




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Keeping the “Non” in the Non-Nuclear Weapon States



**Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference 2010 Papers – 5**

**Keeping the “Non” in the
Non-Nuclear Weapon States**

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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a treaty that aspires to being universal, but is also discriminatory. Members are divided into Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States, also known within arms control circles by their acronyms: the NWS—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—which are the states recognized within the NPT as having tested a nuclear warhead before 1 January 1968; and the NNWS, which are the remaining members without nuclear weapons.

Under the Treaty, the NWS have agreed to work toward nuclear disarmament,¹ and the NNWS have agreed to forswear the possession of nuclear weapons. This paper will review the commitments, challenges and concerns of NNWS with a focus on what motivates them to stay in the Treaty in a way that builds confidence among all members.

¹ For additional background on the NWS, see a previous paper in this series by Chris Lindborg and Nicholas Meros, “Treading Water in 2010: Nuclear Weapon States and Nuclear Disarmament,” BASIC Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2010 Papers —2, 20 April 2010, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/BASIC-NPT-TreadingWaterin2010.pdf>

Background

The NPT alone is not the only block to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it is considered to be the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Today, the Treaty has 184 NNWS – all the states in existence that do not have nuclear weapons. Between the moment when the NPT entered into force in 1970, and today, only one country—North Korea—has abandoned the Treaty.² Beyond the five NWS and North Korea, the three other countries that have nuclear weapons: India, Israel, and Pakistan, were never members.

The NPT rests on its three pillars: global moves toward complete nuclear disarmament; preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; and ensuring safe access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. But the temporary discrimination at the heart of the Treaty has created an avoidable tension between NWS and NNWS that has on occasion boiled over on the floor of the Review Conferences. The NWS have not trusted one another or some of the non-nuclear members enough to make bolder moves on disarmament and feel frustrated with the manner in which states challenge the status quo or cheer on others when they do so. The NWS’ unwillingness to abandon their attachment to nuclear weapons has in turn increased suspicions among NNWS that the

² There has been some debate over whether North Korea’s declaration of withdrawal actually met NPT standards and thus whether it can actually be claimed that it is no longer a Treaty member. (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” Canberra/Tokyo. First published in November 2009. Reprinted December 2009. P. 88.) Although North Korea is thought to have the material and capability to have up to nine nuclear weapons, it is unknown whether it has such a stockpile.

Treaty is being used to keep them down and restrict their access to technology.

The NNWS are not monolithic in their approach. Each NNWS surveys where it fits in strategic relation to other countries both inside and outside of the Treaty while considering its own military, economic, social and internal political interests and dynamics. Some of them have closer relations with the NWS (even taking shelter under their nuclear umbrellas), while others have tumultuous histories with those powers, and these relations also influence their approach to the NPT.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), with 116 members in the NPT, is the largest and most vocal grouping of NNWS. India and Pakistan are the only two NAM members not in the Treaty. The group actively and repeatedly reminds NWS of their disarmament commitments under Article VI, and their promises under Article IV not to obstruct the rights of NNWS to develop and access nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

A group of seven countries formed the separate “New Agenda Coalition” (NAC) in advance of the 2000 NPT Review Conference specifically for the purpose of more effectively advocating for nuclear disarmament under the NPT. The NAC includes the active NNWS members of Brazil, Egypt (currently head of the NAM), Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. They were particularly successful soon after forming, being largely responsible for the negotiations that led to the thirteen disarmament steps within the 2000 Final Document. Since then, though, they have not been so active.

NNWS commitments and challenges

NNWS have accepted their requirements under Articles II and III of the Treaty – not to acquire or

seek to acquire nuclear weapons or associated technology; and to have International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and verification arrangements in place covering facilities and materials. All NPT members with relevant nuclear activities have “Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements”³ (CSAs) with the IAEA.⁴

To help alleviate concerns arising from the experience with Iraq in the 1990s, where safeguards arrangements were successfully evaded, the Agency’s Board approved in 1997 the model Additional Protocol (AP), as a basis for individually tailored APs providing more thorough access and short-notice inspections. Ninety-six countries have APs in force, but there is little chance of them becoming mandatory in the near future.⁵ Notably, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Syria and Venezuela have not signed APs, nor have non-NPT members Israel, North Korea or Pakistan. Both India and Iran have signed but not ratified APs.

Balancing Articles III (verification) and IV (access to civil technology) has become a greater challenge for the regime. Article IV rights are conditional on compliance with Article II, while Article III explicitly states that its provisions cannot undermine Article IV rights. The Final Document of the 2000 RevCon

³ NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Overview of Status, IAEA website, as of 7 April 2010, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/npt_status_overview.html

⁴ David Cliff, “The 2010 NPT Review: Prospects for Verification,” *Trust & Verify*, VERTIC, January – March 2010, Issue No. 128, p. 2.

⁵ Status of Additional Protocols, IAEA website, updated as of 7 April 2010, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html

made the right to produce nuclear energy also contingent on compliance with Article III.⁶

NNWS allow monitoring and verification over sensitive activities and materials, but in an atmosphere of mistrust additional questions arise over secret facilities. The crisis over Iran’s nuclear program is the contemporary focus. The United States, United Kingdom and France have led the charge in pressuring Iran to cease its uranium enrichment because of suspicions over its level of compliance and intentions to use some of the uranium for a weapons program. Tehran denies work on a weapons program, claims to have been in full compliance and affirms that its program is for peaceful purposes, and thus has a right to continue enrichment. Tehran had also worked with the IAEA on an AP, which it has signed, provisionally implemented in 2003 but suspended in 2005, and has not yet ratified. Many suspect Iran of aiming for high nuclear latency – the capacity to break out and rapidly develop a nuclear arsenal at short notice – within the NPT. Iran will choose to use the Review Conference to voice its position and frustrations, and there is likely to be some disagreement on issues surrounding compliance that could become the block to a Final Document.⁷

Syria’s recent actions have also raised suspicions, that led to an Israeli military strike in September

⁶ Cliff, p. 6.

⁷ For more background on the Iran crisis within the NPT context, see the previous paper in this series by Paul Ingram, “Non-proliferation requires disarmament, and vice versa: Advice to the Iranian Government as it seeks to challenge the nuclear order at the NPT Review Conference,” BASIC Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2010 Papers —3, 21 April 2010, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/BASIC-NPT2010Iran.pdf>

2007 on a facility they believed was intended for clandestine nuclear enrichment. Little evidence was left behind to prove the intended purpose of the facility.⁸ During its permitted visit, the IAEA “found particles of anthropogenic natural uranium” and noted, “Given that Syria has no reported inventory of natural uranium, this calls into question the completeness and correctness of Syria’s declarations concerning nuclear material and facilities,”⁹ which means that Syria may have violated its CSA. Syria refused further access for the Agency despite multiple requests. The IAEA refrained from using its powers of “special inspections,” which would have given the Agency the authority to inspect undeclared sites within the country. The IAEA’s decision was criticized for establishing precedent and limiting its future effectiveness.¹⁰

These experiences have heightened worries about countries trying to ride the regime while developing nuclear capabilities, and then leaving the Treaty before putting the pieces together for a full-fledged nuclear weapons program, described as “break out”.

⁸ “U.S. Sees Growing Proof of Illicit Syrian Nuclear Program,” Global Security Newswire, 6 March 2009, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090306_4600.php

⁹ Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report by the Director General, IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2010/11, 18 February 2010, Made available on the website of the Institute for Science and International Security, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Report_Syria_18Feb2010.pdf

¹⁰ For example, see James M. Acton, Mark Fitzpatrick, Pierre Goldschmidt, “The IAEA Should Call for a Special Inspection of Syria,” *Proliferation Analysis*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 26 February 2009, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22791>

With the likely spread of nuclear technology, the dangers are becoming more acute.

Considerations for stronger measures

Numerous proposals seek to block break out, either through threat or enticement. The European Union has proposed that the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy be conditional on the AP. But key members Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Syria and Venezuela have strongly resisted signing an AP, on the grounds that they deem it an unnecessary and burdensome interference with their sovereign rights, an effort to control access to technology, and also fails to account for their concerns within the NPT. The Middle East presents the greatest challenge here.¹¹ Only Jordan and Kuwait have APs in force, and non-NPT member Israel presents a strong reason for other states to hold out on stronger non-proliferation measures.

Some NAM members have linked accepting APs as the new verification standard to a time when the NPT becomes universal, with India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea joining as NNWS.¹² Some have also

¹¹ For more background and recommendation on managing nuclear proliferation within the Middle East, see a previous paper in this series by Anne Penketh, “Peeling the Onion: Towards a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone,” BASIC Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2010 Papers —1, 19 March 2010, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/BASIC-PeelingtheOnion.pdf>

¹² Michael Spies, “Towards 2010 and Beyond: Proposals, Positions and Prospects: Issues facing the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Issue No. 90, Spring 2009.

pointed to the prior need for CSAs to become universal, including and especially Israel.¹³

Meanwhile, some ambitious states are proposing to further expand the IAEA’s remit to include even more intrusive measures beyond the current APs, an “AP-Plus”.¹⁴ Debate has also arisen over the extent to which the Agency is responsible for investigating related weaponization activity – an issue which has also been relevant to the Iran crisis.¹⁵ Earlier in this series, BASIC’s Executive Director, Paul Ingram, proposes in a paper aimed at the Iranian government that strengthening cooperation with the Agency in developing stronger safeguards and verification measures would provide the necessary concrete global leadership to promote the disarmament other states have up to now only been talking about.¹⁶

The Treaty protects the legal right for members to leave under Article X. Proposals include a requirement to return any relevant equipment

¹³ Spies, Spring 2009. For more background on this topic, see “Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East,” Report by the Director General, GOV/2004/61-GC(48)/18, 20 August 2004, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/GC48Documents/English/gc48-18_en.pdf

¹⁴ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, p. 85.

¹⁵ Cliff, p. 4.

¹⁶ See “Non-proliferation requires disarmament, and vice versa: advice to the Iranian Government as it seeks to challenge the nuclear order at the NPT Review Conference,” BASIC Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2010 Papers —3, April 2010, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/BASIC-NPT2010Iran.pdf>

imported while a member of the NPT.¹⁷ U.N. Security Council Resolution 1887 of last September required accountability of withdrawing states for any violations committed while an NPT member.

However, key NAM members currently oppose tighter inspection measures, stronger withdrawal provisions and restrictions on nuclear energy programs.¹⁸

Proposals around a guaranteed international supply of uranium are seen as another avenue for managing the spread of nuclear technology as energy demands increase. Some require participating states to implement more stringent verification measures. But even those without such additional measures are seen by some NNWS as reinforcing inequities and leaving states further dependent. They suspect it could lead to the creation of new rules and requirements that restrict their rights to national programs.¹⁹ A proposal put forward by Germany for a Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP) may be as far as they would go.²⁰

¹⁷ See for example the European Union’s working paper on withdrawal, Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2010 Review Conference, 3 May 2007.

¹⁸ Colum Lynch, “Foreign Policy: Dawn of the Nuclear Backlash,” National Public Radio website, 21 April 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126158682>

¹⁹ Deepti Choubey, “Are New Nuclear Bargains Attainable?” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008, p. 20, especially quotation by South African official.

²⁰ This German proposal would provide “interested States that would like to have their own access to enrichment capacities independent from the technology holders. Interested States would establish one or several multilateral enrichment companies ...that would operate

Key concerns of NNWS

NNWS in general seek to protect their Article IV rights to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and hold the NWS to account for their Article VI promise to work toward nuclear disarmament.²¹ More specifically, on the enforcement of non-proliferation obligations, some NNWS feel from their perspective the focus is unfair when *enforcement* of NWS’ disarmament obligations under the Treaty is non-existent. NNWS are asked to lock themselves into complex and costly arrangements to reassure others they are sticking to their promises, while they are asked simply to trust the NWS will eventually fulfill their duties when the time suits them to do so.²²

Iranian leaders frequently point to the international pressures on them to halt enrichment of uranium as violations of their Article IV rights. And though many NNWS fear the Iranian program may well be a cover to achieve nuclear latency, some have at the same time indicated sympathy with this claim. The NAM

under regular market conditions...The enrichment company or companies would be located in an area administered by the IAEA.” The arrangement would not preclude a participating state from developing its own indigenous capacity. (Communication dated 22 September 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of Germany to the Agency regarding the German proposal on a Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project, IAEA Information Circular, INFCIRC/735, 25 September 2008, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infirc735.pdf>)

²¹ Many NNWS representatives have felt that NWS push the non-proliferation agenda at the expense of attention paid to disarmament. For a discussion based on extensive interviews with officials from NNWS countries, see Choubey, 2008.

²² Spies, Spring 2009.

last year called on states “to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.”²³

H.E. Maged A. Abdelaziz, Egypt’s Ambassador to the United Nations and Chairman of the NAM in 2010, recently lamented the overemphasis on non-proliferation requirements in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1887, hailed by NWS leaders as a major reaffirmation of their disarmament commitments. Abdelaziz warned, “We are not as non-nuclear states going to accept that each time there is progress in disarmament that we have to take more obligations on our side.”²⁴

In an effort to hold NWS accountable to the Article VI commitment, NNWS have on many occasions called for a variety of specific actions on nuclear disarmament. The NWS collectively still retain many thousands of nuclear warheads and a majority of those are still held by Russia and the United States. Though they acknowledge there has been progress in reducing numbers and the salience of these weapons, they also sense that there is little clear intention, beyond the words, to achieve full nuclear disarmament. The NAM, for instance, have

²³ Substantive recommendations to the Third session of the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 Review Conference Working Paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 6 May 2009, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.30, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/328/80/PDF/N0932880.pdf?OpenElement>

²⁴ Colum Lynch, “Foreign Policy: Dawn of the Nuclear Backlash,” National Public Radio website, 21 April 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126158682>

emphasized the principles of “transparency, verifiability and irreversibility” for all of the NWS in working toward disarmament,²⁵ and the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) does not meet all of these criteria (although the United States released figures on its active warhead stockpile as this report was being published).²⁶ If the new START is agreed by the Duma and Senate, these two countries will have a limit on deployed strategic warheads of about 1,500 on each side, but still be able to retain many thousands in reserve – some of which could be deployed after the Treaty expires. Although the verification regime accompanying the treaty and the overall contribution to Russian-U.S. relations is to be lauded, such numbers suggest that there should be no expectation for the other NWS, which have significantly smaller arsenals, to greatly reduce their stockpiles anytime soon.

Beyond reducing inventories, NWS need to move away from relying upon nuclear weapons in their postures if they are to convince NNWS of their intention to fulfill their disarmament duty. Otherwise, the Treaty risks being seen as a flawed method of keeping steady the numbers of states holding nuclear weapons, at some considerable cost to NNWS security.

NNWS have in particular demanded from the NWS negative security assurances (NSAs) - promises that they will not be threatened with nuclear weapons. Bad enough, they say, that NWS still possess these

²⁵ 2010 Review Conference Working Paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States parties, 6 May 2009.

²⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 3 May 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf

weapons, but to use them to threaten an NPT state without nuclear weapons that may not have fulfilled its safeguards responsibilities is not only unjust but also dangerous and destructive to the Treaty.

The request for security guarantees has not been easily answered. Only China has a policy of no-first-use, which applies across the board for NWS and NNWS. Other NWS have given conditional, non-legally binding NSAs. NWS have given guarantees to NNWS in some of the nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) that have included legally binding protocols.

One of the key positive initiatives in the Obama Administration’s recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was the guarantee of non-use to NNWS in compliance with the Treaty. The exclusion of those deemed by the United States not to be in compliance, however, has reduced the beneficial impact, and led to questions over the possible implication of a continued U.S. nuclear threat against certain NNWS when all NWS should focus on negotiating away their nuclear weapons.

NWS have been inclined to maintain a nuclear ambiguity—to keep their nuclear options open—especially in cases where they worry about possible biological attacks or that their conventional forces might be insufficient for perceived threats. But this leaves NNWS exposed.

The NNWS have also called for reducing the alert status of nuclear weapons, the commencement on a fissile materials treaty, and for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). On the CTBT, some NNWS have demanded that the remaining NWS holdouts – namely China and the United States – ratify the Treaty before the remaining NNWS take their turn.

Immediately before the 2010 RevCon, the NAM released its “Elements for a Plan of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.”²⁷ In addition to calling for agreement on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, the plan recommends many steps that should be taken within three specific time frames. The first (2010-15) of three phases incorporates many of the measures already mentioned, with the second phase (2015-20) focusing on greater reductions in nuclear arsenals and related materials in a verifiable manner. The final phase (2020-25 and beyond) includes the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the establishment of universal safeguards on all nuclear facilities –restricting all of them to peaceful purposes.

What would useful movement by NNWS look like in support of the NPT?

On the other hand, Article VI is a responsibility of all member states, not just NWS. Whatever the moral arguments, disarmament will require all states to cooperate in creating the conditions that allow disarmament to be achieved, and NNWS have a role to play in creating those conditions – strengthening the confidence that no state will be able to break out while others follow non-proliferation rules and disarm.

The problem for NNWS is that they are caught in a trap. The threat of proliferation is both a motivation for disarmament, and a block to it. If there were no threat, there may be insufficient NWS motivation to

²⁷ “Elements for a Plan of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons by the Group of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT,” 30 April 2010, available on the website of the Institute for Science and International Security, http://isis-online.org/uploads/conferences/documents/NAM_Plan_of_Action_for_2010_NPT_RevCon_30April2010.pdf

engage in full nuclear disarmament. They might be tempted to retain the status quo, comfortable in exploiting the benefits derived from their status. But at the very same time, the threat of proliferation also undermines the confidence necessary for disarmament. Some within the NAM clearly see their possible agreements to ever-strengthening non-proliferation measures as a leverage against NWS (and those outside the Treaty), and are keen not to give up too much too soon.

Because of its discriminatory nature, the NPT is particularly vulnerable to vicious cycles of ever increasing negative reaction unless concrete and constructive actions are taken by all of its members.

Following up on their International Commission, chaired by Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi,²⁸ Australia and Japan have offered a “joint package” of realistic recommendations aimed at building consensus around all three pillars of the NPT in an effort to make it more sustainable. Such a package recognizes the reality that proposals are essentially linked, and that disarmament requires stronger non-proliferation and vice versa. Responsibilities for NNWS within the Commission’s recommendations include:²⁹

²⁸ For the report and other information on the Commission see: <http://www.icnnd.org/>

²⁹ The recommendations also include measures on nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For the full list of 16 points, see “A New Package of Practical Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Measures for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 24 March 2010, available on the website of the Australian Government Minister for Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2010/fas100324.html>

Bringing the CTBT into force

The CTBT requires key states, including three NNWS (Egypt, Iran and Indonesia), to ratify prior to entering into force. The CTBT would reduce confidence in the reliability of new nuclear weapon designs, and therefore be an important break on their development. The NAM clearly believes that “the five nuclear weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in making the test ban a reality;”³⁰ but there is no clear reason beyond negotiating tactics why this exclusive responsibility should exist.

APs

Agreeing Additional Protocols with the IAEA will also strengthen confidence and develop a virtuous circle of cooperation within the global regime. Stronger verification measures will be required as technology develops and spreads.

Rules for those who leave

NPT members should agree on rules for ensuring the systematic return of nuclear materials and equipment, and materials developed with such equipment, acquired while the state resided under the Treaty. Such a measure makes clear that there are certain benefits to be had from being full NPT members remaining in good standing. However, some NNWS have come to doubt the Treaty’s

³⁰ Substantive recommendations to the Third session of the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 Review Conference Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 6 May 2009, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.30, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/328/80/PDF/N0932880.pdf?OpenElement>

exclusive benefits in the light of the recent nuclear deal with India.³¹

NWFZs

Nuclear weapon-free zones and/or zones free of weapons of mass destruction that are organized by regional groupings formalize arrangements supporting the exclusion of nuclear weapons, and can also help focus on the more specific security needs of its members. The quest for a so-far elusive zone in the Middle East could open up new routes for its very insecure members to grapple with these difficult issues.³²

Conclusion

NNWS perceptions of security are still strongly influenced by the big powers. The NPT will be

³¹ The 2008 deal struck between India and the United States, once finalized, will allow the United States to assist India’s civilian nuclear program. The deal has been criticized for worsening the feeling of inequities around the regime because India has never been a member of the NPT, but the United States still wants to provide the kind of assistance that would be expected under Article IV rights. During the General Debate of the last Preparatory Committee meeting, the Indonesian representative noted, “It is regrettable that certain States Parties of the NPT have endorsed nuclear cooperation with a non-State party, thus providing an incentive for that country to remain outside the regime, and in essence, rewarding such behavior.” Statement by H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, at the general Debate of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 5 May 2009, made available on the website of Reaching Critical Will, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom09/statements/5May_Indonesia.pdf

³² Penketh, 19 March 2010.

strengthened if NWS can demonstrate a reduction in their nuclear threat toward NNWS, and manage issues of extended deterrence that lower the salience of nuclear weapons. NNWS have their own contributions they can make to this agenda. It is a joint mission in the moves toward a world free of nuclear weapons.³³

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³³ For a thorough discussion of the responsibilities of NWS and NNWS in moves closer to zero, see Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, *A World Without Nuclear Weapons: End State Issues*, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 2009.