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**working
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RESERVED DOMAINS AS OBSTACLES TO NORMATIVE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR IN SERBIA


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Abstract

The author's intention with this paper is to identify the reasons why the private security sector in Serbia, for more than 16 years now, has not been regulated by a law specifically relating to this field. In order to realise his intention, the author has resorted to the theory of defective democracies and the postulates on reserved domains deriving from it. According to this theory, when a combination of different interests and actors in a state either directly or indirectly influences the content and direction of the decisions of democratically elected representatives, then reserved domains are present and such a state is described as a domain democracy. Taking these theoretical postulates as a starting point in his paper, the author investigates and analyses circumstances and actors and their interconnections and interests presenting barriers to the normative regulation of the private security sector in Serbia. These interests and actors are linked to economic interests and the secret collection of data, as well as to criminal activities.

Key words: private security sector, reserved domains, defective democracies, law on private security, lack of legislative regulation, crime, secret collection of data, economic espionage, political espionage.



Introduction

The process of security sector privatisation has been ongoing in Serbia since the beginning of the 1990s, gaining speed when the transition process began moving forward after the political changes of 5th October 2000. It is thus estimated that private security companies (PSCs)¹ in Serbia currently employ between 30,000 and 50,000 people², that there are about 3,000 such companies and that about 47,000 firearms owned by companies, have been registered.³ Although PSCs have grown both in number and significance and in economic gain, this sector still faces challenges typical of the 1990s: criminalisation, market dominance of particular companies thanks to their political connections, inadequate training, poor staff selection, etc. Despite this, however, this sector is still legislatively unregulated. Unlike Serbia, all other post-socialist countries (with the exception of the Czech Republic) strived, after the initial period of uncontrolled and “wild“ privatisation of the security sector⁴, to regulate this area through legislation.⁵ Looking for the best ways to regulate this sector, countries such as Bulgaria have even adopted more than one law. In such cases, as soon as they realised that the existing normative model was not yielding good results, a post-socialist country would adopt a new law, repeating this process until they managed to reach the optimum solution. On the other hand, 17 years after the repeal of the Law on Social Self-Defence⁶ and 10 years after its democratic transformation, Serbia has still not normatively regulated the private security sector.

1 In this paper, private security companies are meant to include private companies providing security services and private companies providing detective/intelligence services.

2 For the sake of comparison, the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia employs about 50,000 people, and the Army of Serbia has approx. 28,000 soldiers. “Nedostaje dve hiljade vojnika,” (We Are Short of Two Thousand Soldiers) *Blic* 22.09.2008, <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/57816/Nedostaje-dve-hiljade-vojnika->.

3 Michael Page et al., *SALW i firme za privatno obezbeđenje u jugoistočnoj Evropi: uzrok ili posledica nesigurnosti?* (SALW and Private Security Companies in the SEE Countries: a Cause or a Consequence of Insecurity?) (Beograd: Centar za kontrolu lakog naoružanja u jugoistočnoj i istočnoj Evropi (SEESAC), 2006). p. 3.

4 The main characteristic of the wild privatisation of the security sector is that it takes place spontaneously, unsupervised by state institutions; consequently, a large number of criminal groups use PSCs as legal grounds for extortion, racketeering, and protection of their illegal businesses. In doing this, they contribute to the increasing fear of violence and deterioration of security in the society.

5 For more about security sector privatisation in some post-socialist countries see, e.g., Timothy Frye, *Private Protection in Russia and Poland*, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, no. 3. (July, 2002), pp. 572–584. Philip Gounev, *Bulgaria's Private Security Industry*, in: Alan Bryden, Marina Caparini (eds.), *Private Actors and Security Governance*, DCAF, Geneva, 2006, p. 109.

6 This law regulated the security protection sector in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. It was repealed in 1993 with the explanation that it was inadequate in a situation where several different forms of property exist. The PSC security managers in Serbia, however, hold that this Law was good and that there was no need for its rescission.

This is particularly surprising considering that some institutions, organisations and associations have drafted several model laws, one of which even got as far as parliament in 2003 (drafted by the MoI) but was later withdrawn from the public sphere, for unknown reasons.⁷ Thus there are grounds for asking which circumstances, events, processes, and actors influence developments in the private security sector and which of these factors obstruct the start of reform in this sector, i.e. the adoption of a specific law on the private security sector. In this paper we will try to answer some of these questions, and, to be able to accomplish this, we will resort to the postulates of the theory of defective democracy⁸, and in particular the postulate about reserved domains deriving from this theory.

In addition to local and international literature dealing with security privatisation, democratisation and legal regulation this paper shall also use newspaper articles, and data and information from interviews conducted by the BCBP team with members of the Republic of Serbia National Assembly's Committee for Defence and Security and security managers in PSCs, banks and insurance companies, within the project 'Private Security Companies: Friend or Threat?' Because of the sensitivity of the research topic, BCBP guaranteed anonymity to all interviewed persons; thus, the names of persons cited in this paper are not indicated and members of the project team have exclusive access to the recorded interviews.⁹

⁷ Thus, civil society organisations prepared two drafts: the Model Law on Private Security Sector (CCVO, 2006) and the Draft Law on Private Business Activity of Security Operatives and Property and Detective Work (League of Experts – LEX, 2006). The professional association that gathers together PSCs prepared a Draft Law on Private Security Provision to Persons and Property (Board of the Association of Private Security Companies within the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, 2006). The drafting of the above model law received strong support from CSOs, the Association of PCSs, individual PCSs, and the expert community at a number of conferences, round tables and seminars, in which it was insisted that the authorities should at last adopt a law adequately regulating the private security sector. The Association of PSCs and many individual PSCs adopted codes of business ethics and professional standards. The largest media houses in Serbia have closely followed these activities and some local TV stations (such as KTV, a private TV station in Zrenjanin) broadcast, through the local TV network, a large number of programmes dealing with this topic.

⁸ The theory of defective democracy was developed by a group of German political scientists led by Wolfgang Merkel within the Defective Democracy project (German *Defekte Demokratie*), Wolfgang Merkel, "Ukotvljene i manjkave demokracije," (Embedded and Defective Democracies), *Politička misao* Vol. XLIII, No. 1(2004), p. 80–104.

⁹ The results of this research were published in: Sonja Stojanović, Predrag Petrović, Marko Milošević i Jelena Unijat, eds., *Privatne bezbednosne kompanije u Srbiji - prijatelj ili pretnja?(Public Security Companies in Serbia: Friend or Threat)* (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2008).

Defective Democracies and Reserved Domains

It can be said that the theory of defective democracy combines the theory of weak states and the theory of democratisation. According to this theory, consolidated democracies are defined as strong, functional states, or states that are fortified both internally and externally. They have to “cope with the structural conditions of modern rule, internally with complex societies and externally with a challenging environment. They have to develop certain structures to be able to fulfil different functions”¹⁰ A democracy is consolidated externally when the state performs its socio-economic and security functions and when civil society is well developed so that the state is integrated into international and regional alliances (military, political, economic, etc).

Internal consolidation means that five partial regimes of a democracy are developed and interdependent, namely that the partial regimes support each other. Those regimes, however, must have a satisfactory degree of autonomy. Partial regimes are: a democratic electoral regime (A), political rights of participation (B), civil rights (C), horizontal accountability (D), and the guarantee that the effective power to govern lies in the hands of democratically elected representatives (E).¹¹ When any of the partial regimes is not present or is weak, then defective democracies emerge. We distinguish between four types of defective democracies: exclusive democracy, illiberal democracy, delegative democracy, and domain democracy.

Most important for the subject of this paper is the (non-)existence of partial regime (E) - effective power to rule; for that reason this is the only regime to be explained in any great detail here. This regime enables those who are democratically elected to govern those who are not. However, this is not the case in most weak states, because individual actors - individuals, groups, and/or institutions - influence the direction and content of state decisions, both general and sector related, in accordance with their partial interests. For instance, the state would like to implement reforms in a particular sector - in the private security sector in our case - but the interests of recalcitrant structures (since the reforms would deprive them of benefits - financial, material, and/or other) prevail. The actors known to veto usually include individuals having economic power - tycoons and oligarchs, business complexes (such as military-industrial complexes), multinational

¹⁰ Merkel, *Embedded and Defective Democracies*, p. 83.

¹¹ *Ibid*, pp. 84–90.

corporations, criminal groups (particularly those of an organised nature), paramilitary groups, and guerrilla groups, etc. Actors may also include individual state institutions or their subdivisions which are not subject to adequate democratic control and accountability; these include the military, the police and the security services. The common denominator of all the above-mentioned actors is that they use illegitimate channels in order to thwart reforms, the implementation of which would impair their interests.

Striving to realise their interests, these actors may act independently from each other, and their interests may even conflict. However, the effect of their actions is identical - the inability of legitimately elected citizens' representatives to make and implement

When a combination of different interests and actors in a state either directly or indirectly influences the content and direction of the decisions of democratically elected representatives, then reserved domains are present and such a state is described as a domain democracy.

decisions. And they do often act in concert with the intention of achieving their aims. Thus, for instance, it often happens that some individuals from the security apparatus, particularly from security services, work with tycoons and political

parties in order to influence the content and direction of political decision-making by parliament and the government). When a combination of different interests and actors in a state either directly or indirectly influences the content and direction of the decisions of democratically elected representatives, then reserved domains are present and such a state is described as a domain democracy.

According to the findings of Merkel's research team, important causes of the emergence and survival of defective democracies include economic crises and a low level of socioeconomic development, as well as an authoritarian heritage and informal political and social relationships.¹² Economic crises and low and uneven socioeconomic development create a division between a narrow circle of the wealthy and powerful on the one hand, and a wide circle of the poor and powerless, on the other hand. Those who have economic power can easily turn their economic capital into political capital. "An asymmetric distribution of economic, cultural and intellectual resources promotes acute inequality in the distribution of political resources of action and power among political actors."¹³ Instead of new institutional relations being created in society, old informal networks subsist. "Informal institutions threaten to crack the functional code

¹² Other causes for the emergence and survival of defective democracies are the crisis of the state and/or identity, weak civil society, absence of modernisation, and the international and regional environment. Ibid, pp. 97–99.

¹³ Ibid, p. 98.

of formal, democratically-legitimised institutions, deforming and displacing them. In essential domains of decision-making, democracy can then only function according to non-legitimised, informal institutions and rules which contradict the principles of a democratic state based on the rule of law.”¹⁴

Further in this paper we will attempt to investigate and show which interests and actors are reserved domains in Serbia, and which present obstacles to the adoption of PSC-related legislation, as well as which factors in the social environment promote their survival.

Reserved Domains and Private Security Sector in Serbia

Economic interests

Jobs in the private security sector are among the most lucrative in Serbia today and the main reason for this is not only commercial law or movements in the market; quite the opposite, the main reason is the lack of legislation regulating jobs in the private security

“Widespread illegal work is a huge problem... By adoption of the law, public revenue would increase by some 5 to 7 billion dinars; namely, 150 euros of revenue are missed per employed person, and 30,000 employees times 150 euros amounts to 450,000 euro a month, plus training, plus testing, taxes collected by the state – checks made with the police, with the prosecutors’

sector and the inadequate implementation of existing regulations applicable to this sector. It is typical for this sector that a large number of people employed with PSCs are not duly registered and, consequently, their companies do not pay any contributions to the

Serbian state on their behalf. According to Radomir M. Misaljević, owner of the Pravac agency, the Serbian private security sector employs about 60,000 people, 25 per cent of whom are employed in compliance with the labour law whilst the rest work illegally.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 99.

¹⁵ Branimir Đokić, “Agencije za privatno obezbeđenje van kontrole države” (Private Security Agencies are Beyond the State’s Control), *VESTI online* 18/9/2009.

That is how some private security companies make huge profits. “Two years ago the nine Belgrade companies in this sector alone had a 40 million euro turnover.”¹⁶ A security manager in a state-owned security company, talking about the private security sector, says: “Widespread illegal work is a huge problem... By adoption of the law, public revenue would increase by some 5 to 7 billion dinars; namely, 150 euros of revenue are missed per employed person, and 30,000 employees times 150 euros amounts to 450,000 euro a month, plus training, plus testing, taxes collected by the state - checks made with the police, with the prosecutors’...“¹⁷

It should be added here that the salaries of persons working in the private security sector in Serbia are very low and it is not uncommon that PSCs agree on one price of labour in the contract but then pay much less to the employee.¹⁸ Similarly, some PSCs do not pay a food allowance to their employees, or travel costs, or night work bonus. Due to the lack of a law on the private security sector, they are not under obligation to provide periodical additional training for their employees and their expenses are therefore much lower. A security officer at one of the larger PSCs in Serbia says: “Large security companies pay their workers 87 dinars per hour. They do not pay for travel, or bonuses for night work... In order to get a monthly salary of 20,000 dinars, a person needs to work 250 hours. For

The fact is that a number of PSCs whose owners and/or security managers are members of political parties or closely related with them have, within a very short period of time, increased their business capacity and positioned themselves on the market.

instance, a company for which I work hired three persons to perform security tasks with a gross salary of about 20,000 dinars per employee. The company agreed a 1,500 euro contract with a client. This includes

about 600 euros for labour costs leaving a simple calculation: 1,500 minus 600 euros for an employee equals 900 euros for the company. Besides paying for labour, a company has almost no additional costs relating to safeguarding a building: there is no remote video

¹⁶ “Haos u sektoru privatne bezbednosti,” (Chaos in the Private Security Sector) *Biznis novine*, 31st August 2009, <http://www.biznisnovine.com/cms/item/stories/sr.html?view=story&id=39107>.

¹⁷ Marko Milošević, “Uticaj tržišta na privatni sektor bezbednosti,” (The Influence of the Market on the Private Security Sector) u: *Privatne bezbednosne kompanije u Srbiji - prijatelj ili pretnja?*, (Private Security Companies in Serbia – Friend or Threat?), Sonja Stojanović, Predrag Petrović, Marko Milošević i Jelena Unijat, eds. (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2008). A problem with illegal work is the fact that employees are reluctant to report such cases to Serbian state authorities for fear of losing their jobs and, at the time when a large part of the labour force is idle, it is difficult to find a new job.

¹⁸ Illegal work and the low price of labour result in large fluctuations in the size of the private security sector labour force. For this reason, the seemingly imprecise estimate that this sector employs between 30,000 and 60,000 people are actually correct. At the time of year when construction works are taking place, security people leave their jobs at PSCs and work in the construction sector since those jobs are better paid. This results in the complete disappearance of the private security profession in Serbia. Ibid. p. 51–71.

surveillance or fire protection... Let it be known what kind of contract is being concluded with such private companies”¹⁹

All that is said above is possible, among other things, because of illegitimate connections between the top management of PSCs and persons holding the highest positions of power at national or local level. The fact is that a number of PSCs whose owners and/or security managers are members of political parties or closely related with them have, within a very short period of time, increased their business capacity and positioned themselves on the market. I shall mention only the best known connections between the top management of PSCs and (individuals from) political parties.

First example is Sistem FTO, a company founded in 1996. Its founder, owner, and general manager is Milovan Milošević, a high official in the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). Indicatively, although operating ever since 1996, the company saw its largest expansion after 2000, especially in the course of 2005 and 2006,²⁰ at a time when the DSS was part of the Serbian Government.²¹ This was a period when the DSS held key state leverages in Serbian internal security, as it had placed its people in the leading positions at the Ministry of the Interior and the civilian security-intelligence agency.

The second example is Stracon security, founded in 2004 by Gradimir Nalić, known to the general public as human rights advisor to the President of the FRY in the period 2000 - 2003.²² Somewhat later, William Montgomery, the former American ambassador to Serbia and Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Croatia, and his wife Lynn Montgomery, became co-owners of this company. They are responsible for the company’s strategic consulting, foreign affairs and contacts and for market development. No wonder then that Stracon quickly became a huge success on the Serbian market and cherishes an ambition to become a regional leader in the provision of security services, in which efforts it will certainly be helped by the Montgomery couple’s regional and international contacts.

For the last example to illustrate this phenomenon we chose Protecta, a detective agency founded in 2001 by Dragan Trivan, husband of Jelena Trivan, a deputy in the National Assembly and a Spokeswoman for the ruling Democratic Party (DS). The Agency has grown recently and extended its activities to include private security services and

19 Statement of a security officer at one of the larger private security companies in Serbia.

20 See the graphic presentation of the Sistem FTO company’s development on the company’s website: <http://www.sistemfto.com/sr/onama.html>, date accessed: 12.3.2010.

21 After the political changes of October 5th. The DSS later became an opposition party on July 7th 2008, when the DS, together with the SPS and G17plus formed the government of Serbia.

22 See more at the company’s website: <http://www.stracon.co.rs/Default.aspx?m=about>, date accessed: 9.3.2010.

security consulting services. A company named Protecta d.o.o. was founded for these purposes and the Protecta Detective Agency is now an integral part of this company.²³

Researchers from the Crime Prevention Centre also discovered strong connections between political parties and PSCs. Dušan Davidović, the director of this institution, said that the research “revealed strong lobbies in the private security industry and political parties that prevent the adoption of the law since the existing situation leaves room for the uncontrolled award of contracts to favoured companies which then thank them profusely at the end of each month... And all that is necessary for such companies to make swift progress is that their owners are connected with one of the political parties. In this chaos, the security business is lucrative, especially if you take into account that companies are not required to register their employees or to furnish them with suitable equipment, weapons, and, what is most important, training.”²⁴

The current situation in the Serbian private security sector is such that “each larger party has ‘its own’ agency to which it awards contracts for the provision of security services for people or buildings in the city or institution in which it has power, and takes a part of the agency’s revenues in return (...) Politicians pretend they know nothing about it but it is well known that these arrangements are well-established.”²⁵ According to the BCBP team’s findings, illegitimate connections between political parties and PSCs are possible, inter alia, because the financing of political parties is not adequately regulated by the existing regulations.²⁶

On the other hand, these companies do not ensure hefty profits and good deals only thanks to their strong connections

Former members of the police and security services who held middle, higher or top positions in their previous jobs are now placed in managerial positions in a large number of PSCs.

with the political elite, but thanks also to strong contacts with the security elite. Former members of the police and security services who held middle, higher or top positions in their previous jobs are now placed in managerial positions in a large number of PSCs. Thus, “some police generals and high officials start working at private security companies

²³ See more about the company on its website: <http://www.protectagroup.co.rs/>, date accessed: 2.2.2010.

²⁴ Ivana Pejčić, “Potkupljeni političari omogućili bezakonje,” (Corrupt Politicians Allow Lawlessness) *Danas* 06/10/2008, http://www.b92.net/biz/komentari.php?nav_id=384637.

²⁵ Statement of a PSC security manager, quoted in: “Političari čuvaju agencije za obezbeđenje,” (Politicians Shield Security Agencies), *Nedeljni Telegraf* No. 729, 14.4.2010., p. 4.

²⁶ See more in: Sonja Stojanović, Predrag Petrović, Marko Milošević i Jelena Unijat, eds., *Privatne bezbednosne kompanije U Srbiji - prijatelj ili pretnja? (Private Security Companies in Serbia - Friend or Threat)* (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2008), pp. 78–79.

immediately after they retire.”²⁷ In this way such companies become far more competitive than those unable to hire former high level security apparatus staff. “These people are acquainted with many other people, they have contacts and connections, these people

Most European states have enacted legislation to forbid former members of armed forces from gaining employment in the private security sector immediately after they leave service.

know the secrets of other people who still hold top positions... These people, knowing many other people, can suggest safer contacts and make deals with banks for clients.”²⁸

It should be noted here that most European states have enacted legislation to forbid former members of armed forces from gaining employment in the private security sector immediately after they leave service. In order to get employment with PSCs, they need to wait until a particular time period elapses, and this can take several years.²⁹ The purpose of this restrictive measure is to avoid any possibility of anyone who has worked in the armed forces using (or selling) their connections and contacts for the benefit of the PSC. As no law on the private security sector has yet been adopted, there are no such prohibitions in Serbia.

However, further complicating the situation is the fact that legal regulation of the private security sector could bring in significant earnings. The licensing system, by which operating licenses are issued both to companies as legal entities and to individual employees of PSCs, is one of the most important segments of the law on the private security sector in any state. Anyone wanting to start a company needs to obtain the relevant license. Anyone wishing to work in the security sector needs to obtain a license. This license implies, inter alia, that individuals are required to complete a training course in order to be able to work for PSCs. All this is costly: for instance, private security managers estimate that, once it is required by law, the cost of training prospective employees of PSCs will be about 200 euros³⁰. Given that licenses are necessary for two thirds of people working in the private security sector (considering that about one third perform clerical tasks), or some 30,000

²⁷ Dušan Davidović, quoted in: “Haos u sektoru privatne bezbednosti”. (Chaos in the Private Security Sector)

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ The most restrictive measures in this regard are in place in Belgium and Portugal, where regulations require that at least five years elapse before a license is issued to a person previously working for the police, the military or the security services. See more in: Ivan Dimitrijević, “Pregled zakonodavstva privatne bezbednosti u zemljama Evropske Unije”, in: *Privatne bezbednosne kompanije u Srbiji - prijatelj ili pretnja?*, Sonja Stojanović, Predrag Petrović, Marko Milošević i Jelena Unijat, eds. (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2008). pp. 99–112.

³⁰ The average monthly salary in Serbia in 2010 is 300 euros. “Prosečna plata u Srbiji u maju 33.463 dinara”. *Blic on-line*. <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Ekonomija/195512/Prosecna-plata-u-Srbiji-u-maju-33463-dinara>, date accessed: 23.8.2010.

people, the conclusion may be drawn that six million euros can potentially be earned through licensing, a substantial sum in Serbia. It is also noteworthy that operating licenses for individuals working for PSCs are issued for a limited time period the length of which varies country by country.³¹

The problem is that both the private security sector and the Mol want exclusive licensing rights. The difference of opinion between these two actors is evident in the different formulations of the model laws drafted by the Association of Private Security Companies and the Mol. The model law drafted by the Association vests the licensing rights exclusively in the Association, while the draft law proposed by the Mol grants these rights to the Mol. To make things even more complicated, some PSCs have their own employee training centres and hold that, regardless of who is granted the licensing rights - the Association or Mol - training should be decentralised; namely, every PSC should have the right to train its own candidates.³² Some PSCs intend to protect their financial interests in this way.

According to security managers at some PSCs, and also to some individuals working for the Mol, this difference of opinion is a major obstacle to the adoption of the law. Several PSC security managers have claimed in interviews that the draft law on private security services proposed by the Mol was withdrawn from parliamentary procedure exactly because the right to issue operating licenses to PSCs was vested in the Mol, “which some owners of PSCs did not deem fitting and so they interfered to prevent its adoption”.³³

Secret collection of data

As well as large and medium-sized private security companies, there are many small companies in Serbia which do not employ more than a few dozen people. A large number of these companies engage in intelligence activities and are known as detective agencies in this region. There are no precise records about the companies practicing these activities

31 See more in: Ibid, pp. 99–112.

32 See more in: Predrag Petrović, “Kontrola i nadzor privatnog sektora bezbednosti,” (Control and Surveillance of the Private Security Sector), *Revija za bezbednost* Broj 5, maj 2008, http://www.cbs-css.org/files/revija-za-bezbednost/2008/revija_za_bezbednost_05_2008.pdf, pp. 17–23.

33 Interview with the security manager of a PSC, interviewed by BCBP researchers as part of a project entitled “Private Security Companies in Serbia – Friend or Threat?” The research team guaranteed the anonymity of those interviewed; for this reason only the project team have access to the interviews.

as, due to the lack of a law, they can be registered under various business activity codes.³⁴ This is a problem because detective agencies provide services which mostly involve the interception of data and this can cause significant infringement of both civil and human rights and the rights of business entities.

In Serbia detective agencies are known to the public above all for services such as checking the faithfulness of partners, solving marital problems, looking for missing persons and runaways, getting people out of religious sects, uncovering drug addictions and helping to get rid of such addictions. It is less well known, however, that these agencies also perform some investigative, security and counter-intelligence tasks. Accordingly, the following services are sometimes offered on detective agencies' websites: counterespionage and investigation of business entities; polygraph testing, secret recording, bodyguard services, surveillance, electronic surveillance and tailing;³⁵ tapping of telephone lines; checks on a person's biography and past; checks on judicial data; investigation of criminal justice data; sending anonymous text messages; criminal-legal aid and representation at

Espionage programmes for intercepting text messages and conversations can be bought for 139 euros, or a parabolic microphone capable of recording a conversation at a distance of 200 metres for 109 euros.

court; finding extenuating circumstances in crime committal.³⁶

Many agencies mention on their websites that they obtain all necessary (mostly

personal) data from various state authorities. They also boast of having extensive networks of associates and, on their websites, the door is always open for those willing to become associates of the agency.³⁷

Several things suggest that these claims are not merely bait the agencies use to attract clients, but are actually true. Firstly, wiretapping and monitoring equipment is

³⁴ Many PSCs in Serbia are registered at the Serbian Chamber of Commerce under the codes used for services.

³⁵ For example, *Wolf Security Guard* advertises this service thus: "You are offered a unique opportunity to have your premises or a person subject to electronic surveillance from any location in REAL TIME!" URL: <http://www.wolfsecurityguard.com/usluge.html>, date accessed: 9.4.2010.

³⁶ As an illustration of services provided by detective agencies in Serbia see the *Bond* website: <http://www.bond.rs/bond/index.html>, date accessed: 12.3.2010. The owner of this agency, Ranko Vukomanović, was president of the detective section of the Association of Private Security Services within the Belgrade Chamber of Commerce. See also the *Protecta* detective agency whose owner is Dragan Trivan, president of the detective section of the Association of Private Security Companies within the Serbian Chamber of Commerce. www.protecta.rs, date accessed: 9.4.2010.

³⁷ See, for instance, *Wolf Security Guard*: http://www.wolfsecurityguard.com/postani_saradnik.html, date accessed: 9.4.2010.

cheap and easily available in the unified Western Balkan market.³⁸ Thus, for example, espionage programmes for intercepting text messages and conversations can be bought for 139 euros, or a parabolic microphone capable of recording a conversation at a distance of 200 metres for 109 euros.³⁹ Similarly, much more powerful wiretapping devices can be obtained from abroad at favourable prices.⁴⁰ It is not hard, therefore, for detective agencies to provide the services they advertise. Secondly, according to Božidar Spasić, owner of the SIA detective agency, we should keep in mind “that a large number of our military, police, and voluntary units who took part in the recent wars were given wiretapping devices and, since none have been returned, they are now being used at private wiretapping centres”.⁴¹

It should be added here that it is easy for detectives to collect data from citizens since many of them have identification documents which much resemble those held by the state enforcement forces (the police and security services).

Many actors in Serbia try to take advantage of the capacity these private companies have in terms of human resources and equipment for secret collection of

Many actors in Serbia try to take advantage of the capacity these private companies have in terms of human resources and equipment for secret collection of data. Particularly noticeable recently is an increasing trend in industrial espionage in business.

data. Particularly noticeable recently is an increasing trend in industrial espionage in business, “and thus detective agencies which formerly mostly tracked adulterous partners are now getting more and more clients from the business community... thanks to the espionage, some companies are awarded contracts because they offer around 100 euros more than their competition. Many people in Serbia think it is shameful to be robbed like that and so they keep silent and act like a married woman who has been caught with a lover.”⁴² Business espionage in Serbia is such a widespread problem nowadays that “even if a further 20 serious companies dealt with this kind of espionage, we would not be able to handle the problem; that is how big a problem this is in Serbia”.⁴³

38 A large number of online shops offer delivery goods in the territory of ex SFRY or they have representative offices in individual states. See, for example: www.bubice.net, date accessed: 9.4.2010.

39 *Balkanski špijun* online shop, URL: <http://www.balkanskispijun.com/>, date accessed: 9.4.2010.

40 See e.g.: http://www.endoacustica.com/index_en.htm

41 “Ozvučeno “Pola Beograda”! ,” (Half of Belgrade Covered with ‘Bugs’) *Srpski nacional* 11.04.2005, <http://www.srpski-nacional.com/vesti.php?id=1084>.

42 Director of ZIPA agency Dragan Telesković, quoted in: Ratko Femić, “Industrijska špijunaža cveta u Srbiji,” (Industrial Espionage in Serbia is Flourishing), *Alo*, 07.08.2008, <http://www.naslovi.net/2008-08-07/alo/industrijska-spijunaza-cveta-u-srbiji/771604>.

43 Ibid.

Since the democratic changes of October 5, 2000, we have constantly heard the leading political parties in Serbia accusing each other of wiretapping.⁴⁴ Žarko Korać⁴⁵ said in this regard: “There are reasons to believe that, in our country, and in Belgrade in particular, there exist private wiretapping centres; the necessary equipment is not that expensive nowadays and this means that it can be bought by any large company or political party; mobile phones are being tapped on a large scale (...) As you already know, regrettably, most people use mobile telephones and this leaves a lot of room for illegal dealings.”⁴⁶ However, some of these accusations are much more specific: one of them is that Zoran Janjušević, formerly security advisor to the Prime Minister Đinđić, had equipment for intercepting mobile phones - GSM pasive 900/1800.⁴⁷ This is actually a laptop with sophisticated equipment with which can intercept as many as 200 mobile phones over an 11 kilometre area.⁴⁸ A PSC security manager confirmed in an interview that these are not groundless accusations: “every larger political party in Serbia has its own private security company which provides a wide range of services“.⁴⁹

On the other hand, the Serbian state authorities are not immune to the possibility of (ab)using these private agencies. During research conducted by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations in 2007 and 2008, in more than one interview conducted with PSC security managers the researchers heard that the members of Serbian security services had asked for favours involving interference with the privacy of citizens. They also pointed out that, as far as they know, other PSCs have had identical or similar experiences with the security services. This was mostly pointed out by managers of companies dealing primarily with technical aspects of security. The reason why a state security-intelligence operative would hire a private agency might lie in the fact that the state services require the decision of a court and/or the service director for wiretapping and monitoring, and that the punishments for violation of the relevant legal provisions are very severe.

44 Žarko Korać, B92 Peščanik 10.10.2008, <http://www.sdu.org.rs/images/Zarko%20Pescanik%20101008.doc>.

45 Žarko Korać is a founder and president of the Social-Democratic Union. Korać was the vice-president of the Government of the Republic of Serbia in the period 2001 - 2003, and on 17-18 March 2003, after the assassination of the prime minister Zoran Đinđić, he discharged the duty of the acting president of Serbian Government. Korać is today the Liberal Democratic Party's deputy in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.

46 Korać

47 More details about the device can be seen on the website of manufacturer *Endoacustica*: http://www.endoacustica.com/gsm_interceptor_en.htm, date accessed: 23.1.2010.

48 Nenad Stevanović, «Prisluškivanje – Omiljeni Sport Političara U Srbiji,» Patriot magazin 14.9.2005, <http://www.patriotmagazin.com/media/011.htm>

49 Sonja Stojanović, Predrag Petrović, Marko Milošević and Jelena Unijat, eds., *Private Security Companies in Serbia – Friend or Threat?*.

This does not apply to private agencies, however, as no law to regulate this area is in place. More precisely, the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia⁵⁰ provides penal provisions in Chapter 13 for criminal offences against human and civil rights and freedoms, including those related to the infringement of the inviolability of the home (Article 139), unauthorised disclosure of secrets (Article 141), violation of the privacy of letters and other mail, including the violation of the privacy of electronic mail or other means of communication (Article 142), unauthorised wiretapping and recording (Article 143), unauthorised photography (Article 144) and unauthorised collection of personal data (Article 146). The prescribed penal provisions are much stricter for officials than for private citizens. Anyone who violates the privacy of a person's home shall be punished with a fine or a prison sentence of up to one year (paragraph 1, Article 139), while an official who commits such an offence in carrying out his or her duty shall be punished with a prison sentence of up to three years (paragraph 2, Article 139). The other criminal offences mentioned above are punished similarly.

Even more importantly, infringements of human and civil rights and freedoms which are not committed by officials carrying out their duty can be prosecuted against a private complaint only (paragraph 1, Article 153). In Serbia, however, court proceedings that are conducted against private complaints take too long and the period of limitations lapses for many, or citizens give up. Moreover, many court decisions are not executed.⁵¹ This was identified as a big problem by the European Commission and thus it is said in its Annual Progress Report for Serbia 2009: "... generally speaking, Serbia is moderately advanced in the area of reform of the judiciary. Despite attempts to implement the special programme, the significant backlog in civil, trade, and administrative proceedings cases remains a cause of concern. Enforcement of judgements remains inefficient."⁵²

Even if the courts were more efficient and effective, due to the absence of any control over PSCs it would be hard for ordinary citizens to discover that their rights have been violated by the activities of a detective agency, for instance. "That is exactly why some detective agencies can proceed with what they are doing, namely interfering with the privacy of citizens in many different ways, without fear of being punished."⁵³

Finally, the possibility that the security services, or individuals from their ranks, (ab)use the PSCs, is evident from the findings Slobodan AntoniĆ and Dušan PavloviĆ

50 Criminal Code, Official Gazette 85/05

51 See more about the problems in the judicial system and judicial reform in: Miroslav Hadžić, ed. *Godišnjak reforme sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji - 2008 (Almanac of Security Sector Reform in Serbia)* (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2009). pp. 292–315.

52 *Serbia 2009 Progress Report*, (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities). p. 12.

53 Statement of a security manager in a private security company

describe in their paper, Consolidation of Democratic Institutions in Serbia since 2000. Here the authors denote the entire SIA as a reserved domain that impairs consolidation of democratic institutions in Serbia. They base their arguments on the poor legislative framework governing the status, authorisation and democratic supervision of the SIA, as well as the absence of lustration and opening of secret files that the secret security services (SDB) kept on Serbian citizens. Consequently, the Agency “retained all the negative characteristics of the old SDB“, and “actually was and remained an ‘embellished’ SDB“.⁵⁴ That is why the Agency, or subdivisions and individuals within it were (and still are) able to found front companies (possibly PSCs) and set up secret funding arrangements, outside any democratic control, and use them to gain independence from the institutions of legal order.⁵⁵ Thus, old, informal, underground companies survive and new networks are created that penetrate all segments of society and possibly compromise the (consolidation of) the institutions of a democratic system.⁵⁶

We should of course take into account the fact that all democratic systems allow their security services to establish front companies and organisations so that they can perform secret and undercover operations. In those states, however, as opposed to authoritarian states and a large number of post-communist countries, institutions enjoy a certain level of control over such activities. Accordingly, even in the U.S., for instance, in the period after the 09/11 attack, the security-intelligence apparatus has greatly extended its powers at the expense of human rights, the President and Congressional Committees have the right to oversee and control secret and undercover operations.

That private security companies in Serbia are secretly and illegally collecting data and threatening the security of both citizens and economic and political personalities has been pointed out already by Rade Bulatović, Director of the Security-Information Agency count in the period 2004 - 2008, at a meeting of the RS National Assembly’s Committee for Defence and Security. He said that there were some indications of illegal wiretapping from “some private centres” and underlined that, besides shedding light on some of the gravest forms of crime with potential to compromise the state, this will be among the priorities for the SIA for the next year (2005, author’s note).⁵⁷ At the international conference “Security Sector Reform in Serbia - Achievements and Prospects“⁵⁸ in 2006, the then-director of the

54 Dušan Pavlović i Slobodan Antonić, *Konsolidacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji posle 2000. godine* (Consolidation of Democratic Institutions in Serbia after 2000) (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2007), p. 137.

55 Ibid. p. 139.

56 Ibid. p. 140.

57 “Direktor BIA-e kaže da ima pritisaka,” (SIA Director says Pressure is being Applied), B92 23.10.2004, http://www.b92.net/info/komentari.php?nav_id=158590.

58 The conference was organised by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations. A collection of papers presented at the conference, *Security Sector Reform - Achievements and Perspectives*, is available on the website: http://www.ccmr-bg.org/upload/document/0801101801_reforma_sektora_bez.pdf, date accessed: 10.4.2010.

SIA gave a statement with similar content. Similar claims were made by SIA representatives at the round table discussion, Democratic Oversight on the Use of Special Investigative Techniques in 2008,⁵⁹ and at many subsequent events focusing on the secret collection of data and the protection of privacy. The problem of private wiretapping centres has, therefore, long been present.

Legalisation of criminal activities

A large number of criminal groups, even organised criminal groups which compromise the national security of Serbia, have their own private security companies. More precisely, in most cases the leaders of crime syndicates are not at the same time the owners of PSCs, but they are related to them. There are two main reasons why crime syndicates establish PSCs. Firstly, this is a method of legally acquiring firearms. Since leaders of crime syndicates are people with criminal records and thus are not able to acquire fire arms legally, they instruct their trusted associates to establish PSCs and obtain weapons for the company. The newly-established company then enters into contracts with companies headed by the leaders of crime syndicates to provide these businesses with protection. Therefore, “some agencies are established and operate exclusively as a private police force for financial magnates believed to be related to organised crime.”⁶⁰

A large number of criminal groups, even organised criminal groups which compromise the national security of Serbia, have their own private security companies.

An example of the above is the Total Security System Company, which, according to the Business Register Agency, was founded by Marko Šarić in 2005. The head office of the company is at the home of Darko Šarić⁶¹, leader of one of the most dangerous

⁵⁹ The conference was organised by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations. A collection of papers presented at the conference, *Demokratski nadzor primene posebnih ovlašćenja*, (Democratic Oversight of the Use of Force) is available at the website: http://www.ccmr-bg.org/upload/document/0801101801_reforma_sektora_bez.pdf

⁶⁰ Zoran Mijatović, “Više radnika privatnog obezbeđenja nego policajaca,” (More Private Security Staff than Police Officers), *Građanski list* 22.01.2008, http://www.dragas.biz/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=5344.

⁶¹ The registered address of “Total Security System” is shared by that of “Municipium S”, a consulting company used, according to information obtained by police and prosecutors, by Darko Šarić in his privatisation efforts in Serbia. Vuk Cvijić, “Šarićeva firma za obezbeđenje i dalje radi,” (Šarić Security Company Continues Business Operations), *Blic* 22.03.2010, <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/181818/Sariceva-firma-za-obezbedjenje-i-dalje-radi>.

crime syndicates in the Balkans. According to the findings of the Centre for Research Journalism (CRJ), the employees of the Total Security Agency were mostly hired to provide security at locations related to the Šarić family in one way or another, such as the famous Pascucci cafe, the Code river restaurant and the H2O river club at the Zemun riverside. As is required to practice the business of security, Total Security was granted licenses to procure and carry weapons by the Serbian MoI.⁶² According to CRJ, the MoI claims that it holds all the documents requested from Total Security Company and that they are kept in the Novi Beograd police station. A very dangerous organised criminal group, therefore, has established a security company completely legally and, what is more, the MoI has granted it the license to procure weapons. This company is not alone in this regard, however; as highlighted by Dragiša Jovanović, President of the Board of the Association of Private Security Companies within the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, “many companies in this sector (the private security sector, author’s note) are connected with various crime syndicates which use this activity as a justification for holding weapons”.⁶³

Another reason for crime syndicates establishing PSCs is that these companies provide them with legal cover for a number of illegal dealings. Accordingly, the main duty of security men in many cafes and clubs in Belgrade, including those on the river,

The main duty of security men in many cafes and clubs in Belgrade, including those on the river, is to prevent rival crime groups selling drugs at the premises under their watch.



is to prevent rival crime groups selling drugs at the premises under their watch. “Men providing security at a river cafe necessarily watch over the entrance and allow their

buddies from the clan to enter and sell drugs freely. It is well known that, at such places, a large quantity of narcotics is sold every evening. Also, rival groups are forbidden from coming near the cafe in question.”⁶⁴ In most cases, (armed) conflicts involving employees of private security companies are caused by the trade in narcotics.⁶⁵

In addition, crime syndicates use private security companies as cover for extortions and racketeering. Although this business activity was typical of the emerging private security sector in the 1990s, “thanks to the lack of interest on the part of the state in

⁶² This information was obtained by journalists from CINS (NUNS), using the Law on Freedom of Information of Importance to the Public.

⁶³ Stevan Dojčinović, “Fizičko-tehničko obezbeđenje u Srbiji: čuvari teške ruke” (Private Security Services in Serbia: Guards with Heavy Hands), VREME 1006, 15th April 2010.

⁶⁴ *Blic* source from Serbian MoI, quoted in: Aleksandar Adžić, “Rat klanova za splavove i drogu: dvogodišnja borba za prevlast,” (Mafia Wars for River Cafés and Drugs: A Two-Year Battle for Dominance), *Blic* 17.12.2007, <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/23612/Rat-klanova-za-splavove-i-drogu>, date accessed: 3.7.2008.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

regulating the private security sector, racketeering has survived both the change of regime in Serbia and transition”.⁶⁶ The most drastic illustration of this is the case of a criminal group from Valjevo and the Polito Security Company led by Milan Lazarević⁶⁷. After he was released from prison, Milan Lazarević began extorting from businessmen in the Valjevo region. Those who were not willing to pay up had their business establishments demolished by a bulldozer - this was his way of showing everyone how powerful he was. The owner of Knez, a demolished Valjevo cafe, said: “My cafe was knocked down to frighten other people in Valjevo, because it was widely known that I have good connections with the police; so, if he can do it to me, he can do it to anybody.”⁶⁸ Interestingly, despite a large number of witnesses and marks left on the bulldozer itself, local police allegedly did not have enough evidence to start an investigation against Lazarević.

Lazarević legalised his booming racketeering and extortion business by establishing the Polito Security Agency which was, as is only to be expected, registered in the name of a person without a criminal record. Polito charged Valjevo businesses a high price for security services. In addition to privately-owned establishments, this company provided security services to the National Museum in Valjevo.⁶⁹ Anyone believing they did not need security services from this agency was soon persuaded to the contrary by threats against and attacks on their company’s property. Further confusion and apprehension were caused among the citizens of Valjevo by the fact that Polito employees wore dark blue uniforms resembling the uniforms of members of the Serbian gendarmerie. For this reason many local internet fora and national media publications had headlines such as “Town under the Boot of a Powerful Agency”⁷⁰ and “Whole Town Held Hostage by Mafia”.⁷¹ How powerful this agency was is confirmed by the fact that, because of the powerlessness of the Valjevo police and/or its connections to Lazarević’s group, the Director of Police, Milorad Veljović had to send members of the Serbian MoI’s Criminal Police Administration from Belgrade to solve this case, after which “it took them only 24 hours to ‘calm the situation’”.⁷²

66 Quoted in: Stevan Dojčinović, “Fizičko-tehničko obezbeđenje u Srbiji: čuvari teške ruke” (Private Security Services in Serbia: Guards with Heavy Hands).

67 Widely known under aliases the General and Laza the Grenadier. He got the latter nickname because of his bomb attack on the police in 1992 for which he was sentenced to seven years in prison. He was released from the prison in Padinska Skela in 2000.

68 Stevan Dojčinović, “Fizičko-tehničko obezbeđenje u Srbiji: čuvari teške ruke”. (Private Security Services in Serbia: Guards with Heavy Hands)

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Zoran Uskoković, “Ceo grad talac mafije,” (Whole Town Held Hostage by Mafia), Večernje novosti 07.04.2009, http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=9&status=jedna&vest=142390&title_add=Ceo%20grad%20%3Cbr%2F%3Etalac%20mafije&keyword_add=ubistvo%2C%20zeljko%20djedovic.

72 Members of the Valjevo organised crime group were arrested in April 2009. “Uhapšen vođa kriminalne grupe,” (Leader of Crime Syndicate Arrested), B92 9th April 2009, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyy=2009&mm=04&dd=09&nav_id=354697.

Outside their regular working hours, policemen work either in security companies which are connected with criminal groups or as bodyguards and advisors to the leaders of such groups. With the authority of the insignia which both symbolically and formally represents state power, as well as with information acquired in regular performance of police work, they further strengthen the position of the criminal groups for which they work.



All the above cases suggest that an alliance exists between individual members of the police and security services and criminal groups. Outside their regular working hours, policemen work either in security companies which are connected with criminal groups or as bodyguards and advisors

to the leaders of such groups. With the authority of the insignia which both symbolically and formally represents state power, as well as with information acquired in regular performance of police work, they further strengthen the position of the criminal groups for which they work. Members of the Republic of Serbia police force were involved in a number of armed conflicts which took place in river cafes, clubs and restaurants. Some even helped commit criminal offences, as happened in the case of the Valjevo group.

Connections between former members of the state law enforcement apparatus and controversial businessmen are also obvious. The case of Combat Team Security Solutions is a particularly drastic illustration of the phenomenon of a synergy between former members of the police and military and organised crime. This company's Directors Bojan Bakula (a former non-commissioned officer of the Serbian Army) and Saša Turčinović (a former member of the Special Operations Unit), and their associate Predrag Čanković, worked (admittedly for a very short time) as security guards for William Rosales Suarez, a Bolivian narcotics boss.⁷³ They were killed in a fight against another narcotics group. The company they ran in Serbia was operating legally; it provided security services to primary schools, and on its websites it stated that its management strongly advocated legality in the operations of PSCs.⁷⁴

The problem is that the above examples are not isolated cases since (organised) crime is widespread in Serbia, as well as throughout the Western Balkans, and presents a very serious threat to individual, national, and regional security. How widespread and financially powerful (organised) crime is in Serbia is apparent from the words of Ivica

⁷³ "Đorđe Vučinić, generalni direktor "Securitas Services" Beograd – Uvešćemo potpuno nove usluge obezbeđivanja u Srbiji," ("Đorđe Vučinić, General Manager of "Securitas Services" Belgrade – We will Offer Some Completely New Security Services in Serbia," *Ekapija* 26.12.2008, <http://www.ekapija.com/website/sr/page/211508>).

⁷⁴ *Combat Team Security Solutions* http://ctss.vndv.com/srp_zakon.html, date accessed: 27.4.2010.

Dačić, Serbian Interior Minister, who says that criminal groups in Serbia, over the past ten years (2000-2010), have laundered about a billion euros. “Estimates that a billion euros were laundered through Serbia are most probably true (...) the intelligence data confirm that we are dealing with this kind of figure.”⁷⁵ When state institutions are weak, it is easy for organised criminal groups, through corrupt practices, to turn financial capital into political power, or buy political representatives and their decisions.

⁷⁵ “Dačić: Kriminalci oprali milijarde evra u Srbiji,” (Criminals Laundered Billions of Euro in Serbia), *VESTI online* 6.5.2010, <http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/50907/Dacic-Kriminalci-oprali-milijarde-evra-u-Srbiji>.

Conclusive Remarks

It can be noted, based on the above analysis, that a large number of different actors in Serbia would rather not see the private security sector normatively regulated. These include individuals and groups coming from different social spheres: political parties, the private sector, the security services, the police and military, private security companies, and (organised) criminal groups. These different actors, linked in varied and complex ways, work to further their mutual interests, dominant among which are economic concerns - making and increasing profit and consolidating their position on the private security market. Another important factor is political: the aim of gaining advantage over the political competition. Individuals and parts of the security services want to collect data more easily and quickly and without higher level authorisation from the director of the relevant agency or a court. It follows from the above analysis that an important role in the relationship between these actors is played by some individuals from political parties and current and former members of the state security services. With their information and contacts, and through informal connections and channels, they ensure the successful outcome of new and existing deals and the maintenance of the current unregulated and chaotic situation in the private security sector.

It would be unwise to forget the fact that negative factors in the social environment significantly contribute to the survival of reserved domains in the private security sector. Firstly, several decades of a poor economic situation, further aggravated by a global economic downturn, have brought about the continued existence of a large idle labour force and slowed the pace of social reforms. This has further marred the effectiveness and efficacy of the judiciary, which has facilitated the survival of organised crime and informal connections and practices, particularly those of a corrupt nature. It is worth adding here that, due to globalisation and the fast development of science and technology, surveillance and wiretapping equipment is cheap and easily accessible. This encourages the growth of business espionage and other forms of espionage. All the above facts suggest that reserved domains have an important role in the private security sector in Serbia.

Two questions arise from what has been stated above. Firstly, once the law on the private security sector is adopted, will it regulate this area properly, in line with the liberal-democratic values and standards in place in other (developed) countries? Conversely, will the actors constituting the above reserved domains influence the content of the law and adjust it in their own interests and therefore make it ineffectual. That this dilemma is not only an academic matter is confirmed by the experience of other post-socialist countries,

some of which have to date adopted several laws on the private security sector in an effort to remove all the deficiencies of previous legislative solutions. As mentioned above: three of the four laws proposed in the public sphere do not address the detective activity at all and the fourth regulates this area inadequately.

Once the government finally manages to adopt a law on the private security sector in compliance with liberal-democratic values, a more important question is whether and how it will be implemented in practice. In Serbia, just as in other transition societies, it is not unusual that adopted laws are not applied or are applied inadequately in practice. These laws are applied only as far as it suits the interests of powerful actors. None of the actors described above, nor their interests, will disappear after the law is adopted, and the same is true for the negative factors in the social environment. For this reason, any reform of the private security sector, if it is to be effective, should not end with the adoption of the relevant law; rather, it should have a broader, holistic reach. It should also cover reform of the judiciary, the police, the military and security services. All these reforms must be supported by economic reforms. The adoption of the law on the private security sector is only the starting point, and in no way can it be the final goal of reform of this sector. No genuine reform of the private security sector will be possible if the factors in the social environment which promote the survival of reserved domains are not eliminated.



List of More Well-Known PSCs in Serbia

011 Tactical	www.011tactical.rs
Absolut Security	www.absolutsecurity.rs/
Almaks Security System D.O.O.	www.almaks.rs/
BOND Detective & Security Agency	http://www.bond.rs/bond/index.html
Combat Team Security Solution	
Delta Security	http://ctss.vndv.com/
Digital Security D.O.O.	
Dobergard	www.dobergard.co.rs/
Federal Obezbeđenje D.O.O.	www.federal.co.rs/
Fratello	http://www.fratello.rs/
Gama sigurnost	
GPS Plus	www.gpsplus.rs/
Group4Securicor	www.g4s.rs/
IMP	http://www.imp.rs
Inex Bezbednost	
KNN - Security d.o.o.	http://www.knnsecur.co.rs/
M Protekt	
Nifon	http://www.nifon.rs/
Orca Security	www.orca.co.rs
PAN Security	http://www.pansecurity-ns.com/pages/home.html
PRO - TECH TEAM	http://www.portal-srbija.com/zastita-i-sigurnost/obezbedjenje-lica-objekata/pro-tech-team

List of More Well-Known PSCs in Serbia

Professional Security	http://www.agencijaps.co.cc/html/index1.html
Protec Engineering D.O.O.	
Protecta	www.protecta.rs
Revnost	http://www.revnost.com/on.htm
Sectra Consulting D.O.O.	http://www.sectraconsulting.com/onama-s-f.htm
Sectron	http://www.sectron.co.rs/
Securitas Services D.O.O	http://www.securitas.com/rs/sr/
Security Consulting Agency	http://www.sca.rs
Security Service	http://www.securityservice.co.rs/
SECUT FTO	http://www.secut.rs/secut_fto/secut_fto.htm
SIA	http://www.bspasic.net/index.htm
Sigurnost Vračar A. D.	www.sigurnostvracar.co.rs
Sistem FTO	www.sistemfto.com/
Stracon security	www.stracon.co.rs
Tactical Training Team	http://www.tactical-spec.com/prva_strana.htm
Tigar Obezbeđenje D.O.O	
Trag Security	www.trag-security.com
Varnost – Fitep A.D.	www.varnost-fitep.rs/
WLS Elektronik	www.wls.izlog.org
Wolf Security Guard	http://www.wolfsecurityguard.com/postani_saradnik.html

Online shops for wiretapping equipment

Spy Shop Srbija	http://www.spyshopsrbija.com/
Balkanski špijun	http://www.balkanskispijun.com/
Bubice	http://www.bubice.net/

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