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On November 29-30, 2010, the International Peace Institute (IPI), in partnership with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, hosted a two-day roundtable in New York City to launch a collaborative series, *Being a Peacekeeper: The Challenges and Opportunities of 21st-Century Peace Operations*. Co-sponsored by the government of Morocco, this initial roundtable brought together existing and emerging troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs) in an informal setting to allow for an open and candid exchange of experiences, successes, concerns, and challenges. In addition, it served as a forum to facilitate outreach from the United Nations Secretariat to TCCs and PCCs, and gave them an opportunity to contribute their views to the ongoing policy-development process within the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support.

The *Being a Peacekeeper* roundtable was held under the Chatham House Rule of nonattribution. This meeting note was drafted by Martin Fischer of Pearson, and Adam C. Smith of IPI. It summarizes the *rapporteurs'* interpretation of the themes that emerged during the roundtable discussions and does not necessarily represent the views of the organizing institutions, the sponsoring governments, or all the participants.

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Being a Peacekeeper: The Challenges and Opportunities of 21st-Century Peace Operations

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In its 2010 report, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) emphasized the need to broaden the base of troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs). The Special Committee further recommended that “coordinated initiatives be taken to reach out to new contributors, that former and existing contributors be encouraged to contribute further and that support to emerging contributors be provided.”¹ The joint IPI-Pearson Being a Peacekeeper Series is a response, in part, to those recommendations. The November 2010 roundtable was just the beginning of a conversation. Future meetings, both in New York and in regional capitals, will provide space for continued dialogue among TCCs and PCCs in 2011.

Introduction

The need for skilled military and police contributions to peace operations is an ever-present concern. At the same time, the demands that contemporary peace operations place on contributing countries have become increasingly complex. Existing contributors and the UN Secretariat have assembled an impressive inventory of lessons learned, guidance, and best practices. Yet, the need for continued dialogue and reflection remains. For those countries that are only beginning their involvement in peace operations or those that are considering contributing troops and/or police, the complexity, both of peace operations themselves, as well as of the systems administrating them, may present considerable barriers. Even for experienced contributors, new and emerging norms and operational concepts continue to test capacities, resources, and political will in capitals as well as in the field.

The November 2010 *Being a Peacekeeper* roundtable featured four panels and opened with presentations on the current state of and trends in UN peace operations. The second panel provided an opportunity to discuss the barriers for and motivations of countries who contribute to UN peacekeeping. The final two panels of the roundtable covered the areas of capacity-building, training, and UN Secretariat support to troop- and police-contributing countries.

The following is a summary of comments, grouped around three sets of themes (managing expectations; burden-sharing and capabilities; and effective deterrence and the protection of civilians) that emerged repeatedly throughout the discussions at the first *Being a Peacekeeper* roundtable meeting.

¹ Cf. United Nations, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Doc. A/64/19, 2010, paras. 74 and 75.

Managing Expectations

A key question raised by the TCC/PCC participants was how UN peacekeeping operations could effectively manage the expectations of host populations, host governments, and the international community. Clearly, different constituencies have different expectations of peacekeeping and what it should—or is able to—accomplish. As resources diminish across the board and expectations for the UN's ability to manage conflict continue to rise, the UN must examine and then fully communicate its goals and limitations to all parties. To put it simply, it was suggested that peacekeeping missions should under-promise and over-deliver, rather than the reverse.

In terms of the host population, there is a need for more effective communication between the UN and host societies in order to create an enabling environment in which peace operations are not only welcomed initially, but continue to be seen as a desired presence. In this regard, further work on identifying and mitigating some of the negative, unintended consequences of large peacekeeping presences in host countries would be useful. A thorough examination of the exact nature and potential implications of the “footprint” of each planned peacekeeping operation should be done in advance of deployment. In general, there is a need for improved communication between the UN and the communities most at risk and most affected by their presence. In particular, communication strategies in New York and in the field need to focus on articulating and communicating realistic goals and methods, so as to create and manage realistic expectations. Such communication strategies should be informed as well by the experiences and views of troop- and police-contributing countries. In all cases and circumstances, UN peacekeeping should be framed as a short-term approach by which to create an enabling environment for a legitimate political process to unfold.

The same need for expectation management plagues the UN's relationship with the governments that host peace operations. The pressing issue of managing the consent of the host country requires clear and continuous communication on all sides. It may be necessary to establish a compact of some sort between the UN Security Council and the host country. The compact would serve as agreement on

the specific goals of a peacekeeping presence, the methods by which to achieve those goals, and specific sets of indicators to understand if those goals are being met. One participant suggested that TCCs/PCCs might have a role to play as a “bridge” in the relationship between the Security Council and the host government through regular consultations of TCCs/PCCs in the host-country capital and in New York.

On a final note, many TCCs and PCCs believe that the Security Council and the Secretariat could do a better job of communicating to contributing countries exactly what is expected of them. Better and more frequent articulation of mutual expectations would assist in enhancing the critical triangular system of cooperation between TCCs/PCCs, the Security Council, and the Secretariat.

Burden-Sharing and Capabilities

After six decades of peacekeeping, and two decades of intensive, multidimensional peacekeeping activity, there is a sense that member-state representatives in New York who make key decisions on mandates and funding have increasingly become more isolated from the realities of the field. There is also a troubling divergence in the levels of knowledge and expertise between permanent missions in New York, the capitals of contributing countries, and the field. Although a few permanent missions' military and police advisers are able to benefit from visits to the field, there are many members of the New York diplomatic community who still lack important first-hand experience of the field context.

Peacekeeping is the most visible and most costly activity of the United Nations, yet after a full decade of reform efforts starting with the 2000 UN Panel on Peacekeeping Operations, there are concerns that some member states have become uninterested in peacekeeping or in taking steps to improve it. Critics lamented that the issuing of hollow or perfunctory statements in committees often passes for substantive work. As the complexity of issues confronting contributors has increased, there appears to be an insufficient degree of critical thinking necessary to break deadlocks in policy development. To others, it appeared as though key

permanent missions do not appreciate the multi-lateral process, but rather are “conducting bilateral work in a multilateral setting.” If this is true, all member states should make a renewed effort to prioritize UN peacekeeping in 2011. Each member state should find its own way to contribute to the ongoing efforts to make peacekeeping missions more effective. This could take the form of active and genuine participation in the work of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) or specific contributions to fill the resource, equipment, and other capabilities gaps that plague many missions in the field.

Burden-sharing of peacekeeping responsibilities continues to be rigidly defined, as a handful of countries contribute a majority of the troops, a handful of countries provide the majority of funding, and an even smaller number of countries ultimately decide peacekeeping mandates. Many TCCs and PCCs note with concern the continued low level of participation of developed countries in UN peacekeeping missions. In response, several factors were identified that continue to drive the reluctance of these countries to contribute uniformed personnel to UN peace operations. First, some of these militaries have been considerably downsized since the end of the Cold War and others are currently overstretched by their commitments in Afghanistan. Second, the extended time frame of some of the UN’s peace operations presents decision-makers with political and operational difficulties. Third, there is considerable discomfort with the UN’s decentralized chain of command that is perceived as diffuse and, at times, unreliable. Finally, the low level of strategic interest in countries where UN peace operations are deployed makes it increasingly difficult for political leaders to justify casualties to domestic voters.

Aside from the question of who contributes to the defining of peacekeeping mandates, an important question is also how those mandates are defined. Many TCCs/PCCs have been clear on the need to reform the mandating process to make it a two-stage process. There is no consensus on the particulars of an ideal process, but the first stage would likely involve Secretariat-led assessments of the situation and the capabilities required. After an agreement in principle by the Council, the Secretary-General could set about generating the necessary commitments from TCCs and PCCs to

satisfy the mission requirements. As a final step, a mandate that is realistic, well-defined, sufficiently resourced, and that takes into consideration the concerns of TCCs/PCCs could then be drafted.

For its part, the Secretariat must continue to enhance its outreach efforts to contributing countries in order to improve TCC/PCC understanding of internal UN processes, in particular how communication among capitals, mission headquarters, and the field is handled. The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) and the Police Division should be sensitive to the limited capacity of those contributing countries that have less experience in peacekeeping and are therefore less familiar with the UN’s systems and processes. In addition, as part of the OMA outreach strategy, staff regularly visit existing and potential contributor capitals. However, these visits could be improved if the permanent missions were systematically involved in the preparation, implementation, and post-visit analysis. Participants asked for the Department of Field Support to better manage the full deployment cycle, particularly the start-up and drawdown phases. There is also a desire for the Secretariat to provide mission-specific, as opposed to generic, guidelines. A gap was highlighted in the support to the more basic deployment needs of small and new troop- and police-contributing countries.

Effective Deterrence and the Protection of Civilians

A key issue that arises consistently during discussions with TCCs/PCCs is the use of force, including the related issues of robust postures and deterrent capabilities. A concern of peacekeeping observers is that the perceived deterrent threat of peacekeeping forces has declined at the same time that their size and capabilities have increased. Historically, traditional peacekeeping was intended to have a light footprint, but rely on the credible threat of the use of force if the need arose. Contemporary peace operations, on the other hand, are equipped with large numbers of personnel and incur high financial costs, yet their ability to project deterrent force seems to have decreased.

The other side of the coin is that peace operations today are expected to implement more complex mandates in a more hostile environment than ever before. To be effective in such a context, say some,

a robust posture in the field needs firm support—a robust political posture—from the members of the Security Council and TCC/PCC governments. Such support would have a direct effect on the deterrent capability of UN troops and commanders in the field vis-à-vis spoilers. In addition, for peace operations to effectively and efficiently implement their mandates, especially those elements that require the use of force, the connection between mandated tasks and the requirements for the use of force need to be made more clear to troop and police contributors.

On the critical and much-discussed issue of the implementation of protection of civilians (POC) mandates, presentations focused on the role of mission guidance and mission plans. The Secretariat has identified five priorities regarding POC mandates. First, a strategic framework for peace operations is needed to facilitate the creation of mission-specific strategies. Second, military, police, and civilian personnel require appropriate standardized pre-deployment and in-mission training. Third, effective protection of civilians necessitates a thorough evaluation of capacities and resources. Fourth, all mission components can better contribute to the protection of civilians by applying a coherent pre- and post-deployment planning process. Fifth, the development of

standards for the military and police components will facilitate the implementation of mandated tasks related to POC.

Despite this ongoing work, participating TCC/PCC representatives emphasized that both the Security Council and the Secretariat need to be more realistic about how they expect peace operations to protect civilians. Absent concrete doctrine and guidance, contributors feel that there is still insufficient clarity on how POC is to be implemented by the different components of peace operations. Even if existing capabilities were sufficient to confront current and future protection challenges, a lack of the necessary support resources and guidance hampers full implementation.

Developing and certifying common training and equipment standards is a possible way for DPKO to address this issue. Discussants suggested that national training centers should be upgraded to serve as regional institutions in order to provide contributing countries with the opportunity to train together, as well as to create economic efficiencies and minimize duplication of efforts. Finally, placing a greater emphasis on scenario-based training and including UN lessons-learned in the curricula of national staff colleges could potentially improve POC mandate implementation.

Annex: Roundtable Agenda

Monday, November 29, 2010

- 14:00-14:45 **Welcome**
- Dr. Edward C. Luck, *Senior Vice President for Research and Programs, International Peace Institute (IPI)*
- Dr. Ann Livingstone, *Vice President for Research and Education, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre*
- H.E. Mr. Mohammed Loulichki, *Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations*
- Introductions by all participants
- 14:45-15:00 Coffee break and group photo
- 15:00-17:00 **Setting the Stage: UN Peacekeeping in 2010**
- Chair
Dr. Edward C. Luck
- Presentations
H.E. Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Husseini, *Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations*
Mr. Atul Khare, *Assistant Secretary-General, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*
- Open discussion
- 17:00-18:30 Break
- 18:30 Evening reception

Tuesday, November 30, 2010

- 08:30-09:00 Breakfast
- 09:00-10:45 **Contributing to UN Peacekeeping: Motivations, Barriers, and Lessons-Learned**
- Chair
H.E. Mr. Mohammed Loulichki
- Panelists
H.E. Mr. Hardeep Singh Puri, *Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations*
Brig. Gen. Byambasuren Bayarmagnai, *Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces*

10:45-11:00	Coffee Break
11:00-13:00	Quality, Quantity, and Quickness: Needs, Capacity-Building, and Training Chair Dr. Ann Livingstone Panelists Col. Giuseppe Coco, <i>Deputy Military Adviser, Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations</i> Mr. David Haeri, <i>Head, Best Practices Section, Department of Peacekeeping Operations</i> Col. Noddy Stafford, <i>Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations</i>
13:00-14:00	Lunch
14:00-16:00	Secretariat Support to Contributing Countries: Bridging the Gap Chair Mr. Francesco Mancini, <i>Senior Fellow and Director of Research, IPI</i> Panelists Ms. Susana Malcorra, <i>Under-Secretary-General, Department of Field Support</i> Mr. Atul Khare Commissioner Ann-Marie Orlor, <i>United Nations Police Adviser</i>
16:00-16:30	Break
16:30-17:00	Wrap-up and the Way Forward Mr. Martin Fischer, <i>Research Analyst, Pearson</i> Mr. Adam Smith, <i>Research Fellow, IPI</i>

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