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African Institutions in a Changing Regional and Global Security Environment

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The fifteenth annual IPI New York Seminar took place at the Thayer Hotel at West Point on the campus of the United States Military Academy on April 28-30, 2010. The seminar explored the evolving relationship between the United Nations and African institutions, including the African Union and subregional organizations, in developing a new peace and security architecture, and highlighted reasons for hope and optimism despite entrenched problems in certain areas of the continent.

This meeting note summarizes the main themes and observations of these discussions, which were held under the Chatham House Rule, and provides further background on recent institutional developments. The note was drafted by Carla De Ycaza, who served as *rapporteur* at the seminar, with additional input from John Hirsch, Mashood Issaka, and Adam Lupel. It reflects their interpretation of seminar discussions and does not necessarily represent the view of all other participants.

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Executive Summary

According to the *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, adopted on July 11, 2000, one of the main objectives of the AU is to "promote peace, security, and stability on the continent." Over the past decade the African Union has taken the first steps in establishing a new African peace and security architecture. The UN and AU agreed in 2007 on a Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme to assist the African Union in responding more effectively to ongoing and potential conflicts. While these efforts are underway, eight years after the first session of the African Union Assembly in July 2002, conflict continues on the continent, most dramatically in the Horn of Africa, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Against the backdrop of these events, representatives from the AU, UN, and related academic think tanks shared their insights and experiences at the fifteenth annual IPI New York Seminar with a principal focus on the emergence and evolution of a new African peace and security architecture for the continent.

Ascendant challenges to security in Africa, such as climate change, terrorism, and transnational organized crime, are becoming increasingly central to the work of the United Nations, the African Union, and African subregional organizations. Therefore, the seminar considered new institutional approaches to dealing with these security threats, in addition to exploring ongoing global and regional responses to Africa's conflicts.

Participants in the seminar sought to identify regional and global approaches to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts and crises in Africa. Speakers highlighted new approaches to Africa's security in order to improve peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, to strengthen African diplomacy, to promote good governance and democracy, and to deal with organized crime and climate change, among other pressing problems facing Africa.

Panelists also shared with participants a wide range of perspectives on the responsibility to protect in an African context. Through discussion, participants and speakers discussed how African institutions and the United Nations can work together more effectively to implement strategies in response to contemporary threats to Africa's security.

Introduction

Crises seldom exist in isolation. Challenges to the achievement of durable peace and security in Africa need to be seen in context, as they feed off each other and create a complex security environment. Such crises include an increasing youth population, extreme poverty, inequality within states, lack of education, poor public health, food insecurity, chronic water shortages, poor governance, corruption, and the rise of transnational organized crime, among others.

However, in recent years, much has been achieved on the African continent: many seemingly intractable conflicts have ended (for example, southern Africa is largely peaceful), standards of living and both infant and maternal mortality have improved; HIV/AIDS infection has begun to be reduced. Yet, even with these gains it is increasingly important to develop a multilateral system to meet the many challenges Africa continues to face. There is a need for more strategic coherence with stronger analytical capacity across regions, more effective communication among regions, and strategic partnerships with the international community.

Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has made great strides toward developing a comprehensive peace and security architecture for the continent. During the Cold War, a number of newly independent African states struggling with the legacy of colonialism were proxies in the global battleground between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War and the decline of Africa's strategic importance, civil wars intensified or started in the early 1990s—for example, in Liberia, Angola, and Sierra Leone—while the Somali state collapsed entirely. Other conflicts ended, most notably in Mozambique and Namibia, while South Africa made the transition from apartheid to multiparty nonracial democracy. The end of the Cold War also brought about a shift in global attitudes toward Africa, significantly influencing the African security landscape. African leaders were faced with the task of handling conflicts largely on their own. Regional institutions which had been established to promote economic integration had to assume unexpected security responsibilities. There were a number of ad hoc interventions. For example, in August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), supported by the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and later endorsed by the UN, intervened in Liberia in order to stop a rebel attack on Monrovia through its intervention force, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In 1997, ECOWAS again intervened in Sierra Leone and in 1998 returned the democratically elected government to power. In 1998, South Africa intervened in Lesotho, and in 2003, South Africa, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, deployed peacekeeping forces in Burundi under the auspices of the African Union (AU).

The rise in intrastate conflicts throughout Africa during the immediate post-Cold War period made clear the need for the United Nations (UN) to adapt its traditional approach to peacekeeping, which until this point had focused mainly on interstate conflicts. The United Nations contributed to the negotiation of peace agreements in Namibia and Mozambique. However, the UN's failure to stop the civil war in Somalia and to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda had a profound adverse impact on UN peacekeeping in Africa. Despite these setbacks the United Nations since 1999 has again deployed peacekeepers to Africa, including to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and, since 2007, into Sudan, with the hybrid African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

As a result of US reluctance to intervene in African conflicts after Somalia, and the consequent lack of US support for UN peacekeeping until the end of the decade, the OAU, ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and others were compelled to develop their own mechanisms for conflict management, consistent with Chapter VIII, Article 52 of the UN Charter. The OAU adopted the *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security* in Cairo in 1993 and ECOWAS adopted a comparable structure in Lomé in 1999, setting out guidelines for a regional response to conflict situations in West Africa.

In the 1990s, these interventions, however, were largely ad hoc. Neither the OAU nor ECOWAS had the requisite political, logistical, or administrative framework. Operational structures were therefore improvised. In the first decade of this century,

major changes have taken place. With the adoption of the 2000 *Constitutive Act*, the African Union established the framework for the African peace and security architecture, including the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, and other bodies. The AU under its *Constitutive Act* is committed to act in cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide under the principle of nonindifference. The *Constitutive Act* also provides for sanctions in cases of unconstitutional changes in government by denying leaders of military coups participation in AU decision-making bodies and processes.

In parallel with these developments, the UN and African institutions have established a new framework for cooperation, incorporating these regional approaches into the international legal framework, committing themselves to developing African capacity as part of the UN's global responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As part of the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme agreed upon at the 2005 World Summit, the UN has expanded its liaison office in Addis Ababa under the direction of an Assistant Secretary-General. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) office in Addis Ababa supported the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) which in 2007 became UNAMID, the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur. The UN is also advising the AU Commission on a framework for a continental early-warning system and providing other technical and practical support. In this context participants at the seminar considered the current state of UN-AU cooperation, and offered insights and suggestions on how the two institutions could work more collaboratively in coming years. This report summarizes the main themes and observations of these discussions and provides further background on recent institutional developments.

The African Union, Regional Economic Communities, and the United Nations

THE AFRICAN UNION IN PEACE AND SECURITY: BETWEEN PLAN AND ACTION

Building upon the experience of the OAU, the AU has developed an enhanced vision for confronting

conflicts in Africa, culminating in the adoption of the *African Peace and Security Protocol* at the 2002 summit in Durban, South Africa. With the AU Peace and Security Council as its centerpiece, the protocol includes the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force (ASF)—including its Military Staff Committee—the Peace Fund, and the Panel of the Wise, all of which comprise the African peace and security architecture (APSA). These dimensions of APSA are being developed, respectively, to take the lead in political decision making; to gather and process information during crises; to provide a standby mechanism for peacekeeping; to prevent and mediate disputes and provide good offices for the AU; and to mobilize financial and other resources for supporting peace efforts.

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) has been in place as a standing body since March 2004. Its fifteen-member panel has played a crucial role in dealing with existing conflicts, as well as with prevention. The PSC has also developed a framework of cooperation with UN Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)

The African Standby Force (ASF) is to be a continental African military force operated under the direction of the African Union, with both civilian and police components, and is divided into geographical regions. Progress has been made on the development of the various components of the ASF (military, police, and civilian) although much remains to be done to bring the civilian component to the desired level. Efforts are required to bridge the gap between regional standby brigades, which are at various stages of development. The high-profile nature of conflict has thrust the ASF and military peacekeeping to the center of the APSA. When fully operational, the force is to provide rapid-response capabilities for a variety of crisis scenarios.

The Panel of the Wise was inspired by African ways of dealing with conflict. In traditional African societies, elders play an important role in the resolution of conflict. The Panel of the Wise, comprised of high-level personalities, including former heads of state, is intended to play an important role in the prevention and mediation of conflict in Africa. The Panel is mandated to support the efforts of the PSC and chairperson of the Commission. Current members of the Panel were

appointed for three years during the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in Addis Ababa from January 29-30, 2007, and were inaugurated in December of that year.

The AU has also initiated a process to enhance its capacity to mediate conflicts. The AU and UN have developed a joint work program.¹ Activities of the work program include providing regular training in mediation for current and future AU staff; establishing a roster of potential envoys and technical mediation experts for deployment by the chairperson of the Commission in situations of conflict; establishing effective systems of communication, information-sharing, and decision-making among partner organizations in the field; and convening regular lessons learned workshops on mediation efforts undertaken by the AU, UN, and various African actors. Additionally, the Commission is implementing a three-year project (2010-2012) to formulate a security-sector-reform strategy.

The Commission has also established a Continental Early Warning System, endorsed by the Executive Council in January 2007, and has launched a mapping exercise to assess the effectiveness of the system in order to better align existing and future capacity-building support with the AU's priorities. Along with these initiatives the AU is developing projects addressing emerging security threats, such as nuclear disarmament, piracy and hostage-taking, climate change, transnational crime, protection of vulnerable populations during conflict, and postconflict reconstruction and development. There has been continued progress in the implementation of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) on *Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security Between the AU and Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution*, signed in Addis Ababa on January 28, 2008. Since then, the Commission has continued to work closely on issues of peace and security with the regional economic communities.² Plans are also underway for the AU to establish liaison offices within the regional economic communities (RECs), as required by the PSC

protocol.³

The African Union has also partnered extensively with the United Nations regarding issues of peace and security. While African peace support missions have demonstrated a capacity for initial deployment, the lack of capacity and other resources hampers their ability to effectively implement their mandate in the longer term. Therefore, in 2009, the Prodi panel (chaired by former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi) made a number of recommendations to strengthen the relationship between the African Union and United Nations, and to develop a more effective partnership when addressing issues on their joint agendas. These focused primarily on assuring reliable and sustainable funding for AU peacekeeping deployments.

THE UN-AU TEN-YEAR CAPACITY-BUILDING PROGRAMME

Initial tensions regarding the role of African Institutions for peace and security on the continent have largely abated. As the African Union and the RECs have taken on greater responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, informal understandings on closer cooperation with the UN have developed. The UN has been able to draw strength from its evolving partnership beginning to build an effective coalition for change.

A presentation on the UN/AU partnership noted that the UN has invested considerably in building the capacity of the AU as evidenced by its commitment to the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme. The program requires more than simply having one partner devote resources to help another; the UN and AU must share in their efforts, information, expertise, and resources as appropriate. The AU must bring in regional peacekeeping forces to add to the efforts already in place by the UN. Another speaker noted that the ten-year program should be the first step toward creating a structure and framework for this ongoing partnership. Looking ahead this agreement should be seen as the beginning of a strategic partnership, not a means of assistance from a stronger partner to a weaker recipient.

1 African Union, "2008-2010 Work Programme to Enhance the AU's Mediation Capacity," 2008.

2 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

3 Since, importantly, the RECs have offices in Addis Ababa.

The AU-UN-REC partnerships should provide a forum for information exchange and analysis. In many situations regional organizations have greater knowledge given their location and personal relationships with key actors. The experience of UNAMID underscores the need to bring greater coherence to the UN field presence. An important step is unifying the various UN offices in Addis Ababa under the leadership of an assistant secretary-general.

Four years after the signing of the AU-UN MoU, the biggest challenge remains the inadequate capacity of the AU itself. The AU needs to accelerate its recruitment and training of personnel at all levels and develop a more efficient and transparent financial management. In December 2007, the AU established an independent High-Level Panel to undertake an audit review of its personnel, management, and financial practices.⁴ Among the recommendations to come out of the review was that AU member states should provide more funding and logistical support for AU peace operations rather than rely extensively on external funding. Initial tensions regarding the role of African institutions for peace and security on the continent have largely abated. As the African Union and the RECs have taken on greater responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, informal understandings on closer cooperation with the UN have developed. The UN has been able to draw strength from its evolving partnership beginning to build an effective coalition for change.⁵

Clearly, as the AU-UN relationship continues to evolve, important issues remain to be addressed. The ten-year plan is tilted toward peacekeeping, which remains the main focus of the UN in Africa, while the AU's focus is turning primarily to peacebuilding. Moreover, the AU and UN are competing for funding from the same multilateral and national donors. Participants felt priorities of the two organizations need to be better harmonized and coordinated.

Additionally, local populations are becoming increasingly restive at the lingering UN presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and Burundi. National leaders in the DRC and Chad are

urging the UN to draw down its presence or to leave earlier than planned. Many African countries are getting tired of the large presence of UN forces. Once elections are over, Burundi wants the UN to reconsider its presence in the country, restructuring and redefining their relationship. In Chad, President Idriss Deby has requested the full withdrawal of MINURCAT by spring 2011.

The most successful mediation and peace processes take place where the UN has worked closely with regional organizations. These partnerships were critical in Guinea and Burundi, among others. The role of regional facilitation in leading the peace process in both these situations has thus far been key.

AFRICAN UNION STRATEGIC PLAN 2009-2012

To strengthen its mandate, the African Union Commission has designed an action plan for 2009-2012 to be implemented through four strategic pillars: peace and security; development, integration, and cooperation; promotion of shared values; and institution and capacity building. A presentation on the strategic plan outlined these four areas:

Peace and Security

Since the end of the Cold War the nature of conflict has changed significantly. In turn the African Union is seeking to work more closely with the regional economic communities that are unique to Africa. African institutions work on the principle of complementarity, where member states work with the AU to achieve key objectives including dealing with climate change, combating transnational organized crime, and strengthening the responsibility to protect. Further harmonization and coordination between the African Union and the eight recognized regional economic communities must remain a high priority.

Development, Integration, and Cooperation

AU member states face serious challenges to the quality of life of their populations. Despite an average economic growth rate of more than 5 percent over the last five years, poverty remains pervasive on the continent. In the next fifteen years,

4 High-Level Panel of the Audit of the African Union, "Audit of the African Union," December 18, 2007, available at www.pambazuka.org/action/alerts/images/uploads/AUDIT_REPORT.doc.

5 Ibid., p. xxiii.

African governments must work more closely with nonstate actors in implementing development policies as the private sector and the increasing youth population will drive Africa's economy. The AU is asking member states to invest up to 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on agriculture, and to improve the transportation infrastructure needed to bring agricultural products to urban areas and international markets.

The AU Commission has developed a framework, referred to as PEDDA, for the interactions among demographics (P), the environment (E), socioeconomic development (D) and agriculture (A). This framework seeks to provide a "roadmap" for coordinating continental and national policies on infrastructure, internal trade, exports, agriculture, urban development, etc. Additionally, the idea of a pan-African university to train academics on the policies and politics of economic integration has developed into a concrete reality, with two campuses being established, one in the north and one in the south, which should be operational by the end of this year.⁶

Promotion of Shared Values

In 2010, nine African countries will be holding presidential elections, with an additional five holding general elections. The key challenge is how to ensure that gains are made in terms of democratic values, not just in managing the formal conduct of elections. The AU has been quite active in monitoring elections, and will continue to work closely with civil society to do so.⁷ It is also seeking to increase its involvement with civil society through the African Citizens Directorate (CIDO) and to find new ways to fund and promote civil-society activities.

Shared values also can be pursued collectively across continents. Some shared values are aspirational, while others are to be maintained. The AU must therefore not only establish mechanisms to achieve these shared values but find ways to engage the general population in their fulfillment.

Institution and Capacity Building

African institutions need to create durable,

effective, and financially sustainable mechanisms to serve the continent. At the level of the AU, the goal is to build an African Union Commission that is transparent, accountable, and focused. The AU currently lacks the institutional capacity to implement many of its programs. Even if the AU increases capacity, it will not be able to achieve all of its goals at once. Therefore, it must prioritize depending on where it can have the greatest impact. The third Africa-EU summit in November 2010 will seek to scale down the AU's goals to focus on a few key deliverables which will be incorporated in a multiyear planning cycle. A major challenge remains securing adequate financial resources on a reliable basis and assuring their effective and transparent utilization. A new management approach must be adopted based on the audit report noted above.⁸ The second challenge is to find ways to train, recruit, and retain the next generation of managers, establishing transparent and sustainable employment practices, ensuring professional advancement, and providing adequate remuneration and other incentives for a sustainable civil service at continental, regional, and national levels.

New Paradigms in African Security

PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING

Partnering to Build African Peacekeeping Capacity

Speakers from the UN Secretariat highlighted ongoing efforts by DPKO and DPA to implement the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme, in particular to strengthen the operational effectiveness of the Peace and Security Council and launch the African Standby Force. Their presentations also highlighted the conceptual concerns in both New York and Addis Ababa regarding the peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions of the UN, and the expressed reservations of a number of African leaders regarding the protracted presence of UN peacekeepers in the DRC and elsewhere.

They emphasized that the UN strongly supports

⁶ Campuses are to be located in South Africa and Algeria, with additional sites planned in Central, West, and East Africa as well.

⁷ IPI and the AU Panel of the Wise have also recently published a report on the prevention of election-related violence. African Union Panel of the Wise, "Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence: Strengthening the Role of the African Union in Preventing, Managing, and Resolving Conflict," *The African Union Series*, New York: International Peace Institute, July 2010.

⁸ High-Level Panel of the Audit of the African Union, "Audit of the African Union," p. xxiii.

its partnership with the AU and does not believe that Africans should be left alone to deal with African problems; there is a clear need for complementarity and a coherent sharing of responsibilities to create a better approach to African security issues. Much progress has been made in the last few years in improving the relationship between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council.

UN Secretariat officials recognize that development of AU capacities requires a long-term approach, as there is no shortcut to success. The Prodi report provided an overview of the engagement of the AU in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and postconflict reconstruction. As noted above the panel made recommendations for enhancing the AU's peacekeeping capacity, as well as for developing and strengthening more effective partnerships.⁹ The report recommended establishing two financial mechanisms to support the UN-mandated peace operations undertaken by the African Union, in addition to having the AU develop its logistics capacity and proposed the establishment of a joint UN/AU team to implement the report's recommendations.

In September 2009, the Secretary-General recommended further steps to improve the relationship between the UN Secretariat and the AU, especially to strengthen working-level relationships and promote the exchange of information. The various UN offices in Addis Ababa are being brought together into an integrated office under an assistant secretary-general. Additionally, through short-term deployments to New York, AU staff will have access to UN best practices.

The 2009 DPKO/DFS non-paper, "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping," called for "a peacekeeping policy agenda that reflects the perspectives of all stakeholders in the global peacekeeping partnership" and ways to enhance dialogue on how to improve UN peacekeeping operations and partnerships.¹⁰ The African Standby Force (ASF) is a case in point. It is an ambitious and unique project requiring significant resources, coordination, and support from the UN, the EU, the US, and other

partners.

The ASF will require sustained support, both as an ongoing political process, and in developing the operational capacity of its planned five brigades. An assessment of the ASF is scheduled to take place in October 2010 evaluating AU's current capability to respond to crises on the continent. Both at the UN and the AU there is broad recognition of the need to strengthen political support and commitment by AU member states.

One participant stated that the UN also recognizes the need to develop an integrated strategic approach at UN headquarters that encompasses prevention, peacekeeping, postconflict reconstruction, and development. Until recently peacekeeping has had greater support from member states than peacebuilding. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund should provide for a more coordinated focus on all these aspects.

UN Peacebuilding and Africa: Quo Vadis?

One panelist who spoke on the status of UN peacebuilding efforts in Africa highlighted the concern and disenchantment with UN engagement among some African leaders. DRC President Joseph Kabila has called for the drawdown and withdrawal of MONUC from the DRC and, as already noted above, President Idriss Deby has called for MINURCAT's withdrawal from Chad. These African leaders and others are concerned that Africa has been the laboratory for peacekeeping in the past two decades without sufficient resources and attention to postconflict peacebuilding.

The advent of the PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund may ameliorate these concerns. However, many observers believe there is still no conceptual or strategic vision for how peacebuilding should work. In 2009, the Secretary-General released a report on peacebuilding, describing it as a function of peacekeeping.¹¹ Participants felt that there is still a need for a better understanding of what is meant by peacebuilding, as well as how it relates to peacemaking, mediation, and conflict prevention.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and Field Support (UNDFS), "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping," New York, United Nations, July 2009.

¹¹ United Nations, *Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations Authorized by the United Nations*, UN Doc. A/64/359-S/2009/470, September 18, 2009.

The relationship between peacebuilding and national sovereignty is also unclear. Peacebuilding can bring into conflict the vital principles of national ownership and sovereignty with the Security Council giving intrusive mandates to integrated offices. One speaker argued that while there has been a major increase in the peacekeeping budget (now \$8 billion per annum) there are not many examples of the UN providing support to African peacebuilding in any structural way.

Currently, there is no link between the rising strategic demand for peacebuilding and the necessary flow of resources to support it. Many still view peacebuilding as a follow-up activity after peacekeeping and not as something that requires funding in its own right.

In sum there is much to be learned from a deepening engagement with Africa. The UN must move politically and institutionally to break down barriers and configure missions to what is needed on the ground, not to institutional needs. Some countries are reluctant to commit their resources to peacekeeping. There is also a conflict between what the AU is doing with its meager resources and what the UN thinks it should be doing. The architecture of peacebuilding needs to be developed further so that it becomes a sustainable process.

STRENGTHENING AFRICAN DIPLOMACY

African Diplomacy in the UN

The content of African diplomacy at the UN has changed in recent years, as the key focus for Africa has been economic and social, rather than political. In the first years of African independence the focus was on the assertion of sovereignty, the end of colonialism, and the anti-apartheid struggles. In the twenty-first century, African diplomacy is concerned with economic development, protection of African interests in international trade negotiations, and the need to deal with the consequences of poverty and disease for a growing and young population. African diplomats recognize that there cannot be economic development without peace and security. Strengthening peace and security, therefore, is of utmost importance.

One African ambassador noted a major change in the relationship between Africa and the West. After the end of the Cold War and the transformation of former European colonies into independent states,

diplomacy at the United Nations shifted from an East-West to a North-South perspective. The East-West divide came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and although some differences persist between Russia and the West over nuclear and Middle Eastern issues, inter alia, it has largely diminished. Differences between countries of the global North and the global South at the 1996 World Trade Organization meeting in Singapore amounted to but one example of the existence of a North-South divide. While politically the North-South divide may retain some logic, over the past decade it has made less and less sense in terms of development and peacebuilding where there is a recognized need for closer partnerships. The crux of African diplomacy has become how to navigate different approaches between the global North and the global South while making progress on these important economic issues.

African diplomats recognize that they can have more impact as a group at the United Nations if they speak with one voice. But there is reluctance among smaller states to allow a hegemonic role to be assumed by Africa's stronger powers in dealing with pan-African affairs. One participant urged African diplomats to work harder to define and convey their interests in meetings of the G20 and the Security Council. Greater African involvement in decision making at the UN is critical. It is not enough for African states to be asked to contribute votes to proposals or initiatives coming from the permanent five members of the Security Council (P5) or other regions. Africa and Latin America are currently the only regions without a permanent seat on the Security Council; unfortunately, it seems unlikely that there will be any kind of substantial reform to the Security Council in the near future.

The Changing Strategic Value of Africa to Global Actors

The role of the major powers in Africa is complex and problematic. The UN became involved in Africa during the 1956 Suez crisis and the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Egypt, followed by the Congo intervention four years later. The UN did not return to Africa until the end of Cold War, four decades later, with peacekeeping missions to Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia. Those deployments were not possible during the Cold War. Since then, external actors, especially China, the US, and France, have continued to play

a crucial role in African affairs.

- a. *China*. There has been a long-standing pattern of Afro-Asian cooperation. From 1958 onward, China cooperated with the African Group in support of decolonization and the anti-apartheid struggle. Its collaborative relations with Africa continued with the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia (TAZARA) railway in 1975 as the largest foreign-aid project ever financed and undertaken by China. In the last decade, China began investing heavily in Africa's infrastructure and also began importing a significant percentage of its energy (i.e., oil) from Africa. However, it was noted that many Africans are concerned that China's role on the continent is not always beneficial to African interests. The fact that there are nearly 80,000 Chinese workers in Africa suggests that China is not creating extensive employment for Africans, but rather is exporting its own workers to the continent.

On peace and security issues, China has deployed 1,800 peacekeepers to six peacekeeping missions in Africa. China is also pushing for stronger action in Somalia, and generally taking a more assertive role in African affairs in the Security Council. At the same time China has provided political support to the government of Sudan throughout the Darfur crisis while also contributing troops to UNAMID; and it has opposed the timing of the International Criminal Court indictment of President Omar Bashir, a position similar to that of the African Union and the Arab League.

A separate presentation near the end of the seminar highlighted China's important role in African economic development. China has become a major actor in African affairs, with much scholarship currently being devoted to the emerging China-Africa relationship. China has diplomatic relations with virtually all African countries and has forty-nine embassies in Africa. (It broke and then reestablished relations with Liberia when the latter recognized Taiwan.) For many years, African countries and China have supported one another's political and economic interests at the United Nations and in other international fora. China, one speaker noted, will always remember that it was the African members of the General Assembly

which enabled the People's Republic of China to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council.

The China-Africa relationship in this perspective entails cooperation for mutual benefit. The demand for infrastructure development provides many opportunities for Chinese investment in Africa. China's economic progress in recent years enables it to contribute more substantively to African development through investment and trade. China and Africa will continue to benefit from this economic partnership as attracting foreign investment will also allow China to further develop itself.

- b. *United States*. During the Cold War, the US was focused primarily on containing the Soviet Union in Africa, at times supporting warlords such as Jonas Savimbi in Angola, or autocrats such as Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire or Mohamed Siad Barre in Somalia. The US failures in Somalia and Rwanda contributed to the negative image of the US in Africa. Additionally, the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq painted a picture of the US as arrogant and unilateral. After 9/11, the US began to pursue various initiatives in counterterrorism, deploying 1,700 troops to Djibouti. By some accounts this increased the militarization of US policy toward Africa, including the controversial establishment of the United States African Command (AFRICOM) in October 2008.

However, one participant argued that the US has played important positive roles in Africa as well, including its current support to the African Union and the regional economic communities and support for democratic transformations in many African countries. In addition, the US has provided extensive development assistance to Africa, both directly and through the international financial institutions. In addition, the US has made major contributions to tackling Africa's major health pandemics, including the President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) and initiatives to deal with malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases.

- c. *France*. French influence in Africa has been expressed through a combination of military, financial, cultural, and political means. In 1990, then President François Mitterand linked

French aid to democratic reforms, which had a positive effect, but soon thereafter, one speaker argued, France was caught on the wrong side of history, supporting the Hutu-dominated regime in Rwanda in 1994 during the genocide, and then allowing Hutu *genocidaires* to escape into Zaire. And as late as 1997, France continued to support Mobutu Sese-Seko up to his downfall and flight. France has a long history of interventions in African affairs. However, lately France has reduced its troop presence in Africa, closing bases in Senegal and the Central African Republic. France has also reduced its investments in Africa and diversified its interests to include Anglophone countries such as Nigeria and South Africa.

Seminar participants argued that in dealing with the major powers, African leaders must be strategic in pursuing their interests. One speaker urged that in dealing with the US it is increasingly important to utilize pro-Africa groups to lobby the US Congress to achieve these goals. Other potential resources to tap include constituencies, such as the African diaspora. Africa must press countries to restructure their international institutions to end “global apartheid”—i.e., to provide for meaningful participation in the Security Council, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other international institutions. Africans must negotiate skillfully to assure that the major world powers continue to provide resources for infrastructure and other development projects. Only then can Africa move to a more proactive role in financing its own development and take control of its own destiny.

GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY

Discussions of the future of democracy in Africa center on democratic participation and peace.¹² As one speaker put it, in the colonial era Africans were denigrated by western powers and denied participation in political processes, and African resources were exploited by the colonial powers with little or no attention to African economic development. More than fifty years after the start of independence in Africa, redefining personal and political relations will constitute the basis of a new approach

to international politics. The representation of Africans as “democratic persons” indicates a shift in discourse on democracy in Africa.¹³ Discussions at the seminar noted that democracy is not an event but rather an ongoing process, which must be linked to progress on peacebuilding.

Several speakers argued that a number of African governments are hiding behind the façade of a formal liberal democracy involving elections and multiparty voting. Authoritarian regimes perpetuate their rule over decades through intimidation, bribery, and violence while going through the motions of holding elections. In order to have a true democracy, everyone must have their political, economic, and social rights protected.¹⁴ The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) calls on African states to take proactive steps to achieve transparency, accountability, and good governance.

Discussions also focused on the role of civil society with the recognition that relationships at the local level are more immediately consequential to people than some abstract idea of nationhood. Participants argued that the difficulty of developing democratic practices has to be understood in the context of African experience. One speaker noted that many competent Africans don’t want to enter politics believing they will be compelled to be corrupt in order to succeed. Oftentimes, the anticorruption label is used as a political weapon. Africa also has to deal with the problem of military regimes interfering in politics either by instigating coups or maintaining power behind the scenes. One participant argued that many of today’s authoritarian leaders were the icons of past liberation movements. They claimed to fight for human rights, but when they achieved power, they ended up being among the worst oppressors Africa has had. Another problem in facilitating democratic transitions, one participant argued, is that many heads of state do not want to leave office as there are few alternative means for them to stay actively involved in public life;¹⁵ additionally they may fear that they will be held responsible for their actions in a court of law.

12 See African Union Panel of the Wise, “Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence.”

13 See also the *African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance*, 2007.

14 See the *African Charter on Peoples’ and Human Rights*, 1981.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19, note 14.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN AFRICA

Seminar discussions highlighted the importance of the responsibility to protect (RtoP) for Africa. The key provisions of RtoP were adopted by the UN General Assembly in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.¹⁶ Subsequently, the Secretary-General has posited that RtoP rests on three pillars: First, the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity rests first and foremost with the state. Second, the international community should help states to fulfill this responsibility. And third, in situations where states are manifestly failing to protect their populations from these four crimes, the international community has the responsibility to take collective action in accordance with the UN Charter, making appropriate use of peaceful and coercive means as needed.¹⁷ Importantly, one speaker cautioned, it should be recalled that RtoP concerns only these four specific crimes. It does not apply then to eventualities, such as tsunamis, earthquakes, or poverty that cause human suffering. RtoP is thus both narrow and deep; it is narrow in scope, but deep in terms of the tools available.

Participants noted that while there is no single template for the implementation of RtoP to be applied everywhere in the same way, there are many lessons that can be learned through sharing of experiences across regions and continents.

With respect to Africa, it was noted that the AU has led the way in international acceptance of the concept of RtoP. Five years before the United Nations affirmed RtoP at the World Summit, the African Union enshrined the principle of “nonindifference” in its *Constitutive Act*. Article 4h of the AU *Constitutive Act* established “the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.”¹⁸

From the beginning, African individuals and institutions have been central to the conceptual

development of RtoP. One speaker noted that, as early as 1967, Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui promoted the notion of a *Pax Africana* with continental jurisdiction. Inter-African interventions, he argued, were more legitimate than foreign ones in this context. Ghana’s founding President Kwame Nkrumah had called for an African high command of an army within a unitary continental structure. In establishing the OAU in 1963, however, African leaders rejected this plan, preferring to consolidate the notion of nonintervention in the affairs of the newly independent sovereign states of Africa.

However, with the Cold War over, Africans began to move away from the nonintervention provisions of the OAU Charter and started to promote the idea of the responsibility of African states to protect populations even in other countries where conflict had broken out. In 1993, the OAU summit in Cairo adopted the OAU *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution*. In parallel, the ECOWAS role in Liberia in the early to mid-1990s and later in Sierra Leone was a dramatic example of a regional organization taking action to protect civilian populations from mass violence.¹⁹

In addition, then South African President Nelson Mandela took the lead in pressing the SADC to authorize interventions in Lesotho and Burundi. And his successor Thabo Mbeki also played a key role in the deployments of African peacekeeping troops to the DRC, Burundi, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Based upon these experiences, one speaker argued, the principle of the responsibility to protect could best be implemented in Africa through strengthening both the AU and the RECs. When appropriate, regional hegemony may be able to provide core financial and military resources for intervention. In such cases, the UN could play a useful monitoring role to make sure that the interests of smaller states are also protected. The January 2009 Secretary-General’s report on *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*²⁰ found that NEPAD, the African Peer Review Mechanisms, national human rights institutions, and civil-society groups are also necessary to implement RtoP.

16 United Nations, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, October 24, 2005, para. 138 and 139.

17 United Nations Secretary-General, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, UN Doc. A/63/677, January 12, 2009.

18 *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, 2000, Article 4h.

19 Nigeria also made various efforts to protect the people of Africa through ECOWAS in the 1990s in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

20 United Nations Secretary-General, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*.

Additionally, one participant argued, gender should be integrated into all levels of this concept. UN Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820, as well as the African women's protocol of 2003, discussed developing monitoring mechanisms to gauge the involvement of women in building the pillars of the responsibility to protect. Lastly, the UN Peacebuilding Commission can also play an important role in mobilizing resources for effective peacebuilding. It is therefore imperative to devote resources to more effectively implement the responsibility to protect.

Transnational Challenges and the Regional Approach to Security

CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Broadly defined, transnational organized crime takes place when three or more individuals come together to commit serious crimes for profit. Transnational organized crime is a type of organized crime where actors operate in more than one national jurisdiction, with more than one jurisdiction impacted or involved. Transnational organized crime impacts adversely on human rights and the rule of law, as it often fuels violence and corruption. One panelist argued that while transnational organized crime affects all nations, its impact is felt especially hard in Africa.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC's) initial assessment in 2003 found that sub-Saharan Africa faced the most serious onslaught and highest rates of organized crime. In 2008, 25 tons of cocaine passed through West Africa; in 2009, this number was reduced to 21 tons but is still very significant. While West Africa provides a hub for cocaine trafficking, East Africa serves as a free economic zone for crime. Thirty to 50 tons of heroin pass through East Africa annually. This indicates serious vulnerabilities on the African continent. To combat this level of criminal activity greater international cooperation is required. In addition to enhanced international support, the UN needs to focus on the promotion of sustainable development, implementation of the *UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime*, mobilization of political will, and greater

information sharing are urgently needed.

It is generally recognized that a range of actors must be involved to address these issues effectively. Thus far, there has been a lack of coordination and integrated strategy. There is no effective sharing of information and no joint strategic planning. In 2007, African states agreed to a declaration on issues of transnational organized crime and criminality, with policies to be coordinated on the subregional level. The need for a meaningful and financially viable international strategy, however, still remains.

Fighting transnational organized crime requires international strategies that cut across sovereign borders and entail agreements to share information. Cooperation among law-enforcement agencies is essential to the investigation and policing of international criminal activity. The focus must not be solely on investigating those involved, but also on dealing with broader issues of national security. Many African countries have a fear that political norms and values will be imposed on them by Western countries and that they will have to expend their limited public resources on projects that are not their highest priority. International cooperation, therefore, will require binding agreements to police organized crime and deal with issues of intelligence sharing.

Intelligence is a key source of state power, and therefore is not easily adaptable to an international institution. Moreover, as governments have often used intelligence to repress their population, there is inevitably a certain wariness surrounding the use of intelligence. To use intelligence within the United Nations or other multilateral institutions it is necessary to create the right conditions, including political will, trust, accountability, and confidence that information is accurate.

Intelligence is needed to identify the perpetrators and the target market, as well as to determine whether Africa is a transit point for smuggling, (e.g., of guns, drugs, or people). States and international actors must develop indicators and warnings, such as socioeconomic conditions, and understand the normal business practices of the region. Three types of organized crime pose the greatest threat: narcotics, arms, and cyber crimes. Africa is particularly vulnerable to cyber crime, therefore, expertise in this field is important.

THE GREAT LAKES: CONSOLIDATING REGIONAL PEACE

Another panelist discussed the ongoing conflict in the Great Lakes, highlighting the need for a regional approach aimed at searching for durable solutions. In 2004, a *Declaration on Peace, Security, and Democracy* in the Great Lakes Region was signed in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, by eleven member states of the AU, with the support of the UN.²¹ In 2006, a *Pact on Security, Stability, and Development for the Great Lakes Region* was signed by these member states, and a secretariat was established to oversee the implementation of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).²² This opened a new chapter for the Great Lakes, establishing a formal structure of ownership, inclusiveness, partnership, and complementarity—issues not adequately addressed by the UN and AU.

The ICGLR was officially launched in May 2007, with its secretariat located in Bujumbura, Burundi. The ICGLR was intended to be a process for countries of the region with the support of the United Nations and the African Union to seek a regional solution to their shared security problems.²³ Several important steps have been taken. The governments of the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda have restored their diplomatic relations. Consolidation of peace in the DRC has made significant strides through the implementation of the Goma agreement of January 23, 2008, and the peace agreement between the government and the National Conference for the Defence of the People (CNDP) of March 23, 2009. Additionally, the implementation of the Nairobi Communiqué of 2007 between the DRC and Rwanda has allowed the two countries to adopt a common approach to dealing with FDLR forces in eastern DRC. Participants at the seminar agreed that peace in the DRC is vital to Africa's peace and security on the whole.²⁴

The monitoring of elections in the Great Lakes region is of paramount importance especially in 2010.²⁵ At the time of the seminar, preparations for

elections in Burundi were underway, scheduled to take place in June 2010. But prospects were uncertain as a number of opposition parties had withdrawn. Since the election in 2005, Burundi has been dramatically transformed, with the establishment of an independent electoral commission and voter registration.

The ICGLR is also following closely developments in neighboring Sudan. Legislative elections held there in April 2010 were peaceful, despite some irregularities. The forthcoming referendum on the future of southern Sudan scheduled for January 2011 will be an important test for regional stability. The African Union will address the situation in Sudan on an ongoing basis to make sure that the Peace and Security Council is actively involved in assuring a free and fair process for the referendum. Some participants noted that there are serious consequences for African countries if South Sudan decides on secession, which some member states believe is not the best solution in terms of stability on the continent.²⁶

Despite the improved security situation in parts of the Great Lakes Region, the ICGLR still faces many challenges, including sustaining international attention on the region. If peace is defined as only the absence of war, the region has made great strides in the consolidation of peace. But participants argued that there also needs to be more economic development and movement toward good governance in various countries in the region. There is a need for sustained commitment and support from the AU and the UN to be able to further consolidate peace in the Great Lakes.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND AFRICA

Several presentations from academic and political perspectives underscored the significance of climate change for Africa. While contributing the least to greenhouse-gas emissions and global warming, Africa is the most vulnerable continent to climate change and its population will suffer the most from climate-related disasters. Climate

21 These states include Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, the Central African Republic, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Tanzania.

22 The pact entered into force in June 2008 after being ratified by member states. It dealt with peace and security, economic integration, humanitarian and social issues, and democracy and good governance. It involved people from all sectors of society.

23 The ICGLR only recruits staff from countries that make up the conference, with 100 percent geographical representation. Additionally, it is 100 percent funded by member states.

24 The conflict in the DRC is often referred to as Africa's "world war," as it has involved as many as eight African countries.

25 Five countries in the Great Lakes Region are holding elections in 2010.

26 According to the AU, the organization has never and will never abandon the principle of territorial integrity of member countries.

change events have a direct impact on five of the eight Millennium Development Goals adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2000. The prevalence of hunger, disease, and natural disasters is high in the semi-arid areas of Africa that are the most prone to the negative effects of climate change, adversely affecting development.

Understanding the impact of climate change is critical for dealing with disaster management in Africa. Participants argued that data regarding climate change need to be made relevant and easily accessible to decision makers. Predictive data needs to be better utilized. One such example is the occurrence of malaria in Botswana. Malaria is highly seasonal, and follows the rainy season with a lag of about two months. Thus, if the rainy season becomes longer one could expect a corresponding change in the pattern of malaria outbreaks. This type of data filter linking climate change with the outbreak of disease can help to incorporate climate risk into development programs and help to develop strategies to respond more effectively to such urgent problems.

Participants urged African policymakers to focus on the rapid disappearance of forests and other fingerprints of global warming, including rising temperatures, droughts, rising sea levels, and changes in the pattern of rainfall.

New sources of energy are potentially available in Africa. The idea of a green future requires a new kind of thinking. Efforts are underway to define a science-based African position on climate change; for example, to use technology to create energy from the Sahara desert.

Another speaker noted the interlocking nature of crises affecting Africa, including crises of energy, finance, governance, and the environment. Effective responses to these crises cannot just be left to governments and international institutions to address. From this perspective the environmental movement is at the crux of potential change in Africa. While governments should be held responsible for cleaning up the environment, each individual is responsible for their own community and immediate surroundings.

A third speaker highlighted the importance of the December 2009 Copenhagen conference, noting that climate change is among the most pressing issues on the international agenda. Africa has contributed virtually nothing to global warming but has been among the hardest hit.²⁷ The rise of catastrophic climate change is affecting the lives of everyone. For Africa, climate change directly affects agricultural production and the livelihoods of millions of people. The fifteenth AU summit in Kampala, Uganda, in July 2010 featured discussions focusing on climate change and the environment, recognizing their direct link to security and development. The speaker argued that African leaders indeed recognize the urgent need to develop a comprehensive approach to these issues. A high-level advisory group, currently co-chaired by Ethiopia and Norway, has been convened to develop sources of revenue for addressing climate change.²⁸ The group is expected to issue its final recommendations later this year.

Concluding Observations

At the conclusion of the seminar, participants recognized that, while substantial progress has been made by the African Union and the RECs in adopting new standards for responding to conflicts, much remains to be done to transform these aspirations into operational reality. The Ten-Year UN-AU Capacity-Building Programme as well as the 2009-2012 AU Strategic Plan are important steps. African leaders and international donors need to work more closely in building capacity to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts. But the underlying challenge is for African leaders to adopt practices of good governance and respect for human rights, and to bring an end to authoritarian or military regimes. There is also an important role for civil society and for Africans in the diaspora to strengthen their involvement in the realization of these objectives. A new generation of Africans will face the challenges of assuring a leading role for Africa in the globalized economy while rectifying the deleterious practices of the first fifty years of the postindependence era.

²⁷ The speaker argued that Copenhagen provided Africa with the opportunity to demand compensation due to destruction by climate change caused by the carbon emissions of wealthier countries, adding that although the Copenhagen Agreement is not legally binding, it is important to build upon.

²⁸ The Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing was launched in February 2010 by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and is currently chaired by Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg. Other members are appointed for ten-month terms, including Guyana and the UK. See UN News Center, "Ban Unveils New High-Level Advisory Group to Spur Action on Climate Change," February 12, 2010, available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33748.

Agenda

Wednesday, April 28, 2010

- 15:00 – 15:15 **Welcome**
 Dr. Edward C. Luck, *Senior Vice President for Research and Programs, IPI; Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General with a focus on the Responsibility to Protect*
- 15:15 – 15:45 **Presentation**
 Mr. Francesco Mancini, *Senior Fellow and Director of Research, IPI*
 “Coping with Crisis, Conflict, and Change: Global Perspectives”
- 16:00 – 17:30 **Keynotes: African Union, Regional Economic Communities, and the United Nations**
- Chair**
 H.E. Ms. Heidi Schroderus-Fox, *Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations*
- Speaker 1**
 H.E. Mr. Tête António, *Permanent Observer, Office of the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations*
 “The African Union in Peace and Security: Between Plan and Action”
- Speaker 2**
 Dr. Margaret Vogt, *Deputy Director, Africa 1 Division, Department of Political Affairs, UN*
 “The UN-AU Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme: Where Are We?”
- Discussion**
- 17:30 – 18:30 **Ground Tour: United States Military Academy, West Point**
- 19:00 **Reception/Dinner/Special Presentation**
- Chair**
 Ambassador Adonia Ayebare, *Director, Africa Program, IPI*
- Guest Speaker**
 Mr. Anthony Okara, *Deputy Chief of Staff, African Union Commission*
 “African Union Action Plan 2009-2012: Prioritization in Action”

Thursday, April 29, 2010

- 09:00 – 10:45 **Panel 1: New Paradigms in Africa’s Security: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding**
- Chair**
 H.E. Mr. Anders Lidén, *Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations*

Speaker 1

Mr. Nick Seymour, *Senior Political Affairs Officer, Team Leader, AU Peace Support Team, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

“Rationalizing External Support for Capacity Building of African Peacekeeping”

Speaker 2

Dr. Stephen Jackson, *Senior Political Affairs Officer, UN Department of Political Affairs*

“UN Peacebuilding and Africa: Quo Vadis?”

Discussion

10:45 – 11:00

Coffee Break

11:00 – 12:45

Panel 2: New Paradigms in Africa’s Security: Strengthening African Diplomacy**Chair**

Ambassador Adonia Ayebare

Speaker 1

H.E. Dr. Kaire M. Mbuende, *Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Namibia to the United Nations*

“African Diplomacy in the UN: The Challenge to Speak as One – A UN Perspective”

Speaker 2

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, *Executive Director, Center for Conflict Resolution, South Africa*

“The Changing Strategic Value of Africa to Global Actors – An African Perspective”

Discussion

13:00 – 14:00

Lunch

14:00 – 15:45

Panel 3: New Paradigms in Africa’s Security: Governance and Democracy**Chair**

Dr. Horace Campbell, *Professor, African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University, New York*

Speaker 1

Dr. Margaret Vogt

“The Return of The Dawn Broadcast: Coups D’état and Democratization in Africa”

Speaker 2

Dr. James O. C. Jonah, *Senior Fellow, Ralph Bunche Institute of International Affairs, City University of New York*

“Institution Building and the African State: Overcoming Corruption and Poor Governance”

Discussion

15:45 – 16:00

Coffee Break

- 16:00 – 17:45 **Panel 4: New Paradigms in Africa’s Security: Dealing with Organized Crime**
- Chair**
H.E. Mr. Herman Schaper, *Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations*
- Speaker 1**
Mr. Peter Gastrow, *Senior Fellow and Director of Programs, IPI*
“Transnational Organized Crime: Dealing with Potential and Real Threats to the African State”
- Speaker 2**
Dr. Cindy L. Courville, *Former US Ambassador to the AU*
“Intelligence Sharing and the Fight Against Crime in Africa”
- Discussion**

- 19:00 **Reception/Dinner/Special Presentation**
- Chair**
Ambassador John L. Hirsch, *Senior Adviser, IPI*
- Guest Speaker**
H.E. Mrs. Liberata R. Mulamula, *Executive Secretary, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Bujumbura, Burundi*
“Consolidating Regional Peace in Africa: The Case for the Great Lakes Region”

Friday, April 30, 2010

- 09:00 – 10:30 **Panel 5: The Responsibility to Protect in Africa: Regional and Subregional Efforts and the United Nations**
- Chair**
Ambassador John L. Hirsch, *Senior Adviser, IPI*
- Speaker 1**
Dr. Edward C. Luck
“Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”
- Speaker 2**
Dr. Adekeye Adebajo
“African Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: A Critical View”
- Discussion**
- 10:30 – 11:45 **Panel 6: Climate Change and Africa: Thinking Beyond Copenhagen**
- Chair**
H.E. Mr. Morten Wetland, *Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations*

Speaker 1

Dr. Stephen Zebiak, *Director General, International Research Institute for Climate and Society Columbia University, New York*

Speaker 2

Dr. Horace Campbell

Speaker 3

H.E. Mr. Reta Alemu Nega, *Charge d'Affaires a.i, Permanent Mission of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the United Nations*

Discussion

11:45 – 12:00 Coffee Break

12:00 – 12:45 **Panel 7: Conclusion and Next Steps: African Institutions and the International Community**

Speaker 1

Dr. Edward C. Luck

Speaker 2

Ambassador John L. Hirsch

Discussion

12:45 **Presentation of Certificates**

13:15 – 14:00 Lunch

14:30 Departure for NYC

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