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The forty-first Annual IPI Vienna Seminar was held at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna on May 23-25, 2011. Under the theme “Coping with Crisis in Europe and Central Asia: Adapting to New Threats and Challenges,” senior representatives from the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union (EU), as well as diplomats, policymakers, academics, and journalists from the European continent and beyond, convened to examine new threats and challenges in the European and Central Asian security landscape.

This meeting note was drafted by Pim Valdre, Director of External Relations at the International Peace Institute. It reflects the *rapporteur's* interpretation of the seminar discussions and does not necessarily represent the view of all other participants. The meeting was organized by the newly-opened IPI Vienna office in collaboration with the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Federal Ministry for Defense and Sports. The discussions were conducted under the Chatham House rule of nonattribution and confidentiality.

# 2011 Vienna Seminar

## Coping with Crisis in Europe and Central Asia: Adapting to New Threats and Challenges

### Introduction

The 2011 Vienna Seminar took place against a backdrop of significant changes in the European security environment with several new peace and security challenges confronting European security organizations and the broader international community.

More than two decades after the end of the Cold War, Europe is marked by both opportunities and challenges. Many of the ethnic clashes and wars of secession erupting in former Soviet republics in the 1990s have been resolved with the support of NATO, the OSCE, the EU, and the UN. However, the recent crisis in Kyrgyzstan, the unresolved issues in Kosovo, and ongoing tensions in Georgia, Moldova, parts of the Balkans, and in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrate the fragile stability in the region and the continued clash between the principles of self-determination and the territorial integrity of states as outlined in the Helsinki Final Act.<sup>1</sup>

Some states and larger cities in Europe are struggling with an additional intrastate challenge; namely, how to accommodate a growing number of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural minorities in their societies. The perception of failed integration policies and a growing disconnect between minority and majority populations have led some European leaders to declare the “death of multiculturalism.” Others caution against such statements, and point to the need to strike a balance between the rights and obligations of minorities, and to counter political movements with anti-immigrant and extremist agendas spreading throughout Europe.

In addition to intrastate challenges, transnational security threats are on the rise in Europe and Central Asia. Organized crime, including drug, arms, and human trafficking networks, has grown into a multibillion dollar industry, undermining legal economies and posing a threat to sovereign states. Collaborative initiatives to deal with these entities, activities, and effects remain fragmented and weak, as states continue to jealously guard their crime-control competencies. This reluctance to share information, analysis, and enforcement capacity risks creating space for organized crime and its allies to expand their activities and increase their power and influence.

Another transnational challenge that plays a significant role for Europe's future peace and security landscape is the access to sufficient and reliable sources of energy. Reducing Europe's energy dependence and associated

<sup>1</sup> Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, *Final Act*, August 1, 1975, available at [www.osce.org/mc/39501](http://www.osce.org/mc/39501).

vulnerability to price shocks and disrupted oil and gas deliveries has therefore risen to the top of European policy agendas. Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region can play a significant role in addressing Europe's energy needs; however, strategies for Europe's future energy security also have to take into account the "new great game" in which emerging powers such as China and India are shaping both the access to and the politics of energy.

In light of these challenges, the dimensions of the European security space are expanding and becoming ever more complex. Policymakers have to pay attention not only to the Euro-Atlantic security space, but also to the area that encompasses Central and South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. And they have to make sure that the capacities of regional and multilateral organizations are keeping pace with the speed of new security developments.

The purpose of the 2011 Vienna Seminar was to bring together policymakers, practitioners, and representatives from diplomatic missions, multilateral and regional organizations, academia, and civil society to share views on the changing security environment in Europe and Central Asia and to generate fresh thinking on how to strengthen the response capacities of the international community. It addressed some of the most salient challenges facing policymakers in the region and focused on three levels: intrastate challenges, transnational challenges, and multilateral and regional response capacities.

## Intrastate Challenges with Regional and Global Security Implications

### A CLASH BETWEEN SELF-DETERMINATION AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

The Helsinki Final Act was adopted by the Conference of Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE) on August 1, 1975.<sup>2</sup> It was regarded as a groundbreaking achievement and as a blueprint for promoting peaceful relations among states during the Cold War. The document laid out

a number of key commitments on politico-military, economic, environmental, and human rights issues. It also established ten fundamental principles guiding the relationship between citizens and their states and the relationship between states.

Today, the Helsinki Final Act continues to deeply impact the European security landscape. Two of its core principles, namely, principle IV on the "territorial integrity of states" and principle VIII on "equal rights and self-determination of peoples," have clashed in a number of places in the region and continue to cause controversy. The recent crisis in Kyrgyzstan, the unresolved issues in Kosovo and Georgia, as well as continued instability in Moldova and parts of the Balkans demonstrate the continued tension between the two principles.

It was noted by the seminar participants that, in the strictest interpretation, international law does not recognize the right to unilateral secession based on the principle of self-determination if it is outside of the colonial context. The reason for this can be traced back to the evolution of the right to self-determination as a legal concept that culminated with the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the UN General Assembly in 1960.<sup>3</sup> This declaration stressed independence within the colonial context as the principle means through which self-determination is implemented. Over time, some have argued for more flexibility and for an acceptance of secession under extreme conditions, such as genocide. Yet, this argument has so far reached very little general acceptance and remains largely unsuccessful when applied in practice.

Moreover, international law is also clear when it comes to the rules for self-determination with regards to the removal of a territory from a political state or entity. Here, the principle of *uti possidetis juris* has become overwhelmingly accepted. It grants statehood exclusively to former states, and not to any subentities or break-away regions within those states.

Consequently, independence, particularly if declared unilaterally, remains a solution only in

2 OSCE, "Signing of the Helsinki Final Act," available at [www.osce.org/who/43960](http://www.osce.org/who/43960). The complete Helsinki Final Act is available at [www.osce.org/mc/39501](http://www.osce.org/mc/39501).

3 UN General Assembly, *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, December 14, 1960, UN Doc. A/RES/1514(XV) available at [www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1514\(XV\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1514(XV)).

very exceptional circumstances. Most international policies continue to give precedence to the territorial integrity of states. For example, many of the entities in the OSCE area that sought or are seeking autonomy have been denied recognition, including the Republika Srpska Krajina in Croatia, the Republika Srpska in Bosnia, Transdnistria in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Chechnya in Russia.

Countering this trend is Kosovo, which has been recognized by seventy-five UN member states since its declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008.<sup>4</sup> It has recently achieved other milestones including International Monetary Fund and World Bank membership. However, Kosovo's independence continues to be a contentious issue within the EU and not least for its relationship with Russia. Nevertheless, the partial recognition of Kosovo has served as a source of inspiration and a powerful precedent for other break-away entities and groups aspiring to achieve autonomy and statehood.

Notably, Kosovo's declaration of independence played a major role in the conflict in Georgia that escalated to war with Russia in August 2008. Three years have passed since the end of the armed conflict but the situation remains fragile and highly contentious. Several factors indicate that the dispute is far from settled and that hostilities could quickly flare up again. Among them are the absence of a comprehensive agreement on the future legal status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; the unresolved relationship between the Georgian authorities and the minorities living within its borders; and the strained and ambiguous relationship between Georgia and Russia. Despite widespread recognition of the urgency to address these challenges, the current view is that a durable solution cannot be reached at the moment and thus the situation must be left "frozen" in the status quo.

In many ways, the case of Georgia illustrates the complex set of legal problems surrounding self-determination, the right to secession, recognition, territorial integrity, and state sovereignty that have come into play in post-Cold War Europe. This complexity is compounded by the lack of a common understanding among parties regarding

the correct interpretation of the principles under international law. Additionally, the deliberate misuse of the terms for the purpose of achieving political agendas has led to confusion and to a disconnect between the legal and political interpretations.

In conclusion, on the question of whether the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination can be reconciled in practice, participants agreed that there are good reasons to believe that such a scenario is highly unlikely. The multifaceted dimension of the challenge, involving not only local but regional and international actors and interests, adds to the difficulty of narrowing the gap between the principles. Additionally, the inconsistency with which the international community has applied the two principles in the past can at best lead to further confusion and at worst contribute to the emergence of new waves of claims for self-determination and secession. Some further recommendations were offered by the experts and participants at the Vienna Seminar.

First, the international community should recognize that there is no hard and fast solution to the problem of clashes between self-determination and territorial integrity. Each situation is unique and a result of a complex web of events that involves exceptional historical factors, various forms of minority groups, and a distinctive relationship with neighboring states. Therefore, for conflict-prevention and resolution strategies to be truly meaningful, they need to be tailor-made and context-specific, and avoid any form of cookie-cutter approach.

Second, due to political realities and the fear of ripple effects, secession is likely to remain the exception. The difficulty of generating support for the recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state, and the contentious nature of the issue within the EU, exemplifies the reluctance of the international community to grant full independence. Yet, Kosovo's case, however *sui generis*, could still serve as a precedent for further unilateral declarations in the future—for instance, in the case of the Palestinians' pursuit of an internationally recognized Palestinian state at the UN.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> US Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: Kosovo," April 11, 2011, available at [www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/100931.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/100931.htm).

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Mahmoud Abbas, "The Long Overdue Palestinian State," *New York Times*, May 16, 2011, available at [www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/opinion/17abbas.html?\\_r=2&hpw](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/opinion/17abbas.html?_r=2&hpw).

Third, there is a significant danger in ignoring frozen conflicts. As demonstrated in the case of the sudden eruption of the Georgia crisis, frozen conflicts can quickly turn hot, with devastating consequences. In order to succeed, short-term crisis-prevention and conflict-resolution efforts need to be coupled with mid- and long-term efforts for democratic reform, establishment of the rule of law, and strong state institutions.

### TOWARDS INTEGRATION OR DISINTEGRATION? THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY IN EUROPE

While some European states are struggling with groups calling for secession and independence, others are trying to integrate a growing number of cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities into their societies. The seminar addressed some of the major challenges in Europe relating to integration and the future of multiculturalism.

Participants noted that the political climate in Europe is undergoing dramatic changes and that many countries are rethinking their policies on immigration and integration. While some still support the motto of “United in Diversity” that underpinned the creation of the European Union, others question what diversity means today and doubt the value of multiculturalism. Some mainstream politicians have even taken it a step further by publically rejecting the notion of multiculturalism as a guiding principle for European integration.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed this view in a speech in 2010 declaring that multiculturalism has failed, and “failed utterly.” This opinion was echoed by British Prime Minister David Cameron in 2011, who proclaimed that “under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives.”<sup>6</sup> Other European leaders have followed suit, criticizing the principle for increasing the gap between different social and cultural groups in society.

Yet, seminar participants suggested that the debate on integration and multiculturalism in

Europe is misguided. In reality, as one participant put it, “multiculturalism in Europe isn’t dead; it has never existed.” In fact, the real cause for concern is not whether multiculturalism has lost its value as a doctrine, but how Europe is losing the fight against intolerance and hostility towards minority groups and immigrants.

All across Europe, there are worrying signs that xenophobic movements and political groups with anti-immigrant agendas are on the rise. A recent report by the Council of Europe notes that “from Northern Europe to the Mediterranean, we are witnessing a wave of radical populism.”<sup>7</sup> The report further states that, compared to traditional right-wing parties, today’s radical political movements defy the established political right-left spectrum and appeal to a broader set of voters.<sup>8</sup> Some of them even combine xenophobic messages with an appeal to social liberalism, the defense of the welfare state, and left-wing economic policies.<sup>9</sup> The rise of radicalism and populism is visible even in countries usually defined for their liberal stance on immigration and integration, as radical groups are gaining a foothold in their parliaments and governments.

In light of these disturbing trends, participants agreed that European leaders must not languish in the multicultural debate but rise to the challenge and create systems of integration that are fair, effective, and inclusive. A few guiding principles were discussed as a constructive basis for moving forward.

A first step in the right direction is to realize that integration is not a one-way process but an interactive two-way process that requires changes and adjustments to take place on both sides in society. Or, as one participant expressed it, “integration is less about integrating people into society, than about the integration of societies.” This approach requires states to respect the identities of members of minority groups and make adjustments to allow them to integrate into society. At the same time, it necessitates that persons belonging to minorities cooperate with the state on integration, particularly by respecting the laws of that particular country.

6 Angela Merkel, speech delivered in Potsdam, Germany, October 16, 2010; David Cameron, speech to the Munich Security Conference, February 5, 2011.

7 Council of Europe, “Living Together: Combining Diversity and Freedom in 21st Century Europe,” Report of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe, May 2011, p. 18, available at <http://book.coe.int/ftp/3664.pdf>.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.



On the other hand, it is crucial that laws and regulations are not formulated in such a way that they exclude or discriminate against members of minority communities. Laws related to the acquisition of citizenship are particularly important. Today, many noncitizens, particularly children of immigrants, are excluded from full access to citizenship due to the principle of *jus sanguinis*, which bases citizenship on bloodlines. States in Europe should abandon this approach and instead embrace the principle of *jus soli*—or “birthright citizenship”—as a fairer and more effective path towards naturalization.<sup>10</sup>

Another factor is education, which is a fundamental instrument for promoting integration. It presents one of the most effective strategies for integration as it sows the seeds of pluralism and democracy at an early stage in life and continues to provide the material for building cultural bridges later on. Language education is particularly crucial in order to make employment and the society’s cultural and social spheres accessible to minorities. At the same time, it is important that the education system is balanced and makes an effort to embrace pluralism by allowing minorities to study their national heritage and practice their mother tongue.

It was also emphasized that the participation of minorities in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies, particularly at the local level, supports integration. Municipalities and local governance institutions should make it a priority to actively involve immigrants and other representatives of minority populations in the decision-making process and in the planning and implementation of integration measures.

Finally, it was argued that identities should be considered as an indisputable right and as a voluntary matter. Individuals that move to a new country should not be forced to adopt a new identity, nor should they force their identity upon the host population. Just as members of society living in the United States attribute themselves as Greek-American or Italian-American, Europeans

should embrace the idea of “hyphenated Europeans.” This will help Europe create a more tolerant and respectful society where different identities can coexist peacefully together.

## Transnational Security Challenges in Europe: Organized Crime and Energy Security

### A RISING THREAT

For the second part of the seminar, participants analyzed the impact of transnational challenges on political stability and security in the region, starting with the rise of organized crime. There was a shared sense that this challenge has not yet received sufficient attention and that states and international organizations have so far failed to anticipate the development of organized crime into a strategic threat against governments, societies, and economies.

Today, illicit drugs and organized crime are among the fastest growing threats in the region. Drug trafficking between Europe and Central Asia, including heroin trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe, is one of the most profitable activities and has grown into a multibillion dollar business. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), over \$30 billion is invested in criminal activities annually, diverting much-needed financial attention from development and security efforts and contributing to global instability.<sup>11</sup>

The trafficking and use of drugs also contribute to other social ills. Diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis C, and other epidemics are spreading through the sharing of intravenous needles, affecting not only the drug users but their families and communities as well. For Europe the most recent estimates suggest that there are between 25,000 to 27,000 drug-related deaths annually.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, it is the young generation that is affected the most by drugs—every year 4 percent of

<sup>10</sup> *Jus soli*, also known as birthright citizenship, is a right that states that the citizenship of a child is determined by the place of its birth, in contrast to the principle of *jus sanguinis*, which states that a child’s citizenship is determined by his or her parents’ citizenship.

<sup>11</sup> UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov, “Drugs and Crime: Transnational Challenges to Stability in Europe and Central Asia,” speech delivered in Vienna May 24, 2011, available at [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speeches/2011/May/2010-05-24-ipi-threats-to-europe-and-central-asia.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speeches/2011/May/2010-05-24-ipi-threats-to-europe-and-central-asia.html).

<sup>12</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report 2011* (New York: United Nations, 2011), p. 40, available at [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2011.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2011.html).

deaths among twenty-five to thirty-nine-year-old Europeans are caused by drug overdoses.<sup>13</sup> To protect future generations from the scourge of drugs, European policymakers must make the fight against drug trafficking a top priority.

In addition to drug trafficking, other criminal activities are growing rapidly in Europe and Central Asia, particularly human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Western Europe is becoming a major transit point and destination for human trafficking originating from the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and all the way from Central Asia. Criminal groups involved in acts of recruiting, transporting, and receiving individuals through the use of force or coercion are expanding their activities and increasing their revenues. Every year, this modern form of slavery brings in around \$3 billion and involves around 140,000 victims who suffer from sexual exploitation and other forms of abuse.<sup>14</sup>

Likewise, migrant smugglers in Europe are becoming increasingly organized, establishing professional networks that transcend borders and regions. To increase their illicit business they are using sophisticated methods, including the manufacturing and selling of fraudulent visa documents and the manipulation of information to mislead immigration authorities. Not only do these activities undermine the state's official immigration rules and procedures, they also create vulnerable communities of immigrants that live in the shadows of society. It was noted that the recent popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East and the movement of migrants out of these countries may increase criminal smuggling activities into Europe in the near future.

In the face of these diverse and interconnected challenges, participants agreed that no state can effectively deal with organized crime alone. Since it is cross-border and integrated in nature, the response must be based on a coordinated and comprehensive approach, involving local, regional, and international actors.

So far, this cooperation has only been done in a half-hearted way. Collaborative initiatives to deal with these entities and activities and their effects

are highly fragmented and weak, as states continue to jealously guard their crime-control competences. This reluctance to share information, analysis, and enforcement capacity risks providing opportunities for organized crime and its allies to expand their activities and increase their power and influence.

More cross-border collaboration is therefore necessary, starting with a more shared understanding of the relationship between corruption and organized crime. Anti-corruption collaboration should take the form of regular interaction between the relevant national authorities of the countries concerned, including representatives from law-enforcement agencies, judiciary, intelligence, and government. To make sure that states live up to their commitments, such a platform should also include accountability measures, including peer-review mechanisms and reporting obligations. A promising new initiative is the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA), which was established last year as a joint venture by UNODC, Austria, the European Anti-Fraud Office, and other stakeholders.<sup>15</sup> More than fifty states have already signed up to become parties to the agreement that established the institution, which works to improve anti-corruption education, research, and training.

Additional regional and international collaboration is also required to push back against human trafficking networks. States should create mechanisms to better share information and intelligence on the movements, strategies, and motivations of human trafficking networks. These mechanisms should include joined-up strategies in which competent national authorities are encouraged to cooperate on the protection and assistance of trafficking victims. One example is the Austrian National Task Force on Combating Human Trafficking, which works with both national authorities and civil society and cooperates closely with international actors involved in fighting trafficking activities, including UNODC, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the OSCE.

To effectively fight drug trafficking, states must

13 Fedotov, "Drugs and Crime."

14 Ibid.

15 For more information, see the International Anti-Corruption Academy website at [www.iaca-info.org/](http://www.iaca-info.org/).

work together at the regional and international levels to curb supply and demand. At the international level, states should enforce the implementation of the three drug conventions, as well the conventions against transnational organized crime and corruption.<sup>16</sup> So far, these powerful legal tools have not been utilized to their full extent as states continue to hide behind the wall of sovereignty. At the regional level, counter-narcotics information-sharing initiatives, such as the so-called Triangular Initiative involving Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, should be encouraged as they play an important role in intercepting and combating drug-trafficking networks. At both the regional and international levels, the UNODC continues to play a central role in developing a comprehensive and integrated approach to confronting the global threat from drugs.

#### OPPORTUNITY OR TROUBLE IN THE PIPELINES?

Another transnational challenge that plays a significant role in Europe's future peace and security landscape is the access to sufficient and reliable sources of energy. Participants therefore analyzed the outlook for energy security in Europe, particularly the challenge of reducing Europe's energy dependence and the geopolitical impact of the rise of Central Asia as a critical energy supplier.

It is widely acknowledged that Central and Western Europe will face a considerable decline in their energy supply over the next two decades, with gas and oil prices expected to increase as domestic production declines.<sup>17</sup> The EU is increasingly importing oil and gas to quench its limitless thirst for hydrocarbons. Indeed, in 2008 more than half of the EU's gross inland energy consumption came from imported sources, and this is projected to increase to 70 percent over the next two decades.<sup>18</sup>

Reducing Europe's energy dependence and associated vulnerability to price shocks and disrupted oil and gas deliveries has emerged at the

top of policy agendas across Europe. The EU has made energy diversification a central objective for the coming decades, and it is exploring additional partners and new transit and delivery routes, particularly to lessen its dependency on Russian energy. Nevertheless, Russia still has a strong grip on the European energy market. It is the most important energy partner for the EU, currently accounting for 36 percent of its gas imports and roughly 30 percent of crude oil imports.<sup>19</sup>

Given the scope of the energy supply and demand challenges faced by Europe today and in the years ahead, Central Asia and the Caspian Sea area can play a significant role in addressing the region's energy needs. So far, exploitation of the vast pockets of crude oil and natural gas available in countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have been slowed down due to the lack of infrastructure and export routes to global markets. To succeed with their long-term plans for energy diversification, European leaders must pursue efforts to ensure a more fruitful and cooperative development of these resources.

According to some of the panelists, one way to do this is to continue with the long-planned and much-delayed Nabucco pipeline project. The purpose of this pipeline is to open up a southern corridor that will connect European markets with the significant natural resources of Central Asia and the Middle East. So far the project has been delayed due to a lack of unity within the EU and Germany's skepticism about using public funding for the pipeline. Construction is now set to begin in 2013 with the first gas flow in 2017, three years later than planned. When completed, this 3,900-kilometer pipeline will link the eastern border of Turkey via Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Baumgarten in Austria. This will place Turkey at the heart of energy politics in Europe as it will become the main transit country and the geograph-

16 *United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime*, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 55/25, November 15, 2000; *United Nations Convention Against Corruption*, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 58/4 of October 31, 2003; UNODC, *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs*, 1961; UNODC, *Convention on Psychotropic Substances*, 1971; *United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*, 1988.

17 According to the World Bank, the demand for primary energy in Europe and Central Asia will increase by 50 percent over the next two decades, and the demand for electricity is expected to rise by 90 percent. See World Bank, "World Bank reports on Energy Outlook in Eastern Europe and Central Asia Region," March 18, 2010, available at

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22504929~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258599,00.html>.

18 Eurostat, "Information on Energy Production and Imports," available at [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics\\_explained/index.php/Energy\\_production\\_and\\_imports#Primary\\_production](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports#Primary_production).

19 For 2010 crude oil import statistics, see European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, "Registration of Crude Oil Imports and Deliveries in the European Union," available at <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/doc/import/coi/eu-coi-from-extra-eu-2010-01-12.pdf>.

ical bridge from the Caspian region to the Middle East.

Participants noted that the strategic importance of Central Asia and the Caspian basin is of interest not only to the EU but also to Russia, China, India, and other rising powers. Indeed, the “great game” of the nineteenth century between Russia and the United Kingdom over the control of Central Asia seems to be reappearing with the competition for oil and natural gas in the twenty-first century. Or, as expressed by one seminar participant, “the country or entity that controls energy pipelines will determine a major part of future maps.”

This time, however, the game is much more complex due to the large number of players involved. In many ways, China is by far the most important new actor. China has become the biggest energy consumer in the world, surpassing the US in 2010, and is increasingly importing gas and oil to support its burst of economic growth and its rise as an industrial giant.<sup>20</sup> It is seeking new sources of fossil fuels and engaging actively with Central Asian governments to develop energy partnerships. The new Central Asia–China gas pipeline is one sign of heightened Chinese involvement in the region, and another is the intensified trade relationship between China and Afghanistan.<sup>21</sup>

India is also stepping up its activity and is having a growing impact on the energy markets in Central Asia. While it entered the market relatively late, it has managed to strike up several energy partnerships, among them joining the multibillion dollar Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline and the recent uranium deal with Kazakhstan providing India with more than 2,000 tons of uranium by 2014 for the development of peaceful nuclear energy.<sup>22</sup> Given these developments, strategies for Europe’s future energy security have to take into account a multipolar world where new actors are shaping both the access to and the politics of energy.

But energy security in Europe also requires taking decisive action to fight climate change and reduce greenhouse emissions to secure a sustain-

able and environmentally safe future. Switching to a green economy through the development of renewable energy sources is therefore of vital importance. The fact that EU countries are increasingly dependent on imports of fossil fuels and that these account for 79 percent of the EU’s energy consumption makes this a considerable challenge.

It was noted that green energy will not only contribute to a better environment, it can also help shore up the economy. Renewable energies have significant potential to boost Europe’s industrial competitiveness and add new jobs to its suffering labor market. High-tech green industrial development should therefore be prioritized, including targeted support to public and private-sector initiatives focusing on solar, wind, geothermal, and other types of renewable energy projects.

## Conclusion: Adapting Regional and Multilateral Responses to New Threats and Challenges in Europe

Participants concluded that the rapidly changing and increasingly interconnected peace and security environment in Europe and Central Asia is too complex for states, the United Nations, the OSCE, the EU, NATO, or any other multilateral or regional actor to handle alone. It calls for effective partnerships that are flexible and responsive to the complex realities on the ground.

So far, regional and multilateral institutions have not kept pace with the new peace and security realities in the region. This is evident, for example, in the disjointed responses to transnational security challenges discussed above and the inability of regional and multilateral institutions to take steps in time, before simmering intrastate tensions break out into conflict.

Three main points were discussed in order to improve regional and multilateral responses: first, they have to become more proactive and focused on conflict prevention; second, they have to

20 International Energy Agency, “China Overtakes the United States to Become World’s Largest Energy Consumer,” July 20, 2010, available at [www.iea.org/index\\_info.asp?id=1479](http://www.iea.org/index_info.asp?id=1479). See also Spencer Swartz and Shai Oster, “China Tops US in Energy Use,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 18, 2010, available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703720504575376712353150310.html>.

21 Andrew E. Kramer, “New Gas Pipeline from Central Asia Feeds China,” *New York Times*, December 14, 2009, available at [www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/world/asia/15pipeline.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/world/asia/15pipeline.html).

22 RIA Novosti, “Kazakhstan, India Sign Energy Deals,” April 16, 2011, available at <http://en.rian.ru/business/20110416/163555805.html>.



become more coherent and coordinated, working in effective partnerships; and third, they have to be more capable of acting with the right tools and strategies.

On the first point, it was emphasized that it is time to move from a culture of crisis management towards a culture of conflict prevention in Europe. The consequences of allowing festering grievances and frozen situations to break out into deadly conflict are simply too severe. Human suffering and the loss of lives is not the only devastating effect, conflict also leads to the breakdown of critical infrastructure and domestic markets causing enormous damage to the economic and financial fabric of a society. It was noted that approximately \$130–140 billion was lost during the Balkan wars in the 1990s, and the international community spent significant additional amounts in postconflict-reconstruction efforts. Thus, conflict-prevention measures can be far more cost-effective than responses once violence has broken out.

In order for preventive measures to succeed, they have to be consistent and applied throughout all the different phases of a conflict. This includes the primary phase when relative calm still exists, the secondary phase when violence is ongoing, and the third phase when violence has ended but relapse is still a possibility. Particularly the postcrisis phase requires special attention, given the importance of “staying the course” from a conflict prevention standpoint, as the signing of a peace agreement and alternative forms of conflict settlement rarely bring any guarantee against relapse.

The role of the OSCE’s high commissioner on national minorities (HCNM) was highlighted as playing an important role in detecting intrastate tensions that can flare up quickly. The quiet diplomacy carried out by the high commissioner has proven effective in containing and de-escalating tensions. It has also helped to keep track of and alert members of the OSCE when threatening situations arise. And it has proven effective in detecting and understanding the root causes of ethnic tension. It is therefore important that the HCNM’s mandate is utilized to its fullest potential and that he or she is granted access to and independence from the countries concerned.

Second, participants underscored the need for mutually reinforcing partnerships that are flexible

and responsive to the complicated realities in the field. The lessons learned from the conflicts in the Balkans demonstrate the need for an even closer and more operational cooperation between the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the UN, and other relevant actors. Above all there needs to be coordinated planning at an early stage, combined with a joint vision on long-term political and security objectives. This requires more genuine engagement from all partners and an acknowledgment of the critical importance of all actors involved in achieving success.

At the moment, coordinated crisis-response efforts in Europe and Central Asia are primarily taking place at the political level and need to be improved at the operational level. One example of effective political coordination is the response to the 2010 Kyrgyzstan crisis, in which the EU, OSCE, and UN special envoys worked together to de-escalate the situation. Their joint diplomatic strategy paved the way for a more harmonized effort at the field level through the ensuing OSCE police mission and the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission. Another example is the Geneva Discussions Initiative that was launched in the aftermath of the August 2008 armed conflict in Georgia. These discussions have provided a political platform for senior representatives of the EU, OSCE, and UN to engage with the conflict parties and align their field efforts in a strategic manner. However, focus must now shift towards more robust and regularized mechanisms for operational coordination.

Some practical recommendations were suggested in order to improve coordination in the field. As a start, the exchange of civilian, military, and police staff between various regional and multilateral organizations and their missions should be encouraged. This is a practical way to implement cooperation and to pool mission resources for critical needs. Another key factor in the success of a collaborative crisis-management initiative is the establishment of a clear chain of command. This can only be achieved if a strategic framework for collaboration, based on mutual strengths and weaknesses, is formulated at an early stage. Ultimately, it was emphasized that ensuring realistic funding, particularly to support partnership efforts and make sure they are implemented throughout the life of a mission, is crucial.

Finally, regional and multilateral actors must also have the right tools and capabilities to act decisively in today's complex security environment. Many of these organizations were established in the post-World War II era and today face a completely different set of challenges than those they were designed to face. They also have to take into account new partners and competitors in the region. Therefore, they have to take steps in order to transform, adapt, and stay relevant in the new emerging security environment.

Participants noted that the past decades have seen several attempts at reforming and strengthening

international organizations. The results of these processes have been mixed, ranging from moderate successes to utter failures. A comprehensive review of past multilateral and regional reform initiatives would help to draw lessons from the experiences of the past at the political, strategic, and institutional levels. For example, in many recent cases, including the 2005 World Summit on UN reform, the focus has been more on the formulation of policy prescriptions and less on the institutional strategies needed to put these recommendations into place. Therefore, future reform initiatives should make implementation strategy a priority from the start.

# Agenda

## Coping with Crisis in Europe and Central Asia: Adapting to New Threats and Challenges Vienna, Austria

Monday, May 23, 2011

Dinner Venue: **Ministry for European and International Affairs**

18:00 **Welcoming Remarks**  
Johannes Kyrle, *Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria*  
Terje Rød-Larsen, *President, International Peace Institute*

Tuesday, May 24, 2011

Venue: **Diplomatic Academy of Vienna**

09:00 – 09:30 **Welcome and Introduction**

**Welcoming Remarks**  
Terje Rød-Larsen, *President, International Peace Institute*  
Hans Winkler, *Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna*  
Raimund Schittenhelm, *Commandant, Austrian National Defense Academy*

Part I: **Intrastate Challenges**

09:30 – 11:00 **Session 1: A Clash of Principles: Self-Determination Versus Territorial Integrity**

*Two of the founding principles of the Helsinki Final Act, namely, self-determination and the territorial integrity of states, have clashed over the past decades in a number of places in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, including in Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Transdnistria. What are the implications of Kosovo for other European states that face self-determination and secession challenges such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Spain? Can the two principles be reconciled?*

**Chair**  
Markus Kornprobst, *Chair of International Relations, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna*

**Speakers**  
Heidi Tagliavini, *Former Head of the EU's Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia*  
Franz Josef Kuglitsch, *Deputy Political Director, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria*

Coffee Break

11:15 – 12:45 **Session 2: Integration or Disintegration: Coping with Diversity in Multicultural Societies**

*Immigration and social mobility have changed the dynamics and demographics of European societies, resulting in greater religious, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity. This creates economic opportunities and enriches cultural interaction, but it can also cause social tensions which, if left unaddressed, fuel populism, marginalization, and even extremism. How can European countries promote integration? Have multiculturalism and the European ideal of “unity in diversity” become a myth? Is multiculturalism really dead? What are the security implications of failed integration policies?*

**Chair**

Warren Hoge, *Vice President for External Relations, International Peace Institute*

**Speakers**

Edward Mortimer, *Senior Vice President, Salzburg Global Seminar*

John Packer, *Director, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex*

Ilze Brands Kehris, *Director, Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities*

Barbara Liegl, *Senior Researcher, Ludwig Boltzmann Institut für Menschenrechte*

12:45 – 14:15 Lunch

Part II: **Transnational Challenges**

14:15 – 15:45 **Session 3: Transnational Organized Crime: How Vulnerable Are Europe and Central Asia?**

*Organized crime has gone global, reached macroeconomic proportions, and has the firepower and economic clout to rival and undermine states. How serious is the threat posed by transnational organized crime to Europe, Central Asia, and beyond? How can the region prepare itself more effectively to fend off the threat posed by new challenges like cybercrime?*

**Chair**

Peter Gastrow, *Senior Fellow & Director of Programs, International Peace Institute*

**Speakers**

Yuri Fedotov, *Executive Director, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*

Gürbüz Bahadır, *Director, SECI Center, Bucharest*

Franz Lang, *Director, Austrian Criminal Investigation Service*

Coffee Break

16:00 – 17:30 **Session 4: Energy Security: Troubles or Opportunities in the Pipeline?**

*As long as energy supplies match consumer countries' demand for energy and producing economies' need for revenues, then markets will be functional and energy security will be assured for both sides. Nevertheless, it is often politics rather than market forces that determine the flow of energy. In light of this, the pipelines connecting Europe and Central Asia can either build confidence and provide energy security, or they can become a source of interstate tensions. What is the outlook for energy security in Europe and Central Asia?*



**Chair**

Slavtcho Neykov, *Director, Energy Community Secretariat*

**Speakers**

Gerhard Mangott, *Professor of Political Science, University of Innsbruck*

Karin Kneissl, *Energy Analyst and University Teacher in Vienna and Beirut*

Aleksandar Kovacevic, *Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies*

Thomas Stelzer, *UN Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Coordination and Inter-Agency Affairs*

18:00 – 20:30      **Reception and Dinner**

**Welcome**

Johann Pucher, *Security Policy Director, Austrian Ministry of Defense and Sports*

Wednesday, May 25, 2011

Venue:              **Diplomatic Academy of Vienna**

Part III:            **Multilateral and Regional Capacities**

09:00 – 10:30      **Session 5: Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: Enough Tools, Too Many Carpenters?**

*European security organizations have some of the most innovative conflict-prevention and crisis-management tools in the world. And yet crises persist. How can early warning be more effectively followed by early action? How can duplication and competition be avoided between multilateral and regional actors, like the UN, OSCE, and EU? What lessons can be learned from experiences in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia?*

**Chair**

Albert Rohan, *Former Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria*

**Speakers**

Pierre Morel, *EU Special Representative for Central Asia*

Lamberto Zannier, *Head of UNMIK*

Vladimir Chizhov, *Russian Ambassador to the EU*

Walter Feichtinger, *Head of the Institute for Peace Support and Crisis Management, Austrian National Defense Academy*

Coffee Break

10:45 – 12:30      **Session 6: Can Multilateral Responses Keep Pace with the Globalization of Threats?**

*New global threats and challenges to security have evolved faster than the international means to cope with them. The interstate system and global institutions that were created in the mid-twentieth century are struggling to deal with the global threats of the twenty-first*

*century. Organizations like the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the EU face a completely different set of challenges than what they were created for, and have new competitors. What steps are these organizations taking in order to adapt, and are they still relevant? Is a new culture of cooperation and a sense of community emerging in the European security space?*

**Chair**

Edward Mortimer, *Senior Vice President, Salzburg Global Seminar*

**Speakers**

Christian Schmidt, *Parliamentary State Secretary, Federal Ministry of Defense, Germany*

Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, *Secretary-General of the OSCE*

Terje Rød-Larsen, *President, International Peace Institute*

Wolfgang Waldner, *State Secretary, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria*

12:45

Lunch

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