

Bottlenecks to deployment!

Police capacity building and deployment in Africa

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Changes in the nature of conflicts during the post-Cold War period led to changes in the nature of peacekeeping, from being a tool in mediating inter-state conflicts to that of intra-state conflicts. Peacekeepers are no longer deployed as an interposition force between warring states, but as part of broad efforts in support of peace implementation. Furthermore, rather than the purely traditional military deployments, modern peacekeeping deployments now involve considerable numbers of police officers (and civilians) in multidimensional missions. Against this backdrop, the Norwegian-funded Training for Peace (TfP) Programme has been involved in international and regional efforts to provide training support for police capacity building, as well as civilian, for deployment to UN and AU missions in Africa and elsewhere.

This study was undertaken as part of the TfP initiative to explore the police training environment and gauge some of the key challenges to the smooth deployment of trained police officers: priorities of national police organisations, sequencing of training, gender disparities, and strategic and operational level coordination, among others. The study uses experiences gained from the years of police training provided by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to two police regions in Africa, namely the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) and the Eastern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO). This paper complements the results of a separate study that focused on bottlenecks to civilian training and deployment.¹ The key questions that inform this study are:

- What are the practical imperatives of the demand for African capacities?
- What are the challenges faced in building capacities in Africa?
- What can be done to address the challenges of capacity building?

- What are the training approaches adopted by partners towards building African capacities?

To gain a balanced understanding of the answers to these questions, the study itself is contextualised within the spectrum of peacekeeping in its widest sense. Examination of the study questions is done using the formats of training that directly or indirectly contribute to the deployment of trained police officers. The study establishes that in terms of deployment, the most significant form of training is pre-deployment training that is targeted at police officers selected and earmarked for deployment by national police organisations. This is complemented by normal courses (trainers' courses and trainers' clinics) that aim to prepare officers as trainers to assist in the national rollout of peacekeeping training. Pre-deployment training is provided under bilateral arrangements with member states that request ISS/TfP support, while the two categories of trainers' courses and trainers' clinic courses are conducted within the frameworks of SARPCCO and EAPCCO.

However, the outcomes contained a margin of error arising from at least three key challenges. These challenges related to access in obtaining accurate and reliable data as a result of national police sensitivities in sharing such information; variations in the timeframes covered by data sets; and disparities between the lengths of time during which training support was provided to the two main stakeholder police regions, SARPCCO and EAPCCO. These limitations notwithstanding, the study provides useful insights into the key parameters of the training and deployment of police officers.

In addition to the need for member states to be less reticent about sharing information that contributes towards effective impact assessment of the outcomes and outputs of police training, the results of the study highlight the importance of closer collaboration between stakeholders, as well as improvements in communications between the UN and contributing countries, including streamlining the channels of such

communications. The study also underscores the need for national policy review around the sequencing of the UN selection assistance team (SAT) arrangements, as well as special support to enhance the ability of female officers to qualify for selection and deployment.

THE STUDY: AIMS AND APPROACHES

The study is informed by issues around institutional mechanisms serving as vehicles for building African police capacities for UN peacekeeping and for the AU, including within the framework of the African Standby Force (ASF). It is also informed by experiences (and lessons learned) with regards to force generation and preparation, and the cross-fertilisation of views on improving coordination among the plethora of the UN and AU's international partners in the field of generic capacity building.

Police training exemplifies the challenge the continent grapples with in its efforts to build capacity for peace and security

By focusing on police training, the study articulates such questions as these:

- What are the practical imperatives of the demand for African capacities?
- What are the challenges faced in building capacities in Africa?
- What can be done to address the challenges of capacity building? and
- What are the training approaches adopted by partners towards building African capacities?

The case of police capacity building in EAPCCO and SARPCCO regions (see parts 4 and 5 of the study) is used because, apart from the direct involvement of the authors in the training of police in Africa, police training exemplifies the challenge the continent grapples with in its efforts to build capacity for peace and security, particularly in modern peacekeeping operations.

The study begins with detailed discussions of the imperatives of the demand for police capacities in the region. This is followed by a discussion of the challenges of police capacity building, after which approaches to addressing the challenges are discussed. It ends with the conclusion and recommendations on ways of improving

these approaches on the continent. In the final analysis, the study looks at the merits, deficits and the challenges that militate against the establishment of such capacities. To some extent, it highlights the imperatives of police capacities, including the demand and supply lacuna, and provides an outline of the selection, recruitment and preparation of police. Overall, the study's observations, conclusions and recommendations seek to inform decisions for reviewing existing approaches to police capacity building training in the region for AU and/or UN peacekeeping.

The outcomes of the study are affected by at least three key challenges to obtaining comprehensive data sets. The first most significant challenge that the authors faced concerned access to obtaining accurate and reliable data, especially on the employment and deployment of officers that were trained. This deficit owed largely to sensitivities of police organisations to disclosing details of the employment and deployment of trained personnel. In keeping with appropriate protocols, the authors considered it unwise to obtain such information from other sources, especially through direct contacts with individual officers. Besides being laborious, that approach could have aroused unnecessary suspicions and was considered potentially harmful to building and maintaining mutual trust between stakeholder police organisations and the training provider.

The other significant challenge related to the time-frames covered by data sets. For instance, while accurate data could not be obtained from the AU website on the AMIS deployment, even data sets obtained from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) website cover different periods. Similarly, data sets obtained from national police organisations cover different periods and, in addition, do not cover the full numbers of officers trained within the relevant periods. Overall, even though the institute's training support started in 1994, accurate data was kept only from 2004.

Related to this latter challenge, the study was faced with the problem of disparities between the lengths of time during which training support was provided to the institute's two main stakeholder regions, namely SARPCCO and EAPCCO. Tfp training support in the SARPCCO region was started in the late 1990s. Similar support in the EAPCCO region was initiated in 2006 and fully institutionalised in 2008. This disparity also detracts from constructive comparisons between the two regions.

In consideration of these factors, the study relied predominantly on desk research, but coupled with the extensive field experience of the authors from long periods of involvement in police training and other peacekeeping activities in Africa. The study also used accurate databases derived from participants' lists for training courses. However, the study benefited from accurate data on

employment and deployment of officers during consultations on pre-deployment training support in late 2010. Besides Lesotho and South Africa, such information was disclosed during consultations with four member states, namely Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, on the numbers of trained deployed personnel. However, because this data concerns only two of the countries that had benefited from training support, it does not present a holistic picture of the outcomes of such training support.

To locate the observations made from the study, the analysis of the police component is contextualised within the wider aspects of UN and regional peacekeeping. On the whole, the study does not cover the selection and recruitment of police for senior mission posts or other TFP training support directly undertaken under the auspices of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the East African Standing Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) since 2008/2009.

These limitations notwithstanding, the study provides useful insights into the impact of police training, and the nature and degree of challenges that mitigate the impact of such training support.

Deployments have evolved
from a purely military
composition to the inclusion
of non-military components

INTRODUCTION: MULTIDIMENSIONALITY AND RESOURCE DEMANDS

The study is set in the context of key aspects of post-Cold War multidimensional peacekeeping that led to constraints in the demand and supply of peacekeeping resources. The study therefore begins with an overview of the transition towards multidimensional peacekeeping and the resultant resource lacuna in the non-military component, especially the police (and civilian).²

The move towards multidimensional peacekeeping

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping since its emergence in 1948 has evolved in diverse ways in response to the changing nature of conflicts.³ In its early years, peacekeeping involved mainly the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed military personnel to supervise ceasefires and/or to interposition as a buffer between warring parties, usually states.⁴ Given that the world had just

emerged from the brutish experiences of an inter-state war, World War II, and also that inter-state conflicts still accounted for a significant number of conflicts in the world at the time, the model of peacekeeping during the Cold War was shaped principally by the dynamics of such conflicts.

In the post-Cold War years, however, there has been a significant decline in the number of inter-state conflicts and a rise in the number of intra-state conflicts. The immediate post-Cold War era in particular recorded the peak of internal conflicts across the globe.⁵ Between 1990 and 1992, the number of intra-state conflicts across the world rose from about 38 to more than 53.⁶ As of late 1995, major conflicts in which at least 1 000 people had been killed raged in over 35 locations around the world, and more than a decade after the Cold War, in 2008, more than 30 of these conflicts were still raging.⁷ The most devastating of these occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, where civil wars, armed insurrections, violent secessionist movements and other domestic warfare involving organised groups were common phenomena in the immediate post-Cold War era.⁸

Against the backdrop of the changing nature of conflicts, although peacekeeping was originally developed as a means of dealing with inter-state conflicts, it became necessary to deploy in intra-state situations, as it was one of the key tools the UN could rely on in its quest to curb violent conflicts in the maintenance of international peace and security.⁹

The resultant peculiar operational environment in which 'Blue Helmets' have since had to operate has impacted on the nature, composition and role of peacekeeping operations.¹⁰ From the deployment of troops as an interposition between warring states, peacekeepers are now deployed as part of broad international efforts to support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements between parties (many of whom are non-state actors).¹¹ In addition, deployments have evolved from a purely military composition to the inclusion of non-military components in a model of peacekeeping known as multidimensionality, in which civilians and police components are essential integral parts of the mission structure and role.¹²

The demand for non-military components

While the practice of multidimensionality presents a number of merits, it creates additional demand for peacekeeping personnel, particularly non-military personnel. Following the widely acknowledged Western disengagement since the mid 1990s,¹³ the need for the deployment of additional personnel presents a new challenge for peacekeeping for the rest of the world – particularly for African institutions and member states – because the

majority of the world's peacekeeping operations have continued to be established in the continent.

Owing to this Western disengagement and other factors that are discussed in this study (such as selective political support and commitment to complex peace missions and overstretch of the UN), regional organisations such as the AU and sub-regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and member states have been compelled to bear increasing responsibility for peacekeeping in their own regions, in addition to contributions to missions mandated and deployed by the UN. Nowhere is this challenge more pronounced than for the police component. Three causal factors that are identified as contributing to this dilemma are generally poor police:civilian ratios; coupled with serious levels of violent and organised crimes; and the reality that police recruitment in the African context barely meets national needs. Towards meeting the requirements for the generation of human resources, particularly the non-military

Since the end of the Cold War, police have become an integral part of modern peacekeeping

components, several international actors and states have been engaged in training initiatives and efforts aimed at building African capacity to meet the demands of UN and AU deployments on the continent. The initiatives have taken the form of partnerships aimed at training African peacekeepers in diverse areas to enable them to contribute effectively to the achievement of peace on the continent as well as global peace and security. Because such external initiatives have become a major means of capacity building on the continent in the post-Cold War era, it is pertinent to ask whether such initiatives – which are underpinned by post-1990s disengagement, withdrawal, abdication, hybridisation and regionalisation – constitute an effective formula for the delivery of the capacity needs required for the maintenance of peace in Africa and particularly African-led peacekeeping operations.

DEMAND FOR POLICE CAPACITIES: UNDERSTANDING THE FUNDAMENTALS

The increase in the demand for police capacity in Africa is underscored by a number of imperatives. The study notes the following as key, though the list may not be exhaustive:

- Multidimensionality of peace missions
- Strategic and operational trends and precedence
- Complexity of mandates and mission tasks
- Surge in integrated 'CIVPOL' deployments, including of female officers
- Precedence of AU police deployments

Multidimensionality of peace missions

In both UN and AU terms, the incidence of violent armed conflicts and the consequential establishment of complex missions underscore the doctrinal need for multidimensional missions, composed not only of military, but also of civilians and the police.

Particularly in the context of the AU, the significant provision of the Constitutive Act of the African Union regarding the right of intervention (Article 4),¹⁴ coupled with the stipulations of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Article 13),¹⁵ that the ASF will be multidisciplinary and composed of military, civilians and police, gives further emphasis to the need for police capacities.

Strategic and operational trends and precedence

Since the first deployment of police in the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC 1960–64), police participation in peacekeeping operations has undergone change, starting with the nomenclature of 'Civilian Police' (CIVPOL) in 1964 for the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This development was followed by the establishment of the post of police advisor in the mid 1980s, and by a period of sporadic deployments until 1989 when the police component became an independent entity during the UNTAG (Namibia) deployment.

Since the end of the Cold War, police have become an integral part of modern peacekeeping, generally undertaking specific services and assistance in any of three broad areas:¹⁶

- Interim law enforcement
- Security support to national police and law enforcement agencies
- Reform, restructuring and rebuilding of national police and law enforcement agencies

Complexity of mandates and mission tasks

Significantly, perhaps, these changes have been accompanied by a fundamental change in the mandate of police from the traditional monitoring, observation and supervisory roles to advisory, mentoring and training functions since the early 1990s, in order to act as a

corrective mechanism on national law enforcement agencies.¹⁷ This follows the conclusion of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) that the primary goal of the police components of peace operations should be:

... to focus primarily on the reform and restructuring of local police forces in addition to traditional advisory, training and monitoring tasks.¹⁸

Since 2000, however, police-mission critical and essential tasks flowing from the increasing complexity of police mandates have also become more multifaceted (see figure 1).


The Police Division of the DKPO, within the framework of the ongoing Strategic Development Framework

(SDF),²⁰ is reviewing the roles and functions of police in peace missions. The division is seeking to provide clarity and doctrinal guidance on two main areas of police mandates, namely:

- Public order and public safety, previously security support, revolving around operational support and interim law enforcement
- Police (institutional) development, revolving around reform, restructuring and (re)-building, (capacity-building) training, mentoring and advising


At the end of the framework process, the police mission statement should be nuanced to reflect these complexities, devolving on the co-habiting requirements of security, development and local ownership.

Figure 1 Growing complexity of police tasks (October 2008)



Source: UN DPKO¹⁹

Figure 2: UN police deployments (December 2009)



Surge in integrated CIVPOL deployments

As part of the global surge in the deployment of uniformed personnel, the demand for police deployment has also gone up, as table 1 below shows.


Table 1 Comparative UN Police deployments: 2005–2010

Year	Police	Total in Uniform	% Police
2005 (January)	6 765	65 050	10.55
2010 (July)	13 648	99 879	13.66
% Increase	201.74	153.54	3.11

Practically speaking, this surge means that between 2005 and mid 2010, the demand for police rose by over 200% in terms of police personnel, while the percentage of police to the overall deployment of uniformed personnel also rose by over 150%. The result was that between 2005 and mid 2010, the percentage of the police component to the global deployment of uniformed personnel went up by slightly more than 3% and included a significant amount of FPU personnel, especially after the transfer of the peacekeeping mandate from the AU to the UN in the AU/Un Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) at the end of 2007.

Consequently, as at the end of 2009 the UN was deploying police in precisely 14 of the 15 missions, six of which featured formed police units (FPUs), including five in Africa, namely Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), DRC (MONUSCO), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan-Darfur's AU-UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and

Figure 3 African contribution to UNPOL deployments (as at January 2010)



South Sudan (UNMIS). (Figure 2 is a pictorial display of UN police deployments as at December 2009.)²¹

One dire implication for Africa of this surge has been the continuing demand for the continent to contribute more of such police resources. Thus, as indicated in figure 3 and table 2, the 4 475 personnel provided by African police-contributing countries (PCCs) made up the significant amount of almost 35 per cent of all UN police deployments as at 31 January 2010.²²

Table 2 African PCCs (as at January 2010)

Srl	PCC	Contribution
1	Benin	131
2	Burkina Faso	71
3	Burundi	65
4	Cameroon	145
5	CAR	17
6	Chad	55
7	Côte d'Ivoire	130
8	Djibouti	50
9	Egypt	305
10	Ethiopia	10
11	Gambia	148
12	Ghana	442
13	Guinea	73
14	Kenya	40
15	Libya	3
16	Madagascar	50
17	Malawi	52
18	Mali	50
19	Namibia	33
20	Niger	144
21	Nigeria	806
22	Rwanda	156
23	Senegal	586
24	Sierra Leone	63
25	South Africa	154
26	Tanzania	62
27	Togo	47
28	Uganda	178
29	Zambia	300
30	Zimbabwe	109
Total		4 475

The gender dimension of the surge and mission integration

The post-Cold War surge in peacekeeping deployments and the move towards integrated missions were accompanied by the need for greater involvement and participation of women, more so female police officers, in peacekeeping. Thus, starting with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), the Security Council recognised the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, and ‘called upon Member States, the United Nations system, parties to conflict and all other relevant actors to adopt a gender perspective that would take into account the special needs of women during conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding’. Further to improvements in women’s awareness of their roles in peacebuilding and their increased participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, UN Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) emphasised the protection of civilians and stipulated that ‘rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide’.

Since then, the participation of female police officers has been accepted as a fundamental part of all peacekeeping deployments, even though the overall percentage of deployed female police officers remains small in comparison with their male counterparts (see pages 11–13).

AUPOL deployments and approaches: the precedence

The first deployment of police by the AU during the AMIS operation in Sudan’s Darfur region from 2004 to 2007 was unprecedented compared with the rather cautious approach to peacekeeping by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The deployment of police in AMIS, to contribute to the restoration of a secure situation throughout Darfur, allowing the return of IDPs and refugees, in order to contribute to an environment conducive to a peaceful settlement of the conflicts underscored the fact that ‘CIVPOL’ has become an integral part of African multidimensional interventions, contributing to the protection of human rights in African PSOs. Tables 3 and 4 show the details of AMIS ‘CIVPOL’ deployments and breakdown of contributing countries and/or entities.

In spite of the fact that AU Police (AUPOL) in AMIS was subsumed by UNAMID at the end of 2007, AUPOL is currently present with the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Besides a detachment of the Algerian Air Force for strategic troop lift, the AMISOM force includes a police component of 40 officers, with the headquarters

Table 3 AMIS ‘CIVPOL’ by category (2004–2007)

Srl	Category	Strength
1	AU CIVPOL	1 339
2	EU advisors/US representatives	3 ²³
3	UN LSP	30
Total		1 372

Table 4 AMIS ‘CIVPOL’ by contributing countries (2004–2007)

Srl	PCC	Strength
1	Ghana	425
2	Nigeria	201
3	RSA	126
4	Mali	75
5	Zambia	64
6	Uganda	56
7	Senegal	55
8	Cameroon	51
9	Egypt	50
10	Rwanda	49
11	Niger	42
12	Burundi	39
13	Burkina Faso	36
14	Gambia	30
15	Mauritania	15
16	Lesotho	12
17	Madagascar	10
18	Botswana	2
19	Kenya	1
Total		1 339

(six officers) and a training component (27) in Nairobi and Manyani respectively, and only seven police officers deployed in Mogadishu. The AUPOL PCCs (in order of increasing contributions) are Burundi (1), Zambia (1), Ghana (9), Nigeria (9), Sierra Leone (9) and Uganda (11). Operationally, AMISOM police have trained 900 Somali Police Force officers, as well as conducted training for Somali Police Force trainers.

Paradoxically, therefore, Africa has continued to be a major theatre for UN peacekeeping deployments, as a result of the increase in intrastate conflicts and significant changes in the nature of such conflicts. But the continent has continued to be a major contributor of police personnel at global level, partly as a result of a combination of factors, including Western reluctance

to participate directly in UN peacekeeping missions deployed on the continent, coupled with a new policy of non-indifference and finding African solutions to African problems.

GAUGING RESULTS: TFP AND POLICE CAPACITY BUILDING

This section provides an overview of the global TFP Programme and its framework at the ISS.

Overview of the global TFP Programme²⁴

The TFP model of collaboration has been in existence since 1995. It is a framework arrangement between the Norwegian and South African Ministries of Foreign Affairs (1995–1999). The original members of the partnership in 1995 were the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), focusing on civilian capacity building; the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), focusing on police capacity building; and the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), focusing on research. The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KA IPTC), which joined in 2005, focuses on generic multidimensional training. EASBRICOM, the regional security mechanism for Eastern Africa, became a member in 2008.

In a historical context and from an African perspective, the broad objective of the TFP Programme was to assist in building capacity for peacekeeping in the SADC region, after the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994. This rationale was coupled with significant paradigm shifts, namely the surge in the number of peacekeeping missions, the transformation of peacekeeping missions from ‘traditional to complex multidimensional’,²⁵ the concomitant rising demand for the deployment of greater numbers of troops and police, and the increasing participation of SADC member states in UN peacekeeping.

Pursuant to this, the goal of the programme has been to promote peace through improved and self-sustaining African civilian and police capacity building, in order to contribute to the establishment of a substantial pool of trained civilian and police personnel for deployment in PSOs in Africa. The efforts of the TFP support the strengthening of an African multidimensional peace operations capacity, targeting such groups as:

- AU and African regional organisations, as well as structures of the African Standby Force (ASF)
- The police and other professionals in the rule of law sector
- Civil servants in ministries of defence, foreign affairs, the interior and justice

- Politicians, in particular members of parliamentary foreign affairs and defence/security committees
- Non-governmental organisations, in particular those operating in peace operations and peacekeeping operations
- Peacekeeping personnel, especially civilian and police personnel serving in UN and AU missions

The following statistics²⁶ (table 5) give an overview of the TFP’s contribution globally to African regional capacity building efforts:

Table 5 TFP trained personnel (1996–2008)

Year	ISS	ACCORD	KA IPTC
1996	204	117	
1997	269	71	
1998	132	262	
1999	270	278	
2000	310	188	
2001	360	216	
2002	394	39	
2003	259	991	
2004	156	95	60
2005	846	1280	36
2006	239	472	55
2007	218	321	48
2008	176	203	97
Total	3 833	4 533	296

TFP Programme at the ISS


Traditionally, the ISS/TFP training support for police capacity building has focused on the framework of the UN/AU Police Officers Course (UNPOC) for trainers. The support in the SARPCCO region started in 1995, and initially focused on providing support to member states that requested peacekeeping training assistance. From 1998 the training support was institutionalised within the framework of the SARPCCO. Similar training support arrangements were established in the EAPCCO region in 2006, and consolidated from 2008.

Initially, this training support was delivered in two formats, namely normal training for rank-and-file police officers, and pre-deployment training when requested by member states. Currently, the training support in both police regions is delivered in three formats. It is first delivered as a trainers’ (TOT) course, after which participants deemed to have potential as trainers are invited to

the trainers' clinic. The clinic serves as a platform for the selected participants to present the course modules and lessons, thereby enhancing their knowledge, skill sets and performance. Furthermore, the UNPOC is presented as pre-deployment training for officers earmarked for deployment by their police organisations. In addition, ISS/TfP police capacity building has included a high-level police officers seminar since 2007. With effect from 2008, this seminar has been run annually as a joint SARPCCO/EAPCCO event, aimed at updating senior police leaders and managers about key peacekeeping policies, issues and challenges, especially around deployments.

In terms of UNPOC training approaches – both generic foundational and trainers' formats – the ISS/TfP has presented more than 69 courses (and meetings and seminars), 44 of which were UNPOC courses, seminars and meetings. Overall, between 2004 and 2009 these courses involved over 1 250 police officers (and support staff) from member states of the two regional police organisations; they excluded seminars and workshops.

ISS/TfP provides training support to EAPCCO and SARPCCO not only in terms of funding. The training is based on the standardised generic UNPOC Readers and Trainers, which are distributed to participants and facilitators. Under the guidance of the ISS/TfP, the standardised generic UNPOC curriculum and training manuals were initially developed in 2004 by a SARPCCO task team (Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe). The manuals were revised and updated in 2009, to bring them up to date with new UN training guidelines and standards (UN standardised generic training modules (SGTMs), or standard training module (STM) 1, and the core pre-deployments training modules (CPTMs), including the specialised training materials (STMs)). In the EAPCCO region, the original SARPCCO manuals were revised and updated in 2009 by an EAPCCO task team (Burundi, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda). In addition to achieving standardisation in training, the use of regional task teams contributes to regional ownership.



Evaluating the UNPOC trainers' courses

To recapitulate, while capacitating national police organisations to roll out police peacekeeping training, the UNPOC trainers' courses have aimed at building national and regional capacities for peacekeeping deployments, as well as for contributions to ASF standby arrangements. It would appear that, to a large extent, national police organisations that were deploying police contingents, especially to UN peace missions, have utilised a reasonable number of such personnel in the pre-deployment training and, where possible, have deployed them to the field.

Prior to 2006, the only tools for evaluating the UNPOC were the daily and post-course evaluations to gauge the level of understanding of participants and the effectiveness of the training. From 2006, however, it was proposed to begin to assess the impact of the UNPOC training, in terms of how the trained officers were employed and/or deployed, but in a less intrusive way. The post-course employment evaluation matrix (table 6) was therefore designed for that purpose. As a matter of protocol, the matrix was forwarded to the Interpol Regional Bureaus (RBs), which serve as the EAPCCO and SARPCCO secretariats, and they were requested to submit them to the national police organisation whose officers had attended an UNPOC course. Besides indicating the nature and timeframes of the employment/deployment of officers, the respondent national police organisations were requested to include key lessons and other relevant comments for improvements to the organisation and conduct of the courses.²⁷

Owing to the sensitivities of national police organisations, however, no feedback has ever been received. A firm evaluation is not possible under these circumstances. Informally, however, it is known that a number of participants from the UNPOC training have been deployed to missions on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, a considerable number of the UNPOC facilitators and trainees continue to be employed in EASBRICOM and SADC POL field training exercises, such as Exercise Golfhino (September 2009) in the run up to ASF Exercise Amani 2010. In the case of SADC POL in particular, the ISS/TfP and a crop of facilitators and trainees were involved in the planning and preparations for the exercise, including the adaptation of the SARPCCO UNPOC Training Manuals (Reader and Trainer) to meet the pre-exercise preparatory requirements. In the case of EASBRICOM, the 20-man component of the Seychelles police that took part in their FTX had been specifically trained for EASBRICOM standby functions.

Table 6. Generic post-course evaluation²⁸

Part 1: Background information												
Srl	Background	Details										
1	Title of SARPCCO course	Eg SARPCCO UNPOC, Harare, Zimbabwe, 14 March – 1 April 2006										
2	Course objectives											
3	Rank and name of participant											
4	Reporting period	6 m	From:									To:
		12 m	From:									To:
Part 2: Employment evaluation												
Category/Evaluation	Evaluation Elements*											
	Training facility (Trainer/instructor)			HQ Training branch (Staff post)			Peace mission (Observer/formed)			Unit/station (Gen/specialist duties)		
Relevance	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Professional development	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Service efficiency	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Effectiveness/impact	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Rating: 1: V/Good 2: Good 3: Satisfactory												

GAUGING RESULTS: ISS/TFP CASE STUDIES OF POLICE CAPACITY BUILDING

This section provides an overview of the scope and types of peacekeeping training provided by the ISS/TfP. It uses case studies of selected countries involved in peacekeeping pre-deployment training.

Police pre-deployment training: national frameworks and case studies

The first purpose of the course was to equip selected participants with foundational knowledge and enhance the individual and collective skills required for successful peacekeeping. The second purpose was to contribute to the national and regional pool of trained officers for employment in peacekeeping duties, including the SADC POL component of the Southern African Development Community Standby Force, as one of the five regional building blocks of the African Standby Force (ASF). The participant from Malawi was earmarked for deployment, while others were earmarked for standby, within the regional standby framework for deployment by the AU or SADC.

Both aspects of the course also sought to build and enhance the capacity of the member states of SARPCCO and the SADC region to engage in peace operations mandated by the regional organisation, the AU and the

UN. In addition, it sought to enhance capacity building towards the ASF by providing support for the training of trainers for the national police components of the regional standby force.

The following sub-paragraphs provide a synopsis of pre-deployment training undertaken since 2005 or projected to be undertaken in 2010 and beyond. The choice of national police organisations was based on countries that had previously participated in the project or are considered major peacekeeping countries within EAPCCO and SARPCCO.

UNPOC pre-deployment training support

As part of a strategy of consolidating police capacity building and enhancing the impact of the UNPOC training, in 2010 the ISS/TfP decided to mainstream the pre-deployment training project. The project envisages providing sustained support to selected major national police organisations in the two regions, but more so in the SARPCCO area. At inception, the project was conceptualised to involve and cover these national police organisations:

- Malawi Police Service (MPS)
- Namibia Police (NAMPOL)
- Zambia Police Service (ZPS)
- Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP)

However, owing largely to lack of initial funding support and operational considerations, the project had to be scaled down to cover only NAMPOL and ZPS. This notwithstanding, it was conceptualised subsequently to expand the coverage to such national police organisations as the Tanzania Police Force (TPF) and the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS). The latter was known to be contemplating resuming its commitment to deploy to UN missions.

Among others, it is anticipated that by continuing such engagements with SARPPCO, the certified trained officers of the UNPOC Clinic will be used to facilitate the pre-deployment training programmes, thereby enhancing national and regional capacities even further.

By using the UN's baseline CPTMs and STMs, the project will contribute to greater harmonisation of training that is consistent with UN standards and meets the needs of the ASF. Because the training is targeted at officers who have been selected or earmarked to deploy to UN and/or AU missions, particularly UNAMID, the project achieves greater cost-effectiveness.

Malawi Police Service training support

In February 2005, the ISS/TfP facilitated pre-deployment training for 34 MPS officers at the Police Cottage, Mangochi. The officers constituted a contingent of 26 that deployed to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and a second contingent of eight that deployed to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to undertake normal policing, mentoring, training and advisory tasks and functions. Spare capacity on the training course was utilised to accommodate five training officers from the SAPS.

Certified trained officers of the UNPOC Clinic will be used to facilitate the pre-deployment training programmes

In February and March 2008, the ISS/TfP presented two more pre-mission training courses for 81 officers at the Central Regional Training Centre (CRTC) in Lilongwe. These two training courses were requested by the Inspector General of Police (IGP), to prepare a group of 56 officers for deployment to the AU-UN Hybrid Operation for Darfur (UNAMID). Originally, Malawi had committed to the UN to deploy 50 officers. In June 2009, it deployed 36 officers (30 men and six women) to UNAMID – one additional male officer is still assigned

as an expert on RRR duties, while another is reported to have died. The tour of duty of all the deployed officers was extended for a period of six months beyond their repatriation date in June 2010 to January 2011.

Of the second contingent of 25, the MPS deployed eight to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL – the contingent was subsequently withdrawn as part of drawdown in UNMIL) and four to UNMIK.

Currently, the MPS has undertaken training for a pool of 156 officers. The decision of the IGP is to immediately deploy 115 of these officers, exceeding the original Malawi Police commitment of 50 deployed officers. This number also excludes the 36 officers currently deployed in UNAMID, who will be completing their tour of duty in January 2011.

As a matter of domestic organisational policy, the MPS first conducts foundational training of earmarked officers before the UN SAT. Thus, in 2008, for instance, only about 50 of the officers that were trained were successful at the SAT.

Namibia police training support

The ISS/TfP had facilitated the training of 46 NAMPOL officers. The first batch of 22 were trained in 2007, while the last batch of 24 officers were trained as part of the SARPPCO UNPOC Trainers' Clinic in 2008. Although the officers were originally trained for SADC POL standby duties, 36 officers (26 men and 10 women) were subsequently deployed to UN missions (see next paragraph).

In August 2010, when NAMPOL was being consulted on further pre-deployment training support, it (NAMPOL) was deploying 63 officers (25 men and 38 women) in UNAMID, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNOCI and UNMIT. In UNAMID, for instance, it was deploying 5 male and as many as 34 female officers.

To continue to meet these deployment commitments, NAMPOL was required to train a new pool of 55 officers. Thirty-five of these officers were to be covered under the ISS training support facility in September 2010 at the Israel Patrick Iyambo Police Training College (IPIPC), Windhoek. The remaining officers are expected to be trained under SADC POL regional training programmes at the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), and self-sponsored Russian peacekeeping training.

Lesotho and South Africa police training support

The ISS/TfP facilitated pre-deployment training for 22 LMPS officers in Maseru, in 2005. In the same year, it supported training for 214 officers from the South African Police Service (SAPS) at police training facilities

in South Africa. Subsequently, 12 LMPS and all 214 SAPS officers deployed to AMIS.

Even Although further training was provided for another batch of 21 officers, the LMPS did not deploy to UNAMID, probably because of domestic policy and owing to lack of effective communication between the UN DPKO and the service. As regards South Africa, SAPS has continued to maintain its commitments in UNAMID and other missions in Africa, but since the initial training in 2005 it has institutionalised its own peace support operations training projects, with some assistance from Canada (Pearson Peacekeeping Centre).

Uganda Police Force training support

In September 2008, the ISS/TfP facilitated pre-deployment training for 56 Uganda Police Force (UPF) officers in Kampala. All 56 officers were eventually deployed to UNAMID in 2009. Furthermore, at the request of the Seychelles Police, 25 officers were trained in Victoria in October 2009 specifically for EASBRICOM standby functions. Twenty of this number were deployed in the EASBRICOM FTX (Djibouti, 2009). In addition, five other officers who had participated in the EAPCCO UNPOC between 2008 and 2009 were deployed to UNAMID in 2009, making 61 deployments.

Projected Zambia Police Service training support

In mid 2010, ZPS was deploying about 300 officers (257 men and 43 women) to four UN missions, namely UNAMID, UNMIL, UNMIS and UNMIT. In order to relieve the officers on deployment, ZPS needed support in training 300 officers, in particular because of the apparent withdrawal of Canadian support. The training was planned to take place at Zambia Police

College, Lusaka, in two batches of 99 officers (September 2010) and 147 officers (October 2010) for subsequent deployments in October and November respectively. The projected training support has been moved to 2011, owing to lack of funding support in 2010.

Projected Zimbabwe Republic Police training support

Currently, the ZRP are deploying about 116 officers (91 men and 25 women) to six UN missions, including UNAMID and UNMIS. In addition, the organisation is deploying a few experts to the UN Office in Bissau, and was invited by the UN in mid 2010 to deploy an additional six officers as experts to UNMIL for crime investigation, community policing and public order management duties.

In order to deploy this number, the ZRP trained a pool of 300 officers, as in the case of the MPS. The 145 officers of the 152 who subsequently passed the UN SAT were deployed in the UN missions indicated above and will be due for rotation in January 2011. With these considerations in mind, the ZRP, in mid 2010, was intending to train a new pool of 250 officers for the UN SAT, for deployment in 2011, and to meet other peacekeeping exigencies.

The required training was planned to take place in two batches of 50 officers at the SADC RPTC, Harare, Zimbabwe, and the main group of 200 at the Morris Depot, Harare, all before the end of September 2010. The projected training support has been moved to 2011, owing to lack of funding support in 2010.

SUMMARY OF TRAINING OUTPUTS

The summary of training outputs from 2004 to 2009 is shown in table 8.

Table 8 Beneficiaries of ISS/TfP training support

Srl	Country	Year	Trained	Deployed		Non-deployed	
				Number	%	Number	%
1	Lesotho	2005	22	12	55%	10	45%
		2006	19	0	0%	19	100%
2	South Africa	2005	215	215	100%	0	0%
3	Malawi	2005	34	34	100%	0	0%
		2008	81	37	46%	44	54%
4	Namibia	2007	22	36	78%	10	22%
		2008	26				
5	Uganda	2008	56 (5)	56 (5)	100% (+)	0	0%
6	Total		475	390	82%	83	18%

Deployment of trained personnel

The summary of the pre-deployment training outputs from 2005 to 2008 shows these overall results for deployment:

- Of the total of 475 personnel that were trained from five national police organisations that had requested training support, 82% (390) deployed to AU and UN missions.
- Namibia and Uganda qualified their earmarked personnel under the UN SAT programme before requesting pre-deployment training support. Zambia also applies such a policy. In contrast, Malawi (and Zimbabwe and South Africa) police organisations requested support for generic pre-deployment training prior to the UN SAT.
- The relatively long time lag between training and deployment, as well as disparities in the numbers of trained and deployed personnel, has arisen because of delays in the finalisation of associated administrative measures and operational exigencies in mission areas.

Non-deployment of trained personnel

The summary of the pre-deployment training outputs from 2005 to 2008 shows these overall results and reasons for non-deployment:

- Of the total of 474 personnel that were trained from five national police organisations that had requested training support, 18% (83) might not have been deployed. For instance, it is known that 31 LMPS officers were not deployed. In the case of Namibia, however, part of the non-deployment was occasioned by retirements. With the exception of the LMPS case, however, where the non-deployed personnel had also qualified under the SAT programme, such personnel were placed in a national pool for deployment later.
- In some instances, the deployment took place about a year after the training was provided.
- In general, empirical evidence suggests that delays in deployment and non-deployment were the result of variations in national policies. These were predicated on internal national security considerations, other national priorities, such as national elections, non-effectiveness of personnel as a result of illness and retirements and, specifically in the Seychelles, combating piracy in the Indian Ocean.²⁹
- In addition, the lack of deployment after pre-deployment training, or its delay, could have arisen from miscommunication between the PCC and the UN DPKO or from host-state political difficulties. For instance, the LMPS reported that it was not able to

continue to deploy to UNAMID because the required clarification of pertinent aspects of the deployment was not forthcoming from the DPKO after the subsuming of AMIS in late 2007. The delay in the initial deployment of the MPS to UNAMID was also reported as having arisen from unspecified political and operational difficulties in the mission area.

- In terms of the policy option of organising the UN SAT before pre-deployment training, there is a degree of wastage in this option. All things being equal, organising the UN SAT before pre-deployment training is more cost effective as it results in deployment within a reasonable period of pre-deployment training.

MAKING SENSE OF IT ALL: CONTEXTUALISING KEY OBSERVATIONS

The findings and observations of the study are not fully representative of all police training in Africa because the study is based on a relatively narrow range of 'respondent' police organisations. While the trainers' data for SARPCCO covered all its member states, the data for pre-deployment training were limited to a few of the national police organisations in that region. In terms of EAPCCO, the data for both the trainers and pre-deployment training were limited.

The empirical study provides a basis for a number of key observations that, however, can make practical sense only if contextualised within the wider aspects of the fast-changing environment of complex (modern) peacekeeping and the associated surge in the demand for well-trained police personnel.

Despite the disparities in the variables, the study identifies four main categories of dynamic issues that impede post-training deployment of police officers. These may also be classified as institutional, structural and miscellaneous and are further denominated as follows:

- Institutional bottlenecks
- Structural bottlenecks
- Miscellaneous issues around UN SAT
- Gender deficit and the UNSAT bottlenecks

Institutional bottlenecks

Institutional bottlenecks are those aspects of UN policy implementation that impinge on the understanding and willingness of member state police organisations to respond to requests for police contributions. Because deployments generally reflect and/or form a crucial part of foreign policies of member states, requests for deployments have traditionally been channelled through permanent missions in New York. However, since the

study was not privy to communications between home capitals, their permanent missions and the DPKO, it is not in a position to examine the nature and scope of this dynamic authoritatively.

Nevertheless, the impression gained from the study is that the absence of a police attaché/advisor or a police office/desk at the permanent missions can delay communication or cause miscommunications that affect timely police deployments. On the other hand, the authors consider it permissible to point out that the presence of police attachés/advisors therefore speeds up the transmission of such requests through national ministries of home affairs, safety and security, interior or internal affairs.

At some point in the time covered by the study, a common understanding was arrived at for the Norwegian Police Advisor in New York to share information about DPKO requests and African member state responses/commitments with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ISS. For instance, it was because of such collaborative network that arrangements were made to support pre-deployment training for Malawi and Uganda in 2008.

Even after member states have made commitments towards deployments, changes in the state of internal security may cause them to scrap the policy commitment altogether. In the best case, they may delay deployments that they regard as prejudicial to national security and safety, taking into consideration national police capacities that may be precarious.

During the transfer of the mandate from AMIS to UNAMID in particular it was possible that some miscommunication had taken place between the continental organisation and the UN, which was ultimately responsible for force (and police) generation.

Finally, as regards the integrity of this dynamic or variable, the reticence of member states to disclose the details of the employment and deployment of police personnel may have precluded them from sharing the required information, even though such information is not prejudicial to national security and safety. The fact remains that the numbers of personnel that are deployed are eventually routinely accounted for on the DPKO website. In practice, though, the trained officers of the TFP constitute a significant part of the population of national databases, which form the basis of the standby arrangements for RECs.

Structural bottlenecks

There is a close relationship between institutional and structural bottlenecks. ‘Structural’ in the study refers to the systems and/or mechanisms that are in place for the DPKO and member states to transmit, receive and

make arrangements for the preparation and deployment of national police contingents. A certain amount of layering or overlaying of approaches is observed as a result of the hierarchical nature of these institutions. This layering (overlaying) in communications appears to have been compounded by lack of alternative means of coordination among all stakeholders. The attempt to share information within the TFP family is an example of such coordination that could help to alleviate bottlenecks in hierarchical environments.

Finally, sharing of information on the post-training employment and deployment augurs well for impact assessment, including the review and updating of databases. Once again, especially in the context of the AU (ASF), the issue of databases is ostensibly a policy one devolving on the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) and regional economic communities (RECs)/RMs (Regional Mechanisms). Whatever that policy is, however, it will be most useful if civil society-based training providers, such as the ISS, are able to make inputs, as well as share in its use.

Although it is beyond the remit of external stakeholders to influence national policy, the sequence in which contingents are prepared for deployment has implications for speed and economy of effort. Where contingents are UN SAT-qualified, national police organisations are better able to establish and maintain a ready pool of trained personnel for deployment at shorter notice than would otherwise be possible. In one sense, that framework could address the incidence of prolonged timelines for deployment. In another sense, however, this framework does not provide a solution to host-state impediments to deployment or other operational exigencies that cause such delays.³⁰ This is an issue that requires attention at the highest level of the UN and/or AU Systems.


UN SAT: Success rate and demerits

The study notes that because the UN SAT has a direct correlation with the qualification of police officers to deploy, it was worth considering its success rate and demerits.

The UN SAT comprises three components: language (reading, listening, writing and oral interview); driving; and shooting (in executive missions). In 2008, Farquhar³¹ pointed out that the progressive nature of the tests – one must pass the first to advance to the next – implies a higher attrition rate and the questionable success in these areas constitutes the primary impediment to mission staffing (see figure 4).

The study concurred with prevailing notions that the whole system is fraught with at least three dilemmas around the issues of language, gender and the conflicting

Figure 4 Success rate of UN SAT




demands of human rights protection by police officers. First of all, African and other police officers from non-English-speaking contributing countries have on occasion been dealt a raw deal when instructors involved in the language test can hardly be said to be English speaking themselves. Incidentally, this is an issue that cannot be overemphasised because the cultural dimension of peacekeeping requires that all peacekeepers should be able to communicate in the English spoken by the wide range of personnel drawn from the societies that make up the membership of the UN (and AU) Systems.

The current rates of success in the key SAT component areas (see figure 4) tell the story that there is a need for the modernisation of African police, if that need translates into providing not only holistic training and education programmes for democratic policing, but also capacity-building in the areas of infrastructure, and equipment as part of the reform of the wider rule of law sector.

Table 9 Gender disparities in training and deployment (2005–2009)³³

Srl	Country	Year	Trained	Gender composition		Deployed	Gender composition		Total
				Male	Female		Male	Female	
1	Lesotho	2005	22	21	1	12	12	0	
		2006	19	13	6	0	0	0	
		Total	41	34	7	12	12	0	
	% Women deployed							0	
2	South Africa	2005	215	170	45	215	170	45	
		Total	215	170	45	215	170	45	
	% Women deployed					100		20.9	
3	Malawi	2005	34	32	2	34	32	2	
		2008	81	71	10	37	31	6	
		Total	115	103	12	71	63	8	
	% Women deployed							11.3	
4	Namibia	2007	22	14	8	15	9	6	
		2008	26	22	4	21	17	4	
		Total	48	36	12	36	26	10	
	% Women deployed							27.8	
5	Uganda	2008	56	50	6	56	50	6	
		Total	56	50	6	56	50	6	
	% Women deployed							10.7	
6	Total		475	393	82	390	321	69	17.7
7	Per cent			82.7	17.3		82.3	17.7	

Figure 5 Gender disparity in (a) training and (b) deployment



Possible solutions that have been put forward include SAT national specific language and driver assistance programmes. Even so, police personnel from disadvantaged societies in which driving is not a matter of course may continue to be disadvantaged by the SAT programme, and female police officers are generally the worse off.

UN SAT: genderising the deficit

The Farquhar³² sample shows that a large number of officers (40 per cent), particularly women (90 per cent), from African and other countries and police organisations involved in the pre-deployment training project fail to deploy because of lack of driving experience. Even though the sample of respondent national police organisations used in this study is not necessarily wide or representative enough, the findings of the study of this limited sample show that gender disparities exist in the training and deployment for peacekeeping (see table 9 and figure 5).

The data (table 9) and the corresponding chart (figure 5) bring out three main aspects of the disparities in male and female participation in peacekeeping, namely:

- Only about 17% women are being trained
- On the deployment side, the levels stay fairly much the same, with about 18% women and 82% men deploying
- The ratio of male-to-female training and deployment is more than 4:1

Besides the evidence presented by Farquhar,³⁴ and since security services are predominantly a male domain, there is anecdotal evidence that female deployments are affected by social factors such as family responsibilities that may make it more difficult for women to deploy than men.

The study measured these statistics against the global UN Gender Statistics,³⁵ for instance at the end of March 2009 when such gender statistics included gender disaggregated data for the police component for the first time. At the end of this period, the 850 female and 9 478 male police officers deployed (10 328) by the UN presented a participation level of 8.2% for female and 91.8% for male police officers. Measured against the total of (92 196) deployed uniformed personnel (military and police), the participation level of the 850 female police officers implies a drop to a mere 0.9%. Another way of gauging female police participation is to compare it with female military participation. In raw terms, more military women (1 712) were deploying than the 850 policewomen. However, the female military personnel made up only 2.1% of the total military deployment of 81 868 personnel. In percentage therefore, female police deployments (8.2%) were about 4 times (3.9) those of female military personnel. In comparison with the data presented in the study, the contribution of African female police officers is much greater than the global UN level.

Nevertheless, gender disparities regionally and globally undermine efforts aiming at increasing the deployment of female officers. In addition, however, the inability of female officers to pass the UN SAT on account of lack of driving experience implies that financial and other resources invested in their foundational training are wasted. There is therefore a need for training providers and partners to consider establishing special programmes to enhance the driving skills of female officers.

To help obviate this waste and promote the deployment of female officers, additional funding resources should be made available to support female officers to undergo driving lessons, where necessary, with commercial driving schools, under preferential deals with their police organisations. These deals should, where possible,

include the issuance of local national driver's licences to female learners.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN DEPLOYMENTS

Complex emergencies will continue to be a feature of the political landscape of Africa. So will multidimensional peacekeeping, involving not only military, but also police and civilian components. In this context, the demand for and supply of trained peacekeepers, especially police, will continue to pose a number of challenges for peacekeeping deployments, and in meeting the requirements of the African Police and Security Architecture (APSA).

Meeting these challenges, however, will require multifaceted approaches in collaboration between structures of the AU System, as well as other non-governmental training providers, and donors and partners. It is key that in order to achieve effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of such training and the required support to that end, the collaborative arrangements should as much as possible be organised under the auspices of the UN and AU Systems, working through and with regional and international partners, and bringing together all stakeholders. Towards enhancing existing approaches, however, the following factors should be earnestly considered.

The results of the study underscore the need for efforts towards impact assessment of the outcomes and outputs of police training

The increasing complexity of police mandates and mission tasks, coupled with the fact that police missions within the framework of AU mandates may be subsumed by the UN, close collaboration and coordination between these two institutions and their partners and stakeholders will be essential. Besides helping to avoid overlaps and duplication in efforts, such collaboration and coordination will harmonise peacekeeping doctrine and practices.

Among the range of African and international partners working to enhance African capacities for peacekeeping deployments, since the late 1990s the ISS/TfP has particularly contributed to the enhancement of police capacities through peacekeeping trainers and pre-deployment courses in the two police regions in Southern and Eastern Africa. The training support and facilitation have equally contributed towards national and regional standby commitments for the ASF and the APSA.

The present study was undertaken to examine three key dynamics of these issues, namely the framework(s) of capacity training, and the outcomes and outputs of such training in terms of deployment or non-deployment of the trained officers. To some extent, the study underscores the relevance and importance of gender aspects and the deployment timelines of the trained officers.

On the one hand, the results of the study have been affected by lack of comprehensive data for analysis. This lack, due to the reticence of national police organisations to share information about the employment of officers who had gone through all the types of training, and more so pre-deployment training, is one of the fundamental challenges that ought to be addressed in arrangements for training support. In future, it should not be assumed that the sharing of such information will be a matter of course. The need to share that information for impact assessment should be considered part of agreed arrangements for training support.

Overall, the results of the study underscore the need for efforts towards impact assessment of the outcomes and outputs of police training, especially in terms of deployment. These include dedicated external impact assessments of how the training had contributed effectively to national capacities to meeting their obligations to UN and AU peacekeeping missions, as well as the objectives of the ASF and APSA.

However, even though the results of the study were not definitive on the outcomes of trainers' courses, these courses do add to the capacities of national police organisations to roll out all categories of peacekeeping training, especially in terms of the knowledge and skill sets required for such training. In terms of financial support, a large number of member states will continue to appreciate external support of the type provided through ISS/TfP facilitation, for instance.

That said, the reasons or explanations for the inability or unwillingness of national police organisations to share information on post-training employment and deployment merit a focus and suggest the need for some policy review. As the study has shown, there is need for policies around the ways in which member states make commitments to contributing personnel and around the timelines for the deployment of such personnel to be streamlined.

One fundamental aspect of the utilisation of trained police officers in missions is the process by which UN (and AU) requests are channelled to member states, the process by which member states respond to such requests, and the manner in which both the mandating authority/authorities coordinate the preparation of the pledged contributions for deployment. Even though some delays in deployment arise from in-mission

operational bottlenecks to deployment and host-state impositions and restrictions, the study found some grounds for improvement in the channels of communication between these authorities. Within the framework of the global TFP, for instance, close coordination among the Norwegian Permanent Mission in New York, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo and the ISS/TFP in Pretoria, as well as Nairobi, could go some way towards enhancing the implementation of key requirements for deployment.

Another obvious way of achieving this is for member states and police organisations to pre-test earmarked personnel under the UN SAT arrangements before undertaking pre-deployment training. It makes a huge difference to the force generation (police selection and recruitment) process if police officers receive pre-deployment training, where necessary, just before deployment. In other circumstances, however, there is greater efficiency if personnel who have undergone peacekeeping pre-deployment training go into a ready pool of trained officers. Either way, the results of the study show that this approach reduces wastage in the number of officers that receive training, but fail the UN SAT and therefore are not able to deploy.

The study also shows convincingly that as a result of the key parameters of the UN SAT, particularly driving, female police officers (especially from African societies in which women comparatively do not drive) stand at a disadvantage. A large number of female officers (globally about 40%) are unable to deploy when they fail the driving test. The study underscores the need for some form of assistance to enhance the driving competence of female police officers. Such support could be in the form of special, intensive pre-UN SAT training for nationally selected female officers who are deemed competent based on the other aspects of the UN SAT. Small financial support could get such female officers through driving school training at home, at the end of which they would graduate with national driver's licences.

Efforts in these directions could greatly enhance effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the need for timely deployment of trained police officers.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACCORD	African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AMIS	AU Mission in Sudan-Darfur
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU/OAU	African Union/Organisation of African Unity
AUPCC	AU Police Commanders Course
AUPOL	AU Police

CIVPOL	Civilian Police (old usage and reference to UNPOL/AUPOL)
CPTMs/STMs	Core Pre-deployment Training Materials/Specialised Training Modules
DPKO (UN)	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EAPCCO	Eastern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation
EASBRICOM	Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordinating Mechanism
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FPU	Formed Police Unit
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
LMPS	Lesotho Mounted Police Service
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC
MPS	Malawi Police Service
NAMPOL	Namibia Police
NUPI	Norwegian Institute for International Affairs
ONUC	Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (United Nations Operation in the Congo)
PCC	Police Contributing Country
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD (AU)	Peace Support Operations Division
RB	Regional Bureau (Interpol)
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SADC RPTC	SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
SADCPOL	SADC Police
SARCCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation
SAT	Selection Assistance Team
SDF (UN)	Strategic Deployment Framework
SML (AU)	Senior Mission Leadership (Seminar)
TfP	Training for Peace
TPF	Tanzania Police Force
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNMIL	United Nations Mission to Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UN SAT	UN Selection Assistance Team
UNAMID	AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNPOC (ISS)	AU/UN Police Officers Course
UNPOL	UN Police

UPF	Uganda Police Force
VAWC	Violence against Women and Children
ZPS	Zambia Police Service
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police

NOTES

- 1 See NUPI Report, Security in Practice 3, 2009, <http://www.trainingforpeace.org/Publications/2009>, accessed 1 July 2010.
- 2 In this study, the term and usage of 'police' are as defined in the UN handbook on *UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations*, New York: UN, 2003, 83–85. The term drops the adjective 'civilian', which on occasion is used to qualify police. In this study, the term refers to 'usually law enforcement personnel on active duty in their home countries and ... seconded by member states to UN peacekeeping operations'. Police are differentiated from other civilian disciplines such as human rights, political affairs, finance, etc.
- 3 A Le Roy, Remarks of the under secretary-general for peacekeeping operations to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 23 January 2009, <http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileId=3598>, accessed 11 August 2009.
- 4 UN, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and guidelines*, New York: UN, 2008, 13.
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- 17 In addition, police have been responsible for interim law enforcement since the end of the 1990s in Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo and East Timor. See V K Holt and T C Berkman, *The impossible mandate? Military preparedness, the responsibility to protect and modern peace operations*, Washington DC: Henry L Stimson Center, September 2006.
- 18 UN, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines 2008*.
- 19 UN (DPKO), Strategic Doctrinal Framework (SDF) workshop, Glen Cove, New York, 7–10 June 2010.
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- 21 The 14 UN missions with police presence are BINUB, MINURSO, MINUSTAH (with FPU), MINURCAT, MONUSCO (with FPU), ONUCI (with FPU), UNAMA, UNFICYP, UNMIK (with FPU), UNMIS, UNMIT (with FPU), UNMIL (with FPU), UNOMIG, UNAMID and MINUSTAH (with FPU) and UNOMIG.
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- 23 The accuracy of this figure is highly uncertain. Other sources place the external advisory presence at more than 30. See for instance Festus B Aboagye, *Confronting complex emergencies in Africa: Imperatives of a search for a new doctrine of humanitarian 'security' interventions*, ISS Paper 198, Pretoria: ISS, 2009. The sources used for this paper cited that higher figure.
- 24 See *Training for Peace in Africa Programme, an overview of Training for Peace Programme, 1995–2008*, 5–7, 12–15, www.trainingforpeace.org.
- 25 These terminologies and typologies of peacekeeping are derived from their usage and meaning by the UN in *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines 2008*. See pages 13–14, 21 and 66 of this document.
- 26 In the case of the ISS, the training outputs included peacekeeping courses (normal, trainers and trainers' clinic) that, since 1998, have provided the largest percentage of the outputs. The outputs, however, include two peacebuilding courses on HIV and Aids, and Violence against Women and Children (VAWC), especially from 2004. These peacebuilding courses are outside the framework of peacekeeping deployments. See *Training for Peace in Africa Programme*, 20–212.

- 27 Each candidate had to be evaluated by a supervisor. In a further attempt to obtain some feedback, in 2008 the matrix was discussed at the 2nd Joint EAPCCO/SARPCCO High Level Seminar (Tanzania, 2008). National delegates were given copies of the list of all officers who had previously attended UNPOC courses, while a consolidated list was provided to the RBs.
- 28 The post-course employment evaluation matrix consisted of three parts: background information, employment evaluation and general comments.
- 29 Namibia Police reported only one specific case of resignation in the 2007 training.
- 30 For instance, the speedy deployment of additional personnel and equipment after the transfer of the peacekeeping mandate from AMIS to UNAMID was hampered by Sudanese government restriction, as well as by the slow pace of camp construction, owing to government restrictions and inclement weather. See Festus Aboagye, *Confronting complex emergencies, imperatives of a search for a new doctrine of humanitarian 'security' interventions*. ISS Paper 204, ISS: Pretoria, 2009, 12. See also Festus Aboagye, *The hybrid operation in Darfur, a critical review of the concept of the mechanism*, ISS Paper 149, Pretoria, 2007, 14.
- 31 Colin Farquhar. Presentation at the Police in African Peacekeeping, Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin, 3 December 2008. Supt. Farquhar was then a Police Advisor at the Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN in New York.
- 32 See footnote 31.
- 33 The data in table 9 is based on table 8.
- 34 See footnote 31.
- 35 See UN, Gender statistics, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/gender/shtml>, accessed 7 September 2010.

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ABOUT THIS PAPER

The paper is the result of a study undertaken as part of the Tfp initiative to explore the police training environment and gauge some of the key challenges to the smooth deployment of trained police officers. It examines the priorities of national police organisations, sequencing of training, gender disparities, and strategic and operational level coordination, among others. The study uses experiences gained from the years of police training provided by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to two police regions in Africa, namely the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) and the Eastern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO).

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FUNDER

This publication was made possible through funding provided by the Pretoria Embassy of the Royal Norwegian Government. In addition, general Institute funding is provided by the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.



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P O Box 1787, Brooklyn Square 0075
Pretoria, South Africa
Tel: (27-12) 346 9500 Fax: (27-12) 460 0998
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