



NON PAPER ON THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Non Paper focuses on realistic capability targets for Phase 1 of the African Standby Force (ASF), i.e. to 30 June 2005.
2. The key priorities required to operationalise the ASF for Phase 1 are as follows:
 - a. **Priority 1:** Establishment of a PLANELM at the AU HQ in two steps. During step 1 three officers from the UNDPO and/or SHIRBRIG will undertake preparatory staff work for (step 2) the establishment of a core AU PLANELM consisting of 5 African officers by 1 October 2004. In the period from 1 October 2004 until 30 June 2005, the AU PLANELM will undertake and lead the staff work and preparations for the establishment of the ASF including three key technical studies. The output from these studies should include costed plans for providing: logistics; Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems (C³IS); and training support to the ASF.
 - b. **Priority 2:** Establishment of PLANELMs at REC/Regional¹ level to do force planning, preparation and training of the regional standby elements, consisting of a core of five officers augmented by international expertise by 1 October 2004.
 - c. **Priority 3:** Establishment of a mission HQ level management capability (Bde HQ) within each REC/Region by 1 October 2004.
 - d. **Priority 4:** The development and population of the ASF standby system consisting of observers, individuals and formed units on standby in their countries of origin by 30 June 2005.

Prepared by the Institute for Security Studies, March 2004

¹ Since not all RECs correspond with ASF Regions the terminology REC/Region is used throughout.

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I. INTRODUCTION

2. At its 3rd meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15-16 May 2003, African Chiefs Defence Staff (ACDS) agreed on the document titled: "Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force," which provides a framework for the establishment of the ASF. The key conclusions and assumptions that underpin the ASF emanating from this meeting are summarized in Annex A.

3. The relevant recommendations of the 3rd Meeting of the ACDS were submitted to the Third Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council (Decision Ext/EX/CL/Dec.2-3 (III)), which was held in Sun City, South Africa, from 21-24 May 2003. Among others, the Executive Council recommended that: "further consultations be undertaken with all relevant stakeholders to consolidate the proposals contained in the Policy Framework adopted by the African Chiefs of Staff." Subsequently, the AU Summit in Maputo, Mozambique (July 2003), adopted Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.16 (II), which *inter alia*, took note of the framework document for the establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee.

4. The framework document calls for the establishment of the ASF in 2 phases, namely:

- a. During **Phase One** (up to 30 June 2005) the AU's key objective is to establish a strategic level management capacity for the management of Scenarios 1-2 missions, while RECs would complement the AU by establishing regional forces up to a brigade level grouping to achieve Scenario 4 capabilities.
- b. During **Phase Two** (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010), it is envisaged that by the year 2010 the AU will have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the RECs continue to develop the capacity to deploy a mission HQ for Scenario 4, involving AU/Regional peacekeeping forces.

5. The ACDS held its 4th meeting in Addis Ababa from 17-18 January 2004. The meeting was followed by the 1st Meeting of African Ministers of Defence (AMOD) on 20 January 2004. The purpose of this meeting was to follow-up efforts to institutionalize the structures requisite for the African security architecture and, particularly, to involve the Ministers in the process of the establishment of the ASF. Annex B consists of a summary of the key recommendations of the AMOD.

6. Even though the 4th ACDS Meeting and the 1st Meeting of the Ministers took place on schedule, few if any of the substantive follow-up actions had been completed. Thus, in order to redress the loss of momentum and move the ASF

project forward, the AMOD set a new deadline of October 2004. By that deadline, it was agreed that the AU and RECs should meet to establish multinational and multidisciplinary work groups to identify standby forces, rapid reaction elements, centres of excellence, regional logistical support retirements, location of early warning centres, etc. Furthermore, it was agreed that the AU and RECs should conclude work on outstanding issues, including agreement on pertinent issues regarding the establishment of the ASF, the MSC and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).

7. Progress at regional level includes the following:

- a. In Eastern Africa, the Chiefs of Defence Staff convened a meeting from 13-14 February 2004, in Jinja, Uganda. The meeting adopted a Policy Framework for the Establishment of an Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and considered a Draft Protocol, as well as the contribution of resources by Member States, including details regarding the location and structure of the Panning Element (PLANELM).
- b. In Central Africa, the Chiefs of Defence Staff ECCAS had convened a meeting during December 2003. The details of the outcome of the meeting are yet to be notified to AU HQ.
- c. Considerable progress has been achieved in West Africa within the framework of ECOMOG, but this has to be harmonised with the ASF Policy Framework.
- d. In Southern Africa operations sub-committee of the SADC Interstate Defence and Security Sub-Committee (ISDSC) operational staffs met from 21st-23rd April 2004 in Lesotho to prepare recommendations for adoption by the Chiefs of Defence Staff in SADC.

8. The factors that are delaying progress in the establishment of the ASF that this Paper seeks to address are as follow:

- a. The absence of substantive follow-up consultations and information sharing between the AU and RECs/Regions.
- b. The requirement to translate the continental policy framework for the establishment of the ASF into practical steps on the way forward that could serve as a common guide to RECs and potential donors.
- c. The tightness of AU's political work program and severe capacity constraints.
- d. The requirement to present a clear, logical and detailed implementation plan, with programmes and projects, for the ASF to the Donor Community, especially the G8 and EU.

II. AIM

9. The aim of this Non Paper is to provide clarity on the key steps required for the operationalisation of the ASF in Phase 1 (i.e. up to 30 June 2005).

III. SCOPE

10. The Non Paper will focus on the following components of the ASF as set out in the ASF Policy Framework :

- a. The requirement for a Legitimate Political Capacity to Mandate a Mission, either at the level of the UN, the AU and/or RECs in accordance with relevant provisions of the UN Charter.
- b. Multidimensional Strategic Level Management Capability of which the core requirement during Phase 1 is twofold:
 - i. A PLANELM within the Peace and Security Directorate of the AU Commission, working towards the PSC.
 - ii. A PLANELM for each of the five brigades at regional level.
- c. Mission HQ Level Multidimensional Management Capability, of which the core requirement during Phase 1 is for a brigade HQ for each regional brigade.
- d. Mission Components for Peace Operations, with immediate emphasis on military units on standby that are earmarked, trained and ready for employment as part of the ASF; and CivPol and Milobs on call to the AU.

11. Subsequent sections also deal with:

- a. Training and doctrine;
- b. Logistic sustainability and logistical infrastructure;
- c. Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems (C³IS);
- d. Funding;
- e. Collaboration and cooperation;
- f. Implementation roadmap for operationalisation of the ASF;
- g. Conclusion.

12. The Non Paper does not deal with the Panel of the Wise (POW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) or the Military Staff Committee (MSC), apart from the acknowledgement of the dual function of the continental and regional situation rooms to serve as communication hubs and operations rooms for the ASF at continental and regional level.

IV. LEGITIMATE POLITICAL CAPACITY TO MANDATE A MISSION

13. At the strategic level and in terms of the provisions of the Protocol establishing the PSC, the AU constitutes a legitimate mandating authority under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In this context, it is to be expected that while the AU will seek UN Security Council authorisation of its enforcements actions, the RECs similarly will seek both UN and AU authorisation of their interventions. It is crucial that the AU and RECs clarify the definition of African political regions, in order to avoid confusion over the mandating authority that RECs and Regions may exercise. The AU and RECs should thereafter ensure that the required political mandating authority is established at regional level, where this does not presently exist.

V. MULTIDIMENSIONAL STRATEGIC LEVEL MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY

14. To provide for multidimensional strategic level management capability, the ASF Policy Framework requires the establishment of 15-person PLANELMs at the AU HQ and at each of the RECs HQs, funded from Member State contributions. However, in view of obvious constraints, the 1st AMOD Meeting recommended the phased establishment of these PLANELMs with an initial nucleus of only 5 officers, to be responsible for effective pre-deployment management of the ASF and its regional standby brigades during Phase 1.

15. Against this background the following recommendations relate to the establishment and tasks of the AU HQ PLANELM:

- a. That AU HQ requests a six month attachment of three experienced officers (logistics, communications and ops/training) from the UNDPKO and/or SHIRBRIG, with effect 1 August 2004, to be located at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. These officers are to undertake and finalize the following tasks:
 - i The development of the AU PLANELM staffing and equipment tables including proposed On Call military staff reinforcement system for the AU PLANELM.
 - ii The initiation and accompaniment of the studies on the continental logistic system, continental C³IS system and continental training concept.
 - iii The provision/organization of training of the AU PLANELM.
- b. That AU HQ requests the secondment of five experienced officers from African Member States serving on the PSC for an initial period of 9 months from 1 October 2004 to 30 June 2005. One officer each should be with expertise on: communications, operations, logistics, standby

plans and coordination, and training). These seconded officers are to be located at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa and will constitute the AU PLANELM for Phase 1. For the ASF to achieve its targets for Phase 1, the AU PLANELM must finalize the following tasks before 30 June 2005:

- i The completion of the expert studies to provide a costed continental logistic system, continental C³IS system and continental training concept and the initiation of key recommendations (see sub-par c below and par's 24 (a), 27 and 29 below).
 - ii Determine Standard TOEs in conjunction with RECs/Regions.
 - iii Development and implementation of continental standby system, including link to UNSAS.
 - iv Initiate and coordinate the drafting of MoUs, Letters of Exchange, etc in conjunction with the AU Legal Department and RECs/Regions.
 - v Draft SOPs for the ASF in conjunction with RECs/Regions.
 - vi Elaborate/draft doctrine for the ASF in conjunction with RECs/Regions. This process could be facilitated through the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA).²
 - vii Elaborate/develop standardized training modules in conjunction with RECs/Regions including participation in a Command Post Planning Exercise.
- c. That the AU negotiate with the UN and SHIRBRIG to cover the associated costs of the seconded staff for sub-par a. The AU should source the costs for the three expert studies (estimated at US\$200 000 each) from donors. The AU should cover the costs for sub-par b from the Peace Fund and provide appropriate office space and associated facilities (estimated cost of US\$450 000 for start-up and running costs for Phase 1).

16. The following recommendations relate to the establishment and tasks of the REC/Regional PLANELMs:

- a. That RECs/Regions be guided by the functions and structure of the PLANELM as reflected in Annex C. The core function of the PLANELM is do to force planning, preparation and training including the

² Membership is currently composed of KAIPTC (Ghana), Kenya Staff College, RPTC (Zimbabwe), Nigerian War College, South African War College and the Peacekeeping School in Koulikouro in Mali. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) have offered to source resources in this regard.

verification of Bde HQ and standby elements. This is a full-time requirement.

- b. That RECs/Regions request the secondment of five experienced officers from Member States to the Regional PLANELM for an initial period of 9 months from 1 October 2004 to 30 June 2005 to collaborate with the AU PLANELM in the tasks listed in par 15 above, and the execution of the functions as set out in Annex C.
- c. Where possible, the REC/Regional PLANELM should be collocated with the REC/Regional Bde HQ for ease of command, control and communications.
- d. That the costs for the REC/Regional PLANELM be borne by contributions from Member States.
- e. AU Partners should be approached to contribute to the building and sharing of expertise with the REC PLANELM in a coordinated manner with/through the AU.

VI. MISSION HQ LEVEL MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY

17. The ASF concept requires the establishment of a mission HQ level management capability in the form of a brigade headquarters within each Region. During Phase 1 it is recommended that this involve a nucleus of three officers augmented by non-permanent brigade HQ staff on standby in the respective Member States. Some regions may decide to combine their PLANELM with this nucleus while others may wish to base the standby brigade HQ on an existing Bde HQ in a member state. Other regions may decide in favour of a skeleton Bde HQ based on an existing Bde HQ in a Member State.

18. With the benefit of their peacetime command, control, training and administration of the standby arrangements, Chiefs of Staff could be deployed for specified periods, as Force Commanders or Chief Military Observers, with their respective skeleton HQs, assisted by the respective PLANELMs.

19. Regional standby brigades should have common designations, using their respective regional identifying symbols and the acronym 'SBRIG' for a standby brigade (such as NASBRIG for Northern Africa Standby Brigade, WASBRIG for Western Africa Standby Brigade, CASBRIG for Central Africa Standby Brigade, EASBRIG for Eastern Africa Standby Brigade and SASBRIG for Southern Africa Standby Brigade).

20. Against this background the following recommendations relate to the establishment and tasks of the nucleus of a Bde HQ at Regional/REC level:

- a. That the REC/Region agree on the location, concept and staffing of the Bde HQ and its relation to the REC/Regional PLANELM by 1 July 2004, and communicate its decisions in this regard to the AU.

- b. That the REC/Region constitute a nucleus Bde HQ capacity under a Chief of Staff of the rank of Brigadier General by 1 October 2004 and provide appropriate office space and associated facilities.
- c. That the nucleus Bde HQ verify and report on the operational readiness of the Bde, in conjunction with the REC/Regional PLANELM, for Phase 1 requirements, to the AU PLANELM before 30 June 2005.
- d. That the AU and Regions/RECs negotiate with donors for support to cover the costs for sub-par b above. The estimated cost for Phase 1 (start up and running costs) is US\$350 000 per Bde HQ.

VII. MISSION COMPONENTS

21. In the case of military and police capabilities required for Phase 1, each category of ASF mission component is to consist of observers, individuals and formed units, on standby in their countries of origin ready to be deployed, using a system of On Call lists. The AU PLANELM will undertake the development of the ASF standby system (see par 15.b.iii above). The subsequent population and use of the standby system will therefore only be possible following the completion of this task by the AU PLANELM.

22. Against this background the following recommendations relate to mission components on standby in TCCs. By 30 June 2005:

- a. Member States should nominate and name the Standby Brigade HQ staff and populate the standby database.
- b. Member States should nominate standby units including the completion of the standby database.
- c. Member States should nominate, name and populate the AU CivPol standby database.
- d. Member States should nominate, name and populate the AU Milobs standby database.

23. The routine preparation and training of the ASF components is a national responsibility.

VIII. TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

24. A multinational peace operations capability of the ASF requires standardised doctrine that is consistent with that used by the UN (such as the UN Multinational Peacekeeping Handbook), and complemented by African specificity. To achieve effective ASF training, the AU should:

- a. Appoint a technical working group to develop a set of standardized SOPs based on its Draft Generic SOPs, as well as those existing within ECOWAS and developed for AMIB. This task should be led by the AU PLANELM as indicated in par 15 above.
- b. The pursuit of doctrinal coherence and dissemination of lessons learnt could be facilitated through the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA).
- c. The AU and RECs/Regional PLANELMs should harmonize ASF training cycles with UN and external initiatives, as well as feed into these initiatives to enhance and synergize ASF capacities.
- d. RECs/Regions should adopt an appropriate training policy providing for cycles of national, regional and AU-wide training, but coordinated with the major external initiatives. While ASF training is to be consistent with UN doctrine and, with a view to standardization of doctrine, based on the Standard Generic Training Modules (SGTM), ASF training beyond this level should be regionally coordinated and enhanced through regional peacekeeping centers of excellence.
- e. RECs should streamline the establishment of centers of excellence/use of existing national training institutions within the various regions and regionalize training at these centers to optimize their regional profile and use.
- f. While the AU and RECs await the publication of the UN Standardised Generic Training Modules (SGTMs), they should deploy the efforts of the PLANELMs to develop all aspects of the ASF training policy, including the development of ASF SOPs, TOEs and other training manuals, which could then be updated when the SGTMs become available.
- g. The AU should consider seeking NATO and European advice on the production of doctrine for multinational war fighting tasks, as this is not available from the UN.
- h. The UN (DPKO) should be requested to assist with training-the-trainer and pre-deployment training for ASF brigades and units. (Note: Other AU Partners should be able to advise and assist the ASF brigades with their training programmes based on current PSO experience.)

IX. LOGISTICAL SUSTAINABILITY AND LOGISTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

25. The ASF Policy Framework provides that missions deployed for Scenarios 1-3 should be self-sustainable for up to 30 days, while Scenarios 4-6 missions and operations should deploy with up to 90 days self-sustainability. After the initial 30 days self-sustainment, the AU must take responsibility for the sustainment of ASF

missions or, lacking that capacity, the readiness and ability to start reimbursing TCCs in order for the latter to continue to sustain their respective contingents.

26. The Policy Framework also proposed a system of AU Military Logistical Bases (AMLD), consisting of the AU Military Logistical Depot and regional logistical bases, aiming at rapid deployment and mission sustainability.

27. Par 15 above indicated that a key task of the AU PLANELM during Phase 1 is to initiate and complete a study to present a costed continental logistic system for the ASF that outlines the appropriate concepts and plans for preparing, deploying and sustaining the ASF. The estimated cost for a technical study team based on 10 persons (one from each Region, UN and others) for a minimum period of one month is US\$200 000. The team should include field visits to facilities in Africa as well as the UNLB Brindisi. The team should identify the shortfalls and propose contingencies in this regard, including request and agreements with external partners and service delivery by the private sector.

28. During Phase 1 and until the ASF achieves a viable and sustained logistical capability following the implementation of the ASF logistic concept, the AU system for logistical sustainability should be guided by the following:

- a. ASF mission sustainment should be based on UN rates as a guide, while the actual consumption and reimbursement rates are adjusted in accordance with the African reality. The AU PLANELM should take the lead to determine AU reimbursement rates based on UN rates, but informed, for example, by the experience with AMIB.
- b. While Member States contributing resources to the ASF should focus on national (stocks and reserves) readiness during Phase 1, external logistical facilities should be negotiated to support the establishment of the AMLD. These should involve arrangements for the committal of pre-positioned equipment and/or on-call donor equipment, within the framework of appropriate memorandums of understanding. While RECs/Regions may take the lead in discussions with external partners in this regard this must involve the AU PLANELM.
- c. Similarly, the AU and Regions/RECs should negotiate strategic movements and lifts from external Partners within multilateral regional arrangements.
- d. From the instructive experiences of AMIB, Member States contributing resources to ASF deployed missions should aim at nearly 100 percent wet lease capacity.
- e. However, AMLD stocks should be used partly to beef up the requirements of ASF brigades and units on deployment, and the rest held centrally in second line mission level bases.
- f. While Member States deploy national contingents with the required national operational and logistical capabilities in accordance with the

required deployment and sustainability guidelines, the AU should undertake efforts to reimburse Troop-Contributing Countries at appropriate rates and in a timely manner.

X. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEM (C³IS)

29. Effective command and control of the ASF will depend upon the installation of an appropriate Africa-wide interoperable C³IS integrated infrastructure, linking deployed units with mission HQs, as well as with the AU, PLANELMs and Regions/RECs. To meet this requirement, the AU PLANELM should initiate an expert study of ASF strategic and operational requirements in these areas. The estimated cost for such a technical team based on 10 persons (one from each region, UN and others) for a minimum period of one month is US\$200 000. The team should, amongst others, conduct field visits to the UNLB Brindisi and other facilities in Africa, and investigate various options, including agreements with partner countries, service delivery by the private sector. The output should be a costed C³IS plan. See par 15 above.

XI. FUNDING

30. With the experiences of AMIB in view, it is critical that the AU should have secure sources of funding before mandating an ASF mission or operation. It is proposed that before 30 June 2005 the AU and RECs should:

- a. Assess the detailed cost of the structures of the ASF, including pre-deployment activities such as training and the activities of the PLANELMs and regional brigade groups.
- b. Assess the cost of the types of ASF missions, based on the relevant levels of forces, including mandate, with an average mission timeframe of between one and 2 years for an AMIB type mission, which is long enough a period for the follow-on deployment of a UN mission or operation, and more limited operations in support of peace processes of between 6 months and one year only.
- c. Encourage AU Member States to take the initiative to contribute to the endowment of the ASF Trust Fund/AU Peace Fund, before appealing for external assistance.
- d. The external multinational regional arrangements should cover mechanisms to harness initiatives such as ACOTA, RECAMP, BPST, etc., as in-kind external assistance towards ASF training.
- e. AU and RECs should sustain negotiations with external Partners for assistance to be channeled through multilateral regional (not bilateral) national arrangements.

- f. Additionally, external multinational regional arrangements should be used to harness assistance towards the establishment, stocking, maintenance, use and strategic airlift of equipment and vehicles for ASF pre-deployment training and missions.

31. At the impending joint AU and RECs meeting with potential Partners, AU's Partners should give due consideration to concrete action and pledges of committal of resources requisite for the establishment of the ASF.

- a. Provision of funding, equipment, technical advice and facilities for the establishment and activities of PLANELMs and regional brigade HQs.
- b. Technical assistance to determine the C³IS requirements of the ASF.
- c. Assistance to investigate and plan the establishment of the AMLDs, comprising MLDs to support ASF mission deployments for up to 180 days.
- d. Coupled with the above, agreement on framework mechanisms for the committal of donor-held equipment to ASF missions, including strategic air- and sea-lift.
- e. Mechanisms for the coordination of external initiatives towards ASF training of regional brigade groups, as well as support to regional centers of excellence.
- f. Endowment of the ASF Trust Fund/Peace Fund/access to funding to support short-term ASF deployments and sustainment contingencies, pending the deployment of a UN force.

XII. COLLABORATION AND COOPERATION

32. The AU's traditional collaboration with the UN, the international community and Partners should be maintained and deepened. In addition, collaboration should meet the aspirations and needs of the AU and should avoid conflicting and cross-cutting partner support, seeking rather to bridge the gap in the capabilities of the AU system. In principle, AU collaboration with the international community should lead the continental efforts in this regard and aim at the following broad priority areas:

- a. Establishment of the pre-deployment structures of the ASF, namely PLANELMs and regional brigade HQs, including the relevant activities and running cost of these structures.
- b. Establishment of AMLDs, including the AU and regional MLDs (once the ASF technical study on logistics is complete) and, in default, mechanisms for the committal of donor-held equipment to ASF missions, including strategic air- and sea-lifts.

- c. ASF training of regional brigade groups, including support to regional centers of excellence for training, planning and conduct of Command Post Exercises (CPX), as well as allocation of vacancies to ASF staff for external training (once the technical study on the ASF training concept is complete).
- d. Endowment of the ASF Trust Fund/Peace Fund/accessible financial support to support short-term ASF deployments and sustainment contingencies, as and when necessary, pending deployment of a UN force.

XIII. IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP FOR OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE ASF

33. The ASF is intended to support peace processes and/or provide a holding intervention, pending the deployment of a UN Security Council mandated peacekeeping force or mission or re-hatted as blue beret UN forces. The ASF and its operations are thus efforts on behalf of the UN and the wider international community and require appropriate support and capital.

34. To facilitate the establishment and the operationalisation of the ASF in a practical manner, it is suggested that efforts at the level of the AU and RECs should be guided by the following critical steps during Phase 1:

- a. **Step 1.** Immediate establishment of the nucleus of 5 officers for the PLANELM at the AU HQ to enhance the management capability of the Peace and Security Directorate and the PSC for the establishment of the ASF and the initiation of parallel planning and preparatory processes regarding training, logistics, communications and legal matters.
- b. **Step 2.** Establishment and location of REC/Regional PLANELMs to provide guidance on the structure and region-specific requirements for the establishment of the Regional standby brigades.
- c. **Step 3.** Appropriate decisions by RECs/Regions to establish a Regional standby brigade, including the Bde HQ composition and location, regional political and military command and control framework (where required) and its relationship with the AU HQ PLANELM and with the AU PSC.
- d. **Step 4.** Appropriate offers from Member States and Regional consensus to contribute resources to the Regional standby brigade augmented with complementary offers by other Member States.
- d. **Step 5.** Identification of shortfalls in the resources contributed by Member States; this is to be undertaken by Regional brigade HQs and PLANELM through verification visits and staff checks.

- e. **Step 6.** Rectification of shortfalls in the resources of the Regional brigades through a number of solutions.

XIV. IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP

35. The Non Paper has highlighted the key capabilities necessary for the operationalisation of the ASF, based on crucial priorities of efforts on the part of the AU and RECs, as well as the Partners of the AU. Subsequently, the Non Paper has emphasised the key steps that need to be taken by the relevant stakeholders to achieve these priorities and capabilities.

36. It is emphasised that the establishment of the AU PLANELM is fundamental to the realisation of all the remaining priorities and the execution of the key steps towards the operationalisation of the ASF. Notwithstanding its tight work programme up to July-August 2004, the AU should give serious consideration to the steps outlined for the establishment of the PLANELMs, particularly at the AU HQ, in order to establish the basis of the strategic level management capability.

37. Unless this capability is achieved in a timely manner, further loss of momentum will occur and compromise efforts towards the operationalisation of the Phase 1 structures of the ASF.

Annexes:

- A:** Key Conclusions and Assumptions that underpin the ASF from the 3rd ACDS Meeting (May 2003).
- B:** Summary Recommendations from the 1st AMOD Meeting (January 2004).
- C:** Proposed Functions and Structure of the PLANELM at Regional Level.

ANNEX A TO NON PAPER

KEY CONCLUSIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS THAT UNDERPIN THE ASF FROM THE 3RD MEETING OF THE ACDS (MAY 2003)

I. MISSIONS AND SCENARIOS

1. The ASF structures are informed by missions and scenarios defined within the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF. These are:

- a. **Scenario 1.** AU/Regional military advice to a political mission, e.g., in Cote d'Ivoire. ASF deployment required within 30 days from an AU mandate resolutions.
- b. **Scenario 2.** AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN Mission, e.g., the OAU/AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE) or the Verification Monitoring Team (VMT) in the Sudan. ASF deployment required within 30 days from an AU mandate resolution.
- c. **Scenario 3.** Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission, e.g., the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) or the AU Mission in the Comoros (AMIC). ASF deployment required within 30 days from an AU mandate resolution.
- d. **Scenario 4.** AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace-building), e.g., the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB). ASF deployment required within 30 days from an AU mandate resolution.
- e. **Scenario 5.** AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers. ASF completed deployment required within 90 days from an AU mandate resolution, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days.
- f. **Scenario 6.** AU intervention, e.g., in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly. Here the AMOD demanded that the AU eventually have the capability to deploy a robust military force in 14 days.

II. DEPLOYMENT TIMELINES

1. The ACDS had noted that the speed with which forces will be required to deploy has particular implications for standby force structures and arrangements. Significant implications of varying readiness levels are:

- a. At 14 days readiness collective training involving field exercises with all units is essential prior to activation. At this level of readiness there is also a clear requirement for a standing fully staffed brigade HQ and HQ support. There is also a requirement for an established and fully stocked logistics system capable of sustaining the entire brigade. In the absence of large military alliances such as NATO in Africa, individual AU Member States may be best placed to provide this capability.
 - b. At 30 days readiness collective training at least involving HQ command post exercises must occur prior to activation. At this level of readiness there is also a clear requirement for at least a standing nucleus of a brigade HQ with its attendant HQ support as well as an established and fully stocked logistics system capable of sustaining the entire brigade. SHIRBRIG provides a good example of the HQ structure. In its system, contingents deploy fully self-sustained for 60 days. This is not normally the case with African contingents. In the African context ASF owned logistics bases will be required.
 - c. At 90 days readiness there may be time available to conduct collective training to develop a level of coherence prior to deployment. There is also time to establish a HQ and logistics stocks. A requirement does exist, however, for a small full time staff to manage the standby system, and to standardise procedures and doctrine.
2. To be able to deploy within the relevant timelines for the respective conflict scenarios, the ASF should have mission ready units and HQs, with available equipment, including vehicles and communications, ideally held in centralised regional logistical bases or provided by donors under clear terms of commitment. These requirements pertain to pre-deployment. To launch the ASF elements into mission areas, these pre-deployment arrangements must also be backed up by standing arrangements for strategic sea- and airlift. Subsequently, there will also be need for mission operational and logistical sustainment, for which the experiences of AMIB provides a useful guide.

III. REGIONAL BRIGADE FORCE STRUCTURE

3. Once fully established the ASF will consist of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components located in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment anywhere in Africa at appropriate notice.
4. Non-political-military-police aspects of the ASF is not a Phase 1 priority as UN humanitarian, development and human rights elements, which do not require a UN Security Council mandate, could deploy in tandem with an ASF mission.
5. Within the Policy Framework, the standby brigades are to be composed of:
 - a. Brigade (Mission Level) HQ Support Unit of up to 65 personnel and 16 vehicles.

- b. HQ Company and Support Unit of up to 120 personnel.
- c. 4 x Light Infantry Battalions, each composed of up to 750 personnel and 70 vehicles.
- d. Engineer Unit of up to 505 personnel.
- e. Light Signals Unit of up to 135 personnel.
- f. Reconnaissance Company (Wheeled) of up to 150 personnel.
- g. Helicopter Unit of up to 80 personnel, 10 vehicles and 4 helicopters.
- h. Military Police Unit of up to 48 personnel and 17 vehicles.
- i. Light Multi-Role Logistical Unit of up to 190 personnel and 40 vehicles.
- j. Level 2 Medical Unit of up to 35 personnel and 10 vehicles.
- k. Military Observer Group of up to 120 Officers.
- l. Civilian Support Group consisting of logistical, administration and budget components.

IV CIVPOL, MILOBS AND CIVILIANS STANDBY LIST
AT AU AND RECs LEVELS

- 4. The Policy Framework set the following targets:
 - a. 300-500 Milobs
 - b. 240 CivPol
 - c. Civilians (not a Phase 1 priority)

ANNEX B TO NON PAPER

SUMMARY OF KEY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 1ST MEETING OF AFRICAN MINISTERS OF DEFENCE (20 JANUARY 2004)

1. The AMOD approved the following recommendations from their Chiefs of Defence Staff:

- a. **Mechanisms for Mobilization of Resources**. The AU was to pursue efforts with the EU on the African Peace Support Operations Facility, as agreed to during the Maputo Summit in July 2003. The Facility is now known as the Peace Facility.
- b. **Multidimensional Strategic Level and Mission Level Management Capacities**. The AU Commission and the respective RECs HQs should establish a nucleus of the PLANELM with about 5 Officers. The Staff of the respective PLANELMs should be fully funded by the AU HQ and Regional Economic Communities.
- c. **Regional Brigades**. The AU and RECs should pursue efforts towards the establishment of all 5 regional brigades, after the RECs had reviewed the status of implementation of the recommendations of the 3rd ACDS Meeting. In this respect, the establishment of the regional brigades should not be linked to external assistance, for obvious reasons.
- d. **Standardization of Doctrine, SOPs and Regional Centres of Excellence**. The AU and RECs should adopt UN doctrine for PSO and pursue efforts towards the promulgation of the relevant SOPs. In addition, the establishment of the respective Centres of Excellence should receive the necessary assistance.
- e. **Mission Sustainment and Logistical Bases**. The relevant criteria for the establishment of logistical bases should be worked out, agreed and approved. These facilities should be augmented with external assistance involving on-call donor equipment, including the committal of pre-positioned equipment, within the framework of appropriate memorandums of understanding.
- f. **External Initiatives**. The AU and RECs should explore the possibility of joint resource mobilization initiatives, focusing on the deployment and logistical sustainment of ASF missions. External Partners should be re-engaged on the basis of the recommendation of the 3rd ACDS Meeting, which identified logistics (sustainability) and funding as the most critical challenges for African peace support deployments. Efforts should be intensified to ensure that external initiatives are focused on priority areas identified by Africans.

- g. **Co-operation with the UN.** The AU should initiate strong advocacy with the UN to gain more concrete support in logistics and in other areas. In specific terms, the UN should be requested to provide staff to augment the PLANELM.
- h. **Work Programme.** The AU and the RECs should meet to establish multinational and multidisciplinary regional work groups to identify standby forces, rapid reaction elements, centres of excellence, regional logistical support requirements, location of early warning centres, etc. Additionally, by October 2004, agreement should be reached by the AU Commission and the RECs on pertinent issues regarding the establishment of the ASF, the MSC and the CEWS.

ANNEX C TO NON PAPER

PROPOSED FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF THE PLANELMS


I. FUNCTIONS

1. The proposed Terms of Reference for the PLANELMs at Regional/REC level should include responsibilities to:
 - a. Monitor the implementation of the recommendations relating to the establishment of the regional standby brigade by contributing Member States.
 - b. Develop and update Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), within the framework of the generic AU SOPs for Peace Support Operations (PSO) that are consistent with UN doctrine.
 - c. Co-ordinate and harmonize resource contributions and commitments for the Standby Brigade, submit data to the regional mechanism and share information and planning data with the AU Commission (Peace & Security Division) and the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS).
 - d. Develop databases, options and contingency plans for the strategic movement of regional standby troops and equipment, in order to ensure rapid deployment of the regional standby brigade or its components, by reducing pre-deployment planning and deployment time.
 - e. Evolve a concept of combined (i.e. from different countries) force preparation (ongoing operational training) for the regional standby brigade, including the planning and conduct of regional combined training exercises (CTX).
 - f. Establish a concept of mobilization and pre-deployment training to ensure mission readiness.
 - g. Additionally, co-ordinate efforts towards the establishment of regional centres of excellence for PSO training, as well as monitor training at these centres.
 - h. Be prepared to support the AU Commission with operational planning at all levels, including contingency planning and participating in fact-finding missions towards the deployment of missions involving the deployment of the regional standby brigade.
 - i. Collect, evaluate and determine best practices (lessons learned) from previous and ongoing missions. Where necessary, collaborate with research institutions for this purpose.
 - j. Evaluate and submit an annual report to the regional command and control structures and the Commission of the AU on the status of the

regional standby brigade, make recommendations to address relevant problems and challenges, and projections for the future maintenance and employment of the brigade.

- k. Submit an annual audited report to the regional command and control structures on the financial and budgetary state of the PLANELM and/or regional standby brigade.

II. STRUCTURE



(Note: This may need to be harmonised with the NATO system of joint staff designations)