



# AFRICA'S POLICY IMPERATIVES

Arms Management Programme

## AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROJECT

Issue 6: May 2011

### Enhancing the Role of the OPCW in Building Africa's Capacity to Prevent the Misuse of Toxic Chemicals

*Amelia Broodryk and Noël Stott*

*Issue 6* of 'Africa's Policy Imperatives' focuses on the extent to which the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is adhered to in Africa. The CWC is a key treaty – forming part of a package of various international instruments that proscribe the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of weapons of mass destruction, and which provide important frameworks for preventative actions at the national level.

Previous editions provided general overviews (and updates) of Africa's participation in international efforts to strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation through a number of conventions, protocols and agreements and on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), its adherence in Africa and the potential benefits that Africa can derive from the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

This *Issue* is an edited and enhanced version of a longer paper due to be published by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in May/June 2011 entitled 'African Capacity to Prevent the Misuse of Toxic Chemicals and Participation in Global Efforts to Counter Acts of Terrorism: the role of the OPCW'. It argues that as the OPCW shifts its focus away from chemical weapons disarmament to one that concentrates on non-proliferation and international co-operation and assistance, adjustments to the mandate, programmes and approaches given to the OPCW by its Member States will need to be made.

It has been compiled as a result of research undertaken since 2007 by the Norwegian-funded ISS' "Africa's Development and the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction Project". This project aims to identify and strengthen Africa's role in these international efforts in the context of the continent's developmental imperatives.

#### Introduction

The need to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is an accepted norm amongst virtually all African States – *albeit* without hampering the peaceful use of nuclear, biological and chemical materials. Africa's position, like that of most, if not all, of the developing world, is clear. There needs to be a balance between security and development – that while being fully committed to ensuring the security of nuclear (and other radioactive), biological and chemical materials, this must be done without undermining international co-operation in the peaceful uses of such material, and

without impeding the continued delivery of the developmental benefits provided by such materials and related applications.

Of greater concern in Africa, then, is the need to ensure that the production, storage and use of this type of material by the scientific, medical and industrial community is conducted in an authorised, safe and appropriate manner. The working environment must ensure the safety of workers, the public, and the environment. At the same time, there is a growing recognition that national capacity to better secure such material from unauthorised non-state actors (both armed and unarmed) and criminal

networks, and to prevent the illicit trafficking of such materials to those groups or states with an interest in acquiring or developing a weapon of mass destruction with the intention to cause harm – in particular a device that can disperse such material (such as toxic chemicals) – needs to be significantly enhanced using the limited resources available. In addition to safety considerations, “guards, gates and guns” are now needed to secure sensitive chemical agents, documents and processes from being accessed by the people intent on undermining the global prohibition on WMD.

### **Africa and the Chemical Weapons Convention**

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction or Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was adopted in 1992. The CWC eliminates an entire category of weapons of mass destruction and States Parties enforce the prohibition in respect of persons (natural or legal) within their jurisdiction. All States Parties have agreed to destroy any stockpiles of chemical weapons they may hold and any facilities that produced them, as well as any chemical weapons they abandoned on the territory of other States Parties in the past. States Parties have also created a verification regime for certain toxic chemicals and their precursors (listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 in the Annex on Chemicals to the CWC) in order to ensure that such chemicals are only used for purposes not prohibited.

Importantly, for Africa, the CWC is not only a global disarmament and non-proliferation regime providing key security, but the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)<sup>ii</sup>, the implementing body of the CWC, is proactive in promoting economic, scientific, and technological development through its various projects and programmes in the field of international co-operation.

There are currently 50 African States Parties and three (Angola, Egypt and Somalia) non-signatory states to the CWC. This represents an almost unanimous rejection and an unequivocal ban of chemical weapons in Africa.

In support of the goal of an Africa free of chemical weapons and in accordance with the CWC, Libya had to destroy approximately 9.5 metric tons of mustard agent by 15 May 2011, and a quantity of precursor materials by 31 December 2011. However, recent events in Libya have led the OPCW's

Executive Council to publically express its concern and to remind Libya of its obligation to ensure the security of its remaining stockpile whilst continuing with destruction within the established deadlines.<sup>iii</sup> In mid-May 2011, Libya requested an extension of the deadline, which is currently being considered by the Executive Council. It is believed that Libya has already destroyed the munitions required to use the chemicals as weapons but some 11.25 tonnes of the mustard gas is still awaiting destruction.

The near universalisation of the CWC in Africa is largely due to the numerous co-ordinating activities of the OPCW and, more specifically, as a result of the Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation between the Commission of the African Union and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The Memorandum seeks to enhance co-operation between the two organisations to implement the CWC and to achieve universality in Africa, in accordance with the decision adopted by the 38<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union at Durban, South Africa in July 2002 (Decision AHG/Dec.182 (XXXVIII)).<sup>iv</sup> At this meeting, the Assembly took note of the CWC's aim 'to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction' and, encouraged 'the call to achieve universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Africa'.

The 29 January 2006, Memorandum of Understanding expands on this decision by seeking to enhance co-operation between the two Organisations with respect to both the universality of the Convention in Africa, and for the effective national implementation of its provisions. It also established an effective mechanism between the African Union Commission and the OPCW Technical Secretariat to collaborate in areas of mutual interest.

At the signing ceremony, the then African Union Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konaré stated that co-operation with the OPCW was important for the African Union's goal of establishing a chemical weapons-free zone in Africa and in fostering the peaceful uses of chemistry.

The OPCW's work in Africa includes the following activities:

- Support for, and fostering of, international co-operation in the peaceful use of chemistry;

- building African capacity for national implementation of the Convention as a whole;
- assisting the effective functioning of National Authorities, including the control of imports and exports of Scheduled Chemicals;
- enhancing understanding of the rights and obligations of States Parties;
- enhancing understanding of the verification regimes of the CWC; and,
- facilitating co-operation and enhancing the capacity of African States Parties in the area of assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons

The creation of the a specific Programme for Africa is a recognition within the OPCW of the need for enhanced assistance to African States Parties which have yet to meet all of their obligations under the Convention. Over the years the Programme has expanded in both quantity and in its scope of support provided to African States Parties and further enabled them to participate in training courses and workshops on the continent on topics that are of direct relevance to them.<sup>v</sup> Due to the success of the first phase of the Programme for Africa, OPCW Director-General Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü recently approved the implementation of a second three-year phase.<sup>vi</sup>

The OPCW, in co-operation with States Parties from the region, co-hosts events in Africa ranging from regional meetings of CWC National Authorities to sub-regional training workshops for customs officials.<sup>vii</sup>

As a result of these initiatives, in November 2010, Kalimi Mworira, Director of the OPCW's International Cooperation and Assistance Division, was able to announce that 96 percent of African States Parties have notified the Technical Secretariat of the designation or establishment of their National Authorities.<sup>viii</sup>

However Mworira also revealed that only 22 percent have implementing legislation covering all key areas of the CWC.<sup>ix</sup>

In May 2011, Mauritania became the 186<sup>th</sup> nation to activate a national authority to interact with other member states and with the OPCW as well as to submit mandatory declarations and accompany OPCW officials during inspections of industrial facilities.

## The cases of Angola, Egypt and Somalia

Angola, Egypt and Somalia have neither signed nor ratified the CWC. There are a variety of reasons for this, and each country has unique circumstances preventing them from doing so – despite the view that they should be amongst the easiest to persuade compared with the other four non-States Parties: Israel, Myanmar (Burma), DPRK (North Korea) and Syria.

Angola has no confirmed history of chemical weapons possession and use, no serious external threat to its security since the ending of the decades-long civil war in 2002 and a relatively small chemical industry. However, it should also be noted that South Africa, in defence of its now discontinued chemical and biological weapons programme, often cited its capture of chemical detection and decontamination equipment and treatment regimes in Angola in the 1980s as concrete evidence that the MPLA and Cuban forces were prepared to use chemical warfare against the then South African Defence Force (SADF). South Africa also claimed at the time that the Western European Defence Alliance (WEDA) had substantiated a chemical attack on UNITA by the MPLA.<sup>x</sup>

In July 2010, the official Angolan news agency, Angop, reported that thirty officers from the Angolan armed forces attended a 15-day workshop at the command centre of the fourth infantry division in Kuito – the purpose of which was to educate officials on defences against chemical weapons.

Notwithstanding the optimism expressed by the then OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pflirter, who stated at the 2007 Conference of the States Parties (CSP) that Angola “fully supports” the CWC and that the probable hold-up was logistical and resource constraints rather than political issues, as of May 2011, Angola seems no closer to accession. Indeed, while it is party to the Geneva Conventions concerning international armed conflict, as well as the 1925 Geneva Protocol<sup>xi</sup>, it is neither a party nor a signatory to the numerous other arms control and disarmament conventions and protocols, nor any of the major counter-terrorism conventions – exceptions being the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the CTBT and its submission of an initial 1540 report in 2004. It has signed the Treaty of Pelindaba but not the BTWC.

Since the 1991 outbreak of a civil war, Somalia has had no central government. The internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG) controls only a small part of the country, which has been designated as a failed state and one of the poorest and most violent. The creation of the TFG was based on the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), which outlines a five-year mandate leading to the establishment of a new Somali constitution and a transition to a representative government following national elections. In January 2009, the TFC was amended to extend TFG's mandate until 2011. The lack of a functioning government in Somalia and the current humanitarian crisis mean that CWC accession by Somalia in the near future is probably also unlikely.<sup>xii</sup> Somalia is only party to a limited number of international criminal, human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law treaties and no conventions covering arms control issues.<sup>xiii</sup> Somalia is a state party to the NPT and a signatory of the BTWC and the Treaty of Pelindaba. It has not signed the CTBT and has not reported to the UNSC on its implementation of 1540.

Egypt is perhaps the greatest obstacle to achieving CWC universality in Africa – the main deadlock being Egypt's insistence on linking the issue of nuclear weapons in the Middle East with chemical weapons, namely that Israel, which has a policy of nuclear ambiguity, should first join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Egypt maintains that this linkage is also a necessary component of its support for a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East. Egypt is widely believed to possess a stockpile of chemical weapons and delivery capability, or at least a capability to produce them speedily, perhaps seeing this as a strategic counterbalance to Israel's nuclear weapons. Despite this, Egypt engages with the OPCW, participates in regional workshops and seminars and attends the CWC Conference of Parties as an observer. Egypt has signed but not ratified the BTWC or the Treaty of Pelindaba and, as stated above, remains the only African State whose signature and ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force. Egypt submitted its 1540 reports on 28 October 2004, 17 March 2006 and 28 February 2008.

Egypt has, for many years, promoted the notion of a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East. This idea recently received a significant boost with the adoption of a final document consisting of a 64-step action plan by the 189 States Parties to the NPT by consensus. Egypt as Chair of the Non-Aligned

Movement (NAM) played a significant role in the 8th Review Conference, ensuring that a concrete agreement on ways to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East as reached.<sup>xiv</sup> The so-called Middle East Resolution refers to the decision made in 1995 that all states in the Middle East region join the NPT and put their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The 1995 resolution also required all states in the region to work toward a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and called on all NPT States Parties, in particular the nuclear weapon states, to support this goal. After weeks of negotiations it was agreed that the "UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors (the US, Russia and the UK) of the original resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a Conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East".

This development provides a unique opportunity to move the ratification by Egypt of the CWC forward and, in fact, to build the momentum for universalisation of all WMD-related Conventions in the whole Middle East region.

All three countries continue to be invited, and sometimes participate in, and/or attend Conferences of States Parties (as observers), various OPCW-run basic courses for National Authorities, workshops for customs authorities on technical aspects of the implementation of the scheduled chemicals transfer regime, regional and sub-regional meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Africa, workshops on the implementation of the CWC, including on national implementing legislation, international co-operation issues, and the CWC's provisions for monitoring transfers of scheduled chemicals.

### **Conclusion – the Importance of National Legislation**

The near-universalisation of the CWC in Africa is a testament to the continent's commitment to ensuring that the misuse of dangerous chemicals does not happen either in Africa, or anywhere else in the world.

While it remains important to promote accession in the remaining three states not yet party to the Convention, effective implementation of the CWC in the existing African States Parties continues to be an ongoing challenge. In particular, the fact that only 22 percent of African States Parties have implementing



legislation covering all key areas of the CWC is of major concern.

Indeed, the outcome document of the first CWC Review Conference (in 2003) confirmed the essential role of national legislation and other regulatory measures for the proper functioning of the Convention and "called upon states parties that have not already done so, to inform the OPCW by the next regular session of the Conference of the status" of their national implementation measures. The CWC contains detailed implementation provisions explicitly requiring States Parties to adopt as criminal offences activities that violate the treaty and to extend these measures to offences committed by their citizens outside of their territory. National laws are also necessary to establish and operate the National Authority required under the CWC.

While it may be true that each of the major treaties relating to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons have different requirements for national implementation measures, it does not follow that states need to adopt a separate and dedicated legal instrument for each.

Given the resource constraints that most African countries operate under, it may be useful for African States Parties to consider an integrated approach to the regulation of WMD issues in general. A useful model of the latter is South Africa's Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (Act No. 87 of 1983) and its inter-departmental structure - the South African Non-Proliferation Council for Weapons of Mass Destruction (NPC) – which administers the Act and controls the transfer (export/import/transit/re-export) of dual-use technology, materials and goods.

Such an approach would make it easier for States to implement related treaties such as the NPT and BTWC and indeed UNSC Resolution 1540 thus making the best use of limited resources to, for example, effectively control dual-use nuclear, biological and chemical materials. This approach would also prevent a collage of export control, customs and criminal legislation in a particular country. In addition, it may make it possible for States, through appended regulations, to make provision for new technological developments and risks in the field and new UNSC resolutions covering non-proliferation issues that may arise in the future.

Although the OPCW has achieved a great deal in Africa and beyond, it cannot continue to do this

alone. Other stakeholders of the established National Authorities, such as the chemical industry, customs authorities and other governmental stakeholders, regional and sub-regional bodies, as well as civil society must work collaboratively to ensure that the practical aspects of the Convention are implemented appropriately. This co-operation should also include a tailor-made approach to implementing the CWC, and other related WMD conventions in Africa.

Importantly for Africa is the impact that conventions such as the CWC have on socio-economic development. Benefits of being a States Party includes the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. Therefore, engagement on this issue in Africa must include (or even predominantly focus on) both the developmental benefits as well as the security dimensions of OPCW membership. Implementing the CWC does not solely pertain to security – keeping chemicals out of the hands of unauthorised non-state actors. Implementation also relates to technical assistance, increased co-operation, and transfer of technology. These dimensions are probably most relevant to a continent that struggles with challenges such as poverty, unemployment and under-development.

Importantly, the adoption of the necessary legislation by African States will demonstrate their full compliance and build confidence that the assistance they receive in the development of advanced chemical technologies will be used only for peaceful purposes.

## Recommendations

As the OPCW shifts its focus away from chemical weapons disarmament to one that concentrates on non-proliferation and international co-operation and assistance, adjustments to the mandate, programmes and approaches given to the OPCW by its Member States will need to be made.

As a way to improve effective national implementation of the CWC in Africa, thereby creating the essential conditions for providing reliable non-proliferation assurances, and addressing new challenges faced by States Parties of the Convention, such as the potential use of toxic industrial chemicals (for example, by non-State actors), the following recommendations are proposed for the OPCW:

1. To follow the example of a recent African initiative to establish a Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA). The FNRBA sees itself as assisting States to upgrade their legislation and regulatory frameworks, to promote education training and managing the recent increase in uranium mining on the African continent. The work of the FNRBA complements that of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Nuclear Security Programme in Africa. A similar African initiative with a mandate on the CWC and the chemical industry, in co-operation with the OPCW, could be created in order to sustain and maintain a network for information exchange among diplomats, scientific communities, academic institutions, chemical-industry associations, NGOs, and regional and international institutions.
2. The African Union, which, as described above, has a Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation with the OPCW's Technical Secretariat, should be lobbied to take a more proactive role in strengthening States Parties' capacities against the misuse of toxic chemicals and in finding the appropriate balance between security and development.
3. The OPCW should assist African States in examining current examples of general WMD control legislation that covers the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (BTWC), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as the CWC.
4. It would be important for the OPCW to actively participate in the process leading to the 2012 Conference on a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East implementing the 1995 NPT resolution and if possible to also attend.

Given the OPCW's recognition of the important role that civil society (other than industry and the private sector) plays in the implementation and monitoring of the CWC, evident from recent events including an Article XI Workshop hosted in November 2010, the following recommendations are proposed:

1. Applied policy research institutes, human rights and international humanitarian lawyers, environmentalists, health care practitioners, also have a responsibility to ensure that the Convention remains the norm both in Africa and

globally, and in assisting in the implementation of global conventions and treaties at the national and regional levels.

5. While the OPCW promotes the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), by reaching out to the countries not party to the Convention, international, regional and local organs of civil society are an important sector to complement this work. What seems to be needed is a co-ordinated, comprehensive, systematic and sustained effort on the part of both the OPCW and civil society.
6. Given that the role of both the OPCW and civil society is to promote international peace and security through disarmament and non-proliferation and to enhance security in Africa, we should recognise the complementary nature of our activities and embark on mutually reinforcing actions in, for example, promoting awareness, and universality of the CWC in Africa and lobbying for the enactment of domestic laws. At the same time, civil society must continue to play its traditional watchdog role over the trade in chemicals and riot control equipment as well as on the activities of the OPCW itself.
7. Civil society could provide a strong advocacy voice and outreach to the remaining African states not party to the CWC especially by outlining the developmental benefits of the work of the OPCW for African States, and the importance of African support for full CWC universalisation as well as to offer their assistance in policy and legislative drafting.
8. Many African NGOs also have excellent co-operative relations with most pan-African institutions including sub-regional bodies such as SADC and the Pan-African Parliament. This access could also be used to raise public and parliamentary awareness of the importance of the CWC as part a wider strategy to implement the Common African Defence and Security Policy, as adopted by the African Union's Second Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Head of States and Government, on 28 February 2004 and as a key component of the overall peace and security architecture of the African Union.
9. It is therefore imperative for the OPCW to engage with pan-African and local civil society who can assist in the universalisation of the CWC in Africa and in its implementation with particular reference to Angola, Egypt and Somalia and those African States Parties who do not as yet have domestic implementing legislation.

**African Status: Ratifications and Submission of 1540 Reports (as at May 2011)**

African State	CWC	1540 Reports	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	Treaty of Pelindaba	CTBT	BTWC
Algeria	X	X	X	X	X	X
Angola		X	X			
Benin	X	X	X	X	X	X
Botswana	X		X	X	X	X
Burkina Faso	X	X	X	X	X	X
Burundi	X		X	X	X	
Cameroon	X	X	X	X	X	
Cape Verde	X		X		X	X
Central African Republic	X		X		X	
Chad	X		X			
Comoros	X		X			
Congo (Republic of)	X		X			X
Côte d'Ivoire	X	X	X	X	X	
Djibouti	X	X	X		X	
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	X	X	X		X	X
Egypt		X	X			
Equatorial Guinea	X		X	X		X
Eritrea	X	X	X		X	
Ethiopia	X		X	X	X	X
Gabon	X	X	X	X	X	X
Gambia	X		X	X		X
Ghana	X	X	X			X
Guinea	X		X	X		
Guinea-Bissau	X		X			X
Kenya	X	X	X	X	X	X
Lesotho	X		X	X	X	X
Liberia	X		X		X	
Libya	X	X	X	X	X	X
Madagascar	X	X	X	X	X	X
Malawi	X		X	X	X	
Mali	X		X	X	X	X
Mauritania	X		X	X	X	
Mauritius	X	X	X	X		X
Morocco	X	X	X		X	X
Mozambique	X		X	X	X	X
Namibia	X	X	X		X	
Niger	X	X	X		X	X
Nigeria	X	X	X	X	X	X
Rwanda	X		X	X	X	X

African State	CWC	1540 Reports	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	Treaty of Pelindaba	CTBT	BTWC
São Tomé and Príncipe	X		X			X
Senegal	X	X	X	X	X	X
Seychelles	X	X	X		X	X
Sierra Leone	X	X	X		X	X
Somalia			X			
South Africa	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sudan	X	X	X	X	X	X
Swaziland	X		X	X		X
Tanzania (United Republic of)	X	X	X	X	X	
Togo	X		X	X	X	X
Tunisia	X	X	X	X	X	X
Uganda	X	X	X		X	X
Zambia	X		X	X	X	X
Zimbabwe	X		X	X		X

<sup>i</sup> The authors' opinions expressed in this edition of 'Africa's Policy Imperatives' do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute for Security Studies, its Council, its Trustees or any funder or sponsor of the ISS.

<sup>ii</sup> The OPCW is given the mandate to achieve the object and purpose of the Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and co-operation among States Parties.

<sup>iii</sup> Global Security Newswire, 'OPCW Council Worried About Libyan Chemical Arsenal', [http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\\_20110509\\_9563.php](http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110509_9563.php)

<sup>iv</sup> Stott, du Rand and Dye, 'Africa's Development and the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Update 3', Africa's Policy Imperatives, Issue 4, March 2011, 4.

<sup>v</sup> Stott, du Rand and Dye, 'Africa's Development and the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Update 3', Africa's Policy Imperatives, Issue 4, March 2011, 4.

<sup>vi</sup> 'The OPCW Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention', presentation by Kalimi Mworio to a workshop on Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 24 – 25 November 2010.

<sup>vii</sup> See the OPCW website for details of events hosted in Africa, <http://www.opcw.org>

<sup>viii</sup> 'The OPCW Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention', presentation by Kalimi Mworio to a workshop on Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 24 – 25 November 2010.

<sup>ix</sup> 'The OPCW Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention', presentation by Kalimi Mworio to a workshop on Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 24 – 25 November 2010.

<sup>x</sup> WEDA was set up in the wake of World War II, and after the end of the Cold War ceased to function.

<sup>xi</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

<sup>xii</sup> Daniel Feakes, 'Getting Down to the Hard Cases: Prospects for CWC Universality', *Arms Control Today*, March 2008.

<sup>xiii</sup> See: Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights [http://www.adh-geneve.ch/RULAC/international\\_treaties.php?id\\_state=204](http://www.adh-geneve.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_state=204)

<sup>xiv</sup> See: Hubert Foy, Amelia Broodryk and Noel Stott, "'Keep Calm and Carry On': An Initial African Assessment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 2010 Review Conference" *ISS Occasional Paper* No. 211 June 2010.