



WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

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Through Talks to Trust

Miroslav Hadžić

We are witnessing the final stage of security normalization in the Western Balkans. Various forms of security cooperation have already been established. However, only too often, this cooperation unfolds under the leadership, as well as pressure, of the European Union, the U.S.A. and NATO.

That shows the lack of trust among the countries of this region. But, lasting trust cannot be built by declarations. It will only become possible once the region's states and nations take each other off their respective lists of security threats. To do that, they need to be reacquainted. In that process they will learn if one of them fears another and if so why. And then, they will have to see if that fear is founded. This is all the more necessary knowing that while some of these states engaged in mutual wars, their close and wider environment was radically changed.

Talks pave the way to trust. But, talks of state officials are no longer sufficient. Anyway, security today is not a state, but a public good. It is a sphere where the competences of the army, the police and secret services keep decreasing. And, it is ever more difficult to achieve with arms and force. That is why security should be a subject discussed in and with the public. Naturally, this discussion should be based on professional findings and focused on the causes and culprits for the deficiencies in regional security, and then also on the ways to jointly achieve a sustainable security.

By publishing its Western Balkans Security Observer, the Centre for Civil-Military Relations seeks primarily to encourage the talks among domestic researchers in the security sphere, in particular those of the younger generation, although all willing to join in are most certainly welcome.

Editor's Word

They say you will never get a second chance to make a first impression. That probably applies to the Belgrade School of Security Studies, whose members are now, for the first time, presenting themselves to the public with their contributions to this journal. That is why they made an effort to offer interesting reading to all concerned with security issues, primarily those related to this region.

This issue opens with what will become a regular column – “Security Sector Reform Monitor”. This time, we tried to highlight the tasks related to the military sphere, brought upon the constitution makers and legislators by the disintegration of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The selection of articles for the next column – the “Meeting Point” was inspired by debates on a similar topic – education for security, almost simultaneously organized in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. The text on the reform of police schooling in Serbia explains in greater detail the announced changes in this specific segment of the security sector. The “Challenges, Risks, Threats” column in this edition analyses certain specifics of organized crime in Serbia, while “Security Catch” offers a selection of brief news items, the young researchers of the Belgrade School found especially interesting.

The central topic of the second part of the journal are civil-military relations. Particularly

interesting for us in this vibrant sphere, is the distribution of political power. Bearing in mind that the issues of democratic civilian control are topical in states with long democratic tradition as well as in “new democracies”, we have addressed both. The relevant articles are awaiting the reader in “Atlantic Shores” and “Balkan Topics” columns.

The “Forum” is intended to provide an insight into the current discussion on the relevant security issues and to keep broaching ever new topics. The article published in this edition deals with the ongoing Serbian debate on our participation in peace missions. Bearing in mind that this is a bimonthly journal, the closing column “People and Events” will offer no breaking news. Still, the importance of topics addressed in this brief form may qualify them for subsequent more detailed elaboration.

Belgrade School for Security Studies has just ended its first “semester”, and in view of the summer holidays plans to publish the next edition of its journal in October this year. And since we “learn more by looking for the answers... than from learning the answer itself” (Lloyd Alexander), we would like this journal to be the forum where questions on security are continuously raised.

Jasmina Gajić

State and its Army: Fate (Un)Shared

Dorde Popović

The consequences of the state disintegration for the army will be positive. However contradictory this claim may seem to those who firmly believe that the fate of the army is always closely related to the fate of its state, it is relatively easy to prove it true for Serbia in the year 2006. Arguments to that effect must begin with a reminder of the specific nature of the state concerned - the union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) - thus far unknown form of state association.

Although it resembled a real union, the SCG was a creation *sui generis* – a union of two almost independent states. It emerged out of difficult negotiations and was a result of strong pressures, primarily of the European Union, more than the wishes of its member states. The Constitutional Charter adopted in 2003 already included a provision on the possibility of a referendum enabling both republics to decide about their future in three years time. Already during the negotiations Montenegro stressed that the union was merely a transitory solution and that the joint functions would not be the priorities of its ruling elite. Defence as one of these functions, suffered serious consequences in the “nonexistent state” - a moniker often used for Serbia and Montenegro.

Following the Montenegrin referendum in May this year, Serbia was once again faced with the need to finally complete its state structure, which has for fifteen years already struggled with the troubles of secessions, successions and remnants of former states and unions. In this context the army definitely shares the fate of the state. That is why it is important to at least list the jobs awaiting the constitution makers

and legislators, bearing in mind that the creation of an appropriate legal framework is one of the pressing tasks of the security sector reform.

CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE ARMY

The adoption of the new constitution is an acute political and systemic problem in Serbia, aggravated still further by the outstanding issues in the defence sphere. The analysis of the new constitutional position of the Army, presently defined only by the Serbian 1990 Constitution, shows that some of its solutions are quite unexpectedly practical, although we should warn against the drawbacks of that “regressive” constitutional course.

The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia comprises certain provisions regulating defence, although this particular sphere was within the competence of the federal state. It, e.g. prescribes that Serbia regulates and safeguards its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as well as the defence and security of its citizens in the event of a state of emergency. Furthermore, the Constitution also gives the Serbian Parliament the right to decide on war and peace.

An unplanned “advantage” for 2006 Serbia - one that Slobodan Milošević certainly did not have in mind when he passed this constitution seventeen years ago - is that we now know precisely who is in charge of the armed forces. The president of the republic commands the armed forces in war and peace, orders general mobilization and organizes preparations for defence. In the event that the parliament cannot be convened the president of the state

proclaims the state of war. During the war the president may pass legal acts otherwise within the competence of the parliament, whereby he may limit some human rights and liberties. Under certain conditions he may also declare a state of emergency.

Serbia will finally know who commands the army and who finances it. The existing non-transparent model of command through the Supreme Defence Council will be replaced by a clear chain of command headed by the president and the government of the Republic of Serbia. According to the Constitutional Charter the supreme commander of the armed forces was the Supreme Defence Council, which also decided on the use of the forces. This body comprised the presidents of both republics and the president of the state union, who was also the chairman - the first among equals bound by the Councils decisions taken by a consensus. The main problem was the lack of control over this body. The Charter failed to list the responsibilities of either the Council as a whole, or its individual members. One could perhaps assume that the republics' presidents were accountable to their respective parliaments, but the president of the state union could act completely independently and without any control. In particular, it is not clear what would have happened in the event of disagreement between Supreme Defence Council members, i.e. who would have assumed control over the army in that case.

However, the list of positive consequences stemming from the current validity of Milošević' constitution begins and ends with this bizarre effect - namely, that an undemocratic constitution actually enabled a democratic institute of a clear chain of command,

Constitution is one of the most important legal regulators of democratic and civilian control. The main prob-

lem of the constitutional order is the fact that the current Constitution of the Republic of Serbia lacks the provisions enabling this control. The Constitutional Charter anticipated the submission of Serbia and Montenegro's armed forces to democratic and civilian control. That particular provision represented a major step forward in the security sector reform. It was for the first time that a provision of this kind became a part of our highest legal act, or any legal act for that matter. Until that time the regime and its generals hid behind the term "civilian control". This provision would have to be incorporated into Serbia's urgently required new constitution in order to avoid the very possibility of abuse, however unlikely it actually is today.

Legal regulation is the key issue and will have to be tackled very soon. Namely, the present Serbian constitution has serious democratic deficiencies, which is why it would be the height of cynicism to invoke it in the context of "lifesaving" provisions concerning the armed forces, as some analysts obviously do today. Bearing this in mind, we could say that the adoption of the new Serbian constitution is a precondition for establishing a democratic civilian control over the armed forces.

LEGISLATOR'S TASKS

A National Security Strategy is what Serbia today needs the most. The Defence Strategy of Serbia and Montenegro covered only a part of national security issues. Apart from the formal obstacles for the continuing validity of the old documents in the new state, Serbia should identify all its security challenges, risks, threats and interests. This more general strategy should contain provisions governing not only the army, but also other factors of the security sector.

In addition to the Constitution and the National Security Strategy Serbia

will also have to adopt legal regulations on the army and defence, both of which have thus far been within the competence of the state union. A new defence law needs to be passed. Let us recall that the old law dates back to the time of Milošević's rule and is largely outdated. This particular law is, unfortunately, in accordance with the constitution of the state preceding the union, namely the FRY, and follows its rationale. Its provisions say that control over the army is exercised by the Federal Government and the Supreme Defence Council – two bodies that no longer exist. It is therefore quite clear that there is a need for a completely new regulation of the defence sphere.

Law on the army is another piece of legislation which will have to be adopted for the state of Serbia. The existing law also dates from Milošević's period. Although it has been amended several times already, it was not adjusted to the Constitutional Charter and therefore still prescribes the operation of state bodies nonexistent at that time, as well as at present. Furthermore, it is overly regulatory.

The adoption of these laws is also important since it will prevent the government from regulating this sensitive sphere by means of decrees. We know that in the previous period the most important decisions concerning the army were taken by the Supreme Defence Council. Obsolete legal solutions were in that way adjusted to the new circumstances. But, this manner of regulation, although easier for the authorities – as it skips an occasionally tiring public debate and legislative procedure in the parliament – is far from being a good answer. The best solution for all the above-mentioned problems is the enactment of new modern laws that would regulate this subject matter for a longer period of time.

As for the military doctrine it could be transferred and applied at the level of

the republic of Serbia. In fact, it has not actually been implemented while awaiting the outcome of the Montenegrin referendum. The Montenegrin government refused to apply it, believing that the state independence will change the facts at the basis of the doctrine. This modern document will remain applicable in the part related to Serbia, following its adoption by the republic's parliament.

NO QUARREL OVER PROPERTY

In terms of its organization, the Army of Serbia and Montenegro has already been structured in such a way that the division of the union will not cause major difficulties in this respect. Podgorica Corps, which has a zone of responsibility corresponding with the territory of Montenegro, was not disbanded precisely because the future of the joint state was uncertain. There is hardly any other explanation for retaining this Corps in a situation when this type of organization was replaced by commands of operational forces, branches and logistics. Military property has already been divided since the Law on the Implementation of the Constitutional Charter prescribes that the Army does not have the ownership of property at its disposal. That is why the property used by the Army of Serbia and Montenegro belonged to the republic on the territory of which a specific military unit was located. As for armed forces branches, Montenegro will retain the Navy, except the River Fleet which will go to Serbia. The new states now have the possibility to use the so-called Ukrainian-Russian solution. Namely, after the disintegration of the USSR the two countries agreed on the lease of Ukrainian ports to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Still, in our case, this solution seems highly unlikely. What could actually be the subject to division is the Air Force. In all likelihood Montenegro will have neither the funds nor the need to

maintain an air force, jet planes in particular. A helicopter squadron is quite enough to respond to all the needs the Montenegrin army could have. Judging by all of the above-mentioned facts we can see that the division of property, arms and equipment between the two newly created states will not present too much of a problem. The situation is somewhat different with the command staff. Officers who live in Montenegro and express the wish to continue serving in the army of Serbia will be able to do that. At the time when this article is written officers on the territory of Podgorica Corps are being interviewed and about a hundred of them have so far applied for transfer to the Serbian army.

SECURITY CONTROLLED BY A SINGLE GOVERNMENT

Although the Serbian authorities were almost completely unprepared for the country's independence, and thereby also establishment of control over the army, they should take the advantage of the situation and carry out not only a disassociation of the army, but also its thorough reform. Major steps have already been made in reforming the Army of Serbia and Montenegro, but the process is unfolding too slow and some of the key moves have yet to be taken. In the first place, the new security sector of Serbia will have to be based on the appropriate legal framework that includes an efficient democratic and civilian control over the armed forces. It is necessary to establish a modern, flexible command structure efficient in both war and peace. Also important is the establishment of a system of national security planning that would transfer a major part of obligations from the army to civilian institutions – primarily the newly established Ministry of Defence of Serbia. And once the new army of Serbia is formed, it will also have to set

up a system for human resources management. The military budget will certainly have to be changed. It has been known that the funds for the Army of Serbia and Montenegro were largely appropriated from the Serbian budget so that the disassociation will not essentially influence the financing of the army. However, there is no doubt that the budget of the new and, as announced, professional army will have to be increased. Security sector reform lacking appropriate finances is usually doomed to fail. Particularly dependent on financing is the technical modernization of armed forces.

Personnel solutions based on “republic quotas” will finally be consigned to history. Conditions have been created to choose military commanders on their professional merits and not because they come from Serbia or Montenegro. President of the Republic becomes the supreme commander, while the MoD is a part of the Government of the Republic of Serbia. The Committee for Defence and Security of the Serbian National Assembly shall undertake parliamentary control over the army. One of the positive consequences of the disintegration is also revealed in the fact that all armed forces in the country - the army, police and intelligence services, will be placed under the control of the same government. In this way the security system in Serbia will be made complete.

By acquiring independence Serbia was given the opportunity to structure its security sector in the same way as all modern European states. This opportunity should be taken to thoroughly reform the army and thus restore its reputation in the world lost during the wars that only recently shook the entire region.

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"Safer Balkans Network"

Development of security studies in Western Balkans was the central topic of a regional conference "Safer Balkans Network" arranged by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) in hotel "Norcev" on Mt Fruška Gora from June 22 until 24, this year. The conference was organized with the support of the Balkan Fund for Democracy. A competition for papers was invited in March and addressed at young researchers (below PhD level) from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia. Three of the selected papers were written by members of the CCMR research department – Belgrade School of Security Studies, namely Jelena Petrović, Đorđe Popović and Marko Savković, and one by a CCMR member Maja Zarić.

Jelena Petrović wrote on "Security studies in the police education in Serbia", while Marko Savković analysed the position of these studies in civilian high education institutions – Faculty of Political Sciences and Faculty of Security, University of Belgrade. Maja Zarić discussed the key problems of security studies at the Military Academy in Belgrade, pointing to a specific limiting factor, namely the fact that the curricula and training programmes of the Academy were still considered a military secret. Đorđe Popović reviewed the informal security education programs implemented by Serbian NGOs over the past five years.

An overview of the situation in Croatia was offered by two contributions: "Security in a knowledge-based society", by Sandro Knezović of the Institute for International Relations in Zagreb and a paper on security related education and research in Croatia, co-authored by Ivana Žižić and Ana Hruškovec.

Filip Ejduš, a post-graduate student at the London School of Economics argued that the educational infrastructure in Serbia was ill-suited to the need to produce a new generation of security experts. Sonja Stojanović, a post graduate student at the School of Slavonic and

East-European Studies (University College London), looked for the answers to the question "Who is to blame for the unused possibilities for cooperation between civil society and the police in the police reforms in Serbia". Stojanka Mirčeva, a master of criminology at the Police Academy in Skopje, reviewed the reform of police education in Macedonia.

Participants in a round table organized within the conference "Safer Balkans Network", tried to suggest what kind of knowledge was required for the security sector and what the academic community could offer in that respect. Professor, Dr. Miroslav Hadžić, president of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, pointed out that the main problem for the new understanding of security in Serbia was the "strain between the security dilemma and the new security paradigm", i.e. "overdoing the security dilemma". The result of this quandary is the reorganization, rather than reform of the security sector. Problematising the very concept of the academic community, Dr. Hadžić said that it, too, was undergoing transition. A proper market in this sphere is still missing, despite the apparently increasing interest in security topics by both the scientific and general public.

Jasmina Glišić, deputy director of the Belgrade School of Security Studies stressed that the new thinking and practicing of security required new thinking and practicing of security education. She recalled other similarities between security and education: importance of these two factors for sustainable development, impossibility of their successful attainment within a closed national circle, and the never-ending process their respective reforms. Professor at "Union" University in Belgrade Dr. Bogoljub Milosavljević spoke of two wrong approaches to the study of security phenomena. One addresses only the formal aspects of security structures, e.g. their organization. This approach has been adopted by most of our experts, which is why state security textbooks abound in descrip-

tions of foreign intelligence systems and that is often their only content. Studies of functional security aspects are few and modest. Particularly obvious is the absence of inter-disciplinary research or deeper sociological and politicological studies. This accounts for a widespread lack of understanding of security phenomena and their substantial dimensions.

Professor Dr. Vladimir Cvetković, dean of the Faculty of Security, University of Belgrade, explained the organization of studies at the university. He announced a specific program to be arranged in cooperation with the Military Academy. According to the plan, which should be finalized by this autumn, infantry officers will attend both these institutions so that, in addition to military knowledge they would also acquire civilian education. Zoran Jeftić, assistant to the Serbian defence minister said the reform of military education and military healthcare were two major problems in security sector reforms. However, he pointed out that precisely these sectors might offer possibilities for international cooperation we could use to take the role of a regional centre. Jeftić concluded that “what counts most is that the reform has

started and has become an irreversible process”.

Nataša Ristović of the Law Enforcement Department of the OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro presented the programme of her organization’s activities related to the police reforms in Serbia. One of its objectives is to change the obsolete methods of work and outdated curricula used to educate the police. The OSCE supports legislative changes in this sphere and coordinates the related international assistance.

The conference “Safer Balkans Network” is the first meeting in Serbia whose participants addressed the situation with respect to academic and informal educational and research programmes in the sphere of security studies in Western Balkans. The organizers noted that, although disappointing, it is also indicative that no papers from Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been submitted to the competition. Young researchers who presented their papers, as well as other members of the CCMR Belgrade School of Security Studies should contribute to the further networking of research and educational centres in this scientific field.

J. G.

University and Security

Universities have an extremely important role in establishing and promoting tolerance and cooperation in South-Eastern Europe, and that cooperation will be more successful and complete within a system of collective security such as NATO. These are two of the main conclusions of the session on “University and security” within the conference entitled “Friendly meeting of students of political sciences”. This meeting, organized by the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Zagreb and the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre, from June 6 until 8, 2006 in Zagreb, was attended by students and professors from 11 countries.

Another topic of the conference was “The importance of SEE countries’ NATO membership”, while the students participating in the workshop “A Glance at the Future of Europe” formulated their views on the future of the EU, its internal order and place in international relations. During the meeting held in Zagreb, a researcher of the Belgrade School of Security Studies, Miljan Filimonović, presented the activities of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade School of Security Studies and Specialist Studies of Global and National Security at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade.

M. F.

"Education for Security and Peace in Slovenia"

Maja Garb

Slovenian Political Science Association, as part of its regular activities, organizes an annual conference called "Slovenian Political Sciences' Days". This year the conference, the 17th one, was organized in Portorož, Slovenia, between 29 and 31 May 2006 under the title "Slovenia in European Society of Knowledge and Development". Within this common framework a roundtable on "Education for Security and Peace" was organized to bring together theory and practice from the field of human resource management in the broad security branch.

Unlike several transitional countries in Europe, Slovenia did not suffer from the lack of civilian defence experts at the end of the 1980s and 1990s. Firstly, Slovenia has established education for civilian defence experts on university level since 1975 (the defence studies programme). Secondly, many of the present members of the Slovenian defence system had experience acquired in the previous military structures such as Territorial Defence and the Yugoslav People's Army. Thirdly, other members got involved or were informed about security-defence issues through various forms of activities in that particular field in the former system of all-national defence. Therefore, the establishment of a civilian administration structure in the defence ministry after 1991 was not a particularly difficult task. More problems appeared with the establishment of standard commissioned and non-commissioned officers' corps, since the regular Slovenian armed forces were newly formed. The participants of the roundtable were invited to discuss the positive and negative past experiences; present and future needs; plans, problems, dilemmas and challenges that cannot be avoided when we talk about pro-

viding proper manpower; and also about informing the public on security and peace issues.

The active participants of the roundtable were: two representatives of the Slovenian defence system - Drago Bitenc, director of the Office of Human Resources Management at the Ministry of Defence and Brigadier Alojz Jehart, MSc, from the General Staff of the Slovenian Army; Jasmina Glišič, MA, from the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (Belgrade); Dr. Milan Jazbec, from the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Dr. Anton Žabkar, Dr. Vinko Vegič and Dr. Uroš Svete from the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. The roundtable was moderated by Dr. Ijubica Jelušič and Dr. Maja Garb from the Defence Sciences Division at the Faculty of Social Sciences.

In the debate some actual problems, important findings and interesting ideas were mentioned by the participants of the roundtable, often critical ones. People should not go to schools to get a diploma but to get knowledge; education has to be an investment. The development of military officers should be based more on (theoretical) education and less on (practical) training; especially high ranking military officers should write a lot and participate in international conferences, or, shortly, contribute more to the military science. The decision about the number of military officers needed in the future and about the education they should have (military academies or civilian faculties) is not easy to adopt. Regarding non-military personnel, in diplomacy it is of utmost importance that members of both diplomatic and military organizations get good education in international relations, contemporary diplomacy and international organizations. Without this knowledge

new and small states cannot successfully participate in processes of international cooperation and competition. The lack of security experts in general can also be solved through the non-governmental sector, as in the Serbian case. As for the public attitude towards general education for security, peace and defence in Slovenia, the military lost the opportunity to educate a larger part of the young male population with the abolition of conscription in 2003, but the public had obviously renounced this function a long time before; on the other hand, lately the interest of Slovenian youth in topics that concern education for security, defence and protection is higher than in the general

public, as is also their interest in information about military and national security.

It can be said that the roundtable has reached its goal to bring together practitioners, scientists and interested public, although greater attention and participation of experts could have been expected. Namely, the best way for education for security and peace is not easy to find and all suggestions and explanations can be helpful, since the decisions and measures could have important consequences in the long-run.

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Police Education Reform in Serbia

Jelena Petrović

Conflict resolution, leadership and conflict management skills, the knowledge and respect of cultural differences and human rights... All this should characterize a Serbian policeman in the 21st century. The list of these characteristics is the outcome of a functional analysis of the tasks envisaged for the future police in Serbia. The purpose of the analysis was to define the aims to be attained through the reform of the police and their education.

Serbia's transition from an authoritarian to democratic society cannot be accomplished without reforming the police. In the period before the change that occurred in the year 2000, the police force in Serbia was an instrument of politics and was militarized to a substantial degree. In order to transform the society, it is also necessary to change those who protect it and have the required power. During 2001, OSCE and CoE experts developed two reports which, in addition to reviewing the situation of the

police in Serbia, provided recommendations for overcoming the force's deficiencies. An expert team formed in line with these recommendations proposed to the Serbian Ministry of Interior to split the reform process into 14 segments. Special working groups within the Ministry were established to deal with each of the specific segments, in cooperation with the above-mentioned organizations. One of these segments is the reform of police schooling. Its importance for the overall police reform is substantial since, in addition to the police hierarchy, organization and technical equipment, it will also be necessary to change the police culture. Modern police culture, characteristic of democratic societies rests not only on the knowledge and skills adjusted to the new security challenges, risks and threats, but also on the concept of the police service. This means that modern police in Serbia should serve the citizens and develop a more open relationship with the public, based on mutual

cooperation. Police educational institutions are the source of young police officers. If these young people are given the opportunity to study in institutionally and substantially reformed institutions and to acquire not only professional knowledge but also information on the whole body of human rights, cultural differences, etc., one may expect that by employing them the Serbian police will have embarked upon the most profound part of its reform – that of police culture.

An analysis of the Serbian police education has revealed it as inefficient, non-functional and old-fashioned. Institutions retained from the previous, undemocratic period must be changed. Furthermore, it is necessary to adjust the curricula and training programmes to modern security challenges, risks and threats. These deficiencies pointed to the need for a strategic approach, so that the desired changes can be carried out thoroughly as well as systematically.

NEW FACULTY FOR POLICEMEN

The first step in reforming the police education was marked by the appointment of an assistant to the interior minister in charge of police education and training, revealing the awareness of the reform's importance among decision makers. Next year (2002) a "Vision" document was published noting the absence of a system of police education and stressing the need to pass a law governing this sphere. Until 2004 novelties in the field of police education were reduced to various courses, most often organized by the OSCE. Their topics included human rights, modern security threats and the related problems. Towards the end of that year the Interior Ministry formed a directorate for professional education, qualification, advancement and science. This organizational unit of the Ministry was given the task to manage the police education reform

process and to coordinate all activities related to police education and training in Serbia. At that time a round table on the reform of police education in Serbia was also organized with the participation of domestic experts, as well as those from the neighbouring countries and OSCE. They proposed the establishment of a Police Faculty amalgamating the Police College and Academy, with curricula adjusted to the Bologna Declaration. That is also when the idea to end secondary police schooling was broached, along with the suggestion to replace it by basic training centres. These centres should train male and female recruits of age to perform general uniformed police duties.

In December 2005, a "Strategy for the development of a system of training and education for the needs of the police" (the Strategy) was drafted. It envisaged a project to enhance and concretize the concept of police education reforms in 2006. The goals of the projected police education systems cited in the Strategy define the operational and educational profiles, which had clearly been at variance. In addition, the Strategy's objectives include the creation of a new value system in line with the needs of the police and citizens in Serbia, and in accordance with international standards of police education. This document also suggests the creation of a single high-education institution to provide the highest level of advance professional education to future policemen. The Police Faculty, combining the Police College and Academy, should, according to the schedule set by the Strategy, be created by October 1, 2006.

The project addressing "The position and development of police education" (the Project) envisaged by the Strategy, was implemented in early 2006. The working version of the project defined the operating profiles of police officers. These profiles were used to develop the

initial curricula of the future Police Faculty with four specific divisions: Criminal police, Criminal technique, Uniformed police and National security.

POOR COOPERATION WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

One of substantial problems is still the lack of transparency. The list of subjects taught at educational institutions placed on their web sites is the only publicly available information on their curricula. The syllabus, lecturers' biographies, bibliography (indispensable for a serious analysis of curricula) are inaccessible to the public. This reveals the closed nature of the police education and indicates a substantial degree of detachment of the police system in Serbia in general. Professor Dr. Bogoljub Milosavljević, speaking at a regional conference "Safer Balkans Network" said this particular feature was one of the causes of inadequately developed police studies. The inaccessibility of documents and unwillingness of people heading the police educational institutions to give the researchers more data, show the complexity of extra-systemic research related to police education. In addition to decreasing the trust of civil society, this attitude also affects the police science. "Science needs an open system to be developed, and closed systems should be used only for specific applied research of professional nature," professor Milosavljević said.

Although the police keep some data away from the public eye, it appears that the media on their part, do not manifest too much of an interest for the police education reform either. Articles in daily papers predominantly address the current scandalous affairs implicating the police and the judiciary. The police education reform is featured only occasionally and is generally limited to political statements, institutional changes and gender relation problems, while deeper

analysis of the courses and contents of reforms unfortunately goes missing.

The Strategy anticipates the start up of basic police training with new curricula and training programs in September 2006 in Sremska Kamenica, thus far the seat of the Police High School. This school, in effect, enrolled the last generation of pupils in the school year 2005/2006 and the decision to close it has not been taken as yet. In late June this year the government of the Republic of Serbia submitted to the parliament a bill terminating the validity of the law on the Police Academy. It will enable the adoption of the decision on the establishment of a Faculty of Police Studies, or Criminal Police Academy (the title has not been decided yet). According to the project, implementation of the initial curricula requires previous consultations with decision makers, independent experts, employees of police educational institutions, as well as students. In line with their possible comments the curricula may undergo further changes. This kind of a plan appears ambitious and the deadline is but two months away. Bearing in mind that the establishment of the new faculty implies the merger of two existing institutions of high education, we must reckon with the possible resistance of people afraid of losing their jobs. However, if the announced changes go missing, the Interior Ministry of Serbia will be faced with at least a year of "idling" in education and training of the country's future policemen. This would mean another generation of policemen who have not undergone the kind of training appropriate to the 21st century: the skills of problem solving and respect for cultural differences will remain topics of occasional seminars or individual endeavours at advanced education.

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Organized Crime: The Case of Serbia

Jelena Unijat

If “every state has the kind of crime it deserves” (Dobrivoje Radovanović, director of the Institute for Criminological and Sociological Research), what kind of organized crime does a post-conflict states “deserve”? Is that crime in any way specific, and what does the case of Serbia tell us about it? Analysts say that crime started to develop in the late 1980s, which proves that the criminals did have a good organization even before the war. The Balkan “wars of the 1990s” merely marked the beginning of mutation of its diverse forms. The coupling of war and crime has left a legacy of a serious and direct security threat, as noted in the White Book of Defence of (now already former) state union of Serbia and Montenegro. Crucial for the metastasizing of this problem is its political nature. That is why it requires a political, rather than police solution. In this article I will try to prove these hypotheses and probe into the assumption that one of the remedies could have been lustration, gone missing in Serbia. The adoption of the Lustration Law was excessively prolonged and even when it was finally adopted it was not enforced.

For organized crime to exist, there must be a link between the state and crime. That is the element that basically defines it. Zoran Djindjić already warned that the Serbian case was not about a state having organized crime, but rather of crime having a state. To put it simply, this means that money from illegal deals was used to replenish the state budget, rather than private purses alone. Suffice it to say that the representatives in the Serbian National

Assembly in 1992 included a person wanted by the Interpol. And while in “ordinary” countries criminals bribe politicians in power using briefcases full of money or luxury gifts, mobsters in Serbia treated the politicians to political assassinations. During Slobodan Milošević’s rule over 500, assassinations were carried out in Serbia, most of them still unsolved. The ruling of the Serbian Supreme Court dated June 28, 2006 in the case of assassination of Ivan Stambolić and attempted assassination of Vuk Drašković, confirms that Milošević directly issued the order to Milorad Ulemek Legija, who organized a “criminal group (...) in order to carry out murders“. Survival in power with the assistance of organized criminal groups was a recipe of political rule in Serbia, and this method of political struggle has not entirely disappeared even after the war. The assassination of the Prime Minister proves that.

The public was once again unsettled by showdowns among mobsters in the streets of Belgrade: On June 3, Zoran Vukojević, a collaborating witness for the prosecution in the case of Prime Minister Djindjić’s assassination was murdered. That same night a member of Zemun clan Zoran Pović was also killed. He was expected to provide additional information in the same process, if arrested. The state appears impotent. Why?

UNINTERRUPTED CONNECTIONS

On October 6, 2000 Serbia was faced with numerous tasks that needed to be done urgently and simultaneously. All of the „four Ds“ often cited as the key aims of the police reform – decrim-

inalization, demilitarization, depoliticization and decentralization – could apply to the entire society, although in different degrees. Along with speedy economic reforms, the Serbian state had to establish the rule of law, and October 5 was supposed to mark the beginning of the end of anomy. Many analysts and citizens think that the reforms have hardly begun. Others say it hasn't been possible to move any faster.

Let us briefly recall the key elements of the historical context. Crime and business in Serbia have only too often been synonymous. This was seen throughout the society, even in the streets where vendors of contraband cigarettes every morning opened their small curb boutiques. Illegal businesses involved the widest strata of the population. In the 1995-2000 period about 270,000 people were left jobless and the army of the unemployed was joined by a large number of refugees. Unprecedented inflation and huge unemployment undermined the social values. No one was interested in eliminating the grey market. In war, it alone could satisfy the people's needs for the barest necessities. This minimal relaxation of social tensions came at a high price in terms of the costs of goods, the risks inherent in illegal trade and corruption.

Patrons of organized crime saw huge possibilities for easy profits. The state created parapolice and paramilitary units, recruiting people with criminal backgrounds. Participation in the war meant double gains for the criminals: large earnings and connections in the army and the police as a favourable basis for their future operations.

There are quite a few indications that many of these connections have not been broken to this date, or at least there is no evidence to suggest otherwise. The most conspicuous is certain-

ly the fact that the most wanted Serbian fugitive, accused of war crimes, has not been extradited to the Hague tribunal yet. That fact is invariably brought up by foreign politicians, domestic oppositionists and the media. However, few people grasp the fact that the absence of lustration should not be seen as a minor political problem and the necessary specific of the Serbian way of dealing with the transition. Naturally, the reality that no personal files have been opened presents a wider problem, since access to the social scene remains open to all. However, in the context where organized crime is continuously reinforced this fact gains additional importance, since the big bosses who emerged rich out of the war and cooperated with criminals could now aspire at socially acceptable roles. Moreover, they may even set their eyes on making carriers in politics.

ABSENCE OF LUSTRATION: MULTIPLE CONSEQUENCES

The most important consequence of the missing lustration is revealed in the fact that the positions of key importance for fighting organized crime could still be filled by the contingent of the "non-lustrated". That is why it was possible for Rade Marković, now condemned as abettor in political assassinations, to remain the head of the state security sector for months after the political change of the year 2000. Nebojša Pavković, remained the chief of the SMAF General Staff almost a year and a half (until June 2002) after the change with unconvincing explanation of the state authorities. His indictment for war crimes by the Hague tribunal may be of greater significance for Serbia, but in terms of organized crime in Serbia, his role in providing "helicopter support" to the assassination team is perhaps even more important.

We must also mention Aco Tomić, Milošević's unschooled general, promoted by the Yugoslav president and current Serbian prime minister to the position of the General Staff Security Directorate's chief on July 16, 2001. A man whose controversial biography refers to the fact that he was security adviser to Vojislav Koštunica, Rade Bulatović was in 2004 appointed the head of the Security Information Agency (BIA) of Serbia. He took this office after his "politically motivated arrest" in operation Sabre, as the president of the Democratic Party of Serbia used to say. To all this we should add the fact that all actors of this police action organized after the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjić have been either let go or transferred. By contrast, the suspects in this assassination said they "trusted the authorities" and surrendered to the prosecution.

Something must have gone seriously amiss in a state where only 13.5 per cent of the population believe in the judiciary, according to the findings of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, and criminals manifest their trust in it by reporting to their prosecutors. The lack of legal regulation and still more so of security efficiency, is revealed by a recent statement of Rade Bulatović. In an interview to the daily *Večernje novosti*, in June this year he said that BIA "surely knew" about Mladić's hide-out until spring 2003 and has the data on his movements until December last. Most illustrative in this respect is a comment of a citizen in a B92 Internet forum: "In January 2009 they will know where he was in June 2006. They are doing an excellent job, only they go about it somewhat more slowly than they should. Perhaps in 2015, a reconstruction of his movements between 2002 and 2012 will enable them to establish some regularities and on that basis plot his moves in the 2013-2015 period."

And while the security sector reform unfolds at a "snail's pace" and the police are taking their time in devising strategic measures for a future reform, the development of the "last generation" organized crime in Serbia is gathering speed.

Strict hierarchy of the *cosa nostra* type has today been replaced with a network type structure, where organization is much less exposed. Wherever transnational criminal cooperation is established, it seeks to benefit from differences in national legislations. Elasticity enables the network to survive if a part of it is destroyed. And, perhaps most importantly for the Serbian circumstances – the mobility of these dangerous groups is extremely high. They find it easy to relocate their activities from one region to another fleeing increased risk of prosecution and pursuing more profitable businesses. Furthermore, the lower risk of prosecution is also financially advantageous since it enables them to save on the cost of corruption and leave a small "reserve" fund in case they have to run.

"THE LAST GENERATION" CRIME

Arms deals proved that organized crime in Serbia has all the conditions favouring its development in the 21st century. Large demand for goods under the embargo simultaneously spelled huge profits for shady dealers of all warring sides, who successfully violated the five-year trade ban. That is hardly surprising knowing that they operated on behalf of and for the state. Their use of various techniques: false certificates naming an end user in a neighbouring country, common smuggling or the use of one serial number for several pieces of arms, one of which was sold legally and the other illegally, all make up for a grim security score: five illegal barrels to one legal is the average for the territory of the former

Yugoslavia. The end of the conflict brought about a slight turn refreshing the criminal business agenda. The Balkans drug route was reopened, although alternative routes, used by Albanian mafia to bypass the warring areas, have been retained. It is believed that since 2001 human and drug trafficking has surpassed arms trade. Official statistical data of the Serbian police make more references to confiscated drugs than arms and ammunition. According to the most recent report of the Ministry of Interior, the police have confiscated over 460 kg of narcotics in the past six months alone, which is why we may assume that drugs have once again gone to the top of illegal trade. Arms smuggling from the Balkans to Gaza and Iraq is presently in a shadow and there are disconcerting indications that large quantities of arms have been cached in unstable areas along Albanian and Macedonian borders.

MONEY LAUNDERING, BIOGRAFIES LAUNDERING

Substantial mobility of Serbian organized crime has been noted in the report of the commission set up to look into the security system of the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić. The report quotes that “one of the criminal activities of the group (Zemun clan, J. U.) is taking of motor vehicles for ransom”, and that “towards the end of 2000 and early 2001 the group started with kidnappings demanding millions of German marks to release the victims”.

The absence of lustration has given Serbian criminals a possibility to move their capital and activities into legal channels. Serbia thus fits in the modern and disastrous trend of mixing the “white” and “black” zones of legal and illegal money transactions.

The strategy to curb organized crime in post-conflict Serbia would have to anticipate a strategic association between all components of the

security sector and their submission to democratic civilian control as a matter of emergency. Organized crime has become so strong that “ordinary” repressive measures of the police (e.g. operation “Sabre”) could only function as stopgaps. After a period wherein the state itself stood behind illegal businesses, the mafia has become fairly independent and some say that what it now gives the state are mere crumbs. In addition, the criminals have obviously developed strong immunity to actions of state bodies which, according to traditional views, should be competent to break it.

Policemen and judges are today often referred to as inefficient and corrupt. There is no doubt that this is largely true. But the key problem is not a corrupt individual but rather systemic deficiencies and lack of political will to deal with them. The recent liquidation of a collaborating witness in the trial to assassins of the Serbian prime minister is partly attributable to the deficient law on the protection of witnesses. More important, however, is the complete indifference of the state for the security of a key witness. It is clearly revealed in the oversight of the fact that legal grounds for his protection could have been found in other regulations. Criminology experts think that the most unfortunate thing about this situation is the fact that the local clansmen had laundered not only their financial gains, but also their criminal backgrounds and became part of the social elite now engaged in legal businesses and even important offices. The absence of lustration is, I believe, one of the key factors showing that a perfect crime is, after all, possible. That is the situation in present day Serbia. It seems that the state still does not have “its” crime, but that the crime still has its state.

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Humane Gesture or Calculation

Five former Guantanamo inmates could cause a diplomatic controversy between China and Albania. These Chinese Muslims, members of the Uigur ethnic minority in China will be given sanctuary in Albania having spent five years in the American prison in Cuba. They were detained after the downfall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan under suspicion of having ties to al Qaeda. The US authorities no longer consider them a threat to state security or "intelligence-worthy", and therefore declared them refugees. The authorities are reluctant to extradite them to China fearing that they will be tortured or executed. China, on the other hand, claims they are terrorists and members of Turkmenistan Islamic Movement.

The US officials have for two years now informally looked for a West European country willing to take the former Guantanamo detainees. Albania alone responded to their inquiry. While the US authorities see this as an "important humane gesture", China claims it is all about Albanian economic and military interests. One of Albania's foreign policy objectives is to work out an invitation to join NATO and establish close links with the US, but it also considers China an important - actually fourth largest - foreign trade partner.

The deadline for appeal of all dissatisfied with their status of volunteers in the homeland war expires in late July. The law regulating the rights of Croatian defenders passed on 3 December 2004, among other things, defines who can have the status of a Croatian defender and volunteer in the homeland war. The status entails the right to participate in the distribution of shares of the Croatian Defenders Fund.

The law drew a sharp distinction between those who participated in the war as members of regular armed forces and the volunteers. A volunteer is a member of an armed unit of volunteers who carried arms at least a hundred

A direct telephone line linking the Greek air force centre in Larissa and Turkish air force base in Eskisehir was established on 2 July 2006. This came about after a collision of Greek and Turkish fighter jets on 23 May in the disputable airspace over southern Aegean. Only an hour after the incident, wherein the Greek pilot was killed, officials of the two countries started negotiations seeking to calm the tensions. Intensive diplomatic action is only understandable knowing that in 1998 these two NATO allies were on the verge of a conflict over two small, uninhabited islands.

Aegean "Red Line"

The cause of tensions in the Aegean is a dispute concerning territorial waters, as well as airspace above them. If Greece goes on with the intended expansion of its territorial waters from the present six to 12 nautical miles, Turkey will reportedly consider it a cause for war. Greeks have defined their airspace above the sea at 10 miles around every Greek island, while Turkey and the U.S.A. recognize only six miles. This accounts for

different interpretations of the incident. While Greek officials state that the Turkish pilot entered Greek skies without previously submitting his flight plan, the Turks maintain that their aircraft flew in international airspace.

The direct phone line should help avoid risky manoeuvres, decrease the danger of short distance following and extend the summer moratorium on military manoeuvres on the Aegean until September 15. In addition, within confidence building measures, joint exercises will be organized as well as training for response in the event of natural disasters.

Conflict of Jurisdiction

The European Union and Great Britain prepare a donation valued at several dozen million convertible marks for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the B-H Council of Ministers is waging a silent war about the control of the donation. Namely, it has to do with highly sophisticated equipment for wiretapping which is not intended only for the intelligence service, but may also be used by all security and police services. The equipment was initially intended for the Ministry of Security. However, it goes against international practice to let a ministry, i.e. minister as a political person, have the use of wiretapping equipment.

Different strands in the Federation support different solutions. Representatives of Republika Srpska in the Council of Ministers ask that the equipment be donated to the CIPS (Citizens Identification Protection System) project. The Croatians want it placed under the control of the Ministry of Security, while the Bosniak ministers think the equipment should go to the Intelligence-Security Agency. A compromise solution is also possible anticipating the establishment of a special agency within the Ministry of Security, which will have control over the equipment and do the wiretapping jobs for all intelligence, police and security services, providing that they produce an appropriate court order.

War Shares

days. Those who were killed without fulfilling this condition will not be granted the status and their families will not qualify for the distribution of shares. On the other hand, the defenders are members of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia (Croatian army and the police) who spent at least one day in the battlefield. This provision enabled the registration of 489,000 men with that status. They are, just like those who took part in the war as volunteers, entered into the register of the

Fund and will be given shares in line with the established criteria.

According to these criteria each day spent on the battlefield in the period from 5 August 1990 until 30 June 1996 will score one to eight points. The maximum number of points will be given to those who were in Serbian camps and prisons - eight points for each day of captivity. Possible amendments to the criteria should give the participants in operations Maslenica, Medački Džep and Dubrovnik more points, while the maximum value of shares per person amounts to 18,500 kuna (2570 euro).

Safe Skies for Pope and Football

NATO aircraft secured the Spanish airspace during the Pope's visit to Valencia on July 9, where he attended the "Fifth World Meeting of Families". For that occasion the Spanish authorities requested the engagement of the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&C Force), in line with the practice of defence against global terrorism instituted in 2001. The NAEW&C force has so far carried out over 30 such operations, including the Winter Olympic Games in Turin in February 2006, and the Pope's visit to Poland in late May this year. Upon the request of German authorities NAEW&C Force also secured the skies during the World Football Championship from June 7-9 this year.

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Democratic "Mutiny" against Rumsfeld?

Miljan Filimonović

The dam broke", says Bernard Trainor, former U.S. general. This obviously refers to the surge of criticism against Donald Rumsfeld, whose ouster was publicly requested by a number of former US army generals in March and April this year. The generals claim that the defense secretary is incompetent and arrogant and has little respect for the army and its highest representatives. One of them, Anthony Zinni, says Rumsfeld dismissed the results of ten-year planning of US military strategists concerning the possibility of an effective occupation of Iraq. Zinni also claims that Rumsfeld ushered the army into war, without having an exit strategy.

The criticism of former generals dominated the American media in March and April. In an article published by New York Times on March 19, retired general Paul Eaton censured Rumsfeld's management of the war in Iraq and called for his resignation. Anthony Zinni joined in with his criticism in a TV interview on April 2, followed by another four retired generals by the end of the month. Writings of several American experts published after the case had been opened, highlighted several problems in the US civil-military relations emerged in consequence of the war in Iraq.

The case of "mutiny" against Rumsfeld once again showed how difficult it is to make a precise division of competences between civilian officials and generals in managing and commanding the army. It involves one of the key principles of the modern concept of democratic civilian control over the armed forces. The concept implies a series of precepts, mechanisms and procedures that, to put it simply, place the armed forces under the control of democratically elected authorities. But,

quite often, only one objective figures – "keeping the military away from politics". But very important for this control is that civil authorities respect the professional autonomy of military officers.

CIVIL OR MILITARY AFFAIRS?

This thin demarcation line between politics and military profession has been crossed by both statesmen and generals ever since the American Civil War. Historians particularly stress the case of General Douglas MacArthur who criticized White House politics. He proposed to expand the war in Korea into a war against China but President Truman disagreed and replaced him. Another example of generals' interference in politics is Collin Powell's recent statement against the limited intervention of the American army in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. However, politicians, too, have been known to turn a deaf ear to requests coming from military circles. Les Aspin's refusal to send in tanks and armored vehicles in the Somali war ostensibly cost him the office of the defense secretary. Events of this kind show that the "don't ask, don't tell" formula, widely accepted in the US Army, is but a result of an unstable compromise. The matter of dividing civil and military affairs has been additionally complicated after the end of the Cold War, due to numerous factors: the changed nature of threats, different use of the army and its new role in the 21st century.

In the light of these changes, it appears that a number of objections the former generals addressed at Rumsfeld are of purely military-professional nature. Already in February 2003, general Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, addressing the Senate Armed Services Committee said that the US did

not have sufficient troops for an effective occupation of Iraq. This was subsequently confirmed by a plan developed by Anthony Zinni, head of United States Central Command, stating that 380,000 soldiers were required to “lock down and control” Iraq. Analyses of Rand Corporation and National Security Council experts came up with similar figures. However, invoking the success in Afghanistan, Rumsfeld called for a downsized and faster force. In his discussions with high-ranking officers, the number of men necessary to start up the operation resembled “an accordion – it got bigger, it got smaller”, as Michael Gordon put it. Nevertheless, the invasion on Iraq, as we all know, started with about 120,000 troops, a fact cited today by retired general Paul Eaton as proof of Rumsfeld’s “strategic, operational and tactical incompetence”. This seems to be an example of “assertive control” (Peter Feaver), rather than democratic civilian control of the armed forces. Feaver uses this term to denote direct interference of civilians into military affairs.

Former generals offer another argument noted by the analysts for some time already. It has to do with the failure of civil authorities to precisely define the role of the army in the Iraq war. Let us recall that the claim of Iraq’s possessing weapons of mass destruction has often been invoked as the direct cause for war. Another cause was allegedly Saddam Hussein’s link with al Qaeda. Neither of the proclaimed causes allowed for any conclusion as to the role of the army in the occupation of Iraq. There was still less grounds to expect that the job description for the marines would include “nation building”. That is why already in November 2003, Zinni warned that the US forces were not qualified to deal with that task. It is hard to imagine how military professionals could do a good job, if they were unaware of the objective they were supposed to accomplish.

Without trying to justify them, we believe that the retired us generals have

not violated the principle of democratic civil control by offering the above mentioned objections. However, their criticism was not altogether beyond reproach. They, e.g., said that Rumsfeld and his associates should be purged (gen. Riggs), that Rumsfeld “carries far too much baggage with him” (gen. Swannack) and that he “should retire” (gen. Zinni). The most direct interference in political affairs was former general Gregory Newbold’s article in the *Time*, inviting serving officers to “express their views and ensure that the President hears them clearly”. In contrast to others, he criticized the very decision to start a war on Iraq, which is also a political gesture *par excellence*. True, Newbold invokes the argument of security policy and says that the real threat is al Qaeda, referring to Iraq as “a peripheral job”. However, security policy is nevertheless a policy and Newbold does not hesitate to open the “Pandora’s box of civil-military relations” proposing that an officer should be loyal to the constitution, rather than politicians. All these statements have a doubtlessly political nature and amount to overstepping of professional limits by former military brass.

PUBLIC INQUIRES, CONGRESS SILENT

For the time being the public has not been offered clear answers to numerous issues opened by this case. Even the analysts disagree, for instance about what an officer may or may not say when he retires, and whether or not he can voice his views in public. The leading American media offer controversial views, but it is to their credit that they have at least enabled the public insight into these problems. However, the key element for the functioning of democratic civil control is parliamentary supervision. It is striking that the US Congress has kept silent to this date and has failed to set up a committee to eventually look into the case. Some of the generals’ objections are not easy to

classify as either “legitimate” or “illegitimate” and they will have to be judged by a higher authority. Is it possible to dismiss the generals’ protest over the US failure to form a coalition with its traditional allies, knowing that this could have strengthened the US troops sufficiently to attain their military objective? Has Newbold ventured straight in the foreign policy sphere by objecting to the Pentagon and White House’s alienation from their allies? Or is this criticism in fact a display of justified soldier’s anger?

After al Qaeda’s attack on New York and Washington, proclamation of the global war on terrorism, unilateral action and adoption of the pre-emptive doctrine, civil-military rela-

tions in the USA grow increasingly more complex. The country is faced with a challenge of defining the procedures and instruments to prevent the executive branch from misusing or abusing the army. This is all the more important in view of the USA military power. America seeks to be a role model to “new democracies” undergoing security sector reforms in line with democratic principles. That is why the newly opened issues of democratic control over the armed forces will have to be answered by the highest body of a democratically elected power – the parliament.

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Model Law on Private Security Related Services

Bogoljub Milosavljević

The Belgrade Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) in cooperation with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) prepared a Model Law on Private Security Related Services. This article reviews the main motives the CCMR was guided by in its approach to this task, as well as the basic solutions offered by the prepared model. This review was presented at the promotion of the above-mentioned model at a CCMR press conference held on May 20, 2006.

THE RATIONALE FOR DRAFTING THE MODEL LAW

Private security sector in Serbia witnessed substantial development over the past ten years. Despite the non-existence of precise official data on the number of people, companies and agencies operating in this sector, it is estimated that it currently employs 47-

50,000 people. At the same time, the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia reportedly employs about 45-46,000 police officers and other staff. Furthermore, there is no legal act regulating the numerous sector-specific issues.

Private security operations, actually, register a fast increase throughout the world. Certain neighbouring countries, e.g. Albania, have tried to limit its growth legally, by prescribing that the number of people engaged in private security cannot exceed the number of local policemen in the country’s districts (see: *SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: A Cause or Effect of Insecurity*, SEESAC, August 2005).

Just like several other countries in its environment (neighborhood?), Serbia seems to be facing numerous problems in this sector and its relations with public law enforcement. (?) These problems include the following:

- The use of firearms and wiretaps, surveillance and tracking of persons have not been legally regulated, despite the fact that private security staff carry long and short barrels, and engage in wiretapping, surveillance and tracking;
- A system for the screening, vetting and licensing of security personnel does not exist;
- No one knows who controls their operation or how;
- There are obvious links between certain political parties and private companies owned by politically connected people with private security companies. Some suspect that political parties are influencing private security companies, and that these companies may be linked with organized crime;
- Private security companies employ quite a few former police and security service officers, which gives rise to unprincipled links, uncontrolled exchange of data and possibly abuse on both sides;
- Knowing all that, it is astonishing that Serbia does not even have a draft law aimed at regulating the operation of private security companies and their control. So far, only one proposal to that effect has been drafted by the Ministry of Interior, but it was four years ago and it has not reached the government yet. That was the key motive for producing the Model Law, offered to the government by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations.

THE FRAMEWORK AND MAIN IDEAS OF THE MODEL LAW

We have opted to regulate only one, more important part of the private security sector dealing with guarding people and property. It was our belief that activities of private investigation agencies should be regulated by a special law, since the issues involved are legally different.

The main ideas of the Model Law are the following:

- Private security services should be limited by means of establishing incompatible activities (?) and prohibiting the use of police means, methods, uniforms and insignia;
- Private security services may be rendered by companies and operators, all of whom are obliged to join an association (chamber) once they obtain their licences. Domestic and foreign legal persons are permitted to operate under the same conditions;
- The Association is vested with public authorities to implement training programs, prescribe detailed conditions for operation and provide professional supervision;
- Operating licences should be issued by the Ministry of Interior, as a condition to start operation;
- A person wishing to operate as private security officer must fulfil certain conditions, with respect to non-existence of legal obstacles (conviction, etc.), citizenship, health requirements, education and the like;
- Specific activities (guarding of people and property, escorting transports of valuables, securing of public events, security systems, etc.) are subject to specific conditions, which is why a special licence is issued for each of these activities;
- Authorities of private security officers are limited to warnings, identity checks, body search, prevention of entry and exit, detention pending the arrival of police officers, use of physical force and restraints, and use of firearms under specially prescribed conditions;
- Protection of personal data should be addressed separately;
- Supervision of private security companies' operations is carried out by the Ministry of Interior.

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Changes in the Croatian Security-Intelligence System

Predrag Petrović

A large part of the domestic and foreign professional public believed that Croatia had successfully carried out the “first generation” security sector reform and that the Law on Security Services adopted in 2002, completed the country’s security and intelligence system. Although commended for reforming its security sector efficiently, Croatia decided to change the legislation governing the work of security services. Namely, the parliament, convened on 30 June this year, adopted the Government’s final proposal of the Law on the Security-Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia.

The main motive for drafting a new law was the wish of the law-maker, repeatedly underlined in the accompanying explanation, to increase the efficiency of security services. However, the Proposal included several provisions encroaching on inviolable human liberties and interfering with the efficient democratic civil control of these services. The Parliament failed to register these flaws and the “first reading” elicited no debate. However, when presented to the public the proposed legislation immediately provoked fierce criticism (see box). The government then accepted some objections of civil society actors and, between two readings, amended the text accordingly. The Final Proposal of the law was then (May 25) sent to the Parliament for its adoption and, with a few amendments, finally enacted on June 30.

I shall here analyse some of the key provisions contained in the Final Proposal, i.e. now adopted law, com-

paring them with the Government’s Proposal (before the first reading) and the provisions of the previously effective Law. The text below will thus look into the prescribed organizational changes, the manner of adoption of the services’ rules, the authorities of the Council for Civil Supervision and the procedure for the approval of information gathering measures.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

The first change anticipated by the Proposal is of organizational nature and remained unaltered in the parliamentary procedure. In contrast to the 2002 Law, which established three services – Intelligence Agency (OA), Counter-Intelligence Agency (POA) and Military Security Agency (VSA), the new law envisages only two – Security-Intelligence Agency (SOA) and Military Security-Intelligence Agency (VSOA) (Article 1). The two civil services have thus been merged into a single one, while the “old-new” military agency (VSOA) is actually created by adding another – intelligence – function to the previously existing VSA. In other words intelligence and counter-intelligence are concentrated in both the civil and military agencies.

The proposer believes that the new organization will increase the efficiency of the agencies and remove the problems in their operation, noted in the previous period. The explanation of the Law, for instance, states that inferior coordination between the services in the surveillance of persons suspected of criminal activities created problems.

For instance, in case a suspect left the country he was no longer within the jurisdiction of the POA, but rather of the OA. Security services in stable democratic countries are, presumably, faced with similar difficulties. However, they still do not opt to combine intelligence and counter-intelligence activities in a single agency (e.g., M5 and M6). While appreciating the arguments of the proposer, we may nevertheless ask whether this solution will influence

one organization or agency. A proliferation of different intelligence organizations, perhaps corresponding to separate structures such as the armed forces and police, or domestic and foreign intelligence, may be less efficient and foster bureaucratic competition, but is generally considered to be more conducive to democratic control”.

It remains to be seen how this solution will function in practice, i.e. how intelligence and counterintelligence

Successful Civil Society Pressure

A round table organized by the Centre for Peace Studies (held on 23 May 2006 in Zagreb) discussed the main deficiencies of this Law. The round table was arranged for the purpose of pressuring the authorities into amending the legal provisions limiting the constitutional rights of citizens before the Final Proposal is sent to the parliament for its adoption. In addition to the Centre for Peace Studies the protest against the proposed law was joined by several other civic associations including the Forum for Civil Society, GONG, Group for Women’s Human Rights B.a.B.e, Serbian Democratic Forum, etc.

In his statement for *Western Balkans Security Observer* Tin Gazivoda assessed the role of civil sector actors in changing and improving the Law: “I believe that a very small number of people and organizations accomplished really a lot (...) In the final stage, the Centre for Peace Studies, the Croatian Helsinki Committee and somewhat less GONG and Amnesty International, managed to work out incorporation of several provisions essential to the sphere of human rights and civil supervision.” Tin Gazivoda is a member of the Council for Civil Supervision of security-intelligence agencies nominated by the Centre for Peace Studies and the Croatian Helsinki Committee. He is also president of the Council for Legislative Amendments WG. He thinks that, “At the last moment, the Government understood that the Council for Civil Supervision can only help it build the citizens confidence in the system and will do that even when it identifies certain problems in the operation of these services.”

the democratic control of secret services, and if so, to what degree. As noted by the researchers of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces in their publication *Parliamentary oversight of the security sector* (2003), “A structural means of controlling intelligence is to avoid a monopoly of intelligence function by

activities put together into a single agency will be regulated. Article 62 of the newly adopted Law prescribes that the government, subject to the previous agreement of the president, should pass a decree defining the internal structure, i.e. organizational units and their competences. Only after this decree is adopted will we be able to

make more reliable conclusions in this respect.

The Law anticipates the adoption of rules governing the “internal organization” and the “manner of security-intelligence operation” of the agencies, on the basis of a previously adopted decree defining their internal structure. The law-giver prescribes that the public should not have insight into these rules. They are “classified and are not published” (Art. 63, para 3 and Art. 64, para 3). This provision, too, passed the first reading, and remained in the adopted text of the Law. As for the procedure regulating the adoption of rules, the first solution gave this authority to the agency (SOA) director, i.e. defence minister (VSOA). According to the other, adopted solution, the SOA director will also have to obtain the agreement of the head of the Office of the National Security Council (UVNS), according to Art. 63, para 2 and Art. 64, para 2. This rightly elicits the question as to who can request the verification of compliance of these secret acts with the constitution and law, and how? In other words, what consequences their application may produce in terms of possible violations of human rights – of both the services’ staff and those who may find themselves within the scope of their operation? The dilemma is only partly removed by ensuring that the agency director is no longer the only person responsible for the adoption of the rules. It still appears that the solutions incorporated in the 2002 Law were better. According to Art. 40, para 2 of that Law the rules on internal organization were passed by the government upon the proposal and with the consent of the President of the Republic (i.e. upon the proposal of agency director for OA and POA, and defence minister for the VSA). The rules on the manner of operation are passed by the OA and POA directors, in

agreement with the Council for Coordination of Security Services. The existence of several different control instances at different levels of political power still provided better grounds for checks and balances where the services are concerned.

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT

Reduced authorities of the Council for Civil Supervision elicited fierce criticism of the Croatian public, since the Proposed Law, before the first reading, reduced it to a mere mailbox for citizens’ grievances. Let us recall that the Council is a non-partisan, parliamentary body comprising experts in the spheres of politicology, law and electrical engineering. So what exactly caused so stormy reactions of the public? Under the Proposal (first reading) the Council for Civil Supervision was authorized to consider only the grievances of citizens and citizens’ associations who believed that they were subject to security services activities and that their human rights were thus endangered. The proposer thereby excluded the possibility for the Council to independently, *ex officio*, institute proceedings in order to establish violations of human rights. The Council may, but is not obliged to, participate in direct supervision over the services when the procedure to establish the violation of rights has been initiated by the Committee and the Office of the National Security Council.

We should also mention the fact that, under this proposal, the Council was supposed to lose a series of competences compared with the 2002 Law. Thus, for instance, the provisions of Art. 81 allowing the Council to monitor the legality of operation of security services, monitor and supervise the application of secret information gathering measures limiting the constitu-

tional human rights and fundamental freedoms, were dropped. However, subsequent amendments restored this provision to the finally adopted text of the Law.

However, the Council no longer monitors national security regulations in other countries. It cannot propose solutions for the promotion of legal regulations related to the legality of operation of security services. True, the importance of these, once substantial, competences of the Council was decreased by the provision stating that the Council should perform operations referred to in Art. 81 of this law on the basis of a programme adopted by the Committee for National Security (Art. 82, para 1). Therefore, the function of the Council would have been substantially reduced, were it not for the amendments. The mailbox metaphor would actually have been a fair description of reality.

The amendments enabled the Council to carry out the duties referred to in Article 111 "on the basis of a program adopted by the National Security Committee; requests of citizens, state bodies and legal persons who have noted illegal acts or irregularities in the operation of security intelligence agencies, especially in cases of violation of constitutionally guaranteed human rights and liberties" (Art. 112).

Therefore, the adopted amendments extended the circle of persons who may initiate supervision. But, despite the obvious improvement of the Council's position, it appears that the Law still has certain deficiencies. Namely, the government failed to prescribe sanctions for the established illegalities, and the Council merely reports such cases to the president of the Republic of Croatia, the prime minister and the attorney general (Art. 113, para 3). Furthermore, a clear obligation of

the supervised to comply has not been established either.

In conclusion, despite certain improvements in the legal solutions introduced between the two readings, the parliamentary committee retains the key role in security sector control. And this role is, especially in new democracies, largely reduced to party control. As Žarko Puhovski put it in his statement for Croatian TV Daily News (25 May), "Two parties may reach an agreement on stability, which is important, but the price of this stability may be paid by citizens without party protection who will thus be deprived of a possibility to attain their rights within the system".

"IN PROCESS" FOR LIFE

According to the Proposal, surveillance of people in public spaces and surveillance of international communications are characterized as milder forms of violation of human rights, which is why an order to that effect does not have to be approved by the Supreme Court, but only by the Agency director. This solution has provoked a series of critical reactions of citizens' associations and the Croatian public. They requested a clear distinction between measures for information gathering in open and enclosed public spaces, and pointed out that recording of what people say in public constitutes a grave violation of human rights, so that a measure of this kind requires the permission of the Supreme Court. The government initially ignored these requests of the public, but finally, a day before the Law was adopted, came up with an amendment saying that tapping of suspects' talks in open and public places had to be approved by the Supreme Court.

However, the problem of a possibly lifetime monitoring of people "in process" has not been removed. Namely, the Law does not in any way

limit the number of times a surveillance order can be extended. The previous law restricted even the judge of the Supreme Court. The judge could extend the order for secret wiretapping of stationary and mobile phones, reading of telefax and e-mail messages, secret control of mailed correspondence or packages, as well as the tracking, surveillance or wiretapping a suspect only two times in succession. According to that law the first court permission was valid for four months, and could only be extended for another three-month period. No further extensions were possible. Under the new law surveillance may be extended for an unlimited period of time, although it requires the approval of a panel of three authorized judges.

The newly adopted law apparently contains a better solution since it prescribes that talks between agents and citizens must be recorded. This has not been permitted thus far without the approval of the persons concerned. The recordings so made will not be immediately available to the people who were interviewed, since that could endanger the services' operational activities. The recordings will be kept by the agency and made available to judicial and supervisory bodies.

Although the possibility of a person to choose whether his/her interview will be recorded or not may appear to be a "democratic" option, it still seems that the new solution is a better one. It should prevent secret recordings such as the one in the "Puljiz" affair two years ago. Let us recall that at that time journalist Helena Puljiz was exposed to threats and blackmail during a five-hour interview in the POA premises. Later on, it turned out that the interview was also recorded, despite the fact that the interrogated journalist did not agree to that. Maybe the agents of security

services will in future refrain from abuses of this kind, knowing that they are on a tape available to the court.

Therefore, some solutions of the new law are better, while some others are inferior compared with the previous one. Efficiency should not be the only consideration in shaping the security system of a country. This certainly applies to Croatia, which has substantially improved its security position over the past ten years. Today, it tries to maintain good relations with its neighbours and does not really have any major disputes with any of them, which is why it is unlikely that its security will be externally endangered. Fear of ethnic unrest or revolt is just as unfounded. The largest security risks are, like in

most transition countries, corruption and organized crime, and the arcane structures of power work precisely in their favour. That is why the strengthening of institutions – along with respect for the principles of the rule of law –

would be the strongest tool in fighting these challenges. The described legislative process has revealed that civil society actors in Croatia have still managed to work out substantial improvement in the provisions of the law on the security-intelligence system that could infringe upon the sphere of human rights.

"I believe that the adopted text of the Law (...) regulates the most important issues of relevance for the protection of human rights in a satisfactory manner. All measures of secret information gathering that represent gross infringement of human rights and liberties may be applied by security services only subject to the permission of the Supreme Court."

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Talks between agents and citizens must be recorded

Peace Missions - Serbian Debate

Marko Milošević

International cooperation of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro (Serbia) has been increasing over the past few years and, in that context, its participation in peace missions is also mentioned. A possibility for joint participation in such operations has been recently brought up by Norwegian defence minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen visiting Belgrade in June this year. Why does the public know so little about this means for conflict prevention, management and/or resolution?

A democratic public debate on peace missions that would allow the citizens to learn about the related problems and potential benefits, does not exist. The issue is, in effect, instrumentalized for the purposes of everyday politics. Serbian prime minister Zoran Živković's offer of a thousand soldiers for peace missions in 2003, elicited diverse public reactions. Instead of a constructive discussion the Serbian citizens were given arguments of party leaders reflecting their mutual animosities. A consensus on this matter was not reached, and the citizens did not learn anything of importance concerning these missions as a valuable instrument of international and security policies. Let us recall that the prime minister was objected the lack of authority to pledge our troops and the fact that the matter of peace operations within NATO or the UN had not been addressed by the public at a referendum. Some even said that the army should go back to

Kosovo, instead of trying to deal with other people's problems.

The Law on Peace Operations was passed at the end of 2004, after a lot of dawdling. This was followed by the establishment of the SMAF Centre for Peace Operations and several domestic military observers were assigned to humanitarian missions abroad.

PARTIES' GAMES IN SECURITY POLICY

Political parties' views on peace missions are different and depend on their current politics. Party programmes do not specifically refer to these missions. Their views may be deduced from their attitudes towards international integrations with the EU, NATO or Partnership for Peace. The Democratic Party supports European and regional integrations. The Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) believes that Serbia, as a European state, must cooperate with other European states and participate in the work of European organizations in order to ultimately become an equal member of the EU. The Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) supports "active foreign policy and accession to all international organizations and treaties". This party's programme stresses that there is no national or state reason for non-compliance with the UN Charter.

The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) wrote its Statute in 1992 (and has not amended it since), so that it says

nothing about peace missions or our engagement in such efforts. The Declaration of the VI Party Congress, which is the most recent relevant document, notes “the absence of conditions for accession to the PfP”, stating that a possible proposal for accession to this effect calls for a referendum. Serbian socialists are emphatically opposed to the Hague Tribunal, but declare their support for European integrations and resolute struggle against terrorism under the UN auspices. G17+ party programme states that Serbia should “accede to the EU and Euro-Atlantic security and other integrations”, including the PfP. The Serbian Radical Party’s (SRS) programme opposes entry of NATO, saying that the Army’s only obligation is to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the homeland.

Reactions of parliamentary parties to Živković’s 2003 offer were polarized. The opposition was against it to the last man, while the parties in power revealed a sharp division and focused their debate on the prime minister’s authorities. The defence minister Boris Tadić claimed that the Army was an instrument of foreign policy and that its participation in peace missions – an obligation deriving from the UN Charter - reflected our foreign policy attitudes. The Serbian radicals, true to their programme, opposed this engagement as “obsequious” submission to American orders, claiming the UN were an instrument of the USA and that UNMIK failed to protect the Kosovo Serbs. They maintained that the Army must be

sent back to Kosovo, instead of being dispatched to places “all over the world”. Another line of the radicals’ criticism had to do with the mandate of the prime minister. They argued that as a republic’s official he did not have the right to offer the services of the Army, since that was the prerogative of the state union. Velimir Ilić (New Serbia) challenged the prime minister’s authority in this matter, saying that a decision concerning the participation of our soldiers in peace missions must be verified at a referendum. The DSS maintained that the prime minister lacked the competences in the sphere of defence, adding that the country was in a difficult economic situation and had “more urgent matters to attend to”. Before the referendum on Montenegrin independence this year, participating in a state union’s parliament debate about sending the domestic troops to Congo, the Serbian radicals said it was “pointless to discuss peace missions when the future of the state was uncertain”. Based on these party views we cannot conclude anything about the potential benefits or costs related to a possible participation in peace missions.

A survey of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations “Serbian and Montenegrin public on army reforms” (VI) was the only one that inquired into the public views on peace missions. The citizens were asked what they thought about the SMAF’s participation in peace missions under the UN flag, and who should take the relevant decision. The survey was carried out on the

***Citizens don’t even
know who decides
on participation
in peace missions***

territory of Serbia and Montenegro in 2004 and 2005, when Živković's proposal was made public. The citizens were, in principle, opposed to the Army's engagement in UN peace missions and this trend appears to be stable in Serbia. The citizens of Montenegro were opposed to it in the II and IV rounds, but declared in its favour in round III. As for the second question, namely who decides on such engagements, the Serbian public (25,7%) thought it was the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro, as opposed to citizens of Montenegro who thought it was the republic parliament (20%). The fact that only a quarter of respondents gave the accurate answer is indicative of the degree of information the citizens have on this topic. As for Montenegro, the survey findings may be interpreted in the light of the forthcoming referendum on independence. The survey also shows that the number of respondents in favour of the Army's participation in peace missions increases with the level of their education.

The Union of Serbia and Montenegro is the only country in the neighbourhood that does not have its soldiers in peace missions. That is what we usually say, but it really means that there are no larger units assigned to such missions. We have observers in four countries (Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi and Congo), but they are all individual army members, except for a medical team in Congo. Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina take part in peace missions all over the world. And while we talk about these missions as of problems, these other countries take a definitely affirmative attitude towards their peace troops. Although

there is no evidence of direct political advantages, some of the ensuing events are highly indicative. Bosnia-Herzegovina sent a platoon of 36 men to Kabul, and received a positive appraisal. Soon after, it managed to collect a debt in Iraq and obtain assistance for army reforms. A Macedonian unit in Iraq saved several American soldiers, which was followed by the US recognition of Macedonia under its constitutional name in bilateral relations. Romania has a battalion-size contingent in Iraq and Afghanistan, and also participates in a few smaller missions. Speaking of Romanian engagement in peace missions the chief of the General Staff Zdravko Ponoš said that "the Romanian involvement in peace operations did more for the country's foreign policy than its entire foreign ministry". The Romanian Army has been reformed pursuant to NATO standards and the country expects to be admitted to the European Union.

Participation in peace missions is not necessarily conducive to a country's progress, but may be interpreted as its sign of good will and readiness to assume its share of responsibility for the preservation of peace in the world. Serbia will not fare well with an attitude that integration into international organization means only assistance and benefits, without being prepared to shoulder the part of responsibilities their membership implies.

ARMY'S CAPACITIES

The White Book of Defence claims that the state is committed to participation in the collective security system. In that way it contributes to devising and building a favourable security environment on regional and global levels and con-

tinues the 1956 tradition of participation in peace missions. Faced with this new task the Army has established a Centre for Peace Operations. It is intended for the training soldiers and units, and for the monitoring of their engagement in peace missions and other operations concerned with keeping the peace and security in the world.

EXPERIENCED DOCTORS APPRECIATED

SMAF members have so far been trained in the Czech Republic and Greece while, of late, their training has been organized by the Centre for Peace Operations. All these programmes are implemented according to UN standards. The SMAF has thus far trained a company of infantry and engineers each, a medical team and a military police platoon. At this point we must indicate two specific problems. One has to do with numbers, since in order to send a team of this kind to join a mission, it is necessary to have twice as many trained soldiers for rotation purposes. In other words, the present capacities permit us to send an engineer and infantry platoon each, while two from their respective companies would remain in reserve. The second problem related to the present contingent is the fact that the soldiers are volunteers coming from different units. Therefore, internal cohesion does not match that of regular units where soldiers know each other. Military circles say that optimum conditions will be attained once the army is professionalized, since we will then be able to send out compact, already well organized units.

Army potentials have not been fully utilized yet. The key problems are the knowledge of the English language, communication systems and interoperability. By contrast from non-commissioned officers and soldiers who could do with the basic knowledge of English, officers should have a better command of the language. This situation is partly improved by organising courses at the Military Academy, open to all army members interested in attending. The Military Academy issues certificates of the II degree, while the desirable level is STANAG III certificate, which still cannot be obtained in this country. Communications, too, present a problem on two accounts: first, the lack of equipment compatible with NATO standards (presently very few in the army) and second, training for communications using the related frequencies. Interoperability implies the harmonization of procedures that facilitate cooperation of units and systems to enable their effective joint action.

Foreign military partners, Belgium and Norway in particular, recognized the potentials of our Army, primarily physicians and medical staff. In view of the recent conflicts, our physicians acquired practical experience valued throughout the world. One of our medical teams is already in Congo, operating within a Belgian contingent. In addition, our military units can also provide engineering services, based on experience in demining operations. Possible participation of our soldiers would generally be non-combat, but apparently no one explained that to our public.

In order to engage our forces in peace operations several conditions have to be fulfilled: the specific peace mission has to be within the UN mandate, there must be an agreement between the conflicting parties, the decision should be taken by the Serbian parliament, and clear rules of engagement must be formulated.

WHO PAYS

The economic aspect of peace missions includes the questions of overall costs and ways of financing. It is also possible to ask how justified these investments are. It is estimated that a year's engagement of an infantry battalion (the unit we now have ready for a peace mission) costs about 30 million euros per year. For comparison purposes, let us say that Montenegro paid an annual sum of about 60 million euros to the military budget. Our observers in four UN missions, along with regular salaries, receive another 6000 dollars per year, half of which comes from a special state budget and the other half from the UN.

There are at least two models for the Army's participation in peace operations. One is within the UN forces, since this organization refunds the costs. Engagement within NATO implies greater possibilities for involvement, but in that case we would have to cover the costs of operation ourselves, unless we found a strategic partner. It is important to note that operation under a UN flag requires the signing of a stand-by arrangement, which is subject to parliamentary vote.

The link between the economic and military levels is the equipment necessary for peace operations. Our

army does not have sufficient technical facilities, communication and other equipment adjusted to specific climatic conditions. Usually, smaller and poorer countries participating in such missions receive the required equipment from their strategic partners. Thus, for instance, we obtained a field hospital for our medical team in Congo from our Belgian partners. In this same way the army may be given (the possession or use) of communications equipment, motor vehicles or light arms. The Army estimates that this would allow it to partly renew its resources – by participating in peace missions the army may obtain vehicles and means of communication it could use after the assignment is terminated.

The public should be informed on all these facts. Peace missions are one of three forms of missions defined by the Defence Strategy. In order to be successfully implemented funds and personnel are both required. A law regulating this particular sphere has been adopted, the army is (organization-wise) ready to continue preparations and the necessary voluntariness of the soldiers has been sufficiently manifested. Knowing that participation in peace missions may be highly beneficial for our country, the only problems are those of technical nature and political will. It would therefore be advisable to see that the future debate on this particular issue does not develop in the discourse of daily politics, but in a professional context. A possible consensus should be reached by recognizing the potential of peace missions, rather than by political tradeoffs negotiated out of public sight.

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Ponoš in Pentagon

A Serbian MoD delegation, headed by Major general Zdravko Ponoš, left for Washington on 26 June, to “present its views on the overall security situation in the region of Western Balkans”. The visit of the “first man of the Serbian military” to the US Department of Defense, after almost twenty years, testifies to the increasingly intensified military cooperation of the two countries.

New Beginning for the Region

Serbian president Boris Tadić visited Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from June 26 until 29. In Montenegro he said the “present situation should be seen as a new beginning for the region”. During his talks with Filip Vujanović, defence cooperation was discussed including “joint participation in certain missions when the time comes”.

In Skopje, Tadić spoke with his counterpart Branko Crvenkovski and repeated that he was opposed to Kosovo’s independence, stressing that this outcome would have negative consequences not only for the national interests of Serbia, but also for the entire region.

Following his talks with members of B-H presidency in Sarajevo, the Serbian president emphasized that “Serbia does not wish to challenge the border between B-H and Serbia in any way”, since he did not want political or economic ruin of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In his talks with Stjepan Mesić and Ivo Sanader, Tadić noted that the return of refugees was not developing in the best way. “I expect from Croatia to make an additional effort so that the Serbs, refugees from Croatia, would go back to their homes and continued to live as loyal citizens of the Republic of Croatia”, Tadić said.

Two American fighter bombers, for the first time ever, landed on Batajnica airport on 23 June this year. The US ambassador to Serbia Michael Polt said the training of Serbian pilots at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado could start next year already. He also referred to the increasing cooperation between the Army of Serbia and the National Guard of Ohio, Serbia’s partner state in defence system reform.

Officers of the Serbian army participated in the “Forces management overview” event organized from June 25 until 30 at the Forces Management School, Virginia.

Assistant to the defence minister for defence policy Snežana Samardžić-Marković, head of the Serbian delegation visiting Washington, emphasized that the Serbian-American military cooperation showed “continuity and an upward trend”. Exchange of officers’ visits and joint military exercises will, reportedly, be possible following the signing of the SOFA – Status of Forces Agreement, and entry of the State Partnership Programme, enabling military cooperation in general.

NATO Commends Albania

NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commended Albania’s determined effort to implement far-reaching reforms, with considerable success. He also emphasized that Albania played a helpful, moderating role in the region, especially with regard to Kosovo, and should be commended for that constructive approach. Scheffer expressed these views addressing the Albanian parliament during his visit to Tirana on July 6 this year.

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Call for Contributions

The editors of *Western Balkans Security Observer* would like to publish the papers of researchers newly introduced to security studies, as well as articles of already affirmed authors. We therefore call upon all concerned with security theory or practice, and especially regional security topics, to send their papers to the Belgrade School for Security Studies. Although we would expect the papers to be of analytical nature it is not necessary that they are outfitted with scientific analytical apparatus. The authors are encouraged to first forward executive summaries to office@ccmr-bg.org. The texts should not exceed 15,000 characters, Times New Roman 12, 1,5 lines.

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