

**WESTERN
BALKANS
SECURITY
OBSERVER**

**Journal of the
Belgrade School of
Security Studies**

No. 6

JULY-SEPTEMBER 2007

Publisher:

Centre for Civil-
Military Relations

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Printed by:

GORAGRAF, Beograd

Circulation:

250 copies

Belgrade School of
Security Studies is
established with the
assistance of the
Kingdom of Norway.
Its functioning was
supported by the
Balkan Trust for
Democracy.

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Editor's word

We present to the expert and wider public the sixth issue of the journal Western Balkans Security Observer. The assembled papers are organized into four sections according to their thematic concerns.

The first section presents the study of our new associate, Mr. Klemen Groselj. His analysis focuses on the partnership between Russia and the European Union in the area of energy security. The author's findings can be seen as valuable for everyone attempting to comprehend the Balkan states' security issues within the context of European and global processes. It is even more true due to the key protagonists' influence on the security dynamics of the (sub)region.

Following the same principles, the papers concerning the courses, forms and scopes of the regional security cooperation are arranged to form the second section. Those are the papers based on the reports from the international conference "Security cooperation in the Western Balkans", organized in September 2006 in Skopje by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), Belgrade. As the members of civil society organizations from the regional countries participated in the conference, their suggestions regarding the enhancement of regional cooperation are also included in this issue.

Capacities for security cooperation in the Western Balkans mostly depend on how the local actors understand the contents and the scope of a notion of security; it is also important whether, and to which extent, they managed to master new and/or different, both theoretical and methodological, approaches for the investigation of actual security situation. It is feasible to assume that the academic community takes part, in a practical way, in modeling the dominant interpretation of different security levels in each particular local country. Yet, in order to measure its influence, it is primarily necessary to determine the general state of the academic security studies in the countries of the region. With intent to encourage further research and debate on this topic, in the third section of this issue we present the findings of several authors which were previously presented at the international conference "The safer Balkans' network: The influence and the role of academic institutions in the security sector reform", organized on Fruska Gora in June 2006 by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations and with the support of the Balkan Trust for Democracy.

The fourth section presents the study of Amadeo Watkins that provides an outside view on the military education in Serbia.

Miroslav Hadžić

Energy Security in Russia - EU Partnership

Klemen Grošelj

UDK: 330.524:620.92(4-672EU); 339.92(470:4-672EU)

Abstract:

The worldwide rise of energy prices, influenced, among other factors, by political and military tension in the Middle East and the Gulf, has also affected the EU. In the light of the mounting tension between Russia and former Soviet transit countries, fierce discussions on energy security in the EU were even more exuberated by the rising EU energy dependence on imports from Russia. The question of reliability of energy supply from Russia was raised for the first time in the EU. Even more, the question of energy imports from Russia became a strategic political matter in the EU, and it will be even more significant as EU in the process of enlargement approaches the borders of the former Soviet Union and Russia. The aim of this article is to present the comprehensive complexity of Russia-EU relations in the light of the so-called energy security. The starting point of the analysis will be the general frame of these relations and key characteristics of both entities in regard to wider European security and stability. This will be followed by the analysis of the political options that both EU and Russia have at their disposal for establishing a future policy acceptable for both sides. The article discovers that even though we have various statements by officials and Common energy strategy of the European commission, we can hardly talk of common European energy policy or Euro-Russian energy dialogue. This on the other hand means that the question of energy security remains strongly in the hands of the national governments and EU member states.

Keywords: energy security, energy dialogue, energy strategy, energy supply, European Union, Russia

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Introduction

Regardless of all doubts in the last few years, the EU has become almost as strong economically as the US (Walker, 1999). In parallel with the growing economic strength, the EU identified the need to strengthen political and security integration of its Member States, which would make it possible for the EU to manage relations with non member states. The result of this policy is the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), on one hand, and a wide range of agreements between the EU and vital non-member states, on the other. One of them, representing the foundation of the EU-Russia cooperation, is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement from 1997. This Agreement is a reflection of goals which Russia and EU are trying to achieve. Its major aim is to create a true strategic partnership based on mutually shared interests and values in the frame of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Furthermore, with this Agreement political, social and economic stability should be strengthened in the European region and wider. This Agreement should also help the modernization of the Russian industry and its integration in to the global economy. Last but not least, this Agreement should also enhance cooperation in the field of security between the EU and Russia.

At the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to create four 'common spaces' in the framework of the Agreement: a Common Economic Space, a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, a Space of co-operation in the field of External Security; and a Common Space for Research and Education, including Cultural Aspects. The prime objective of all four Common Spaces is to strengthen the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia across the broadest range of policy domains (Country Strategy Paper 2007-13, Russian Federation, 2007: 4-5). In spite of the progress and growing trade, the EU-Russia relations are mostly burdened by the ongoing crisis in the North Caucasus and, even more, by the EU concerns about the state and future development of democracy in Russia. In this context, the last EU-Russia Summit in Samara was additionally burdened by the differences in respect to the missile shield and Russia's intentions to put a moratori-

um on the implementation of the CFE-1A Agreement. Unpleasant feelings in EU were also caused by other statements and actions of different high-ranking Russian officials and sabre rattling, all of which could hamper the progress of the aforementioned common spaces. Beside this, EU enlargement brought to light some problems, like the so-called frozen conflict in the CIS, corruption, organized crime, etc., to the attention of the EU.

At this point, we could say that the relations and cooperation between the EU and Russia are defined by the interaction of two levels of politics. The first level is composed of different common EU policies, like CFSP and EU-Russia Agreements, while the second level consists of a mixture of various national policies. The differences between these two levels may sometimes have very positive, but also negative influences on the EU-Russia relations. It should be clear to us that any differences between these two levels give the other side the upper hand in many ongoing negotiation processes.

If we now look at the Russian side of these relations, we can find out that the Russian policy towards the EU could be split into two periods. The first period was marked by close and genuine Russian cooperation with the EU and the West in different areas of common interests. In this period, Russia had particularly positive attitude towards EU CFSP, because this view was compatible with the so-called Primakov's doctrine of a multi-polar world, in which EU should be one of many power centres. The Russian foreign policy saw CFSP as a step towards greater EU independence from the US; CFSP was seen as the counterweight to the NATO-centric Europe (Rontoyanni, 2002: 814). All these Russian expectations ended with the expansion of NATO, when NATO became the main security organization in Europe and CFSP was to a great extent dependent on its technical, organizational and other support. In response, Russia formed the so-called pragmatic foreign policy, which emphasises the Russian interests and, in regard to the EU, favours bilateral relations with key Member States. The Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (2007) describes this policy as multi-vectoral and decisive, and also as non-confrontational in pursu-



ing vital Russian national interests. The focus points of this policy are the major powers, which are of strategic importance for Russia, and which include EU Member States like Germany, France and the UK. With those states Russia is trying to enhance cooperation in different areas, energy being the dominant one, especially outside the EU framework. But at the same time Russia is cooling down its relations with other EU Member States (Poland, the Baltic States, etc.). Apart from that, Russia is more often perceiving the EU enlargement as a source of the strengthening of the anti-Russian forces in Europe and CIS, which has created a perception of Russian policies as non-European and even as anti-European (Karaganov, 2007a). Russia sees the EU as a possible competitor for influence in the areas of vital Russian interest; especially in the unacceptable Caspian-Caucasus region and Central Asia. Russia is especially worried by the EU claims that Russia is not a reliable energy supplier and that EU needs new gas and oil pipelines bypassing Russia (Karaganov, 2007b). And this is becoming the main reason why energy issues are in the heart of the EU-Russia relations.

EU-Russia Energy Dialogue or Competition?

Since the focal point of the EU-Russia dialogue is energy security, it is necessary to define this notion. Energy security importance is based on the importance of energy for comprehensive economic life and functioning of the modern societies. This is the reason why energy security is defined as (Johnson, 2005: 256), the nature and level of risk related to a certain energy supplier and/or energy source. The modern EU understanding of energy security can be defined as (European Commission, 2004): *“managing demand, diversification of energy sources by using renewable sources, creation of streamlined internal energy market and controlling external supply by reaching special relations with supplier countries”*. While Final report on the Green Paper “Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply” defines energy security as (European Commission, 2002): *ensuring diversification by energy source, supply countries and supply routes is widely seen as the key response to grow-*

ing import dependence. This security is subdivided into long-term security (stable energy policy within the EU and between the EU and energy supplying countries) and short-term security (capability to avoid cuts in energy supplies resulting from extraordinary circumstances). In this respect, Johnson (2005: 257) identifies two risks to the EU energy security: increase in consumption and risks not directly related to energy sources. On the other hand, Spajner (2007: 2890) defines energy security as system security, which includes stable energy supply in requested quantities today as well as in the foreseeable future. Regardless of all the efforts we can avoid energy dependence, because this dependence is the result of available energy sources, transit routes and their capacities. We can now define energy security as the security of sufficient quantities of energy at economically acceptable prices, from different and dispersed sources and transit routes.

As mentioned before, energy, especially natural gas and oil, are in the heart of the EU-Russia cooperation. It is a cooperation based on close interconnected dependence due to the fact that 60% of Russia export is oil, that 60% of all exported Russian oil ends up on the EU markets and represents 25% of all oil imported in the EU. In the case of natural gas, 50% of all Russian natural gas is exported to the EU and this represents 25% of all natural gas imported in the EU (European Commission, 2007). Even more, the trend of increasing oil and gas imports from Russia is clearly present and is forcing the EU to establish EU-Russia energy partnership as a way to energy security of both sides. As Johnson (2005: 257-62) states, this is in line with two major strategies available to the EU in providing its energy security and lowering its energy dependence. The first one is to cut consumption by introducing new, mainly renewable energy sources, and finding new energy sources or energy suppliers. This is a viable long-range strategy, while the only short-term strategy is to foster close relations and partnership with the main suppliers of energy to the EU. At the moment the EU policy is based on a combination of both strategies, especially in relation to Russia, EU is trying to reach some kind of a mutually beneficial energy partnership. The main reason



for this is, as Johnson (2005: 264) concludes, the growing EU dependence on gas imports from Russia, which is, on one hand, the result of a general trend of increasing EU dependence on energy imports, and on the other hand the result of a growing dependence on Russian gas and oil pipeline network, which makes Russian energy sources more attractive to the EU. This trend is most obvious in gas imports where dependence on Russia increased because the majority of new Member States depends heavily on the imports through Russian gas pipelines. Even though pipelines are a very inflexible way of energy transport and usually they limit the choices of gas suppliers to one producer, they are still the most efficient way of gas transport available at the moment. This dependence cannot be overcome in the near future, because construction of new pipelines is technically and economically a demanding undertaking. Besides, routing new pipelines is always a politically complex and intense process, which proves to be of great importance in the EU-Russia relations. Today's pipeline network forces both sides to cooperate as this network increases mutual interdependence. This will last at least as long as Russia constructs its pipeline network to the Far East and/or until EU secures a pipeline connection to the Central Asia, bypassing Russia. And this is also the reason why the EU has been trying for almost a decade to formalize its energy relations with Russia with the Energy Charter, which Russia declined to ratify on the grounds that it does not suit Russian energy interests.

Since these relations are not institutionalised to the extent the EU wants them to be, Correlje and van der Linde¹ (2006: 537-8) conclude that EU is facing sudden and creeping supply gap², which I will call gradual supply disruptions. Sudden disruptions are usually the consequences of political decisions or military conflict, technical failures or disasters. Gradual supply disruptions, on the other hand, are a result of processes which are not sudden or single events and which demand long-term planning and searching for new sources and energy supply routes. In both cases, the EU has to develop different strategies for confronting both types of disruption. But before defining these strategies, we must define two major scenarios of future developments on the global energy

¹ This is part of a wider and more detailed Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/energy_transport/doc/2004_lv_ciep_report_en.pdf, 20.8.2007.

² It defines the following types of gaps: as a result of lack of investment climate and as a result of religious and ideological choice (Correl and van Linde, 2006).

market, which will determine the nature of these EU strategies. The first strategy is called Markets and institutions (MI), and the second one is Regions and empires (RE) (Correlje in Van der Linde, 2006: 535-6). I will label those two scenarios as realistic and liberal. The liberal scenario is optimistic and based on assuming intensive social, cultural and economic internationalisation and globalisation of markets and international relations. It is based on an idea of intensive cooperation among states and nations and envisages a multiparty state system which governs the international community and strengthens international institutions, and liberalisation of markets and market forces in international trade and exchange. On the contrary, the realistic scenario has a pessimistic perspective on the future development of international political and economic system. It envisages ideological, religious, regional and state based partition of the world. In this world different political, ideological, regional and strategic blocks are caught in fierce competition. Different national and regional security dilemmas limit international economic integration and all economic activities are heavily regulated. Since there is no global market of strategic commodities, their trade is based on bilateral trade agreements among states and blocks. This further strengthens different blocks with satellite regions joining the race for markets and energy sources. The nature of the EU-Russia relations and especially the EU-Russia energy partnership depends on which scenario prevails or which assumptions are dominant in the international community. According to the realistic scenario, Russia and EU will be two blocks competing for sources and arranging mutual trade with trade agreements, while in the liberal scenario EU and Russia will gradually form common space of free trade.

In case of either scenario, EU should, according to Correlje in van der Linde (2006: 539-541), develop the following strategies to cope with possible disruptions of energy supply:

- a) Prevention (in the liberal scenario the aim is strengthening the international institutions and energy markets; in the realistic scenario long term bilateral trade agreements are crucial).



b) Deterrence (in the liberal scenario it is necessary to strengthen the role and powers of the UN and Security Council to enable them to enforce sanctions and authorize peace operations to solve different conflicts; while the realistic scenario is based on effective and strong military force).

c) Containment (the liberal scenario does not envisage any crucial role of containment; in the realistic scenario this is a crucial mechanism of damage control).

d) Crisis management is equally relevant for both scenarios and envisages the creation of strategic reserves of energy, regime of reduced use of energy, etc.

But regardless of different scenarios and strategies EU faces different options regarding its energy security. The first one is to leave this issue to the individual Member States and their ability to achieve beneficial bilateral agreements with the producing countries with or without any wider EU framework. The next option is to establish a comprehensive EU energy policy which will ensure that all Member States have a secure and stable energy supply. This will also benefit producing countries, because the agreement with the EU will grant them access to one of the biggest energy markets in the world. But this will be possible only if, as Correlje and van der Linde (2006: 542) claim, EU develops the internal energy market capable of overcoming the sudden and gradual supply disruptions using alternative energy sources and ensuring the necessary strategic stocks. Nevertheless, EU must develop its own internal and external capabilities, which will enable it to materialise its energy vis-à-vis the producing countries. This also means that it is necessary to develop true EU military capabilities, independent of the US in many aspects.

Another option in this respect is the creation of a regional energy market or EU-centric geo-energy space. Mane-Estrada (2006: 3774-3784) claims that the forming of true liberal global energy market is an illusion and that the only option is to create common geo-energy space in which consumer, transit and producing countries cooperate to achieve optimum beneficial results for all participating countries. This would mean that EU should try to create such common geo-energy space together with Russia, the Caspian States

and Turkey. This space would be regulated by multilateral agreements and above all by mutual dependence of all participating countries. In this way, all countries could fulfil their interests and aims without competition, insecurity and tension. But this would demand from every participating country to accept an inclusive energy policy and try to avoid, as much as possible, narrow and exclusive national energy policies.

Of course, we must take into account the fact that Russia also has its own choices in creating its own energy policy or, as Rutland (1999) said, development paradigms of energy policy. Rutland (1999) identifies the following:

a) “*Kuwaitization*”: envisages the energy sector as the resource provider and starting point for the development of the Russian economy and society.

b) “*Liberalization*”: in this paradigm the Russian energy sector should develop in accordance with market forces and without any state regulation or red tape.

c) “*Rent seeking*”: in this paradigm the energy sector is controlled by small managerial-political elite, which seek rents and profits from the energy sector’s monopolistic position in the exports of oil and gas.

d) “*Russian bear*”: means state control over energy sector, which makes Russia a great power with interests near and far abroad.

e) “*Pluralistic school*”: a state in which rival groups compete for control over energy sector.

However, Russia as an energy producing country has some unique characteristics, which considerably strengthen its position in the world markets. These characteristics are (Mane-Estrada, 2006: 3778-9):

a) Russia not only pumps and exports oil and gas, but it also refines and processes them and is present at different markets thanks to its geography and centralized and wide network of oil and gas pipelines. This enables Russia to cover an area spanning from Europe to the Far East and from the Mediterranean to the Indian and Pacific Ocean.

b) Russia also has its own integrated and vertically developed oil companies, which are capable not only of



developing their own capabilities, but also of investing abroad.

c) Russia is also a relatively developed industrialized country with quite a strong non-energy industrial base.

d) Increasing demands for oil and gas in different parts of the world lead to an even stronger position of Russia as an energy producing country.

Yet, the Russian energy sector also faces many challenges and dilemmas. One of them is the problem of double pricing the export and home use of gas and oil, which lowers the incomes of the energy sectors. Unfinished transition from command to market economy and non-transparent privatisation put additional pressure on the sector. There is also the problem of internal political unwillingness to allow foreign investments; even more, in the last few years we can witness some kind of a renationalisation of the energy sector and the political pressure to control state energy resources with the help of a loyal managerial elite. All of the above-mentioned problems limit the transfer of know-how and slows the development of the energy sector. The lack of clear and transparent legal framework is also an important disadvantage for further development. In spite of all these problems Russia remains the second largest oil and first gas producing country in the world, which in addition possesses one of the world's biggest known deposits of oil and gas (Johnson, 2005: 266-71). Because of this Gazprom, a Russian natural gas monopolist, became one of the biggest energy companies with ambitions to spread its operations into the EU, which causes additional problems in the EU-Russia relations (see Spajner, 2007: 2892). The EU sees Gazprom as a threat to its energy market and demands from Russia to split up Gazprom and liberalize the gas industry. However, Russia refuses to lose the increasingly important tool of its foreign policy.

The question of transport routes is an open issue in the EU-Russia relations. Paradoxically, opposing interests in the transit countries are the main cause of tensions between EU and Russia. This was especially obvious during the orange revolution in Ukraine and the gas war which followed. EU and Russia started seeking solutions to this problem. Russia

started the construction of new alternative pipelines towards the EU and the Far East. The most important pipeline project to Europe is the Northern Stream under the Baltic Sea, which will enable Russia to by-pass the third countries and export gas directly to the German market and other western markets. What is astonishing is the fact that this project was completed on a bilateral level between Russia and Germany. A very similar project is the Southern Stream to the Balkans and Italy, which will represent an alternative export route for Russian gas and oil. This project is also based exclusively on bilateral agreements between Russia and the interested countries, among which Italy and its national energy company ENI has a special status. There is also the third way – The Blue Stream in Turkey, which represents Russia's third export route.

Even though the above bilateral agreements are not problematic from the legal point of view, they are problematic from the point view of EU interests in energy security. These bilateral agreements are becoming an ever increasing obstacle in the forming of a common EU energy policy, especially with Russia. We can understand that the EU Member Countries wish to ensure their energy security, but these agreements are frequently concluded at the expense of common EU energy policy. German and Italian activities in this regard can be described as typical and common to almost all EU member states (Baillie, 2006). In both countries energy markets are dominated by national energy suppliers, the German E.ON and the Italian ENI, which are both working closely with the Russian Gazprom. Both ENI and E.ON are trying to ensure their market position and business outcome are as good as possible, and they see cooperation with Gazprom as a good business opportunity, while both states see this as a way to ensure a stable and reliable energy supply. In spite of the fact that this, in short term, creates monopolistic or semi-monopolistic markets with relative high levels of stability and good economic outcomes for involved companies, it is damaging in the long run – because this practice is undoubtedly damaging to the common EU energy strategy, it limits the choices of other Member States



and makes the EU more exposed to different external pressures.

In addition, the EU is involved in an energy race for the access to Caspian and Central Asian energy sources (Kimmage, 2006). This is becoming an area where a new Great game is taking place, because this area possesses an estimated 5% of world oil and gas reserves (Johnson, 2005: 274). The race is even tougher because Russia perceives this area as its vital strategic interest over which it must exercise direct or indirect control. Russia will by all means try to prevent the influx of western influence into the region or at least to minimize the EU and US influence and to strengthen its control over oil and gas exports from both regions. At the moment the race to gain access to Central Asian resources is the fiercest especially between Russia and the US, but China is also joining them from the other geographical side. In this respect the EU is losing this race even though a non-Russian pipeline from Central Asia is of vital importance for EU energy security. We should be aware of the fact that once the Russian controlled pipeline network is open, there will not be neither any political nor economic interest for EU pipeline projects. EU should pursue its own interest in the region more actively and with far more determination, since the results of this game will determine the development of the energy markets in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

We can conclude that even if EU-Russia relations are influenced by a high level of interdependence, this does not necessarily mean harmonic relations. Since Russian foreign and energy policy is becoming more and more similar to the realistic scenario and Russian energy development to a mix of the Russian bear and Kuwaitization scenarios, EU should definitely establish its own clear and far reaching strategy of relations with Russia, with a special emphasis on energy security. EU should try to form a common policy towards Russia that would bring the national policies and the existing common EU policy closer together, which is important for the EU-Russia relations and cooperation. It is vital for

the EU to be uniform in its response to the Russian pragmatic foreign policy. Member States should forget their egoistic short-term interest for the sake of common long-term beneficial results. This does not mean that the EU should ignore the Russian interests, on the contrary - it should take Russian interests into account, but it should also clearly present its own interests to Russia. In other words, we should tell Russia what is the line we are not willing to cross. Furthermore, the EU should be more active and interest driven in obtaining access to dispersed energy sources. This does not necessary mean conflicts with other states, but we should not let other countries to gain monopolies over energy sources vital for the EU future in the field of energy. In this respect the EU should use mainly its “soft” power and prestige it enjoys in those parts of the world. The long-term strategic optimum for the EU would be a geo-energy common space in which all major energy producers relevant for the EU would be included; all transit states and also all consumer states. In this way unproductive tensions would be avoided and everyone involved would benefit more from this as they would otherwise. But since this is only possible on a long-term basis, in short term the EU should be more egoistic in securing its own energy security as it is at the moment.

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Regional Initiatives in South East Europe¹

Jelena Radoman

UDK: 327.5656(4-12); 351.74/.78(4-12)

Abstract

The regional security initiatives in South Eastern Europe are the topic of this study. Firstly, we will present the initiatives which have been investigated in our research, then the criteria for their study, and finally, the main findings of the research. The aim was to review effectiveness and extent of the work of regional initiatives in this region. We believe that it is important to investigate the contribution of regional initiatives to security stabilisation and normalisation of the region.

Key words: regional initiatives, security, South Eastern Europe, Euro-Atlantic integration

Regional Initiatives which were the Topic of this Research and the Research Criteria

The authors of this research have considered the following initiatives to be relevant:

- Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, SPSEE
- South East European Initiative, SEEI
- Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative, SECI
- South-East European Cooperation Process, SEECF
- South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, SEESAC
- Southeastern Europe Defence Ministerial, SEDM
- Stabilization and Association Process, SAP²
- Adriatic-Ionian Initiative , AII
- Central European Initiative, CEI
- Black Sea Economic Cooperation, BSEC³
- US-Adriatic Charter, AC.

¹ Research fellows of the Belgrade School of Security Studies of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations from Belgrade, Jelena Radoman, Jelena Petrović and Miljan Filimonović are the authors of the study "Regional Initiatives in South East Europe". Jelena Radoman presented the main findings of this work at the International Conference "Security Cooperation in the Western Balkans", Skopje, 10th September 2006

² Although the SAP is an EU programme and not a regional initiative, it has been included in the analysis since it is characterised by a regional approach and inclusion of all countries in the region.

³ In 1998, the BSEC has grown into a regional international organisation, but we have put it in the group with regional initiatives since a number of analysed initiatives treat it in that way.

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The listed initiatives have been analysed according to the following criteria:

- emergence,
- participants,
- objectives,
- areas of work,
- methods and means of implementation,
- financing,
- control mechanisms, and
- mutual cooperation.

Main Findings

The oldest analysed initiative is the Central European Initiative (CEI), established in November 1989. CEI is a political cooperation forum which initially gathered the Central European countries and then the South Eastern and East European countries as well.⁴

Most of the aforementioned initiatives have been established in 1996 and 1999. Three regional initiatives were formed in 1996: South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), as the only framework of the political cooperation between the South East European countries which was created on the initiative of the region (Bulgaria), Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM). SECI and SEDM have been established on the initiative of the United States. In the process of establishment of all three initiatives, the focus was on their regional approach. After the end of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it has become clear that the responsibility for maintaining the peace should be mutually shared; however, only the projects which included all those actors the peace process depends on were most likely to be fruitful.

Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP) was established in 1999. The founding of this initiative was an expression of commitment of external subjects to the long-term strategy for conflict prevention rather than to simple and subsequent conflict solving. In the same year, 1999, the European Union launched the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). Like in the case of SP, the starting point of the SAP establishment was a belief that the region needs stable democratic institutions, the rule of law and the market economy as preconditions for peace and stability.

⁴ CEI members have cooperation in 18 areas in total (agriculture, civil protection, combating organised crime, cross-border cooperation and local development, culture, education, energy, environmental protection, HR development, information and media, IT, migration, minorities, science and technology, SMEs, tourism, transport, youth).

<http://www.ceinet.org/main.php?pageID=4>

29/09/2006

During the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the Alliance launches the South East Europe Initiative (SEEI) during the summit in Washington. This initiative encompasses a number of programmes and initiatives with an aim to promote the regional cooperation and lasting stability in the Balkans. Hence, the SEEI represents a continuation of the NATO cooperation with the countries in the region, which this organisation develops through the Partnership for Peace programme. Some of the SEEI member states were the countries which did not have the institutionalised cooperation with NATO, like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. In this manner, NATO has established the cooperation with all the countries except the FRY.

After 2000, new initiatives have been formed or were developed from the old ones as the separate projects. Although their activity plans were defined in a better and more exact way, their long-term goals were the same – peace, stability, safety, and prosperity of the region through the cooperation of the countries in the region (SEESAC, SEEGROUP, SEECAP).

All the countries in the region, without exception, participate in the work of the regional initiatives. Since requirements for the membership in a regional initiative are not difficult to meet, all the countries from the region participate in more than one initiative. Nevertheless, the countries from outside the region, the United States, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, etc., also participate in their work. Their participation is characterised by the fact that these countries have actually initiated the establishment of the initiatives; they also actively participate in their ongoing work by defining the priorities and financing their activities. Actors from outside the region, who participated in the establishment and work of the regional initiatives, also include the international organisations like EU, NATO, United Nations, OEBS, OECD, and UNHCR. The international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)) have also participated in the activities of regional initiatives, providing financial support for their work.

According to the proclaimed goals, the South East Europe initiatives are unequivocally oriented towards peace, stability, security and economic development of the region. What most of them also have in common is the emphasis of the necessity of cooperation between the countries from the region as the only way for the proclaimed goals to be achieved, which would be accomplished with the support from the actors from outside the



region (EU, United States, NATO). The long-term goals have been specified at lower organisational levels. Hence, there is a number of special programmes and initiatives being developed within SP and aimed at achieving the short-term and specific objectives, for example Stability Pact Initiative against Organised Crime (SPOC), Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI), Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI Regional Forum), Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC), etc.

Above described regional activities cover the following areas of work (in the brackets is noted the number of initiatives whose programmes fit the stated area of work):

- Security sector reform (3)
- Control of small arms and light weapons (3)
- Disaster prevention (3)
- Fight against organised crime (9)
- Fight against corruption (4)
- Migration, Asylum and Refugees (4)
- Police cooperation (4)
- Cross-border cooperation (9)
- Crisis management (2)
- Fight against terrorism (5)
- Environmental protection (5)
- Energy (6).

Work methods and instruments of the analysed initiatives are directly related to their structure. The organisation of activities within regional initiatives shows both regular elements and work on *ad hoc* basis. The initiatives with wide scope of activities (CEI, BSEC) have permanent bodies with regular annual sessions (annual meetings of the Prime Ministers of the CEI Member States – CEI Summit⁵ and plenary sessions of the BSEC Parliament held twice a year) where guidelines for political and economic activities of initiatives are being adopted. Non-institutionalised cooperation initiatives, such as SEECF, also have their regular annual meetings of heads of the state or prime ministers, or like AII and SEDM⁶, conduct regular meetings, but at a lower, ministerial level. Issues with a lower level of universality and those which require some specialised knowledge are being addressed by more narrow working groups of either permanent or *ad hoc* character (for example, Working Group of the SECI Regional Centre for Combating Cross-Border Crime).

⁵ At their annual meetings, the Member States' Heads of Government adopt political guidelines for the CEI work. Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopt decisions on the CEI work organisation at their annual meetings. The Initiative also functions through the meetings of Ministers of Economic Sectors and ministers of certain sectors. The Committee of National Co-ordinators is in charge of the implementation of CEI programmes and projects.

<http://www.ceinet.org/main.php?pageID=15>, 29.09.2006

⁶ Agreement from 2000 set forth the establishment of the SEDM Coordination Committee (SEDM-CC) in charge of coordination of activities within the SEDM.

There are three basic models of financing the regional initiatives. According to the first model, regional initiative's work is entirely financed by one or more international organisations. The states submit project proposals individually or jointly (the SP donor conferences can be taken as an example). According to the second model, projects within a regional initiative are jointly financed by the states participating in the work of initiatives and international actors (example being SEEL, AC). Finally, scarce are regional initiatives (e.g., CEI) which have their own funds for financing of projects and initiative's activities.

Regional initiatives' documents are designed to propose the bodies and procedures for activity monitoring, control and assessment. However, what is precisely outlined is their establishment, but not the monitoring and control function. One of the control implementation mechanisms is a responsibility to submit periodical reports to a body which approved project implementation.

Mutual cooperation is one of the most successful aspects of activities of regional initiatives. It is being accomplished in several forms. One of the forms is a full participation of one or more initiatives in the work of another initiative. Another example of mutual cooperation is mutual right to attend the sessions of other initiatives (CEI and SP are guests of the SEECF). Examples from practice of regional initiatives also include a partnership status of akin initiatives (SPO partners are: BSEC, CEI, SECI and SEECF).

Conclusion

The analyses above provided an insight into a number of regional initiatives, that is - the areas of cooperation stemming from the broad scope of their activities and their mutually intertwined competencies. Beside that, we found out that the most of existing regional initiatives in South East Europe formally have the same objectives: achieving and maintaining peace and stability in the region in order to create the preconditions for economic development and development in general within the Euro-Atlantic integrations of the region. In achieving these envisioned goals, there is an intensive mutual cooperation between the regional initiatives, as well as between the regional initiatives and international organisations. All this raises a question whether a relatively large number of initiatives with the same or similar



goals represent a successful outcome of strategies for stabilisation and development of the region, or it is an indicator of the lack of an adequate and comprehensive approach to safety, political and economic problems in this part of Europe.

The fact that these cooperation processes have mainly been initiated by external actors indicates that the countries in the region do not have sufficient capacities to independently establish mechanisms which would help them to work together for the benefit of peace, stability and development of the region. At the same time, the countries in the region show readiness to participate in the work of already established initiatives. Declaratively, they all express a high level of motivation and eagerness for cooperation in general and cooperation in a form of regional initiatives; consequently, the expected benefit should be of political nature as each participating country would promote itself as an active and cooperable partner. In this manner, one of the basic requirements of the Euro-Atlantic community has been met: regional integration as a precondition for the Euro-Atlantic integration. Low costs of participation in regional initiatives could be one of the reasons for their multitude, as well as for the fact that countries in the region express great readiness to participate in their work. But they could also be the cause of lack of more specific effects of their existence.

Most regional initiatives in South East Europe have been established following the idea of external actors (SAD, EU, NATO) or as a result of their initiative. SEECP remains the only example of the initiative created on the proposal of a state from the region. Although basic objectives of certain initiatives (SEECP, SECI, SEEI, SEDM), defined at their very establishment, are meant to equip the countries in the region with the competence for self-initiated and effective cooperation, they still serve as the instruments of their creators' foreign policy towards and within the region. Further development of established cooperation, the plans for individual projects and their financial support have been under the authority of the instigator of the initiative. There is a growing tendency for the member states from the region to undertake the leadership in already initiated and unfolded activities; however, that also includes a larger share in financial responsibility for the implementation of current and future programmes, in accordance with their capacities.⁷

⁷ Stability Pact, Core Objectives for 2005; Core Objectives for 2006

<http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/default.asp> and Stability Pact, Annual Report 2005, 25.08.2006

<http://www.stabilitypact.org/r/RT%20Prague-AR2005%20final.pdf>

More significant achievements of regional initiatives, i.e. their greater contribution to stabilisation and normalisation of the region, could be expected only with the change in the attitudes of both the South East Europe countries and the “external” actors towards this form of international cooperation. Countries in the region are expected to undertake the “ownership” over the established initiatives, in order to define their own work priorities and to personally direct their activities. In this way, the regional initiatives would become the autonomous instruments of democratisation of the region.

Translated from Serbian to English by Dragana Dakić



Security Cooperation in South East Europe - Home-grown vs. Externally Sponsored Initiatives

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UDK: 327.56::351.88(4-12)

Abstract

Author begins the article by stressing the new reality of international relations – globalization - that rapidly transforms the international security environment. New technologies have facilitated increasing interdependence and interconnectedness all over the globe, so traditional concept of security based on military power and territorial national defence no longer represents a key instrument in solving security matters. Therefore it should be enriched by new dimensions, such as human security, that includes internal political and social stability, effectiveness and transparency of democratic political institutions, sustainability of economic development and a permanent access of citizens to information, namely through education. Regarding risks and threats in a globalised world, he emphasises that we are facing new ones, such as organised crime, terrorism and environmental and demographic disasters and therefore argues that qualified human capital is essential in facing them. He underlines that this is very much the case in the region of South East Europe, and elaborates it in details. Author also analyses international initiatives and regional response to security in the region, especially the role of the EU. He argues that the international community needs to gradually reduce the sponsorship function coinciding with strengthening of the local administrative and democratic authorities. He sums up by outlining the perspectives for the future development of South East Europe and gives some recommendations for the period to come.

Key words: security, South East Europe, globalisation, EU, democratisation, co-operation, knowledge-based society

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Introduction: Challenges to Security in the Age of Globalization

Globalisation, understood as rapid development and diffusion of information technologies represents a contemporary reality of international relations rapidly transforming the international security environment. New technologies have facilitated increasing interdependence and interconnectedness which means that conflicts or economic crises in different parts of the world don't seem so distant; on the contrary, they have an enormous impact on each other.

Blurring borders make it more difficult for the nation-state to control the circulation of goods, people, information and weapons which implicates that the traditional concept of security based on military power and territorial national defence no longer represents a key instrument in solving security matters. Therefore it should be incorporated by new dimensions, such as human security. Thus, a new understanding of security would include internal political and social stability, effectiveness and transparency of democratic political institutions, quality sustainability of economic development and a permanent access of citizens to information, namely through education.

Nowadays, the main sources of instabilities in the world are economic issues and political instabilities of new democracies. Therefore, forming a new multilateral security system means involving reformed states along with the western institutional network and connecting the national, multinational and international levels of security.

Regarding risks and threats in a globalised world, it is relevant to note that even though traditional threats remain (interstate and intrastate war, ethnic conflicts, nuclear weapons...) nowadays we are facing new threats, related to the use of new technologies as well as the increase in the impact of non-traditional threats (organised crime, terrorism, environmental and demographic disasters).

Qualified human capital is a key element to face contemporary challenges. By concentrating efforts on the incorporation and diffusion of new technologies as well as on the development of human resources increased effectiveness to



deal more successfully with traditional and non – traditional threats could be achieved.

The term “knowledge based society” highlights the importance of human capital and relevance of more intangible assets such as knowledge and information in modern societies.

As it was mentioned earlier, national security no longer depends solely on military – defensive strength of the state but also on its ability to ensure the economic, political, scientific, technologically-technical and social development in general. This very much relates to the region of South East Europe.

Overview of Defence Reform in South East Europe

The states of the SEE region face greater challenges in security sector reform than the other post-communist states of Central Europe. The presence of international forces and administrations means that reform can only be completed hand in hand with re-localisation of authority. “New threats” caused by transition are rife and national progress is tied up with regional factors.

Aid provided by NATO and EU represents the backbone of outside world’s support for reform in the Western Balkans. This situation has advantages but there is a risk of making progress in Western Balkans dependent on outside support and pressure, thus making it insufficiently grounded in local politics.

Throughout the region, the new reform agenda is an improvement on wartime conditions but the progress made can affect the donations and is still hampered by imperfect international coordination. The outside world requires more time and patience to ensure that reforms not only give due place to democratic institutions, but are achieved with democratic methods and adequate local ownership.

The conditions in this region have changed considerably after the dissolution of former Yugoslavia which makes it no longer a black hole in European security or a direct threat to its neighbouring countries. Today, a possibility of any type of military attack between countries has been eliminated along

with the possibility of any kind of regional military action. Paradoxically, the dangers, which interfere with security of this region, have not been eliminated, despite attempts to improve relations and the presence of the international armed forces. Strong nationalistic sentiments, ethnic conflicts, xenophobia and huge economic problems are still a part of political reality in this region which makes security issues even interrelated to nationalistic, religious or social factors. Also it is necessary to underline the new dominant challenges to regional security that represent the major concern for the forthcoming year, such as organized crime, corruption, grey economy and other deformations that escalated during and after the war. They represent the main worry for security situation in the coming years.

Despite the fact that these problems existed also in former Yugoslavia, they erupted after its breakdown due to the fact that the repressive mechanism that kept them at the acceptable level disappeared as well as the fact that new countries failed to establish the mechanisms that will enable the functioning of the rule of law.

Despite the mentioned difficulties it is encouraging to notice that the region, although under international pressure, generates common vision for the future with respect for the independence of the new countries, or, in other words, a full membership in the EU.

Bearing in mind the comprehensiveness of the European integration process that is under way (includes meeting of the political, economic and administrative criteria, as well as respect for the commitments taken in the SAA process for the countries in the region) it can be claimed that the conditions set in the process of the EU accession present sort of an umbrella that gathers the largest part of huge set of aspects for projection of SEE future, not only the security one.

International Initiatives and Regional Response to Security in the Region

A transitional economic society of free commerce and industry links people across borders and thus enhances state interest in cooperation and peace. Regional cooperation is



an integral part in the preparation for the integration into European structures.

The EU insisted on improved relations between countries that were involved in recent conflicts, not only because it encourages and supports economic development, but also because it is a guarantee of stability and security. It can be only achieved through cooperation and common action. The aim is for the countries in the region to develop better and closer relations in all fields and therefore overcome the confrontation stemming from the nature of their past relations, and to furtherer mutual understanding. The ultimate objective is promoting better relations and ensuring conditions where people can live in true and lasting peace, free from any security threat or attempt to endanger security.

The SEE is a heterogeneous region composed of a wide range of nationalities, cultures and religions in a relatively small area. While it is important to acknowledge differences in political, economic, social and cultural aspects of the countries, they have enough in common to create a solid basis for cooperation. Commitment to bilateral and regional cooperation, particularly with the aim to advance the integration into Euro – Atlantic structures, remains an important common interest for the countries in the region. Regional cooperation serves as a catalyst to the aspirations of these countries to integrate themselves into those broader structures.

Supporting the regional cooperation initiatives (Baltic Sea Cooperation, Visegrad Group, Black Sea Cooperation), in this part of Europe, especially taking into account the recent conflicts, EU firmly insisted on regional cooperation as a precondition for development of any aspect of relations between countries from the region and EU itself. Defining the above-mentioned regional cooperation as an alternative to instabilities, EU has clearly underlined its main goal: upgrading the cooperation between neighbouring countries and building a climate for lasting peace and sustainable development.

The EU's first initiative to stabilise SEE was launched in December 1996. Known as Royaumont Process, its aim was to support the implementation of the Dayton Peace agreements.

In 1997 the EU opted for the regional approach, establishing political and economic conditions as a prerequisite for the bilateral relations with the five countries of the region. These conditions included respect for the democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law, minority protection, market economy reforms and regional cooperation.

In 1999, the EU encouraged reforms in the region which were meant to serve as preconditions for accession into the EU. It became apparent that the countries of the region need to establish bilateral and multilateral relationships among themselves, and therefore the EU attempted to launch “a regional multilateral tool”: the Stability Pact.

Launched in 1999, the Stability Pact was an initiative that drew together the EU and some other partner states with the aim of bringing peace, stability and economic development to the Balkans.

A corner stone in the EU’s approach to the SEE after the post – Kosovo crisis was the introduction of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). This process promotes stability within the region and facilitates a closer association of the SEE countries with the EU, and ultimately assists countries in their preparation for the EU membership. The individual modality of the SAP is executed through Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) that eventually each SEE country should sign with the EU.

The political significance of the SAA is the fact that it grants to the signatory party potential candidate status, thus offering the key to its EU accession. The regional cooperation is the focus of every EU initiative and represents the only alternative to the instability in the region.

The EU Security Strategy first drafted by Javier Solana and then adopted by the European Council focuses not only on threats that threaten rich societies such as terrorism, but also on those which threaten the weak ones, such as conflict, disease, environment collapse and underdevelopment. It proposes that the enlarged EU should actively seek to spread cooperative security philosophy that is beneficial for all., not just because it could improve stability and thus help protect its own territory, but because it will help its neighbouring countries to bring them closer to the day when they could even think of joining the EU. It defines the use of force clear-



ly as a last resort, even in the context of protecting ourselves, as it no longer remains the adequate way of dealing with “new threats”.

The international community needs to gradually reduce the sponsorship function coinciding with strengthening of the local administrative and democratic authorities. The countries of the SEE should finally understand and accept the necessity to replace all types of confrontation with cooperation. They should not rely on conflict as a mean of solving problems should be ready to accept all forms of cooperation. It is left upon the international community to support these efforts.

Perspectives for the Future Development of South East Europe

As a consequence of the recent clashes, as well the difficulties in transition process; the political instability remains a major characteristic of the region. Weak states pose a big problem due to existence of parallel structures as well as international bodies with unprecedented amount of power. Carrying out political and economic reforms in the transitional countries, as well as the existence of corruption and organized crime contributes to great extent to economic decline. As a significant aspect of organised crime, weapon and drugs trafficking, illegal migration and human trafficking should be underlined. These threats should be regarded as top priorities of regional cooperation.

To sum up, being already out of the critical stage and midway on the success path, Croatia sustains and spills over the positive effect to other countries in the region while all the five countries by absorbing experience and expertise, fully demonstrate the necessary willingness to learn from each other. Further implementation of defence reforms in SEE will encourage integration of the region and its countries in the international community as well as the stabilisation of the only remaining hotspot in Europe. The countries of the region have to play an active role in this process and show constant progress.

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Obstacles for Achieving Functional and Effective Regional Security Cooperation in the Western Balkans -Policy Analyses-

Jelena Petrović

UDK: 327.56(497.11)

Abstract

Functional regional security cooperation is hard to achieve in the Western Balkans. This is due to many political obstacles deriving not only from its' turbulent past but also because of foreign interference which doesn't always correspond to the regions actual needs. One of the ways to overcome these obstacles is to raise awareness among public about them and to organise debates to discuss possibilities of surpassing them. Using the three level analyses we can detect various types of political obstacles. At state level the most important is the issue of war heritage and slow transition which leads to certain division among regional states. This partition can be detected at the regional level too. As a consequence of these obstacles we can notice lack of coordination between regional initiatives active in this area, which inhibits further cooperation. Lack of coordination is also noticeable when it comes to the foreign actors input, especially Euro Atlantic ones. Lack of in-depth understanding of regional characteristics and daily politics together with certain tensions between foreign actors themselves decrease the efficiency of regional security initiatives in the Western Balkans.

Key words: regional security initiatives, obstacles, cooperation, states, Western Balkans, Euro Atlantic area

Introduction

The importance of regional security initiatives is a complex issue. Not only that those forms of cooperation increase integration and overall progress of whole region, but they also have

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functional role in security policies and image conception of the Western Balkans states which was poor after events that took place in last fifteen years. The fact that most of existing regional security procedures and instruments are initiated from abroad, mainly through USA or EU engagement, shows lack of capabilities of regional states to cooperate by themselves. Our intention is to show possible obstacles on state, regional and Euro Atlantic level, which inhibit reaching the satisfying level of regional cooperation and home-grown initiatives.

Examining the possibility to achieve and maintain sustainable security in Western Balkans is possible through three levels of analyses:

- The State level
- The Regional level
- The Euro-Atlantic level

Each of these levels plays an important role in creation of procedures and instruments for regional cooperation. In order to develop these procedures and instruments states need to overcome the obstacles and to create political preconditions for regional self-governance, which is the core of the autonomous regional cooperation.

Obstacles for Regional Sustainable Security at State Level

The main obstacles for achieving sustainable regional security in the Western Balkans at the state level are:

- The issue of war heritage - the last decade of the 20th century was marked with wars in Southeastern Europe. Many issues, such as war crimes, territorial disputes, status of ethnical minorities and many more, are still not solved. Peace enforcement that came from outside the region brought ceasefire but not the satisfaction of the involved countries.
- The issue of tradition - After the conflicts in the 90s, transition was continued slowly and with a lot of difficulties. There is no consensus among state elites about pace and price of the transition. Inequality in political preconditions, resources and war heritage has resulted in territorial, economic and security asymmetry.
- The issue of division of the region - The region is now softly divided to North and South, and East and West. This division is one of the main obstacles in development of regional cooperation.



Regional Level Obstacles

The region is, also, divided by ethnic nationalism which doesn't always coincide with state constellation. Differences that exist between states and their individual political goals resulted in the lack of common understanding in the region. Usage of geographical and political arguments in order to prove that one state is or isn't part of the South Eastern Europe is something that can often be seen in daily politics.

The lack of political consensus between state elites on the importance of regional cooperation represents also another obstacle. States in this region are highly interconnected by security threats, risks and challenges, however although there is a formal acceptance of cooperation, there is a lack of political will for that cooperation to take place and to be maintained.

There is also a lack of coordination between regional initiatives, themselves. For example, out of eleven analyzed initiatives - nine is focusing, among other things, on combating organized crime.¹ Someone would think that with nine regional initiatives and all of their programs, with full cooperation of participant states, South Eastern Europe would wipe out organized crime...unfortunately that is not a case. On the contrary, organized crime is still one of the biggest security threats in the region. It might be so because states are not fully cooperative, because problem is too large to be dealt in such a way, or it has to do with a lack of coordination and a waste of resources.

Euro-Atlantic Influence Obstacles

Finally, there is the level of Euro-Atlantic integration. All countries from the region have expressed interest to achieve certain level in Euro-Atlantic integration. Such foreign policy aims of the countries from the region give additional "weight" to the influence of the EU and NATO. Apart from that, the nonintegrated countries from South Eastern Europe are located in "the surrounding area", which binds their strategic, security and political position to the aforementioned actors (that particularly applies to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Macedonia which have a foreign military presence on their territories). There are two main types of obstacles when it comes to global players, such as NATO, EU or USA.

¹ More details in Jelena Radoman, "Regional Initiatives in South East Europe", *Western Balkans Security Observer* 6, 2007: 18-24

First, one of the problems is the relationship between the external actors themselves, which is often contradictory or, at least, not coordinated. NATO, EU, and the USA are still trying to act concurrently. The EU's aspiration for the establishment of its own security identity has created a gap in the relationship with the North-Atlantic organisation and the USA. On the other side, since 11th September 2001, the USA has started to lead a more independent policy in relation to NATO in both a military and political sense. This disharmony of interests and approaches between the external actors brings confusion to the lines of regional countries and reduces the efficiency of the work of regional initiatives.

The two "track" policy carries with itself the danger that one of those two approaches may "prevail". If the approach that gives the importance to the bilateral relations prevails, there could be a decline in the will to carry out regional initiatives. If states have a greater chance of achieving their interests in bilateral relations with some of the external actors, the regional initiatives could become only the formal frame for cooperation among them. That frame would serve more to present their readiness for cooperation (and in that way to insincerely satisfy the external actors' demands) than as the functional instrument for the increase of cohesion in South Eastern Europe. If the regional approach prevails, that could cause a decline in the influence of the external actors, but also the intensified interdependency of the regional states. This interdependency could, without the objective supervision and support from "outside", in an already unstable South Eastern Europe, slow down the development of the region and its integration in the Euro-Atlantic community. A balance between the regional and bilateral approach is necessary but also difficult to achieve. What is needed is to find the right proportion of engagement of both external actors and regional actors in regional initiatives and bilateral relations. Such a proportion would provide the best results and would lead to the development of both individual states and the whole region.

Change of daily politics led by global players creates confusion among the regional states. If there was a firm policy framework towards region and individual states in the region, perhaps the states would establish firmer regional cooperation. Western Balkans states should be depending more on themselves and neighbouring countries than on global players, which are still necessary as observers and supporters of change.



Conclusion

In order to achieve stable and effective regional cooperation, states need to become aware of all of the obstacles and to discuss ways of surpassing them. It is not helpful if they perceive regional cooperation and initiatives as a way to improve their image in the eyes of more powerful foreign actors. This approach apart from increasing the cost will decrease the chances to establish true relations and achieve decent results.

Although the region is in a certain way immature and in need of guidance, having in mind all the events occurring among powerful foreign actors, this assistance should be taken critically and with a clear idea that it is just a help in development of home grown ideas and initiatives.

Only when states decide to overcome political obstacles (especially ones connected to the regions history), through initiatives and other programmes of cooperation in the area of regional security, there is a possibility to achieve satisfying level of efficiency and functionality.

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The Role of NGOs in Regional Security Cooperation

Miroslav Hadžić

UDK: 061.2(497); 327.56(497)

Abstract

As the regional cooperation in the field of security has been carried out through various activities and aiming to different goals, non-governmental organizations used to initiate the discussion on the particular security topics. There are, however, numerous obstacles for the NGOs to engage more intensively in the security cooperation in the Western Balkans. Additionally, there are few NGOs specialized for the security topics. It is also worth mentioning that civil society is at different stages of development in each particular country of the region; moreover, the status of NGOs still hasn't been regulated by the law in most of the countries. The sphere of national security is, after all, the least available to the civil society activists. Therefore, the local NGOs can contribute to the improvement of regional security cooperation by striving on the security sector reform within their respective countries.

Key words: regional security cooperation, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), national security, the Western Balkans

It should be noted at the very beginning that there are no reliable records regarding the regional cooperation of non-governmental organisations in the Western Balkan countries. Incomplete data shows that such cooperation is most frequently a matter of *ad hoc* and one-off joint actions. It is also obvious that regional and cross-border conferences, seminars, workshops and training sessions are the prevailing form of the joint acting of local NGOs. For the time being there is not, or I am not aware of, any proof of the existence of a single regional NGO. There are, of course, numerous local organisations with regional ambitions.

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In spite of that, we can, from these NGO's previous regional activities, and from the methodical point of view, divide them into two groups according to their content and goals. The first group includes those programmes which have dealt with or still are dealing with the rehabilitation issues stemming from the various consequences of the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. They deal with a very wide range of issues and/or problems to which they wish to draw the attention of the public and the authorities: from the search for missing persons, through the protection of the rights of victims of war and internally displaced persons and refugees, to the provision of aid for their socio-economic adaptation to their new living environment.

A somewhat smaller number of multilateral actions have also been noted, which have resulted in demands for the systematic and comprehensive establishment and sanctioning of responsibility for wars, and the criminal prosecution of those indicted for war crimes. The second group includes various activities focused on the post-war normalisation of relations between the states and nations in the Western Balkans. That was considered as the supposition for the political and security stabilisation of the region, i.e. for the renewal and improvement of relations between neighbouring countries.

All those activities, directly or indirectly, have contributed to the creation of the atmosphere in which the need for cooperation has stopped being the exception. The actors of the civil society have thus become the forerunners of their states in a large number of cases. Moreover, many of them have often acted contrary to their official state policies. It is not surprising, therefore, that NGOs were the first to raise the issues and problems which were, being part of the insurmountable war legacy, still jammed with strong emotions and overloaded with ideology. In doing so, NGOs and their activists were often exposed to political and security risks in their surroundings. The effects and the range of their achievements, however, evade serious appraisal. After all, according to the CCMR analytic team's report, that is also the case with those regional initiatives whose participants are the Western Balkan countries.

These brief insights apply to a great extent to those NGOs acting in the field of security. Moreover, a significantly smaller number of regional activities with an even smaller number of participants have been achieved in this field. These findings can, surely, be challenged or revised after the gathering of additional information. The insufficient presence of the civil society in the processes of security cooperation can be explained by the fact that

a very small number of specialised NGOs operate in the Western Balkan countries. Additionally, we should consider the unequal development of the civil society in those countries, which is partially the product of the imbalanced relations of political elites and authorities towards the self-organisation of citizens.

It would be therefore appropriate to question whether and how we can sapiently problematize the role of NGOs in regional security cooperation. The assigned subject, surely, can be understood in at least two, albeit connected, ways. Firstly, as the desire to summarise and evaluate the previous output of NGOs in this field. I consider that we might soon run short of factographic material for this procedure. Secondly, as the intention to point out and/or to create optimal models for regional networking, and in accordance with that to list and/or recommend the forms, means and methods required for the more active participation of local NGOs in the security cooperation between the Western Balkan countries. If we opt for this second one, I am afraid that we may give into the temptation to make a list of nice, but hardly feasible, desires.

Therefore, it is reasonable to firstly search for the answer to the question as to whether local NGOs can at all, and if so, to which extent, contribute to the improved security cooperation between the countries from this region. For that purpose it is appropriate to consider, in terms of principles and models, the complex relationship between the civil society and the sphere of security. Therefore, I offer for consideration the supposition according to which the sphere of national (state) security is the least attainable to the actors from civil society for several reasons:

- The state's political monopoly in this field is still not disputed.
- National security is still, and above everything else, under the jurisdiction of special state bodies and forces, which build their exclusivity on special knowledge and skills as well as on the control of the flow of tangent information.
- The sphere of security is protected from the public by the Constitution, laws and sub-law acts and as such is the least open for public debate and the direct acting of citizens and their associations.
- National security often presents a political and ideological taboo which it is not advisable to bring into question.
- National security is, especially in a state of crisis, highly ideologised and patriotised, thus leaving little space for public critical reconsideration and rational debate.



- Foreign policy and security cooperation are still under the exclusive authority of the executive, and to some extent the legislative powers.
- Efficient democratic civil control over the security sector and the state apparatuses of force is still a desirable but virtually never fully feasible or attainable ideal.
- The public can in principle, but only in limited scope, influence the foreign and security policy of its country, especially since the public can also be manipulated

The radical changes of the global security ambiance at the beginning of the 1990's were followed by the adoption of the new security paradigm, announcing the possibility of the gradual demonopolisation, demystification and demilitarisation of the security sphere. At a time when it seemed that the problem of citizens' security had irreversibly arrived at the centre of theoretical and political consideration, the terrorist attack on the USA, as well as the subsequent declaration of world war against terrorism, refuted that in many ways. The state's cause again became crucial and thus all limitations were removed. The field for the discretionary implementation of intelligence-security proceedings toward both domestic and foreign citizens is spreading. At the same time the number of those who hold such authority is also growing. The main holders of the world's power make increasingly less effort to at least feign the implementation of procedures and instruments for the democratic civil control over their armed forces and satellite coalitions. The principle of the division of power is being deserted in the name of efficiency and the security power is placed into the hands of the supreme holders of executive power. Consequently, the public and civil society find increasingly difficult to supervise, even less to control, the civil commanders and the apparatuses of power they hold.

The aforementioned changes do not, of course, lead to the same consequences everywhere. It is reasonable to expect that modern societies, thanks to their democratic capacities, will manage to save their fundamental values and accordingly established order. Those societies in transition, however, find themselves in a much more difficult situation. It is even more so in the area of the Western Balkans where the majority of cases refer to post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies. The political and civil actors in them face a double task and challenge. They firstly have to bring their societies to a state of normality. That demands from them, among other things, the adoption and implementation of the basic principles of democracy. In that aim, they have to radically reform the inherited security sector, and establish the conditions

for the democratic civil control of the inherited armed forces. The experiences of Serbia, and Serbia is not alone in this, show that this does not refer only to economically expensive undertakings, but also to those which anticipate both political and security risks. At the same time these states and their elites are expected to unconditionally adopt the new interpretation of the main threats to global security, and to actively participate in the fight against terrorism and the other holders of non-military threats.

The echo of that can be found in the national security and/or defence strategies of some countries from this region which, without great hesitation, declared terrorism as the main threat to their security. One does not need to have great powers of imagination to envision all the dangers which await citizens if their power-holders start taking over all available resources for the fight against terrorism from others and to implement them without control. It could therefore occur, for instance, that the principles, procedures and instruments for the democratic civil control of the security forces in those countries are suspended even before they have ever been seriously implemented. The same excuse can be used for the reduction of transparency within the security sphere, as well as for the expulsion of the recently emerged public and civil society from it.

To make matters even more difficult, the majority of the Western Balkan countries, as regards the view and practice of their security, still cannot, even if they so desired, abandon the “security dilemma” model. This is the logical consequence of the facts that in those countries the issues of preserving, i.e. protecting the state, occupying, i.e. liberating territories, national unification and so on are still on the agenda. If we add to this the legacy of the war/s, the situation becomes even more complicated. Therefore the current renewal of national monolithic thought, which leaves little space for others and those who think differently, comes as no great surprise.

In spite of that, it still could be said that we are the witnesses to the final phase of the security normalisation of the Western Balkans. Different forms of security cooperation between the countries have been established. However, this cooperation too often develops under the leadership, but also the pressure from the European Union, the USA and the NATO. We should not forget that the external actors are still the crucial guarantors of the achieved, but forced, security in this region.

That is the proof that there is a lack of trust among the states in this region. Permanent trust cannot be built on declarations. This trust will be possible only when states and nations remove



each other from their lists of threat-holders to their security. In order to achieve that, what is needed for them, among other things, is to get to know each other again. In doing so, they will find out whether and why somebody is afraid of somebody else and, relatedly, whether that fear is justifiable. This point opens up the space for the individual and joint acting of NGOs.

However, the range of their activities is limited to a great extent by the nature and the status of NGOs in the majority of the Western Balkan countries. Since there is no serious research regarding this issue, I base my insights on the experiences from Serbia. In spite of the changes which have taken place in Serbia in the meantime, the majority of NGOs still cannot rid themselves of the burden which the old regime imposed on them. The majority of them originate from two main sources: firstly, from their political opposition to the regime, and secondly, from their exclusive financial dependence on foreign donors. Both of those arguments have gained momentum with the approach of NGOs to the security sector. To make matters even more difficult, the public status of the NGO sector was not changed even after the arrival of the pro-democratic forces to power. The fact that the status of NGOs has still not been determined by law bears witness to that. We can also add here the fact that the state budget for financing this sector has still not been established.

In fact, the civil sector also needs demystification. It should be born in mind that NGOs cannot replace the state and do its part of the job. They also do not have sufficient power to force the state to reform the security sector, or to join regional and global security cooperation. The position that NGOs reflect the society which they originate from could have a similar methodical value. Therefore, in principle and in the final instance, they cannot be much better, brighter or more capable than their native society. We can add to this that NGO's exclusive dependence on foreign financial support has made security issues conjunctive and consequently has contributed to their commercialisation.

Even if the real picture of NGOs is more attractive than the one I, albeit roughly, have drawn, the possibilities for their regional engagement are directly limited by the nature of existing initiatives for security cooperation. Let me remind you, they are all designed for states. There is no any space in them for civil society actors to join. Therefore, what is left for those actors is to find an alternative option. It is certain that the regional networking of specialised NGOs can serve as an introduction to that. Among other things, that would create an additional channel for the flow and exchange of knowledge, information and experience.

Moreover, that could help in the establishment of the regional civil public interest in the irrevocable transformation of the Western Balkans into a region of peace and cooperation.

For that reason, I feel free to remind you that dialogue opens up the way for trust establishment. Talks between the state officials are no longer enough. After all, security today has moved from the state-property sphere to the public one. Security should be less under the authority of the army, the police and the secret services while it is increasingly difficult to achieve it with arms and force. Therefore, security should become more of a subject of the public debate, of course, on the basis of the expert analyses of the causes and grounds for the existing deficit of regional security, as well as in the light of cooperational attaining sustainable security.

It is my view, however, that the local NGOs can make the greatest contribution to the regional security cooperation through their support for the security sector reform in their own countries. Yet, that should be primarily a part of their struggle for the establishment of self-preserving democratic order. In that way, they can contribute, together with other actors of their society, to the improvement of the security cooperation and the integration of the Western Balkan countries.

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Do we Need to Establish Network of Specialized NGOs in the Western Balkans: View from Macedonia

Stojan Slaveski

UDK: 061.2(497.7); 327.56(497)

Abstract

By informing the public, presenting of unbiased assessments and acceptable alternative policies, the non-governmental organizations may boost the public interest and act as spokespersons on issues of particular interest. They can put the security related issues of major importance to the whole society on the political agenda of the Government and the Parliament. Stated differently, they can promote transparency. It is not a means in itself, but a tool to achieve “security and stability” of the security sector and to present to the citizens, i.e. to the tax payers, that it works in their interest and not in the interest of someone else. Transparency is the most important tool in the fight against corruption and other types of violation of the laws. It should protect the state, and more importantly, the interests of the citizens. Thus it will contribute to fulfilling the key requirements for Macedonian integration into NATO and EU.

Key words: security sector reform, transparency, cooperation

Introduction

Very often the members of the parliament and the politicians in the government lack expertise in the management of security reforms, the complexity of which constantly increases. In such cases the non-governmental organizations can contribute to the democratic control of the security sector through: offering their expertise to the state administration, thus making themselves available to the political representatives in the government; assis-

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tance to the expert formation of the security sector through their training and seminars; providing alternative expert opinion on the governmental security and defense policy, budget, procurements, etc.; issuing independent analyses and information to the parliament, media and the public about the work of the security sector; informing the public about the way in which national security policy related decisions are brought and implemented; monitoring and inciting the respecting of the rule of law and human rights in the security sector; educating the public and enabling alternative discussions in the public and initiating public debates and formulating alternative political options.¹

The role of the NGOs in the support of the building of the security community is great and it gives an important incentive through creating an informal network of communication. This is particularly important if it's known that the activities of the non-governmental sector should assist in overcoming the barrier between the security and the civilian sector.

The parliament and the government encourage very frequently the participation of the non-governmental organizations and the research institutes in the public debates on national security, armed forces, police and the intelligence services. However, sometimes the state organs are also skeptical in relation to the intentions and the expertise of the security sector.

Hence, the non-governmental organizations have more chances to accomplish their goals if they unite their efforts.² Uniting the resources and the expertise will enable them to establish links with the parliament and the government more easily, thus increasing their influence in the social affairs. The NGO network can also have regional and international dimension.³

It may be concluded that the non-governmental organizations have an exceptional influence in the building of the security community, within the state, the region and on the international basis. Their activities can be connected to the building of the society "security culture" with unbreakable links, and in that way of the institutionalization of an effective democratic management of the security sector.

NGOs in Macedonia and the Security Sector Reforms

In the past years, the cooperation between the non-governmental organizations and the security sector in the Republic of Macedonia has been limited primarily due to the fact that the nature of the national security issues was confidential. Though

¹ See more: Hans Born, *Parliamentary oversight of the security sector: Principles, mechanism and practices*, Geneva: IPU and DCAF, 2003.

² A good example for this was the three-year work of a number of Bulgarian non-governmental organizations that had united in the "security sector reform coalition", which has been actively involved in the issues related to the Bulgaria's NATO membership.

³ Velizar Shalamanov, "Progress and Problems in Security Sector Reform in the Western Balkans: Is there a Universal Solution?" in Istvan Garmati and Scott Vesel, *Security Governance in the Western Balkans 2004*, Baden Baden: IISS, SIPRI and UNDP, 2004: 51-67.



the changes in the political system were made immediately after the Republic of Macedonia gained independence, still the new challenges in the security sector and the adaptation to them, particularly in the part related to the cooperation with the civilian sector, were carried out very slowly.⁴ The obstacles that needed to be overcome, among the other things, were: the resistance of the personnel working in the security sector, the lack of legislation on the clear division of the affairs among different entities in the security sector and the sensitivity of the sector that prevented deeper cooperation with the non-governmental organizations.

At this moment we cannot speak about an enviable level of transparency culture and active involvement of the NGOs in the decision making process in the country. In order to achieve the wished level of transparency in the work of the security sector, the key instruments leading to that end need to be found, “balancing” at the same time between the transparency and the protection of the classified (confidential) information. However, it should be known that it is of a national interest to develop a strategy on the transparency in the security sector reforms. Transparency is important as the unique way to initiate a public debate on the security sector related issues, and as a result, to receive a public support to the reforms.

At the beginning, the opening of the security services in the Republic of Macedonia to the non-governmental sector was manifested through gradual transformation of the security culture, whose major characteristics were expressed through transparency within the security policy, as well as through establishing working contacts with the non-governmental organizations. In our opinion, there are a number of fields where the non-governmental organizations could be engaged.⁵

First, it would be good to establish a practice for an annual review and assessment of the transparency level in the security sector with evaluation of specific cases. That would greatly contribute to increasing the culture of transparency and the support by the parliament and the international organizations.

Second, a more significant role should be given to the NGOs in the reforms of the security sector. The key projects that should be developed in the Republic of Macedonia with participation of the NGOs are: “Reform of the Intelligence Community in the Republic of Macedonia”, “Integration of the Republic of Macedonia in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union”, “National Security Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia”, etc.

⁴ *National Integrity System of the Republic of Macedonia (Country study Report)*, September 2002.

⁵ See: Tihomir Ilievski, “The Foreign Policy and Security Issues of the Republic of Macedonia” in Istvan Garmati and Scott Vesel, *Security Governance in the Western Balkans 2004*, Baden Baden: IISS, SIPRI and UNDP, 2004: 165-175.

Third, regular round tables and conferences on various defense and security policy related issues need to be organized, such as the participation of the ARM in the international operations, budgeting and procurement in the security sector, etc. Thus, the public would understand the necessity for reforms in the security sector.

Forth, activities need to be taken that are necessary for the information exchange at regional level and involvement of the media in NGO-led projects, as well as possible publishing of a monthly newspaper in electronic form (for e.g., “Security Watch” or “Security Sector Reform Focus”).

For these projects and reforms in the security sector to succeed, support of the international community is necessary, both in terms of material assistance and in the context of developing joint projects and studies with foreign security related non-governmental organizations.

The Activities of the “George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Alumni Association from the Republic of Macedonia – Skopje”

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Alumni Association from the Republic of Macedonia was formed in 2005. For this short period of time the Association managed to gather and unite the majority of the graduates who have attended any of the Marshall Centre curricula programs.⁶ These are people working at the Assembly, the Government, the Cabinet of the President of the Republic, as well as people from the ministries of defense, foreign affairs and interior and governmental agencies that deal with security and defense related issues. The objectives of the Association are:

- To pass on and implement the knowledge and experiences acquired during the education process at the Marshall Center;
- To promote the motivating ideas for the establishing of the Marshall Center in the area of the national and international security;
- To find ways for prevention and resolution of crises and conflicts of religious, interethnic or social nature; and
- To contribute to the developing of democracy and democratic institutions in the Republic of Macedonia.

⁶ So far, there are approximately 100 individuals from the Republic of Macedonia who have been educated at this Center, of which 70 are actively involved in the Association.



In addition, the Association offers its expert assistance for better understanding of the security and defense related reform policies, the foreign policy, the security and stability in the South Eastern Europe, and particularly in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the Association has a capacity to develop assessments and strategies to contribute to the security and stability in the region and its Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as to contribute to the creation of transparency and accountability in the work of the security sector.⁷

Conclusion

The Association maintains contacts with similar associations within the South Eastern Europe; however, at this moment we cannot speak about an established network and closer cooperation. Hence, we support establishing regional network of specialized security and defense related non-governmental organizations and we are ready to give our contribution to the security and defense in the regional level.

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⁷ With the intention to accomplish these objectives the Association held two round tables. The topic of the first one was related to the Macedonia's expectations, results and perspectives for its Euro-Atlantic integration. The other was a forum where the security of the Western Balkans was discussed. These round tables were supported by the Marshall Centre from Garmischpartenkirchen. The reports thereof have been forwarded to the competent state organs.

Three General Problems Faced by Security Studies in Serbia and Other Countries in Transition

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UDK :327.56::351.88(4-664); 351.74/.75(497.11)

Abstract

Serbia and other countries in transition lack developed academic security research. Security specialists whose work is of practical nature are being produced within established security structures. The academic security sphere has a tendency to work only on the formal aspects of this field and there is a lack of inter-disciplinary research on the role of security structures and security phenomena. The lack of political science and sociological research is especially striking.

Keywords: security studies, academic security research, formal and functional aspects of security, research of police forces

The Democratisation of Society and Security Studies

If we accept the fact that the level of development of academic security research in particular society is directly dependent on a level of democratisation in this society, it becomes clear why the level of security studies in Serbia and other countries in transition is lower than in the countries with longer democratic traditions.

In so-called 'old democracies', the work in the security sector is both academic and professional. The work done in academic circles is carried out in an open, civil atmosphere and is scientific by definition or at least that is how it should be. The practical side of the work is organised from within security structures, i.e. from within military, police and intelligence gathering institutions; it is carried out by trained professionals and can often be quasi-scientific in nature. The combination of these two elements requires a certain level of cooperation that is not always free of competition.

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Nevertheless, this approach offers mutually beneficial advantages. If, for example, the US intelligence-gathering organisation, the CIA, creates a security interests agenda for the country's next twenty years, this will be carried out with a clear application of conclusions reached in the academic sphere. Something similar is hardly possible in the countries in transition as the academic work done in the

Two examples of brutal plagiarism.

Example No. 1: Unaccredited translations

Yugoslav decision-makers, intelligence-gathering services and police academies were aware of relevant foreign security research and specialist publications, at least in part. Translations of these works were carried out on a limited basis for the use of various security services and were occasionally marked as top-secret. Apart from coming from the services and the open 'market', translation services were also provided by intellectuals in prison. As this kind of work was carried out without compensation (presumably this practice was/is applied by many countries) the translations remain unaccredited. These translations were also put to another use; they became the basis of the plagiarised content of numerous textbooks and quasi-scientific works produced from within the security services.

Example No. 2: Unaccredited Authors

This practice was connected to the military and, as far as it can be discerned, continues even today. It is considered normal (even though it is nothing of the sort, for it is an unethical practice) for the faculty heads and leading professors at the Military Academy, and other military educational establishments, to demand from their students to write chapters or other parts of future textbooks and other works. As the cover of the consequent work carries only one name, it is easy to presume that the signed author is the recipient of all of the royalties. The ultimate academic dishonesty in this case comes from the fact that the prefaces to these books contain no acknowledgements for the work done by the real authors.

security field is so modest in its scope. Even if this were not the case, there would still exist other insurmountable barriers, such as deep self-conviction of the security structures that it is only them who are qualified to work in this field.

Socialist countries used to allow only one of the two levels of the sector to exist: the practical one. They therefore lacked a functioning scientific level. Security was the exclusive domain of the state security structures and their military and police institutions. Apart of that, certain academic work did exist in this field, although it was focused mainly on the international aspects of security, usually within the international relations framework. Even here, however, there was a clear demarcation line – it was not allowed for this academic research to influence formal policy creation which was normally dictated by the communist parties in such systems.

All this created an isolated and untouchable sphere of military and police security specialists. Developed in military and police educational institutions, this sphere allowed all the weaknesses associated with closed systems of this kind. Some of these weaknesses include: a lack of rational thought, ideological indoctrination, a lack of transparency, marked resistance toward the civilian and academic sectors, self-reproduction, resistance to innovation and the intention to idealise the actual security practice. Widespread and brutal plagiarism (see Box 1) of the work carried out by academics without informing the public is just one of the consequences of such system.

Transition requires the development of academic security research which can be isolated from the influence of the security structures themselves and which must unmistakably be civilian in its nature. Police and military educational institutions ought to have this role revoked, as it is not appropriate for them. It is also necessary for their educational function to be adequately restricted (through the closing of military and police high schools and the reform of the Police Academy). This task will be difficult but must form a part of the security sector reform. Resistance to this task comes from the quasi-specialists who are a product of the closed police and military security spheres and who are frequently in league with the remnants of the former regime and with unreformed security structures.

Form (Organisation) and Content (Function)

Most specialist or scientific works published in the security sphere in Serbia over the last half of the century are characterised by two highly restricted approaches: the first one considering only the formal aspects of security structures and the second one considering exclusively the specific functional



aspects of security. In the case of studies related to the police forces, the examination of the legal issues that affect the organisation and functioning of the police dominates the subject matter. On the other hand, the textbooks originating from the intelligence-gathering community are overflooded with depictions of foreign intelligence services which actually make the greatest part of their content. Works dealing with the strategic and tactical aspects of internal security are few in number and rather modest in scope.

Especially evident is the lack of interdisciplinary research and in-depth sociological or political science studies of the military, police and intelligence services and their complex role in a society. It is also noticeable that domestic political science has yet to include the study of security structures in its curriculum even though these structures play a crucial role in political systems¹. Consequently, there is a lack of understanding of security concepts, especially their substance and socio-political dimensions.

The field of security studies should be developed so that it also encompasses organisational and functional aspects of the security sector, which ought to be studied on a multidisciplinary basis.

Why is the Research of the Police Forces Underdeveloped?

The police force in Serbia is much less frequently the subject of the research than the military. This might be true for both developing and developed countries. The first serious research of the police forces dates back only to the middle of the twentieth century. There is a number of reasons for this and some of them have already been addressed in the police related analyses (Earle, Easton, Dennis, Reith, Bittner, Holdaway, Loubet del Bayle i naročito D. H. Bayley)²:

- First of all, police forces rarely play a significant role in the shaping of historical events: their tasks are routine, they do not dictate global or social policy, and the destiny of the nation rarely depends on their activities. Also, in contrast to armies, the police forces are rarely significant actors in political coups³.

¹ More on this: Milosavljevic, Bogoljub, „Politička istraživanja o policiji“, *Srpska politička misao*, 1-4 1998: 127-142.

² As seen in: Milosavljevic, Bogoljub, *Nauka o policiji*, Beograd: Policijska akademija, 1997, page 49 onwards.

³ Enloe, C, *Policija, vojska i etnicitet: temelji državne moći*, Zagreb: Globus, 1990: 148.

- Secondly, police officers do not represent a social elite and their profession is not a highly regarded one. Social analysts are primarily interested in the investigation of social elites and those professions with critical political influence..
- Thirdly, serving as an instrument of social control, the police forces frequently inspire researchers to ethically ponder while, on the other hand, they create a certain reserved morality in ordinary people.. The internal application of force is not as highly motivated as the use of military force for the purpose of freedom, defence of the homeland or even conquest.
- Fourthly, the research of the police forces inherently brings along many problems such as the difficulty of finding relevant analytical material as well as police resistance to become the object of the research. Usually the police forces are more inclined to offer information about other social groups than the information about themselves⁴. Thus, a barrier is erected between the researchers and the police, a barrier that is frequently insurmountable and that is based on mutual distrust as well as the inaccessibility of police organisation⁵.
- Fifthly, the study of police forces is a complex research topic; it is multifaceted, with a complex organisational structure and various but vaguely defined roles. These facts, along with the necessary multidisciplinary approach and the difficulties of establishing a theoretical framework, are enough to discourage most conformist researchers.

As a result of the aforementioned reasons, the research of the police forces is rather late in its development. In spite of that fact, those who have chosen to research the work of police forces have certainly encountered a very interesting research field. Having that in mind, I call upon young researchers to embark on this task.

Translated from Serbian to English by Ivan Kovanović

⁴ Lapiere, J. W., *Analyse des systemes politiques*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973: 18.

⁵ "The police are cultivated to distrust outsiders, including the press and researchers", according to Forcese, D. P., *Policing Canadian Society*, Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1992:64.



Talking Truth to Power: Do Educational Infrastructures in Serbia Meet the Needs for New Generations of Security Specialists?

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UDK: 351.74:377(497)

Abstract

The paper argues that a set of major weaknesses hinders educational system in Serbia to prepare in a satisfactory way the new generation of security specialists. Some of the problems are general and derive from an outdated educational system in Serbia. This system focuses exclusively on individual reading, memorizing data and oral presentation while team work, research and critical thinking, research and written skills are ignored. Other problems relate specifically to education in the academic field of security studies. In fact, research in this field is under-developed, there is a lack of independent centers of knowledge and the curricula are too nation-centric.

Key words: education, security, specialists, Serbia, research, policy

Introduction

Alvin Toffler, famous writer and futurist once said that the illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn. This is especially so in the field of security where rapid global changes constantly transform the logic of threats and vulnerabilities. This global “risk society” emerging from the ashes of the Cold War demands understanding of security problems that is constantly evolving.² The educational infrastructures in Serbia do not seem to have the capacity to prepare young peo-

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¹ At the time when this article was made, The author was post graduate student at London School of Economics

² Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (New Delhi: Sage, 1992.)

ple for this important challenge. Until the year 2000 and arguably even beyond that, Serbia has been a prisoner of 19th century ethno-nationalist ideas which plunged the country into destructive autism and collective anomie.³ During these critical years, the rest of the world has become, as Thomas Friedman puts it, *one and flat*. In the flattening world individuals, companies and states have become extremely empowered by the forces of global competition.⁴ One cannot overemphasize the role that education and universities play in the global competition for knowledge and resources. Even some of the richest European nations with Universities whose tradition dates back to the early Middle Ages, today justly fear that their educational systems are not adapting quickly enough to new global challenges and therefore lose the global competition in the field of higher education against the more dynamic systems in the US and East Asia. The fact that this is not a concern for policy and decision makers in Serbia doesn't necessarily mean that the destiny of marginalization and irrelevance are not looming over the future place of Serbia's educational system in the global space. On the contrary, this negligence conceals a dangerous fact that Serbia is lagging far behind the world in educational matters and unless radical and substantial reforms are not undertaken in the higher education the country will hardly avoid a destiny of globalization-looser. Even worse, if its higher education in the field of security fails to breed the new generation of people who understand the complexities of the new global security environment, Serbia risks not only losing the competition for knowledge and resources but its survival as well.

It is against this backdrop that the main question of this article will be posed: do educational infrastructures in present Serbia meet the needs for new generation of security specialists? My argument is that the educational infrastructures suffer several essential weaknesses that hinder the satisfactory creation of new generation of security specialists. The argument will unfold in two steps. Firstly, I will discuss what I mean by the term educational infrastructures, security specialists and the need for the new generation. Secondly, I will assess some major shortcomings of Serbia's educational system to respond to these needs.

³ Emil Dirkem, *Samoubistvo: sociološka studija*, Beograd: BIGZ, 1997 .

⁴ Thomas Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century*, New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 2006.



Educational Infrastructures, Security Specialists and Security Needs

For the purpose of this article, educational infrastructures will be understood as the sum of governmental and non governmental institutions that generate and disseminate knowledge about security. In Serbia, security is studied at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Faculty of Security Studies, Academy of Diplomacy and Security, Diplomatic Academy within the MFA, Institute for Security within the SIA, Military Academy within the Serbian Armed Forces, and a host of informal educational programs launched by NGOs such as ISAC fund, Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, Centre for Civil-Military Relations and Belgrade School of Security Studies. The mere number of these institutions in Serbia suggests a wrong impression of a hyper production of security knowledge. But does quantity necessarily mean quality.

In order to define security specialist it will be useful firstly to say who is not. Security specialist should be distinguished from generalist and public intellectual who often discusses security issues as part of politics but lacks theoretical, conceptual and structured knowledge about it. Security specialist is also not a person who is trained only in practicing security such as a firefighter, policeman, soldier or a private security manager. Finally, security specialist should be distinguished from a securitizing actor, a person who frame its political discourse in terms of survival and existential threats and proposes exceptional and extraordinary measures that otherwise wouldn't be legitimate had the securitizing discourse not taken place.⁵ Positively, security specialist will in this presentation be defined as a person who received a special training in security studies. He possesses more specialized and theorized knowledge than the generalist, more abstract knowledge than the policeman and in contrast with the securitizing actor, he doesn't participate in threat politics and securitizing processes.

Finally, one has to answer why Serbia needs a new generation of security specialists? Firstly it is so because, for a long time, Serbia has been suffering a chronic lack of security.⁶ In other words, general feeling of the military, political, economic and societal insecurity at the individual, state and national levels is still a pervading characteristic of its society. Whether

⁵ Barry Buzan, *Security: A new framework for analysis*, Boulder, CO Lynne Rienner, 1998

⁶ Miroslav Hadžić, *Hroničan Manjak Bezbednosti: slučaj Jugoslavije*, Beograd: Centar za Civilno Vojne Odnose, 2001.

the threats are objective and inherent in the Balkans or manufactured by its political and security elites' is irrelevant to the point made here. What is however important is that only the new generation of security specialists, who are capable of learning, unlearning and relearning changing concepts of security will be capable of overcoming this permanent state of insecurity. Their presence in academia, policy-making or decision-making environments is the precondition for the society and the region to find its way out of destructive *hypersecuritizations* from the past and think more intelligently about its collective and indivisible security in the future. Secondly, a new generation of security specialist is needed for successful integration of the society into the Euro Atlantic "security community"⁷ and for undertaking the security sector reform.⁸ Successful achievement of these important goals demands a new generation of security specialists. Now that we identified major components of the equation, the argument can move on to the analysis of factors that hinder the educational infrastructures to create this new generation.

Shortcomings of Educational Infrastructures

The focus in this essay will be on the formal higher education at the University. Informal education to a certain extent overcame the shortcomings present at the University, but its impact and scope is still limited to have significant structural effects. Because I cannot address all the negative aspects in this short essay I will only identify several key issues that are the most hindering factors in the process of creation of new generation of security specialists. These issues are the general purposes of education, the poor state of the art of security studies in Serbia and finally the absence of independent centers of security knowledge and analysis.

(1) *Purpose of Education*

The first and the most important question underlying any educational system is its *aims of education*.⁹ What is the purpose of higher education in the field of social sciences at the University of Belgrade? Besides prolonging adolescence, delay-

⁷ Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community: North-Atlantic Area*, New York: Greenwood Press 1957.

⁸ For a conceptualized study of SSR see: Alan Bryden, Heiner Hanngi eds., *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Geneva: DCAF, 2004.

⁹ For a good discussion of this see: John Mearsheimer's welcoming address *The Aims of Education* delivered at the University of Chicago on October 23 1997.



ing the draft to the Armed Force and subsidized cantina food is there any added value of higher education in Serbia? Firstly, it is learning to memorize and reproduce data and other people's thoughts. By far the most important emphasis during studies is put on making students memorize vast amounts of data and reproduce it at the end of the year. Secondly, students are almost exclusively thought how to orally reproduce materials and can graduate without having written one single essay, with the exception of the final dissertation that is obligatory to all students. Thirdly, an impression that a student gets during the studies, is that what matters for his grade is much more *what* he says in the exam than *how* he argues that. In contrast to this, I believe that one of the central aims of education should be development of critical thinking and student's own opinion. In other words, it should not matter *what* one argues but *how* he defends his arguments. Fourthly, students are trained exclusively for individual work throughout the studies. There are no collective projects that students have to accomplish together with their colleagues, reality that awaits them upon graduation. Finally, at the University of Belgrade it takes both undergraduates and postgraduates at least twice as long to obtain degrees than it takes their colleagues in Western Europe.¹⁰ This is so neither because their European counterparts are brighter nor because the Serbian students learn twice as much. Unfortunately the problem is in the outdated and overloaded educational system. University curricula are usually filled with unnecessary content which has no contemporary theoretical relevance or real life application utility. Thus, studies may be not expensive in terms of money but they are unbearably expensive in terms of time spent. For example, students should be getting their PhDs when they are 26 like they do it in France or in the UK and not when they are 40 or 50 like it is the case in Serbia.¹¹

In sum, the University education in Serbia is too long, excessively focused on individual reproduction of memorized materials and not enough on collective work, critical thinking and writing skills. If education is, as one English statesman put it¹² what remains when we have forgotten all that we have been thought than Serbian education is in a deep trouble.

¹⁰ <http://www.svetlost.co.yu/arhiva/2002/374/374-6.htm>.

¹¹ According to data available at the website of the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade the average age of the last 10 persons obtaining PhD is 43.7. Source: http://www.fpn.bg.ac.yu/pages/p_id1/d_p1.html

¹² The quote belongs to George Savile.

(2) Poor State of the Art of Security Studies in Serbia

The next problem concerns the *state of the art* of security studies in Serbia. Assessing the quality of security studies can look either at the quality of research or at the quality of teaching. I will try to assess both.

The quality and level of scientific research by an individual or community in any given academic discipline is best evaluated by looking at the publications in the peer reviewed professional academic journals. Judged according to this criterion, situation in research of security in Serbia is quite grey. Given the number of academic institutions that teach security, and a number of MAs and PhDs obtained in security studies¹³ it is quite stunning that so far not a single serious academic journal in Serbia has appeared.¹⁴ Related to this, is almost an absolute absence of articles and researches written by scholars from the University of Belgrade in major international academic journals. Taking into consideration all this, it is excellent news that Belgrade School of Security Studies is about to launch its own academic journal Western Balkans Security Observer, where ideas of scholars and researchers from Serbia and region can be tested and strengthened through criticism and debate.

Regarding the teaching of security, situation is somewhat brighter. On the surface, things have started to change in the good direction. As already mentioned, the number of institutions teaching security is on the increase. Both undergraduate and postgraduate curricula are also being modernized and new paradigms of security are thought. Writing and presentation skills are being introduced in addition to the learn-by-heart-all-that-you-can method from the past.

However, under closer examination academic curriculums show signs of incompleteness. For example, the focus of the curriculum of specialist studies of global and national security at the Faculty of Political Sciences is clearly on the Security Sector Reform. In other words, international and global aspects are covered only to set the scene for the pressing issues of security sector reform and not as issues worth studying in their own right. Such a situation is understandable given the pressing problems of Serbian socio-political reality. However, this doesn't mean that global and international aspects of security shouldn't be thought in much more detail. If Serbia is

¹³ Only the Faculty of Security issued 130 MA and 40 PhD degrees.

Source: www.fb.ac.yu

¹⁴ The exception that confirms this is the Journal of Human Security. Launched in 2003 under the auspices of then Faculty of Civil Defense today Faculty of Security Studies according to its website this journal so far has published only 2 issues. Source: <http://www.fb.ac.yu/srp/izdavastvo/casopisi.php> accessed 18 June 2006. Moreover, Google Scholar Search shows that since its inception 3 years ago, the journal was referenced only once in another academic journal. Search undertaken 18 June 2006. Hit in the following article: Liotta, 'Through the looking glass' Security Dialogue, Vol. 36, No. 1, 49-70 (2005).



ever to contribute seriously to regional and global security and crisis management operations through NATO, UN or ESDP, it will need security specialists capable of understanding global security issues that go far beyond the Security Sector Reform.

Finally, one can point out to the quasi complete lack of area studies at the faculties. One of the exceptions to that is the establishment of the Centre for the Study of the U.S. at the Faculty of Political Sciences. This is to a certain extent a result of apparent loss of relevance of geopolitics in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, if the geography lost some of its erstwhile importance, it doesn't mean that geopolitical and area studies don't have anything to say about national and international security.

(3) *The Absence of Independent Centers of Knowledge*

Finally, the third shortcoming of our educational infrastructures is the absence of pluralism of independent sources of knowledge and analysis. Peter Haas who studied the impact of scientific and epistemic communities on the policy and decision making argued that science matters only under the condition it is developed behind a politically insulated wall and if there is a pluralism of sources of knowledge.¹⁵

At the University of Belgrade, there is a strong personal overlapping between the centers of power, such as the Security Intelligence Agency and the academia. I believe that this relationship can be healthy only provided that the presence of security practitioners is transparent and the utility of their experience is directly and overtly transferred to students. If the presence of security practitioners is somewhat obscured, their role becomes more a function of *securing the studies* than *studying security*. The disguised overlapping of these two spheres is not only harming basic principles of democracy and university. It also hinders the scientific and research achievements in the field of security studies. In the final analysis, because the sources of knowledge are not autonomous, the market of ideas about security is underdeveloped and the overall practice of security suffers a lack of good quality scientific analysis.

¹⁵ Peter Haas, 'When does power listen to truth? A constructivist approach to the policy process,' Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4, 2004.

Concluding Thoughts

In conclusion, in this presentation I argued that a set of major weaknesses hinders educational system to satisfactory prepare the new generation of security specialists. Some of them are general problems of educational system while others are characteristic for security studies related education. In teaching, situation is a bit better than in research. Finally, obscure overlapping of people who at the same time teach and research security at the University and who covertly practice security in security agencies doesn't help security studies in overcoming these problems. What is more, only if there is a pluralism of independent centers of knowledge can there be a healthy discussion and progress in knowledge.



In the Need for New Generation of Security Specialists: Belgrade School of Security Studies¹

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UDK: 351.74:371; 378.6:351.74(497.11)

Abstract

The civilians' right to control the armed forces in a democratic society is widely discussed in the literature on democratic governance of security sector. The civilians' lack of expertise, understanding and interest in security matters is sometimes recognized as an obstacle but the scope of the knowledge needed and the responsibility for providing the appropriate education have been neglected research issues. This paper argues that the level of the knowledge needed depends on the role a civilian might have – as a professional, a member of legislature or “an ordinary citizen”, i.e. a member of civil society. The need for a new generation of security specialists in the postcommunist countries is discussed in the first part of the paper. The second part describes the way in which a Serbian civil society organisation addressed this need. The research management in the initial phase of Belgrade School of Security Studies is presented.

Key words: security education, civil society, Serbia, democratic governance of armed forces

Introduction

The responsibility of the civilians to educate themselves about defence issues and military culture lies at the core of the civil-military relations based on the principles of liberal democracy. This applies to civilian leaders³, first of all, but may be applied to a whole society. In the prevailing literature on civil-military issues, surmounting attention is paid to the powers that are/should be given to civilians in a democracy, and to the ways of establishing checks and balances between

¹ Elements of this paper were presented at the round table on “Education for Security”, Slovenian Political Scientists Days, Portoroz, 2006.

² At the time when this article was made, the author was a PhD candidate at the Belgrade Faculty of Political Sciences and worked as the Deputy Head of the Belgrade School of Security Studies, CCMR.

³ Nye, Joseph S, Jr. “Epilogue: The Liberal Tradition”, in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

the branches. The purpose of this text is to inspire closer scrutiny of the specific knowledge and skills necessary for exercising those powers. In the first part of the text, the need for the new generation of the security specialists is discussed, with particular emphasis on the problems the postcommunist countries have been facing. In the second part, a specific way that the Serbian nongovernmental organisation is addressing this need is presented, through the description of the Belgrade School of Security Studies (BSSS), newly established research unit of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations. In concluding remarks, the prospects of this endeavour are only generally outlined, having in mind the limits of this project and the short time of the BSSS operation.

I The Need for Security Competence

The concept of democratic civilian control of armed forces was prescribed as a desirable model for power distribution between civilian and military sphere in a democratic society at the end of the 20th century. In a vast majority of the literature, the responsibilities of the legislative and executive branch were prescribed in more or less detail⁴. Therefore, various typologies of actors, their roles and procedures to be followed were produced. The list of standards that should be respected by the head of the state, members of the parliament and its defence and security committees, individual ministries, etc, may vary from a brief policy test⁵ to a complex scholarly designed matrix⁶. However, none of the studies, to our best knowledge, focused particularly on the issues of (1) what kind of knowledge and skills are needed so that these duties can be performed in a competent and professional manner, and (2) who should be responsible to gain, create and disseminate the desired security knowledge.⁷ Certainly, the implicit answer to the first question could be logically deducted from the existing literature. Namely, “a curriculum” for many of those who guard the guardians may be derived based on the list of duties assigned to the executives and legislators. Still, both questions points to the field of possible further research.

The debate on how to secure subordination of the armed forces to the democratically elected authorities has moved in

⁴ For a very short review of modern theoretical debate, see Glišić, Jasmina, “Democratic Civil Control of Armed Forces”, November 2 2005, internet, <http://www.ccmr-bg.org/analyze/rec/word58.htm>.

⁵ Such as the Carnavolo-Simon test, taken as a basic instrument to evaluate the status of democratic control of armed forces in the Central Eastern European countries, seeking NATO membership.

⁶ Such as the Alexandre Lambert's matrix which lists numerous indicators relevant for evaluating the situation in any specific country, including over a hundred individual criteria, classified in fifteen categories.

⁷ Among 29 chapters of the unique manual for the parliamentarians, only one gives a set of suggestions for improvement of the MPs security expertise. See: Born, Hans (ed) *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector*, Geneva: Interparliamentary Union and Geneva Centre for DCAF, 2003.



recent years to the question of how to make the ‘managers of violence’ “accountable to the citizens as well”.⁸ Consequently, the model of democratic civilian control has evolved into the concept of democratic governance of the armed forces. In our perspective, this implies the necessity that the public possesses at least minimum of knowledge on the security issues. This normative viewpoint stands in opposition to denials of the public’s role in foreign/security policy.⁹ It also contradicts warnings against highly volatile public opinion,¹⁰ as well as the scepticism toward the mass public which is “neither interested nor informed” on these issues,¹¹ It is, however, in agreement with substantial research proving the rationality of public opinion in security matters¹² and detecting the connections between the foreign policy attitudes and key values of individuals.¹³ In assessing the need of the public to be informed about security issues, one should take into account these findings. In examining the most adequate ways of informing the public, one should also take into consideration different cognitive styles of the individuals and strategies of processing information,¹⁴ levels of previously gained knowledge, etc.

The previous two sections were to show how the current demand for gathering, creating and disseminating the security knowledge is steadily growing, due to the broadening of the civilian circles, responsible for democratic governance of the armed forces.¹⁵ It may be reasonable to assume that the level of expertise required rises (security specialists not employed by the state excluded) with the responsibility in the decision-making process. Broadly set, the civilian “target groups”¹⁶ with specific needs in terms of knowledge on security issues may be located on (a) macro level – professionals, to hold key positions in a ministry of defence but also in other, security relevant departments in the state bureaucracy (ministry of foreign affairs, finance institutions, etc); (b) meso level – legislators, who may be “in office” only for a period of time between elections and with the attention divided to various policy issues, security being only one of them and (c) micro level – citizens, whose engagement in defence issues is of the limited nature¹⁷ while the interest is in strong and indicative correlation with higher education,¹⁸ It would go beyond the aim of this text to make further hypothesis on the depth and the scope of the demanded security competence for each of the target groups

⁸ Forster, Anthony, *Armed Forces and Society in Europe*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.

⁹ Rosenau, James N., cited after: Powlick, Philip J. and Andrew Z. Katz “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus”, *Mershon International Studies Review*, 1998.

¹⁰ Almond, Gabriel A., “Public Opinion and National Security Policy”, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer 1956), p. 376.

¹¹ See more in: Holsti, Ole R., “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippman Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec. 1992), pp. 439-466.

¹² Page, Benjamin I. and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

¹³ Hurwitz, Jon, Pefley, Mark, “How are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Dec. 1987), pp. 1099-1120.

¹⁴ Fiske, Lau and Smith 1990, Krosnick and Milburn 1990, McGraw and Pinney 1990, Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991.

¹⁵ General preconditions such as the end of the Cold War, rapid changes in security environment, globalization, technology development, broadening the notion of security, new military roles and mission, etc, will not be discussed in this text.

¹⁶ This typology partly draws upon the three areas Forster finds to be critical in securing accountability – “of the armed forces to the civilian authorities and society, and of the civilian authorities to society as regards the management and use of the armed forces” (Forster, 2006, p. 27).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁸ Glišić, Jasmina, “How informed and interested are the citizens in the military issues?”, in: Glišić, Jasmina, Miroslav Hadžić, Milorad Timotić i Jovanka Matić, *The Public of Serbia and Montenegro on the Military Reform*, [“Javnost Srbije i Crne Gore o reformi Vojske”], I –VII round. Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2003-2005.

mentioned, as well as on the pace and methods to acquire that competence. However, the range, importance and clear difference among these groups may show the growing need is for critical, up-dated and responsible security analyses (in a broadest meaning of this term). The results of these analyses should be communicated to the diverse body of recipients, in a modern, 'target'-tailored and user-friendly manner.

The Need for Security Specialists in Postcommunist Countries

The importance of knowledge cannot be overstressed when the security sector reform in postcommunist countries is discussed. The inherited model was high militarization of the economic, political and social functions.¹⁹ The armies in these countries were

oversized, bureaucratized, politicized, ineffective and they had to undergo considerable reduction, reorganization and rationalization. With the impoverishment of members of society the army were also brought into an unfavourable economic position, which unavoidably reflected on their morale and motivation, so that most of these armies experienced, and some are still experiencing a deep institutional crisis.²⁰

However, having contrasted the whole list of challenges that the new democracies had to face in reforming civil-military relations, Huntington assessed that "civil-military relations are a dramatic exception to the lackluster performance of democracies in so many areas".²¹ Moreover, he argued that "future problems in civil-military relations in new democracies are likely to come not from the military but from the civilian side of the equation".²² His warnings primarily go against the failures of democratic governments to promote economic development and maintain law and order, as well as the weak political institutions. In addition, Diamond and Platner emphasised the need for capacity as a crucial factor of civilian supremacy. Capacity involves "not just statutory authority but the knowledge, understanding, and experience to make these decisions effectively".²³ These predictive statements proved to be true, according to the analysis of the civil-military relationship in European states, carried out a decade later. It showed "critically, the effective democratic control of the armed forces

¹⁹ See more in: Forster, Anthony, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, eds., "Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe". Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

²⁰ Timotić, Milorad, "Civil-Military Relations and the Principle of Civilian Control of the Army", in Hadžić, Miroslav (ed): *Civilian Control of the Army and Police*, 2000: 23.

²¹ The discussion and offered explanation in: Huntington, Samuel, P. "Reforming Civil-Military Relations", in Diamond, Larry (ed): *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, 1996: 5.

²² *Ibid*, p. 11.

²³ Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Platner, 1996: xxvii.



depends [not only on constitutional arrangements, chains of command and defence laws but also] on accountability and transparency in the day-to-day practices and interactions at all levels between the armed forces and the society”.²⁴ As Bruneau and Tollefson put it, “‘the devil is in the details’, and it is only civilians with an understanding of these details who will be able to craft and maintain institutions in such a way as to play a central role in the policymaking process”.²⁵

The countries in transition not only from the authoritarian regime but also struggling with the war heritage, such as the Western Balkans states, face the most severe challenges in establishing the democratic control and striving for the democratic governance of the armed forces. Their transition is delayed, countries are devastated in terms of financial resources and human capital, and external factors play the key role in the reconstruction of the security sector. While this sector is usually fragmented,

the armed forces are overdeveloped for peacetime conditions, over-politicised and structured along ethnic or religious lines. Non-state armed formations, [...] private military companies, criminal groups and guerrilla movements may exist alongside state security structures weakened by corruption.²⁶

Serbia presents a unique case in more than one sense, that will not be discussed here.²⁷ Let us only emphasise that the weak democratic capacities of the postconflict Serbia are further tested against the “dual challenge [for] the exponents of reform in Serbia. They must rid the country of the heritage of war and autocracy and create the prerequisites for a democratic order. What is more, they cannot do one thing first, and then the other.”²⁸ The security sector reform in Serbia (then Serbia and Montenegro) has been assessed as a “sluggish” one, carried out in a slow and inconsistent manner.²⁹

Roles of Security Specialists

The above discussed state of armed forces and society relations in old, new and not-yet-democracies point to the growing demand for the civilian expertise in security field. Further research should determine more precisely what requirements the new generation of security specialist should meet. In reflecting over the possible roles the academics in this

²⁴ Forster et al, p. 39.

²⁵ Bruneau, Thomas and Tollefson, “Who Guards the Guardians and How”. University of Texas Press, 2006: 264.

²⁶ Caparini, Marina, “Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Stabilisation: The Case of the Western Balkans”, in: Bryden Alan and Heiner Hanngi (eds), *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004.

²⁷ For more detailed discussion, see Hadžić, 2000 and 2001; Caparini, 2004.

²⁸ Hadžić, Miroslav, “Distinguishing Seemingly the Same”, October 21 2005, internet <http://www.ccmr-bg.org/analize/rec/word57.htm>, 5/18/2006

²⁹ Glišić, Jasmina “Sluggish Security Sector Reform in Serbia and Montenegro”, paper presented at the 62nd Rose-Roth Seminar, in Tirana, April 24-26, 2006, available at <http://www.ccmr-bg.org/analize/rec/word61.htm>

field, several questions seem to be worth investigating: what can they do what the others cannot/would not/should not do?

In this normative analysis, the reference to the proposed typology of 'target'-groups may be useful. Indeed, at a macro level, a significant number of well-educated professionals is urgently needed in the executive branch. Some analysts suggest that "a plausible model would be to assign a military officer as deputy to each senior civilian within the ministry [of defence], and a civilian deputy to each senior military officer within the ministry".³⁰

At a meso level, substantial support in expertise and research is needed to help in neutralizing the factors inhibiting the legislators in maximising their role in democratic governance of armed forces. The main factors are: lack of parliamentarians' interest in defence, "which is rarely seen as a cause on which to build a parliamentary reputation"; the executive tradition of limiting the primary legislation (laws) by passing orders, decrees, etc ('soft' law); lack of the military experience and the necessary expertise, and restriction on access to relevant information, which is in addition exacerbated by the absence of alternative sources of information.³¹

At a micro level, the notion that "democracy is a very demanding political system both for elites and for average citizens"³² may serve as a useful reminder. This gets us back to the initial statement in this text: that civilians have the responsibility to educate themselves about defence issues and military culture. Having in mind the extreme complexity of security matters, as well as the widely discussed tendencies of armed forces to closure before the public scrutiny, average citizens need all the help they can get in acquiring necessary knowledge. The level of what can be considered as a minimum would certainly depend on the impact a particular decision or a security policy measure, may have on the individual, societal and national security.

Having all these levels in mind, we shall try to outline a general picture of the possible roles of security specialists. For the micro and meso level, they should provide complete, in-depth research of contemporary issues, relevant for the security and defence policy. Most often, parliamentarians as well as the average citizens, do not have time, will or capacity to investigate, for example, the comparative solutions for controlling the extrabudgetary funds. Security specialists should

³⁰ Bruneau, Thomas C. and Richard B. Goetze Jr. (2006), "Ministries of Defence and Democratic Control", in Bruneau 2006: 94.

³¹ According to Foster 2006: 29-31.

³² Bruneau, Thomas C. and Kenneth R. Dombrovski, "Reforming intelligence: The Challenge of Control in New Democracies", in Bruneau, 2006: 156.



be capable of defining the important research topics, and of producing comprehensive and timely analyses in a user-friendly form.

Next, security specialists should engage in keeping the constructive public interest and vibrant debate on security issues. This is not to say that the life of citizens should be excessively politicized or, to put it differently, everyday life topics should not be securitized. On the contrary, security specialists should try to balance possible involvement of media in defining the foreign/security policy and even counterbalance so-called CNN effect. Ideally, security specialist should find different motivation from the media, which are often driven by the demand for drama “to seek the most eye-catching and arresting action”.³³ However, security specialists of new generation should understand and use all the capacities media and new information technologies can offer in order to reach the broader audience and keep it better informed. For both legislators and average citizens (and when they are not employed within the executive branch themselves), security specialists should serve as an independent, alternative source of information. To highlight this once again, the absence of such sources is considered to be particularly important in cases when access to relevant official information is restricted.³⁴

In addition, security specialists should permanently access the level of democratic control/governance in a society, according to the up-dated, applicable standards. They should also strive to set such standards themselves. They may significantly contribute to further development of security education (educating the educators, first of all), which is the task to be carried out by the governmental and nongovernmental organisations as well.

At this point, we conclude the preliminary list (by no means complete) of ‘missions’ which security specialists can, should and hopefully will perform and we offer it to possible critiques and contributors. It should be kept in mind that it includes only those specific roles that the actors at the macro, meso and micro level could not or would not carry out.

Finally, we shall suggest only one role that those actors should not take over, and that is – setting the research agenda. This is not to say that the analyses of certain issues of interest should never be commissioned by the executive professionals or the parliamentarians. Nor that the public pressure or

³³ Howard, Ross “The Media’s Role in War and Peace Building”, in Caparini, Marina (ed) *Media in Security and Governance*. Baden-Baden: BICC/DCAF, 2004.

³⁴ Foster, 2006: 31.

increased interest in particular security topics should not be taken into account when individual/collective research strategies are created. However, security specialists will fulfil the above mentioned roles best if no constraints are imposed – by the legislative or executive branch, media or non-governmental organizations, or general public – when it comes to the development of research agenda. Simply speaking, there should be no forbidden research questions. This is one of the mottos that have been leading the researchers and the management of the Belgrade School of Security Studies, which will be described in the second part of the text.

II Establishment of the Belgrade School of Security Studies

Education and specialization of the civilians for the security issues make an important part in the security sector reform in Serbia. Nongovernmental organizations here are seen as putting much more effort in reference to this than the state-owned and state-run institutions.³⁵ Belgrade School of Security Studies (BSSS) was designed as an original project by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), non-governmental organization based in Belgrade.³⁶ The School is aimed at contributing to the development of security studies and academic advancement of young researchers in Serbia. It is also to participate in the CCMR's mission, in promoting “the public and responsible participation of civil society in increasing the security of the citizens and state based on modern democracy principles, as well as security cooperation with neighbouring countries and Serbia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community”.³⁷ The research management and strategy of this unique group will be presented in more details in this part of the text. Finally its possible impact in forming the new generation of security specialists in Serbia is discussed.

The BSSS was projected as a special research unit of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, according to the idea of the Centre's President Miroslav Hadžić, who formulated the aims as follows: “forming and training young researchers for systematic scientific and analytical research of national, regional, and global security; planned transfer of contemporary knowledge and experience; stimulating the development of theoretical and empirical research of the domestic security

³⁵ Simić, Dragan, “Role of Science in the Security Sector Reform”, presentation at the conference on “The Role of the Civil Society in the Security Sector Reform”, Kanjiža, 2005.

³⁶ Full information available at www.ccmr-bg.org

³⁷ <http://www.ccmr-bg.org/ona/ma/about.htm>



sector; contribution to the qualified public debate on domestic security needs and capacities; stimulating faster involvement of local researchers in international scientific cooperation and research projects as well as the local research networking”, etc.³⁸

The project was outlined in details in December 2004/January 2005,³⁹ after LtC. Brigit Harr Vaage, then Defence and Security Advisor in the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Belgrade expressed the possibility that Norway might support this initiative, within its substantial contribution to security sector reform in Serbia. The School was opened in January 2006, thanks to the support of the Royal Norwegian Government and the Balkan Trust for Democracy. It employs ten young research fellows, chosen after the previously conducted two-month selection procedure. Striving for the workforce diversity, the Selection Team⁴⁰ decided to target the applicants with BA and/or MA obtained from local and/or foreign universities and majoring in different social sciences. Along with the high requirements in regard to the candidates’ success at graduate studies and the reference check, the age limit was set to 30 and proficiency in English was tested by written and oral exams. Having in mind the specific high demands of the research fellows’ position,⁴¹ most important selection tools were work sample analyses and structured interviews. The level of requirements could partly explain the relatively small applicant pool,⁴² out of which ten associates were selected. Most of them obtained their BAs from the Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade University (5, among whom 4 at the International Politics Department and 1 at the Political Science Department), 2 got their BAs at the Faculty of Law (among them 1 MA from the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Hamburg, Germany), 1 graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy of Belgrade University (Sociology Department) and 1 with an MA in Politics, University “La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy.

The BSSS International Advisory Board was established, including senior scholars and eminent security experts,⁴³ while the Supervisory Board ensures the monitoring position for the donors’ representatives.

³⁸ A selection out of the “Incubator, Aims”, cited according to the project documentation, CCMR Archive, 2004.

³⁹ The CCMR Project Team included President Miroslav Hadžić, Mihajlo Cicmilović, then the CFO at the CCMR (outlining the financial management issues) and Jasmina Glišić, then the CEO at the CCMR (outlining the research management issues).

⁴⁰ Including Miroslav Hadžić, Head of the BSSS, Milorad Timotić, Project Coordinator at the CCMR, and Jasmina Glišić, with the administrative support provided by Maja Zarić, Office Manager at the CCMR.

⁴¹ Ryan, Ann Marie and Tippins, Nancy T., *Attracting and Selecting: What Psychological Research Tells Us*, *Human Resource Management*, Winter, 43(4), 2004: 305-318.

⁴² Total of 76 applications, which should be read in the context of 20% unemployment rate in Serbia, and particularly severe in the youth population, according to the Announcement of the Serbian Institute for Statistics, No. 100, year. LVI, 20/04/2006, internet

<http://webzrs.statserb.sr.gov.yu/axd/dokumenti/rs10102005.pdf>, 10/ 5/ 2006.

⁴³ Professor Anthony Forster, Head of Department of Politics, University of Bristol, Director of the Governance Research Centre, University of Bristol, Professor of Politics and International Relations; Dr Vladimir Bilandžić, Special Adviser in the OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro (for confidence and security-building measures), Professor Dr Vladimir Goati, president of the NGO “Transparency Serbia”, Belgrade, Ivan Vejvoda, MA, Executive Director of the Balkan Trust for Democracy, Belgrade, Miljenko Dereta, Executive Director of the Civic Initiative, nongovernmental, organisation in Belgrade, Stille Ullriksen, Deputy Director of the Norwegian Institute of Foreign Policy (NUP), Oslo, Ambassador Dr Theodor H. Winkler, Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and Milorad V. Timotić, MA, one of the founders and presently the coordinator of the projects in the Centre for Civil-Military Relations.

The School's Work Processes

Belgrade School of Security Studies was to become the original, research, academic and educational institution. In searching for the ways how to reach these goals, four most important concerns were the issues of: “(1) how to organize and structure the time and work of the Research Fellows, (2) how to inspire and stimulate the Research Fellows, most of them being at the starting point of their individual careers, (3) how to monitor and evaluate their efficiency and (4) how to make them succeed in one of the most important tasks for a scholar – to publish”.⁴⁴ In the next four sections of the text, these issues will be addressed, presenting both the plans and the assessment of their results so far.

(1) “Flexible but Firm”

Usual research management⁴⁵ in social sciences in Serbian civilian institutions at the end of 20th and beginning of 21st century mostly was founded on the loosely defined working hours, non-standardized work procedures, poor working conditions and poor, non-competitive salaries so all the achievements mostly resulted from individual or small-groups’ efforts and enthusiasm.⁴⁶ Belgrade School of Security Studies operates at the standard 40-hour week, in superb work conditions (see below) and with highly dynamic work agenda.

Introductory activities included the Introductory Week, in which the CCMR members presented the past and present projects, activities and results. This was organized in order to help the Research Fellows (hereafter RFs) “find their way around” and get acquainted with the CCMR work but also to prevent any “disruptive organizational response”⁴⁷ after employing a group that actually outnumbered the permanent staff of the CCMR. During the Introductory Month, group and individual discussions with the RFs were held, in order to hear their expectances, ideas and proposals. This was also the opportunity to select their field of research, divided according to the projects to five broadly defined areas.⁴⁸ The introductory lectures delivered by Miroslav Hadžić and Jasmina Glišić were followed by the training workshop on the access to digital scientific and research sources.⁴⁹ During this period, the

⁴⁴ Glišić, Jasmina, Presentation of the BSSS Project, Donors’ Conference at the OSCE Mission to Serbia, 5/ 9/ 2006.

⁴⁵ If there has been any.

⁴⁶ Personal experience of a number of researchers, obtained by the author in private conversations. Names and details here excluded to protect their privacy.

⁴⁷ Baum, A.C. Joel, Singh, V. Jitendra, *Dynamics of Organizational Responses to Competition*, Social Forces, Vol. 74, No. 4, (June), 1996: 1261-1297.

⁴⁸ Euro-Atlantic Security, Security Profile of Southeastern Europe and Western Balkans, Security Sector Reform of SCG, Social Development and Security, and Public Oversight of the Security Sector of Serbia and Montenegro

⁴⁹ Lecture delivered by Biljana Kosanovic, the Programme Manager from the National Library of Serbia.



RFs met with their co-mentors, the eminent senior security scholars from Ljubljana, Skopje and Zagreb⁵⁰ who delivered the inaugural lectures and discussed the individual research plans and the overall strategy of the School. All RFs delivered their own lectures, organized for the members of the School exclusively, in order to present their main topics of interest and/or their previous work.

Substantial part of the time and energy in the first three-month period was invested in creation of the Security Database, a specific product of the School, which comprises security related documents, articles, maps, news and other different texts. The list of topics includes neighbouring and G8 countries, international organizations, research institutions and universities, think-tanks, non-governmental organizations, etc.

Regular activities also include the process of making lists of books that RFs propose for future purchase, since the CCMR/BSSS has been establishing a specialized security library. The BSSS web pages are regularly updated at the CCMR website.

Specific program of guest lecturers has been designed in order to meet different demands according to the School's strategy. Senior scholars offered the insight in the findings of their recent studies; junior ones were particularly helpful by sharing with the RFs their research strategies, while the practitioners provided the necessary link to the current topics problems in the security sector. Together with local political decision-makers and important foreign guests on the list of 26 visitors in first 30 weeks of the School's operation, it was expected that the lectures program will additionally inspire that specific combination of "hubris and humility",⁵¹ which may be essential for the new generation of security specialists in Serbia.

(2) *"Everything Can be Questioned"*

A similar effect is expected to be achieved by the "Power Lunch" program. This "code name" stands for the planned informal lunch meetings with specially chosen important politicians, or representatives of the NGOs, or provocative members of the think-tanks – local and foreign – particularly

⁵⁰ Professor Biljana Vankovska, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute for Defence and Peace Studies, Skopje and board member of the Macedonian Helsinki Committee, Professor Marjan Malešić, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, and Head of Defence Research Centre, Coordinator of Post-Graduate Studies, Professor Ljubica Jelušić, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Head of Research Project "Slovenian Military in Peace Operations" and Professor Siniša Tatalović, Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, and the guest lecturer at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana.

⁵¹ Mearsheimer, John J. "The Aims of Education", *Philosophy and Literature*, 22(1) (April), 1998: 135-157.

connected with security sector. It is expected that these informal and hopefully exciting meetings can motivate the RFs and inspire their critical approach to the world of practical politics. So far one out of six such planned events was carried out.⁵²

“Going Out” program has been designed to secure the visits to the main governmental institutions and NGOs, important for security sector. The central idea is to secure “backstage” entrance and conversations with the top officials “behind the closed door”. Within this program, the RFs visited Serbia and Montenegro Ministry of Defence,⁵³ where expert presentations were held in the Defence Policy Sector, Human Resources Sector, Public Relations Department, as well as in the Centre for Peace Operations and Military Academy. The scheduled study visit to the National Assembly of Serbia (Committee for Defence and Security) was temporarily postponed due to the organizational changes after the State Union disintegration. The study visit to Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, scheduled for September 2006, should provide the RFs with substantial insight in activities of this institution and its latest research.

The program “Deep to the Topic” was designed as a series of the closed meetings with the external guest who would deliver a short presentation on a “hot” security issue. Preferred guests would be the politicians willing to talk “off-the-record”, or the top-rank media analysts, while the crucial role would be given to senior researcher(s) who would moderate the discussion. The aim of this program is to practice how the social issues can be transformed into the scientific questions and research topics.

Internal Debates are regularly held every month, in form of reading groups, when the RFs gather to discuss articles of interest for all. This included the basic texts such as on the concept of security or international relations and international security but also more specific topics, such as on the aims of education, which was appropriate in process of preparing the regional conference on security studies, which will be described later. These internal debates proved to be an important part of the group work, aimed primarily at exchanging views and understandings of the topic discussed. However,

⁵² Thanks to Col. Simon Vandeleur, British Embassy Defense Attaché in Belgrade.

⁵³ It was the first study visit of an NGO in this Ministry's history.



they are also the place where the individual talents for oral presentations are developed, where disciplined and clear scientific and logical thinking is exercised, and where a balanced and cultivated debate style is encouraged.

(3) “*Get and Give*”

Belgrade School of Security Studies provides excellent working conditions, particularly if compared to local circumstances. Beside the day-to-day and individually tailored research management, each RFs is equipped with the above described “research software”, and provided with the personal computer,⁵⁴ a constant access to internet and to more than 8,000 academic journals, provided through the National Library of Serbia and a growing specialized library. Since the School is expected to deliver high quality products, which will be discussed later, the process of monitoring and evaluation of the RFs’ efficiency and progress is essential. Having in mind the original design of the School and its unique work processes, the evaluation instruments had to be specifically designed to meet these demands.

All RFs submit regular monthly reports, which are analysed and serve as basis for monthly resumes. Management Board holds regular monthly group and individual discussions with the RFs. After the first six-month period, an overall overview of individual engagement and progress of the RFs was carried out. Management Board reached the conclusion that two RFs could not step over the threshold of research activities and results as projected so their contracts were renounced based, while one RF left the School at own request, claiming that the work load was too challenging.⁵⁵

For each different task, the quality of work at the BSSS is controlled separately: for example, the contribution to the Security Database,⁵⁶ the first articles written by the RFs, their participation in the conferences, the quality of their work at the Reading Groups, etc.

The academic progress is particularly carefully monitored, and has been assessed as satisfactory so far. One RF is expected to become a PhD candidate by the end of 2006, 4 RFs are expected to become MA candidates and possibly get the

⁵⁴ Compared to the total of four PCs with the internet connection at the Military Academy in Belgrade, according to the data provided during the workshop on “Developing Research Capability Serbia and Montenegro Ministry of Defence”, organized by the Jefferson Institute in Belgrade, January 30 2005

⁵⁵ In the recruitment procedure, the BSSS now opted for was headhunting, resulting in 2 MAs in International Studies and 1 BA in Psychology with specialization in Global and National Security who joined the School in September 2006. The age of the group remained the same – the average of 27.4, while the gender ratio is now more favourable, as to 50% male and 50% female RFs.

⁵⁶ Along with the quantitative criteria, quality was assessed through the good structure, compliance to the instructions and creative solutions, relevance of the documents collected, sorting out, usability of the documents, etc.

degree in 2007, and 2 RFs are to enrol in postgraduate studies in 2006. According to the contract, they will all apply with the thesis on security topics.

(4) “*Publish or Vanish*”

According to the project, all RFs should produce at least one academic article, two articles for the School’s magazine “Western Balkans Security Observer” (WBSO) and a book review by the end of 2006. While the sub-project of the “BSSS Quarterly Report”, an academic, peer-reviewed journal, is still in the fundraising phase, the first issue of the WBSO⁵⁷ was published in July 2006.

At first projected as a monthly bulletin, and then redesigned into a bi-monthly publication, “Western Balkans Security Observer”⁵⁸ will monitor, analyze and provide deeper insight of current security processes in Serbia. It brings news and covers the reform of the armed forces, explores security processes in the South East Europe and the Western Balkans region, and follows security integration processes. The call for contributions is opened to researchers newly introduced to security studies in particular, but also to the already affirmed authors. The magazine targets the broader audience, and therefore insists on simple but not simplified style combined with strong analytical approach.

The preparations for other translating and publishing activities of the School are still in course, while collection of papers will come as results of the conferences that will be briefly described later in this text. The School’s website will also be important in disseminating the research findings.

Regional Outreach

The first conference organized by the BSSS addressed the regional issue of development of security studies in Western Balkans. Titled “Safer Balkans Network”, it was held from June 22-24, 2006, after the call for papers had been opened for young researchers (below PhD level) from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia. Three of the selected papers were written by BSSS RFs.⁵⁹ This conference was the first meeting in Serbia whose participants

⁵⁷ Available at http://www.comr-bg.org/bsss/casopis/e-bezbednost_zap_balkana_no1.pdf.

⁵⁸ Supported by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

⁵⁹ Petrović Jelena: Security studies in the police education in Serbia, Popović Djordje: The Non-Academic Education in Security Studies in Serbia, and Marko Savković: The Academic Programs of Security Studies at University of Belgrade.



addressed the situation with respect to academic and informal educational and research programmes in the sphere of security studies in Western Balkans. The organizers noted that, although disappointing, it was also indicative that no papers from Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been submitted to the competition. The gathering was assessed as an important initiative to further networking of research and educational centres in security studies.

For the second conference, organized by the CCMR, on “Security Co-operation in the Western Balkans” (September 10-12 2006), three RFs prepared the paper on “Regional Security Initiatives of the South Eastern Europe”,⁶⁰ and “How to Develop the Autonomous Procedures and Instruments for the Regional Sustainable Security”.⁶¹

Both conferences will result in collection of papers. In addition, RFs participated in about 20 conferences, roundtables and seminars, organized in Serbia and abroad, establishing important contacts and initiating new ways of cooperation.

Community and Public Outreach

At “The Europe Day Schools Meeting”, May 9 2006, the guests of the BSSS were the pupils who attend the 1st Belgrade Grammar School, and the presentations given by the RFs⁶² were to raise the youth awareness on the importance of the country’s integration to Europe. Starting from its official opening, on March 1 2006, the BSSS presented its activities in numerous newspapers articles (14), news agencies tickers (5), TV and radio reports (8), websites posts (16). At the EXIT Festival in Novi Sad, June 6-9 2006, the BSSS RF⁶³ gave legal advices relating to the military/civil service to the visitors of the CCMR stand.

Challenges and Advantages

The greatest challenge the BSSS faced was the lack of methodological knowledge and practical experience in academic writings. The analysis of the work of the BSSS RFs in the first six-month period has shown that one of the major problems was the lack of methodology knowledge and insuf-

⁶⁰ Filimonović Miljan, Petrović Jelena and Radoman Jelena.

⁶¹ Petrović Jelena

⁶² Petrović Jelena and Savković Marko.

⁶³ Popović Djordje

ficient training in methodological techniques, skills and procedures. In addressing this problem, a number of guest lecturers dealt more closely with the methodology issues. The immediate response was the *ad hoc* designed internal self-education methodology course, covering the basic issues in academic production. The course was designed, based on (1) presumption that each graduate student should be an independent learner, and (2) good experience in small group teaching/learning efficiency. RFs were divided in three-member teams, each of them preparing a methodology workshop for the rest of the BSSS. The material drew upon the scientific literature, was based on practical examples, and concentrated on security issues.⁶⁴ The project of more in-depth methodology course was designed and is being planned in co-operation with the Bristol University, Department of Politics.

The lack of the funds to support the advanced School programmes, such as the individual study tours, group study tours, summer seminar, etc. is seen as the second challenge so the fundraising activities are constant and perceived as important ones. The insecure financial status of the School, as a unit within the non-governmental organization, dependent on future donations, may be a serious challenge since the RFs might be attracted to more secure positions elsewhere.

The School has proved to be a highly dynamic in creating and managing the work plans.⁶⁵ This is an important advantage in comparison with the larger institutions, where the work processes are subject to longer decision-making procedures.⁶⁶ This is also expected, due to its non-governmental status which, in addition, secures the independence in choosing the research topics and research strategies. Finally, the firm but flexible work agenda, with small-group typical face-to-face communication as a consistent pattern, and daily designed and implemented academic self-improvement techniques are expected to give good results in a short period of time.

Prospects

At the moment, it is impossible to predict with greater certainty the prospects of the BSSS and its possible impact in forming the nucleus for the new generation of security special-

⁶⁴ The topics covered included: strategy of academic writing; preparation, choice of the topic, disciplinary approach, scientific and social relevance; structure of academic article: title, keywords, abstract, introduction, methods, results, discussion, references, appendixes; scientific and popular scientific styles; state of art – the aim, techniques, sources, problems; PhD and MA thesis, logical fallacies in academic writing; disciplined and clear thinking; creative thinking.

⁶⁵ School monthly workplans, the BSSS Archive 2006.

⁶⁶ See, for example, University Law, Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia, No. 21/02, or the Statute of Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade.



ists in Serbia. In the “worst case scenario”, the research capacities of the CCMR will be significantly improved. This development can be assessed as important by itself, having in mind that this organization managed to achieve most of its considerable results⁶⁷ while being seriously understaffed. This was possible thanks to the method of networking with external researchers. It is reasonable to expect that strengthening the CCMR capacities with specifically trained RFs will mark a new stage of the development of this NGO.

According to the project, the BSSS was not established only to gather and produce security knowledge while providing guidance for the academic development of its members. It is also to put significant effort in adequate dissemination of scientific information to wider public. The first experiences (the Europe Day and EXIT festival) proved that the RFs could become highly qualified educators, primarily for the young generation, whose information processing style they can easily cope with. This will be particularly important in production of publications and broadcasting materials, specially designed to attract and inform ‘generation Y’.

Depending on their academic progress, it is reasonable to expect that some of the RFs may continue their careers at high education institutions in Serbia, which lack both staff, literature and expertise for the delivering of high quality security studies courses.⁶⁸ For the CCMR, “the best case scenario” would bring long-term self-sustainability, as an independent institution which would permanently contribute to the public oversight of the security sector in Serbia. Finally, through different multiplying mechanisms (the School’s magazine, regional networking), the impact of the BSSS may spread over the national borders.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ For details, browse sections Books, Analyses, Results at the www.ccmr-bg.org.

⁶⁸ Ejđus, Filip “Do Educational Infrastructures in Serbia Meet the Needs for New Generations of Security Specialists?”, paper presented at the “Safer Balkans Network”, conference organized by the BSSS/CCMR, Fruška Gora, June 22-24 2006.

⁶⁹ According to the statement of a donor’s representative, a request of “establishing the Belgrade School of Security Studies in Skopje was already received”.

Education and Research of Security Issues in Republic of Croatia¹

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Ana Hruškovec

UDK: 378.6:355(497.5)"1975/..."

Abstract

The system of education and research of security issues of Croatia has been constantly changing between 1990. and 2006, throughout several development stages. At that time, the conditions have been developing gradually to form the system of military education and research inside the Croatian defense system. The Program CADET indicates that Croatia has chosen the system of military education that would represent a combination of military and civil education. Changes that took place on Faculty of political science in Zagreb represented the foundation for the modern security studies. That was considered necessary because of an obvious need for that kind of professionals, not just in a defense system and other departments of state government, but also outside that area (in Parliament, media, NGO-s etc.)

Key words: education and research of security issues, education of officers, project CADET

Defense and Security Course 1975 – 1994

The first research of security issues in Croatia took place under the Defense and security course in 1975. at the Faculty of political science, University of Zagreb, whose first head was dr. Nedeljko Rendulić. That was the result of the ideological assumption that the defense of the country and its political system was not only the task of the army but the whole nation;

The authors are postgraduate students at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb

¹ This paper is made with mentorship of Siniša Tatalović, professor on Faculty of political science University of Zagreb



therefore, the education of experts for that field should be entrusted to civilian institutions.

The course was terminated in 1992 because of its association with the ideological concept of defence and society that had not led to the ideologically proclaimed “socialization of defence” but had threatened with the militarization of the society. It seems, however, that the decision to abort this course was not based exclusively on scientific concerns. The arguments by the professors of the FPS stated that, in the last two decades, the Course had largely dropped its original ideological character and should be, therefore, transformed into the course of national security (course equivalent to security studies in western democratic states).

The need for the Course of National Security in democratic systems soon became obvious. This study has again been envisaged through the Faculty’s new curriculum, and the Course will be taught by the graduates of the Course for Defense and Protection.

Education and Research of Security Development 1990– 2000

During the war, in the 1990-s, the education of armed forces’ personnel was organized within the Armed forces by founding of The Croatian military college and The Centre for strategic studies that operated between 1992-1996. on the matters of defense and security. The Institute for defense studies was founded in the 1995. Also, after The Centre for strategic studies ceased to exist, The Military-technical council started to work, among other issues, on the research security issues related to the corporation with civilian institutions.

In 1997 The Institute for defense studies, research and development started to work with extremely extensive conception which deals with all matters of defense. It was founded as a successor of Military-technical council for the purpose of conducting applied and development research.

Besides realization of its own research and development programs, Institute provides realization of projects by using Croatian scientific and research institutions. Approximately 70% of scientists and researchers from other institutions, mostly electro-technicians and mechanical engineers, are

engaged in the Institute projects. There is a certain cooperation with Croatian MoD and the boards of General Headquarter of Armed Forces which connects the user, the client, and the performer.

The Institute represents a core of scientific and research work in MoD and General Headquarter of Armed Forces. There were many achievements in the area of guided missile systems, human resources management, modelling of armed combat and analytic support in managing complex organizational systems. Therefore, the Institute bears a great significance for future organization and guiding of research and scientific work as well as for the staff-training and delivering the knowledge necessary for defense. It is assumed that the Institute resources were sufficient for financing the important research, development and production capacities for the future period. Forty young people, educated for work at the Institute, are currently employed at the Institute. The idea of education was abandoned because of the lack of finances. In 2002 the Institute and Department of Defense were transformed into The Institute for research and development of defense systems, which deals with technical and scientific fields of research. The social component of the defense system research came under the authority of the Directorate of defense policy, within which the Direction for defense research should have been formed; however, that has never actually happen.

This situation implied that research from the field of military technology was emphasized within the defense system, while the fields of theoretical research, defense system analyses, and strategic studies were neglected.

The Changes at the Faculty of Political Science after 2001

Between 1995 and 2002, the courses named *International security* and *Political geography and geopolitics* were organized within the stream A: *International politics and diplomacy*.

In 2001, the idea of education and research of security issues was reconsidered at the Faculty of political science, as a part of undergraduate study, under the stream B, named *National security*.



The course Basics of National security was organized within the B-stream on the third year with a purpose of study the basics of national security, processes and mechanisms of security in the society and the state, as well as the basics of the Croatian national security.

The content of the course implies the following topics: the meaning and the content of security, national security, national values, interests and goals, correlation between human rights and national security, sources and forms of threat to national security, systems of national security, security institutions and processes and Croatian national security.

The courses Politics of national security, and European security, were organized within the B-stream, on the fourth year.

Politics of national security deals with the study of factors of politics of national security processes of forming, development and implementation of politics of national security, and Croatian politics of national security. The content of the course implies the topics such as: determination of politics of national security within political science, fashioning the politics of national security for the purposes of development, strategies of national security, strategies of defense and military, implementation of the politics of national security, civil and military relations, transparency of defense system, and national security.

The European security course is devoted to the research of the European models of security, institutions of European security and European security processes. The content of the course implies the analysis of the European political space and foundation of European security, common values, interests and goals, European North and South with their differences and similarities, European East and European West with their distinctive and common features of security and defense policy, European security architecture, peacekeeping operations in Europe, Croatian and European perspective in security and defense integrations.

The course *International politics and diplomacy* is the study of security issues organized within the A-stream on the fourth year. The course *National and international security* is organized with it with the aim to investigate the following subjects: the phenomenon of national and international security, security on the national state level, security on the international level, regional and global approach to security, conceptual determination of security, process of national and

international security institutionalization, system of all defense modes (national, preventive, deterrent, universal...), system of international security, regional security organizations and processes, and Croatian national security.

Postgraduate Study

Until the implementation of Bologna declaration, the security issues were studied within the course of three undergraduate studies: the course National and International security, within the postgraduate study *International relations*, Comparative systems of national security, within the postgraduate study *Comparative politics* and Croatian national security, within the postgraduate study *Croatian political system and management*.

Today, the reorganization of the University, that comes along with the Bologna declaration, assumes the transitional doctoral studies with some programmes addressing the issues of national security.

In 2004, the government ratified the Law about the changes and remarks for the High Education and Scientific Development Law. According to the Article 25, the University may organize postgraduate specialist studies lasting 1 to 2 years, after which a student becomes a specialist for a certain area (spec.). According to the demands of the Law, a legal background is being created for the needs of army and police. The goal of this Law is to raise the level of education as highly as possible throughout the following mechanisms:

1. Professors are to be elected according to the strictly regulated procedures, which implies constant re-elections and the extensive scientific work
2. The program of education must be verified by the National council for science.

By such law enforcement, the election of professors wouldn't be internal, which means that it would be verified by the system of national verification, not the verification of the local authority.

Following the academic year 2006/2007, a new postgraduate study will be implemented into the new reformed postgraduate curriculum, including the courses: *Contemporary security politics*, *Security sector control*, *Crisis management*, *Croatia in the European security architecture* and *Military*



and war history. Students will be obligated to choose one course from the postgraduate studies *International relations*, and one more elective course from other postgraduate studies.


Education of Officers in the General Headquarters of Armed Forces

The professional training of officers is based on 4 levels of education:

1. Basic education of the officers,
2. Advanced education of the officers,
3. Command-Staff College,
4. War College.

The Joint Education and Training Command was structured under the direct command of the General Staff. Its administrative and executive part has the following key- tasks: ²

- Implementing of the intraservice education and training of officers and NCOs
- Proposal and elaboration of the joint doctrine of the Armed Forces
- Taking part in setting unified standards and criteria for education and training in the Armed Forces
- Making instructions for education and training



² From: http://www.morh.hr/osrh/data/zzio_en.html

The Joint Training and Education Command conducts joint training in the obtaining of expert military knowledge at higher levels (Command-Staff and War colleges, the operative strategic simulation centre and higher NCO school) as well as specific knowledge (foreign languages, military-diplomatic education). All CAF branches have their own training and education commands for specific branch training and education of individuals and units.

The development model for NCOs is based on a selection of the most successful and best quality soldiers that are to be sent for education and promoted to NCOs. Following the basic training, they will be sent for a specialist training in order to gain skills and knowledge in a specific military activity, then to join their units. Having gained required skills, knowledge and experience, based on the evaluation of their success as the main selection criteria, NCOs qualify for training and education in higher NCO positions. Besides regular training, this model also encompasses specialist courses for specific military duties as well as tactical and technical capabilities enhancement, which will be supplemented with further NCO education at the highest NCO educational level.

One of the most important priorities of the training and education in the CAF is the learning of foreign languages, a key-aspect of interoperability with NATO, which is to be conducted by the Foreign Languages School. The School has the departments of the English, German, French and Italian languages. Classes are held at the central school in Zagreb, as well as in the two separate sections in Split and Osijek. The Centre for Individual Learning of Foreign Languages has also been established within the school. The school emphasizes the preparation of candidates for further education and training, as well as for participation in peace operations abroad. Foreign language education is partly conducted through the education of personnel abroad.³

Project CADET

Higher education in Croatia is organized at the faculties and colleges within or outside the Universities and community colleges. Educational plans and programmes are structured according to the needs of specific professions that students are trained for. Most of the higher education programmes are struc-

³ From: <http://www.morh.hr/katalog/documents/OSCE%20WD99%20-%20CROATIA%202006.pdf>



tured according to the following distribution of educational courses: common obligatory core courses (60%), elective courses (30%) and optional courses (10%).

The Project CADET is a model of civil and military education. It offers the scholarships for cadets available from the first year of study, implemented military and educational modules, military camps necessary for the training of cadets, and programme of education adjusted to the needs of all three branches of Armed Forces.

The Project CADET includes the education of students (i.e., cadets) for the needs of all three branches of Armed Forces (navy, aviation and army). The project of education, conducted at the civil faculties and founded with the goal of reaching transparency and openness of the system, has the main purpose of gaining an appropriate civilian degree that will help the officer in the civil career after the career in the military.

This Project provides the opportunity of education to all interested candidates, according to the needs of Croatian Armed Forces. andwith implemented military modules.⁴ There is a quota of specialized courses that cadets are obliged to take instead of standard elective courses (although this is not yet a part of cadet education), with provided accommodation and food within the military facilities. After graduation, the cadets become officers of the Armed Forces allocated within the Armed Forces for the purpose of duty holding.

During the study, cadets are accommodated within the military objects and they attend their faculties with all the obligations that are arising from their regular student status. Nevertheless, with all these academic obligations, students are obligated to attend various training programs that are organized by the army. During the summer and winter breaks, they attend the camps in which they must adopt basic military skills and knowledge related to: physical training, self-orientation, handling and maintaining weapons, military communication, warcraft skills, commanding skills, driving motor vehicles, parachute training, skiing, swimming, and sailing (all depending on a branch orientation).

The Project CADET takes place at the University of Zagreb and the University of Split including many Faculties.⁵

Recruitment conditions for the interested candidates:

- Croatian nationality
- Born in 1985. or later
- Enrolled regularly in the 1st year
- Fulfilments of psychological and medical criteria

⁴ Universal military module consists from 5 obligatory courses (Military history, Comparative defense systems, Managing and guidance in military organization, Military geography, Military psychology) and one elective course (Contemporary combat systems, Military law or Military sociology)

⁵ List of the Faculties at the University of Zagreb and University of Split involved in Programme CADET (on the grounds of announced vacancies in daily newspaper on 14th January 2005.).

I. UNIVERSITY OF ZAGREB

Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Naval Architecture, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing, Faculty of Chemical Engineering and Technology, Faculty of Economic Science, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, (engineering orientation – mathematics, physics, geophysics, geology), Faculty of Geodesy, Faculty of Civil Engineering, Faculty of Traffic Engineering (orientation – road traffic, postal and teletraffic, airtraffic, aeronautics, military pilot), Faculty of Food Technology and Biotechnology, Faculty of Philosophy – Study of Psychology and Study of Information Science, Faculty of Political Science, Catholic Faculty of Theology

II. UNIVERSITY OF SPLIT

Faculty of Maritime Studies, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering and Naval Architecture, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics and Educational Areas, Faculty of Chemical Technology, Catholic Faculty of Theology, Faculty of Economic Science, Catholic Faculty of Theology

- Fulfilments of security requirements
- Proper results from examination for recruits (for males only)

During their study, MoD is obligated to, on its own expense, provide the housing for the cadets in the army facilities. The housing conditions have to be of high quality and congruent to the standards of well-equipped student dormitory.

Cadets from the University of Zagreb are housed in Črnomerec, a newly furnished facility of the Croatian military college in the barracks Lora. Each cadet is accommodated in a single room with a PC.

Other contractual obligations of the MoD towards the cadet include: 4 organized meals (breakfast, lunch, snack, dinner); urban transport; transport to the place of residence twice per year; textbooks and stationery; sports equipment; use of sport facilities inside the army objects; monthly scholarship payment until the end of the studying (scholarship is presumed as a future salary because the MoD, through the scholarship contract, obligates the cadets for working for them after graduation).

After the basic officer training, (all cadets are obligated to attend this training after graduation) and according to the branch and profession, each cadet gains a rank of lieutenant and is allocated at basic officer duty as lieutenant. As an officer, he performs the duties of a platoon commander for a few years and afterwards is appointed to a higher level of military training.

According to this model, he generates conditions for continuing his professional development, meaning, he strives to coordinate his professional duties with the higher education related duties. Certain advantage and a motivation factor is a great opportunity for the further education and career improvement, including working abroad. Croatia, as a future NATO candidate, will be able to count on the different places and positions in the NATO command, regional headquarters, military missions in foreign countries etc.

After the basic education through the Project CADET, Cadets have right and obligation, as well as the other members of the MoD and the Croatian Army, to pursue various kinds of specialization through the various forms of military and civil education in Croatia and abroad. That will provide them with the possibilities for professional development and career promotion.



As regarding of the issue of housing, the cadets will have, just as the other members of Croatian Army, the equal possibilities through favourable credits, official residences etc.

With the beginning of systematic education for the purpose of the Croatian Army, there will be finally resolved dilemma about whether Croatia needs a military academy. Croatia, as it seems, gave up from that kind of military education. There is a general opinion on Krešimir Square⁶ that the military academy, by educating only professional soldiers, would additionally burden military budget, while its students would be deprived from other, civil knowledge and qualifications.

MoD announced the call for scholarships for the 1st year graduates through the Project CADET for academic year 2006/2007. According to the needs of MoD and the Croatian Army, MoD will this year accept the maximum of 70 candidates for the Project CADET, and everybody who enrolls in the 6 already mentioned courses at the University of Zagreb or the University of Split can compete for this scholarship.

Candidates that are admitted into the scholarship programme will be the 4th generation to be educated within the Project CADET, which means assured housing, meals, textbooks and financial assistance by the MoD.

A scholarship user is to sign a contract and the MoD is to relieve him from the military service. In return, cadet is required to stay in the army twice the time of his education (eight to ten years). According to some evaluations, approximately 40 000 E per cadet will be spent from military budget for housing costs and education.

That means that after his graduation, cadet will enter into the Croatian Army with a rank of lieutenant and a faculty degree. Beside the chance of promotion up to the rank of general, cadet can also easily find employment inside the civil system, thanks to his civil degree.

Interest for Military Education

According to the current survey⁷ on official MoD web-site, 67% of the Internet users declared themselves as interested in getting military scholarship for civil education. The idea of the MoD is to fulfil requirements for qualified personnel by giving scholarships for the military (Project CADET) and civil education.

⁶ Adrese of Croatian MoD

⁷ June 2006.

Conclusion

The changes occurred a few years ago in the area of education and research inside the Croatian defense system imply that the foundations were set for further development of military education in Croatia.

In the area of educating civil experts for the security and defense matters, changes that were made at the Faculty of Political Science represent the first step in creating modern security studies. Experience from the past sixteen years shows that the decision of banning the Study of defense and protection was a great mistake, not only because the education of the civil experts for that area had stopped, but the ongoing scientific work in that area was also terminated. That was noted also by the foreign specialist. One of the objections which was appointed not only from the NATO representatives but also from the independent researchers from that area, was the absence of civilian experts for the field of security and defense.

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Officer Education in Serbia: Balancing Tradition with Modernity*

Amadeo Watkins¹

UDK: 355.231(497.11)

Abstract

This short paper is designed to address key aspects regarding military educational reform in Serbia and thus aid any decision making process on this subject. It argues that military education is only one segment of the overall personnel management system, especially when a professional all-volunteer force is in question. Both the past and the present place pressures on the current decision-makers to make hard decisions relating to this complex issue, but these can not be avoided any longer.

Key words: military education, civil-military model of education, personnel management system, continuous career development, Military High School, Defence University, Institute for Strategic Research, military-security related publications

There is no doubt that Serbia has lots of history and pride in its officer education system, with origins dating back as far back as 1850. This paper does not question this statement. To the contrary, it aims to reinforce and build upon it using a realistic approach, taking into account all relevant parameters. It accepts that reform is a process and that in order for Serbia to continue to provide a modern and efficient education model to its officers – one with which it will create a proud and effective officer core - there is a constant need to refresh and re-evaluate achieved standards and methods in this field. **Accepting the past and the present introduces one new constant to the debate which has to date been lacking in the overall process: cost-efficiency.**

¹ At the time when this article was made, the author was the Assistant Cluster Director for Security & Organisational Reform at the Advanced Research & Assessment Group, UK Defence Academy, UK Ministry of Defence.

Before going into the details, it is important to highlight one issue. In its reform processes, Serbia is no different from other countries in the region in the challenges it faces. Many of the problems were and still are common throughout the region and beyond, including reforming military education. As a post-conflict and transition country many legacies prevail and have not been addressed in an appropriate manner over the past 5 or so years. At the strategic level it is the question of the lack of will and capacity as well as the never ending question of resources. Lower down the scale it



relates to the need to address the past with the present – tradition, pride and desires against the very limited resources and realistic needs.

There is no doubt that education of the future generation of officers is of strategic importance to Serbia's Armed Forces. **This paper argues that military education is the pillar of ongoing military reforms**, influencing personnel factors such as morale, recruitment and retention as well as more strategic issues such as defence diplomacy and foreign policy and ultimately civil-military relations within a country, the last of which must not be neglected as the military



strives towards professionalisation and ceases to be a secretive system within the state.

For example, unless the education system provides a quality output it will negatively affect the recruitment of the next generation of officers who will not be interested in a career after which they will have little prospects – especially in an all-volunteer professional military. As previous years have shown the lack of adequate reform has already had severe impact on military recruitment in Serbia with only a handful of applicants applying to the Military Academy last year. Experience shows that increasing salaries as a way to address this issue is not appropriate and will only damage long-term efforts at building a quality armed force with positive civil-military relations. Reasoning for this is simple: as professional military officers do not expect to spend their entire working lives in the military, civilian orientated (transferable) skills are an important element in any recruitment initiatives. Thus it is the opportunity to acquire such skills, rather than the salary alone, that encourages people to become officers. Moreover, the military as just one employer on the overall employment market has never been able to offer competitive salaries compared to the civilian market.

For all these reasons, small countries are ideally served with a civil-military model of education. Such a model offers a very cost-efficient and sustainable solution to many of the issues mentioned above. **It is suggested Serbia also adopts this model on a lessons-learned principle, although the importance of the historical aspect justifies the creation of a 9 month to 1 year Military Academy for new cadets having completed a basic level of academically accredited education.** The adoption of such a model would over the medium to long term provide the basic conditions for the development of a regional aspect to military education in which other neighbouring countries might consider participating.

In addressing the issue of military education in a satisfactory and cost-efficient manner there is a need to look at the question from a strategic perspective. It is important to note that education does not exist to serve its own purpose.

Those thinking about this sector need to answer the simple question: why do we have military education – what purpose does it aim to achieve and for whom? In other words, thinking should answer the question: what type of future officer do we require and how does education- fit into this, rather than simply saying: this is what we have, lets see how we can mould it into some kind of military educational model.

The current documents, such as the SDR, can only serve as an overall guide to reform initiatives and do not enter the subject area in sufficient detail to enable guidance to reform in this specialist and complex area. A more focused study is needed looking at the medium to long term with objectives, challenges and possible solutions presented with a cost-efficient denominator. Answers to burning questions need to be provided and current ad-hoc activities be replaced by a coherent strategic approach.

Specifically, military education must be focused on future needs and modern practices, based not only on academic but also operational experiences. Mistakes from the past must be avoided, especially with regards to education for the sake of ‘status’. Focus must be given to security rather than defence, in line with development on the global scene. Euro-Atlantic integration, not only as a strategic policy orientation of the country, but also as a global security factor, must be given space on the curriculum as must more focus be placed on higher level English Language training. Overall, focus must be given to a modular concept based on active rather than passive educational models, especially at the higher levels of education. This can only be achieved to a desirable standard if there is a benchmarking-evaluation system with regards the military educational staff.

The identification of personnel as a key component of a personnel management system is vital for any country that strives to develop a quality defence capability. This paper has made it clear that education is a fundamental element in the success of this system. In today’s complex world, professional development is based on three supporting models: institutional and operational development as well as self-development, all of which are part of a long-term and con-



tinuous career development effort. It is vital that the personnel management system implemented by the Ministry of Defence in Serbia works towards enabling the domestic military educational establishments to offer all three models of education to its personnel. An obvious way forward would be a Training and Education Needs Analysis, which would inform the above mentioned debate. Again, the desire to have an all volunteer professional force structure only reinforces this requirement.

Related to this is the role of international assistance in the whole process, which is important for two reasons. First, by entering the 'Euro-Atlantic process' new models and thinking is required and it is normal that foreign assistance is required. In this light, in addition to the bilateral assistance programmes, the NATO Defence Reform Group concept is a very desirable tool to steer and coordinate the various bilateral and multilateral efforts in this respect. The fact that military education is planned to be part of Serbia's Presentation Document to the Alliance can only aid this process. Furthermore, if Serbia is to catch up lost time, something that is a realistic requirement, then not only is this foreign expertise a requirement, but more importantly is the experience and lessons learned. No country has all had a problem-free reform process and has all the knowledge to advance reforms, even the best regarded among European countries.

For all these reasons current military decision-makers in Serbia face an enormous challenge, especially in terms of making difficult decisions sooner rather than later. Primary obstacles to date are very clear: lack of political will, lack of sufficient understanding and knowledge on how to approach the subject with a long-term vision in mind and fundamentally resistance to the adoption of a new set of values throughout the system.

Looking at the details of military education in Serbia the first observation is the overall size of the current military educational establishment. In terms of requirements, there is no doubt the current system is over-sized despite the 'ongoing' reform efforts, including a reported 30 percent reduction in size. Moreover, in terms of thinking it is still

largely dominated by the shadow of the former ‘Yugoslav’ model. As such it is not functional and can not meet desired outcomes. When I say functional, I mean it does not provide value for money – it does not serve the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence and ultimately the society of which it is part effectively and efficiently.

Looking at this from another perspective an oversized military educational establishment directly affects the educational model being utilised, including educational methodology at one end and the lack of qualified lecturers at the other end of the spectrum. In the case of Serbia, it is clear that it has not changed at a pace that corresponds to strategic changes that have occurred both at the global and the regional level, such as the end of the Cold War and the corresponding shrinking in military spending, as well as new security challenges and roles of armed forces. In other words, **the very system that should be leading the way forward still very much relies on the outdated model, hence driving the future military backwards.**

The aspiration to create a Defence University to meet perceived Serbia’s requirements can appear to offer advantages. However, the argumentation which has been put forward does not seem to justify the development of such a model, which only a select few countries can afford to maintain to a required standard. Such an option would take a long time to implement and would be extremely costly while at the same time would not offer the desired output along the lines described above. **In other words, Serbia does not have the resources to implement this model, which would only offer short term ‘private’ and ‘social’ benefit at the expense of the new generations of military personnel.** In reality, it would only reinforce the outdated model of thinking, hidden behind a new curtain. Furthermore, the system offering double degrees, while recognised as transitional, makes little sense. On the one side it recognises the benefits of a civilian academic qualification to officer career development and transferable skills. However, with this it simultaneously negates the requirement for the current military educational model as a costly duplication.

Justification for continuing the Military High School is also not clear and is based on the argumentation that it sig-



nificantly contributes to the recruitment of future officers. However, committing youngsters and their families (mostly from underdeveloped regions with poor incomes) is not a favourable arrangement. If this is the main concern, a much more cost effective and logical argument, and one which is being considered even in the UK, is increasing the level of military scholarships for potential future military cadets.

The educational system should serve as *a centre of excellence in military thinking*. Together with an effective research and analytical capacity, based on a versatile and open model, it should help spearhead reforms and thinking in the military and beyond as the country moves towards 'Euro-Atlantic' integration, requiring input from numerous other government bodies. As such the newly revitalized Institute for Strategic Research should be the prime instrument within the system to advance such a process and help policy decision-making directly if correctly structured and implemented. This can only be achieved if the Institute is granted academic freedom that will serve as an expert counterweight to those structures within the MOD tasked more directly to formulate policy. The implementation of such a process will clearly show the maturity and seriousness of reform initiatives which can absorb and learn even from critical analysis within the system, as well as those that will be always present from the civil society at large, mostly in the form of NGOs.

Last but not least is the issue of military-security related publications, which is currently confused and costly, not offering a quality and up to date insight to foster debate and information-sharing at various levels, and last but not least should serve as a link towards the society as a whole. Ultimately, these will need to be streamlined and outputs based on the same questions raised above: what purpose do these publications serve, who is the realistic audience. In other words, what is the cost-efficiency factor.

Conclusion: The Way Forward

I like to take the long term view and conclude that eventually there will be no invention of hot water on this nor any other matter related to defence reform, including military

education. Many countries have tried and failed in implementing a third way. The question for Serbia is will it learn from these mistakes - including those in the UK - and cut 'experimentation' costs. At this practical level, even if one does not accept all the facts presented above, at the level of *realpolitik* Serbia can simply not maintain the current system for lack of financial resources.

Tradition needs to be valued but at the same time new and hard decisions need to be made in a timely manner that are based on the present and future. This is especially true when one considers that fact that currently there is a problem in realistically accepting the past and the present. Ultimately, there is no escape from this reality and political maturity and consensus must support this. The British Armed Forces, more than any in the world, know this very well, with many historic regiments with strong local traditions dating back hundred of years being amalgamated and no longer in existence. Simultaneously, up to date operational experience from various 'combat' zones is directly being fed into educational modes bringing valuable experience to the purely academic efforts, ultimately not only contributing to foreign policy objectives but more importantly saving lives.

Serbia is not being asked to do something that nobody has ever done before. Quite the opposite, it is being asked to remember the past and periods of self-initiative with reforms such as SNAGA, DRVAR 1 & 2 and RUDO. Furthermore it is being asked to remember its past role and relations with the West, especially during the 1920-30s and international bodies, such as the UN during the post-1945 period. A strategic vision is also not something new as the passing of the document *Strategija oružane borbe* dates back to 1973 and again 1983. All this shows there is historical precedent to support ongoing efforts.

As noted above, any reform of this sector needs to take a strategic long-term perspective, not only relating to a long-term approach, but also being all encompassing, addressing the whole model from the Military High School to the War College. Once a strategic model is developed, various lower level projects that feed into the model can be



implemented and developed. The end product should ideally be a “re-branded” military educational model based on the recognition that the military is just another employer competing on the market to attract the very best towards building a bright future and quality armed forces for Serbia. The ‘social’ model should be replaced by a more cost-efficient model.

All factors considered, education is the best and possibly only investment in the future that can ensure a quality Armed Force that will return to its long lost and sought glory.

**This paper is based on the Authors direct experience in SSR, and sepcifically miliary educational reform, during the past 5 years in the Balkans. The views expressed in this paper are of the Author alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the UK Ministry of Defence or any other part of HMG.*

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1. <http://consortium.pims.org/>
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327.56 (497)

WESTERN Balkans Security Observer :
journal of the Belgrade School of Security
Studies / editor-in-chief Miroslav Hadžić.
Belgrade (Gundulićev venac 48) : Centre for
Civil-Military Relations, 2007 – (Beograd
: Goragraf). - 24 cm

. - Ima izdanje na drugom jeziku:
Bezbednost Zapadnog Balkana = ISSN
1452-6050
ISSN 1452-6115 = Western Balkans Security
Observer
COBISS.SR – ID 132633356

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