

# The Case for

# Alliances

By ELIZABETH SHERWOOD-RANDALL

**D**oes America need allies? The United States is the strongest nation on earth, the only standing superpower, and its natural impulse is to assume that it can act unencumbered. Paradoxically, America needs allies because of its overwhelming strengths and the vulnerabilities that lurk in the shadow of such unprecedented national power.

In this era of American predominance, alliances are more compelling than ever, yet U.S. citizens are largely unaware of or uninformed about who their allies are. For example, in the recent uproar over the potential acquisition by a Dubai company of contracts for management of U.S. ports, many were ignorant of Dubai's status as a long-standing partner providing critical support to American policies in the Persian Gulf. The lack of clarity underscores the fact that policymakers and analysts have failed to think strategically or systematically about the role alliances should play in American national security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As a consequence, they have also failed to build the public support necessary for sustained global engagements.

What does an alliance offer that the United States cannot obtain otherwise? Alliances are binding, durable security commitments between two or more nations. The critical ingredients of a meaningful alliance are the shared recognition of common threats and a pledge to take action to counter them. To forge agreement, an alliance requires ongoing policy consultations that continually set expectations for allied behavior. In light of the amorphous nature of new security challenges, such consultations will be essential instruments of American leadership, especially with regard to building and maintaining consensus on ends and means. To generate the capacity to operate together, an alliance requires

Royal Saudi Land Forces and other coalition members roll through channel cleared of mines, Operation Desert Storm

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DOD (Dean M. Fox)

COMMENTARY

sustained preparations for combined action. In the past, such action has resided largely in the domain of military cooperation; in the future, it will extend to a broader set of collaborative activities that only recently have come to be understood as vital to national security.

Alliances can range in their obligations from the most expansive—"an attack on one is an attack on all"—to guarantees that are more limited in ambition. Across all alliances, the ideal is the creation of an entity in which the sum of cooperation between or among the participating states will be greater than the sheer arithmetic addition of the constituent parts. At a minimum, allies are expected to take into consideration the perspectives and interests of their partners as they make foreign and defense policy choices. The first impulse of allies should be to turn to one another for support; the last impulse should be to go without or around an ally, or to oppose and seek to thwart an ally's policy goals.

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Alliances also create incentives for reaching multinational consensus. In the most effective alliances, participants benefit from a central coordinating mechanism that structures consultations and enables horse trading. Allies do not consider each policy issue narrowly on its own merits but rather within the broader context of prior shared experience, concomitant items on the current agenda, and longer-term goals. Therefore, allies are constantly stimulated to consider how their interests dovetail with the interests of their partners in order to maximize support for their own priority initiatives.

It is instructive to contrast an alliance with the "coalition of the willing." The two are entirely different organisms with respect to the durability of the commitment and the breadth of cooperation, particularly in an era in which cooperation must go far beyond traditional military definitions. Indeed, the argument that alliances can be replaced with such impromptu arrangements derives from a failure to recognize one fundamental fact: the capabilities that have been fielded by these groupings are based almost entirely upon underlying alliance commitments that over decades have coordinated

national policies and prepared participants to operate effectively together on the battlefield. Recent coalitions of the willing have borrowed from investments made in long-standing alliances without acknowledging their debt.

### What Does America Get from Alliances?

In the intensely interconnected security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the view espoused by some senior Bush administration officials, especially during the first term, that the costs of allies outweigh their benefits, is strategically flawed. Alliances are the antithesis of altruism or passivity: they are a highly self-interested instrument for advancing American national security. While it is self-evident that the United States should retain the right to defend itself, that old institutions must adapt to changing times, and that less formal arrangements can make a meaningful security contribution, America's national interests now require a greater investment than ever in

alliances. Going forward, the purpose of alliances must be fourfold:

- generate capabilities that amplify U.S. power
- create a basis of legitimacy for the exercise of American power
- avert the impulse to counterbalance U.S. power
- steer partners away from strategic apathy or excessive self-reliance.

*Generate Capabilities That Amplify U.S. Power.* The initial phase of the Iraq War, with the rapid and high-intensity maneuver operations that few U.S. allies today are capable of undertaking, is often cited as an example of why traditional alliance relationships are no longer required or useful. This claim is wrong both with respect to Iraq itself and with regard to the underlying assumption that Iraq is the most likely model of future conflict. The involvement of some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies on a national basis provided important (though not decisive) military support and was almost entirely dependent on the years of



USS Tarawa (Marvin Harris)

Sailor stands watch aboard  
USS Tarawa at Jebel Ali, United  
Arab Emirates

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doctrinal development, planning, equipping, and training undertaken by NATO members. Furthermore, the fact that the Atlantic Alliance was split over the decision to go to war and that key NATO allies such as France and Germany were unwilling to join in the military campaign severely reduced the multinational assistance available to the United States during the much longer and more costly postconflict phase of the effort.

The opening phase of the Iraq War is also not likely to be the dominant paradigm for the engagement of U.S. military power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. While preparing for large-scale conventional and unconventional warfighting will remain necessary to enhance deterrence as well as to deploy force, America will face many threats that will not lend themselves to such robust military responses, much less unilateral ones. The short list of significant threats that the United States can neither prevent nor respond to alone includes attacks by terrorists armed with nuclear and/or biological weapons; widespread proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-range delivery vehicles; stability operations in a growing number of failed states that are perfect petri dishes for extremist groups; and the rise of "new" transnational security challenges, such as pandemic disease. Each of these threats may grow in danger in relation to the growth of another; for example, the proliferation of WMD beyond the current nuclear weapons states makes it much more likely that terrorists will be able to obtain them.

To act preventively rather than react only after catastrophe, America needs an expanded toolkit that fully engages the capabilities of other countries as well as its own. Because the United States cannot hermetically seal its borders and cocoon itself within them, there are few scenarios in which it can respond effectively to these challenges without the sustained support of allies and partners.

An alliance can be distinguished from other kinds of cooperative relationships between or among nations by the existence of interoperable military capabilities that enhance prevention, provide deterrence, and contribute to effective defense. A fully evolved alliance is notable for its capability to undertake combined strategic planning, in which two or more nations' security establishments conduct threat assessments, anticipate future security needs, and commit to the development and implementation of a common program to meet the requirements generated by this process. Rather than scrambling to coordinate their capabilities in a crisis, allies can count on preparing to operate alongside one another.

Preparedness in the face of new security threats will require the expansion of strategic planning and coordination of effort across allied governments, involving agencies that previously did not consider themselves essential to national security. The day-to-day business of a meaningful future alliance will necessitate the collaboration of national security establishments, not just defense and military establishments. This will involve broader and deeper combined planning, training, and equipping of personnel—including those that do not belong to departments or ministries of defense—than has previously been achieved. To be fully effective, the United States will need to lead an effort to link agencies of government that have not engaged in sustained multinational collaborative activities and that have traditionally resisted "foreign" access. This is most notable in the need for sharing intelligence and fusing data in real time.

In the defense and intelligence domains, America's extraordinary technological prowess presents an additional challenge to the full integration of allied capabilities. It is hard for most militaries to fight alongside American forces.<sup>1</sup> Yet it is not in American interest for its allies to lack capabilities, to use such a deficit as an excuse not to join us in military action, or to be such a burden on the U.S. military that it resists taking allies along (as was the case in Afghanistan in 2001). The United States therefore needs to lead a continuing effort to improve interoperability and information connectivity with allies.

*Create a Basis of Legitimacy for the Exercise of American Power.* For the United States, the issue of legitimacy was largely dormant throughout the Cold War. America held the moral high ground; the enemy was repressive domestically and imperialistic abroad.

Occasionally, the United States chose to use its power in ways that strained relations with allies, such as at Suez in 1956 or during the Vietnam War, but never to the breaking point; what held its alliances together was so much more compelling than whatever centrifugal forces might be at work.

With traditional approaches to prevention, deterrence, and defense under siege, alliances offer the single most effective mechanism

*Avert the Impulse to Counterbalance U.S. Power.* As America's power has become ever more dominant, there is a growing inclination to seek to constrain U.S. unilateralism—to bind the American Gulliver.<sup>2</sup> The current effort to generate European Union foreign and defense policy competencies partially reflects the impulse to establish a counterweight to U.S. power. In Asia, U.S. dominance is also questioned by those who resent American



U.S. Navy (Edward N. Vasquez)

Participants boarding Russian KA-27 while U.S. Sailors secure area during joint humanitarian exercise *Passex '06*

for ensuring that American actions are perceived to be legitimate. Planning for and using American power in a multinational context enables the United States to build an updated consensus on when and how to use force. Acting without such international "cover" is increasingly problematic, both because it foments resistance to U.S. policies and because the United States needs the help of others to achieve its goals, especially in the arduous and extended aftermath of most military operations.

There is another way in which the legitimacy conferred by alliance relationships can either strengthen the U.S. hand or reduce its effectiveness. If America uses its power in ways that are perceived to respect international norms, it can bolster the global stature and influence of its allies. This creates a favorable climate for the pursuit of its national security goals. Conversely, if it chooses to act outside of its alliances, it undermines its allies' international standing, making it harder for them to support American policies. This makes it harder to achieve American objectives. Ultimately, the United States also risks diminishing the stature of leaders who are most closely identified with its policies, which can lead to their ouster and the election of governments less committed to cooperation.

influence and yearn to chart their own course, potentially in association with others seeking greater global stature, such as China. Washington's ability to preempt or mitigate such balancing behavior is considerably enhanced by transmitting its power through binational or multinational structures.

*Steer Partners Away from Strategic Apathy or Excessive Self-Reliance.* Another challenge facing the United States is the real danger that key allies will cease to believe that international security requires their active engagement. The end of the Cold War exacerbated latent tendencies in this direction, and the construction of a unified Europe has provided an internally oriented focal point for many over the past decade. Such a divergence of attention has begun to create a divergence of interests that undermines solidarity in the Atlantic Alliance. Across the globe and under different circumstances, long-standing American ties in the Republic of Korea are facing challenges, especially from a younger generation that feels no debt to the United States, with the potential to alter the security landscape in that region and beyond.

On the other end of the spectrum, countries whose security is not embedded in a network of steady relationships may be inclined

to pursue autarkic paths. For example, leaders feeling threatened and insecure may fan the flames of fanatical nationalism, leading some to revisit and possibly reverse their commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

### Do America's Alliances Meet Needs?

In 2006, the landscape of American commitments around the world—and the commitments that others have made to the United States—retains many of the features of the Cold War alliance system. These arrangements are neither systematic nor comprehensive. The durability of the old structures can be explained by several factors: the pent-up longing for association with the West that was finally requited after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the U.S.-led effort to redefine the missions of key alliances and partnerships in the 1990s; sheer inertia; and the fact that 15 years is a mere blip in human history, so that change may be under way but is as yet not entirely perceptible, especially because the generation that invested so much in Cold War institutions still retains some influence over the policy process in many allied countries.

as they once were on the American security guarantee. Second, it needs to spearhead a sustained initiative to reconcile the tension between the regional rootedness of its partnerships and the increasingly globalized nature of 21<sup>st</sup>-century security challenges. Third, America should work to expand its alliance relationships to encompass a wider set of governmental and nongovernmental capabilities that provide tools to respond to the full range of likely threats.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Europe consumed the lion's share of America's international energies. Although conflicts in other regions of the world preoccupied the United States from time to time, Europe remained dominant in terms of the attention and resources that it absorbed and the partnership that it offered in support of U.S. policies. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, other regions of the world command American interest and engagement. With Europe reunified, America is no longer riveted on its fate. So, too, Europeans believe that they no longer need to depend on the United States for their security as they did throughout the Cold War. The same may be said of American alliances in Asia. Overall,

the American Government, between the United States and key allies, and among alliances that span the globe. Alliances provide the political framework, the fundamental underpinning, to broad engagement across agencies that affect national security. It will be necessary to build up over time, both bilaterally and in multinational alliances, a dense network of interactions. This will be crucial in dealing with threats such as WMD proliferation and nonstate terrorism, which are less susceptible to traditional military tools and which require intimate cooperation across previously "domestic" structures such as departments of justice, treasury, health, and law enforcement. Old notions of protection of national intelligence assets are also severely challenged by the imperatives of addressing new threats, where the sharing of information on a timely basis may make the difference between life and death for millions.

### How Does America Get There from Here?

An American alliance strategy would take a comprehensive, long-range view of national security requirements and would be multifaceted, multilayered, and multiyear. It would commit the United States to a four-pronged policy:

- build upon existing bilateral and multilateral alliance institutions, relationships, and capabilities
- promote the establishment of stronger ties that might become enduring alliances
- pursue peacetime security cooperation with countries that will not necessarily become formal allies
- utilize the full spectrum of cooperative international arrangements that complement alliances.

*Build Upon Existing Bilateral and Multilateral Alliance Institutions, Relationships, and Capabilities.* Even though polling data show a huge drop in public support for American policies and doubts about America's role in the world, goodwill—and a preference to work constructively together—remains prevalent among older elites that have invested much in ties with the United States. For younger generations, American behavior in the next few years will profoundly influence whether they see Washington's leadership as benign or malign.

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## *two major sets of alliance relationships are discernable: one cluster in Europe, and one in Asia*

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Looking at the globe, two major sets of alliance relationships are discernable: one cluster in Europe, and one in Asia. They are vastly different in structure and in content. In addition, the United States maintains close security ties with countries in other regions, including Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. What is most striking is that there is no overarching framework for America's relationships abroad and that unparalleled U.S. power does not necessarily translate into the ability to achieve American security goals. In the Cold War, security analysts used to worry about a "strategy-force mismatch." Now they should be at least equally concerned about the "power-influence mismatch."

While the array of relationships that exists today provides a strong foundation for the exercise of American influence, it needs to evolve in several critical dimensions in order to meet present and future needs. First, the United States must take into account the fact that its allies are no longer as dependent

the tables are slowly turning: In the future, the United States—all powerful in one dimension but often hamstrung by its very might—might depend more rather than less on its allies in Europe and Asia to achieve its global goals.

Further challenging existing maps and mindsets, the United States is now faced with the phenomenon of globalization in all its dimensions. Though the most precise definition is an economic one, globalization has significant implications in the security domain, with consequences for threats as well as responses. With respect to alliances, it compels rethinking of some of the fundamentals. In the face of transnational dangers, alliances will need to be defined in broader terms than the classical geographically based model. Transregional linkages among allies and alliances will need to be forged in response to the fact that many 21<sup>st</sup>-century threats are global rather than regional in nature.

Effective security cooperation now necessitates a much wider embrace of governmental functions. This is true within

The Bush administration needs to undertake a major effort to renew America's most important bilateral relationships. Spanning the globe, from Turkey to the Republic of Korea, from Brazil to Poland, a systematic and sustained commitment to listening to allies is urgently required. Consultation must be more than just informing counterparts of predetermined American positions; it must take their perspectives into consideration while policies are being formulated. Genuine give and take is crucial to achieving consensus on threats and responses. Furthermore, these bilateral ties are also the essential building blocks of multinational alliances.

Given the pace of globalization, it makes sense to ask whether the existing regionally based alliance structures are outdated. To a certain extent, geography is still destiny, and the neighborhood in which a state exists will play a great part in shaping its security perspective and in determining its participation in alliances. But to be relevant to the full range of real and potential security challenges, alliances must increasingly be functionally oriented. NATO has already taken note of this important trend and has transformed itself, moving from a strict definition of its theater of operations to common acceptance that its only meaningful missions will most likely be "out of area."

Extending this concept further, NATO should pursue a greater degree of interface and potential formal coordination with other countries, groups, and organizations. Already, some of this is taking place, with mechanisms such as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Mediterranean Dialogue, and Southeast Europe Initiative, in discussions of expanded linkages with Australia, Israel, and Japan, and in structured partnerships with Russia and Ukraine. However, there is no overarching conceptual framework for these arrangements. The evolution of mechanisms for marrying NATO's competencies with the European Union's potential will also be critical.<sup>3</sup>

In Asia, U.S. interests dictate the maintenance of a robust diplomatic, economic, and military presence. In the cases of Japan and the Republic of Korea, it is preferable to wrestle with disagreements within the context of an alliance relationship than to succumb to pressures that would cast either one of them strategically adrift. Furthermore, the presence of U.S. forces in both countries helps prevent either from feeling isolated in playing its role as an American ally. Should

the U.S. presence be drastically reduced or terminated in one, pressures would likely mount in the other to follow suit. As China plays an increasingly shrewd game in the region, cultivating opportunities to enhance its power in ways that may diminish the U.S. role, America's Asian alliances become all the more significant.<sup>4</sup> They are also necessary building blocks for collective responses to global security challenges.

Looking to the longer term, the United States should seek to establish a worldwide network of key allies, with the objective of creating an alliance of alliances. This would permit bridge-building between and among existing institutional arrangements and would facilitate linkages with organizations such as the Group of Eight, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the United Nations, marrying competencies in diplomacy, economics, and defense.

*Promote the Establishment of Stronger Ties That Might Become Enduring Alliances.* A U.S. alliance strategy that maximizes the benefits of enduring relationships would not only seek to strengthen existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements but also attempt to advance the development of relationships that currently fall short of alliance status. For a variety of reasons, it will most likely not be realistic to offer or ask for guarantees similar to NATO's Article V, but the United States can and should pursue the institutionalization of security cooperation with a number of countries.

In identifying potential allies, the United States should consider factors including governance, geography, regional stature, and potential for meaningful security cooperation. Based on these standards, America should continue the development of fuller security ties with India. With a capable professional military under firm civilian control—setting it apart from many of its neighbors—and major modernization programs under way, India has the potential to be a highly competent military partner. Much progress has been made in this direction in the past 5 years, but much more is possible. Inevitably, the pursuit of enhanced ties with India will complicate the relationship with Pakistan, and while this dynamic must be well managed, it should not stand in the way of the fruition of an important alliance relationship. Other countries that present opportunities for the advancement of bilateral security cooperation with a view toward

the establishment of more formal alliance ties include Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Africa.

In the multilateral domain, the absence of a security cooperation mechanism is most striking in Asia. The United States has played a major stabilizing role in the region since the end of World War II and has relied heavily on bilateral relationships to achieve its security goals. Historic and current rivalries among regional powers have been a major obstacle to the establishment of institutionalized multinational cooperation. Yet the need is greater than ever for a mechanism that provides a regular forum for consultation, policy coordination, crisis management, and response.

*Pursue Peacetime Security Cooperation with Countries That Will Not Necessarily Become Formal Allies.* A much undervalued U.S. policy instrument involves the pursuit of peacetime security cooperation with countries whose orientation and future may be uncertain. Correctly conceived and executed, such efforts can reduce suspicion, build confidence, and encourage reform; they can also lay the foundations for prospective partnership and potential alliance relationships. These kinds of investments require U.S. policymakers to look beyond the immediate requirements of national security. Also, they necessitate sustained engagement and taking a genuine interest in the perspectives and concerns of other countries.

Such initiatives are usually low in cost but offer the possibility of big payoffs if they are conceptually sound and pursued with sensitivity and discretion. A leading example took place a decade ago in Central Asia. Looking at maps of the world, senior Pentagon officials noted that what had been considered the underbelly of the Soviet Union was now accessible and without firm geopolitical orientation. A subsequent, relatively modest program to establish bilateral and multilateral security ties with these countries literally redefined the borders of Europe so that newly independent states adjacent to Afghanistan and Iran became members of NATO's Partnership for Peace and offered basing rights to the United States after 9/11.

Today, there are a variety of countries in the world with whom discreet, substantive security cooperation—such as in preventing proliferation or interdicting terrorist activity—can contribute to shaping positive perceptions. In some cases, these initiatives will establish patterns of behavior that might ultimately take



President George W. Bush commends coalition forces at Saddam's former presidential palace

U.S. Navy (Dorell Crandall)

on the characteristics of an alliance. In others, they may not lead to such close ties but will nevertheless anchor participants in activities that serve their own security interests as well as contribute to American goals, demonstrating the rewards of partnership to both sides. In less felicitous cases, they provide American policymakers with valuable early warning about deteriorating domestic conditions, derailments in bilateral relations, or looming sources of conflict.

*Utilize the Full Spectrum of Cooperative International Arrangements That Complement Alliances.* An effective American alliance strategy would be complemented and indeed strengthened by the recognition that alliances will not fulfill all U.S. national security needs and that other arrangements may be more appropriate in specific circumstances. The informal approach to multilateralism has sound roots: During the Cold War, for example, the United States and its NATO allies found that out-of-area challenges, beyond the formal domain of allied commitment, were often best met through ad hoc arrangements that drew upon the political foundation and military preparedness of the Alliance structure but did not burden the allies with reaching agreement to or participation in action by all members.<sup>5</sup> A leading contemporary case of such cooperation was the first Gulf War, for which the United States organized a multinational coalition that drew upon NATO assets outside the formal Alliance framework and also involved non-NATO nations. The Combined Joint Task Force model developed in the mid-1990s to create a vehicle for those NATO members with the will and capability to take action beyond the European theater is an example of available synergies between existing alliance structures and less formal arrangements.

In the diplomatic realm, informal coalitions have been devised to address specific policy challenges, and “contact groups” have been created for ongoing conflict resolution efforts such as the Middle East peace process and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, processes such as the Six Party Talks on North Korea have facilitated engagement with interested parties on an issue of vital national security concern to the United States. Finally, the Proliferation Security Initiative has created a new model of cooperation for a specific international security challenge: interdicting the transit of materials and delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. These examples suggest the range of additional possibilities available to an American administration that seeks to exploit opportunities for international support.

Less formal structures, however, do not supplant more formal arrangements. Indeed, the success of informal undertakings will depend in large part on the vitality and durability of the bilateral and multilateral ties the United States maintains and cultivates. Decisions about participation in such ad hoc groupings will continue to be made on a case-by-case basis in national capitals. Multilateral alliances can generate momentum and incentives for supporting American initiatives that are being pursued through more informal processes.

To achieve an enduring sense of common interest and purpose, it will not be sufficient to flex American power and expect others to fall in line. The United States must find ways to transform its power into a magnetic force that draws peoples and nations to its goals. It will not serve American national security interests to disparage multilateralism or to abandon the pursuit of enduring ties in the illusory hope that less formal arrangements will provide both flexibility and sustained support.

The United States must rebuild its alliances and innovate a new kind of connectivity across countries, institutions, and regions that results in a broad-based alliance system that is far greater than the sum of its disparate parts. The United States must also remain committed to making it possible for foreign forces to operate capably alongside American troops and to establishing mechanisms that permit more effective security cooperation with international institutions and nongovernmental organizations.

Day in and day out, the default mode must be to work with allies to get things done. In the short run it may be easier to go it alone. However, foreign and defense policies are measured not only by how they respond to present requirements but also by whether they create the conditions for a safer future. A strategic approach to American alliances will enable the United States to translate its unique power into effective global influence that genuinely enhances American national security. **JFQ**

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, *Mind the Gap* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999); and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “Managing the Pentagon’s International Relations,” in *Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future*, ed. Ashton B. Carter and John P. White (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 235–264.

<sup>2</sup> For an insightful and enduring treatment of the challenge that America’s unrivaled power poses to its foreign policy, see Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver’s Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968).

<sup>3</sup> A number of useful ideas for linking the United States, NATO, and the European Union are offered by Charles Grant and Mark Leonard, *What New Transatlantic Institutions?* Centre for European Reform Bulletin 41 (April/May 2005), available at <[http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/41\\_grant\\_leonard.html](http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/41_grant_leonard.html)>.

<sup>4</sup> Several new structures have emerged in Asia, some of which involve the United States but some of which pointedly do not. Americans do participate in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which deals principally with economics, and the ASEAN Regional Forum, a vehicle for Asia-Pacific security dialogue. The newest entrant is the Six Party Talks, established in 2003 to address North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, involving the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and both North and South Korea. In stark contrast, ASEAN Plus Three, a process involving Southeast Asian nations along with China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which involves China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (and which recently extended observer status to India, Iran, and Pakistan), do not accord Americans a place at the table.

<sup>5</sup> Elizabeth D. Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 184–187.