

Arno Tausch · Christian Bischof  
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# Why Europe has to offer a better deal towards its Muslim communities

A quantitative analysis of open international data



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by Arno Tausch, Christian Bischof, Tomz Kastrun and Karl Mueller

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# Why Europe has to offer a better deal towards its Muslim communities.

## A quantitative analysis of open international data

By

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with Christian Bischof<sup>2</sup>, Tomaz Kastrun<sup>3</sup> and Karl Mueller<sup>4</sup>

2006

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<sup>5</sup>

While there is a never-ending debate on Islamism, Islamist terrorism and the identity of Europe *vis-à-vis* growing Muslim communities in Europe, there are hardly any solid cross-national data being presented on the real extent of the Islamist threat facing Europe, and on the social conditions that lead to Islamist radicalism. By and large, our **rigorous quantitative results**, based on the first systematic use of the Muslim community data contained in the “*European Social Survey*” (ESS) all support a socio-liberal view of “migration” and “integration”, compatible with much of the rest of current European political economic thinking regarding the future alternatives for the European Union, and contradict the very extended current alarmist political discourse in Western Europe.

First we show with new data that the much hailed “**European social model**” is a myth, when you compare poverty rates in OECD countries and in Europe on the basis of absolute income data, and not just poverty lines in terms of national means. The more that absolute poverty grows in Western Europe, largely due to failed integration policies, and due to the fact that the European Union expands and takes in new members characterized by low average incomes and large scale poverty rates of their own, the old national and relative poverty lines (in terms of 60 % of the national median) become obsolete.

As large scale poverty of Europe’s Muslim communities threatens to grow, political radicalism might fall on a fertile ground. But we present materials, based on the ESS that give strong support to the hypothesis that **passive support for Islamist radicalism in Europe and the complete distrust in democracy does not exceed 400.000 persons**. We also compare our research results with the recent PEW data. By and large, the two datasets yield the same results. Regrettable as Islamist extremism in Europe might be, it is a far way from alarmist views that present “Islam” in Europe as such as being incompatible with the future of democracy.

We also find strong evidence that **Muslim communities in Europe are not different from other religious communities in their tendency towards secularism**. We also find that Muslim economic and social alienation in Europe very much corresponds to deficiencies of the implementation of the “Lisbon” process. Using the ESS cross-national and quantitative data, we first estimate a new UNDP-type index of “**Muslim development**” in Europe, based on

- the percentage of the Muslim community living above poverty
- the percentage of the Muslim community expressing trust in democracy
- the percentage of the Muslim community expressing trust in the legal system

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<sup>5</sup> The authors would like to emphasize that the original data as well as other files are all freely available from the Lalisio Scientific Network in Berlin (sponsored by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the German Ministry of Economics and Labor) at [http://www.lalisio.info/lalisio/members/m\\_TAUSCH/publications/114986208075/114986228444/](http://www.lalisio.info/lalisio/members/m_TAUSCH/publications/114986208075/114986228444/)

- the percentage of the Muslim community expressing trust in parliament
- the percentage of the Muslim community expressing trust in the police

Likewise, we construct another UNDP type index, which we call "**Muslim empowerment index**", which measures

- a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country living above poverty
- a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country expressing trust in democracy
- a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country expressing trust in the legal system
- a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country expressing trust in parliament
- a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country expressing trust in the police

Also, indices of growth over time between the ESS surveys 2002 and 2004 for these two basic indices are being constructed. **Indicator performance closely correlates with a combined European Union Lisbon strategy index**, which was already presented elsewhere in the literature (Tausch, 2006; Tausch and Heshmati, 2006). The performances of the ESS countries are also compared with indicators of economic growth and gender empowerment, and ESS data are used to construct also a Muslim Human Development Index for several European countries.

In this publication, we then draw some optimistic, socio-liberal conclusions about Islam in the world system. Countering some alarmist voices in the West, neither migration nor Muslim culture are to be blamed for the contemporary crisis, but the very nature of unequal capitalist accumulation and dependency that is at the core of the world capitalist system.

For one, our analysis is based on current thinking on **Kondratiev waves** of world political development inherent in recent work by IIASA and the NATO Institute for Advanced Studies. We also present analyses in the framework of the debate on cross-national determinants of human well-being in the world system. While we are cautiously optimistic about a socio-liberal, non-interventionist policy alternative, we come to the conclusion that present patterns of global governance, modeled around the neo-liberal Washington Consensus and American hyperpower, are doomed to failure.

In the second part of our analysis, we first present a rigorous re-analysis of United States Department of State data on acts of global terrorism in the framework of Kondratiev cycle waves. We then proceed to an analysis of the determinants of economic growth and ecological and social development in 140 nations with complete data.

The data presented show that before the present war in Iraq the **global war on terrorism already showed very positive effects**, and that the strong linear



**downward trend in global terrorism**, to be observed during the last two decades, **coincided with rising globalization in both the centers and the peripheries of the world system**, and that the percentage of people with less than 2 \$ a day even declined in the Middle East and North Africa. We also found no systematic interaction between the differentials of growth in the center and the periphery or inequality differentials in the center and the periphery and patterns of global terrorism. I. e. a western socio-liberal, multi-lateral and non-interventionist policy could have won the fight against international terrorism. We then refute empirically the Huntington hypothesis about the incompatibility of Islam and successful socio-economic development.

Our publication re-establishes the notion that capitalist development is of cyclical nature, with strong fluctuations every 50 years. For us 1756, 1832, 1885, 1932 and 1975 are the beginnings of new Kondratiev waves, while 1756, 1774, 1793, 1812, 1832, 1862, 1885, 1908, 1932, 1958, 1975, and 1992 are the turning points (troughs) of the Kuznets cycles. Vigorous upswings of the capitalist world economy need to be supported by a tightly organized new world political hegemonic order, while the strength of the downswings and the severity of the depressions always are a function of the waning world political order. We show the fatal interconnection between these world political and world economic "tsunami waves" in a more systematic fashion. In the most recent phase of capitalism, its "Casino" character becomes ever more apparent, with a sharp distinction between the winners and losers of the system.

Winning the war against global terrorism would imply arriving at more inclusive and less unilateralist structures of global governance. While our analysis on world development 1990 – 2003 shows the detrimental effects of dependency and globalization on the social and ecological balances of the world, data on membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference or Muslims per cent of total population were compared in their effects on a number of dependent variables of socio-economic development in 140 countries of the world with complete data:

- economic growth, 1990-2003
- eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)
- female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate
- freedom from % people not expected to survive age 60
- freedom from a high quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)
- freedom from civil liberty violations, 1998
- freedom from high CO2 emissions per capita
- freedom from political rights violations, 1998
- human development Index
- life expectancy, 1995-2000

*Ceteris paribus*, **Muslim culture** (measured by the percentage of Muslims in the respective population of a given country) **significantly and positively affects the human rights record, human development, and the ecological balances.**

Further dispelling irrational immigration-phobias and Islamophobia in general, the present work also shows that, by and large, pretty much the same functions

of key (positive or negative) UNDP development indicators (y-axis) hold in comparison with purchasing power per capita (x-axis) in the Muslim world and the non-Muslim countries.


It is shown furthermore that the analysis of the new UN data on **migration balances** per total population in over 100 countries also supports the socio-liberal view that *ceteris paribus*, **not only Islam, but also inward migration are very much compatible with successful and egalitarian patterns of development**. While neo-liberal globalization, *ceteris paribus*, contributes to the social polarization of the host countries of transnational capital penetration, **Muslim communities** or membership in the **Organization of the Islamic Conference** are to be regarded as **socially stabilizing** and **growth enhancing factors**.

Thus a new, socio-liberal global consensus on global migration, global order and global governance could emerge.

JEL Classification Numbers: C43, J70, F15, O10, O57, C21, D31, E30, F02

Key Words: Index numbers, labor discrimination, economic integration, economic development – general, comparative studies of countries; Cross-Section Models, Income Distribution, Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles – General; International Economic Order, Inequality, Economic Integration: General

*"The European Social Survey is the worst form of survey, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." (following Sir Winston Churchill, House of Commons speech Nov. 11, 1947)*





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# PART I – HOW EUROPEAN MUSLIMS LIVE AND WHAT THEY THINK

## 1: INTRODUCTION

The author of this essay shares the analysis by the US-American diplomat Timothy M. Savage, according to whom European decision makers completely failed to address the social distress of large sections of the more than 5% (2050 predictably 20%) of the European population, constituted by the Muslims in Western Europe. However, the basic message of the present publication is that a forward looking policy that adheres to the goals of the Lisbon process with its requirements for a social coherence oriented policy will be able to address the basic issues of integration.

Needless to say here that large scale and even growing poverty of the Muslim population in Europe would squarely contradict the main principles of the “Lisbon process” that aims to increment economic growth to 3 percent a year, to increase employment and combat unemployment, to reduce social exclusion and poverty, and to improve the environment (Tausch, 2006; Tausch and Heshmati, 2006). As it is also well known, the 14 main structural “Lisbon” agenda indicators, created to measure progress in meeting the Lisbon targets, play an important role in European policy making. The Lisbon lists of indicators, apart from the debt-related well-known Maastricht criteria of the European Monetary Union, are perhaps the most important checklists for government success or failure in Europe today. They are omni-present in the public political as well as in the scientific debate and are defined as:


1. GDP per capita in PPS
2. Labor productivity
3. Employment rate
4. Employment rate of older workers
5. Educational attainment (20-24)
6. Research and Development expenditure
7. Comparative „price levels“ (developed on the basis of the relationship between gross domestic product at exchange rates and gross domestic products at purchasing power parity rates (the Commission maintaining that a low value is good result))
8. Business investment
9. At risk-of-poverty rate (low value good result)
10. Long-term unemployment rate (low value good result)
11. Dispersion of regional employment rates (low value good result)

- 12.Greenhouse gas emissions (low value good result)
- 13.Energy intensity of the economy (low value good result)
- 14.Volume of freight transport (low value good result)


Large scale failure to properly integrate the European Muslim population would mean failure of the Lisbon targets 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 11 and would negatively affect targets 1 and 2, and most probably target 8 as well.

Needless to say that Europe will be confronted in the coming years by an increasing phenomenon of Muslim migration, with which the aging continent has to come to terms with. The picture about population potentials in contiguous surrounding territories is clear indeed:

**Map 1: the aging continent and its neighbors**








Source: our own calculations from UNDP, 2003 – 2006. “Bis” is shorthand for: ranging from ... to

In this publication, we systematically use data gathered by European Social Survey Project, financed by the European Commission, to construct for the first time in the literature really comparable indicators of the social exclusion of Muslims in the enlarged European Union.

Needless to say that such an evaluation touches upon almost every major decision pending in the Union – the enlargement process, Turkey, what to do next with migration especially from North Africa and the Middle East, the rifts that appear in the social systems of major European Union countries, etc.



## 2: THE MYTH OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL AND THE THREE MAJOR POVERTY GROUPS IN THE EXPANDED EU-25: MUSLIMS IN THE WEST, AND PEOPLE IN STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT REGIONS AND THE ROMA COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST

There is reason to believe – as we will explain below – that the growing signs of crisis of the “European social model” cannot be any longer disconnected from the social marginalization and the poverty of the 15 million or more Muslims, living in the countries of the European Union. Thus we start our evidence with a very thorough re-analysis of existing comparative poverty data in the framework of the “Lisbon process”.

The official discourse on the “European social model” is characterized for years by a jargon like this. Such recent texts might be encountered at random:

*Source: European Parliament  
Published Friday, 8 September, 2006 - 06:11  
<http://www.egovmonitor.com/node/7511>*

*The European Social Model "reflects a common set of values, based on the preservation of peace, social justice, equality, solidarity, the promotion of freedom and democracy and respect of human rights". According to MEPs, "in the last 60 years this set of common values has allowed a growing EU to successfully become an area of greater economic prosperity and social justice". They underline that social policies, when appropriately designed "cannot be regarded as a cost but, instead, as a positive factor in the EU's economic growth". Although Member States have different social systems, and have implemented these values in different ways, they commonly aim to attain a balance between economic growth and social solidarity, and this is reflected in the European Social Model as a unity of values with a diversity of systems, members underline. (...) MEPs stress the necessity to preserve and enhance the values associated with the European Social Model and the high social standards already achieved. They are convinced that the economic and social systems must be urgently reformed where they fail to meet the criteria of efficiency and socially sustainable development, and where they are inadequate to tackle the challenges of demographic change, globalisation and the IT revolution.. Also to restore citizen's confidence in the EU project, which provides jobs, growth and prosperity, the EU's commitment to a Social Europe needs to be renewed, members stress.*

*(...) Members underline that even if employment and social policy remain broadly within national competence, the EU needs to create an economic and social framework which allows Member States to implement reforms as necessary at national level, according to their own economic, social and political circumstances. They call on the Commission and the Council to respect the initial equilateral triangle of the Lisbon Strategy and to develop an approach that is better balanced between economic coordination on the one hand and employment and social protection policy on the other. The Commission is asked to take further initiatives to achieve full implementation of the internal market, having regard to exclude any race to the bottom in social, consumer or environmental standards. The Commission shall also incorporate already now the social dimension in its impact analyses, in accordance with the social clause provided for in the proposed Constitutional Treaty.*

*Members recognise the advantages of 'flexicurity' systems which Member States should adopt. They consider them as a means of promoting reconciliation of work-life balance and work and life-cycle concepts. Since many Member States are far from achieving the Lisbon Strategy objectives they are called to achieve, in particular, the specific targets set for employment, especially of women and young people, Research and Development investment, child care and lifelong learning. Member States shall furthermore undertake reforms in order to ensure the financial sustainability of national social systems, without prejudicing acquired rights, mutual support and intergenerational solidarity. They should also improve the coordination of their tax policies with a view to avoiding harmful tax competition, ensuring sustainable financing for social protection and making tax policy more employment friendly. The EU funds, such as the European Structural Funds, shall be used more efficiently to co-finance national reforms. MEPs underline that any successful reform of the social systems should involve all stakeholders, in particular the social partners and civil society.*

While there has been large emphasis in recent social policy literature on different aspects of social exclusion and relative poverty in Europe and the Lisbon process, **four basic tendencies** so far have not been adequately addressed. These issues make the comparative research about European poverty and the social groups, constituting the European poor, all the more important:

- 1) the realization that – as the Union expands – our social situation more and more becomes comparable to that of other continents. There seems to be a definitive **end of a specific “European social model”**. Large scale Muslim poverty in Western Europe, Roma poverty in Eastern Europe and the necessity to cut back on the pension entitlements of Europe’s growing elderly population all contribute to the fact that today, there are 8.7 per cent of the population in the United States who receive 40 % of the United States median equivalized household income, while in key EU states this percentage is already higher than the corresponding US figure. **In France, the UK, Ireland and Italy is already higher than in the US**, while in Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden this percentage is only somewhat lower than in the US (8.7 percent versus 7 percent to 7.9 percent in these key West European states).

- 2) **poverty risk**, i.e. the measure that indicates to us how many times a **certain social group** is likely to fall into the poverty trap, more and more becomes a question whether or not a European resident is a citizen of his country or she or he is a **“foreigner” from outside the borders of the EU-25**. Calculations on this phenomenon only slowly become available, but the data already at the disposal of social science are very clear and suggest that on the level of the old Western European EU-15, the poverty risk for foreigners is two times higher than for EU-citizens. We also compared the poverty risk of foreigners in the EU with the poverty risk of being under age 20, above age 60, of living in a household with three or more children, a single parent household, or of being unemployed. In *“old Europe”*, foreigners were confronted with the highest risk of being poor in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain and at the level of the entire EU-15 countries (or rather 14, because data for Sweden were missing for this comparison) in the late 1990s. These data were based on European Community Household (ECHP) data evaluations; forthcoming new calculations by Eurostat, based on the new EU-SILC data system, will most probably become available by the beginning of 2007<sup>6</sup>.
- 3) First calculations published by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Fahey, 2005) dramatically emphasize **the consequences of the high levels of absolute poverty in the new Europe of 25 countries**. Assuming that absolute US poverty today is not too far away from the British figures, we can only gather that the absolute poverty rates of marginal groups – and hundreds of thousands of Muslims among them – in Europe are really very high (see graphs 1a and 1c).
- 4) Add to this the millions of poor unemployed people in Eastern Europe and the millions of destitute Roma and Sinti in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and you can imagine that **poverty in the US and the EU-25 is today really comparable or even surpasses it**. The overall performance of the European region in terms of the development of the UNDP human development index, which is a very sensitive measure to grasp inter-temporal changes in social conditions, is unsatisfactory, especially in countries with a large Muslim community, i.e. the social conditions of hundreds of thousands of Muslims in Europe seem to have stagnated or even deteriorated over the last years (see map 2 and appendix 6). Apart from that, European poverty statistics, based on the traditional criterion of poverty as defined in terms of the percentage of population falling under 60 % of the national median income, are extremely biased and do not grasp the true amount of poverty in the EU-25 (Graph 1c, Table 1d and 1f):

Thus, our combined evidence, which all implies the enormous and growing social policy task of alleviating Muslim poverty in Western Europe, and Roma and structural employment poverty in Eastern Europe, suggests the following:

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
<sup>6</sup> Personal communication from Dr. Ian Dennis, Eurostat, Luxembourg



- Absolute poverty rates in several European states are higher than in the US in terms of the threshold – 40 % or lower than the purchasing power of the US median
- New calculations made available in this publication even suggest that poverty rates in terms of a new measure, developed by Professor Toney Fahey, based on a EU-25 wide threshold of 60 % or less than the median income in the entire EU-25, are very high in the new member countries of the Union, and exceed 10 % in the West European countries UK, Spain, Germany, Greece, and Portugal. The German poverty rate of 25.5 % is especially distressing, considering the demographic, economic and political importance of Germany in the wider European Union
- Survival rates at age 65 in many European Union member countries by far are below the respective values for Japan, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand and Canada and – in some countries of Eastern Europe – even in the US, with huge gender gaps of more than 5 years between low male and higher female survival rates being encountered in most EU-25 nations
- Human development growth is more and more stagnating in Western Europe, and Western Europe is losing its once very high world ranks on the UNDP human development scale
- Poverty rates for migrants and non-EU-citizens that are 1.5, two or even three times higher than the national average were to be encountered in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Spain, Portugal, Austria, and Finland. With the exception of Finland, all these cases have to be analyzed in the context of their large Muslim communities
- Combined poverty indicators (see below) seem to suggest the same diagnosis, for which Spain, the UK, Greece, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland and Portugal all had to be ranked below the US. With the exception of the Irish Republic, all other cases can be well explained by the factors: Muslim and immigrant poverty; structural unemployment in backward and old industrial regions, or Roma and Sinti communities
- An analysis of key UNDP indicators (Table 1d) reveals that the worst performers in the EU-25 in terms of human development are easily being outperformed by Latin American countries for 8 of the 9 indicators used, and by Arab Mediterranean countries for 5 of the 9 indicators used.
- Even worse, the European Commission and the member states absolutely did not as yet answer this crisis by using adequate statistical instruments. Instead of using the framework of the United Nations statistical system, Eurostat analyzes poverty in terms of the famous 60 % or less of the national median income criterion, which of course becomes the more biased, the lower the level of development of a nation becomes. Our statistical analysis, based on the data of Professor Tony Fahey, suggests that in comparison to the necessary EU-25-wide median income, poverty rates in the new member countries in the Baltic's and in Bulgaria and Romania as well as in the candidate country Turkey are being underestimated by a factor of 40 % or more.




Graph 1a: absolute poverty in OECD countries




Source: our own calculations from Schmitt J. and Zipperer B. (2006)

**Graph 1b: absolute household poverty in Europe – EQLS data, on the basis of an EU-25 wide median income**




Source: calculated from the data provided by Fahey et al. (2005) (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions). Professor Fahey's results are the first published comparison of European poverty rates after enlargement with the EU-25 wide median income as the poverty level. The original EXCEL-spreadsheet was kindly put at our disposal by Professor Fahey.

**Graph 1c – the human development dimension of poverty in OECD countries – female survival rates**




Source: graph, arranged with data from UNDP (2005)

**Graph 1d – the human development dimension of poverty in OECD countries – male survival rates**



Source: graph, arranged with data from UNDP (2005)


**Graph 1d – the human development dimension of poverty in OECD countries –gender gaps in survival rates**



Source: our own calculations from UNDP (2006)

**Map 2: gains in human development world ranks in Europe, 1995 - 2003**

**HDI success 1995 - 2003**



Legend: Dark shades indicate a good performance. Changes in world human development ranks, 1995 – 2003. Data source: UNDP, 2005

To evaluate European poverty indicators at once, we constructed a UNDP-type combined “avoidance of poverty indicator” (Table 1b) from the data of Table 1a, which summarizes available UNDP, CEPR and Eurostat materials on the subject.

The UNDP type indicators are based on a simple principle, designed in the 1990s by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen: if you want to combine 2 or more variables to

an indicator, calculate for each of the variables a dimension index, using the formula (UNDP, 2005):

**(1) Dimension index** = (actual value – minimum value) / (maximum value – minimum value)

Calculating the famous “**Human Development Index**” of the United Nations Human Development Programme, one is supposed to proceed in the following way. According to formula (1), one first has to calculate a **life expectancy component**, called “**life expectancy index**”. Then, the same formula is used for an “**education index**”, based on the figures for adult literacy and gross enrollment (the weight for adult literacy is 2/3, and 1/3 for gross enrollment). The “**GDP index**” is now based on a small alteration of formula (1), working with the log GDP. In earlier years, the UNDP worked exactly with formula (1). Today, the UNDP calculates according to the following formula:

(1a) **GDP index** = (log (actual value GDP PPP per capita) minus log (100))/(log (maximum value GDP PPP per capita) minus log (100))

The UNDP HDI then will be the combined result of

**(2) Human development index** = 1/3 \* (life expectancy index) + 1/3 \* (education index) + 1/3 \* (GDP index)

In our case, we calculated, using formula (1) the 8 different dimension indices for our new **avoidance of poverty index**:

- probability of surviving to age 65 female
- probability of surviving to age 65 male
- relative poverty rate (PPP < 40 % of national median)
- absolute poverty rate (PPP < 40 % of United States national median)
- relative poverty rate (PPP < 60 % of national median, mid 1990s)
- relative poverty rate (PPP < 60 % of national median, mid 2000s, Eurostat)
- % of the population aged 24-64 with at least upper secondary education
- quintile ratio (difference in incomes between the richest 20 % and the poorest 20 %).

Due to missing values, we were satisfied with simply calculating the means from the 8 available different components:

**(3) avoidance of poverty index** = the means from

- component index probability of surviving to age 65 female
- component index probability of surviving to age 65 male
- component index avoiding a high relative poverty rate (PPP < 40 % of national median)
- component index avoiding a high absolute poverty rate (PPP < 40 % of United States national median)
- component index avoiding a high relative poverty rate (PPP < 60 % of national median, mid 1990s)
- component index avoiding a high relative poverty rate (PPP < 60 % of national median, mid 2000s, Eurostat)
- component index % of the population aged 24-64 with at least upper secondary education
- component index avoiding a high quintile ratio

Admittedly, the data used here are provisional and deficient. But today, **Japan** outperforms most probably even the very advanced European countries Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Iceland, Austria, Czech Republic, while **New Zealand** and **Canada** outperform Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France and Luxembourg, and the **United States and Australia** are ranked ahead of Spain, the United Kingdom, Greece, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland and Portugal.

Only Mexico presents an overall more dramatic poverty picture than all the combined European Union countries (Tables 1a to 1d). Especially the comparative data from Table 1d reveal how the *“European social model”* has become a myth under the pressures of globalization:



**Table 1a: social exclusion in Europe by international comparison – the raw data**

	probability of surviving to age 65 female	probability of surviving to age 65 male	relative poverty rate (PPP < 40 % of national median)	absolute poverty rate (PPP < 40 % of United States national median)	relative poverty rate (PPP < 60 % of national median, mid 1990s)	relative poverty rate (PPP < 60 % of national median, mid 2000s, Eurostat)	% of the population aged 24-64 with at least upper secondary education	quintile ratio
Australia	91,5	85,7	6,6	16,4	18,8		62,0	7,0
Austria	91,0	82,4	4,0	6,3	13,7	13,0	79,0	4,7
Belgium	90,4	82,5	3,2	7,2	13,2	15,0	62,0	4,5
Canada	90,7	85,0	6,5	6,5	16,5		84,0	5,8
Czech Republic	88,2	75,2				8,0	86,0	3,5
Denmark	87,0	81,0	4,9	7,3	12,0	11,0	81,0	4,3
Finland	91,2	80,9	2,1	6,8	10,8	11,0	76,0	3,8
France	91,2	80,9	3,3	10,0	13,5	14,0	65,0	5,6
Germany	90,5	82,3	4,2	7,0	15,7	16,0	83,0	4,3
Greece	91,5	82,0			21,7	20,0	51,0	6,2
Hungary	83,7	64,7				12,0	74,0	3,8
Iceland	91,4	87,4				10,0	59,0	
Ireland	89,7	83,1	8,0	15,4	20,7	21,0	62,0	6,1
Italy	92,2	84,6	7,3	18,8	21,9	19,0	44,0	6,5
Japan	93,3	85,7			13,9		84,0	3,4
Luxembourg	89,9	82,6				11,0	59,0	
Mexico	84,0	75,2			27,7		21,0	19,3
Netherlands	89,7	83,5	4,5	7,4	13,5	12,0	66,0	5,1
New Zealand	89,1	84,1					78,0	6,8
Norway	90,6	84,7	2,8	2,6	14,6	11,0	87,0	3,9
Poland	87,0	69,7				17,0	48,0	5,5
Portugal	90,2	79,8				21,0	23,0	8,0
Slovak Republic	86,8	69,3				21,0	87,0	4,0
Spain	92,8	82,1	5,2			20,0	43,0	5,4
Sweden	91,5	86,4	3,6	7,9	10,3	11,0	82,0	4,0
Switzerland	91,9	85,4	4,0	3,5	11,8		70,0	5,8
United Kingdom	89,4	83,6	5,4	11,8	19,5	18,0	65,0	7,2
United States	86,7	79,1	10,7	8,7	24,0		88,0	8,4

Source: our own calculations from UNDP HDR 2005; CEPR, Eurostat

**Table 1b: towards an overall UNDP type indicator of poverty avoidance in Europe, based on the materials of Table 1a**

	component index probability of surviving to age 65 female	component index probability of surviving to age 65 male	component index relative poverty rate (PPP < 40 % of national median)	component index absolute poverty rate (PPP < 40 % of United States national median)	component index relative poverty rate (PPP < 60 % of national median, mid 1990s)	component index relative poverty rate (PPP < 60 % of national median, mid 2000s, Eurostat)	component index % of the population aged 24-64 with at least upper secondary education	component index quintile ratio	avoidance of poverty index
<i>Japan</i>	1,000	0,925			0,793		0,940	1,000	<b>0,932</b>
<i>Norway</i>	0,719	0,881	0,919	1,000	0,753	0,769	0,985	0,969	<b>0,874</b>
Sweden	0,813	0,956	0,826	0,673	1,000	0,769	0,910	0,962	<b>0,864</b>
<i>Switzerland</i>	0,854	0,912	0,779	0,944	0,914		0,731	0,849	<b>0,855</b>
Finland	0,781	0,714	1,000	0,741	0,971	0,769	0,821	0,975	<b>0,846</b>
<i>Iceland</i>	0,802	1,000				0,846	0,567		<b>0,804</b>
Austria	0,760	0,780	0,779	0,772	0,805	0,615	0,866	0,918	<b>0,787</b>
Czech Republic	0,469	0,463				1,000	0,970	0,994	<b>0,779</b>
<i>New Zealand</i>	0,562	0,855					0,851	0,786	<b>0,764</b>
<i>Canada</i>	0,729	0,894	0,488	0,759	0,644		0,940	0,849	<b>0,758</b>
Denmark	0,344	0,718	0,674	0,710	0,902	0,769	0,896	0,943	<b>0,745</b>
Netherlands	0,625	0,828	0,721	0,704	0,816	0,692	0,672	0,893	<b>0,744</b>
Germany	0,708	0,775	0,756	0,728	0,690	0,385	0,925	0,943	<b>0,739</b>
Belgium	0,698	0,784	0,872	0,716	0,833	0,462	0,612	0,931	<b>0,738</b>
France	0,781	0,714	0,860	0,543	0,816	0,538	0,657	0,862	<b>0,721</b>
Luxembourg	0,646	0,789				0,769	0,567		<b>0,693</b>
<i>United States</i>	0,313	0,634	0,000	0,623	0,213	1,615	1,000	0,686	<b>0,635</b>
<i>Australia</i>	0,813	0,925	0,477	0,148	0,511		0,612	0,774	<b>0,609</b>
Spain	0,948	0,767	0,640			0,077	0,328	0,874	<b>0,606</b>
United Kingdom	0,594	0,833	0,616	0,432	0,471	0,231	0,657	0,761	<b>0,574</b>
Greece	0,813	0,762			0,345	0,077	0,448	0,824	<b>0,545</b>
Slovak Republic	0,323	0,203				0,000	0,985	0,962	<b>0,495</b>
Hungary	0,000	0,000				0,692	0,791	0,975	<b>0,492</b>
Ireland	0,625	0,811	0,314	0,210	0,402	0,000	0,612	0,830	<b>0,475</b>
Italy	0,885	0,877	0,395	0,000	0,333	0,154	0,343	0,805	<b>0,474</b>
Poland	0,344	0,220				0,308	0,403	0,868	<b>0,429</b>
Portugal	0,677	0,665				0,000	0,030	0,711	<b>0,417</b>
<i>Mexico</i>	0,031	0,463			0,000		0,000	0,000	<b>0,099</b>

The countries printed in indented letters are not members of the European Union

As we already stated, the cast-like character of European society and the discrimination patterns that we often encounter, emerge from the thorough statistical analysis of poverty risk rates in Europe. Many years ago, Mancur Olson (Olson, 1982) analyzed such social discrimination patterns and came to the conclusion that racial and ethnic discrimination are incompatible with the workings of a liberal market economy:

**Table 1c: the poverty risk rates of different social groups in Europe – 1990s**

relative poverty risk for the different social groups	Germany	Denmark	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxembourg	France	UK	Ireland	Italy	Greece	Spain	Portugal	Austria	Finland	EU-14
gender male	92	93	94	93	98	94	90	93	96	98	100	93	87	96	94
gender female	107	107	105	106	102	105	109	107	104	102	100	106	112	104	106
age < 20	127	48	127	118	146	121	128	131	123	92	128	103	119	73	122
age 20 - 29	123	182	171	90	84	123	99	69	128	95	95	64	87	173	114
age 30 - 49	87	53	77	80	81	74	71	90	84	72	96	78	83	79	81
age 50 - 59	79	73	59	88	109	83	65	76	97	94	90	95	73	100	82
age 60 +	93	195	77	118	79	105	126	93	82	147	84	153	128	122	104
single parent hh	227	67	243	150	147	175	224	154	108	108	111	126	142	98	177
couple with 3 or more children	131	40	138	118	183	104	125	134	173	92	188	189	224	38	129
low education	104	148	127	137	110	135	123	115	113	145	114	111	133	139	122
EU citizens	89	103	90	93	86	90	87	82	97	103	95	98	86	108	92
<b>non-EU citizens</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>319</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>313</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>396</b>	<b>203</b>
unemployed	171	82	192	179	182	197	200	164	212	134	153	89	157	203	180
pensioners	93	189	162	109	98	99	128	68	66	150	68	143	102	118	99
inactive total	135	188	123	140	120	162	161	130	132	108	115	131	147	202	138
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: our own compilations from BMSG Sozialbericht 2001

The dire consequences of such discrimination patterns are the “Latin Americanization” and the “Mediterraneanization” of the European Union:

**Table 1d: Social cohesion in the EU-25, in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in the MEDA partner countries of the European Union**

critterion	Which Latin American and Caribbean countries outperform worst performing EU nation?	Which Arab MEDA EU-partner countries outperform worst performing EU nation?	worst EU-25 nation	value for worst EU-25 nation	value for the US
human development index	Barbados, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica		<b>Latvia</b>	0, 836	0, 944
inequality between richest 20 % and poorest 20 %	Jamaica	Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia	<b>Portugal</b>	8	8, 4
life expectancy at birth	Costa Rica, Chile, Cuba, Dominica, Uruguay, Mexico, Barbados, Panama, Argentina, Ecuador, Antigua and Barbuda, Venezuela, Colombia, Saint Lucia, Belize	Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon	<b>Latvia</b>	71, 6	77, 4
probability at birth of surviving to age 65, female	Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Uruguay, Panama, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador	Tunisia, Syria, Libya	<b>Latvia</b>	81, 9	86, 7
probability at birth of surviving to age 65, male	Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Panama, Mexico, Barbados, Uruguay, Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela, Belize, Saint Lucia, Paraguay, Colombia, Saint Vincent, Peru, Jamaica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Trinidad & Tobago, Honduras, Suriname, Brazil, Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Guatemala	Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt	<b>Estonia</b>	57, 2	79, 1
ratio of estimated female to male earned income	Jamaica, Bahamas, Barbados, Uruguay, Panama, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, Nicaragua, Bolivia, El Salvador, Brazil, Venezuela, Guyana, Chile, Mexico, Honduras, Costa Rica, Argentina, Dominican Republic	Morocco, Tunisia	<b>Austria</b>	0, 35	0, 62
real income of the poorest 20 % in purchasing power parities	none		<b>Latvia</b>	3749	10142

gender development index	Barbados, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay		<b>Latvia</b>	0, 834	0, 942
gender empowerment measure	Bahamas, Costa Rica, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Mexico, Panama, Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, Colombia, Ecuador		<b>Malta</b>	0, 486	0, 793

Source: Tausch (2007)

As we already mentioned, the statistical instruments used by Eurostat are not adequate any more to fully grasp this crisis, constituted by large scale Muslim poverty in the West, structural unemployment and Roma poverty in the East. Eurostat "official" poverty rates not only show with lower incomes a growing bias, but they also imply a "perverse" correlation between hard-core poverty indicators and their poverty rates. With increasing poverty (Eurostat definition, based on the national median incomes) you get rising life expectancy rates and a rising UNDP Human Development Index, while the new data set, provided by Professor Toney Fahey, seems to suggest that the EU-25-wide 60 % median income poverty criterion has 4/5 of variance in common with life expectancy and the human development index, and the relationship is indeed in the expected direction.

**Table 1f: Poverty in the EU-25 according to the new criterion: poverty = below 60 % of the EU-25 wide median income**


	% poor re country median	% poor re EU25 median	implicit measurement bias [over- or underestimation of poverty in % of the total population]
Bulgaria	10,9	88	-77,1
Romania	15,2	85,9	-70,7
Lithuania	29,4	78,5	-49,1
Turkey	24	73,5	-49,5
Latvia	22,9	70,5	-47,6
Poland	21,6	66,6	-45
Estonia	17,5	58,1	-40,6
Slovakia	11	40,3	-29,3
Portugal	20,7	39,1	-18,4
Hungary	18,6	38,4	-19,8
Greece	23,8	28,2	-4,4
Germany	29,1	25,5	3,6
Cyprus	26,1	20,8	5,3
Slovenia	20,5	20,2	0,3

Spain	22,3	19,8	2,5
Czech Rep	15,2	17,8	-2,6
Malta	18,2	16,7	1,5
UK	30,1	11,9	18,2
Denmark	23,2	7,9	15,3
Luxembourg	21,4	7,7	13,7
Finland	18,5	7,7	10,8
Italy	21,5	7,3	14,2
Belgium	14,7	7,3	7,4
Ireland	22,6	5,9	16,7
France	17,7	5,4	12,3
Austria	15,3	5	10,3
Netherlands	18,6	4,4	14,2
Sweden	14,6	2	12,6

Source: calculated from the data provided by Fahey et al. (2005) (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions). Professor Fahey's results are the first published comparison of European poverty rates after enlargement with the EU-25 wide median income as the poverty level. The original EXCEL-spreadsheet was kindly put at our disposal by Professor Fahey.

Our graphical presentation of the measurement bias is as follows:

**Graph 1e: The traditional Eurostat poverty statistics are biased**





Source: calculated from the data provided by Fahey et al. (2005) (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions). Professor Fahey's results are the first published comparison of European poverty rates after enlargement with the EU-25 wide median income as the poverty level. The original EXCEL-spreadsheet was kindly put at our disposal by Professor Fahey.

The mentioned correlations between the old and the new poverty measures (based on national means versus the new EU-25 criterion) and UNDP life expectancy and human development indices are staggering indeed. The old national median Eurostat measure does not explain to us more than 95 % of these two hard core UNDP poverty measures, and the direction of the assumed relationship is even perverse (with more poverty you get better living conditions), while Professor Fahey's new measure receives a forceful statistical confirmation:





**Graph 1f: The traditional Eurostat poverty statistics are biased – percentage of the population poor according to the national, Eurostat poverty lines (poverty = income below 60 % of national median) and life expectancy or the human development index. The result is a perverse positive correlation between poverty and life expectancy or the human development index**



Source: calculated from the data provided by Fahey et al. (2005) (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions) and UNDP, 2005. Professor Fahey's results are the first published comparison of European poverty rates after enlargement with the EU-25 wide median income as the poverty level. The original EXCEL-spreadsheet was kindly put at our disposal by Professor Fahey.

**Graph 1g: The new EU-25 wide poverty statistics are NOT biased – percentage of the population poor according to the new, EU-25 wide poverty lines (poverty = income below 60 % of EU-25 median) and life expectancy or the human development index. The result is the expected negative correlation between poverty and life expectancy or the human development index**



Source: calculated from the data provided by Fahey et al. (2005) (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions), and UNDP, 2005. Professor Fahey's results are the first published comparison of European poverty rates after

enlargement with the EU-25 wide median income as the poverty level. The original EXCEL-spreadsheet was kindly put at our disposal by Professor Fahey.

Limited as these data may be, they seem to indicate that a more thorough, systematic study of the poverty of the more than 15 million Muslims in Europe is needed to test the hypothesis that Muslim poverty in western Europe, Roma poverty in Eastern Europe and the plight of the unemployed especially in Southern and Eastern Europe are all part of the rapid peripherization of the European continent.

At this point, we also should refer to the data compiled in the appendix to this work. Appendix 1 and 2 quotes the ESS data in more detail and mentions also the number of cases *n* for each country. Appendix 3 mentions the data for


- income
- trust in democracy
- trust in the legal system
- trust in parliament
- trust in the police

for the Muslim population and the non-Muslim population in Europe and in the ESS OECD reference country Israel. In the data appendix 7 – 10 to this essay, we further elaborate on the issue of proper new European poverty indices.

In appendix 7 and 8 we show that the generally unsatisfactory growth of the UNDP Human Development Index in Europe (with the exceptions of Ireland, Luxembourg, the UK, Portugal, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and Norway) most probably already reflects the dimensions of Muslim and Roma marginalization in Europe, especially in countries like Bulgaria, Romania, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Germany, Austria, Denmark and Italy. We calculated the residuals from a simple OLS regression, predicting the UNDP HDI (UNDP, 2005 data) in 1990 on the UNDP HDI 2003 at the level of the world system (UNDP, 2005 data). We also drew a scatter plot between the Muslim development index and these human development regression residuals. The operation shows that at least a part of the variance of the unsatisfactory human development in the 1990s and beyond in Europe (at least 1/5) can be attributed to the dimension of "Muslim discrimination". Better integrating the Muslim communities in Europe would create the conditions for an overall more satisfactory human development. Appendix 7 to 10 shows the relationships of the new EU-25 wide poverty index, developed by Professor Tony Fahey, with the UNDP Human Development Index. The UNDP HDI explains 79.67 % of the variance of the EU-25-wide 60 % median income poverty measure, and linear estimates based on the UNDP yield interesting estimates for countries within and outside the EU-25. Appendix 6 finally analyses some other interesting properties of the new index. While the country median poverty values are mainly an (insignificant) reflection of the quintile ratio, the new index is to be explained in a significant way by more than 4/5 by an insufficient human development, by a high quintile ratio, and a low international comparative price level (1/ERDI). In line with arguments put forward by the author and his associates in other publications (especially Kohler/Tausch, 2001), low comparative price levels – or as world systems theory prefers to say – unequal exchange – has a strong

influence of its own on national poverty rates. We also estimate a UNDP-HDI for the European Muslim communities. French and Greek Muslims are facing a poverty that is similar to the national averages in countries like Bulgaria or Mexico.

Since dealt with structural employment and Roma poverty in Eastern Europe extensively in earlier publications (Tausch and associates, 2001 – 2007), we concentrate here on the poverty of the Muslim communities in the new enlarged Europe.





### 3: METHODOLOGY OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY – BASED RESULTS

The systematic analysis of **comparative** aspects of the socio-economic situation of the respective European Muslim communities, let alone the interaction of this situation with aspects of what is generally described in EU-jargon as the “Lisbon process” of catching up by 2010 with the United States of America, to make Europe the most competitive, knowledge-based economy in the world is until now absent from the literature due to lacking systematically comparable data.

Our research report, which starts from the tradition of cross-national, **quantitative** political science, economics and sociology, would like to move away the debate from the in-depth analysis of the patterns and trajectories of Muslim migration to Europe, still so common today in the literature, towards the cross-national, comparative perspective. Which policies favored “integration” and human well-being among the Muslim communities, and which policies were conspicuously absent, where were such efforts obviously less successful? Which relationships exist between the failures to integrate the some 15 million Muslim immigrants in Europe and the failures of the “Lisbon process” observable up to now?

In this report, we use the powerful instrument of the *European Social Survey* for the first time to study the situation of the Muslim communities in Europe. The ESS, financed by the European Commission, and national co-partners, is the key social scientific data collection of the EC apart from the usual Eurostat and Euro barometer data. The raw data are freely available on the internet, and can be downloaded with the advanced SPSS and SAS statistical software packages<sup>7</sup>.

Systematic use of the ESS data up to now was made, among others, for the study of the attitudes of the majority populations in Europe towards European minorities. This study was carried out by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) in Vienna<sup>8</sup>. In view of the far-reaching political debate on Islam, Islamism and Muslim communities in Europe, the deficit to use the ESS data also for the analysis of the situation of Muslims in Europe is somewhat surprising.

The ESS data are based on true random samples of the European populations that could adequately work with the complex, European-wide questionnaire (sufficient language capabilities). The religion or denomination variable included - 1 Catholic, 2 Protestant, 3 Eastern Orthodox, 4 other Christian, 5 Jewish, 6 Islam, 7 Eastern religions, and 8 for the other non-Christian religions. Working with small sub samples from larger random samples entails a certain

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

<sup>8</sup>


[http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/index.php?fuseaction=content.dsp\\_cat\\_content&catid=3fb38ad3e22bb&contentid=42369ad95426f](http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/index.php?fuseaction=content.dsp_cat_content&catid=3fb38ad3e22bb&contentid=42369ad95426f)

methodological risk, very well known in survey research. The margin of error at 90 % confidence is approximately determined by the formula<sup>9</sup>:

$$(4) \text{ margin of error at 90 \% confidence} = 0.82 / (n^{0.5})$$

We thus arrive at the following margins of errors for our sub samples (Graph 2a to Graph 2c).


**Graph 2a: margin of error at 90 % confidence**




<sup>9</sup> [http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Margin\\_of\\_error](http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Margin_of_error) . Please note that n = sample size



Graph 2b: margin of error at 90 % confidence in small samples



**Graph 2c: margin of error at 90 % confidence in medium-sized samples**



The sample sizes and main results for the left-right political scale are reproduced in the appendix, error margins can be immediately concluded from the size of n in the appendix and Graphs 2a – 2c. We excluded cases, where the number of Muslim interview partners for the ESS teams were 5 representative persons or less.

## 4: THE ISLAMIST THREAT IN EUROPE – FIRST (GUESS)(E)STIMATES ON MYTHS AND REALITY

Our report about the ESS results should start with a comparison of the PEW research data on the totalitarian potential among Muslim communities in Europe with our own, new ESS data. With the great European Muslim scholar Bassam Tibi, we differentiate strictly between Islam on the one hand and totalitarian, jihadist Islamism on the other hand. Djihadist Islamism does not only want to establish a state, in which the divine law is above the human law, but it is also ready to fight for this goal with arms (see 'Jihadism's root in political Islam' by Bassam Tibi; *Internationally Herald Tribune*, August 30, 2005). This being stated, we quickly present Tables 2a and 2b that are the basis of our assessment of the size of the real terrorist threat in Europe, away from myths and fancies.

Of course, it might seem to be heroic to conclude from the PEW studies, which only include Muslims in France, the UK, Germany, and Spain, a solid knowledge on opinions of all the Muslims in all EU-25 countries. But the PEW sample makes valid assumptions about approximately ¾ of all Muslims in Europe, and the ESS samples present an even more complete subsection of presumed realities (9/10).

**Table 2a: The Islamist threat in Europe - the country weights for the PEW and ESS materials to draw conclusions at the EU-25 level**

	total population, 2002	percentage of Muslims	total number of Muslims in 2002 (conservative estimate)	country code	PEW	ESS	country weights Muslim population Europe PEW sample	country weights Muslim population Europe ESS sample
Austria	8048000	4,7	378256	A	NO	YES		0,030119012
Belgium	10333000	3,5	361655	B	NO	YES		0,028797141
Denmark	5374000	3	161220	DK	NO	YES		0,012837304
France	59485000	7,5	4461375	F	YES	YES	0,440160212	0,355241445
Germany	82495000	3,7	3052315	G	YES	YES	0,301142051	0,243043634
Greece	10631000	1,3	138203	GR	NO	YES		0,011004552
Luxembourg	444000	2	8880	LUX	NO	YES		0,000707079
Netherlands	16144000	6	968640	NL	NO	YES		0,077128929
Slovenia	1964000	2,5	49100	SI	NO	YES		0,003909637
Spain	40917000	2,5	1022925	SP	YES	YES	0,100921999	0,081451426
Sweden	8924000	4	356960	SW	NO	YES		0,028423297
UK	59229000	2,7	1599183	UK	YES	YES	0,157775737	0,127336545

Cyprus	765000	0,5	3825				
Czech Republic	10210000	0,2	20420				
Estonia	1358000	0,75	10185				
Finland	5199000	0,2	10398				
Hungary	10159000	0,6	60954				
Ireland	3920000	0,49	19208				
Italy	57690000	1,7	980730				
Latvia	2338000	0,02	468				
Lithuania	3469000	0,6	20814				
Malta	397000	7,6	30172				
Poland	38626000	0,08	30901				
Portugal	10177000	0,35	35620				
Slovakia	5379000	0,05	2690				
<b>Total EU-25</b>	<b>453675000</b>		<b>13785095</b>	<b>10135798</b>	<b>12558712</b>		

Source: our own calculations, based on nationmaster.com, which again is based on United States Department of State, religious freedom data 2003.

We now proceed to simply extrapolate our national results from the ESS and from the PEW studies on totalitarian Muslim potential in Europe. The reasons for our relative political optimism in interpreting our results are manifold. Our materials generally confirm that it is also sociologically very valid to distinguish between "Islam" and "Islamism". Our materials render strong support to the hypothesis that **passive support for Islamist radicalism in Europe and the complete distrust in democracy does not exceed 400.000 persons**. While there is an understandable siding by European Muslims with the Arab side in the Middle East conflict, and widespread and lamentable reservations against "Jews" and the state of Israel, low trust in democracy is already far less widespread, and ideological open support for suicide bombings in order "to defend Islam" is only shared by 1/6 of Muslims in Europe. The hard core of open Osama Ben Laden supporters and people who have zero trust in democracy are 2 to 3 percent of all Muslims in Europe, a figure, which by the way neatly corresponds to the figures established by Western intelligence agencies, quoted by the high-ranking United States diplomat Timothy M. Savage in his 2004 article in the *"Washington Quarterly"*. Regrettable as Islamist extremism in Europe might be, it is a far way from alarmist views that present "Islam" in Europe as such as being incompatible with the future of democracy. The overall figures are:

**Table 2b: The Islamist threat in Europe - the presumed EU-25 wide results, based on a simple extrapolation of the PEW and ESS materials to draw conclusions at the EU-25 level**

	implied population weighted total percentage, EU-25	implied total number, EU-25	source	country coverage of all Muslims residing in the EU-25
% of European Muslims say relations between Muslims and the people in Western countries are bad	56	7678000	PEW	73,53%
% of European Muslims not expressing explicit favorable ratings of Jews	49	6814000	PEW	73,53%
% of European Muslims believe Hamas victory is good for Palestinians	44	6009000	PEW	73,53%
% of European Muslims want to be distinct from society	33	4570000	PEW	73,53%
% of European Muslims expressing low trust in parliament	31	4282000	ESS	91,10%
% of European Muslims expressing low trust in the legal system	26	3518000	ESS	91,10%
% of European Muslims with pronounced left views	24	3371000	ESS	91,10%
% of European Muslims favor Iranian nuclear weapons	23	3211000	PEW	73,53%
% of European Muslims not expressing explicit favorable ratings of Christians	20	2714000	PEW	73,53%
% of European Muslims expressing low trust in the police	19	2624000	ESS	91,10%
% of European Muslims expressing low trust in democracy	15	2003000	ESS	91,10%
% of European Muslims favor suicide	13	1810000	PEW	73,53%

bombings (violence is sometimes justified in order to defend Islam)				
% of European Muslims who identify with fundamentalists	8	1037000	PEW	73,53%
% of European Muslims with extreme right-wing views	5	622000	ESS	91,10%
% of European Muslims expressing a lot of confidence in Osama Ben Laden	3	394000	PEW	73,53%
% of European Muslims expressing zero trust in democracy	2	316000	ESS	91,10%

Source: our own calculations from PEW and ESS data

## **5: MUSLIM SECULARISM IN EUROPE OR ECUMENICAL EUROPEAN THEOLOGY OF GLOBAL PEACE AND JUSTICE?**

A traditional answer by western sociology and philosophy to the problem of religion consists in expecting that with progressive "modernization" religious values will diminish in importance. But Inglehart and Norris (2004) show that although members of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations during the past 50 years, people with traditional religious views constitute a growing proportion of the world's population. Secularization is occurring in Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada and Western Europe. Even in the U.S., there has been some movement in this direction. Within most advanced industrial societies, attendance at religious services has fallen during the past several decades. Religious authorities largely have lost their authority to dictate to the public on birth control, divorce, abortion, sexual orientation and the necessity of marriage before childbirth. But this process of secularization is linked with a sharp decline in human fertility rates: As a result, the proportion of the world's population with traditional religious values is growing, not shrinking. Organized religion is losing its grip on the public, but spiritual concerns are taking on growing importance. The Inglehart and Norris findings also show that Moslems are much more likely than Protestants to subscribe to the values associated with the "Protestant work ethic" (Inglehart and Norris, 2004).

Secularism and "protestant" work ethics will characterize in an increasing fashion the cultural landscape of Muslims in Europe. As stated, the reasons for our optimism are manifold. Apart from the fact that open support for radical djihadist Islamism and zero trust in democracy only amounts presumably to 2-3 % of the total European Muslim population, secularism seems to affect not only the European majority culture landscapes, but also a considerable proportion of the European Muslim communities. The well-known statements of political science and sociological modernization theories and world value research again are being confirmed here:



**Table 3a: secularism among the majority cultures**

	% of total pop 2004 (2002) never attending religious services
EE Estonia	79,3
SE Sweden	73,7
CZ Czech Republic	73,3
BE Belgium	67,4
IS Iceland	62,3
NL Netherlands	62,1
FR France	61,9
NO Norway	59,8
GB United Kingdom	59,2
DE Germany	54,1
DK Denmark	49,6
HU Hungary	47,5
ES Spain	45,3
LU Luxembourg	40,3
CH Switzerland	37,9
AT Austria	36,6
FI Finland	35,8
SI Slovenia	35,6
UA Ukraine	30,3
IT Italy	29,7
SK Slovakia	29,6
IL Israel	26,5
PT Portugal	25,6
IE Ireland	14,6
GR Greece	11,3
PL Poland	9,3

Source: calculated by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

**Table 3b: secularism among the Muslim communities**

	% of total Muslim pop 2004 (2002) never attending religious Muslim religious services
LU Luxembourg	57,1
SE Sweden	50
SI Slovenia	37,5
GR Greece	33
NL Netherlands	33
ES Spain	30
CH Switzerland	29,2
AT Austria	23,8
NO Norway	23,8
DK Denmark	21,4
GB United Kingdom	17,5
FR France	17,4
BE Belgium	16,3
DE Germany	11,9
IL Israel	7,4

Source: calculated by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

By far, the secularists are the biggest denominational reality in Europe, and Christianity – with a few exceptions – is already at the margins. This can be shown by analyzing the three biggest denominational/religious subgroups for each European country with the ESS data:

**Table 3c: Component analysis of the different denominational and political groups, and their share in total population**

	religious practice	frequency rank among denominational groups in the country	% of total population, 2004	DYN denominations, 2002-2004
<b>AT Austria</b>	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	1	41,55	4,53
AT Austria	without denomination	2	29,33	-1,95
AT Austria	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	3	12,79	-2,44
<b>BE Belgium</b>	without denomination	1	55,35	3,42
BE Belgium	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	2	20,65	-3,6
BE Belgium	Roman Catholic: never	3	11,5	2,81
<b>CH Switzerland</b>	without denomination	1	30,5	-7,35
CH Switzerland	Protestant: less frequent than every week	2	24,75	4,76
CH Switzerland	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	3	22,35	1,09
<b>CZ Czech Republic</b>	without denomination	1	69,17	2,86
CZ Czech Republic	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	2	15,23	-1,12
CZ Czech Republic	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	3	6,42	-0,77
<b>DE Germany</b>	without denomination	1	46,1	0,4
DE Germany	Protestant: less frequent than every week	2	19,81	-3,84
DE Germany	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	3	14,83	1,45
<b>DK Denmark</b>	Protestant: less frequent than every week	1	44,03	5,79
DK Denmark	without denomination	2	36,62	-5,2

DK Denmark	Protestant: never	3	12,52	-2,21
<b>EE Estonia</b>	without denomination	1	78,15	xx
EE Estonia	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	2	8,9	xx
EE Estonia	Protestant: less frequent than every week	3	6,51	xx
<b>ES Spain</b>	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	1	34,73	-3,71
ES Spain	without denomination	2	26,72	3,74
ES Spain	Roman Catholic: never	3	18,21	0,6
<b>FI Finland</b>	Protestant: less frequent than every week	1	57,8	xx
FI Finland	without denomination	2	24,11	xx
FI Finland	Protestant: never	3	11,48	xx
<b>FR France</b>	without denomination	1	49,64	-0,91
FR France	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	2	25,32	xx
FR France	Roman Catholic: never	3	11,24	xx
<b>GB United Kingdom</b>	without denomination	1	48,8	-1,01
GB United Kingdom	Protestant: less frequent than every week	2	12,74	-5,6
GB United Kingdom	Protestant: never	3	7,95	-2,43
<b>GR Greece</b>	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	1	63,48	-3,08
GR Greece	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	2	23,42	-1,19
GR Greece	without denomination	3	9,09	5,86
<b>HU Hungary</b>	without denomination	1	36,7	0,57
HU Hungary	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	2	28,54	xx
HU Hungary	Protestant: less frequent than every week	3	11,44	xx
<b>IE Ireland</b>	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	1	55,45	6,48
IE Ireland	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	2	25,79	-0,58

IE Ireland	without denomination	3	12,4	-4,29
<b>IS Iceland</b>	without denomination	1	51,78	xx
IS Iceland	Protestant: less frequent than every week	2	30,77	xx
IS Iceland	Protestant: never	3	10,51	xx
<b>IT Italy</b>	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	1	41,18	xx
IT Italy	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	2	27,59	xx
IT Italy	without denomination	3	23,74	xx
<b>LU Luxembourg</b>	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	1	33,11	6,15
LU Luxembourg	without denomination	2	30,3	3,67
LU Luxembourg	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	3	9,7	-1,4
<b>NL Netherlands</b>	without denomination	1	53,88	-2,77
NL Netherlands	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	2	14,85	1,01
NL Netherlands	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	3	7,37	0,54
<b>NO Norway</b>	without denomination	1	48,19	-0,82
NO Norway	Protestant: less frequent than every week	2	30,36	-2,75
NO Norway	Protestant: never	3	9,42	-0,19
<b>PL Poland</b>	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	1	56,21	2,37
PL Poland	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	2	33,12	-1,83
PL Poland	without denomination	3	8,06	-0,13
<b>PT Portugal</b>	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	1	44,96	2,36
PT Portugal	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	2	26,13	-0,03
PT Portugal	without denomination	3	15,33	-1,7
<b>SE Sweden</b>	without denomination	1	68,21	-1,96
SE Sweden	Protestant: less	2	20,29	-7,12

	frequent than every week			
SE Sweden	Protestant: never	3	5,07	-1,9
<b>SI Slovenia</b>	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	1	27,95	1,59
SI Slovenia	without denomination	2	22,24	-28,38
SI Slovenia	Roman Catholic: never	3	12,57	9,73
<b>SK Slovakia</b>	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	1	27,69	xx
SK Slovakia	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	2	27,04	xx
SK Slovakia	without denomination	3	24,78	xx
<b>UA Ukraine</b>	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	1	46,65	xx
UA Ukraine	without denomination	2	25,77	xx
UA Ukraine	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	3	6,33	xx

Source: calculated by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

Only in Ireland and in Poland, regular Sunday Catholic religious service attendance constitutes the dominant social practice of a European country, and Protestant regular Sunday Church attendance rates fare even worse and only in the Netherlands and in the UK, they are only above 5 % of total population. By any standards, secularism defined as belonging **to no religious group** is now the dominant "denomination" in a majority of European countries, and number 2 or number 3 in an equally astonishing manner:

**Table 3d: "Pagan" Europe?**

	religious practice	frequency rank among denominational groups in the country	% of total population , 2004	DYN denominations, 2002-2004
EE Estonia	without denomination	1	78,15	xx
CZ Czech Republic	without denomination	1	69,17	2,86
SE Sweden	without denomination	1	68,21	-1,96
BE Belgium	without denomination	1	55,35	3,42
NL Netherlands	without denomination	1	53,88	-2,77
IS Iceland	without denomination	1	51,78	xx
FR France	without denomination	1	49,64	-0,91
GB United Kingdom	without denomination	1	48,8	-1,01
NO Norway	without denomination	1	48,19	-0,82
DE Germany	without denomination	1	46,1	0,4
HU Hungary	without denomination	1	36,7	0,57
CH Switzerland	without denomination	1	30,5	-7,35
DK Denmark	without denomination	2	36,62	-5,2
LU Luxembourg	without denomination	2	30,3	3,67
AT Austria	without denomination	2	29,33	-1,95
ES Spain	without denomination	2	26,72	3,74
UA Ukraine	without denomination	2	25,77	xx
FI Finland	without denomination	2	24,11	xx
SI Slovenia	without denomination	2	22,24	-28,38
SK Slovakia	without denomination	3	24,78	xx
IT Italy	without denomination	3	23,74	xx
PT Portugal	without denomination	3	15,33	-1,7
IE Ireland	without denomination	3	12,4	-4,29
GR Greece	without	3	9,09	5,86



	denomination			
PL Poland	without denomination	3	8,06	-0,13

Source: calculated by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

Muslim weekly prayer attendance rates were, on average for the period 2002-2004, just about 1/3 of total Muslim (European) population or even below in the following countries (ranked by their rates of Muslim “secularism”): Luxembourg, Sweden, France, Slovenia, Belgium, Austria, Norway, Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Israel, and in Greece. Only Swiss and British Muslims were, on average, more observant of their weekly regular prayers in their Mosques, but even here one could remark that several Christian groups, so in the Ukraine, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Poland, Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the UK, Netherlands, and Switzerland were more observant than British or Swiss Muslims.

**Table 3e: religious practice (weekly or more frequent religious service attendance rate per total membership of the denominational group)**

	N = 2002	N = 2004	% regular observants in % of the religious group 2002	% regular observants in % of the religious group 2004	DYN religious observance, 2002-2004	country code	average observation rate, 2002 - 2004
Orthodox	20	9	20,00	0,00	-20,00	AT	10,00
Protestant	66	63	9,09	14,29	5,19	AT	11,69
<b>Muslim</b>	16	21	25,00	14,29	-10,71	AT	19,64
Roman Catholic	1149	1188	25,85	20,96	-4,89	AT	23,40
<b>Muslim</b>	28	49	14,29	22,45	8,16	BE	18,37
Roman Catholic	692	632	22,25	18,20	-4,06	BE	20,23
Protestant	8	10	12,50	40,00	27,50	BE	26,25
Orthodox	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	BE	xx
Orthodox	7	18	0,00	5,56	5,56	CH	2,78
Protestant	484	649	6,40	12,33	5,92	CH	9,37
Roman Catholic	568	625	19,37	21,12	1,75	CH	20,24
<b>Muslim</b>	9	24	55,56	20,83	-34,72	CH	38,19
Protestant	44	68	20,45	16,18	-4,28	CZ	18,32
Roman Catholic	343	620	25,66	25,65	-0,01	CZ	25,65
Orthodox	xx	6	xx	50,00	xx	CZ	50,00
Muslim	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	CZ	xx
Protestant	801	685	5,87	7,59	1,72	DE	6,73
Orthodox	14	18	14,29	5,56	-8,73	DE	9,92

Roman Catholic	533	581	22,89	20,14	-2,75	DE	21,51
<b>Muslim</b>	41	42	17,07	38,10	21,02	DE	27,58
Protestant	765	817	3,14	3,79	0,66	DK	3,47
Roman Catholic	9	17	11,11	5,88	-5,23	DK	8,50
<b>Muslim</b>	17	14	11,76	28,57	16,81	DK	20,17
Orthodox	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	DK	xx
Orthodox	xx	158	xx	9,49	xx	EE	9,49
Roman Catholic	xx	10	xx	10,00	xx	EE	10,00
Protestant	xx	135	xx	20,74	xx	EE	20,74
Muslim	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	EE	xx
Orthodox	xx	6	xx	16,67	xx	ES	16,67
<b>Muslim</b>	xx	10	xx	20,00	xx	ES	20,00
Roman Catholic	1051	976	25,50	23,46	-2,04	ES	24,48
Protestant	xx	7	60,00	71,43	11,43	ES	65,71
Orthodox	20	xx	5,00	xx	xx	FI	5,00
Protestant	1379	xx	5,00	xx	xx	FI	5,00
Muslim	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	FI	xx
Roman Catholic	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	FI	xx
<b>Muslim</b>	46	xx	8,70	xx	xx	FR	8,70
Protestant	21	xx	14,29	xx	xx	FR	14,29
Roman Catholic	607	xx	15,32	xx	xx	FR	15,32
Orthodox	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	FR	xx
Orthodox	xx	6	xx	16,67	xx	GB	16,67
Protestant	648	446	17,59	20,63	3,04	GB	19,11
<b>Muslim</b>	27	40	33,33	40,00	6,67	GB	36,67
Roman Catholic	175	181	44,57	40,33	-4,24	GB	42,45
Roman Catholic	7	15	28,57	20,00	-8,57	GR	24,29
Orthodox	1858	1728	26,26	26,39	0,12	GR	26,33
Protestant	7	xx	28,57	xx	xx	GR	28,57
<b>Muslim</b>	34	21	23,53	42,86	19,33	GR	33,19
Protestant	234	xx	9,83	xx	xx	HU	9,83
Roman Catholic	625	xx	20,32	xx	xx	HU	20,32
Muslim	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	HU	xx
Orthodox	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	HU	xx
Protestant	54	58	51,85	44,83	-7,02	IE	48,34
Roman Catholic	1324	1601	62,69	66,46	3,77	IE	64,57
Muslim	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	IE	xx
Orthodox	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	IE	xx
Roman Catholic	86	xx	17,44	xx	xx	IL	17,44
<b>Muslim</b>	323	xx	30,34	xx	xx	IL	30,34
Orthodox	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	IL	xx
Protestant	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	IL	xx
Protestant	xx	232	xx	5,17	xx	IS	5,17
Muslim	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	IS	xx
Orthodox	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	IS	xx
Roman Catholic	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	IS	xx
Roman Catholic	697	xx	37,02	xx	xx	IT	37,02
Protestant	8	xx	50,00	xx	xx	IT	50,00
Muslim	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	IT	xx
Orthodox	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	IT	xx

Protestant	12	10	0,00	0,00	0,00	LU	0,00
<b>Muslim</b>	16	7	6,25	0,00	-6,25	LU	3,13
Roman Catholic	619	705	21,49	18,58	-2,90	LU	20,03
Orthodox	6	xx	33,33	xx	xx	LU	33,33
Roman Catholic	449	408	16,26	16,18	-0,08	NL	16,22
<b>Muslim</b>	36	21	25,00	19,05	-5,95	NL	22,02
Protestant	367	318	41,96	41,19	-0,77	NL	41,58
Orthodox	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	NL	xx
Protestant	904	755	6,08	6,62	0,54	NO	6,35
Orthodox	xx	7	xx	14,29	xx	NO	14,29
Roman Catholic	13	17	7,69	23,53	15,84	NO	15,61
<b>Muslim</b>	18	21	11,11	28,57	17,46	NO	19,84
Orthodox	12	8	25,00	0,00	-25,00	PL	12,50
Roman Catholic	1580	1246	59,87	62,12	2,25	PL	61,00
Muslim	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	PL	xx
Protestant	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	PL	xx
Roman Catholic	957	1115	32,92	32,11	-0,81	PT	32,51
Protestant	11	6	81,82	83,33	1,52	PT	82,58
Muslim	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	PT	xx
Orthodox	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	PT	xx
<b>Muslim</b>	25	12	8,00	0,00	-8,00	SE	4,00
Roman Catholic	18	19	0,00	15,79	15,79	SE	7,89
Protestant	473	511	12,47	8,02	-4,45	SE	10,25
Orthodox	9	7	0,00	28,57	28,57	SE	14,29
<b>Muslim</b>	12	8	8,33	12,50	4,17	SI	10,42
Orthodox	14	13	7,14	15,38	8,24	SI	11,26
Protestant	xx	9	xx	22,22	xx	SI	22,22
Roman Catholic	538	509	35,13	17,68	-17,45	SI	26,41
Protestant	xx	87	xx	22,99	xx	SK	22,99
Orthodox	xx	14	xx	35,71	xx	SK	35,71
Roman Catholic	xx	722	xx	46,26	xx	SK	46,26
Muslim	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	SK	xx
Orthodox	xx	757	xx	11,10	xx	UA	11,10
Roman Catholic	xx	143	xx	38,46	xx	UA	38,46
Protestant	xx	19	xx	89,47	xx	UA	89,47
Muslim	xx	xx	xx	xx	xx	UA	xx

Note: only subgroups with n > 5.0 were evaluated. Source: calculated by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

For all countries and sub-regions of the world system, there is a fairly regular tendency for more developed states to show a higher degree of “secularization” (lower regular religious service attendance rates). As we will further develop in Chapter 7, “secularism” does not have to be the only answer, though.

Confronted with the deep human desire for spirituality and eternal values, the process of never-ending secularization finds an impasse. Rejecting the culturalist and exclusivist project of a “**Christian fortress Europe**” that is at the basis of the recent utterly unacceptable remarks by Pope Benedict XVI on Islam and the

Prophet Mohammed<sup>10</sup>, it is time to spell out anew the counter-project of

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<sup>10</sup> The catastrophic sentence, together with the rest of this speech, is to be found at: [http://www.vatican.va/holy\\_father/benedict\\_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf\\_ben-xvi\\_spe\\_20060912\\_university-regensburg\\_ge.html](http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_ge.html) The Pope's reference to the by now rightly famous and unacceptable quotation is an incredible step backwards from the days of the Second Vatican Council, that specifically praised Islam in the following fashion:

*"The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all- powerful, the Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, submitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they revere Him as a prophet. They also honor Mary, His virgin Mother; at times they even call on her with devotion. In addition, they await the day of judgment when God will render their deserts to all those who have been raised up from the dead. Finally, they value the moral life and worship God especially through prayer, almsgiving and fasting. **Since in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities have arisen between Christians and Moslems, this sacred synod urges all to forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom.**" (see <http://www.dialog.org/dialog/nostra-eng.html>).*

The present author allows himself to remind the Muslim readership of this article of a few things in this context:

- 1) the old conflicts of Cardinal Ratzinger with liberation theology and the theologies of the South, which imply the lamentable apparent and present inability of the Pope to engage into a true dialogue with the world's South. Among the sharpest criticism voiced against the new Pope came from liberation theologian Leonardo Boff from Brazil (see: <http://www.causapopular.com.ar/article375.html>)
- 2) his long-standing, lamentable opposition to Turkish entry into the European Union, which must have been known to the other Cardinals who elected him (see also: [http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/20060915.FIG000000254\\_les\\_musulmans\\_chouques\\_par\\_les\\_propos\\_du\\_pape.html](http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/20060915.FIG000000254_les_musulmans_chouques_par_les_propos_du_pape.html) )
- 3) the recent apparent sidelining of liberal advisers on Islam in the Vatican in favour of hardliners, which was documented, among others, in <http://www.chiesa.espressonline.it/dettaglio.jsp?id=45084&eng=y>
- 4) the not too distant publication, when Pope Benedict XVI was Cardinal in the Vatican, in a "revisionist" hard-core German nationalist Austrian publication, "*Aula*", which with justification is criticized again and again as an important vehicle of the Neo-Nazi scenery in Europe (see the Documentation archive of the Austrian Resistance Movement at: [http://www.doew.at/projekte/rechts/chronik/1998\\_11/1848aula.html](http://www.doew.at/projekte/rechts/chronik/1998_11/1848aula.html) ; evidence is also available from *Aula's* own website at: <http://www.dieaula.at/buchdienst.htm> The editor of that book is Dr. Otto Scrinzi, a very well-known figure in the Austrian extremist right wing scenery: (see also [http://lexikon.idgr.de/s/s\\_c/scrinzi-otto/scrinzi-otto.php](http://lexikon.idgr.de/s/s_c/scrinzi-otto/scrinzi-otto.php) ).

A most valuable source of information is Armstrong (2006). Readers of this publication are being asked to be patient with this long quotation, but it the central point of today's situation, end-September 2006. Among the central points, Professor Armstrong makes, are:



"We were posing as a tolerant society, yet passing judgment from a position of extremes and irrationality". (...) "September 11th has confirmed a view of Islam that is centuries old, which is that Islam is inherently violent and intolerant of others" (...) "The events have been a great shock to the Americans, and they are now in a state of numbness and depression," Armstrong explained. " (...) "On the East Coast where I spent most of my time, people descended en masse on the bookstores and took off the shelves everything they could find about Islam. While some did this to confirm old prejudices and fears -- depending on who you choose to read -- the majority was keen on learning about Islam." (...) The key question would be, "why do they hate us?" Armstrong said, followed by others, such as: "What do Muslims think of Christians and Jews? Is Islam an inherently violent religion? Why do we always hear bad rhetoric about Christians? What about women in Islam? Is Islam against modernity?" (...) In responding to such questions, Armstrong walks a fine line between deconstructing long-held stereotypes while at the same time not becoming apologetic. She noted that there are differences in the way her views are received in the US and in Europe. "One of the good things about the Americans is that they do like to know," she says. "There is earnestness about them that one does not observe in a European society such as Holland, for example. They are open to criticism in a way that does not exist in Europe, where people assume they know it all." (...)

"Anti-Islamic doctrine is in-built in the Western ethos that was formulated during the Crusades," she says. "This was the period when the Western world was re-defining itself. The 11th century marked the end of the Dark Ages in Europe and the beginnings of the new Europe. The Crusades were the first co-operative act on the part of the whole new Europe, and the whole crusading ethos shaped the psyche of the key actors performing at this crucial time." (...) "Islam was the quintessential foreigner, and people resented Islam in Europe much as people in the Third World resent the US today. One could say that Islam then was the greatest world power, and it remained so up until the early years of the Ottoman empire. Muslims were everywhere in the Middle East, Turkey, Iran, South-East Asia, China. Wherever people went, there was Islam, and it was powerful, and people felt it as a threat." (...) "The period of the Crusades was a crucial historical moment during which the West was defining itself, and Islam became a yardstick against which it measured itself. " Islam was everything that the West thought it was not, and it was at the time of the Crusades that the idea that Islam was essentially a violent religion took hold in the West. "Europe was projecting anxiety about its own behaviour onto Islam, and it did the same thing too with the Jewish people," Armstrong said. Even in non-religious societies such as England, Armstrong believes that prejudice against Islam remains, saying that "I think it is in-built into people that Islam is a violent religion." These hostile feelings were given a new lease of life during the colonial period, Armstrong believes, since many of the colonised countries were Muslim countries, and the colonial powers saw in them what they regarded as 'backwardness', attributing this to Islam.

Although she feels that university campuses are almost the only places in the US where big questions are asked, Armstrong says that the events of 11 September divided US academics into two camps. The first camp, led by Martin Kramer, head of the Near and Middle East Studies Institute in Washington DC, accused Armstrong, together with academics such as John Esposito, head of Islamic-Christian Dialogue at Georgetown University, of 'duping' people into believing that Islam was not a threat, an argument Kramer claimed had been proved wrong by the attacks. Only a few weeks after 11 September, Kramer wrote an article, *Ivory Towers Built on Sand*, in which he put the blame squarely on academics for failing to predict the atrocities. Armstrong explains how the media in the US attempted to silence opposing voices after 11 September. For example, she had been commissioned by the *New Yorker* magazine to write an article on Islam, but the article was killed and the magazine published one by the academic Bernard Lewis instead. "They thought I am an apologist for Muslims, because my article was about the prophet as a peacemaker, and this did not suit their agenda as much as Lewis's did. Both Lewis and Kramer are staunch Zionists who write from a position of

**“liberation theology”** in a global and in a pan-European and ecumenical fashion. The alternative would be a **European ecumenical theology of global peace and justice** that challenges the present ongoing hegemonistic project of the United States of America and that links the forces opposing the ongoing wars, especially the one in Iraq, in favor of a global order that is based on

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*extreme bias. But people need to know that Islam is a universal religion, and that there is nothing aggressively oriental or anti-Western about it. Lewis's line, on the other hand, is that Islam is an inherently violent religion," she said.*

*"We have to take the extreme right-wing groups very seriously," she says. "This is the European form of fundamentalism; because we don't express discontent in a religious form it comes out in a right-wing way. It's the desire to belong to a clearly defined group combined with a pernicious fear of the other -- a sense of pent-up rage and disappointment with multi-cultural society giving way to this kind of emotion, which feeds into fundamentalism."*


*Armstrong's Muhammad: a Biography of the Prophet has sold millions of copies since it appeared in 1996, and she has become used to accusations of being "an apologist for Islam", while not taking much notice of such rhetoric. "It is very nice that people think that the book was written by a Muslim," she says, "but what a religious scholar tries to do is to enter into a religion by a leap of the imagination, in order to understand not just the beliefs, or the history and doctrine, but also the underlying feel of the religion, and I try to do this with all religions and not just with Islam. I did the same when I wrote the history of Judaism, and I am doing the same now that I am writing a biography of the Buddha."*

*Armstrong is currently also working on a history of the period from 800 BC to 200 AD when many great world faiths came into being. "Europe," she says, "is about the only place where religion does not matter much. People in Europe might need to rinse their minds of all their bad and lazy theology. People in Europe have not yet asked the big questions about religion; they have tried get rid of primitive forms of religion, but very often what we see in the churches today is exactly the kind of religion that these people are trying to get rid of... Jesus would be horrified by the practices of the church today. I would love to show him around the Vatican, when Christians cannot even share a church together. He would be appalled, much as Mohamed would be appalled if he knew that September 11th was done in the name of Islam." (...)*


*How does she think that the Western world and Islam can come together? Is there any common ground between them? Armstrong believes that both sides should try and deal with the extremism in their midst. (...) "Similarly, the West has got to learn that it shares the planet with equals and not with inferiors. This means giving equal space in a conflict such as that between Israel and Palestine. It doesn't mean just using governments to get oil: you promote Saddam Hussein one day, and the next day he becomes public enemy number one. The West promoted people like the Shah of Iran simply because of its greed for oil, even though he had committed atrocities against his own people. There should be no more double standards, because double standards are colonialism in a new form. Western people have also got to disassociate themselves from inherited prejudices about Islam." (...) "Muslims can run a modern state in an Islamic way, and this is what the West has got to see... There are all kinds of ways in which people can be modern, and Muslims should be allowed to come to modernity on their own terms and make a distinctive Islamic contribution to it." (Source: <http://www.islamfortoday.com/karenarmstrong02.htm>)*

international law, the United Nations, and respect for the different cultures of spirituality around the globe (see the different essays, starting from the cultural traditions of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Marxism in Tausch, *et al.* 2000). One cannot underestimate the **possible catalyst role of Euro-Islam in that context**: challenging neo-liberal and hegemonistic globalization in favor of a European Union characterized by cultural tolerance, social justice, and an openness towards **increased cooperation with and migration from the Mediterranean partner countries of the European Union. A positive attitude towards a successful accession process of the Turkish Republic to the European Union is a *sine qua non* in such a political counter-project.**

In appendix 1 to 5, and in appendix 13, we further analyze the religious or secular landscape of the European countries and Israel, which, as we stressed, forms part and parcel of the ESS survey effort. Further reference to these data will be made in Chapter 7, which deals with the conclusions to be drawn for policy makers.







## 6: EUROPEAN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND THE LISBON PROCESS – COMPARATIVE RESULTS FROM THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY

The first, and sad fact that we have to state in this context is that discriminatory policies in the last years seem to have increased poverty among the Muslim communities in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, while Norway, Slovenia, Spain and the UK reduced Muslim poverty from 2002 to 2004.

**Table 4a: poverty among Muslims in the ESS countries, 2002 and 2004**

	very difficult on present income + difficult on present income, 2002	very difficult on present income + difficult on present income, 2004
Austria Muslims	36,7	46,5
Belgium Muslims	26,4	46,5
Denmark Muslims	19	25,1
France Muslims	79,6	
Germany Muslims	28,1	47,7
Greece Muslims	80,2	82,8
Israel Muslims	47,4	
Luxembourg Muslims	38,4	47,8
Netherlands Muslims	30,8	53,6
Norway Muslims	35	27,3
Slovenia Muslims	21,1	10
Spain Muslims	66,6	64
Sweden Muslims	26,1	28,6
Switzerland Muslims	7,7	56,6
UK Muslims	27,8	27,1

Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

Likewise, poverty among the non-Muslim population seems to have increased in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and in the UK, while in Austria, Denmark, Greece, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden, poverty seems to have decreased in the time period between 2002 and 2004.

**Table 4b: poverty among non-Muslims in the ESS countries, 2002 and 2004**

	very difficult on present income + difficult on present income, 2002	very difficult on present income + difficult on present income, 2004
Austria non-Muslims	18,3	12
Belgium non-Muslims	15,4	21,9
Denmark non-Muslims	5,1	3,9
France non-Muslims	44	no data
Germany non-Muslims	10,7	14,8
Greece non-Muslims	51,9	50,4
Israel non-Muslims	39,5	no data
Luxembourg non-Muslims	9,7	11,3
Netherlands non-Muslims	9,6	12,9
Norway non-Muslims	7,7	9,2
Slovenia non-Muslims	17,4	14,1
Spain non-Muslims	21,8	18
Sweden non-Muslims	8,7	8,6
Switzerland non-Muslims	8,2	12,1
UK non-Muslims	12,2	17

Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

To calibrate our ESS measures of poverty, we compared the maximally time-matched ESS poverty rates with the UNDP Human development index, with life expectancy at birth (UNDP), with Eurostat poverty rates, and with the UNDP/OECD measure no survival to age 60, and the percentage of the population below the 50 % of median income threshold. While ESS-non-Muslim poverty rates correlate closely with the UNDP Human Development Index, Muslim poverty rates indeed correlate highly with the overall Eurostat poverty rate. 27 % of the variance of Eurostat poverty rates in Europe is already being explained by Muslim poverty rates.

**Table 4c: other poverty indicators**

	UNDP HDI	UNDP Life expectancy	Eurostat poverty rate	OECD poverty rate < 50 % median income	no survival to age 60

Austria	0,936	79	13	8	9,1
Belgium	0,945	78,9	15	8	9,4
Denmark	0,941	77,2	11	9,2	10,4
France	0,938	79,5	12	8	9,8
Germany	0,93	78,7	16	8,3	8,8
Greece	0,912	78,3	20		9,2
Israel	0,915	79,7		13,5	7,7
Luxembourg	0,949	78,5	11	6	9,7
Netherlands	0,943	78,4	12	7,3	8,7
Norway	0,963	79,4	11	6,4	8,4
Slovenia	0,904	76,4	10	8,2	11,8
Spain	0,928	79,5	20	10,1	8,7
Sweden	0,949	80,2	11	6,5	7,2
Switzerland	0,947	80,5		9,3	7,8
UK	0,939	78,4	18	12,5	8,7

Sources: see Table 1c. We took great care to time-match properly, as far as we could, the data with Muslim and overall non-Muslim poverty rates in the ESS survey. French and Israeli data refer to 2002, the rest to 2004.

**Table 4d: calibration of the ESS poverty measures**

	correlation with non-Muslim poverty	correlation with Muslim poverty
UNDP HDI	- <b>0,52548059</b> <b>5</b>	-0,121134764
UNDP Life expectancy	0,134261793	0,413331423
Eurostat poverty rate	0,486550285	<b>0,51941088</b> <b>8</b>
OECD poverty rate < 50 % median income	0,440115634	0,026565342
no survival to age 60	-0,017283814	-0,212872958

Sources: our own comparisons from Tables 1c and 4a – c above.

Using the ESS cross-national and quantitative data, we first estimate a new UNDP-type index of **“Muslim development”** in Europe, based on the ESS indicators

- the percentage of the Muslim community living above poverty
- the percentage of the Muslim community expressing some or great trust (levels 4 to 10 on the ESS scale) in democracy
- the percentage of the Muslim community expressing some or great trust (levels 4 to 10 on the ESS scale) in legal system
- the percentage of the Muslim community expressing some or great trust (levels 4 to 10 on the ESS scale) in parliament

- the percentage of the Muslim community expressing some or great trust (levels 4 to 10 on the ESS scale) in the police

Likewise, we construct another UNDP type index, which we call “**Muslim empowerment index**”, which measures

- a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country living above poverty
- a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country expressing trust in democracy
- a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country expressing trust in the legal system
- a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country expressing trust in parliament
- a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country expressing trust in the police

From here on, the results of this study can be relatively quickly presented. Our overall indicator of Muslim development in Europe is presented in Table 5a. The best practice countries: printed in **bold letters**. It emerges that the **two multinational states** in Europe *par excellence*, are Switzerland and Belgium, show the best results for the Muslim development indicator, while multinational Belgium and Sweden have the best results for the Muslim empowerment indicator. Austria, France, Germany, the OECD ESS comparison country Israel, and Slovenia are ranked very low on our two main indicators. Thus, in the EU-25 countries Austria, France, Germany, and Slovenia there is a compelling need to improve performance in terms of creating opportunities for increased Muslim participation in the following areas

- democracy
- economy
- legal system
- parliament
- police

**Table 5a: the Muslim development index, Europe**

	UNDP-type <b>Muslim development index</b> Europe (1/5 * each component index)
<b>Switzerland</b>	0,8547
<b>Belgium</b>	0,7003
Denmark	0,6861
Sweden	0,6801
Norway	0,6579
UK	0,6437
Netherlands	0,5874
Greece	0,5714

Luxembourg	0,5621
Germany	0,5410
Austria	0,4943
Israel	0,4038
France	0,3879
Slovenia	0,2182
Spain	0,1441

Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>


**Table 5b: the Muslim empowerment index, Europe**

	UNDP-type <b>Muslim empowerment index</b> Europe (1/5 * each component index)
<b>Belgium</b>	0,8478
<b>Sweden</b>	0,8037
Luxembourg	0,7875
UK	0,7457
Spain	0,6129
Greece	0,5331
Denmark	0,5317
Switzerland	0,5244
Norway	0,4930
Germany	0,4912
Netherlands	0,4819
France	0,4718
Austria	0,4559
Israel	0,4143
Slovenia	0,0567

Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

Probably the most important single result from this study is the realization that there is a close connection between the Lisbon process and Muslim development in Europe. Using a single Lisbon process indicator that was developed elsewhere in the literature (Tausch, 2006, wiiw) we found that Lisbon process implementation explained more than half of the variance of "Muslim development" in Europe. With other words: the best way, European decision makers can meet the hopes and expectancies of the Muslim communities in Europe, is to implement the Lisbon process properly. Also, there is a very close statistical relationship between the UNDP Human Development Index and the new Muslim Development Index Europe. The relationship explains some 2/5 of the variance of "Muslim development".


**Graph 3a: The Lisbon process and the Muslim development index**



Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>




**Graph 3b: Human development and Muslim development in Europe**



Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

Graph 3c again shows the relevance of the hypotheses and theories put forward by Professor Mancur Olson. Market economies are in a stark contradiction with cast societies; every system that rewards people by a cast principle is at the end of the day doomed to failure. It is no surprise, then, to see that European systems that are characterized by a high and unacceptable degree of gender discrimination are also the ones that strongly discriminate against their Muslim communities, and vice versa.

**Graph 3c: Overall societal discrimination and the discrimination of Muslims: the interrelationship between the gender empowerment index and the Muslim empowerment index**



Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

Dynamic aspects in the Muslim integration/discrimination process should not be overlooked. While Spain and Luxembourg at least tried to improve their performance over time, again Austria's performance in the changes of the Muslim development index from 2002 to 2004 was very modest, compared to the already leading position that Belgium and Switzerland had in 2002. Only the Netherlands had a worse performance, then, as Austria, on this indicator; while in Table 6b Austria and the Netherlands also emerge as the relative laggards in implementing Muslim empowerment.

Again, a rather interesting relationship emerges between these newly derived indicators of Muslim performance and the overall political economic processes going on in Europe. Since solid dynamic indicators of the Lisbon process would be very hard to construct in countries outside the EU-25, it might suffice here that we mention the close relationship between the rate of economic growth 1990 – 2003 and the dynamic changes in the Muslim development index from 2002 to 2004. I.e. long-run economic dynamics indeed could change the lot of the Muslim communities of Europe, while Muslims were hardest hit by stagnation and the concomitant unemployment.

**Table 6a: the dynamics of the social situation of Muslims in Europe – best or worst increases in the Muslim development index**

	<b>UNDP DYN Muslim development index</b> (*0,20 times each component index)
<b>Spain</b>	0,9231
<b>Luxembourg</b>	0,7530
UK	0,5944
Greece	0,5798
Germany	0,5534
Norway	0,5524
Denmark	0,4890
Slovenia	0,4704
Sweden	0,4692
Austria	0,4456
Belgium	0,3475
Netherlands	0,3466
Switzerland	0,2723


Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

**Table 6b: the dynamics of the social situation of Muslims in Europe – best or worst increases in the Muslim empowerment index**

	<b>DYN Muslim empowerment index</b>
<b>Spain</b>	<b>0,8892</b>
<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>0,8271</b>
UK	0,6851
Germany	0,6458
Norway	0,5979
Greece	0,5961
Sweden	0,5848
Denmark	0,5251
Slovenia	0,5175
Austria	0,4332
Netherlands	0,4032
Belgium	0,3740
Switzerland	0,3030

Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

**Graph 4: economic growth and increases in the Muslim development index**



Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

Finally, we present in a systematic way the political landscape of the Muslim communities in Europe and the ESS reference countries. Systematic conclusions about the relatively straightforward relationship between the political landscape of Muslims in Europe and the socio-economic Lisbon process are presented in Chapter 7.

By and large, the political attitudes of Muslim communities in Europe, in part to be explained by the class-context of a large scale Muslim working class migration to Europe from the beginnings of the 1960s, tend to be left-wing oriented. The large Muslim communities in Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, France, Spain (and also in Israel) tend to share a sizeable segment of far-left political orientations, while the far right only plays a mayor role in Greece, Denmark and Luxembourg. The Muslim political center is weakest in Israel, Spain, Luxembourg, Belgium and France, where center, center left and center right political orientations among the Muslim communities make up 60 % or less of the total Muslim adult voting age population, studied in the ESS sample. Extreme Muslim left political orientations even increased in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the UK, while the far political right increased its presence among the Muslim communities of Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Luxembourg. In Denmark, Luxembourg, Greece, Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands, Muslim political orientations around the center decreased over time,

while in Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and Austria the weight of the center increased.


Table 7 and Graphs 5a to 5e present the results in more detail:

**Table 7: Political profiles in Europe. General left-right attitudes among the European Muslims and the overall European population, by international comparison**

<b>Muslim population</b>	left	moderate left	center	moderate right	right
AT	14,3	23,8	57,1	4,8	0
BE	34,7	18,4	30,6	8,2	8,2
CH	20,8	20,8	45,8	8,3	4,2
DE	14,3	26,2	47,6	9,5	2,4
DK	7,1	35,7	28,6	7,1	21,4
ES	50	10	30	10	0
FR	34,8	26,1	19,6	13	6,5
GB	10	10	65	12,5	2,5
GR	0	9,5	52,4	23,8	14,3
IL	66,3	13,6	13,9	2,8	3,4
LU	0	14,3	42,9	0	42,9
NL	19	33,3	28,6	14,3	4,8
NO	4,8	28,6	33,3	23,8	9,5
SE	8,3	41,7	33,3	8,3	8,3
SI	12,5	12,5	75	0	0
<b>Total Population</b>	left	moderate left	center	moderate right	right
AT	14,5	22,4	41,1	15,4	6,6
BE	11,4	21,7	36,6	22,1	8,1
CH	9	22,7	35,9	22,3	10,1
CZ	13	17	27,1	20	22,9
DE	12,8	28,5	38,9	14,9	4,9
DK	7,1	19,4	27,8	29,7	16
EE	8,6	19,5	39,4	21,2	11,4
ES	18,7	28,3	29,8	14,1	9,1
FI	4,9	16,9	30,7	25,7	21,8
FR	16,8	22,9	30,4	17,4	12,4
GB	7,2	19,5	48,3	17,6	7,4
GR	7,8	14,1	36	19,1	23
HU	12,9	18,8	35,8	18,2	14,2
IE	4,2	17,6	47,1	20,4	10,7
IL	21,5	14,4	20,5	13,8	29,8
IS	9,8	24,2	29,1	24	12,9
IT	15,8	25,3	25,8	20,6	12,4
LU	8,9	17,3	43,5	17	13,4
NL	9,7	23	27,2	28,1	12
NO	8,9	30,3	24	23,5	13,2
PL	9,7	14,5	37,5	19,8	18,5
PT	11,8	28,7	26,2	18,9	14,5
SE	11,6	21,2	27,5	23	16,7
SI	13,3	15,5	42,7	13,6	14,8
SK	15,5	20,9	33,7	15,1	14,7
UA	12,2	11,8	37,5	14,8	23,8


Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

**Graph 5a: left wing extremism among European Muslims**




Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

**Graph 5b: the political center among the Muslim communities in Europe**



Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>


**Graph 5c: far right-wing extremism among the Muslim communities in Europe**



Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>




**Graph 5d: dynamic increases/decreases in % from 2004 to 2004 – left wing extremism among the European Muslim communities**




Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

**Graph 5e: dynamic increases/decreases in % from 2004 to 2004 –right wing extremism among the European Muslim communities**




Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

**Graph 5e: dynamic increases/decreases in % from 2004 to 2004 –center orientation among the European Muslim communities**



Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>



## 7: POLITICAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ESS RESULTS FOR THE EUROPEAN DECISION MAKERS

This essay made it clear that the key to stability in the *banlieus* is the proper implementation of the Lisbon agenda. There simply **must** be new mechanisms in place that assure the leveling off of the up to now existing very high poverty risks for Europe's "third country" citizens. At the end of the day, mass demand, mass contributions to the social security system, increased profits due to investments in human capital, labor productivity and rising investment levels due to increased mass demand could all be the positive spin-offs of a better integration of the millions of Muslims in Europe. Table 8 once more summarizes the basic tendencies of "integration policies" in Europe:

**Table 8: Muslim poverty and the poverty risk of foreigners from Third countries in Europe**


Ranked by alphabet	Muslims: Income deficit group (columns 3 + 4)	non-Muslims: Income deficit group (columns 3 + 4)	relative poverty risk, Muslims (non-Muslims = 100)	relative poverty risk, non-EU citizens, 1990s (nationwide = 100)
Austria	46,5	12,0	387,5	272,0
Belgium	46,5	21,9	212,3	219,0
Denmark	25,1	3,9	643,6	124,0
France	79,6	44,0	180,9	348,0
Germany	47,7	14,8	322,3	199,0
Greece	82,8	50,4	164,3	124,0
Israel	47,4	39,5	120,0	
Luxembourg	47,8	11,3	423,0	199,0
Netherlands	53,6	12,9	415,5	354,0
Norway	27,3	9,2	296,7	
Slovenia	10,0	14,1	70,9	
Spain	64,0	18,0	355,6	244,0
Sweden	28,6	8,6	332,6	
Switzerland	21,9	12,1	181,0	
UK	27,1	17,0	159,4	116,0
Ranked by „social Apartheid“	Muslims: Income deficit group (columns 3 + 4)	non-Muslims: Income deficit group (columns 3 + 4)	relative poverty risk, Muslims (non-Muslims = 100)	relative poverty risk, non-EU citizens, 1990s (nationwide = 100)
Denmark	25,1	3,9	643,6	124,0
Luxembourg	47,8	11,3	423,0	199,0
Netherlands	53,6	12,9	415,5	354,0
Austria	46,5	12,0	387,5	272,0
Spain	64,0	18,0	355,6	244,0
Sweden	28,6	8,6	332,6	
Germany	47,7	14,8	322,3	199,0

Norway	27,3	9,2	296,7	
Belgium	46,5	21,9	212,3	219,0
Switzerland	21,9	12,1	181,0	
France	79,6	44,0	180,9	348,0
Greece	82,8	50,4	164,3	124,0
UK	27,1	17,0	159,4	116,0
Israel	47,4	39,5	120,0	
Slovenia	10,0	14,1	70,9	

Source: calculated by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

In the following, we try to present some preliminary bi-variety and multivariate analyses to further underline our point. Graph 6 calibrates the use of the UNDP Human Development Index for our further comparisons. This is due to the fact that the OECD country Israel as well as the EFTA/EEA countries Norway and Switzerland, which are part of the ESS sample, of course are not or are not sufficiently covered by the Eurostat data, so that we somehow had to estimate the Israeli, Norwegian and Swiss "Lisbon performance" indirectly. A non-linear formulation, based on the UNDP HDI, would explain some 2/3 of the variance of our Lisbon index, so that the use of the UNDP Human Development Index as a Lisbon process proxy is justified – at least for the moment being.


**Graph 6: The UNDP HDI, a combined Lisbon development index, social cohesion and center politics in Europe**



Based on A. Tausch (2006) 'On heroes, villains and statisticians'. The Vienna Institute Monthly Report, No. 7, July 2006: 20 - 23. Vienna: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) and UNDP HDR 2005

Graph 7 shows the extent of the Muslim middle and upper class in Europe, as far as it can be inferred from the statistical materials, contained in the ESS. Sweden, Norway, the UK, Denmark, Switzerland and Slovenia all have a sizeable Muslim middle or middle and upper class, while in Greece, France and Spain the middle class is just 1/3 or less of the entire Muslim population in the country.


**Graph 7: “Muslim Calvinism”, Muslim middle class**



Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

With and without the outlying case of Israel, whose political dynamics and its Muslim minority within the borders of the year 1948 are a real special case, the relationship between the UNDP HDI as a proxy for the Lisbon process and the formation of a Muslim middle class is quite strong:


**Graph 8a: The implementation of the Lisbon process as a requirement for a strong Muslim political middle class – results from the ESS by international comparison**



Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>



**Graph 8b: the implementation of the Lisbon process as a requirement for a strong Muslim political middle class – results from the ESS by international comparison without the special case of Israel**



Based on Based on A. Tausch (2006) 'On heroes, villains and statisticians'. *The Vienna Institute Monthly Report*, No. 7, July 2006: 20 - 23. Vienna: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) and UNDP HDR 2005, and on our own calculations from ESS, quoted in this work

Our hypothesis about a politically stabilizing role that the Muslim middle class could play in Europe, which in turn will be supported by a Lisbon process oriented policy, is further supported by our multivariate analysis reproduced in Table 9. Here, we explain Muslim European political orientation (as documented in Table 7 of this publication) as being determined by the development of a Muslim middle class, by the Muslim development index and the Muslim empowerment index, as well as by the UNDP human development index for the entire country and the prevailing countrywide, general center political orientation. It emerges that the only significant ( $p < .10$ ) determinant of Muslim political orientation in Europe is the size of the Muslim middle and upper class, affecting significantly the center political orientation of Muslims and reducing left wing extremism (there are no significant predictors for right wing Muslim political extremism):

**Table 9: the multivariate determinants of political center orientation and political extremism among the Muslim communities in Europe**

	Muslim upper class and middle class	Muslim development index	Muslim empowerment index	UNDP HDI	general pol. orientation center+center left+center right	constant
<b>Muslim left extremism</b>	-1,26474	181,7859	17,78695	-38,3039	-0,00711	-44,2671
	0,648493	451,6824	32,8271	34,47714	0,258018	393,8853
	<b>0,464556</b>	17,30822				
	1,561695	9				
	2339,219	2696,17				
t-test	-1,95027	0,402464	0,541837	-1,11099	-0,02757	-0,11239
	Muslim upper class and middle class	Muslim development index	Muslim empowerment index	UNDP HDI	general pol. orientation center+center left+center right	constant
<b>Muslim right wing extremism</b>	-0,16993	105,9194	16,6715	6,636208	-0,02999	-88,9321
	0,46744	325,577	23,66208	24,85145	0,185982	283,9163
	<b>0,19336</b>	12,47593				
	0,43148	9				
	335,7968	1400,839				
t-test	-0,36353	0,325328	0,704566	0,267035	-0,16123	-0,31323
	Muslim upper class and middle class	Muslim development index	Muslim empowerment index	UNDP HDI	general pol. orientation center+center left+center right	constant
<b>Muslim center politics</b>	1,436186	-287,885	-34,3575	31,53203	0,036453	233,3008
	0,505964	352,4088	25,61215	26,89954	0,201309	307,3147
	<b>0,60559</b>	13,50411				
	2,763778	9				
	2520,027	1641,249				
t-test	2,838517	-0,81691	-1,34145	1,172215	0,181081	0,759159

Legend: Our entire EXCEL 7.0 calculations are from UNDP and other data sources, quoted above. As in all EXCEL 7.0 outputs, first row: un-standardized regression coefficients, second row: standard errors, second last row: t-Test and direction of the influence. The values immediately below the standard errors are  $R^2$  (third row, left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom (fourth row). Below that:  $ss_{reg}$ ;  $ss_{resid}$ , i.e. the sum of squares of the regression and the sum of squares of the residuals. The right-hand entry in the third row is the standard error of the estimate y.

In the light of this analysis, we might ask ourselves who might be the political forces then that might act in solidarity with the large and growing numbers of the Muslim poor in Europe to transform the present tendencies towards marginalization? It is noteworthy that not even the Muslim development index, let alone the Muslim empowerment index, nor the UNDP HDI sufficiently strongly determines Muslim center political orientation in Europe. Why that? The explanation seems to be relatively easy – it is not the extent of poverty as such that causes extremism, but the inability of social systems to provide adequate opportunities for motivated and especially young people to become members of the elite.

That already was a point made by Professor Daniel Pipes, who certainly cannot be accused of siding with Islamist radicals, wrote back in 2002:

*"Moreover, there is a specifically Islamic phenomenon of the faith having been associated with worldly success. Through history, from the Prophet Muhammad's time to the Ottoman Empire a millennium later, Muslims usually had more wealth and more power than other peoples, and were more literate and healthy. With time, Islamic faith came to be associated with worldly well-being-a kind of **Muslim Calvinism**, in effect." (Pipes, 2002)*

Various quotations from the literature, above all the striking similarity with the results achieved by the recent ESI report on "Islamic Calvinism" come to one's mind (European Stability Initiative, 2006):

*"[Foreign Minister] Abdullah Gül: "The name of this concept [i.e. of rapid economic growth in the Turkish province of Kayseri] is **Calvinism** in Christianity. In different religions it has different names. They compare the sociological situation in Kayseri to this. They explain it in this way. It is very true." (Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, quoted in European Stability Initiative, available at <http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=114> )*

*"BBC: the new entrepreneurialism sweeping across the province is providing an unlikely catalyst for a remarkable religious transformation. A new form of Turkish Islam is emerging here, one which is pro-business and pro-free market, and it's being called Islamic Calvinism. ...Critics say it's a Western conspiracy to Christianise Islam, but others have passionately argued in its favour, holding it up as a model for how Islam and modernity can co-exist. One of its most prominent defenders has been Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister, Abdullah Gül, himself a native of Kayseri and the son of an entrepreneur. He sees no contradiction in the term and argues that Turkey can provide a lasting template for a new kind of modern Islam. "The most important thing to ask," he says, is what kind of modernism do we want? Are you living in this world, or are you dreaming? The people of Kayseri are no[t] dreaming - they are realistic, and that's the kind of Islam we need." quoted in European Stability Initiative, available at [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=154&news\\_ID=72](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=154&news_ID=72) )*

Our basically neo-liberal policy conclusion would not contradict the view that in the short- and medium term, a coalition of trade unionists, environmentalists, alter-globalists, minorities, human rights activists and religious "progressives" will be most likely to act in solidarity with Europe's Muslim communities. The old

traditions of the ecumenical religious left in Europe before the second World War, which were basically linked to the social democracies, the “Euro-communist” left in the Mediterranean countries of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s that always also contained an important religious element, and the liberation theology movement from the “Third World” in the 1980s (Tausch et al., 2000) all have to grapple with the fact that religious practice in the advanced countries of the West dwindles, traditional sectors of the urban, industrial workforce in many European countries have politically shifted to the right, and – above all – traditional “social policies” of the Left most probably will not solve the issues of enterprise creation, middle class development and employment creation for the 15 million or more Muslims in Europe.

In view of the ongoing world political confrontations, especially in Iraq, the support of the anti-war left, especially also the religious left, for the Muslim communities in Europe continues to be important. Religiously motivated larger left-wing oriented constituencies of more than 3 % of the electorate are to be encountered in some European countries; many Muslims in Europe will feel much more at home in political alliances with them rather than with the often staunchly atheist secular left.

**Table 10 – the strength of the religious left in Europe in % of the total population**

**The Catholic Left**

	religious practice	Left ... from that denominational group in % of the total population 2004 (for some countries, 2000)	DYN Left from that denominational group 2002 - 2004
SK Slovakia	Roman Catholic: observant	4,22	xx
PL Poland	Roman Catholic: observant	4,16	-1,22
IT Italy	Roman Catholic: observant	3,2	xx
PT Portugal	Roman Catholic: observant	2,56	0,49
IE Ireland	Roman Catholic: observant	1,28	-0,49
ES Spain	Roman Catholic: observant	1,14	-0,07
CZ Czech Republic	Roman Catholic: observant	0,93	0,36
HU Hungary	Roman Catholic: observant	0,85	xx
AT Austria	Roman Catholic: observant	0,72	0,15
CH	Roman Catholic:	0,41	0,09

Switzerland	observant		
IL Israel	Roman Catholic: observant	0,39	xx
GB United Kingdom	Roman Catholic: observant	0,35	0,14
BE Belgium	Roman Catholic: observant	0,31	-0,24
LU Luxembourg	Roman Catholic: observant	0,3	-0,45
FR France	Roman Catholic: observant	0,21	xx
SI Slovenia	Roman Catholic: observant	0,19	-0,31
DE Germany	Roman Catholic: observant	0,12	-0,14
NL Netherlands	Roman Catholic: observant	0,06	-0,03

**The Protestant Left**

	religious practice	Left ... from that denominational group in % of the total population 2002	DYN Left from that denominational group 2002 - 2004
CH Switzerland	Protestant: observant	0,46	0,46
SK Slovakia	Protestant: observant	0,24	xx
EE Estonia	Protestant: observant	0,2	xx
GB United Kingdom	Protestant: observant	0,18	0,07
NL Netherlands	Protestant: observant	0,17	-0,01
ES Spain	Protestant: observant	0,14	0,14
DE Germany	Protestant: observant	0,12	0,01
IT Italy	Protestant: observant	0,11	xx
NO Norway	Protestant: observant	0,11	0,06
SE Sweden	Protestant: observant	0,11	-0,06
SI Slovenia	Protestant: observant	0,1	0,1
UA Ukraine	Protestant: observant	0,08	xx
DK Denmark	Protestant: observant	0,07	0,07
BE Belgium	Protestant: observant	0,06	0,06
FI Finland	Protestant: observant	0,05	xx
GR Greece	Protestant: observant	0,05	0,05
CZ Czech Republic	Protestant: observant	0,04	-0,12

**The Muslim Left**<sup>11</sup>

	strength of the total Muslim left per cent of total population
IL Israel	9,31
FR France	1,13
BE Belgium	1,05
ES Spain	0,35
CH Switzerland	0,25
DE Germany	0,24
GB United Kingdom	0,23

<sup>11</sup> Religiously observing persons, selectively observing persons, and secular Muslims combined

NL Netherlands	0,23
AT Austria	0,15
SI Slovenia	0,1
UA Ukraine	0,08
DK Denmark	0,07
NO Norway	0,06
SE Sweden	0,05

In terms of the policy conclusions for the European policy makers, our advice is relatively simple – do everything that Muslim elites can develop in Europe. Table 10 further summarizes our results in the shape of a target scoreboard for European decision makers. Human development, i.e. fulfilling the Lisbon process, well explains (1/3) of centrist political orientation in Europe. Just these two variables, the Lisbon process, and creating or strengthening the political center will be, according to our analysis, the really decisive ones also in determining the success or failure of *“Muslim integration”* = implementing the Lisbon process in Europe. If Samuel Huntington and the development of global terrorism especially since 9/11 posed the question, certainly the development of *“Muslim Calvinism”* is the answer for Europe. The rest – i.e. Islamophobia – is based on myths and fantasies.



**Table 11: implementing Lisbon, furthering human development, creating a middle class – an international scoreboard**

	UNDP HDI as a proxy for the Lisbon process	Overall, country-wide center+center left+center right political orientation
Austria	0,936	78,9
Belgium	0,945	80,4
Czech	0,874	64
Denmark	0,941	76,9
Estonia	0,853	80,1
Finland	0,941	73,3
France	0,938	70,7
Germany	0,93	82,3
Greece	0,912	69,2
Hungary	0,862	72,8
Iceland	0,956	77,3
Ireland	0,946	85,1
Israel	0,915	48,7
Italy	0,934	71,8
Luxembourg	0,949	77,7
Netherlands	0,943	78,3
Norway	0,963	77,9
Poland	0,858	71,8
Portugal	0,904	73,8
Slovakia	0,849	69,7
Slovenia	0,904	71,9
Spain	0,928	72,2
Sweden	0,949	71,7
Switzerland	0,947	80,9
Ukraine	0,766	64
United Kingdom	0,939	85,4

Source: estimated by the author, based on the data calculations provided by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

## PART II WHY EUROPE SHOULD NOT BE AFRAID

### *Introduction*

In this publication, new quantitative insights on the structures of the contemporary crisis should be presented that largely are based on insights of "critical political economy" of the late 19th and the early 20th Century.

It cannot be precluded that patterns of global terrorism correspond to the more general swings of world politics and economics that are being intensely studied by world scholarship (Devezas (under the auspices of NATO), 2006; IIASA, 2007). The idea of global cycles goes back to the Russian statistician Nikolai Kondratiev. For one, Nicolai Kondratiev's work and personality now received due international attention. Although many contemporary economists treat the legacy of Kondratiev with utter contempt, Louçã could show that several **major figures of economics** of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, **among them Economic Nobel Prize winners**, were deeply impressed by Kondratiev's research. It suffices to mention here not just Joseph Alois Schumpeter and also in a way **Simon Kuznets**, but **Ragnar Frisch; Gottfried Haberler; Alvin H. Hansen; Walt Rostow; and Jan Tinbergen**. The **revival of Kondratiev research** in the 1960s and beyond is linked to the simulation efforts of **Jay Forrester** at the **MIT** in the context of his world-modeling for the **Club of Rome**. **IIASA** developed a highly sophisticated debate on the issue, centered mainly around the works of the **physicist Cesare Marchetti** and the **Portuguese systems scientist Tesseleno Devezas**. Devezas' research is particularly noteworthy here, because it combines sociological insights into values and generations with the mathematics of cyclical swings in economics and demography. **Forrester** reproduced a 50 year pattern for the US-economy, based on his System Dynamics National Model (NM-model) which is based on 15 sectors. Marchetti moved the debate away from price series to physical quantities, including production and energy consumption. Unfortunately, as sophisticated and statistically satisfying as this IIASA debate might sound, it has been rather overlooked by both the mostly Marxist and world system supporters of Kondratiev waves and also by their economist detractors.

In this context it should be emphasized that the recent Russian re-reading of Kondratiev also touches on the nature of waves in the center and in the periphery. Especially the Russian economist Aleksandr Bobrovnikov put forward an interesting frame of reference, in fact linking the Kondratiev cycle debate with *dependencia* theory. Bobrovnikov makes the point that transnational capital flows during the beginning downswing in the center to the periphery, where the belated cycle still allows huge profits; during the belated periphery depression transnational capital again flows to the center, thus exacerbating the debt crisis in the periphery. Our publication precisely continues this debate with new data about world development, 1990 – 2003.

From the quantitative analysis of global conflict and global terrorism, which basically shows that at present the world system is confronted with the period of the de-legitimization of US leadership and rising regional and local conflicts, we proceed to estimate the quantitative weight of such explanatory factors as Muslim culture, transnational migration and structures of dependency for world economic growth and social development. Again, the relevance of the “classic” political economy explanations and the center-periphery structure reading of the K-cycles emerges to be relevant.

### ***Re-thinking Kondratiev cycles***

In this contribution, we try to present some new perspectives on the importance of the legacy of this great Russian researcher for the debates about the contemporary global crisis. Let us be precise: Kondratiev downswings were always particularly severe in the periphery of the world system, and the ups and downs of reform and the re-centralization of governments there are closely linked to the Kondratiev cycle. Looking at the growth and development differentials, Bobrovnikov’s such important point for world systems governance receives a dramatic illustration (Tausch, 2007, based on UTIP and World Bank data from more than 60 countries of the world since 1960). The cyclical swings in the periphery are by far more pronounced than in the center and the depressions more severe. The level of inequality is historically higher in the periphery than in the center, but inequality also increases in the centers. Such comparisons clearly suggest three tendencies:

- a) first, a faster growth in the peripheries during the beginning B-phase of the Kondratiev cycle
- b) a more severe depression in the peripheries than in the center
- c) a belated recovery in the periphery

The very logic of industrial processes and basic innovations, as well as the societal models, connected with them, would suggest to build cyclical fluctuations into more general theories of development (Amin, 1997). Blast furnaces and other important components of the industrial process, too, have a certain life-cycle, comparable with the Juglar and Kuznets cycle, just as technical innovations are scattered in a non-random fashion along time, coinciding with the Kondratiev cycle (Bornschiefer, 1988 and 1995; for a very comprehensive summary Scandella, 1998). There are short term instabilities of 3 to 5 years duration (Kitchin cycles), 8-11 years duration (Juglar cycles), 18-22 years duration (Kuznets waves), and longer, 40-60 year Kondratiev waves. The following dating scheme could be suggested in the light of the Schumpeterian theory tradition (Scandella, 1998). Global capitalism since 1740 had the following Kuznets cycles (our calculations based on the untransformed rates of global industrial production growth, 1740 – 2004), based on polynomial expressions of the 6<sup>th</sup> order:

1741-1756;  $R^2 = 23.5 \%$   
 1756-1774;  $R^2 = 36.1 \%$   
 1774-1793;  $R^2 = 34.8 \%$

1793-1812;  $R^2 = 39.7 \%$   
 1812-1832;  $R^2 = 16.4 \%$   
 1832-1862;  $R^2 = 25.7 \%$   
 1862-1885;  $R^2 = 36.3 \%$   
 1885-1908;  $R^2 = 56.2 \%$   
 1908-1932;  $R^2 = 44.2 \%$   
 1932-1958;  $R^2 = 19.1 \%$   
 1958-1975;  $R^2 = 60.9 \%$   
 1975-1992;  $R^2 = 75.8 \%$

We tended to analyze the period between 1756 and 1832 as the 1<sup>st</sup> Kondratiev cycle of the industrial age, the period between 1832 and 1885 as the 2<sup>nd</sup> Kondratiev cycle, the period between 1885 and 1932 as the 3<sup>rd</sup> Kondratiev cycle, and the period between 1932 and 1975 as the 4<sup>th</sup> Kondratiev cycle. So, according to this logic, we are now in the 5<sup>th</sup> Kondratiev cycle of the industrial age, with one Kuznets cycle after the depression of the mid-1970s already well behind us, and the second Kuznets cycle since 1992 pointing in a downward direction. The long cycle literature tells us why there is a recurrent pattern of instability in the social orders both at the level of national society as well as at the level of the international system.

Our tests that we report in Tausch 2007 show that our Bornschier dating scheme much better corresponds to the structure of world production data than the alternative, proposed by Goldstein. This scheme is in line with the dating scheme proposed by Joshua Goldstein, Phil O'Hara, and Ernest Mandel, among many others. However this dating scheme might very well correspond to the movement of prices.

For us **1756, 1832, 1885, 1932** and **1975** are the beginnings of new **Kondratiev** waves, while 1756, 1774, 1793, 1812, 1832, 1862, 1885, 1908, 1932, 1958, 1975, and 1992 are the turning points (troughs) of the Kuznets cycles.

It also should be noted that the hypothesis about B-phases of the Kondratiev waves – a very strong linear or non-linear down-ward swing of about 20 years duration, - receives at least some direct confirmation from the untransformed, original new world industrial production growth data, based on Goldstein (1740 – 1974 and UNIDO Statistical Office, 1975 – 2004). Working with a polynomial expression of the 3<sup>rd</sup> order, we arrive at the following  $R^2$  for our B-phases of the Kondratiev waves. For all 20 year periods before our measurement points, the B-phase-hypotheses are confirmed:

pre-1756	12, 8 %
pre-1832	6, 5 %
pre-1885	8, 9 %
pre-1932	41, 8 %
pre-1975	28, 4 %

Although we date the trough in the 1830s earlier than Bornschier, we coincide with his analysis of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century and large sections of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Having been written originally in the late 1980s, Bornschier's work is somewhat unclear about the crisis in the last part of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century; we always believed that the culmination point of the stagnation from 1973 onwards was overcome

by the Reagan boom of the 1980s and the Clinton period boom. We somewhat differ with other world system scholars on the dating game, for sure:

**Table 1: The Kondratiev cycle dating game**

**a) untransformed original data**

	O'Hara	Tausch	Dates suggested by sliding correlation method
1st Kondratiev	1779-1847	1756-1832	1756-1819
2nd Kondratiev	1847-1893	1832-1885	1819-1862
3rd Kondratiev	1893-1931	1885-1932	1862-1918
4th Kondratiev	1931-1992	1932-1975	1918-1954
5th Kondratiev	1992-	1975-	1954-1993
R <sup>2</sup> 1st K	2, 59	3, 25	<b>4, 43</b>
R <sup>2</sup> 2nd K	4, 68	1, 5	<b>15, 77</b>
R <sup>2</sup> 3rd K	24, 66	<b>28, 71</b>	7, 39
R <sup>2</sup> 4th K	8, 01	<b>9, 34</b>	5, 59
R <sup>2</sup> 5th K	<b>33, 7</b>	6, 32	23, 14

**b) 9-year sliding averages**

	O'Hara	Tausch	Dates suggested by sliding correlation method
1st Kondratiev	1779-1847	1756-1832	1756-1819
2nd Kondratiev	1847-1893	1832-1885	1819-1862
3rd Kondratiev	1893-1931	1885-1932	1862-1918
4th Kondratiev	1931-1992	1932-1975	1918-1954
5th Kondratiev	1992-	1975-	1954-1993
R <sup>2</sup> 1st K	32,6	41,3	<b>45,6</b>
R <sup>2</sup> 2nd K	25,2	15,3	<b>27,2</b>
R <sup>2</sup> 3rd K	50,0	43,8	<b>65,6</b>
R <sup>2</sup> 4th K	27,7	<b>39,6</b>	32,7
R <sup>2</sup> 5th K	91,9	70,2	<b>92,0</b>

One of the most intriguing features of world systems theory is its prediction of the recurrence of global wars in the world capitalist system.



By re-analyzing latest conflict data (great power battle fatalities from all wars, Goldstein, 1988 and COW/PRIO, 2005) from 1495 to 2002 and as yet unpublished UNIDO data about the growth of world industrial production 1740 – 2004 it was shown that the long Kuznets and Kondratiev swings and cycles of capitalist world development that play such an important role in the analysis of global war since 1495 have indeed not ended after the end of Communism, and that instability, and not stability, characterize the world economy, and that there is an indented “W” shaped pattern of global conflict since 1495 that did not end with the end of the Cold War (Tausch, 2007).

By now, we all know very well today that there were voices that predicted the “end of history” in the 1990s. The world systems approach always took a more cautious line and would never preclude – at least in principle – a repetition of the insane economic cycles and major power rivalries that characterized the course of history since 1450 and which produced three devastating global wars, 1618 – 48; 1793 – 1815; and 1914 – 45 (see the by now classic contribution by Goldstein, 1988). In view of the methodological critique by several authors, including Beck (1991) and Silverberg (2005), against the “long wave school” it would seem appropriate rather to talk about “tendencies” or “waves” and not about “cycles”. Silverberg’s recent research paper applies spectral density analysis to two famous world system time series, Modelski’s and Thompson’s sea power index and the Levy-Goldstein great power fatalities data series. However, we try to show by using Kondratiev’s classic techniques of polynomial regressions that there are indeed several cycles, and not one cycle, of global economics and politics.

### ***Kondratiev cycles and global conflict***

One of the most startling consequences of the relevance of Kondratiev are the insights of the long cycle schools on global conflict. The international system is indeed characterized according to Goldstein by the following sequence of cycles:

**global war      world hegemony of the dominant power      de-legitimization of the international order      de-concentration of the global system      global war et cetera**

The duration of these sub-phases of the international order is approximately one Kondratiev cycle each (an economic cycle of 50 to 60 years duration, see below), so the unit of time of the international system can be symbolized by the expression – one Kondratiev - 1K. An entire hegemonic cycle lasts 3 Kondratiev waves.

A more careful re-reading of the world systems approach – especially the writings of Giovanni Arrighi, George Modelski, Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein – does suggest that the 21st Century will be characterized by a further shift of the world economic centers of gravity towards Asia, and that the maintenance of peace of the enlarged Europe to the outside world will depend on European Union democracy, technical innovation, and the avoidance

of what Arrighi has called – in allusion to the concept of power of historical Venice – a 'terra ferma' constellation, i.e. the territorial concept of power and the exploitation of the hinterland – the terra ferma. In the history of the world economy, such major geographical shifts of economic activities and of military power – like in 1340, 1560, 1750 and 1930 -, were always associated with major wars and with a very deep economic depression.

We agree with Modelski (1999) that global challengers in the world system were always characterized by the interaction of

a large army  
a large economy  
a closed, controlled society  
and weak, ethnocentric media.

Russett's hypothesis about the great probability of peace between democracies is an all-important, further element in this debate.

At any rate, the future of the open society in Europe, the exact fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria of a functioning democracy and market economy in the EU enlargement process, and the future democratization of the Union - also in face of the darker sides of the European heritage and the very idea of an economically united Europe under authoritarian premises under Nazi rule before 1945 (Laughland, 1998) - become decisive whether or not Europe will become a global challenger in Modelski's sense, and will determine whether Europe is a new challenger of the new evolving global leadership along the Pacific axis that could fit into the pattern, described by Modelski:

an oceanic navy  
lead industries, fiscal strength  
democratic potential, party system  
strong active media.

A relatively closed society, combined with high customs, a reliance on military land power, exploitative relations with the internal and immediate external peripheries (the hinterland of Northern Italy before the great Italian wars of the 13th and 14th Century, the Spanish colonies and internal peripheries in Hapsburg Europe before the global war 1618, the French internal peripheries and colonies before the Napoleonic Wars, and Germany's 'Drang nach Osten' before 1914) and a relatively weak technological home-base characterized the attempts at world power, while the successful world hegemonies (the United Provinces of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) were each time the practical opposites on all or most of these dimensions: a naval, knowledge-driven and world-market concept of power, a society open to migration, low customs, a large sea power and a smaller, but mobile and disciplined and readily deployable land-army, and a strong technological home-base.

Significant for hegemonic success is also the strong social role of the urban merchant class that is in stark contrast to the ties between the land and capitalism, characteristic of the 'rentier' political economy of Hapsburg Europe, France, and Germany, the historic challengers that lost the world leadership contest.



World hegemonies that characterize the workings of world capitalism arise and they also end. As it is well-known in world system research, especially from the works of Arrighi and Silver, there are signal crises of world capitalism (the usual Kondratiev depressions), and there are terminal crises of the world system, when hegemonies end.

Peaceful transitions from one hegemony to the other are among the most intricate questions of peace research and peace policy of our time.

These moments of world hegemony transformation, as Arrighi and Silver and as Boswell (1999) have shown, are especially dangerous culminations of world depressions and are characterized by a subsequent fight for world hegemony, like during the great crash of the 1340s, which marked the beginning of the Genoese age (Arrighi) or Portuguese and Genoese age (Modelski), the crash of the 1560s, which marked the beginning of the Dutch era, the depression of the 1750s and 1760s, which marked the beginning of the British era, and the Great Depression in the 1930s, which was the terminal crisis of British world capitalist dominance (Arrighi, 1995). Regulation can be successful, like after 1560, and 1930, and deregulation can be successful, like after 1340, 1760, and - most probably - the 1980s (compiled from Arrighi, 1995).

A world-hegemony evolves and declines during at least two Kondratiev waves. We think it fairly safe to assume that there is no such early immediate terminal crisis of the capitalist system, but that the risk for such a crisis rapidly increases after 2020 or 2030. Even at the risk of gross oversimplification, the following scheme could be drawn.

There seems to be ample evidence, reproduced, among others, in Tausch (2003) that the terminal crises of capitalism, like Tsunami waves of world politics, have devastating consequences for the well-being of the great majority of humanity. Evidence, based on the works of Andre Gunder Frank and Rudolph Rummel suggests that as a consequence of the terrible world depressions of the 1350s (coinciding with the Black Death) and 1750s, Europe lost significantly its share in total world population, while the earthquake of world politics 1900 – 1950 had an estimated 187.7 million victims in terms of political repression, genocide and democide, i.e. a good part of all the estimated total victims (482 million human beings) of democide, wars and repression in total human history. Among the major world systems researchers of our time, the late Andre Gunder Frank was most active in championing the idea that there are major economic cycles dating back 5000 years in human history. This idea was put forward by him for example in 1994, in an important paper which he presented to the New England Historical Association. A more final word by Frank on these large cycles is to be found, among others, in his "ReOrient", 1998: 248 ff.

So, where are we now? 1870? 1913? 1938? World systems theory is full of speculation about the future, and much of world systems research writing projects a major global war by around 2020 or 2030. Just let us quote from famous world systems researchers:

a) Goldstein (2005) returned to his "conflict clock" (Goldstein, 1988: 259). Looking back on his predictions and his work, he now defines 2000 as the war

trough year, to be followed by a 2005 price trough and real wage peak, 2010 an expansion phase, 2015 a production peak, 2020 an investment peak, 2025 an innovation trough and 2025 a war peak, and 2030 a price peak. Goldstein is clear about his prediction about the 2020s as the next real danger zone of world politics:

*"In my 1988 book I pointed to the period around the 2020s as a potential danger zone, and it still worries me" (Goldstein, 2005: 8)*

b) Chase-Dunn and Podobnik (1999) see a 50/50 chance of global war by around 2020, with the most likely contenders of the US being either a United Europe under German leadership or Japan

c) Boswell (1999) presents a list of 10 system evolution steps, starting by the relative decline of the United States, followed by imperial rivalry and global war between 2010 and 2020, to be followed by another world system sequence, ending by 2080 or 2090 in yet another cycle of relative decline of the hegemon who won the last world war by 2010/2020 ...


d) Work by Attinà and Modelski also suggests that we most probably will not escape the fatal cycle of global leaderships and global contenders. Since the mid 1960s, the defense pact aggregation index that measures the percentage share of defense pact members in the total number of states in the international system i.e. the control that existing, established mechanisms of world political leadership exercise over global politics, has declined, suggesting that the era of global power by the United States, which was established in 1945, definitely comes to an end and that our era is pretty similar to the era 1850 – 1878, which was characterized by the de-legitimation of the then British leadership, followed by the de-concentration of the international system and the era of coalition-building between 1878 – 1914, which ended, as we all too well know, in the catastrophe of 1914.

The Italian political scientist Professor Fulvio Attinà interprets the global political cycles of the world system in accordance with Modelski as:

**global war macrodecision    global power execution    de-legitimization  
and agenda setting    de-concentration and coalition building    global  
war macrodecision et cetera**

His defense pact aggregation index neatly measures, Attinà argues, these cycles. We established in that context that the tsunamis of the break-up of the world military order precede the tsunamis of world depressions. We further compared these cycles with the long swing of world economic development and came to the conclusion that these two cyclical movements are roughly in parallel. But the tsunami crisis of world politics indeed, as we already stated, precedes the tsunami economic crisis (Tausch, 2007).

**Graph 1: the stylized interrelationship between the strength of the 75 year downswing correlations of the logistic cycles and the hegemonic cycle (Attina's defense pact index)**



Legend: Potenziell: potential function; polynomisch: polynomial function. Gleitender Durchschnitt: sliding average (10 year sliding averages). The "sliding 75 year correlation analysis" shows that the hypothesis that there was an end-point in a negative, 75 year downswing period received strongest confirmation during the world depression of the 1930s. The analysis also confirms that by the late 1860s and the 1980s there were turning points in world long-run capitalist development. The golden periods of the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century and from 1945 onwards seem to have reached their end. The analysis also shows that the movements in the world political order, measured by Professor Attina's defense pact index, actually **precede** the world economic swings. The breakdown of the world political order precedes the breakdown of the world economic order; a vigorous world political order is a precondition of a vigorous world economic order. All war-related calculations are based on the data on great power battle fatalities from all wars in 000 victims, 1495 – 2002. The data 1495 – 1945 (1975) were reported in Goldstein, 1988 (see his definition, page 235 of his book), the data 1946 – 2002 are based on the war data base as reported by PRIO Oslo: [http://www.prio.no/page/CSCW\\_research\\_detail/Programme\\_detail\\_CSCW/9649/45656.htm](http://www.prio.no/page/CSCW_research_detail/Programme_detail_CSCW/9649/45656.htm), re-calculated for the aims of a comparison of "great power battle fatalities from all wars". Great Powers after 1945: the members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. Legend: Calculations based on the data provided by Goldstein (1740 – 1974; based on Goldstein, 1988) and UNIDO data, provided by Dr. Tetsuo Yamada, UNIDO statistical department (1975 – 2004).

At any rate, the contemporary geographic and systemic selective retreat of the respects for civil rights around the globe – an average positive trend

development 1995 – 2003 notwithstanding -, suggests that freedom is on the retreat precisely in those regions, where there were gains in freedom and human rights owing to the transformations of 1989 and the second and third wave of democratization of the 1980s and 1990s, thus partially contradicting the liberal globalist optimism inherent in the analysis by Soysa and Gleditsch (2002). The retreat of democracy and human rights will most probably go hand in hand with a more conflict-oriented foreign policy in years to come. Under the weight of globalization and the openings of markets, the weak economies and societies of the former communist world and several democracies of the South witness a real retreat of civil liberties.

Just as during the world depression of the 1930s democracy could not survive in the region (Polanyi, 1944), today the danger arises that instability and not democratization will triumph in the end. The turning points in the long waves between the ascents and decline phases (B-phases) were always the beginnings of political decay in the region, while the ascent phases were associated with authoritarian modernization; time-lags between the Western cycle and the Eastern semi-periphery and periphery have to be taken into account. The decisive-kairos-years are (dates before 1756 from Goldstein, 1988):

1509  
1539  
1575  
1621  
1689  
1756  
1832  
1885  
1932  
1975

The former hegemonic contenders from earlier global wars slowly slide into a non-acceptance of their status in the international system. The real power struggle erupts already soon after the great hegemonic war, and through the ups and downs of the history of the system evolves slowly into the hegemonic challenge. Seen in such a way, not 1989 or September 11, 2001, but Korea and Vietnam could become rather the benchmarks of the future W-structure of conflict in the international arena.

The triumphalism of America being the unrivalled military hegemonic power of our world notwithstanding, we believe that a serious strategic and political science analysis quickly reveals the direct manpower and other military constraints against continued U.S. military and political dominance in world affairs (Adams, 2005). It is often said that like Old Rome, America is without parallels in terms of military strength. But such claims are, a simple myth, resting upon military spending figures that just demonstrate that the Pentagon spends a real lot of money converted into international exchange rates that are still favorable to the US Dollar but which are exchange rates untenable in the long run in view of the huge double deficits of the US economy. What is unparalleled in human history is not the “bang” that the US Conventional Forces can deliver on the ground, especially in a guerrilla warfare situation, but the “buck” that went to the Pentagon defense contractors, indeed an amount really

unparalleled around the globe. The US budget deficit is now at 3.46 % of GDP, the current account balance deficit per GDP 4.90 % (2003), as stated by "Economist" Country Briefings, July 2005. The cumulated public debt of the United States is now 62.43 % of the US GDP. Compare this to the +2.44 % Maastricht budget data when President George W. Bush took office in 2000, as well as the current account deficit that was still only at 4.19 % of GDP the same year. When William Jefferson Clinton handed over the office of the President, the cumulated public debt of the United States was only 57.98 % of the US GDP. What military manpower is concerned, even the "smaller" wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan show the extreme limits of the current capital intensive U.S. military doctrine, and for manpower reasons alone the US would be in no position to fight several conventional wars at the same time, let alone fighting another major confrontation at the same time as fighting the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The combination of factors that favor war and not peace in the world system could not be more adverse: the relationship between declining world political order (as measured by the Attinà defense pact index), declining world economic growth (as measured by the rates of world industrial production growth), rising war intensity (that only leveled off in the 1990s in order to increase anew, see above) and rising world inequality (as measured by the rising world GINI inequality index, calculated by Schultz) have to be reconsidered. Our hypothesis is - also in view of developments beyond the 1990s - that the belle époque of globalization from 1960 – 1990 did not bring about a more stable, egalitarian and peaceful world (see our quantitative analysis, below).

### ***The de-legitimization of the contemporary global order, agenda setting and the limits of US superpower***

What does all this mean in terms of the concept of the "balance of power"? To quote from Colin S. Gray, the perhaps most influential strategist in the United States military apparatus:

*"(...) high-tech transformation will have only modest value, because war is a duel and all of America's foes out to 2020 will be significantly asymmetrical. The more intelligent among them, as well as the geographically more fortunate and the luckier, will pursue ways of war that do not test US strengths. Second, the military potential of this transformation, as with all past transformations, is being undercut by the unstoppable processes of diffusion which spread technology and ideas. Third, the transformation that is being sought appears to be oblivious to the fact claimed here already, that there is more to war than warfare. War is about the peace it will shape." (Gray, 2005: 20 – 21)*

One of the most intriguing features of world systems theory is its prediction of the recurrence of global wars in the world capitalist system. In the 1990s, many people would have thought that after the end of the Cold War, such theories are rather obsolete. With growing military confrontations in Afghanistan, Iraq etc. in the framework of the "global war on terror" and with the growing military might




of China, this theory tradition deserves at least a thorough empirical re-thinking and re-analysis.

The world systems approach takes a more cautious line than “end of history” predictions and would not preclude – at least in principle – a repetition of the insane economic cycles and major power rivalries that characterized the course of history since 1450 and which produced three devastating global wars, 1618 – 48; 1793 – 1815; and 1914 – 45 (see the by now classic contribution by Goldstein, 1988).

The following graph tries to summarize the deeper underlying logic of war, economics and conflict in the international system, each interpreted as a long logistic cycle of 150 years duration:

**Graph 2: The logistic 150 year cycle of world politics, world economics, and global war**



The graph clearly shows the “war peaks” of the 30 Years War, the long French battle for world supremacy of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century and the Napoleonic Wars, and the German thrust towards world hegemony 1914 – 1945. The “logistic power cycle” shows the waning type


of order in the international system in the post-Cold-War-Period, and the end of the long post-World-War II boom years.

We challenged the neo-liberal assertion that globalization goes hand in hand with global peace by principally showing that battle fatalities from wars, in which the major powers (after 1945 the 5 members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) are involved, swing rhythmically in the world economy since around 1495, and that **there is no support for the hypothesis that conflict levels will not increase again after the end of the Cold War in the long run**. Thus the liberal globalist case cannot be maintained on a 1:1 basis, because globalization increased after the 1970s as did **battle fatalities from wars, in which the major powers are involved, which point in an upward direction**, at least since 1989.

**Professor Brecke** uses a different methodology as the one used in this study and also different from the study by de Soysa and Gleditsch, but comes pretty much to the same conclusions as we do, namely that **there is no era of peace and stability “around the corner”** (Brecke, 1999, at: [http://www.inta.gatech.edu/peter/PSS99\\_paper.html](http://www.inta.gatech.edu/peter/PSS99_paper.html)). Brecke bases his research on conflicts since the 15<sup>th</sup> Century, which he put into “conflict catalog”, a listing of all recorded violent conflicts that meet Richardson's magnitude 1.5 or higher criterion (32 or more deaths).

There is one very long and large cycle of conflicts from the mid 1400s to the mid 1700s, and a strongly fluctuating but certainly not linear downward trend from the mid 1700s onwards. In the last period before 2000, there is even an increase in the number of conflicts, and not a decrease. The main results of Brecke's research paper (1999) on the level of the world system are then:


**Graph 3: the world conflict cycles from 1400 to the present**




Note: this and the following graphs are reprinted from the internet version of the essay by Professor Peter Brecke (2001).




The two world regions with the highest conflict intensity, Europe and Africa, present the following picture:



Graph 4: the world conflict cycles from 1400 to the present - Europe




Graph 5: the world conflict cycles from 1400 to the present - Africa



The regional breakdown for Western Europe and Eastern Europe is the following:

**Graph 5: the world conflict cycles from 1400 to the present – Western Europe**




While there is indeed an era of peace and stability in Western Europe after the end of the Second World War, trends in Eastern Europe are more alarming and do not support the hypothesis that “the end of history” is in sight:

**Graph 6: the world conflict cycles from 1400 to the present – Eastern Europe**

**Number of Conflicts per Decade**

**Eastern Europe**




While Western Europe largely stabilized, the conflict potential especially in Africa increased over the last decades, thus de-stabilizing Europe's Southern neighborhood:


**Graph 7: the world conflict cycles from 1400 to the present – Northern Africa**

**Number of Conflicts per Decade**


**North Africa**



The well-known hypothesis about the growth of internal conflicts versus inter-state conflicts is again confirmed in the Brecke-study:




**Graph 8: the world conflict cycles from 1900 to the present – civil versus interstate conflicts**



### ***Global terrorism and the Kondratiev cycle***

Our reading of the latest available, comparable figures on global terrorism from US State Department sources in the context of the Kondratiev cycle debate is certainly controversial. While our materials show that there a **long-lasting trends** towards conflict in world society, which are a reflection of the underlying hegemonial cycle, and that there are growing regional conflicts as well, the available hard data suggest a very “Clintonian” and “Democratic Party” reading of events. The fight against international terrorism showed its real fruits, September 11, 2006 notwithstanding, and there was a very clear downward trend in international terrorism (the  $R^2$  for the linear estimate  $> 62\%$ ) before events in Iraq will have overshadowed the performance. We only can guess at the trends after 2003, for the US State Department discontinued its comparable data series and now refers to the Homeland Security data, which do not allow world level aggregations.


**Graph 9: the world since 1945: while US State Department data show that global terrorism diminished until the war in Iraq ... the underlying conflicts in world society have increased**



Source: Global economics and conflict data Tausch, 2007; data on global terrorism: United States Department of State, available at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003/>



... the underlying conflicts in world society have increased



Legend: Calculations about world industrial production growth are based on the data, provided by Goldstein (1740 – 1974; based on Goldstein, 1988) and UNIDO data, provided by Dr. Tetsuo Yamada, UNIDO statistical department (1975 – 2004). All war-related calculations are based on the data on great power battle fatalities from all wars in 000 victims, 1495 – 2002. The data 1495 – 1945 (1975) were reported in Goldstein, 1988, the data 1946 – 2002 are based on the war data base as reported by PRIO Oslo:

[http://www.prio.no/page/CSCW\\_research\\_detail/Programme\\_detail\\_CSCW/9649/45656.htm](http://www.prio.no/page/CSCW_research_detail/Programme_detail_CSCW/9649/45656.htm) re-calculated for the aims of a comparison of "great power battle fatalities from all wars". Great Powers after 1945: the members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. Gleitender Durchschnitt: sliding average (5 year sliding averages). Polynomisch: polynomial expression. Battle fatality rates: 10th root of the original values. In addition to the previous graph, this analysis now compares the movements of international production and war with Professor Attina's defense pact index and the movements of world income inequality, as reported by Nobel laureate Ted Schultz. The graph shows the dangerous Kairos of world politics that we are confronted with: stumbling economic growth, rising world political tensions, rising world income inequality (world GDP at exchange rates), a withering world political order.

To further confront popular myths, the economic and employment performance in the predominantly Muslim regions of the world, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, was quite remarkable, given the severe constraints like the absence of a lasting peace in the region etc.

**Table 2: decreasing poverty and increasing employment ratios in the Muslim world**

Year	1995	2000	2005*	1995	2000	2005*
	(million)	(million)	(million)	share in total employment (%)	share in total employment (%)	share in total employment (%)
<b>US\$1 a day working poor</b>						
World	627.4	582.0	520.1	25.7	22.1	18.3
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS	12.6	11.7	4.3	7.5	7.1	2.6
East Asia	174.8	150.3	104.0	24.7	20.2	13.4
South-East Asia and the Pacific	39.8	30.3	29.7	18.6	12.7	11.4
South Asia	252.9	224.2	202.3	55.1	44.3	35.8
Latin America and the Caribbean	23.5	27.0	28.0	12.5	12.9	11.8
Middle East and North Africa	2.6	3.5	3.5	3.1	3.5	2.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	121.1	134.9	148.3	57.8	57.4	56.3
<b>US\$2 a day working poor</b>						
World	1'354.3	1'396.2	1'374.6	55.5	53.1	48.4
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS	53.8	57.6	21.1	32.0	35.0	12.5
East Asia	452.5	422.6	361.4	63.9	56.9	46.5
South-East Asia and the Pacific	143.6	147.8	150.0	67.2	62.1	57.6
South Asia	419.1	451.2	494.3	91.3	89.1	87.3
Latin America and the Caribbean	68.3	70.9	75.6	36.4	33.8	31.8
Middle East and North Africa	34.3	39.6	42.7	40.8	39.6	36.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	181.9	205.9	229.4	86.8	87.6	87.0

Source: ILO Trends Working Poverty Model. For more information on estimation methodology, see S. Kapsos, "Estimating growth requirements for reducing working poverty: Can the world halve working poverty by 2015?", Employment Strategy Paper, No. 14 (Geneva, ILO, 2004); available on website: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/download/esp14.pdf>. Differences from earlier estimates are due to revisions of the IMF estimates of GDP growth used in the model as well as revisions in the labour market data used. \*2005 are preliminary estimates.

Source:

<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/download/getb06en.pdf>

Region	Change in unemployment rate (percentage point)	Unemployment rate (%)			GDP growth rate (%)			Employment-to-population ratio (%)		Annual labour force growth rate (%)	Annual GDP growth rate (%)
		1995	2004	2005*	2004	2005*	2006 <sup>p</sup>	1995	2005*		
World	0.0	6.0	6.3	6.3	5.1	4.3	4.3	62.8	61.4	1.6	3.8
Developed Economies and European Union	0.0	7.8	7.1	6.7	3.3	2.5	2.6	55.8	56.4	0.7	2.6
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS	-0.4	9.4	9.5	9.7	8.2	5.7	5.5	55.5	52.1	0.1	4.0
East Asia	-0.2	3.7	3.7	3.8	8.7	8.0	7.5	75.2	71.7	1.0	7.6
South-East Asia and the Pacific	1.2	3.9	6.2	6.1	6.1	5.1	5.4	67.2	65.8	2.2	3.8
South Asia	0.2	4.0	4.7	4.7	7.1	7.1	6.4	58.9	57.2	2.2	5.8
Latin America and the Caribbean	-0.5	7.6	7.4	7.7	5.5	4.0	3.8	59.2	60.9	2.5	2.8
Middle East and North Africa	-0.7	14.3	13.1	13.2	5.4	5.0	5.3	44.2	46.4	3.5	4.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.3	9.2	9.9	9.7	5.4	4.5	5.5	69.0	66.7	2.4	3.9


Source: ILO, Global Employment Trends Model, 2005; IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, September 2005; see also note to table 1.

\*2005 are preliminary estimates; p = projections.

Available data do not permit any other causal inferences about the downward trend of global terrorism than the hypothesis, to be gained from a visual inspection of the data, that **globalization** in both the centers and the peripheries increased dramatically while terrorism in fact **decreased**.

However, as we will show below, it is equally clear that neo-liberal globalization creates its contradictions and disturbances, and *ceteris paribus* negatively affects the overall development performance, while Muslim population per total population or membership of a country in the Organization of Islamic Conference – *again ceteris paribus* – even brings about positive performances in terms of economic growth, human development and the environment.

**Graph 10: Globaler terror and world political cycles**



## ***Re-analyzing the contemporary global crisis – dependency, the Muslim world and global migration***

A recent very thorough liberal globalist flagship synopsis of the quantitative peace- and development research evidence over the last decades by de Soysa and Gleditsch (2002) maintains that globalization, especially openness to trade and foreign direct investment, lead towards

- a) increased democracy
- b) development
- c) less inequality
- d) a better environment
- e) peace.

De Soysa and Gleditsch centered their analysis about globalization and the human condition on the indicator "world economic openness", which in a way is biased. Conventional wisdom of the "Washington Consensus" has it that it is always the periphery or semi-periphery country that got it all wrong during a crisis, like in East Asia, Russia or recently in Turkey and that a good combination of economic freedom, privatization, tight monetary policies and above all private foreign direct investment will "fix" it, once the forces of the market are properly at work (see also Raffer in Tausch, 2003, and Chapter 1 above). Literature, supporting the "Washington Consensus" now abounds, highlighting pro-market policies and world economic openness as strategies for social and economic well-being, social justice and economic growth, and a peaceful world [Barro R. J. (1991), Barro R. J. (1994), Barro R. J. (1996a), Barro R. J. (1996b), Barro R. J. (2000), Barro R. J. (2001), Barro R. J. (2003), Barro R. J. (2004a), Barro R. J. (2004b), Barro R. J. and Grilli V. (1994), Barro R. J. and McCleary R. M. (2003a), Barro R. J. and McCleary R. M. (2003b), Barro R. J. and McCleary R. M. (2004), Barro R. J. and Sala-i-Martin X. (1991), Barro R. J. and Sala-i-Martin X. (1995/98), Barro, R. J. and Sala-i-Martin X. (1992), Becker G. (1993), Betcherman G. (2002), Bhagwati J.N. (1989), Carroll E. (2000), Dollar D. (2005), Dollar D. and Kraay A. (2000), Dollar D. and Kraay A. (2001a), Fukuyama F. (1991), Gholami R., Lee S. Y. T and Heshmati A. (2003), Haouas I; Yagoubi, M; and Heshmati A (2002a), Haouas I; Yagoubi, M; and Heshmati, A. (2002b), Harss C. and Maier K. (1998) Heshmati A. (2003a), Heshmati A. (2003b), Heshmati A. and Addison T. (2003), Kearny A.T. (2001), Klein M. et al. (2001), Moore M. (2003), Nederveen-Pieterse J. (1997), Olson M. (1982), Olson M. (1986), Olson M. (1987), Weede E. (1990), Weede E. (1992), Weede E. (1993a), Weede E. (1993b), Weede E. (1996a), Weede E. (1996b), Weede E. (1997), Weede E. (1999a), Weede E. (2002) Weede E. (2003), Weede E. (2004a), Weede E. (2004b), Weede E. (2004c), Weede E. (2004d), Weede E. (2005), Weede E. and Muller E. N. (1998)].

The counter-position, advanced by globalization critics, environmentalists, liberation theologians of all denominations, and - most recently - dissidents from the once homogeneous neo-liberal camp would hold that unfettered globalization increases the social gaps between rich and poor both within countries as well as

on a global scale. Most of the adherents of this camp would share the view proposed by Cornia and Kiiski that income distribution in the world system has worsened during the period of globalization. Indeed, the challenge by dependency theory to the neo-classical consensus is a real one – especially in a time of growing stagnation in the centers and social polarization in many countries of the periphery. The massive literature on dependency is still influential in the countries of the world periphery, the recent wave of neo-liberal globalization notwithstanding [Addo H. (1986), Amin S. (1973), Amin S. (1976), Amin S. (1980) Amin S. (1984), Amin S. (1989), Amin S. (1992), Amin S. (1994a), Amin S. (1994b), Amin S. (1994c), Amin S. (1997a) Amin S. (1997b), Avery W. P. and Rapkin D. P. (1989), Bello W. (1989), Bello W.; with Shea Cunningham and Bill Rau (1999), Cardoso F. H. (1969), Cardoso F. H. (1972), Cardoso F. H. (1973), Cardoso F. H. (1977), Cardoso F. H. (1979), Cardoso F. H. and Faletto E. (1971), Cordova A. (1973), Cordova A. and Silva - Michelena H. (1972), Dubiel I. (1983), Dubiel I. (1993), Falk and Szentes (1997), Feder E. (1972), Flechsig St. (1987), Flechsig St. (1994), Flechsig St. (2000), Froebel F. et al. (1977a), Froebel F. et al. (1977b), Froebel F. et al. (1984), Froebel F. et al. (1986), Furtado C. (1970), Gonzales Casanova P. (1973), Griffin K. and Gurley J. (1985), Hettne B. (1983), Kay C. (1989), Kay C. (1991), Kent G. (1984), Kirby P. (2003a), Kirby P. (2003b), Köhler G. (1975), Köhler G. (1976b), Köhler G. (1978b), Köhler G. (1995), Prebisch R. (1981), Prebisch R. (1983), Prebisch R. (1984), Prebisch R. (1986), Prebisch R. (1988a), Prebisch R. (1988b) Raffer K. (1987a), Russett B. (1978), Singer P. I. (1971), Singer P. I. (1971), Singer P. I. (1972), Singer P. I. (1973), Singer P. I. (1974) Singer P. I. (1976), Singer P. I. (1977), Singer P. I. (1981a), Singer P. I. (1981b), Singer P. I. (1986), Singer P. I. (1987), Singer P. I. (1988), Singer P. I. (1991), Singer P. I. (1998), Singer P. I. (1999a), Singer P. I. (1999b), Singer P. I. et al. (1977), So A. Y. (1990), Sunkel O. (1966), Sunkel O. (1973a), Sunkel O. (1973b), Sunkel O. (1978a), Sunkel O. (1978b), Sunkel O. (1980), Sunkel O. (1984), Sunkel O. (1991), Sunkel O. (1994), Szentes T. (1988), Szentes T. (1989), Szentes T. (2002), Szentes T. (2003a), and Szentes T. (2003b)].

It has been established fairly well enough that there is a continuing phenomenon of world poverty. But what beyond that? Is globalization really the cause of world poverty? Or is rather the absence of globalization and foreign investment to blame for the continued misery in countries, say, like Myanmar, while outward-looking policies dramatically increased the lot of wide strata of the population in countries like China, Thailand and India over the last decades?

This growing international controversy on globalization and social inequality can be neatly portioned in two camps – scholars maintaining that world inequality is increasing during globalization, and scholars, maintaining that world inequality is decreasing over time during globalization. Much of the confusion rests on the fact that most globalization - > increasing inequality studies deal with world incomes measured at exchange rates, while world income distribution and world social equity, measured in purchasing power parities or “hard” basic human needs indicators, tended to become more egalitarian over recent decades. Flagship studies, permitting a pessimistic interpretation now include Arrighi G. (1991), Arrighi G. et al. (1996b), Babones S. J. (2005), Bergesen A. J. and Bata M. (2002), Berry A. et al. (1981), Bornschier V. (2002), Borocz (2005), Breedlove W. L. and Patrick N. D. (1988), Caminada K. and Goudswaard K. (2000), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (1984), Cornia G. A. (Ed.)(2004), Cornia G. A. and Kiiski S. (2002),



Cornia G. A., Addison T. and Kiiski S. (2003), Galbraith J. K. (2002), Galbraith J. K. and Berner M. (2001), Galbraith J. K. and Kum H. (2005), Galbraith J. K. and Pitts J. W. (2002), Gradstein M and Milanovic B. (2004), Korzeniewicz R. P. and Moran T. P. (1997), Milanovic B. (2002), Milanovic B. (2003a), Milanovic B. (2003b), Milanovic B. (2005), Nollert M. (1990), and Schultz T. P. (1998). Especially the thorough methodological criticism voiced by the very well-known US economist James K. Galbraith should be mentioned here. Borocz (2005), in an interesting thought experiment, has shown the dramatic positive consequences of a halving of global inequalities for global development and global basic human needs in the spirit of a redistributive global economic institution (the United Nations), as foreseen by Karl Polanyi.

The most important studies that support the hypothesis that world income inequality decreases with globalization today include Australian Treasury (2001), Crafts N. (2000), Dowrick, S. and Akmal M. (2001b), Firebaugh G. (1999), Firebaugh G. (2000), Firebaugh G. (2002), Firebaugh G. (2003), Firebaugh G. and Goesling B. (2004), Goesling B. (2001), Goesling B. and Firebaugh G. (2004), Melchior A., Telle, K., and Wiig, H. (2000), and Rodas-Martini P. (2001).

Ever since Kurt Rothschild's famous article in the *Economic Journal* in 1944, it is known that the share of imports – or also of exports - per GDP is a function of the size of nations. Per se, small and open economies tend towards social compromise, and are in fact the subject of an important, today mostly neglected debate about "small states in the International System". To this one must add that corporatism, high union density, social coherence, and other characteristics of these small, world economically open democracies interact [Katzenstein P. (1974), Rothschild K. W. (1963), Rothschild K. W. (1966), Rothschild K. W. (1984), Rothschild K. W. (1985), Wallerstein M. (1989)]. Such characteristics would be assumed to be typical for countries like Austria, the Irish Republic, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, but certainly not all neo-liberally oriented countries of the world.

Even with adjustments, the indicator is heavily dependent upon the size of a nation. It emerges from the Dollar/Kraay data set that the highest openness over the last decade was to be found in Estonia, Norway and Saint Lucia. From their data set it also emerges that among the 30 most open economies of the entire world economy were small territory and country cases like Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Saint Lucia, Slovenia and Switzerland. Also we find the two nations Communist Bulgaria before the transformation and Belarus under the Lukashenka regime. The heavily social democratic "Consociational Democracies" Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden in the 1980s and 1990s, and social democratic Norway are also among the sample. If anything, thus the Dollar and Kraay results demonstrate either (what Kraay certainly did not intend) that Communism Bulgarian or Lukashenka-style is the model of world economic openness, or that there is some truth in Professor Peter Katzenstein's theory about small states, the need for social compromise and social partnership in such states, and redistribution and development in such nations and their ascent in the international system .

For the globalization -> poverty reduction school to be maintained, it must be shown that several indicators of globalization, and not just the indicator "share of

foreign trade by GDP", are significantly and systematically linked to a series of indicators of national and social well-being, including income redistribution, democracy, and sustainable development, irrespective of the development level achieved.

Today, a truly massive cross-national research literature exists whose results are often diametrically opposed to one another, with dependency scholars claiming that dependency has adverse affects on the 'human condition' (economic growth, income equality, human well-being, gender and ecological relationships), while neo-liberal scholars claiming the opposite. In view of the massive, contradictory evidence, often based on smaller samples of countries and equally limited number of indicators, a new approach is taken here, trying to show the effects of the major available indicators, ranging from dependency to basic elements of the Washington Consensus, relevant in the literature, available for a sufficient number of countries (> 120 nations), on the widest number of available international indicators from standard international sources (above all the UNDP) from a wide number of UN-Millennium indicators and basic human needs, social inequality, human rights, gender justice, and/or ecological well-being variables. We try to do justice to some 240 quantitative studies that are contained in our bibliography, and try to present in this theoretical overview those determinants of the "human condition" that are sufficiently available for more than 120 nations [see Ahluwalia M. S. (1974), Ahluwalia M. S. (1976), Alderson A. and Nielsen F. (1999), Alderson A. S., Beckfield J. and Nielsen F. (2005), Babones S. J. (2002), Barro R. J. (1991), Barro R. J. (1994), Barro R. J. (1996a), Barro R. J. (1996b), Barro R. J. (2000), Barro R. J. (2001), Barro R. J. (2003), Barro R. J. (2004a), Barro R. J. (2004b), Barro R. J. and Grilli V. (1994), Barro R. J. and McCleary R. M. (2003a), Barro R. J. and McCleary R. M. (2003b), Barro R. J. and McCleary R. M. (2004), Barro R. J. and Sala-i-Martin X. (1991), Barro R. J. and Sala-i-Martin X. (1995/98), Barro, R. J. and Sala-i-Martin X. (1992), Becker G. (1993), Beckerman W. (1992), Beer L. (1999), Beer L. and Boswell T. (2002), Bergesen A. and Fernandez R. (1999), Betcherman G. (2002), Bhagwati J.N. (1989), Bornschier V. and Ballmer-Cao, T. H. (1979), Bornschier V. and Chase-Dunn Ch. K (1985), Bornschier V. and Heintz P., reworked and enlarged by Th. H. Ballmer - Cao and J. Scheidegger (1979), Bornschier V. and Nollert M. (1994), Bornschier V. et al. (1980), Bornschier V., Chase-Dunn Ch. and Rubinson R. (1977), Boswell T. and Dixon W. J. (1993), Boswell T. and Dixon W.J. (1990), Bradshaw Y. (1987), Bradshaw Y. and Huang J. (1991), Bradshaw Y. W. and Schafer M. J. (2000), Bradshaw Y. W., Noonan R; and Gash L. (1993), Breedlove W. L. and Armer J. M. (1996), Breedlove W. L. and Armer J. M. (1997), Bullock B. and Firebaugh G. (1990), Burns T. J. et al. (1994), Burns T. J., Kentor J. D. and Jorgenson, A. (2002), Burns T. J., Kick E. L. and Davis B. L. (2003), Caporaso J. A. (1978), Carroll E. (2000), Chan St. and Mintz A. (1992), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (1975), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (2005), Clark R. (1992), Clark R. et al. (1991), Crenshaw E. M. (1991), Crenshaw E. M. (1992), Crenshaw E. M. (1993), Crenshaw E. M. (1995), Crenshaw E. M. and Ansari A. (1994), Crenshaw E. M. and Jenkins J. C. (1996), Crenshaw E. M. and Oakey, D. R. (1998), Crenshaw E. M.; Ameen A. Z.; and Christenson. M. (1997), Crenshaw E. M.; Christenson M.; Oakey D. R. (2000), Delacroix J. and Ragin Ch. (1981), Dixon C. J., Drakakis-Smith D. and Watts H. D. (1986), Dixon W. J. (1984), Dixon W. J. and Boswell T. (1996b), Dollar D. (2005), Dollar D. and Kraay A. (2000), Dollar D. and Kraay A. (2001a), Easterly W. (2001), Easterly W. (2002), Ehrhardt-Martinez K.; Crenshaw E. M.; and Jenkins J. C. (2002), Evans P. B. and Timberlake M. (1980),



Fain H. D. et al. (1997), Fiala R. (1992), Firebaugh G. (1992), Firebaugh G. (1996), Firebaugh G. and Beck F. D. (1994), Frey R. S. and Field C. (2000), Fukuyama F. (1991), Galtung J. (1971), Galtung J., Chase-Dunn, Ch. K. et al. (1985), Gartner R. (1990), Gholarah H. et al. (2001), Gholami R., Lee S. Y. T and Heshmati A. (2003), Gissinger R. and Gleditsch N. P. (1999), Goldfrank W. L. (1999), Gore A. (1994), Grimes P. and Kentor J. (2003), Hadden K. and London B. (1996), Haouas I; Yagoubi, M; and Heshmati A (2002a), Haouas I; Yagoubi, M; and Heshmati, A. (2002b), Hertz E. et al. (1994), Heshmati A. (2003a), Heshmati A. (2003b), Heshmati A. and Addison T. (2003), Huang J. (1995), Roberts J. T., Grimes P. E. and Jodie L. Manale J. L. (2003), Jenkins J. C. and Scanlan S. J. (2001), Johnson R. B. (1986), Jorgenson A. K. and Rice J. (2005), Kasarda J.D. and Crenshaw E.M. (1991), Kearny A.T. (2001), Kent G. (1995), Kentor J. D. (1998), Kentor J. D. (2001), Kentor J. D. (2005), Kentor J. D. and Boswell T. (2003), Kentor J. D. and Jang J. S. (2004), Kick E. L. and Davis B. L. (2001), Kick E. L. et al. (1990), Kick E. L. et al. (1995), Kick E. L., Davis B. L. and Burns T. J. (1998), Kick E. L., Davis B. L. and Burns T. J. (2000), Klein M. et al. (2001), Klitgaard R. and Fedderke J. (1995), Köhler G. (1976a), Köhler G. and Tausch A. (2002), Kohli A. et al. (1984), Krahn H. and Gartrell J. W. (1985), Lena H. F. and London B. (1993), London B. (1987), London B. (1988), London B. (1990), London B. and Robinson T. (1989), London B. and Ross R. J. S. (1995), London B. and Smith D. A. (1988), London B. and Williams B. A. (1988), London B. and Williams B. A. (1990), Lopez G. A. and Stohl M. (1989), Meyer W. H. (1996), Miller C. D. (1999), Mittelman J. (1994), Moaddel M. (1994), Moon B.E. and Dixon W.J. (1992), Moore M. (2003), Muller E. N. (1988), Muller E. N. (1993), Muller E. N. (1995), Muller E. N. and Seligson M. A. (1987), Munasinghe M., Miguel: de and Sunkel O. (2001), Neapolitan J. L. and Schmallegger F. (1997), Nederveen-Pieterse J. (1997), Nielsen F. (1995), Nolan P. D. (1983), Nollert M. (1994a), Nollert M. (1994b), O'Loughlin J.; Ward M. D.; and Shin M. (1998), Olson M. (1982), Olson M. (1986), Olson M. (1987), Prechel H. (1985), Ragin C. C. and Bradshaw Y. W. (1992), Ram R. (1992), Robinson T.D. and London B. (1991), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1993a), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1993b), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1996a), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1996b), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1999), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (2002), Rothgeb, J. M. Jr. (1995), Rubinson R. (1976), Russett B. (1983a), Russett B. (1983b), Sawada Y. and Yotopoulos P. A. (1999), Sawada Y. and Yotopoulos P. A. (2002), Shafik N. and Bandyopadhyay S. (1992), Shandra J. M., London B. and Williamson J. B. (2003), Shandra J. M., Ross R. J. S., London B. (2003), Shandra J. M.; London B.; Whooley O. P; Williamson J. B. (2004), Shandra J. M.; London B.; Williamson J. B. (2003), Shandra J. M.; Nobles J.; London B.; Williamson J. B. (2004), Shandra J. M.; Nobles, J. E.; London B.; Williamson, J. B. (2005), Shandra J., London B, Whooley O. P., et al. (2004), Shen C. and Williamson J. B. (2001), Shin M. E. (1975), Shin M. E. (2002), Simpson M. (1990), Smith D. A and London B. (1990), Smith D. A. (1994), Smith D. A. (1996), So A. Y. (1990), Soysa I. de (2002), Soysa I. de (2003), Soysa I. de and Gleditsch N. P. (2002), Soysa I. de and John R. Oneal, J. R. (2000), Soysa I. de and Neumayer E. (2005), Spar D. (1999), Stack St. (1998), Stokes R. and Anderson A.. (1990), Sunkel O. (1990), Suter Ch. (2005), Tausch A. (1986), Tausch A. (1989a), Tausch A. (1989b), Tausch A. (1990), Tausch A. (1991), Tausch A. (1998a), Tausch A. (1998b), Tausch A. (2003b), Tausch A. (2005b), Tausch A. (2005d), Tausch A. and Prager F. (1993), Timberlake M. and Kantor J. (1983), Timberlake M. and Williams K.R. (1984), Timberlake M. and Williams K.R. (1987), Trezzini B. and Bornschier V. (2001), Tsai P-L. (1995), Van Rossem R. (1996), Wagstaff A. and Watanabe N. (2002),

Ward K. B. (1984), Weede E. (1985), Weede E. (1990), Weede E. (1992), Weede E. (1993a), Weede E. (1993b), Weede E. (1996a), Weede E. (1996b), Weede E. (1997), Weede E. (1999a), Weede E. (2002), Weede E. (2003), Weede E. (2004a), Weede E. (2004b), Weede E. (2004c), Weede E. (2004d), Weede E. (2005), Weede E. and Muller E. N. (1998), Weede E. and Tiefenbach H. (1981), Wickrama K. A. S. and Mulford Ch. L. (1996), Wimberley D. W. (1990), Wimberley D. W. (1991), Wimberley D. W. and Bello R. (1992), Wimmer A. (2002), Yotopoulos P. A. (1996), Yotopoulos P. A. (1997a), Yotopoulos P. A. (1997b), Yotopoulos P. A. and Floro S. L. (1992), Yotopoulos P. A. and Lin J. Y. (1993), Yotopoulos P. A., Nugent J. B. (1976), Yotopoulos P. and Sawada Y. (2005)].

Dependency authors generally explain backwardness and stagnation by the ever-growing dependent insertion of these countries into the world economy. Starting with the writings of Perroux, Prebisch and Rothschild in the 1930s, their leading spokespersons all would stress the unequal and socially imbalanced nature of development in regions that are highly dependent on investment from the highly developed countries. Short-term spurts of growth notwithstanding, long-term growth will be imbalanced and unequal, and will tend towards high negative current account balances.

Later world system analyses – that started with the writings of the Austro-Hungarian socialist Karl Polanyi after the First World War - tended to confirm and expand this dependency argument. Capitalism in the periphery, like in the center, is characterized by strong cyclical fluctuations, and there are centers, semi-peripheries and peripheries. The rise of one group of semi-peripheries tends to be at the cost of another group, but the unequal structure of the world economy based on unequal transfer tends to remain stable. Authors from the world system approach tended to discard the “culturalist” explanations, offered by Huntington, and rather would support the argument that world economic position, and not culture, determines conflict. The massive world systems literature continues to be a stream of the scientific debate subsisting at the major Universities, publishing houses and scholarly journals around the world, the near complete global triumph of the neo-liberal theory notwithstanding [Arrighi G. (1989), Beaud M. (1990), Chase-Dunn Ch. (1999), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (1991), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (1992a), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (2000), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. and Grimes P. (1995), Denmark R. A., Modelski G., Gills B. K. and Friedman J. (2000), Dunaway W. A. and Wallerstein I. (Eds.)(2003), Frank A. G. (1978a), Frank A. G. (1978b), Frank A. G. (1980), Frank A. G. (1981), Frank A. G. (1983), Frank A. G. (1992), Frank A. G. (1994), Frank A. G. (1998), Frank A. G. and Frank - Fuentes M. (1990), Frank A. G. and Gills B. (Eds.)(1993), Goldfrank W. L. (1978), Goldfrank W. L. (1990), Hettne B. (1989), Hettne B. (1995a), Hopkins T. K. (1982), Hopkins T. K. and Wallerstein I. et al. (1982), Oddone and associates, 2004 – 2005; Polanyi, K. (1979), Polanyi K. (1957), Ray J. L. (1983), Ross R. J. S. and Trachte K.C. (1990), Wallerstein I. (1974), Wallerstein I. (1976), Wallerstein I. (1978), Wallerstein I. (1979a), Wallerstein I. (1979b), Wallerstein I. (1980), Wallerstein I. (1982), Wallerstein I. (1983a), Wallerstein I. (1983b), Wallerstein I. (1984), Wallerstein I. (1986), Wallerstein I. (1989a), Wallerstein I. (1989b), Wallerstein I. (1990), Wallerstein I. (1991a), Wallerstein I. (1991b), Wallerstein I. (1997), Wallerstein I. (1998), and Wallerstein I. (2000)]

Dependency and world system theory generally hold that poverty and backwardness in poor countries – like in Latin America and the Muslim world - are caused by the peripheral position that these nations have in the international division of labor. Ever since the capitalist world system evolved, there is a stark distinction between the nations of the center and the nations of the periphery. Fernando Henrique Cardoso summarized the quantifiable essence of dependency theories as follows:

- there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery
- this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and between them and the centers
- this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery
- this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations
- these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance (Cardoso, 1979)

A rising degree of monopolization in the leading center countries over time determines that, in order to keep the share of wages at least constant, a rising exploitation of the raw material producers sets in to offset the balance. There is massive, internationally published evidence that speaks in favor of dependency theory. However, it would be wrong to portray dependency simply in terms of MNC penetration, and to neglect other aspects of that relationship. Such authors as Singer and Tausch from the dependency camp and Hollis B. Chenery from the World Bank have put emphasis on the **resource balance** as an indicator of the weight of **foreign saving**. The work of the Brazilian economist Paul Israel Singer, which is particularly neglected in the English speaking world, must be especially mentioned here, because his “dependency theory” specifically integrated foreign saving.

Other formulations of dependency insisted on ‘**unequal exchange**’, which, according to one such formulation, hampers development (i.e. double factorial terms of trade of the respective country are  $< 1.0$ ; see Raffer, 1987, Amin, 1975). Labor in the export sectors of the periphery is being exploited, while monopolistic structures of international trade let the centers profit from the high prices of their exports to the world markets in comparison to their labor productivity. Since double factorial terms of trade are simply net barter terms of trade weighted by productivities (F) of X, exports, and M, imports, the formula

$((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = 1$  denotes the conditions of ‘equal’ exchange as opposed to unequal transfer:

$$((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = < 1.0$$

Nations with

$$((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = > 1.0$$

are the countries that benefited from unequal exchange.

Losses or gains from unequal transfer are calculated as the difference between a "fair value" of exports/imports and the "actual (unfair) value" of exports/imports. The estimation formula is:

$$T = d \cdot X - X$$

where

$d$  = the exchange rate deviation index (also designated as "ERD" or "ERDI" in the literature)

$X$  = the volume of exports from a low- or middle-income country to high-income countries (valued at the actual exchange rate)

$T$  = the unrecorded transfer of value (gain or loss) resulting from unequal transfer

The transfer of value from the peripheries to the center, according to this reasoning, is gigantic:

### Unequal transfer 1965 and 1995, by Center/Periphery

	Unequal transfer	
	Gain (+)	Loss (-)
	CENTER (% of OECD GDP)	PERIPHERY (% of NON-OECD GDP)
1965	+1.4%	- 1.8 %
1995	+8 %	-24 %

(Number of countries: OECD N=19 (1965) and N=22 (1995); NON-OECD N=88 (1965) and N=97 (1995)) [See Kohler/Tausch, 2002, further literature on unequal exchange as a development bloc includes today Emmanuel, A. (1972), Köhler G. (1998a), Köhler G. (1998a), Köhler G. (1999a), Köhler G. (1999b), Raffer K. (1987b), Raffer K. (1995), Raffer K. and Murshed S. M. (1993), Raffer K. and Singer H. W. (1996), Raffer K. and Singer H. W. (2001), Sawada Y. and Yotopoulos P. A. (1999), Sawada Y. and Yotopoulos P. A. (2002), Yotopoulos P. A. (1996), Yotopoulos P. A. (1997a), Yotopoulos P. A. (1997b), Yotopoulos P. A. and Floro S. L. (1992), Yotopoulos P. A. and Lin J. Y. (1993), Yotopoulos P. A., Nugent J. B. (1976), and Yotopoulos P. and Sawada Y. (2005)].

**Comparative „price levels“** are, the Eurostat definition goes, the ratio between GDP at purchasing power parities (PPPs) and GDP at market exchange rates for each country. To quote Eurostat:

*“Comparative price levels are the ratio between Purchasing power parities (PPPs) and market exchange rate for each country. PPPs are currency conversion rates that convert economic indicators expressed in national currencies to a common*



currency, called *Purchasing Power Standard (PPS)*, which equalises the purchasing power of different national currencies and thus allows meaningful comparison. The ratio is shown in relation to the EU average (EU-25 = 100). If the index of the comparative price levels shown for a country is higher/ lower than 100, the country concerned is relatively expensive/cheap as compared with the EU average." (Quotation from Eurostat website, April 6, 2005, at: [http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?\\_pageid=1133\\_1406352\\_1133\\_1406373&\\_dad=portal&\\_schema=PORTAL](http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1133_1406352_1133_1406373&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL))

"Comparative price levels" do measure nothing else but the reciprocal value of our variable "unequal exchange" (ERDI). A country, following the Commission's price reform strategy, is a country with a low international price level and a high ERDI.

The abundant research literature on the semi-periphery highlights the non-permanent character of the semi-peripheral position, with historic strong upward and downward movements, but a stability of the structure as such. While some semi-peripheries rise, the others stagnate, almost suggesting that one semi-periphery rises at the cost of the other [Arrighi G. et al. (1991), Arrighi G. et al. (1996c), Arrighi G., Hamashita T. and Selden M. (Eds.)(2003), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. and Hall Th. D. (1997), Inglehart R. and Carballo M. (1997), Martin W. and Wallerstein I. (Eds.)(1990), Tausch A. (1993), Vaeyrynen R. (1997)].

In general terms, we observe today high levels of MNC penetration in the "dominion economies" like Australia and Canada, in Western Europe, in some parts of Eastern Europe, in Central Asia, other parts of the former USSR, in many parts of Latin America, Southern and Western Africa, in Egypt, in Tunisia, and in China and Southeast Asia:

MNC penetration received a vast attention in the published titles of the comparative research literature of the last three decades, among them Bailey P.; Parisotto A. and Renshaw G. (1993), Bornschier V. (1976), Bornschier V. and Heintz P., reworked and enlarged by Th. H. Ballmer - Cao and J. Scheidegger (1979), Bornschier V. et al. (1980), Dixon C. J., Drakakis-Smith D. and Watts H. D. (1986), Gosh P. K. (1984), International Labor Office and United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (1988), International Labour Office (2000), Jenkins R. (1987), Nollert M. (2005), Robinson R. D. (1987), Twomey M. J. (1993), United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (1983), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (current issues), and Wheelwright T. (2001). While different authors disagree on the direction of the influence of MNC penetration on the human condition, they'd all underline the **strong influence** of MNC penetration on employment, economic growth, income distribution and overall development.

**Foreign saving**, for its turn, is strongest in many parts of Latin America, Southern Africa, in the "new Europe" and in China and in several countries of Southeast Asia.

During the 1990s, penetration by transnational capital dramatically increased in many parts of Europe (especially in what was described by Donald Rumsfeld<sup>12</sup>,

<sup>12</sup> See also: <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/01/24012003172118.asp>

US Secretary of Defense as "the new Europe"); in eastern Latin America, in Southern Africa, in Central Asia and in South and Southeast Asia. However, there was a **dramatic decrease of MNC penetration in most countries of the Arab world** during the second half of the 1990s.

As to the **causality** of the **dependency/underdevelopment connection**, perhaps one of the clearest paragraphs to be found in the current literature is to be encountered in the essay written by L. Beer in 1999:

*"As opposed to Modernization theory's emphasis on the internal dynamics of economic growth, World-System and Dependency theories are neo-Marxist perspectives that focus on the global structure of the capitalist world economy.*

*(...) This approach argues that national economic growth, inequality and sociopolitical change can only be understood through the analysis of a nation's relative position in the spacioeconomic hierarchy of the world system. That is, the relationship between economic growth and income inequality within any single nation is dependent on that society's relational position in the world division of labor and global power structure. It is asserted that the dynamics of capitalist accumulation in developing countries are different than the processes observable in core nations.*

*(...) The issue that World-System/Dependency analyses point our attention to is not the lack of economic growth in developing nations, but the type of growth their dependent status affords them and it's consequences.*

*(...) In the World-System/Dependency perspective, capitalist development is dependent on social and material inequality and this inequality is in turn a result of incorporation into the world system. National economic growth and income distribution are in large part determined by growth potentials of productive activities in the larger global structure. Therefore, this approach hypothesizes that stratification of income will correspond with the world division of labor and position in the world economy.*

*(...) There are variants to the World-System/Dependency approach regarding the creation of income inequality, some of which emphasize concentration of land ownership (...) or national export-structure. (...) Many empirical studies of this relationship have confirmed a significant association between foreign corporate penetration.*

*(...) In the World-System/Dependency perspective there are three mechanisms that are hypothesized to link foreign investment and social inequality.*

*(...) . First, foreign investment in developing countries generates large sectoral disparities in the national economy, creates labor aristocracies and results in the underutilization of indigenous labor. Second, transnational corporations operating in developing nations accrue a disproportionate share of local sources of credit and repatriate profits rather than reinvesting them in the local economy. Finally, the governments of these nations, motivated by the necessity (generated by their incorporation into the capitalist world economy) of attracting and maintaining foreign investment, implement policies and strategies that decrease*

*the power of labor and inhibit vertical mobility. These include tax concessions, guarantees of profit repatriation, and labor laws unfavorable to workers.*

*(...) Scholars in the World-System/Dependency tradition argue that the relationship between foreign investment and internal income inequality has different effects on various sectors of the economy, but in all segments it creates and sustains income inequality in the national population.*

*(...) Foreign capital investment in the agricultural sector destroys traditional production processes and leads to unemployment and overurbanization through its capital intensive means of organization (i.e. labor shedding, land enclosure). In the extractive sector of the economy, foreign investment benefits only a small portion of the national population and thereby increases income inequality. This is because TNC penetration in this sector creates only a small well-paid labor force and because ownership of natural resources is typically concentrated.*

*(...) World-System theorists argue that foreign investment in the manufacturing sector has the most harmful effect on national income distribution. National economies in non-core nations with large manufacturing sectors have high levels of income inequality because profits in this sector are increased by the maintenance of a large, surplus low-wage labor force. Therefore, high rates of income inequality are in the interest of transnational corporations and national elites who benefit from foreign investment; they have little incentive to take action to distribute income more equitably. Contrary to the hypotheses of Modernization theorists, the World-System perspective argues that the uneven development of highly penetrated developing economies benefits transnational corporations in that the only segment of the population which can afford to buy these manufactured goods is the wealthy elite.*

*(...) Domestic demand for these goods depends on the concentration of wealth and high levels of income inequality. Although redistribution of wealth and the resultant expansion of markets may be in the long term interest of foreign corporations, they are driven primarily by the short-term profit logic of capitalism.*

*(...) Furthermore, there is a convergence of interests between transnational corporations and the wealthy elite segments of the national population in maintaining income inequality which creates barriers to the "trickle-down" effect of industrialization predicted by Modernization theories. In addition to the incentives for inequity for foreign investors discussed above, the national elite strive to maintain their power and higher income so as to maintain privileged consumption patterns and access to status symbols. A common international class interest in the persistence of high levels of inequality thus link foreign investors and indigenous elites, leading these powerful groups to support (and in some cases attempt to increase) the existing unequal income distribution and to coopt and repress opposition from other segments of the population (...) (Beer, 1999: 4 - 7)*

It seems to be important at this point to emphasize that our three indicators of dependency measure three different types of "dependent development":



- **MNC penetration** measures the different degrees of weight that foreign capital investments have in the host countries
- **Unequal exchange** (ERDI) measures the degree to which globalization has contributed to lowering the international price level of a country; i.e. it is an indicator about the openness of the price system *vis-à-vis* the pressures of globalization. The result of this is an unequal transfer from the peripheries to the centers, which used to be high-price countries
- For dependency authors, **foreign savings** show the weight that foreign savings, mostly from the centers and richer semi-peripheries, have in the accumulation process of the host countries in the periphery and semi-periphery.

Neo-liberal authors, by contrast, interpret the world in a complete different direction from the explanations, offered by dependency theory. For them, **foreign investments** are a solid **pre-condition of growth**. A **reliance on foreign savings** would **not necessarily exclude rapid economic growth and income redistribution** in a world of liberalized financial markets (for an overview of these debates, see Kendall P., 2000; for a dependency-theory oriented counter-position Ghose A. K., 2005). Following the neo-liberal literature on the subject, there would be absolutely no need for **“financial repression”**. Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) believed that “financial repression” [i.e. what neo-liberals term as such, for example capital convertibility controls etc.] had retarded the growth of many less developed countries (LDCs). Interest rate policy which resulted in the imposition of below market rates created a disincentive to save. The results are a shortage of investible resources and growth retardation. Shaw and McKinnon are thus in favor of interest rate liberalization. Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) as well as Barro (1991) maintain that “financial repression” contributed to slow growth in Latin America during 1960 to 1985. The question whether or not foreign savings “crow out” domestic savings might be hotly contested (see Ghose A. K., 2005), but for the neo-liberals it is certain that free flows of global savings and investments contribute to global and national economic and social well-being. Since capital is abundant in the centers and scarce in the periphery, the return on investment is much higher in the periphery than in the center, and capital should flow from the centers to the peripheries. In addition, neo-liberal authors, starting with Michael Lipton, have attacked **“exchange rate overvaluation”** in the developing countries, thus are diametrically **contradicting** the approach by Yotopoulos and other adherents of theories of **“unequal exchange”**, presented above.

Price levels have risen faster than world price levels for the rich countries while the reverse has been the case for the poor countries. Evidence over several decades thus fails to sustain, Rao says, the expectation of growing price convergence from growing globalization. However, neo-liberals would argue that the leveling of world price levels are beneficial for world system and country economic growth rates. The most massive onslaught against the dependency theory consensus [i.e. that dependency leads to stagnation and inequality], is presented by arguments put forward by neo-liberal authors that world economic openness leads to high growth and to a redistribution of incomes. Their preferred measure of world economic openness is the share of foreign trade in total GDP, i.e. countries should re-orient their economic policies towards external markets and unfettered competition.

The following further determinants of the human condition that form part of our model should be mentioned: On a global economy level, **neo-liberal authors** like Barro; Barro and associates; Crafts; Dadush and Brahmbatt; Dollar and Kraay and Weede generally tend to think that with the establishment of **“economic freedom”** positive patterns of development will prevail in practically all countries of the globe, irrespective of their development level. However, such reasoning should not go uncontested. Especially the painful experience of the neo-liberal transformation process in Eastern Europe after the end of Communism is a warning sign to decision-makers and scholars alike that **“economic freedom”** plus **“world economic openness”** alone cannot be for themselves the only necessary, let alone the sufficient condition for a successful capitalist development [Amsden A. H. et al. (1994), Angresano J. (1994), Barta V. and Richter S. (1996), Bauer P. (1998), Bhaduri A. and Laski K. (1996), Borocz J. (1996), Borocz J. (1999), Borocz J. and Kovacz M. (Eds.) (2001), Borocz J. and Sarkar M. (2005), Borocz J. and Smith D. A. (1995), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (1992b), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (Ed.), Cornia G. A. (Ed.) (1993), Cornia G. A. (Ed.) (1994), Cornia G. A. and Panizza R. (Eds.) (2000), Deacon B. (1992a), Deacon B. (1992b), Frank A. G. (1990), Gierus J. (1998), Goldfrank W. L. (1982), Havlik P. (1996), Hettne B. (1994), Hickmann Th. (1994), Hofbauer H and Komlosy A. (1994), Hofbauer H and Komlosy A. (2000), Holmes L. (1999), Holtbruecke D. (1996), Huber P. (1999), Huber P. (1999), Huebner K. (1994), Inotai A. (2001a), Inotai A. (2001b), Inotai A. and Hettne B. (1999), Inotai A. and Hettne B. (2000), Inotai A. and Hettne B. (2001), Inotai A. and Sander H. (2002), Juchler J. (1986), Juchler J. (1992a), Juchler J. (1992b), Juchler J. (1992c), Juchler J. (1992d), Juchler J. (1994), Juchler J. (1995), Juchler J. (2001), Juchler J. (2003), Juchler J. (2004), Linnemann H. and Sarma A. (1991), Morawetz R. (1991), Nolte H. H. (1989), Orenstein M. A. (1996), Orłowski L. T. (1996), Spiesberger M. (1998), Srubar I. (1994), Tausch A. (1991), United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS (1999)]. Thus, selective intervention by the state seems to be the development lesson of East and South-East Asia as well as Scandinavia during the last decades. The ample literature about these aspects of selective government intervention in some of the most competitive economies in the world economy should be more widely known in cross-national research. **“Industrial policy”**, and **“active adoption to the changing structures of the international division of labor”**, and not pure economic freedom seems to be the catchword of the day [Chan St. (1989), Chan St. and Clark C. (1992), Chow P. C. Y. (2002), Cox R.W. (1994), Gereffi G. and Miguel Korzeniewicz M. (1994), Haddad M. (2002), Kiljunen K. (1987), Kiljunen K. (1988), Kiljunen K. (1992), Kiljunen K. (Ed.) (1989), Kiljunen K. (Ed.) (1990), Kiljunen K. and Avakov R. M. (Eds.) (1991), Landesmann M. (1996), Landesmann M. and Burgstaller J. (1997), Landesmann M. and Rosati D. (Eds.) (2004), Landesmann M. and Székely I. (Eds.) (1995) Landesmann M. et al. (Eds.) (2003), Liemt G. van (1992), McCallum C. (1999), Piore M. (1990), Raffer K. (1996), Tausch A. (2002b), Tausch A. (2003), and Tausch A. (2005a)]. In addition, the **“Keynesian”** legacy should not be under-estimated. **“Keynesians”** would expect **positive trade-offs** to hold between **“government intervention”** and **the human condition**, and not the other way around. Major Keynesian analyses include nowadays Baran P. A. (1957), Corden W. M. (1987), Cornwall J. and Cornwall W. (2001), Galbraith J. K. (1995), Kalecki M. (1972), Kalecki M. (1979), Modigliani F. (1987), Schmidt M. G. (1983), Schmidt M. G. (1986), Schwartz H. (2000), Stack St and

Zimmerman D. (1982), Stack St. (1978), Stack St. (1980), Therborn G. (1985), Therborn G. (1986), and Vickrey W. (1996). Apart from that, current literature, formulating counter-positions to the neo-liberal dogma, suggests that the state is not or not always a "villain", with only some neo-liberally inspired studies postulating a general negative trade-off between age of democracy, state sector strength and economic performance, most notably in the works of the German sociologist Erich Weede [for a survey of the debate, see also Almond G. (1991), Apter D. (1987), Axtmann R (2004), Balibar E. (1991), Barnes S. H. et al. (1979), Bollen K. A. and Jackman R. W. (1985), Dixon W. J. (1994), Esping - Andersen G. (1985), Gwartney J. et al. (1998), Jackman R.W. (1975), Korpi W. (1985), Korpi W. (1996), Korpi W. and Palme J. (2000), Kothari R. (1986), Lipset S.M. (1994), London B., Bradshaw Y. and Kim Y. J. (1993), Midgal J. S. (2001), Moeller St. et al. (2003), Weede E. (1986a), Weede E. (1986b), and Weede E. (1989)].

One variable was excluded from the final research design of this analysis, due to the often contradictory results it achieves (Tausch, 2007). Ever since the writings of Colemann (1965), also education should be mentioned among the determining variables of the development performance of a country. **Education and human capital formation** figure prominently in the "*Human Development Reports*" of the United Nations Development Programme as variables which determine positively the development outcome. For the UNDP it has been self-evident over the last decade that gender empowerment and the re-direction of public expenditures away from defense will positively contribute to a positive development outcome. However, neo-liberal thought would caution against such premature conclusions. Erich Weede (2002) has shown that standard indicators of human capital endowment - like literacy, school enrollment ratios or years of schooling - suffer from a number of defects. They are crude. Mostly, they refer to input rather than output measures of human capital formation. Occasionally, Weede and Kaempf believe, they produce implausible effects. They are not robustly significant determinants of growth. They replaced them by average intelligence. This variable consistently outperforms the other human capital indicators in spite of suffering from severe defects of its own. Weede and his associates maintain that the immediate impact of institutional improvements, i.e., more government tolerance of private enterprise or economic freedom, on growth is in the same order of magnitude as intelligence effects are. **Public education expenditures** are still public expenditures, and it is entirely conceivable that in the long run public education expenditures might negatively affect the development chances of a society, not because they are education expenditures, but because they are still public expenditures. For such a theoretical understanding, University reform and University privatization would be important political steps to achieve a more viable development. The UNDP has devoted considerable energies into developing its own kind of human capital and human development approach that quoted large amounts of statistics how much different countries devoted to their "unproductive" military efforts and how little they devoted to the "good" public education expenditures. Such number games, however much they were linked to the generally laudable effort to document world poverty and the lack of basic human needs satisfaction, suffered from a major scientific handicap by evading the vital question to statistically show that – development levels constant – high shares of public education expenditures contribute uniformly to a good development performance, measured by indicators of growth, human rights, social justice, gender empowerment and



ecological well-being, while the “bad” military expenditures contribute to the opposite [see Dasgupta P. (1995), Griffin K. (1987), Griffin K. and Knight J. (Eds.)(1990), O’Neill H. (1997), United Nations Development Programme (1998a); United Nations Development Programme (1998b), United Nations Development Programme (2004), United Nations Development Programme (2005a), United Nations Development Programme (2005b), United Nations Development Programme (current issues), United Nations Development Programme, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (2002), and Yunker J. A. (2000)]. In our macro-quantitative research design, we did not include anymore the well-documented “butter versus guns” dimension [see also Bullock B. and Firebaugh G. (1990), Chan St. and Mintz A. (1992), Deshingkar G. (1989), Kentor J. D. and Woo J. (2000), Kick E. L. et al. (1990), Köhler G. (1978a), Köhler G. (1980a), Köhler G. (1980b), Shin M and Ward M. D. (1999), Tausch A. (1986), and Tausch A. (1989a)], because the availability of military expenditure data would have limited our sample with countries with complete data for the independent variables to less than 120 nations. However, the effects of public education on development are not uniformly positive (Tausch, 2007).

Our theoretical survey should be concluded by two processes, being of great importance especially to the European continent. One is the obvious argument about the **European Union** as a determining factor of European development patterns, for good or for bad. There are very diverse views nowadays on the European Union. As a research paper, published in the journal “*Parameters*” of the US Army, maintains (Wilkie, 2003):

*“Still, there are those on both sides of the Atlantic who believe that the European Union, as an old-fashioned socialist bureaucracy, is “fundamentally unreformable” and also culturally hostile to the United States” (Wilkie, 2003: 46)<sup>13</sup>*

There is a wide range of literature now available that highlights also the negative effects of European integration in a globalized world economy [for a survey of the literature and politometric evidence, see Tausch and Herrmann, 2001, furthermore Botsford D. (1997), Chiti V. (1998), Friedman M. (1997), Fuest C. (1996), Giering C. (1998), Haller M. (Ed.)(2001), Haller M. and Richter R. (Ed.)(1994), Haller M. and Schachner-Blazizek P. (Ed.)(1999), Haller M. and Schachner-Blazizek P. (Eds.)(1994), Heidenreich M (1997), Heidenreich M (1998a), Heidenreich M (1998b), Heidenreich M. (1999), Heidenreich M. (2001a), Heidenreich M. (2001b), Heidenreich M. (2003a), Heidenreich M. (2003b), Heidenreich M. (2004a), Heidenreich M. (2004b), Heidenreich M. (2004c), Heidenreich M. and Töpsch K. (1998), Hilferding R. (1915), Holzmann R. (Ed.)(1996), Malcolm N. (1995), Nollert M. (1996), Nollert M. and Fielder N. (1997), Portillo M. (1999), Rothschild K. W. (1997), Seers D. (Ed.)(1978), Tausch A. (2004a), Van Apeldoorn B. (2002), Woods A. (2000), Woodward A. and Kohli M. (2001)]. The voice of “euro-optimists” is small, but influential, including later works by Volker Bornschier, and the writings by economics Nobel laureate Robert Mundell and Stanford Professor emeritus Pan Yotopoulos. [Bornschier V. (1992), Bornschier V. (1999), Mundell R. A. and Clesse A. (Eds.)(2000), Mundell R. A. et. al. (Eds.)(2005), and Yotopoulos P. A. (2004)].

<sup>13</sup> <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/wilkie.htm>

The well-known **acceleration** and **maturity** effects of development have to be qualified in an important way. Ever since the days of Simon **Kuznets**, development researchers have applied curve-linear formulations in order to capture these effects. The curve-linear function of **growth**, being regressed on the natural logarithm of development level and its square, is sometimes called the 'Matthew's effect' following Matthew's (13, 12):

*'For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, for him shall be taken away even that he hath'*

Social scientists interpreted this effect mainly in view of an acceleration of economic growth in middle-income countries *vis-à-vis* the poor countries and in view of the still widening gap between the poorest periphery nations ('have-nots') and the 'haves' among the semi-periphery countries (Jackman, 1982).

Finally, we also should mention the variable "**pension reform**", which was included into our research design. Proponents and critics of fully funded, three-pillar pension models alike agree on the fact that pension reform policy is one of the biggest challenges that especially advanced democracies with their age structure are facing in world society. To neglect pension funds in investigations about the capitalist world economy would be misleading. Private pension funds already amount to 44 % of current world GDP, with countries like the United States; Japan; United Kingdom; Netherlands; Canada; Switzerland; Australia; Sweden; Ireland; Finland; and Denmark taking the lead in fund development either via the introduction of a "World Bank" three pillar pension model or simply via a strong element of private pensions ("the third pillar") besides the first, traditional PAYGO pillar (like presently in the United States of America). Slow pension fund development in most countries of the €-zone determines that the overall share of private pension funds from the €-zone is just over 2 % of world GDP. If Europe wants to fulfill its Lisbon agenda of catching up with the United States, it must, the argument runs, overhaul its pension systems and introduce some form or other of private pension funds, which are a major force in financing technological advance in the capitalist world economy today. Tausch (2004) showed that World Bank pension reforms are associated in a positive way with the rates of change of a country's performance to the better. The time-series correlations for each country in the world system from 1980 onwards with economic growth (World Bank data series), unemployment (ILO data series), and economic inequality (University of Texas Inequality Project) are neatly explained by the explanatory variables of the multivariate model; the direction of the influence of pension reform on the three dependent variables each time indicating that pension reform is compatible with economic growth, full employment and the redistribution of incomes. The same positive effects are also at work in explaining economic growth, full employment and reductions of unemployment over time in Europe's over 300 different regions. The European regions, whose countries realized a three-pillar pension model, developed more rapidly and had – *ceteris paribus* – a better employment record than non-reformers. Persistent non-reform, as the German example especially dramatically shows, can lead to a *circulus viciosus* of stagnation and unemployment under the conditions of globalization [see also Barr N. (2001), Boersch-Suppan A., Ludwig A., and Winter J. (2003), Brooks S. and James E. J. (1999), Cadette W. (1999), Clark G. L. (2001a), Clark G. L. (2001b), Dahlmanns G. (2000), European Commission (2000a), European Commission (2000b), European Roundtable of

Industrialists, ERT (2001), Ferrera M. (2005), Fink M. and Schuh U. (2005), Fox L. and Palmer E. (2000), Gray C. and Weig D. (1999), Hagfors R. (2000), Hausner J. (1999), Holzmann R. (2000a), Holzmann R. (2000b), Holzmann R. (2004), Holzmann R. (2005), Holzmann R. (Ed.)(2001), Holzmann R. (Ed.)(2002), Holzmann R. et al. (1999), Kay St. J. (1999), Lindemann D. (2000), Mackellar L. et al. (2000), Modigliani F. (1985), Modigliani F. and Muralidhar A. (2004), Modigliani F., Ceprini M.L., and Muralidhar A. (2000), Normann G. and Mitchell D. J. (2000), Orenstein M. A. (2001), Orłowski L. T. (1995), Orszag P. R. and Stiglitz J. E. (1999), Paul S. S. and Paul J. A. (1996), Quiggin J. (1998), Raffer K. (2003), Roos J. P. (2000), Rothenbacher F. (2000), Rother P. C., Catenaro M. and Schwab G. (2003), Rutkowski M. (1998), Rutkowski M. (1999), Scherman C. G. (2000), Siebert H. (2000), St. John S. (1999), Tausch A. (2004b), Tausch A. (Ed.)(2003), The World Bank Group (2000), and Turner J. (2000)]. The integration of the pension reform variable with the research design presented here would be an important task for future research. In this essay, however, we concentrate ourselves on the effects of globalization on world development.

This canon of well-established variables wielding important causal effects on development was now confronted in the present analysis with two “newcomers” to the cross-national debate, Muslim culture and patterns of world migration.

**Cultural theories** of development tend to stress that at present development perspectives for the large Muslim region between Morocco in the West and Iran in the East are not good. Their principal spokesperson today is Huntington, but also such diverse sources as the UNDP's *Arab Human Development Report* (2002) or the World Bank's *MENA Report* (2002) tend to highlight the various development constraints in that region. While the UNDP stresses lack of democracy, human resource development and gender equality as the main development blocks, the World Bank highlights the negative heritage of “Arab Socialism” or past state sector influence. Several authors, among them Noland<sup>14</sup> and Tausch, explicitly contradicted Huntington with empirical, cross-national evidence, however. With all the global interest being expressed nowadays on Islam after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the negligence of the issue of Muslim culture as a variable in cross-national comparative social science is surprising. For an informed debate, *inter alia* the following cross-national-research-relevant literature is available [Abdullah M. S. and Khoury A. Th. (1984), Garcia de Cortázar F. and Gonzáles Vesga J. M. (1995), S. P. (1993), Huntington S. P. (1996), Jabber P. (2001), Khoury A. Th. (1980), Khoury A. Th. (1981), Khoury A. Th. (1991), Moaddel M. (1996), Moaddel M. (1998), Moaddel M. (2004), Raffer K. and Salih M. A. M. (Ed.)(1992), Tausch A. (2003b), Tausch A. (2005c), Tausch A. (2005d), Tibi B. (1973), Tibi B. (1981), Tibi B. (1985), Tibi B. (1990), Tibi B. (1992), Tibi B. (1997a), Tibi B. (1997b), Tibi B. (1997c), Tibi B. (1998a), Tibi B. (1998b), Tibi B. (2001a), and Tibi B. (2001b)].

<sup>14</sup> see especially: Marcus Noland and associates: <http://www.iiie.com/publications/pb/pb04-4.pdf> and <http://www.iiie.com/publications/wp/2003/03-8.pdf>. Arno Tausch: (2005) 'Is Islam really a development blockade? 12 predictors of development, including membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference, and their influence on 14 indicators of development in 109 countries of the world with completely available data'. Ankara Center for Turkish Policy Studies, ANKAM, Insight Turkey, 7, 1, 2005: 124 - 135. Full PDF version available at [http://www.insightturkey.com/tausch2005\\_multivariate\\_analysis\\_world\\_dev.pdf](http://www.insightturkey.com/tausch2005_multivariate_analysis_world_dev.pdf)



Next, we turn to the effects of **migration** on development. For one, a research design similar to the one reported here already had been tested with worker remittances as a further explanatory variable, besides the variables mentioned here (Tausch, 2004c). Inotai and associates have dramatically shown the burdens that western protectionism imply for the catching-up process of the East European semi-periphery. Inotai correctly points out, quite in the spirit of Balassa and Samuelson in 1964:

*At present, the differences in wages between the existing EU member countries and the candidate countries are striking, even though, in a few cases, the huge gap has started to narrow in recent years. It is a certainty that in the next several years most CEECs will experience substantial wage pressure, and not only as a consequence of the coming EU accession. The productivity gap between the EU average and some of the better-prepared candidate countries is much less than the wage gap, which will make adjustment unavoidable. The basic question is how this adjustment process will be managed. It is a question not only of the speed and timing of the process, but also of the factor mix. Wage differences have to be considered on the basis of disposable income (which should be used to predict migration potential as well, rather than real wage differences). The narrowing of the wage gap does not depend only on differences in real wage increases in the coming years between the European Union and the candidate economies. No less important are exchange rate developments, or, more precisely, currency appreciations in the CEECs (even if workers there perceive an increase in their income only when they buy imported goods or travel abroad). Finally, lower taxes can noticeably contribute to higher disposable income. This, however, will require comprehensive tax reform, which is already on the agenda in some candidate countries.*

*Exchange rate policies are a critical component of sustainable development, particularly at times of structural transformation. High productivity gains in recent years and still-untapped opportunities for such gains argue for a gradual appreciation of the national currency without major risks to the sustainability of competitiveness. However, a too-drastic appreciation, which can accompany the free floating of the currency within a relatively large band, can seriously damage the position of many in the economy, particularly the less competitive small and medium-size firms. Since these are an important part not only of the economic but also of the social network of a given country, the sustainability of the catch-up process may be jeopardized from both a social and a political point of view. (The recent examples of Poland and Hungary provide some costly lessons.)*

*All experts consider the arrival of the euro and the eventual accession of new member countries to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to be a fundamental challenge. Binding the national currency to the euro has several advantages, from more efficient anti-inflationary policies to reduced volatility of the exchange rate to a general increase of confidence in the economy. On the other hand, the lack of maneuvering room under the new currency may strangle economic development and could conceivably end in depression. Such a situation is more likely to happen if the adjustment to the Maastricht criteria is too quick or--and this seems not unlikely--if the introduction of the euro has strong economic and psychological impacts not only on the members of the euro area but also on*

those candidate countries that are heavily dependent on EU commodity, services, and capital markets.

Perhaps the most dangerous consequence could be growing social opposition or even hostility to some key elements of the catch-up process. Developments in recent years have led to a highly uneven distribution of income and have burdened large parts of society with adjustment costs, and the search for scapegoats has already started. If populist and demagogic arguments come to identify the international environment in general, and foreign capital and the European Union in particular, as the main enemies of a "genuine national development," the sustainability of the modernization process could come into question. (Inotai A. "Sustainability of the Transformation Process in Central and Eastern Europe", available at: <http://www.inwent.org/ef-texte/web02/inotai.htm>)

In Tausch/Herrmann, it was said on the other hand that large scale outward migration from the periphery to the center conserves economic structures in the periphery that inhibit peripheral world economic adjustment. The most pronounced proponents of mass migration, it was further argued, from the semi-periphery and periphery are in reality those very social strata that represent the powerful urban power monopolies: instead of bringing their monopolies under the discipline of the market and allowing their agricultural regions to prosper under a system of export-led growth and mass-demand at home, they are inclined to send a considerable part of their talented work-force abroad so that it does not constitute any threat to the elites' privileged social position. State sector expenditures and a reliance on foreign aid will be part and parcel of such a migration-driven development model. The empirical evidence that was achieved by combining available data for worker remittances in 59 countries with a 109 country sample with complete data of the general model, presented in Tausch (2003b, 2005c, and 2005d) confirms a mixture of world system and neo-classical interpretations:

1) dependency on worker remittances is highly influenced by the supply of free and relatively high standard education in many of the semi-periphery countries that is reflected in the public education expenditure per GDP indicator. This argument would tend to be compatible with standard neo-classical analysis. But the status of a country as a guest worker economy is also greatly influenced by the "flows of unequal exchange", or – to put it in the language of the neo-classics, exchange rate under-valuation; and ceteris paribus Muslim nations have a significantly higher propensity towards migration. Labor scarcities in the center that drain up the "industrial reserve army", like those induced by high military expenditures; certainly contribute significantly towards the status of a country as a net labor importer.

2) outward migration eases to a great extent the national sending country gap between rich and poor, but it significantly (5 % level) is associated with slow economic growth. Outward migration reduces unemployment in the sending countries, but the effect is not significant. There are very significant positive effects on female shares in total life years and female economic activity rates (very well explainable by arising scarcities on the labor market caused by massive male outward migration), as well as on combined indices of development (the Human Development Index). There is also a 12.5 % significant

positive effect on female life expectancy. The effect of migration on the environment is contradictory: on the one hand, outward migration increases the transport intensity of a country, and thus reduces the GDP output efficiency of energy use (significant at the 12.5 % level). Outward migration is also associated with higher CO2 emissions per capita (not significant at the 12.5 % level), but the Yale/Columbia overall environment sustainability index is significantly better at the 12.5 % level (most probably, because the pressure on farm land and other resources, especially in the rural regions, decreases with massive outward migration). Interestingly enough, also the other conjecture is true: countries at the receiving end of international migration flows will be tending towards unequal growth, with deficient gender development and human development. They will experience a socially polarized development pattern, characterized by high gaps between rich and poor, but by a rapid rate of economic growth.

By and large, these results tended to support the view that much more intensive research on migration, social well being and the world system is needed to reach a canon of well-confirmed hypotheses on the subject [Arrighi G. and Silver B. J. (1984), Bauer Th. and Zimmermann, K. F. (1999), Boehring W.R. and Schloeter - Paredes M.L. (1994), Cohen R. (1991), Cohn - Bendit D. (1993), Coppel J. et al. (2001), Datta A. (1993), Franzmeyer F./Brücker H. (1997), Garson J. P. et al. (1997), Goedings S. (1997), Goedings S. (1999), ICMPD (1998), IFO-Institut (1999), IOM (International Organization for Migration) (1999), Korcelli P. (1992), Lindert P. H, and Williamson J. G. (2001), Loeffelholz H. D., und G. Köpp (1998), Morawska E. (2000), Nuscheler F. (1993), Opitz P. J. (1988), Parnreiter Ch. (1994), Rogers R. (1992), Salt J. (1996), Salt J. et al. (1999), Stalker P. (1994), Tausch A. (1997), Tausch A. (2004c), United Nations Economic and Social Council (1993a), United Nations Economic and Social Council (1993b), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (1994), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (1996), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (1998), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and United Nations Population Fund (1998), United States Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Intelligence Board (2001), United States Department of State (current issues), Williamson J. G. (1991), Williamson J. G. (1996), Williamson J. G. (1997), Williamson J. G. (1998a), and Williamson J. G. (1998b)].

Countering some alarmist voices in the West, neither migration nor Muslim culture are to be blamed for the contemporary crisis, but the very nature of unequal capitalist accumulation and dependency that is at the core of the world capitalist system.

What is our quantitative proof for this? The United Nations World Economic and Social Survey, 2004, presents for the first time in the international literature a really comparable data set on migration patterns in world society from 1950 to 2000. The data are presented in the Table below, ranked by the total number of immigrants in millions of persons.

**Table 3: the world migration balances, 1950 - 2000**

	total net migration 1950-2000	popula tion in 2000	total net migr. rate 1950-2000 as % of total pop. 2000
United States	32,1	285	11,26
Germany	9,5	82	11,59
Canada	5,8	31	18,71
France	4,7	59	7,97
Australia	4,4	19	23,16
Saudi Arabia	4,1	22	18,64
Russia	2,9	146	1,99
Cote d'Ivoire	2,2	16	13,75
Hong Kong, China	1,9	7	27,14
Israel	1,7	6	28,33
Jordan	1,3	5	26,00
Argentina	1,2	37	3,24
Venezuela	1,2	24	5,00
Switzerland	1,1	7	15,71
South Africa	1	44	2,27
Ukraine	0,9	50	1,80
Netherlands	0,8	16	5,00
Tanzania	0,7	35	2,00
Sweden	0,7	9	7,78
Azerbaijan	0,7	8	8,75
Malaysia	0,6	23	2,61
Greece	0,6	11	5,45
Japan	0,5	127	0,39
Belgium	0,5	10	5,00
<b>Austria</b>	<b>0,5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6,25</b>
Libyan AJ	0,4	5	8,00
United Kingdom	0,3	59	0,51
Czech Republic	0,2	10	2,00
Zambia	0,2	10	2,00
Senegal	0,2	9	2,22
Denmark	0,2	5	4,00
Brazil	0,1	172	0,06
Ethiopia	0,1	66	0,15
Spain	0,1	41	0,24
Kenya	0,1	31	0,32
Cameroon	0	15	0,00
Congo, Dem Rep	0	49	0,00
Papua New Guinea	0	5	0,00
Sudan	0	31	0,00
Uganda	0	23	0,00
Slovakia	-0,1	5	-2,00
Chad	-0,1	8	-1,25
Rwanda	-0,1	8	-1,25
Niger	-0,1	11	-0,91
Serbia	-0,1	11	-0,91
Zimbabwe	-0,1	13	-0,77
Madagascar	-0,1	16	-0,63
Finland	-0,2	5	-4,00

Honduras	-0,2	6	-3,33
Guinea	-0,2	8	-2,50
Ecuador	-0,2	12	-1,67
Iran	-0,2	66	-0,30
Nigeria	-0,2	115	-0,17
Lao People's Democratic Republic	-0,3	5	-6,00
Paraguay	-0,3	5	-6,00
Angola	-0,3	12	-2,50
Myanmar	-0,3	48	-0,63
Pakistan	-0,3	143	-0,21
Georgia	-0,4	5	-8,00
Nicaragua	-0,4	5	-8,00
Hungary	-0,4	10	-4,00
Malawi	-0,4	11	-3,64
Cambodia	-0,4	13	-3,08
Syria	-0,4	17	-2,35
Yemen	-0,4	18	-2,22
Uzbekistan	<b>-0,4</b>	<b>25</b>	-1,60
Korea, Republic of	-0,4	47	-0,85
Somalia	-0,5	9	-5,56
Chile	-0,5	15	-3,33
Iraq	-0,5	23	-2,17
Benin	-0,6	6	-10,00
Bolivia	-0,6	8	-7,50
Dominican Republic	-0,6	8	-7,50
Nepal	-0,6	24	-2,50
Tajikistan	-0,7	6	-11,67
Haiti	-0,8	8	-10,00
Belarus	-0,8	10	-8,00
Ghana	-0,8	20	-4,00
Italy	-0,8	58	-1,38
Bulgaria	-0,9	8	-11,25
Tunisia	-0,9	10	-9,00
Mozambique	-0,9	18	-5,00
Korea, North	-0,9	122	-0,74
Bangladesh	-0,9	138	-0,65
El Salvador	-1	6	-16,67
Cuba	-1	11	-9,09
Thailand	-1	61	-1,64
Peru	-1,1	26	-4,23
Burundi	-1,2	6	-20,00
Guatemala	-1,2	11	-10,91
Romania	-1,2	22	-5,45
Sri Lanka	-1,3	19	-6,84
Mali	-1,4	12	-11,67
Kazakhstan	-1,4	16	-8,75
Poland	-1,4	39	-3,59
Burkina Faso	<b>-1,5</b>	<b>12</b>	-12,50
Portugal	-1,8	10	-18,00
Morocco	-1,8	29	-6,21
Turkey	-1,8	68	-2,65
Vietnam	-1,8	78	-2,31
Algeria	-2,1	30	-7,00
Indonesia	-2,2	212	-1,04



Columbia	-2,4	42	-5,71
Afghanistan	-3,1	21	-14,76
Egypt	-3,5	68	-5,15
Philippines	-4,2	76	-5,53
India	-4,4	1017	-0,43
China	-5,5	1275	-0,43
Mexico	-8,7	99	-8,79

Macroquantitative analyses modeled around the dependency/world system school generally claimed to have confirmed dependency arguments. According to these quantitative data analyses, there are powerful influences at work, which cause inequality and external imbalances in the periphery. Flagship essays and book publications of this school include nowadays over 50 studies, published internationally, dealing with dependency, economic growth and or income inequality [Alderson A. and Nielsen F. (1999), Alderson A. S., Beckfield J. and Nielsen F. (2005), Babones S. J. (2002), Beer L. (1999), Beer L. and Boswell T. (2002), Bergesen A. and Fernandez R. (1999), Bornschier V. and Ballmer-Cao, T. H. (1979), Bornschier V. and Chase-Dunn Ch. K (1985), Bornschier V., Chase-Dunn Ch. and Rubinson R. (1977), Boswell T. and Dixon W.J. (1990), Bradshaw Y. and Huang J. (1991), Breedlove W. L. and Armer J. M. (1996), Caporaso J. A. (1978), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (1975), Crenshaw E. M. (1991), Crenshaw E. M. (1992), Crenshaw E. M. (1993), Crenshaw E. M. and Ansari A. (1994), Delacroix J. and Ragin Ch. (1981), Dixon W. J. and Boswell T. (1996b), Evans P. B. and Timberlake M. (1980), Fiala R. (1992), Galtung J. (1971), Galtung J., Chase-Dunn, Ch. K. et al. (1985), Johnson R. B. (1986), Kentor J. D. (1998), Kentor J. D. (2005), Kentor J. D. and Boswell T. (2003), Kick E. L. and Davis B. L. (2001), Kohli A. et al. (1984), Krahn H. and Gartrell J. W. (1985), London B. (1987), London B. and Ross R. J. S. (1995), London B. and Smith D. A. (1988), Moaddel M. (1994), Muller E. N. (1988), Muller E. N. (1993), Nielsen F. (1995), Nolan P. D. (1983), Prechel H. (1985), Rubinson R. (1976), Russett B. (1983a), Russett B. (1983b), Shandra J. M., Ross R. J. S., London B. (2003), Shandra J. M.; London B.; Whooley O. P.; Williamson J. B. (2004), Shandra J. M.; Nobles, J. E.; London B.; Williamson, J. B. (2005), Shandra J., London B, Whooley O. P., et al. (2004), Suter Ch. (2005), Tausch A. (1998a), Tausch A. (1998b), Tausch A. (2005b), Timberlake M. and Kantor J. (1983), Trezzini B. and Bornschier V. (2001), Tsai P-L. (1995), and Wimberley D. W. and Bello R. (1992)].

There has been a tendency in more recent cross-national research to focus not only on such variables as economic growth, income inequality and a few other indicators of social well-being, but to interpret "well-being" more widely to include also democracy, demographic transition, freedom from crime, freedom from structural imbalances in the economy, gender equality, political stability, respect for human rights, the environment. Research results by these scholars in general terms indicate that there is reason to believe that the march of global capitalism not only negatively affects the distribution of economic values in the world system, but also of democracy, human development, gender equality and the quality of the environment. These 70 or more studies were published, as their counterparts on the detrimental effects of dependence on economic growth and income inequality, with leading scholarly journals or publishing houses, thus publicizing a scholarly well-founded "globalization critique" [Bradshaw Y. (1987), Bradshaw Y. W. and Schafer M. J. (2000), Bradshaw Y. W., Noonan R; and Gash L. (1993), Breedlove W. L. and Armer J. M. (1997), Burns T. J. et al. (1994), Burns T. J., Kentor J. D. and Jorgenson, A. (2002), Burns T. J., Kick E. L. and



Davis B. L. (2003), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (2005), Clark R. (1992), Clark R. et al. (1991), Crenshaw E. M. (1995), Crenshaw E. M. and Jenkins J. C. (1996), Crenshaw E. M. and Oakey, D. R. (1998), Crenshaw E. M.; Ameen A. Z.; and Christenson. M. (1997), Crenshaw E. M.; Christenson M.; Oakey D. R. (2000), Dixon W. J. (1984), Ehrhardt-Martinez K.; Crenshaw E. M.; and Jenkins J. C. (2002), Fain H. D. et al. (1997), Frey R. S. and Field C. (2000), Gartner R. (1990), Ghobarah H. et al. (2001), Gissinger R. and Gleditsch N. P. (1999), Goldfrank W. L. (1999), Gore A. (1994), Grimes P. and Kentor J. (2003), Hadden K. and London B. (1996), Hertz E. et al. (1994), Huang J. (1995), J. Timmons Roberts J. T., Grimes P. E. and Jodie L. Manale J. L. (2003), Jenkins J. C. and Scanlan S. J. (2001), Jorgenson A. K. and Rice J. (2005), Kasarda J. D. and Crenshaw E.M. (1991), Kent G. (1991); Kentor J. D. (2001), Kentor J. D. and Jang J. S. (2004), Kick E. L. et al. (1995), Kick E. L., Davis B. L. and Burns T. J. (1998), Kick E. L., Davis B. L. and Burns T. J. (2000), Lena H. F. and London B. (1993), London B. (1988), London B. (1990), London B. and Robinson T. (1989), London B. and Williams B. A. (1988), London B. and Williams B. A. (1990), Miller C. D. (1999), Miller M. A. L. (1995), Mittelman J. (1994), Moon B.E. and Dixon W.J. (1992), Munasinghe M., Miguel: de and Sunkel O. (2001), Neapolitan J. L. and Schmallegger F. (1997), Nollert M. (1994a), Ragin C. C. and Bradshaw Y. W. (1992), Ram R. (1992), Robinson T.D. and London B. (1991), Shandra J. M., London B. and Williamson J. B. (2003), Shandra J. M.; London B.; Williamson J. B. (2003), Shandra J. M.; Nobles J.; London B.; Williamson J. B. (2004), Shen C. and Williamson J. B. (2001), Shin M. E. (1975), Shin M. E. (2002), Smith D. A. and London B. (1990), Smith D. A. (1994), Smith D. A. (1996), Stack St. (1998), Stokes R. and Anderson A.. (1990), Tausch and Prager, 1993, Ward K. B. (1984), Wickrama K. A. S. and Mulford Ch. L. (1996), Wimberley D. W. (1990), and Wimberley D. W. (1991)].

This essay is well within the tradition of cross-national, macro-political and macro-sociological research. The fundamental literature on the subject and recent highlights in the relevant methodological debate are assumed to be known here [Achen Ch. H. (1982), Berry W. D. and Feldman S. (1985), Bollen K. A. (1980), Clauss G. and Ebner H. (1978), Davis B. L., Kick E. L. and Burns T. J. (2004), Deininger K. and Squire L. (1996), Deutsch K. W. (1960), Deutsch K. W. (1966), Deutsch K. W. (1978), Deutsch K. W. (1979), Deutsch K. W. (1982), Dixon W. J. and Boswell T. (1996a), Goldstein J. S. (1985a), Haller M. (2003), Haller M. (Ed.)(1990), Kriz J. (1978), Krzysztofiak M. and Luszniwicz A. (1979), Kuznets S. (1955), Lewis - Beck M. S. (1980), Lundberg M. and Squire L. (2001), Nielsen F. and Alderson A. (1997), Opp K.D. and Schmidt P. (1976), Paukert F. (1973), Puchala D. J. (2003), Russett B. (1967), Tellis A. J. et al. (2001), and Whitehouse E. (2000)].

At this point and in view of the results confirmed in this work it seems appropriate to recall here that Galtung's original 1969 essay was all connected to his theory of "structural violence". Galtung at that time was not interested in economic growth, but in "structural violence", and what Peadar Kirby today calls "vulnerability", which is occurring when life conditions of a partner in a systematic interaction are below levels which might be potentially experienced in a different, and more just global social order (i.e. the large majority segments of population living in poverty in the periphery, referred to in "critical peace research" as the "periphery of the periphery", are subjected to a relationship of domination, wielded by the small and powerful elites in the Third World, which is

part and parcel of the domination structure, commanded by the elites of the center over the entire global structure). The term “potential realizations”, introduced by “critical peace research” in the late 1960s and early 1970s is also important here, for it links life conditions to the level of development of the productive forces in society. We interpret this as nothing else but the residuals from the “plateau curve of basic human needs”, introduced by Joshua Goldstein in his article in “World Development”, 1985. Let us re-analyze in this context Galtung’s famous definition:

*“(…) the basic idea is that there is such a concept as “premature death.” This we know, because we know that with some changes in social structure, in general and health structure in particular, life expectancy can be improved considerably. More particularly, it may be possible to give to the whole population the life expectancy of the class enjoying appropriate health standards, that is, the “upper classes.” The level enjoyed by them would be an indicator of the potential possibility to “stay alive” in that society; for all but the upper classes that would be above the actual possibility to stay alive. The difference when avoidable, is structural violence”. (Galtung, 1969)*



*“Violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations (...) Violence is here defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance” (Galtung, 1969)*

*“The structural violence is the sum total of all the clashes built into the social and world structures and cemented, solidified so that unjust, inequitable outcomes are almost unchangeable”. (Professor Johan Galtung, on his website at <http://www.transcend.org/TRRECBAS.HTM>)*

*“violence as avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible” (Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, article on “Structural violence” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural\\_violence](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_violence))*

Graph 11 immediately follows from the above quotations:


**Graph 11: structural violence in the world system and the plateau curve of basic human needs – the actual somatic and mental realizations of the citizens of the countries of the world are below their potential realizations**




The gaps in life expectancy development in relation to the non-linear trade-off with the level of productive forces are distributed in the following fashion in the countries of the world system:

Map 1: structural violence in the world system

# structural violence



Legend: "bis" is the shorthand for "ranging from" "to". Countries marked in green color: missing values



Legend: "bis" is the shorthand for "ranging from" "to". Countries marked in green color: missing values

The 12 predictors in our equations measure the already achieved development level as an important control variable for possibly diminishing returns on capital, 3 important processes of economic history and geography (transition process, access to the seas versus landlocked countries, urbanisation) as well as 3 dimensions of globalization, economic freedom versus state interventions and two variables that measure possible counter-identities to the otherwise now "unified house of capitalism" – the membership of a country in the "house of Islam" ("*Dar al Islam*") or membership in the European Union (EU-15).

**The choice of the 140 countries was determined by the availability of a complete data series for these independent variables (if not mentioned otherwise, UNDP data):**

- **(I-S)/GNP (calculated from UNDP 2000)**
- development level  $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})$
- development level, square (maturity effects)  $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})^2$

- EU-15-membership (EU member by the year 2000, dummy variable)
- Islamic conference membership (OIC website<sup>15</sup>)
- **MNC PEN 1995 (UNCTAD)**
- Dummy: transition country<sup>16</sup>
- Dummy: landlocked country<sup>17</sup>
- Urbanisation<sup>18</sup>
- state interventionism (absence of economic freedom; Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal website for economic freedom<sup>19</sup>, 2000)
- **unequal transfer (calculated from UNDP, concept: ERDI, reciprocal value of comparative "price levels" (developed on the basis of the ERD-Index Yotopoulos et al.)<sup>20</sup> (the Commission maintaining that a low value is good result)**

These variables correspond to the following dimensions:



<sup>15</sup> <http://www.oic-oci.org/> there the icon "members".

<sup>16</sup> Taken from William Easterly, EXCEL data file freely available at <http://www.cgdev.org/content/expert/detail/2699/>

<sup>17</sup> Taken from William Easterly, EXCEL data file freely available at <http://www.cgdev.org/content/expert/detail/2699/>

<sup>18</sup> Taken from William Easterly, EXCEL data file freely available at <http://www.cgdev.org/content/expert/detail/2699/>

<sup>19</sup> These data are contained in <http://www.freetheworld.com/>; also: <http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/>. We used the latter website as the source of our data. It has to be kept in mind that the "worst" countries on the economic freedom scale have the numerically highest values, while the best countries have the numerically lowest values. Lao People's Dem. Rep. – the economically "unfreest" country in our sample, has the numerical value 4.6, while the economically freest country, Singapore, scores 1.45. We thus decided to call our indicator "state interventionism"

<sup>20</sup> it can be shown that the Eurostat data series GDP PPP per capita/GDP exchange rate per capita (EU-25=100), used for the "price level", in reality measure GDP exchange rate per capita/GDP PPP per capita (EU-25=100).

<sup>21</sup> See nationmaster.com at [http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/rel\\_isl\\_per\\_mus-religion-islam-percentage-muslim](http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/rel_isl_per_mus-religion-islam-percentage-muslim)



### **Recent world economic history**

Dummy for transition economy  
Development level and development level squared [ $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})$  and  $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})^2$ ]

### **Pension Reform efforts**

World Bank pension reform

The list of our dependent variables is long and multidimensional. We claim to present with this analysis one of the most comprehensive synopses of the logic of post-1989 development available in the literature.

We proceeded in each multiple regression with list wise deletion of missing data from the list of dependent variables.

### **Democracy**

Absence of democracy: political rights violations (Easterly, 2006<sup>22</sup>)  
Absence of democracy: civil rights violations (Easterly, 2006)

### **Environment**

CO2 emissions per capita  
ESI-Index ((Yale/Columbia environment sustainability index project website)  
GDP output per kg energy use (*"eco-social market economy"*<sup>23</sup>)

### **Gender development and gender empowerment**

Female economic activity rates as percentage of male economic activity rates

### **Human development**

% people not expected to survive age 60  
life expectancy, 1995-2000

<sup>22</sup> Taken from William Easterly, EXCEL data file freely available at <http://www.cgdev.org/content/expert/detail/2699/>

<sup>23</sup> This term is most probably an Austrian invention. The governing Conservative People's Party – to be precise, its former Chairman Dr. Josef Riegler – seems to have invented this term in the late 1980s. For more on that debate: <http://www.nachhaltigkeit.at/bibliothek/pdf/Factsheet11OekosozMarktw.pdf>; and Michael Rösch, Tübingen University at [http://tiss.zdv.uni-tuebingen.de/webroot/sp/spsba01\\_W98\\_1/germany1b.htm](http://tiss.zdv.uni-tuebingen.de/webroot/sp/spsba01_W98_1/germany1b.htm). As an indicator of the reconciliation between the price mechanism and the environment we propose the indicator GDP output per kg energy use; the term 'eco-social market economy' neatly grasps all the aspects of this empirical formulation

**Redistribution, growth and employment policies**

economic growth 1990-2003  
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% (quintile ratio)

**(Equation 1a) development performance**  $_{1990 - \text{end } 1990s} = a_1 \pm b_1$  \*first part curvilinear function of development level  $\pm b_2$  \*second part curvilinear function of development level  $\pm b_3$  \* **stock of transnational investment per GDP (UNCTAD) mid 1990s**  $\pm b_4$  \* **comparative price levels (ERDI)**  $\pm b_5$  \* **foreign saving**  $\pm b_6$  \* **dummy transition economy**  $\pm b_7$  \* **percentage of the population adhering to the Muslim faith**  $\pm b_8$  \* **European Union membership**  $\pm b_9$  \* **state interventionism**  $\pm b_{10}$  \* **urbanisation**  $\pm b_{11}$  \* **dummy landlocked country**  $\pm b_{12}$  \* **dummy World Bank pension reform**

**(Equation 1b) development performance**  $_{1990 - \text{end } 1990s} = a_1 \pm b_1$  \*first part curvilinear function of development level  $\pm b_2$  \*second part curvilinear function of development level  $\pm b_3$  \* **stock of transnational investment per GDP (UNCTAD) mid 1990s**  $\pm b_4$  \* **comparative price levels (ERDI)**  $\pm b_5$  \* **foreign saving**  $\pm b_6$  \* **dummy transition economy**  $\pm b_7$  \* **membership in the Islamic Conference**  $\pm b_8$  \* **European Union membership**  $\pm b_9$  \* **state interventionism**  $\pm b_{10}$  \* **urbanisation**  $\pm b_{11}$  \* **dummy landlocked country**  $\pm b_{12}$  \* **dummy World Bank pension reform**

***Results for the effects of Muslim population as a percentage of total population***

The t-values and the directions of influence in the multiple regressions are the following. For reasons of brevity, we only mention results, which are significant at the 10 % level:

**Table 4: the significant effects of Muslim culture on development, compared to other predictors**

variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003	Dimension
Muslims as % of total population	-4,075	-2,786		-2,321	2,523	2,072		-2,019	1,943			MUSLIM CULTURE
(I-S)/GNP	5,404	4,847	-2,167	-2,816	1,768		-3,556			-2,556		ALTER-GLOBALIZATION vs. WASHINGTON CONSENSUS NEOLIBERALISM
state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)			-1,758					-2,498	2,166			WASHINGTON CONSENSUS NEOLIBERALISM
MNC PEN 1995									-2,241			ALTER-GLOBALIZATION vs. WASHINGTON CONSENSUS NEOLIBERALISM
low comparative international price level (ERD)	3,061	2,007				-1,794		3,226	-2,032			ALTER-GLOBALIZATION vs. WASHINGTON CONSENSUS NEOLIBERALISM
world bank pension model	2,658			2,351	-2,087	-2,599					-2,719	WASHINGTON CONSENSUS NEOLIBERALISM
EU-membership (EU-15)	4,801	5,384								-1,787	-2,477	EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
landlocked country								-1,943	2,522			GEOGRAPHY
Dummy for transition economy			-2,584	2,342	-2,290	-1,918	5,959	6,576	2,115			DEVELOPMENT HISTORY
Urbanization ratio, 1990			2,400	-3,260	3,317	3,624	-6,119	-5,989				GEOGRAPHY
ln(GDP PPP pc)	2,294	2,447					-2,793	2,947	-1,854		-3,666	DEVELOPMENT HISTORY
ln (GDP PPP pc)^2			-3,188	-1,988	2,381	4,699	6,046	3,182	-3,692			DEVELOPMENT HISTORY
Dimension	POL DEV	POL DEV	JUSTICE	HUM DEV	HUM DEV	HUM DEV	GENDER	ENVIRON	ENVIRON	ENVIRON	ECON	
R^2	0,641	0,660	0,316	0,732	0,784	0,912	0,492	0,747	0,714	0,396	0,319	
F entire equation	18,000	19,554	3,465	27,572	36,513	104,868	9,775	27,582	19,804	6,126	4,616	
error probability, entire equation	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	

**Table 5: t-values for the variable “Muslims per cent of total population”**

	Muslims as % of total population
<b>Political rights violations, 1998</b>	-4,07542
<b>Civil liberty violation, 1998</b>	-2,7856
<b>% people not expected to survive age 60</b>	-2,32143
<b>CO2 emissions per capita</b>	-2,01932
<i>female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate</i>	<b>-0,7578</b>
<i>ESI-Index</i>	<b>-0,4217</b>
<i>quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)</i>	<b>0,31076</b>
<b>economic growth, 1990-2003</b>	1,357943
<b>eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)</b>	1,943243
<b>HDI 2005</b>	2,072334
<b>life expectancy, 1995-2000</b>	2,522753

### ***Results for the effects of membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference***

Likewise, the results for the membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference maintain or optimistic conclusions, to be drawn from Table 9.2

Our research design with the independent variables

- (I-S)/GNP
- Dummy for being landlocked
- Dummy for transition economy
- EU-membership (EU-15)
- Islamic conference
- $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})^2$
- $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})$
- low comparative international price level (ERD)
- MNC PEN 1995
- state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)
- Urbanization ratio, 1990
- world bank pension reform

yielded the following results:

**Table 6: determinants of global well-being. Not Islam, but neo-liberal globalization is the problem**

(t-test from global regression analyses)

effect from/ on →	freedom from political rights violations, 1998	freedom from civil liberty violations, 1998	freedom from % people not expected to survive age 60	freedom from a high quintile ratio (share of income/ consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	freedom from high CO2 emissions per capita	economic growth, 1990- 2003	life expectancy, 1995- 2000	eco- social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	rough estimate of total effects (combined t-values)
<b>Islamic conference membership</b>	<b>4,2772 15</b>	<b>2,8395 68</b>	<b>2,2044 58</b>	- 0,70796 6	<b>2,9076 41</b>	<b>2,7373 06</b>	<b>2,3629 13</b>	<b>2,1494 19</b>	- 0,85650 3	17,9140 5
state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	1,02185 56	0,68456 07	0,88551 62	<b>1,7085 45</b>	<b>2,1343 28</b>	- 0,14635	0,83543 18	<b>1,8444 25</b>	- 0,16586 2	8,80245 05
ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	1,15172 8	0,43093 02	<b>1,7592 98</b>	<b>3,3436 3</b>	- <b>3,4034 9</b>	0,58720 5	<b>2,1465 2</b>	- <b>3,8457 7</b>	<b>6,3983 26</b>	7,39396 68
landlocked country	- 0,19896	0,05141 53	- 0,18633 5	- 0,12199 5	<b>1,7244 41</b>	0,80674 66	- 0,34718	<b>2,2317 26</b>	0,36844 7	4,32830 69
Dummy for transition economy	0,78402 56	1,37815 01	- <b>2,4153 3</b>	<b>2,7391 81</b>	- <b>6,1995 8</b>	0,36511 2	- <b>2,4725 2</b>	<b>2,4405 51</b>	<b>5,8375 31</b>	1,72689 74
Urbanization ratio, 1990	- 0,46933 1	- 1,05460 5	<b>3,2994 65</b>	- <b>2,5718 4</b>	<b>5,6605 43</b>	0,77615 04	<b>3,4683 29</b>	- <b>1,8428 6</b>	<b>-5,9905</b>	1,27536 35
MNC PEN 1995	- 0,04869 8	- 0,27839 9	1,40073 76	1,65880 6	- 1,62030 7	- 0,42091 3	0,93988 45	- <b>2,1849 6</b>	- 1,25820 59	0,70435 25
(I-S)/GNP	- <b>4,9186 3</b>	- <b>3,3492 6</b>	0,68803 46	<b>1,7327 19</b>	- 1,09484	0,29196 05	- 0,33206	0,10582 99	- <b>2,4624 7</b>	- 9,33871 9
world bank pension model	- <b>2,4277 7</b>	- 0,68995 4	- <b>2,3775 6</b>	- 1,28771 2	0,38183 99	<b>-2,982</b>	- <b>2,1011 6</b>	1,34292 77	- 0,43423 4	- 10,5756 2
ln(GDP PPP pc)	- <b>2,1370 4</b>	- <b>2,1876 6</b>	1,63974 75	- 0,94982 6	- <b>2,9370 3</b>	- <b>3,3739 1</b>	- <b>1,8470 93</b>	- 1,52815 8	- <b>3,4591 6</b>	- 13,0859 5
EU- membership (EU-15)	- <b>5,0076 2</b>	- <b>5,3350 5</b>	- 1,25448 4	- 0,26199 1	- 0,00734 9	- 1,00588 8	- 1,40894 6	0,39552 67	- 1,10513 5	- 14,9909 4
low comparative international price level (ERD)	<b>-4,064</b>	- <b>2,9893 2</b>	- <b>1,7345 5</b>	- 0,74742 7	- <b>3,4548 6</b>	<b>2,9507 4</b>	- <b>2,3841 5</b>	- <b>1,6892 2</b>	- 0,95987 9	- 15,0726 6
R^2	62,156	61,070	71,959	30,953	73,357	35,213	78,019	70,525	47,500	
F	17,38	16,60	27,16	3,44	27,07	5,62	37,56	19,54	9,57	
Error probability, total equation	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	

## Results for the effects of migration rates and membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference

Additionally introducing net migration (Table 9.1) into our equations, based on the predictors

(I-S)/GNP  
 Dummy for being landlocked  
 Dummy for transition economy  
 EU-membership (EU-15)  
 Islamic conference  
 $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})^2$   
 $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})$   
 low comparative international price level (ERD)  
 MNC PEN 1995  
 state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)  
 total net migration rate 1950-2000 as % of total pop. 2000  
 Urbanization ratio, 1990  
 world bank pension reform

we arrive at the following results:

**Table 7a: The effects of migration on development (a positive immigration rate is to be observed in immigration countries, while a negative migration rate is typical of labour surplus societies in the periphery and semi-periphery of the world system)**

t-value total net migration rate 1950-2000 as % of total pop. 2000	effect on
1,279069	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)
1,27459	economic growth, 1990-2003
1,160785	ESI-Index
0,607328	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate
0,511675	HDI 2005
0,059306	% people not expected to survive age 60
-0,01645	Political rights violations, 1998
-0,07726	life expectancy, 1995-2000
-0,22916	CO2 emissions per capita
-0,27561	Civil liberty violation, 1998
-0,39828	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)



We also tested the differential effects of migration on world society in general and on the developed OECD democracies in particular:

**Table 7b: The differential effects of migration on development in world society as a whole and in the OECD country subsample**

difference	total net migration rate 1950-2000 as % of total population, 2000 - OECD countries	total net migration rate 1950-2000 as % of total population, 2000 - world system	effect on
-1,4458	-0,171216	1,27459	economic growth, 1990-2003
-1,042	0,2370199	1,27907	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)
-0,9069	-1,182469	-0,2756	Civil liberty violation, 1998
-0,713	-0,201283	0,51167	HDI 2005
-0,6039	-0,681136	-0,0773	life expectancy, 1995-2000
-0,2871	-0,516276	-0,2292	CO2 emissions per capita
-0,1404	-0,156868	-0,0165	Political rights violations, 1998
0,30646	1,4672463	1,16078	ESI-Index
0,67493	0,7342385	0,05931	% people not expected to survive age 60
0,98385	1,5911818	0,60733	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate
1,96051	1,562226	-0,3983	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)

## Discussion

In our summary, to be presented here, we concentrate on the specification equation 1a above that measures the effects of the variable “Muslims as a percentage of total population” in comparison with the other, more traditional variables of cross-national development research. We present t-values and the direction of influence, significant at least at the 10 % level. The results, using OIC-membership as a “dummy variable” largely, and again, confirm our analysis.

Our first result concern the effects of **Muslim culture** on development. The empirical test reveals that – *ceteris paribus* – there is lot of reason for optimism for the future of inter-cultural relations, with the percentage of Muslims per total population **positively** affecting the human rights, the human development, and the ecological record of a country.

variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003
Muslims as % of total population	-4,075	-2,786		-2,321	2,523	2,072		-2,019	1,943		

**Geography**, as William Easterly correctly observes, also plays an important part in today's cross-national development determinants. Paradoxically enough, the status of a country as a **landlocked country** significantly and positively affects two of the three environment variables under scrutiny here.

variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003
landlocked country								-1,943	2,522		

**Urbanisation** also plays a major role. In the vast quantitative literature on globalization and development, there is recurrent reference to the issues of "structural disarticulation", i.e. the imbalance between the different economic sectors. Although highly urbanised, and often prematurely urbanized societies in Africa, Asia and Latin American can manage better than their less urbanised counterparts the problem of CO2 emissions (with population density making environmental investments, public transport and energy saving less costly), and although they tend to have a very positive human development record, their main structural deficits are income polarization and a very high social exclusion of women from employment, thus supporting earlier literature that tended to analyze structural disarticulation on such terms [see the results, reported by Breedlove W. L. and Armer J. M. (1997), Huang J. (1995), Stokes R. and Anderson A.. (1990), Wickrama K. A. S. and Mulford Ch. L. (1996)]. The same applies to the interesting studies on premature and "inflated" urbanization that is well compatible with the original writings of dependency theory [see: Bradshaw Y. (1987), Bradshaw Y. W. and Schafer M. J. (2000), Crenshaw E. M. and Oakey, D. R. (1998), Kasarda J.D. and Crenshaw E.M. (1991), Smith D. A and London B. (1990), Smith D. A. (1996)].

variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003
Urbanization ratio, 1990			2,400	-3,260	3,317	3,624	-6,119	-5,989			

Easterly also correctly points out that what we call here **development history** plays an important role in the determination of development. **Transition economies** still tend to be characterized by comparatively lower rates of economic inequalities and higher shares of women in the labor force, and notably enough they tended to increase their eco-market efficiency in recent years, but still they are characterized by very high rates of CO2-emissions.

variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003
Dummy for transition economy			-2,584	2,342	-2,290	-1,918	5,959	6,576	2,115		

Next, we look into the well-known curve-linear effects of development levels on development performance. The first expression in the well-known **acceleration and maturity effects of development**  $- + b1 * \ln (PCIt_n) -$  yields the following results. The immediate **effects** of rising **development levels** on world development are deteriorating human rights records, increasing marginalization of women on the labor market, rising environmental strains and sinking rates of economic growth, thus contradicting the optimistic views of the development process. Much of the ills of the Middle Eastern region, often attributed to Islam, are in reality nothing else but the expression of this “modernization crisis” of all poorer countries in the world system, already described in great detail by the classics of political science. Most notably enough, several of these ills seem to disappear with rising levels of per capita incomes (see below).

variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003
ln(GDP PPP pc)	2,294	2,447					-2,793	2,947	-1,854		-3,666

The **second more optimistic part of the “Kuznets-curve”** -  $b_2 * (\ln(\text{PCI}_{it}))^2$  - has the following **results** for the “maturity effects” of development: the human development and the gender specific employment record of a society dramatically improve, and social cohesion makes good progress after certain levels of development are being reached. The price for this in social terms are deteriorating ecological balances, thus making far-reaching environmental policies and consciousness necessary already at lower stages of development.

variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003
ln(GDP PPP pc)^2			-3,188	-1,988	2,381	4,699	6,046	3,182	-3,692		

**Muslim culture** is not an impediment against human rights, human development and ecological development, but *ceteris paribus* the **European Union** is. Our results again clearly contradict many of the expectations inherent in the writings of Professor Samuel Huntington. Three dimensions of development – human rights, human development and ecological development, are *ceteris paribus* positively and significantly determined by the percentage share of Muslims per total population, while the old member countries of the EU (EU-15) have – *ceteris paribus* – a very negative human rights balance, slow economic growth and a low environment sustainability index (ESI index).

variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003
EU-membership (EU-15)	4,801	5,384								-1,787	-2,477

Our results about the separate effects of **globalization** are not as clear-cut as one might expect from the literature. As one of the three main indicators of dependency, the **reliance on foreign savings** eases the distribution burden against the poorer segments of society during the accumulation process and it positively affects the human development record in society, but it hampers environmental sustainability and it has a negative effect on female employment, and it is to be considered as one of the main negative determinants of the human rights record of a country:

variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003
(I-S)/GNP	5,404	4,847	-2,167	-2,816	1,768		-3,556			-2,556	

**MNC penetration** contributes to a negative balance of a country on the eco-social market economy indicator, while other, often well-known effects on economic growth, human survival and life expectancy cannot be maintained any longer under the specifications of the present research design.

variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003
MNC PEN 1995									-2,241		

The costs of **World Bank pension reforms** in social terms seem to be very high. Our cross-national design confirms the scepticism, voiced by such authors

as Raffer (2003), thus also contradicting earlier findings reported in Tausch (Ed.) (2003).

variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003
world bank pension model	2,658			2,351	-2,087	-2,599					-2,719

Contrary to the neo-liberal credo, **state interventionism** increases the social cohesion and improves the eco-social efficiency of a country.

variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003
state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)			-1,758					-2,498	2,166		

The crown jewel of neo-liberal European Union policies, the **lowering of comparative price levels**, or, if you wish, **unequal exchange**, has negative significant effects on the human rights record, on the human development index, and on two of the three ecological indicators presented here.


variable	Political rights violations, 1998	Civil liberty violation, 1998	quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)	% people not expected to survive age 60	life expectancy, 1995-2000	HDI 2005	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	CO2 emissions per capita	eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)	ESI-Index	economic growth, 1990-2003
low comparative international price level (ERD)	3,061	2,007				-1,794		3,226	-2,032		



This process – just as the contradictory effects of modernity described above - , well explains the crisis in many parts of the Middle East. Several Muslim countries are not in crisis, because they are Muslim, but because they suffer from the general contradictions of the modernization process, and because they have a low comparative international price level or – if you wish – they suffer from unequal exchange. Our following maps show the dramatic world shifts in price levels relative to the United States in recent years, and support our hypothesis that largely **unequal exchange** (or neo-liberal price reform strategies), **are to blame for many of the present ills of the Muslim world**. Contrary to what European policy makers expected with their Eurostat **politically binding price level indicator**, which is, after all, **one of their 14 main Lisbon targets**, the United States as the Lisbon competition country was a high price region throughout much of the late 1990s and the early 2000s.

In 1998, and in comparison to the US, Canada and Australia, much of Europe was still a high-price region, while the Muslim countries were all low-price regions:


**Map 2: Comparative price levels (US=100) in the world system, 1998**



Legend: "bis" is the shorthand for "ranging from" "to". Countries marked in green color: missing values

In 2002 however, important European countries had a lower relative price level than the United States, while most Muslim countries pushed through a neo-liberal price reform policy path:

**Map 3: Comparative price levels, 2002 (US=100). The United States became a global high-price country, while several European countries and the Muslim world lost their relative position**




Legend: "bis" is the shorthand for "ranging from" "to". Countries marked in green color: missing values

It is important to grasp the **"tectonic shifts"** that underlie this process. Our following map shows the radical character of the neo-liberal transformation that many European nations, but also Egypt, Iran and Turkey had undergone in what Rao called *"the growing price convergence from growing globalization."* Europe pushed liberal, free trade policies, pushing down its price level in a much more radical fashion than the United States of America:

Map 4: comparisons of the shifts, 1998 – 2002 in the “Atlantic arena” and the world in genral

# DYN price level 98/02



Legend: “bis” is the shorthand for “ranging from” “to”. Countries marked in green color: missing values

$$\text{DYN price level} = (100/\text{ERD } 2002 * 0,9927670) - (100/\text{ERD } 1998 * 1,01248497)$$

$$\text{ERD US } 2002 = 0,9927670; \text{ ERD US } 1998 = 1,01248497$$

By and large, it is shown that the member countries of the “old” EU-15, and especially the Euro zone countries, are on the losing side in that transnational equation. No “old” European country improved its position; on the contrary, “old Europe” becomes a region that is itself a victim of unequal transfer. It also emerges that *ceteris paribus* the Muslim world indeed became the main loser of these tectonic shifts.

It is entirely conceivable that these pressures – as Gernot Kohler has shown and as we already hinted at above – also explain a good part of the negative trends

on the labor markets in the Muslim countries and in Europe (Tausch/Heshmati, 2007).

The vast dependency and world systems research literature on **globalization and the decaying environment** receives qualified support.  $(I-S)/Y$ , i.e. foreign savings, negatively affects the environment sustainability index, state interventions in reality are helpful in achieving a better environmental balance, and MNC penetration negatively affects the capability of a country to achieve a better eco-social economy balance. Low comparative price levels desastrously affect the environment, thus replicating earlier findings about the negative effects of globalization on the environment [see Beckerman W. (1992), Burns T. J. et al. (1994), Burns T. J., Kick E. L. and Davis B. L. (2003), Crenshaw E. M. and Jenkins J. C. (1996), Ehrhardt-Martinez K.; Crenshaw E. M.; and Jenkins J. C. (2002), Fain H. D. et al. (1997), Goldfrank W. L. (1999), Grimes P. and Kentor J. (2003), J. Timmons Roberts J. T., Grimes P. E. and Jodie L. Manale J. L. (2003), Jorgenson A. K. and Rice J. (2005), Munasinghe M., Miguel: de and Sunkel O. (2001), Shafik N. and Bandyopadhyay S. (1992), Shandra J. M., and London B. and Williamson J. B. (2000)].

The literature on **dependency as a reason of repression, political and social conflict** also receives **confirmation**. Pro-globalization policies that increase all either foreign savings, price reform or World Bank inspired pension reforms, or the two or three mentioned indicators at once, all negatively affect the human rights record of a country, thus again replicating many of the earlier research findings by cross-national development research [Lopez G. A. and Stohl M. (1989), Meyer W. H. (1996), Muller E. N. (1995), O'Loughlin J.; Ward M. D.; and Shin M. (1998), Simpson M. (1990), Spar D. (1999), Timberlake M. and Williams K.R. (1984), Timberlake M. and Williams K.R. (1987)]. But no significant negative effects can be reported for the other repression, political and social conflict variables under scrutiny here, thus only allowing a rather cautious confirmation of the earlier quantitative research literature [Gartner R. (1990), Gissinger R. and Gleditsch N. P. (1999), Kick E. L., Davis B. L. and Burns T. J. (2000), London B. and Robinson T. (1989), London B. and Williams B. A. (1988), Mittelman J. (1994), Neapolitan J. L. and Schmallegger F. (1997), Nollert M. (1994a), and Robinson T.D. and London B. (1991)].

Support for a **gender-oriented world systems theory** is to be found in the multiple regression that shows the strong negative trade-off between foreign savings and **female employment**. **State interventions** alleviate **social injustices**, and furthermore, variables of **neo-liberal globalization negatively** affect the **basic human needs** record of a society, to be measured by life expectancy, early death or the human development index.

High **foreign savings** have **good effects for the freedom of a society from a high income concentration** – [again measured by the ratio of the share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%]. High foreign savings also positively affect the basic human needs record. The reaction to the quantitative evidence on dependency, **income distribution and economic growth** was massive indeed in the macro-quantitative research literature. After the pioneering studies by Volker Bornschier and his school in Zurich [based on the famous compendium of data by Bornschier V. and Heintz P., reworked and enlarged by Th. H. Ballmer - Cao and J. Scheidegger (1979), with the first

research results published among others in Bornschier V. et al. (1980)], this debate never really ended, and grew to hundreds of titles in the major journals of social sciences, especially published in the United States of America. That dependency in the short term might lead towards spurts of growth, but to long-term stagnation and an unequal distribution of incomes, was among the early consensuses of this kind of theory. Needless to say that Latin American dependency theory – especially in the works of Fernando Henrique Cardoso – never accepted such a stagnation oriented implications of dependency “economic growth theory”, while in the macro-quantitative research literature this theme received an enormous attention. Only some of the most important titles can be mentioned here [see Alderson A. and Nielsen F. (1999), Alderson A. S., Beckfield J. and Nielsen F. (2005), Babones S. J. (2002), Beer L. (1999), Beer L. and Boswell T. (2002), Bergesen A. and Fernandez R. (1999), Bornschier V. and Ballmer-Cao, T. H. (1979), Bornschier V. and Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (1985), Bornschier V., Chase-Dunn Ch. and Rubinson R. (1977), Boswell T. and Dixon W.J. (1990), Bradshaw Y. and Huang J. (1991), Breedlove W. L. and Armer J. M. (1996), Caporaso J. A. (1978), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (1975), Crenshaw E. M. (1991), Crenshaw E. M. (1992), Crenshaw E. M. (1993), Crenshaw E. M. and Ansari A. (1994), Delacroix J. and Ragin Ch. (1981), Dixon W. J. and Boswell T. (1996b), Evans P. B. and Timberlake M. (1980), Fiala R. (1992), Galtung J. (1971), Galtung J., Chase-Dunn, Ch. K. et al. (1985), Johnson R. B. (1986), Kentor J. D. (1998), Kentor J. D. (2005), Kentor J. D. and Boswell T. (2003), Kick E. L. and Davis B. L. (2001), Kohli A. et al. (1984), Krahn H. and Gartrell J. W. (1985), London B. (1987), London B. and Ross R. J. S. (1995), London B. and Smith D. A. (1988), Moaddel M. (1994), Muller E. N. (1988), Muller E. N. (1993), Nielsen F. (1995), Nolan P. D. (1983), Prechel H. (1985), Rubinson R. (1976), Russett B. (1983a), Russett B. (1983b), Shandra J. M., Ross R. J. S., London B. (2003), Shandra J. M.; London B.; Whooley O. P.; Williamson J. B. (2004), Shandra J. M.; Nobles, J. E.; London B.; Williamson, J. B. (2005), Shandra J., London B, Whooley O. P., et al. (2004), Suter Ch. (2005), Tausch A. (1998a), Tausch A. (1998b), Tausch A. (2005b), Timberlake M. and Kantor J. (1983), Trezzini B. and Bornschier V. (2001), Tsai P-L. (1995), and Wimberley D. W. and Bello R. (1992)].

True enough, this literature received an unusual attention also from neo-liberal authors. The uncomfortable facts (with or without “”) of globalization and dependence, leading towards poverty and stagnation, could not go uncontested, because such facts contradict the very basic neo-liberal assumptions of how our global system works and should work. Writers were quick to point out several of the methodological difficulties of the dependency + stagnation + income inequality paradigm, and as the numbers of published articles supporting dependency theory grew, so did the methodological critiques in tandem [Firebaugh G. (1992), Firebaugh G. (1996), Firebaugh G. and Beck F. D. (1994), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1993a), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1993b), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1996a), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1996b), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1999), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (2002), Rothgeb, J. M. Jr. (1995), Soysa I. de (2002), Soysa I. de (2003), Soysa I. de and Gleditsch N. P. (2002), Soysa I. de and John R. Oneal, J. R. (2000), Soysa I. de and Neumayer E. (2005), Van Rossem R. (1996), Weede E. (1985), Weede E. and Tiefenbach H. (1981)]. Neo-liberal authors, writing mostly in the 1990s, went further by trying to prove that the opposite of dependency theory holds true – not dependency, but the very lack of world economic openness and state sector influence are to blame for Third World stagnation and indeed for global



economic ills. In the neo-liberal 1990s, this approach became the dominant paradigm [Barro R. J. (1991), Barro R. J. (1994), Barro R. J. (1996a), Barro R. J. (1996b), Barro R. J. (2000), Barro R. J. (2001), Barro R. J. (2003), Barro R. J. (2004a), Barro R. J. (2004b), Barro R. J. and Grilli V. (1994), Barro R. J. and McCleary R. M. (2003a), Barro R. J. and McCleary R. M. (2003b), Barro R. J. and McCleary R. M. (2004), Barro R. J. and Sala-i-Martin X. (1991), Barro R. J. and Sala-i-Martin X. (1995/98), Barro, R. J. and Sala-i-Martin X. (1992), Becker G. (1993), Betcherman G. (2002), Bhagwati J.N. (1989), Carroll E. (2000), Dollar D. (2005), Dollar D. and Kraay A. (2000), Dollar D. and Kraay A. (2001a), Fukuyama F. (1991), Gholami R., Lee S. Y. T and Heshmati A. (2003), Haouas I; Yagoubi, M; and Heshmati A (2002a), Haouas I; Yagoubi, M; and Heshmati, A. (2002b), Harss C. and Maier K. (1998), Heshmati A. (2003a), Heshmati A. (2003b), Heshmati A. and Addison T. (2003), Kearny A.T. (2001), Moore M. (2003), Nederveen-Pieterse J. (1997), Olson M. (1982), Olson M. (1986), Olson M. (1987), Weede E. (1990), Weede E. (1992), Weede E. (1993a), Weede E. (1993b), Weede E. (1996a), Weede E. (1996b), Weede E. (1997), Weede E. (1999a), Weede E. (2002), Weede E. (2003), Weede E. (2004a), Weede E. (2004b), Weede E. (2004c), Weede E. (2004d), Weede E. (2005), Weede E. and Muller E. N. (1998)].

But our final cross-national evidence regarding economic growth and income redistribution is rather mixed: while foreign savings alleviate social inequalities (as already predicted by the dependency author Paul Israel Singer) economic growth is negatively affected by neo-liberal World Bank pension reforms. Most determinants of growth and redistribution however belong to the institutional sphere – EU membership, the transition process, and the urbanization process.

The **most promising research direction for future dependency and world system research** will deal with **vulnerability (Kirby, 2006), social conditions and structural violence**. The earlier more than two dozen studies, which receive ample confirmation here, are, among others Bradshaw Y. W., Noonan R; and Gash L. (1993), Burns T. J., Kentor J. D. and Jorgenson, A. (2002), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (2005), Dixon W. J. (1984), Frey R. S. and Field C. (2000), Ghobarah H. et al. (2001), Jenkins J. C. and Scanlan S. J. (2001), Kick E. L. et al. (1995), Kick E. L., Davis B. L. and Burns T. J. (1998), Klitgaard R. and Fedderke J. (1995), Lena H. F. and London B. (1993), London B. (1990), London B. and Williams B. A. (1990), Moon B.E. and Dixon W.J. (1992), Ragin C. C. and Bradshaw Y. W. (1992), Ram R. (1992), Shandra J. M.; Nobles J.; London B.; Williamson J. B. (2004), Shen C. and Williamson J. B. (2001), Shin M. E. (1975), Shin M. E. (2002), Tausch A. (1989b), Tausch A. (1990), Tausch A. (1991), Tausch A. and Prager F. (1993), Wimberley D. W. (1990), and Wimberley D. W. (1991). Support for a **gender-oriented world systems theory** is to be found in the multiple regression that shows the strong negative trade-off between foreign savings and **female employment**. **State interventions** alleviate **social injustices**, and furthermore, variables of **neo-liberal globalization negatively** affect the **basic human needs** record of a society, to be measured by the effects of World Bank pension reforms on the human development record and by neo-liberal price reform on the human development index.

Dependency theory, to this day, connected with **globalization critique** and also **liberation theology** in the world's South [see inter alia: Kirby P. (1981), and Müller Andreas et al. (2000)]; for a neo-liberal critique of liberation theology



Novak M. A. (1987), and Novak M. A. and Jackson M. P. (1985)], poses uneasy questions about the justness of our global order, and automatically receives a more thorough “screening” by world scholarship than contending neo-liberal theories, real methodological problems that might exist notwithstanding [for the neo-liberal critique of published quantitative dependency and world systems theory writings see the per se brilliant articles Firebaugh G. (1992), Firebaugh G. (1996), Firebaugh G. and Beck F. D. (1994), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1993a), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1993b), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1996a), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1996b), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (1999), Rothgeb J. M. Jr. (2002), Rothgeb, J. M. Jr. (1995), Soysa I. de (2002), Soysa I. de (2003), Soysa I. de and Gleditsch N. P. (2002), Soysa I. de and John R. Oneal, J. R. (2000), Soysa I. de and Neumayer E. (2005), Van Rossem R. (1996), Weede E. (1985), Weede E. and Tiefenbach H. (1981)].

Scholars and policy-makers alike would be well advised to study the **“dissidents”** (in one way or the other) of the **not at all so homogeneous camp of neo-classical economics**, often coinciding with a continuation of debates begun by classical development economics of the 1940s, 1950s and the early 1960s. The contradictions and inefficiencies of the “neo-model” are too obvious, and critical assumptions are hardly met in the oligopolistic environment of a periphery or semi-periphery country, characterized by centuries of colonization [Abbott J. P. and Worth O. (2002), Aghion Ph. and Williamson J. G. (1998), Alexandratos N., Bruinsma J. and Yotopoulos P. A. (1983), Chenery H. and Syrquin M. (1975), Dadush U. and Brahmabhatt M. (1995), Easterly W. (2001), Easterly W. (2002), Floro S. L. and Yotopoulos P. A. (1991), Gurr T. R. (1991), Holzmann R. (1999), Kanbur R. (2001), Kanbur R. (2005), Kanbur R. and Squire L. (2001), Lewis Sir W.A. (1978), Meier G.M. and Seers D. (Eds.)(1984), Milanovic B. and Squire L. (2005), Mills J. (2002), Myrdal G. (1972), Myrdal G. (1974), Myrdal G. (1984), O’Hara P. A. (2000), O’Hara P. A. (2003a), O’Hara P. A. (2005b), O’Hara P. A. (Ed.)(2001), O’Hara P. A. (Ed.)(2004), Pepelasis A. and Yotopoulos P. A. (1962), Perroux F. (1961), Rodrik D. (1997), Rostow W. W. (1980), Rothschild K. W. (1993a), Rothschild K. W. (1993b), Schumpeter J. A. (1950), Schumpeter J. A. (1969), Schumpeter J. A. (1980), Schumpeter J. A. (1982), Stiglitz J. (1998), Streissler E. (2002), United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLAC/CEPAL, (2002), Wood A. (1994), Yotopoulos P. A. (1966), Yotopoulos P. A. (1967), Yotopoulos P. A. (1977), Yotopoulos P. A. (1984), Yotopoulos P. A. (1989a), Yotopoulos P. A. (1989b), and Yotopoulos P. A. (1989c)]. In view of the current **“fundamentalism” of the Washington Consensus** and neo-liberalism, it seems appropriate here to recall one of the last articles by the late **Sir Karl Raimund Popper** (Popper, 1991), who quite explicitly warned against a type of market economy totalitarianism, substituting the socialist planned economy in the East.

A certainly promising direction of future research is the **basic human needs and growth-for-the-poor** approach that is so prominent nowadays also in the publications influenced by the UNDP. The cross-national quantitative studies about poverty reduction, basic needs and economic growth all suggest that the basic Myrdalian argument about poverty reduction as an engine of growth is correct. In view of the existing research results, future world system scholars, studying the relationship between dependency and development, would be well advised to think about poverty, basic human needs, life expectancy, infant mortality, survival probability at age 40 or 65 etc. and not so much on

phenomena relating to "the sphere of production" like economic growth or the distribution of money incomes [see Ahluwalia M. S. (1974), Ahulwalia M. S. (1976), Bradshaw Y. W., Noonan R; and Gash L. (1993), Burns T. J., Kentor J. D. and Jorgenson, A. (2002), Chase-Dunn Ch. K. (2005), Crenshaw E. M. (1995), Crenshaw E. M.; Ameen A. Z.; and Christenson. M. (1997), Crenshaw E. M.; Christenson M.; Oakey D. R. (2000), Dixon W. J. (1984), Frey R. S. and Field C. (2000), Ghobarah H. et al. (2001), Jenkins J. C. and Scanlan S. J. (2001), Kentor J. D. (2001), Kick E. L. et al. (1995), Kick E. L., Davis B. L. and Burns T. J. (1998), Klitgaard R. and Fedderke J. (1995), Lena H. F. and London B. (1993), London B. (1988), London B. (1990), Lopez G. A. and Stohl M. (1989), Meyer W. H. (1996), Moon B.E. and Dixon W.J. (1992), Muller E. N. (1995), O'Loughlin J.; Ward M. D.; and Shin M. (1998), Ragin C. C. and Bradshaw Y. W. (1992), Ram R. (1992), Shandra J. M.; Nobles J.; London B.; Williamson J. B. (2004), Shen C. and Williamson J. B. (2001), Shin M. E. (1975), Shin M. E. (2002), Simpson M. (1990), Spar D. (1999), Stack St. (1998), Tausch A. (1989b), Tausch A. (1990), Tausch A. (1991), Tausch A. (2003b), Tausch A. (2005c), Tausch A. (2005d), Tausch A. and Prager F. (1993), Timberlake M. and Williams K.R. (1984), Timberlake M. and Williams K.R. (1987), Wimberley D. W. (1990), and Wimberley D. W. (1991)].

It also emerges that unfettered globalization, properly specified as investment globalization, foreign saving, and unequal exchange (exchange rate deviation index) is responsible for a host of social problems and polarizing development models.

### ***Are world cultures really that different?***

Further dispelling irrational immigration-phobias and Islamophobia in general, the present work also shows that by and large, there are pretty much the same functions of key (positive or negative) UNDP development indicators (y-axis) as compared with purchasing power per capita (x-axis) in the Muslim world and the non-Muslim countries.

- % of people not surviving to age 60
- Contraceptive prevalence
- Female share in secondary school enrollment
- Fertility rates
- Gender empowerment
- HIV rates
- Infant mortality rates
- Maternal mortality ratios
- Rape
- Share of women in total suicide
- Smoking patterns
- Teen-age mothers
- Youth in prison rates

With rising per capita incomes, Muslim countries even enjoy a more successful human development in terms of

- Avoiding rising divorce rates
- Declining male and female suicide rates
- Implementing fertility decline

while, with rising per capita incomes, their still existing social policy deficits are:

- Avoiding rising homicide rates
- Avoiding road accidents
- Female share in parliamentary seats
- Female to male earnings ratios

**Table 8: Islam is not really different. Development patterns: rising income (GDP per capita at real purchasing power parities) has the following effects**

(results from correlation analyses for the Muslim world and the non-Muslim world)

	correlation with purchasing power per capita in the Muslim world	correlation with purchasing power per capita in the non-Muslim world	divergence in development paths (correlation of development indicator with per capita purchasing power in the non-muslim world minus correlation of development indicator with per capita purchasing power in the non-muslim world)	indicator should be maximized according to "western standards"	Islam outperforms the West according to its own standards
Total fertility rate (births per woman), 2000-2005	-0,525958	-0,547477	-0,021519	no	no
Gender-related development index (GDI) value	0,7124842	0,7637777	0,0512935	yes	no
Contraceptive prevalence rate (%)	0,3366267	0,6100842	0,2734575	yes	no
Gender empowerment measure (GEM) value	0,5068979	0,8497615	0,3428637	yes	no

Seats in lower house or single house held by women (as % of total)	-0,16228	0,2572059	0,4194857	yes	no
Ratio of estimated female to male earned income	-0,50115	0,0589094	0,5600597	yes	no
Secondary net enrolment ratio (female rate as % of male rate)	0,5718899	0,0413586	-0,530531	yes	yes
Maternal mortality ratio adjusted (per 100000 live births)	-0,556781	-0,469865	0,0869162	no	yes

In fact, Muslim societies are not really different in their development patterns from global society. Social indicators (y-axis) and GDP per capita PPP (x-axis) (UNDP data. Muslim countries = OIC member nations).

In a recent publication, the United Nations Development Programme and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (2002): 'Arab Human Development Report 2002' undertook a first major comprehensive analysis of human development in the Arab world. This analysis highlights a - what it terms - contradictory performance of the region in terms of the main social indicators: while overall performance in terms of life expectancy and infant mortality reduction was quite good, the region – the Report says – suffers from three major deficits:

- a freedom deficit
- a women's empowerment deficit
- a human capabilities/knowledge deficit relative to income

Our macro-quantitative re-analysis of the very data set from which UNDP drew its conclusions shows that in the final result, the analysis of the Arab Human Development Report 2002 is not entirely correct.

According to the well-established definition by Professor Samir Amin, Eurocentrism is a culturalist phenomenon that assumes the existence of irreducibly distinct cultural invariants that shape the historical paths of different peoples. It claims that imitation of the western model by all peoples is the only solution to the challenges of our time. It posits a progression from the Greek and Roman classical world to Christian feudalism and the European capitalist system, neglecting the crucial role played by the Arab-Islamic world.

It is absolutely important to consider in a proper statistical way the influence of levels of historically determined national poverty on development performance.

Applying such a methodology, first proposed by Samir Amin in 1994, and showing the correlations of social indicators for the Islamic and the entire world economy as two separate groups of nations, it is shown that with increasing levels of income Islamic countries (the members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)) had a very positive social and human development. We thus could 'simulate' a development path of Islamic nations and a development path of the non-Islamic nations alike.

An overview of the main development concepts used by the UN system today draws from the following free electronic sources:

1. UNDP Human Development Report Office:  
<http://www.undp.org/hdro/general/past.htm>
2. Glossary of Poverty Statistics, Asian Development Bank:  
<http://www.adb.org/Statistics/Poverty/glossary.asp>
3. Analytical Tools for Human Development  
<http://www.undp.org/hdro/statistics/anatools.htm>
4. Globalisation– Economic Growth and Development and development indicators (Phillip Miles)  
<http://www.planetpapers.com/Assets/4302.php>

Following Samir Amin, we are interested here in the comparison of correlation/regression patterns between per capita income (measured in terms of the purchasing power per capita concept) and societal variables in two different sets of countries to be investigated, i.e. the Muslim countries and the non-Muslim countries. It is obvious that we expect an increase in 'good' phenomena in terms of the UNDP methodology (like female employment) and rising per capita income levels, and a decrease in 'bad phenomena' (like the rate of reported, committed rapes per 100.000 inhabitants). A development pattern, where with rising per capita incomes you are confronted with falling life expectancy and a rising murder rate would be totally perverse.

Ideally, nations should reach their highest real per capita income today, starting from a lower level of real per capita income earlier on in history. The idea of a development reversal, i.e. progressive impoverishment in the course of history, contradicts everything that market economy optimism stands for.

For Samir Amin (1997), ascent and decline is largely being determined in our age by the following 'five monopolies'

- the monopoly of technology, supported by military expenditures of the dominant nations
- the monopoly of control over global finances and a strong position in the hierarchy of current account balances
- the monopoly of access to natural resources
- the monopoly over international communication and the media
- the monopoly of the military means of mass destruction



Let also recall, that for Amin (1975), there are four main characteristics of the peripheral societal formation

- the predominance of agrarian capitalism in the 'national' sector
- the formation of a local bourgeoisie, which is dependent from foreign capital, especially in the trading sector
- the tendency of bureaucratization
- specific and incomplete forms of proletarianization of the labor force

In partial accordance with liberal thought, (i) and (iii) explain the tendency towards low savings; thus there will be

- huge state sector deficits and, in addition, their 'twin'
- chronic current account balance deficits

in the peripheral countries. High imports of the periphery, and hence, in the long run, capital imports, are the consequence of the already existing structural deformations of the role of peripheries in the world system, namely by

- rapid urbanization, combined with an insufficient local production of food
- excessive expenditures of the local bureaucracies
- changes in income distribution to the benefit of the local elites (demonstration effects)
- insufficient growth of and structural imbalances in the industrial sector
- and the following reliance on foreign assistance

The history of periphery capitalism, Amin argues, is full of short-term 'miracles' and long-term blocks, stagnation and even regression.

While mass demand and agricultural structures (Elsenhans, 1983, a disciple of Amin) were responsible for the transition from the tributary mode of production in Western Europe to capitalism from the Long 16<sup>th</sup> Century onwards, periphery capitalism was and is characterized by the following main tendencies (Amin, 1973 - 1997):

- regression in both agriculture and small scale industry characterizes the period after the onslaught of foreign domination and colonialism
- unequal international specialization of the periphery leads to the concentration of activities in export oriented agriculture and or mining. Some industrialization of the periphery is possible under the condition of low wages, which, together with rising productivity, determine that unequal exchange sets in (double factorial terms of trade < 1.0; see Raffer, 1987)
- these structures determine in the long run a rapidly growing tertiary sector with hidden unemployment and the rising importance of rent in the overall social and economic system
- the development blocks of peripheral capitalism (chronic current account balance deficits, re-exported profits of foreign investments, deficient business cycles of the periphery, that provide important markets for the centers during world economic upswings)



- structural imbalances in the political and social relationships, inter alia a strong 'compradore' element and the rising importance of state capitalism and an indebted state class.

Several of the negative effects which we above described, and which the UNDP Arab Human Development Report 2002 calls the three deficits of human development in the region, might still be caused by other influences, and not the status of a country as a Muslim nation.

The Arab socialist legacy from the days of Bandung, together with cautious liberalization strategies and a civil society in which income redistribution for religious purposes indeed takes place combined to make development more viable than one would imagine under such adverse external conditions. In the Islamic tradition, social security has an important place.

According to the authoritative electronic Muslim website– 'The Light of Islam' - we find the following description by Shaykh Shawkat Husayn:

*The first instance of social security laws in Europe can be seen in the scheme of compulsory State insurance, which was introduced by Bismarck in Germany in 1883. Germany was followed by Austria and some other countries. By the beginning of this century most of the European countries initiated promulgation of laws in this direction. In America, except the Workman's Compensation Act passed in 1908, no significant legislation was enacted until 1935 when the Social Security Act was passed by Congress.*

*Contrary to the European tradition, in Islam, right from the beginning, fulfillment of the basic needs of the subjects was conceived to be the concern of the State. Zakat is the first institution of social security in Islam. Payment of 2 ½ percent of his/her savings of the zakat fund is one of the fundamental duties of a Muslim. The State is responsible to collect zakat and make arrangements for its distribution. Non-payment of it is tantamount to waging war against the State. The Caliph Abu Bakr subjugated by force all those who refused to pay it.*

*Non-Muslims are also included in one of the categories of the recipients of zakat. While prescribing laws for the distribution of zakat, the Quran includes them among those 'whose hearts are to be conciliated'.*

*Some present day scholars also hold the view that poor and destitute among non-Muslims can be helped out of the zakat funds. It is reported that 'Umar interpreted the word masakin in the verse "Alms are for the poor and the needy (masakin) and those employed to administer the funds..." as non-Muslims. Besides zakat, the Quran provides for collection of sadaqat<sup>24</sup>. Although sadaqah is not an obligatory duty like zakat, the Quran has given great Importance for it. Emphasizing the payment of sadaqah, the Quran goes to the extent of declaring, "You will never attain piety until you spend of what you love."*

*The difference between zakat and sadaqah is that while the former is to be paid at a fixed rate, no such rate has been prescribed for the latter (...) Collection and*

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


<sup>24</sup> Charity

*distribution of sadaqah along with zakat are among the fundamental duties of the government.*


*If the funds raised out of zakat and sadaqah are insufficient to meet the needs of the poor, the State can impose other taxes to realize funds for this purpose. While prescribing the rules of zakat and sadaqah, the Quran emphasizes that the needs of those who are economically hard-pressed and unwilling to ask for help out of self-respect should be given priority. Thus it is clear that these funds are to be spent primarily to relieve people from immediate hardships without creating a class of social parasites. Besides Quranic institutions of zakat and sadaqah, there are several Prophetic traditions which hold the State responsible for the fulfillment of the basic needs of all its subjects. The Prophet (S) is reported to have said : "I am the guardian of a person who has no guardian". Another hadith declares: "The State is the guardian of a person who has no guardian". <http://home.swipnet.se/islam/articles/Non-Muslim.htm>*

There is no justification to scornfully look at the Islamic world. Both sides along what still might look like a cultural deviding line – should begin to learn again from the very positive co-existence that existed in Spain before the Reconquista 1492. The peaceful coexistence and economic convergence between Europe and Islam could even become the basis of future European well-being in world society.



### Contraceptive prevalence






### Fertility growth/decline




### Total fertility rates





**Female share in net secondary school enr.**






**Female/male earnings ratios**




**Gender empowerment**





### Maternal mortality ratios





### Female share in parliamentary seats





### Infant mortality



### HIV






### % people not surviving age 60








### Smoking





### Rape





### Youth in prison





### Road accidents





### Female suicide





### Male suicide





### Share of women in total suicide





### Teen-age mothers



### Divorce



## Muslim countries are not really different ..... homicide



## Political conclusions

Present attempts to stabilize the world order by bringing in the major western industrialized countries plus Russia (the so-called G-8, composed by France; United States; United Kingdom; Russian Federation; Germany; Japan; Italy; Canada; European Union) must face up to the fact that these countries represent a declining part of world purchasing power. The rise of Asia makes the present G7/G8 structure increasingly irrelevant.

An interesting counter-position to overcome the present world governance inequalities is the G-20, largely created under the influence of Chinese foreign policy. The members of the G-20 are the finance ministers and central bank governors of the following 19 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi-Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Another member is the European Union, represented by the Council presidency and the President of the European Central Bank. The managing director of the IMF and the president of the World Bank, plus the chairpersons of the International Monetary and Financial Committee and Development Committee of the IMF and World Bank also participate in the talks as ex-officio members.

Some real "ascending dragons" are outside the G-8 group. We can only underline here the point, driven home by the eminent US military strategist Colin S. Gray, who was an architect of President Ronald Reagan's armament strategy in the 1980s:

*"The menace of major, if not necessarily decisive, interstate war will return to frighten us when great-power rivals feel able to challenge American hegemony. If you read Thucydides, or Donald Kagan, you will be reminded of the deadly and eternal influence of the triad of motives for war: "fear, honor, and interest".*

*Unquestionably, there has been a radical change in the character of the dominant form of terrorism since the end of Cold War. The roots of this phenomenon lie in a crisis within the Islamic domain. However, it is ironic that the United States contributed hugely, though inadvertently of course, to al Qaeda's development with its vast level of support for the holy warriors who defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan. Strategists should never forget the peril of ambush by the malign workings of the law of unintended consequences.*

*Al Qaeda is justly regarded today as the defining threat of this era. The catastrophic events of 9/11 certainly brought down the curtain on the strategically somewhat aimless interwar decade of the 1990s. But does the emergence of such terrorism signal an enduring change in the character of warfare? The answer has to be a resolute no. No guarantees can be offered, but it is as certain as anything can be in the inherently uncertain world of international conflict that al Qaeda will lose, and lose decisively. It will be beaten, but not by the United States and assuredly not by the US armed forces. Al Qaeda will be defeated by fellow Muslims devoted to moderate and modernizing policies." (Gray, 2005: 22 – 23)*

Following our reasoning, inspired by world system theory and world system governance, the "West" should try to accommodate as best as possible at least the legitimate aspirations of the rising world Muslim powers, like Indonesia, Turkey, Iran<sup>25</sup>, Saudi-Arabia, Egypt, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Algeria and Morocco. The policies of Turkish accession to the European Union and of the European Neighborhood Policies with the Mediterranean countries in the so-called Barcelona process have no alternative.

What is also really at stake in the forthcoming South eastern enlargement of the European Union to integrate Turkey is precisely to bridge the gap in these structures of global governance to include the largest Muslim economy of the globe into the structures of "global governance". Europe would be well advised to evaluate the possible positive repercussions of the integration of the world's largest Muslim economy into its fold also from this perspective. The top 18 global players control 90 % of the world's military expenditures. Likewise, global purchasing power is very unevenly distributed. In fact, the top 18 entities of the world economy – 17 nation states plus the EU-25 – again control 90 % of global economic power, while the rest of the world just has 10 %. However, there are serious imbalances among these world top power holders, insofar as the military power of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and China is not (as yet) supported by sufficient economic power, while in world military expenditure terms, the EU-25, Japan, Mexico, Canada, Brazil, Indonesia and Argentina are dwarfs in comparison to their gigantic economic status. It is to be expected that these imbalances will be closed some way or the other during the coming years.

What does all this mean in terms of the concept of the "balance of power"? To quote again from Colin S. Gray:

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<sup>25</sup> Integrating Iran under the present regime with its tendencies to negate the Holocaust etc. is morally out of the question. The present author hopes that at the end of the day the Clergy will see to it that the regime returns to the conciliatory policies of Ayatollah Khatami [written August 31, 2006].

*"Where Is the Balance of Power? (...) America is the hegemon by default. (...) As noted already, the past 15 years comprised principally a postwar, or interwar, period. The political and strategic behavior of those years reflected the temporary context provided by a world abruptly deprived of its balance-of-power architecture. (...) We can predict that although the transformation push may well succeed and be highly impressive in its military-technical accomplishments, it is likely to miss the most vital marks.*

*There are a number of reasons for this rather harsh judgment. First, high-tech transformation will have only modest value, because war is a duel and all of America's foes out to 2020 will be significantly asymmetrical. The more intelligent among them, as well as the geographically more fortunate and the luckier, will pursue ways of war that do not test US strengths. Second, the military potential of this transformation, as with all past transformations, is being undercut by the unstoppable processes of diffusion which spread technology and ideas. Third, the transformation that is being sought appears to be oblivious to the fact claimed here already, that there is more to war than warfare. War is about the peace it will shape." (Gray, 2005: 20 – 21)*

Europe's economic power would suggest that Europe increases its share in global military expenditures by 4.7%, while America's economic power, measured in the share of the US in world purchasing power, does not support their high share in global military outlays by more than 8%

Times and times again there was evidence in the literature that globalization leads to a cycle what Fernando Henrique Cardoso once termed:


- there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery
- this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and between them and the centers
- this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery
- this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations
- these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance

We have shown in the analysis about world development since the 1980s that uncontrolled globalization leads to no end of the problem of structural violence. If we really want to achieve long-lasting breakthroughs in "global governance", we have to re-consider the theoretical and practical implications of the "CEPAL/ECLAC" - alternative approach to global governance, and not simply rely on the forces of "world economic openness". The synthesis of our empirical research results allows the hypothesis that the mobilization of internal savings and an active and stronger state, and less uncritical reliance on direct foreign investments, as was correctly foreseen by the early CEPAL/ECLAC-school (Flehsig St., 1984, Flehsig St., 1994, Flehsig St., 2000, Prebisch R., 1983, Prebisch R. 1986, Prebisch R. 1988a, Prebisch R. 1988b, Singer P. I. 1971), are still the most efficient tools of "global governance". With neo-liberal economic and social governance continuing on an unabated scale, and with the world hegemonic power play by the United States entering the limit zone of its feasibility, the question about world systems governance transition enters the stage.



In their world-systems-based analysis of the spiral of capitalism and socialism, Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) arrive at the conclusion that the European Union would be best fitted to become an engine of socially progressive transformation of the world system. Such an analysis would find lots of sympathy among labor-oriented or social-movement oriented circles on both sides of the Atlantic and beyond, and is also reflected in various other 'denominations' of the world systems profession, like in the statements by Samir Amin, who - although very critical of the Union in its present form - speaks about the necessity for Europe to become an alternative pole in the world economy, characterized by the tendencies towards unfettered globalization.

The European role in transforming the present-day western-biased global governance system cannot be underestimated: the European Union as the driving force behind a movement towards global governance, as the only and reasonable alternative to the workings of the capitalist world system and its tendencies towards inequality and conflict, was on the minds of several world system writers. This scenario is the policy-option and practical end-result of the assessment of future trends in the world system, presented by Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000). Although there is wide agreement in the literature on the need of a transition of the world system to a system of global governance (see Kiljunen, 2000), the ways to achieve this are more or less a theme for speculation.



# APPENDIX TO PART I



Fallzahl = n number of cases

### 1. Joined ESS1 and ESS2 on "satisfied with democracy"

		How satisfied with the way democracy works in country									
		ESS1					ESS2				
		0	1	2	3	Fallzahl	0	1	2	3	Fallzahl
Austria	Muslims	3,8	3,8	11,5	0,0	26,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	4,8	21
	Non Muslims	3,1	1,9	4,3	9,2	1438,0	1,1	1,3	3,3	6,7	1472
Belgium	Muslims	0,0	0,0	2,9	0,0	35,0	1,8	0,0	7,1	5,4	56
	Non Muslims	1,7	1,4	4,0	6,9	828,0	2,6	1,7	5,7	6,8	725
Switzerland	Muslims	0,0	0,0	9,1	0,0	11,0	0,0	3,6	0,0	3,6	28
	Non Muslims	0,7	0,4	1,8	3,7	1201,0	0,6	0,8	1,7	3,4	1416
Czech Repub	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
	Non Muslims	5,1	5,4	9,0	16,1	410,0	6,9	5,1	8,1	11,8	788
Germany	Muslims	3,5	3,5	0,0	7,0	57,0	1,7	3,3	3,3	3,3	60
	Non Muslims	3,6	1,8	4,5	10,7	1511,0	3,2	2,8	6,3	8,1	1450
Denmark	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	20,0	0,0	6,3	6,3	0,0	16
	Non Muslims	0,6	0,2	0,7	1,2	830,0	0,1	0,7	1,3	2,7	877
Estonia	Muslims						0,0	0,0	0,0	33,3	3
	Non Muslims						7,7	7,7	8,2	15,3	378
Spain	Muslims	14,3	0,0	14,3	14,3	7,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	9,5	21
	Non Muslims	1,5	1,1	2,9	6,4	1227,0	1,6	1,1	3,1	4,5	1141
Finland	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
	Non Muslims	0,8	1,1	1,6	3,6	1461,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
France	Muslims	3,8	1,9	1,9	7,7	52,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
	Non Muslims	4,2	2,2	6,6	9,3	687,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
United Kingdc	Muslims	0,0	2,9	5,9	8,8	34,0	0,0	0,0	8,7	8,7	46
	Non Muslims	3,4	1,7	6,5	11,1	940,0	3,6	2,4	6,1	10,4	872
Greece	Muslims	1,5	1,5	1,5	3,0	66,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	34
	Non Muslims	4,0	4,3	5,2	7,3	2352,0	1,3	1,8	2,8	5,1	2098
Hungary	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
	Non Muslims	4,9	2,7	6,3	11,4	956,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
Ireland	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
	Non Muslims	5,7	3,9	6,9	8,8	1551,0	2,1	2,0	3,4	5,7	1867
Iceland	Muslims						0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
	Non Muslims						3,1	0,8	2,7	9,7	257
Israel	Muslims	22,3	7,8	10,0	9,2	359,0					
	Non Muslims	7,0	2,6	6,6	9,5	1446,0					
Italy	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,0					
	Non Muslims	4,6	2,5	5,5	9,8	869,0					
Luxembourg	Muslims	4,2	0,0	4,2	12,5	24,0	0,0	0,0	4,8	0,0	21
	Non Muslims	1,2	0,5	1,1	3,1	1001,0	1,3	0,6	1,0	3,0	1023
Netherlands	Muslims	5,1	0,0	7,7	12,8	39,0	3,6	7,1	10,7	7,1	28
	Non Muslims	0,6	1,1	1,0	4,7	960,0	1,0	1,1	4,1	5,3	809
Norway	Muslims	5,0	0,0	0,0	10,0	20,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	22
	Non Muslims	0,6	0,7	1,8	4,4	994,0	0,9	1,1	1,6	6,4	855
Poland	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1
	Non Muslims	7,8	5,6	10,3	16,0	1811,0	10,8	7,1	12,5	15,4	1483
Portugal	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1
	Non Muslims	5,5	3,7	7,7	11,5	1137,0	7,4	12,8	17,2	18,3	1670
Sweden	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	4,2	24,0	7,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	14
	Non Muslims	1,3	0,9	2,2	5,8	534,0	2,1	0,9	4,5	8,1	581
Slovenia	Muslims	11,1	0,0	16,7	0,0	18,0	0,0	0,0	42,9	0,0	7
	Non Muslims	6,4	4,6	10,2	15,0	714,0	5,6	2,8	10,3	12,6	708
Slovakia	Muslims						0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	2
	Non Muslims						12,2	7,5	11,7	13,8	1065
Ukraine	Muslims						30,0	10,0	0,0	0,0	10
	Non Muslims						13,9	6,2	7,4	12,7	1187

## 2. Joined ESS1 and ESS2 on "income"

		Feeling about household's income nowadays					Trust in country's parliament				
		ESS1					ESS2				
		Living comfortably on present income	Coping on present income	Difficult on present income	Very difficult on present income	Fallzahl	Living comfortably on present income	Coping on present income	Difficult on present income	Very difficult on present income	Fallzahl
Austria	Muslims	3,3	60,0	20,0	16,7	30	14,3	39,3	17,9	28,6	28
Austria	Non Muslims	30,6	51,1	13,6	4,7	1478	39,2	48,9	9,3	2,7	1506
Belgium	Muslims	20,6	52,9	23,5	2,9	34	17,2	36,2	37,9	8,6	58
Belgium	Non Muslims	41,6	42,9	12,4	3,0	855	34,2	43,8	16,5	5,4	739
Switzerland	Muslims	30,8	61,5	0,0	7,7	13	6,7	36,7	43,3	13,3	30
Switzerland	Non Muslims	52,2	39,5	7,1	1,1	1222	48,3	39,6	9,8	2,3	1462
Czech Repub	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
Czech Repub	Non Muslims	7,9	51,7	32,0	8,4	441	7,3	43,4	34,0	15,3	779
Germany	Muslims	8,8	63,2	26,3	1,8	57	6,3	46,0	30,2	17,5	63
Germany	Non Muslims	31,1	58,2	9,0	1,7	1514	29,9	55,4	12,3	2,5	1474
Denmark	Muslims	28,6	52,4	19,0	0,0	21	18,8	56,3	6,3	18,8	16
Denmark	Non Muslims	67,9	27,1	4,0	1,1	835	65,6	30,5	3,5	0,4	897
Estonia	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	33,3	66,7	0,0	3
Estonia	Non Muslims	6,1	41,6	34,8	17,4	442	6,1	41,6	34,8	17,4	442
Spain	Muslims	0,0	33,3	22,2	44,4	9	0,0	36,0	48,0	16,0	25
Spain	Non Muslims	28,7	49,5	17,9	3,9	1305	36,4	45,7	15,1	2,9	1176
Finland	Muslims	0,0	66,7	33,3	0,0	3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
Finland	Non Muslims	21,1	65,5	9,8	3,6	1491	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
France	Muslims	2,0	18,4	61,2	18,4	49	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
France	Non Muslims	8,4	47,5	35,5	8,5	692	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
United Kingdo	Muslims	11,1	61,1	25,0	2,8	36	25,0	47,9	18,8	8,3	48
United Kingdo	Non Muslims	43,1	44,7	10,9	1,3	973	38,8	44,1	12,8	4,2	904
Greece	Muslims	2,8	16,9	39,4	40,8	71	2,9	14,3	45,7	37,1	35
Greece	Non Muslims	10,8	37,3	35,6	16,3	2393	9,2	40,4	36,3	14,1	2127
Hungary	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
Hungary	Non Muslims	5,4	45,3	37,0	12,3	1052	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
Ireland	Muslims	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
Ireland	Non Muslims	37,3	47,1	12,3	3,4	1661	48,4	41,1	8,8	1,7	1974
Iceland	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0
Iceland	Non Muslims	58,6	33,5	4,2	3,8	263	58,6	33,5	4,2	3,8	263
Israel	Muslims	18,1	34,5	28,5	18,9	365					
Israel	Non Muslims	17,8	42,7	26,2	13,3	1456					
Italy	Muslims	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1					
Italy	Non Muslims	33,5	49,5	14,7	2,3	907					
Luxembourg	Muslims	30,8	30,8	19,2	19,2	26	4,3	47,8	30,4	17,4	23
Luxembourg	Non Muslims	54,6	35,7	8,6	1,1	1099	52,2	36,5	8,8	2,5	1106
Netherlands	Muslims	20,5	48,7	20,5	10,3	39	14,3	32,1	39,3	14,3	28
Netherlands	Non Muslims	51,9	38,5	8,4	1,2	980	44,1	43,0	10,4	2,5	835
Norway	Muslims	10,0	55,0	25,0	10,0	20	45,5	27,3	27,3	0,0	22
Norway	Non Muslims	52,7	39,6	6,5	1,2	1007	52,9	38,0	6,4	2,8	859
Poland	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1
Poland	Non Muslims	4,6	49,7	39,8	5,9	1935	4,9	54,1	35,8	5,2	1563
Portugal	Muslims	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1
Portugal	Non Muslims	7,9	51,0	30,5	10,6	1240	7,8	52,2	29,2	10,8	1751
Sweden	Muslims	26,1	47,8	17,4	8,7	23	21,4	50,0	14,3	14,3	14
Sweden	Non Muslims	53,5	37,8	7,3	1,4	561	56,1	35,2	7,3	1,3	599
Slovenia	Muslims	15,8	63,2	15,8	5,3	19	40,0	50,0	10,0	0,0	10
Slovenia	Non Muslims	33,2	49,4	14,2	3,2	741	38,4	47,5	11,4	2,7	747
Slovakia	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	50,0	50,0	0,0	2
Slovakia	Non Muslims	5,0	40,2	35,8	19,0	1097	5,0	40,2	35,8	19,0	1097
Ukraine	Muslims	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	20,0	50,0	30,0	10
Ukraine	Non Muslims	1,0	19,5	46,8	32,7	1386	1,0	19,5	46,8	32,7	1386

Endnotes on Data and results:

1. Data were downloaded on 18.6.2006 from [www.europeansocialsurvey.com](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.com). ESS1 (5.1edt) and ESS2 (2.0edt).

2. Variables used: TRSTPRL, TRSTLGL, TRSTPLC, TRSTPLT, STFDEM, RIGDNM\* and HINCFEL.

Trust variables (TRSTPRL, TRSTLGL, TRSTPLC and TRSTPLT) and STFDEM have 11 items scales: 0 – No trust at all, 1 – 1, ..., 9 – 9, 10 – Complete trust.

Rigdnm was made a dummy variable with the same the pattern as shown in 3.  
HIMCFEL has 4 items scale: 1 – Living comfortably on present income,  
2 – Coping on present income,  
3 – Finding it difficult on present income,  
4 – Finding it very difficult on present income.

3. Variable RELIGION is recoded RigDnm\* variable with the following procedure: item 6 = Muslims, Items 1+2+3+4+5+7+8 = Non Muslims.

4. All the results shown are represented in percentage (%).

In section 1 (on trust) + 2 (satisfied with democracy) values are the percentage (%) presenting only first four values on 11-items scales and are prepared to have comparability. Row total of the whole 11-items scale is 100%.

In section 3 (on income) the percentage (%) are row totals (100%) for each country on Muslim|NonMuslim.

Source: calculated by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>



### 3. Religious practice versus secularism in Europe and in Israel

country	Religious practice		% of total pop 2002	% of total pop 2004	dyn % total pop
AT Austria	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	AT	0,2	0,2	-0,1
AT Austria	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	AT	0,2	0,0	-0,2
AT Austria	Muslim: less frequent than every week	AT	0,3	0,7	0,4
AT Austria	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	AT	0,3	0,5	0,2
AT Austria	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	AT	0,7	0,4	-0,3
AT Austria	Protestant: less frequent than every week	AT	2,6	2,5	-0,1
AT Austria	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	AT	15,2	12,8	-2,4
AT Austria	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	AT	37,0	41,6	4,5
BE Belgium	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	BE	0,0	0,0	0,0
BE Belgium	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	BE	0,1	0,2	0,2
BE Belgium	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	BE	0,1	0,1	-0,1
BE Belgium	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	BE	0,2	0,7	0,4
BE Belgium	Protestant: less frequent than every week	BE	0,4	0,3	-0,1
BE Belgium	Muslim: less frequent than every week	BE	1,0	1,9	0,9
BE Belgium	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	BE	9,4	7,2	-2,3
BE Belgium	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	BE	24,2	20,6	-3,6
CH Switzerland	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	CH	0,0	0,1	0,1
CH Switzerland	Muslim: less frequent than every week	CH	0,2	0,6	0,5
CH Switzerland	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	CH	0,3	0,3	0,0
CH Switzerland	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	CH	0,3	0,8	0,5
CH Switzerland	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	CH	1,6	4,1	2,4
CH Switzerland	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	CH	5,8	6,7	0,9
CH Switzerland	Protestant: less frequent	CH	20,0	24,7	4,8

	than every week				
CH Switzerland	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	CH	21,3	22,4	1,1
CZ Czech Republic	Muslim: less frequent than every week	CZ	0,0	0,0	0,0
CZ Czech Republic	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	CZ	0,0	0,0	0,0
CZ Czech Republic	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	CZ	0,0	0,1	0,1
CZ Czech Republic	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	CZ	0,0	0,1	0,1
CZ Czech Republic	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	CZ	0,7	0,4	-0,3
CZ Czech Republic	Protestant: less frequent than every week	CZ	2,0	1,7	-0,4
CZ Czech Republic	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	CZ	7,2	6,4	-0,8
CZ Czech Republic	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	CZ	16,4	15,2	-1,1
DE Germany	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	DE	0,1	0,0	0,0
DE Germany	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	DE	0,3	0,6	0,4
DE Germany	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	DE	0,4	0,6	0,1
DE Germany	Muslim: less frequent than every week	DE	1,0	0,8	-0,1
DE Germany	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	DE	1,7	2,0	0,3
DE Germany	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	DE	4,5	4,5	0,0
DE Germany	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	DE	13,4	14,8	1,5
DE Germany	Protestant: less frequent than every week	DE	23,6	19,8	-3,8
DK Denmark	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	DK	0,0	0,0	0,0
DK Denmark	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	DK	0,1	0,1	0,0
DK Denmark	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	DK	0,1	0,3	0,1
DK Denmark	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	DK	0,2	0,1	-0,1
DK Denmark	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	DK	0,4	0,9	0,4
DK Denmark	Muslim: less frequent than every week	DK	0,7	0,5	-0,2
DK Denmark	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	DK	1,7	2,2	0,5
DK Denmark	Protestant: less frequent than every week	DK	38,2	44,0	5,8
EE Estonia	Muslim: less frequent than every week	EE		0,1	
EE Estonia	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	EE		0,0	
EE Estonia	Orthodox: less frequent	EE		8,9	

	than every week				
EE Estonia	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	EE		1,0	
EE Estonia	Protestant: less frequent than every week	EE		6,5	
EE Estonia	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	EE		1,9	
EE Estonia	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	EE		0,6	
EE Estonia	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	EE		0,1	
ES Spain	Muslim: less frequent than every week	ES	0,0	0,4	0,4
ES Spain	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	ES	0,0	0,2	0,2
ES Spain	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	ES	0,0	0,1	0,1
ES Spain	Protestant: less frequent than every week	ES	0,1	0,1	0,0
ES Spain	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	ES	0,2	0,1	-0,1
ES Spain	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	ES	0,2	0,4	0,1
ES Spain	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	ES	19,2	16,2	-3,0
ES Spain	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	ES	38,4	34,7	-3,7
FI Finland	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	FI	0,0		
FI Finland	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	FI	0,0		
FI Finland	Muslim: less frequent than every week	FI	0,1		
FI Finland	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	FI	0,1		
FI Finland	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	FI	0,1		
FI Finland	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	FI	0,9		
FI Finland	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	FI	3,6		
FI Finland	Protestant: less frequent than every week	FI	57,8		
FR France	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	FR	0,0		
FR France	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	FR	0,1		
FR France	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	FR	0,2		
FR France	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	FR	0,3		
FR France	Protestant: less frequent than every week	FR	0,9		
FR France	Muslim: less frequent than every week	FR	2,4		
FR France	Roman Catholic: weekly	FR	6,6		

	or more frequent				
FR France	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	FR	25,3		
GB United Kingdom	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	GB	0,0	0,1	0,1
GB United Kingdom	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	GB	0,1	0,1	0,1
GB United Kingdom	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	GB	0,5	0,9	0,5
GB United Kingdom	Muslim: less frequent than every week	GB	0,6	1,0	0,3
GB United Kingdom	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	GB	3,6	4,4	0,8
GB United Kingdom	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	GB	4,2	4,3	0,1
GB United Kingdom	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	GB	6,1	5,4	-0,8
GB United Kingdom	Protestant: less frequent than every week	GB	18,3	12,7	-5,6
GR Greece	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	GR	0,1	0,1	0,0
GR Greece	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	GR	0,1	0,6	0,5
GR Greece	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	GR	0,1	0,2	0,1
GR Greece	Protestant: less frequent than every week	GR	0,3	0,1	-0,1
GR Greece	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	GR	0,4	0,5	0,1
GR Greece	Muslim: less frequent than every week	GR	1,0	0,3	-0,7
GR Greece	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	GR	24,6	23,4	-1,2
GR Greece	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	GR	66,6	63,5	-3,1
HU Hungary	Muslim: less frequent than every week	HU	0,0		
HU Hungary	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	HU	0,0		
HU Hungary	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	HU	0,0		
HU Hungary	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	HU	0,1		
HU Hungary	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	HU	1,6		
HU Hungary	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	HU	9,1		
HU Hungary	Protestant: less frequent than every week	HU	11,4		
HU Hungary	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	HU	28,5		
IE Ireland	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	IE	0,0	0,0	0,0
IE Ireland	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	IE	0,0	0,0	0,0
IE Ireland	Muslim: less frequent	IE	0,1	0,0	-0,1

	than every week				
IE Ireland	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	IE	0,1	0,0	-0,1
IE Ireland	Protestant: less frequent than every week	IE	1,5	1,6	0,1
IE Ireland	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	IE	1,7	1,4	-0,3
IE Ireland	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	IE	26,4	25,8	-0,6
IE Ireland	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	IE	49,0	55,4	6,5
IL Israel	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	IL	0,0		
IL Israel	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	IL	0,0		
IL Israel	Protestant: less frequent than every week	IL	0,0		
IL Israel	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	IL	0,0		
IL Israel	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	IL	0,7		
IL Israel	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	IL	2,6		
IL Israel	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	IL	4,3		
IL Israel	Muslim: less frequent than every week	IL	8,7		
IS Iceland	Muslim: less frequent than every week	IS		0,0	
IS Iceland	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	IS		0,0	
IS Iceland	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	IS		0,0	
IS Iceland	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	IS		0,0	
IS Iceland	Protestant: less frequent than every week	IS		30,8	
IS Iceland	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	IS		2,3	
IS Iceland	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	IS		0,0	
IS Iceland	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	IS		0,0	
IT Italy	Muslim: less frequent than every week	IT	0,0		
IT Italy	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	IT	0,0		
IT Italy	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	IT	0,0		
IT Italy	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	IT	0,0		
IT Italy	Protestant: less frequent than every week	IT	0,3		
IT Italy	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	IT	0,4		
IT Italy	Roman Catholic: weekly	IT	27,6		

	or more frequent				
IT Italy	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	IT	41,2		
LU Luxembourg	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	LU	0,0	0,0	0,0
LU Luxembourg	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	LU	0,1	0,0	-0,1
LU Luxembourg	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	LU	0,2	0,1	-0,1
LU Luxembourg	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	LU	0,2	0,1	-0,1
LU Luxembourg	Muslim: less frequent than every week	LU	0,3	0,2	0,0
LU Luxembourg	Protestant: less frequent than every week	LU	0,6	0,6	0,0
LU Luxembourg	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	LU	11,1	9,7	-1,4
LU Luxembourg	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	LU	27,0	33,1	6,1
NL Netherlands	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	NL	0,0	0,0	0,0
NL Netherlands	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	NL	0,1	0,1	0,0
NL Netherlands	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	NL	0,4	0,2	-0,2
NL Netherlands	Muslim: less frequent than every week	NL	0,8	0,6	-0,2
NL Netherlands	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	NL	3,2	3,7	0,5
NL Netherlands	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	NL	6,8	7,4	0,5
NL Netherlands	Protestant: less frequent than every week	NL	6,9	7,1	0,2
NL Netherlands	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	NL	13,8	14,8	1,0
NO Norway	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	NO	0,0	0,1	0,1
NO Norway	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	NO	0,1	0,2	0,2
NO Norway	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	NO	0,1	0,3	0,2
NO Norway	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	NO	0,2	0,3	0,1
NO Norway	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	NO	0,4	0,6	0,3
NO Norway	Muslim: less frequent than every week	NO	0,5	0,6	0,1
NO Norway	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	NO	2,8	2,9	0,1
NO Norway	Protestant: less frequent than every week	NO	33,1	31,2	-1,9
PL Poland	Muslim: less frequent than every week	PL	0,0	0,1	0,1
PL Poland	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	PL	0,0	0,0	0,0
PL Poland	Protestant: less frequent	PL	0,1	0,1	0,0



	than every week				
PL Poland	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	PL	0,1	0,1	0,0
PL Poland	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	PL	0,2	0,0	-0,2
PL Poland	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	PL	0,5	0,6	0,1
PL Poland	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	PL	34,9	33,1	-1,8
PL Poland	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	PL	53,8	56,2	2,4
PT Portugal	Muslim: less frequent than every week	PT	0,0	0,0	0,0
PT Portugal	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	PT	0,0	0,1	0,1
PT Portugal	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	PT	0,0	0,0	0,0
PT Portugal	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	PT	0,0	0,0	0,0
PT Portugal	Protestant: less frequent than every week	PT	0,0	0,1	0,1
PT Portugal	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	PT	0,7	0,4	-0,4
PT Portugal	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	PT	26,2	26,1	0,0
PT Portugal	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	PT	42,6	45,0	2,4
SE Sweden	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	SE	0,0	0,1	0,1
SE Sweden	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	SE	0,0	0,2	0,2
SE Sweden	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	SE	0,1	0,0	-0,1
SE Sweden	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	SE	0,4	0,3	-0,2
SE Sweden	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	SE	0,8	0,8	0,0
SE Sweden	Muslim: less frequent than every week	SE	0,9	0,3	-0,6
SE Sweden	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	SE	3,1	2,2	-0,9
SE Sweden	Protestant: less frequent than every week	SE	17,5	20,3	2,8
SI Slovenia	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	SI	0,1	0,1	0,0
SI Slovenia	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	SI	0,1	0,2	0,1
SI Slovenia	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	SI	0,1	0,2	0,1
SI Slovenia	Protestant: less frequent than every week	SI	0,3	0,7	0,3
SI Slovenia	Muslim: less frequent than every week	SI	0,5	0,4	-0,1
SI Slovenia	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	SI	0,9	0,6	-0,3
SI Slovenia	Roman Catholic: weekly	SI	15,8	8,7	-7,1

	or more frequent				
SI Slovenia	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	SI	26,4	27,9	1,6
SK Slovakia	Muslim: less frequent than every week	SK		0,1	
SK Slovakia	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	SK		0,1	
SK Slovakia	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	SK		0,6	
SK Slovakia	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	SK		0,4	
SK Slovakia	Protestant: less frequent than every week	SK		4,5	
SK Slovakia	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	SK		1,6	
SK Slovakia	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	SK		27,7	
SK Slovakia	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	SK		27,0	
UA Ukraine	Muslim: less frequent than every week	UA		0,2	
UA Ukraine	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	UA		0,0	
UA Ukraine	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	UA		46,6	
UA Ukraine	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	UA		6,3	
UA Ukraine	Protestant: less frequent than every week	UA		0,2	
UA Ukraine	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	UA		1,3	
UA Ukraine	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	UA		6,3	
UA Ukraine	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	UA		4,1	

**4. ESS results on religious practice and percentages of each denominational/sociological group positioning itself on the left/right scale and numbers of observations in the ESS analyses – Europe and Israel**

		left right scale												
		ESS 1 2002						ESS 2 2004						
	religious practice	left	mode rate left	cente r	mode rate right	right	n	left	mode rate left	cente r	mode rate right	right	n	
AT Austria	without denomination	22,0	26,7	32,5	13,4	5,4	610	24,5	25,7	35,6	9,3	4,9	571	AT
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	3,7	16,5	40,7	27,9	11,1	297	5,6	14,1	42,2	25,7	12,4	249	AT
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	8,4	23,3	45,4	17,5	5,4	722	10,4	22,4	43,5	16,9	6,8	809	AT
	Roman Catholic: never	13,1	20,8	37,7	21,5	6,9	130	10,8	21,5	50,0	14,6	3,1	130	AT
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	0,0	33,3	50,0	16,7	0,0	6	0,0	0,0	55,6	33,3	11,1	9	AT
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	20,0	20,0	36,0	20,0	4,0	50	8,3	33,3	33,3	20,8	4,2	48	AT
	Protestant: never	0,0	20,0	40,0	40,0	0,0	10	0,0	16,7	66,7	16,7	0,0	6	AT
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	25,0	25,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	AT
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	7,7	38,5	46,2	7,7	0,0	13	25,0	25,0	37,5	12,5	0,0	8	AT
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	66,7	33,3	0,0	3	0,0	100, 0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	AT
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	50,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	4	33,3	33,3	0,0	33,3	0,0	3	AT
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	20,0	40,0	20,0	20,0	0,0	5	7,7	30,8	61,5	0,0	0,0	13	AT
	Muslim: never	14,3	14,3	28,6	28,6	14,3	7	20,0	0,0	80,0	0,0	0,0	5	AT
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>13,2</b>	<b>23,4</b>	<b>39,3</b>	<b>17,7</b>	<b>6,3</b>	<b>1950</b>	<b>14,5</b>	<b>22,4</b>	<b>41,1</b>	<b>15,4</b>	<b>6,6</b>	<b>1947</b>	<b>AT</b>
BE Belgium	without denomination	16,0	23,9	36,1	16,4	7,5	848	13,1	24,4	37,0	19,2	6,3	890	BE
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	5,8	11,7	42,9	19,5	20,1	154	4,3	17,4	45,2	23,5	9,6	115	BE
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	7,3	18,9	39,4	27,5	6,8	396	7,8	17,5	34,0	29,2	11,4	332	BE
	Roman Catholic: never	9,2	19,0	39,4	21,8	10,6	142	8,1	20,5	35,7	25,4	10,3	185	BE
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	100, 0	0,0	1	25,0	0,0	25,0	50,0	0,0	4	BE

	Protestant: less frequent than every week	0,0	16,7	50,0	33,3	0,0	6	0,0	60,0	0,0	40,0	0,0	5	BE
	Protestant: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	BE
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	BE
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	50,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	2	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	BE
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	BE
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	25,0	0,0	75,0	0,0	0,0	4	18,2	27,3	36,4	9,1	9,1	11	BE
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	25,0	18,8	31,3	12,5	12,5	16	36,7	16,7	30,0	6,7	10,0	30	BE
	Muslim: never	37,5	12,5	37,5	0,0	12,5	8	50,0	12,5	25,0	12,5	0,0	8	BE
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>12,2</b>	<b>20,8</b>	<b>38,2</b>	<b>19,8</b>	<b>9,0</b>	<b>1633</b>	<b>11,4</b>	<b>21,7</b>	<b>36,6</b>	<b>22,1</b>	<b>8,1</b>	<b>1608</b>	<b>BE</b>
CH Switzerland	without denomination	16,3	25,7	31,7	19,2	7,0	712	13,4	28,0	31,6	18,7	8,3	599	CH
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	5,5	16,4	40,0	22,7	15,5	110	6,1	18,2	38,6	22,7	14,4	132	CH
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	6,3	24,8	37,0	25,3	6,8	400	6,4	18,9	41,2	21,9	11,6	439	CH
	Roman Catholic: never	6,9	19,0	39,7	27,6	6,9	58	11,1	22,2	40,7	18,5	7,4	54	CH
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	0,0	32,3	32,3	25,8	9,7	31	11,3	17,5	36,3	23,8	11,3	80	CH
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	5,3	22,9	35,6	25,5	10,6	376	6,2	19,8	36,0	27,6	10,5	486	CH
	Protestant: never	9,1	36,4	24,7	22,1	7,8	77	4,8	30,1	28,9	25,3	10,8	83	CH
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1	CH
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	66,7	33,3	0,0	6	12,5	18,8	31,3	25,0	12,5	16	CH
	Orthodox: never	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	CH
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	40,0	0,0	40,0	20,0	0,0	5	20,0	20,0	40,0	0,0	20,0	5	CH
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	0,0	33,3	33,3	0,0	33,3	3	8,3	16,7	58,3	16,7	0,0	12	CH
	Muslim: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	42,9	28,6	28,6	0,0	0,0	7	CH
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>10,3</b>	<b>24,7</b>	<b>34,1</b>	<b>22,8</b>	<b>8,2</b>	<b>1881</b>	<b>9,0</b>	<b>22,7</b>	<b>35,9</b>	<b>22,3</b>	<b>10,1</b>	<b>1964</b>	<b>CH</b>
CZ Czech Republic	without denomination	10,4	20,3	28,6	17,4	23,3	811	13,4	16,8	26,2	20,1	23,5	1712	CZ
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	8,0	19,3	31,8	23,9	17,0	88	14,5	12,6	26,4	26,4	20,1	159	CZ
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	8,5	20,0	31,0	22,0	18,5	200	10,6	19,1	27,1	18,8	24,4	377	CZ
	Roman Catholic: never	14,5	14,5	29,1	14,5	27,3	55	11,9	19,0	44,0	10,7	14,3	84	CZ
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	22,2	11,1	22,2	22,2	22,2	9	9,1	0,0	18,2	27,3	45,5	11	CZ
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	24,0	24,0	8,0	24,0	20,0	25	12,2	22,0	22,0	17,1	26,8	41	CZ
	Protestant: never	10,0	40,0	10,0	30,0	10,0	10	37,5	18,8	18,8	6,3	18,8	16	CZ
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	33,3	0,0	0,0	66,7	0,0	3	CZ

	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	50,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	2	CZ
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1	CZ
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	CZ
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	CZ
	Muslim: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	CZ
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>10,8</b>	<b>20,0</b>	<b>28,6</b>	<b>18,7</b>	<b>21,9</b>	<b>1223</b>	<b>13,0</b>	<b>17,0</b>	<b>27,1</b>	<b>20,0</b>	<b>22,9</b>	<b>2475</b>	<b>CZ</b>
DE	without denomination	15,7	30,2	36,3	12,8	5,1	1237	19,1	28,2	37,9	10,6	4,2	1194	DE
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	5,7	18,9	36,9	23,8	14,8	122	2,6	23,1	44,4	21,4	8,5	117	DE
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	5,0	26,2	45,0	17,1	6,6	362	6,0	29,9	41,9	18,5	3,6	384	DE
	Roman Catholic: never	16,3	20,4	44,9	14,3	4,1	49	11,3	22,5	45,0	12,5	8,8	80	DE
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	6,4	27,7	34,0	23,4	8,5	47	5,8	21,2	48,1	19,2	5,8	52	DE
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	8,4	27,8	36,6	19,5	7,7	640	6,2	29,8	38,0	20,9	5,1	513	DE
	Protestant: never	14,0	28,9	40,4	8,8	7,9	114	14,2	26,7	33,3	14,2	11,7	120	DE
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	DE
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	8,3	16,7	50,0	8,3	16,7	12	20,0	33,3	26,7	20,0	0,0	15	DE
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2	DE
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	28,6	28,6	42,9	0,0	0,0	7	12,5	18,8	56,3	12,5	0,0	16	DE
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	11,5	26,9	38,5	23,1	0,0	26	14,3	28,6	47,6	9,5	0,0	21	DE
	Muslim: never	0,0	37,5	62,5	0,0	0,0	8	20,0	40,0	20,0	0,0	20,0	5	DE
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>11,6</b>	<b>28,1</b>	<b>38,3</b>	<b>15,5</b>	<b>6,4</b>	<b>2707</b>	<b>12,8</b>	<b>28,5</b>	<b>38,9</b>	<b>14,9</b>	<b>4,9</b>	<b>2590</b>	<b>DE</b>
DK	without denomination	9,2	22,2	27,0	27,2	14,4	585	10,6	20,8	28,3	26,9	13,4	509	DK
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	DK
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	0,0	50,0	0,0	16,7	33,3	6	25,0	16,7	16,7	25,0	16,7	12	DK
	Roman Catholic: never	50,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	2	50,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	50,0	4	DK
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	0,0	8,3	41,7	33,3	16,7	24	3,2	19,4	22,6	29,0	25,8	31	DK
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	4,1	15,7	30,3	28,4	21,5	535	3,6	17,3	27,6	34,5	17,0	612	DK
	Protestant: never	3,4	15,5	34,0	29,6	17,5	206	6,9	21,8	26,4	27,0	17,8	174	DK
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	DK
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	66,7	0,0	33,3	0,0	3	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	DK
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	DK
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	50,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	2	25,0	75,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	4	DK
	Muslim: less	10,0	10,0	40,0	20,0	20,0	10	0,0	28,6	57,1	0,0	14,3	7	DK

	frequent than every week													
	Muslim: never	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	5	0,0	0,0	0,0	33,3	66,7	3	DK
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>6,4</b>	<b>18,2</b>	<b>29,9</b>	<b>27,9</b>	<b>17,6</b>	<b>1399</b>	<b>7,1</b>	<b>19,4</b>	<b>27,8</b>	<b>29,7</b>	<b>16,0</b>	<b>1390</b>	<b>DK</b>
EE Estonia	without denomination	x	x	x	x	x	x	7,4	18,2	40,0	22,9	11,6	1177	EE
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	EE
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	11,1	33,3	33,3	22,2	0,0	9	EE
	Roman Catholic: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	EE
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	10,7	17,9	28,6	25,0	17,9	28	EE
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	7,1	19,4	34,7	19,4	19,4	98	EE
	Protestant: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	44,4	0,0	22,2	33,3	0,0	9	EE
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	13,3	33,3	40,0	13,3	0,0	15	EE
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	17,9	24,6	41,8	9,0	6,7	134	EE
	Orthodox: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	44,4	44,4	0,0	11,1	9	EE
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	EE
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	50,0	2	EE
	Muslim: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	EE
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>8,6</b>	<b>19,5</b>	<b>39,4</b>	<b>21,2</b>	<b>11,4</b>	<b>1506</b>	<b>EE</b>
ES Spain	without denomination	28,7	37,7	23,1	7,8	2,8	321	29,7	36,9	23,9	5,8	3,7	377	ES
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	6,3	15,3	31,7	27,6	19,0	268	7,0	17,0	30,6	24,5	21,0	229	ES
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	14,5	32,4	30,9	16,4	5,8	537	15,9	26,5	31,0	18,2	8,4	490	ES
	Roman Catholic: never	15,9	32,9	36,2	13,0	2,0	246	16,7	30,4	33,5	10,9	8,6	257	ES
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	0,0	33,3	0,0	33,3	33,3	3	40,0	20,0	40,0	0,0	0,0	5	ES
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	50,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	2	ES
	Protestant: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	ES
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	ES
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	33,3	0,0	33,3	33,3	3	ES
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1	50,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	2	ES
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	33,3	0,0	66,7	0,0	0,0	3	50,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	2	ES
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	40,0	20,0	40,0	0,0	0,0	5	ES
	Muslim: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	66,7	0,0	0,0	33,3	0,0	3	ES
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>16,5</b>	<b>30,2</b>	<b>30,4</b>	<b>15,8</b>	<b>7,1</b>	<b>1397</b>	<b>18,7</b>	<b>28,3</b>	<b>29,8</b>	<b>14,1</b>	<b>9,1</b>	<b>1411</b>	<b>ES</b>
FI Finland	without denomination	9,4	24,3	32,2	23,5	10,5	456	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI



	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	50,0	2	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI
	Roman Catholic: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	1,4	11,6	23,2	31,9	31,9	69	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	4,2	15,0	32,0	27,5	21,2	1093	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI
	Protestant: never	9,7	18,9	32,3	19,8	19,4	217	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	17,6	23,5	35,3	23,5	17	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	50,0	50,0	0,0	2	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI
	Muslim: never	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	FI
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>5,9</b>	<b>17,5</b>	<b>31,7</b>	<b>26,2</b>	<b>18,8</b>	<b>1891</b>	<b>4,9</b>	<b>16,9</b>	<b>30,7</b>	<b>25,7</b>	<b>21,8</b>	<b>1929</b>	<b>FI</b>
FR France	without denomination	21,8	28,2	29,8	11,3	8,9	698	22,8	26,4	33,2	11,7	5,9	826	FR
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	3,2	17,2	17,2	36,6	25,8	93	x	x	x	x	x	x	FR
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	9,3	17,1	26,1	24,2	23,3	356	x	x	x	x	x	x	FR
	Roman Catholic: never	16,5	19,6	33,5	20,3	10,1	158	x	x	x	x	x	x	FR
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	0,0	33,3	33,3	33,3	0,0	3	x	x	x	x	x	x	FR
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	0,0	38,5	15,4	23,1	23,1	13	x	x	x	x	x	x	FR
	Protestant: never	0,0	0,0	80,0	20,0	0,0	5	x	x	x	x	x	x	FR
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	FR
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	FR
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	FR
	F Muslim: weekly or more frequent	75,0	25,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	4	x	x	x	x	x	x	FR
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	35,3	23,5	20,6	14,7	5,9	34	x	x	x	x	x	x	FR
	Muslim: never	12,5	37,5	25,0	12,5	12,5	8	x	x	x	x	x	x	FR
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>16,7</b>	<b>23,5</b>	<b>28,4</b>	<b>17,6</b>	<b>13,8</b>	<b>1406</b>	<b>16,8</b>	<b>22,9</b>	<b>30,4</b>	<b>17,4</b>	<b>12,4</b>	<b>1695</b>	<b>FR</b>
GB United Kingdom	without denomination	6,8	20,8	46,1	19,2	7,0	926	8,0	20,4	51,6	15,8	4,2	835	GB
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	5,1	21,8	42,3	17,9	12,8	78	8,2	24,7	41,1	17,8	8,2	73	GB
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	0,0	19,4	50,7	26,9	3,0	67	10,5	21,1	44,7	17,1	6,6	76	GB
	Roman Catholic: never	6,7	23,3	43,3	20,0	6,7	30	12,5	21,9	46,9	9,4	9,4	32	GB
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	1,8	16,7	37,7	29,8	14,0	114	3,3	19,6	33,7	23,9	19,6	92	GB
	Protestant: less	4,4	15,2	42,5	23,8	14,1	341	4,6	15,1	47,7	22,9	9,6	218	GB

	frequent than every week													
	Protestant: never	9,3	14,5	40,9	21,2	14,0	193	5,1	20,6	40,4	19,9	14,0	136	GB
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1	GB
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	2	GB
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	66,7	0,0	33,3	3	GB
	GB Muslim: weekly or more frequent	0,0	22,2	66,7	11,1	0,0	9	6,3	12,5	62,5	18,8	0,0	16	GB
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	0,0	58,3	25,0	8,3	8,3	12	17,6	5,9	70,6	5,9	0,0	17	GB
	Muslim: never	0,0	16,7	50,0	16,7	16,7	6	0,0	14,3	57,1	14,3	14,3	7	GB
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>6,0</b>	<b>19,4</b>	<b>44,0</b>	<b>21,1</b>	<b>9,5</b>	<b>1859</b>	<b>7,2</b>	<b>19,5</b>	<b>48,3</b>	<b>17,6</b>	<b>7,4</b>	<b>1711</b>	<b>GB</b>
GR Greece	without denomination	21,9	21,9	28,1	14,1	14,1	64	15,3	16,9	41,2	15,8	10,7	177	GR
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	50,0	0,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	2	0,0	0,0	33,3	0,0	66,7	3	GR
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	50,0	2	0,0	33,3	41,7	16,7	8,3	12	GR
	Roman Catholic: never	0,0	0,0	33,3	33,3	33,3	3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	GR
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	50,0	2	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	GR
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	0,0	20,0	40,0	40,0	0,0	5	0,0	50,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	2	GR
	Protestant: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	GR
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	3,1	9,8	37,9	14,1	35,0	488	4,2	9,9	30,9	20,8	34,2	456	GR
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	6,1	18,9	40,0	13,9	21,1	1320	7,8	14,8	36,9	19,4	21,1	1236	GR
	Orthodox: never	14,0	32,0	24,0	8,0	22,0	50	22,2	25,0	36,1	0,0	16,7	36	GR
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	0,0	12,5	37,5	12,5	37,5	8	0,0	0,0	66,7	33,3	0,0	9	GR
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	5,3	15,8	63,2	5,3	10,5	19	0,0	0,0	20,0	40,0	40,0	5	GR
	Muslim: never	14,3	0,0	85,7	0,0	0,0	7	0,0	28,6	57,1	0,0	14,3	7	GR
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>6,1</b>	<b>17,0</b>	<b>39,1</b>	<b>13,7</b>	<b>24,1</b>	<b>1983</b>	<b>7,8</b>	<b>14,1</b>	<b>36,0</b>	<b>19,1</b>	<b>23,0</b>	<b>1947</b>	<b>GR</b>
HU Hungary	without denomination	17,5	22,0	36,8	11,5	12,1	513	15,5	25,1	36,0	15,3	8,1	458	HU
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	9,4	18,1	22,8	22,0	27,6	127	x	x	x	x	x	x	HU
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	12,3	22,8	30,1	17,8	17,0	399	x	x	x	x	x	x	HU
	Roman Catholic: never	20,2	25,3	28,3	13,1	13,1	99	x	x	x	x	x	x	HU
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	0,0	21,7	17,4	34,8	26,1	23	x	x	x	x	x	x	HU
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	10,6	16,3	39,4	16,9	16,9	160	x	x	x	x	x	x	HU
	Protestant: never	25,5	25,5	15,7	15,7	17,6	51	x	x	x	x	x	x	HU
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	HU
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	HU
	Orthodox: never	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	HU

	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	HU
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	HU
	Muslim: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	HU
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>14,8</b>	<b>21,5</b>	<b>32,4</b>	<b>15,4</b>	<b>16,0</b>	<b>1398</b>	<b>12,9</b>	<b>18,8</b>	<b>35,8</b>	<b>18,2</b>	<b>14,2</b>	<b>1229</b>	<b>HU</b>
IE Ireland	without denomination	9,9	25,1	42,0	14,5	8,5	283	9,7	28,2	42,0	13,0	7,1	238	IE
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	3,6	10,8	39,0	27,6	18,9	830	2,3	12,1	50,7	21,7	13,2	1064	IE
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	5,6	20,8	41,8	20,1	11,6	447	5,7	24,2	42,4	21,0	6,7	495	IE
	Roman Catholic: never	12,8	17,0	40,4	17,0	12,8	47	4,8	19,0	38,1	23,8	14,3	42	IE
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	3,6	14,3	39,3	32,1	10,7	28	0,0	15,4	42,3	23,1	19,2	26	IE
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	8,0	16,0	44,0	16,0	16,0	25	3,2	9,7	61,3	19,4	6,5	31	IE
	Protestant: never	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	IE
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IE
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IE
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IE
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IE
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IE
	Muslim: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IE
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>5,7</b>	<b>16,1</b>	<b>40,6</b>	<b>22,9</b>	<b>14,7</b>	<b>1695</b>	<b>4,2</b>	<b>17,6</b>	<b>47,1</b>	<b>20,4</b>	<b>10,7</b>	<b>1919</b>	<b>IE</b>
IS Iceland	without denomination	x	x	x	x	x	x	12,0	24,3	27,9	21,7	14,1	276	IS
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IS
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IS
	Roman Catholic: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IS
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	25,0	33,3	41,7	0,0	12	IS
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	5,5	25,6	32,3	25,6	11,0	164	IS
	Protestant: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	12,5	23,2	28,6	26,8	8,9	56	IS
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IS
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IS
	Orthodox: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IS
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IS
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IS
	Muslim: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	IS
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>9,8</b>	<b>24,2</b>	<b>29,1</b>	<b>24,0</b>	<b>12,9</b>	<b>533</b>	<b>IS</b>
IL Israel	without denomination	19,7	20,0	24,4	13,4	22,5	574	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL
	Roman Catholic:	60,0	6,7	26,7	6,7	0,0	15	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL

	weekly or more frequent													
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	69,5	11,9	18,6	0,0	0,0	59	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL
	Roman Catholic: never	58,3	0,0	25,0	16,7	0,0	12	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL
	Protestant: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	64,3	15,3	13,3	2,0	5,1	98	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	67,2	13,4	13,9	3,5	2,0	201	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL
	Muslim: never	66,7	8,3	16,7	0,0	8,3	24	x	x	x	x	x	x	IL
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>21,5</b>	<b>14,4</b>	<b>20,5</b>	<b>13,8</b>	<b>29,8</b>	<b>2301</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>IL</b>
IT	without denomination	24,8	30,2	18,9	15,3	10,8	222	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
Italy	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	11,6	24,0	28,3	20,9	15,1	258	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	13,0	22,1	28,3	24,9	11,7	385	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
	Roman Catholic: never	22,2	33,3	20,4	13,0	11,1	54	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	25,0	25,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	4	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	66,7	33,3	0,0	3	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
	Protestant: never	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
	Muslim: never	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	IT
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>15,8</b>	<b>25,3</b>	<b>25,8</b>	<b>20,6</b>	<b>12,4</b>	<b>935</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>IT</b>
LU	without denomination	19,1	22,3	40,1	13,2	5,3	319	11,7	23,5	42,1	16,1	6,6	409	LU
Luxembourg	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	6,8	3,0	45,9	21,1	23,3	133	3,1	6,9	39,7	19,1	31,3	131	LU
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	9,3	14,9	37,2	22,6	16,1	323	7,8	13,6	44,1	22,1	12,3	447	LU
	Roman Catholic: never	18,4	22,1	39,3	11,7	8,6	163	6,3	22,8	48,8	8,7	13,4	127	LU
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	LU

	Protestant: less frequent than every week	0,0	14,3	28,6	57,1	0,0	7	0,0	37,5	50,0	12,5	0,0	8	LU
	Protestant: never	20,0	0,0	0,0	60,0	20,0	5	0,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	50,0	2	LU
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	50,0	50,0	0,0	2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	LU
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	50,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	LU
	Orthodox: never	0,0	50,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	2	0,0	0,0	50,0	50,0	0,0	2	LU
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	LU
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	33,3	0,0	66,7	0,0	0,0	3	0,0	33,3	66,7	0,0	0,0	3	LU
	Muslim: never	0,0	41,7	50,0	0,0	8,3	12	0,0	0,0	25,0	0,0	75,0	4	LU
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>12,9</b>	<b>16,4</b>	<b>41,4</b>	<b>17,2</b>	<b>12,2</b>	<b>1198</b>	<b>8,9</b>	<b>17,3</b>	<b>43,5</b>	<b>17,0</b>	<b>13,4</b>	<b>1350</b>	<b>LU</b>
NL Nether lands	without denomination	11,2	24,7	27,9	25,7	10,6	1277	13,4	28,1	26,3	22,9	9,4	958	NL
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	2,7	9,6	37,0	35,6	15,1	73	1,5	15,2	33,3	28,8	21,2	66	NL
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	5,8	19,9	29,2	30,8	14,4	312	6,8	16,7	28,8	37,9	9,8	264	NL
	Roman Catholic: never	9,4	20,3	31,3	29,7	9,4	64	7,7	19,2	35,9	23,1	14,1	78	NL
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	2,6	13,0	14,3	40,3	29,9	154	2,3	8,4	24,4	32,8	32,1	131	NL
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	6,4	15,4	26,9	33,3	17,9	156	4,0	18,3	24,6	42,9	10,3	126	NL
	Protestant: never	8,8	14,0	19,3	33,3	24,6	57	1,6	16,4	27,9	39,3	14,8	61	NL
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	NL
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	50,0	50,0	0,0	2	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	2	NL
	Orthodox: never	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	NL
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	11,1	11,1	22,2	33,3	22,2	9	25,0	75,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	4	NL
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	16,7	22,2	27,8	27,8	5,6	18	20,0	30,0	20,0	20,0	10,0	10	NL
	Muslim: never	22,2	33,3	44,4	0,0	0,0	9	14,3	14,3	57,1	14,3	0,0	7	NL
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>9,1</b>	<b>21,5</b>	<b>27,0</b>	<b>28,8</b>	<b>13,6</b>	<b>2254</b>	<b>9,7</b>	<b>23,0</b>	<b>27,2</b>	<b>28,1</b>	<b>12,0</b>	<b>1778</b>	<b>NL</b>
NO Norwa y	without denomination	8,2	27,4	24,0	25,6	14,8	974	10,1	31,5	21,4	23,3	13,7	854	NO
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	0,0	0,0	50,0	25,0	25,0	4	NO
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	0,0	28,6	14,3	28,6	28,6	7	9,1	36,4	18,2	9,1	27,3	11	NO
	Roman Catholic: never	0,0	40,0	20,0	40,0	0,0	5	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2	NO
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	1,8	29,1	18,2	30,9	20,0	55	4,0	18,0	36,0	30,0	12,0	50	NO
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	4,6	25,1	26,9	28,3	15,2	658	8,2	30,5	26,6	22,3	12,5	538	NO
	Protestant: never	6,3	18,8	26,2	33,0	15,7	191	7,8	31,1	24,0	24,0	13,2	167	NO
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	NO
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	25,0	50,0	0,0	25,0	4	0,0	0,0	20,0	80,0	0,0	5	NO

	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	NO
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	0,0	50,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	2	0,0	50,0	16,7	33,3	0,0	6	NO
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	22,2	0,0	33,3	22,2	22,2	9	0,0	20,0	60,0	10,0	10,0	10	NO
	Muslim: never	28,6	14,3	42,9	0,0	14,3	7	20,0	20,0	0,0	40,0	20,0	5	NO
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>6,5</b>	<b>25,7</b>	<b>25,3</b>	<b>27,3</b>	<b>15,1</b>	<b>1987</b>	<b>8,9</b>	<b>30,3</b>	<b>24,0</b>	<b>23,5</b>	<b>13,2</b>	<b>1722</b>	<b>NO</b>
PL Poland	without denomination	23,6	25,7	31,9	7,6	11,1	144	13,5	23,4	38,7	7,2	17,1	111	PL
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	10,0	15,2	35,7	18,2	20,8	946	7,4	12,5	36,2	23,3	20,7	774	PL
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	16,6	19,1	37,3	13,0	14,0	614	12,3	15,8	39,5	17,3	15,1	456	PL
	Roman Catholic: never	20,0	15,0	45,0	10,0	10,0	20	25,0	6,3	25,0	25,0	18,8	16	PL
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1	PL
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	PL
	Protestant: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	PL
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	66,7	0,0	33,3	0,0	0,0	3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	PL
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	33,3	22,2	44,4	0,0	0,0	9	12,5	12,5	50,0	12,5	12,5	8	PL
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	PL
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	PL
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	PL
	Muslim: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	PL
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>13,9</b>	<b>17,5</b>	<b>36,1</b>	<b>15,1</b>	<b>17,4</b>	<b>1757</b>	<b>9,7</b>	<b>14,5</b>	<b>37,5</b>	<b>19,8</b>	<b>18,5</b>	<b>1377</b>	<b>PL</b>
PT Portugal	without denomination	16,6	33,2	28,3	14,6	7,3	205	17,1	36,7	28,1	12,4	5,7	210	PT
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	7,9	21,3	27,3	25,1	18,4	315	9,8	23,2	25,4	23,7	17,9	358	PT
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	12,7	26,9	27,9	20,7	11,9	513	10,6	28,6	25,3	18,5	17,0	616	PT
	Roman Catholic: never	15,5	25,6	28,7	20,9	9,3	129	13,5	31,2	27,7	19,1	8,5	141	PT
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	0,0	22,2	11,1	55,6	11,1	9	0,0	40,0	20,0	20,0	20,0	5	PT
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	PT
	Protestant: never	50,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	PT
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	PT
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	PT
	Orthodox: never	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	PT
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	PT
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	PT
	Muslim: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	PT
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>12,6</b>	<b>26,2</b>	<b>27,7</b>	<b>21,0</b>	<b>12,4</b>	<b>1204</b>	<b>11,8</b>	<b>28,7</b>	<b>26,2</b>	<b>18,9</b>	<b>14,5</b>	<b>1370</b>	<b>PT</b>




SE Sweden	without denomination	18,2	24,9	21,6	20,6	14,7	1327	12,9	22,7	27,1	21,6	15,7	1264	SE
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	66,7	33,3	0,0	3	SE
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	20,0	33,3	20,0	20,0	6,7	15	7,1	21,4	14,3	21,4	35,7	14	SE
	Roman Catholic: never	33,3	0,0	66,7	0,0	0,0	3	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	2	SE
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	3,4	18,6	25,4	32,2	20,3	59	4,9	19,5	31,7	24,4	19,5	41	SE
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	13,0	21,2	23,3	21,8	20,6	330	7,7	16,5	29,0	28,2	18,6	376	SE
	Protestant: never	13,1	27,4	25,0	16,7	17,9	84	10,6	22,3	24,5	21,3	21,3	94	SE
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2	SE
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	50,0	25,0	0,0	12,5	12,5	8	20,0	0,0	20,0	40,0	20,0	5	SE
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	SE
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	0,0	50,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	SE
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	29,4	17,6	23,5	29,4	0,0	17	0,0	33,3	50,0	0,0	16,7	6	SE
	Muslim: never	33,3	0,0	16,7	33,3	16,7	6	16,7	50,0	16,7	16,7	0,0	6	SE
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>16,8</b>	<b>24,0</b>	<b>22,2</b>	<b>21,0</b>	<b>16,0</b>	<b>1891</b>	<b>11,6</b>	<b>21,2</b>	<b>27,5</b>	<b>23,0</b>	<b>16,7</b>	<b>1853</b>	<b>SE</b>
SI Slovenia	without denomination	22,0	22,5	43,5	6,4	5,6	605	20,4	17,8	46,1	8,3	7,4	230	SI
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	3,2	8,5	37,0	28,0	23,3	189	2,2	8,9	33,3	22,2	33,3	90	SI
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	7,0	12,7	59,0	13,0	8,3	315	11,4	15,2	42,6	14,5	16,3	289	SI
	Roman Catholic: never	17,6	14,7	41,2	14,7	11,8	34	26,9	20,0	36,9	7,7	8,5	130	SI
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	1	50,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	2	SI
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	0,0	25,0	50,0	0,0	25,0	4	0,0	42,9	57,1	0,0	0,0	7	SI
	Protestant: never	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	SI
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1	0,0	0,0	0,0	50,0	50,0	2	SI
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	27,3	18,2	45,5	9,1	0,0	11	0,0	66,7	16,7	16,7	0,0	6	SI
	Orthodox: never	0,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	50,0	2	20,0	20,0	20,0	40,0	0,0	5	SI
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	1	SI
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	6	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	4	SI
	Muslim: never	40,0	0,0	60,0	0,0	0,0	5	33,3	33,3	33,3	0,0	0,0	3	SI
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>14,6</b>	<b>17,2</b>	<b>46,8</b>	<b>12,1</b>	<b>9,4</b>	<b>1195</b>	<b>13,3</b>	<b>15,5</b>	<b>42,7</b>	<b>13,6</b>	<b>14,8</b>	<b>1034</b>	<b>SI</b>
SK Slovakia	without denomination	x	x	x	x	x	x	16,7	21,9	31,7	13,1	16,7	306	SK
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	15,6	17,7	33,2	15,3	18,3	334	SK
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	14,6	23,4	35,4	16,1	10,5	342	SK


	Roman Catholic: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	32,6	17,4	26,1	13,0	10,9	46	SK
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	15,0	35,0	30,0	10,0	10,0	20	SK
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	16,1	23,2	35,7	16,1	8,9	56	SK
	Protestant: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	27,3	18,2	36,4	9,1	9,1	11	SK
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	40,0	60,0	0,0	0,0	5	SK
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	14,3	28,6	57,1	0,0	0,0	7	SK
	Orthodox: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	50,0	2	SK
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	SK
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	1	SK
	Muslim: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	SK
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>15,5</b>	<b>20,9</b>	<b>33,7</b>	<b>15,1</b>	<b>14,7</b>	<b>1235</b>	<b>SK</b>
UA	without denomination	x	x	x	x	x	x	14,6	14,3	40,6	16,4	14,0	342	UA
	Roman Catholic: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	5,5	16,4	12,7	65,5	55	UA
	Roman Catholic: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	12,0	16,9	20,5	50,6	83	UA
	Roman Catholic: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	20,0	80,0	5	UA
	Protestant: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	5,9	5,9	41,2	23,5	23,5	17	UA
	Protestant: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	50,0	2	UA
	Protestant: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	UA
	Orthodox: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	10,7	6,0	47,6	9,5	26,2	84	UA
	Orthodox: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	13,2	11,6	39,4	14,1	21,6	619	UA
	Orthodox: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	29,6	11,1	37,0	9,3	13,0	54	UA
	Muslim: weekly or more frequent	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0	UA
	Muslim: less frequent than every week	x	x	x	x	x	x	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0	50,0	2	UA
	Muslim: never	x	x	x	x	x	x	100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1	UA
	<b>Total population</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>12,2</b>	<b>11,8</b>	<b>37,5</b>	<b>14,8</b>	<b>23,8</b>	<b>1327</b>	<b>UA</b>

## 5. The dynamics of political attitudes in Europe and Israel, 2002 – 2004

### The size of the political center – all denominations




General population, political dynamics – dyn extreme left




	Dyn extreme left
NO Norway	2,3
ES Spain	2,2
CZ Czech Republic	2,2
GR Greece	1,7
<b>AT Austria</b>	<b>1,3</b>
DE Germany	1,2
GB United Kingdom	1,2
DK Denmark	0,8
NL Netherlands	0,6
FR France	0,1
BE Belgium	-0,8
PT Portugal	-0,9
FI Finland	-0,9
SI Slovenia	-1,2
CH Switzerland	-1,3
IE Ireland	-1,5
HU Hungary	-1,9
LU Luxembourg	-4,0
PL Poland	-4,2
SE Sweden	-5,2

### General population, political dynamics – dyn center



	Dyn Center
IE Ireland	6,5
SE Sweden	5,3
GB United Kingdom	4,3
HU Hungary	3,4
LU Luxembourg	2,1
FR France	2,1
CH Switzerland	1,8
<b>AT Austria</b>	<b>1,8</b>
PL Poland	1,4
DE Germany	0,6
NL Netherlands	0,2
ES Spain	-0,7
FI Finland	-1,0
NO Norway	-1,3
BE Belgium	-1,5
PT Portugal	-1,5
CZ Czech Republic	-1,5
DK Denmark	-2,1
GR Greece	-3,1
SI Slovenia	-4,0

### General population, political dynamics – dyn extreme right




Dyn extreme right	
SI Slovenia	5,4
FI Finland	3,1
PT Portugal	2,1
ES Spain	2,0
CH Switzerland	1,9
LU Luxembourg	1,2
PL Poland	1,2
CZ Czech Republic	1,0
SE Sweden	0,8
AT Austria	0,3
BE Belgium	-0,9
GR Greece	-1,1
FR France	-1,3
DE Germany	-1,5
NL Netherlands	-1,5
DK Denmark	-1,6
HU Hungary	-1,7
NO Norway	-1,9
GB United Kingdom	-2,1
IE Ireland	-4,0



**6. The gaps in trust in parliament, legal system, police, democracy and the gaps in real incomes and poverty, Muslim population and non-Muslim population. ESS data 2002 and 2004**

	low trust in parliament 2002	low trust in Parliament 2004		low trust in parliament 2002	low trust in Parliament 2004		low trust in parliament 2002	low trust in Parliament 2004	DYN relative discrimination
Austria Muslims	28,6	37	Austria non-Muslims	23	26,7	Austria implied discrimination	5,6	10,3	4,7
Belgium Muslims	16,1	21,4	Belgium non-Muslims	20,7	24,8	Belgium implied discrimination	-4,6	-3,4	1,2
Denmark Muslims	26,3	31,4	Denmark non-Muslims	10	9,4	Denmark implied discrimination	16,3	22	5,7
France Muslims	31,4		France non-Muslims	24		France implied discrimination	7,4		
Germany Muslims	37,7	34,5	Germany non-Muslims	29,4	34,1	Germany implied discrimination	8,3	0,4	-7,9
Greece Muslims	8,3	14,6	Greece non-Muslims	31,9	28,8	Greece implied discrimination	-23,6	-14,2	9,4
Israel Muslims	41,7		Israel non-Muslims	32,3		Israel implied discrimination	9,4		
Luxembourg Muslims	35,4	0	Luxembourg non-Muslims	12,6	12,1	Luxembourg implied discrimination	22,8	-12,1	-34,9
Netherlands Muslims	13,1	48,1	Netherlands non-Muslims	16,1	23	Netherlands implied discrimination	-3	25,1	28,1
Norway Muslims	15,8	9,6	Norway non-Muslims	13,6	17,4	Norway implied discrimination	2,2	-7,8	-10
Slovenia Muslims	77,8	50	Slovenia non-Muslims	43,4	40,3	Slovenia implied discrimination	34,4	9,7	-24,7
Spain Muslims	50	31,7	Spain non-Muslims	25,3	19,1	Spain implied discrimination	24,7	12,6	-12,1
Sweden Muslims	4,2	16,7	Sweden non-Muslims	11,9	20,7	Sweden implied discrimination	-7,7	-4	3,7

Switzerland Muslims	10	16	Switzerland non-Muslims	9,9	13,6	Switzerland implied discrimination	0,1	2,4	2,3
UK Muslims	14,4	17,8	UK non-Muslims	27,7	35,7	UK implied discrimination	-13,3	-17,9	-4,6



	low trust in the legal system 2002	low trust in the legal system 2004		low trust in the legal system 2002	low trust in the legal system 2004		low trust in the legal system 2002	low trust in the legal system 2004	DYN relative discrimination
Austria Muslims	17,1	35,6	Austria non-Muslims	13,3	14	Austria implied discrimination	3,8	21,6	17,8
Belgium Muslims	11,1	22,3	Belgium non-Muslims	33,6	26	Belgium implied discrimination	-22,5	-3,7	18,8
Denmark Muslims	22,2	17,7	Denmark non-Muslims	7,5	6	Denmark implied discrimination	14,7	11,7	-3
France Muslims	28,9		France non-Muslims	25		France implied discrimination	3,9		
Germany Muslims	26,4	22,3	Germany non-Muslims	15,5	18,3	Germany implied discrimination	10,9	4	-6,9
Greece Muslims	4,5	14,3	Greece non-Muslims	17,1	23,6	Greece implied discrimination	-12,6	-9,3	3,3
Israel Muslims	16,4		Israel non-Muslims	15		Israel implied discrimination	1,4		
Luxembourg Muslims	13,5	4,8	Luxembourg non-Muslims	11,8	13,5	Luxembourg implied discrimination	1,7	-8,7	-10,4
Netherlands Muslims	17,5	22,2	Netherlands non-Muslims	17,4	16,9	Netherlands implied discrimination	0,1	5,3	5,2
Norway Muslims	0	19,1	Norway non-Muslims	11,8	10,8	Norway implied discrimination	-11,8	8,3	20,1
Slovenia Muslims	58,7	60	Slovenia non-Muslims	40,9	47,3	Slovenia implied discrimination	17,8	12,7	-5,1
Spain Muslims	62,5	42,9	Spain non-Muslims	34,6	27,4	Spain implied discrimination	27,9	15,5	-12,4
Sweden Muslims	21,7	30,8	Sweden non-Muslims	12,4	16	Sweden implied discrimination	9,3	14,8	5,5
Switzerland Muslims	0	17,9	Switzerland non-Muslims	9,9	10,4	Switzerland implied discrimination	-9,9	7,5	17,4
UK Muslims	14,3	11,1	UK non-Muslims	23,1	23	UK implied discrimination	-8,8	-11,9	-3,1

	low trust in the police 2002	low trust in the police 2004		low trust in the police 2002	low trust in the police 2004		low trust in the police 2002	low trust in the police 2004	DYN relative discrimination
Austria Muslims	33,3	39,2	Austria non-Muslims	9,6	11,5	Austria implied discrimination	23,7	27,7	4
Belgium Muslims	13,5	20,6	Belgium non-Muslims	13,1	14,2	Belgium implied discrimination	0,4	6,4	6
Denmark Muslims	9	11,1	Denmark non-Muslims	2,4	2,1	Denmark implied discrimination	6,6	9	2,4
France Muslims	22,9		France non-Muslims	10,8		France implied discrimination	12,1		
Germany Muslims	19,4	14,3	Germany non-Muslims	6,5	7,2	Germany implied discrimination	12,9	7,1	-5,8
Greece Muslims	11,5	5,8	Greece non-Muslims	15,6	15,9	Greece implied discrimination	-4,1	-10,1	-6
Israel Muslims	26,8		Israel non-Muslims	14,8		Israel implied discrimination	12		
Luxembourg Muslims	16	12,6	Luxembourg non-Muslims	9,8	10,3	Luxembourg implied discrimination	6,2	2,3	-3,9
Netherlands Muslims	22,5	23	Netherlands non-Muslims	11,4	9,4	Netherlands implied discrimination	11,1	13,6	2,5
Norway Muslims	20	23,9	Norway non-Muslims	5,8	6,4	Norway implied discrimination	14,2	17,5	3,3
Slovenia Muslims	42,2	80	Slovenia non-Muslims	28,9	32,2	Slovenia implied discrimination	13,3	47,8	34,5
Spain Muslims	37,5	20	Spain non-Muslims	17,1	12,3	Spain implied discrimination	20,4	7,7	-12,7
Sweden Muslims	16,7	13,4	Sweden non-Muslims	6,8	10,1	Sweden implied discrimination	9,9	3,3	-6,6
Switzerland Muslims	0	6,4	Switzerland non-Muslims	4,7	5	Switzerland implied discrimination	-4,7	1,4	6,1
UK Muslims	17,2	10,5	UK non-Muslims	12,7	12,8	UK implied discrimination	4,5	-2,3	-6,8


	low trust in the way democracy works in the country 2002	low trust in the way democracy works in the country 2004		low trust in the way democracy works in the country 2002	low trust in the way democracy works in the country 2004		low trust in the way democracy works in the country 2002	low trust in the way democracy works in the country 2004	DYN relative discrimination
Austria Muslims	19,1	4,8	Austria non-Muslims	18,5	12,4	Austria implied discrimination	0,6	-7,6	-8,2
Belgium Muslims	2,9	14,3	Belgium non-Muslims	14	16,8	Belgium implied discrimination	-11,1	-2,5	8,6
Denmark Muslims	0	12,6	Denmark non-Muslims	2,7	4,8	Denmark implied discrimination	-2,7	7,8	10,5
France Muslims	15,3		France non-Muslims	22,3		France implied discrimination	-7		
Germany Muslims	14	11,6	Germany non-Muslims	20,6	20,4	Germany implied discrimination	-6,6	-8,8	-2,2
Greece Muslims	18,5	0	Greece non-Muslims	20,8	11	Greece implied discrimination	-2,3	-11	-8,7
Israel Muslims	49,3		Israel non-Muslims	25,7		Israel implied discrimination	23,6		
Luxembourg Muslims	20,9	4,8	Luxembourg non-Muslims	5,9	5,9	Luxembourg implied discrimination	15	-1,1	-16,1
Netherlands Muslims	25,6	28,5	Netherlands non-Muslims	7,4	11,5	Netherlands implied discrimination	18,2	17	-1,2
Norway Muslims	15	0	Norway non-Muslims	7,5	10	Norway implied discrimination	7,5	-10	-17,5
Slovenia Muslims	27,8	42,9	Slovenia non-Muslims	36,2	31,3	Slovenia implied discrimination	-8,4	11,6	20
Spain Muslims	42,9	9,5	Spain non-Muslims	11,9	10,3	Spain implied discrimination	31	-0,8	-31,8
Sweden Muslims	4,2	7,1	Sweden non-Muslims	10,2	15,6	Sweden implied discrimination	-6	-8,5	-2,5
Switzerland Muslims	9,1	7,2	Switzerland non-Muslims	6,6	6,5	Switzerland implied discrimination	2,5	0,7	-1,8
UK Muslims	17,6	17,4	UK non-Muslims	22,7	22,5	UK implied discrimination	-5,1	-5,1	0

	very difficult on present income + difficult on present income, 2002	very difficult on present income + difficult on present income, 2004		very difficult on present income + difficult on present income, 2002	very difficult on present income + difficult on present income, 2004		very difficult on present income + difficult on present income, 2002	very difficult on present income + difficult on present income, 2004	DYN relative discrimination
Austria Muslims	36,7	46,5	Austria non-Muslims	18,3	12	Austria implied discrimination	18,4	34,5	16,1
Belgium Muslims	26,4	46,5	Belgium non-Muslims	15,4	21,9	Belgium implied discrimination	11	24,6	13,6
Denmark Muslims	19	25,1	Denmark non-Muslims	5,1	3,9	Denmark implied discrimination	13,9	21,2	7,3
France Muslims	79,6		France non-Muslims	44		France implied discrimination	35,6		
Germany Muslims	28,1	47,7	Germany non-Muslims	10,7	14,8	Germany implied discrimination	17,4	32,9	15,5
Greece Muslims	80,2	82,8	Greece non-Muslims	51,9	50,4	Greece implied discrimination	28,3	32,4	4,1
Israel Muslims	47,4		Israel non-Muslims	39,5		Israel implied discrimination	7,9		
Luxembourg Muslims	38,4	47,8	Luxembourg non-Muslims	9,7	11,3	Luxembourg implied discrimination	28,7	36,5	7,8
Netherlands Muslims	30,8	53,6	Netherlands non-Muslims	9,6	12,9	Netherlands implied discrimination	21,2	40,7	19,5
Norway Muslims	35	27,3	Norway non-Muslims	7,7	9,2	Norway implied discrimination	27,3	18,1	-9,2
Slovenia Muslims	21,1	10	Slovenia non-Muslims	17,4	14,1	Slovenia implied discrimination	3,7	-4,1	-7,8
Spain Muslims	66,6	64	Spain non-Muslims	21,8	18	Spain implied discrimination	44,8	46	1,2
Sweden Muslims	26,1	28,6	Sweden non-Muslims	8,7	8,6	Sweden implied discrimination	17,4	20	2,6
Switzerland Muslims	7,7	56,6	Switzerland non-Muslims	8,2	12,1	Switzerland implied discrimination	-0,5	44,5	45
UK Muslims	27,8	27,1	UK non-Muslims	12,2	17	UK implied discrimination	15,6	10,1	-5,5




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Source: calculated by Christian Bischof, Tomaz Kastrun, Karl Mueller and the author from the data of the ESS, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>



## 7. The Lisbon process, European neighborhood policy and poverty in terms of the EU-25 wide new poverty criterion




Source: calculated from UNDP (2005) by the author

Country	residual HDI 2003 from predicted HDI (regression HDI 1990->HDI 2003)	HDI 1990	HDI 2003	World rank in terms of social development (residual measure of increments in the UNDP HDI)
Ireland	0,0379681	0,87	0,946	24
Luxembourg	0,0270821	0,884	0,949	38
United Kingdom	0,0180739	0,883	0,939	48
Portugal	0,0167972	0,849	0,904	49
Cyprus	0,0166914	0,836	0,891	50
Hungary	0,0164554	0,807	0,862	51
Poland	0,0164228	0,803	0,858	52
Sweden	0,0141878	0,897	0,949	57
Norway	0,0133099	0,912	0,963	59
Belgium	0,0082041	0,899	0,945	63


Italy	0,0071227	0,889	0,934	66
Denmark	0,005196	0,898	0,941	68
Austria	0,0041634	0,894	0,936	72
Germany	0,0041146	0,888	0,93	73
Spain	0,0040983	0,886	0,928	74
Malta	0,0036019	0,825	0,867	76
Iceland	0,0033343	0,915	0,956	77
Finland	0,0022204	0,901	0,941	78
Greece	0,0019844	0,872	0,912	80
Estonia	0,0005124	0,814	0,853	82
Switzerland	-0,000706	0,91	0,947	83
Latvia	-0,00161	0,799	0,836	87
Netherlands	-0,002723	0,908	0,943	90
France	-0,002763	0,903	0,938	91
Lithuania	-0,009414	0,823	0,852	97
Romania	-0,018829	0,772	0,792	106
Bulgaria	-0,025642	0,795	0,808	108
<b>Other states</b>				
China	0,0879905	0,627	0,755	2
Tunisia	0,0562347	0,657	0,753	7
India	0,0480627	0,513	0,602	11
Lebanon	0,0423974	0,677	0,759	19
Morocco	0,0423476	0,548	0,631	21
Egypt	0,0395999	0,579	0,659	23
Albania	0,037609	0,703	0,78	25
Syrian Arab Republic	0,0351451	0,646	0,721	28
Algeria	0,0331695	0,649	0,722	30
Turkey	0,0324056	0,678	0,75	31
Jordan	0,0304462	0,683	0,753	34
Israel	0,0188705	0,858	0,915	46
Croatia	-0,003553	0,806	0,841	92
Japan	-0,005698	0,911	0,943	94
United States	-0,009658	0,916	0,944	98
Armenia	-0,017114	0,737	0,759	103
Canada	-0,017552	0,929	0,949	105
Belarus	-0,039707	0,787	0,786	118
Kazakhstan	-0,04487	0,767	0,761	119
Russian Federation	-0,060463	0,817	0,795	123
Ukraine	-0,07161	0,799	0,766	126
Moldova, Rep. of	-0,107098	0,739	0,671	129

Source: calculated from UNDP (2005) by the author

The (partial) European incapacity to increase the Muslim development index well explains the unsatisfactory human development performance, 1990 – 2003; see also the data from the Table Appendix 4 above and Table 6a.



**8. The new index of poverty in the enlarged EU-25, based on the criterion: poverty as defined by the percentage of people whose income is 60 % or less the EU-25 wide mean income**



	UNDP HDI 2003	implied new EU-25 poverty rate $y = -464,45 * \text{UNDP HDI} + 445,93$ ; $R^2 = 0,7967$
Turkey	0,75	97,59
Tunisia	0,753	96,2
Jordan	0,753	96,2
China	0,755	95,27
Lebanon	0,759	93,41
Armenia	0,759	93,41
Kazakhstan	0,761	92,48
Ukraine	0,766	90,16

Albania	0,78	83,66
Belarus	0,786	80,87
Romania	0,792	78,09
Russian Federation	0,795	76,69
Bulgaria	0,808	70,65
Latvia	0,836	57,65
Croatia	0,841	55,33
Lithuania	0,852	50,22
Estonia	0,853	49,75
Poland	0,858	47,43
Hungary	0,862	45,57
Malta	0,867	43,25
Cyprus	0,891	32,11
Portugal	0,904	26,07
Greece	0,912	22,35
Israel	0,915	20,96
Spain	0,928	14,92
Germany	0,93	13,99
Italy	0,934	12,13
Austria	0,936	11,2
France	0,938	10,28
United Kingdom	0,939	9,81
Denmark	0,941	8,88
Finland	0,941	8,88
Netherlands	0,943	7,95
Japan	0,943	7,95
<b>United States</b>	<b>0,944</b>	<b>7,49</b>
Belgium	0,945	7,02
Ireland	0,946	6,56
Switzerland	0,947	6,1
Luxembourg	0,949	5,17
Sweden	0,949	5,17
Canada	0,949	5,17
Iceland	0,956	1,92



**9. Further properties of the new poverty index, based on the EU-25 wide median income**

	% poor re EU25 median	UNDP HDI	quintile ratio	comparative price level (based on 1/ERDI)	GDP US \$	GDP PPP \$
Sweden	2	0,949	4	1,258765	301,6	239,6
Netherlands	4,4	0,943	5,1	1,073452	511,5	476,5
Austria	5	0,936	4,7	1,039425	253,1	243,5
France	5,4	0,938	5,6	1,062636	1757,6	1654
Ireland	5,9	0,946	6,1	1,019907	153,7	150,7
Italy	7,3	0,934	6,5	0,939231	1468,3	1563,3
Belgium	7,3	0,945	4,5	1,026871	301,9	294
Luxembourg	7,7	0,949	3,7	0,949821	26,5	27,9
Finland	7,7	0,941	3,8	1,124306	161,9	144
Denmark	7,9	0,941	4,3	1,250147	211,9	169,5
UK	11,9	0,939	7,2	1,114429	1794,9	1610,6
Malta	16,7	0,867	4,6	0,7	4,9	7
Czech Rep	17,8	0,874	3,5	0,537448	89,7	166,9
Spain	19,8	0,928	5,4	0,911333	838,7	920,3
Slovenia	20,2	0,904	3,9	0,725131	27,7	38,2
Cyprus	20,8	0,891	4,1	0,797203	11,4	14,3
Germany	25,5	0,93	4,3	1,048974	2403,2	2291
Greece	28,2	0,912	6,2	0,782016	172,2	220,2
Hungary	38,4	0,862	3,8	0,559919	82,7	147,7
Portugal	39,1	0,904	8	0,7813	147,9	189,3
Slovakia	40,3	0,849	4	0,447043	32,5	72,7
Estonia	58,1	0,853	7,2	0,497268	9,1	18,3
Poland	66,6	0,858	5,5	0,482283	209,6	434,6
Latvia	70,5	0,836	5,6	0,466387	11,1	23,8
Turkey	73,5	0,75	7,7	0,501984	240,4	478,9
Lithuania	78,5	0,852	5,1	0,450495	18,2	40,4
Romania	85,9	0,792	5,2	0,360303	57	158,2
Bulgaria	88	0,808	5,8	0,328926	19,9	60,5

Ex definition, the comparative price level in the US = 1.0, because GDP \$ = GDP PPP \$ in that country

% poor re EU25 median	UNDP HDI	quintile ratio	comparative price level (1/ERDI)	constant
	- 39,69438	3,260533	- 256,3087	274,4523
	18,21282	1,885556	98,64139	78,74213
	<b>0,84096</b>	11,92869		
	42,30157	24		
	18057,73	3415,047		
t-test	- 2,179474	1,729216	- 2,598389	3,485457
t-test and direction of influence $\wedge^2$	4,750109	2,990187	6,751623	12,14841
t-test and direction of influence $\wedge^{0,5}$	2,179474	1,729216	2,598389	3,485457
degrees of freedom	24	24	24	24
error probability	<b>0,03934</b>	<b>0,096615</b>	<b>0,015762</b>	0,00191
F equation	42,30157	42,30157	42,30157	42,30157
error probability, entire equation	9,75E-10	9,75E-10	9,75E-10	9,75E-10
% poor re country median	UNDP HDI	quintile ratio	comparative price level (1/ERDI)	constant
	3,992491	1,220667	2,381668	8,547088
	7,618334	0,788719	41,2612	32,93744
	0,131813	4,989711		
	1,214608	24		
	90,7211	597,5332		
t-test	0,524064	1,547658	0,057722	0,259495
t-test and direction of influence $\wedge^2$	0,274643	2,395246	0,003332	0,067337
t-test and	0,524064	1,547658	0,057722	0,259495

direction of influence $\wedge 0,5$				
degrees of freedom	24	24	24	24
error probability	0,605041	<b>0,134791</b>	0,954448	0,797467
F equation	1,214608	1,214608	1,214608	1,214608
error probability, entire equation	0,325855	0,325855	0,325855	0,325855

Legend: Our entire EXCEL 7.0 calculations are from UNDP and other data sources, quoted above. As in all EXCEL 7.0 outprints, first row: un-standardized regression coefficients, second row: standard errors, second last row: t-Test and direction of the influence. The values immediately below the standard errors are  $R^2$  (third row, left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom (fourth row). Below that:  $ss_{reg}$ ;  $ss_{resid}$ , i.e. the sum of squares of the regression and the sum of squares of the residuals. The right-hand entry in the third row is the standard error of the estimate y.


## 10. Estimating the Human Development Index for the Muslim communities in Europe from ESS data

Since there are no direct data available, which allow the calculation of the UNDP Human Development Index for the Muslim communities in Europe, we simply used the data of Table 10 to calculate a linear estimate of the UNDP HDI, based on the available ESS data on income deficit groups.

This calculation might be a very crude one, but it provides at least an informed guess about the assumed human development indices of the Muslim communities in Europe.

First we estimate the relationship between the percentage of income deficit groups per total population according to the ESS and the UNDP HDI:

	income deficit groups per total population	UNDP HDI as a proxy for the Lisbon process
Austria	12	0,936
Belgium	21,9	0,945
Czech	49,3	0,874
Denmark	3,9	0,941
Estonia	52,2	0,853
Finland	13,4	0,941
France	44	0,938
Germany	14,8	0,93
Greece	50,4	0,912
Hungary	49,3	0,862
Iceland	8	0,956
Ireland	10,5	0,946
Italy	17	0,934
Luxembourg	11,3	0,949
Netherlands	12,9	0,943
Norway	9,2	0,963
Poland	41	0,858
Portugal	40	0,904
Slovakia	54,8	0,849
Slovenia	14,1	0,904
Spain	18	0,928
Sweden	8,6	0,949
Switzerland	12,1	0,947
Ukraine	79,5	0,766
United Kingdom	17	0,939



This yields the following estimates for the UNDP HDI for the Muslim communities in Europe:

	% of total Muslim population belonging to income deficit groups	assumed UNDP HDI $y = -0,002x + 0,9689$ ; $R^2 = 0,7884$
Greece Muslims	82,8	0,8033
France Muslims	79,6	0,8097
Spain Muslims	64	0,8409
Switzerland Muslims	56,6	0,8557
Netherlands Muslims	53,6	0,8617
Luxembourg Muslims	47,8	0,8733
Germany Muslims	47,7	0,8735
Austria Muslims	46,5	0,8759
Belgium Muslims	46,5	0,8759
Sweden Muslims	28,6	0,9117
Norway Muslims	27,3	0,9143
United Kingdom Muslims	27,1	0,9147


Denmark Muslims	25,1	0,9187
Slovenia Muslims	10	0,9489

Our second estimate is based on the percentages of the political center per total population. This estimate yields the following results:

	center+center left+center right	UNDP HDI as a proxy for the Lisbon process
Austria	78,9	0,936
Belgium	80,4	0,945
Czech	64	0,874
Denmark	76,9	0,941
Estonia	80,1	0,853
Finland	73,3	0,941
France	70,7	0,938
Germany	82,3	0,93
Greece	69,2	0,912
Hungary	72,8	0,862
Iceland	77,3	0,956
Ireland	85,1	0,946
Italy	71,8	0,934
Luxembourg	77,7	0,949
Netherlands	78,3	0,943
Norway	77,9	0,963
Poland	71,8	0,858
Portugal	73,8	0,904
Slovakia	69,7	0,849
Slovenia	71,9	0,904
Spain	72,2	0,928
Sweden	71,7	0,949
Switzerland	80,9	0,947
Ukraine	64	0,766
United Kingdom	85,4	0,939



The relationship is again quite strong, explaining over 1/3 of the variance of the UNDP HDI.



The estimates for the UNDP HDI are the following:


		% of the Muslim population oriented towards the political center	assumed UNDP HDI $y = 0,0047x + 0,5594$ ; $R^2 = 0,3372$
Spain		50,0	0,7944
Belgium		57,2	0,82824
Luxembourg		57,2	0,82824
France		58,7	0,83529
Denmark		71,4	0,89498
Switzerland		74,9	0,91143
Netherlands		76,2	0,91754
Germany		83,3	0,95091
Sweden		83,3	0,95091
Austria		85,7	0,96219
Greece		85,7	0,96219
Norway		85,7	0,96219
Slovenia		87,5	0,97065
United Kingdom		87,5	0,97065

Working with estimate (1) we are confronted with the following table of world-wide Human Development:

	Human development index 2003
Norway	0,963
Iceland	0,956
Australia	0,955
Luxembourg	0,949
Canada	0,949
Sweden	0,949
<b>Slovenia Muslims</b>	<b>0,949</b>
Switzerland	0,947
Ireland	0,946
Belgium	0,945
United States	0,944
Japan	0,943
Netherlands	0,943
Finland	0,941
Denmark	0,941
United Kingdom	0,939
France	0,938
Austria	0,936
Italy	0,934
New Zealand	0,933
Germany	0,93
Spain	0,928
<b>Denmark Muslims</b>	<b>0,919</b>
Hong Kong, China (SAR)	0,916
Israel	0,915
<b>United Kingdom Muslims</b>	<b>0,915</b>
<b>Norway Muslims</b>	<b>0,914</b>
Greece	0,912
<b>Sweden Muslims</b>	<b>0,912</b>
Singapore	0,907
Slovenia	0,904
Portugal	0,904
Korea, Rep, of	0,901
Cyprus	0,891
Barbados	0,878
<b>Austria Muslims</b>	<b>0,876</b>
<b>Belgium Muslims</b>	<b>0,876</b>
Czech Republic	0,874
<b>Germany Muslims</b>	<b>0,874</b>
<b>Luxembourg Muslims</b>	<b>0,873</b>
Malta	0,867
Brunei Darussalam	0,866
Argentina	0,863
Hungary	0,862

<b>Netherlands Muslims</b>	<b>0,862</b>
Poland	0,858
<b>Switzerland Muslims</b>	<b>0,856</b>
Chile	0,854
Estonia	0,853
Lithuania	0,852
Qatar	0,849
United Arab Emirates	0,849
Slovakia	0,849
Bahrain	0,846
Kuwait	0,844
Croatia	0,841
<b>Spain Muslims</b>	<b>0,841</b>
Uruguay	0,84
Costa Rica	0,838
Latvia	0,836
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0,834
Bahamas	0,832
Seychelles	0,821
Cuba	0,817
Mexico	0,814
Tonga	0,81
<b>France Muslims</b>	<b>0,810</b>
Bulgaria	0,808
Panama	0,804
<b>Greece Muslims</b>	<b>0,803</b>
Trinidad and Tobago	0,801
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0,799
Macedonia, TFYR	0,797
Antigua and Barbuda	0,797
Malaysia	0,796
Russian Federation	0,795
Brazil	0,792
Romania	0,792
Mauritius	0,791
Grenada	0,787
Belarus	0,786
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0,786
Colombia	0,785
Dominica	0,783
Oman	0,781
Albania	0,78
Thailand	0,778
Samoa (Western)	0,776
Venezuela	0,772
Saint Lucia	0,772
Saudi Arabia	0,772
Ukraine	0,766
Peru	0,762
Kazakhstan	0,761
Lebanon	0,759

Ecuador	0,759
Armenia	0,759
Philippines	0,758
China	0,755
Suriname	0,755
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0,755
Paraguay	0,755
Tunisia	0,753
Jordan	0,753
Belize	0,753
Fiji	0,752
Sri Lanka	0,751
Turkey	0,750



## ***11. The UNDP HDI (Human development index) and religious service attendance in different nations of the world and among the European Muslim communities***


xx	HDI 2003	religious service attendance rate	ex USSR
Russian Federation	0,795	0,02	yes
Estonia	0,853	0,04	yes
Latvia	0,836	0,05	yes
Belarus	0,786	0,06	yes
Armenia	0,759	0,08	yes
Georgia	0,732	0,1	yes
Moldova, Rep, of	0,671	0,1	yes
Ukraine	0,766	0,1	yes
Lithuania	0,852	0,16	yes
Japan	0,943	0,03	no
Finland	0,941	0,04	no
Iceland	0,956	0,04	no
Sweden	0,949	0,04	no
Denmark	0,941	0,05	no
Norway	0,963	0,05	no
Azerbaijan	0,729	0,06	no
China	0,755	0,09	no
Bulgaria	0,808	0,1	no
Czech Republic	0,874	0,14	no
Korea, Rep, of	0,901	0,14	no
Australia	0,955	0,16	no
Switzerland	0,947	0,16	no
Romania	0,792	0,2	no
France	0,938	0,21	no
Hungary	0,862	0,21	no
Croatia	0,841	0,22	no
Argentina	0,863	0,25	no
Chile	0,854	0,25	no
Spain	0,928	0,25	no
United Kingdom	0,939	0,27	no
Austria	0,936	0,3	no
Uruguay	0,84	0,31	no
Venezuela	0,772	0,31	no
Netherlands	0,943	0,35	no
Brazil	0,792	0,36	no
Canada	0,949	0,38	no
India	0,602	0,42	no
Peru	0,762	0,43	no



Turkey	0,75	0,43	no
Belgium	0,945	0,44	no
United States	0,944	0,44	no
Italy	0,934	0,45	no
Mexico	0,814	0,46	no
Portugal	0,904	0,47	no
Slovakia	0,849	0,47	no
Poland	0,858	0,55	no
South Africa	0,658	0,56	no
Philippines	0,758	0,68	no
Ireland	0,946	0,84	no
Nigeria	0,453	0,89	no
xx	xx	xx	xx
xx	Human development index 2003	religious service attendance rate	ex-USSR
Austria Muslims	0,876	14,3	no
Belgium Muslims	0,876	22,4	no
Denmark Muslims	0,919	28,6	no
France Muslims	0,81	8,7	no
Germany Muslims	0,874	38,1	no
Greece Muslims	0,803	42,9	no
Luxembourg Muslims	0,873	0	no
Netherlands Muslims	0,862	19	no
Norway Muslims	0,914	28,6	no
Slovenia Muslims	0,949	12,5	no
Spain Muslims	0,841	20	no
Sweden Muslims	0,912	0	no
Switzerland Muslims	0,856	20,8	no
United Kingdom Muslims	0,915	40	no


Source: our own calculations from ESS, 2002 and 2004, and nationmaster.com based on world value survey<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Some statistics on Muslim communities in the text also drew from "Islamicweb" at <http://islamicweb.com/begin/population.htm> . For Malta, we implied a community of 0.5 % Muslims, for Cyprus, where the last population census with religious data took place only before the events of the 1970s, we equally assumed a percentage of 0.5 %.










## 12. Why fears about high Muslim fertility rates in Europe are exaggerated


*The world maps of demographic conditions, calculated from the data files of the UNDP*

In fact, many Muslim countries are the regions of the world with the most rapid fertility decline




Source of this and all following demographic graphs: our own calculations and compilations from UNDP electronic data file, available at <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/>

# Fertility rates, 1970-75




# Fertility rates, 1970-75







# Fertility rates, 2000





# Fertility rates, 2000





# Fertility increase/decrease







	fertility rate 75	fertility rate 2002	above/below trend fertility increase/decrease
<b>United States</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2,1</b>	<b>0,7414649</b>
Argentina	3,1	2,4	0,6380467
Israel	3,8	2,7	0,6209984
Finland	1,6	1,7	0,4640305
France	2,3	1,9	0,4416285
Denmark	2	1,8	0,4414649
Malta	2,1	1,8	0,4089696
Norway	2,2	1,8	0,375697
Belgium	1,9	1,7	0,3732012
Cyprus	2,5	1,9	0,3710273
Iceland	2,8	2	0,3586656
New Zealand	2,8	2	0,3586656
Croatia	2	1,7	0,3414649
Luxembourg	2	1,7	0,3414649
Netherlands	2,1	1,7	0,3089696

Sweden	1,9	1,6	0,2732012
United Kingdom	2	1,6	0,2414649
Australia	2,5	1,7	0,1710273
Germany	1,6	1,4	0,1640305
Canada	2	1,5	0,1414649
Switzerland	1,8	1,4	0,1041961
Austria	2	1,3	-0,058535
Japan	2,1	1,3	-0,09103
Portugal	2,7	1,5	-0,102992
Greece	2,3	1,3	-0,158372
Lithuania	2,3	1,3	-0,158372
Poland	2,3	1,3	-0,158372
Ireland	3,8	1,9	-0,179002
Hungary	2,1	1,2	-0,19103
Czech Republic	2,2	1,2	-0,224303
Estonia	2,2	1,2	-0,224303
Slovakia	2,5	1,3	-0,228973
Italy	2,3	1,2	-0,258372
Latvia	2	1,1	-0,258535
Russian Federation	2	1,1	-0,258535
Romania	2,6	1,3	-0,265545
Bulgaria	2,2	1,1	-0,324303
Slovenia	2,2	1,1	-0,324303
South Africa	5,4	2,6	-0,43464
Spain	2,9	1,2	-0,480594
Turkey	5,2	2,4	-0,494514
Korea, Rep, of	4,3	1,4	-0,939827







# population+migration policy



# population+migration policy





## Appendix to Part II - Documentation of the main cross-national quantitative results

The general model of Islam and development on a world scale. Muslim countries = OIC members

economic growth, 1990-2003	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln(GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	0,484336	-0,06746	2,31291	0,135122	-0,11026	-0,09531	0,028723	-0,44702	0,044784	-0,05011	-0,37238	-1,53318	-9,28959
	0,600357	0,184753	2,979977	0,46281	0,753391	0,226434	0,009734	0,444407	0,016361	0,014851	0,634149	0,514146	11,81819
	<b>0,35213</b>	2,146047											
	5,616423	124											
	310,3984	571,0841											
t-test and direction of influence	0,806747	-0,36511	0,77615	0,291961	-0,14635	-0,42091	<b>2,95074</b>	-1,00589	<b>2,73731</b>	<b>-3,3739</b>	-0,58721	<b>-2,982</b>	-0,78604
degrees of freedom	124	124	124	124	124	124	124	124	124	124	124	124	124
error probability	0,421357	0,71565	0,439138	0,770805	0,883883	0,674547	<b>0,00379</b>	0,316428	<b>0,00711</b>	<b>0,00099</b>	0,558133	<b>0,00345</b>	0,433343
F equation	5,616423	5,616423	5,616423	5,616423	5,616423	5,616423	5,616423	5,616423	5,616423	5,616423	5,616423	5,616423	5,616423
error probability, entire equation	2,62E-08	2,62E-08	2,62E-08	2,62E-08	2,62E-08	2,62E-08	2,62E-08	2,62E-08	2,62E-08	2,62E-08	2,62E-08	2,62E-08	2,62E-08
life expectancy, 1995-2000	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln(GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	-0,535	-1,15879	26,19474	-0,3902	1,619349	0,546556	-0,05897	-1,59835	0,099132	0,07049	3,486185	-2,74539	-70,5508
	1,540989	0,468667	7,552554	1,175103	1,938338	0,581514	0,024733	1,134432	0,041954	0,038163	1,624111	1,306606	29,95667
	<b>0,78019</b>	5,52286											
	37,56401	127											
	13749,33	3873,752											
t-test and direction of influence	-0,34718	<b>-2,4725</b>	<b>3,46833</b>	-0,33206	0,835432	0,939885	<b>-2,3841</b>	-1,40895	<b>2,36291</b>	<b>1,84709</b>	<b>2,14652</b>	<b>-2,1012</b>	-2,35509
degrees of freedom	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127
error probability	0,729031	<b>0,01474</b>	<b>0,00072</b>	0,740392	0,405044	0,349061	<b>0,0186</b>	0,161295	<b>0,01965</b>	<b>0,06706</b>	<b>0,03373</b>	<b>0,0376</b>	0,02005
F equation	37,56401	37,56401	37,56401	37,56401	37,56401	37,56401	37,56401	37,56401	37,56401	37,56401	37,56401	37,56401	37,56401
error probability, entire equation	2,47E-38	2,47E-38	2,47E-38	2,47E-38	2,47E-38	2,47E-38	2,47E-38	2,47E-38	2,47E-38	2,47E-38	2,47E-38	2,47E-38	2,47E-38

Political rights violations,1998	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	0,077268	-0,0926	0,893324	1,456653	-0,49918	0,007137	0,025331	1,43168	-0,04522	0,020553	-0,47141	0,799443	-3,62607
	0,388361	0,118114	1,9034	0,29615	0,488501	0,146553	0,006233	0,2859	0,010573	0,009618	0,409309	0,329292	7,549701
	<b>0,62156</b>	1,391875											
	17,38246	127											
	404,1037	246,0391											
t-test and direction of influence	0,19896	-0,78403	0,469331	<b>4,91863</b>	-1,02186	0,048698	<b>4,064</b>	<b>5,00762</b>	<b>-4,2772</b>	<b>2,13704</b>	-1,15173	<b>2,42777</b>	-0,48029
degrees of freedom	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127
error probability	0,842612	0,434485	0,639638	<b>2,6E-06</b>	0,308792	0,961237	<b>8,4E-05</b>	<b>1,8E-06</b>	<b>3,7E-05</b>	<b>0,03451</b>	0,251596	<b>0,01659</b>	0,631845
F equation	17,38246	17,38246	17,38246	17,38246	17,38246	17,38246	17,38246	17,38246	17,38246	17,38246	17,38246	17,38246	17,38246
error probability, entire equation	3,23E-23	3,23E-23	3,23E-23	3,23E-23	3,23E-23	3,23E-23	3,23E-23	3,23E-23	3,23E-23	3,23E-23	3,23E-23	3,23E-23	3,23E-23
Civil liberty violation, 1998	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	-0,01542	-0,12572	1,550299	0,766049	-0,25827	0,031511	0,01439	1,178011	-0,02319	0,01625	-0,13622	0,175467	-5,36103
	0,299938	0,091221	1,470028	0,228722	0,377278	0,113186	0,004814	0,220806	0,008166	0,007428	0,316117	0,254318	5,830763
	<b>0,6107</b>	1,074969											
	16,60205	127											
	230,2156	146,7559											
t-test and direction of influence	-0,05142	-1,37815	1,054605	<b>3,34926</b>	-0,68456	0,278399	<b>2,98932</b>	<b>5,33505</b>	<b>-2,8396</b>	<b>2,18766</b>	-0,43093	0,689954	-0,91944
degrees of freedom	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127
error probability	0,959075	0,17058	0,293608	<b>0,0107</b>	0,494869	0,781159	<b>0,00336</b>	<b>4,2E-07</b>	<b>0,00526</b>	<b>0,03052</b>	0,66725	0,491482	0,359609
F equation	16,60205	16,60205	16,60205	16,60205	16,60205	16,60205	16,60205	16,60205	16,60205	16,60205	16,60205	16,60205	16,60205
error probability, entire equation	1,97E-22	1,97E-22	1,97E-22	1,97E-22	1,97E-22	1,97E-22	1,97E-22	1,97E-22	1,97E-22	1,97E-22	1,97E-22	1,97E-22	1,97E-22
% people not expected to survive age 60	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	0,536641	2,115586	-46,5723	-1,51104	-3,20787	-1,52232	0,080177	2,659707	-0,17285	-0,11695	-5,34005	5,805854	268,7141
	2,879982	0,8759	14,1151	2,196171	3,622595	1,086801	0,046223	2,120161	0,078408	0,071323	3,03533	2,441939	55,98657
	<b>0,71959</b>	10,32177											
	27,15933	127											
	34722,34	13530,45											
t-test and	0,18633	<b>2,41533</b>	<b>-3,2995</b>	-	-0,88552	-1,40074	<b>1,73455</b>	1,25448	<b>-2,2045</b>	-1,63975	<b>-1,7593</b>	<b>2,37756</b>	4,79961

direction of influence	5			0,68803				4					7
degrees of freedom	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127
error probability	0,852479	<b>0,01715</b>	<b>0,00126</b>	0,492686	0,377552	0,163731	<b>0,08525</b>	0,21197	<b>0,02929</b>	0,103532	<b>0,08094</b>	<b>0,01892</b>	4,39E-06
F equation	27,15933	27,15933	27,15933	27,15933	27,15933	27,15933	27,15933	27,15933	27,15933	27,15933	27,15933	27,15933	27,15933
error probability, entire equation	1,49E-31	1,49E-31	1,49E-31	1,49E-31	1,49E-31	1,49E-31	1,49E-31	1,49E-31	1,49E-31	1,49E-31	1,49E-31	1,49E-31	1,49E-31
<b>quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	0,204929	-1,38628	21,11305	-2,42498	-3,46157	-1,18331	0,025214	0,365121	0,040795	0,043273	-6,35372	1,840381	-68,052
	1,67982	0,506094	8,209322	1,399526	2,026033	0,713352	0,033734	1,393641	0,057623	0,045558	1,900246	1,429186	32,71173
	<b>0,30953</b>	5,291392											
	3,436922	92											
	1154,757	2575,892											
t-test and direction of influence	0,121995	<b>-2,7392</b>	<b>2,57184</b>	-1,7327	<b>-1,7085</b>	-1,65881	0,747427	0,261991	0,707966	0,949826	<b>-3,3436</b>	1,287712	-2,08036
degrees of freedom	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
error probability	0,903169	<b>0,0074</b>	<b>0,01172</b>	<b>0,0865</b>	<b>0,09091</b>	0,10056	0,456712	0,793914	0,480756	0,344689	<b>0,0012</b>	0,201076	0,040273
F equation	3,436922	3,436922	3,436922	3,436922	3,436922	3,436922	3,436922	3,436922	3,436922	3,436922	3,436922	3,436922	3,436922
error probability, entire equation	0,000171	0,000171	0,000171	0,000171	0,000171	0,000171	0,000171	0,000171	0,000171	0,000171	0,000171	0,000171	0,000171
<b>CO2 emissions per capita</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	-1,27642	1,492713	-22,11	0,646569	-1,98469	0,508381	0,045591	0,004205	-0,06629	0,056112	2,707825	-0,25695	78,12618
	0,740193	0,240777	3,905994	0,59056	0,929888	0,313756	0,013196	0,572188	0,022798	0,019105	0,795603	0,672929	15,52983
	<b>0,73357</b>	2,645336											
	27,07429	118											
	2273,526	825,7409											
t-test and direction of influence	<b>-1,7244</b>	<b>6,19958</b>	<b>-5,6605</b>	1,09484	<b>-2,1343</b>	1,620307	<b>3,45486</b>	0,007349	<b>-2,9076</b>	<b>2,93703</b>	<b>3,40349</b>	-0,38184	5,030718
degrees of freedom	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118
error probability	<b>0,08725</b>	<b>8,6E-09</b>	<b>1,1E-07</b>	0,275816	<b>0,03489</b>	0,107836	<b>0,00077</b>	0,994149	<b>0,00435</b>	<b>0,00399</b>	<b>0,00091</b>	0,703267	1,77E-06
F equation	27,07429	27,07429	27,07429	27,07429	27,07429	27,07429	27,07429	27,07429	27,07429	27,07429	27,07429	27,07429	27,07429
error probability, entire equation	2,39E-30	2,39E-30	2,39E-30	2,39E-30	2,39E-30	2,39E-30	2,39E-30	2,39E-30	2,39E-30	2,39E-30	2,39E-30	2,39E-30	2,39E-30
<b>eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative internati	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant



energy use)		economy			of ec. freedom)		onal price level (ERD)						
	0,845736	0,316213	-3,90812	0,035537	0,876313	-0,35101	-0,01634	0,124818	0,030799	-0,01644	-1,59528	0,52185	14,11394
	0,378961	0,129566	2,120685	0,335794	0,475115	0,160649	0,009671	0,315575	0,014329	0,010761	0,414815	0,388591	8,59121
	0,705252	1,331954											
	19,54059	98											
	416,0037	173,8618											
t-test and direction of influence	<b>2,23173</b>	<b>2,44055</b>	<b>-1,8429</b>	0,10583	<b>1,84442</b>	<b>-2,185</b>	<b>-1,6892</b>	0,395527	<b>2,14942</b>	-1,52816	<b>-3,8458</b>	1,342928	1,642835
degrees of freedom	98	98	98	98	98	98	98	98	98	98	98	98	98
error probability	<b>0,02791</b>	<b>0,01646</b>	<b>0,06837</b>	0,915934	<b>0,06814</b>	<b>0,03128</b>	<b>0,09436</b>	0,693314	<b>0,03406</b>	0,129695	<b>0,00021</b>	0,182397	0,103622
F equation	19,54059	19,54059	19,54059	19,54059	19,54059	19,54059	19,54059	19,54059	19,54059	19,54059	19,54059	19,54059	19,54059
error probability, entire equation	2,1E-22	2,1E-22	2,1E-22	2,1E-22	2,1E-22	2,1E-22	2,1E-22	2,1E-22	2,1E-22	2,1E-22	2,1E-22	2,1E-22	2,1E-22
<b>female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	1,337774	6,446167	-106,602	-6,81798	-0,7575	1,723931	-0,05594	-2,95394	-0,08467	-0,31104	24,4844	-1,33683	519,0561
	3,630846	1,104263	17,79517	2,768752	4,567071	1,37015	0,058274	2,672926	0,09885	0,089918	3,826695	3,078597	70,58328
	<b>0,475</b>	13,01285											
	9,575253	127											
	19457,01	21505,44											
t-test and direction of influence	0,368447	<b>5,83753</b>	<b>-5,9905</b>	-2,4625	-0,16586	1,258206	-0,95988	-1,10513	-0,8565	<b>-3,4592</b>	6,398326	-0,43423	7,353811
degrees of freedom	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127
error probability	0,713153	<b>4,2E-08</b>	<b>2E-08</b>	<b>0,01514</b>	0,868529	0,210626	0,33894	0,271191	0,393333	<b>0,00074</b>	2,76E-09	0,664855	2,09E-11
F equation	9,575253	9,575253	9,575253	9,575253	9,575253	9,575253	9,575253	9,575253	9,575253	9,575253	9,575253	9,575253	9,575253
error probability, entire equation	3,39E-14	3,39E-14	3,39E-14	3,39E-14	3,39E-14	3,39E-14	3,39E-14	3,39E-14	3,39E-14	3,39E-14	3,39E-14	3,39E-14	3,39E-14
<b>HDI 2005</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	0,004486	-0,01016	0,299432	-0,03001	0,024707	0,000637	-0,00041	-0,00976	0,001132	0,000658	0,081555	-0,03858	-1,0732
	0,015731	0,004784	0,077101	0,011996	0,019788	0,005936	0,000252	0,011581	0,000428	0,00039	0,01658	0,013339	0,305816
	<b>0,91471</b>	0,056381											
	113,5066	127											
	4,329771	0,403707											
t-test and direction of influence	0,285193	-2,1245	3,88362	-2,5019	1,248592	0,10734	-1,63895	-0,84256	2,64293	1,68949	4,91892	-2,8927	-3,50929

degrees of freedom	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127
error probability	0,77596 1	0,03556 8	0,000165	0,0 136 26	0,21411 1	0,91468 9	0,10369 8	0,40105 6	0,00925	0,09358	2,6E-06	0,0045	0,00062 2
F equation	113,506 6	113,506 6	113,5066	113 ,50 66	113,506 6	113,506 6	113,506 6	113,506 6	113,506 6	113,506 6	113,506 6	113,506 6	113,506 6
error probability, entire equation	1,26E-64	1,26E-64	1,26E-64	1,2 6E- 64	1,26E-64	1,26E-64	1,26E-64	1,26E-64	1,26E-64	1,26E-64	1,26E-64	1,26E-64	1,26E-64
<b>ESI-Index</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	2,67650 9	0,72657	-9,56762	- 1,9 360 3	-4,10732	-0,48385	0,01030 4	-2,10224	0,01670 6	-0,01276	0,72151 6	0,72232 8	87,7092 5
	1,92741 5	0,60431 1	9,734337	1,4 782 68	2,52855 7	0,74392 3	0,04311	1,47333	0,07406 4	0,05218 6	1,99567 6	1,68354 4	38,4490 7
	<b>0,34105</b>	6,72268 8											
	4,91681 3	114											
	2666,55 7	5152,17 7											
t-test and direction of influence	1,38865 2	1,20231 3	-0,98287	- 1,3 096 6	-1,624	-0,65041	0,23901 1	-1,42686	0,22556 6	-0,24445	0,36154	0,42905 2	2,28118
degrees of freedom	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114
error probability	0,16764 6	0,23173 4	0,327751	0,1 929 45	0,1071	0,51673 9	0,81152 6	0,15635 3	0,82194 3	0,80732 3	0,71836 5	0,66869 5	0,02439 5
F equation	4,91681 3	4,91681 3	4,916813	4,9 168 13	4,91681 3	4,91681 3	4,91681 3	4,91681 3	4,91681 3	4,91681 3	4,91681 3	4,91681 3	4,91681 3
error probability, entire equation	4,69E-07	4,69E-07	4,69E-07	4,6 9E- 07	4,69E-07	4,69E-07	4,69E-07	4,69E-07	4,69E-07	4,69E-07	4,69E-07	4,69E-07	4,69E-07

**The general model of Islam and development on a world scale. Muslim identity = Muslims as % of total population (according to nationmaster.com)**

economic growth, 1990-2003	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Muslims as % of total population	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	0,520899	-0,13562	3,319787	0,002676	-0,14286	0,073585	0,004596	-1,0415	0,021491	-0,05132	-0,52988	-1,2622	-11,024
	0,554191	0,16742	2,702765	0,005239	0,683015	0,213987	0,009726	0,42049	0,015826	0,014	0,581315	0,464188	10,6734
	<b>0,31947</b>	1,920325											
	4,616267	118											
	204,2781	435,1427											
t-test and direction of influence	0,939926	-0,81007	1,228293	0,510767	-0,20917	0,343874	<b>0,47254</b>	-2,47688	<b>1,35794</b>	<b>-3,666</b>	-0,91152	<b>-2,7192</b>	-1,03284
degrees of freedom	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118
error probability	0,349175	0,41953	0,221781	0,610468	0,83468	0,731553	<b>0,63742</b>	0,014671	<b>0,17707</b>	<b>0,00037</b>	0,36388	<b>0,00753</b>	0,303789
F equation	4,616267	4,616267	4,616267	4,616267	4,616267	4,616267	4,616267	4,616267	4,616267	4,616267	4,616267	4,616267	4,616267
error probability, entire equation	1,27E-06	1,27E-06	1,27E-06	1,27E-06	1,27E-06	1,27E-06	1,27E-06	1,27E-06	1,27E-06	1,27E-06	1,27E-06	1,27E-06	1,27E-06
life expectancy, 1995-2000	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Muslims as % of total population	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	0,028373	-1,08837	25,42015	0,026569	1,87425	0,442559	-0,04016	-1,67693	0,114537	0,055385	3,964434	-2,75384	-69,1697
	1,592361	0,475371	7,664071	0,015026	1,965834	0,614463	0,027551	1,202184	0,045402	0,04024	1,664761	1,319303	30,2592
	<b>0,7836</b>	5,528486											
	36,51282	121											
	13391,8	3698,263											
t-test and direction of influence	0,017818	<b>-2,2895</b>	<b>3,31679</b>	1,768254	0,953412	0,720236	<b>-1,4576</b>	-1,39491	<b>2,52275</b>	<b>1,37638</b>	<b>2,38138</b>	<b>-2,0873</b>	-2,28591
degrees of freedom	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121
error probability	0,985813	<b>0,02378</b>	<b>0,0012</b>	0,079539	0,342282	0,472769	<b>0,14755</b>	0,165599	<b>0,01294</b>	<b>0,17124</b>	<b>0,01881</b>	<b>0,03896</b>	0,024
F equation	36,51282	36,51282	36,51282	36,51282	36,51282	36,51282	36,51282	36,51282	36,51282	36,51282	36,51282	36,51282	36,51282
error probability, entire equation	9,84E-37	9,84E-37	9,84E-37	9,84E-37	9,84E-37	9,84E-37	9,84E-37	9,84E-37	9,84E-37	9,84E-37	9,84E-37	9,84E-37	9,84E-37
Political rights violations, 1998	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Muslims as % of total population	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	0,027324	-0,09773	0,979403	0,01986	-0,53143	0,046068	0,020629	1,411881	-0,04526	0,022576	-0,63775	0,857656	-4,05782
	0,389487	0,116274	1,874608	0,003675	0,480837	0,150296	0,006739	0,294051	0,011105	0,009842	0,407195	0,322697	7,401306
	<b>0,64095</b>	1,352251											
	18,00031	121											
	394,9804	221,2584											
t-test and direction of influence	0,070154	-0,84052	0,522458	<b>5,40361</b>	-1,10522	0,306513	<b>3,06118</b>	<b>4,80149</b>	<b>-4,0754</b>	<b>2,29378</b>	-1,56619	<b>2,65777</b>	-0,54826

degrees of freedom	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121
error probability	0,944187	0,402273	0,602307	<b>3,3E-07</b>	0,271259	0,759741	<b>0,00272</b>	<b>4,6E-06</b>	<b>8,2E-05</b>	<b>0,02353</b>	0,119915	<b>0,00893</b>	0,584526
F equation	18,00031	18,00031	18,00031	18,00031	18,00031	18,00031	18,00031	18,00031	18,00031	18,00031	18,00031	18,00031	18,00031
error probability, entire equation	2,5E-23	2,5E-23	2,5E-23	2,5E-23	2,5E-23	2,5E-23	2,5E-23	2,5E-23	2,5E-23	2,5E-23	2,5E-23	2,5E-23	2,5E-23
<b>Civil liberty violation, 1998</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Muslims as % of total population	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	-0,0824	-0,11294	1,416871	0,013058	-0,3495	0,083527	0,009914	1,160645	-0,02268	0,017653	-0,29107	0,228727	-5,27092
	0,285515	0,085236	1,374192	0,002694	0,35248	0,110175	0,004945	0,215555	0,008141	0,007215	0,298497	0,236555	5,42557
	<b>0,65978</b>	0,991275											
	19,55409	121											
	230,5724	118,8978											
t-test and direction of influence	-0,28862	-1,32502	1,031057	<b>4,84688</b>	-0,99156	0,758131	<b>2,00697</b>	<b>5,38444</b>	<b>-2,7856</b>	<b>2,44662</b>	-0,97513	0,966907	-0,9715
degrees of freedom	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121
error probability	0,773369	0,187661	0,304571	<b>3,8E-06</b>	0,323392	0,449847	<b>0,04698</b>	<b>3,6E-07</b>	<b>0,0062</b>	<b>0,01586</b>	0,331439	0,335519	0,333239
F equation	19,55409	19,55409	19,55409	19,55409	19,55409	19,55409	19,55409	19,55409	19,55409	19,55409	19,55409	19,55409	19,55409
error probability, entire equation	9,43E-25	9,43E-25	9,43E-25	9,43E-25	9,43E-25	9,43E-25	9,43E-25	9,43E-25	9,43E-25	9,43E-25	9,43E-25	9,43E-25	9,43E-25
<b>% people not expected to survive age 60</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Muslims as % of total population	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	-0,67774	2,053749	-46,0983	-0,07807	-3,8176	-1,41317	0,055101	3,173241	-0,19445	-0,08754	-6,10642	5,723471	268,2302
	2,937765	0,877018	14,13953	0,027721	3,62679	1,133631	0,050828	2,217923	0,083762	0,074238	3,071336	2,433997	55,82554
	<b>0,73222</b>	10,19957											
	27,57169	121											
	34419,78	12587,77											
t-test and direction of influence	-0,2307	<b>2,34174</b>	<b>-3,2602</b>	-2,81613	-1,05261	-1,24658	<b>1,08407</b>	1,430726	<b>-2,3214</b>	-1,17921	<b>-1,9882</b>	<b>2,35147</b>	4,804794
degrees of freedom	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121
error probability	0,817938	<b>0,02083</b>	<b>0,00145</b>	0,005677	0,294617	0,214958	<b>0,28049</b>	0,155086	<b>0,02194</b>	0,240626	<b>0,04905</b>	<b>0,02032</b>	4,49E-06
F equation	27,57169	27,57169	27,57169	27,57169	27,57169	27,57169	27,57169	27,57169	27,57169	27,57169	27,57169	27,57169	27,57169
error probability, entire equation	4,34E-31	4,34E-31	4,34E-31	4,34E-31	4,34E-31	4,34E-31	4,34E-31	4,34E-31	4,34E-31	4,34E-31	4,34E-31	4,34E-31	4,34E-31
<b>quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Muslims as % of total population	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	-0,26802	-1,31851	19,8771	-0,03707	-3,54933	-1,23455	0,032479	0,703551	0,018553	0,049918	-6,19603	1,771878	-63,529
	1,726663	0,510363	8,281726	0,017107	2,018535	0,760004	0,034242	1,422158	0,059701	0,047987	1,943773	1,429386	32,79632
	<b>0,31601</b>	5,270204											
	3,465121	90											
	1154,927	2499,755											
t-test and direction of influence	-0,15522	<b>-2,5835</b>	<b>2,40012</b>	<b>-2,1669</b>	<b>-1,7584</b>	-1,6244	0,948502	0,494706	0,310761	1,040221	<b>-3,1876</b>	1,239608	-1,93708

degrees of freedom	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
error probability	0,87699 <sub>4</sub>	<b>0,01139</b>	<b>0,01845</b>	<b>0,03288</b>	<b>0,08208</b>	0,10778 <sub>7</sub>	0,34541 <sub>4</sub>	0,62201 <sub>3</sub>	0,75670 <sub>1</sub>	0,30102 <sub>4</sub>	<b>0,00197</b>	0,21834 <sub>3</sub>	0,05587 <sub>2</sub>
F equation	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>	3,46512 <sub>1</sub>
error probability, entire equation	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>	0,00016 <sub>2</sub>
<b>CO2 emissions per capita</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Muslims as % of total population	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	-1,46819	1,59269 <sub>5</sub>	-23,5245	0,00701 <sub>8</sub>	-2,32819	0,54124 <sub>5</sub>	0,05468 <sub>4</sub>	0,34168	-0,05653	0,05971 <sub>4</sub>	2,57766 <sub>8</sub>	-0,31429	81,5280 <sub>1</sub>
	0,75581 <sub>9</sub>	0,24220 <sub>8</sub>	3,92803	0,00732 <sub>1</sub>	0,93200 <sub>1</sub>	0,33872 <sub>9</sub>	0,01694 <sub>9</sub>	0,60961 <sub>2</sub>	0,02799 <sub>3</sub>	0,02026 <sub>6</sub>	0,81008 <sub>7</sub>	0,66657 <sub>7</sub>	15,5646
	<b>0,74717</b>	2,61691											
	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	112											
	2266,66 <sub>7</sub>	767,000 <sub>7</sub>											
t-test and direction of influence	<b>-1,9425</b>	<b>6,57574</b>	<b>-5,9889</b>	0,95850 <sub>8</sub>	<b>-2,4981</b>	1,59786 <sub>7</sub>	<b>3,22635</b>	0,56048 <sub>7</sub>	<b>-2,0193</b>	<b>2,9465</b>	<b>3,18199</b>	-0,4715	5,23803 <sub>9</sub>
degrees of freedom	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112
error probability	<b>0,05458</b>	<b>1,6E-09</b>	<b>2,6E-08</b>	0,33987 <sub>1</sub>	<b>0,01394</b>	0,11289	<b>0,00164</b>	0,57626 <sub>7</sub>	<b>0,04584</b>	<b>0,00391</b>	<b>0,00189</b>	0,63820 <sub>4</sub>	7,69E-07
F equation	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>	27,5821 <sub>9</sub>
error probability, entire equation	6,96E-30	6,96E-30	6,96E-30	6,96E-30	6,96E-30	6,96E-30	6,96E-30	6,96E-30	6,96E-30	6,96E-30	6,96E-30	6,96E-30	6,96E-30
<b>eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Muslims as % of total population	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	0,96149 <sub>4</sub>	0,27053 <sub>2</sub>	-3,25367	0,00067 <sub>1</sub>	1,01666 <sub>8</sub>	-0,36437	-0,01949	-0,06846	0,02820 <sub>7</sub>	-0,0201	-1,5258	0,53151	12,7010 <sub>1</sub>
	0,38122 <sub>3</sub>	0,12790 <sub>4</sub>	2,09287 <sub>5</sub>	0,00396 <sub>6</sub>	0,46946 <sub>9</sub>	0,16260 <sub>9</sub>	0,00959 <sub>3</sub>	0,32165 <sub>3</sub>	0,01451 <sub>5</sub>	0,01084 <sub>2</sub>	0,41331 <sub>3</sub>	0,38231 <sub>6</sub>	8,43817 <sub>1</sub>
	0,71440 <sub>8</sub>	1,30490 <sub>1</sub>											
	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	95											
	404,649 <sub>5</sub>	161,762 <sub>8</sub>											
t-test and direction of influence	<b>2,52213</b>	<b>2,11511</b>	<b>-1,5546</b>	0,16926	<b>2,16557</b>	<b>-2,2408</b>	<b>-2,0319</b>	-0,21285	<b>1,94324</b>	-1,85386	<b>-3,6916</b>	1,39024	1,50518 <sub>5</sub>
degrees of freedom	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95
error probability	<b>0,01333</b>	<b>0,03704</b>	<b>0,12336</b>	0,86595 <sub>2</sub>	<b>0,03285</b>	<b>0,02737</b>	<b>0,04496</b>	0,83190 <sub>4</sub>	<b>0,05495</b>	0,06686 <sub>2</sub>	<b>0,00037</b>	0,16770 <sub>5</sub>	0,13559 <sub>4</sub>
F equation	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>	19,8035 <sub>4</sub>
error probability, entire equation	2,92E-22	2,92E-22	2,92E-22	2,92E-22	2,92E-22	2,92E-22	2,92E-22	2,92E-22	2,92E-22	2,92E-22	2,92E-22	2,92E-22	2,92E-22
<b>female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Muslims as % of total population	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	0,63810 <sub>4</sub>	6,55829 <sub>8</sub>	-108,566	-0,12369	-1,73496	2,13564 <sub>7</sub>	-0,06928	-2,30312	-0,07965	-0,26016	23,3015 <sub>4</sub>	-1,54033	523,720 <sub>3</sub>
	3,68631 <sub>7</sub>	1,10048 <sub>5</sub>	17,7423 <sub>3</sub>	0,03478 <sub>5</sub>	4,55090 <sub>8</sub>	1,42248 <sub>3</sub>	0,06378	2,78305 <sub>7</sub>	0,10510 <sub>5</sub>	0,09315 <sub>5</sub>	3,85392 <sub>2</sub>	3,05418 <sub>7</sub>	70,0500 <sub>6</sub>
	<b>0,49223</b>	12,7984 <sub>5</sub>											
	9,77457 <sub>5</sub>	121											
	19212,9 <sub>4</sub>	19819,8 <sub>4</sub>											
t-test and direction of influence	0,17310 <sub>1</sub>	<b>5,95946</b>	<b>-6,119</b>	<b>-3,5558</b>	-0,38123	1,50135 <sub>1</sub>	-1,08617	-0,82755	-0,75783	<b>-2,7928</b>	6,04618 <sub>8</sub>	-0,50433	7,47637 <sub>2</sub>

degrees of freedom	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121
error probability	0,86286 2	<b>2,6E-08</b>	<b>1,2E-08</b>	<b>0,00054</b>	0,70369 8	0,13587	0,27956 2	0,40955 3	0,45002 7	<b>0,00608</b>	1,7E-08	0,61494 4	1,33E-11
F equation	9,77457 5	9,77457 5	9,77457 5	9,77457 5	9,77457 5	9,77457 5	9,77457 5	9,77457 5	9,77457 5	9,77457 5	9,77457 5	9,77457 5	9,77457 5
error probability, entire equation	3,08E-14	3,08E-14	3,08E-14	3,08E-14	3,08E-14	3,08E-14	3,08E-14	3,08E-14	3,08E-14	3,08E-14	3,08E-14	3,08E-14	3,08E-14
<b>HDI 2005</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Muslims as % of total population	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	0,00672 5	-0,0096	0,29242	-0,00017	0,02325 9	0,00189 9	-0,00052	-0,01411	0,00099 1	0,00063 4	0,08236 8	-0,0361	-1,04701
	0,01676 7	0,00500 5	0,08069 8	0,00015 8	0,02069 9	0,00647	0,00029	0,01265 8	0,00047 8	0,00042 4	0,01752 9	0,01389 1	0,31861
	<b>0,91228</b>	0,05821 1											
	104,867 5	121											
	4,26421 5	0,41001 7											
t-test and direction of influence	0,40108 4	<b>-1,9177</b>	<b>3,62365</b>	<b>-1,0962</b>	1,12366	0,29351 8	-1,79356	-1,11434	<b>2,07233</b>	<b>1,49682</b>	<b>4,699</b>	<b>-2,5987</b>	-3,28619
degrees of freedom	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121
error probability	0,68906 5	0,05750 6	0,00042 6	0,27516 6	0,26338 2	0,76962 9	0,07538 1	0,26734	<b>0,04036</b>	<b>0,13704</b>	<b>7E-06</b>	<b>0,01052</b>	0,00132 9
F equation	104,867 5	104,867 5	104,867 5	104,867 5	104,867 5	104,867 5	104,867 5	104,867 5	104,867 5	104,867 5	104,867 5	104,867 5	104,867 5
error probability, entire equation	1,3E-60	1,3E-60	1,3E-60	1,3E-60	1,3E-60	1,3E-60	1,3E-60	1,3E-60	1,3E-60	1,3E-60	1,3E-60	1,3E-60	1,3E-60
<b>ESI-Index</b>	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Muslims as % of total population	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension model	constant
	2,66396 2	0,58815 7	-7,8798	-0,04764	-2,7725	-0,61607	-0,01074	-2,69734	-0,03358	-0,02186	1,20586 2	0,50560 8	87,1714 5
	1,97260 4	0,60673 4	9,79787 7	0,01864 1	2,47216 9	0,76735 8	0,04322 5	1,50938 4	0,07963	0,05352 2	2,02818 2	1,68061 2	38,6864
	<b>0,39626</b>	6,68845 4											
	6,12586 2	112											
	3288,51 6	5010,36 7											
t-test and direction of influence	1,35048	0,96938 3	-0,80424	-2,55581	<b>-1,121</b>	-0,80284	-0,24842	-1,78705	-0,42167	-0,40849	0,59455 3	0,30084 8	2,25328 4
degrees of freedom	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112
error probability	0,17958 5	0,33444 3	0,42296 5	0,01193 4	<b>0,2645</b>	0,42376 7	0,80426 4	0,07663 5	0,67407 4	0,68369 3	0,55334 1	0,76408 8	0,02618 8
F equation	6,12586 2	6,12586 2	6,12586 2	6,12586 2	6,12586 2	6,12586 2	6,12586 2	6,12586 2	6,12586 2	6,12586 2	6,12586 2	6,12586 2	6,12586 2
error probability, entire equation	7,02E-09	7,02E-09	7,02E-09	7,02E-09	7,02E-09	7,02E-09	7,02E-09	7,02E-09	7,02E-09	7,02E-09	7,02E-09	7,02E-09	7,02E-09

**Is migration a threat to development? Is Islam a threat to development?  
A general model of migration, Islam and development on a world scale.  
Muslim countries = OIC members**


<b>HDI 2005</b>	total net migration rate	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension reform	constant
	0,00982	-0,0147	0,38215	-0,0353	0,02182	-0,00688	4,4E-05	0,00082	0,00171	0,00015	0,07246	-0,02597	0,00017	-1,4397
	0,01919	0,00658	0,10482	0,01501	0,02527	0,00788	0,0005	0,01548	0,00083	0,00056	0,02178	0,01652	0,00091	0,4036
	<b>0,9239</b>	0,05734												
	78,475	84												
	3,35458	0,27621												
t-test and direction of influence	0,51167	-2,2266	3,64588	-2,3536	0,8634	-0,8668	0,08742	0,05276	2,05413	0,27164	3,32764	-1,5704	0,18737	-3,5671
degrees of freedom	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
error probability	0,61022	0,02865	0,00046	0,02093	0,39037	0,3885	0,93055	0,95805	0,04307	0,78657	0,0013	0,12007	0,85182	0,0006
F equation	78,475	78,475	78,475	78,475	78,475	78,475	78,475	78,475	78,475	78,475	78,475	78,475	78,475	78,475
error probability, entire equation	4,6E-42	4,6E-42	4,6E-42	4,6E-42	4,6E-42	4,6E-42	4,6E-42	4,6E-42	4,6E-42	4,6E-42	4,6E-42	4,6E-42	4,6E-42	4,6E-42
<b>Civil liberty violation, 1998</b>	total net migration rate	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension reform	constant
	-0,0956	-0,1991	3,05571	0,54391	-0,5613	-0,0698	0,00717	1,31526	-0,0187	0,00314	-0,4214	0,13875	0,00438	-11,822
	0,34668	0,11898	1,89408	0,27125	0,4567	0,14233	0,00906	0,27967	0,01501	0,01012	0,3935	0,29849	0,01649	7,29332
	<b>0,6443</b>	1,03622												
	11,7028	84												
	163,356	90,1947												
t-test and direction of influence	-0,2756	-1,6735	1,61329	2,00522	-1,229	-0,4905	0,79128	4,70298	-1,2458	0,31049	-1,0708	0,46486	0,26563	-1,6209
degrees of freedom	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
error probability	0,78352	0,09795	0,11043	0,04816	0,2225	0,62508	0,43101	1E-05	0,21629	0,75696	0,28731	0,64324	0,79117	0,10879
F equation	11,7028	11,7028	11,7028	11,7028	11,7028	11,7028	11,7028	11,7028	11,7028	11,7028	11,7028	11,7028	11,7028	11,7028
error probability, entire equation	2E-14	2E-14	2E-14	2E-14	2E-14	2E-14	2E-14	2E-14	2E-14	2E-14	2E-14	2E-14	2E-14	2E-14
<b>Political rights violations, 1998</b>	total net migration rate	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension reform	constant
	-0,0075	-0,1076	1,38977	1,35318	-0,707	0,10497	0,01802	1,30227	-0,0527	0,00981	-0,5175	0,77706	0,0013	-5,6958
	0,45433	0,15593	2,48224	0,35548	0,59852	0,18653	0,01188	0,36651	0,01967	0,01326	0,51569	0,39118	0,02161	9,55805
	<b>0,6497</b>	1,35798												
	11,9856	84												
	287,339	154,906												
t-test and direction of influence	-0,0165	-0,6904	0,55989	3,80668	-1,1812	0,56273	1,51734	3,5532	-2,6812	0,74002	-1,0035	1,98646	0,06011	-0,5959
degrees of freedom	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
error probability	0,98691	0,4918	0,5770	0,0002	0,2408	0,5751	0,1329	0,0006	0,0088	0,4613	0,3185	0,0502	0,9522	0,5528



		7	5	7	5	2	3	3	3	5	2	4	1	3
F equation	11,9856	11,9856	11,9856	11,9856	11,9856	11,9856	11,9856	11,9856	11,9856	11,9856	11,9856	11,9856	11,9856	11,9856
error probability, entire equation	3,9E-15	3,9E-15	3,9E-15	3,9E-15	3,9E-15	3,9E-15	3,9E-15	3,9E-15	3,9E-15	3,9E-15	3,9E-15	3,9E-15	3,9E-15	3,9E-15
<b>% people not expected to survive age 60</b>	total net migration rate	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln(GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension reform	constant
	0,19738	1,8557	-44,094	-3,6085	-1,6407	-0,9908	-0,0114	0,74738	-0,2304	-0,0772	-5,3846	6,66164	0,16041	270,463
	3,32826	1,14227	18,1838	2,60406	4,38448	1,36645	0,08702	2,68487	0,14409	0,09716	3,77773	2,8656	0,15833	70,0181
	<b>0,7655</b>	<b>9,948</b>												
	21,0907	84												
	27133,5	8312,86												
t-test and direction of influence	0,05931	1,62457	-2,4249	-1,3857	-0,3742	-0,7251	-0,1309	0,27837	-1,5991	-0,7942	-1,4254	2,32469	1,01313	3,86276
degrees of freedom	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
error probability	0,95285	0,108	0,01746	0,1695	0,70919	0,47043	0,89614	0,78142	0,11355	0,42932	0,15776	0,0225	0,31391	0,00022
F equation	21,0907	21,0907	21,0907	21,0907	21,0907	21,0907	21,0907	21,0907	21,0907	21,0907	21,0907	21,0907	21,0907	21,0907
error probability, entire equation	2,4E-22	2,4E-22	2,4E-22	2,4E-22	2,4E-22	2,4E-22	2,4E-22	2,4E-22	2,4E-22	2,4E-22	2,4E-22	2,4E-22	2,4E-22	2,4E-22
<b>CO2 emissions per capita</b>	total net migration rate	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln(GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension reform	constant
	-0,1728	1,45522	-20,574	0,4103	-2,3883	0,47219	0,01731	0,66648	-0,0231	0,00263	3,42764	-1,1104	0,07672	69,2051
	0,75402	0,29005	4,68261	0,61001	0,99981	0,38099	0,02022	0,64728	0,03402	0,02337	0,88004	0,70145	0,03798	18,1317
	<b>0,7836</b>	<b>2,24135</b>												
	21,4424	77												
	1400,35	386,822												
t-test and direction of influence	-0,2292	5,01713	-4,3938	0,67262	-2,3887	1,23937	0,85613	1,02966	-0,6787	0,11244	3,89486	-1,583	2,02	3,8168
degrees of freedom	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77
error probability	0,81935	3,3E-06	3,5E-05	0,5032	0,01936	0,21897	0,39458	0,30639	0,49938	0,91077	0,00021	0,11753	0,04686	0,00027
F equation	21,4424	21,4424	21,4424	21,4424	21,4424	21,4424	21,4424	21,4424	21,4424	21,4424	21,4424	21,4424	21,4424	21,4424
error probability, entire equation	1,6E-21	1,6E-21	1,6E-21	1,6E-21	1,6E-21	1,6E-21	1,6E-21	1,6E-21	1,6E-21	1,6E-21	1,6E-21	1,6E-21	1,6E-21	1,6E-21
<b>female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate</b>	total net migration rate	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln(GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension reform	constant
	2,5722	6,73807	-111,37	-6,1043	4,63874	2,49975	-0,0906	-2,8199	-0,3404	-0,3807	26,6248	-1,5807	0,07159	539,186
	4,23528	1,45357	23,1392	3,31372	5,57935	1,73884	0,11073	3,41656	0,18336	0,12364	4,80724	3,64654	0,20148	89,0995
	<b>0,5501</b>	<b>12,659</b>												
	7,89943	84												
	16456,6	13461,1												
t-test and direction of influence	0,60733	4,63554	-4,813	-1,8421	0,83141	1,4376	-0,8183	-0,8254	-1,8563	-3,0793	5,53846	-0,4335	0,35533	6,0515
degrees of freedom	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
error probability	0,54527	1,3E-05	6,5E-06	0,06898	0,4081	0,15426	0,41548	0,41151	0,06692	0,0028	3,4E-07	0,66578	0,72323	3,9E-08
F equation	7,89943	7,89943	7,89943	7,89943	7,89943	7,89943	7,89943	7,89943	7,89943	7,89943	7,89943	7,89943	7,89943	7,89943
error probability, entire equation	1E-10	1E-10	1E-10	1E-10	1E-10	1E-10	1E-10	1E-10	1E-10	1E-10	1E-10	1E-10	1E-10	1E-10
<b>eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)</b>	total net migration rate	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln(GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension reform	constant

			y			e of ec. freedom		price level (ERD)							
	0,56872	0,42375	-5,5796	0,16524	0,52319	-0,4007	-0,0147	0,15541	0,02193	-0,0139	-2,0681	0,67252	-0,0249	20,3691	
	0,44464	0,16694	2,68408	0,3994	0,59194	0,20121	0,01227	0,4032	0,01974	0,01404	0,53147	0,43738	0,02314	10,4556	
	<b>0,7446</b>	1,31854													
	15,9223	71													
	359,861	123,437													
t-test and direction of influence	1,27907	2,53833	-2,0788	0,41371	0,88385	-1,9912	-1,2003	0,38545	1,11094	-0,9882	-3,8913	1,53761	-1,0745	1,94816	
degrees of freedom	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	
error probability	0,20504	0,01333	0,04125	0,68034	0,37976	0,0503	0,23403	0,70105	0,27034	0,32639	0,00022	0,12859	0,28622	0,05535	
F equation	15,9223	15,9223	15,9223	15,9223	15,9223	15,9223	15,9223	15,9223	15,9223	15,9223	15,9223	15,9223	15,9223	15,9223	
error probability, entire equation	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	4,5E-17	
<b>life expectancy, 1995-2000</b>	total net migration rate	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension reform	constant	
	-0,1359	-1,0487	25,2802	0,60508	1,14465	0,09429	-0,0054	-0,299	0,14662	0,0422	3,84548	-3,4416	-0,0532	-73,045	
	1,75918	0,60376	9,61121	1,3764	2,31746	0,72225	0,046	1,41911	0,07616	0,05135	1,99676	1,51464	0,08369	37,0087	
	<b>0,8194</b>	5,25811													
	29,3211	84													
	10538,6	2322,41													
t-test and direction of influence	-0,0773	-1,737	2,63028	0,43961	0,49392	0,13055	-0,1173	-0,2107	1,92512	0,82169	1,92586	-2,2722	-0,636	-1,9737	
degrees of freedom	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	
error probability	0,9386	0,08606	0,01015	0,66135	0,62265	0,89645	0,90692	0,83362	0,0576	0,41358	0,0575	0,02563	0,5265	0,0517	
F equation	29,3211	29,3211	29,3211	29,3211	29,3211	29,3211	29,3211	29,3211	29,3211	29,3211	29,3211	29,3211	29,3211	29,3211	
error probability, entire equation	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	4,5E-27	
<b>quintile ratio (share of income/consumption on richest 20% to poorest 20%)</b>	total net migration rate	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension reform	constant	
	-0,6741	-1,6116	24,3911	-3,7078	-5,0576	-1,8081	0,00079	-0,0714	0,01855	0,08268	-7,6438	1,70888	-0,139	-77,518	
	1,69239	0,57296	9,19521	1,43582	2,16032	0,7746	0,04595	1,52229	0,08265	0,04958	2,09711	1,47691	0,08074	35,7221	
	<b>0,42</b>	4,76571													
	3,84341	69													
	1134,79	1567,13													
t-test and direction of influence	-0,3983	-2,8128	2,65259	-2,5824	-2,3411	-2,3342	0,01709	-0,0469	0,22445	1,66746	-3,6449	1,15706	-1,7219	-2,17	
degrees of freedom	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	
error probability	0,69165	0,00639	0,0099	0,01194	0,02212	0,0225	0,98641	0,96273	0,82307	0,09996	0,00051	0,25124	0,08957	0,03345	
F equation	3,84341	3,84341	3,84341	3,84341	3,84341	3,84341	3,84341	3,84341	3,84341	3,84341	3,84341	3,84341	3,84341	3,84341	
error probability, entire equation	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	6,2E-05	
<b>economic growth, 1990-2003</b>	total net migration rate	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension reform	constant	
	0,81072	-0,1064	3,08014	0,51234	-0,3305	0,2287	0,02449	-0,8665	0,0272	-0,0616	-0,5903	-1,2468	0,00014	-11,94	
	0,63607	0,21935	3,49726	0,50425	0,8373	0,26103	0,01745	0,51335	0,02755	0,01857	0,72621	0,55531	0,03024	13,4918	
	<b>0,3243</b>	1,8995													

		4												
	3,0274	82												
	142,008	295,877												
t-test and direction of influence	1,27459	-0,4851	0,88073	1,01604	-0,3947	0,87615	1,40372	-1,688	0,98749	-3,3195	-0,8128	-2,2452	0,00453	-0,885
degrees of freedom	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82
error probability	0,20605	0,62891	0,38104	0,3126	0,6941	0,38351	0,16418	0,09521	0,32631	0,00135	0,41869	0,02745	0,99639	0,37877
F equation	3,0274	3,0274	3,0274	3,0274	3,0274	3,0274	3,0274	3,0274	3,0274	3,0274	3,0274	3,0274	3,0274	3,0274
error probability, entire equation	0,00067	0,00067	0,00067	0,00067	0,00067	0,00067	0,00067	0,00067	0,00067	0,00067	0,00067	0,00067	0,00067	0,00067
<b>ESI-Index</b>	total net migration rate	landlocked country	Dummy for transition economy	Urbanization ratio, 1990	(I-S)/GNP	state interventionism (absence of ec. freedom)	MNC PEN 1995	low comparative international price level (ERD)	EU-membership (EU-15)	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln(GDP PPP pc)^2	world bank pension reform	constant
	2,35272	-0,2088	3,39956	-2,8766	1,79705	-0,5063	-0,0236	-2,9712	-0,0519	0,03308	-2,126	3,3095	0,07847	45,1353
	2,02684	0,69562	11,0735	1,58582	2,67006	0,83214	0,05299	1,63503	0,08775	0,05917	2,30056	1,74509	0,09642	42,6396
	0,41857	6,05813												
	4,65169	84												
	2219,38	3082,88												
t-test and direction of influence	1,16078	-0,3002	0,307	-1,814	0,67304	-0,6085	-0,4457	-1,8172	-0,5915	0,55914	-0,9241	1,89646	0,81382	1,05853
degrees of freedom	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
error probability	0,24902	0,76476	0,7596	0,07325	0,50277	0,54452	0,65696	0,07275	0,55578	0,57755	0,35808	0,06134	0,41805	0,29285
F equation	4,65169	4,65169	4,65169	4,65169	4,65169	4,65169	4,65169	4,65169	4,65169	4,65169	4,65169	4,65169	4,65169	4,65169
error probability, entire equation	2,2E-06	2,2E-06	2,2E-06	2,2E-06	2,2E-06	2,2E-06	2,2E-06	2,2E-06	2,2E-06	2,2E-06	2,2E-06	2,2E-06	2,2E-06	2,2E-06



## Documentary appendix on the situation of Muslim communities in the European Union (EU-25 + acceding countries) (United States Department of State)

### **Austria**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; however, there is some societal mistrust and discrimination against members of some nonrecognized religious groups, particularly those referred to as "sects." There was no marked deterioration in the atmosphere of religious tolerance in the country during the period covered by this report.

#### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 32,382 square miles, and its population is an estimated 8 million. The largest minority groups are Croatian, Slovene, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, and Roma. In the past several years, the country has experienced a rise in immigration from countries such as Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has increased the number of Muslims in the country.

According to the 2001 census, membership in major religions is as follows: Roman Catholic Church--74.0 percent; Lutheran and Presbyterian churches (Evangelical Church--Augsburger and Helvetic confessions)--4.7 percent; Islamic community--4.2 percent; Jewish community--0.1 percent; Eastern Orthodox (Russian, Greek, Serbian, Romanian, and Bulgarian)--2.2 percent; other Christian churches--0.9 percent; other non-Christian religious groups--0.2 percent. Atheists accounted for 12 percent; 2 percent did not indicate a religious affiliation.

The vast majority of groups termed "sects" by the Government are small organizations with fewer than 100 members.

The provinces of Carinthia and Burgenland have somewhat higher percentages of Protestants than the national average. The number of Muslims is higher than the national average in Vienna and the province of Vorarlberg, where industry drew a

disproportionately higher number of guest workers from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia.

According to a poll by FESSEL-GfK 78 percent of respondents said that they belonged to a church or religious group. Of that number, 2 percent attended services more than once a week, 15 percent attended weekly, 17 percent attended a minimum of once a month, 34 percent attended several times a year (on special occasions), and 32 percent never attended.

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

The Government is secular. The Roman Catholic Church is the predominant religion; many Roman Catholic holidays are also government holidays.

The status of religious organizations is governed by the 1874 Law on Recognition of Churches and by the 1998 Law on the Status of Religious Confessional Communities, which establishes the status of "confessional communities." Religious organizations are divided into three legal categories (listed in descending order of status): officially recognized religious societies, religious confessional communities, and associations. Each category of organizations possesses a distinct set of rights, privileges, and responsibilities.

Recognition as a religious society under the 1874 law has wide-ranging implications, such as the authority to participate in the mandatory church contributions program, to provide religious instruction in public schools, and to bring religious workers into the country to act as ministers, missionaries, or teachers. Under the 1874 law, religious societies have "public corporation" status. This status permits religious societies to engage in a number of public or quasi-public activities that are denied to confessional communities and associations. The Government provides financial support for religious teachers at both public and private schools to religious societies but not to other religious organizations. The Government provides financial support to private schools run by any of the 13 officially recognized religious societies.


The Government recognizes 13 religious bodies as religious societies: the Roman Catholic Church, the Protestant churches (Lutheran and Presbyterian, called "Augsburger" and "Helvetic" confessions), the Islamic community, the Old Catholic Church, the Jewish community, the Eastern Orthodox Church (Russian, Greek, Serbian, Romanian, and Bulgarian), the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the New Apostolic Church, the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Methodist Church of Austria, the Buddhist community, and the Coptic Orthodox Church.

Muslims have complained about incidents of societal discrimination and verbal harassment. In response to past incidents of Muslim schoolgirls encountering difficulties with school authorities for wearing the headscarf at school, the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture circulated a policy document in June 2004 to all schools under its jurisdiction emphasizing that the wearing of the headscarf is protected by the right to freedom of religion under the Constitution and the European Convention of Human Rights. It further stated that any efforts designed to prohibit Muslim schoolgirls from wearing it are unlawful.

Muslim women have reported difficulties in the job market when potential employers learn they wear a headscarf. Observers hoped victims would be able to use the Equal Treatment Bill, which implemented the EU Anti-Discrimination and Anti-Racism

Guidelines and took effect on July 1, 2004, to take action in court. Women who wear the headscarf have also reported that they experienced harassment in public areas.

No Muslim cemeteries were desecrated during the period covered by this report.





## **Belgium**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and Government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion. However, the Government continued to observe and research groups that a parliamentary commission's unofficial report labeled "harmful sects."

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom. Some Muslim community leaders and spokespersons for non-recognized religions cited instances of discrimination by government officials. There were also isolated instances of discrimination by private individuals.

### **Section I. Religious Demography**

The country has an area of 11,780 square miles, and its population is approximately 10.3 million.

The population is predominantly Roman Catholic. According to the 2001 Survey and Study of Religion, jointly conducted by a number of the country's universities and based on self-identification, approximately 47 percent of the population identify themselves as belonging to the Roman Catholic Church. According to these figures, the Muslim population numbers approximately 364,000, and there are an estimated 328 mosques in the country. Protestants number between 125,000 and 140,000. The Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches have approximately 70,000 adherents. The Jewish population is estimated at between 45,000 and 55,000. The Anglican Church has approximately 10,800 members. The larger non-recognized religions include Jehovah's Witnesses (25,000), independent Protestant congregations, Adventists, the Church of Scientology, Mormons, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs and Hare Krishnas.

Estimates indicate that approximately 15 percent of the population does not identify with any religion. Approximately 7.4 percent of the population describes itself as "laic" (members of nonconfessional philosophical organizations), and another 1.1 percent belongs to organized laity that receives funding for its programs.

According to a 1999 survey by an independent academic group, 11.2 percent of the Roman Catholic population attends weekly religious services; the Catholic Church has estimated that church attendance ranges between 10-15 percent. Religion plays a role in major life events. As of 1999, with regard to the Catholic population, 65 percent of the children born in the country were baptized; 49.2 percent of couples opted for a religious marriage; and 76.6 percent of funerals included religious services.

### **Section II. Status of Religious Freedom**

#### **Legal/Policy Framework**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.

The Government accords "recognized" status to Roman Catholicism, Protestantism (including evangelicals and Pentecostals), Judaism, Anglicanism, Islam, and Orthodox Christianity (Greek and Russian). Representative bodies for these religions receive subsidies from government revenues. The Government also supports the freedom to participate in laic organizations. These secular humanist groups serve as a seventh recognized "religion," and their organizing body, the Central Council of Non-Religious Philosophical Communities of Belgium, receives funds and benefits similar to those of the six recognized religions.

The Federal Government and Parliament have responsibility for recognizing faiths and paying the wages and pensions of ministers of those faiths.

As a result of constitutional reforms enacted by Parliament in 2001, religious instruction, financial accountability of religious groups, and religious buildings have become the jurisdiction of the regional governments. Laic organizations remain under the jurisdiction of the federal authorities.

By law, each recognized religion has the right to provide teachers at government expense for religious instruction in public schools. The Government also pays the salaries, retirement benefits, and lodging costs of ministers and subsidizes the construction and renovation of religious buildings for recognized religions. The ecclesiastical administrations of recognized religions have legal rights and obligations, and the municipality in which they are located must pay any debts that they incur. Some subsidies are the responsibility of the federal government, while the regional and municipal governments pay others. In 2003, the Government paid salaries for 6,929 ministers of the Catholic faith, 123 ministers of the Protestant Evangelical faith, 14 ministers of the Anglican faith, 41 ministers of the Jewish faith, and 53 ministers of the Orthodox faith. (These figures include part-time functions.) While the Government is prepared to pay salaries for Muslim imams, the Muslim community has not yet finalized a proposal for the Government to do so. For salaries only, this amounted to a total wage cost of 77.2 million euro for the Catholic faith, 2.8 million euro for the Protestant faith, 0.3 million euro for the Anglican faith, 0.7 million for the Jewish faith and 1.0 million euro for the Orthodox faith.

In 2004, total outlays for ministers of the faith amounted to 82 million euro, and nine million euro for the laic organizations. As there was no agreement reached on recognizing mosques, 1.7 million euro earmarked for the Muslim faith was not dispensed. For 2005, the budgetary outlays were 79.5 million euro for the recognized faiths, 9.3 million euro for the laic organizations and six million euro for the Muslim faith.

In 2004, the federal government, and the regional governments of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels formally signed a cooperation agreement to put into effect the 2001 Constitutional agreement. This allows the regions to enact their own legislation for the religious and philosophical organizations coming under their jurisdiction.

The Government applies five criteria in deciding whether to grant recognition to a religious group: the religion must have a structure or hierarchy; the group must have a sufficient number of members; the religion must have existed in the country for a long period of time; it must offer a social value to the public; and it must abide by the laws of the State and respect public order. The five criteria are not listed in decrees or laws, and the Government does not formally define "sufficient," "long period of time," or "social value." A religious group seeking official recognition applies to the Ministry of Justice, which then conducts a thorough review before recommending approval or rejection. Final approval of recognized status is the responsibility of the Parliament alone; however, the Parliament generally accepts the decision of the Ministry of Justice. A group whose application is refused by the Ministry of Justice may appeal the decision to the Council of State. No minority religious group has attempted and failed to be registered in the last 3 years.

The lack of recognized status does not prevent a religious group from practicing its faith freely and openly. Nonrecognized groups do not qualify for government subsidies; however, they may qualify for tax-exempt status as nonprofit organizations.

The Muslim faith was recognized in 1974. Since then, the Government has tried to find reliable interlocutors capable of speaking for the entire Muslim community. In 1998, elections for a Muslim Council and a smaller Executive Committee (Executive) were organized to represent the Islamic faith. While the Executive received government funding during the period covered by this report, mosques, imams, and Islamic schools and teachers did not. Subsidies have not been paid to mosques and imams, despite the Government's official recognition in 1998 that the Executive would serve as the administrative instrument for distributing government subsidies. The Government pledged in 2004-05 that as soon as a new Council and Executive were formed it could begin the process of paying approved clergy and teachers. However, regional governments are still in the process of recognizing mosques eligible for funding.

In late 2004, Justice Minister Laurette Onkelinx, called new Muslim Council elections; the Council in turn would choose a new Executive. In response to growing concern about radical fundamentalism and links to terrorism in the country, she proposed that candidates for the Executive would be subjected to vetting by the State Security. In early 2005, Parliament adopted legislation providing an improved legal basis for a wide range of security checks. These laws were applied to candidates for the Muslim Executive. These measures and electoral procedures were protested and challenged in court by the outgoing leadership of the Executive Committee, which also promoted a boycott of the elections, which were held on March 20, 2005. The Council of State, the highest court for the matter turned down the appeal.

Only 45,000 registered voters turned up at the polling stations. The low turnout was explained by the election boycott organized by several mosques, especially in Brussels, by the Antwerp-Mechelen based Arab European League (AEL), and also by the outgoing Muslim Executive, who encouraged their largely ethnic North African Arab constituents not to vote. The election resulted in a landslide victory for ethnic Turkish Muslims who won 40 of the 68 Council seats. The ethnic Moroccan community won only 20 seats, despite constituting a substantial majority of the Muslim population. Six seats went to candidates originating from other countries, and two converted Belgians won the remaining seats. In light of the boycott organized by Moroccan mosques and the Muslim Executive, the result was not surprising.

Moreover, the Turkish community of the country had actively prepared for the elections. Thus, the most successful candidates were young Turks, and the most successful was Hacer Duzgun, a young Turkish woman who actively canvassed her Limburg province. She was one of the five women elected to the Council. Her tally of 3,640 votes contrasted starkly with the mere 307 votes won by the leading Moroccan candidate from Brussels, where the largest Muslim community lives. At the first meeting of the new Council, Turkish and Moroccan elected council members found common ground, and chose a Moroccan as head of the Council. Neither the Chairman of the Muslim Executive, chosen by the seventeen-member executive board elected by the council, nor the executive board was selected by the end of the period covered by this report. The Chairman and the Executive are responsible for direct relations with the federal government and for the payment of support for mosques, clerics and teachers. Most of the Community, including most of those who had boycotted the elections, were waiting to see how the court rules on a challenge to the legislation permitting the elections.

In 1993 the Government established by law the Center for Equal Opportunity and the Struggle against Racism. Commonly known as the Anti-Racism Center, it is an independent agency responsible for all non-gender related discrimination, including religious. Although formally part of the Office of the Prime Minister, it is under the

guidance of the Ministry of Social Integration. Its head is appointed by the Prime Minister for six years, but the Prime Minister may not remove the individual once appointed. Several nongovernmental organizations such as the Movement against Racism, Anti-Semitism, and Xenophobia, the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme and the Liga voor Mensenrechten are also active in promoting religious freedom. The Government hosted an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conference against Racism in September 2004, to follow the May OSCE Anti-Semitism Conference in Berlin.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

Religious or "moral" instruction was mandatory in public schools, and provided according to the student's religious or nonreligious preference. All public schools offered a teacher for each of the six recognized religions. A seventh choice, a nonconfessional or secular moral instruction course was available if the child did not wish to attend a religious course. Public school religion teachers were nominated by a committee from their religious group and appointed by the Minister of Education. Private authorized religious schools that follow the same curriculum as the public schools were known as "Free" schools, and receive government subsidies for working expenses and teacher salaries. Almost all of "Free" schools were Roman Catholic, and they offered only Roman Catholic religious instruction.

#### Section III. Societal Attitudes


The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; however, several religious groups report incidents of discrimination, particularly Jews and Muslims, as well as religious groups that have not been accorded official "recognized" status by the Government.

Prejudice in the private sector against members of the Muslim community was not unknown, affecting housing, employment and in some cases education. However, these prejudices affected primarily the North African communities (including both immigrant and first-generation). Muslims of Turkish and other national origins appeared to be far less frequently the targets of such prejudice, which can be described as more ethnic than religious.

In one instance of obvious religious discrimination, a Muslim woman of Turkish origin resigned her job with a food packing concern in Flanders, after she and her employer received multiple threats. The woman was singled out because she wore a Muslim headscarf. When the story broke, however, public outcry encouraged her to go back to work and the employer insisted he would not give in to threats. The police arrested a suspect, and the prosecution was being prepared.

In March 2005, the Center for Equal Opportunity issued a comprehensive report on public symbols of religious and philosophical convictions. The 2003 act made discrimination on religious and philosophical grounds unlawful. The report found that neither Flemish nor Francophone schools imposed restrictions given by the governing authorities and that it was left to the individual schoolmasters to decide on what signs would be tolerated. Most schoolmasters in the country imposed a headscarf ban for both pupils and teachers. A survey released in 2004 showed that in Brussels, of 110 surveyed schools, only 8 allowed headscarves. Schools on both sides of the Belgian linguistic border allow free days for attending religious festivals. The public educational system, from kindergarten to university, requires strict neutrality for teaching personnel, except for teachers of religion. The subsidized Catholic educational institution (which constitutes the largest number of educational establishments nationwide) allows the wearing of religious symbols. Schoolmasters also opposed the invoking of religious grounds for not attending certain courses, physical education classes in particular.

The federal government has no specific directives on wearing religious symbols. The same applies in regional and municipal services. Wearing religious symbols is prohibited for selected public service officials, such as judges, police, and other uniformed officials.





## **Bulgaria**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion; however, the law prohibits the public practice of religion by unregistered groups. The Constitution also designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the "traditional" religion.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; however, discrimination, harassment, and general public intolerance, particularly in the media, of some religious groups remained an intermittent problem.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 42,855 square miles, and its population was approximately 7.8 million at the end of 2003, according to the National Statistical Institute. The majority of citizens, estimated at approximately 85 percent, are at least nominally Orthodox Christians. Muslims make up the largest minority, estimated at approximately 13 percent, while the remainder includes Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Gregorian-Armenian Christians, and others. Among the ethnic-Turkish and Roma minorities, Islam is the predominant religion. While not officially enumerated, academic research estimates up to 40 percent of the population are atheist or agnostic. Official registration of religious organizations is handled by the Sofia City Court; it reported that 61 denominations in addition to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) were registered at the end of January 2005, a 36 percent increase over the previous reporting period.

Some religious minorities are concentrated geographically. The Rhodope Mountains (along the country's southern border with Greece) are home to many Muslims, including ethnic Turks, Roma, and "Pomaks" (descendants of Slavic Bulgarians who converted to Islam centuries ago under Ottoman rule). Ethnic-Turkish and Roma Muslims also live in large numbers in the northeast of the country, primarily in and around the cities of Shumen and Razgrad, as well as along the Black Sea coast. More than half of the country's Roman Catholics are located in the region around Plovdiv. Many members of the country's small Jewish community live in Sofia, Rousse, and along the Black Sea coast. Protestants are dispersed more widely throughout the country. While clear statistics are not available, evangelical Protestant groups have had particular success in attracting numerous converts from among the Roma minority, and areas with large Roma populations tend also to have some of the highest percentages of Protestants.

Although no exact data are available on active participation in formal religious services or rituals, most observers agree that evangelical Protestants tend to participate in religious services more frequently than other religious groups. Members of the country's Roman Catholic community also are regarded as more likely than members of other faiths to attend religious services regularly.

Foreign missionaries from several denominations, including, for example, Protestant churches, the Catholic Church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and the Jehovah's Witnesses, are present in the country.

### Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

## Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion; however, the law prohibits the public practice of religion by unregistered groups. The Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity, represented by the BOC, as the "traditional" religion; some minority religious communities are perceived as holding historic places in society, such as the Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish religions.

The 2002 Denominations Act allows only legally registered denominations to perform public activities outside their places of worship. The 2002 law transferred responsibility for registering religious groups to the Sofia City Court, which is responsible for maintaining the national register of religious denominations and political parties. The Council of Ministers' Religious Confessions Directorate, which used to be responsible for registering religious groups, provides "expert opinions" on registration matters upon request by the court; however, its overall role remains ambiguous, particularly as regards its administrative oversight and sanctioning functions. All applicants have the right to appeal negative registration decisions to the Court of Appeals. Different denominations acknowledged a general improvement in the registration process since the court took over this responsibility in 2003; however, the International Christian Church complained that its registration took more than a year before it was successfully registered in 2004. Some local branches of nationally registered denominations experienced problems with local authorities who insisted that the branches be registered locally; however, the 2002 Confessions Act does not have any requirement for local formal registration of denominations.

Representatives of some evangelical Protestant churches reported encountering problems in obtaining permission from local authorities, including the Dobrich and General Toshev municipalities, for public evangelization and proselytization.

A Council of Europe review of the 2002 Denominations Act, prepared in early 2003, highlighted that the provisions dealing with the process of registration specify neither the criteria establishing the basis on which the Court should grant registration nor the grounds on which such registration can be withheld. The act also fails to specify the consequences of failure to register as a religious community or outlines any recourse if a competent court refuses to grant registration.

In October 2004, the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights reviewed draft proposals for amending the 2002 Denominations Act. The changes were introduced by two center-right opposition parties to address the Council of Europe's criticisms of the law, including the law's recognition of the BOC exempting it from the requirement of legal registration. The amendments also envisaged special tax exemptions for all religious groups. However, the majority of the Committee's members effectively ignored the Council of Europe's recommendations by rejecting the proposed amendments.

On May 11, 2005, a Sofia City Court judge issued five separate rulings in an attempt to resolve the 18-month-old leadership dispute within the Muslim community. The most important ruling was the decision to officially register Mustafa Alish Hadji as the new Chief Mufti. The dispute broke out as a result of the 2003 election of two different chief muftis by bodies which both claimed to represent the Muslim community. One of the 2003 conferences elected Fikri Sali as the new chief mufti to replace Selim Mehmed; Sali formerly held the position from 1992-94. The other conference was convened by another former chief mufti, Nedim Gendzhev, and selected Ali Hadji Saduk to replace Mehmed. Both conferences submitted documentation to the Sofia City Court listing their respective candidates as the new chief mufti. A registration controversy ensued, leaving no legally recognized successor to Mehmed.

On March 8, 2004, two Sofia City Court rulings annulled the Muslim denomination's 1997 and 2000 conferences, thereby invalidating the leadership selected by each of the



conferences. On July 19, 2004, the Sofia City Court appointed Fikri Sali, Ridvan Kadiov, and Osman Osmailov as interim representatives of the Muslim community pending the settlement of some civil court cases related to the leadership dispute. On November 5, 2004, the Sofia Appellate Court overruled the appointment of the triumvirate, stating that the Muslim community's leadership could be appointed only on its own initiative and not by the Sofia City Court. In January 2005, the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the ruling; the Supreme Court's ruling combined with the March ruling of the Sofia City Court effectively restored the pre-1997 Supreme Islamic Council, headed by Nedim Gendzhev, as the legal representative of the Muslims in the country.

However, following the Supreme Court's January 2005 ruling, the Supreme Cassation Prosecution confiscated the case files, which prevented the files from being transferred to the Sofia City Court and thereby delayed Gendzhev's registration of the new leadership. In May 2005, the Prosecution turned the case files over to the Sofia City Court for 24 hours, allowing the Sofia City Court to pass the five rulings affecting the leadership dispute. Gendzhev immediately appealed the registration of Mustafa Alish Hadji, and the appeal was pending the Prosecution's release of the case files.

On November 5, the Pazarjik District Court passed a 3-year suspended sentence on Ahmed Ahmed Musa for preaching radical Islam and instigating societal hatred along religious lines. He was also fined for disgracing the national flag. During the trial, Musa made a full confession and pleaded guilty to the charges brought against him. Five doctors confirmed that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and as such was extremely susceptible to outside influence. Musa chose not to appeal the sentence.

For most registered religious groups, there were no restrictions on attendance at religious services or on private religious instruction. Two BOC seminaries, a Jewish school, three Islamic schools, the university-level Islamic Higher Institute, a Muslim cultural center, a multi-denominational Protestant seminary, and university theological faculties operated freely. Bibles, Qur'ans, and other religious materials in the Bulgarian language were imported or printed freely, and religious publications were produced regularly.

An optional religious education course was first introduced in state-run schools in 1997. The curriculum, developed by the Ministry of Education's Commission on Religion, initially focused on Christianity but was expanded in 1999 to cover Islam, as well. The course, taught in Bulgarian, examines the historical, philosophical, and cultural aspects of religion and introduces students to the moral values of different confessions. All officially registered religious confessions can request that their religious beliefs are included in the course's curriculum. According to the Ministry of Education, the course was offered to 13,209 primary and secondary school students in 199 schools during the 2004-05 academic year. While the Ministry provides the course material for free to students, the existing 166 religious education teachers are funded directly from municipal budgets.


The Chief Mufti's office also supports summer Qur'anic education courses.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

The law requires religious groups wishing to operate and be recognized as legal entities, as well as those wanting to engage in public activities outside of their places of worship, to formally register with the Sofia City Court; however, official registrations of religious denominations has continued to increase, from 36 in 2003 to 45.

There were no indications that the Government discriminated against members of any religious group in making restitution to previous owners of properties that were nationalized during the Communist period. However, the BOC, the Catholic Church, the Muslim community, the Jewish community, and several Protestant denominations all claimed that a number of their properties confiscated under the Communist government

were not returned. For example, the Catholic Church reported that only 60 percent of its confiscated properties had been restituted; in addition to its many outstanding restitution claims, the Jewish community was still involved in a long legal battle over a high-value property in central Sofia. A central problem facing claimants is the need to demonstrate that the organization seeking restitution is the organization--or the legitimate successor of the organization--that owned the property prior to 1944. This is difficult because Communist hostility to religion led some groups to hide assets or ownership, and because documents have been destroyed or lost over the years.



## **Cyprus**

The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the reporting period, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religious groups in Cypriot society contributed to religious freedom; however, there were a few reports of vandalism of religious sites and cemeteries.

### **Section I. Religious Demography**

Cyprus has an area of 5,747 square miles, and the population in the government-controlled areas is estimated at 749,200.

Prior to 1974, the country experienced a long period of strife between its Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. In response, the U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) began peacekeeping operations in 1964. The island has been divided since the Turkish military intervention of 1974, following a coup d'etat directed from Greece. The southern part of the island is under the control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, while the northern part is governed by a Turkish Cypriot administration. In 1983, that administration proclaimed itself the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC), although it is not recognized by the United States or any other country except Turkey. A buffer zone patrolled by the UNFICYP separates the two parts. In 2003, Turkish Cypriot authorities relaxed many restrictions on movement between the two communities, including abolishing all crossing fees. The new procedures led to relatively unimpeded contact between the communities and permitted Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to visit religious sites located in the other community; however, Cypriots must show identification at the buffer zone checkpoints to cross from one side to the other.

Approximately 96 percent of the population in the government-controlled areas is Greek Orthodox. An estimated 0.7 percent of the remaining population is Maronite, slightly less than 0.4 percent is Armenian Orthodox, 0.1 percent is Latin (Roman Catholic), and 3.2 percent belong to other groups. The latter category includes small groups of Protestants and foreigners of various religious beliefs.

A 1998 opinion poll indicated that about 48 percent of Greek Cypriots attended regularly church services, while 49 percent attended only for major religious holidays and ceremonies such as weddings and funerals. The remainder did not attend religious services at all.

There is some western Protestant missionary activity in the government-controlled area.

### **Section II. Status of Religious Freedom**

#### **Legal/Policy Framework**

The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. Turkish Cypriots residing in the south and Greek Cypriots living in the north are allowed to practice their religions freely.

The 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus specifies that the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, which is not under the authority of the mainland Greek Orthodox Church, has the exclusive right to regulate and administer its internal affairs and property in accordance with its holy canons and charter. The Greek Orthodox Church is exempt from taxes with regard to religious activity. According to law, the Church is required to pay taxes only on strictly commercial activities.

Three other religious groups are recognized in the Constitution: Armenian Orthodox, Maronite Christians, and Latins (Roman Catholics). These groups also are exempt from taxes and are eligible, along with the Greek Orthodox Church, for government subsidies to their religious institutions.

The Government of Cyprus has constitutional or legal bars against religious discrimination. The basic agreement covering treatment of Greek Cypriots and

Maronites living in the north and Turkish Cypriots living in the south remains the 1975 Vienna III Agreement. Among other things, this agreement provides for facilities for religious worship.

Religions other than the five recognized religions are not required to register with the authorities; however, if they desire to engage in financial transactions, such as maintaining a bank account, they must register as a nonprofit company. To register, a group must submit an application through an attorney that states the purpose of the nonprofit organization and provides the names of the organization's directors. Upon approval, nonprofit organizations are tax-exempt and are required to provide annual reports of their activities. Registration is granted promptly, and many religious groups are recognized. No religious groups were denied registration during the reporting period.

There are no prohibitions against missionary activity or proselytizing in the government-controlled areas. Foreign missionaries must obtain and periodically renew residence permits in order to live in the country; normally, renewal requests are not denied.

The Government requires children in public primary and secondary schools to take instruction in the Greek Orthodox religion. Parents of other religions may request that their children be excused. These children are exempted from attending religious services and instruction.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

In 2001, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Government of Turkey was responsible for imposing restrictions on Greek Cypriots.

Since 2003 when restrictions of movement were relaxed, Greek Cypriots have reported relatively easy access to Apostolos Andreas monastery and other religious sites in the north. Likewise, Turkish Cypriots enjoyed relatively easy visits to religious sites, including Hala Sultan Tekke in the government-controlled area.


Missionaries have the legal right to proselytize, but the Government closely monitors missionary activity. It is illegal for a missionary to use "physical or moral compulsion" to make religious conversions. The police may investigate missionary activity based on a citizen's complaint. They may also open an investigation if missionaries are suspected of being involved in illegal activities that threaten the security of the republic, constitutional or public order, or public health and morals. There are occasional apprehensions but there have been no arrests under these laws.

#### Section III. Societal Attitudes

There are polite relations between the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the other religious communities in the south. Greek Cypriots report that unused Orthodox churches

and cemeteries in the north continued to be robbed and vandalized, and the Government maintained its claim that Orthodox icons had been smuggled out of the north. In April, a Turkish Cypriot cemetery in Larnaca, which had recently been rehabilitated as part of a U.S.-funded project aimed at improving bicomunal relations, was vandalized.

The Orthodox Church is suspicious of any attempts to proselytize among Greek Cypriots and closely monitors such activities. As the largest owner of real estate in the south and the operator of several large business enterprises, the Greek Orthodox Church is a significant economic factor.



## **Czech Republic**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

### **Section I. Religious Demography**

The country has an area of 30,442 square miles, and its population is estimated at 10.2 million. The country has a largely homogenous population with a dominant Christian tradition. However, in part as a result of 40 years of Communist rule between 1948 and 1989, the vast majority of citizens do not identify themselves as members of any organized religion. In a 2004 opinion poll, 32 percent of respondents claimed to believe in God, while 49 percent identified themselves as atheists. There was a revival of interest in religion after the 1989 "Velvet Revolution"; however, the number of those professing religious beliefs or participating in organized religion has fallen steadily since then in almost every region of the country.

An estimated 5 percent of the population attends Catholic services weekly. Most live in the southern Moravian dioceses of Olomouc and Brno. The number of practicing Protestants is even lower (approximately 1 percent of the population). Leaders of the local Muslim community estimate that there are 20,000 to 30,000 Muslims; Islam was registered as an officially recognized religion in 2004. There is a mosque in Brno and another in Prague. The Jewish community, which numbers only a few thousand persons, is an officially registered religion because of its recognition by the State before 1989.

Missionaries of various religious groups, including the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) and Jehovah's Witnesses, are present in the country. Missionaries of various religions generally proselytize without hindrance.

### **Section II. Status of Religious Freedom**

#### **Legal/Policy Framework**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full, and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors.

Religious affairs are the responsibility of the Department of Churches at the Ministry of Culture. All religious groups officially registered with the Ministry of Culture are eligible to receive subsidies from the State, although some decline to receive state financial support as a matter of principle and as an expression of their independence. There are 26 state-recognized religious organizations. In 2004, the Center of Muslim Communities was officially registered, the first such registration for a Muslim organization in the country. The Jewish Center Chai, which applied for registration last year, was denied because its application did not meet the appropriate legal conditions. The Center did not have the



requisite number of signatures, and it came to light that some signatures were falsely placed on the document. The citizens involved are considering legal action against the Center. An appeal by the Unification Church to overturn their denial to register in 1999 was denied by the Constitutional Court in 2004.

The 2002 law on "Religious Freedom and the Position of Churches and Religious Associations" created a two-tiered system of registration for religious organizations. To register at the first (lowest) tier, a religious group must have at least 300 adult members permanently residing in the country. First-tier registration conveys limited tax benefits and imposes annual reporting requirements, as well as a 10-year waiting period before the organization may apply for full second-tier registration. To register at the second tier, a religious group must have membership equal to at least 0.1 percent of the country's population (approximately 10,000 persons) and have been registered in the first tier for at least 10 years. Second-tier registration entitles the organization to a share of state funding. Only clergy of registered second-tier organizations may perform officially recognized marriage ceremonies and serve as chaplains in the military and prisons, although prisoners of other faiths may receive visits from their respective clergy. Religious groups registered prior to 1989, such as the small Jewish community, are not required to meet these conditions for registration. Unregistered religious groups may not legally own community property but often form civic-interest associations for the purpose of managing their property and other holdings until they are able to meet the qualifications for registration. The Government does not interfere with or prevent this type of interim solution. Unregistered religious groups otherwise are free to assemble and worship in the manner of their choice.

Religious organizations receive approximately \$117 million (3 billion Czech crowns) annually from the Government. Funds are divided proportionally among the 21 religious organizations eligible for state assistance based on the number of clergy in each, with the exception of 4 religious organizations (Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, the New Apostolic Church, and Open Brethren) that do not accept state funding. Of this sum, approximately \$32 million (818 million Czech crowns) is used to pay salaries to clergymen. The rest of the funding goes to state grants for religious organizations' medical, charitable, and educational activities, as well as for the maintenance of religious memorials and buildings.

A 2000 law outlaws Holocaust denial and provides for prison sentences of 6 months to 3 years for public denial, questioning, or approval of, or attempts to justify the Nazi genocide. The law also outlaws the incitement of hatred based on religion.

Missionaries must obtain a long-term residence and work permit if they intend to remain longer than 90 days. There were no reports of delays in processing visas for missionaries during the period covered by this report. There is no special visa category for religious workers; foreign missionaries and clergy are required to meet the relatively stringent conditions for a standard work permit even if their activity is strictly ecclesiastical or voluntary in nature.

Religion is not taught in public schools, although a few private religious schools exist. Religious broadcasters are free to operate without hindrance from the Government or other parties.

Members of unregistered religious groups may issue publications without interference.

The Ministry of Culture sponsors religiously oriented cultural activities through a grant program. The Ministry sponsored some inter-faith activities during the period covered by this report, including partial funding of the Christian and Jewish Society.

Restrictions on Religious Freedom



Government policy and practice contributed to the generally free practice of religion.

Under the 2002 religious registration law, the Ministry of Culture has responsibility for registering religious charities and enterprises as legal entities. The Catholic Church has criticized the law on the grounds that it unduly restricts the manner in which the Church manages and finances many of its social projects. An October 2003 Constitutional Court ruling that the Ministry of Culture improperly interpreted the registration law in failing to register a religious enterprise operated by the Catholic Church in the northern Moravian town of Lipnik nad Bécvou was implemented by the Ministry in 2003 and the enterprise in question was registered. The Catholic Church reported that religious charities and enterprises continue to experience difficulties and delays in registering as legal entities, although there has been some recent improvement in the speed of granting registrations.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

The immigrant population is still relatively small and includes persons from Ukraine, Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Greece. Immigrants have not reported any difficulties in practicing their respective faiths.

Plans to build a mosque in the northern Bohemian town of Teplice were withdrawn in 2004 because of protests from the town's residents. A petition against the mosque, noting recent incidents of Arab terrorism, garnered 4,500 signatures from a population of 53,000. Teplice is popular among Arab tourists for its medicinal spas; in 2003, the town had approximately 2,850 visitors from Arab countries.

## Denmark

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Evangelical Lutheran Church is the state church and enjoys some privileges not available to other faiths.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has a total area of 16,639 square miles, and its population is approximately 5.4 million. As of January 2005, 83.2 percent of the population belonged to the official Evangelical Lutheran Church. Although only approximately 3 percent of church members attend services regularly, most members utilize the church for weddings, funerals, baptisms, confirmations, and religious holidays.

The second largest religious community is Muslim, constituting approximately 3.5 percent of the population (180,000 persons), followed by communities of Catholics (35,000), Jehovah's Witnesses (15,000), Jews (7,000), Baptists (5,500), Pentecostals (5,000), and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) (4,500). There are also many communities with fewer than 3,000 members, including Seventh-day Adventists, the Catholic Apostolic Church, the Salvation Army, Methodists, Anglicans, and Russian Orthodox. The German minority in southern Jutland and other non-Danish communities (particularly Scandinavian groups) have their own religious groups. Approximately 5.4 percent of the population is not religious, and an estimated 1.5 percent is atheist.

### Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

#### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors.

The Constitution stipulates that the Evangelical Lutheran Church is the national church, the reigning monarch shall be a member the church, and the state shall support it. The Evangelical Lutheran Church is the only religious organization that can receive state subsidies or funds directly through the tax system. Approximately 12 percent of the Church's revenue comes from state subsidies; most of the rest comes from the church tax that is paid only by members. No individual may be compelled to pay church tax or provide direct financial support to the national church or any other religious organization. Members of other faiths, notably Catholics, have argued that the system is unfair, and that the Government does not provide religious equality, despite providing religious freedom. Allowing other religious organizations to be given the same status and privileges as the Evangelical Lutheran Church would require changes to the Constitution.

Eleven Christian holy days are considered national holidays: Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Easter, Easter Monday, Common Prayer Day, Ascension, Pentecost, Whit Monday, Christmas Eve, Christmas, and Christmas Day 2 (December 26). The holidays do not have a negative impact on any religious groups.

Aside from the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Government gives official status to religions in two ways: it recognizes religions by royal decree, and it approves religions under the 1969 Marriage Act. As of April 2005, 12 religious organizations were recognized by royal decree, including the Roman Catholic, Methodist, Baptist, and Russian Orthodox churches as well as Judaism; and 91 were approved, including several Islamic groups, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Seventh-day Adventists, Sikhs, Buddhists, Christian Orthodox, Hindu, Baha'is, and Hara Krishnas. By approving religions under the 1969 Marriage Act, the Government allows individually named priests to conduct officially recognized marriage ceremonies, and thereby legally approves the religion.

Both recognized and approved religions enjoy certain tax exemptions. Other religious communities are entitled to practice their faith without any sort of licensing, but their marriage ceremonies are not recognized by the state and they are not granted tax-exempt status.

During the period covered by the report, the Government considered legislative and administrative proposals to promote further social integration of refugees and immigrants. The proposals emerged out of widespread political and social attitudes favoring the integration of immigrants and refugees. In June 2004, the Parliament enacted a law directed at foreign religious leaders seeking residence visas. The so called "Imam Law," which is applied by immigration authorities to all foreign religious leaders, requires that the number of religious residence visas be reasonably proportioned to the size of the corresponding religious community. Additionally, the visa applicant must prove association with a recognized or approved religious community and possess a relevant background or education as a religious preacher, missionary or member of a religious community. The Ministry for Refugees, Immigrants, and Integration continued to consider providing resources to establish schools to educate imams, similar to the support the Government provides Christian theological university programs or seminaries. Reaction to the proposal in the Muslim community was mixed. Many young Muslims stated that the imams who come to the country on temporary visas do not speak Danish and cannot answer their questions or address the problems of being a young Muslim in the country. However, the Ministry declined to act on the initiative in the fall of 2004, choosing to wait until the country's divided Muslim community could organize to make its own proposal for publicly funded Islamic education.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

Government policy and practice contributed to the generally free practice of religion.

In December 2004, the Dansk Islamisk Begravelsefond (Danish Islamic Cemetery Fund) purchased property in the greater Copenhagen area to use for a Muslim cemetery. The purchase was the culmination of a several-year effort by members of the Muslim community to establish the first Muslim cemetery in the country. The Danish Islamic Cemetery Fund overcame a publicized dispute with municipal authorities over the value of the land, which prolonged the purchase efforts. The cemetery is expected to open by 2007.

#### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationship among religious groups in society contributed to religious freedom. The country has a long history of welcoming religious minorities and

affording them equal treatment. There are generally amicable relations between religious groups, although the influx of a substantial Muslim population over the last several years resulted in some tension between Muslims and the rest of the population. In September 2004, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights concluded in a report that the overall political climate for Muslims in the country has deteriorated since 2001.

Minority group unemployment figures, crime rates (especially among young adults), and education dropout rates tend to be higher, and allegations sometimes are raised of discrimination on the basis of religion. However, it is difficult to separate religious differences from differences in language and ethnicity, and the latter may be equally important in explaining unequal access to well-paying jobs and social advancement. The integration of immigrant groups from Islamic countries is an important political and social topic of discussion. During its national election campaign in February 2005, the coalition center-right Government (successfully reelected to a four-year term) affirmed its commitment to pursuing and promoting effective integration policies intended to address disproportionately high crime rates and unemployment among immigrants from Islamic countries (and other ethnic minorities in the country.)

The international Muslim organization Hizb ut-Tahrir continues to operate in the country despite periodic calls by the various political parties to ban the group. The group has not been cited for any illegal activity since 2002, when the spokesman of the Danish branch of the group was sentenced to 60 days probation for distributing pamphlets calling for the murder of all Jews.

## **Estonia**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

The U.S. Government discusses religious freedom issues with the Government as part of its overall dialogue and policy of promoting human rights.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 17,666 square miles and a population of 1.35 million (68 percent ethnic Estonian, 26 percent Russian, 2 percent Ukrainian, 1 percent Belarusian, and 1 percent Finnish). The Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church (EELC) was the largest denomination, with 165 congregations and approximately 170,000 members. The Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC) had 59 congregations with approximately 18,000 members and the Estonian Orthodox Church, subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate (EOCMP), had 30 congregations with approximately 150,000 members. There were smaller communities of Baptists, Roman Catholics, Jehovah's Witnesses, Pentecostals, Old Believers, Methodists, and other denominations. There was a small Jewish community with 2,500 members, with one synagogue in operation. There were also communities of Muslims, Buddhists, and many other denominations and faiths; however, each of these religious groups had fewer than 6,000 adherents.

Fifty years of Soviet occupation diminished the role of religion in society. Many neighborhoods built since World War II do not have religious centers, and many of the surviving churches require extensive renovations. The renovation of two churches--St. John's Lutheran Church in Tartu and St. Simeon's and St. Anne's Orthodox Church in Tallinn--were completed during the reporting period. St. John's church, which had been in ruins since 1944, was inaugurated in December 2004. Church attendance, which had seen a surge coinciding with the independence movement in the early 1990s, now has decreased significantly.

### Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

#### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full, and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors. The Constitution states that there is no state church.

There are other laws and regulations that directly or indirectly regulate individual and collective freedom of religion. The activities of religious associations are regulated by the

Churches and Congregations Act and the Non-Profit Associations and Unions Act. The statutes of churches, congregations, and unions of congregations are registered at the City Courts. The Churches and Congregations Act decrees that the commanding officer of each military unit shall guarantee conscripts the opportunity to practice their religion. Military chaplain services extend to service members of all faiths. The Churches and Congregations Act decrees that prison directors shall ensure inmates the opportunity to practice their religion. Conscripts and prisoners exercised this right in practice. Chaplains are prepared by the Theological Seminary of the Methodist Church and appointed by the Council of Churches. A church, congregation and association of congregations must have management boards. A person who is a citizen or who has the right to vote in local government elections may be a member of the management board. In order to formally register a religious association with the City Court, the management board of the religious association submits an application, which is signed by all members of the management board. A congregation must have at least 12 adult members. The minutes of the constitutive meeting, a copy of statutes, and a notarized copy of signatures of the members of the management board serve as supporting documents to the registration application.

A program of basic ecumenical religious instruction was available in public schools. A school is under obligation to offer religious studies at the primary or secondary level if at least 15 students request it. Comparative religious studies were available in public and private schools on an elective basis. There were no official statistics on how many students participated in these classes. There were two private church schools in Tartu that had a religious-based curriculum.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

Relations between the various religious communities were generally amicable. Although the majority of citizens were nominally Lutheran, ecumenical services during national days, Christian holidays, or at public events were common.



## **Finland**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. According to law, the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Orthodox Church are the established state churches.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 130,127 square miles, and its population is approximately 5.2 million. At the end of 2004, 83.6 percent of the population belonged to the Evangelical Lutheran Church, and one percent belonged to the Orthodox Church. The percentage for the Evangelical Lutheran Church was 84.1 a year earlier. A total of 27,000 people left the Evangelical Lutheran Church, a figure that is virtually the same as the previous year. In 2003, the new Religious Freedom Act simplified procedures for leaving the Church, which has led to an increase in the number of people who do so. Analysts believe that many people who leave the Church do so to avoid paying taxes to support the Church. During 2004, a total of 49,670 children were christened, which accounts for 86 percent of the babies born that year.

In the past decade, the number of Muslims has grown from 1,000 to approximately 20,000, most of who are immigrants to the country. Of these, approximately 5,000 are Shiites and 15,000 Sunni. The largest single national group is Somalis, but the communities also include North Africans, Bosnians, peninsula Arabs, Tartars, Turks and Iraqis. There are four major Muslim communities in the country: The Muslim Community in Finland, the Tampere Muslim Community, Shi'a Muslims and the Multicultural Dawa Center of Islam. There are seven Roman Catholic congregations with approximately 8,000 registered members, and two Jewish congregations with 1,513 members.

A Gallup poll, conducted in 2003, showed that locals held a more positive view toward Christian churches and religious groups than in the past. Over one half of those interviewed believed that one was accountable for one's deeds in afterlife. 77 percent held positive views about the Lutheran Church, 65 percent held positive views of the Salvation Army and 62 percent held positive views of the Orthodox Church. A majority of the population held negative views about Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Christian Science, and Islam. People were fairly evenly split on positive and negative perceptions of Judaism.

The Evangelical Lutheran Church conducted a recent study among its employees regarding their religious commitment. Some were surprised that 10 percent of those interviewed were either weakly or not at all committed to the Church doctrines. However, as many as 70 percent of the rest were nonetheless strongly committed. The Archbishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church was satisfied with the results. He stated that any



business would be pleased if as many as 9 out of 10 of its employees were committed to the values the company represented.

In 2004, an attendance of nearly 18 million was registered at worship services, christenings, weddings, funerals and other church meetings, e.g. concerts, by the Evangelical Lutheran Church. The congregations have approximately 2,200 choirs and 600 musical bands with a total membership of 44,000. The attraction of Sunday schools has decreased by some ten percent; only 1 child out of 10 in the group of 4 to 10 year-olds attended Sunday school. However, confirmation classes have been the flagship of the Church's youth work, and in 2004 as many as 57,000 youngsters, i.e. some 90 percent of the age group (approximately 15 years) attended.

In the last few decades the Evangelical Lutheran Church has started to show far greater awareness of its international responsibilities. This is reflected in increased support for missionary work and development assistance, and in a greater interest in ecumenical work. Support for missionary work has doubled since the early 1980s, and the proceeds of church collections for foreign aid have increased many times over.

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. There are two state churches: the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Orthodox Church. All citizens who belong to either state church pay a church tax set at 1 to 2 percent of income, varying with the congregation, as part of their income tax. Those who do not want to pay the tax must inform the applicable state church that they are leaving it. These taxes are used to defray the costs of running the churches. State churches also handle services such as recording births, deaths, and marriages, which for citizens outside these churches are handled by official state registrars. Nontraditional religious groups are eligible for some tax relief (for example, they may receive tax-free donations), provided that they are registered with, and recognized by, the Government as religious communities.

State subsidies are being planned for religious communities. An Education Ministry taskforce was working on a proposal that it was originally supposed to submit in March 2005, but had not by the end of the period covered in this report. The first subsidies of this kind should be included in the 2007 state budget. The amount of the subsidy would be linked to the number of members of the religious community and be approximately 5 euro (\$7) per person. The smallest communities would not qualify for these subsidies. The funds would have to be applied for separately. Although not of substantial financial significance, the subsidies would nonetheless mean a step toward greater religious equality.

To be recognized, religious groups should have at least 20 members. The purpose of the group should be the public practice of religion, and the activities of the group should be guided by a set of rules. The Government recognizes 55 religious groups.


The new Religious Freedom Act includes regulations on registered religious communities. Their autonomy was increased, and the law on associations is extensively applied to them. As in the old law, a minimum of 20 members is required to form a religious organization. Furthermore, the new law no longer prevents a person from being a member of several religious communities simultaneously. The religious communities will decide independently whether or not their members can belong to other religious communities as well. The one-month reconsideration period and the personal notice of resignation have been abandoned. Resignation can be submitted by mail, and it will take effect immediately upon receipt.

The new law further clarifies that the religious denomination of a child is not automatically determined by the faith of the parents: the child's membership of or resignation from a religious community is always based on a separate expression of the will of the parents/guardians, such as baptizing the child. The independence of the child has been increased so that the denomination of a 12-year old may be changed only by permission of the child.

The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion. Various government programs available through the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labor focus on ongoing discrimination, including discrimination based on religion. Studies and research, integration programs, and recommendations for further incorporation of immigrants into society have been the focal points of these programs. Religion has not been highlighted in particular, but remains a part of the Government's overall attempts to combat discrimination.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.



## France

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, some religious groups remain concerned about legislation passed in 2001 and 2004, which provided for the dissolution of groups under certain circumstances and banned the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols by public school employees and students. A 1905 law on the separation of religion and State prohibits discrimination on the basis of faith.

Government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion. A law prohibiting the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in public schools by employees and students entered into force in September 2004. Despite significant efforts by the Government to combat anti-Semitism, anti-Semitic attacks and incidents persisted. The Government has a stated policy of monitoring potentially "dangerous" cult activity through the Inter-ministerial Monitoring Mission against Sectarian Abuses (MIVILUDES).

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to freedom of religion. Anti-Semitic incidents at the end of 2004 and in the first half of 2005 declined from previous record levels, but continued to occur at a disturbing rate. Government leaders, religious representatives, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continued to criticize strongly anti-Semitic and racist violence, and the Government maintained increased security for Jewish institutions.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 211,209 square miles, and its population is approximately 62.4 million.

The Government does not keep statistics on religious affiliation. According to press reports, only 12 percent of the population attends religious services of any faith more than once per month. In a poll released in December 2004, 64.3 percent of the respondents indicated they were Catholic, even if they never attended religious services. Another 27 percent polled stated they had no religious affiliation, while 8.7 percent cited another religious affiliation. Of those who identified themselves as something other than Catholic, 49.4 percent were Muslim, 21.8 percent were Protestant, 7 percent were Jewish, and 21.8 percent responded with another, unspecified religion. A February 2004 poll indicated that 60 percent of those interviewed believed in God, and 12 percent attended religious services often. The vast majority of the population is nominally Roman Catholic, but according to one member of the Catholic hierarchy, only 8 percent of the population are practicing Catholics. Muslims constitute the second largest religious group. There are an estimated 5 to 6 million Muslims in the country (8 to 10 percent of the population), although estimates of how many of these are practicing Muslims vary widely. Protestants make up 2 percent of the population, and the Jewish and Buddhist faiths each represent 1 percent, and those of the Sikh faith less than 1 percent. According to various estimates, approximately 6 percent of the country's citizens are unaffiliated with any religion.

The Jewish community numbers approximately 600,000. According to press reports, at least 60 percent are not highly observant, celebrating at most only the High Holy Days. The large majority of observant Jews are Orthodox. There are small Conservative and Reform congregations as well.

Jehovah's Witnesses claim that 250,000 persons attend their services either regularly or periodically.

Orthodox Christians number between 80,000 and 100,000; the vast majority is associated with the Greek or Russian Orthodox Church.

Other religions present in the country include evangelicals, Christian Scientists, and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). Membership in evangelical churches is growing because of increased participation by African and Antillean immigrants. According to the press, there are approximately 31,000 Mormons. The Church of Scientology has an estimated 5,000 to 20,000 members.

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. A long history of conflict between religious groups and between the Church and the French Republic led the state to break its ties to the Catholic Church early in the last century and adopt a strong commitment to maintaining a totally secular public sector. The 1905 law on the separation of religion and State, the foundation of existing legislation on religious freedom, prohibits discrimination on the basis of faith. Of the country's 10 national holidays, 5 are Christian holy days.

Religious organizations are not required to register, but may if they wish to apply for tax-exempt status or to gain official recognition. The Government defines two categories under which religious groups may register: "associations cultuelles" (associations of worship, which are exempt from taxes) and "associations culturelles" (cultural associations, which are normally not exempt from taxes). Associations in these two categories are subject to certain management and financial disclosure requirements. An association of worship may organize only religious activities, defined as liturgical services and practices. A cultural association may engage in profit-making activity. Although a cultural association is not exempt from taxes, it may receive government subsidies for its cultural and educational operations, such as schools. Religious groups normally register under both of these categories; the Mormons, for example, run strictly religious activities through their association of worship and operate a school under their cultural association.

Under the 1905 statute, religious groups must apply with the local prefecture to be recognized as an association of worship and to receive tax-exempt status. The prefecture reviews the submitted documentation regarding the association's purpose for existence. To qualify, the group's purpose must be solely the practice of some form of religious ritual. Printing publications, employing a board president, or running a school may disqualify a group from tax-exempt status.

According to the Ministry of the Interior, 109 of 1,138 Protestant associations, 15 of 147 Jewish associations, and approximately 30 of 1,050 Muslim associations have tax-free status. Approximately 100 Catholic associations are tax-exempt; a representative of the Ministry of Interior reports that the number of non-tax-exempt Catholic associations is too numerous to estimate accurately. More than 50 associations of the Jehovah's Witnesses have tax-free status.

According to the 1905 law, associations of worship are not taxed on the donations that they receive. However, the prefecture may decide to review a group's status if the association receives a large donation or legacy that comes to the attention of the tax authorities. If the prefecture determines that the association is not in fact in conformity with the 1905 law, its status may be changed, and it may be required to pay taxes at a rate of 60 percent on present and past donations.

The 2001 About-Picard Law tightened restrictions on associations and provided for the dissolution of groups, including religious groups, under certain conditions. These include: endangering the life or the physical or psychological well-being of a person; placing minors at mortal risk; violation of another person's freedom, dignity, or identity; the illegal practice of medicine or pharmacology; false advertising; and fraud or falsification.

For historical reasons, the Jewish, Lutheran, Reformed, and Roman Catholic groups in three departments of Alsace and Lorraine enjoy special legal status in terms of taxation of individuals donating to these religious groups. Adherents of these four religious groups may choose to have a portion of their income tax allocated to their religious organization in a system administered by the central government.

Central or local governments own and maintain religious buildings constructed before the 1905 law separating religion and State. In Alsace and Moselle, special laws allow the local governments to provide support for the building of religious edifices. The Government partially funded the establishment of the country's oldest Islamic house of worship, the Paris mosque, in 1926.

Public schools are secular. In March 2004, the Government passed legislation prohibiting public school employees and students from wearing conspicuous religious symbols, including the Muslim headscarf, the Jewish skullcap, and large crosses; the legislation took effect at the beginning of the school year in September 2004. Religious instruction is not given in public schools, but religious facts are taught as part of the history curriculum. Parents may home-school children for religious reasons, but all schooling must conform to the standards established for public schools. Public schools make an effort to supply special meals for students with religious dietary restrictions. The Government subsidizes private schools, including those that are affiliated with religious organizations.

The Government has made efforts to promote interfaith understanding. Strict anti-defamation laws prohibit racially or religiously motivated attacks. Denial of crimes against humanity is illegal. The Government has programs to combat racism and anti-Semitism through public awareness campaigns and through encouraging dialogue among local officials, police, and citizen groups. Government leaders, along with representatives from the Jewish community, the Paris and Marseille Grand Mosques, the Protestant Federation, and the French Conference of Bishops have publicly condemned racist and anti-Semitic violence. In 2003, a law was passed against crimes of a "racist, anti-Semitic, or xenophobic" nature; the law classifies racist motivations for violent acts as aggravating circumstances and mandates harsher punishment for these crimes. March 2004 legislation further increased punishment for "hate" crimes. The Government regularly applies these laws in prosecuting anti-Semitic crimes.

The Government consults with the major religious communities through various formal mechanisms. The Catholic community is represented by the Council of Bishops. In 2002, the Government and the Catholic Church initiated an institutional dialogue focusing on administrative and judicial matters, such as chaplaincy services.

The Protestant Federation of France, established in 1905, comprises 16 churches and 60 associations. Its primary purpose is to contribute to the cohesion of the Protestant community. It also acts as an interlocutor with the Government.

The Central Consistory of Jews of France, established in 1808, includes the Jewish "worship associations" from the entire country. It acts as a liaison with the Government, trains rabbis, and responds to other needs of the Jewish community. In 1943, Jewish members of the French Resistance formed the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France (CRIF). The CRIF's mission is to fight anti-Semitism, preserve the



memory of the Holocaust, affirm solidarity with Israel, and promote peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The national French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) and 25 affiliated regional councils serve as interlocutors for the Muslim community with local and national officials on such civil-religious issues as mosque construction and certification of halal butchers. In November 2004, then-Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin announced the creation of a Foundation for French Islam which will assist in the funding of mosques, provide a transparent vehicle for individual and foreign donations, and assist in the training of foreign imams in the French language, history, and civics.

The Inter-ministerial Monitoring Mission against Sectarian Abuses (MIVILUDES) is charged with observing and analyzing sect/cult movements that constitute a threat to public order or that violate French law, coordinating the appropriate responses to abuses by cults, informing the public about potential risks, and helping victims to receive aid.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

In March 2004, on the recommendation of an inter-ministerial commission established by the president to study secularism, integration, and the place of religion in the country, the Government passed a law prohibiting the wearing of "conspicuous" religious symbols--including Muslim headscarves, Jewish skullcaps, and large crosses--by employees and students in public schools. In June 2004, the European Commission on Human Rights ruled that the law did not violate the freedom of religion; the law was implemented in September 2004. Some Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Sikh leaders, human rights groups, and foreign governments voiced concerns about the law's potential to restrict religious freedom. By school year's end in June 2005, the Ministry of Education reports that 44 Muslim girls and 3 Sikh boys had been expelled from public school for violating this law; all had reportedly enrolled in private schools, distance education courses, or schools abroad. One Muslim group, however, indicates that the law has adversely affected 806 Muslim girls, whether by causing them to seek alternative educational options or requiring them to remove their veil. Media reports estimate that of the 13 million schoolchildren, approximately 1,200 Muslim school-aged girls wear veils. The Sikh community reports that of the roughly 200 school-aged Sikh boys, 84 percent are affected by the legislation.

The Paris Court of Appeals rejected a telemarketing firm's appeal of a 2003 ruling in favor of a young woman who sought reinstatement, damages, and interest after she was fired by the telemarketing firm for refusing to wear her headscarf in a manner deemed appropriate by her employer. A Lyon administrative appeals court rejected the case of a civil servant who filed a lawsuit after being disciplined in 2002 for wearing a Muslim headscarf at work, ruling that she had violated the principle of neutrality in the public service and disobeyed the orders of her superiors. Some Muslim and Sikh groups have protested the Government policy prohibiting the wearing of the head coverings in national identity photos. A case brought before the highest French court for administrative matters by a Sikh wishing to be permitted to wear his turban in driver's license and passport photos was ongoing at the end of the period covered by this report.

In July 2004, Parliament passed a law permitting the expulsion of individuals for "inciting discrimination, hatred or violence against a specific person or group of persons." Abdelkader Bouziane, an imam, was deported from the country in October, accused of publicly justifying wife-beating in an article.

#### Improvements in Respect for Religious Freedom

In late 2003, the Ministry of Education created a national commission to combat anti-Semitism in schools and the Government continued efforts to promote tolerance and combat racism and anti-Semitism throughout the reporting period. In August 2004, the



Mayor of Paris sent letters to all Paris-area principals calling for "debates on anti-Semitism, racism and discrimination" when classes resumed in September.

Additionally, the Government has taken other proactive steps to fight anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic attacks, including instructing police commissioners to create monitoring units in each department and creating a department-level Council of Religions to raise public awareness of increased racial and sectarian assaults and other incidents.

The number of reported racist and anti-Semitic incidents rose to a new high during 2004, particularly during the first half of the year, which is covered by last year's report. The number of such incidents in the period covered by this report has decreased sharply. According to the Ministry of Interior, there were 290 anti-Semitic acts in the first six months of 2005, down 48 percent from the 561 incidents recorded during the same period in 2004. Violent acts dropped even more dramatically, with 49 occurring in the first half of 2005 as opposed to 148 in 2004. The Government attributed the decreases to the culmination of efforts initiated since 2002, including a beneficial dialogue with the Jewish community and the determination of the State's internal security forces.

In June 2005, Rabbi Michel Serfaty, co-president of the French Judeo-Muslim Friendship Association (AJMF), launched a tour of Jewish and Muslim leaders throughout the country during the same time as the famous Tour de France cycling race to promote dialogue between the two communities. The organizers reported overall positive responses to the initiative.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; however, there were a number of anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic incidents during the period covered by this report. The Council of Christian Churches in France is composed of three Protestant, three Catholic, and three Orthodox Christian representatives. It serves as a forum for dialogue among the major Christian churches. There is also an organized interfaith dialogue among the Christian, Buddhist, Muslim, and Jewish communities, which discusses and issues statements on various national and international themes.

In June 2004, the Government commissioned Jean-Christophe Rufin, a doctor, writer, and president of the humanitarian association Action against Hunger, to prepare an in-depth report on racism and anti-Semitism in the country. The Rufin report, released in October, concluded that racism and anti-Semitism were a threat to French democracy and that anti-Semitic acts are not only carried out by elements of the extreme right and youth of North African descent, but also by "disaffected individuals" whose anti-Semitic obsessions prompt their attacks against Jews and Jewish institutions. The Rufin report also warned against radical anti-Zionists who question Israel's right to exist. The report recommended that a law be created to punish those publicly equating Israel with apartheid or Nazi Germany. Additionally, the report concludes that the press law of 1881, designed to guarantee freedom of the press, is too unwieldy to adequately address the issues of racism and anti-Semitism. It recommends removing from the press law all injunctions against incitement to racism and anti-Semitism and putting them into a new law written to specifically address these issues. The Rufin report also called for countering intolerance in primary schools and educating new immigrants about the fight against racism and anti-Semitism. Finally, the report advised following the recommendation of the Movement against Racism and for Community Friendship (MRAP) to create an observation system to monitor racist and anti-Semitic websites and work closely with authorities to prosecute offenders.

In a March 2005 annual report to the Prime Minister, the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (NCCHR) indicated that there were 1,565 racist and anti-Semitic incidents in 2004, nearly double the 833 recorded in 2003. The number of anti-

Semitic incidents--including physical assaults, attacks against property, cemetery desecrations, threats, and reported insults--increased from 601 in 2003 to 970 in 2004. Disturbingly, the number of incidents occurring in schools nearly tripled. There have been no reported deaths due to anti-Semitic violence since 1995, but 36 persons were injured in anti-Semitic attacks in 2004.

Based on investigations of the incidents, the NCCHR concluded that people from an "Arab-Muslim background" committed the majority of anti-Semitic acts and represented 104 of the 209 individuals questioned. The large increase in anti-Semitic incidents since 2000 has been attributed to the beginning of the Second Intifada, the war in Iraq, and other events in the Middle East; however, the report remarks that 2004's increase does not correlate to current events and warns that "anti-Semitism is becoming established in a continuous and lasting manner."

The report noted that the number of incidents decreased dramatically in the fourth quarter of 2004 and expressed hope that the trend would continue into 2005. The Ministry of Interior reports that in 2004, there were 182 individuals arrested for anti-Semitic incidents. The Ministry of Justice, which uses different criteria in its collection of data, registered 387 anti-Semitic acts in 2004. The Justice Ministry reported in the NCCHR report that 95percent of incidents prosecuted resulted in some form of punishment.

The Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in the country (CRIF) operated a hotline to register allegations of threats in the greater Paris region. Additionally, the CRIF contributed an analysis of anti-Semitic acts and threats in the NCCHR's 2004 annual report. Based on its own information and that of the Jewish Community Protection Service (CSPCJ), the CRIF registered 95 anti-Semitic incidents during the first six months of 2005, as opposed to 590 for the entire year in 2004, 516 in 2002, and 503 in 2003. The CRIF stated in the NCCHR report that its figures do not always correspond to those of the Government, as victims do not always report their attacks to both the police and the CRIF.

In April 2005, CRIF condemned the sale of anti-Semitic cassettes by the Committee for the Well-being and Rescue for Palestinians (CBSP) at the annual meeting of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF). The president of the UOIF called the situation "regrettable" and lamented that the situation had not been brought to his attention earlier, so as to prevent the dissemination. He stated, "We cannot tolerate the sale of such cassettes, this is an incitation to racial hatred, an incitation against religions. This is unacceptable."

In November 2004, a group of students visiting Auschwitz were accused of inappropriate behavior, including running, throwing snowballs, smiling next to pictures of deportees, and in the case of one student, making comments that approved of the Nazis actions. In January 2005, an appeals court rejected the appeals of two of the disciplined students, upholding the permanent expulsion for the student who made the remarks and confirming a 15-day suspension for another student.

In October 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called comments by Radio France International editor Alain Menargues "unacceptable." Menargues called Israel a "racist" state while publicizing his book on the West Bank security barrier. Menargues resigned as a result of his comments.

Jewish organizations and the Government criticized al-Manar, a Lebanese Hezbollah satellite channel, for consistently airing anti-Semitic programming, including an anti-Semitic television series during Ramadan in 2003. In July 2004, the Government amended the telecommunication laws, giving new regulatory powers over satellite broadcasts to the Audio Visual Superior Council (CSA). The CSA signed a one-year, limited license with al-Manar in November that included provisions banning expression of

anti-Semitic sentiments, favorable coverage of suicide bombers and other terrorists, and incitement to racial and religious hatred. Shortly thereafter, the CSA petitioned the State Council, the country's highest administrative court, to ban the station based on the broadcaster's failure to curb anti-Semitic programming despite the restricted license agreement. In December 2004, the State Council banned altogether the transmission of al-Manar in the country. Prime Minister Raffarin called al-Manar's anti-Semitic programming "incompatible with French values" and urged the issue of satellite broadcasts be taken up at the European Union level. The country has also banned Sahar 1, an Iranian satellite station that broadcast similarly anti-Semitic and anti-Israel programming.

In 2003, after an arson attack destroyed a Jewish school in Gagny, President Chirac stated "an attack on a Jew is an attack on France" and ordered the formation of an inter-ministerial committee charged with leading an effort to combat anti-Semitism. Since its first meeting in 2003, the committee has worked to improve government coordination in the fight against anti-Semitism, including the timely publication of statistics and reinforced efforts to prosecute attackers.

Authorities condemned anti-Semitic attacks, maintained heightened security at Jewish institutions, investigated the attacks, made arrests, and pursued prosecutions. The Government maintained increased security for Jewish institutions. More than 13 mobile units, totaling more than 1,200 police officers, have been assigned to those locales having the largest Jewish communities. Fixed or mobile police are present in the schools, particularly during the hours when children are entering or leaving school buildings. All of these measures were coordinated closely with leaders of the Jewish communities in the country, notably the CRIF.

The Government took other steps to combat anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance, particularly among young people; however, some groups asserted that the judicial system was lax in its sentencing of anti-Semitic offenders. During the period covered by this report, schools have emphasized the need for tolerance and copies of the film "Shoah" were distributed to all high schools for use in history and civics classes.

The Government has taken other proactive steps to fight anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic attacks, including instructing police commissioners to create monitoring units in each national department and announcing in June 2004 the creation of a department-level Council of Religions to raise public awareness of increased racial and anti-sectarian incidents. In September, the Mayor of Paris launched a campaign to fight all forms of intolerance that included 1,200 municipal billboards and bulletins in major newspapers.

International organizations have voiced support for the Government's efforts to combat anti-Semitism. In September 2004, representatives of the American Jewish Committee visited Paris to meet with government officials. They commended the country's tough approach to fighting anti-Semitism. The group's executive director stated, "I think France today realizes the seriousness of the struggle, and is mobilizing its government and its forces to fight against it." Following the publication of the Rufin report in October 2004, Israel's Ambassador to France called the report "exceptional." He continued, "France had the courage to accept the conclusions of the report and the change at the level of the intelligentsia, the authorities, and the media is remarkable." On January 23, 2005, the Global Forum against Anti-Semitism, a group under the auspices of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's office and the Jewish Agency, released its annual report. Based on its methods of measurement, incidents in the country stayed relatively level and, in fact, declined in the second half of the year. According to the report, "Over the past year, French authorities have invested significant effort in fighting, and educating against, anti-Semitism." Members of the Arab/Muslim community experienced incidents of harassment and vandalism, particularly on the island of Corsica. In November 2004, assailants opened fire on an imam as he answered a knock at the door of the Muslim Cultural Association of Sartene, in southern Corsica. The imam was uninjured. In December 2004,

there were two attacks against a building housing immigrants. The attacks have caused some families to move to the mainland or return to their countries of origin.

The attacks were blamed on elements of the island's nationalist movement, and many incidents involved graffiti with such slogans as "Arabs Out" and "Corsica for the Corsicans" written in the Corsican language. In November 2004, police placed 14 members of the nationalist group *Clandestini Corsi* under investigation. In December, Corsican authorities held a week of events aimed at increasing awareness of the danger of racism and promoting co-existence between immigrant and native Corsican populations.

According to the NCCHR, there were 595 racist acts recorded in 2004, up sharply from the 232 committed in 2003. The NCCHR study reported that, while responsible for 90 percent of acts between 1994 and 1999, far-right extremists were responsible for 14 percent of incidents in 2002 and 18 percent in 2003. However, 2004 marked a resurgence in extreme-right activity, which was cited as the motivating factor in 30 percent of the racist and anti-Semitic incidents. The NCCHR noted a shift, remarking that right-wing elements appeared to target individuals of Arab-Muslim background (292 acts) more often than those of Jewish origin (169 acts).

Negative societal attitudes regarding the wearing of Muslim headscarves may have led to incidents of discrimination against Muslim women. Members of the Muslim community alleged that, when wearing headscarves, they had been refused service by private businesses. Media reports indicated that some companies discourage women employees from wearing the headscarf or encourage them to wear a bandanna in its place.

In September 2004, a court handed down a 4-month suspended sentence and a \$13,624 (10,000 euros) fine to a woman who refused to sell property to an Arab couple.

Cemeteries and religious sites were often targets of attack; the Interior Ministry announced desecrations and destructive acts at 92 Christian, 31 Jewish, and 28 Muslim sites in 2004. Many of these incidents occurred in Alsace, where extreme-right groups have ties to similar groups across the border in Germany; some have linked the attacks against Jewish and Muslim sites to the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II. In May 2005, approximately 60 gravestones were smashed and a swastika drawn on a door of a Jewish cemetery in Sarreguemines (eastern France) shortly after the memorial service for the town's Holocaust victims had been held. Two young vandals, aged 14 and 12, were caught and confessed to having committed the act "out of foolishness."



## Germany

The Basic Law (Constitution) provides for religious freedom, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, discrimination against certain religious minorities remains an issue. There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the free practice of religion. As the country's religious demography grew increasingly complex, the generally amicable relationships among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

Important religious issues of concern included the organization of Islamic religious instruction in schools; social and governmental (federal and state) treatment of certain religious minorities, (...) notably bans in certain states on the wearing of headscarves by female Muslim teachers in public schools.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 137,847 square miles, and its population is approximately 82 million. There are no official statistics on religions; however, unofficial estimates and figures provided by religious organizations give an approximate breakdown of the membership of the country's denominations. The data below were compiled from various sources and are for 2003 unless otherwise noted.

The Roman Catholic Church had a membership of approximately 26.5 million. The Evangelical Church, a confederation of the Lutheran, Uniate, and Reformed Protestant Churches, has approximately 26.2 million members. Together, these two churches account for two thirds of the population.

Other religious communities comprising more than 0.1 percent of the population are Protestant Christian: New Apostolic Church: 400,000; Ethnic German Baptists from the FSU: 300-380,000; Baptist: 85,000. Muslims number 3.3 million (2001), including Sunnis: 2.2 million (2001); Alawites: 340,000 (2000); Shiites: 170,000 (2000). Orthodox Christian number 1.4 million, including Greek Orthodox/ Constantinople Patriarchate: 400,000; Serbian Orthodox: 250,000; Romanian Orthodox: 250,000; Russian Orthodox, Moscow Patriarchate: 100,000.

Buddhists number 210,000, and Jehovah's Witnesses 166,000. Jews number 189,000, including Central Council Affiliated (primarily Orthodox): 105,000 (2004), and non-affiliated: 80,000 (2004). Hindus number 97, 500.

Note: Under a liberal immigration policy, more than 199,000 Jews and their dependents from the former Soviet Union (FSU) have come to the country since 1990, with smaller numbers arriving from other countries as well. Not all new arrivals join congregations, resulting in the discrepancy between population and congregation membership. In December 2004 negotiations began between the Government and the Central Council of Jews in Germany that could place new limits on Jewish immigration from the FSU.

An estimated 21 million persons, or a quarter of the population, either have no religious affiliation or belong to unrecorded religious organizations.

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

The Basic Law (Constitution) provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, discrimination against and unequal treatment of some minority religious groups remain an issue, in part because of the legal/constitutional structure of church-state relations. The structure for managing church-state relations, established in 1949, is gradually adapting to the country's increasingly diverse religious make-up.

Religious organizations are not required to register with the state. However, most religious organizations are registered and treated as nonprofit associations, which enjoy a degree of tax-exempt status. State-level authorities review registration submissions and routinely grant tax-exempt status. Their decisions are subject to judicial review. Organizations must provide evidence, through their own statutes, that they are a religion and thus contribute socially, spiritually, or materially to society. Local tax offices occasionally conduct reviews of tax-exempt status.

Religion and state are separate, although a special partnership exists between the State and those religious communities that have the status of a "corporation under public law." Any religious organization may request that it be granted "public law corporation" status, which among other things entitles it to name prison, hospital and military chaplains and to levy a tithe (averaging nine percent of income tax) on its members that the State collects. (Public law corporations pay a fee to the Government for this tax service; not all avail themselves of it.) The decision to grant public law corporation status is made at the state level based on certain requirements, including an assurance of permanence, the size of the organization, and an indication that the organization is not hostile to the constitutional order or fundamental rights. Religious groups that have been granted public law corporation status, in addition to the Evangelical and Catholic Churches, include the Jewish community, Mormons, Seventh-day Adventists, Mennonites, Baptists, Methodists, Christian Scientists, and the Salvation Army.

The Muslim communities remain an exception. To date, no state has granted any Muslim group public law corporation status, in large measure because of intra-Muslim disputes over which organization can be considered representative of the community as a whole. The federal Government is in principle in favor of granting public law corporation status to Muslim communities but has urged Muslims to agree upon a single organization with which the state and federal governments could deal.

Most public schools offer Protestant and Catholic religious instruction in cooperation with those churches, and instruction in Judaism, if enough students express interest. Depending on the state, a nonreligious ethics course or study hall may be available for students not wishing to participate in religious instruction. In early 2005, a dispute arose between the state of Berlin and the evangelical and Catholic churches over proposals to establish a mandatory secular ethics course for all students in Berlin public schools. The churches argue that the state should not be responsible for transmitting ethical values and cannot properly teach about the ethical content of religions. Although confessional education would remain on offer in Berlin on a voluntary basis, the churches believe that their teaching would be undermined.

In 2004, providing Islamic education in public schools was a controversial topic nationally. Education is a state responsibility and, because no nation-wide Islamic organization exists that all states recognize as a public law corporation, the form and content of Islamic instruction varies from state to state. Organizations providing Muslim instruction in several states do not have public law corporation status.



Bavaria, in cooperation with the Turkish government, has offered Islamic religious instruction in Turkish in its public schools since the 1980s. Since 2001, in a separate state-initiated and much smaller program, Islamic instruction has been offered in German. In 2003-04, a pilot Islamic education program in German in cooperation with the local Muslim community began at one public school.

Baden-Wuerttemberg will offer Islamic religious courses in select public schools in 2006-07. Local Islamic organizations will be responsible for the religious classes, using a curriculum developed by the state.

Following favorable rulings by courts on the status of the Berlin Islamic Federation as a religious community, the Federation began in 2001 to provide Islamic instruction in several Berlin schools. The decision has drawn criticism from Muslim organizations not represented in the Federation, and from others concerned about the Federation's alleged links to a Turkish group classified as extremist by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (OPC). In June 2005, media reported that the state government was planning to establish a training program for teachers of Islam at the Free University to permit the development of a state-sponsored alternative to the Islamic Federation's program.

In 2003, Lower Saxony began a pilot Islamic instruction program in German in eight elementary schools. The program was developed by the state in collaboration with local Muslim communities. The program was tentatively set to be expanded to additional elementary schools in 2005.

In North Rhine-Westphalia, Islamic instruction began in Turkish in 1999. As of 2004, Islam was taught, through a state-developed curriculum in German, to more than 6,000 students in 110 schools. However, these courses seek to provide objective information about Islam rather than educate students in their faith, as is the case in Protestant and Catholic classes. Efforts are underway to develop such a course in cooperation with Islamic organizations

One school in Bremen offers instruction in Islam. The new government of Schleswig-Holstein has begun to consider how to introduce Islamic instruction in German. No Islamic instruction is provided in schools in Hamburg as the authorities have suspended an initiative for an interreligious program. In a number of eastern states (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Thuringia, and Saxony-Anhalt), the number of Muslim students is too small and dispersed for Islamic instruction to be practicable.

Ministry of Defense efforts to develop a Muslim chaplaincy have failed because of an inability to reach agreement on a plan with the multiple Muslim groups. Independently, the Ministry has developed a code of conduct to facilitate the practice of Islam by an estimated 3,000 Muslim soldiers.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

Government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

After 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court cleared the way for state legislation that would ban female Muslim teachers from wearing headscarves at work; several states indicated their intention to enact laws prohibiting Muslim public servants from wearing headscarves on duty. From April 2004 to January 2005, six states passed such legislation; four states were considering draft laws, and no action had been taken in five states. New legislation generally used language that could be applied to wearing any symbol that could be taken as a rejection of constitutional values or as a symbol of oppression. At least in the case in Baden Wuerttemberg, this legislation is now under judicial review.

In October 2004, a Leipzig court ruled that Christian nuns teaching in public schools (a common practice) must obey a Baden Wuerttemberg law that prohibits the wearing of religious paraphernalia in schools. In November 2004, Bavaria banned headscarves and other religious symbols deemed contrary to constitutional order; however, it did not ban the wearing of crucifixes or nuns' habits, claiming that they were professional uniforms.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society continued to contribute to religious freedom.

The country is becoming increasingly secular and, at the same time, religiously diverse. Regular attendance at religious services is decreasing. Fifteen years after reunification, the eastern part of the country remains far more secular than the west. Only 5 to 10 percent of eastern citizens belong to a religious organization.

The rise of a substantial Muslim minority has at times led to social conflict with religious, ethnic, and cultural overtones. Commonly, this includes local resistance to the construction of mosques or disagreements over whether Muslims may use loudspeakers in residential neighborhoods to call the faithful to prayer. Authorities argue that many disputes also appear to be related to compliance with construction and zoning laws; private groups (with some Interior Ministry financing) are seeking to better educate Muslim groups about these laws. Muslim groups, however, argue that such rules are often abused or that local opposition is motivated by anti-Muslim bias. Local opposition in Munich has, for example, delayed plans to build a new mosque there. There was an arson attack against a mosque in the Hessian town of Usingen in December 2004, with \$12,500 (10,000 euros) worth of damage done. Authorities believed the attack was the work of an individual, but no arrests were made and no person or group had claimed responsibility for the attack. Islamic instruction in Turkish or Arabic has also come under criticism from politicians and others who are concerned that such classes may convey anti-constitutional or anti-Western messages.

On several occasions police raided mosques and other Muslim institutions in connection with counter-terrorism investigations. Some raids, such as the July 2004 raid on a Frankfurt mosque, triggered accusations of discrimination from members of the mosque. There also remain areas where the law conflicts with Islamic practices, for example with regard to the call to prayer, Muslim ritual slaughtering, or the segregation of older boys and girls during sports classes.

## Greece

The Constitution establishes the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ as the prevailing religion, but also provides for the right of all citizens to practice the religion of their choice; however, while the Government generally respects this right, non-Orthodox groups sometimes face administrative obstacles or encounter legal restrictions on religious practice. The Constitution prohibits proselytizing and stipulates that no rite of worship may disturb public order or offend moral principles.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom. Some non-Orthodox citizens have complained of being treated with suspicion or told that they were not truly Greek when they revealed their religious affiliation.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 81,935 square miles, and its population is an estimated 10.9 million. Approximately 97 percent of citizens identify themselves at least nominally with the Greek Orthodox faith. There are approximately 500,000 to 800,000 Old Calendarists--ultra-conservative Orthodox--who use the Julian calendar and adhere to traditional Greek Orthodox practice, throughout the country. The Government does not keep statistics on religious groups; censuses do not ask for religious affiliation. Officials estimate the size of the Turcophone Muslim community at 98,000 although other estimates range up to 140,000. Ethnic Greeks are a sizeable percentage of most Christian non-Orthodox denominations. The Jehovah's Witnesses report having approximately 30,000 active members and 50,000 people affiliated with the faith; Members of the Roman Catholic faith are estimated at 50,000; Protestants, including evangelicals, at 30,000; and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) at 300. Scientologists report 500 active registered members. The longstanding Jewish community numbers approximately 5,000 adherents; an estimated 2,000 reside in Thessaloniki. Approximately 250 members of the Baha'i Faith, the majority of whom are citizens of non-Greek ethnicity, are scattered throughout the country. Followers of the ancient polytheistic Hellenic religions report 2,000 members. There also are small populations of Anglicans, Baptists, and nondenominational Christians. There is no official or unofficial estimate of atheists.

The majority of non-citizen residents are not Greek Orthodox. The largest group is the Albanians (approximately 700,000 including legal and illegal residents); most Albanians are secular in orientation. Despite such secularism, Albanians traditionally associate themselves with the Muslim, Orthodox, or Roman Catholic faiths. Aside from the indigenous Muslim minority in Thrace, the Muslim immigrant population in the rest of the country is estimated at 200,000 to 300,000.

Roman Catholics reside primarily in Athens and on the islands of Syros, Tinos, Naxos, and Corfu, as well as in the cities of Thessaloniki and Patras. Immigrants from the Philippines, Poland, and Iraq also practice Roman Catholicism. The Roman Catholic immigrant population is estimated to be 200,000. The Bishop of Athens heads the Roman Catholic Holy Synod.

Some religious groups, such as the Greek evangelicals and Jehovah's Witnesses, consist almost entirely of ethnic Greeks and some Russian and Albanian immigrants. Other groups, such as Mormons and Anglicans, consist of an approximately equal number of ethnic Greeks and non-Greeks.

The indigenous Muslim community, concentrated in Thrace with small communities in Rhodes, Kos, and Athens, is composed mainly of Turcophones but also includes Roma and Pomaks, a Slav-origin linguistic minority. A growing number of Muslim immigrants live in Athens and in rural areas.

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution establishes the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ as the prevailing religion, and provides for freedom of religion. However, while the Government generally respects this right, non-Orthodox groups sometimes face administrative obstacles or encounter legal restrictions on religious practice. The Constitution prohibits proselytizing and stipulates that no rite of worship may disturb public order or offend moral principles. The Orthodox Church exercises significant political and economic influence. The Government, under the direction of the Ministry of Education and Religion, provides some financial support. For example, the Government pays for the salaries and religious training of clergy, and finances the maintenance of Orthodox Church buildings. The Government also passed taxation legislation in 2004 that gradually abolishes by 2007 tax on revenues for Greek Orthodox Churches and institutions. While this appears to preferentially benefit the Greek Orthodox Church, leaders of other faiths reported that such laws typically refer only to the Greek Orthodox Church. Upon judicial examination, the laws are usually applied to all churches; however this practice presents unnecessary administrative obstacles for non-Orthodox churches.

In 2005, a series of scandals alleging the theft of antiquities, trial-fixing, and other illegal and immoral behavior by high-ranking Greek Orthodox clerics shook the powerful Orthodox Church. The scandals renewed discussion in the media of a separation of church and state.

In 2001, the Government added a conscientious objector provision to the Constitution. A government ombudsman office provided an effective means for citizens to resolve human rights and religious freedom problems. The office was granted adequate resources to perform its functions and was widely recognized. These two developments helped foster government tolerance of minority religions.

The Orthodox Church, Judaism, and Islam are the only groups considered to be "legal persons of public law." Other religions are considered "legal persons of private law." In practice, the primary distinction is that the Civil Code's provisions pertaining to corporations regulate the establishment of "houses of prayer" for religions besides the Orthodox Church, Judaism, or Islam. For example, other religions cannot own property as religious entities; the property must belong to a specifically created legal entity rather than to the religious body itself. In practice, this places an additional legal and administrative burden on other religious community organizations, although in most cases this process has been handled routinely. Members of religious groups that are classified as private entities cannot be represented in court as religious entities and cannot bequeath or inherit property as a religious entity. The law extended legal recognition as a private entity to Roman Catholic churches and related entities established prior to 1946. By virtue of the Orthodox Church's status as the prevailing religion, the Government recognizes the Orthodox Church's canon law, both within the church and in such areas of civil law as marriage. The Catholic Church unsuccessfully has sought government recognition of its canon law since 1999.



Leaders of some non-Orthodox religious groups claimed that all taxes on religious organizations are discriminatory, even those that the Orthodox Church has to pay, because the Government subsidizes the Orthodox Church, while other groups are self-supporting.

Muslim religious leaders say there are approximately 375 mosques in Thrace. The Government pays the salaries of the two official Muslim religious leaders, or "muftis," and the salaries of approximately 20 out of 130 imams. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne gives Muslims in Thrace the right to maintain social and charitable organizations called "wakfs" and allows muftis to render religious judicial services in the area of family law.

The Lausanne Treaty provides the Turcophone Muslim minority with the right to Turkish-language education, and provides a reciprocal entitlement for the Greek minority in Istanbul (less than 3,000 persons). Western Thrace has secular Turkish-language bilingual schools and two Qur'anic schools funded by the state. As of 2004, approximately 7,000 Muslim students are enrolled in Turkish bilingual grammar schools and 953 attend minority high schools. Another 280 students, many of whom become schoolteachers, attend the Islamic schools. The majority of Thrace Muslim students, approximately 3,650, attend public secondary schools, which are deemed better preparation for Greek-language universities.

Special consideration is given to Thrace Muslims for admission to technical institutes and universities that set aside 0.5 percent of the total number of places for them annually. Approximately 900 Thrace Muslim students take advantage of this affirmative action program; a small number choose to attend university in Turkey. In April 2005, the Minister of Education announced that ten full scholarships for the academic year 2005-2006 would be offered for Muslim students who will enter universities.

The Government maintains that Muslims outside Thrace are not covered by the Treaty of Lausanne and therefore do not enjoy those rights provided by the Treaty. Muslim parents complain that hundreds of Turcophone children in the Athens area do not receive remedial Greek instruction, other than in one multicultural elementary education "pilot school."

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

Non-Orthodox citizens have claimed that they face career limits within the military, police, fire-fighting forces, and the civil service because of their religions. In the military, generally only members of the Orthodox faith become officers, leading some members of other faiths to declare themselves Orthodox. Few Muslim military personnel have advanced to the rank of reserve officer, and there were reports of pressure exerted on Greek Orthodox military personnel not to marry in the religious ceremony of non-Orthodox partners, which might cause them to be passed over for promotion.

Muslim citizens are underrepresented in public sector employment and in state-owned industries and corporations. While partly due to the education level of the available applicant pool, activists blame lack of transparency in the civil service hiring process and endemic discrimination. Muslims claim they are generally hired for lower level positions. One Turcophone Muslim currently holds a seat in Parliament. In Xanthi and Komotini, Muslims hold seats on the prefectural and town councils and serve as local mayors. Thrace municipalities hire Muslims as public liaisons in citizen service centers and provide Turkish lessons for other civil servants.

Unlike in Thrace, the growing Muslim community in Athens (composed primarily of economic migrants from South Asia, the Middle East and a small portion of Thrace Muslims and estimated by local press and experts to be between 200,000 and 300,000) still does not have an official mosque or any official cleric to officiate at religious functions, including funerals. Press reports in 2004 claimed that the number of unofficial

prayer rooms in Athens ranged from 25 to 70. Members of the Muslim community must use the official Muslim clerics in Thrace for official religious rites. Some Muslims in Athens and other cities travel to Thrace for wedding ceremonies and some transport their deceased there for religious burials; some who cannot afford to travel to Thrace must have unrecognized religious rites performed.

Although the Parliament approved a bill in 2000 allowing construction of the first Islamic cultural center and mosque in the Athens suburb of Peania, construction had not started by the end of the period covered by this report. The Archbishop of Greece and members of the Orthodox Church have made public their opposition to the cultural center, claiming it may "spread the ideology of Islam and the Arab world" and "serve as a breeding ground for terrorism" rather than as a simple cultural center. On a more practical level, local authorities in Peania have opposed the mosque and cultural center's location because there are less than a dozen Muslims in their community. Representatives of Muslim communities have complained that the proposed mosque and cultural center location is too far --at least 40 minutes' drive--from central Athens neighborhoods where many Muslim migrants live to be practical.

Differences remain within the Turcophone Muslim community and between segments of the community and the Government regarding the means of selecting muftis. Under existing law, the Government appoints two muftis and one assistant mufti, all residents in Thrace. The Government argued that it must appoint the muftis, as is the practice in Muslim countries, because in addition to religious duties, they perform judicial functions under Muslim religious law, for which the State pays them. Hence the Government selects a committee of Turcophone Muslim notables, which recommends candidates for the 10-year terms of office. Some Muslims accept the authority of the two government-appointed muftis; other Muslims have "elected" two muftis to serve their communities since they maintain that the government of a non-Muslim country cannot appoint muftis. There is no established procedure or practice for these non-governmental elections, and the Government does not recognize the "elected" muftis.

The Government recognizes Shari'a (the Muslim religious law) as the law regulating family and civic issues of the Muslim minority in Thrace. The First Instance Courts in Thrace routinely ratify decisions of the Muftis who have judicial powers on civic and domestic matters. The National Human Rights Committee, an autonomous human rights body that is the Government's advisory organ on protection of human rights, has stated that the Government should limit the powers of the muftis to religious duties, and should stop recognizing sharia law, because it restricts civic rights of Muslim Greek citizens. There are underage marriages among Muslims, and some may be arranged. There is no evidence that there are forced marriages.

Controversy between the Muslim community and the Government also continues over the management and self-government of the wakfs, particularly regarding the Government's appointment of officials to serve on administrative boards that govern the wakfs and the degree and type of administrative control, which prior to the 1960s was exercised by the Muslim community. In response to objections from some Muslims that the appointment of officials weakened the financial autonomy of the wakfs and violated the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, a 1996 presidential decree placed the wakfs under the administration of a committee for three years as an interim measure pending resolution of outstanding problems. The interim period has been extended every two years by presidential decree.

Orthodox religious instruction in public, primary, and secondary schools is mandatory for all Orthodox students. Non-Orthodox students are exempt from this requirement, however schools offer no alternative supervision for the children during the period of religious instruction; hence these children sometimes attend Orthodox religious instruction by default. Members of the Muslim community in Athens are lobbying for Islamic religious instruction for their children.



In the past, Muslim activists have complained that the Government regularly lodges tax liens against the wakfs, although they are tax-free foundations in theory. Under a national land and property registry law that entered into full effect in 1999, the wakfs, along with all property holders, must register all of their property with the Government. The law permits the Government to seize any property that the owners are not able to document; there are built-in reporting and appeals procedures. The wakfs were established in 1560; however, because of the destruction of files during the two world wars, the wakfs are unable to document ownership of much of their property. Because they have not registered the property, they cannot pay assessed taxes. The Government had not sought to enforce either the assessments or the registration requirement by the end of the period covered by this report.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

Religious affiliation is very closely linked to ethnicity. Many attribute the preservation of national identity to the actions of the Greek Orthodox Church during approximately 400 years of Ottoman rule and the subsequent nation-building period. The Church exercises significant social, political, and economic influence and it owns a considerable, although undetermined, amount of property.

Many Greeks assume any ethnic Greek is also an Orthodox Christian. Some non-Orthodox citizens have complained of being treated with suspicion or told that they were not truly Greek when they revealed their religious affiliation.

Members of minority faiths have reported incidents of societal discrimination, such as local Orthodox bishops warning parishioners not to visit clergy or members of minority faiths, and requesting that the police arrest missionaries for proselytizing. However, with the exception of the burgeoning Muslim population, most members of minority faiths consider themselves satisfactorily integrated into society. Organized official interaction between religious communities is infrequent.

In November 2004, on one of the last days of Ramadan, as many as 2000 people gathered in protest in a Muslim Pomak village outside the northern city of Xanthi after two inappropriately-clad actresses working on a soap opera sought refuge from the rain in the village mosque. Representatives from the Government and the Greek Orthodox Church noted that the crew did not show adequate respect to a place of worship. Police detained the crew and actors, who were charged with disturbing the peace. Their cases were transferred to Athens, where they are pending. Five residents of the village were also charged with causing damage to the crew's property and the local police station.

## **Hungary**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. There is no state religion; however, the four "historic religions" (Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, Jewish) and certain other denominations, such as Unitarian and Orthodox Churches, enjoy some privileges not available to other faiths.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion. However, several points of friction between the Government and religious organizations arose during the period covered by this report, relating to the Christian churches' support for the December 2004 dual citizenship referendum, and two recent laws affecting church-run social institutions.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

### **Section I. Religious Demography**

The country has an area of 35,919 square miles, and its population is an estimated 10 million.

Strict enforcement of data protection regulations impedes the collection of official statistics on popular participation in religious life; however, surveys and other evidence suggest that the country's citizens are less devout than the average European. According to a 2004 survey by the Economic Research Institute of Hungary (GFK), 58 percent of respondents declared themselves to be "believers," and 55 percent responded that they believe in "God or the super-natural." Only 15 percent of those believers declared that they go to church at least once a week and 25 percent stated that they never attend church.

The 2001 national census, the latest data available, contained an optional question on religious affiliation, and 90 percent of the population provided a response. According to the census results, 55 percent of citizens are Roman Catholic, 15 percent are members of the Reformed Church, 3 percent are members of the Lutheran Church, and less than 1 percent are Jewish. These four faiths comprise the country's historic religions. Three percent of respondents identified themselves as Greek Catholics, and 15 percent of respondents declared no religious affiliation. The remaining percentage of the population is divided among a number of other denominations. The largest of these is the Congregation of Faith, a local evangelical Christian movement. Other denominations include a broad range of Christian groups, including five Orthodox denominations. In addition, there are seven Buddhist groups and three Islamic communities.

Hungarian citizens are able to donate 1.0 percent of their income taxes to the religion of their choice and an additional 1.0 percent to the nonprofit agency of their choice. The Government nearly doubles the taxpayers' donation, adding 0.9 percent of the sum given to each group. Statistics from the collection of tax revenue voluntarily directed for use by religious groups confirm the ranking of traditional estimates of religious affiliation. In 2004, 15.6 percent of the taxpayers contributed \$17.5 million to 119 religious groups.

### **Section II. Status of Religious Freedom**

## Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors.

Easter Monday, Whit Monday, All Saints' Day, and Christmas are celebrated as national holidays. These holidays do not negatively affect any religious groups.

The 1990 Law on the Freedom of Conscience regulates the activities and benefits enjoyed by religious communities and establishes the criteria for legal designation. To register as a religion, religious groups must submit a statement to a county court declaring that they have at least 100 followers. The court questions only whether the registration of the new group is constitutional. While any group is free to practice its faith, formal registration makes available certain protections and privileges and grants access to several forms of state funding. The courts have registered a total of 144 religious groups since 1990.

Religious instruction is not part of the education curricula in public schools; however, the Government permits primary and secondary school students to enroll in extracurricular religious education classes. Optional religious instruction is usually held after the normal school day and is taught by representatives of religious groups in school facilities. While the Government makes provisions for minority religions to engage in religious education in public schools, the four historical religions provide the majority of after-hours religious instruction. During the 2004-05 school year, 45 registered religious groups provided religious instruction to 515,223 out of a total of 1.4 million students in public schools.


The military chaplain's service has permanent pastoral representation by the four historic religions in the defense forces. The Government also requires the military to respect the rights of other religions by providing pastoral care for their members. The Ministry of Defense funds and maintains the chaplain's service. There is no evidence that soldiers receive preferential treatment for either foregoing or using the chaplain's service. The Ministry of Justice regulates a similar system for the provision of religious services to prisoners.

The Government allocates public funds to registered religions. In 2004, the Government allocated approximately \$130.3 million in public funds for various religious activities and related programs. Government expenditures supported religious practice, educational work, and the maintenance of public art collections of cultural value. Compensation for non-restituted religious property, the reconstruction of religious institutions, and the general subsidy for religious activities comprised the largest components of state financial support. The Government provides the same level of financial support for private religious education as for state institutions on a per child basis. Government support decreased in 2005 because of budgetary constraints.

In 2003, the Government allocated \$7.5 million to clergy working in settlements with populations of less than 5,000.

To promote the revitalization of religious institutions and settle property issues, the Government signed separate agreements with the four historic religions and with two smaller churches (Hungarian Baptist and Budai Serb Orthodox) between 1997 and 1999. The religious groups and the Government agreed on a number of properties to be returned and an amount of monetary compensation to be paid for properties that could not be returned. These agreements are subsumed under the 1991 Compensation Law, which requires the Government to compensate religious groups for properties confiscated by the Government after January 1, 1946. In 2004, the Government paid religious groups \$11 million, and was expected to give \$15 million to religious groups in 2005, as

compensation for the assets confiscated during the Communist regime. While these agreements primarily address property issues and restitution, they also have provisions requiring the Government to support religious organizations that provide social services as well as support for the preservation of religious monuments.



## **Ireland**

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

### **Section I. Religious Demography**

The country has an area of 27,136 square miles, and its population is approximately four million. The country is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. According to official government statistics from the 2002 census, the religious affiliation of the population was 88.4 percent Roman Catholic (3,462,606), 2.9 percent Church of Ireland (115,611), 0.55 percent Christian (unspecified), 0.52 percent Presbyterian (20,582), 0.25 percent Methodist (10,033), 0.49 percent Muslim (19,147), and less than 0.1 percent Jewish (1,790). Approximately 5.5 percent (217,358) of the population stated no preference or adherence to a particular religion.

The number of immigrants increased, and they tended to be non-Catholic. Muslim and Orthodox Christian communities in particular continued to grow, especially in Dublin. Immigrants and noncitizens encountered few difficulties in practicing their faiths.

According to a survey, which included Northern Ireland, conducted by the Catholic Bishops' Conference, approximately 60 percent of the 4, 171,000 Irish and Northern Irish Roman Catholics attended Mass once a week and 220,000 attended Mass once a day. The Conference reported that there was a noticeable increase in attendance during Christmas and Easter holidays and around the time of the death of Pope John Paul II.

### **Section II. Status of Freedom of Religion**

#### **Legal/Policy Framework**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full, and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors.

The Constitution prohibits promotion of one religion over another and discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, and the Government does not restrict the teaching or practice of any faith. There is no state religion, and there was no discrimination against nontraditional religious groups. There is no legal requirement that religious groups or organizations register with the Government, nor is there any formal mechanism for government recognition of a religion or religious group.

The Employment Equality Act prohibits discrimination in employment on nine grounds, including religion. The Equality Authority works toward continued progress in the elimination of discrimination and the promotion of equality in employment. The Equal Status 2000 Act prohibits discrimination outside of employment (such as in education or provision of goods) on the same grounds cited in the Employment Equality Act.



While Roman Catholicism is the dominant religion, it was not favored officially or in practice. Because of the country's history and tradition as a predominantly Catholic country and society, the majority of those in political office are Catholic, and some Catholic holy days are also national holidays.

The following religious holy days are considered national holidays: St. Patrick's Day (the country's national day), Good Friday, Easter Monday, Christmas, and St. Stephen's Day. These holidays did not negatively affect any religious group. The Government does not require but does permit religious instruction in public schools. Most primary and secondary schools are denominational, and their boards of management were governed partially by trustees within the Catholic Church or in some cases, the Church of Ireland. Under the terms of the Constitution, the Department of Education must and does provide equal funding to schools of different religious denominations, including Islamic and Jewish schools. Although religious instruction is an integral part of the curriculum, parents may exempt their children from such instruction.

In 2003, the Equality Authority published a booklet that states that church-linked schools are permitted legally to refuse to admit a student who is not of that religion, providing the school can prove that the refusal is essential to maintain the "ethos" of the school (i.e., too many Catholics in a Muslim school could prevent the school from having a Muslim "ethos"). However, there were no reports of any children being refused admission to any school for this reason. The Government permitted homeschooling, but few parents chose this educational option.

#### Improvements in Respect for Religious Freedom

In November 2004, in an effort to reach out across community and faith lines, the government invited key religious leaders, including the imam from a prominent mosque, to take part in the country's presidential inauguration. In December 2004, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, in line with a proposed EU Constitution Interfaith initiative, announced the development of a new interfaith dialogue (yet to begin). In March 2005, government officials attended and took part in a "Muslims in Ireland Today" conference held at a prominent mosque in the country. In addition, the Garda (the police) Racial and Intercultural Office placed 145 Ethnic Liaison Officers around the country to advise police and monitor policing activity in light of the increasing number of ethnic and religious groups that are immigrating to the country.



## **Italy**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion. There is no state religion; however, the Roman Catholic Church enjoys some privileges, stemming from its sovereign status and its historical political authority, not available to other faiths.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom. The Catholic Church's influential role in society has led to controversy when church teachings have appeared to influence Catholic legislators on matters of public policy. Increasing immigration has led to some anti-immigrant sentiment; for the country's many Muslim immigrants, religion has served as an additional factor differentiating them from native-born citizens.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 116,347 square miles, and its population is approximately 57.8 million. An estimated 87 percent of native-born citizens are nominally Roman Catholic, but only 20 percent regularly participate in worship services. According to numbers reported by the communities, members of Jehovah's Witnesses form the second largest Christian denomination among native-born citizens, numbering approximately 231,000 adherents, followed by members of the Assembly of God (78,000), Methodists and Waldesians (27,000), and Mormons (22,000).

However, immigration--both legal and illegal--continues to add large groups of non-Christian residents, mainly Muslims, from North Africa, South Asia, Albania, and the Middle East. Of 2.9 million legal immigrants, an estimated 1 million are Muslim, primarily Sunnis. There are approximately 75,000 Hindus. Buddhists include approximately 40,000 adherents of European origin and 20,000 of Asian origin. A Jewish community of approximately 30,000 maintains synagogues in 21 cities. Other significant religious communities include Orthodox churches, small Protestant groups, the Baha'i Faith, and South Asian Hindus. Polls conducted in 2003 showed that approximately 14 percent of the population consider themselves to be either atheists or agnostics.

### Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

#### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors.

Prior to the Constitution's adoption in 1947, the country's relations with the Catholic Church were governed by a 1929 Concordat, which resolved longstanding disputes stemming from the dissolution of the Papal States and established Catholicism as the country's state religion. A 1984 revision of the Concordat formalized the principle of a secular state but maintained the practice of state support for religion--support that also

could be extended, if requested, to non-Catholic confessions. In such cases, state support is to be governed by legislation implementing the provisions of an accord ("intesa") between the Government and the religious confession. An intesa grants ministers of religion automatic access to state hospitals, prisons, and military barracks, allows for civil registry of religious marriages, facilitates special religious practices regarding funerals, and exempts students from school attendance on religious holidays. If a religious community so requests, an intesa may provide for state routing of funds, through a voluntary check-off on taxpayer returns, to that community, a privilege that some communities initially declined but later requested. The absence of an intesa does not affect a religious group's ability to worship freely; however, the privileges granted by an intesa are not always granted automatically, and a religious community without an intesa does not benefit financially from the voluntary check-off on taxpayer returns.

In 1984, the first such accord granted specific benefits to the Waldesian Church. Similar accords, which are negotiated by the Prime Minister's Office and require parliamentary approval, extended similar benefits to the Adventists and Assembly of God (1988), Jews (1989), and Baptists and Lutherans (1995). In 2000, the Government signed accords with the Buddhist Union and Jehovah's Witnesses; however, these intese did not receive parliamentary ratification before that Government left office in 2001. The Government initiated negotiations with the Mormons (2000), the Orthodox Church of the Constantinople Patriarchate (2000), the Apostolic Church (2001), Hindus (2001), and Soka Gakkai (Japanese Buddhists -2001). The Government chose to complete work on pending requests and submit all such accords--including those previously signed with the Buddhist Union and Jehovah's Witnesses--to Parliament as a single package. Before seeking approval of the accords, the Government wants to complete pending omnibus religious freedom legislation, which incorporates provisions contained in other laws. It plans to complete this legislation before its term expires. Consequently, the accords awaited parliamentary approval at the end of the period covered by this report. Divisions among the country's Muslim organizations, as well as its multiple Muslim immigrant groups, have hindered that community's efforts to seek an intesa.

The revised Concordat of 1984 accorded the Catholic Church certain privileges. For example, the Church is allowed to select Catholic teachers, paid by the State, to provide instruction in "hour of religion" courses taught in the public schools. This class is optional, and students who do not wish to attend are free to study other subjects or, in certain cases, to leave school early. While in the past this instruction involved Catholic priests teaching catechism, church-selected instructors now may be either lay or religious, and their instruction is intended to include material relevant to non-Catholic faiths. Problems may arise in small communities where information about other faiths and numbers of non-Catholic communicants is limited. The Constitution prohibits state support for private schools; however, declining enrollment in Catholic schools has led Catholic Church officials, as operators of the country's most extensive network of private schools, to seek government aid.

While Roman Catholicism is no longer the state religion, its role as the dominant religion occasionally gives rise to problems. In 2004, Parliament passed legislation favored by the Vatican that equates an embryo with a human life, prohibits the use of donated sperm for artificial insemination, restricts the production of embryos, and limits scientific research on embryos. The legislation drew support from Catholic legislators across the political spectrum, while secular conservatives and Communists joined to oppose it. In January 2005, Camillo Ruini, President of the Italian Bishops' Council, urged Catholics to abstain from voting for four referenda to abolish parts of the new fertility law; this sparked strong reactions from some leftist leaders who accused the Catholic Church of inappropriate interference in the political process. The June 2005 referenda failed when only 26 of the required 50-plus percent of the population voted. The low turnout reflected a variety of factors, including Church opposition, the ambivalence of most secular politicians, and voter apathy on a summer weekend. During the period covered by this report, prominent Catholic politicians joined Pope John Paul II and other church officials

(including Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, who has now been elected Pope Benedict XVI) in asserting that the draft European Constitution should include language recognizing Europe's Christian heritage.

The continuing presence of Catholic symbols, such as crucifixes, in courtrooms, schools, and other public buildings has drawn criticism and has led to a number of lawsuits. In April 2005, a court ruled that crucifixes do not have to be removed from polling stations, as requested by the president of a small Islamic association. In December 2004, the Constitutional Court ruled that, based on a technicality, a 1928 regulation that provides for the display of crucifixes in public classrooms is constitutional. A mother in Venice, who asked that the crucifixes be removed, brought the case. In March, Interior Minister Pisanu argued publicly that the crucifix was a symbol of great value that represented 2,000 years of civilization and culture. In 2003, President Ciampi argued that the crucifix was a symbol of national identity and not only a religious emblem and was praised by several politicians and intellectuals for his position.

Muslim women are free to wear the veil in public offices and schools; however, there were occasional reports of objections to women wearing a burqah (a garment that completely covers the face and body). In August 2004, a woman in Drezzo was fined for wearing a burqah under a seldom-used 1931 law that forbids persons from hiding their identity.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes


The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom. Religious and government officials continued to encourage mutual respect for religious differences.

Increasing immigration, from Eastern Europe, Africa, China, and the Middle East, is altering demographic and cultural patterns in communities across the country and has led to some anti-immigrant sentiment. For the country's Muslim immigrants, religion serves as an additional factor differentiating them from native-born citizens. Some Catholic politicians and community leaders have contributed to popular reaction by emphasizing the perceived threat posed by immigrants to the country's "national identity," whereas others, including Interior Minister Pisanu and Chamber of Deputies President Casini, underlined the need in speeches and statements during the period covered by this report to integrate different ethnic groups present in the country. Interior Minister Pisanu ordered his Prefects to reach out to moderate Muslim communities to enhance their integration into society. In December 2004, the Minister of Equal Opportunity created a new national Office to Combat Racial and Ethnic Discrimination to monitor and prevent discrimination and assist victims with legal assistance. The office established a hot line to receive complaints and began a public relations effort to discourage ethnic, racial and religious discrimination.

The arrest and prosecution of Islamic extremists in 2002 for using prayer centers to plan, coordinate, and support terrorism and the replacement of the imam of Rome's Grand Mosque for preaching violence against "infidels" prompted some commentators and politicians to generalize about Islam's incompatibility with societies organized around Judeo-Christian values and beliefs. Other prominent politicians, including Interior Minister Pisanu and Senate President Marcello Pera, rejected such generalizations and urged increased interfaith dialogue. Pisanu proposed a European Charter of Interfaith Dialogue to the European Council of Ministers in 2003 during the country's tenure in the rotating European Union (EU) Presidency (June-December 2003); the EU Council of Ministers of Interior approved the Charter in November. Pera advocated rapid conclusion of an intesa with leaders of the Islamic faith as an additional means to isolate extremists.

Some members of the Northern League political party, a minority member of the governing coalition, asserted that practices present in many Islamic societies, notably polygamy, Islamic family law, the role of women, and the lack of separation between religion and state, rendered many Muslim immigrants incompatible for integration into society.

Government units provide funds for the construction of places of worship as well as public land for their construction, and they help preserve and maintain historic places of worship that shelter much of the country's artistic and cultural heritage. In 2001, the Campania regional administration approved the request for approximately \$3.1 million (2.6 million euros) to build a mosque in Naples despite the absence of a formal intesa between the State and the Muslim confession. Construction had not yet begun at the end of the period covered by this report.



## **Latvia**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion; however, bureaucratic problems persisted for some minority religions.

The generally amicable relations among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; however, lingering suspicions remained toward newer, nontraditional faiths.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of approximately 25,000 square miles, and its population is estimated at 2.4 million. The three largest faiths are Lutheranism, Catholicism, and Orthodox Christianity. Denominational membership statistics are self-reported estimates and are not completely reliable. Sizeable religious minorities include Baptists, Pentecostals, and various evangelical Protestant groups. The once large Jewish community was virtually destroyed in the Holocaust during the 1941-44 German occupation and now totals only an estimated 6,000 persons.

As of April 2005, the Justice Ministry had registered 1174 congregations. This total included: Lutheran (304), Roman Catholic (250), Orthodox (118), Baptist (93), Old Believer Orthodox (67), Seventh-day Adventist (50), Jehovah's Witnesses (13), Methodist (13), Jewish (13), Buddhist (4), Muslim (13), Hare Krishna (11), Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) (4), and more than 100 other congregations.

Interest in religion has increased markedly since independence. However, a large percentage of these adherents do not regularly practice their faith. In 2004, churches provided the following estimates of membership to the Justice Ministry: Lutherans (539,600), Roman Catholics (428,067), Orthodox (350,000), Baptists (7,123), Old Believer Orthodox (70,635), Seventh-day Adventists (3,950), Jehovah's Witnesses (155), Methodists (1,010), Jews (667), Buddhists (108), Muslims (355), Hare Krishnas (126), and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) (776). Although no reliable statistics exist, it is widely acknowledged that a significant portion of the population is atheist. Orthodox Christians, many of whom are Russian-speaking, non-citizen, permanent residents, are concentrated in the major cities, while many Catholics live in the east.

### Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

#### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. However, bureaucratic problems persist for some minority religions. There is no state religion; however, the Government distinguishes between "traditional" (Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Old Believers, Baptists, and Jewish) and "new"



religions. In practice, this has not resulted in government discrimination against any particular religion.

Jews are considered an ethnic group and listed as such in passports rather than Latvian or Russian. Under the country's system, citizens' passports indicate the ethnicity of the bearer only when requested by the bearer. Ethnicity is not listed on the personal information page of the passport, but is instead stamped onto a blank visa page.

December 25 is celebrated as Christmas and is a recognized national holiday. Good Friday and Easter Monday are also national holidays. The Orthodox Church has been seeking recognition of Orthodox Christmas for several years, but the Government had not adopted this proposal by the end of this reporting period.

The Latvian Lutheran Church established its own clergy education center, the Luther Academy in Riga, in 1998. The Roman Catholic Church also has its own seminary. The University of Latvia's theological faculty is nondenominational.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

The Law on Religious Organizations does not permit simultaneous registration of more than one religious association (church) in a single confession, and therefore, the Government does not register any splinter groups. This has resulted in the denial of registration applications of several groups, including an independent Jewish congregation, the Latvian Free Orthodox Church, and a separate Old Believers group.

#### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom. Ecumenism still is a new concept in the country, and traditional religions have adopted a distinctly reserved attitude toward the concept. Although government officials encourage a broader understanding and acceptance of newer religions, many citizens continue to doubt the validity of newer, nontraditional faiths.



## **Lithuania**

The Constitution establishes the right to freedom of religion except where religious observance would violate the Constitution or national law, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. There is no state religion. Some religious groups enjoy government benefits not available to others. Nontraditional religious groups face some restrictions.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continues to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 25,174 square miles and its population is approximately 3.4 million. In May 2005, there were 675 Roman Catholic parishes. Some 140,000 adherents of the Eastern Orthodox Church constituted the country's second largest religious group, with 52 communities mainly along the border with Belarus. The Old Believers, numbering 27,000, have 60 registered religious communities. The estimated 20,000 Lutherans had 58 communities, primarily in the southwest. The two branches of the Evangelical Reformed community had approximately 7,000 members in 17 communities. The six Sunni Muslim communities counted approximately 2,700 members, while the Greek Catholic community had approximately 300 members. The Jewish community numbered approximately 4,000. The majority of local Jews are secular, and only about 1,200 belonged to one of the seven religious communities.

The Chabad Lubavich, a Hassidic Jewish group, operates a school (kindergarten through 12th grade), a social center, and a kosher kitchen in the capital of Vilnius.

The Karaites have been in the country since 1397. Karaites, while not unique to the country, exist in few other locations in the world. Karaites speak a Turkic-based language and use the Hebrew alphabet. Some consider Karaite to be a branch of Judaism; the religion is based exclusively on the Old Testament. The Government recognizes the Karaites as a distinct ethnic group. Two houses of worship, one in Vilnius and one in nearby Trakai, serve the Karaite religious community of approximately 250 members. Their only religious leader is also their community president.

Roman Catholicism, the dominant faith in Lithuania prior to Soviet era, survived the years of occupation and remains both dominant and influential. According to the 2001 census, approximately 79 percent of the inhabitants considered themselves to be Roman Catholics. An estimated 9.4 percent of the population did not identify with any religious denomination. According to 1998 research data, approximately one-third of the country's Roman Catholics attended church services at least once a month. Data on religious participation for members of other faiths were not available.

Approximately 0.23 percent of the population belonged to what the Government refers to as "nontraditional" religious communities. The most numerous are the Full Gospel Word of Faith Movement, Pentecostals/Charismatics, Jehovah's Witnesses, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, and the New Apostolic Church. According to the Ministry of Justice, a total of 1,046 traditional and 172 nontraditional religious associations, centers, and communities have officially registered with the State Register of Legal Entities.

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for the right to religious freedom, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

The Constitution provides that a person's freedom to profess and propagate his or her religion or faith "may be subject only to those limitations prescribed by law and only when such restrictions are necessary to protect the safety of society, public order, a person's health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others." It is unlawful to make use of the religious teachings of churches and other religious organizations, their religious activities, and their houses of prayer for purposes that contradict the Constitution or the law. The Government has never had occasion to implement this law. The Government may also temporarily restrict freedom of expression of religious conviction during a period of martial law or a state of emergency. There is no state religion; however, under the 1995 Law on Religious Communities and Associations, some religious groups enjoy government benefits not available to others, including government financing, the right to teach religion in public schools, and the right to register marriages.

The Constitution classifies religious communities into state recognized traditional groups and others. In practice, however, a four-tiered system exists: traditional, state recognized, registered, and unregistered communities.

The law grants property rights for prayer houses, homes, and other buildings to religious communities, associations, and centers, and permits construction of facilities necessary for their activities. A 2003 change in the law enables all registered religious groups to own property.

In the absence of any legal definitions, government authorities arbitrarily acknowledge as traditional only those religions that can trace their presence in the country back at least 300 years.

The law specifies nine traditional religious communities: Latin Rite Catholics, Greek Rite Catholics, Evangelical Lutherans, Evangelical Reformed Church, Orthodox Christians (Moscow Patriarchate), Old Believers, Jews, Sunni Muslims, and Karaites.

Traditional religious communities and associations may register marriages, may establish subsidiary institutions, are eligible to receive government assistance, may establish joint private/public schools, and have the right to provide religious instruction in the public schools. Their highest religious leaders are eligible to apply for diplomatic passports, their clergy and theological students are exempt from military service, and they may have military chaplains. The Ministry of Justice does not require traditional religious communities and associations to register their bylaws. Traditional religious communities do not have to pay social and health insurance for clergy and other employees, and they are not subject to a value added tax (VAT) on basic utilities, such as electricity, telephone, and heat.

The law stipulates that the Government may officially recognize nontraditional religious communities that have societal support and have been registered in the country for at least 25 years. Nontraditional religious communities must apply to the Ministry of Justice and provide a description of their religious teachings and their aims and a founding statement signed by no fewer than 15 members who are adult citizens of the country. The Ministry must review the documents within 6 months.

While only traditional religious communities receive annual state subsidies, nontraditional groups are eligible for government support for their cultural and social projects.

The Baptists are currently the only state-recognized religion. They do not receive annual subsidies, tax exemptions, or exemptions from military service enjoyed by traditional communities. In practice, state-recognized religions receive some additional privileges from the Government, but not to the extent that traditional religious groups do. They are entitled to perform marriages and do not have to pay social and health insurance for clergy and other employers.

Registered religious communities can act as legal entities and thus may rent or own land for religious buildings. They do not receive regular subsidies, tax exemptions, social benefits, or exemptions from military enjoyed by traditional communities.

Communities must register to obtain official status, a requisite for opening a bank account, owning property, or acting in a legal or official capacity as a community.

Unregistered communities have no legal status or state privileges. There were no reports that the Government prevented any such groups from worshiping or seeking members.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relations among various religious communities in society contributed to religious freedom, although members of religious minorities occasionally are targets of acts of intolerance, such as insults.

## **Luxembourg**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

### **Section I. Religious Demography**

The country has an area of 999 square miles, and its population is approximately 450,000. The country is historically Roman Catholic, and Catholicism remains the predominant faith. According to a 1979 law, the Government may not collect or maintain statistics on religious affiliation; but over 90 percent of the population is estimated to be baptized Catholic. The Lutheran and Calvinist Churches are the largest Protestant denominations. Muslims are estimated to number approximately 6,000 persons, including approximately 885 refugees from Montenegro; Orthodox (Greek, Serbian, Russian, and Romanian) adherents are estimated to number 5,000 persons; and there are approximately 1,000 Jews. The Baha'i Faith, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the Universal Church, and Jehovah's Witnesses are represented in smaller numbers. The number of professed atheists reportedly is growing.

### **Section II. Status of Religious Freedom**

#### **Legal/Policy Framework**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full, and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors. There is no state religion. The Government does not register religious groups. However, based on the Concordat of 1801, some churches receive financial support from the state. The Constitution specifically provides for state payment of the salaries and pensions of clergy of those religions who have signed conventions with the Government. Pursuant to negotiated agreements with the Government, the following religious groups receive such support: Roman Catholic, Greek and Russian Orthodox, Jewish, and some other Protestant denominations. In 2003, the Romanian and Serbian Orthodox and Anglican Churches also concluded conventions with the Government.

An application for financial support for the Muslim community has been under consideration for over seven years. In late 2003, the Muslim community named a national representative and single interlocutor, which allowed discussions over the convention to proceed. Once signed, the convention will allow the Muslim community to receive government funding. There was no agreement by the end of the period covered by this report.

The following religious holy days are considered national holidays: Shrove Monday, Easter Monday, Ascension Day, Whit Monday, Assumption Day, All Saints' Day, All Souls' Day, Christmas, and the second day of Christmas.

There is a long tradition of religious education in public schools. A 1997 convention between the Minister of National Education and the Roman Catholic Archbishop governs religious instruction. In accordance with this convention, religious instruction is a local matter, coordinated at the communal level between representatives of the Catholic Church and communal authorities. Government-paid lay teachers provide instruction (totaling two school hours per week) at the primary school level. Parents and pupils may choose between instruction in Roman Catholicism or an ethics course; requests for exemption from religious instruction are addressed on an individual basis. Although approximately 85 percent of primary school students choose religious instruction, the number drops to 65 percent for high school students.

The State subsidizes private religious schools. All private, religious, and nonsectarian schools are eligible for and receive government subsidies, if the religious group has concluded a convention with the State. The State also subsidizes a Catholic seminary.

The government launched a pilot program in one high school that provides nondenominational values education, highlighting the principal world religions and schools of thought. This program was developed in consultation with the Catholic Church and Muslim community, among others, and, after five years, it is intended to be made universal in the country's school system.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom. The Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim faiths work well together on an interfaith basis. Differences among religious faiths are not a significant source of tension in society. There were no reports of verbal or physical violence against Jewish persons or property during the period covered by this report.



## **Malta**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the state religion.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country is an archipelago, consisting of three occupied islands in the Mediterranean Sea, and has an area of 122 square miles. Its population is approximately 400,000. The overwhelming majority of citizens (approximately 95 percent) are Roman Catholic, and approximately 63 percent attend services regularly. Most of the country's political leaders are practicing Roman Catholics. The country joined the European Union in 2004, and the Maltese government supported the failed effort to include a reference to "Europe's Christian heritage" in the European Constitution.

Most congregants at the local Protestant churches are not Maltese but rather some of the many British retirees who live in the country and vacationers from many other nations. Of the Protestant churches in the country, the Church of England has a congregation of about 350 members; the united congregations of the Presbyterian and Methodist Church number 120 and the Evangelical Church of Germany has approximately 145 members. There is also a union of 16 groups of Evangelical churches with approximately 500 members in all, which include the Pentecostal and other non-denominational churches. There are approximately 680 Jehovah's Witnesses, 108 members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and 30 members of the Bible Baptist Church. There is a Jewish congregation with approximately 120 members. Zen Buddhism has approximately 10 members and the Baha'i Faith also has approximately 30 members. There is one Muslim mosque and a Muslim primary school. Of the estimated 3,000 Muslims in the country, approximately 2,250 are foreigners, 600 are naturalized citizens, and 150 are native-born citizens.

### Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

#### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors.

The Constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the state religion and declares that the authorities of the Catholic Church have "the authority to teach which principles are right and which are wrong." Divorce is not available in the country. However, the state generally recognizes divorces from individuals domiciled abroad who have undergone



divorce proceedings in a competent court. The Government and the Catholic Church participate in a foundation which finances Catholic schools, where tuition is free. The foundation was established in 1991 as a result of the transfer from the Church to the State of properties not set aside for pastoral use under the 1991 Ecclesiastical Entities Act. The Government subsidizes children living in church-sponsored residential homes. There is one Muslim private school; work on a projected 500-grave Muslim cemetery did not begin during the period covered by this report.

There are six religious holy days that are considered to be national holidays: The Motherhood of Our Lady, St. Paul's Shipwreck, Good Friday and Easter Sunday, the Assumption, and Christmas Day. These holidays do not affect any religious groups negatively.

Since 1991, all churches have had similar legal rights. Religious organizations can own property such as buildings, and their ministers can perform marriages and other functions. While religious instruction in Catholicism is compulsory in all state schools, the Constitution establishes the right not to receive this instruction if the student (or guardian, in the case of a minor) objects, and this right is respected in practice.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The Roman Catholic Church makes its presence and its influence felt in everyday life. However, non-Catholics, including converts from Catholicism, do not face legal or societal discrimination, and relations between the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations generally are characterized by respect and cooperation. Proselytism by practitioners of non-Catholic faiths is conducted freely and openly. To promote tolerance, school curricula include studies in human rights, ethnic relations, and cultural diversity as a part of values education for students. There were no reported cases of anti-Semitic incidents during the year.

## **Netherlands**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to an overall environment of religious freedom and mutual tolerance. Latent tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim communities, however, were severely aggravated by the November 2004 killing of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh--whose work had been criticized as anti-Islamic--by a Dutch-born member of a radical Islamic group. The killing triggered multiple instances of violence against Islamic institutions and mosques, reprisals against churches, and clashes between Muslim and other youth who identified themselves as "native Dutch." Even before the van Gogh killing, Dutch Muslims had increasingly been defending themselves against criticism for such perceived problems as the poor integration of Muslim immigrants into society, the high level of criminal activity among Muslim youth, and the conservative views of orthodox Muslims on women's rights and corporal punishment. There were fewer anti-Semitic incidents recorded in 2004 than in previous years, and many of these appeared to have been politically motivated in reaction to developments in the Middle East.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 16,485 square miles, and its population is approximately 16.3 million. Approximately 60 percent of the population has some religious affiliation, even though many do not practice their religion actively. Approximately 31 percent consider themselves Roman Catholic, 14 percent Dutch Reformed, 6 percent Muslim, 6 percent Calvinist Reformed, 3 percent non-Christian (Hindu, Jewish, or Buddhist), and 40 percent atheist or agnostic. Other Protestant denominations include Baptists, Lutherans, Anglicans, Protestants from the United States, and Remonstrants. Approximately 20 percent of citizens, primarily among those who have left the "traditional" churches, describe themselves as "seekers of spiritual or philosophical truths." These persons tend to gravitate toward (although not necessarily join) newer or nontraditional religious movements, such as Pentecostal groups, Jehovah's Witnesses, Hare Krishna, Transcendental Meditation, Scientology, Theosophy, or Anthroposophy.

Society has become increasingly secularized over the past several decades. According to the Government's Social Cultural Planning Bureau, religious membership has declined steadily from 76 percent in 1958 to 41 percent in 1995 and continues to decrease, although at a slower pace. Membership is decreasing among all religions except Islam. Approximately a quarter of church members are active within their religious communities. In 2002, an estimated 25 percent of Roman Catholics, 33 percent of Dutch Reformed, 55 percent of Calvinist Reformed, and 50 percent of Muslims attended church/mosque at least once every 2 weeks. Approximately 70 percent of the total population never attends services. There are no figures for Jewish participation rates.

Research reveals that those who leave a religion rarely return. Nonetheless, significant numbers of those who have left their religions still consider themselves to be members of a religious group. The beliefs and practices of many of these adherents have developed into what some describe as a selective approach to religion, accepting what they consider the positive but not the negative aspects of a particular religion.

Following the secularization that began in the 1960s, many Roman Catholics have left the Church. Among those remaining, many express alienation from their religious hierarchy and doctrine. For example, most of the country's Catholics express no objections to female or married priests and differ with church thinking on a number of sensitive doctrinal issues.

Dutch Protestantism is quite heterogeneous. Among the Protestant churches, the Dutch Reformed Church remains the largest, although it also has suffered the greatest losses to secularization. Church membership in this denomination has declined by two-thirds in the past 50 years. The second largest Protestant group, the Calvinist Reformed Church, has been less affected by membership losses and even has succeeded in attracting former members of the Dutch Reformed Church. In 2003, the main Dutch Protestant churches merged into the United Protestant Churches; however, a few orthodox communities refused to merge.

Thanks to a long-established climate of religious tolerance, Jews numbered more than 140,000 in 1940. Amsterdam harbored one of the largest and liveliest Jewish communities in Europe. During the Second World War, 106,000 Dutch Jews were killed, the highest percentage in Western Europe. Of the remainder, approximately 5,000 remained in the country while the rest fled. In the post-war period, Jewish life slowly revived and flourished. While the Dutch have generally shied away from discussing this grim period of their history, Prime Minister Balkenende recently acknowledged publicly Dutch "collaboration, indifference and treason" during the war, and "the lack of humanity and understanding" towards Jews in the post-war period.

The number of Muslims continues to rise, primarily because of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants marrying partners from their countries of origin. By 2004, 945,000 Muslims constituting 5.8 percent of the total population were living in the country, primarily in the larger cities, including approximately 341,000 Turks and 295,000 Moroccans. Other Muslims came from the former colony of Suriname. In the past decade, Muslim numbers further increased because of the large numbers of asylum seekers from countries such as Iran, Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. A network of mosques and cultural centers serves the Islamic community. This network is organized to conform to the national system of subsidies, which underwrites cultural activities geared to social orientation and the promotion of equal opportunities. The number of mosques has increased to approximately 400; more than half cater to Turks, approximately 140 to Moroccans, and approximately 50 to Surinamese. The founding of more than 30 Islamic schools further reflects the increased influence of Islam. Muslims are not separately organized politically. The Contact Body for Muslims and Government (CMO,) representing approximately 80 percent of the Muslim community, discusses the community's interests with the Government. The official Muslim community unanimously condemned the Van Gogh killing.

There are approximately 95,000 Hindus, of whom 85 percent originally came from Suriname and approximately 10 percent from India. The country also hosts smaller numbers of Hindus from Uganda, as well as similar movements based on such Hindu teachings as Ramakrishna, Hare Krishna, Sai Baba, and Osho. The Buddhist community is quite small, with approximately 17,000 members.

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors. The Constitution permits the Government to place restrictions on the exercise of religion only on limited grounds, such as health hazards, traffic safety, and risk of public disorder.

The Government provides state subsidies to religious organizations that maintain educational facilities. The Government provides funding for education to public as well as to religious schools, other religious educational institutions, and health care facilities, irrespective of their religious affiliation. To qualify for funding, institutions must meet strict nonreligious criteria for curriculum standards, minimum size, and health care.

Religious groups are not required to register with the Government; however, the law recognizes the existence of religious denominations and grants them certain rights and privileges, including tax exemptions. Although the law does not formally define what constitutes a "religious denomination" for these purposes, religious groups generally have not experienced any problems qualifying as a religious denomination.

The law provides for religious minorities to have their views broadcast on radio and television. For example, broadcasting time has been allotted to the Islamic Broadcasting Foundation, an alliance of all Muslim groups in the country.

The Government of Turkey exercises influence within the country's Turkish Islamic community through its religious affairs directorate, the Diyanet, which is permitted to appoint imams for the 140 Turkish mosques in the country. There is no such arrangement with the Moroccan Government. The Moroccan Government maintains connections with the approximately 100 Moroccan mosques through a federation of Moroccan friendship societies but has no mechanism to exercise direct influence in the country.

The authorities have expressed concern regarding Turkish and Moroccan interference with religious and political affairs because such interference appears to run counter to government efforts to encourage integration of Muslims into society. For example, government authorities insist on strict observance of mandatory school attendance up to the age of 16 despite appeals by foreign imams to keep girls under the age of 16 at home.

To counter undesired foreign influence, the Government has begun to provide subsidies to universities providing training for local persons interested in becoming imams to ensure that they have a basic understanding of local social norms and values. Given the strict separation between the State and religion, however, the authorities themselves cannot organize such training and must depend on private organizations. In addition, the assembled Muslim organizations decided in February 2005 to found an Islamic institute to educate imams and Islamic theologians in coordination with individual university programs. Parliament has proposed phasing out the issuance of work permits to foreign imams by 2008 to increase the number and influence of locally educated religious leaders. As an interim measure, the Government has decided that all imams and other spiritual leaders recruited in Islamic countries first must follow a yearlong integration course before they are allowed to practice in the country.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

Government policy and practice contributed to the generally free practice of religion.

Disputes have arisen when the exercise of the rights to freedom of religion and speech has clashed with the strictly enforced ban on discrimination. Such disputes are addressed either in the courts or by antidiscrimination boards. Complaints have repeatedly been



filed against religious or political spokesmen who publicly condemn homosexuality. However, longstanding jurisprudence dictates that such statements made on religious grounds do not constitute a criminal offense absent an intention to offend or discriminate against homosexuals.

The Equal Opportunities Committee (CGB) and the courts have also repeatedly addressed the wearing of headscarves in schools and places of employment. The prevailing opinion is that the wearing of headscarves may be banned only on narrow grounds, such as security considerations or inconsistency with an official government uniform. In 2003, the CGB stated that a recent ban by Amsterdam schools on wearing burqas in class is not discriminatory. The CGB stated that open teacher-student and student-to-student interaction is more important than the right to wear a burqa.

In other areas, employers have been rebuked publicly by antidiscrimination boards for failure to allow non-Christians to take leave from work on their religious holidays, for objecting to Sikhs wearing turbans or to Muslim women wearing headscarves, or for objecting to observance of food requirements on religious grounds. The CGB ruled against a company that had denied employment to a Turkish applicant because he intended to attend Friday service at a mosque. This was considered a violation of freedom of religion. According to the CGB, Friday service for Muslims is equivalent to Sunday service for Christians. It ruled that employers are obliged to take account of reasonable religious demands from their employees, except in exceptional circumstances.

In 2003, legislation took effect that explicitly permits employees to refuse to work on Sunday for religious reasons, unless the work's nature, such as in the health sector, does not permit such an exception. The legislation came in the wake of charges by the Calvinist Reformed Social Union of religious discrimination by employers and reports of job applicants being turned down for employment for refusing to work on Sundays for religious reasons.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

Religious communities have tended to live alongside each other in harmony. Among them, the Protestant denominations in particular promote the Jewish cause and reach out to the Islamic community. However, in the fall of 2001, widespread societal resentment towards growing numbers of Muslims and their culture became apparent. Populist politician Pim Fortuyn, who was killed shortly before the 2002 general elections, received broad support for his characterization of Islam as "a backward culture" that is intolerant toward women and homosexuals and that allows practices from the Middle Ages.

The November 2004 killing of Dutch filmmaker and critic of Islam Theo van Gogh by a Dutch Muslim extremist exacerbated existing social tensions. The killing triggered a brief upsurge of violent incidents, including upwards of 30 arson attacks against mosques, Muslim schools, churches, and other property. There were numerous minor incidents, including intimidations, brawls, vandalism, and graffiti with abusive texts. Expanding pockets of both radicalized Muslim and other youth, who identify themselves as "native Dutch," were responsible for many of these instances of violence. A number of offenders were arrested, prosecuted, and convicted. Polls revealed that popular attitudes towards Muslims were rapidly becoming more negative, and a majority now views their presence as a threat.

Muslims already faced continuing criticism for such perceived problems as the poor integration of Muslim immigrants into society, the high level of criminal activity among Muslim youth, and the conservative views of orthodox Muslims on topics such as women, homosexuals, and corporal punishment. Overcoming habitual reticence and abandoning Dutch libertarian attitudes toward religion, a number of outspoken politicians, mainly on the right, openly argue that Islam itself is incompatible with Dutch traditions and social values.

In response, the Government launched a comprehensive outreach campaign to counter anti-Muslim sentiments, stressing that the majority of Muslims fit comfortably into Dutch society. At the same time, the Government made clear that it would combat directly groups espousing violence in support of an extremist Islamic agenda. These efforts raised public awareness and triggered debate, but concerns remain about the effectiveness of the new measures.

The vast majority of the population is not anti-Semitic. Certain groups opposed to Israeli policies in the occupied territories, however, such as the Arab European League and the Stop the Occupation Movement, frequently use seemingly anti-Semitic language and images to express political views. Explicitly anti-Semitic sentiments also prevail among certain segments of the Muslim community and among fringe nationalist and neo-Nazi groups.

In its latest report covering the period between May 2003 and May 2004, the Center for Information and Documentation on Israel (CIDI) registered 334 anti-Semitic incidents, compared to 359 in 2002, the first decrease (7.5 percent) in anti-Semitic incidents since 2000. In addition, the number of serious incidents (physical violence, threat with violence, and defacing of cemeteries and synagogues) decreased by 40 percent. There were no serious attacks on synagogues or Jewish institutions or shops. Provisional statistics on the subsequent period confirmed this trend. A considerable number of offenders were of North African origin.

The Government has repeatedly condemned any form of anti-Semitism and has a comprehensive action plan to combat any form of discrimination. According to this plan, parents have primary responsibility for preventing anti-Semitic incidents; however, schools can also help to combat discrimination and inculcate respect and tolerance. Public debate and dialogue are other tools to achieve these goals, to which end several nongovernmental organizations have launched projects such as *Een Ander Joods Geluid* (An Alternative Jewish Viewpoint) to foster debate on equality, tolerance, and human dignity. Also, the Dutch Coalition for Peace has called on Jews, Palestinians, and other Muslims in the country to work together to restore peace in the Middle East.

Stricter instructions to prosecutors and the police took effect in 2003 to ensure proper attention to incidents of discrimination. Measures were also taken to deal more effectively with discrimination on the Internet. Despite these measures, critics have noted that law enforcement agencies still do not give priority to instances of discrimination. For that reason, they say, prosecutions and convictions remain rare.

The Ministry of Education has tasked schools in longstanding guidelines to teach about different religions and ideologies in conjunction with discrimination and intolerance. Explicit attention must be paid to the persecution of Jews in World War II. The Ministry of Welfare subsidizes a special program to teach children about the Second World War and the persecution of Jews. In particular, the program is designed to raise awareness about the consequences of prejudice. The Government also seeks to promote dialogue and supports initiatives that aim to create a better understanding between Jews and Muslims. The Anne Frank Foundation published a book with "Fifty Questions on Anti-Semitism," primarily intended for teachers in dealing with Muslim students.

The labor federations have been working to include in collective bargaining agreements stipulations that permit non-Christian employees to take leave on non-Christian holy days. Such stipulations now have been included in most agreements.



## **Poland**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom. Jewish community leaders report no serious anti-Jewish incidents in the country over the last two years.

### **Section I. Religious Demography**

The country has an area of 120,725 square miles, and its population is an estimated 39 million. More than 96 percent of citizens are identified as Roman Catholic; however, Eastern Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and much smaller Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim congregations meet freely.

According to the 2004 Annual Statistical Yearbook of Poland, the following figures represent the formal membership of the listed religious groups but not the actual number of persons in those religious communities; for example, the actual number of Jews is estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000, while the formal membership of the Union of Jewish Communities totals only 2,500. The Yearbook estimated that there are 34,294,521 baptized Roman Catholics; 509,100 Orthodox Church members; 82,000 Greek Catholics; 126,573 Jehovah's Witnesses; 79,050 Lutherans (Augsburg Confession); 24,025 Old Catholic Mariavits; 21,299 members of the Polish Catholic Church; 20,571 Pentecostals; 9,487 Seventh-day Adventists; 4,627 Baptists; 5,114 members of the New Apostolic Church; 110 members of Muslim associations; 910 Hare Krishnas; 4,400 Methodists; 2,800 members of the Church of Christ; 3,563 Lutherans (Reformed); 2,353 Catholic Mariavits; and 1,199 members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). Each of these religious groups has a relationship with the State governed by either legislation or treaty, with the exception of Jehovah's Witnesses, the New Apostolic Church, the Church of Krishna Consciousness (Hare Krishna), and the Church of Christ.

A 2003 public opinion poll indicates that the attitude of Poles toward religion is little changed from the last polling, conducted in 2001. Approximately 57 percent of citizens actively participate in religious ceremonies at least once per week. Nine percent of respondents declared that they have no contact with the Roman Catholic Church, an estimated 34 percent declared that they attend church irregularly or sporadically, and approximately 2 percent declared themselves to be nonbelievers. The survey also found women to be more religious than men, with 65 percent of the former attending church regularly, compared with 48 percent of the latter. There was a slight (3 percent) decrease in the number of Poles identifying themselves with the Roman Catholic Church and an identical increase in the number of those reporting they prefer to "believe in their own way."

### **Section II. Status of Religious Freedom**

## Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors. The Criminal Code stipulates that offending religious sentiment through public speech is punishable by a fine or up to a 3-year prison term. The Roman Catholic Church is the dominant religion in the country.

There are 15 religious groups whose relationship with the State is governed by specific legislation that outlines the internal structure of the religious groups, their activities, and procedures for property restitution. There are 144 other registered religious groups that do not have a statutorily defined relationship with the State. All registered religious groups, including the original 15, enjoy equal protection under the law and there were no reports of serious conflicts among churches or religious groups.

Religious communities may register with the Ministry of the Interior; however, they are not required to do so and may function freely without registration. According to the 1989 Law on Guaranteeing Freedom of Conscience and Belief, registration requires that the group submit the names of at least 100 members as well as other information about the group. This information on membership must be confirmed by a notary public, although the registration itself often appears to be a formality. In 2004, three new religious groups registered with the Ministry: the Muslim League of the Republic of Poland, (January); the Taoist Union (May) and the Evangelical Union of the Republic of Poland (May). All registered religious groups share the same privileges, such as duty-free importation of office equipment and reduced taxes.

Citizens enjoy the freedom to practice any faith that they choose. Religious groups may organize, select and train personnel, solicit and receive contributions, publish, and meet without government interference. There are no government restrictions on establishing and maintaining places of worship.

The law places Catholic, Jewish, Orthodox, and Protestant communities on the same legal footing, and the Government attempts to address the problems that minority religious groups may face.

Foreign missionaries are subject only to the standard rules applicable to foreigners temporarily in the country. There are no reports that missionaries were denied entry into the country.

Although the Constitution gives parents the right to bring up their children in compliance with their own religious and philosophical beliefs, religious education classes continue to be taught in the public schools at public expense. Children have a choice between religious instruction and ethics, and the Ombudsman's office reported that in 2004, in contrast to prior years, there were no complaints regarding a lack of ethics courses in the schools. Although Catholic Church representatives teach the vast majority of religious classes in the schools, parents may request such classes in any of the religions legally registered, including Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish religious instruction. While it is not common, such non-Catholic religious instruction exists in practice, and the Ministry of Education pays the instructors. Religious education instructors, including clergy, receive salaries from the State for teaching religion in public schools. Catholic Church representatives are included on a commission that determines whether books qualify for school use.

Catholic religious holy days (Easter Monday, Corpus Christi Day, Assumption of the Virgin Mary, All Saints' Day, Christmas, and St. Stephen's Day) are national holidays.

In 1998, the Concordat, a treaty signed in 1993 regulating relations between the Government and the Vatican, was ratified by Parliament, signed by the President, and took effect. The vote came after years of bitter disputes between Concordat supporters and opponents. The debate centered on whether the treaty ensured the Catholic Church's right to guarantee freedom of religion for its congregants or blurred the line between church and state. The Government and the Catholic Church participate at the highest levels in a Joint Government-Episcopate Task Force, which meets regularly to discuss Church-State relations.

The Government continues to work with both local and international religious groups to address property claims and other sensitive issues stemming from Nazi- and Communist-era confiscations and persecutions. The Government enjoys good relations with international Jewish groups. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is largely responsible for coordinating relations between the Government and these organizations, although the President also plays an important role. The Government cooperates effectively with a variety of international organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, for the preservation of historic sites, including cemeteries and houses of worship. However, contentious issues regarding property restitution and preservation of historic religious sites and cemeteries remain only partially settled.

Progress continues in implementing the laws that permit local religious communities to submit claims for property owned prior to World War II that subsequently was nationalized. The Catholic and Orthodox Churches report general satisfaction with government action to reconstitute property.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

In June, the Fifth Annual Muslim Cultural Days conference was held in Gdansk. The Warsaw Islamic Council is also planning to organize an open-air Muslim cultural fair in that city in the near future. In July, the first Pomeranian Days of Ethnic Culture celebration was held in Sopot, jointly organized by the Tatar Cultural Center and the Jewish Community of Gdansk.

## **Portugal**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; there are a number of government and privately sponsored activities that contribute to interfaith understanding.

### **Section I. Religious Demography**

The country has an area of 35,672 square miles, and the population as of January 2005 was estimated to be 10.4 million. More than 80 percent of the population above the age of 12 identify with the Roman Catholic Church; however, a large percentage state that they do not participate actively in church activities. Approximately 4 percent identify with various Protestant denominations (including about 250,000 evangelicals), and approximately 1 percent with non-Christian religions. Less than 3 percent state that they have no religion.

Practitioners of non-Christian religions include approximately 35,000 Muslims (largely from Portuguese Africa, who are ethnically sub-Saharan African or South Asian), approximately 700 Jews, and very small numbers of Buddhists, Taoists, and Zoroastrians. There is also a Hindu community of approximately 7,000 persons, which largely traces its origins to South Asians who emigrated from former colonies in Africa and the former colony of Goa in India. Many of these minority communities are not organized formally.

Government estimates suggest that there are more than 200,000 immigrants from Eastern European countries in the country. More than half of these immigrants are from Ukraine; many are Eastern Orthodox. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) reports 35,000 members. Brazilian syncretistic Catholic churches, which combine Catholic ritual with pre-Christian Afro-Brazilian ritual, such as Candomble and Umbanda, also operate in small numbers, as do Seventh-day Adventists. The Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God), a proselytizing church that originated in Brazil, also exists. The Church of Scientology has approximately 200 active members, primarily in the Lisbon area.

### **Section II. Status of Religious Freedom**

#### **Legal/Policy Framework**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full, and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors. The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion.

The Government is secular. Other than the Constitution, the two most important documents relating to religious freedom are the 2001 Religious Freedom Act and the 1940 Concordat with the Holy See.

The Religious Freedom Act from 2001, created a legislative framework for religions established in the country for at least 30 years or those recognized internationally for at least 60 years. The act provides qualifying religions with benefits previously reserved for the Catholic Church: full tax-exempt status, legal recognition for marriage and other rites, chaplain visits to prisons and hospitals, and respect for traditional holidays. It allows each religion to negotiate its own Concordat-style agreement with the Government, although it does not ensure the acceptance of any such agreements. The act also called for an independent consultative commission within the Justice Ministry to oversee the application of the act. Representatives of some religions protested the fact that the Catholic Church, although exempt from the act, was granted membership on the commission. Rules implementing this legislation took effect in 2003; however, some rules are still needed to create a registry of religious entities. No group had instituted action to reach such agreement under these rules during the period covered by this report.

The Catholic Church maintains a separate agreement with the Government under the terms of the 1940 Concordat. To comply constitutionally with the Religious Freedom Act, the Government negotiated with the Vatican and signed the new amended Concordat in May 2004. This document abrogates the previous Concordat, which had been in force for 64 years but was considered obsolete due to the changes in national life. The new Concordat was approved by Parliament in September 2004; it was approved by the President of the Republic and ratified in December 2004. The new Concordat recognizes for the first time the juridical personality of the Portuguese Episcopal Conference. The Catholic Church will be able to receive 0.5 percent of the income tax that citizens can allocate to various institutions in their annual tax returns.

Public secondary school curriculums include an optional course called "religion and morals." This course functions as a survey of world religions and is taught by laypersons. It can be used to give instruction on the Catholic religion; the Catholic Church must approve all teachers for this course. Other religions may set up such a course if they have 10 or more children in the particular school. For example, the Evangelical Alliance held 265 classes in schools during the 2004-05 school year. (No figures are available for 2004-05.) Under the 2001 Act, each religion may approve the course's respective instructors.

In 2004, the Government established a Working Group for Inter-Religious Dialogue, a task force to promote multicultural and multireligious dialogue between the Government and society. Among its objectives are fostering tolerance for religious diversity, promotion of interreligious studies, and participation in national and international religious events. The working group is led by a Government-appointed chairman and consists primarily of teachers who, by the nature of their jobs, have professional experience in this area.

Under the Concordat, major Catholic holy days also are official holidays. Seven of the country's 16 national holidays are Catholic holidays.

The Diocese of Leiria-Fatima broadcasts national Catholic programming through the Brazilian Catholic Television network, Cancao Nova.

The Government takes active steps to promote interfaith understanding. Most notably, 5 days a week the state television channel (Radiotelevisao Portuguesa 2) broadcasts "A Fe dos Homens" (The Faith of Men) a half-hour program consisting of various segments written and produced by different religious communities. The Government pays for the segments, and professional production companies are hired under contract to produce the segments. Religious communities send delegates to a special television commission,



which determines the scheduling of segments. The television commission has operated on the general rule that religious communities eligible for the program are those that have been operating for at least 30 years in the country or at least 60 years in their country of origin.

The Catholic Church receives 22.5 minutes of programming time per episode, while the remaining 7.5 minutes is divided among the other religions. The Evangelical Alliance receives two 7.5-minute segments per week, while other participating religions receive approximately one 7.5-minute segment per month. The Catholic Church has a program of its own called "70x7," while other religious faiths work together to schedule programming on the "Caminhos" ("Paths") broadcast every Sunday morning.

Lisbon municipal government provided matching funds for completion of the city's mosque, which was not completed at the end of the period covered by this report. The municipality also provided matching funds for the restoration of Lisbon's 19th century synagogue, considered a building of historic significance and still used by the Jewish community for religious services and cultural events. The municipality of Lisbon also provides an opportunity for the religious communities to participate in summer festival events.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

Government policy and practice contributed to the generally free practice of religion. The Catholic Church receives some preferential treatment; for example, chief chaplaincies for the military, prisons, and hospitals remain state-funded positions for Roman Catholics only. The Papal Nuncio is always the dean of the diplomatic corps.

#### Section III. Societal Attitudes

There are amicable relations among the various religious communities. Participation among the various faiths in crafting the programming schedule for "A Fe dos Homens" has facilitated greater understanding and enhanced mutual respect. Many communities conduct "open houses" or sponsor interfaith education seminars.

There were no reported cases of verbal or physical attacks against Jewish persons or property during the period covered by this report.

Following the interfaith congress held in 2003 at the Catholic shrine of Fátima, representatives of the world's leading religions explored the possibility of opening the shrine to a variety of faiths. The first steps in developing Fátima as a multifaith center were taken in May 2004, when a Hindu religious service was held at the shrine in the Chapel of the Apparitions. There have since been a number of events involving Muslims and Buddhists at the Fátima Sanctuary. As a result, a few conservative Catholic organizations have criticized the Church and called for a more traditionalist role for the Catholic shrine. However, several bishops, including the chairman of the Portuguese Episcopal Conference, have publicly dismissed the criticism.

A number of initiatives during the period covered by this report focused on the promotion of religious tolerance. In October 2004, President Sampaio participated in a rededication ceremony at the Lisbon synagogue, at which Catholic and Muslim community representatives were also present. The former Minister of State and National Defense, Paulo Portas, represented the Government on January 31, 2005, in visits to the Lisbon synagogue and mosque, where he met with the heads of the Jewish and Muslim communities. Days later, he visited the bishop of the Azorean Island of Terceira. The goal of this series of gatherings was to promote religious freedom and tolerance in liberal societies. These initiatives received significant media coverage.



## **Romania**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion; while the Government generally respects this right in practice, some restrictions adversely affect religious freedom, and several minority religious groups continued to claim credibly that low level government officials impeded their efforts at proselytizing and interfered with other religious activities.

There was no overall change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report. The Government continues to differentiate between recognized and unrecognized religions, and registration and recognition requirements still posed obstacles to minority religions. The Government did not adopt a new law regulating religions; however, a draft law on religious freedom is under debate by the State Secretariat for Religious Denominations and the recognized religions.

Relations among different religious groups are generally amicable; however, there have been incidents where the Romanian Orthodox Church showed some hostility toward non-Orthodox religious churches and criticized the proselytizing of Protestant, neo-Protestant, and other religious groups.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of approximately 91,699 square miles, and its population is approximately 21.7 million.

The Romanian Orthodox Church is the predominant religion in the country. The Government officially recognizes 17 religions: the Romanian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Greek Catholic Church, the Old Rite Christian (Orthodox) Church, the Reformed (Protestant) Church, the Christian Evangelical Church, the Romanian Evangelical Church, the Evangelical Augustinian Church, the Lutheran Evangelical Church Synod Presbyterian, the Unitarian Church, the Baptist Church, the Pentecostal Church, the Seventh-day Adventist Church, the Armenian Church, Judaism, Islam, and Jehovah's Witnesses (first recognized as a religion in 2003). Members of other faiths worship freely but are not afforded various forms of state support.

According to the 2002 census, the Romanian Orthodox Church had 18,817,975 members (86.8 percent of the population). The Roman Catholic Church had 1,026,429 members. The Catholic Church of Byzantine Rite (Greek Catholics or Uniates) had 191,556 members. This figure is disputed by the Greek Catholic Church, which claims that there were many irregularities such as census takers refusing to note Greek Catholic affiliation and automatically assuming Orthodox affiliation, which led to an inaccurate result. The Greek Catholic Church estimated in 2003 that its adherents numbered more than 790,000. (Greek Catholics were former members of the Romanian Orthodox Church who in 1697 accepted principles required for union of the Orthodox Church with the Roman Catholic Church, but continue to maintain many Orthodox observances and traditions).

There were 6,075 Jews, according to the 2002 census. The Jewish Community Federation states that they have approximately 10,200 members. Romanian Muslims, mostly Turks and Tartars, have 67,257 members. Jehovah's Witnesses, which did not have legal status as a recognized religion at the time of the census, are estimated to have approximately

80,000 members and associates. According to the same census, the number of atheists was 8,524, and there were 12,825 persons who did not have any religious affiliation.

Most Muslims are located in the southeastern part of the country in Dobrogea, near Bulgaria and the Black Sea coast. Most Greek Catholics are in Transylvania, but there is also a large Greek Catholic community in Moldavia. Protestant and Catholic believers tend to be in Transylvania, but many also are located around Bacau. Orthodox or Greek Catholic ethnic Ukrainians are mostly in the northwestern part of the country. Orthodox ethnic Serbs are in Banat. Armenians are concentrated in Moldavia and the south. Members of the Protestant Reformed, Roman Catholic, and Unitarian churches in Transylvania are virtually all ethnic Hungarians.

According to a nationwide poll conducted by Gallup Organization Romania in May 2005, 1 percent of the respondents stated they go to church on a daily basis; 3 percent attend services several times a week; 19 percent stated they go to church once a week; 17 percent claimed to go to church several times per month; 34 percent of the respondents stated that they go to church only at Christmas and Easter; 5 percent claimed they go to church once per month; 9 percent attend services once a year or less; 11 percent responded they do not go to church at all. In the same poll, 83 percent of the respondents stated that the church is the institution they trust most.

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

Although the Constitution provides for freedom of religion, the Government exercises considerable influence over religious life through laws and decrees. The Orthodox Church exercises substantial influence in its dominant role among a majority of the population and policymakers. Government registration and recognition requirements still pose obstacles to minority religions. Several minority religious groups continued to claim credibly that low-level government officials and the Romanian Orthodox clergy impeded their efforts at proselytizing and interfered with other religious activities.

A communist-era decree, number 177 of 1948, remains the basic law governing religious denominations. It allows considerable state control over religious life. Technically almost none of the articles of this law have been abrogated formally; however, according to the State Secretariat for Religious Denominations, a large number of its articles have been nullified in practice by the Constitution and a series of governmental decrees. Although several religious denominations and religious associations confirmed that articles stipulating the State's interference with or control over religious life and activities have not been enforced, such provisions still exist in the law.

The Government requires religious groups to register. There is no clear procedure for the registration of religious groups as religions. The Government has refused to recognize a number of religious groups since 1990. After a long period of persistent refusal to enforce a 2000 Supreme Court ruling that ordered that Jehovah's Witnesses be recognized, the Government granted the Jehovah's Witnesses the status of a recognized religion in 2003.

The total number of recognized religions remains low. Under the provisions of Decree 177 of 1948, the Government recognized 14 religions; subsequently, it added the Greek Catholic Church (1989) and the Jehovah's Witnesses (2003). The Government registers religious groups that it does not recognize either as religious and charitable foundations or as cultural associations.

The number of adherents of each recognized religion in the 2002 census determines its state-provided budget. The Orthodox religion receives the largest share of governmental financial support. In addition, Orthodox religious leaders generally preside over state

occasions. In 2004, the Government allocated financial assistance (for various purposes, including the priests' salaries) amounting to almost \$8.9 million (ROL 291,480 million) to the Orthodox Church, approximately \$970,000 (ROL 31,855 million) to the Roman Catholic Church, close to \$180,000 (ROL 5,905 million) to the Greek Catholic Church, and approximately \$326,000 (ROL 10,660 million) to the Reformed Church.

The law governing the rights of foreigners, revised in 2003, introduced a long-stay visa for religious activities.

Christmas and the Orthodox Easter are national holidays. Members of the other recognized religions that celebrate Easter on a different date are entitled by law to have an additional holiday. Religious leaders occasionally play political roles. In particular, many Orthodox leaders make public appearances with prominent political figures, and religious messages often contain political promises or goals, and support for particular political positions.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

There is no law against proselytizing, nor is there a clear understanding by the authorities of what activities constitute proselytizing. Although protected by law, several minority religious groups, which include both recognized and unrecognized religions, made credible complaints that low-level government officials and Romanian Orthodox clergy impeded their efforts to proselytize, interfered in religious activities, and otherwise discriminated against them during the period covered by this report. Few politicians sponsor bills and measures that would oppose the Orthodox Church, because of its substantial influence. Local officials tend to be tolerant, but there have been incidents where they have been pressured or intimidated by Orthodox clergy. In some instances, local police and administrative authorities tacitly supported societal campaigns (a few of which involved physical intimidation) against proselytizing by non-Romanian Orthodox religious groups.

#### Section III. Societal Attitudes

According to the local Muslim community, Bucharest City government failed to respond to repeated requests by the Muslim community for land for a Muslim cemetery. This has led to difficulties in locating a proper burial ground for Romanian Muslims. The Muslim community has engaged in prolonged negotiations with local authorities and has identified appropriate land for a cemetery. However, the Muslim community continued to encounter bureaucratic deadlock in receiving final authorization for the cemetery.

## **Slovakia**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; however, anti-Semitism persisted among some elements of the population.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 18,859 square miles, and its population is 5,396,193. According to the 2001 census, the number of persons who claimed a religious affiliation increased from 72.8 percent in 1991 to 84.1 percent in 2001. This increase may be in part due to greater willingness among persons to state their affiliation, unlike in 1991 immediately after the fall of communism. According to the census, there were 3,708,120 Roman Catholics (68.9 percent of the population), 372,858 Augsburg Lutherans (6.9 percent), 219,831 Byzantine Catholics (4.1 percent), 109,735 members of the Reformed Christian Church (2 percent), 50,363 Orthodox Christians (1 percent), and 20,630 members of Jehovah's Witnesses. There were also approximately 3,562 Baptists, 3,217 Brethren Church members, 3,429 Seventh-day Adventists, 3,905 Apostolic Church members, 7,347 Evangelical Methodist Church members, 3,000 Jews, 1,733 Old Catholic Church members, 6,519 Christian Corps in Slovakia members, and 1,696 Czechoslovak Husite Church members. According to the 2001 census, 12 percent of the population claimed no religious affiliation, and 2 percent were undecided. There were also some Muslims living in the country, primarily immigrants from Middle Eastern countries, international students, or Albanian immigrants. Estimates of the Muslim population vary from 300 to 3,000.

### Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

#### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors.

The Constitution provides for the right to practice the religion of one's choice, the right to change religion or faith, and the right to refrain from any religious affiliation. The Government observes and enforces these provisions in practice.

The law provides for freedom of religion and defines the status of religious groups, including those groups not registered with the Government. It does not prohibit the existence of nontraditional religions. It allows the Government to enter agreements with religious communities. The law is applied and enforced in a nondiscriminatory fashion.



Governmental entities at all levels, including the courts, interpret the law in a way that protects religious freedom.

No official state religion exists; however, because of the numbers of adherents, Catholicism is considered the dominant religion. The Catholic Church receives significantly larger government subsidies because of the higher percentage of Catholics in the country. In 2001, the Government signed an international treaty with the Vatican, which provides the legal framework for relations between the country's Catholic Church, the Government, and the Vatican. Four corollaries to the framework treaty have been proposed. In 2002, the Government signed an agreement with 11 other registered religious groups in an attempt to counterbalance the Vatican agreement and provide equal status to the remaining registered religions. This agreement is subordinate to national law and subject to amendment by statute; the Vatican treaty, as an international agreement, can be amended only through international legal mechanisms.

In 2002, the Government approved one of the corollaries regarding military service for priests. In 2003, the President signed a second corollary regarding religious education, which was approved by Parliament in January 2004. An identical agreement was signed with 11 other registered religions. This treaty mandates that all public elementary schools require children to take either a religion class or an ethics class, depending on their (or their parents') preference. This was previously required only for students in fifth through ninth grade. Private schools affiliated with a particular religion do not need to provide classes in other religions. These courses are often taught by religious leaders, and the religious groups are responsible for providing instructors, although their salaries are paid from the government budget. There is a lack of qualified teachers for certain religions. Some representatives of religious groups complain that the status of religious lecturers is not equal to that of regular teachers. Religious lecturers are usually hired on contract and are not paid during the 2-month summer vacation. There was some concern about possible ostracism of student members of smaller religions, who might be one of a small group requesting the class, especially in smaller municipalities. Despite these resource concerns, smaller churches reiterated that they were still generally pleased with the system.

The remaining two corollaries to the Vatican treaty, including a proposal to allow Catholic employees to refuse to perform official functions on religious grounds, remained under consideration at the end of the period covered by this report.

Registration of religious groups is not required, but under existing law, only registered religious groups have the explicit right to conduct public worship services and other activities, although no specific religions or practices are banned or discouraged by the authorities in practice. Those that register receive government benefits, including subsidies for clergymen, office expenses, the right to visit and proselytize in prisons and hospitals, and access to public television broadcasting. Government funding also is provided to religious schools and to teachers who lecture on religion in state schools. The Government occasionally subsidizes one-time projects and significant religious activities, and registered religious groups are partly exempt from paying taxes and import custom fees. A religion may elect not to accept the subsidies.

There are currently 16 registered religious groups in the country; the last group to successfully register was the Apostolic Church in 2001.

To register a new religion, a group must submit a list of 20,000 permanent residents who adhere to that religion. In 2000, the Muslim community in Bratislava purchased a plot of land with the hope of building an Islamic center. While they previously speculated that municipal officials were denying them permission for the construction, it appears that financial problems, zoning questions, and a lack of identifiable leadership in the Muslim community could have also affected the construction delay. Several of Bratislava's Muslims also criticized the registration law, noting that the community in the Czech

Republic was able to submit an application for first-tier registration under Czech law (300 or more citizen member signatures).

Because the law on registration of religious groups does not provide for registration of nontheistic groups, the Department of Church Affairs suggested that an atheist group that had made inquiries into obtaining registration might find funding from the Department of Minority Culture.

There are several religious holidays that are celebrated as national holidays, including Epiphany, the Day of the Virgin Mary of the Seven Sorrows, All Saints Day, St. Stephen's Day, Christmas, and Easter. A treaty with the Vatican prohibits the removal or alteration of existing religious holidays considered as state holidays.

Under the auspices of the government Office for National Minorities and Human Rights, an official agreement was signed between the Government and the Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches to conclude property disputes stemming from the Communist and post-World War II eras. Since 1989, the Government has promoted interfaith dialogue and understanding by supporting events organized by various religious groups. The state supported Ecumenical Council of Churches promotes communication within the religious community. Most Christian churches have the status of members or observers in the Council. The Central Union of Jewish Religious Communities in the Slovak Republic (UZZNO) was invited and participates in its activities.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

Government policy and practice contributed to the generally free practice of religion. Although government support is provided in a nondiscriminatory manner to registered religious groups that seek it, the requirement that a registered organization have 20,000 members disadvantages smaller faiths. Some property restitution cases remain unresolved.



## **Slovenia**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

### **Section I. Religious Demography**

The country has an area of 7,827 square miles, and its population is approximately 1,964,036. Estimates of religious identification vary. According to the 2002 census, the numbers are: Roman Catholic, 1,135,626; evangelical, 14,736; other Protestant, 1,399; Orthodox, 45,908; other Christian, 1,877; Muslim, 47,488; Jewish, 99; Oriental, 1,026; other religion, 558; Agnostic, 271; Believer, but belongs to no religion, 68,714; unbeliever/atheist, 199,264; no reply, 307,973; unknown, 139,097.

The Orthodox and Muslim populations appear to correspond to the country's immigrant Serb and Bosniak populations, respectively. These groups tend to have a lower socioeconomic status in society.

Foreign missionaries, including a mission of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) and other religious groups (including Hare Krishna, Church of Scientology, and the Unification Church) operate without hindrance.

### **Section II. Status of Religious Freedom**

#### **Legal/Policy Framework**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors.

There are no formal requirements for recognition as a religion by the Government. Religious communities must register with the Government's Office for Religious Communities if they wish to be legal entities, and registration entitles such groups to rebates on value-added taxes. There are currently 40 religious communities officially registered, up from 36 in 2003. One case remained pending at the end of the period covered by this report.

Registered religious groups, including foreign missionaries, may receive value-added tax rebates on a quarterly basis from the Ministry of Finance. All groups report equal access to registration and tax rebate status.

The appropriate role for religious instruction in schools continued to be an issue of debate. In 2004, several political parties proposed that religious instruction be made compulsory; however, the Ministry of Education rejected the initiative on the basis of

existing legislation. The Constitution states that parents are entitled to give their children "a moral and religious upbringing." Only those schools supported by religious bodies taught religion.

After independence in 1991, Parliament passed legislation calling for denationalization (restitution or compensation) within a fixed period. The law provides for denationalization of church properties--church buildings and support buildings, residences, businesses, and forests--that were nationalized after World War II by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. By March 31, 2005, the Government had completed 34,465 (90 percent) of the 38,156 denationalization claims filed. In 2004, the Government reallocated existing resources to reduce the backlog in cases, and there was improvement in speeding up resolution of cases.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

Societal attitudes toward religion are complex. Historical events dating from long before the country's independence color societal perceptions regarding the dominant Catholic Church. Much of the gulf between the (at least nominally) Catholic center-right and the largely agnostic or atheistic left stemmed from the massacre of large numbers of alleged Nazi and Fascist collaborators in the years 1946-48. Many of the so-called collaborators were successful businessmen whose assets were confiscated after they were killed or driven from the country, and many were prominent Catholics. After independence, right-of-center political groups called for a purge of communist government and business officials, but this call was quickly replaced by one for reconciliation. Since religious undertones today are minor and tangential, this issue no longer attracts much public attention.

Interfaith relations were generally amicable, although there was little warmth between the majority Catholic Church and foreign missionary groups that were viewed as aggressive proselytizers. Societal attitudes toward the minority Jewish, Muslim and Serb Orthodox communities generally were tolerant; however, some persons feared the possible emergence of Muslim fundamentalism. While there are no governmental restrictions on the Muslim community's freedom of worship, services commonly are held in private homes under cramped conditions.

There are no mosques in the capital of Ljubljana. The lack of a mosque has been due, in part, to a lack of Muslim community organization and to complex legislation and bureaucracy in construction and land regulations. The Muslim community has conceptual plans to build a new facility in Ljubljana. In 2001, the Ljubljana Municipality Council selected one of five potential sites that the city previously had identified for the facility and tasked the city's planning department to begin preparing the materials necessary to move ahead with the project. At the beginning of 2003, Ljubljana city officials expressed support for the Mosque and the location on which it was to be built. Plans for building the mosque were stalled in part because of discovery that part of the land the city identified as for sale to the Muslim community was subject to a denationalization claim by the Catholic Church. The Church has agreed to forgo its claim if the city will compensate it with another piece of property. At the end of the period covered by this report, negotiations were ongoing.

## **Spain**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. There is no state religion; however, the Catholic Church enjoys some privileges unavailable to other faiths.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationships among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 194,897 square miles, and its population is approximately 43.9 million.

The law prohibits the collection of census data based on religious belief, which limits the ability to compile statistical data on the number of adherents in the country. The Center for Sociological Investigation (CIS), an autonomous state agency, collects statistics on religious trends in the society. In February 2005, a CIS survey reported that 79.3 percent of citizens consider themselves Catholic; however, 47.1 percent stated that they never attend Mass. Among non-Catholics, 11.7 percent said that they were agnostics, 4.9 percent said that they were atheists, and approximately 2 percent said that they practiced other religions.

The Episcopal Conference of Spain (CEE) estimates that there are approximately 34 million Catholics in the country. The director of the Federation of Evangelical Religious Entities (FEREDE) stated that FEREDE represents 400,000 evangelical Christians and other Protestants, but estimates that 30 percent of its members are immigrants from Latin America and Africa. FEREDE also estimates that there are 800,000 foreign Protestants, mostly European, who reside in the country at least 6 months of each year. There is little comprehensive information on the Muslim community in the country; and estimates place its size anywhere from 500,000 to 1,000,000. The Federation of Spanish Islamic Entities (FEERI) estimates that there are close to 1 million Muslims, including both legal and illegal immigrants. Recent government estimates support local source reports that there are 40,000 to 50,000 Jews in the country. There are approximately 9,000 practicing Buddhists.

The majority of Muslims are recent immigrants from Morocco, but there are also Algerians, Pakistanis, and immigrants from other Arab or Islamic countries, as well as a number of Spanish converts to Islam. The Ministry of Justice's Office of Religious Affairs notes that although the majority of Muslim immigrants come from Islamic countries, there is also a small number of Christians who emigrated from countries such as Egypt and Lebanon. In April 2005, the National Institute of Statistics reported that immigrants from Morocco were the largest immigrant group in the country. Moroccan nationals represent 13.7 percent of the 3.7 million immigrants in the country. There are 386,958 Moroccans living in the country legally and as many as 120,000 illegal Moroccan immigrants.

Most Orthodox Christians are from Eastern European countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and the Ukraine. Immigrants who practice evangelical religions tend to come from African and Latin American countries, according to government officials.

The country's largest cities, Madrid and Barcelona, host the largest number of religious confessions, according to Government officials. The last government census taken in 2002 indicated that the largest communities of immigrants from predominantly Islamic countries were located in the autonomous communities of Catalonia, Andalusia, Madrid, Valencia, Murcia, and the Spanish North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The population of orthodox Christian communities is largest in Aragon and Valencia. The country also hosts a number of foreign missionaries of evangelical Christian, Mormon, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Islamic faiths.

In January 2005, the Register of Religious Entities maintained by the Ministry of Justice listed 12,453 entities created by the Catholic Church. There are 1,388 non-Catholic churches, denominations, and communities in the register, including 1,064 Protestant church entities. Protestant entities include 305 charismatic churches, 128 Assemblies of Brethren, 228 Baptist churches, 125 Pentecostal churches, 38 Presbyterian churches, one Evangelical Church of Philadelphia, 10 Church of Christ churches, one Salvation Army entity, 18 Anglican churches, 63 interdenominational churches, 35 Churches for Attention to Foreigners, 4 Seventh-day Adventist churches, 3 Reformed Adventist churches, and 121 other evangelical churches. In addition there are also 10 Orthodox churches, 4 Churches of Christ, Scientist, one Jehovah's Witnesses entity, 1 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), 1 Unification Church, 10 entities of other Christian confessions, 16 entities of Judaism, 254 entities of Islam, 11 entities of the Baha'i Faith, 3 entities of Hinduism, 21 entities of Buddhism, and 3 entities of other confessions.

The number of non-Catholic churches and religious communities in the country may be much larger. Some religious groups choose to register as cultural organizations with the regional governments rather than with the national registry of religious entities in Madrid because the national registration process can take up to 6 months and requires much paperwork.

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors. Discrimination on the basis of religious beliefs is illegal.

Article 16 of the Constitution provides for religious freedom and the freedom of worship by individuals and groups. It also states, "No faith shall have the character of a state religion." However, the Government provides certain public financing benefits to the Catholic Church that are not available to other religious entities in practice. These benefits derive from four accords signed with the Holy See in 1979. They cover economic, religious education, military, and judicial matters. The Catholic Church receives financing through voluntary tax contributions and direct payments. Taxpayers can select a box on their income tax forms to contribute up to 0.5 percent of their taxes to the Catholic Church. In 2003, taxpayers contributed \$127.2 million (135 million euros) to the Catholic Church. In addition to voluntary taxpayer contributions, the Government provided the Catholic Church an additional \$33.6 million (28 million euros). This sum did not include state funding for religion teachers in public schools, military and hospital chaplains, and other indirect assistance. There will be no updates on public financing of the Catholic Church until 2006.



Representatives of Protestant, Jewish, and Islamic faiths signed bilateral agreements with the Government in 1992. Protestant entities signed the accord as the Federation of Evangelical Religious Entities of Spain (FEREDE); Jewish entities signed as the Federation of Israelite Communities of Spain (FCIE); and Islamic entities signed as the Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE). The CIE is composed of two federations: the FEERI, the Federation of Spanish Islamic Entities, and the UCIDE, the Union of Islamic Communities in Spain. In 2003, the Government expanded the concept of "well-known deeply-rooted" beliefs (*notorio arraigo*) to allow other religious groups, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons, to sign bilateral agreements. By the end of the period covered by this report, only the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints had been granted *notorio arraigo*; however, the church has not negotiated a bilateral agreement with the Government.

Some autonomous regions have also signed agreements with religious groups in order to encourage social integration. For example, the Catalanian government has signed agreements with the Islamic Council of Catalonia, and Protestant, Jewish, and Baha'i religious communities. These agreements were social rather than financial in nature and were intended to encourage social integration.

National religious holidays include Epiphany (January 6), Holy Thursday and Good Friday, Assumption (August 15), All Saints' Day (November 1), Immaculate Conception (December 8), and Christmas (December 25); some communities celebrate local religious holidays. National religious holidays do not have a negative effect on other religious groups. In the 1992 cooperation accords with the FCIE and CIE, the Government agreed to recognize Jewish and Muslim holidays. The 1992 accord with FEREDE accommodates Protestant entities, such as the Seventh-day Adventists, that celebrate Saturday as the Sabbath, by giving them Friday afternoon off from work with pay to prepare for the Sabbath.

The Law of Religious Freedom of 1980 implements the constitutional provision for freedom of religion. The 1980 law establishes a legal regime and certain privileges for religious organizations. To enjoy the benefits of this regime, religious organizations must be entered in the Register of Religious Entities maintained by the Office of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Justice, which is updated regularly. To register with the Ministry of Justice, religious groups must submit documentation supporting their claim to be religions. If a group's application is rejected, it may appeal the decision to the courts. If it is judged not to be a religion, it may be included on a Register of Associations maintained by the Ministry of Interior. Inclusion on the Register of Associations grants legal status as authorized by the law regulating the right of association. Religions not officially recognized are treated as cultural associations.

In 2004, leaders of the Protestant, Muslim, and Jewish communities discussed the issue of expanded tax benefits and public funding, the opening of new places of worship, and the quality of religious education with the Office of Religious Affairs in the Ministry of Justice; in particular, they sought public financing comparable to that enjoyed by the Catholic Church. All religious minority groups requested the Government to revise the national income tax form to allow taxpayers the option to donate a percentage of their taxes to non-Catholic entities. However, these negotiations ended without an agreement between the Government and religious leaders. In general, the Government places no legal restrictions on opening new places of worship; however, representatives of minority religious groups sometimes have difficulty opening places of worship, most frequently because of resistance from neighborhood groups.

Muslim and Protestant leaders also have called for the Government to provide more support for public religious education in their respective faiths. In 2004, the Government responded to these calls by approving legislation that provides funding for teachers of courses in Catholic, Islamic, evangelical/Christian, and Judaic studies in public school classes of 10 or more students. These courses are not mandatory. Those students who

do not elect to take confessional courses are obliged to take an alternative course covering general social, cultural, and religious themes.

In 2004, the Government set aside funds to pay for 20 Muslim teachers to teach courses on Islam to public school students in Madrid, Catalonia, Andalusia, and Valencia. The Government required that the teachers hold degrees from a Spanish university, have training in Spanish law, and be fluent in Spanish. As of the end of the period covered by this report, courses on Islam were not yet being offered because government officials and members of the Islamic Commission of Spain had not selected Muslim teachers who met the qualifications.

There are religious schools for Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and Jewish students. There are no restrictions placed on parents who want to provide their children religious home school training or enroll them in private religious schools.

The Government has taken steps to promote interfaith understanding through the support or sponsorship of programs on interfaith dialogue. Members of all religious faiths serve as members of a government Committee of Advisors on Religious Freedom. On March 25, 2005, the Government participated in an interreligious seminar on "Religious Pluralism and Coexistence" in Madrid. It also sponsors university courses and seminars with representatives of different religious confessions. In 2005, the government held inter-religious roundtables at the University Menendez Pelayo of Santander and the University of Madrid. On June 8-9, 2005, the Government hosted a conference in Cordoba under the auspices of the Organization for European Security Cooperation on Anti-Semitism and Other Forms of Intolerance. The conference included representatives of all religious faiths as well as international experts on the subject of religious freedom. Government officials placed great emphasis specifically on the issue of anti-Semitism in the country and expressed interest in maintaining a regular dialogue with the U.S. Government on anti-Semitic activity in the country. The Government also appointed a special envoy to serve as a liaison between the Jewish community and international organizations dedicated to combating anti-Semitism in Europe, such as the forum for International Cooperation on Holocaust, Education, Remembrance, and Research in Warsaw.

#### Restrictions on Freedom of Religion

Government policy and practice contributed to the generally free practice of religion.

The Islamic and Protestant Federations continued to report that the building permit process for new mosque construction can be difficult and lengthy, especially for building sites in central urban locations. According to FEERI, new mosque construction sometimes was forced into less-visible suburban areas, primarily because of resistance from neighborhood groups. However, in 2003, the construction of a large and prominent mosque was completed in Granada. FEERI reported that female Muslim students who wear headscarves had not encountered problems with school dress codes. The Government has consistently held that the right to education takes priority over the enforcement of clothing regulations.

The Government funds Catholic chaplains for the military, prisons, and hospitals. The 1992 bilateral agreements recognize the right of Protestant and Muslim members of the armed forces to have access to religious services, subject to the needs of the service and authorization by their superiors. According to the agreements, such services are to be provided by ministers and imams approved by the religious federations and authorized by the military command. However, Protestant and Muslim leaders continued to report that there are no military regulations to implement the 1992 agreements. FERDE reported that evangelical military service personnel must leave their barracks to access chaplains and participate in evangelical religious services. Muslim leaders report that



prison officials generally provide access for imams to visit Muslim prisoners, but officials have not granted permission for imams to hold religious services on prison grounds.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationships among religions in society contributed to religious freedom. The growth of the country's immigrant population has at times led to social friction, which in isolated instances has had a religious component. Many citizens blame recent Moroccan immigrants for increased crime rates in the country. These beliefs sometimes result in anti-Muslim sentiment. There was no documented increase in violence toward Muslims following the March 2004 terrorist train bombings in Madrid. Muslim leaders have stated that Islamic communities continued to suffer from discrimination, particularly in obtaining employment and rental housing. They were concerned that media reports appeared to link Islam to the terrorist attacks. In February 2005, Sigma Dos, a private polling agency, conducted a national survey of 1000 individuals on attitudes on the Muslim population in the country. The poll revealed that 70 percent of those who responded had had no contact with Muslims, and 48 percent stated they knew almost nothing about Islam or Muslims. Nevertheless, some 43 percent of respondents said the greatest threat of the presence of Muslims in the country was the possibility that fundamentalists would carry out a terrorist attack.

As in past years, in 2004 there were some reports of vandalism to Jewish community institutions in Barcelona, Toledo, and in Melilla. Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia, has an estimated population of 4,000 Jewish residents. A group of individuals painted anti-Semitic slogans in German on the walls of the ATID (Hebrew for "Future") community center and the Sephardi School in October 2004 in Barcelona. Following these incidents, the Catalan regional government temporarily provided additional security for community center and the school. In August 2004, unidentified persons defaced with red swastikas a statue in front of the El Transito Synagogue in Toledo. The local government later removed the graffiti and deployed local police to provide additional protection of Jewish historical sites. On a Jewish holy day in August 2004, local youth attacked a synagogue in Melilla with stones as worshippers celebrated the Prayer of Shabbat. No arrests were made in the incident. The Ministry of Justice expressed its concern about incidents of anti-Semitism, stating that these incidents appear to be isolated events attributed mostly to small groups of youth or immigrants.

Jewish community leaders also cited some incidents of anti-Semitic propaganda in the media and in local government institutions. The Catalan newspaper *El Periodico de Catalunya* published an article in November 2004 that described the deaths of Palestinians in the Middle East as acts of "extermination" by Israeli authorities. During the same month, a Star of David appeared placed side-by-side with swastika on a City Hall webpage in Barcelona. City officials removed the symbols without explaining why they were placed there or apologizing for the incident. Also in November 2004, in the region of Galicia in the northern part of the country, the mayor of the town of Oleiros approved public signs that described the Israeli Prime Minister as an "animal" and labeled members of his government "neo-Nazis." The Government responded by issuing a strong statement condemning the incident. The mayor later agreed to remove the signs.

Two Jewish synagogues in Barcelona belonging to the Jewish community of Barcelona and the ATID Jewish community were vandalized at various times in recent years and again in March 2005. The vandalism included anti-Semitic graffiti on the walls of the synagogue. The groups also reported their belief that local extremist groups monitored them. The regional government responded by increasing security at the center.

In October 2004, partly in response to attacks against Jewish persons and institutions, the Council of Ministers approved a proposal from the Ministry of Justice calling for a Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence.

## Sweden

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 173,732 square miles, and its population is an estimated 9.0 million. Approximately 78.3 percent of the population belongs to the Church of Sweden. Since the Church and the State separated in 2000, increasing numbers of persons have left the Church each year. In 2004, 79,031 persons left the Church. According to studies carried out by the Church of Sweden, the main reason for persons leaving appears to be economic; membership carries a tax of 1.19 percent of members' incomes. In 2004, the Church of Sweden baptized 68.5 percent of children, a figure that has steadily declined over the past 2 decades. Confirmations have declined even more sharply; 37.6 percent of Swedish children were confirmed in 2004, as opposed to 80 percent in 1970.

There are an estimated 145,000 Roman Catholics, of whom 82,000 are registered with the Roman Catholic Church. Approximately 85 percent of Catholics are first or second generation immigrants, the largest groups coming from Southern Europe, Latin America, and Poland. Within the Stockholm Catholic Diocese, the Armenian, Chaldean, Maronite, Melchite, and Syrian churches celebrate Mass in their respective languages. Since the 1960s approximately 100 persons have converted to Catholicism annually.

The Orthodox Church has approximately 100,000 practicing members, and the main national Orthodox churches are Syrian, Serbian, Greek, Romanian, and Macedonian. There is also a large Finnish-speaking Lutheran denomination. While weekly services in Christian houses of worship generally are poorly attended, a large number of persons observe major festivals of the ecclesiastical year and prefer religious ceremonies to mark turning points in life such as weddings and funerals. Those who attend Protestant churches, other than the Church of Sweden, total more than 400,000. The Pentecostal movement and the Missionary (or Missions) Church are the largest Protestant groups outside of the Church of Sweden. In 2004, the Pentecostal movement provided religious services to approximately 127,000 persons, of whom an estimated 90,000 were registered members. The 90,000 membership figure continues a steady decline from a peak of more than 100,000 in 1985. The Missionary Church provided services to approximately 129,000 members (registered and nonregistered).

The total number of Jews living in the country is estimated to be 18,500-20,000; however, the Jewish community estimates 10,000 active, or practicing, members. There are Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jewish synagogues, found mostly in the cities. Large numbers of Jews attend High Holy Day services but attendance at weekly services is low.

The major religious communities and the Church of Sweden are spread across the country. Large numbers of immigrants in recent decades have introduced various religions to the country, such as Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and a number of Christian churches other than the Church of Sweden in those communities populated by immigrants. These communities tend to be concentrated in the larger cities.

Buddhists number approximately 15,000; Hindus between 7,000 and 10,000. There are estimated to be just over 1,000 Sikhs, and approximately 500 Zoroastrians. Reliable statistics on the number of atheists are not available; however, past estimates have placed the figure as high as 15 to 20 percent of the adult population.

The exact number of Muslims is difficult to estimate; however, it has increased rapidly through immigration in the past several years. The number provided by the Muslim community is approximately 350,000 members, of whom an estimated 100,000 are reportedly active. Muslim affiliations among immigrant groups are predominantly with the Shi'a and Sunni branches of Islam. There are mosques in many parts of the country.

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect this right in full and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors. The rights and freedoms enumerated in the Constitution include the rights to practice one's religion and protection of religious freedom. The laws concerning religious freedoms are observed and enforced at all government levels and by the courts in a non-discriminatory fashion. Legal protections cover discrimination or persecution by private actors.

Since the separation of church and state in 2000, seven recognized religious denominations, in addition to the Church of Sweden, raise revenues through member-contributions made through the national tax system. All recognized denominations are entitled to direct government financial support, contributions made through the national tax system, or a mix of both. The State does not favor the Church of Sweden at the expense of other religious groups in any noticeable way. Since the population is predominantly Christian, certain Christian religious holy days are considered national holidays, but this does not appear to affect other religious groups negatively. School students from minority religious backgrounds are entitled to take relevant religious holidays.

No recognition or registration is required to carry out religious activity. Religious groups that want to receive government aid may apply for it. The Government considers the number of members in the group and its length of establishment, but applies no specific criteria.

Religious education covering all major world religions is compulsory in public schools. Parents may send their children to independent religious schools, all of which receive government subsidies, provided they adhere to government guidelines on core academic curriculum.

The Office of the Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination investigates claims of discrimination "due to race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, or religion." Discrimination on religious grounds is illegal, and specific legislation concerning the work place was introduced in 1999. In 2003, legislation concerning the provision of public and private services was enacted.

Following a 1998 public opinion poll that showed a low percentage of Swedish school children had even basic knowledge of the Holocaust, the Government launched nationwide Holocaust education projects. Approximately one million copies of the projects' core textbook are in circulation and available in many languages, at no cost, to every household with children.

In 2003, the Government established the Living History Forum, an official organization dedicated to promoting tolerance, democracy, and human rights using the Holocaust as a starting point. The Living History Forum, together with the Swedish Committee against Anti-Semitism, has planned a three-part educational program on the Holocaust, anti-Semitism, and Racism, to take place in the second half of 2005. Designed for teachers and others working in education, the program aims to establish a network of well-educated and engaged individuals who can spread knowledge of the Holocaust.

The Government promotes interfaith understanding and meets annually with representatives from various religious groups. The Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities (SST) is a government body consisting of 22 registered religious groups (37, including sub-groups) entitled to Government aid.

Many religious communities are involved in interfaith dialogue. However, in May 2004, the Jewish central council decided that the Jewish community should withdraw from official cooperation with the Church of Sweden after the launch of the Church's HOPP (HOPE) campaign for a just peace in the Middle East. Archbishop KG Hammar endorses the campaign, which includes a recommendation to boycott Israeli goods originating from occupied territory.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

Government policy and practice contributed to the generally free practice of religion.

The law requires animal slaughter to be preceded by the administration of anesthetics to minimize undue suffering by the animal. The Jewish community has protested that this prevents the practice of kosher slaughter in the country, requiring kosher meat to be imported. The Muslim community appears to be split between those who feel certain anesthetic methods do not conflict with halal requirements, and those who feel that it does.

Since 2001, the law stipulates that male circumcision may be performed only by a licensed doctor or, in the case of boys under the age of 2 months, in the presence of a person certified by the National Board of Health. Approximately 3,000 Muslim boys and 40 to 50 Jewish boys are circumcised each year. The National Board of Health has certified Jewish mohels (persons ordained to carry out circumcision according to the Jewish faith) to carry out the operations, but a medical doctor or an anesthesia nurse must accompany them. Some members of the Jewish and Muslim communities have protested against the law on the grounds that it interferes with their religious traditions. This law is scheduled for a mandatory review and evaluation in 2005.

Individuals serving in the military are given the time and opportunity to fulfill religious requirements. The military makes available food options fulfilling religious dietary requirements and allows time for appropriate mourning periods. Some regiments have an imam attached to them to facilitate religious observance by Muslim soldiers. Jehovah's Witnesses are exempt from national military service.

In 2003, the Home Guard (a rough equivalent to the National Guard in the USA) denied entry to a Muslim woman because of her use of a headscarf. As a result of this incident, the Office of the Ombudsman for Discrimination initiated a dialogue with the armed forces that resulted in new guidelines that allow the wearing of religious headwear. In 2005, a Sikh finished his military service, throughout which he wore a turban.



On June 27, 2005, the country's "Svenska Dagbladet" newspaper reported that the Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination was suing Gothenburg city for two instances where Muslim women were turned away at a swimming pool because they were wearing arm-length tops. Pool employees maintain the clothing violated pool regulations. One of the women believed that she was turned away because she was wearing a veil. The Ombudsman has requested approximately \$19,230 (150,000 SEK) in compensation for each of the women.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

Citizens are tolerant of diverse religious practitioners. However, some anti-Semitism exists, which occasionally takes the form of vandalism or assault. It also appears that Muslims are sometimes subject to societal discrimination. Swedish law enforcement maintains statistics on hate crimes but does not break the figures down by categories relating to the targeting of specific religious groups, with the exception of anti-Semitic attacks. There are inadequate figures on incidents or crimes motivated by religious prejudice or intolerance towards members of the Muslim community. The Office of the Ombudsman for Discrimination received reports of discrimination on religious grounds, including religious affiliation, during the period covered by this report. Exact statistics are not available.

The number of reported anti-Semitic crimes has increased since the end of the nineties, and averaged approximately 130 annually during the period 2000-03, with 128 crimes reported in 2003. The largest single category of anti-Semitic crime in 2003 was agitation against an ethnic group with 52 reported incidents, and unlawful threat/molestation second with 35 reported incidents. There were three reported cases of assault during the same period. Some Jews believe that increases in attacks are directly linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and increased tensions in the Middle East at large. Since the beginning of the second intifada in 2000, the Jewish Community in the country no longer sees its primary threats coming from neo-Nazis but from Islamic and leftist extremists.

In 2003, four young persons of Arabic origin broke into a Jewish-owned shop in Malmö, shouting anti-Semitic epithets and threats, after which they attacked the shop owner and another Jew. The shop owner was sent to hospital for treatment. Two weeks earlier, Muslims had thrown stones at employees of the Jewish Burial Society at the Jewish cemetery in Malmö. In June 2004, a football match between a Jewish and predominantly Muslim Somali youth team ended with the Jewish players being attacked by Muslim Somali players. More recent examples of anti-Semitic incidents include the harassment for being "from Israel" of a Jew at a commercial establishment in Stockholm in December 2004, and the burning of a swastika at a Jewish burial site in Norrköping in January 2005.

In 2003, the Islamic Center in Malmo in the southern part of the country, which includes a mosque, community center, and school, was seriously damaged in an arson attack.

## **United Kingdom**

The law provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom. Centuries-old sectarian divisions and instances of violence persisted in Northern Ireland.

The U.S. Government discusses religious freedom issues with the Government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The United Kingdom has an area of 94,525 square miles, and its population in mid-2003 was approximately 59.6 million. The 2001 census for the whole of the United Kingdom reported that approximately 42 million persons (almost 72 percent of the population) identify themselves as Christians. Approximately 1.6 million (2.7 percent) identify themselves as Muslims. The next largest religious groups are Hindus (1 percent), followed by Sikhs (0.6 percent) and Jews (0.5 percent). More than 9 million (15.5 percent) of respondents stated they have no religion. The census's religion question was voluntary, and only 7.3 percent chose not to respond.

Religious affiliation is not evenly distributed among ethnicities. In 2001 census data for Great Britain, approximately 70 percent of the white population described themselves as Christians. Almost 75 percent of black Caribbean respondents stated that they were Christians, as did 70 percent of black Africans. Meanwhile, 45 percent of Indians were Hindus, and 29 percent were Sikhs. Approximately 92 percent of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were Muslims.

Non-Christian populations are concentrated in London and other large urban areas. London is home to 56 percent of Jews, 52 percent of Hindus, 38 percent of Muslims, and 31 percent of Sikhs. Census figures showed that Muslims, as compared to adherents of other religions, had higher rates of unemployment and ill health and lower rates of educational qualifications.

Information on membership in Christian denominations was not recorded in the 2001 census. In 2003, the Office for National Statistics indicated approximately 29 percent of the population identify with Anglicanism, 10 percent with the Roman Catholic Church, and 14 percent with other Christian churches. An additional 2 percent of the population is affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the Church of Christ, Christian Scientists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Unitarians.

In Northern Ireland, the 2001 Census showed that 53.1 percent were Protestants and 43.8 percent were Catholics. Church attendance in Northern Ireland is estimated at 30 to 35 percent. The divisions between nationalists and unionists in Northern Ireland have largely evolved along religious lines. The policy of the Government remains one of promotion of religious tolerance.



Most Catholics and Protestants continue to live in segregated communities in Northern Ireland, including public housing ("housing estates") and other working class areas, although many middle class neighborhoods are mixed communities. Intimidation by paramilitary gangs often results in members of the minority community leaving housing estates, increasing the level of segregation.

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

The law provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government at all levels strives to protect and promote this right in full and does not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors. The law provides for the freedom to change one's religion or belief. The 1998 Human Rights Act guarantees freedom of religion and bans discrimination based on religion. Religious discrimination in employment and vocational training was made illegal by the 2003 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations. The 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act covers "religiously aggravated offenses," based on existing assault, harassment, criminal damage, and public order offenses. Those convicted of "religiously aggravated offenses" face higher maximum penalties where there is evidence of religious hostility in connection with a crime. According to the Crown Prosecution Service's annual report for 2003-04 (published in January), perpetrators of 44 religiously aggravated offenses were prosecuted under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act between April 2003 and the end of March 2004. In 22 of the offenses, the actual or perceived religion of the victim was Islam. The Crown Prosecution Service reported a 77 percent conviction rate on the 44 charges.

On July 7, 2004, the Government announced plans to reintroduce legislation making incitement to religious hatred a criminal offense. If enacted, the offense would complement existing legislation prohibiting incitement to racial hatred (which, courts have ruled, covers Sikhs and Jews, but not Muslims, Christians, or Hindus). Originally, the Government had tried to include such an offense in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, but the provision was dropped over some peers' concerns about the law's potential implications. In the months after the proposal's reintroduction (as part of the Serious Organized Crime and Police Bill), some members of public and civil society spoke out against the measure. One opponent, comedian Rowan Atkinson, said it was a "fundamental freedom of society" to criticize others' religions. Partly because of this opposition, the offense was removed from the final version of the Serious Organized Crime and Police Bill, which Parliament then passed. On May 17, 2005, the Government announced it would once again introduce legislation containing the offense, this time as a stand-alone bill. Some religious organizations have allied with secularist bodies to oppose the bill, saying it would restrict freedom of speech. The Government maintains that the bill would apply only to extremist organizations that provoke hatred against religious faiths but not criminalize "criticism, commentary, or ridicule" of religions or their adherents. At the end of the period covered by this report, Parliament had not considered the new legislation.

There are two established (or state) churches, the Church of England (Anglican) and the Church of Scotland (Presbyterian). The Monarch is the "Supreme Governor" of the Church of England and always must be a member of the Church and promise to uphold it. The monarch's connection with the Church of England is the subject of ongoing public debate. In 2003, a nongovernmental Commission on the Future of the Monarchy called for the Queen to be stripped of the title of Supreme Governor.

The monarch appoints Church of England officials on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Crown Appointments Commission, which includes lay and clergy representatives. The Church of Scotland appoints its own office bearers, and its affairs are not subject to any civil authority. The Church in Wales, the Scottish Episcopal Church, and the Church of

Ireland are members of the Anglican Communion. There are no established churches in Wales or Northern Ireland. A February 2001 Home Office study suggested that the establishment status of the Church of England causes "religious disadvantage" to other religious communities. Those who believe that their freedom of religion has been infringed upon have the right to appeal to the courts for relief.

The Government has indicated it has no plans to move towards disestablishment of the Church of England unless both the Church and the public favor such a move; furthermore, the Government takes the view that establishment is deeply embedded in the nation's history and in no way indicates a lack of respect for other faiths. Official events take an inclusive approach; for example, the national Remembrance Day Service, conducted under the auspices of the Church of England, also includes representatives of a broad range of faiths. The Government makes efforts to address specific needs of different faith communities, such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's provision of a special Hajj delegation to provide consular and medical assistance to British Muslims on pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia.

Religious holy days that are considered national holidays include Good Friday, Easter Monday, and Christmas.

Religious groups are not required to register with the Government. No church or religious organization--established or otherwise--receives direct funding from the State. Religious bodies are expected to finance their own activities through endowment, investments, and fund-raising. The Government funds the repair of historic religious buildings, such as cathedrals and churches, but such funding is not restricted to Church of England buildings. A government grants program, financed largely through lottery money, helps to fund repair and maintenance of listed places of worship of all religions nationwide. The Government also contributes to the budget of the Church Conservation Trust, which preserves "redundant" Church of England buildings of architectural or historic significance. Several similar groups in England, Scotland, and Wales repair non-Anglican houses of worship.

Most religious institutions are classified as charities and, as such, enjoy a wide range of tax benefits. (The advancement of religion is considered to be a charitable purpose.) In England and Wales, the Charity Commission reviews the application of each body applying for registration as a charity. Commissioners base their decisions on a substantial body of case law. In Scotland and Northern Ireland, the Inland Revenue performs this task. Charities are exempt from taxes on most types of income and capital gains, provided that the charity uses the income or gains for charitable purposes. They also are exempt from the value-added tax.

The Government provides funding for a large number of so-called "faith schools." As of January 2004, there were 6,903 state-funded schools with a religious character in England. All but 121 of these schools were Anglican, Catholic, or Methodist schools; there is also a well-established tradition of state support for Jewish schools. The Government has helped set up and fund a number of schools reflecting other religious traditions. These include four Muslim, two Sikh, one Greek Orthodox, and one Seventh-day Adventist school. In January 2005, Chief Inspector of Schools for England, David Bell, called on faith schools to be "intolerant of intolerance." In February 2005, then-Schools Minister for England Stephen Twigg published a list of best practices of how faith schools can implement inclusiveness and collaboration.

In Scotland, most faith-based government-funded schools are Roman Catholic, although there is also a Jewish school. The Scottish Executive has funded an ongoing study into whether faith-based schools promote sectarianism or intolerance.

Almost all schools in Northern Ireland receive state support. In Northern Ireland, more than 90 percent of students attend schools that are either predominantly Catholic or

Protestant. Integrated schools serve approximately 5 percent of school-age children whose families voluntarily choose this option, often after overcoming significant obstacles to provide the resources to start a new school and demonstrate its sustainability for 3 years before government funding begins. Demand for places in integrated schools outweighs the limited number of places available.

The law requires religious education in publicly maintained schools throughout the United Kingdom. According to the Education Reform Act of 1988, it forms part of the core curriculum for students in England and Wales. In Scotland, religious education of some sort is mandated by the Education Act of 1980. Throughout the United Kingdom, the shape and content of religious instruction is decided on a local basis. Locally agreed syllabi are required to reflect the predominant place of Christianity while taking into account the teachings and practices of other principal religions in the country. Syllabi must be nondenominational and refrain from attempting to convert pupils.

In addition, schools in England and Wales have to provide a daily act of collective worship. In practice, this action mainly is Christian in character, reflecting Christianity's importance in the religious life of the country. This requirement may be waived if a school's administration deems it inappropriate for some or all of the students. All parents have the right to withdraw a child from religious education, but the schools must approve this request. Under some circumstances, non-Christian worship may instead be allowed. Teachers' organizations have criticized school prayer and called for a government review of the practice.

Where student bodies are characterized by a substantial percentage of religious minorities, schools may observe the religious festivals of other faiths. Schools also endeavor to accommodate religious requirements, such as providing halal meat for Muslim children.

In Northern Ireland, the Fair Employment Act bans employment discrimination on the grounds of religious or political opinion. A broad network of laws, regulations, and oversight bodies work to ensure that there is equal opportunity for employees of all religious faiths. All public sector employers and all private firms with more than 10 employees must report annually to the Equality Commission on the religious composition of their workforces and must review their employment practices every 3 years. Noncompliance may result in criminal penalties and the loss of government contracts. Victims of employment discrimination may sue for damages. In addition, the 1998 Northern Ireland Act stipulates that all public authorities must show due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity, including on the basis of religious belief. Each public authority must report its plans to promote equality to the Equality Commission, which is to review such plans every 5 years.

In 2003, Parliament approved the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations of 2003, which adopted a European Commission Directive against religious discrimination. The regulations prohibit employment discrimination based on religious belief, except where there is a "genuine occupational requirement" of a religious nature. The Government attempts to raise awareness of protections under the new regulations through help lines and good-practice advice. The regulations, which specifically do not apply in Northern Ireland, came into force in later in 2003.

The Government makes an active effort to ensure that public servants are not discriminated against on the basis of religion and strives to accommodate religious practices by government employees whenever possible. For example, the Prison Service permits Muslim employees to take time off during their shifts to pray. It also provides prisoners with Christian, Jewish, and Muslim chaplains. The Advisory Group on Religion in Prisons monitors policy and practice on issues relating to religious provision. The military generally provides soldiers who are adherents of minority religions with chaplains of their faith.

The Home Office's Faith Communities Unit is responsible for promoting interfaith contact and ensuring that members of all faith communities enjoy the same life opportunities and government services. The Faith Communities Unit is also undertaking a project of "faith literacy" to improve government employees' understanding of different religious communities. In March 2004, the Home Office published a report, "Working Together: Co-operation between Government and Faith Communities," in partnership with senior faith community representatives. The report specifically recommends measures to ensure that government consultations include relevant input from faith communities when forming policy, to assess the extent to which faith communities benefit from government funding programs, to address funding deficiencies, and to involve the different faith communities in national services and celebrations in a way that reflects the diversity of the country. The Faith Communities Unit is charged with following the report's recommendations, and a Home Office Steering Group was scheduled evaluate the effect of its recommendations in 2005.

### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

Government policy and practice contributed to the generally free practice of religion.

On March 2, 2005, the Court of Appeal ruled that Shabina Begum, a Muslim teenager, had been unlawfully excluded from her high school in Luton for wearing a jilbab, a traditional dress that leaves only the face and hands exposed. The school, which is 79 percent Muslim, had expelled Begum in 2002 for contravening its uniform policy, which had been drawn up after consultation with local Muslim organizations. The school's policy allowed girls to wear a skirt, pants, or a shalwar kameez, which comprises a loose tunic and pants, and to cover their heads with headscarves. After her expulsion, Begum filed suit in the High Court, which ruled in the school's favor. The Court of Appeal then overturned this decision. Some educators observed that the ruling opened a "legal minefield" for schools and called on the Government to provide more concrete guidance about their rights and obligations when it comes to uniform policies.

The 2003 Communications Act increased broadcasting opportunities for religious groups by lifting previous restrictions on religious bodies' ownership of broadcasting licenses. Under the new legislation, religious bodies can hold local and national digital radio and digital terrestrial television licenses. Prior to the law's enactment, religious bodies could hold cable, satellite, and local analog radio licenses. Because of the limited broadcast spectrum, religious groups are still prohibited from holding national analog radio licenses, national television analog licenses, and radio and television multiplex licenses.

In August 2004, new immigration regulations came into force, requiring visa applicants who wish to enter the country as ministers of religion to obtain level 4 competence in spoken English (on a scale of 1 to 9) on the International English Language Testing System. Visa adjudicators are permitted to waive the testing requirement at their discretion and where other evidence of English competency is provided for applicants educated in an English-speaking country.

Other than some Anglican bishops' inclusion in the House of Lords, membership in a given religious group does not confer a political or economic advantage on individual adherents. The Anglican Archbishops of York and Canterbury; the Bishops of Durham, London, and Winchester; and 21 other bishops, in order of seniority, receive automatic membership in the House of Lords, whereas prominent clergy from other denominations or religions are not afforded this privilege. The Removal of Clergy Disqualification Act 2001 removed restrictions that prohibited all clergy ordained by an Anglican bishop, as well as ministers of the Church of Scotland, from seeking or holding membership in the House of Commons.



While not usually enforced and essentially a legal anachronism, blasphemy against Anglican doctrine remains technically illegal. Several religious organizations, in association with the Commission for Racial Equality, were attempting to abolish the law or broaden its protection to include all faiths. On January 13, 2005, Commission for Racial Equality Chairman Trevor Phillips told lawmakers that the Government's plan to enact legislation outlawing incitement to religious hatred should be paired with a repeal of the blasphemy law. At the end of the period covered by this report, the Government had not reviewed the question, and the blasphemy law had not been abolished or revised.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationship among religions in British society contributed to religious freedom.

From July 2004 through June 2005, the Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 482 anti-Semitic incidents in the United Kingdom. CST recorded 77 assaults and 43 instances of desecration and damage to property. The number of anti-Semitic incidents rose significantly during 2004. Figures from Israel's Global Forum against Anti-Semitism stated that 310 anti-Semitic incidents occurred in the United Kingdom during the year, of which 77 were violent, as opposed to 163 anti-Semitic incidents in 2003, of which 55 were violent. The report stated that a "central cause" of the increase in incidents was "years of hostile reporting and commentary about Israel in the UK press."

On August 22, 2004, cemetery officials discovered the desecration of approximately 60 gravestones in a Jewish cemetery in Birmingham. Police charged two suspects with racially aggravated criminal damage, racially aggravated public disorder, and causing racially aggravated harassment, alarm, or distress. On October 19, police charged Abu Hamza al-Masri with 16 criminal offenses, including soliciting or encouraging the murder of Jews, inciting racial hatred, and possessing a document that contained information "of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism." At the end of the period covered by this report, his trial was pending.


The Muslim community was subject to intermittent incidents of Islamophobia, although no formal statistics were available. On January 15, 2005, an employment equality tribunal ruled in favor of a Muslim man whose employer dismissed him after he took 6 weeks off work to make a pilgrimage (Hajj) to Mecca. Prior to making his trip, the man had submitted a vacation request but received no response; a manager then told that him in the absence of a reply, he could assume his leave had been granted. Upon his return, he was suspended without pay and then fired for gross misconduct, with his employer stating that his leave had not been authorized. The tribunal ruled that by not trying to accommodate the employee's religious requirement to go on Hajj or justifying a refusal to authorize his leave, the company was placing Muslim employees at a particular disadvantage and discriminating on the grounds of religion.

The Islamic community has criticized an increase in the use of the police's "stop and search" powers and arrests of Muslims under anti-terrorism laws, with only a handful of searches actually leading to arrests or convictions. In an Islamic Human Rights Commission poll released in December 2004, 80 percent of British Muslims (compared with 45 percent in 2000 and 35 percent in 1999) stated they had been discriminated against because of their faith.

On December 14, 2004, police arrested the leader of the British National Party (BNP) on suspicion of incitement to racial hatred. His arrest was the twelfth following the July broadcast of a BBC documentary entitled "Secret Agent" in which BNP members were covertly recorded as they called Islam a "vicious, wicked faith." At the end of the period covered by this report, the leader's trial was pending.

The United Kingdom has both active interfaith and ecumenical movements. The Council of Christians and Jews works to advance better relations between the two religions and to combat anti-Semitism. The Interfaith Network links a wide range of religious and educational organizations with an interest in interfaith relations, including the national representative bodies of the Baha'i, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jain, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, and Zoroastrian communities. The Network has a consultative relationship with the Home Office, from which it receives financial support. The Inner Cities Religious Council encourages interfaith activity through regional conferences and support for local initiatives. The NGO Respect continues to operate to encourage voluntary time-sharing and mutual understanding among adherents of different religions.

The main ecumenical body is the Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland, which serves as the main forum for interchurch cooperation and collaboration. Interchurch cooperation is not limited to dealings among denominations at the national level. For example, Anglican parishes may share their church with Roman Catholic congregations.





## Documentary appendix on the situation of Muslim communities in the European Union candidate countries (United States Department of State)

### **Croatia**

The Constitution provides for freedom of conscience and religion and free public profession of religious conviction, and the Government generally respects these rights in practice. There is no official state religion; however, the Roman Catholic Church enjoys a close relationship with the State not shared by other religious groups. The legal position of most major religious communities has improved due to agreements with the State, which grant benefits similar to those enjoyed by the Catholic Church.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and the coalition Government that took power in 2003 has continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.

Religion and ethnicity are linked closely in society. Since independence in 1991, religious institutions of all faiths were victimized by the ethnic conflicts that led to the breakup of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There were sporadic reports of intimidation and vandalism, particularly in the war-affected areas, directed against Serbian Orthodox clergy and property, although there was a decrease in severity and frequency of such attacks.

#### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has a total area of 21,831 square miles, and its population is approximately 4,437,000. The religious breakdown of the country is approximately: Roman Catholic, 85 percent; Orthodox Christian, 6 percent; Muslim, 1 percent; Jewish, less than 1 percent; other, 4 percent; and atheist, 2 percent. The statistics correlate closely with the country's ethnic makeup. The Orthodox, predominantly ethnic Serbs associated with the Serbian Orthodox Church, primarily live in cities and border areas with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. Members of other minority religions reside mostly in urban areas. Most immigrants are Roman Catholic ethnic Croats.

Protestants from a number of denominations and foreign clergy actively practice and proselytize, as do representatives of Asian religions. A variety of missionaries are present, including the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah's Witnesses, Greek Catholics, Pentecostals, Hare Krishnas, and a wide range of evangelical Protestant Christians (including Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Church of Christ, and various nondenominational organizations such as Campus Crusade for Christ).

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of conscience and religion and free public profession of religious conviction, and the Government generally respects these rights in practice. There is no official state religion; however, the Roman Catholic Church, Serbian Orthodox Church, Islamic community, and other smaller Christian denominations that have signed agreements with the State, receive some state support.

The Law on Legal Status of Religious Communities broadly defines religious communities' legal positions and covers such issues as government funding, tax benefits, and religious education in schools. Other important issues, such as pensions for clergy, religious service in the military, penitentiaries and police, and recognition of religious marriages, were left to each religious community to negotiate separately with the Government. Most religious communities considered the law an improvement over the previous state of affairs. Restitution of nationalized or confiscated church property is regulated under the Law on Return of Property Expropriated or Nationalized during the Yugoslav Communist Rule, which was amended in 2002.

In 2003, the Government approved a regulation on the registration of religious communities, known as the "Regulation on Forms and Maintaining Records of Religious Communities in Croatia," which required all religious communities to submit registration applications within six months. The new regulation stipulates that to register, a religious community must have at least 500 believers and must be registered as an association for five years. All religious communities in the country prior to passage of the law are being registered without conditions; religious communities that are new to the country since passage of the law will need to fulfill the requirements for the minimum number of believers and time registered as an association. By mid 2003, approximately 40 religious communities had been registered. Registered religious communities are granted the status of a "legal person" and enjoy tax and other benefits under the Law on Religious Communities. Religious communities that are based abroad need to submit written permission for registration from their country of origin. The Helsinki Commission reported on conditions to register new religious communities, but prominent human rights organizations including the Croatian Helsinki Committee considered the requirements well within OSCE standards and granting them "privileges that were more than sufficient." No specific licensing is required for foreign missionaries.

In line with the Concordats signed with the Catholic Church and in an effort to define their rights and privileges within a legal framework, agreements have been signed with the following religious communities: the Serbian Orthodox Church and Islamic Community (2002); the Evangelical Church, Reformed Christian Church, Pentecostal Church, Union of Pentecostal Churches of Christ, Christian Adventist Church, Union of Baptist Churches, Church of God, Church of Christ, and the Reformed Movement of Seventh-Day Adventists (2003); and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Macedonian Orthodox Church, and Croatian Old Catholic Church (2003). In addition, in 2003, the Government adopted unilaterally an agreement with the Jewish Community of Zagreb, which refused to sign the agreement because of lack of sufficient progress on property restitution issues. The Government's general approach is to negotiate agreements with individual religious communities based on a common framework rather than set uniform, nondiscriminatory standards and practices. Leaders of non-Roman Catholic religions have expressed general satisfaction with the communication they have with the Government, most notably with the Government Commission on Relations with Religious Communities, chaired by the Minister of Culture.

An agreement between the Roman Catholic Church and the state-run Croatian State Radio and Television (HRT) provides regular, extensive coverage of Roman Catholic events (as many as 10 hours per month). Other religious communities receive

approximately 10 minutes broadcast time per month or less. The Roman Catholic Church operates one of the country's private national radio stations, Catholic Radio, which is financed by private contributions. There are no restrictions on religious broadcasting. Topics of interest to major non-Roman Catholic religious groups are covered regularly on weekly religious programming on HRT. The Roman Catholic Church on several occasions reacted to its treatment in the media. In April 2004, the Zagreb Auxiliary Bishop Vlado Kotic, who presides over the Bishops' Conference's "Justitia et Pax" Commission, wrote to CNN requesting an apology for comments about the beatified Croatian Cardinal Stepinac, made during the funeral of Pope John-Paul II. CNN had reported that many perceived Stepinac as close to the country's WWII Nazi puppet regime. CNN denied the request, claiming that no explicit accusations against Stepinac were made and that they merely reported about his life. In November 2004, Christian youth associations protested against a satirical cartoon series critical of the Roman Catholic Church that is broadcast by Croatian national television. In May 2005, the Catholic Radio Marija Association collected more than 40,000 signatures requesting that the series be removed, and sent an open letter to the OSCE disagreeing with the organization's view that the program was an expression of civic and media freedoms. The Islamic community's Bairam ceremony, usually attended by high-level government officials, is telecast live annually from the Zagreb Mosque. The Islamic community credits the monthly TV broadcast "Ekumena" for contributing significantly to an atmosphere of greater tolerance.

Muslims have the right to observe their religious holy days. They are granted a paid holiday for one Bairam and have the right to observe the other as well (although they are not paid for the day).

There is no government-sponsored ecumenical activity.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

The concordats regulate recognition of marriages, public school catechisms, and military chaplains. The Ministry of Defense employs 15 full-time and 4 part-time Catholic priests and chaplains. After the Government signed an agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church, five Orthodox priests began service in prisons and penitentiaries; the Islamic Community has deployed one imam in the same service. In May 2005, the Government signed a protocol with the Islamic community that guarantees that armed forces' members and recruits of the Muslim faith have regular access to chaplains, are provided with halal meals, and are excused from duty during major holidays.

Other than the Law on Return of Property Expropriated or Nationalized during Yugoslav Communist Rule, there are no specific property restitution agreements between the Government and non-Roman Catholic religious groups.

The Muslim community has no property claims, but it complained that local authorities in Rijeka have stalled the procedure to approve the detailed environmental plan, the last administrative step before they can build a mosque. A location permit was first issued in 1991, but local opposition to the mosque and bureaucratic and financial obstacles combined over the years to delay the project. Officials within the Islamic community earlier reported a supportive attitude on the part of local authorities. The community is now concerned that local pressure from war veterans associations who have publicly opposed the project will lead to further delays.

#### Section III. Societal Attitudes

Religion and ethnicity are closely linked in society, and religion often was used historically to identify non-Croats and single them out for discriminatory practices. This link led to the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s and to the perpetration of violence and intimidation against religious persons, institutions, and symbols of all faiths. Such incidents still occur,

primarily directed against Serbian Orthodox clergy and property, although there was a decrease in severity and frequency.

During the period covered by this report, both international observers and religious leaders noted that overall ethnic and religious relations improved. However, incidents involving harassment of clergy and desecration and vandalism of Serbian Orthodox Church property continued to occur sporadically.

The Muslim and Jewish communities have reported no major incidents of violence or harassment toward religious persons or sites during the period covered by this report. However, in June 2004, a Muslim flag was burned at the entrance to the Muslim cemetery in Osijek. In July 2004, unknown perpetrators desecrated 24 tombs at the same cemetery, setting fire to wreaths on the grave of the recently deceased wife of the local imam, and spraying swastikas and fascist messages on 24 graves. Police investigated; preliminary indications were that a group of local youths was behind the incident.

While the Roman Catholic Church officially seeks no role in political life, conservative elements within the Catholic hierarchy have expressed dissatisfaction with government policies on war legacy issues, including cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), and concern for citizens indicted for war crimes. Popular priest Zlatko Sudac attracted attention in March when he publicly invited Croatian general Ante Gotovina--indicted for war crimes by the ICTY--not to surrender to the Tribunal. The Croatian Bishop's Conference promptly responded that his statement was not an official position of the Church.

On Easter, Cardinal Josip Bozanic delivered a notable sermon discussing the country's integration into the European Union and cooperation with ICTY, calling on Croatians to examine themselves rather than blame international institutions for their problems. He also called on citizens to respect and utilize international institutions and the legal system to further the country's cause, rather than denigrate them. In May, the Bishops' Conference invited PM Sanader to speak to the group about EU integration and the role of the Church.

Since Cardinal Bozanic took office as Archbishop of Zagreb in 1997 and became head of the Bishop's Conference, the Catholic Church leadership has sought a more proactive role in advocating reconciliation. Ecumenical efforts among the religious communities have developed in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. For example, religious leaders meet frequently to discuss issues of mutual interest and to cooperate and coordinate with the Government Commission for Relations with Religious Communities. In late 2004, the three largest religions jointly declared their opposition to legalized abortion.



## **Macedonia**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.

There was no overall change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report. The continued absence of provocative actions by state and nonstate actors, and ongoing government efforts to consolidate a unitary, multiethnic state, helped foster a climate of general respect for religious freedom. However, the law places some limits on religious practice by restricting the registration of religious groups and locations where religious rites may be performed. During the period covered by this report, these restrictions were applied to a small group aligned with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which denies the ecclesiastical independence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church.

### **Section I. Religious Demography**

The country has an area of 9,781 square miles and its population is a little more than 2 million. The country has two major religions: Orthodox Christianity and Islam. Nominally, 66 percent of the population is Macedonian Orthodox, 30 percent is Muslim, 1 percent is Roman Catholic, and 3 percent is of other faiths (largely various Protestant denominations). There is also a small Jewish community in Skopje. Public participation in religious activities tends to center on major holidays or weddings and funerals.

Numerous foreign missionaries are active and represent a wide range of faiths. Many of these missionaries enter the country in connection with other work, often charitable or medical. Several Protestant missionary groups and members of Jehovah's Witnesses are active.

### **Section II. Status of Religious Freedom**

#### **Legal/Policy Framework**

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. However, the law places some limits on religious practices, including the establishment of places of worship, the collection of contributions, and locations where religious rites may be held.

The constitutional provision for religious freedom is further defined by the 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups. This law designates the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Community, the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish community, and the Methodist Church as religious communities. All other registered associations are considered to be religious groups. In 1998 and 1999, the Constitutional Court struck down several provisions of the 1997 law, including the requirement that religious groups must be registered to perform religious ceremonies. In practice, the remaining provisions are not enforced consistently.

The law requires that religious groups be registered to perform a number of activities. For instance, only registered religious groups may obtain permits to build churches or request visas for foreigners coming to the country to undertake religious work. The Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups contained a number of specific requirements for the registration of such groups, but these requirements were struck

down by the Constitutional Court in 1999. Consequently, there was considerable confusion over which procedures still applied. The law prohibits the registration of more than one group for each religious confession.

Regulations require that foreigners entering the country with the intent to carry out religious work or perform religious rites obtain approval from the State Commission on Relations with the Religious Communities and Groups to receive a visa. When applying for visas, such persons must submit a letter of invitation from representatives of a registered religious group in the country to the Commission, which then issues a letter of approval to be submitted with the visa request. Approvals were typically issued in less than a week. During the period covered by this report, there were no reports that any applications for religious visas were denied to qualified candidates of registered religious communities or groups.

The Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups places some restrictions on the locations where religious ceremonies may be held. It provides that religious rites and religious activities "shall take place at churches, mosques, and other temples, and in gardens that are parts of those facilities, at cemeteries, and at other facilities of the religious group." Provision is made for holding services in other places, provided that a permit is obtained at least 15 days in advance. No permit or permission is required to perform religious rites in a private home. The law also states that religious activities "shall not violate the public peace and order, and shall not disrespect the religious feelings and other freedoms and rights" of other citizens.

Education laws restrict the establishment of all private primary schools, including parochial schools. However, there are no restrictions placed on religious education that takes place in religious spaces such as churches and mosques. Children below the age of 10 years may not receive religious instruction without the permission of their parents or guardians.

The Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups also places some limitations on the collection of contributions by restricting it to places where religious rites and activities are conducted. In practice, these provisions of the law are not enforced.

In May 2005, after a lengthy delay, the Ministry of Justice released a new draft law on religious communities and groups. The draft law proposed a transfer of the responsibility for registering religious groups to the judiciary from the State Commission on Relations with the Religious Communities and Groups. Parliament had taken no action on the legislation by the end of the period covered by this report.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

Government policy and practice contributed to the generally free practice of religion; however, restrictions contained in the Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups continued to be applied to a group known as the Orthodox Archbishopric of Ohrid.

Churches and mosques often are built without the appropriate building permits; however, the Government normally does not take action against religious buildings that lack them. In the past, several Protestant groups have been unable to obtain building permits for new church facilities because of bureaucratic complications that affect all new construction. In October 2004, policemen demolished a small monastery that was being built by members of the Orthodox Archbishopric of Ohrid in Nizepole, near Bitola. The organization's lawyer conceded that the monastery was being constructed without a permit but noted that other buildings in the area, also built without permits, were not destroyed. At the end of the period covered by this report, the OSCE was unable to obtain a copy of the decision by the competent ministry authorizing the monastery's destruction.



The issue of restitution of religious properties expropriated by the former Yugoslav Government had not been fully resolved. Many churches and mosques had extensive grounds or other properties that were expropriated by the communist regime. Some progress was made in restitution of previously state-owned religious property. Virtually all churches and mosques have been returned to the ownership of the appropriate religious community, but that was not the case for many of the other properties. Often restitution or compensation claims are complicated by the fact that the seized properties have changed hands many times or have been developed. In view of the country's very limited financial resources, it was unlikely that religious communities would gain restitution of many of the expropriated properties.

The Bektashi, a Sufi Islamic group, have sued the Government for not reversing the former Yugoslavia's nationalization of the Bektashis' Tetovo compound, the Arabati Baba Tekke. The Bektashi also have filed suit against the Macedonian Islamic Community, armed members of which seized part of the complex in 2002 and continue to occupy the mosque. These disputes were ongoing at the end of the period covered by this report.

### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom, and prominent religious leaders frequently spoke out in support of pluralism and religious tolerance.

Religious differences in the country often correspond with ethnic identity. Specifically, most Muslims are ethnic Albanians. However, there are a number of ethnic Macedonians who are Muslim. Some ethnic Macedonian Muslims contended that the State sometimes confused them with ethnic Albanians and ethnic Turks because of Muslim surnames and mixed marriages and, in some instances, assigned their children to Albanian language classes. However, societal discrimination is more likely to be based upon ethnic bias than upon religious prejudice.

## Turkey

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, the Government imposes some restrictions on Muslim and other religious groups and on Muslim religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions, including universities.

There was some deterioration in respect for religious freedom during the reporting period. The Government's Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) initiated a public campaign against Christian missionary activity in the country. High-level government officials made statements depicting missionaries as a threat. There was also an increase in anti-Christian media coverage. Threats and vandalism against Christians and church facilities increased.

In addition, some Muslims, Christians, and Baha'is faced some restrictions and occasional harassment for alleged proselytizing or holding unauthorized meetings. The State continued to oppose "Islamic fundamentalism." Authorities continued their broad ban on wearing Muslim religious dress in government facilities, including universities, schools, and workplaces.

The generally tolerant relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom in principle; however, a sharp debate continued over the country's definition of "secularism," the proper role of religion in society, and the potential influence of the country's small minority of Islamists.

According to the general perception, Turkish identity is based on the Turkish language and the Islamic faith. Religious minorities say they are effectively blocked from careers in state institutions, a claim supported in a report by a government human rights body. Christians, Baha'is, and some Muslims faced societal suspicion and mistrust, and more radical Islamist elements continued to express anti-Semitic sentiments. Additionally, persons wishing to convert from Islam to another religion sometimes experienced social harassment and violence from relatives and neighbors.

### Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 301,383 square miles, and its population is approximately 70 million. According to the Government, an estimated 99 percent of the population is Muslim, the majority of whom are Sunni. According to the human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) Mazlum-Der and representatives of various religious minority communities, the actual percentage of Muslims is slightly lower. The Government officially recognizes only three minority religious communities--Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian Orthodox Christians, and Jews--although other non-Muslim communities exist. The level of religious observance varies throughout the country, in part due to the influence of secular traditions and official restrictions on religious expression in political and social life.

In addition to the country's Sunni Muslim majority, there are an estimated 7-million Alevis, followers of a belief system that incorporates aspects of both Shi'a and Sunni Islam and draws on the traditions of other religions found in Anatolia as well. Some Alevis practice rituals that include men and women worshipping together through

oratory, poetry, and dance. The Government considers Alevism a heterodox Muslim sect; however, some Alevi and radical Sunnis maintain Alevi are not Muslims.

In several areas of western Anatolia, there is also a small group of Muslims, sometimes referred to by outsiders as Tahtacılar, some of whose practices include rituals with ancient Turkmen (shamanist) roots; some Sunni groups consider these practices to be un-Islamic.

There are several other religious groups, mostly concentrated in Istanbul and other large cities. While exact membership figures are not available, these religious groups include approximately 65,000 Armenian Orthodox Christians, 23,000 Jews, and fewer than 2,500 Greek Orthodox Christians. The Government interprets the 1923 Lausanne Treaty as granting special legal minority status exclusively to these three groups, although the treaty text refers broadly to "non-Muslim minorities" without listing specific groups. However, this recognition does not extend to the religious leadership organs; for example, the Ecumenical and Armenian Patriarchates continue to seek recognition of their legal status.

There also are approximately 10,000 Baha'is, an estimated 15,000 Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians, 5,000 Yezidis, 3,300 Jehovah's Witnesses, 3,000 Protestants, and small, undetermined numbers of Bulgarian, Chaldean, Nestorian, Georgian, Roman Catholic, and Maronite Christians. The number of Syriac Christians in the southeast was once high; however, under pressure from government authorities and later under the impact of the war against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), many Syriacs migrated to Istanbul, Western Europe, or North and South America. Over the last several years, small numbers of Syriacs have returned from overseas to the southeast, mostly from Western Europe. In most return cases, older family members have returned while younger ones have remained abroad.

Christian organizations estimate there are approximately 1,100 Christian missionaries in the country.

## Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

### Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, the Government imposes some restrictions on Muslim and other religious groups and on Muslim religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions, including universities, usually for the stated reason of preserving the "secular state." The Constitution establishes the country as a "secular state" and provides for freedom of belief, freedom of worship, and the private dissemination of religious ideas. However, other constitutional provisions regarding the integrity and existence of the secular state restrict these rights. The Constitution prohibits discrimination on religious grounds. Core institutions of the State, including the Presidency, armed forces, judiciary, and state bureaucracy, have played the role of defending traditional Turkish secularism throughout the history of the Republic. In some cases, elements of the State have opposed policies of the elected government on the grounds that they threatened the secular state.

The Government oversees Muslim religious facilities and education through the Diyanet, which is under the authority of the Prime Ministry. The Diyanet has responsibility for regulating the operation of the country's 75,000 registered mosques and employing local and provincial imams, who are civil servants. Some groups, particularly Alevi, claim that the Diyanet reflects mainstream Sunni Islamic beliefs to the exclusion of other beliefs; however, the Government asserts that the Diyanet treats equally all who request services.

A separate government agency, the General Directorate for Foundations (Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu), regulates some activities of "non Muslim" religious groups and their affiliated churches, monasteries, synagogues, and related religious property. There are 161 "minority foundations" recognized by the Vakiflar, including Greek Orthodox foundations with approximately 70 sites, Armenian Orthodox foundations with approximately 50 sites, and Jewish foundations with 20 sites, as well as Syrian Christian, Chaldean, Bulgarian Orthodox, Georgian, and Maronite foundations. The Vakiflar also regulates Muslim charitable religious foundations, including schools, hospitals, and orphanages.

In 1936, the Government required all foundations to declare their sources of income. In 1974, amid political tensions over Cyprus, the High Court of Appeals ruled that the minority foundations had no right to acquire properties beyond those listed in the 1936 declarations.

The Court's ruling launched a process, continuing today, under which the State has seized control of properties acquired after 1936. The law also allows the State to expropriate properties in areas where the local "non-Muslim" population drops significantly. Minority religious groups, particularly the Greek and Armenian Orthodox communities, have lost numerous properties to the State in the past and continue to fight ongoing efforts by the State to expropriate properties.

The law allows the 161 religious minority foundations recognized by the Vakiflar to acquire property, and the Vakiflar has approved 340 applications by "non-Muslim" foundations to acquire legal ownership of properties. However, the legislation does not allow the communities to reclaim the hundreds of properties affiliated with foundations expropriated by the State over the years. Foundations have also been unable to acquire legal ownership of properties registered under names of third parties, including properties registered under the names of saints or archangels, during periods when foundations could not own property in their own name.

Government authorities do not interfere in matters of doctrine pertaining to "non-Muslim" religions, nor do they restrict the publication or use of religious literature among members of the religion.

There are legal restrictions against insulting any religion recognized by the Government, interfering with that religion's services, or debasing its property.

Alevis freely practice their beliefs and build "Cem houses" (places of gathering), although Cem houses have no legal status as places of worship. Alevis in the Kartal district of Istanbul continued to fight a court battle against a decision by local authorities to deny them permission to build a Cem house. In January, Alevis in the Cankaya district of Ankara applied to acquire property to open a Cem house. Municipal authorities consulted the Diyanet, which issued a letter stating that Alevis in Cankaya did not need a Cem house because they could worship at a local mosque. Also in January, the Diyanet issued a letter to authorities in the Sultanbeyli district of Istanbul stating that Cem houses violate Islamic principles and Turkish law.

Many Alevis allege discrimination in the Government's failure to include any of their doctrines or beliefs in religious instruction classes in public schools. They also charge a bias in the Diyanet, which does not allocate specific funds for Alevi activities or religious leadership.

The Constitution establishes compulsory religious and moral instruction in primary and secondary schools. Religious minorities are exempted. However, some religious minorities—such as Protestants—face difficulty obtaining exemptions, particularly if their identification cards do not list a religion other than Islam. The Government claims the religion courses cover the range of world religions; however, religious minorities say the

courses reflect Sunni Islamic doctrine, which, they maintain, explains why "non-Muslims" are exempt.

An Alevi parent in January 2004 filed suit in the European Court of Human Rights charging that the mandatory religion courses violate religious freedom; the case was ongoing at the end of the period covered by this report. In a June 2004 report, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance recommended that the Government either make the courses optional or revise the content so that they genuinely and fairly cover all religions.

Officially recognized religious minorities may operate schools under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. Such schools are required to appoint a Muslim as deputy principal; reportedly these deputies have more authority than their nominal supervisors. The curriculum of these schools includes Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish instruction. In May 2004, the Education Ministry stated that children with "non-Muslim" mothers could attend minority schools; previously, only those with "non-Muslim" fathers were permitted.

The Caferis, the country's principal Shi'a community numbering between 500,000 and 1 million (concentrated mostly in eastern Turkey and Istanbul), do not face restrictions on their religious freedoms. They are free to build and operate their own mosques and to appoint their own imams; however, as with the Alevis, the Diyanet does not allocate funds for this purpose. The Caferis claim to have faced discrimination and repression in the past, but such incidents reportedly have been rare in recent years.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

Government policy and practice contributed to the generally free practice of religion; however, state policy imposes some restrictions on religious groups and on religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions, including universities.

"Secularists" in the military, judiciary, and other branches of the bureaucracy continued to wage campaigns against what they label as proponents of "Islamic fundamentalism." These groups view "religious fundamentalism," which they do not define clearly, but which they assert is an attempt to impose the rule of Shari'a law in all civil and criminal matters, as a threat to the "secular State." The National Security Council (NSC) categorizes religious fundamentalism as a threat to public safety.

According to Mazlum-Der and other groups, some government ministries have dismissed or barred from promotion civil servants suspected of anti-state or Islamist activities. Reports by Mazlum-Der, the media, and others indicated that the military sometimes dismisses religiously observant Muslims from military service. Such dismissals were based on behavior that military officials believed identified these individuals as Islamic fundamentalists, which they were concerned could indicate disloyalty to the secular State.

According to Mazlum-Der, the military charged individuals with lack of discipline for activities that included performing Muslim prayers or being married to women who wore headscarves. According to the military, officers and NCOs were sometimes dismissed for maintaining ties to Islamic fundamentalist organizations, despite repeated warnings from superior officers.

In February, a military court reportedly dismissed the deputy commander of the Jandarma Command in Ardahan for worshipping at a mosque while wearing his uniform. Mystical Sufi and other religious-social orders (tarikats) and lodges (cemaats) have been banned officially since the mid 1920s; however, tarikats and cemaats remain active and widespread. Some prominent political and social leaders continue to associate with tarikats, cemaats, and other Islamic communities.



Under the law, religious services may take place only in designated places of worship. Municipal codes mandate that only the Government can designate a place of worship, and if a religion has no legal standing in the country, it may not be eligible for a designated site. "Non-Muslim" religious services, especially for religious groups that do not own property recognized by the Vakiflar, often take place on diplomatic property or in private apartments. Police occasionally bar Christians from holding services in private apartments, and prosecutors have opened cases against Christians for holding unauthorized gatherings.

Members of the St. Paul Union Church Association continued to try to purchase an abandoned church building in Antalya. The Foreign Ministry has been reviewing the purchase agreement since 2001.

In September 2004, Bodrum police closed a Protestant church and confiscated its signs under orders from the Governor. Authorities reopened the church several days later.

Protestants in Tarsus claimed they were subject to repeated threats and harassment, including from individual law enforcement officials and municipal officials, during the reporting period.

In May, the High Board of Radio and Television ordered a program of the Christian station Radyo Shema off the air for one episode as punishment for a broadcast it deemed "discriminatory." Christians affiliated with the station said the broadcast featured only passages read directly from the Bible. In June, the High Court of Appeals reportedly annulled the decision to sanction the station.

In September 2004, Parliament adopted a law prohibiting imams, priests, rabbis, or other religious leaders from "reproaching or vilifying" the Government or the laws of the State while performing their duties. Violations are punishable by prison terms of 1 month to 1 year, or 3 months to 2 years if the crime involves inciting others to disobey the law.

The authorities continue to monitor the activities of Eastern Orthodox churches but generally do not interfere with their activities. The Government does not recognize the ecumenical status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, acknowledging him only as the head of the country's dwindling Greek Orthodox community. High-level government leaders often assert publicly that use of the term "ecumenical" in reference to the Patriarch violates the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. However, government officials privately acknowledge that Lausanne does not address the issue.

As a result, the Government has long maintained that only citizens of the country can be members of the Church's Holy Synod and participate in Patriarchal elections. Members of the Greek Orthodox community said these restrictions threaten the survival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul, because, with fewer than 2,500 Greek Orthodox left in the country, the community is becoming too small to maintain the institution.

In March 2004, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I appointed six non-Turkish-citizen metropolitans to the Holy Synod, representing the first time in the 80-year history of the country that noncitizens had been appointed to the body. Government officials said they were conducting a legal analysis of the appointments.

The Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul continues to seek to reopen the Halki seminary on the island of Heybeli in the Sea of Marmara. The Government closed the seminary in 1971, when the State nationalized all private institutions of higher learning. Under existing restrictions, religious communities other than Sunni Muslims cannot legally train new clergy in the country for eventual leadership. Coreligionists from outside the country have been permitted to assume leadership positions in some cases, but in general all religious community leaders, including Patriarchs and Chief Rabbis, must be citizens.



In November 2004, the High Court of Appeals upheld the Vakiflar's February 2004 expropriation of an orphanage on the Prince's Islands that had belonged to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In April, the Patriarchate filed an appeal with the European Court of Human Rights.

The Armenian Orthodox community continued a legal battle against the Government's expropriation of properties belonging to the Yedikule Surp Pirgic Armenian Hospital Foundation in Istanbul. In March, the Treasury attempted to sell a building expropriated from the foundation to a private company, but the Finance Ministry blocked the sale. The European Court of Human Rights continued proceedings related to the appeal by the Armenian Orthodox community of the 1999 expropriation of two other foundation properties.

No law explicitly prohibits proselytizing or religious conversions; however, many prosecutors and police regard proselytizing and religious activism with suspicion. Police occasionally bar Christians from handing out religious literature. Proselytizing is often considered socially unacceptable; Christians performing missionary work are sometimes beaten and insulted. If the proselytizers are foreigners, they may be deported, but generally they are able to reenter the country. Police officers may report students who meet with Christian missionaries to their families or to university authorities.

The Government waged a public campaign against Christian missionary activity. The Diyanet drafted an anti-missionary sermon and distributed it to imams. The sermon, delivered in mosques across the country in March, depicted missionaries as part of a plot by foreign powers to "steal the beliefs of our young people and children." The sermon also implied that Christians are polytheists.

State Minister Mehmet Aydin, who oversees the Diyanet, issued a written statement in response to a question in January from a parliamentarian about missionaries. In the statement, Aydin calls missionary activity "separatist and destructive" and claims that, "history, as well as contemporary developments, have demonstrated that missionary activities are not an innocent act of communicating one's religion or exercising religious freedom, but a highly planned movement with political motives." Aydin also advised citizens to report missionary activity to authorities.

Interior Minister Abdulkadir Aksu issued a similarly argued statement, in which he reported that 344 persons had informed authorities that they had changed their religion between 1997 and 2004; 338 converted from Islam to Christianity and 6 from Islam to Judaism.

In June, three Selcuk University faculty members spoke at a conference in Adana on "Armenian Issues and Missionary Activities." The speakers reportedly depicted both Armenians and missionaries as threats, with one faculty member warning the audience that missionaries seek to "divide Turkey."

Also in June, the Diyanet published a book on missionaries in which the author states that "missionaries and the Crusades are related." The author further claims that Muslims throughout history have never tried to convert "non-Muslims" and have only explained their beliefs "in an honest fashion," whereas Christian missionaries have used "all means, including the use of sheer force." The Diyanet distributed the book free of charge to parliamentarians and students.

By the end of the reporting period, there was no verdict in the trial proceedings in the case of three members of the Nationalist Movement Party who severely beat Yakup Cindilli, a convert to Christianity, for distributing New Testaments in Bursa Province in 2003.

Authorities continued to enforce a long-term ban on the wearing of headscarves at universities and by civil servants in public buildings. Women who wear headscarves and persons who actively show support for those who defy the ban have been disciplined or have lost their jobs in the public sector as nurses and teachers. Students who wear head coverings are officially not permitted to register for classes, although some faculty members permit students to wear head coverings in class.

Many secularists accuse Islamists of using advocacy for wearing the headscarf as a political tool and say they fear that efforts to repeal the headscarf ban will lead to pressure against women who choose not to wear a head covering.

Opponents of the headscarf ban staged a number of nonviolent protests against the policy during the reporting period. In May, an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 persons attended an Ankara demonstration against the headscarf ban.

In March, the High Court of Appeals upheld the conviction and 20-month prison sentence of Mehmet Sevket Eygi for writing against the headscarf ban. The court in its ruling argued that freedom of speech is subordinate to the protection of public order in democracies, and it maintained that Eygi's criticism of the headscarf ban and its supporters constituted "hatred and animosity."

In May, Constitutional Court President Mustafa Bumin and Speaker of Parliament Bulent Arinc engaged in a sharp, public dispute over the headscarf ban. Bumin asserted in a speech that the Constitutional Court would annul any parliamentary legislation aimed at lifting the ban; Arinc replied that Parliament has the authority to close the Court.

A 1997 law made 8 years of secular education compulsory. After completing the 8 years, students may pursue study at imam hatip (Islamic preacher) high schools, which cover both the standard high school curriculum and Islamic theology and practice. Imam hatip schools are classified as vocational, and graduates of vocational schools face an automatic reduction in their university entrance exam grades if they apply for university programs outside their field of high school specialization. This reduction effectively bars imam hatip graduates from enrolling in university programs other than theology. Many pious Turks criticize the religious instruction provided in the regular schools as inadequate. Most families who enroll their children in imam hatip schools do so to expose them to more extensive religious education, not to train them as imams.

Only the Diyanet is authorized to provide religion courses outside of school, although clandestine private courses do exist. Students who complete 5 years of primary school may enroll in Diyanet Qur'an classes on weekends and during summer vacation. Many Qur'an courses function unofficially. Only children 12 and older legally may register for official Qur'an courses, and Mazlum-Der reports that police often raid illegal courses for younger children. According to Mazlum-Der, in 2 separate incidents in March, law enforcement authorities raided a Qur'an course in Kabala, Mardin Province, detaining 30 persons, and a course in Tarakli, Sakarya Province, detaining 3 persons.

In June, Parliament adopted a law reducing the prison term for those convicted of operating illegal educational courses and allowing courts to issue fines instead of prison sentences. The law would apply to illegal Qur'an courses.

In September 2004, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses requested legal recognition as a religious association. They were informed that association status could be given, but it would remain illegal for anyone who was not part of the association to attend religious meetings. The Jehovah's Witnesses, unable to accept these terms, did not submit their request.

Jehovah's Witnesses reported continuing official harassment of their worship services because they are not members of an officially recognized religion. In June, authorities

sealed a Kingdom Hall (place of worship) used by members of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Akcay, Balikesir Province.

Restoration or construction may be carried out in buildings and monuments considered "ancient" only with authorization of the regional board on the protection of cultural and national wealth. Bureaucratic procedures and considerations relating to historic preservation in the past have impeded repairs to religious facilities, especially in the case of Syrian Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox properties. Groups are prohibited from using funds from their properties in one part of the country to support their existing population in another part of the country.

Religious affiliation is listed on national identity cards. Some religious groups, such as the Baha'i, are unable to state their religion on their cards because their religion is not included among the options; they have made their concerns known to the Government. There were reports that authorities have become more flexible regarding the religious affiliation that may be listed. In September 2004, an Ankara court approved the application of a family requesting permission to leave the religion portion of their children's identity cards blank until they reach 18 years of age.

There were reports that local officials harassed some persons who converted from Islam to another religion when they sought to amend their cards. Some "non Muslims" maintained that listing religious affiliation on the cards exposes them to discrimination and harassment.

In October 2004, the Government's Human Rights Consultation Board issued a report on minorities, which stated that "non-Muslims" are effectively barred from careers in state institutions such as the armed forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police, and the National Intelligence Agency. Without refuting its findings, a number of government officials harshly criticized the report, and Ankara prosecutors opened an investigation against the report's principal authors. There were no developments in the investigation at the end of the reporting period. Members of minority religious communities confirmed the report's conclusions. They said "non-Muslim" citizens are viewed as foreigners, and are therefore considered unqualified to represent the state.

In March, the High Court of Appeals upheld an Istanbul court's June 2003 acquittal of 13 Ahmadi Muslims charged under the Anti-Terrorism Law.

There were no reports of religious detainees or prisoners.

#### Forced Religious Conversion

There were no reports of forced religious conversion, including of minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the United States.

#### Abuses By Terrorist Organizations

There were no reports of abuse targeted at specific religions by terrorist organizations during the reporting period.

At the end of the reporting period, court proceedings continued in the Istanbul trial of 69 suspects charged in connection with the November 2003 terrorist bombings of two synagogues, the British Consulate, and a bank.

In an incident that arose out of the bombings, a court case was opened in September 2004 against the 17-year-old son of one of the alleged perpetrators and two journalists on anti-Semitism charges. The charges stemmed from an interview with the daily *Milliyet* in which the youth said, "The attacks did not touch the hearts of the members of my family because the target was Jews," and, "If Muslims hadn't been killed, we would have

been happy. We don't like Jews." Two Milliyet journalists were charged with providing a platform for incitement against members of another religion. Trial proceedings in the cases continued at the end of the reporting period.

#### Improvements and Positive Developments in Respect for Religious Freedom

In September 2004, the Governor and Jandarma officials in Sirnak Province evicted members of a civil defense force known as the village guards who were preventing a group of Syriac Christians from returning to their homes. The Syriacs, who fled due to the PKK conflict, returned and found 20 village guards occupying their homes in the village of Sarikoy. The Sirnak Governor cut off electricity to the village, and Jandarma officers evacuated the village and disarmed the village guards. The Syriacs reportedly paid local authorities \$93,700 for the relocation effort.

Also in September, Parliament adopted a law that prohibits forcing persons to declare or change their religious, political, or philosophical beliefs or preventing them from expressing or spreading such beliefs. The law specifically prohibits the use of force or threats to prevent persons from gathering for worship or religious ceremonies. Violations of the law are punishable with 1 to 3 years in prison.

In November 2004, a local board charged with protecting cultural and historic sites approved the application of the Diyarbakir Evangelical Church to have its property zoned as a place of worship, reversing its May 2004 ruling against the Church.

Local authorities for the first time allowed the Syriac community to hold a Syriac New Year celebration. Members of the Syriac community said more than 3,000 visitors from Europe, Iraq, and Syria attended the event, held April 1 in Midyat, Mardin Province.

In June, the Council of State, a high administrative appeals court, ruled that the Batikent Protestant Church in Ankara is entitled to receive water from the municipality at no cost. The court determined that the municipality had been violating the principle of equality by supplying free water to mosques but not churches. A lower court had rejected the church's request for free water.

In June, members of the Baha'i community received written notification that they would be permitted to renovate a sacred property in Edirne.

#### Section III. Societal Attitudes

The officially tolerant relationship among religions in society contributes to religious freedom; however, some Muslims, Christians, Baha'is, and other religious communities face societal suspicion and mistrust. Jews and Christians from most denominations freely practice their religions and report little discrimination in daily life. However, citizens who convert from Islam to another religion often experience some form of social harassment or pressure from family and neighbors. Proselytizing on behalf of "non-Muslim" religions is socially unacceptable and sometimes dangerous. A variety of newspapers and television shows regularly publish and broadcast anti-Christian messages, and government officials have asserted that missionary activity is not covered under the concept of religious freedom.

Religious pluralism is widely viewed as a threat to Islam and to "national unity." Nationalist sentiments sometimes contain anti-Christian or anti-Semitic overtones.

In September 2004, an estimated 1,000 protestors gathered outside the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul and burned an effigy of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I. The protest was organized by the youth wing of the Nationalist Movement Party, whose leaders accused the Patriarch of interfering in internal politics by commenting on religious



reform and the country's EU candidacy. In October 2004, unknown persons threw a homemade bomb over the wall of the Patriarchate; the bomb blew out several windows and damaged the roof of the cathedral. Police provided protection for the Christian religious leaders following these incidents.

In November 2004, three assailants broke into the office of an expatriate Protestant in Gaziantep, threatened him with a gun and knife, bound and gagged him, and told him he had to leave the country because of his religious activities.

Also in November 2004, approximately 40 members of an extreme nationalist organization raided a Christian music concert in Tarsus.

There was a significant increase in anti-Christian media coverage following the distribution of Bibles in December 2004 by missionaries in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. ATV, for example, broadcast a report in January mixing coverage of a Protestant church with footage of a sex cult. In May, the Islamist daily *Yeni Safak* published an interview with a person who claimed missionaries were using hypnosis to convert Muslims. The negative publicity coincided with the Government's anti-missionary campaign, and was followed by an increase in threats against Christians and attacks on churches.

In December 2004, unknown individuals set fire to a wall outside the Izmit Protestant Church. In February, assailants threw a Molotov cocktail into the upper floor of the church.

In January, a group of 60 to 70 nationalists gathered outside Dirilis Protestant Church in Istanbul, chanted slogans, vandalized the premises, and beat the landlord when he confronted them. Police subsequently refused to provide protection for the church on the grounds that the property is not an officially registered place of worship. Police later detained three suspects believed to have participated in the protest.

In April, unknown assailants detonated percussion bombs outside the Protestant Fellowship office in Gaziantep and in front of the home of a Fellowship member. Fellowship members also received threatening letters.

In April, unknown assailants smashed the windows of the International Protestant Church of Ankara and threw two Molotov cocktails into the building, damaging the carpet and walls. The church was empty at the time. One month before the attack, the church received an email from a group threatening to kill Christians.

In April, Syrians who had recently returned from abroad to the village of Sari discovered an explosive device in an orchard where they were planning to re-start cultivation. In June, a landmine exploded in the village of Harabele as a car carrying a Syriac bishop and two others passed by. No one was injured in the explosion. The vehicle passengers were working to assist the return of Syrians from abroad. No suspects were identified in either case. Members of the Syriac community said the bomb incidents discouraged Syrians abroad from returning to the country.

Members of the Syriac community said local villagers, particularly village guards, often occupied the homes of Syrians who fled the country, refusing to leave when Syrians attempted to return. The village guards are a civil defense force of approximately 58,000, mostly in the southeast. They are reputed to be the least disciplined of the security forces and are often accused of drug trafficking, rape, corruption, theft, and other human rights abuses.

According to the Syriac community, more than 50 unoccupied Syriac homes have been destroyed in the village of Bardakci, Mardin Province, since 2000. The majority of the village's Syriac residents fled the region in the mid-1980s. One of the village's two Syriac

churches has been converted into a mosque, without consulting with the Syriac community.

In May, unknown individuals painted a red swastika on the apartment door of a Protestant pastor in Izmit and left a threatening letter.

Also in May, a Christian couple in Kayseri received two e-mails from an unknown party threatening to kill them because of their religious faith.

During the reporting period, Adolf Hitler's "Mein Kampf" climbed to the top 10 on the bestseller lists of some of the country's major bookstore chains. In February, the Islamist daily *Vakit* published crude cartoons depicting German Interior Minister Otto Schily covered with Swastikas and Stars of David. The cartoons were published in protest of the German Government's decision to close the paper's European edition for its articles denying the Holocaust.

Trial proceedings continued in the appeal of Kerim Akbas, who was convicted in 2004 for TV broadcasts inciting violence against Christians.

Members of the secular establishment fear the influence of Islamism and reject the involvement of even moderate Islam in politics.

During the observance of Ramadan in October-November 2004, there were reportedly several incidents of university students attacking students who were not fasting in accordance with Islamic tradition. In October, the rector of Gaziosmanpasa University in Tokat opened an investigation against 10 students and a faculty member in connection with such attacks. In November 2004, police intervened after fasting students at Ankara University attacked nonfasting students, according to press reports.

Iftar dinners, evening events tied to the daily breaking of the Ramadan fast, often involve invitations to religious and secular leaders of various faiths. Iftars hosted by diplomats, as well as business and religious leaders, may include invitations to people of other faiths as a sign of openness and hospitality.



## Documentary appendix on Islamist extremism in the European Union (EU-25 + acceding countries + candidate countries) (Excerpts from “Country Reports on Terrorism”, United States Department of State)

Country Reports on Terrorism  
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism  
April 28, 2006

### **Austria**

Austria has made efforts to tighten controls on suspected terrorism financing and fulfilled its obligations to asset freeze decisions pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions and EU Clearinghouse designations. However, it failed to initiate any freezing actions independently. Austria's legal and institutional framework include comprehensive money laundering and terrorist financing legislation consistent with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations.

Through November, the Austrian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and the Federal Agency for State Protection and Counterterrorism (BVT) received 24 reports on suspected terrorism financing transactions. This was a significant increase over 2004, and was largely due to improved banking control mechanisms and better international cooperation.

A legislative package introduced in July earmarked 105 million euros for terrorism prevention measures and related research through the year 2013; five million euros were earmarked for the year 2005.

Austria amended its immigration laws to have more restrictive legal tools against foreign visa holders suspected of terrorist links and extremist preaching and incitement. Austria began an investigation into potential terrorist recruitment in prisons and refugee camps, a concern that followed a 2004 surge of Chechen asylum seekers.

In the wake of the London bombings, the Interior Ministry's intelligence arm, the Federal Agency for State Protection and Counterterrorism (BVT), stepped up surveillance of suspected Islamic extremists. The BVT singled out a handful of suspected extremist mosques in Vienna for increased monitoring. It continued surveillance of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement and of suspected Afghan extremists entering Austria as asylum seekers.

Austria maintained four police instructors at the Iraqi Police Academy in Jordan to help train Iraqi police. In Afghanistan, Austria temporarily deployed 93 soldiers to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help provide security for the September elections. Additionally, Austria committed four liaison officers to the ISAF headquarters in Kabul and two advisors to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

Together with the United States and the EU, Austria operated two counterterrorism-related training programs for countries in Central Asia: the Central Asian Border Initiative (CABSI) and the Vienna Central Asia Initiative (VICA).

Austria pledged a total of US \$1 million for the period between 2002 and 2006 to the UN program to combat terrorism. It is a major donor country to the United Nations' Vienna-based counterterrorism and anti-drug office, the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP).

## **Belgium**

Overall awareness of the terrorist threat to Belgium increased this past year, partly in reaction to the London bombings, but also in response to home-grown threats to Belgian security. The London bombings intensified Belgium's continuing effort to improve cooperation with foreign security agencies. Belgian police continue to work directly with such agencies both in neighboring and more distant countries. In addition to long-standing arrangements with police in Germany, France, and the other two Benelux nations, Belgium now has cooperation agreements with Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Cooperation with the United States also continued to improve under the efforts of Belgian Interior Minister Dewael. Belgian authorities stressed the need for more information sharing in order to move legally against suspected terrorists.

Consequently, the government was active on a number of fronts, including enforcement, internal coordination, development of legislation, and consequence management. Belgian authorities responded more aggressively to activities inside the country's borders with investigations, raids, arrests, and use of new counterterrorism legislation. Prosecutors are also seeking lengthier sentences in ongoing trials under the counterterrorism law.

Belgium is an active partner in the Department of Homeland Security's Container Security Initiative for the ports of Antwerp and Zeebrugge, and on port security in general.

Belgian authorities remained concerned about potential terrorist activities by groups from Algeria and North Africa. The government targeted investigations against the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), and a nebulous Islamic extremist network operating out of several provinces, including Charleroi, that is suspected of connections with the November 9 suicide attack in Iraq by a Belgian woman. Two leading Kongra-Gel (KGK)-affiliated media production studios, BRD Corporation Media Production Company and Roj-NV, are co-located in Belgium.

On November 9, Belgium began the trial of 13 defendants linked to the GICM, using for the first time its 2003 counterterrorism law criminalizing terrorist acts and membership in terrorist groups. The trial, expected to last several months, is the result of arrests made in 2004 by Belgian counterterrorism police. This series of raids throughout Belgium dismantled a network that is believed to have supported the 2004 bombings in Casablanca and Madrid and that also is suspected of attempting to recruit fighters to support attacks against American interests in Iraq.

Belgian judicial authorities continued prosecution of a case against 11 DHKP/C members charged with belonging to a criminal organization, arms possession, forgery, and use of forged documents. Turkish authorities alleged that one of the suspects, Fehriye Erdal, was involved in the 1996 murder of Ozdemir Sabanci, an influential business executive in Turkey. The chairman and the secretary of the then-DHKP/C headquarters in Belgium were charged under the 2003 counterterrorism legislation with belonging to a terrorist organization.

On November 30, Belgian federal police made 14 additional arrests on terrorism charges in the aftermath of a November 9 suicide attack by a Belgian woman against American forces in Iraq. Police conducted numerous searches in Brussels, Charleroi, Tongeren, and Antwerp, and seized large quantities of documents, computers, and other material. Six of those arrested were held and charged under the 2003 counterterrorism legislation for providing support to a terrorist organization.

Belgian authorities alleged that those arrested in connection with the attack in Iraq were using Belgium as a platform for recruiting and transporting volunteer fighters to Iraq. According to Federal Prosecutor Daniel Bernard, the suicide attack inside Iraq prompted authorities to speed up what had been an investigation lasting more than four months and involving several Belgian and foreign security services. Public awareness of the presence of terrorist-affiliated support networks on Belgian soil has grown. The Belgian Government has moved energetically against these networks, including the investigation and prosecution noted above. It also has disrupted untraced money flows through such alternative remittance systems as phone shops.

Belgium continued to respond fully to EU and UN Security Council actions to freeze suspected terrorist assets. The burden of proof on judges is relatively high, however. In order to constitute a criminal offense, authorities must demonstrate that the support was given with the knowledge that it would contribute to the commission of a crime by the terrorist group. Further, an FATF mutual evaluation found that Belgian law was out of compliance with FATF standards on asset freezing and does not establish a national capacity for designating foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). Belgian authorities must demonstrate in each case that the group given support actually constitutes a terrorist group.

Belgium's greatest contribution in military terms to the global war on terror was to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, with a troop presence of 300 in 2005. Belgium planned to expand its technical assistance efforts in Iraq, and began implementing Iraqi debt forgiveness within the framework of Paris Club agreements.

## **Bulgaria**

Bulgarian responses to terrorism included numerous official public statements, efforts to assist with international terrorism investigations, and participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Bulgaria's support consisted of 75 military personnel, including staff officers, a mechanized infantry platoon, and military instructors. In addition, one Bulgarian battalion with 386 personnel served in Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA) was charged with inspecting financial institutions and investigating transactions valued at or above 30,000 Bulgarian lev (approximately U.S.\$ 18,750). It remained vigilant against terrorist financing and continued to cooperate with the U.S. Government in identifying terrorist assets. The FIA distributed lists of

individuals and organizations linked to terrorism to all banks in Bulgaria, the Ministry of Interior, Customs, and the Border Police. The FIA coordinated information received on searches for persons and entities named in Executive Order 13224 lists. It also provided feedback, including information on the response level of Bulgarian banks, to the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), as well as to the U.S. Embassy. In addition, the FIA provided statistics to the United States on suspicious transactions that were referred to the Prosecutor General for further action.

## **Croatia**

Croatia backed up its stated commitment to the global war on terror with concrete contributions. It deployed to Afghanistan the sixth rotation of a 50-person military contingent, attached to the ISAF, that included 43 Military Police personnel assigned to a multinational MP company. In addition, Croatia deployed a three-person team of one diplomat and two civilian police to the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Feyzabad, and a four-person team to a combined medical unit.

## **Cyprus**

Cyprus generally supported international efforts to block and freeze terrorist assets, implemented Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, and conformed to EU directives on counterterrorism. The Cypriot Government drafted legislation to restructure, modernize, and strengthen Cyprus' Central Intelligence Service (KYP) for the first time since the Republic was founded.

Cyprus' legal framework for investigating and prosecuting terrorist-related activity remained weak. There was some debate about possible amendments to the Cypriot constitution, but no political consensus has yet developed.

Although Cypriot law enforcement and intelligence services were generally cooperative on counterterrorism, legal and constitutional restrictions made it difficult for Cyprus to investigate and prosecute terrorism-related activities effectively. A recent change to evidentiary law allows the introduction of hearsay evidence in court proceedings, but information obtained through wiretaps and direct surveillance is prohibited. Further changes to strengthen the laws of evidence would make a real difference, but this likely would require amending the constitution. Meanwhile, Cyprus is working on a number of laws that could strengthen counterterrorism capabilities. These include new legislation aimed at modernizing and restructuring the Cypriot Central Intelligence Service (KYP) and a new law on arms brokering intended to bring Cypriot practices in line with an EU common position.

In July, the Government of Cyprus and the United States signed a ship boarding agreement under the auspices of the Proliferation Security Initiative. The Cypriot Parliament ratified the agreement in November. This was the United States' first such agreement with an EU member state. With the world's ninth largest commercial fleet, Cyprus is a strong ally in U.S. efforts to regulate international maritime traffic to reduce the risk of both WMD proliferation and terrorism. Cypriot Government officials made significant improvements to Cyprus' offshore industry regulation as a result of efforts to bring Cypriot law and practice into accordance with EU requirements. Cyprus was also an

advocate for the completion of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) and followed the EU position on the text.

The United States and Cyprus cooperated closely on issues related to terrorist finance and money laundering. The U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the Cypriot Financial Intelligence Unit (MOKAS) signed a Memorandum of Understanding designed to formalize and enhance their historically excellent relations.

Although Cyprus established an effective legal framework with regard to export controls - with Cyprus Customs as the lead enforcement entity -- it did not establish a cohesive export control system. Police and customs officers need additional training in areas of basic inspection, equipment utilization, and familiarization.

## **Czech Republic**

Whether providing military assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan or assisting the United States in routine investigations, the Czech Republic proved itself a reliable partner in preventing possible terrorist activity.

In October, the Czech Parliament ratified the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. This action marked the final step in providing the Czech Government the appropriate legal, regulatory, and statutory mechanisms to combat terrorist financiers more effectively.

Pursuant to a U.S. arrest warrant and INTERPOL Red Notice, Czech authorities in December arrested Oussama Kassir, a Lebanese-born Swedish national, while he was in transit from Stockholm to Lebanon. Kassir was wanted in the United States on allegations that he had conspired to provide material support to terrorists in the planned establishment of a terrorist training camp in Bly, Oregon. At the end of 2005, Kassir remained in Czech custody pending extradition to the United States.

## **Denmark**

Acting under provisions of its 2002 counterterrorism law, Danish authorities made several arrests on terrorism-related charges. In the fall, Danish police arrested seven persons on suspicion of planning a suicide attack in Europe. At year's end, Danish prosecutors were still holding and considering whether to press charges against five of the detainees. The Danish Government's actions were related to the Bosnian police's arrests of a Swede and a Danish citizen of Turkish origin. Both were accused of possessing a significant quantity of explosives.

In September, Danish police also arrested Said Mansour, a Danish citizen originally from Morocco, on charges of distributing terrorist recruiting materials. At year's end, police were also reportedly investigating possible links between Mansour and the five persons still detained on suspicion of planning a suicide attack in Europe. He remained in police custody at the end of the year, pending trial. Mansour previously served a 90-day sentence from December 2004 on weapons possession charges.



Danish prosecutors pressed charges against the Danish NGO "Revolt" (Opror) after the group's spokesman, Patrick MacManus, informed local media that the group had raised and transferred funds to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In December, the Danish Justice Minister announced that Danish prosecutors would press charges against the Danish chapter of al-Aqsa for raising funds for HAMAS.

The Danish Government cooperated with regional and international terrorist fora. Within the European Union, it implemented the designation of terrorist organizations through its obligations under the EU's terrorism finance, UNSCR 1267, and Clearinghouse mechanisms. Denmark continued to deploy more than 500 military personnel in southern Iraq to assist with security and reconstruction efforts, and contributed more than 170 military personnel to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Denmark also chaired the UN Security Council's Counterterrorism Committee in 2005.

## **Estonia**

Numerous Estonian police, security, rescue, and emergency response agencies participated in a large U.S.-funded (International Counterproliferation Program) two-week counterterrorism/non-proliferation exercise from October 27 to November 4. The exercise was showcased to representatives and observers from Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, France, Britain, and Sweden.

Estonia contributed explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan operating in Kabul. In December, Parliament renewed the Afghanistan troop mandate for up to two years and increased the limit on Estonian participation by 150 troops to support a UK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in southern Afghanistan. In Iraq, the Estonian infantry platoon ESTPLA-11 was stationed in Baghdad under the command of the 1st Armored Division of the U.S. Army. In December, Parliament renewed the mandate of Estonian troops in Iraq for 12 months. Estonia contributed to the NATO training mission in Iraq, donated 50,000 euros to the NATO Iraq Fund, and had two constitutional experts on call to support the drafting of Iraq's constitution.

## **Finland**

Finland remained strongly committed to Afghan reconstruction; the government aimed to provide 10 million euros in development and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan on an annual basis. Approximately 100 Finnish troops were deployed in Afghanistan in support of ongoing ISAF operations, and a number of Finnish civilian crisis management experts were working in Afghanistan as well.

Interior Minister Rajamaki visited Washington in July for discussions with Justice and Homeland Security officials, and other Finnish officials participated in training courses in the United States. Finland actively supported and took part in European Union counterterrorism efforts, and participated in a number of EU and OSCE-sponsored events.

New regulations entered into force on October 1, requiring ships to submit security-related information prior to entry into port. Finland signed a Mutual Legal Assistance



Treaty (MLAT) with the United States in late 2004. The treaty is awaiting ratification by the Finnish Parliament.

Finnish security police maintained a dedicated counterterrorism unit. Finland has national authority to freeze terrorist assets. The Money Laundering Clearinghouse performed investigations on all individuals suspected of financing terrorist acts, including all individuals and entities on the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list. In the event that such assets are identified, they can be immediately frozen while a criminal investigation occurs either in Finland or abroad.

In cases when another government presented a legal request for action or when an individual or organization was suspected of having committed an offense within Finland's borders, Finland implemented regulations that allowed it to freeze assets without EU or UN approval. Finland amended its criminal code to make it possible to sentence leaders of terrorist groups to 15 years in jail, although the group has to have actually committed an act of terrorism in Finland before investigation or prosecution can begin. If the charge includes murder, the maximum sentence is life imprisonment.

## **France**

France continued to uncover and dismantle terror networks present on its soil, including several that recruited terrorists to Iraq. Following the London bombings, French officials worked closely with their British counterparts. Perceiving a number of deficiencies in their counterterrorism capabilities, France proposed legislation to remedy these deficiencies. Since March, the French Government has been drafting a white book on terrorism.

At the political and diplomatic level, France continued its engagement within the UNSC Counterterrorism Committee and the G8's Counterterrorism Action Group. On the military front, its Special Forces participated in counterterrorist operations in Afghanistan and as a part of Task Force 150, a multinational naval force that patrolled the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to interdict the movement of suspected terrorists between Afghanistan and the Arabian Peninsula. In Afghanistan, French Mirage-2000 fighters flew with USAF fighters to assist American and Afghan ground troops.

France continued to develop the competencies and capabilities of TRACFIN, the Ministry of Finance's terrorism financing coordination and investigation unit. Within the European Union, France played an active role in the Clearinghouse, the EU process for designating terrorist organizations under UNSCR 1373. France has not designated HAMAS-affiliated charities, such as the French-based *Comite de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens*, arguing that they have no proven links to terrorism. France also opposed EU designation of Lebanese Hizballah as a terrorist organization, although it supported Hizballah's eventual disarmament, which it maintained would result in Hizballah's gradual integration into Lebanese politics.

France cooperated closely with the United States in pressing for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559. This resolution reaffirmed a call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon; it also called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.

The government continued its policy of expulsion for non-French citizens engaged in activities that promoted hate. Interior Minister Sarkozy announced October 4 that 19 Islamic extremists had been expelled from France since the beginning of the year; 102 have been expelled since 2002. In March, the CSA, France's equivalent of the FCC, ordered the Eutelsat satellite company to cease transmitting Sahar 1, an Iranian

television station, because of its anti-Semitic and hate-filled broadcasting. Following the CSA's banning of Hizballah-affiliated al-Manar satellite television, Hizballah deputies lobbied the French Government in 2005 to lift the ban. Separately, the Conseil d'Etat, France's highest administrative court, reviewed an appeal by al-Manar to reinstate its broadcasting license.

French officials were concerned about the role of prisons in converting petty criminals into terrorists. Prisons served as a center of recruitment for the Safe Bourrada terror network that was dismantled in late September. According to statistics provided by the Ministry of Justice in September, 358 people are imprisoned for terrorism; of these, 159 are Basque-related, 94 are Islamic extremists, and 76 are Corsica-related.

Under French law, terrorism suspects may be detained for up to 96 hours before charges are filed. The new bill proposed extending the 96-hour period an additional 48 hours, for a maximum total detention of six days. Suspects can be held for up to three and a half years in pretrial detention while the investigation against them continues. Other measures in the bill included increasing the maximum penalty for association with a terrorist enterprise from ten to 20 years in prison, and increasing the maximum penalty for terrorist enterprise organizers from 20 to 30 years in prison. The National Assembly approved the bill in late November.

On January 26, French police arrested 11 people, three of whom eventually were charged with terrorism conspiracy, in Paris' 19th arrondissement for reportedly recruiting young French residents to launch terrorist attacks in Iraq. It was the first arrest since the opening in September 2004 of an investigation by the Paris prosecutor's office into "Jihadists to Iraq." French intelligence, security, and judicial authorities consistently identified the conflict in Iraq as an attractive force for French extremists and made a number of arrests in 2005. French officials stated in November that 22 young people had left for Iraq, and at least seven were killed there, including two suicide bombers.

Djamel Beghal, the ringleader of a group arrested in 2001 on suspicion of planning to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Paris, was convicted March 15 for terrorist conspiracy. Beghal received the maximum ten-year sentence; his five accomplices were also found guilty and received sentences ranging from one to nine years in prison.

The last three French nationals detained at Guantanamo were transferred to French custody on March 7, following the transfer of four other nationals in 2004. France released Mustaq Ali Patel in March and Imad Kanouni in July. The other five remain in pretrial detention and could be charged with terrorist conspiracy. The former Guantanamo detainees' detention has withstood multiple appeals by defense lawyers.

On April 24, French police in Paris arrested Said al-Maghrebi, an Afghanistan training camp veteran, on suspicion of organizing potential terrorists to fight in Iraq. Four others reportedly belonging to al-Maghrebi's network were arrested in Paris and Marseilles. Two were later released.

A French court on May 16 declared five people guilty of organizing logistic support for the suicide bombers who assassinated Afghan commander Ahmed Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001. The five were sentenced to between two and nine years' imprisonment.

French police arrested nine people in late September on suspicion of belonging to a terrorist group. According to press reports, the group, reportedly led by GSPC sympathizer and convicted terrorist Safe Bourrada, was in the initial phases of planning terrorist attacks against targets in France, including the Paris Metro, Orly Airport, and the headquarters of the DST, France's internal security service. Four more suspected members of the Bourrada network were arrested in early October.

British authorities transferred Rashid Ramda to French custody on December 1. Ramda is the suspected financier of the 1995 GIA attacks in the Saint-Michel RER train station, the Musee d'Orsay RER train station, and the Maison-Blanche Metro station. Ramda had been in British custody for the last ten years; his extradition to France removed a major irritant in French-British relations.

On December 12, French police arrested approximately 25 people on charges of support for terrorism. The alleged ringleader is Ouassini Cherifi, a French-Algerian who spent time in prison for passport fraud.

The judicial investigation into the activities of six suspected members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) arrested in 2004 continued. The six suspects were held in pretrial detention and are alleged to have provided logistical support to those who committed the March 2004 Madrid bombings.

Judicial investigations continued following the 2003 arrests of German national Christian Ganczarski and Moroccan national Karim Mehdi, who are suspected of ties to al-Qaida. Both remained in pretrial detention in France.

Investigations into the "Chechen network," a loose grouping reported to have links with the Beghal network and the Frankfurt network (which attempted in 2000 to attack cultural sites in Strasbourg, including the cathedral) concluded, although a trial date for those arrested was not set. Several suspected members of the "Chechen network" were arrested in France; members of that network allegedly were interested in using chemical agents to commit terrorist attacks.

## **Germany**

German cooperation with the United States on the counterterrorism front remained strong, although sometimes limited by German laws and procedures. Throughout the year, German law enforcement authorities conducted numerous actions against individuals, organizations, and mosques suspected of involvement in terrorism. In some cases, German authorities charged individuals with membership in terrorist organizations, specifically al-Qaida, Ansar al-Islam, or the Kongra-Gel/PKK. In other instances, German officials took action against crimes such as document fraud, illegal residency, or weapons law violations.

As of the end of the year, German authorities were investigating 186 cases of terrorism-related crimes nationwide; there were a few high profile cases where German courts did not convict suspects accused of terrorism and related crimes.

German laws and traditional procedures, as well as the courts' long-standing and expansive view of civil liberties, sometimes limited the success of cases prosecutors brought to trial. On August 19, a Hamburg court convicted Moroccan citizen Mounir el Motassadeq in a retrial for his membership in a terrorist organization and sentenced him to seven years in prison. A Hamburg court released another "Hamburg cell" suspect, Moroccan citizen Abdelghani Mzoudi, in February 2004, based on the claim that prosecutors were unable to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence presumably held by the United States. Prosecutors appealed, but on June 9 a federal court upheld the acquittal. German officials had already begun the process to expel Mzoudi when he voluntarily departed Germany for Morocco on June 21, on the eve of his deportation.

On December 15, a German panel of three judges released Mohammed Ali Hamadi, convicted by a German court in 1989 for the 1985 killing of U.S. Navy diver Robert D. Stethem and the hijacking of a TWA flight. Although sentenced to life in prison, according to German law Hamadi was eligible for parole after 15 years' imprisonment. The judicial

panel rejected Hamadi's release when they first considered it in late 2001. When he was released, Hamadi had served 19 years in jail. Senior USG officials had strongly urged German authorities not to release Hamadi.

On May 31, a Bavarian court began the trial of Iraqi citizen Lokman Amin Mohammed, accused of logistical, financial, and recruiting support for Ansar al-Islam.

German law enforcement officials arrested three alleged members of Ansar al-Islam in December 2004 on charges of plotting an attack on then-Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi during his visit to Berlin. On November 16, the Federal Prosecutor formally charged them with the planned murder of Allawi, financial crimes, and membership in, financing, and recruiting for a foreign terrorist organization. All three remained in custody with legal proceedings underway.

A Berlin court convicted Tunisian national Ishan Garnaoui on April 6 on charges of tax evasion, illegal possession of weapons, and violation of the immigration law. The court sentenced him to three years and nine months in prison, but acquitted him of the terrorism charges. Prosecutors are appealing the terrorism acquittal. Garnaoui was first arraigned in March 2003 for attempting to form a terrorist organization and planning to attack U.S. and Jewish targets in Germany.

On October 26, a Düsseldorf court convicted four members of the al Tawhid terrorist group on charges of membership in a terrorist organization, forgery, and violations of weapons laws. They were sentenced to prison terms ranging from five to eight years. The court established that the group's leader was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and that the defendants had planned terrorist attacks against Jewish and Israeli targets in Berlin and Düsseldorf.

In October 2004, German authorities arrested Syrian-German dual national Mamoun Darkazanli for extradition to Spain, where a 2003 arrest warrant accused him of membership in al-Qaida and providing it logistical and financial support. German authorities used the new EU arrest warrant, which enables swifter German extradition of its own citizens. On July 18, however, the German Constitutional Court voided the German law implementing the EU arrest warrant, criticized its lack of protections for German nationals, and ordered Darkazanli released. The Justice Minister immediately announced she would act to get the provision reinstated. German authorities have not indicted Darkazanli under German law.

The German Interior Ministry used its authority under the Law on Associations to ban organizations that it believed were connected to terrorist groups. Germany has banned a number of such organizations in recent years. On August 30, the Interior Ministry banned Yatim Children's Aid on the grounds of its being a successor organization to al-Aqsa. The Interior Ministry had banned the al-Aqsa Foundation in 2002 on the grounds that it provided financial support to HAMAS; a German court upheld the ban in 2004. The European Union added al-Aqsa to its list of entities subject to asset freezes in 2005, following a German proposal. On February 25, Germany banned the Yeni Akit publishing house in Moerfelden-Walldorf on the grounds of distributing anti-Semitic, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli propaganda.

German authorities issued several indictments and made a number of arrests related to the Turkish terrorist group Kongra-Gel/PKK. The Federal Prosecutor charged some with positions of leadership in Kongra-Gel fundraising. German officials arrested one prominent suspect, but a German court subsequently released him, finding that there was insufficient evidence from Turkey, which had requested his extradition. On September 5 the Interior Ministry banned E. Xani Press and Publishing Company, publisher of the pro Kongra-Gel newspaper "Ozgur Politika", on the grounds of its being its mouthpiece. E. Xani appealed the ban, and at the end of October the courts suspended the ban.



Germany participated in Department of Homeland Security programs to combat terrorism, including the Container Security Initiative in the ports of Hamburg and Bremerhaven. The Transportation Security Administration's presence in Frankfurt, together with U.S. and German air marshals, formed key parts of bilateral efforts to provide air transport security for the six German airports with flights to the United States.

In a German initiative, Germany and five other EU countries signed an agreement on May 27 that deepened law enforcement cooperation. The agreement enabled faster sharing of information, DNA, and fingerprint data.

Germany proposed several names for designation by the UN Security Council 1267 Committee to enable worldwide asset freezes and travel bans. The United Nations added those names to its list of individuals and entities on December 6.

## **Greece**

With improved counterterrorism infrastructure in place following the August 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, Greece continued its work to fight domestic and international terrorism throughout the year. In October, the Greek Government passed a bill aimed at combating money laundering and terror finance, bringing Greek legislation in line with EU directives. Under the new legislation, the Greek Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) enjoyed broadened investigative authority; financing terrorism is defined as a predicate offense and subject to harsh penalties. Greece signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism in November.

Greece sustained its participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan by continuing to provide a unit from the Greek Corps of Engineers and a NATO medical unit in Kabul. In October, Greece took the lead for security at Kabul International Airport.

## **Hungary**

Hungary continued to support U.S. counterterrorism initiatives and contributed 186 personnel to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Hungary fields a light infantry reconnaissance company, a non-combatant medical unit, and a contingent of air traffic controllers. In addition, 18 Hungarian personnel are assigned to the NATO training mission in Iraq. Hungary donated to the Iraqi Army 77 T-72 tanks and four support vehicles that arrived in time for the crucial December parliamentary elections.

U.S.- Hungarian cooperation on export and border controls is outstanding. In September, the United States and Hungary signed a cooperative agreement for the destruction of Hungary's stockpile of 1,540 SA-7 man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) missiles and related equipment. Final destruction and verification were completed later in the year.

## ***Ireland***

There were notable positive developments in Irish counterterrorism cooperation. A remarkable change from 2004 was the September 26 decommissioning of weapons by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). In addition, Ireland passed new counterterrorism legislation, signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the United States, and came into compliance with a 2004 UN International Maritime Organization code.

On March 9, the Irish Government made strides in strengthening counterterrorism legislation when President Mary McAleese signed the Criminal Justice (Terrorism Offenses) Bill into law. It enabled Ireland to ratify and accede to four international conventions and protocols on terrorism, and significantly strengthened the government's ability to seize assets and prosecute those suspected of supporting terrorism.

Before this law was passed, authorities could only pursue and prosecute terrorist suspects if they committed criminal offenses in Ireland or were designated by the United Nations or EU. On September 15, Ireland signed, subject to ratification, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

In July, the government completed the installation of new counterterrorist security measures at Irish international seaports, bringing Ireland into compliance with the UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) code established in July 2004. These arrangements are aimed at preventing a terrorist strike on Ireland or the use of Irish ports for an attack on another country. In July, the Irish Justice Minister and the U.S. Ambassador signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) to further increase cooperation in the fight against global crime and terrorism. This agreement allows for more bilateral cooperation in police investigations and updated rules on extraditions. Nonetheless, the Irish courts' restrictive approach to carrying out extraditions continued to be of concern to U.S. officials.

## ***Italy***

Italy worked to fight terrorism within its borders, cooperated internationally, and participated in Coalition activities with a strong military presence in peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Italy's law enforcement authorities maintained an initiative against locally based terrorist suspects through investigations, detentions, prosecutions, and expulsions. In extensive raids throughout Italy on May 18-19, law enforcement officials arrested 18 individuals associated with the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group and Ansar al-Islam. After the July 7 bombings in London, Italian law enforcement officials detained multiple terrorist suspects and quickly passed enhanced counterterrorism legislation that increased the government's ability to expel extremists considered a threat to national security, authorized improved surveillance techniques, and brought Internet operators under state supervision.

Italy expelled 13 individuals in the interest of national security, including Turin-based Imam Bouchta Bouriki. The closely coordinated investigation, arrest, and extradition of failed London suicide bomber Hamdi Isaac is an example of effective international cooperation. Law enforcement authorities arrested Casablanca bombing suspect El Bahri Abdelouahed on May 9. Italy has submitted more names of suspected terrorist financiers to the UN 1267 Committee than any country other than the United States.



A controversial judicial decision to release three suspected terrorists, on the grounds that their activities to recruit fighters for the insurgency in Iraq did not "necessarily constitute terrorist activity," complicated the government's aggressive campaign to pursue terrorist suspects and resulted in calls for increased coordination of national terrorism prosecutions.

Domestic anarchist-inspired terrorist groups presented a diminished threat as a result of Italian authorities' continued efforts to dismantle their organizations. However, the Informal Anarchic Federation claimed responsibility for a series of small package bombs causing minimal damage. Extremist groups protesting a high-speed train line between Turin and Lyon, France, caused considerable disruption and also threatened violence.

## **Latvia**

Latvia contributed troops to Coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and cooperated productively with the United States on money laundering and terrorist finance concerns.

Latvia's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) continued to maintain a terrorist financing (OFAC) database that it shared with local banks. Bilateral efforts to combat financial crime accelerated, and the Latvian Government and Latvian banks continued to take steps to strengthen anti-money laundering and "Know Your Customer" regimes against possible terrorist exploitation. In response to U.S. concerns about financial crime, the Latvian Parliament in May passed an anti-money laundering legislative package that introduced enhanced regulatory and law enforcement measures designed to strengthen the government's ability to combat financial crime.

Latvia contributed a ten-person team to support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan; in October, the team's mandate was renewed for 12 months. In Iraq, Latvia contributed up to 137 soldiers under Polish command.

## **Lithuania**

In January, the Lithuanian Parliament approved a new national security strategy that cited international terrorism as a threat to Lithuania's security. In September, Lithuania's State Security Department established an antiterrorism division. Lithuanian law enforcement cooperated fully in monitoring and freezing assets of suspected terrorists.

Lithuania had approximately 55 troops in Iraq, including three trainers in the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). In Afghanistan, Lithuania has committed to deploying 40 Special Operations Force personnel when their current training rotation ends. Lithuania also leads a Provincial Reconstruction Team in western Afghanistan's remote Ghor Province that undertook water sanitation and bridge-building projects and repaired a community orphanage and mosque.

## **Macedonia**

Macedonia was a ready and willing partner in the global war on terror on multiple fronts, increasing its participation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Iraq to 40 officers and Special Forces.

The Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance Program office conducted six antiterrorism training courses for Macedonia. More than 120 Macedonian officials participated in this training, which was designed to assist Macedonia in countering the threat of terrorism.

## **Malta**

Malta made significant progress in the area of customs inspection and border security procedures, helped by extensive U.S. assistance. Improvements included establishment both of the authority for Maltese Customs to inspect goods transiting the container port (Malta Freeport) and the necessary procedures for effectively using the container-scanning the Cargo, Vehicle, and Container Inspection System (VACIS) system to prevent the transshipment of WMD material through the Freeport.

In June, the Maltese Parliament approved an amendment to the criminal code to include provisions on terrorism. The bill defined, for the first time, an "act of terror" and "terrorism," and specifically enumerated actions that constitute the offense. The legal notice making this act law has not yet been issued. Regardless, provisions exist in Maltese law that provide adequate opportunity to prosecute and punish terrorist acts or activities.

U.S. and Maltese authorities reached agreement in November on new extradition and legal assistance agreements following more than a year of negotiations.

Malta criminalized terrorist financing in 2005. In 2002, the criminal code was amended in such a way that terrorist financing would meet the standard for categorization as a serious crime under Malta's Prevention of Money Laundering Act. On June 6, the Act was extensively amended and expanded to include provisions on funding of terrorism.

## **The Netherlands**

The Netherlands continued to respond to the global terrorist threat with leadership and energy in the areas of border and shipping security, terrorist financing, and support of efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Netherlands has 378 personnel deployed to the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan's Baghlan province as part of the NATO ISAF mission, and 254 personnel and Special Forces participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan since April 18 on a one-year deployment. Dutch OEF personnel and Special Forces troops (more than 700) supported the Afghan elections in August. The Dutch pledged 75 million euros toward the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund to support the transition from humanitarian to reconstruction assistance between 2004 and 2006.

In July, the Amsterdam District Court sentenced Mohammed Bouyeri to life imprisonment for the murder of film director Theo van Gogh, the attempted murder of eight police officers, and threatening the life of MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali. The court found that Bouyeri acted

"with terrorist intent" in November 2004 when he murdered Van Gogh, impeded the work of Hirsi Ali, and possessed a firearm. Bouyeri did not appeal the verdict. Bouyeri is also charged, along with 13 other alleged members of the so-called Hofstad group, with membership in a terrorist organization. The trial of these 14 alleged members of the Hofstad terrorist network began on December 5. The 14, including Bouyeri, were charged with participating in a criminal organization "with terrorist intent." Bouyeri was not sentenced because he is already serving a life term. This was the first case tried under the Terrorist Crimes Act that took effect in August 2004. Under the Act, membership in a terrorist group is a crime; ordinary group members may be sentenced to a maximum jail sentence of eight years, and leaders to 15 years.

A new terror alert system became operational in June. This early warning system was designed to trigger a clear and rapid response to terrorist threats by both the public and private sector. It linked the sector-specific measures to the latest threat information from the National Counterterrorism Coordinator. There are four alert levels: basic, low, moderate, and high threat. Initially, the port of Rotterdam, Schiphol Airport, the petrochemical industry, the railways, and the water supply sector were included; the natural gas, electricity, and nuclear sectors were added in October. By 2007, a total of 14 sectors will be part of the system. The first bi-annual national counterterrorism exercise, "Operation Bonfire," was held in the spring.

Using national sanctions authority, the Dutch blocked the accounts and financial transactions of a HAMAS fundraiser, the al-Aqsa Foundation, and the al-Qaida-affiliated Benevolence International Nederland in 2003. In July 2004, the Netherlands froze all financial assets of the Dutch branch of al-Haramain. The Dutch have been active in seeking support for an EU designation of Hizballah as a terrorist group. They also played a crucial leadership role in establishment of an informal US-EU dialogue on terrorism finance, pursuant to commitments of the June 2004 US-EU Declaration on Combating Terrorism.

## **Poland**

Poland worked to fight terrorism within its borders, cooperated in international counterterrorism efforts, and participated in Coalition activities with a strong presence in peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In May, Polish border guards conducted a one-week training program in railway inspections for their counterparts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Croatia.

Chechen refugees from Russia continued to enter Poland, with 6,500 arriving in 2004. Most of these refugees simply transited Poland to other EU countries. However, some legitimately sought refuge in Poland. Poland granted refuge to 200 Chechen refugees in 2005, while three others were denied refuge following adverse security checks by Poland's internal security agency.

## **Portugal**

Indian terrorist Abu Salem Ansari, whom the Portuguese arrested in September 2002, was extradited to India with his wife and codefendant Monica Bedi in November after they exhausted their appeals. Salem was convicted by the Portuguese High Court in November 2004 of using false documents, making false statements, resisting arrest, and bribing a law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to prison for four years and six

months; Bedi was sentenced to two years. Salem was wanted in India for suspected involvement in a series of 1993 bomb blasts that left 278 dead in Mumbai, and for more than 20 other high-profile murders, money laundering, and extortion. He was also sought for his criminal association with notorious underworld figure Dawood Ibrahim, who is on New Delhi's list of 20 most wanted criminals.

In July, Portugal formally agreed to join the Container Security Initiative; its office is now staffed and fully functioning. That same month, Portugal and the United States signed bilateral Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance instruments.

## **Romania**

Romania's President Basescu stressed the importance of a proactive approach to fighting terrorism that involves taking concrete steps beyond Romania's national borders. About 1,400 Romanian troops serve in Iraq and Afghanistan, and President Basescu and other senior leaders said publicly that Romania would maintain its commitment of troops in both countries as long as necessary.

In the fall, Romania deported five students for allegedly having ties to al-Qaida and attempting to recruit supporters. The five had been under surveillance since early 2005. A Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) spokesman stated that "the operation aimed to stop this radical Islamic group in Romania and remove these people from the national territory."

The Romanian Government established internal mechanisms to combat terrorism, including adoption of a national antiterrorism strategy. In February, the government adopted an ordinance, enacted by Parliament in May as Law 162/2005, modifying and strengthening the law regarding the establishment of the Directorate for Terrorism and Organized Crime Investigations.

Bucharest is the site of the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), a regional center that provides law enforcement training and intelligence sharing on transborder criminal activities, including terrorism, for 12 member countries in Southeast and Central Europe.

In July, Romania ratified the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Organization's Additional Protocol to Combat Terrorism, signed in Athens in December 2004. In October, the Romanian Minister of Administration and Interior and his counterparts from 13 other European nations signed an agreement on fighting terrorism, illegal migration, organized crime, and corruption.

Romania adopted adequate legislation to address financial crimes and terrorist financing. Nevertheless, Romania remains vulnerable to money laundering and other financial crimes that potentially finance terrorist organizations. Weaknesses include insufficient resources, both of funding and personnel devoted to prosecuting financial crimes. Romanian financial entities independently identified one case of possible terrorism financing activity in Romania. Information on the case has been forwarded to the United States.

In August, legislation took effect that extended the jurisdiction of the Romanian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) beyond money laundering offenses to suspected acts of terrorist financing (Law 230/July 2005 amending Law 656/2003 for the Prevention and Combat of Money Laundering). The FIU was authorized to conduct proactive investigations. The law extended the reporting requirements applicable to financial institutions, defined to

include banks, insurance companies, gambling firms, and pawn companies, for transactions suspected to involve terrorist financing.

## **Slovakia**

Slovakia continued to support U.S. counterterrorism initiatives and contributed 57 personnel to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and 112 personnel to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Slovakia fields a team of deminers and construction engineers in Afghanistan and deminers in Iraq. Slovakia also donated materiel to the Afghan National Army.

## **Slovenia**

Slovenia's economic stability and location on the Balkan drug route offered attractive opportunities for money laundering. Slovenia ratified seven Council of Europe conventions relating to counterterrorism. In 2003, Slovenia established an inter-ministerial Working Group for Implementing Sanctions and Activities in the War Against Terrorism, whose powers and competencies were re-established on March 24. In November, Slovenia participated in instructor training on dual-use licensing as part of its ongoing cooperation with the United States under the Export Control and Border Security program. Slovenia continued to provide police instructors in Amman, Jordan, to train Iraqi policemen.

## **Spain**

Spain arrested scores of individuals with possible links to al-Qaida and related extremist organizations; there were 79 detentions. At year's end, 29 of those 79 detainees remained in custody, while the other 50 were released on bail or cleared of charges. The Minister of Interior reported in October that Spain held a total of 125 Islamist terrorist suspects; that figure rose to 131 total detainees by the end of the year. These detainees included individuals arrested in 2004 for conspiring to bomb Spain's High Court and other Madrid landmarks. In April, Switzerland extradited the alleged leader of this conspiracy, Mohamed Achraf, to Spain where he is awaiting trial. Authorities continued to hold 10 Pakistani nationals arrested in Barcelona in 2004 for allegedly providing logistical support to al-Qaida.

Spain cooperated closely with the United States to investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism and to prevent future attacks. Spanish authorities provided extensive information for the trial in the United States of Zacarias Moussaoui. Spanish officials also provided U.S. investigators substantial information regarding the July 2001 visit to Spain of September 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and other September 11 plotters.

Spain worked hard to disrupt terrorist acts that possibly were directed against U.S. interests. In June, Spanish police dismantled a network that was facilitating the movement of suicide bombers and other terrorists to Iraq to attack Coalition forces. On March 11, U.S. Attorney General Gonzales and Spanish Minister of Justice Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar announced the formation of the U.S.-Spain Counterterrorism Experts Working Group to increase cooperation in terrorism investigations and prosecutions. This



working group brought together prosecutors, investigators, and other experts from both countries; it met twice to discuss terrorism cases of mutual interest.

Spain cooperated with the Department of Homeland Security on the Container Security Initiative to scan containers bound from the port of Algeciras to the United States for hazardous and illicit materials. Spain and the United States co-chair the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Terrorism Finance Working Group. Spain participated in all meetings of the G8 Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG), based on its high level of counterterrorism assistance to third countries. The Spanish Government prepared but has not yet issued implementation regulations for the 2003 Law to Prevent Terrorist Financing.

A Spanish court sentenced 18 members of an al-Qaida cell to between six and 27 years in prison. Separately, authorities continued to investigate the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191 people and wounded hundreds of others.

On September 26, Spain's High Court convicted Spain-based al-Qaida cell leader Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas and sentenced him to 27 years in prison for membership in a terrorist organization and conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. Seventeen other members of the Barakat Yarkas cell also were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to 11 years; six defendants were acquitted. Barakat Yarkas, a Syrian immigrant to Spain, was detained in November 2001 on charges of having provided support to al-Qaida and of having helped Mohamed Atta organize the September 11 terrorist attacks. Among those convicted was al-Jazeera journalist Taysir Alony, who was sentenced to seven years in prison for transporting funds from Barakat Yarkas to terrorists in Afghanistan under his cover as a journalist.

Spanish authorities continued their investigation into the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. Police arrested 31 individuals in connection with the investigation, bringing to 110 the total number of suspects detained as part of the investigation; 30 suspects remain jailed awaiting trial or further investigation. In September, Serbian authorities extradited Moroccan national Abdelmajid Bouchar to Spain in response to an international arrest warrant seeking Bouchar for his alleged role in the Madrid train bombings. Bouchar had escaped a Spanish police raid in Madrid in April 2004 and warned his colleagues of the approaching police, allowing the suspects to barricade themselves in their apartment. The seven suspected terrorists detonated explosives in the apartment, killing themselves and one police officer.

In April, Spain joined France, Germany, and Belgium in an agreement to link the criminal record registries of each country to help accelerate background checks on suspected terrorists operating in the region.

The High Court convicted Spanish national Hamed Abderrahman and sentenced him to six years' imprisonment for membership in a terrorist organization. Abderrahman was transferred to Spain from the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo in February 2004 at the request of Spanish authorities.

On June 1, a UK judge authorized the extradition to Spain of Moroccan national Farid Hilali. Spanish investigators believed Hilali was the person referred to as "Shakur" in multiple conversations intercepted by police as part of the Barakat Yarkas case. In his discussions with Yarkas, "Shakur" indicated significant knowledge of planning for the September 11 attacks in the United States. At year's end, Hilali had not yet been transferred to Spanish custody.

On June 15-28, police undertook "Operation Tigris," arresting 11 individuals on charges of working on behalf of Ansar al-Islam to recruit potential suicide bombers in Spain for operations against Coalition and Iraqi Government forces in Iraq.



On November 23, police arrested 11 Algerian nationals on charges of providing financial and logistical support to the Algerian terrorist group GSPC from the proceeds of narcotics trafficking and credit card fraud. Four of the suspects, Khaled Bakel, Said Bouchemma, Salim Zerbouti, and Lyies Sihamida, allegedly sought to purchase explosives and were suspected of having links with extremists in Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Denmark. The four were held pending further investigation, while the other seven Algerian nationals were released on bail.

On December 9, authorities arrested seven more suspected GSPC members in several towns along Spain's Mediterranean coast on charges of raising funds for the GSPC through robbery. According to press reports, this cell was in contact with senior GSPC figures responsible for extending GSPC actions beyond Algeria's borders, and had funded terrorist attacks in North Africa, Afghanistan, and possibly in Pakistan and Chechnya.

On December 19, police arrested 19 suspected Islamist extremists on charges of recruiting individuals to carry out suicide bombings in Iraq. The detainees included 12 Moroccans and one national each from Spain, France, Belarus, Ghana, Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. The investigating magistrate ordered six of the individuals held in pre-trial detention while the rest were released pending further investigation. Three of the detainees reportedly served as imams in their local mosques in Malaga and Ceuta.

The conviction in September of Imad Eddin Barakat Arkas and 17 associates was believed to have significantly reduced al-Qaida's direct presence in Spain, although al-Qaida affiliates and supporters appeared to remain active.

The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) was believed to be active among extremist elements in Spain's large Moroccan immigrant community. Many of the Madrid train bombing suspects had direct or indirect relationships with the GICM. GICM figure Hassan El Haski and three associates were arrested in Spain in December 2004.

The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is known to use Spain as a logistical base and transit point. On November 23, authorities arrested 11 Algerian citizens on charges of raising funds for the GSPC through drug trafficking and credit card fraud. Police released seven on bail, but continued to hold four of the suspects on charges that they also sought to obtain explosives. On December 9, police arrested a second group of seven GSPC members on similar charges.

Police believed that the Iraqi terrorist group Ansar al-Islam was the main organizer of a terrorist facilitation network that funneled potential suicide bombers from Spain to Iraq, primarily through Syria. In June, police arrested 11 individuals on charges of recruiting terrorists for Ansar al-Islam.

Authorities believed they had nearly eradicated the extreme leftist First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), but a joint Spanish, French, and Italian police operation in October that resulted in the arrest of two GRAPO members led observers to speculate that the group possibly was reconstituting itself.

## **Sweden**

In June, the Swedish Foreign Minister approved a new counterterrorism strategy for MFA activities. This strategy called for increased multilateral cooperation, increased capacity building and prevention through foreign assistance, and improved internal analysis and threat assessment.

Sweden contributed US \$125,000 to the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation, a collaborative endeavor spearheaded by the Australian and Indonesian governments to increase regional counterterrorism cooperation in Southeast Asia.

In May, the Stockholm District Court convicted two Iraqi citizens living in Sweden of conspiracy to commit terrorist crimes in Iraq. The court found the men guilty of violating Sweden's 2003 Terrorism Law for having sent money to the terrorist organization Ansar-al Islam. The two men, 25-year-old Fermi Abdullah and 29-year-old Ali Berzenghi, were sentenced to six and seven years in prison, respectively. Both appealed the conviction, which an appeals court subsequently upheld. The appeals court, however, lowered Berzenghi's sentence to five years in prison and Abdullah's to four years and six months. It additionally found both men guilty of violating the 2002 terrorist financing act and ordered that both be expelled from Sweden upon completion of their sentences. This case marked the first occasion in which Sweden convicted individuals under both the 2003 Terrorism Law and the 2002 Terrorist Financing Act.

In November, Bosnian authorities in Sarajevo arrested Mirsad Bektasevic, an 18-year-old man with Bosnian and Swedish citizenship, on suspicion of conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. Swedish police initiated an investigation into this case.

Pursuant to a U.S. arrest warrant and INTERPOL Red Notice, Czech authorities in December arrested Oussama Kassir, a Lebanese-born Swedish national, as he was in transit from Stockholm to Lebanon. Kassir was wanted in the United States on allegations that he had conspired to provide material support to terrorists in the planned establishment of a terrorist training camp in Bly, Oregon. At the end of 2005, Kassir remained in Czech custody pending extradition to the United States.

Sweden endorsed the June 2004 revised EU Plan of Action on combating terrorism, as well as the European Commission's September 2005 communication on terrorist recruitment, which subsequently was approved by the European Council in December. In May, at a summit meeting in Warsaw, Sweden signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, an instrument to increase the effectiveness of existing international texts on the fight against terrorism. Sweden is an active participant in EUROPOL and EUROJUST, European law enforcement institutions that coordinate member states' counterterrorism cooperation and activities. Sweden participates in the Nordic Council of Ministers' Regional Forum for Nordic Governmental Cooperation.

Sweden freezes assets of entities and persons on the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee list once the EU takes action. It also acts on entities designated by the UN Clearinghouse process. Sweden has not yet proposed individuals or entities for inclusion on any such lists. Assets of Ahmed Yusuf, one of three Swedes designated on UN and EU lists in 2002 for connections with the al-Barakat terrorist organization, remained frozen by Swedish authorities.

## ***Turkey***

Domestic and transnational terrorist groups have targeted Turks and foreigners, sometimes including U.S. Government personnel, for more than 40 years. International and domestic terrorist groups operating in Turkey include Marxist-Leninist, radical Islamist, separatist, and pro-Chechen groups.

In August, Turkish authorities arrested Luay Sakka, a Syrian national linked to al-Qaida and the Zargawi network. Sakka is an important international terrorist, connected to the funding of the November 2003 Istanbul bombings and the deaths of U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq. Sakka was in Turkey allegedly plotting a terrorist attack on Israeli cruise ships in Turkish ports.

A criminal trial is underway for dozens of defendants allegedly involved in the November 2003 Istanbul bombings. The lead defendants admitted to contacts with al-Qaida and warned of further attacks if Turkey continues to cooperate with the United States and Israel. Most of the other defendants, however, denied responsibility for or knowledge of the bombings.

In addition to sharing intelligence information on various groups operating in Turkey, the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) conducted an aggressive counterterrorist campaign and detained numerous suspected terrorists in scores of raids, disrupting these groups before terrorist acts could be carried out. Overall, in the last five years the Government of Turkey has worked closely with the United States in the apprehension, conviction, and punishment of those responsible for terrorist attacks in Turkey. However, Turkish law still defines terrorism as attacks against Turkish citizens and the Turkish state. Though the government recognizes the need to align this legal definition with international norms, the old definition has yet to be amended. The TNP continues to provide excellent protection of U.S. diplomatic and military facilities throughout Turkey; its response is always immediate and substantial when alerted to threats or incidents involving U.S. interests. Similar to the handling of security at high profile events such as the Istanbul NATO Summit in 2004, security at the World University Games that took place in August in Izmir was appropriately proactive and without incident.

Turkey commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan for a second time from February to August, contributing 1,500 troops.

Turkey permitted the transport to Iraq of humanitarian goods, contributed humanitarian goods and services, and helped re-supply Coalition forces in Iraq with the transport and sale of fuel, food, and water. Turkey also allowed Incirlik Air Base to be used as a cargo hub for non-lethal goods transported to support OIF and OEF, and for the outbound rotation of U.S. troops returning from Iraq. Turkey was active in reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity to Iraq. Some 70 Turkish citizens were killed providing logistical support to Coalition forces or performing reconstruction in Iraq. Turkey contributed headquarters personnel to the NATO training mission in Iraq, helped train Iraqi diplomats and political parties, and offered senior military leadership training in Turkey as a further contribution to NATO's Iraq Training Mission.

Turkey's ongoing struggle against the Kongra-Gel/PKK was marked by increased violence across Turkey. In the Southeast, Turkish security forces were active in the struggle against the Kongra-Gel/PKK. There were a number of bombings and attempted bombings in resort areas in western Turkey and Istanbul, some of which resulted in civilian casualties. A Kurdish separatist group calling itself the Kurdish Freedom Falcons (TAK), widely believed to be affiliated with the Kongra-Gel/PKK, claimed responsibility for many of these attacks.

Turkey is working to strengthen its counterterrorism finance regime for an upcoming peer review under the auspices of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Pursuant to its obligations under UNSCR 1267 and subsequent resolutions, Turkish officials continue to pass UN and U.S.-designated names of terrorists to all law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as to financial institutions. The Government of Turkey submitted legislation to Parliament that will explicitly criminalize terrorism finance and offer safe harbor protection for filers of suspicious transaction reports (STRs).

## **United Kingdom**

London suffered terrorist attacks on July 7 and July 21. The July 7 attacks were carried out by four suicide bombers who detonated their bombs on the London public transportation system, three in the Underground and one on a city bus. Fifty-six people, including the terrorists, were killed in the July 7 attacks and more than 700 were injured. Three of the bombers were UK-born citizens of Pakistani descent; the other was a British national of Jamaican descent and a convert to Islam. A video of one of the bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan, was released through the media after the attacks, and in that video Khan attributed his act of violence to anger over UK foreign policy.

A separate group of terrorists attempted to detonate bombs in the London Underground on July 21, but those bombs failed to detonate completely and did not cause any casualties. UK authorities have arrested individuals in connection with this attack; the suspected bombers are East and West African in origin.

Government authorities reported that at least two attempted attacks have been thwarted since July. In August, Prime Minister Blair outlined plans to strengthen counterterrorism efforts in the United Kingdom by augmenting government authority to deport and exclude foreigners engaged in extolling extremism and justifying terrorism, increasing powers to arrest and detain suspects, and proscribing groups and individuals glorifying or inciting terrorism. Prime Minister Blair met with senior leaders of the Muslim community in Britain for advice on how to curb radicalization and to solicit support from Muslim communities to do the same.

The United Kingdom has played a leadership role in working to develop an understanding of radicalization and in seeking to identify the structural and motivational factors that may drive the terrorist recruitment process. The British government worked with its European counterparts to stimulate discussion on radicalization and has sought to work with its domestic Muslim populations to identify how this process unfolds and how communities and governments can prevent the spread and appeal of extremist ideology.

The additional measures that the Prime Minister detailed in his August address to the nation have yet to be passed into law, although a draft Terror Bill is making its way through Parliament. The government engaged in a series of bilateral negotiations to allow the return of foreigners to their home countries, with a specific understanding that those individuals will not be subject to human rights abuses.


The July attacks in London pointed to a new phenomena in global terrorism, that of homegrown terrorism in Europe. While the United Kingdom has experienced homegrown terrorism in the past linked to Northern Ireland, the July 7 bombings were the first successful attacks carried out by UK-born Islamic extremists. It is not yet clear if the July 7 and 21 terrorists had any ties to al-Qaida or other international terrorist organizations. The July 7 terrorists traveled out of the United Kingdom to Pakistan prior to the attacks. The Khan video suggests that at a minimum Khan affiliated himself with the goals of al-Qaida.

The United Kingdom simultaneously held the presidency of the European Union and the chairmanship of the G8. The United Kingdom used its leadership of both entities to advance intra-EU cooperation on counterterrorism measures and policy. During the UK presidency of the EU, the EU agreed on a counterterrorism strategy and a review of the problem of radicalization and terrorist recruitment within Europe.

The United States and the United Kingdom work closely together within the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to deny terrorists and their supporters access to the international financial system. The United Kingdom has strong legal provisions for freezing assets related to terrorist financing, including Terrorism (UN Measures) Order 2001, the al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2001, and the Antiterrorism Crime and Security Act 2001.

When Prime Minister Blair gave his August 5 address listing his intentions to strengthen UK counterterrorism measures, he said he would seek to designate Hizb-ut Tahir (HT), an international group with operations in Britain. This group was not proscribed, however. Individuals, including prominent Muslim leaders within the United Kingdom, argued that the group, while endorsing violent action elsewhere in the world, does not manifest itself in the same manner in the United Kingdom. On other matters of proscription, the United States and the United Kingdom had regular consultations.







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
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
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
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