



BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION

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## Training in Small Arms Control in South Sudan

### BICC – APFO Workshop Report

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## List of Acronyms

APFO	Africa Peace Forum
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
CBO	Community-based organization
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DD&R	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
NGO	Non-governmental organization
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army / Movement
SSDDRC	South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission

## **Executive Summary**

Despite the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, South Sudan continues to be plagued by underdevelopment and insecurity. One of the factors perpetuating insecurity is the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons, which exacerbates conflict at both the local and national levels. It is important to note that South Sudan is not homogenous—the causes of conflict and insecurity vary from region to region, and thus capacity-building efforts on small arms control must be tailored accordingly.

The prevailing situation in South Sudan at the moment is not conducive to an undertaking of large scale disarmament. Until there is a more reliable and effective security establishment, small arms control is the best strategy to pursue to help curb the proliferation and misuse of small arms.

Lessons learned from capacity-building organizations working in South Sudan include the importance of follow-up and evaluation, information dissemination, identifying indigenous tools and processes for training, and creating local buy-in for peace-building and arms control. More coordination between training organizations is also needed to prevent duplication and to reach a wider range of target groups.

Training on small arms control is needed at all three levels of government in South Sudan: national, state and county. The SSDDRC has a key role to play in coordinating the delivery of these training needs, as well as in promoting cooperation between Government and civil society on this issue.

Issues and approaches for further consideration include possible entry points for future training on small arms control in South Sudan, distinguishing between DD&R and small arms control activities, and helping to overcome the challenges facing the SSDDRC. A key issue requiring further analysis and debate is how to measure the impact of our activities. BICC plans to organize a follow-up workshop to deal with these and other issues of coordination in early 2007.

## **Introduction**

On 14–16 June 2006, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), in cooperation with the Africa Peace Forum (APFO), organized a workshop at the Fairview Hotel in Nairobi entitled “Localization Workshop on Training in Small Arms Control in South Sudan.” This workshop took place as part of BICC’s capacity-building project on small arms control in South Sudan, funded by the Canadian Government. The workshop brought together a number of organizations working to promote peace and conflict transformation in South Sudan through training or other capacity-building activities. Other important stakeholders in the South Sudan peace process were also present. Prominent among them were a member of the legislature of the Government of South Sudan in Juba, and of the legislature of the Government of National Unity in Khartoum. Two representatives of the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC) were also present, among them the Commissioner himself, Mr.

Arop Mayak, and the Executive Director, Mr. Benjamin Gimba. Both were instrumental in providing local insight and establishing many points for consideration.

The workshop had three main objectives:

- To get a better understanding of what local and international stakeholders are doing on the ground in South Sudan;
- to discuss training methodologies appropriate for South Sudan; and
- to map out the road ahead for small arms control training.

The overall goal of the workshop was to identify effective strategies for promoting disarmament and peace-building in South Sudan, and to encourage greater cooperation between training organizations in the field.

### **Background: South Sudan**

Sudan has experienced internal conflict since it gained independence in 1956. The most devastating of these conflicts was between the north and south, where only 11 years of relative peace have been observed in the last 50 years. In 2003, conflict erupted in the western region of Darfur, which has claimed at least 200,000 lives and displaced over two million people. A third conflict has also been escalating in the northeastern region of Sudan since last year, where negotiations between the Government and the Eastern Front opposition have not yet yielded results. Religious, ethnic, livelihood and tribal divides have all been cited as causes of conflict, compounded by struggles over natural resources at all levels of society. Of these three conflict situations in the country (Darfur, the Beja-Eastern Sudan, and Southern Sudan), this workshop focused solely on the situation in South Sudan.

On 9 January 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the ruling National Congress Party and the former rebel group, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). This agreement officially ended the north-south war that began in 1983<sup>1</sup>, and mandated the incorporation of the SPLA/M into a new Government of National Unity. It also established the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) as an interim, autonomous body to govern the region until a referendum is held on the question of secession in 2011.

The signing of the CPA provides a unique opportunity to address the small arms problem in South Sudan, which is one of the most persistent contributors to insecurity in the region. Though research is still ongoing, anecdotal evidence suggests that many Sudanese households are armed, most with automatic weapons.<sup>2</sup> South Sudan continues to lack basic services, strong leadership, and institutional capacity. The GoSS, which is largely composed of former SPLM members, is also lacking adequate capacity to implement the peace agreement's provisions. Towards this end, a number of organizations have been undertaking various capacity-building initiatives to help promote peace, security and progress in the implementation of the CPA.

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<sup>1</sup> The first north-south war raged from 1956–1972, while the second war was fought between 1983–2005.

<sup>2</sup> Small Arms Survey, forthcoming.

While a full description of the South Sudanese context is beyond the scope of this report, it is nevertheless useful to recognize and highlight a number of key aspects of the situation:

- The south has historically been marginalized, due in part to colonial policies and to the presence of resources in the region that have been plundered over the years including slaves, ivory, and more recently, oil.
- Despite the presence of large swathes of natural resources, the entire area exudes extreme poverty with extremely low Human Development Indices.<sup>3</sup>
- The south consists of a mosaic of often antagonistic ethnic groups whose mistrust, mutual misunderstanding and antagonism is fuelled at the most elementary level by linguistic, cultural, social and, most significantly, productive differences.
- The SPLM—the dominant political force in southern Sudan—and the majority element of the GoSS is not a representative political movement. Its authority is based on a mix of force of arms and political savvy. The road to a more representative government is hampered by ethnic divisions, reluctance to lose power, and the threat (and possibly active interference) of northern interests.
- Communications in Sudan are extremely difficult. All-weather roads are few and those that exist are subject to banditry on a regular basis. Many population centers are reachable only by air and therefore difficult to access for practical purposes.
- The isolation of different areas has meant that roots of conflict may well be specific to a particular area. Though some generalizations are possible, causes of conflict can vary.
- Conflict factors are therefore multi-dimensional in South Sudan. Conflicts at lower levels of organizations (personal, familial) can easily escalate into higher levels (an ethnic group or area) and *vice versa*: Ideological and political conflicts can very quickly attain a personal dimension.

Workshop participants agreed that conflict causes in South Sudan can be roughly divided into those that are local in nature and those that are national, though there are thick strands of events and meaning that tie these levels together. Any given conflict may very well feed from one cause or level into another—'local' conflicts can very quickly become elements in national conflicts, and national conflicts often encompass and sustain local conflicts. It was agreed that mapping out these causes, both overarching ones and local ones, is critical in the preparation and design of an effective intervention. The following discussion provides an overview of the main causes of conflict identified in the workshop.

### *Local Conflict Factors in South Sudan*

At the very local level, Dr. Alfred Lokuji presented five major conflict factors for interpersonal and local violence in South Sudan:

**Marriage** and quarrels over bride price, which is normally paid in cattle, are a major cause for quarrels that can escalate to violence. It is important to note that for virtually all

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<sup>3</sup> For reference, see [http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/cty/cty\\_f\\_SDN.html](http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/cty/cty_f_SDN.html).

ethnic groups in South Sudan, related women (daughters and sisters) represent a potential source of wealth and prestige for the family, since no marriage is considered legitimate unless a full bride price has been paid. In the absence of a full bride price, men often resort to elopement and kidnapping, which complicates the problem extensively. This reality is exemplified in the stringent efforts made as a consequence of the Abyei Peace Agreement (2004) between the Nuer and the Dinka peoples in which large numbers of women were either repatriated to their natal groups, or the bride price was paid by their abductors.

**Cattle:** It is difficult to overestimate the importance of cattle for many of the South Sudanese people. Though transhuman cattle herding is a feature of life of only a portion of the ethnic groups (i.e. Dinka, Nuer, Masalit, Murle, Toposa), the use of cattle as a sign of prestige and wealth is common among sedentary groups as well. For example, it was noted that the Murle believe that cattle were given to them by God and therefore they have a legitimate right to repossess them from other groups, leading to cattle rustling. Recent local warfare has often been triggered by cattle raids.<sup>4</sup>

**Crops:** Disputes over crop, crop theft and incursions into agricultural land are a common feature of life and a major cause for quarrels.

**Pasture and water:** The nature of the ecology in South Sudan is such that pastoralists must adjust to two extremes. In the rainy seasons, wide meadows—the *sud*—emerge in the plains. These are crucial to the cattle's ability to put on fat and survive during the leaner seasons. During the dry season as water becomes scarce, herdsmen must concentrate their cattle around water sources—the few waterholes and the drying rivers—in order to survive. Unsurprisingly, both pasturage during the wet season and water sources during the dry season are major sources of conflict.

**Murder:** In the absence of a formal judiciary, traditional law in South Sudan is a mix of *lex talionis* and mutual responsibility. The advent of partially implemented modern forms of legislation and judiciary, the presence of small arms, and the ongoing civil wars (all of which are related) has brought about a greater reliance on mutual responsibility by local groups who are able to mobilize to defend perpetrators as members of the group and to exact vengeance. Murder, in particular, has been the cause of inter-ethnic fighting, as well as fighting between clans and groups within ethnic groups, and between government forces and individuals and local groups.

### *National and Other Conflict Factors in South Sudan*

Participants also noted a number of broader factors that either exacerbate or further complicate local conflict issues. These include:

- ***Politicization of ethnicity***

A great deal of evidence suggests that the Khartoum government has, for a number of decades, politicized ethnicity as a means of exerting control over and engaging

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<sup>4</sup> For reference, please see [http://www.act-intl.org/news/dt\\_nr\\_2000/dtsud0400.html](http://www.act-intl.org/news/dt_nr_2000/dtsud0400.html); [http://www.fews.net/centers/files/Sudan\\_200303en.pdf#search=%22cattle%20raiding%20south%20sudan%22](http://www.fews.net/centers/files/Sudan_200303en.pdf#search=%22cattle%20raiding%20south%20sudan%22).

in resource extraction in the peripheries (ICG, 2002; Rone, 2003; HRW, 2003). This has clearly been the case in South Sudan, as it is now in Darfur and the Beja areas of eastern Sudan. That ethnic differences and conflicts do exist goes beyond question; but the fact that the central government exploits these in a divide and rule process must be understood as one of the challenges to peace and stability in the area.

- ***Competition over diminishing natural resources***

There is some growing evidence that global changes in weather are making the lives of pastoralists in South Sudan more difficult. Rainfall is erratic and not as plentiful, and as a result, the delicate pattern of nomadic pastoralist lives is being eroded. In addition to the very real physical difficulties, this has also created more pressures to settle disputes by violence. Pastoralists driven by the need for more pastures have been known to invade agricultural settlements, pushing farmers away from their land and villages.

- ***Breakdown of traditional values and structures***

South Sudan has been governed by traditional values and mechanisms of providing justice, security and resolving conflict. During the north-south conflict, power and authority was placed in the hands of the SPLA/M and the modern judicial system, effectively stripping traditional chiefs and leaders of a great deal of authority. As a result, local disputes have and often continue to proceed without punishment with young men growing up in this context not accepting the authority of traditional chiefs. If these young men are armed, the result is a general lack of security, as well as a lack of trust and justice both within and between ethnic communities in the South. This is exacerbated by continuing disputes over cultural practices and livelihoods.

- ***Cross-border issues***

South Sudan is also not immune to the effects of conflict in its neighboring countries. For example, attacks by members of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda against villages close to the border constitute a continuing threat to the security of the southern region as a whole.

Through this discussion, it became clear that there is no homogenous 'South Sudan'. The causes of conflict and insecurity vary from region to region, and thus our efforts must be tailored to each specific reality on the ground. What is more, a comprehensive approach to promoting disarmament and peace-building in South Sudan is crucial—interventions must take into consideration and indeed respond to the broader issues of insecurity and underdevelopment.

## **Disarmament and Small Arms Control**

It is largely accepted that small arms and light weapons (SALW) are not often the **cause** of violent conflicts. Participants acknowledged this to be true for South Sudan, but noted that small arms availability has contributed to the escalation of inter-communal conflicts. Where small arms are present, they tend to exacerbate conflicts in a number of ways:

- SALW **can** make conflicts more likely, since the technical capacity to do harm is inherent in the weapon.

- SALW often have an additive effect, in that once a potential conflict partner acquires SALW, others are likely to follow.
- SALW increase the likelihood of criminal activities (UN, 1997).
- SALW have a clear deleterious effect on development and on the likelihood of development (ibid).

As a result of the north-south war, SALW in South Sudan have become a common feature of life. During the war, many people acquired arms for individual protection or collective security. While a Small Arms Survey project in Sudan is currently mapping the availability and impact of small arms in the area<sup>5</sup>, it is likely that SALW are commonly available to almost everyone. Clashes between different ethnic groups as well as domestic and other disputes are extremely likely to lead to fatalities when SALW are brought into play.

Participants discussed the challenge of identifying the owners of small arms in South Sudanese communities. Arms are frequently loaned from one individual or household to another, or exchanged for cattle on an individual basis. Possession is also mainly a private and hidden matter. There are very few identifiable armed groups apart from the SPLA—even members of the national police force look like armed civilians due to a lack of uniforms. Those that have organized into groups are mainly armed youth, forming what has been called the ‘white army’ in the states of Upper Nile and Jonglei. The white army is little more than a collective of armed youth/men who protect their cattle, pastures, communities and themselves through the use of small arms. On occasion, they engage in cattle raids and predation on their neighbors. Affiliation to the white army is loose, and there is little command and control structure. Identifying its members is only possible with the cooperation of local villages and communities; but insofar as security remains an individual and communal affair, it is unlikely they will work against their own security by revealing the owners and possessors of these weapons.

In a post-conflict region with a high saturation of SALW, the ultimate objective of any action against these weapons is preferably disarmament. However, in the South Sudanese reality, disarmament is highly unlikely to happen voluntarily or easily. There are two main reasons for this estimate, which was agreed on by all participants:

1. There is no functioning security establishment in South Sudan and, given the number and heterogeneity of armed groups and individuals, many equate being unarmed with being insecure.

A general observation was made that the police in South Sudan act more like armed forces than service providers. Very few officers have experience in peacetime activities and many have been accused of terrorizing the populations they purport to protect. This is likely due to the fact that the police are mainly composed of former members of the SPLA who have little experience in human rights, the rule of law and small arms control. Improvements to the police and military structures are desperately needed—this was recently indicated as a high priority for local security by residents of the Lakes Region (SAS, 2006). Participants at the meeting thus warned of the wisdom of promoting

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<sup>5</sup> See [www.smallarmssurvey.org](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org) for information on their Sudan project.



disarmament without also addressing issues of real and perceived insecurity, such as through security sector reform.

2. Previous attempts at disarmament in South Sudan have largely been pursued for governmental ends, almost always crudely and brutally, and have not brought upon the desired results of increased security/fewer casualties. Rather, disarmament has brought on greater tensions, more conflict, and less security.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement calls for the removal of any independent armed group other than the Government of South Sudan (GoSS). However, many of these groups—including the Government of Sudan and GoSS supported militia—have not complied. Given this, as well as the difficulty in differentiating armed groups from regular civilians, the GoSS implemented a forced civilian disarmament program beginning in December 2005 in the state of Jonglei. The results were disastrous: many civilians, white army members and SPLA soldiers were killed in armed clashes in January 2006; civilian mistrust in the Government and SPLA increased; a sense of insecurity deepened and communities were further divided along inter- and intra-tribal lines.<sup>6</sup> The campaign also resulted in a growing reluctance to disarm on the part of all groups, since protection against cattle raiding and banditry could not be guaranteed. Crucially, forced disarmament appeared to be carried out in favor of, or against, one or another group, providing an opportunity for predation by neighboring or rival communities. Hoping to avoid the negative consequences of such a forced campaign, local authorities implemented a more **voluntary** program in Akobo County, Jonglei, with some positive results. Brokered by the Commissioner of Jonglei in collaboration with local administrators and civil society, this program saw the disarmament of over 1,000 men and boys who voluntarily handed in their weapons in preparation for peace.<sup>7</sup> This is despite the fact that many continued to express fears of attack by neighboring communities and concerns about the lack of adequate protection.<sup>8</sup>

Rather than create new vulnerabilities by exacerbating these fears and concerns, participants agreed that promoting small arms control could help increase stability, promote trust and confidence at the community level by minimizing the proliferation and misuse of these weapons. It could also be an interim measure until the space is available for voluntary disarmament or the implementation of legally mandated programs on a larger scale. In order to promote arms control in the region, participants identified a number of key actions:

- Presenting policymakers with a list of options for arms control based on national and international best practices and lessons learned.
- Targeted training and capacity-building for civil society, local administrators, community leaders, parliamentarians, state officials and the security sector (including the military) on small arms control measures, and promoting cooperation between them on this issue as a confidence- and trust-building measure.

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<sup>6</sup> [http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=54959&SelectRegion=East\\_Africa](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=54959&SelectRegion=East_Africa).

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/13087.html>.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

- Identifying local and traditional gun and violence control measures that helps prevent the misuse of small arms and that can be promoted as examples for other communities.
- Promoting cooperation between the State, local authorities and community leaders to ensure that all arms control efforts are sustainable and supported through relevant legislation, policy and practice. This includes linking arms control activities, as much as possible, to social and economic programs.

## **Lessons Learned from Training in South Sudan**

### **Targeting key needs**

Participants acknowledged that many training courses simply take place because there is funding in place. Oftentimes, these events occur without a clear purpose or sense of whether there is a situation that requires transformation. Consequently, emphasis is placed on the instruments and process of training rather than on the impact or end result of it, and the project is deemed a success merely for having been completed. To ensure a more substantive contribution, training organizations should first be clear of the needs that they aim to address, the target groups that have these needs as a matter of priority, and the end result that they seek to achieve. This last point was particularly emphasized in the case of small arms control training, where it was noted that the more specific the end goal, the easier it is to identify priority target groups, and the more measurable the impact.

### **The importance of follow-up and evaluation**

Follow-up was also highlighted as a critical activity for ensuring that the results of training are sustainable. However, it is also one that is often neglected. A variety of reasons for this were mentioned, including a lack of funding, resources and capacity to monitor the progress of trainees and support follow-up activities. Evaluations of training courses and other capacity-building efforts were also noted as critical for assessing the value and impact of the training, though this is too often neglected as well. One of the main reasons for this neglect is the fact that such evaluations are more meaningful over the long term, or at least several months following the end of the course. Once again, resources, time and funding are rarely available or secured for return missions to the field, so evaluations that are carried out tend to focus only on immediate outcomes and impressions of the training. A more systematic assessment of the learning that was achieved was agreed by all as a necessary component of all training and capacity-building efforts. In the context of South Sudan, however, many communities are difficult to maintain contact with, as they lack the means of communication and/or move around frequently with their livestock. Following up with these communities to assess the resulting behavioral changes from training is an extremely challenging task for any local organization, and nearly impossible for any organization without a local presence or partner. This must be kept in mind during the overall design of the training—particularly when identifying target groups—to ensure that an impact assessment is indeed feasible.

### **The need for information dissemination**

In terms of the actual process of training in South Sudan, it was noted that information dissemination is a critical component for any capacity-building effort in the region. This is because there is a high degree of local suspicion with regard to 'international' intentions surrounding the peace process in South Sudan, and even more skepticism at the prospect of disarmament. A great deal of ignorance and misunderstanding of the CPA and its provisions is also abundant at the local level. Any intervention must therefore aim to first dispel local skepticism by being as transparent and sensitive of local concerns as possible. Attention to detail, clarity of purpose and transparency were noted as critical aims toward this end.

### **The need for localized training material and methodology**

With one of the lowest literacy rates in the world<sup>9</sup>, placing the written word at the center of any training or capacity-building methodology for South Sudan is not going to ensure a sustainable impact. Rather, disseminating messages through alternative and more local mediums is critical in the southern Sudanese context. For example, using local artists to disseminate messages in the form of theater, film or song was identified as a possibility that has proven effective in other country contexts. For example, the community radio station in Juba was noted as a particularly good medium for the dissemination of information due to its high number of listeners. BICC reported on its use of cartoons and pictures to illustrate a number of key concepts in their localized training manuals, though an important lesson learned was the use of identifiable (human) and culturally sensitive images. For example, playful cartoons of a Dinka cow performing human activities were not positively received by a largely pastoralist trainee group in Thiet (Tonj South County). Properly used, however, such cultural and artistic tools have the potential to be more sustainable in terms of delivering important messages, and are likely to have a wider reach than the participants in any one workshop. Participants also acknowledged the potential effectiveness of handing out T-shirts or other memorabilia to trainees as a means of creating institutional memory and tracking the long-term reach of a particular intervention.

It was nevertheless agreed that handing out training manuals and documents is extremely important for trainees, even if they are not directly understood. Despite a low rate of literacy in South Sudan and a multitude of local languages, experience has shown that people want to receive something tangible from training aside from the transfer of new knowledge and skills. Written manuals, documents and paper/notebooks represent tools of knowledge and are highly valued as symbols of intelligence in South Sudan. While most international training material is written in English, it was recommended that translation or the use of a translator is only necessary when training civil society at the grassroots level.

Key points can be summarized as follows:

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<sup>9</sup> See [http://www.alertnet.org/printable.htm?URL=/db/crisisprofiles/SD\\_PEA.htm](http://www.alertnet.org/printable.htm?URL=/db/crisisprofiles/SD_PEA.htm),  
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article7602>,  
<http://www.ineesite.org/page.asp?pid=1335>.

- Training should respond to the needs of trainees. Proper follow-up and evaluation is necessary to ensure that these needs are met and to assess the extent of learning that was achieved.
- Information dissemination is critical for capacity-building and can be accomplished in a variety of different ways. Training organizations should consult the local repertoire to identify the most effective training tools for a particular community. For example, what forms of expression do they use? Are there traditional ways of disseminating knowledge that we can use to deliver our message?
- Attention to detail is important in winning the trust and confidence of our target groups. Using inappropriate cultural images or not paying attention to our presentation of material can significantly obstruct the impact we want to make.
- Whether or not trainees are literate, it is important that they receive something tangible from training. These materials can help create buy-in to our efforts, help disseminate messages more widely, and motivate trainees to take action on the issue at hand.

It was widely accepted that, in terms of reducing the incidence of violence and insecurity in South Sudan, training in small arms control alone is not sufficient. What is needed is a more integrated approach that links training on this issue with broader development, peacebuilding and reconstruction initiatives. Participants called for greater cooperation between training organizations and opportunities to collaborate with GoSS institutions toward this end.

### **Key Issues and Challenges for Arms Control Training in South Sudan**

The following key issues and challenges for conducting arms control training in South Sudan—and capacity-building work in general—were identified by participants in the workshop. Recommendations for how to overcome and address some of these challenges are outlined below.

#### *Importance of Reaching Children and Youth*

Participants noted that targeting adults in small arms control efforts—particularly those that carry these weapons—is critical for treating the problem, but not necessarily for preventing it. In order to be more proactive and stem the demand for small arms, children and youth should be targeted more directly. To date, very few peacebuilding efforts have attempted to target the general category of youth and children, despite the fact that they are key entry points for preventing the spread of small arms. More effort is therefore needed to ensure that children and youth are also beneficiaries of our capacity-building interventions. A number of recommendations were made toward this end:

- **Education on the dangers of small arms.** More specifically, the inclusion of a small arms control component within the Ministry of Education’s primary school curriculum. International organizations could assist in the development of these components and in training educators to implement them.

- **Promoting positive role models for youth.** While in the past, military figures were generally regarded as role models, local artists and/or other influential leaders could be commissioned to promote the small arms control message to youth.
- **Creating cultural substitutes.** Preventing the proliferation of small arms by educating youth and children is a long-term approach that has to confront countervailing, and often more powerful influences in the culture. For example, it was observed that many youth in Thiet and Tonj County carry spears as part of their culture, which says that one must be armed in order to be an adult. Research is therefore needed on ways to create cultural substitutes for weapons, and decision- and opinion-makers need to be trained in promoting non-violent conflict resolution.

### *Importance of Small Arms Data Collection*

There was widespread agreement on the need for more information regarding when, where and how small arms violence is triggered in South Sudan. This data could provide indicators of crime and conflict zones and/or high-risk areas. Such information would be invaluable for planning purposes—indicating where to prioritize arms control efforts—as well as to measure our impact on the small arms problem more reliably. At present, data on small arms violence in South Sudan exists, but is not systematically gathered or recorded, residing more in the memory and experience of local people. The problem lies therefore in accessing, collecting and disseminating small arms data that could serve as a baseline for our efforts. The need to address this deficiency was underlined by participants in the workshop, and several key recommendations were highlighted:

- The role of the police in collecting data on small arms violence is critical. In order to increase their ability to do so, international actors could assist in identifying the necessary information and methodology for collecting this data. This could be done by way of a formular template and an accompanying ‘how-to’ manual to be provided to police institutions.
- Local newspapers are an excellent source of information and can be used to collect data on small arms violence at the local level. Conducting an analysis of back issues for reports on small arms violence would provide vital information on this topic.
- According to organizations in the field, county officials in South Sudan are already collecting data on small arms incidents. The question remains as to how to access and disseminate this data to community leaders and local authorities so that they can help prevent or mitigate the escalation of conflict. Pact noted that facilitating radio networks and creating social ties between different communities is an effective way of calming tensions and preventing the escalation of misunderstandings.

Representatives from the SSDDRC informed workshop participants of an existing database of small arms incidents in South Sudan, but noted that this database will only be shared at the request of local and international partners.

### *Importance of Information Dissemination*

Once again, information dissemination was highlighted as another critical aspect for the success of any arms control intervention. Three key reasons for this were mentioned:

- **Building trust and confidence between local people and communities.** As previously discussed, the more information that is shared between chiefs and their communities, the less likely the chance for misinterpretation, miscommunication and misunderstanding.
- **Spurring collective action with regard to small arms control.** If people are aware of actions they can take to help minimize and prevent the small arms problem, then the likelihood of them doing so is much greater. Our efforts should also be directed toward those at the local level that are uninformed, unaware or generally disinterested in the peace process, in order to ensure that they do not become potential spoilers to of our arms control efforts.
- **Sharing lessons learned** on disarmament in South Sudan to help inform communities of the most appropriate strategies. Knowledge of best and worst practices from neighboring states can help build confidence in the process of disarmament, particularly if there is evidence that helps increase local security. The sharing of lessons learned and best practices is also a good source of encouragement and motivation for other communities to take part in the disarmament process.

To date, lessons learned from civilian disarmament in South Sudan have not yet been formally compiled and analyzed, though the need to do so was widely acknowledged by participants at the workshop. It was agreed that the SSDDRC should be the ultimate repository of these lessons learned once it has the capacity to collect and store this information.

### *Gender and Age*

While a specific focus on the issue of gender was beyond the scope of the workshop, many participants noted the difficulty of encouraging women to participate in co-ed training environments. Although women are generally included in these efforts, they rarely provide their opinion or speak out in front of their male counterparts, despite attempts by trainers to make the environment more inviting. Separating men and women and/or focusing strictly on women's groups as an alternative strategy for capacity-building was generally discouraged by participants, namely because capacity is necessary not only among women but also between men and women to work collectively for positive change. Confronting gender issues in a vacuum—without the participation of men—would thus be ineffective in changing gender dynamics over the longer term.

With regard to small arms, participants noted that women in the region have generally played two different roles: advocates of weapons collection and disarmament, and promoters of small arms possession. The latter role deserves attention, as it is not known what exactly motivates women to support the retention of guns, especially since they are the ones mainly left behind or victimized by armed violence. As such, more in-depth

research is needed of the different roles women have and continue to take in South Sudan with regard to small arms violence.

Nevertheless, women have proven to be a powerful force for demobilization and arms control in a variety of different countries and settings. The capacity of women to act as agents of peace and disarmament is also present in South Sudan, where there is a growing number of indigenous women's organizations working to promote positive change in the region. The question remains as to how to best mobilize these women and utilize their capacity to promote small arms control. One suggestion was the role of women as important witnesses and monitors of small arms violence, with the potential to contribute to the documentation and dissemination of conflict factors both within their own community, and/or between neighboring communities.

### *Coordination between Training Organizations*

Given the link between small arms control and many other post-conflict needs, the importance of coordination was highlighted as a key issue for improving our collective impact on the peace process in South Sudan. Coordination was underlined for two main reasons: first, to avoid the duplication of effort; and second, to ensure that our efforts are as spread out as possible. Currently, many capacity-building efforts are concentrated in the main administrative centers in South Sudan, such as Juba, due to the presence of local infrastructure. However, these efforts occur at the expense of less attractive areas that are also in need of external intervention. Participants agreed that combining efforts in a way that brings together each organization's comparative advantage in the field—whether on the issue of small arms training, conflict transformation or peacebuilding—is likely to have the greatest impact on the ground. Coordination to ensure that our efforts are spread out across the ten states in South Sudan was also recognized as vital.

Given the complexity of the challenges facing South Sudan, no one group or organization is able to transform the situation alone. It was therefore agreed that a routinized system of informing one another of our actual or planned efforts is needed. In this spirit, BICC noted its plans to conduct further training on small arms control in South Sudan in late 2006.

## **Training Issues and Approaches for Further Consideration**

### *Possible Entry Points for Future Training*

Entry points for training on small arms control were discussed on an ongoing basis over the course of the workshop. The SSDDRC was identified as the key link between the GoSS and civil society—they are best positioned to bring recommendations from civil society actors up to the state level, while helping to implement state policy on the ground. Working through the SSDDRC was therefore identified as an ideal entry point for small arms training; however, until the Commission is fully operational, efforts will have to continue at the invitation and demand of local actors.

Without concrete data on the needs and gaps of specific local actors, it was agreed that training on small arms control should be spread out across various levels of society, and provided to a variety of target groups. The following three levels of government and key actors within them were identified as possible entry points:

<i>Entry point</i>	<i>Target groups</i>
<i>National, SSDDRC</i>	Commission staff
	Parliamentarians
<i>State level</i>	Police
	Army
	State SALW facilitator
	NGOs
	Church organizations
<i>County level</i>	Local chiefs
	Security committee representatives
	Peace committee members
	Civilian-based organizations (CBOs)

In terms of geographic location, participants highlighted the **state of Jonglei as an area of priority for implementing small arms control training**, given the presence of ethnic tensions and widespread possession of small arms by all groups, young and old alike. At the same time, interventions are needed in all areas of South Sudan, particularly those that are less accessible and attractive to external actors.

It was once again underlined that frustrations are generally quite high among the South Sudanese people on issues of disarmament. Small arms control training will therefore need to create buy-in among local people and in order to do this, tangible outcomes must be delivered through training—whether in the form of new skills, activities or relationships. Most importantly, however, buy-in requires a sense of hope for a more stable and secure future. While small arms control training alone cannot provide such hope, it can provide individuals with a better sense of empowerment and control over their security situation. Participants identified the need for alternative income-generation programs as a key element of providing a greater sense of hope for the future, as it would discourage the dependency on cattle and remove a root cause of local conflict.

As the issue of small arms contains a number of important sub-issues, a practical exercise was then undertaken to identify possible training needs for the different target groups at each level, and to identify where these needs overlap. The following table attempts to map this discussion. It must be noted that this list is not exhaustive and would need to be substantiated by a proper needs assessment.



		SALW & Human Security	SALW Transfers	SALW Agreements, legal aspects	SALW research & data collection	Conflict analysis & conflict transformation	Negotiation	Human rights law	Civil society action on SALW	Technical aspects of SALW control	Youth & SALW control
National, SDDRC	Commission staff	●	●	●						●	●
	Parliamentarians	●	●	●							●
State level	Police			●	●	●	●	●		●	●
	Army	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	●
	State SALW facilitator	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	NGOs	●		●	●				●		●
	Church organizations	●		●	●	●	●		●		●
County level	Local chiefs					●	●		●		●
	Security committee representatives	●		●		●	●	●			●
	Peace committee members				●	●	●		●		●
	Civilian-based organizations (CBOs)	●			●	●	●		●		●

Several key questions were identified in the design of training or other capacity-building programs:

- How can we support the SSDDRC in approaching the state level to design a strategic and systematic training plan?
- In the immediate period, how do international training organizations target and involve local NGOs in training? What should be the criteria for determining which NGOs to invite as participants, and how do we go about attracting their attention?
- How do we encourage and motivate youth to get involved?
- How do we go about ensuring that our training efforts have continued value after we leave and is making an impact on the ground?

### *Distinguishing DD&R from Small Arms Control Activities*

By nature, DD&R is mainly a military process, whereas small arms control is both a military and civilian process. Small arms control includes a variety of different activities, from awareness-raising campaigns to arms reduction strategies and civilian disarmament. With regard to disarmament, **removing weapons from the military and from regular civilians are two completely different processes** – in the former, there is a clear and identifiable group to be disarmed with an established chain of command, so orders are followed in a more structured and efficient manner. Civilians owning arms, however, are very difficult to identify and control. They will not easily admit to owning weapons or step forward for disarmament without security guarantees or other tangible benefits. While DD&R and small arms control are not mutually exclusive, they still demand distinct approaches. For example, relying on DD&R as the only form of small arms control could neglect the role that civilians can play in reestablishing security. At the same time, promoting small arms control in a militarized society is neither effective nor wise, and should be linked with broader disarmament and demobilization programs. It is important to understand the distinction between these two processes in order to come up with appropriate policy and programming prescriptions.

### *Role and Challenges Facing the SSDDRC*

The SSDDRC aims to function across four different levels in South Sudan: the political, policy, technical and programming levels. The political level will be represented by a body composed of representatives from various national ministries, including the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Head of Police. While not yet functional, this body will ultimately be responsible for decision-making on various recommendations put forth by the Commission, as well as supporting nation-wide implementation. The policy level is represented by the SSDDRC Commissioner's office, which provides policy recommendations on how to operationalize the DD&R commitments of the GoSS in line with the CPA. Program plans are formulated at the technical level, where there will be a Director appointed for identified areas of priority, including youth/child soldiers, women associated with fighting forces and other vulnerable groups. Heads of Units and other

commission officials will then be responsible for implementing these programs and monitoring their impact.

While the structure appears to be in place, the substance of the Commission is currently lacking. To date, the SSDDRC is not yet fully operational, with only a few of the positions filled. The Commission faces the challenge of staffing these positions as quickly as possible, and progress toward this end has been incremental. It is not entirely clear what the reason is for such delay, though it is clear that the **lack of progress has had negative repercussions for the start of disarmament and arms reduction activities throughout the region.**

SSDDRC representatives nevertheless noted that work on child demobilization had begun in the Upper Nile region, and that actions were being taken on several other fronts. For example, the Commission is currently developing a database of local and international partners with whom they will reach a memorandum of understanding to implement disarmament and arms control activities. They are also in the process of constructing two community training centers in Upper Nile and noted the need for material help and assistance in developing appropriate curricula and expertise for the training of demobilized soldiers at the centers. Both issues were noted as possible areas for follow-up and cooperation with workshop participants.

The SSDDRC advised that its staff members will require training on technical issues related to small arms reduction and control down the line, and that the Commission aims to oversee the coordination of such training for national and state-level institutions as well. They underlined that general awareness and knowledge of the small arms problem exists within South Sudan, but what is needed is more intervention and action on these issues.

**Assistance in facilitating small arms control and reduction training was therefore identified as a priority.**

The biggest complaint expressed by the SSDDRC was the lack of a legal framework in which to pursue their DD&R mandate. Without a legal basis for implementing a national DD&R program, the Commission noted that they have very few tools with which to pursue small arms reduction activities. There was general agreement that the SSDDRC need not wait for legislation in order to advise the GoSS on this front. As a first step, it was recommended that the SSDDRC bring together relevant NGOs and international partners to develop a road map for activities related to DD&R and small arms control. On the one hand, this road map could support the creation of legislation for the Commission's work, while on the other hand allow work to be prioritized and carried out without further delay.

As the SSDDRC is still in the process of establishing itself, the workshop provided an opportune time for participants to provide advice and recommendations on the potential structure of the Commission's upcoming work with regard to disarmament and small arms control. Recommendations included:

- The SSDDRC should collect and serve as a nexus of information on small arms issues to be made available to national, state and county institutions, as well as international partners. This includes information on target groups and areas of priority/high-risk.

- The SSDDRC should act as an advisory committee to the GoSS and the military, particularly on whether, where and how to engage in disarmament.
- **The issue of civilian and military arms control should be a Commission priority and be pursued in parallel to DD&R.** Toward this end, it was recommended that the SSDDRC consider establishing an independent unit to focus specifically on small arms issues, and that they encourage the creation of a similar sub-committee in the Parliament of South Sudan.
- The SSDDRC should encourage the immediate build-up and training of the police force, as the police will be responsible for promoting small arms control when the disarmament and demobilization phases of the DD&R process are complete.

## Conclusion

The workshop provided an ideal opportunity for experts, practitioners and academics to come together for the first time to share their work and experiences on capacity-building in South Sudan. The atmosphere was one of collaboration, cooperation and commitment to support the peace process and improve the overall level of security on the ground. Of particular value was the participation of South Sudanese parliamentarians, the SSDDRC and members of civil society, which provided a unique opportunity to engage in concrete dialogue about local needs and priorities for small arms control, peace and disarmament.

In terms of mapping the road ahead, it became clear that the space is not yet available to pursue disarmament in South Sudan on a large scale. Until such time as there is a more effective and reliable security sector, small arms control and reduction was identified as a more appropriate strategy to pursue. It also became clear that future training and capacity-building initiatives should aim for coordination with the SSDDRC to ensure that lessons learned and best practices are applied throughout the region.

**The workshop also made clear the need for training on small arms control and reduction at all three levels of government** in South Sudan: national, state and county. While the specific needs of target groups vary at each level, the overall capacity to tackle the region's small arms problem is severely lacking. Civil society should also be targeted through these efforts and encouraged to work more effectively with local governments. The SSDDRC was identified as an important intermediary between government and civil society on this front.

More coordination among training and capacity-building organizations working in this field was also identified as an important element of our success on the ground. In line with this, **BICC noted that it will hold a follow-up workshop in early 2007** to deal more in depth with the topic of partnerships and effective coordination, among other things.

A key issue requiring further analysis and debate is one of impact. For example, how can we ensure that our capacity-building efforts make a positive impact on the ground? How do we measure impact and what parameters should we use to determine our success? How do we publish and disseminate this information for the best possible use? Examining these questions will provide guidance in the design and implementation of more

routinized and systematic assessments of our efforts to help ensure that we make an effective contribution on the ground.

While important progress has been made on a number of fronts since the signing of the CPA, South Sudan remains to be plagued by low-level violence and insecurity. As one of the main perpetrators of this insecurity, the abundance of small arms in the region must be tackled effectively, albeit incrementally. This workshop aimed to bring together a number of organizations working on this issue to enhance our methodologies, programming and overall contribution to the peaceful reconstruction of South Sudan.

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## Annex I: List of Participants

**Amb. Ochieng Adala**

Africa Peace Forum

**Dr. Michael Ashkenazi**

Bonn International Center  
for Conversion

**Ms. Lilian Bogonko**

Africa Peace Forum

**Mr. Laban Cheruiyot**

Africa Peace Forum

**Mr. Daniel Deng**

Chairman, Security Committee,  
South Sudan Parliament

**Mr. Benjamin Gimba**

Executive Director, South Sudan DD&R  
Commission

**Mr. Nikolai Hutchinson**

Pact

**Ms. Elvan Isikozlu**

Bonn International Center  
for Conversion

**Mr. David Lochhead**

UNDP Sudan

**Mr. Arop Mayak**

Commissioner, South Sudan DD&R  
Commission

**Ms. Apollonia Mathia**

Juba Post

**Dr. Alfred Lokuji**

Consultant, Africa Peace Forum

**Dr. Peter Adwok Nyaba**

Researcher/Consultant  
Member of Legislature, Government  
of National Unity, Sudan

**Mr. Kennedy Odhiambo**

African Centre for Human Advocacy

**Mr. Wolf-Christian Paes**

Bonn International Center  
for Conversion

**Mr. Sam Perera**

UNDDR-Khartoum

**Mr. Kizito Sabala**

Africa Peace Forum

**Mr. Ferdinand Von Habsburg-Lothringen**

UNDP Sudan

## **Annex II: Overview of Participating Organizations**

### **African Centre for Human Advocacy (ACHA)**

ACHA launched a peacebuilding and conflict transformation training programme in 2004 to strengthen the capacities of local NGOs, community-based organizations and local authorities in Eastern Upper Nile to participate in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Programme objectives include the promotion of practical skills and knowledge on conflict transformation at the community level, as well as the promotion of a culture of peace, rule of law and good governance among communities along the river Sobat. For more information on ACHA's activities, inquiries can be made to Mr. Kennedy Odhiambo, at [kenodhiss@yahoo.com](mailto:kenodhiss@yahoo.com)

### **Africa Peace Forum (APFO)**

APFO's mission is to contribute towards the prevention, resolution and effective management of conflicts by engaging state and non-state actors in exploring collaborative approaches to bring lasting peace in the Greater Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions. Africa Peace Forum promotes the objective of peace and security through participating in and supporting peace initiatives and processes in the Horn of Africa sub-region. APFO has over the years participated in the Sudan peace process by promoting dialogue among the various groups in Southern Sudan and in the process leading up to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. Following the signing of the CPA, APFO continues to work with the government of Southern Sudan by supporting the post war reconstruction process through capacity building. Currently APFO runs two projects in Southern Sudan namely: Building capacity for Sustainable Peace: Track two Diplomacy and the Sudan Conflict in collaboration with Project Ploughshares of Canada and SALW control training in Southern Sudan in collaboration with the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) based in Germany. For more information about APFO visit their website at [www.amaniafrika.org](http://www.amaniafrika.org).

### **Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)**

BICC is working to enhance security and peace-building in South Sudan by implementing a series of comprehensive SALW control training sessions. The objective of training is to provide the people of South Sudan with a comprehensive set of tools for the control of SALW in clearly identified problem areas, in order to strengthen the formal Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The activities are expected to act in parallel to the formal and diplomatic efforts to establish and enhance the peace in Sudan. They involve all elements of society and establish channels of communication and practices that will aid communities in South Sudan become effective partners in their own governance, security, and government.

### **Pact**

Pact has been working on peacebuilding in Sudan since 2002. Pact Sudan is currently working with local administration and the UNDDR program in three priority areas in the South: Bahr el Ghazal, Jonglei and the Upper Nile regions. In terms of capacity-building, Pact is focusing on information dissemination on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in partnership with local governments and the Ministry of Information. For more information on their activities in the region, visit their website at [www.pactsudan.org](http://www.pactsudan.org).

**UNDP Sudan**

The UNDP is working to implement the Promotion of Good Governance and Social Inclusion for Peace building and Recovery programme in South Sudan. Capacity-building activities include training on a variety of related issues, from organizational administration to training on the rule of law in partnership with UNMIS and the South Sudan Law Society. UNDP is also working to combat the widespread feeling of isolation and exclusion in South Sudan by promoting access to resources such as libraries, internet, and copies of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. For more information on the UNDP's activities in South Sudan, visit their website at <http://www.sd.undp.org/>.

**United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)**

According to its mandate, UNMIS is tasked with supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This includes facilitating the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons; providing demining assistance; and contributing towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan. UNMIS is also assisting in the development of Sudan's police service and promoting civilian arms control in a non-coercive way. For more information, visit the official website of UNMIS at [www.unmis.org](http://www.unmis.org).



## Annex III: Workshop Agenda

WEDNESDAY, 14 JUNE

- 9:00 – 9:30                    **Welcome and administrative arrangements**
- BICC
  - APFO
- 9:30 – 10:30                **Training experiences in capacity-building for peace in Southern Sudan**
- BICC
  - APFO
  - ACHA
  - UNDP Sudan
  - UNMIS
  - Pact
- Break**
- 11:00 – 13:00                **Conflict issues and locations in Sudan**
- Presentation by Dr. Lokuji
- Lunch**
- 14:00 – 15:30                **Conflict issues and locations in Sudan (cont'd)**
- Discussion, all participants
- Break**
- 16:00 – 17:00                **Mapping capacity-building onto conflict issues and locations**
- Discussion, all participants

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THURSDAY, 15 JUNE

- 9:00 – 10:30                **Mapping a strategy for capacity-building on peace and SALW control in South Sudan**
- SSDDRC
  - UNDP Sudan
  - UNMIS
- Break**
- 11:00 – 13:00                **Mapping a strategy for capacity-building on peace and SALW control in South Sudan (cont'd)**
- Discussion, all participants
- Lunch**
- 14:00 – 15:30                **What are the main technical lessons learned from training experiences in Sudan?**
- BICC
  - Pact
  - UNDP Sudan
- Break**
- 16:00 – 17:00                **What are the main lessons learned from training experiences in Sudan? (cont'd)**

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**FRIDAY, 16 JUNE**

9:00 – 10:30

**Adapting training material for use in South Sudan**

- BICC

**Break**

11:00 – 13:00

**Adapting training material for use in South Sudan (cont'd)**

- Discussion, all participants

**Lunch**

14:00 – 15:30

**Adapting training material for use in South Sudan (cont'd)**

- Discussion, all participants

**Break**

16:00 – 17:00

**Summary of workshop and continued action**

18:00

**Dinner hosted by BICC**