring in the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa as the two emerged from their violent rogue past and attempted to rejoin the international community. Of note, some of these policies, such as vetting of soldiers and officers and political and civic education, have been implemented in both countries. While it will take many years (perhaps generations) before the fruits of these efforts will be realized, it is not too early to introduce these ideas and have government planners, in-county policymakers, and area specialists evaluate whether they are appropriate, and if not how they can be adjusted.

Transparency.

Although the process of German remilitarization initially took place under considerable secrecy, once the decision had been reached, deliberations became much more open. South African defense planning also placed a high premium on openness and actively solicited ideas and comments from a wide spectrum of South African society. Given the totalitarian past of both Iraq and Afghanistan, policymakers should avoid charges of hyper-secrecy and attempt to assure these societies that the future armed forces are truly theirs.

Legislative Monitoring Mechanisms.

Permanent institutional mechanisms should be created to guarantee that opposition leaders and members of parliament would be active participants in the

creation and structuring of civil-military institutions. This will not only ease their approval of funding and deployment, but also ensure that they share the responsibility for the armed forces.

Representative Armed Forces.

Either through limited conscription or proactive recruitment and personnel policies, efforts should be made to ensure that the armed forces mirror the political community they are being asked to defend. This enhances the military's legitimacy and eases suspicions that the organization will unfairly target specific religious, ethnic or regional groups. Also, while more systematic analysis needs to be done on the possible sociological effects of military service, this may offer a significant contribution to the process of nation-building in ethnically and religiously divided countries.

Political Education.

With representative democracy new to Iraq and Afghanistan, training in democratic values, the importance of the rule of law, civilian primacy over the military, etc., are vital to the military's continued willingness to respect and support legitimate civilian authority. Also, soldiers and officers will take these ideas and values home with them and, one hopes, expose them to a much wider audience. Given the relative importance of foreign military trainers and advisors, efforts must also be made to ensure their education in and familiarity with democratic values.

Vetting of Officers and Legitimate National Security Responsibilities.

While not without some reluctance, both the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa employed military leaders and personnel from their past. Officer boards were created to make sure that potential officers were politically acceptable and thus did not threaten the transition process. In both cases this process was important not only for the military itself but also society at large.

Despite the troubles and past abuses, many looked back with some pride and were unwilling (or unable) to accept the fact that anyone with prior military experience was still an enemy and/or had nothing to offer the future. Employing these prior service personnel also makes good military sense in that it eases the burden of training an entirely new officer corps. Finally, the military, as a professional organization, must be an active participant in defining its country's national security strategy and given genuine policymaking responsibilities.

CONCLUSION

Designing democratic civil-military institutions is obviously a formidable task. These efforts are all the more difficult for states with authoritarian, militaristic pasts. When this is coupled with social and economic conditions characterized by inequality and enmity, efforts at democratic state and nation-building may prove elusive.

However, the political rehabilitation of Germany, culminating in its current leadership role in European

integration, demonstrates that successful democratic state building is possible. While South Africa's efforts at both state and nation-building are still in their early stages, qualified progress has been made. In both cases, I argued that military institutions played a vital role.

On the surface, this is not a contentious or innovative claim. However, when one analyzes in detail the multifaceted approach to the design of civil-military institutions in these countries, one realizes how extensive a role they were able to play. They were constructed not only to respond to the countries' core security requirements, but also proactively designed to promote democratic ideals and civic values and assist in the reconstruction of the national community.

With combat operations still underway in both Afghanistan and Iraq, it is hard to be too optimistic. Furthermore, many confounding variables stand in the way of successful democratic transitions in these two countries. For example, without substantial and prolonged international involvement and assistance, prospects for democratic transition will not be as hopeful in Iraq and Afghanistan as they were in Germany and South Africa. Nonetheless, if one were to ask informed observers in the summer of 1945 what the prospects of a democratic Germany were, or the same question in the late 1980s about South Africa, most would have responded with similar skepticism and perhaps scorn.

ENDNOTES

1. The U.S. Department of Defense is required to provide regular assessments on the progress of establishing security and stability in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Reports on Iraq are available from www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/, and the most recent report on Afghanistan is available from www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/1230_June2009Final.pdf.

2. For a few early policy-related discussions on a future Afghan military, see Anja Manuel and P. W. Singer, "A New Model Afghan Army," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4, July/August 2002; and Mark Sedra, *Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, Working Paper #25, Bonn, Germany: International Center for Conversion, 2002. For more recent studies of the status and progress in the Afghani and Iraqi militaries, see Olga Oliker, *Iraqi Security Forces: Defining the Challenges and Assessing Progress*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, March 2007; and Cheryl Bernard, Ole Kværnø, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, and Kirsten Cordell, eds., *Afghanistan: State and Society, Great Power Politics, and the Way Ahead*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008, particularly Chap. 11.

3. James Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 29, No. 1, Fall 2002, pp. 7-29.

4. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard Press, 1957/1964.

5. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960.

6. Burk, p.8.

7. Huntington, p. 83.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

10. Janowitz, p. 101.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 439.

12. Burk, p. 12.

13. Interestingly, both Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa had systems of civil-military relations in which the armed forces were technically subordinate to civilian authorities. While

neither was democratic in the sense of universal suffrage, free and fair elections, etc., ultimate authority rested in the hands of civilians—the *Führer* or the President.

14. Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, eds., *Democratic Control of the Military in Post-communist Europe: Guarding the Guards*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001; Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, eds., *The Challenge of Military Reform in Post-communist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002; and Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, eds., *Soldiers and Societies in Post-communist Europe: Legitimacy and Change*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Also, for an earlier insightful analysis of the transition of the Czech and Russian armed forces, see Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.

15. Forster, *et al.*, eds., *Democratic Control of the Military in Post-communist Europe: Guarding the Guards*.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

17. Forster, *et al.*, eds., *The Challenge of Military Reform in Post-communist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces*.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-12.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 250.

21. Forster, *et al.*, eds., *Soldiers and Societies in Post-communist Europe: Legitimacy and Change*.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

24. For a thorough definition of security sector reform, see Sean McFate, "Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries," *Special Report 209*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 2008. For those

interested more specifically in the relationship of civil-military relations and security sector reform, see Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, New York: United Nations University Press, 2006.

25. McFate, p. 2.

26. Robert M. Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990*, New York and London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991.

27. Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, New Haven, CT: Yale Nota Bene, Yale University Press, 2001, p. 265.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 265-266.

29. Philip Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm: the Armed Forces in South Africa's Democratic Transition*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000, p. 2.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-14.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24. This in effect left the South African Police as the primary villain of the apartheid era abuses. As Philip Frankel wrote, "the SAP now became the sacrificial lamb for apartheid atrocities."

32. Gavin Cawthra, "From 'Total Strategy' to 'Human Security': The Making of South Africa's Defence Policy 1990-98," *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Paper*, Copenhagen, Denmark: March 1999, p. 8.

33. *Defence in a Democracy White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa*, Pretoria, South Africa: Department of Defence, Republic of South Africa, May 1996.

34. *South African Defence Review*, Pretoria, South Africa: Department of Defence, Republic of South Africa, 1998.

35. Thompson, p. 270.

36. *Defence in a Democracy White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa*, p. 9.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 9-11.

38. Frankel, p. 118.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

40. *Defence in a Democracy White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa*.

41. *South African Defence Review*, Chap. 2, p. 1.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Defence in a Democracy White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa*, p. 5.

44. *South African Defence Review*, Chap. 7, "Non Military Tasks."

45. Increasingly, critics in South Africa have raised numerous concerns about the status and combat effectiveness of the SANDF. Most of these problems, however, are a product of underfunding, poor training, and/or health issues such as HIV/AIDS. For an eye-opening discussion on the problem of HIV/AIDS in the SANDF, see Lindy Heinecken, "Facing a Merciless Enemy: HIV/AIDS and the South African Armed Forces," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 29, No. 2, Winter 2003, pp. 281-300.

46. Susan Willett, "The Pariah Comes in from the Cold: South Africa's Changing Security Environment," *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Paper*, Copenhagen, Denmark: April 1998, pp. 10-11.

47. Willie Bokala, "We are an Integrated Force," *Johannesburg Sowetan*, March 24, 2003, p.5.

48. The *South African Defence Review* outlines four options for the SANDF force structure. Chosen because it was deemed most cost-effective and within means, Option #1 calls for 22,000

full-time and 70,000 part-time soldiers. See *South African Defence Review*, Chap. 8, "Force Design Options."

49. *Ibid.*

50. *Ibid.*, Chap. 3, "Self-defence and the Peacetime Force," pp. 1-10.

51. According to the *South African Defence Review*, the goal is to create a "Rainbow Part-Time Component" that mirrors the South African "Rainbow Nation." Chap. 11, "The Part Time Component," *South African Defence Review*, 1998, p. 20.

52. Frankel, p. 101.

53. *Defence in a Democracy White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa*; and *South African Defence Review*.

54. Contacts with the U.S. Defense Equal Opportunities Management Institute were established as early as 1994. See Frankel, pp. 203-204.

55. Frankel, p. 137.

56. *South African Defence Review*, Chap. 10, "Human Resources."

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

58. Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1988, pp. 167-169.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 123. For a very enlightening discussion of the waxing role of the Bundestag Security Committee, see Chap. 6, "The Bundestag Security Committee Takes Up the Issue," pp. 121-135.

60. Frank Buchholz, *Strategische und militärpolitische Diskussionen in der Gründungsphase der Bundeswehr 1949-1960 (Strategic and Political-Military Discussions (Debates) in the Founding of the Bundeswehr 1949-1960)*, Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Verlag Peter Lang GmbH. 1991, p. 128.

61. *Ibid.*

62. Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 744.

63. Military History Research Institute, *The Beginning of West German Security Policy 1949-1956, Vol. 3, "The NATO Option*, Munich, Germany: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993, p. 605.

64. *Ibid.*

65. Johannes M. Becker, *Die Remilitarisierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und das deutsch-französische Verhältnis: die Haltung führender Offiziere (1945-1955)* (The Remilitarization of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German-French Relationship: The Opinions of the Higher Officers (1945-1955), Marburg, Germany: Hitzroth Verlag, 1987, p. 83.

66. *Military History Research Institute.*

67. *Ibid.*

68. David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996, pp. 38-41. Also see Hans Speidel, Klaus von Schubert, ed., *Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Dokumentation, 1945-1977 (The Security Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany: Documents, 1945-1977)*, 2 vols., Cologne, Germany: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1978-1979, Vol. 2, pp. 65-81.

69. Buchholz, p.126.

70. Large, pp. 97-103.

71. Military History Research Institute, p. 33.

72. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34. This concept was part of a larger attempt to bridge the gap between German and French ideas. It was called the Spofford Compromise, named after Charles Spofford, the U.S. representative on the North Atlantic Council. See Large, pp. 95-107.

73. Large, p. 103. For a more lengthy example of Schumacher's concerns with the Pleven Plan, see "Rede des Oppositionsführers Kurt Schumacher (SPD) in der Debatte des Deutschen Bundestages vom 8.11.1950" ("Speech by Opposition Leader Kurt Schumacher (SPD) in the Debate in the German Bundestag on November 8, 1950), Klaus von Schubert, ed., pp. 106-110.

74. Detlef Bald, *Militär und Gesellschaft 1945-1990: Die Bundeswehr der Bonner Republik (Military and Society 1945-1990: The Bundeswehr of the Bonn Republic)*, Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994, p. 53.

75. At this point, the Federal Republic was not legally allowed to establish a defense ministry. Instead, Adenauer created a section of the government, directly responsible to his office, in charge of military affairs. Headed by Theodor Blank, the office assumed the semi-official title of *Dienststelle Blank*.

76. Large, p. 183.

77. Abenheim, p. 97.

78. Large, pp. 184-192.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

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