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The fortieth annual IPI Vienna Seminar was held on May 16-18, 2010, at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. Discussions focused on the potential for renewed and expanded partnerships that respond more effectively to peace and security challenges. Participants included peacekeeping experts, academics, and officials from the United Nations, African Union (AU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and European Union (EU), among others.

The seminar was held under the Chatham House Rule of nonattribution. This meeting note, drafted by Adam C. Smith of IPI, represents the *rapporteur's* interpretation of discussions during the seminar and does not necessarily represent the views of all participants.

2010 Vienna Seminar: UN Peacekeeping in the 21st Century—Partnerships for Peace

The objectives of the 2010 IPI Vienna Seminar were to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of existing multilateral partnerships in specific aspects of peace operations, such as civilian protection, police and civilian expertise, and the transition from early recovery to long-term peacebuilding; to identify ways of strengthening partnerships among the UN, the AU, NATO, the OSCE, the EU, and other organizations, as well as among major stakeholders at the UN; and to facilitate the transfer of ideas, experience, and best practices in peace operations between the UN and other peacekeeping and peacebuilding actors, such as member states and nongovernmental organizations.

Background

On the Vienna Seminar's fortieth anniversary in 2010, the typical UN peace operation bore little resemblance to the first UN peace operation in 1948. Both the size and scope of such missions have increased dramatically in the intervening years. At the same time, the community of peacekeeping actors has multiplied. The expanding group of actors that lead or play operational roles in peace operations includes regional and subregional organizations, individual member states, nongovernmental organizations, and, increasingly, actors from the private sector.

The presence of more and more actors in the peacekeeping sphere would seem to indicate that there is more political will—and perhaps adequate burden-sharing—set to the task of peacekeeping. Yet, by most accounts, the resources for peace operations (troops, equipment, financing, expert personnel, and diplomatic pressure) still fall short of what is needed to accomplish the ambitious goals of twenty-first-century peace operations.¹ Given the rise in the number of peacekeepers deployed around the world (540,000 at the end of 2010),² it would be hard to say that the political will to *do* peacekeeping is lacking; however, authorizing a mission and deploying peacekeepers do not mean that there is sufficient will to make peacekeeping *succeed*. Political will is more meaningfully measured when states are faced with hard decisions and choose to put in the diplomatic effort and resources to make peacekeepers successful. It is no secret that the missions in Darfur have also been consistently, and perhaps terminally, underresourced.³

1 The “peacekeeping in crisis” theme is a perennial one in peacekeeping literature. For recent examples, see Bruce Jones, “Peacekeeping in Crisis? Confronting the Challenges Ahead,” *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 154, No. 5 (October 2009); and Richard Gowan, “The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006-2008,” *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 4 (2008): 453-469.

2 Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2010* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010).

3 Three years after UNAMID's initial deployment, the very modest (relative to the large size of the operating theater) troop authorization of 19,555 has yet to be met. In addition, according to the December 2010 DPKO capabilities gap lists, at the end of 2010 the mission still lacked, *inter alia*, eighteen military utility helicopters; a fixed wing recce squadron; armored personnel carriers (APCs), and pick-up for the formed police units (FPUs).

The UN's experience in Sudan also illustrates the changing nature of contemporary conflict, and the fact that such trends have complicated, or will complicate, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. Those trends include (1) the shift from interstate to intrastate armed conflict, which continues to exacerbate state fragility and retard the development of state capacities; (2) increasing demand for (and potential conflict over) clean water and fertile land as a result of climate change and environmental degradation; and (3) the systematic targeting of civilians, a challenge described in detail below. The combined effect of these trends hints at an ever more complex landscape in which peace operations will have to operate.

The lack of resources for peacekeeping, combined with a growing operational burden on the peacekeeping system (i.e., more missions with more people doing more tasks), create the need for partnerships and burden-sharing in today's peace operations at virtually every level of engagement and in every operational environment. However, the changing nature of conflict and the difficulties encountered by UNAMID also illustrate that the need is not just for partnerships, but rather for highly productive, rational, and predictable partnerships.⁴

As the planners of UNAMID would agree, creating such partnerships is no simple task, and sometimes (perhaps in Darfur) is not even possible. Organizations, member states, and other institutions involved in peace operations have unique cultures, expertise, and sets of resources—not to mention visions, goals, and procedures—that are often distinct. Aligning organizations under a single vision is challenging enough. Agreeing on a method of implementation, ensuring a clear line of command and control, preventing duplication of effort, and avoiding critical capability gaps all continue to prove particularly vexing.

The United Nations has only recently improved the coordination of its own various internal components, through integrated missions in the field and integrated planning and support mechanisms at headquarters.⁵ However, partnership with individual or groups of member states (regional organizations or “coalitions of the willing”) that bring their own pots of resources, capacities, and interests to the cause is a much more complicated matter. The ideal roles (based on comparative advantage) of regional and subregional organizations are only starting to be understood and will likely change from one context to another. In addition, effective partnership with civil society on peacebuilding and humanitarian affairs is critical to the long-term success of a peacekeeping mission, but this partnership is often constrained by differences in mandates and methods, as well as the very real challenge of coordination among so many actors.

The focus of the fortieth IPI Vienna Seminar was to bring together the UN and key partners to better identify the root of these partnership challenges, as well as how to overcome them in order to leverage the important contributions of all peacekeeping actors and better support the path toward long-term, sustainable peace in postconflict and fragile states.

The Essential Partnership: Host Countries, the Security Council, the Secretariat, and Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries

The tenuous four-way partnership among host countries, the Security Council, the Secretariat, and troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs) is essential not only to the effectiveness of current peacekeeping efforts, but also to the

4 For more on the increasing complexity of peace operations, see Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds., “Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges of UN Peace Operations,” New York: International Peace Institute, July 2009.

5 These mechanisms include the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) and the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs). The IMPP is “a planning process that engages the capacities of all parts of the UN System relevant to achieving impact in a given country setting... It aims to ensure that the right people are at the table, that the right issues are being considered, and that the appropriate authorities and accountabilities are in place to motivate flexible, creative, and integrated strategic and operational thinking and planning.” See United Nations, “Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General,” June 13, 2006, available at www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/FN/Multidimensional%20and%20Integrated/06_DPKO_IMPP_final_.pdf. On the day-to-day side, the IOTs “incorporate political, military, police, specialist civilian, logistics, financial and personnel expertise. The teams will be supported by functional expertise to deliver substantive and support tasks.” See United Nations, *Overview of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Doc. A/60/696, February 24, 2006.

History of the IPI Vienna Seminar

The beautiful hall of the Austrian National Defence Academy was the site of the opening session of the fortieth IPI Vienna Seminar on “UN Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century: Partnerships for Peace.” The year 2010 marked the fortieth anniversary of the International Peace Institute (established as the International Peace Academy [IPA]), as well as forty years of successful collaboration with the Austrian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the Diplomatic and National Defence Academies in Vienna.

The original idea for the Vienna seminar came about in 1970, born of a desire to provide a forum for exchanging ideas and expertise in peacemaking and peacekeeping. It was guided by the vision of IPA's founding President, Indian Major General Indarjit Rikhye, one of the first force commanders of a UN peacekeeping mission, and later military adviser to Secretaries-General Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant. In choosing a site for IPA's training programs, General Rikhye looked for a non-aligned host country with significant interest in the international process of conflict resolution. His final choice was Austria and the Diplomatic and Defence Academies in Vienna, which agreed to sponsor an annual training seminar on conflict resolution and peacekeeping. However, it was Kurt Waldheim, an Austrian diplomat at the time, who gave the green light for the establishment of the seminar. Over the past forty years, the Vienna Seminar has evolved to become a dynamic platform for policy dialogue on emerging peace and security challenges and the role of the multilateral system in addressing them.



Participants in the first Vienna Seminar, July 1970.

long-term sustainability of peacekeeping. The UN peacekeeping system simply cannot function without the consent and participation of all four parties. Unfortunately, major sources of tension exist within this relationship.

Over the last decade, as the UN Security Council authorized more deployments of blue helmets and adopted increasingly ambitious mandates, the demands put on UN Secretariat, TCCs, and PCCs continued to grow. This has strained the capacity of UN staff at headquarters and in the field, and has exacerbated a rift between some members of the Council and many of the larger troop- and police-contributing countries. So-called “robust” peacekeeping mandates have been at the center of an ongoing debate between members of the Council concerned about confronting spoilers and protecting civilians, and the TCCs concerned about the danger to their troops and the realistic prospects for success. At the same time, states that host peacekeeping operations (both governments and their citizens) have bristled at the wide scope of activity—and the seemingly endless presence—of peacekeepers. Arguably at no point in recent memory has the tension over the role of UN peacekeepers been more evident than in 2009-2010 when the governments of Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo all requested the departure of UN peacekeeping forces.

The relationship among the Security Council, the Secretariat, the TCCs and PCCs, and the host country is defined in large part by the mandates that authorize peacekeeping deployments. As such, the *process* by which the Council members—informed by the Secretariat and in consultation with TCCs and PCCs and the host country—draft those mandates is critically important, and has been the subject of the Council’s own debates.⁶ While the relationship between the Secretariat and the Council was clarified and improved by implementation of the well-known recommendation of the 2000 *Brahimi Report* (i.e., that the Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear), there has yet to be such a seminal moment for TCCs and

PCCs or host countries regarding their role in Council deliberations.⁷

Arguably, the tension among these partners is inherent; the members of the Security Council often have different aims than those of host governments or they want to employ different methods than do the TCCs and PCCs. The pessimistic view is that such differences are unavoidable and perhaps even intractable. There is hope, however, that the differences at least can be narrowed through improved and increased consultations and more inclusive working methods of the Council. The May 2010 resolution of the dispute between the Kabila government and the Council (in which the mandate and name of MONUC were revised to prevent the mission’s expulsion⁸) provides some hope in this regard. The disappointing outcome of negotiations over the future of the UN mission in Chad (MINURCAT), on the other hand, proved there is still more work to be done.

In addition, certain adjustments to the working methods of the Council have recently been attempted to address some concerns of TCCs and PCCs. These include moving debates on mandate renewal forward, so as to allow adequate time for the views of TCCs to influence the mandate’s substance, as well as the increased use of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations as a forum for Council member-TCC/PCC discussion. In 2009, the Working Group had as a particular focus “the improvement of the mechanisms for consultations with troop-contributing countries, police-contributing countries, and other stakeholders.”⁹ Regular meetings of the Working Group were held throughout 2009 and 2010, and the transition to a new chair for 2011, one that is also a major TCC (Nigeria), might be cause for further optimism.

Longtime UN observers will note, however, that attempted reforms on this subject are not new. Rather, improving this relationship was recommended in the *Brahimi Report* in 2000, and in January 2001 the Council itself emphasized “the need to strengthen cooperation with troop-contributing countries, as part of a series of

6 See the June 13, 2001, Security Council debate (UN Doc. S/PV.4326), and, more recently, the June 29, 2010, debate (UN Doc. S/PV.6153).

7 United Nations, *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations* [Brahimi Report], UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, para 64.

8 MONUC is now MONUSCO, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

9 United Nations, *Report of the Working Group on the Enhancement of Cooperation with Troop-Contributing Countries, Police-Contributing Countries and Other Stakeholders*, UN Doc. S/2009/659, December 17, 2009.

measures to ensure more coherent and integrated concepts of operations and to enhance managerial efficiency and operational effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations.”¹⁰ One might hope that the presence of a number of large TCCs on the Security Council in 2011 (Brazil, India, Nigeria, and South Africa) could aid in the further realization of those words.

Partnering for a Purpose: Protecting Civilians

As mentioned above, the evolution of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period has seen an increased focus on the protection of civilians (PoC) from violence. In 1999, the first explicit Security Council mandate to protect civilians authorized the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to “afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”¹¹ Ten years later, a majority of the UN’s peacekeepers were operating under a Security Council mandate to protect civilians.¹² Fairly or unfairly, due to the expectations of host populations and the broader public, even the remaining UN peacekeepers are often seen to have at least an implicit mandate to protect civilians—even if they have not been given adequate resources or trained to do so.

Often overlooked is the fact that PoC as a concept and practice is not new to UN peacekeeping. As early as 1960, then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld explicitly instructed the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) to protect all civilians, not just white Belgians, citing the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and the *Genocide Convention*.¹³ However, as armed nonstate actors came to employ systematic violence—and sometimes sexual violence—against civilians as a tool of war, and as the UN has at times been put in the awkward position of protecting a population from its own government, it can be argued that civilian protection in 2010 is a much more difficult

proposition than it was fifty years ago.¹⁴

In 2009, a major study commissioned by DPKO and OCHA assessed the experience of the previous years of PoC mandates in UN peacekeeping. Its central finding was that “the ‘chain’ of events to support protection of civilians—from the earliest planning, to Security Council mandates, to the implementation of mandates by peacekeeping missions in the field—is broken.”¹⁵ Two things are clear from this finding. First, effective protection of civilians cannot be done by one group alone, but rather demands a better understanding of the task and more strategic and coordinated efforts by many actors: the Security Council, the Secretariat, senior mission leadership, humanitarians on the ground, and peacekeeping troops, police, and civilians. Second, the report’s key finding implies that the blame for the UN’s failure to implement PoC mandates effectively over the past decade must be shared. As such, if protecting civilians is, in fact, dependent on the actions of so many actors, overcoming the obstacles to effective partnership is a pre-condition for successful PoC implementation.

It is largely agreed that the primary responsibility for protecting civilians remains with each sovereign government. As the events of the last decade have shown, the most difficult challenges for peacekeeping occur when a government is unable to protect those inside its borders or unwilling to do so. The matter is further complicated when a state is seen as complicit in attacks on civilians, such as in the DRC or Sudan. In this respect, improving the capacity of or creating incentives for governments to exercise their responsibility should be the starting point of UN action. When a peacekeeping mission operates within such contexts, the relationship between the host government, senior mission leadership, and the Security Council is severely tested. The suggestion to establish a kind of “compact” between the Council and the host government at the outset of a mission might help make more explicit the expectations and the

10 UN Security Council Resolution 1353 (June 13, 2001), UN Doc. S/RES/1353.

11 UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (October 22, 1999), UN Doc. S/RES/1270.

12 United Nations, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks, and Remaining Challenges* (New York, 2009), p. 3.

13 Paul D. Williams, *Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2010), p. 4.

14 One of the first major reports to highlight this trend was the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/1999/957, September 8, 1999.

15 United Nations, *Protecting Civilians*, p. 5.

responsibilities of both the government and the UN's peacekeepers. In addition, such a compact might help establish a basis for managing the consent of a host government, which is a necessary pre-condition for the presence of UN peacekeepers. The difficulties encountered by UNAMID's peacekeepers—in terms of mobility and area access—are illustrative of what can happen if the Council is not able to secure the meaningful consent of the host government.

Others rightly point out that the UN's senior leadership in peacekeeping missions—Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs), Force Commanders (FCs), Police Commanders, and commanders of individual contingents—can greatly influence the effectiveness of PoC efforts on the ground. Through its case studies of MONUC and UNAMID, the DPKO/OCHA-commissioned study highlights both sides of the equation: successful instances when protection efforts were enabled by strong leadership, as well as many other failures of protection due to weak or divided mission leadership.¹⁶ In addition to increased efforts to better select and train senior leaders, DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) have also made mission planning and the development of PoC training modules for mission personnel a priority.

Of course, leadership without the proper resources can only go so far. It has been pointed out that the gap between expectation and capacity can be rather large in cases such as the DRC, where the physical protection of the 20 million residents of the eastern DRC by 20,000 troops is unrealistic at best. In the absence of adequate will, troops, and funding in the DRC, the expectation gap could be narrowed at least in part through effective engagement of the local population to nurture a more realistic understanding of UN's ability to provide protection.

Finally, a key element of peacekeeping protection efforts is the effective coordination of the UN's military and police actors with humanitarian and other civil-society actors operating in the field. The ability of humanitarian actors to maintain adequate "space" from military actors has become increas-

ingly vexing. Humanitarian agencies operating in the same area as peacekeeping operations rightly fear that any loss of their perceived neutrality (by an association with troops of the UN or the host government) will lead to decreased access to the populations they serve and physical harm to their staff. The UN's peacekeeping commanders, of course, realize that some of their most reliable information about potential and ongoing threats to civilians can come from their humanitarian counterparts. UN troops are also relied on at times to provide protection for the humanitarian actors themselves.

A solution to this dilemma is unlikely. However, most can agree that the troubled dynamic needs to, and can, be improved. Better coordination mechanisms and more information-sharing is a start. The DPKO-OCHA study strongly recommends cross-mission strategies for protection that incorporate all components of a peacekeeping mission: military, police, and civilian. Cross-mission strategies would work to put the PoC challenge of a certain conflict area in the proper context and seek to optimize the complementarity of roles of the different actors. When conflicting views inevitably arise among the various mission components, and there is a need to act quickly, the UN has come to realize the necessity of having a plan in place by which to act and strong leadership to direct that strategy.

Partnering to Strengthen Capacity: Police and Civilian Assets in Peace Operations

The continued growth in the number of deployed peacekeeping troops—cited often to illustrate the expansion of UN peacekeeping activity—is, at least in recent years, dwarfed by a much larger growth in the number of UN police. From the end of 2005 to the end of 2010, the number of police deployed in UN peacekeeping operations grew by 100 percent, compared to a 37 percent increase in troops over the same period.¹⁷ The more than 14,000 civilian police deployed by the UN at the end of 2010 perform a range of functions, including public-

¹⁶ Ibid. pp. 241-286 and 337-368.

¹⁷ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contribution to United Nations Operations," March 31, 2011, available at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/index.htm.

order maintenance, election support, community policing, and providing training and capacity-building to the host-country police.

Reflected in more than just numbers, policing has taken on an increasingly important role in UN peace operations, as the push for the UN's Standing Police Capacity (SPC) in 2005 signaled. The rationale for the creation of the unit, which became operational in 2007, was a belief in the necessity of immediate and rapid start-up law-enforcement capabilities for new UN peace operations. A key objective of the SPC is to incorporate law-enforcement assessment and police expertise at the very outset of mission planning. In one of the few meaningful reforms to survive negotiations at the 2005 World Summit, the unit was agreed to, but limited to twenty-five posts initially. Following positive reviews of the experiment, as well as continued demand for this kind of standing capacity, the General Assembly agreed to an increase of fourteen additional posts in June 2010.¹⁸

By far, the most common task of UN police is to provide support and training to local police forces. However, training police—whether in Afghanistan or Timor-Leste—has proved to be no easy task for the international community. At the United Nations, DPKO, DPA, UNDP, and UNODC are all involved in some way in police training. An even vaster array of other actors (INTERPOL, EUPOL, regional organizations, civil-society organizations, and individual member states) is involved in police training as well. Yet, while many countries and organizations can draw from an adequate supply of experienced police, there is still a distinct need for experts who are good at training other police. Indeed, the need becomes even more pronounced when the object of demand is a good police trainer with knowledge of the context of the operating environment and the trust of the local and national police forces.

Similar to the situation of UN police, civilian staff who are experts in specialized areas have become increasingly vital to UN peace operations tasked

with addressing the root causes of conflict—many of which relate to governance, state fragility, and specialized rule-of-law issues. The move toward missions with more civilian expertise and a focus on the political and governance-related sustainability of peace reflects an acknowledgement of the high rates of war recurrence and the importance of strong state institutions to durable peace.¹⁹ The recent trend by the UN to reconfigure its peacekeeping missions into peacebuilding ones, rather than to withdraw completely, is illustrative of this paradigmatic shift. With 19,990 civilians employed by UN peacekeeping operations at the end of 2010, and several civilian-expertise-supply initiatives being developed both by member states (e.g., Australia, the UK, and the US) and regional organizations (e.g., the African Standby Force's civilian component), it seems clear that few expect the demand for civilian expertise to diminish in the near future.²⁰

As civilian deployments increase, there is, if not a global shortage of available expertise, at least a significant problem in recruiting, hiring, and retaining civilian experts for peace operations. The associated critical challenge is in using such civilian expertise to strengthen the indigenous capacities of the populations that host peace operations. The independent review of civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict (Civcap Review), initiated by the Secretary-General in March 2010, put the challenge bluntly in its final report: "Faced with expanded civilian mandates in a growing number of crises, the United Nations struggles both to rapidly deploy the range of expertise required and to transfer skills and knowledge to national actors. This has increased the risk of relapse into conflict."²¹

How can partnerships among the UN, regional organizations, and member states enhance existing civilian and police capacity? One recent, positive example of partnerships in the field of policing was the collaboration among national, regional, and global actors in West Africa to address the growing challenge of drug trafficking in the region. A

18 See United Nations, *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Standing Police Capacity's First Year of Operation*, UN Doc. A/63/630, December 19, 2008.

19 On the importance of strong and legitimate state institutions, see Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth, *Building States to Build Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008). For a discussion on rates of war recurrence, see Astri Suhrke and Ingrid Samset, "What's in a Figure: Estimating Recurrence of Civil War," *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 2 (2007): 195-203.

20 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "UN Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet," December 2010, available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.pdf.

21 United Nations, *Report of the Senior Advisory Group of the Independent Review on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict*, UN doc. A/65/747-S/2011/85, February 22, 2011.

Ministerial Conference in Praia, Cape Verde, in October 2008, served as the forum for discussion among individual states in the region, the AU, the EU, ECOWAS, DPKO, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and INTERPOL. Jointly they developed a detailed Regional Response Action Plan as a “road map” for building local-capacity to fight drug trafficking, as well as a political declaration endorsed at the next ECOWAS summit.²²

To make real progress, however, successful strategic partnerships like that in West Africa must be complemented by partnerships in the field. Such partnerships begin by ensuring interoperability among civilian experts in member-state rosters with UN and regional organization peace operations. As the Civcap Review notes, “many of the civilian capacities most needed by conflict-affected communities are not to be found within the United Nations. In those cases, the United Nations will serve conflict-affected communities better by drawing on capacities beyond the United Nations, in its Member States and in civil society.”²³ For instance, the United Kingdom is developing its Civilian Stabilisation Group, with the goal of having 1,000 deployable civilian experts, 500 police, and the ability to deploy up to 150 police advisers at any one time. The United States and Australia are also harnessing the experience of their civilian experts, having formed the US Civilian Response Corps and Australian Civilian Corps.

Such initiatives by developed countries, taken alone, may not have an overwhelming effect on UN peace operations. The need for geographic and gender balances argues for developing operational partnerships between states that have created corps of expert civilians and the developing countries who will be working toward such a goal. These partnerships would not only have the benefit of enlarging the global pool of civilian experts, but, through increased interaction between the parties, should also augment cross-cultural understanding, knowledge-sharing, and interoperability.

Making the Transition: Partnering for Long-Term Peacebuilding

As the international community has repeatedly witnessed, preventing a return to conflict requires more time and effort than a peacekeeping operation over a period of three to five years is typically able to provide. Indeed, current thinking estimates that it may take an entire generation for a country to recover fully from the effects of violent conflict.²⁴ Thus, in places like Sierra Leone and Burundi, rather than pulling out completely, the UN reconfigured a peacekeeping mission into a peacebuilding one. The shift from one to the other is not simple, however. The successful transition from early recovery and basic security operations to longer-term peacebuilding efforts requires the right adjustments on the ground in force composition, leadership, expertise, and capabilities. Making such adjustments in the right way and at the right moment, of course, requires proper strategic planning—something that is never easily done among many groups, especially when nearly every decision is considered a political one. Effective planning processes entail interagency coordination at both the headquarters and field levels, from the initial assessments through to the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of activities.

In practice, of course, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not actually sequenced processes, even though the UN’s peace operations often assume a linear progression from a “peacekeeping mission” to a “peacebuilding mission.” Rather, these processes are (or should be) simultaneous. According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, its peacekeepers are early peacebuilders,²⁵ and, as such, the “transition” from peacekeeping to peacebuilding is a misnomer. Peacebuilding should begin from the very start of a peacekeeping operation, not at the point when peacekeepers have begun to depart. This was also a

22 James Cockayne and Phil Williams, “The Invisible Tide: Towards an International Strategy to Deal with Drug Trafficking Through West Africa,” New York: International Peace Institute, October 2009.

23 United Nations, *Report of the Senior Advisory Group*, para. 14.

24 World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (Washington, DC, April 2011), p. 10.

25 UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) “Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus,” New York, September 2010.

key conclusion of the Secretary-General's 2009 *Report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*.²⁶

The Security Council and the peacebuilding architecture however, are still engaged in the question of how best to manage the tricky period of troop drawdown. For even though peacekeeping and peacebuilding may be simultaneous, there still comes a time when all or a majority of the peacekeeping troops should withdraw. But, troop drawdowns must be based on some objective assessment of the conditions on the ground. As such, benchmarks are increasingly used as a way to measure the impact or progress of a peace operation toward creating the conditions necessary for sustainable peace. But how measurable or quantifiable can a peace operation's impact be? The international community has developed a full range of benchmarks related to *output*, such as how many ex-combatants have been disarmed and reintegrated, but the methodology to identify and track indicators of successful *outcomes* is much less clear. And it is ultimately the outcomes—not the outputs—on which important decisions, like a troop drawdown, should be based. In addition, indicators of progress and benchmarks for success have little meaning if they are not developed and measured in partnership with the host government. This partnership, aimed at understanding and measuring progress toward identified peacebuilding goals (in other words, a peacebuilding strategy), necessarily includes the Security Council, senior officials of the UN mission, the host government, and local civil society. A peacebuilding strategy excluding any one of these four parties is incomplete; yet the problem of how to coordinate the interests of all to develop the right plan still bedevils the international community.

The concept of the integrated UN mission was designed in part to offer a vehicle for the parallel implementation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Yet, while the integrated mission can be credited with improving the overall coherence of the UN's activities in a country, it is not able to compensate for the lack of a coherent

integrated peacebuilding strategy. The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) were created in part to aid in this coordination and planning of peacebuilding efforts among varied partners. While most would admit that the PBC has room for improvement, one of its key added values has been in providing a platform for UN member states and the range of actors involved in peacebuilding (UN member states; UN agencies, funds, and programs; NGOs; and the international financial institutions including the World Bank) to discuss peacebuilding efforts specific to a certain country. The agenda of the PBC now includes six countries—Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone—that are discussed separately through the PBC's country-specific configurations. This forum has helped to provide visibility, political support, and financial resources for peacebuilding when peacekeeping troops have departed or the issue is no longer high on the Security Council's agenda.

Importantly though, discussions in the PBC are limited, in the respect that they often do not include civil society or the populations of the host country—those who arguably have the most to gain or lose by the implementation of a peacebuilding strategy. In addition, the host society is also the group on which the ultimate success of peacebuilding efforts is most dependent. Peacebuilding is, in fact, something that local actors do and the international community can only support; as DPKO and DFS put it, “peacebuilding is primarily a *national* challenge and responsibility, and national factors will largely shape its pace and sequencing.”²⁷ As such, the link to the host population, provided by the UN mission on the ground, can be critical in bridging the gap between discussions of the PBC and Security Council in New York and discussions of local NGOs and community groups in Bujumbura, Bangui, or Bissau.

The role of the UN mission on the ground in this regard can be seen as two-fold. First, it is to help understand and relay the concerns and priorities of the local population, so those can be integrated into

26 United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, UN Doc. A/63/881- S/2009/304.

27 DPKO and DFS, “Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding.”

a country's peacebuilding strategy. The second (also challenging) task of the UN mission on the ground is then to provide sufficient support to the local actors who have the primary responsibility of building peace in their communities. It is, of course, these local actors who will be building peace long after the international community has departed.

Conclusion: Partnering for Sustainability and the Future of Peace Operations

Ensuring that the right capacities and other resources are available is a necessary, but not alone sufficient, component of effective international responses to conflict. As described in the sections above, there also needs to be coordinated planning and action, smart and inclusive strategies, and an overall focus on long-term political and governing sustainability. "Sustainability" is a key concept of successful peacekeeping partnerships. Partnership arrangements between peacekeeping stakeholders, such as between the Security Council and TCCs, must be made sustainable in the long run. This involves more genuine engagement from both sides, and an acknowledgment of the critical importance of both parties in achieving success. The Council's partnership with host-country governments must also be made sustainable. The contentious breakdown of several host-country-Security Council partnerships in 2010 showed what can occur without genuine partnership arrangements. But the example of the MONUC-to-MONUSCO settlement also proved that acceptable negotiated outcomes are possible with determined engagement by the members of the Security Council.

Of course, the conditions on the ground that peace operations help create must be sustainable. All too often, quick fixes lead to short-lived success, wasted resources, disappointment, and disillusion, calling into question the very reasons the international community intervened in the first place. It is a quick fix when international actors substitute local capacity, rather than support and build it. At the outset of a crisis, UN troops, police, and civilians may be the only ones able to handle the

pressing security and basic needs of a population, but the continued use of UN capacities creates a dependency that is wholly unsustainable, and therefore counterproductive. The review of civilian capacities highlights this problem and provides recommendations for building, rather than draining local capacity.

The longer-term peacebuilding support focus of the Security Council with regard to situations like Liberia and Sierra Leone should also be considered a positive step toward sustainability. However, the troubling resurgence of violence in next-door neighbor Côte d'Ivoire—despite the ongoing presence of a UN peacekeeping mission—reminds us that the fundamental problems that peacekeeping and peacebuilding face are still political, not technical. The election-related violence in Côte d'Ivoire at the end of 2010 showed that deep political divides resulting from, and in turn causing, years of conflict cannot be bridged through bureaucratic improvements in the UN's systems of coordination or through time alone. Rather, peacekeeping and peacebuilding strategies are ultimately about getting the politics right. Effective partnership in such situations means sustained engagement in the political elements of a country's recovery from the time of the initial deployment onward.

In many ways, conceptual clarifications and bureaucratic innovations in the field of peacekeeping have professionalized the business and allowed peacekeepers to operate in ever more complex environments in close partnership with an increasing numbers of actors. Discussions among peacekeeping's various stakeholders though cannot lose sight of the actual political problems—including a deficit of political will by many member states—that seem endemic to the business. The political issues among local actors that led to the violence in Côte d'Ivoire are not unique to that country or region, but are faced by many a peacekeeping operation. Likewise, the lack of political unity among the UN, its member states, and the African Union that may have prevented effective diplomatic resolution of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire is not unique either. This suggests that "partnership" should not be a code word for developing institutional and technical innovations

in order to avoid the more important, but contentious political issues that still divide the community of peacekeeping actors. Rather, it should be acknowledged that partnership is, above everything else, political. As such, efforts need to be made and results seen at the political and strategic

levels, not just at the bureaucratic and technical ones. As important as structures and processes can be to success, getting the politics right is what will ultimately sustain peacekeeping partnerships into the future.

Conference Agenda

UN Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century: Partnerships for Peace Vienna, Austria

May 16, 2010

17:00 – 18:30

Opening Statements

Welcoming Remarks

Amb. Terje Rød-Larsen, *President, International Peace Institute (IPI)*

Brig.-Gen. René Ségur-Cabanac, *Deputy Commandant, Austrian National Defence Academy*

Prof. Markus Kornprobst, *Chair of International Relations, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna*

Film presentation: Fortieth Anniversary of IPI

Introduced by Mr. Warren Hoge, *Vice President for External Relations, IPI*

Introduction of the Speakers

Dr. Edward C. Luck, *Senior Vice President for Research and Programs, International Peace Institute*

Opening Dialogue

Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, *Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

H.R.H. Prince Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein of Jordan, *Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United States of America*

18:30-20:30

Reception and Dinner

Featured Speaker

Gen. Edmund Entacher, *Chief of Staff of the Austrian Armed Forces*

May 17, 2010

10:00-10:30

Public Session: Opening Statements

Welcoming Remarks

Hon. Norbert Darabos, *Austrian Minister for Defence and Sports*

Amb. Terje Rød-Larsen

10:30-12:30

Public Session: Realizing the Potential of the Global Peacekeeping Partnership

The past two decades have seen a significant increase in the number of multilateral institutions involved in establishing or supporting peace operations. Will the next decade witness an even greater demand for regional and subregional peacekeeping? What dilemmas do the UN, the AU, the EU, NATO, and other organizations face in managing complex peacekeeping partnerships? How can they leverage their relative capabilities and comparative

advantages to maximize the potential of the global peacekeeping partnership? Can partnerships in peace operations raise accountability challenges? How can regional organizations, such as the OSCE, support such partnerships and contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management?

Chair

Amb. Terje Rød-Larsen

Speakers

Hon. Michael Spindelegger, *Austrian Minister for European and International Affairs*

H.E. Mr. Alain Le Roy, *Under-Secretary-General, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

Ms. Claude-France Arnould, *Deputy Director-General, Crisis Management and Planning, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union*

Mr. Zoltán Nagy, *Head of Section, NATO and Multilateral Affairs, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, North Atlantic Treaty Organization*

Amb. Herbert Salber, *Director, Conflict Prevention Centre, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*

12:30-14:30

Lunch

14:30-16:00

Session 1: Defining Stakeholder Relationships for Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations: the Security Council, the Secretariat, and Troop-Contributing and Host Countries

As the Security Council authorizes more deployments of blue helmets and adopts increasingly complex mandates, the demands on the UN Secretariat and troop-contributing countries (TCCs) grow. Are current arrangements for TCC consultations with the Security Council during mandate creation and renewal satisfactory to all parties? Are those countries that supply large numbers of police or civilians to peace operations consulted sufficiently? Will member states provide the Secretariat with sufficient resources to implement the expanding (in scope and in number) mandates of the Security Council? How can the information flow between the Security Council and the Secretariat be strengthened? Are host-country views taken into account sufficiently when mandates renewals and/or adjustments are considered?

Chair

Prof. Markus Kornprobst, *Chair of International Relations, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna*

Speakers

Amb. Yukio Takasu, *Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations*

H.R.H. Prince Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein of Jordan

16:30-18:00

Session 2: Implementation of the Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations

In November 2009, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1894 to improve the protection of civilians in armed conflict. What should be the next steps for the Security Council and the Secretariat to effectively design and implement protection mandates in peace operations? Should protection mandates be mainstreamed into peace operations or should distinct protection units be established? What changes should be made to the structure, composition, or daily operations of a peace operation to ensure that military and humanitarian actors

work together productively? How can peace operations best communicate with at-risk host populations to manage their expectations for physical protection? Does the protection of women, children, and other vulnerable groups call for new or special methods of protection? What can be done to effectively implement resolutions 1820 and 1888 on sexual violence in armed conflict, and how can the 1325 agenda on women, peace, and security be further strengthened in the light of this year's tenth anniversary?

Chair

Amb. Thomas Mayr-Harting, *Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations*

Speakers

Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu

Gen. Martin Luther Agwai, *former Force Commander of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)*

18:30-20:30

Reception and Dinner

Featured Remarks

Amb. Georg Lennkh, *Special Representative of the EU Presidency for the Political Dialogue in Chad*

May 18, 2010

09:00-10:30

Session 3: Police and Civilian Capabilities in Peace Operations

As law enforcement, police training, and the strengthening of national security institutions have become central elements of peace operations, police forces, and civilians working on rule of law assume essential roles in the implementation of mandates. What is the current state of multilateral police capacity or of civilian expertise on subjects such as DDR or judicial reform? How can partnerships between the UN, regional organizations, and/or member states enhance existing capacity? What lessons can be learned from interorganization partnerships in training and standardization of police contributions?

Chair

Dr. Winrich Kühne, *Adjunct Professor in International Relations, Johns Hopkins University*

Speakers

Mr. Walter Wolf, *Chief of the United Nations Standing Police Capacity*

Ms. Catherine Bishop, *Deputy Head of the United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit*

10:30-11:00

Coffee Break

11:00-12:30

Session 4: Making the Transition from Peacekeeping and Early Recovery to Long-Term Peacebuilding

A successful transition from early recovery and basic security operations to longer-term peacebuilding efforts requires the right adjustments, at the right time, in force composition, expertise, and capabilities on the ground. How can the Secretariat and the Security Council best assess the capacity needs of a peace operation during a transition? How can a peace operation work with all partners to identify relevant and realistic benchmarks? As the amount of peacebuilding activity in a postconflict country increases, how should the role of

the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office, and the Peacebuilding Fund relate to the Security Council? How can UN leaders in the field be provided with the necessary authority and capacity to facilitate prioritization and strategy development among national and international actors in postconflict settings?

Chair

Amb. Irene Freudenschuss-Reichl, *Director-General for Development Cooperation, Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs*

Speakers

Amb. Jean-François Régis Zinsou, *Permanent Representative of the Republic of Benin to the United Nations and Vice Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission*

Dr. Richard Caplan, *Professor of International Relations, Director of the Centre for International Studies, Oxford University*

12:30-13:45

Lunch

13:45-15:15

Session 5: Future Political Challenges and the Demand for Peacekeeping

The number of uniformed personnel in UN peacekeeping has risen markedly over the past ten years. However, many believe the UN has reached—or exceeded—its capacity to finance, manage, or locate troops for any additional missions. If asked to field additional multidimensional peace operations, where will the UN secure the necessary resources and troops? Will TCCs be more willing to contribute troops to regional and subregional organizations than to the UN? Some also fear that operational overstretch or a premature withdrawal due to host-country pressures could lead to another dramatic peacekeeping failure, which could create a retrenchment in peacekeeping commitments similar to the sharp decline in the mid-1990s. How can this be prevented? Will the peacekeeping successes of the 2000s—if sustained and broadened—contribute to a reduced demand for peacekeeping in the coming decade? Which current or anticipated pressing conflict—if any—might call for a peace operation, UN or otherwise, in the foreseeable future?

Chair

Amb. Terje Rød-Larsen

Speakers

Amb. Jarmo Veli Tapio Viinanen, *Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations*

Amb. David M. Satterfield, *Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers*
H.R.H. Prince Turki Al-Faisal, *Chairman of the Board of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies*

15:45-16:30

Session 6: Conclusion and Way Forward

Speakers

Major-General Johann Pucher, *Security Policy Director, Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports*

Dr. Edward C. Luck

The **INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI)** is an independent, international not-for-profit think tank with a staff representing more than twenty nationalities, with offices in New York, facing United Nations headquarters, and in Vienna. IPI is dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of conflicts between and within states by strengthening international peace and security institutions. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, convening, publishing, and outreach.



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