



Searching for Aid Effectiveness in Small Arms Assistance

Kerry Maze

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FOREWORD

International assistance and cooperation for implementing the UN Programme of Action to Combat, Prevent and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects is essential. The states most affected by the illicit proliferation and misuse of small arms are often the states with the fewest resources to address the issue.

The Programme of Action has now been underway for nine years. In this time, states and international, regional and civil society organizations have undertaken several commendable projects and programmes to help states address the illicit small arms in their territory and to strengthen their national small arms controls. As the international community, we have also significantly improved our understanding of the complex, multi-faceted and transnational nature of small arms. However, we do not know if the assistance that is provided and received is effective in bringing us closer to successful implementation of the Programme of Action and if the assistance is undertaken in the most strategic and coordinated manner.

In my capacity as Chair of the 2010 Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action, it has become clear to me the value and importance states place on the subject of assistance and cooperation, stressing the importance of developing strategies that include aspects of both combat and prevention of the illicit trade of arms. I am convinced that prevention will enable us to reach concrete and long-term results in curbing the illicit trade of arms and the devastating effects that it has in our societies. I am pleased that states support the idea of devoting a session to assistance and cooperation during the meeting, and look forward to the issue being addressed in the outcome document.

I also warmly welcome the initiative of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to take stock of the existing policy commitments and frameworks on SALW assistance and to point out some of the challenges that states and organizations face when implementing, measuring and evaluating the impact and effectiveness of that assistance. This report provocatively introduces the concept of aid effectiveness that has evolved in other fields and applies it to SALW assistance. It highlights that while many lessons can be drawn from other fields, states,

organizations and the international community at large must still consider the particular needs and attributes of SALW issues in order to establish how best to approach aid effectiveness for SALW assistance.

In reading the report, I positively took note of the many structures and frameworks already in place to support states and organizations in their efforts to address SALW that thus could be used to help establish the best approaches for improving SALW assistance. There are also many opportunities that lie before us, beginning with the 2010 Biennial Meeting of States, to advance a stronger more directed approach to addressing SALW assistance. I thus encourage states and international, regional and civil society organizations alike to read the present report, contemplate the recommendations therein, and come together to discuss making SALW assistance even more effective.

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons causes considerable and unacceptable harm to states, communities and people. It is thus our responsibility to ensure that the actions we take are as effective and beneficial as possible. Strengthening how we discuss and approach SALW assistance and cooperation will contribute toward and build upon our efforts to fulfil the commitments we all agreed to undertake in 2001.

Pablo Macedo
Ambassador, Director General
United Nations Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico
Chair of the 2010 Biennial Meeting of States

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The international community has made several concerted efforts to address small arms and light weapons (SALW) at the international and regional level. These have included the development of policy instruments that establish the commitments of states to address SALW and the creation of best practice guidelines and online tools that help states address the various challenges posed by the illicit trade in SALW. States, regional and international organizations and civil society organizations have also provided financial and technical assistance to help states address SALW. However, there is no framework or system in place for measuring the impact of these efforts and for determining whether or not donors are getting the most value out of the assistance they provide and, likewise, whether or not recipient states are measurably benefiting from such assistance.

The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (PoA) is the principle international policy document for addressing assistance and cooperation. At the Third Biennial Meeting of States on implementation of the PoA in 2008, states underlined that much work needed to be done on the subject. States have since agreed to consider including these issues in the work of an open-ended meeting of governmental experts anticipated for 2011. As they did at the 2008 Biennial Meeting, states are also lending their support to devoting a session to assistance and cooperation at the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States to be held in 2010. States have thus expressed a willingness to advance the issue of assistance and cooperation and it is therefore essential for states to build their knowledge and understanding of SALW assistance.

This report highlights several general and practical challenges of SALW assistance, ranging from a lack of clarity or precision on how to measure and evaluate SALW assistance to a lack of coordination in organizing and managing SALW assistance at the national, regional and international level.

In order to overcome the challenges of SALW assistance, this report explores the concept of aid effectiveness as contained in the Paris Declaration

on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, being the most widely recognized set of international principles on aid effectiveness. Many of the principles and commitments of aid effectiveness contained in the Paris Declaration and its Accra Agenda for Action—notably ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability—can apply to addressing SALW. The report demonstrates the structures, measures and tools that already exist to make SALW assistance more effective. With some modification and investment to these existing structures and tools, states could create a stronger environment for measuring the effectiveness and progress made as a result of SALW assistance. The report concludes with a series of recommendations that states and organizations could undertake at the international, regional and country level.

These include:

- Using the Biennial Meetings of States on PoA:
 - to promote consistent and strategic dialogue on SALW assistance;
 - to facilitate matching needs and resources; and
 - to strengthen the process and procedures of the PoA in the area of SALW assistance and aid effectiveness.
- Encouraging states to report on their views in the lead up to the 2012 Review Conference on the different opportunities and activities for strengthening SALW assistance and aid effectiveness on topics such as ownership, harmonization and managing results.
- Promoting and facilitating national, regional and international coordination on SALW assistance.
- Encouraging the open-ended meeting of governmental experts anticipated for 2011 to take on board important discussion points for improving SALW assistance and promoting aid effectiveness.
- Promoting a better understanding of SALW assistance in the context of development, armed violence reduction, public health, peacebuilding, women's peace and security, and conflict prevention.
- Taking national steps for improving the organization and management of assistance, such as:

- preparing and supporting the development of national strategies on SALW and strengthening country systems to coordinate on SALW issues;
- making SALW assistance more predictable;
- better coordinating and harmonizing efforts on SALW assistance; and
- promoting transparency, information sharing and systematic reporting of SALW activities implemented, underway and needed at the national, regional and international level.

INTRODUCTION¹

The Programme of Action to Combat, Eradicate and Prevent the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (PoA), agreed by consensus in 2001, remains the principle UN policy document for addressing small arms and light weapons (SALW). The PoA led to a number of achievements, particularly with respect to raising awareness and building knowledge on SALW, and spurring the development of the International Instrument on Tracing² and the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Brokering.³ However, the issue of SALW assistance has not been well explored at the international level. This is in spite of the fact that the PoA includes a number of commitments to international SALW assistance and that states regularly emphasize the importance of SALW assistance in their national reports⁴ and in statements presented at biennial meetings on PoA implementation.⁵

Regional organizations have also taken concerted efforts to address SALW and some regions have established strong supportive frameworks and systems to facilitate SALW assistance. However, there is little inter-regional coordination on SALW, especially with regard to assistance.⁶ International and regional discussions on SALW have yet to tackle many important questions related to:

- challenges of delivering and undertaking SALW assistance from the perspective of donors, recipient states and implementing organizations;
- means and tools required for evaluating and measuring effectiveness and impact of SALW assistance;
- good practices for providing, processing and implementing technical and financial assistance; and
- procedural issues for promoting dialogue and follow-up of key assistance-related topics at the international and regional levels, such as taking stock of assistance allocated and addressing emerging issues and challenges related to assistance.

Thus, it is difficult to gauge the impact of the financial and technical assistance of donors on implementation of the PoA and, likewise, whether or not recipient states in all regions are measurably and optimally benefiting from such assistance.

A 2006 research survey conducted on international SALW assistance provided from 2001 through 2005 revealed that only 29% of respondents answered that their state considered that the SALW assistance received was sufficient to address their SALW situation.⁷ Additionally, only 23% of respondents answered that their state perceived that the assistance received addressed their most important SALW priorities.⁸ The findings of two regional case studies, conducted respectively in East Africa⁹ and the South Pacific,¹⁰ and of consultations held with representatives of states and international and regional organizations further highlighted a number of challenges associated with SALW assistance, including the piecemeal or ad hoc nature of SALW assistance.

States demonstrate a willingness and interest in taking a more concerted approach to addressing SALW assistance. In 2008 states devoted a session of the Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the PoA to the issue of assistance and cooperation.¹¹ In the meeting's outcome document, states agreed to strengthen information-sharing between states requiring assistance and donors, through more systematized requests for and reports on assistance. States also underlined that more work was needed to address assistance and cooperation.¹² In recognition of the need to advance discussions and action on SALW assistance, states are supporting the inclusion of assistance and cooperation in the upcoming 2010 Fourth Biennial Meeting of States¹³ and have also proposed that assistance and cooperation be one of the issues addressed by an open-ended meeting of governmental experts, anticipated to convene in 2011.¹⁴ In support of these efforts, it is thus important to build a greater understanding of SALW assistance.

This report first takes stock of the political and legal instruments in place that frame the international policy on SALW assistance in order to establish the normative environment in which states and organizations plan, request and deliver assistance. It then provides an overview of the current status of SALW assistance. The report explores the concept of aid effectiveness as contained in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. Drawing from these models and based on the author's previous research on SALW assistance and on multiple consultations with donors, recipient states and implementing agencies, the report provides a preliminary examination of what aid effectiveness could mean in the context of SALW. The report concludes with recommendations on how existing frameworks and processes, notably through the PoA, could be best

used to improve SALW assistance and promote dialogue on and take steps toward aid effectiveness.

POLICY INSTRUMENTS SUPPORTING SALW ASSISTANCE

OVERVIEW OF SALW INSTRUMENTS¹⁵

The PoA is the principle policy document through which states and organizations address SALW. States agreed the commitments of the PoA by consensus and thus, while it is not a legally binding document, its commitments apply equally to all UN Member States. The PoA sets out specific national, regional and global level actions for states on key issues related to the illicit trade in SALW. Procedurally, states agreed in the PoA to submit annual reports on national implementation of the PoA and to meet biennially to discuss the national, regional and global implementation of their commitments. States also agreed in the PoA to convene a Review Conference in 2006 and agreed in later General Assembly resolutions on SALW¹⁶ to convene an open-ended meeting of governmental experts on SALW in 2011 and to meet for a second Review Conference in 2012.

As part of the follow-up steps outlined in Section IV of the PoA, states agreed to undertake a study on the feasibility of an international instrument on tracing.¹⁷ A Group of Governmental Experts prepared the study,¹⁸ which spurred the development of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (2005), commonly known as the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). The ITI focuses on marking, record-keeping, and cooperation in tracing of SALW. Like the PoA, it is politically binding and it universally applies to all UN Member States. Procedurally, states discuss implementation of the ITI as an issue separate from the PoA, but still under the general framework of the PoA at international meetings.

Several other policy instruments address SALW (table 1 lists the key regional instruments). At the international level, the United Nations Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, known commonly as the Firearms Protocol, was adopted in 2001 and came into force in 2005.¹⁹ It is the only legally binding SALW instrument at the international level. Seventy-nine states have ratified the Protocol as of February 2010.

Table 1. Key regional SALW instruments

	Instrument	Type of document	Accompanying documents	Membership	Status
Africa	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials	Legally binding	Implementation guidelines	10 ratifications ²⁰	Adopted 14/06/2006 Entry into force 29/9/2009
	The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control, and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa	Legally binding	Implementation guidelines	12 ratifications ²¹	Entry into force 5/05/2006
	The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials	Legally binding	Operating guidelines	10 ratifications ²²	Signed 14/8/2001 Entry into force 8/11/2004
	The Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons	Politically binding	None	The 53 members of the African Union	Adopted 1/12/2000
Americas	Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials	Legally binding	Model regulations	30 ratifications ²³	Signed 14/11/1997 Entry into force 01/07/1998
	Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects	Politically binding	None	4 members ²⁴	Adopted 25/06/2003

	Instrument	Type of document	Accompanying documents	Membership	Status
Asia-Pacific	The Nadi Framework (Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons Control)	Politically binding	Model weapons control bill	17 signatories ²⁵	Signed 10/03/2000
	Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime	Politically binding	Work Programme	The 10 members of ASEAN	Adopted 23/06/1999
Europe	EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports	Politically binding	None	EU members	Adopted 5/6/98
	Council Joint Action of 12 July 2002 on the European Union's Contribution to Combating the Destabilizing Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons	Politically binding	EU strategy document	EU members	Adopted 12/06/2002 ²⁶
	EU Council Common Position on Brokering	Politically Binding	None	EU members	Adopted 23/05/2003
	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Document on SALW	Politically binding	Best practice guidelines	OSCE members	Entry in to force 24/11/2000
	Stability Pact Regional Implementation plan	Politically binding	Regional standards and guidelines	Stability Pact partners	Adopted 10/6/1999 (revised 2006)

The Protocol contains articles to address issues such as marking, brokering and seizure and destruction of illicitly manufactured or trafficked firearms. Unlike the PoA, the Firearms Protocol directly covers the issue of ammunition. However, its scope is limited to covering commercial and not state-to-state transfers of firearms and ammunition. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime oversees implementation of the Protocol.

Regional organizations also took up the issue of SALW, having produced politically and legally binding instruments, declarations, plans of action and model guidelines, many of which pre-date UN achievements.

In addition to international and regional instruments, the international community produced a number of commitments to address SALW in the context of other concerns. From the time that SALW first emerged as an issue at the international level in the 1990s, states acknowledged the close linkages between SALW and development.²⁷ In 2005, the Development Assistant Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) made a landmark decision to include “support for controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of SALW in those activities which qualify as development spending internationally”.²⁸ The DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation apply to the following SALW activities:

- a) development of laws, regulations and administrative procedures for the control and reduction of weapons proliferation;
- b) development of institution structures for policy guidance, research and monitoring;
- c) public awareness campaigns on SALW;
- d) promotion of regional co-operation and information exchange on SALW programmes;
- e) weapons collection and destruction.²⁹

Aiming to bridge the security and development fields in a formal declaration, states, international organizations and civil society put forward the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development in 2007. The Declaration’s 108 signatories (as of February 2010) commit to enhancing financial, technical and human resources for addressing armed violence, which includes practical measures to “stem the proliferation, illegal trafficking and misuse of small arms and light weapons and ammunition, and lead to effective weapons reduction, post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and small arms control”.

The growing body of knowledge generated on the topic of armed violence reduction and the progress made in advancing the Geneva Declaration means that many SALW activities are increasingly taken up under the umbrella of armed violence.³⁰

Most recently, in August 2009, the UN Secretary-General delivered the report "Promoting Development Through the Reduction and Prevention of Armed Violence".³¹ Making precise references to SALW, the report elaborates in detail the multifaceted and varying dynamics of armed violence, its impact on development and the underlying factors that can lead to intensified armed violence. While the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) do not establish explicit goals for security-related issues, the Secretary-General's report on armed violence noted that the MDGs "offer entry-points for development agencies to consider. Objectives such as reducing poverty, ensuring maternal health and promoting education are all associated with effective armed violence prevention and reduction initiatives".³² There is increasing interest to have the issue of armed violence better profiled within the MDG process, by encouraging states to include references to armed violence in the outcome document of the MDG Review Summit in September 2010.³³

SALW ASSISTANCE IN EXISTING POLICY FRAMEWORKS

At the 2008 Biennial Meeting of States, states noted that "assistance and cooperation include technical and financial support, the provision of expertise and technology, networking and information-sharing on implementation experiences".³⁴ The international and regional instruments on SALW help establish the parameters and scope of SALW assistance. All three of the international and 10 of the 12 key regional SALW instruments refer to assistance in some manner or another.

SALW assistance: international frameworks

UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in SALW

The PoA serves as the main international framework for SALW assistance as it covers the broadest range of issues and applies equally to all states. The importance of SALW assistance is recognized throughout the document. In the Preamble, states stress "the urgent necessity for international cooperation and assistance, including financial and technical assistance".

In Section II, states commit at the regional level to support national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. States further encourage at the regional level the provision of technical assistance to help states respect moratoria or other measures on the transfer and manufacture of SALW and regional action programmes to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW. At the global level states agree to strengthen the ability to cooperate in identifying and tracing SALW.³⁵

In Section III, states in a position to provide assistance are encouraged to do so, upon request, on the following issues:

- conflict prevention;
- strengthening legislative frameworks;
- law enforcement;
- stockpile management and security;
- destruction and disposal;
- customs and borders;
- marking and tracing;
- coordination and engagement with international and regional information-sharing networks and mechanisms;
- mutual legal assistance;
- drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism;
- disarmament, demobilization and reintegration;
- sustainable development; and
- research for greater awareness and understanding of the illicit trade in SALW.

The nature of the assistance prescribed in Section III of the PoA centers primarily on coordination, training and information exchange, however Section III, paragraph three contains a commitment for states and international and regional organizations to “seriously consider rendering assistance, including technical and financial assistance where needed, such as small arms funds, to support the implementation of the measures [of the PoA]”. Section IV, paragraph 2(b) encourages “all initiatives to mobilize resources and expertise to promote the implementation of the Programme of Action and to provide assistance to states in their implementation of the Programme of Action”. Non-governmental organizations and civil society are encouraged in paragraph 2(c) to “engage, as appropriate, in all aspects of international, regional, subregional and national efforts to implement the present Programme of Action”.

While Section III suggests areas where donors could consider providing support on specific topic areas, it does not provide a framework for approaching assistance nor does it lay out processes and procedures for facilitating assistance. The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) serves as the secretariat for implementing the PoA. It has a broad mandate to support implementation of the PoA but it has not been mandated with budgetary support to perform clearing house or implementation support functions for assistance, making it difficult for ODA to assist in the fundraising and mobilization of resources on behalf of states in need of SALW assistance. Nor does any other organization have such a mandate. ODA thus relies on independent and voluntary contributions from states and organizations to finance PoA-related activities, such as hosting regional seminars on implementation or developing and maintaining the electronic PoA Implementation Support System (PoA-ISS). The PoA-ISS website is intended to serve as a focal point for all matters related to the PoA and facilitate access to SALW best practice documents and country profiles on PoA implementation. The site also hosts a database of all national focal points on SALW and intends to host an online mechanism for matching needs and resources. The mechanism uses a checklist to help states to identify their needs for assistance and then matches those needs with the information that donors and implementing agencies have submitted.³⁶

International Tracing Instrument

Section VI of the ITI encourages states to consider providing to other states, upon request, the technical and financial assistance necessary to implement all commitments of the ITI and to promote the development and sharing of new technologies and equipment that facilitate the implementation of these issues. The support systems and the approach to assistance for the ITI fall under the same structures and systems as the PoA.

Firearms Protocol

Article 14 of the Firearms Protocol, under the heading Training and Technical Assistance, states that:

States Parties shall cooperate with each other and with relevant international organizations, as appropriate, so that States Parties may receive, upon request, the training and technical assistance necessary to enhance their ability to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components

and ammunition, including technical, financial and material assistance in those matters identified in articles 29 and 30 of the [United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime].

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the depositary of the instrument. The UNODC is currently preparing model legislation to assist states in incorporating the Protocol into their respective national laws. SALW assistance in the Protocol has stronger implications on states than in the other UN instruments because its measures are legally binding. However, its impact on SALW assistance is less due to its narrow focus on illicit manufacturing and trafficking. Furthermore, numerous donors—namely Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States of America—have not yet acceded to the Protocol, meaning they are not bound to providing assistance to states to implement it.

SALW assistance: Regional instruments and organizations for providing assistance

European Union Joint Action

The main SALW instrument of the European Union addressing SALW assistance is the Council Joint Action of 12 July 2002 on the European Union's Contribution to Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons. The Joint Action contains four articles on the issue of assistance, which highlight thematic priorities (Articles 4, 5 and 6) and procedural issues (Articles 6 and 7).³⁷ The Joint Action establishes that the European Union should consider providing assistance upon request from states and that decisions made on funding are done on a case-by-case basis in consideration of the requesting state's respect of human rights, compliance with international humanitarian law and the protection of the rule of law, and compliance with international commitments, particularly existing peace treaties and international arms control agreements. Members are encouraged to engage with, or channel support through, the UN and other international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, regional arrangements and non-governmental organizations.

Thematically, the Joint Action focuses on the prevention of SALW accumulation, the resolution of armed conflict and the removal of arms from post-conflict situations:

- Article 4 establishes that the European Union will aim to provide assistance for controlling and eliminating surplus SALW; and promote confidence-building measures and incentives to encourage the voluntary surrender of surplus or illegally held SALW, demobilization and reintegration.
- Article 5 establishes that the European Union will consider the possibility of making necessary provisions for the removal of SALW from conflict settings.
- Article 6 establishes that the European Union shall provide financial and technical assistance to programmes and projects which make a direct and identifiable contribution to the principles and measures referred to in the document on such issues as collection, security sector reform, demobilization and reintegration and victim assistance.

Stressing the need to ensure a coordinated and complementary approach with the Joint Action, the EU Development Council further encourages the European Union and its member states to engage with SALW in development cooperation in a resolution endorsed in May 1999. The particular areas covered under this resolution are:

- inclusion of the small arms issue in the political dialogue with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States and other development cooperation partner countries of the EU;
- development cooperation support for countries seeking assistance in the control or elimination of surplus small arms, as well as other incentives to encourage the voluntary surrender of small arms and their destruction;
- the combating of illicit trafficking of small arms through the promotion of appropriate measures, including regional and international cooperation and independent monitoring; and
- the effective disarmament and demobilisation of combatants and their subsequent rehabilitation and reintegration into civil life ...;
- ... public education and awareness programmes ... ; and
- considering support, where necessary, to strengthen appropriate government institutions and legislation to better control small arms.³⁸

The European Union also developed an internal strategy that highlights thematic and geographical priorities for the direction of its SALW

assistance.³⁹ The strategy emphasizes that activities should fit within the European Union's overall programming in Africa, Asia and Latin America and South-Eastern Europe and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan: Combating the proliferation and impact of SALW

An initiative of the European Union, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was created in 1999 to replace the crisis intervention policy that was put in place to address the conflicts and instability in the Balkans. It now serves as a long-term conflict prevention strategy. Membership of the Stability Pact includes forty states and institutions, composed of donors inside and outside the region, states of the region, international organizations, development banks and other international and regional groups.⁴⁰

The Regional Implementation Plan on Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons was developed as part of the Stability Pact's activities. The Regional Implementation Plan's design included provisions for an administrative and management unit, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), which was created under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The diversity of the partners involved in agreeing and implementing the Plan facilitated the mobilization of resources for SALW assistance.

SEESAC is to "provide, on request, project development, technical advisory, project monitoring and evaluation support, in order to ensure state compliance with established international 'best practices' in SALW Control interventions".⁴¹ The Plan also specifies two measures through which partners will provide support:

- technical assistance programmes to strengthen comprehensive and integrated policies, institutional structures and capacities as well as legislation to combat and prevent illicit trafficking and destabilizing accumulations of SALW;
- measures and mechanisms to promote operational cooperation between law enforcement and arms control agencies of the countries of the region as well as with other partners of the Stability Pact.⁴²

SEESAC also developed the Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines, an evolving process which began in 2003, to provide guidance to SEESAC's own initiatives and to those of national authorities undertaking SALW activities in South-Eastern Europe.⁴³

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Document on SALW

The OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons specifically addresses areas where financial, technical or consultative assistance can be provided to participating states, upon request, such as in monitoring, collection, reduction and disposal of SALW, as well as in providing advice for border control.⁴⁴ Sections IV and V, in particular, focus on consulting and coordinating and Section V lays down a framework for integrating SALW measures into other OSCE activities. Such measures, according to the Document, include:

- assistance on the security and management of stockpiles of small arms;
- assistance with, and possible monitoring of, the reduction and disposal of small arms;
- advice or mutual assistance to implement and reinforce border controls to reduce illicit trafficking in small arms; and
- assistance with small arms collection and control programmes.

The OSCE *Handbook of Best Practice Guidelines on Small Arms and Light Weapons* is a guide for the implementation of the OSCE Document.⁴⁵

In November 2009, the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation updated its Expert Advice on Implementation of Section V of the OSCE Document.⁴⁶ In the form of an annex to the original document, it specifies the steps the Forum for Security Co-operation would take upon receiving a request for assistance from a participating state. It also sets out specific actions for states to improve transparency in needs and assistance and on conducting needs-assessment missions, preparing project plans, final reports and evaluations. Detailed model questionnaires for both requesting and donor states are also included in the annex which allow needs and resources of participating states to be matched. The OSCE encourages its members that are interested in receiving assistance to submit requests through their delegation to the OSCE Permanent Council. There are also provisions that request that the Permanent Council consider the possibility of raising

funds separately for SALW assistance and the use of mobile teams of SALW experts to provide training.

Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Explosives, Ammunition and Other Related Materials

The Organization of American States' (OAS) Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Explosives, Ammunition and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) has states parties that are donors, and states parties that may require technical or financial assistance.

With respect to assistance, CIFTA refers primarily to matters of information-sharing, technical assistance, and the exchange of experience and training in Articles 15, 16 and 20. According to CIFTA:

States Parties shall cooperate in formulating programs for the exchange of experience and training among competent officials, and shall provide each other assistance that would facilitate their respective access to equipment or technology proven to be effective for the implementation of this Convention.⁴⁷

States Parties shall cooperate with each other and with competent international organizations, as appropriate, to ensure that there is adequate training of personnel in their territories to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.⁴⁸

States Parties shall cooperate with each other and with relevant international organizations, as appropriate, so that States Parties that so request receive the technical assistance necessary to enhance their ability to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials, including technical assistance ...⁴⁹

In order to attain the objectives of this Convention, the States Parties shall establish a Consultative Committee responsible for ... promoting training and exchange of knowledge and experience among States Parties and technical assistance between States Parties and relevant international organizations, as well as academic studies.⁵⁰

The OAS has prepared four model legislation documents to help the states parties implement CIFTA. Three more model legislation documents are in

process. The OAS sets out its priorities for providing assistance in a draft resolution and agrees on a work plan during its annual conference. The organization does not have an internal budget to undertake assistance activities and thus the level of engagement in a given year depends on the resources made available by donors and organizations. The OAS also acts as a clearing house by facilitating the mobilization of resources from donors and organizations on behalf of states that submit requests for assistance and as well raises funds to undertake its own projects.

Regional instruments and organizations for requesting and mobilizing assistance

The Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) is the depositary of the Nairobi Protocol and serves as the main clearing house and support unit for the Protocol's implementation. RECSA developed the Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons as a way to support states' implementation of SALW activities. The East African Community (EAC) is another subregional organization that provides assistance to its members to implement the Nairobi Protocol.⁵¹ The EAC collaborates with RECSA on joint projects and coordinates regularly to prevent the duplication of activities. Both RECSA and the EAC receive financial contributions from their member states but also rely largely on donor assistance to implement SALW activities.

The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO), based in INTERPOL's Sub-Regional Bureau in Harare, undertakes activities to support implementation of the SADC Protocol. SARPCCO's activities are guided by a set of standard operating procedures established to support implementation of the SADC Protocol. SARPCCO receives funds mainly from INTERPOL but occasionally from other donors as well. The region is also in the process of developing a regional action strategy on SALW.⁵²

The ECOWAS secretariat is the depositary of the ECOWAS Convention. The ECOWAS secretariat contains a Small Arms Unit dedicated to supporting SALW activities. Another programme, the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP),⁵³ also works closely with donors and UNDP to implement SALW activities.

The Andean Plan, the ECOWAS Convention and Nairobi Protocol (through its implementation guidelines)⁵⁴ include a statement of support for the secretariat or depositary of the instrument to seek international assistance. For instance, the accompanying implementation guidelines for the Nairobi Protocol states that regional institutions, such as RECSA, can “assist with the mobilization of necessary resources such as funding and technical assistance, to support member States’ programmes on awareness raising, collection, disposal and destruction of small arms and light weapons”.⁵⁵ Article 24 of the ECOWAS Convention stipulates that the Executive Secretary shall define and carry out the policy for mobilizing the necessary resources for implementing the Convention and thereby provide financial and technical support to member states to carry out the measures of the Convention. The Executive Secretary will additionally facilitate and seek assistance for the training of officials in intra- and interstate cooperation.

The Andean Plan, the ASEAN Plan and the Bamako Declaration all identify specific thematic areas of interest for technical and financial assistance from the wider international community, including international organizations. In the Andean Plan, these areas of interest include:

- establishing and maintaining an information exchange mechanism and national databases;
- developing national action plans and strengthening the capacity of national authorities;
- holding workshops, meetings and training programmes;
- conducting research and awareness-raising;
- destroying seized, confiscated, surplus and obsolete SALW; and
- implementing programmes to reduce the demand for and curb the violence and proliferation of illicit SALW (conflict prevention and poverty reduction).

According to the Work Programme of the ASEAN Plan, the ASEAN secretariat will “seek technical assistance and funding considerations for weapons collection and destruction, the strengthening of law enforcement and institutional capacity building”.⁵⁶

The Bamako Declaration appeals to the international community for financial and technical support for national programmes that reintegrate demobilized youth and those who possess small arms and light weapons illegally, for action-oriented research on the nature and scope of the SALW

problem, and for identifying and destroying surplus, obsolete and seized stock.

All of these regional instruments—the Andean Plan, the ASEAN Plan, the Bamako Declaration, the ECOWAS Convention, the Nairobi Protocol and the SADC Protocol—emphasize mutual cooperation, South–South cooperation and support among regional neighbours. Under the SADC Protocol, for instance, states agreed to reinforce their capacities as well as support the capacities of their neighbours through exploring “the possibility for exchange programmes for such officials [police and customs] within the Region, and with their counterparts in other regions”.⁵⁷ See Annex A for an overview of how SALW assistance is addressed in the key international and regional instruments.

Several other international or regional organizations or initiatives support SALW activities, independent of a particular regional instrument. The UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) supports implementation of the PoA by promoting and facilitating communication and information exchange among a network of 21 UN entities (departments, offices, agencies, programmes and funds) on their SALW activities. CASA does not implement country-level projects; however, its members are in the process of jointly developing International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). The ISACS are intended to help UN agencies and departments undertake SALW control activities but their applicability extends to any authority or organization undertaking such work. CASA anticipates launching working modules of the standards at the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States.⁵⁸

ODA additionally has three Regional Centres that focus on disarmament, peace and security, based in Nepal, Peru and Togo. The Regional Centres provide technical support to the states of the region, particularly with respect to developing legislation, information exchange and promoting and facilitating meetings on PoA implementation.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mobilizes funds from its member states and, through its Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), undertakes SALW activities at the request of states. Most activities are undertaken in the Commonwealth of Independent States and South-Eastern Europe. NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council established an Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine Action in 1999. The Working Group provides a forum for states to discuss these issues and additionally

organizes meetings and workshops to raise awareness on these issues. The Working Group also facilitates the management and creation of projects under the Partnership for Peace Trust Fund and updates delegates on where assistance is needed. In line with NATO procedures, projects are led by one state, which works with NATO staff and an appointed executive agent to oversee the development of project proposals. NATO focuses its assistance mainly on physical security and stockpile management and destruction, especially surplus weapons, but will respond to the requests of states on other practical SALW issues as well.

The Security Commission of the Central American Integration System (SICA), the subregional organization comprised of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, approved the creation of the Central American Programme on Small Arms Control (CASAC) in June 2003. Based in part on the SEESAC model, the General Secretariat of SICA is the official executor of the programme while UNDP, with additional financial support from donors, provides advice and financing for the activities.

As noted, there is a strong international and regional commitment from states to address SALW and to assist other states in their efforts to undertake SALW-related activities. There are numerous policy instruments and several structures in place to facilitate SALW assistance, particularly at the regional level.

The membership of SALW instruments, whether they are international or regional, shapes how states approach SALW assistance. International and some regional instruments include commitments on providing assistance, upon requests from states. Regional instruments are more easily tailored to the particular SALW needs and priorities of states within a region. However, many regional SALW instruments do not have major donors of financial and technical SALW assistance as member states, and external donor states are not bound by the commitments of these instruments. In such instances, the commitments of the regional instruments emphasize mutual cooperation, and such instruments may encourage member states to solicit assistance and cooperation from non-member states and international organizations. When both donors and states requesting assistance are members of the same organization or are partners within an instrument, donors may have a stronger sense of commitment to the states requesting assistance from within the region. Furthermore, as donors

and states agreed the instrument's commitments together, the instruments reflect regional priorities, which help to ensure that assistance is closely aligned with the needs of the state.

Many of the instruments emphasize specific thematic areas for providing or receiving SALW assistance, especially in the area of developing or strengthening legislation, collection, destruction, marking and tracing, record management and the establishing of databases, awareness-raising and focusing on the demand factors for SALW. The nature of the assistance outlined in the instruments includes the transfer of financial and technical resources, expertise, knowledge, experience and training. The goal of assistance is to help another state strengthen its capacity to address and control SALW nationally and to cooperate on SALW regionally and internationally. The instruments further underline the role of institutions in helping to coordinate assistance, and of secretariats in helping to mobilize funds on behalf of member states.

Despite the existence of these instruments and structures, implementation remains a serious challenge for many states and regions. The level of implementation of the PoA and other regional commitments vary from one state or region to the next.⁵⁹ To know whether SALW assistance provided is having a positive impact on the SALW situation in the recipient country, and whether the results of the assistance have contributed to achieving international and regional goals to address SALW, requires measuring and evaluating the impacts of SALW assistance. The next section provides an overview of the SALW assistance implemented and assesses how this assistance is measured and evaluated.

CURRENT STATE OF SALW ASSISTANCE

OVERVIEW OF SALW ASSISTANCE PROVIDED

In 2006, UNIDIR undertook a global survey of international SALW assistance during the first five years of the PoA's implementation.⁶⁰ Assistance was broken down according to 17 key issues in the PoA. An activity was counted as SALW assistance when it directly engaged and benefited a recipient state. Activities were not counted if they targeted a general or global audience; however, sponsorship for representatives to attend international or regional meetings was counted as assistance.

However, the survey was not able to account for most of the technical assistance provided between developing countries, as it is often not recorded as assistance in national reports. This indicates that the definition of assistance should be clarified to include all such activities that strengthen the capacities of other states.

The findings of the global survey estimated that cumulatively during 2001 through 2005, states and organizations provided approximately US\$ 660 million of SALW assistance. The support was mainly channelled through and implemented by international and regional organizations, followed by international non-governmental organizations.

The results of the survey and the information made available in national reports make it clear that SALW assistance from states and organizations during this period had a limited geographic and thematic focus. The vast majority (70%) of the US\$ 660 million reported as SALW assistance covered the operational costs of implementing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) missions in Asia and Africa; while destruction programmes, implemented primarily in South-Eastern Europe, accounted for 8% of the reported SALW assistance.⁶¹ Collection and stockpile management absorbed about 6% and 1% respectively of the total assistance allocated, while 4% was used for meetings, conferences and workshops. The remaining 11% covered other activities related to national commissions, borders, law enforcement, marking, tracing and awareness-raising in some 94 countries.⁶²

Regionally, Africa received the largest concentration of total financial assistance (49%), however over three quarters of that assistance went toward the issue of DDR in a handful of countries. The implementation of conferences, meetings and workshops and weapons collection programmes were the other forms of SALW assistance, making up the 13% of the global financial total and 35% of the total number of specific activities. Excluding DDR from the figures, collectively members of the Stability Pact and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States received the largest concentration of assistance—approximately 32% of the financial assistance and 46% of the specific activities.⁶³

The survey identified other key challenges associated with SALW assistance. For instance, it was noted that information on PoA assistance is inconsistent among all actors involved in providing and receiving assistance, partly

because states had different views of what constituted SALW assistance and had difficulty isolating SALW assistance from broader programmes, particularly peacebuilding and statebuilding. The study also noted that there is a lack of information-sharing and coordination among donors, recipients and regional, international and civil society organizations.

Few studies have been conducted on the SALW assistance provided during 2006 through 2009. According to the OECD, states and organizations provided approximately US\$ 58 million (2006), US\$ 71 million (2007), and US\$ 72 million (2008)⁶⁴ in technical cooperation toward the development of legislation and institutional structures, public awareness campaigns and information exchanges on SALW programmes, weapons collection and destruction, and reintegration, which are the activities to be included under OECD-DAC reporting directives.⁶⁵

Calculations based solely on the information that states submitted in national reports on implementation of the PoA, which is not comprehensive, would not be accurate. Nevertheless, observations can be made from the 204 national reports (from 120 states) submitted during 2006 to 2009:⁶⁶

- the level of assistance states provided increased, at least moderately, compared to the assistance provided in the previous years;
- DDR appears to receive the majority of financial assistance (67%). With respect to the frequency of supporting DDR, it ranks second (12%) behind support for meetings, conferences and workshops (including trainings, 22%), but is well above any other SALW issue. (The number of times donors supported an activity should not be confused to be the number of times an activity took place. Multiple donors may have contributed to the implementation of one activity.);
- apart from DDR, financial assistance primarily supported meetings, conferences and workshops (including trainings, 15%), destruction (3.5%), collection (3.3%) and law enforcement (3%); and
- the scope of SALW assistance notably increased, especially on the issue of marking and tracing (likely due to the adoption of the ITI) as well as on the issues of law enforcement and border controls.

Analysis of this information can illustrate the basic trends of how donors and implementing agencies have aligned SALW assistance priorities geographically and thematically. It cannot, however, provide insight into

whether the assistance provided had a positive impact on the SALW situation in the recipient country, whether it aligned with the priorities of the recipient states or whether the results of the assistance contributed to achieving international and regional goals.

As noted in the introduction of this report, the results of the global survey on SALW assistance revealed that only 29% of respondents answered that their state considered the assistance received to be sufficient to address their SALW situation, and that only 23% responded that their state perceived the assistance to be aligned with national SALW priorities.⁶⁷

During the research phase of the 2006 global survey, states were asked to list their SALW assistance priorities. The most frequent themes were capacity-building, support for national commissions, record management, support in legislation and customs and borders.⁶⁸ The most common themes in the assistance requested in national reports during 2006 to 2009 were record management, marking and tracing, customs and borders, stockpile management and destruction.

However, financial assistance provided has not always aligned with the assistance desired. According to the global survey and the national reports, the themes that received the most assistance—in terms of the amount of financial assistance and of the frequency with which they were supported—in 2001 through 2009 were DDR, destruction, conferences and meetings (including trainings), collection, stockpile management and latterly law enforcement. The issues more frequently sought in 2001 through 2005 were capacity-building, support for national commissions, record management, support in the area of legislation and customs and borders. In the 2006 through 2009 national reports, states most often requested record management and borders (11 states each), marking and tracing (10 states), law enforcement (8 states) followed by capacity-building, national commissions, destruction, stockpile management and collection (6 states each).

MONITORING, EVALUATING AND MEASURING SALW ASSISTANCE

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Most SALW assistance is channelled through and managed and implemented by international or regional organizations or non-governmental organizations. Donors and implementing agencies monitor and evaluate their activities according to the goals and targets determined in the terms of reference of the project or programme. States generally rely on the implementing agency (such as an international or regional organizations or non-governmental organization) to submit reports evaluating the implementation.⁶⁹ The success of SALW assistance is often based on criteria such as the number of weapons collected or destroyed and the number of former combatants reintegrated. A programme that collected a large number of weapons is deemed a success while a programme that collected fewer weapons than anticipated is deemed a failure. However, the number of weapons collected and destroyed does not provide insight into the number of weapons still in circulation, the quality of the weapons turned in (for example, non-working weapons versus working weapons), or the real and perceived risks still faced by the population. It also does not provide insight into the practices used for collecting the weapons (Were there cash incentives that might result in competition with other disarmament programmes? Did the collection programme take public and environmental safety into account?).

Monitoring and evaluating SALW assistance activities concentrate on the outputs of the project directly and rarely take into account the larger picture and longer-term perspective, or outcome, that the assistance has at the national level.⁷⁰ The number of former combatants reintegrated can only be considered a measure of success if the former combatants do not return to participate in local or external conflicts or crime, and if the individual is provided with vocational training and tools appropriate to their needs and their community's needs.⁷¹ The provision of equipment is only useful if staff is trained appropriately to use it and if the equipment can be maintained and continuously used under the conditions where the equipment is used. Meetings, seminars and trainings are only useful if the working level staff is able to participate in the sessions, if what they learned can be applied with the conditions and capacities available in the environment in which they work and if the participants are able to use their

gained knowledge to inform policies or to teach other colleagues. These longer term impacts, unfortunately, are often not taken into consideration in project evaluations.

In one example, a weapons collection programme was deemed successful; however, the weapons were later discovered on the illicit market elsewhere.⁷² On the other hand, one report found that even in situations where the number of weapons fell short of expected targets, there still may have been a number of benefits coming from the assistance: promotion and facilitation of community-level dialogue on SALW, promotion of gender issues and their inclusion in SALW matters, and increasing knowledge on the security situation in the local areas.⁷³

There has been little study of the best practices for establishing baseline criteria and performance and success indicators for SALW issues and for monitoring and evaluating SALW projects.⁷⁴ In the absence of such criteria and indicators, evaluations may not be rigorous or objective, especially if future donor support is contingent on the success of the project. SEESAC includes monitoring and evaluation in its Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines, which state that performance and success indicators should be set up based on criteria agreed between project implementers and the state where the activity is taking place.⁷⁵ The Standards and Guidelines do not elaborate extensively on “how-to” steps to help determine and agree the indicators themselves. However, a discussion paper published by SEESAC highlighted the need for development of quantitative and qualitative performance indicators for SALW projects and provided examples of possible performance indicators.⁷⁶ The information necessary for building indicators and the criteria used as a baseline for the indicators may be sensitive,⁷⁷ making it more important for donors, recipient states and implementing agencies to be aware of the best practices and methodologies that could be applied.

The ISACS are also expected to contain a module on monitoring, evaluation and reporting. Since the goal of ISACS is to provide a clear set of conditions that are necessary for SALW control to be effective, they could have an important role at the country level to help a state determine how its operations perform in relation to a particular standard and to help an implementing agency measure how much its assistance contributed toward reaching a particular standard.⁷⁸ Once finalized and operational,

the ISACS could have an impact on improving how SALW projects are evaluated.

Ideally, the results of individual assistance programmes are measured against the objectives of a national strategy on SALW in order to gauge country-level progress. The outcome document of the Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider Implementation of the UN Programme of Action and many regional instruments encourage states to prepare National Action Plans that outline the priorities in addressing SALW over a period of five years.⁷⁹ The purpose of National Action Plans is not to solicit SALW assistance; however, assistance from donors and implementing agencies is usually necessary for developing the plan and for undertaking the activities in the plan. About 20 states have National Action Plans in place,⁸⁰ and donors, regional organizations and implementing agencies are actively supporting the development of plans in at least another 10 states.⁸¹

REPORTING AND MEASURING GLOBAL IMPACT

It is essential to consider the contribution of individual SALW activities and country-level programmes on the global effort to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW. There is no basis for measuring what impact, if any, a given activity has had toward achieving international and regional goals, and whether or not assistance was optimally used to help achieve these goals. Internationally, states rely solely on information provided in national reports on implementation of the PoA and the Biennial Meetings of States to assess the impact of SALW assistance on meeting the commitments of the PoA.⁸² The utility of the national reports for overseeing the issue of SALW assistance has been limited thus far. Not all states submit reports, and few report in a consistent manner.⁸³ The content, structure and length of the reports vary. States sometimes use the reporting template prepared jointly by ODA, UNIDIR and UNDP, and some follow the structure of the PoA, while others use another structure altogether.⁸⁴ Therefore, while analyses of the national reports are useful to comment on the trends of states in the reporting process, they only provide limited observations on state practice.⁸⁵

Specifically with respect to SALW assistance, the main reporting template states use is based on the structure of the PoA itself, and only invites states to report on the assistance provided. Some variations of the template additionally have states report on the assistance they received.⁸⁶ Recent

notes verbales from ODA ask states to report additionally on the assistance they require or the assistance they are in a position to consider providing.⁸⁷ Few states provide comprehensive information about the assistance received or provided, many selecting to report a few examples of their overall assistance. The fact that a state does not refer to an assistance activity does not mean that it did not take place. Furthermore, states may include the same assistance project from one report to the next, especially when the projects take place over a period of many years. This makes it difficult to determine if the state is restating a previously reported activity or if it is a new activity. Interestingly, the global survey on SALW assistance observed that donors and recipient states sometimes reported differently on the same assistance activity. The details of SALW assistance in the national reports sometimes differed from the information made available by international and regional organizations,⁸⁸ as well as the information submitted to the OECD as part of monitoring DAC assistance. National reporting on implementation of the PoA could be a useful tool for states to document and record SALW assistance and promote transparency. It would thus be useful if reporting templates requested systematized information from states on the assistance they received or provided.

The only other means available for states to assess the overall impact of SALW assistance is during the Biennial Meetings of States on the implementation of the PoA. The chair of the Third Biennial Meeting of States in 2008 devoted a session to the issue of assistance and cooperation and further allowed states to highlight their needs for assistance during the thematic discussions. Forty states delivered statements during the main session on assistance and cooperation: 11 provided details on the types of assistance they would like to receive, nine outlined examples of the assistance they received, 11 referred generally to the assistance they had provided (three of which detailed that assistance), two specifically outlined areas that they are willing to consider supporting, and four others highlighted the centrality of SALW assistance, either as a donor or recipient of assistance, without providing further detail.⁸⁹ While some states use the Biennial Meetings of States as opportunities for relaying the challenges they face in implementing the PoA, the discussions during the meeting have not generated in-depth debates or exchanges of experience on the challenges and practices of delivering and evaluating SALW assistance. The level of discussion does not enable assessments to be made on the impact of SALW assistance.

Furthermore, few studies have yet critically explored the issue of SALW assistance, either from a regional or international perspective. As a result, there is no research base on tracking or monitoring SALW assistance that could help states and implementing agencies see how their assistance contributes to achieving global goals of preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in SALW. Apart from the global survey and regional case studies on SALW assistance, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) gathered information on states' SALW activities for its *Biting the Bullet* initiative. Known as the Red Book, the publication focused on state implementation of the PoA and summarized what PoA-related structures and activities existed and did not exist. The publication did not aim to specifically assess the quality or impact of SALW assistance, though it sought to provide an overview of activities on the subject and the main entities involved. The sheer magnitude of the initiative and the cost and time requirements made it difficult to replicate. As a result, IANSA members published updates on the Red Book in 2006 but have not repeated the initiative since.⁹⁰ The limited amount of research available is a considerable challenge to understanding, improving and monitoring the impact and effectiveness of SALW assistance.

This report has highlighted a number of general challenges related to SALW assistance:

- there is a lack of clarity and precision in defining the scope and parameters of SALW assistance;
- the level and scope of SALW assistance provided does not seem to match the expectations or needs of the majority of recipient states;
- numerous states who require assistance have not assessed and articulated their priorities for addressing SALW in national strategies or action plans for various reasons;
- some regions have stronger, better resourced frameworks for facilitating SALW assistance than other regions;
- international and regional coordination and information-sharing on SALW assistance is inconsistent, as is the available data; and
- there are few systems or frameworks to objectively determine whether or not assistance is appropriate or adequate in meeting the needs of states.

Despite the expressed willingness in policy documents and statements of states to address SALW assistance and the abundance of SALW systems

and instruments, there has been little international and inter-regional coordination aimed at building a coordinated, systematic approach to SALW assistance that could help overcome the many challenges to knowing whether or not SALW assistance has been effective.

SALW ASSISTANCE AND AID EFFECTIVENESS

Since states and implementing agencies have not defined aid effectiveness for SALW assistance, this report will draw from other instruments addressing the effectiveness of assistance in development, notably the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the related Accra Agenda for Action. These documents, adhered to by 130 states and 28 international organizations as of February 2010, contain the most widely supported set of principles on aid effectiveness.⁹¹

DEFINITION OF AID EFFECTIVENESS FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

The OECD-DAC states that aid effectiveness “is about improving the management, delivery and complementarity of development co-operation activities to ensure the highest development impact”. The political commitments and operating principles of the Paris Declaration frame how these improvements can be made.

The Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action

States agreed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2001. The MDGs establish specific targets to be achieved by 2015. At a High-Level Conference in Monterrey in 2002, representatives from states, organizations, development banks and civil society recognized that increased donor spending alone would not be enough to meet the targets and deadlines of the MDGs; rather, they would need to find ways to ensure that development assistance would be used in a manner that was beneficial and effective.⁹² As a result, ministers and heads of agencies from developing countries, donor states, emerging economies, UN and multilateral institutions, global funds, foundations and civil society participated in two high-level fora organized by OECD-DAC, one in Rome in 2003 and the other in Paris in 2005. States and organizations agreed the principles and commitments of the Paris Declaration by consensus at the Paris meeting.

The Paris Declaration establishes five key principles for improving how development assistance is organized and managed, these being: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability.

Under each principle of the Paris Declaration are several commitments, 56 in total, that guide states on the requirements needed for meeting the Declaration's principles. Many of these specific actions are linked to one or more of 12 indicators used to measure progress at the country level.

In 2008, the OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness organized a Third High-Level Forum in Accra, Ghana. The Forum assessed progress made in aid effectiveness and discussed reforms aimed at bolstering implementation of the Declaration and emerging issues of aid effectiveness. By the end of the Forum, states and organizations in the Accra Agenda for Action committed to additional reforms to support aid effectiveness. The reforms address issues related to using and strengthening country systems,⁹³ and addressing the fragmentation of aid, untying of aid, partnerships, transparency, predictability and conditionality, supplementing the existing principles. The fact that states and organizations agreed to take on reforms demonstrates that states and organizations are willing to revise and adapt the definition and parameters of aid effectiveness according to emerging issues, concerns and accumulated knowledge on the issue.

The OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness coordinates procedural aspects of implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda and undertakes activities to support and promote the principles and commitments. Representatives from donor and recipient states, financial institutions, global funds and international, regional and civil society organizations, 83 entities in total, make up the membership of the Working Party. A 25-member Executive Committee coordinates and manages the Working Party, presents policy and strategy decisions to the Working Party and makes operational decisions. The Working Party is organized in five clusters: Ownership and Accountability, Country Systems, Transparent and Responsible Aid, Assessing Progress, and Managing for Development Results. Two Task Teams address Health as a Tracer Sector and South-South Cooperation respectively.

The deadline set for achieving the targets of the Paris Declaration is the end of 2010. The OECD conducted two rounds of surveys, one in 2006

and the other in 2008, to monitor the Paris Declaration's progress and to assess the gaps that needed to be filled to meet the 2010 targets.⁹⁴

The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness will convene the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Korea in 2011, where the achievements for meeting the 2010 targets will be reviewed and the plans for new fora will be made to meet the needs of emerging issues in aid effectiveness.

SALW ASSISTANCE UNDER THE PARIS DECLARATION

The fact that the OECD agreed to have SALW assistance qualify as official development assistance⁹⁵ raises the question of whether the principles and commitments of the Paris Declaration already apply to SALW assistance when administered through the development channels of those states that have signed on to the Paris Declaration. On the one hand, a developing country could include SALW in its national development plans, for example the Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks or Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers reflected in annual budgets, the development of which are required by the Paris Declaration. SALW would thus be treated as a national development priority by the recipient state and donors would be expected to align their development assistance accordingly.

The principles and commitments of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda concentrate on improving the process of organizing and managing development assistance. The MDGs establish the goals and targets to be achieved through development assistance but do not include specific targets and goals on SALW. Clearly established indicators and targets are necessary for measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of SALW assistance. As noted above, the SALW field is still lacking in this area, although the ISACS, once finalized, could help in this regard.

Few states have included SALW in their overall national development strategies. Often, developing countries lack the capacity or resources to identify and document SALW priorities. This makes it difficult for relevant authorities on development assistance within the state and donors of development assistance to include SALW issues in development strategies, especially since they may not be familiar with the relationship between SALW and development and the programmatic implications thereof. The Centre for International Cooperation and Security notes that "linkages between SALW and development programming have tended to be weak

or non-existent. Both strands of programming have tended to take place with little or only minimal reference to each other".⁹⁶ States may not want to include SALW in their development strategies as they could see it as encroaching on their monopoly over security-related matters.⁹⁷

Another important point to consider is the fact that not all SALW activities have an obvious development component to them. Weapons collection, disarmament and reintegration are the most common SALW- and development-related activities. However, developing or post-conflict states require additional assistance to build their capacity in areas where justifications of development spending are less apparent or that fall outside of what development budgets fund. These issues can include destruction, stockpile management and security, export, import and brokering controls, border security, ballistics, marking, tracing and transnational organized crime. Such issues often fall under the mandates and priorities of other donor ministries and departments such as those handling governance, defence, customs, policing and those dealing with drugs, crime and terrorism. Assistance coming from these ministries and departments does not fall under the development assistance requirements and commitments of the Paris Declaration. Further, the need for SALW interventions may coincide with other time-specific programmes such as DDR, security sector reform, peacebuilding and repatriation in post-conflict environments. The planning and resource mobilization for these activities are often done outside, and often prior to the preparations, of larger development assistance strategies.

Furthermore, a state's capacity to lead its own development agenda is a fundamental assumption at the center of the Paris Declaration. States experiencing conflict or that are in a post-conflict transition, that are unable to provide a minimum level of service and protection to its citizens, or that are experiencing problems related to legitimacy and weak governance (fragile states), may require different responses, interventions and forms of assistance than other states. In such contexts, where the negative impacts of SALW can be most severe, the commitments of the Paris Declaration as they stand may not be appropriate or relevant. The OECD thus established the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. These Principles, which were endorsed by Ministers and Heads of Agencies at a High-Level Meeting in April 2007, aim to complement the Paris Declaration. The Principles for Good International Engagement recognize that priorities have to be set according

to long- and short-term goals that may focus on conflict prevention and statebuilding before development and encourage donors to take a “whole of government” approach.⁹⁸ SALW-related interventions are generally treated through arms embargoes and under DDR or security sector reform programmes, which only partially cover a state’s disarmament and SALW-control needs. However, further study is necessary to better understand appropriate and timely forms of engagement on community disarmament, community protection, managing private security and SALW-control in such environments.⁹⁹

It is possible to consider that the Paris Declaration may apply to some SALW assistance through development assistance. However, as not all states have signed the Paris Declaration and since SALW may not be included in national development strategies and because development assistance is limited to the types of SALW assistance it covers, the principles and commitments of the Paris Declaration do not necessarily apply to or have implications on the delivery of SALW assistance. Nevertheless, there are many practices of the Paris Declaration that states and implementing agencies could nevertheless consider as good practice for strengthening and improving SALW assistance.

STRENGTHENING AID EFFECTIVENESS FOR SALW ASSISTANCE

USEFUL LESSONS FROM THE PARIS DECLARATION AND ACCRA AGENDA

According to the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda, donors, recipient states and aid agencies share the responsibility of creating an enabling environment that maximizes the benefits of development assistance and minimizes parallel, overlapping and duplicated systems of aid management, evaluations and reporting. This report does not evaluate whether the principles and commitments of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda provide the best solution for improving aid effectiveness. However, it does take into consideration the fact that ministers and heads of agencies from developing and donor countries, UN and multilateral institutions, global funds, foundations, and civil society have all participated in the process of defining and revising the principles of aid effectiveness. Further, as the two documents have been endorsed by 130 states and 28 organizations, funds or agencies, this report considers that the principles and commitments

contained in the two documents reflect the most widely held assumptions on improving assistance practices.

The following explores useful lessons of the Paris Declaration that could apply to SALW.

Principle 1: Ownership

This principle emphasizes the role of recipient states in taking the lead in developing and implementing their own policies and strategies. The leading activity for recipient states is to develop national development strategies and to strengthen national capacities to manage assistance. This includes developing coordination ministries or departments responsible for planning, coordinating and managing all aspects of state's development assistance. Under this principle, donors should support the activities that build the expertise, institutions and management systems in recipient states in order to help them to exercise the leadership.

In the field of SALW, the PoA and other instruments such as the Firearms Protocol, CIFTA, the EU Joint Action and the OSCE Document emphasize that assistance should be considered upon the request of states. This makes it the responsibility of the states seeking assistance to identify their SALW priorities. As noted above, states and regional organizations encourage the development of national action plans, however, only 21 states currently have such plans or strategies in place¹⁰⁰ and many states lack the resources to prepare them.

States also agreed in the PoA to establish "national coordinating bodies or agencies and institutional infrastructure responsible for policy guidance, research and monitoring" on matters related to SALW. According to national reports submitted on PoA implementation, most states have a national coordinating body or national commission in place.¹⁰¹ For many states, the lack of human, financial and technical resources to run the national coordinating body poses serious challenges on the coordinating body's ability to prepare and implement national strategies on SALW, mobilize resources and request assistance and coordinate effectively on SALW issues at the national, regional and global level.¹⁰²

Application to SALW assistance

In order to improve and promote aid effectiveness of SALW assistance, states seeking assistance should assign national resources to strengthening the state's capacity to lead in organizing, managing and supporting SALW assistance, including the preparation and parliamentary or congressional approval of national strategies on SALW or the inclusion of SALW in national development strategies. Donors and implementing agencies could make a concerted effort to help states strengthen their systems to take the lead on SALW issues, especially through strengthened national coordinating bodies and the preparation of national strategies or action plans on SALW.

Principle 2: Alignment

The Paris Declaration commits donors to align their assistance according to the priorities outlined in the recipient's national strategy and to use the country systems of the recipient states. When the systems of the recipient state are not sufficient to manage the assistance effectively, donors are expected to help strengthen these structures. Donors also promise to improve the predictability of aid by about three to five years¹⁰³ in order to help recipient states organize and prepare their own national budgets.

A key challenge for donors is that not all states have national strategies or action plans on SALW assistance. Further, many developing countries do not have SALW as a priority concern and thus may not see the need to invest in developing a national strategy or plan on SALW or in requesting SALW assistance. However, the same state may have weak infrastructure or systems in place for addressing SALW that illicit brokers and traffickers could exploit; thus these states could still benefit from some level of technical assistance or training. In the absence of national SALW strategies, regional strategies could help these states to strengthen their capacity to address SALW.

Recipient states commonly identify the lack of predictable funding as a challenge for planning and implementing SALW activities, whether or not the activity is contained in a national strategy. If the state has not managed to mobilize sufficient national or international resources to undertake the activities outlined in the plan, the timeframe of the plan may be well

advanced even though few or none of the activities have taken place or the plan may have to be stopped or scaled down for a lack of funding.¹⁰⁴

Donors and implementing agencies increasingly develop multi-year funding projects for SALW;¹⁰⁵ however, the instalments are often based on annual allocations that may take much longer than anticipated to become available, that may never materialize or that, for a range of reasons, may fall short of actual costs.¹⁰⁶ Also, donors and implementing agencies may pledge funding that requires the recipient state to contribute a percentage of their national resources, but the timing often does not coincide with the recipient state's budget cycle, making it difficult if not impossible for the recipient state to mobilize sufficient resources to undertake the activity.¹⁰⁷ The types of SALW activities that donors support, such as meetings, workshops and trainings, are short-term, often one-off activities that are held or hosted by the donor state or implementing agency, which are also difficult for a recipient state to foresee and consider when planning its annual activities.

In order to facilitate predictability and alignment of assistance, the Paris Declaration commits donors to prepare policy statements or pass legislation that frame and articulate their objectives and priorities in providing assistance. With respect to SALW, the Netherlands developed a Policy Memorandum on Small Arms and Light Weapons covering 2008 to 2011. Switzerland developed a national strategy, to combat the illicit trade in and abuse of SALW for 2008 to 2011,¹⁰⁸ which was adopted by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, and the Federal Department of Economic Affairs. Both the Memorandum and the Swiss strategy provide an overview of key SALW issues, and set out how the respective governments engage on SALW in bilateral commitments and at the multilateral level of the OECD, Geneva Declaration, NATO and OSCE. They also outline the objectives and activities the states aim to undertake in the area of SALW assistance and cooperation. In its internal strategy, Belgium prioritizes specific geographic locations, based on where it has established diplomatic presence, and notes that assistance to thematic topics such as stockpile management, destruction, strengthening legislation, sponsoring research and maintaining border controls should be given preferential consideration. Japan includes specific references to assistance for the collection and disposal of weapons in its *Diplomatic Bluebook*.¹⁰⁹

While no specific SALW strategy has been established in Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, these states often recognize SALW in general statements, in internal documents and in informal agreements between departments, or as part of their policies dealing with broader issues, such as post-conflict recovery, DDR, security sector reform or peacebuilding. Members of the European Union note that even though individual states may not have a specific strategy, they align their SALW activities behind the objectives and priorities of the European Union. Austria, Canada, Ireland and Norway have all initiated or recently completed reviews of their disarmament policies toward SALW that, according to representatives, may lead to a stronger focus in SALW-related issues, including armed violence reduction.¹¹⁰ In place of a long-term strategic policy, the German Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)¹¹¹ meet three to four times a year to assess proposals for SALW assistance and to determine priority areas to fund.

Under the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, donors are expected to focus on untied aid, meaning that recipient states are not restricted to spending aid money on the donor state's goods and services. With respect to SALW, in order to strengthen the country systems of a recipient state, donors often provide technical assistants to work alongside staff of a recipient government. While serving a valuable teaching and support role for the internal capacity of a state, broadly, this type of assistance has come under criticism, particularly if the assistance is not balanced by other forms of infrastructural and material assistance to the recipient or if it is used in lieu of the national personnel or services of the recipient state. The OECD notes that there is "little data-based analysis of the overall effectiveness of technical assistance as an aid instrument"¹¹² and others assert that it is difficult to measure the benefit of technical assistance, that the high salaries of technical assistance over their national counterparts can breed resentment in the recipient state, and because it can seem to inflate the financial amount a state provides as assistance.¹¹³ Similarly, most SALW assistance provided by donors is channelled through regional or international organizations or international non-governmental organizations, not through national country systems. Some donors noted that they preferred to channel funds through organizations as the country systems of some recipients were not sufficiently able to absorb and manage the SALW assistance to the same standards as those of the donor.¹¹⁴

Technical assistance could thus have a role to play in capacity-building and in strengthening country systems for addressing SALW (especially as many national coordinating bodies on SALW are recent developments since the inception of the PoA), as long as it fits within the recipient states needs and can measurably demonstrate the transfer of knowledge.

Application to SALW assistance

In order to improve and promote SALW aid effectiveness, recipient states and regional organizations should make efforts to prepare national and regional strategies on SALW, focusing especially on resource mobilization strategies and country systems for processing and implementing SALW assistance.

In addition to supporting such efforts within recipient states, donors should articulate their priorities and objectives for SALW assistance in national policy documents. The priorities should try to balance the use of technical assistants with other types of financial, infrastructural and material assistance. Donors could also work with specific regions, states and implementing agencies to reach agreements on the types and anticipated duration of assistance that the donor could provide, and that recipient states and implementing agencies could expect over a period of time. This could promote the predictability and long-term planning of SALW control at the country level and could facilitate greater coordination and strategic planning of assistance and promote the building of partnerships on assistance among donors, regional organizations and implementing agencies.

Principle 3: Harmonization

Under the Paris Declaration, donors aim to coordinate better to avoid duplication of efforts and to minimize transaction costs for recipient states. Transactions costs concern the time and resources of national staff in recipient states required for participating in multiple meetings, consultations and assessment activities, often on the same issue but for different donors or delegations. Such costs are increased by the high turnover of staff in international organizations, secondments and diplomatic delegations. Consequently, new staff often must repeat or restart discussions and consultations and participate in new situational assessments and analyses. Donor states have different bureaucratic procedures and assessment,

reporting and evaluation requirements, thus staff of recipient states spend extra time conforming and tailoring similar content to the demands of different donors, and often in second languages. As a way to encourage the harmonization of assistance, the Paris Declaration encourages states to take “programme-based approaches”.

The working environment of donor states and implementing agencies in developing countries are typically saturated with coordination meetings internally and among each other. Nevertheless, both donor and recipient states note that there is little coordination on SALW assistance.¹¹⁵ Governments of recipient states are not always able to account for the SALW activities taking place in their country since donors of SALW often go directly to individual ministries or departments to plan and implement activities, not through a central planning ministry or department. Furthermore, much SALW assistance is channelled through regional, international or non-governmental organizations and is implemented directly in communities or rural areas outside of, and without the direct involvement of, the capital.¹¹⁶

As noted above, although the relationship between security and development is increasingly better defined this has not been translated in better integrating, mainstreaming or supporting development- and SALW-related activities at the programming level. During two regional case studies conducted by UNIDIR, there was little evidence found of interaction or partnering between the development and SALW sectors in field programmes.¹¹⁷ Often when development sector officials from donor and recipient states were approached to discuss SALW during the research of the case studies, the meetings were declined and often delegated to officials working in security.¹¹⁸ In cross-sectoral or inter-departmental interviews involving both security and development officials, the relationship between security and development was regularly acknowledged; however, the dialogue seemed to remain limited to within, rather than across, the disciplines.¹¹⁹ SALW projects seem bound to be implemented with little cross-over or synergy with development activities that potentially would be mutually reinforcing.

Application to SALW assistance

States and organizations could make an effort to harmonize certain procedures and reporting to minimize the bureaucratic requirements

placed on recipient states, and to encourage programme-based approaches. This could include creating common templates for requesting, evaluating and reporting on assistance; having donors and organizations undertake joint assessment or diagnostic reviews; and the pooling of resources.

Recipient states, donors and implementing agencies could all work toward improving the knowledge management of SALW assessments, activities and programmes. This would require building up the research and statistical information base and infrastructure of a state so that data and reports (evaluations, situational analyses and impact assessments) could be easily transmitted, as appropriate, between and among states and organizations. Better knowledge management would not only build the institutional memories of states and organizations but could also support better coordination among states and organizations.

States and organizations could also increase their efforts to better elaborate on the practical and programmatic implications of SALW in their activities and to incorporate a solid understanding of SALW in existing coordination networks and mechanisms in fields such as development, armed violence reduction, public health, peacebuilding and conflict prevention, as well as in the context of implementing of Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.¹²⁰ Such an incorporation would reduce the overlapping of assistance in fields that address multiple issues and could help in the creation of harmonized data gathering and reporting so that relevant information on SALW can be easily accumulated and shared.

Principle 4: Managing for results

This principle requires donors and recipient states to mutually agree on tools and systems that measure the impact of the assistance. Recipient states are additionally expected to have performance assessment frameworks in place that measure the impact of the assistance.

As noted above, the PoA does not contain time-specific targets and indicators for measuring progress of implementation. However, states and implementing agencies use a number of tools to facilitate or support the development of performance assessment indicators. As noted previously, The UNODC and OAS have formulated model legislation to support states to implement the Firearms Protocol and CIFTA respectively. The SADC and

Nairobi Protocols, OSCE Best Practice Guidelines and SEESAC's Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines also help provide direction for SALW activities in their respective subregions. Since the process of developing the ISACS involves multi-regional consultations, and cover a wider breadth of issues than the existing standards and guidelines, the modules will be more universally applicable than the regional standards and guidelines. These tools help states and organizations determine the minimum standards that SALW activities, and the assistance used to implement these activities, are expected to achieve. States and organizations can thus use these to formulate performance indicators to measure whether or not an activity fulfilled its expectations.

Application to SALW assistance

Recipient states should aim to include performance and success indicators in their national strategies on SALW. Donors, implementing agencies and recipient states should all agree on the performance and success indicators in their terms of reference on SALW assistance.

States and organizations could also support periodic objective impact assessments of the country-level progress of the SALW activities and assistance taking place.

Once the ISACS have been finalized, donor and recipient states could also consider adopting the criteria of some or all of the ISACS standards into their national legislation and incorporating the standards into their various strategies.

Mutual Accountability

Donors and recipient states commit to increasing transparency, to each other and nationally to their respective parliaments and citizens, in the provision and use of aid funds. The donors and recipient states also commit to undertaking mutual assessments of progress in implementing the agreed commitments of the Paris Declaration.

SALW is a subject that implicates national security. This can make it difficult for states to admit to the existence of possible weaknesses in their state systems for handling and controlling SALW and it can also become a politically charged issue when dealing with assistance and cooperation.

However, clearly defined national strategies and policy statements from donor states and recipient states can help in increasing the transparency of SALW assistance.

Another obstacle to transparency is the low level of knowledge management and institutional memory on SALW present in states and organizations, noted above, making it difficult to track information on SALW assistance.

Representatives from donor states and implementing agencies have noted also that in some instances they felt the recipient states were playing donors and agencies against each other, or not revealing an assistance activity taking place in an attempt to receive more funds.¹²¹ Strengthened country systems in recipient states to organize, manage and report on assistance, and improved coordination and information sharing among donors and implementing agencies could help to minimize this.

Application to SALW assistance

Clear objectives and priorities on the part of recipients states, donors and implementing agencies, improved knowledge management on SALW and stronger coordination among states, donors and implementing agencies could improve the mutual accountability of SALW assistance. States and organizations could also undertake mutual assessments of performance as part of project evaluations or as separate, periodic assessments.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPROACHING SALW AID EFFECTIVENESS

The preceding section highlighted several practical challenges to SALW assistance:

- Recipient states often lack the human, financial and technical resources to identify and document their SALW priorities and to sustain national, regional and international level activities and coordination.
- Donors and implementing agencies may not receive the documentation necessary from recipient states in order to administer the SALW assistance. The administrative requirements of donors and organizations can overwhelm the small and often under-resourced public institutions typical in recipient states.

- Recipient states, donors and implementing agencies are often not aware of the totality of SALW activities that took place or that are taking place within a state and there is a lack of coordination on SALW assistance at the national, regional and international levels.
- States and organizations do not have strong institutional memories on SALW activities, in part due to the lack of adequate knowledge management and reporting on SALW activities and in part due to the high turnover of staff in diplomatic missions and international and regional organizations.
- For recipient states and implementing agencies there is a lack of predictable funding and lack of flexibility on when and how funding can be spent.
- Representatives working in fields that have linkages with SALW, such as development or armed violence reduction, often do not have practical or programmatic guidance on better integrating, mainstreaming or supporting SALW activities.

The principles and commitments of the Paris Declaration and its Accra Agenda for Action can help mitigate some of these challenges. However, there are many considerations of the nature of SALW issues that should be taken into account when identifying or elaborating the most appropriate and relevant parameters for aid effectiveness in the context of SALW assistance. One of these is the number of different arms of government—such as foreign affairs, development, defence, customs, policing or special offices dedicated to dealing with drugs, crime and terrorism—involved in providing technical or financial assistance. Each ministry and department usually follows its own rules of procedures for delivering assistance and has their own monitoring, evaluation and reporting requirements. Despite the role of national coordinating bodies on SALW, the findings of the global survey and consultations with multiple donors noted that inter-agency coordination on SALW was low.¹²² Further, there may be a lack of clarity regarding which ministry or department is responsible for funding and delivering the aid. In the case of the European Union, questions over the competencies to provide SALW assistance led to legal proceedings, which had a stalling impact on the European Council and Commission’s SALW activities during the four year proceedings.¹²³

In some states, there is a strong national authority and governing system in place and bilateral assistance for these states to undertake the necessary activities is sufficient. The OECD report *Armed Violence Reduction:*

Enabling Development, however, notes that “the pursuit of aid effectiveness ... is premised on the assumption that a government is willing and able to lead and is perceived as legitimate by its citizens. In areas affected by high levels of armed violence, these assumptions do not always hold”.¹²⁴ In such cases, the type of assistance needed and the ability of a state to absorb the assistance may require broader, more comprehensive and longer-term assistance interventions. The OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations suggest that donors and implementing agencies should frame assistance around statebuilding activities, using international compacts or multi-donor trust funds, particularly if the country systems are not strong enough to support the assistance.¹²⁵

SALW assistance in the form of disarmament programmes can have serious political and security implications. For instance, material incentives for handing over a weapon can appear to reward weapon ownership and thus can breed resentment among individuals, groups or communities that are equally in need of development support but that were either disarmed voluntarily or chose not to own a weapon or participate in armed groups in the first place. Ill-conceived collection or reintegration programmes can bring insecurity to an area where some groups have disarmed and some have not, especially when violent conflict continues in neighbouring regions. Equally, badly planned weapons buy-back programmes can even fuel an illicit market of weapons, with individuals turning in old or malfunctioning weapons and using the financial reward to purchase other weapons. The public’s confidence in the government can also be undermined when national action plans on SALW are developed but remain unimplemented. Similarly, if a disarmament project begins without full or adequate funding, or the costs of implementation rise above anticipated budgets, there can be a gap in the implementation of the activity, such as leaving weapons in an unsecured storage area, suspending important and symbolic destruction ceremonies and renegeing on incentives promised to former combatants, communities and other individuals.¹²⁶

The transnational nature of the illicit trade in SALW means that it is not enough to address the SALW situation in only one state. Progress on SALW needs to be geographically balanced to prevent shifting SALW problems to other areas in the country or into neighbouring countries.¹²⁷ A developing country may not have a marked SALW problem and thus may not seem to require SALW assistance. If such developing states do not have sufficient

structures in place to address and prevent the illicit trade in SALW, it can become a base or transit point for illicit brokers or traffickers that take advantage of the weak safeguards.¹²⁸ This is when donors or agencies working in other fields, or regional organizations could help to ensure that SALW issues are brought on board.

The Secretary-General's report on Armed Violence points out that although an array of institutions, departments and organizations have an interest in reducing armed violence—and thereby also addressing SALW—“programmes are, however, not always designed on the basis of a solid diagnosis of the problem or comprehensive evidence of what works and what does not”.¹²⁹ There has been little attention given to determining the best practices for conducting and diagnosing SALW-related problems and how they relate to the activities of fields linked with SALW. Aside from individual efforts at the country or agency level to discuss how SALW issues fit in development programmes, there are few formal or in-depth studies or “how-to” guides on the practical implications and opportunities for better integrating, mainstreaming or supporting development and SALW-related activities.

New approaches are evolving, however, that accommodate SALW issues in overarching programmes, for example armed violence prevention programmes (AVPP) and community security programmes. The AVPP approach, initially a collaboration between UNDP and the World Health Organization and later involving other UN agencies, is based on developing an evidence base on the causes, nature and impacts of armed violence and generating best practices on the lessons learned in their armed violence reduction and prevention programmes. Community security, undertaken by UNDP, aims to look holistically at community needs from the perspective of governance, strengthened rule of law, arms control and improved development planning. UNDP has recently initiated community security programmes in Croatia, Jamaica, Kosovo, Somalia and Southern Sudan. Such programmes view SALW as an important component of community security that can be tackled in parallel at the community and institutional levels.

Armed violence reduction, community security and development approaches are essential for addressing SALW, particularly in the areas of micro-disarmament and crime and conflict prevention. However, SALW is an issue that cross-cuts many other issues. In addition to addressing SALW

through armed violence reduction and conflict prevention, states must be able to sustain and coordinate adequate responses to *all* aspects of SALW control on a regular basis.¹³⁰

OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROMOTING AID EFFECTIVENESS IN EXISTING STRUCTURES, FRAMEWORKS AND TOOLS

The results of the 2006 PoA Review Conference suggest that international efforts on improving the effectiveness of SALW assistance must therefore fit within the parameters of existing frameworks.

The PoA itself is a good starting point for discussing SALW aid effectiveness. While the PoA lacks the specific targets and measurable indicators found in, for instance, the MDGs, it does claim one very significant goal: the preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in SALW. Within this goal, the commitments of the PoA set up specific expectations on what states should be able to implement in a sustainable manner on the issue of SALW. The are international and regional instruments that cover a wide range of SALW issues, and states recognize—at least in preambles, General Assembly Resolutions and the growing field of armed violence reduction—the complexity of SALW problems that need to be addressed.

States meet on a biennial basis to discuss implementation of the PoA and have shown an increasing willingness to submit national reports and to discuss how to make the reporting process better, particularly as a tool for supporting SALW assistance.¹³¹ States could use the biennial meetings to promote substantive dialogue on assistance not only in support of matching needs and resources but also in terms of creating a platform for discussing key issues related to identifying the parameters of aid effectiveness of SALW assistance and for promoting supportive practices. Similarly, states could aim to agree on ways to make the recording of assistance in national reports more systematic and consistent, in order to facilitate research, assessments, measurability and project evaluations.

The Geneva Declaration and the growing body of work around armed violence reduction, particularly with respect to building measurable indicators on armed violence, provide other entry points for addressing SALW aid effectiveness. The initiative of Norway to raise the profile of SALW and armed violence within the framework of the MDGs could also provide a stronger platform within the development field to address SALW

issues, especially micro-disarmament, demand for SALW and armed violence reduction. There is also a lot of potential for the ISACS to promote aid effectiveness, since the purpose of the ISACS is to provide states and organizations with benchmarks of the minimum requirements necessary for SALW control to be effective.

Many support systems for addressing SALW already exist in most regions. Enhanced regional level coordination coupled with increased efforts at the international level could help in providing a more balanced and systematic distribution of assistance to all regions. With a stronger mandate from states, ODA could also take on more active clearing house and support functions especially in regions that do not count donor states among members of the regional organizations. The ODA regional centres could be strengthened to take a more active role in coordinating and facilitating information exchanges on SALW assistance and in helping to mobilize resources on behalf of states in the region. Regional organizations and the UN regional offices could be further used to promote the harmonization of procedural and administrative aspects of SALW assistance.

Discussions at the international level on this subject, even if they do not result in an agreed document or plan, could still help states and implementing organizations independently improve the manner in which they organize and manage SALW assistance. International dialogue could also guide and promote regional organizations to tailor discussions on SALW aid effectiveness to fit their own particular environment and needs. With respect to development assistance, the Pacific has, for instance, through the Pacific Island Forum, adapted the Paris Declaration to fit its own regional context by creating the “Pacific Aid Effectiveness Principles” in 2007.¹³² However, it would still be necessary for dialogue to take place at the international level to ensure that progress in SALW aid effectiveness and assistance is geographically balanced, coordinated and working toward the prevention, combating and eradication of the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects.

CONCLUSION

States have demonstrated a willingness to address the issue of SALW assistance. However, much work remains to be done to improve SALW assistance and promote effectiveness. There are many opportunities and

fora for states to advance discussions on the subject. Likewise, there are many frameworks and tools to support a more coordinated approach to assistance. With a Review Conference on PoA implementation in 2012, it is important for states to have a better understanding of the direction they would like to take in framing and addressing SALW assistance.

It is not enough to rely on advancements made in the armed violence reduction and development fields in addressing SALW and aid effectiveness, since many important aspects of dealing with the transnational nature of the illicit trade in SALW fall outside the scope of these fields. Some states may require assistance to strengthen existing legislation or to develop information infrastructure while other states may require the strengthening of physical infrastructure or bureaucratic and other internal procedures governing SALW control. Other states may require a more comprehensive approach to SALW and longer-term commitment for SALW assistance, from post-conflict clean up of weapons (for example collection and disposal) and reform of the security sector to reintegration, armed violence reduction, community development and numerous other SALW-related issues.

This report has aimed to help states and implementing organizations better understand what aid effectiveness could mean applied to SALW assistance. The Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action can serve to guide us toward a better understanding of the characteristics and attributes of aid effectiveness in the context of SALW assistance. However, it remains up to the international community to determine how SALW assistance can be made more measurable, more geographically balanced and more effective; for this, further dialogue, study and debate are necessary. However, apart from building longer-term and strategic approaches to addressing SALW assistance at the international and regional levels, states and organizations could still take more immediate steps to improve the manner in which they manage, evaluate and measure assistance.

Several recommendations were made in this report and they are summarized below.

RECOMMENDATIONS

International level

- States could use the Biennial Meetings of States:
 - to promote consistent and strategic dialogue on SALW assistance;
 - as opportunities for matching needs and resources; and
 - to discuss process and procedures for strengthening the PoA framework to support SALW assistance and aid effectiveness.
- Before the 2012 Review Conference, states could consider reporting their views to the UN Secretary-General on the different opportunities and activities for strengthening SALW assistance and aid effectiveness on topics such as ownership, harmonization and managing results. States could include their views on the feasibility of setting up specific activities, procedures, goals and targets for promoting SALW assistance and aid effectiveness. States could discuss the results of the reports at the Review Conference.
- Regional organizations and their member states should consider making a greater effort to coordinate on SALW activities, especially on matters related to promoting and facilitating a balanced approach to assistance within and across regions.
- States should ensure that international or regional meetings held on the issue of SALW include specific sessions on improving SALW aid effectiveness, in order to promote the mobilization of resources and the exchange of information on needs and resources, and to build partnerships for implementing and coordinating assistance activities.
- The open-ended meeting of governmental experts on SALW anticipated for 2011 could consider:
 - defining the scope and parameters of SALW assistance, including South–South Cooperation;
 - assessments of best practices for administering and evaluating technical and financial SALW assistance of both donors and recipient states;

- impact assessments of the SALW assistance implemented to date, with particular focus on the impact of the initiatives of regional organizations to facilitate SALW assistance; and
 - identifying target countries and the issues that need to be addressed there and recommending that they be prioritized for assistance for the achievement of specific, measurable goals within a certain period of time.
- States could consider providing consistent and predictable core funding specifically aimed at supporting a clearing house and an implementation support unit for the PoA, whether the main functions take place at the international or regional levels.
 - As noted in the outcome document of the Third Biennial Meeting of States, national reports could be better used to provide more systematic and consistent details on SALW assistance received, required, provided and that could be provided, and states should use and support the maintenance of the PoA-ISS. Future reporting templates could establish a common form for coding SALW assistance activities, to make it easier to quantify, track and assess assistance activities.
 - Once the ISACS are finalized, states could consider adopting the relevant modules into their national SALW control processes and systems.
 - States and implementing agencies should increase their attention in the practical programming of activities on strengthening the relationship of SALW with such areas as development; conflict prevention; peacebuilding; women, peace and security; public health and armed violence reduction. States and implementing agencies could also identify ways to promote compatible planning, reporting and evaluation techniques for programmes, so that information on SALW can be easily collected and compared, making it easier for the international community to measure progress made in these fields toward addressing SALW at the global level.

Country level

Recipient states:

- States requiring assistance should ensure that they have SALW strategies in place that detail their national priorities for addressing SALW and their needs for international assistance, and which are passed through the state's parliamentary or congressional systems. The strategies should include performance and success indicators for evaluating SALW assistance.
- States requiring SALW assistance should invest in strengthening their own national institutions or coordinating bodies on SALW in order to effectively manage, coordinate and oversee SALW assistance. This includes strengthening knowledge management systems and the institutional memory of SALW activities implemented and assistance received.
- States should also make efforts to be as transparent and accountable as possible to their own citizens and donors about the SALW assistance received and detailing how the assistance was used and evaluated. This could include promoting and facilitating dialogue between the state, donors and implementing agencies in the country to share information on the SALW activities underway and highlight opportunities for assistance.

Donor countries:

- Donors, regional organizations and implementing agencies should develop policy documents that outline their priorities for providing SALW assistance. The documents should aim to promote transparency and accountability as much as possible (for their own citizens, other states and implementing agencies) about the SALW assistance they have supported and are willing to support. These policy documents could include commitments from donors to align their assistance to the priorities of recipient states and to foster greater predictability in the SALW assistance they are in a position to provide.

- Donors should increased their efforts to provide the necessary technical and financial assistance to help states prepare or update SALW strategies and to implement the strategies.
- Donors and implementing agencies could ensure that every assistance project taking place in a recipient state also includes a contribution toward strengthening the national systems to address and coordinate on SALW issues, such as national coordinating bodies on SALW.
- Implementing agencies, specifically international and regional organizations, could aim to play a larger role in sharing information on assistance activities taking place in a given country or region, coordinating among donors in a given country or region and setting up systems that help harmonize the assessments, reporting and procedures between recipient states and donors. This could also include strengthening knowledge management systems and the institutional memory of SALW activities implemented and assistance received.

ANNEX A

OVERVIEW OF SALW ISSUES AND ASSISTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS

This table provides an overview of the SALW issues covered by the key international and regional instruments. It summarizes which instruments directly refer to financial or technical assistance. Shaded boxes indicate that the instrument refers generally to the issue, while an “A” indicates that the instrument refers in some way to financial or technical assistance, including training. Assistance may be referred to as general requirements for external assistance or as a commitment to, or recognition of, the need to provide assistance.

The thematic headings for this table have been shortened. The full headings are as follows:

Nat'l Commission—National Commissions, National Coordinating Bodies, liaisons and focal points
Legislation—laws, regulations and administrative procedures, including criminalization
Transfers—transfers including brokering and end-use certificates
Legal production
Law enforcement
Borders and customs
MLA—mutual legal assistance
Partnerships—partnerships and cooperation
Information Sharing
Record mgmt—record management
Stockpiles—stockpile management and security
Marking and tracing
Destruction—destruction and disposal
Collection
DDR—disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
Awareness—awareness-raising and education
Prevention and development—conflict prevention, development, gender, children
Research—action-oriented research
Linked issues—organized and transnational crime, trafficking, and terrorism
Civil society
Public ownership—public ownership of weapons

Region	Instrument	Nat'l Commission	Legislation	Legal Production	Transfers	Law enforcement	Borders and customs	MLA	Partnerships	Information sharing	Record mgmt	Stockpiles	Marking and tracing	Destruction	Collection	DDR	Awareness	Prevention and development	Research	Linked issues	Civil society	Public ownership
Asia/Pacific	Nadi Framework																					
	ASEAN Plan				A									A	A							
Europe	EU Code of Conduct ^{vi}																					
	EU Council Joint Action													A	A	A						
	OSCE Document											A	A	A	A							
	Stability Pact Plan ^{vii}		A				A	A	A						A						A	

i UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.

ii International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.

iii Article 14 of the Firearms Protocol makes specific reference to providing assistance to the issues identified in Articles 29 and 30 of the United Nations Convention on against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto (2004).

iv Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons, *Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 2005, p. 16.

v Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Explosives, Ammunition and Other Related Materials.

vi EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

vii Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan.

Notes

- ¹ For the purposes of this report, states that received or that may be interested in receiving assistance are referred to as “recipient states”. States that provide technical assistance and financial assistance to address SALW are referred to as “donors”. The term “implementing agencies” or “practitioners” is used to describe any organization or group that implements SALW activities using technical or financial assistance. The SALW field and the SALW community are terms used to collectively describe individuals working on SALW issues in states, international and regional organizations, implementing agencies, academic and research institutes and civil society.
- ² International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.
- ³ General Assembly, *Report of the Group of Governmental Experts Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 60/91 to Consider Further Steps to Enhance International Cooperation in Preventing, Combating and Eradicating Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light weapons*, UN document A/62/163, 30 August 2007.
- ⁴ S. Parker and S. Cattaneo, *Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the National reports Submitted by States from 2002 to 2008*, UNDP, UNIDIR, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs and Small Arms Survey, 2008, pp. 29–35.
- ⁵ At least 80 states referred to the importance of assistance in statements delivered at the Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the PoA.
- ⁶ The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Synergy Conference for Regional Organizations on Implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons”, NATO headquarters, Brussels, 28–30 May 2008.
- ⁷ K. Maze and S. Parker, *International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Findings of a Global Survey*, UNIDIR, 2006, p. 21.
- ⁸ The positive responses came largely from states in South-Eastern Europe, where regional and international organizations oversaw and channelled donor funds into large-scale and coordinated SALW programmes.
- ⁹ K. Maze and H. Rhee, *International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Case Study of East Africa*, UNIDIR, 2007.
- ¹⁰ K. Maze and Y. Issar, *International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Case Study of the South Pacific*, UNIDIR, 2009.

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- ¹¹ Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, New York, 14–18 July 2008.
- ¹² General Assembly, *Report of the Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, UN document A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3, 20 August 2008.
- ¹³ Letter to Permanent Missions of the Member States to the United Nations from the Chair-Designate of the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations, transmitted by the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations, New York, 12 March 2010, <www.poa-iss.org/bms4/Documents/2010-03-12Letter-AmbMacedo.pdf>.
- ¹⁴ General Assembly, *The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, UN document A/RES/63/72, 2 December 2008; and General Assembly, *The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, UN document A/RES/64/50, 12 January 2010.
- ¹⁵ For a comprehensive overview of SALW policy, see International Action Network on Small Arms, *International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action*, 2005.
- ¹⁶ General Assembly, *The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, UN document A/RES/63/72, 2 December 2008.
- ¹⁷ *Programme of Action to Combat, Eradicate and Prevent the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, UN document A/CONF.192/15, 2001, §IV, para. 1(c).
- ¹⁸ General Assembly, *Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to general Assembly resolution 56/24 V of 24 December 2001, Entitled "The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects"*, UN document A/58/138, 11 July 2003.
- ¹⁹ The UN Firearms Protocol is one of three Protocols of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
- ²⁰ Ten ECOWAS member states have ratified the Convention: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
- ²¹ Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.
- ²² Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia. Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar and Zimbabwe have yet to ratify the Protocol.
- ²³ Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,

Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Canada, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the United States have yet to ratify the Convention.

- ²⁴ Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.
- ²⁵ Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Since 2006, associate member territories are New Caledonia and French Polynesia.
- ²⁶ The Council Joint Action was first adopted on 17 December 1998. It was replaced by the revised Council Joint Action of 12 July 2002.
- ²⁷ The first reference was made in the UN Secretary-General's Report "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", which recognized that SALW proliferation posed a serious threat to peace and security. General Assembly, *Report of the Secretary General, Supplement to An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, UN document A/50/60-S/1995/1, paras. 47, 62 and 63.
- ²⁸ OECD, *Conflict Prevention and Peace Building: What Counts as ODA?*, 3 March 2005.
- ²⁹ OECD-DAC, *DAC Statistical Reporting Directives*, OECD document DCD/DAC(2007)34, 6 April 2007, p. 14.
- ³⁰ See section "SALW assistance and aid effectiveness" of this report for more detail on the growing tendency to address SALW under armed violence.
- ³¹ General Assembly, *Promoting Development Through the Reduction and Prevention of Armed Violence: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN document A/64/228, 5 August 2009.
- ³² *Ibid.*, para. 33.
- ³³ Seminar hosted by the Government of Norway to brief states, international organizations and civil society on its preparations to host a conference, to be held April 2010, that aims to encourage states to consider raising the issue of armed violence during the MDG Review Summit, briefing held at the United Nations Office in Geneva, 18 February 2010.
- ³⁴ General Assembly, *Report of the Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, UN document A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3, 20 August 2008, para. 5.
- ³⁵ *Programme of Action to Combat, Eradicate and Prevent the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, UN document A/CONF.192/15, 9–20 July 2001, §II.
- ³⁶ The original structure of the mechanism was developed by UNIDIR to be incorporated into the PoA-ISS. The checklist contained within the mechanism is available in Kerry Maze, "Implementing the UN Programme of Action: A Checklist for Matching Needs and Resources", UNIDIR, 2009.

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- ³⁷ Council of the European Union, *Council Joint Action of 12 July 2002 on the European Union's Contribution to Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP*, EU document 2002/589/CFSP, 12 July 2002.
- ³⁸ European Commission, *Small Arms and Light Weapons: The Response of the European Union*, 2001, pp. 17–8.
- ³⁹ Council of the European Union, *EU Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and Their Ammunition*, EU document 5319/06, 13 January 2006.
- ⁴⁰ See <www.stabilitypact.org/partners/>.
- ⁴¹ Stability Pact, *Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Regional Implementation Plan, revised 2006, §4(b).
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, §4.
- ⁴³ See <www.seesac.org/resources/standards-rmdsg/1/>.
- ⁴⁴ OSCE, *OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 24 November 2000.
- ⁴⁵ OSCE, *Handbook of Best Practice Guidelines on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 1 December 2003.
- ⁴⁶ Forum for Security Co-operation, *Update of FSC Decision no. 15/02 on Expert Advice on Implementation of Section V of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, OSCE document FSC.DEC/11/09, 25 November 2009.
- ⁴⁷ Art. 15(1).
- ⁴⁸ Art. 15(2).
- ⁴⁹ Art. 16.
- ⁵⁰ Art. 20(1)d.
- ⁵¹ The EAC is a regional intergovernmental organization composed of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. It came into existence with the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community on 7 July 2000.
- ⁵² According to Lesotho's 2010 national report on implementation of the PoA, available at <www.poa-iss.org/PoA/NationalReportList.aspx>.
- ⁵³ The ECOWAS Convention replaced the 1998 ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons. UNDP was the main support unit of the moratorium through the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED). Still closely involved with UNDP, ECOSAP replaced PCASED.
- ⁵⁴ RECSA, *Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 2005.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- ⁵⁶ Work Programme on Terrorism to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, Kuala Lumpur, 17 May 2002, §4.6(b).
- ⁵⁷ SADC, *Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials*, 2001, art. 6(d).
- ⁵⁸ Interview with Patrick McCarthy, ISACS Coordinator, Geneva, 4 March 2010.

- ⁵⁹ The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the OSCE, “Synergy Conference for Regional Organizations on Implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons—Summary Report”, 2008, <www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2008/05/35224_en.pdf>, p. 29; see also I. Berkol, *Effective Implementation of Existing Instruments on Small Arms and Light Weapons: an Analysis of the OSCE Document*, Groupe de Recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, 2008.
- ⁶⁰ K. Maze and S. Parker, *International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Findings of a Global Survey*, UNIDIR, 2006.
- ⁶¹ It is important to remember that the operational costs of DDR and destruction activities are significantly higher than other no-less-important activities such as the provision of technical support for developing legislation and conducting meetings, workshops and seminars.
- ⁶² K. Maze and S. Parker, *International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Findings of a Global Survey*, UNIDIR, 2006, pp. 9–10.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- ⁶⁴ The numbers here reflect the figures posted on the OECD database for all states and organizations listed except for the United States of America. The United States of America lists in its national reports on implementation of the PoA that it has provided approximately US\$ 67 million as international assistance from 2001 through 2008. The figures posted on the OECD database are US\$ 513 million allocated from 2006 through 2008. Different agencies and departments report to the OECD and to the PoA. The United States is verifying the figures but an answer was not available by March 2010.
- ⁶⁵ OECD-DAC, *DAC Statistical Reporting Directives*, OECD document DCD/DAC(2007)34, 6 April 2007, p. 14.
- ⁶⁶ These observations were made using the same criteria for determining international assistance as in the 2006 study: researchers only counted an activity as SALW assistance when it directly engaged and benefited a recipient state. Activities targeting a general or global audience were not counted.
- ⁶⁷ K. Maze and S. Parker, *International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Findings of a Global Survey*, UNIDIR, 2006, p. 21.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 22.
- ⁶⁹ Consultations with representatives from donor states—Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America—undertaken between January and March 2010.

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- ⁷⁰ International Action Network on Small Arms, *International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action*, 2005, p. 235.
- ⁷¹ United Nations, *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards*, 2006.
- ⁷² Example drawn from A. Wilkinson, *Performance Indicators for the Monitoring and Evaluation of SALW Control Programmes—Discussion Paper*, SEESAC, 2004, pp. 2 and 10.
- ⁷³ G. Mugumya and S. Koyama, *Applying Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) Approaches to Weapons Collection and Weapons for Development Programmes*, UNIDIR, 2002, <www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf-act235.pdf>.
- ⁷⁴ The terminology of performance and success indicators is from Adrian Wilkinson, *Performance Indicators for SALW Control Programmes*, SEESAC, 2004, p. 1. The paper noted that only two other documents referenced the issue.
- ⁷⁵ See <www.seesac.org/resources/standards-rmdsg/1/>.
- ⁷⁶ A. Wilkinson, *Performance Indicators for the Monitoring and Evaluation of SALW Control Programmes—Discussion Paper*, SEESAC, 2004, pp. 4–15.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- ⁷⁸ Interview with Patrick McCarthy, ISACS Coordinator, Geneva, 4 March 2010.
- ⁷⁹ For example, General Assembly, *Report of the Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, UN document A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3, 20 August 2008, pp. 8–10. Also, the ISACS Coordinator confirmed that a module on preparing National Action Plans is under development; interview with Patrick McCarthy, ISACS Coordinator, Geneva, 4 March 2010.
- ⁸⁰ Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Croatia, El Salvador, Ghana, Kenya, Kosovo, Macedonia, Mali, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tanzania and Uganda have National Action Plans or similar strategies in place.
- ⁸¹ Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Guatemala, Malawi, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Sri Lanka and the Sudan are among the states preparing national plans.
- ⁸² International Action Network on Small Arms, *International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action*, 2005, p. 273.
- ⁸³ Since 2006, the frequency of national report submissions has increased and quality has improved; S. Parker and S. Cattaneo, *Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the National Reports Submitted by States from 2002 to 2008*, UNDP, UNIDIR, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs and Small Arms Survey, 2008, pp. 29–35.

- ⁸⁴ National reports can be accessed at <www.poa-iss.org/PoA/NationalReportList.aspx>.
- ⁸⁵ E. Kytomaki and V. Yankey-Wayne, *Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the Reports Submitted by States in 2003*, UNDP, UNIDIR, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs and Small Arms Survey, 2004; E. Kytomaki and V. Yankey-Wayne, *Five Years of Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Regional Analysis of National Reports*, UNDP, UNIDIR, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs and Small Arms Survey, 2006; and S. Parker and S. Cattaneo, *Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the National reports Submitted by States from 2002 to 2008*, UNDP, UNIDIR, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs and Small Arms Survey, 2008.
- ⁸⁶ Many states use the original reporting template, which was largely based on the structure of the PoA. See “Template for use in the reporting on the implementation of the Programme of Action”, at <www.poa-iss.org/DocsUpcomingEvents/PoA_template_English.doc>. The original template was revised in 2005. Among the moderate revisions, the template asks states to list the assistance they received. The revised version was developed as part of the “Assistance Package: Guidelines for reporting on implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects”, prepared jointly by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme and UNIDIR in 2005.
- ⁸⁷ For example, note verbale, UN document ODA/37-2009/SALW-BMS/CORR, 11 December 2009, <www.poa-iss.org/poa/NoteVerbale/10-019nve.pdf>.
- ⁸⁸ K. Maze and S. Parker, *International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Findings of a Global Survey*, UNIDIR, 2006, p. 15.
- ⁸⁹ See statements listed on the official website of the Third Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms and Light Weapons, <www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/BMS/bms3/1BMS3Pages/1Statementsindex.html>.
- ⁹⁰ International Action Network on Small Arms, *International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action*, 2005.
- ⁹¹ See <www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_36074966_1_1_1,00.html>.
- ⁹² United Nations, *Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development*, 2003, p. 5.
- ⁹³ Country systems refers to, but is not limited to, systems for public financial management, procurement, audit, monitoring and evaluation, and social and environmental assessment. See <www.undp.org/mdtf/docs/Accra-Agenda-for-Action.pdf>.
- ⁹⁴ The surveys revealed that all indicators showed some level of progress. Three indicators were on track for meeting the 2010 deadline and the others were

either “within reach with some effort” or “within reach requiring very special effort”. See OECD, *2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration*, 2008, pp. 23–5.

⁹⁵ See section “Policy instruments supporting SALW assistance” in this report.

⁹⁶ J. Ginifer and M. Turner, “SALW and Development Programmes: Issues and Priorities”, background paper for the project European Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War, UNIDIR, 2006, p. 13.

⁹⁷ Consultations with representatives from donor states, regional and international organizations and civil society undertaken between November and March 2010. Twenty-four private consultations were held, many on the condition of anonymity because of their candid nature. These points were also raised on several occasions during consultations with donor government representatives in country missions and international organizations undertaken in various locations between 2006 and 2009.

⁹⁸ Whole of government is the term used by the OECD and governments to describe multi-agency integrative approaches to handling issues that cross portfolio boundaries.

⁹⁹ For an exploration of SALW-related challenges in a state’s transition from war to peace, see Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2009: Shadows of War*, 2009, pp. 219–47.

¹⁰⁰ Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Croatia, El Salvador, Ghana, Kenya, Kosovo, Macedonia, Mali, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tanzania and Uganda have National Action Plans or similar strategies in place.

¹⁰¹ S. Parker and S. Cattaneo, *Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the National reports Submitted by States from 2002 to 2008*, UNDP, UNIDIR, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs and Small Arms Survey, 2008, pp. 137–43.

¹⁰² See for example K. Maze and S. Parker, *International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Findings of a Global Survey*, UNIDIR, 2006; K. Maze and H. Rhee, *International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Case Study of East Africa*, UNIDIR, 2007; International Action Network on Small Arms, *International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action*, 2005.

¹⁰³ According to paragraph 26 of the Paris Declaration, improving aid predictability entails donors committing to provide reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and disbursing aid in a timely and predictable fashion according to agreed schedules.

¹⁰⁴ K. Maze and H. Rhee, *International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Case Study of East Africa*, UNIDIR, 2007, p. 10.

- ¹⁰⁵ See K. Maze and S. Parker, *International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Findings of a Global Survey*, UNIDIR, 2006, p. 8. This is also evident by the information states provide in their national reports on implementation of the PoA submitted from 2006 through 2009.
- ¹⁰⁶ The costs of activities may also increase for any number of reasons, from currency inflation and depreciation and raised fuel and travel costs to having to accommodate new security measures in response to sudden outbreaks of violence or heightened insecurity of an area. Similarly, more weapons may be collected and require destruction, or more combatants show up for demobilization and reintegration programmes.
- ¹⁰⁷ From a discussion during a meeting of SALW National Focal Points at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Accra, Ghana, 23–26 February 2009.
- ¹⁰⁸ *La stratégie 2008–2011 de la Suisse pour lutter contre la prolifération illicite des armes légères et de petit calibre*, 2008.
- ¹⁰⁹ See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html>>.
- ¹¹⁰ For many states, disarmament-related assistance has tended to focus on mine action.
- ¹¹¹ The German Agency for Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) is a international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development owned by the German government and used for implementing its development initiatives.
- ¹¹² OECD, *Development Cooperation Report 2005*, 2006, p. 119.
- ¹¹³ See Australia Agency for International Development, *Annual Review of Development Effectiveness 2007*, 2008, pp. 32–4; OECD, *Development Cooperation Report 2005*, 2006, p. 119; and F. Duxfield and K. Wheen, *Fighting Poverty or Fantasy Figures? The Reality of Australian Aid*, Aid Watch, 2007, pp. 24–5.
- ¹¹⁴ Consultations with representatives from donor states, regional and international organizations and civil society undertaken between November 2009 and March 2010. Twenty-four private consultations were held, many on the condition of anonymity because of their candid nature.
- ¹¹⁵ Consultations with representatives from donor states, regional and international organizations and civil society undertaken between November 2009 and March 2010. Twenty-four private consultations were held, many on the condition of anonymity because of their candid nature.
- ¹¹⁶ Interviews with Balwyn Fa’otusia, Acting Director, Aid Management Division, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Nuku’alofa, 2 October 2008; Johnson Naviti, Head, Aid Coordination and Negotiation Unit, Office of the Prime Minister, Port Vila, 9 October 2008; Christine Carlson, Deputy Resident Representative, United Nations Development Programme, Honiara, 15 October 2008; Oscar Schiappa-Pietra, Senior Advisor, Strengthening Aid Coordination and Management Capacities Project, United Nations Development Programme,

Port Moresby, 21 October 2008; and William Kewa and William Kumunga, Aid Coordination and Planning, Department of National Planning, Port Moresby, 24 October 2008.

¹¹⁷ K. Maze and H. Rhee, *International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Case Study of East Africa*, UNIDIR, 2007; and K. Maze and Y. Issar, *International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Case Study of the South Pacific*, UNIDIR, 2009, p. 47.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 46–7.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

¹²⁰ Security Council, *United Nations Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security*, UN document S/RES/1325, 31 October 2000.

¹²¹ Consultations with representatives from donor states, regional and international organizations and civil society undertaken between November and March 2010. Twenty-four private consultations were held, many on the condition of anonymity because of their candid nature. These points were also raised on several occasions during consultations with donor government representatives in country missions and international organizations undertaken in various locations between 2006 and 2009.

¹²² K. Maze and S. Parker, *International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Findings of a Global Survey*, UNIDIR, 2006. p. 21. Consultations with representatives from donor states, regional and international organizations and civil society undertaken between November and March 2010. Twenty-four private consultations were held, many on the condition of anonymity because of their candid nature.

¹²³ See *Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 20 May 2008—Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union*, Case C-91/05, EU document 2008/C 171/03, 5 July 2008. The judgment handed down by the EU Court of Justice in May 2008 clarified that the Council should cover security-related issues (collection and destruction etc.) while the Commission should cover development-cooperation activities (awareness-raising etc.). According to representatives of the European Commission, the Lisbon Treaty should ease much of the remaining uncertainties and promote and facilitate SALW assistance. Activities will be determined on a case-by-case basis according to the breadth, scope and nature of the planned activity. Interview with Quentin Weiler, Policy Desk Officer, European Commission, 15 March 2010.

¹²⁴ OECD, *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development*, 2009, p. 23.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*; and see principles 3 and 5 in OECD, *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, 2007.

- ¹²⁶ K. Maze and Y. Issar, *International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Case Study of the South Pacific*, UNIDIR, 2009; and K. Maze and H. Rhee, *International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Case Study of East Africa*, UNIDIR, 2007. These points were also raised on several occasions during consultations with donor government representatives in country missions and international organizations and representatives in recipient states undertaken in various locations between 2006 and 2009. States also highlight these challenges in their national reports and in statements at international and regional meetings.
- ¹²⁷ K. Maze and H. Rhee, *International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Case Study of East Africa*, UNIDIR, 2007, pp. 1 and 12.
- ¹²⁸ K. Maze and Y. Issar, *International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Case study of the South Pacific*, UNIDIR, 2009, p. 49.
- ¹²⁹ General Assembly, *Promoting Development Through the Reduction and Prevention of Armed Violence: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN document A/64/228, 5 August 2009, para. 30.
- ¹³⁰ Such as, for instance, processing paperwork, vetting licenses and permits, verifying documents, maintaining and updating records, responding to tracing requests, undertaking searches at borders, complying with extraditions and mutual legal assistance, sharing information, coordinating on related issues, and participating in joint actions across borders.
- ¹³¹ This observation is based on the increase in the number of states reporting since 2006 on the assistance they would like to receive. See S. Parker and S. Cattaneo, *Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the National reports Submitted by States from 2002 to 2008*, UNDP, UNIDIR, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs and Small Arms Survey, 2008, pp. 29–31. The growing willingness of states to report on assistance is also expressed in General Assembly, *Report of the Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, UN document A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3, 20 August 2008, pp. 8–9.
- ¹³² Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, *Pacific Aid Effectiveness Principles*, 2007.

ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CASA	Coordinating Action on Small Arms
CASAC	Central American Programme on Small Arms Control
CIFTA	Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials
DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
EAC	East African Community
ECOSAP	ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
IANSAs	International Action Network on Small Arms
ISACS	International Small Arms Control Standards
ITI	International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
ODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PoA	Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; Programme of Action on Small Arms
PoA-ISS	United Nations Programme of Action Implementation Support System
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SARPPCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization

SEESAC	South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SICA	Central American Integration System
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

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States and organizations recognize the centrality of international assistance to help states prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW). However, addressing SALW remains a serious challenge for many states. States and organizations have yet to tackle important questions about the practices of delivering, evaluating and measuring SALW assistance. This report explores these questions and highlights areas where further work remains to be done. Looking partly through an aid-effectiveness lens, this report aims to help the international community work toward ensuring that assistance is being used optimally and that states are measurably benefiting

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