SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN US STRATEGY

Edited by

Frank R. Barnett B. Hugh Tovar Richard H. Shultz

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FOREWORD

In March 1983, the National Strategy Information Center, the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and the National Defense University jointly sponsored a two-day symposium on "The Role of Special Operations in US Strategy for the 1980s." This meeting attracted current and former practitioners in the various functional areas of special operations and brought them together with other professionals from government, academia, the media, and public policy centers. The purpose was two-fold: first, to examine how special operations can complement an effective "conventional" defense capability; and second, to determine the means by which special operations could be legitimized as a crucial element in national security policy.

Framed by a Keynote Address by the Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army, this volume contains the major papers presented at the symposium, along with the discussions which followed each presentation. In this text, the papers are introduced by Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz, each of whom was instrumental in arranging the symposium itself, as well as editing the work at hand.

My predecessor, Lieutenant General John S. Pustay, US Air Force, believed that public awareness of vital national security concerns required active and cooperative

educational efforts by both the government and the private sector. The Special Operations symposium was the result of such cooperation, and I am pleased to publish these proceedings.

Richard D. Lawrence
Lieutenant General, US Army
President, National Defense University

INTRODUCTION

A serious illness can be difficult to detect because the initial symptoms are confused with those of commonplace disease. Some types of aggression likewise defy an early, accurate diagnosis. These species of political-military virus or ideological infection resist early detection and can lead to large scale war if they are not identified and countered in their early stages. This book applies these medical analogies to the Soviet role in promoting and assisting "revolutionary" insurgencies with methods for which, as yet, the West has found no effective cure. (Some remedies, however, are proposed.)

Moscow is busy not only deploying missiles and tank armies, or testing its four-ocean navy, for a possible major war. In the last dozen years, while the United States has remained off balance from the societal undertow of Vietnam, the USSR has dramatically increased its "low-intensity" conflict skills, as well as increasing its "conventional" war forces. The blatant Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was atypical. Normally, Moscow's power projection is better camouflaged.

Thus, in the last half of the 1970s, eight pro-Soviet communist parties seized power in Asia, Africa, and Central America with hardware (plus subversive software) provided by the Kremlin. These include Hanoi's invasion of South Vietnam (1975), the Pathet Lao's triumph in Laos (1975), the MPLA's defeat of two rival insurgent groups in Angola (1975–1976), Colonel Mengistu's *coup de main* in Ethiopia (1977), Hanoi's replacement of Pol Pot in Cambodia with a pro-Soviet regime (1979), and the Sandinista overthrow of Somoza in Nicaragua (1979). Grenada came close to being added to this list. And, as we know, El Salvador is still under heavy pressure; the guerrillas are receiving extensive outside support.

While revolutionary success admittedly stems from a variety of factors, in each case noted above the Soviets gave active support—sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly via surrogates such as the Cubans, East Germans, Czechs, North Koreans, Vietnamese, Libyans, South Yemenis, or the Palestine Liberation Organization. Clearly, Moscow now has developed a tri-continental consortium for low-visibility warfare. Conversely, not only is the United States ill-prepared to wage this sort of ambiguous conflict; its halting efforts are criticized even by its NATO Allies and a significant bloc in Congress. It is evident that the Western democracies are still stultified by a form of "warfare" undefined in the gentleman's lexicon.

In making a list of national security priorities, one normally begins with the need to deter nuclear war, defend NATO, and prevent the Soviets from ambushing us with "technological surprise"—e.g., anti-submarine warfare (ASW) breakouts or workable space-based lasers. Few can doubt that the Pentagon is justified in expending large resources to avert "worst-case scenarios" that could paralyze or terminate Western civilization. Yet the most terrible danger may be the least likely to materialize. Hence, while we constantly strive to ward off Armageddon, we cannot ignore lesser threats that recur with disturbing frequency—terrorism, subversion, insurgency, guerrilla war, and the like.

Of course, not every instance of political violence on this troubled planet puts US security at risk, nor is every revolution or *coup d'etat* fomented by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, for

Leninists the nursing of sedition into full-blown insurrection is a highly developed management science. So is the sometimes successful "capture" of the ideals and control machinery of a noncommunist protest movement. Since Stalin, the Kremlin has perfected the art of indirect assault. Stalin brought surrogates to power in Eastern Europe by overawing opponents with the propinquity of the Red Army. Today, Moscow has developed a longer reach and more finesse with techniques for reshaping the power balance without a parade of Soviet military force on a nearby border. When a target nation is attacked, the Kremlin now masks the real game. The rebels are presented to the world as a "progressive coalition." Indigenous Marxist-Leninists seem to be content with their advertised role as junior partners. Few Russians are present at the scene of the crime. Local military cadres are trained by Cubans and the Palestine Liberation Organization. East Germany provides intelligence and internal security skills. Arms are offered by Vietnam, Libya, and other Soviet surrogate states.

The violence of insurgency and terrorism is promoted under the inoffensive semantics of "active measures." This Soviet term encompasses a host of overt and covert techniques for influencing events in target countries. Leninist paramilitary aid includes training cadres in guerrilla warfare skills and supplying their weapons, using advisors to radicalize insurgencies, and of course, schooling and supporting terrorists. Further, to help ensure paramilitary effectiveness "on the ground," Soviet international propaganda and political action seek to promote insurgent "legitimacy" in the world atmosphere. World opinion's acceptance of the "just cause" of the insurgents, and the "repressive-immoral" character attributed by many to the incumbent regime, play important roles in protracted conflict. Thus, in support of what may seem to be only a *regional* struggle, Moscow goes to great pains to shape *global* public opinion, working through local communist parties, international peace fronts, and United Nations ancillary organizations and friendship societies. Worldwide networks of media assets are also employed in close coordination with Soviet diplomatic offensives and disinformation campaigns.

Apparently, the decision during the early 1970s to broaden the scope of Soviet low-intensity conflict in the Third World was based

in part on the Kremlin's low assessment of political stamina in the West. Soviet military power projection capabilities waxed in conjunction with a waning US political-military commitment to a forward strategy beyond Europe. The psychological fall-out from detente on the will of the democracies appears to be a factor in Moscow's decision to become increasingly bold in aggravating instability in the southern hemisphere. This low-risk geostrategic gambit, outflanking NATO in regions rich in oil and critical minerals, poses a potential threat to the viability of the economies of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe.

If the Soviet Union gradually encircles the raw materials storehouses of the earth, the United States will eventually have to commit formidable amounts of economic and military assistance, as well as a much larger American military force, to safeguard vital economic assets. However, only recently have we begun to develop a serious capability to offset Soviet Third World ambitions. Even today, except for in Latin America and a sector of the Pacific, there are few Third World conflicts where the United States is in a position to employ adequate force on behalf of vital, or even major, interests.

Soviet and communist bloc capabilities for "twilight" war, on the other hand, continue to expand. The Soviet Union's elite *Spetsnaz* number in the hundreds of thousands. These special military forces are integral elements of the KGB, the GRU, the MVD, and the Red Army, and are maintained by Moscow at peak efficiency, charged with the conduct of sensitive military, paramilitary, and sabotage operations abroad. North Korea has over 100,000 men in its special forces. Cuban and East German "mercenaries" are already active in 10 Third World countries. In addition to these paramilitary assets, Moscow and its surrogates maintain a wide array of propaganda and political action tools to sanctify the cause of insurgent movements blessed by the Kremlin.

The probability that low-intensity conflicts will seriously affect US interests is more imminent every day. Why, in the face of such manifest danger, has US national security planning been inadequate to cope with this special problem? Clearly, for at least a decade, the United States has underemphasized force allocation, doctrine, training, and equipment for the one level of conflict most likely to arise during the 1980s. The element of strategy that would

govern a US response to challenges in the irregular or unconventional categories has likewise received short shrift. Special operations are still outside the mainstream of US military force structure and doctrine. The term "special"—whether applied to warfare, operations, or the personnel so designated—is tolerated uneasily in many echelons of the armed services. (Recently, however, the leaders of the armed forces, including General John Vessey, Chairman of the JCS, and John O. Marsh, Secretary of the Army, have revitalized the Army's commitment to unconventional warfare.)

There are even differences of opinion on the proper definition of special operations and, therefore, on the tailoring of appropriate forces to meet low-intensity threats. It is scarcely surprising that the "unconventional" arts should fare best in time of crisis, when unique skills are in urgent demand to support a friendly government against Soviet-assisted "insurgents." Nor is it odd that when the crisis abates, unorthodox skills should experience a diminution of legitimacy in the minds of the public and the military establishment. To compound the problem, American elites are not prone to define the ambiguous threats of Soviet-style undeclared war as "crises." Hence, there is little public enthusiasm for recourse to unconventional acts in time of "formal peace." Many Americans, for example, strenuously oppose the arming of freedom fighters against the Sandinista junta in order to dissuade Castro's Nicaraguan proxy from exporting revolution to El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and elsewhere in Latin America.

Granted, a democracy should not embrace the terrorist tactics of its adversaries. But the ethical question is often complex. To intervene on behalf of the victim, after provable aggression is already well advanced, would not appear *a priori* to be immoral or unwise in the light of previous experience with the behavior of totalitarian states and movements. It does not necessarily violate the "rule of law" to use modest force to constrain the lawbreaker. Moreover, the selective "cry of conscience" that ignores the atrocities of a distant empire is not always as replete with humane values as its authors proclaim.

Abhorrence of force can temper policy but can in no way substitute for it. Special operations may not always be compatible with the ideals of the American public, but sometimes the options

are even more unpalatable. For instance, much of our current distaste for low-intensity conflict stems from our experience in Vietnam. American frustration over Vietnam led to a societal revulsion against employing force anywhere. The political inferences drawn from Vietnam also distorted the military lessons which, misconstrued, led to the neglect of preparations for the type of conflicts the United States is most likely to be called upon to fight.

Given a primordial aversion by some segments of the Pentagon to unconventional strategy, this state of affairs is not surprising. When some "special" force is required to deal with problems that defy treatment by conventional military methods, invariably such recourse to novel or elitist approaches implies criticism of the conventional military and makes many hierarchies uncomfortable. Consequently, in the aftermath of Vietnam, a significant bias against John F. Kennedy's "Knights" of the Green Beret surfaced in the revised US military doctrine, force posture, and contingency planning. The nonmilitary instruments for conducting special operations were also largely dismantled. By 1981 the ability of the United States to conduct low-intensity operations was virtually nonexistent.

If an untutored American public sees little attraction in unconventional warfare as a solution to regional conflicts affecting US interests, even at demonstrably lower levels of cost and risk, is it then realistic for the US military to prepare to fight an unconventional war? An examination of the US military and nonmilitary assets at the end of the 1970s for conducting low-intensity operations was not encouraging; but at least the Reagan administration has given a green light to both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to develop such unconventional capabilities.

On the plus side, the political leverage from even modest efforts to rebuild low-intensity skills is a visible asset. Positive doctrinal and force structure decisions send signals to our allies and potential allies (as well as to our adversaries) about the renewed ability of the United States to respond to unconventional conflicts. Moreover, Washington has dared to act, even though the false analogy of Vietnam continues to compound the controversy surrounding US involvement in El Salvador. Moreover, the political will of the

American public is not static, as evidenced by the favorable reaction to the Grenada operation. Public opinion can be changed by successful deed as well as through education. Hence, it is not written in the stars that the ambiguities implicit in current US approaches to special operations will forever inhibit our use of the art form in an effective mode.

With a view toward reexamining special operations in the larger context of US strategic interests, the National Strategy Information Center, in cooperation with the National Defense University and the National Security Studies Program of Georgetown University, organized a 2-day symposium in Washington, DC, on March 4 and 5, 1983. This was intended as an initial step to help focus attention on a larger potential role for special operations in the 1980s. Approximately 60 former and currently active specialists in military aspects of special operations were invited to take part, together with experts from civilian agencies and the Congress, the media, and the academic world.

A precedent for this effort by the National Strategy Information Center to draw attention to sensitive public policy was established several years ago with the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). The Consortium was designed to provide an institutional focus for the manifest need to articulate a balanced, coherent understanding of the role of intelligence in a democratic society. The proceedings of symposia subsequently held by the Consortium have been published in the five-volume series, *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s,* and are being widely used by government agencies, Congressional staffs, the press, and university instructors across the country. By no means all issues raised and debated in the intelligence symposia were resolved. On the other hand, substantive discussions were conducted without the passionate acrimony which colored public debate on intelligence during the mid-1970s. The net result of the CSI approach is that intelligence is being studied as a necessary instrument of foreign policy, and debate is focusing on quality and effectiveness. The conference on special operations aims to follow a similar pattern.

The premise of the special operations conference was that the United States must develop diverse and even novel ways to defend its economic and geopolitical interests when these are affected by

unconventional conflicts, particularly in the Third World. An equally important assumption was that a democracy requires a "civil-military partnership" to undergird national defense. Public opinion and the national will are vital ingredients in national security, and of course, civilian authority is preeminent in the defense sphere.

The conference also sought to transcend a common fallacy that pertains to the much-advertised "window of vulnerability." This is almost invariably interpreted as the threat of a first strike against our missile silos, which in turn necessitates concentration on an adequate nuclear response. But it is a sad fact that Western society lives in a house with many windows, and quite a number of them are breakable. The heirs of Lenin may threaten in the north, but their proxies seize ground in the south laden with many vital resources. It is there—beyond NATO—that the United States lacks a robust capability to cope with conflict. Against this backdrop, the conference was organized with three specific, albeit limited, purposes:

(1) To identify and discuss the form and scope of special operations (including Soviet bloc capabilities), and to consider whether the existing US ability to conduct such measures permits the United States to respond effectively to unconventional crises and limited war conflicts in the 1980s.

(2) To determine whether there is a sound basis for legitimization in governmental circles and in public attitudes of special operations as an element of US security strategy, particularly given the atmosphere of the post-Vietnam era.

(3) To enable government specialists in different sectors of the special operations community (the United States Information Agency (USIA), the National Security Council staff, the CIA, the various components of the armed services) to exchange ideas with each other and with selected academics and journalists on the subject of special operations.

The organizers of the conference, recognizing the wide divergence of views on the subject of special operations, sought to in-

clude among the participants individuals well-versed in its complexities. Thus, attendance at the conference reflected a representative cross-section of interested groups, among them the National Security Council staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, the Department of State, the US Information Agency, the Congress, the academic community, research and policy centers, and the media. From the outset, it was hoped that the published proceedings of the conference would prove relevant and useful to the curricula of universities, military schools, and War Colleges, and to concerned government agencies as well.

The conference proceedings open with an address by the Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army. Secretary Marsh traces the history of US special operations to the Revolutionary War and outlines the recent developments in that area in the wake of the 1981 Defense Guidance document. The Secretary lauds the new conceptual focus being placed on special operations as an indispensable adjunct to an effective conventional deterrent.

Drs. Maurice Tugwell and David Charters of the Centre for Conflict Studies at the University of New Brunswick made the initial presentation, and sought to establish a generally acceptable definition of special operations. Their essay is the first in this volume. By isolating the unique characteristics of special operations, Drs. Tugwell and Charters aimed to establish common ground upon which the ensuing discussions might build. Their formula is synthesized as follows:

> Small-scale, clandestine, covert or overt operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant political or military objectives in support of foreign policy. Special operations are characterized by either simplicity or complexity, by subtlety and imagination, by the discriminate use of violence, and by oversight at the highest level. Military and nonmilitary resources, including intelligence assets, may be used in concert.

The participants found this to be a useful point of departure, although some offered variations on the same theme. General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.), Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who retired from the US Army in 1976 after 39

years of military service, emphasizes the role that special operations can play in the offensive as well as defensive aspects of US national security. He also describes the constraints that affect the US government's pursuit of its strategic objectives, focusing on the lack of public, congressional, and Executive appreciation of the nature of the competition with the Soviet bloc. Brigadier General Joseph C. Lutz, USA, the Commander of the 1st Special Operations Command, suggests a somewhat broader definition than Tugwell and Charters, to include overt, covert, and clandestine operations, and specialized techniques employed by small, specially trained and configured formations capable of independent operations where the use of general purpose forces is either inappropriate or infeasible.

In chapter 2, Dr. William V. O'Brien, Professor of Government at Georgetown University, examines the moral, legal, political, and cultural constraints on the US use of special operations. He notes the real problems of ensuring compliance with moral-legal standards and coping with political-cultural objections that arise in situations where special operations are prolonged (e.g., long-term counterinsurgency efforts). Dr. O'Brien concludes that special operations can indeed be justified within the general framework of American moral-legal values.

Mr. William Kucewicz, an editorial writer for *The Wall Street Journal*, argues that some members of the American elite, particularly in the news media and in academia, have developed a hypercritical attitude toward US policy and interests. This attitude will be overcome only through a determined effort on the part of the US government, which must candidly and repeatedly explain the nature of the threat and the rationale for our actions, including special operations. Rear Admiral John S. Jenkins, USN (Ret.), former Judge Advocate General of the US Navy, stresses that unless there are legal bases for special operations, it is extremely unlikely that political support will be forthcoming.

In the next chapter, Dr. John J. Dziak of the Defense Intelligence Agency examines the Soviet approach to special operations. He concludes that Soviet "Special Purpose" (*Spetsnaz*) forces have become an important element in the newly-acquired ability of the Soviet military to intervene in regions well beyond the

USSR's territorial confines, such as occurred with surrogate Cuban special operations in Angola in 1975 and with the subsequent Soviet-Cuban-East German intervention in Ethiopia. *Spetsnaz* missions in wartime include espionage, reconnaissance, sabotage, assassination, partisan warfare, interdiction of lines of communication, and other direct action operations of a clandestine nature intended to weaken the political-military capabilities of the target country. The KGB, MVD, and regular military (especially the GRU) all have significant *Spetsnaz* capability. Harriet Fast Scott provides additional historical background on Soviet special operations and notes that the former Soviet leader (Yuri Andropov) had extensive special operations experience even before his tenure as KGB chief. Mrs. Scott has published widely on Soviet defense policy and serves as a consultant to various government and private organizations on that subject. Mr. Arthur A. Zuehlke, Jr., currently Deputy Chief of the Soviet Political and Military Affairs Branch of the Defense Intelligence Agency, analyzes the special forces capabilities of the KGB, the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), and the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence). He notes that their likely targets in wartime would include US/NATO nuclear missiles in Europe, especially the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. *Spetsnaz* units pose potential threats to the US rapid deployment capabilities, to American forces and bases overseas, and possibly to the continental United States.

The fourth chapter is an examination of US military capabilities and special operations in the 1980s. Colonel Roger Pezzelle, USA (Ret.), recalls briefly the history of American special operations and contends that this area has always suffered from a general lack of understanding, resource limitations, and intra- and inter-service rivalries. He then suggests some requirements and capabilities that US special operations will need in the next decade to overcome these handicaps. This includes active interdepartmental coordination, proper recruitment and training, and the use of improved technology. Above all, Colonel Pezzelle favors a joint special operations organization at the national level that is capable of long-range planning, interdepartmental coordination, and effective response to direction from the National Command Authority. At the time of his retirement from active duty, Colonel

Pezzelle was Chief of the Special Operations Division (J-3) in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Edward Luttwak, Senior Fellow at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, reaches a pessimistic conclusion about future special operations capabilities because the US military establishment focuses primarily on administration, bureaucracy, major weapons system acquisitions, management, and office politics—and thus regards commando activities as deviant. Major General Michael D. Healy, USA (Ret.), former Commanding General of the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, stresses that special operations require the most carefully selected and trained and the best-led soldiers in the armed forces. He cites the operations of the Special Forces in Vietnam, where 2,300 US soldiers skillfully led 69,000 indigenous fighters, as an example of a successful special operation.

Chapter 5 examines the relationship between intelligence and special operations. B. Hugh Tovar argues that there is a special affinity, a symbiosis, between the two, and that any special operation (however *ad hoc* in character it might be) must be predicated upon good intelligence. It must also have a functioning capability for ongoing acquisition and distribution of intelligence. Mr. Tovar, who was formerly a senior officer of the CIA with extensive experience in covert action and paramilitary operations, gives an historical overview of the US experience in special operations, with particular stress on the role of intelligence in each case described. He discusses the kinds of special operations this country might need to mount in the years ahead, with particular emphasis on the intelligence factor. He urges collaboration among the participating military and civilian agencies, together with measures to facilitate effective pooling not only of intelligence but also of personnel and material resources.

Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, USA (Ret.), who commanded the 6th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and later became Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, addresses the subject of military special operations not by defining them but by describing their characteristics, the principles applicable to them, and the unique requirements which distinguish them from other operations. It is his view that neither a nuclear confrontation nor a

conventional war with the Soviets is at all likely. Instead, we live with the reality of a resource war, and in defense of the world's "choke points," special operations of the highest quality will be required.

Theodore G. Shackley notes that the United States is limited to a defensive mode in considering irregular warfare options, the role of a "counterpuncher." Recognizing the need for an integrated special operations effort, he suggests the presidential appointment of a panel to consider how the nation should organize itself to deal with insurgency and terrorism in the 1980s. Mr. Shackley formerly held many senior positions in the CIA, both in Washington and overseas. He is author of a recent book on special operations, *The Third Option*. His view is that intelligence should be a critical factor in determining when to initiate special operations, and how—perhaps even whether—they should be continued.

In the sixth chapter, Douglas S. Blaufarb discusses economic/security assistance and special operations. Economic aid, broadly interpreted, has often strengthened local governments in the countryside, allowing those governments to deal better with rural insurgencies. Security assistance can transfer skills and possibly resources to a threatened foreign government, enabling it to conduct its own special operations. Mr. Blaufarb was also a senior officer of the CIA, and he is the author of *The Counterinsurgency Era*. He advocates the establishment of a multi-center agency where planning, policies, and programs for economic and security assistance can be coordinated. This center, to include the USIA, CIA, and Special Forces, would be staffed permanently at the White House (National Security Council) level. Mr. Blaufarb warns, however, against assuming the high-visibility approach of the Kennedy administration. John Kelly, former Legislative Assistant to Senator William Armstrong and now Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower, Resources, and Military Personnel, agrees with the need for such an organization, but cautions that bureaucracies such as the Agency for International Development or the USIA lack an understanding of the nature and problems of special operations. The solution, as Kelly sees it, involves persuading the American people to think seriously about developing private means to carry out the information war, and

to recognize that by preparing for low-intensity conflict we can avoid high-intensity warfare. Major David Decker, USA, an instructor at the School of International Studies of the US Army Institute for Military Assistance, emphasizes the need to develop cultural empathy as well as technical expertise among those who will be involved in Military Assistance/Civic Action programs.

In chapter 7, Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USA, seeks to evaluate US Psychological Operations (PSYOP) capabilities in light of the Vietnam experience. Colonel Paddock maintains that PSYOP was inadequate during the Vietnam War and argues that little has been done since to improve this capability. PSYOP should be institutionalized in the appropriate field manuals and PSYOP doctrine should be taught in service schools; PSYOP should be distinguished from special operations, since it is a "weapons system" that can be used throughout the conflict spectrum. Colonel Paddock, former Chairman of the Department of National and International Security Studies at the US Army War College and former Commander of the 4th Psychological Operations Group, calls for the establishmnent of a national-level PSYOP organization. George Bailey, now Director of Radio Liberty, compares the Soviet determination to control and manipulate information with the adversarial role assumed by the Western media. Dr. E. Frederick Bairdain, Vice President of Applied Systems Science Technology, states that PSYOP must be better defined and tasked by the United States. Dr. Bairdain suggests that the tarnished image of PSYOP could be enhanced, perhaps by changing the term altogether.

In the final chapter, Professor Sam C. Sarkesian of Loyola University of Chicago analyzes organizational strategy and low-intensity conflicts. He notes that the American political system and its military have always been uneasy with unconventional conflicts and unconventional or special organizations. Dr. Sarkesian concludes that there is an urgent need for a permanent command system combining military and civilian capabilities whose primary mission is (1) the conduct of low-intensity conflict and (2) a conceptual synthesis of bureaucratic views and interpretations regarding low-intensity conflict. He also emphasizes the distinction between conducting and countering low-intensity conflict, as well as the distinction between organizations designed specifically for

low-intensity conflict and for conventional forces. Kenneth Bergquist, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Reserve Affairs and Mobilization), stresses even further the problem of bureaucratic resistance to organizational change. He also suggests a phased program of change and adaptation carefully tailored to the existing organizational environment. Dr. George Tanham, a former Vice President of the Rand Corporation, warns that there does not seem now to be a logical organizational focus for informing the American people about Soviet actions in low-intensity conflict situations. Dr. Tanham notes that an information effort could be the most important factor in developing popular support for special operations.

It is worthy of note that among the conference participants there were four prominent British citizens who came to share their expertise and extensive experience acquired through service with the prototype of special operations competence, the SAS, or Special Air Service Regiment. Viscount Slim and his associates made a significant contribution to the discussions.

No attempt was made in this conference to hammer out consensus positions. There were, however, many areas of general agreement. Most participants favored the development of an effective US special operations capability. Opinions differed on ways and means of achieving that objective. The views expressed in the papers and the observations of the discussants are, of course, those of the individuals themselves. This is particularly true of those participants who are current employees of the Executive and Legislative branches of the US government. The views they have expressed should not be construed as representing the positions of their departments, agencies, or committees. The papers and the summaries of discussions should nevertheless clarify some of the issues and problems affecting US special operations, and we hope they will contribute to public understanding of a subject that is certain to command increasing attention throughout this decade.

Frank R. Barnett
B. Hugh Tovar
Richard H. Shultz

December 1984

Keynote Address

By The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr. Secretary of the Army

I am extremely grateful for the opportunity to speak here today at what I believe is a symposium of enormous import to our nation. I would like to thank our host, General John Pustay of the National Defense University, the co-sponsor of this conference. I would also congratulate Dr. Frank Barnett of the National Strategy Information Center and Dr. Stephen Gibert of the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, the sponsors of this gathering, for alerting not only our government, but also the crucial nongovernmental sectors of our society to the nature of the threat we face and how to come to grips with that threat.

If one were to leave Washington, DC, and drive west along Highway 50, a solitary stone monument would appear in a meadow south of the highway outside Middleburg, Virginia. A perusal of the historical marker near the monument would reveal that the site is dedicated to John Champ, a First Sergeant in the regiment of "Light Horse" Harry Lee during the American Revolution. Champ was ordered by his Commander-in-Chief, General Washington, to fabricate a "desertion" from Lee's regiment

and to "defect" to the British lines. Champ was to "defect" as part of a plan to capture the famous traitor Benedict Arnold and return him to the American lines for trial. Apart from Washington and Champ, regimental commander Lee was the only person aware of the ruse.

Under extremely hazardous circumstances, Champ was able to "defect" and convince the British of his legitimacy. After joining the British Army in New York, Champ narrowly missed his chance to kidnap Arnold, owing to a last-minute change in Arnold's plans. Champ returned to Virginia with the British forces, and soon thereafter escaped to Washington's headquarters. Although Washington vouched for Champ's valor and honor, Champ was never able to overcome that "desertion" and failed kidnap attempt. After being discharged from the American Army, Champ moved to another part of Virginia and died a broken man, notwithstanding Washington's efforts to explain the true circumstances of Champ's service to his country.

I mention this particular "special operation," because there were many such missions during the American Revolution, as there were during the Civil War. A special breed of soldier is required to operate under such conditions, and a special operations capability is an essential adjunct to an effective conventional force structure designed to support our national policy of deterring war and preserving peace.

The issuance of the Defense Guidance of 1981 was a significant event in the history of activity under review at this symposium. The Defense Guidance directed all the armed services to develop a Special Operations Forces (SOF) capability. It was the first time that the term had appeared in an official document. Credit for this change in the Department of Defense should go to General Richard Stilwell, and to the others in DOD who supported him.

The term "special operations" or "SOF" now is applicable to each of the four armed services. An SOF capability is particularly applicable to the Army, to which I will direct most of my comments, and specifically to the Rangers, the Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Warfare capabilities. Yet, special operations is a much broader term than that denoted in its strictly military application. And we should keep that in mind.

The reaction in the Army to the 1981 Defense Guidance document has been marked. In 1982 alone, we saw an increase in our force structures of over 1,200 spaces for Special Forces. This buildup will continue in the years ahead. It is interesting to note that the Soviets have appreciated this effort—there was the recent *Tass* story, which claimed that "these units of saboteurs and murderers would do extensive duty in Latin America, Asia, and Western Europe." I recommend the story to all of you, as it provides a revealing indication of Soviet awareness of this new emphasis on SOF.

Anyone associated with the military will understand the importance of the SOF citation in the Defense Guidance. It clearly incorporates special operations into the national strategy. In the long run, its greatest significance for the Army will be in the development of doctrine. The development of doctrine is the cornerstone upon which an SOF capability can be erected. It is my personal view that our failure in the past to link special operations with national strategy through the Defense Guidance—and thereby to develop doctrine—has prevented special operations in the Army from gaining permanence and acceptability within the ranks of the military.

The question to be asked—and it has been asked at this conference—is, "Why is it so important that we develop this capability?" I realize that the participants here possess vast experience in the field. And yet, among many of our military, our national legislators, and our citizenry in general, the subject of special operations is not adequately understood. Looking at the world scene today, we can observe unconventional warfare in so many countries. In northeast Ethiopia, Eritrean guerrillas attack Ethiopian patrols, patrols accompanied by Cuban advisors. In the border areas of Morocco and Algeria, *Polisario* guerrillas are armed with sophisticated equipment, and on occasion have used anti-aircraft missiles to shoot down Moroccan jet fighters. On the Pacific Coast of Central America, near the borders of El Salvador and Nicaragua, small boats slip out to sea and off-load other ships bringing equipment to be distributed inland in support of guerrilla cadres fighting the government of El Salvador. The same thing is happening in Kampuchea, and in the Hindu Kush Mountains of Af-

ghanistan, where a guerrilla force using recoilless rifles may take on a Russian garrison.

If one studies the regions where there are insurgencies, one cannot fail to be struck by the commonality of the situations: immature governments, developing economies, exploding populations, and social problems that relate to inadequate diet, poor health care, and a high degree of illiteracy. These uprisings often occur in areas that are rich in natural resources of considerable interest to the West. Many of these governments are susceptible to infiltration, subversion, and destabilization. Another feature of the present world scene is the plague of terrorism, a phenomenon of the last decade and a half. Terrorism is the commission of a criminal act of violence in order to achieve a political end. These are the realities of the world in which we live, and they drive the special operations concept.

If one were to visualize a chart depicting from left to right the gradations of military activity, from terrorism on the one side to strategic nuclear war at the other extreme, it is apparent that the odds favoring involvement of our armed forces are heavily weighted toward the former. On that end of the conflict spectrum, we see a concentration of the various types of low-intensity warfare, such as guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and other sub-conventional activities. Such conflicts are the ones most likely to engage our military forces, and at relatively low risk compared to the other, strategic end of the spectrum.

At present, the Army and many others in the defense community are working hard to strengthen our conventional capability. The aim of such efforts, of course, is to avoid the nuclear battlefield. This is the essence of American defense policy. It is also easier to make a decision to employ force at the lower end of the conflict spectrum than it is to develop resolve for the use of any type of force at the upper end.

This prospect of low-intensity conflict will be with us for the rest of this decade, indeed for the rest of the century. Under such conditions special operations forces may not always be decisive. But at times they may influence not only the outcome of a particular battle, but of history itself.

In March 1864, a special, unguarded train departed Washington with one of the most senior officers in the Union Army aboard.

The train stopped unexpectedly outside Culpepper, Virginia, and the general inquired about the delay. The conductor pointed to a group of horsemen on the horizon, identified as the famous Confederate partisan unit, "Mosby's Raiders." The raiders were in pursuit of a New York cavalry unit, and when the southerners had passed, the train resumed its journey. Thus was General Ulysses S. Grant introduced to John Mosby's partisans. After the war, Grant and Mosby became close friends, and when Grant assumed the Presidency, Mosby visited him in the Oval Office. "If that train had been 2 minutes earlier," said the President, "you would have captured me." "If I had been there 2 minutes earlier," Mosby replied, "I might have been President, and you would be visiting me."

Over the years in the United States there has been resistance among leaders of conventional forces toward unconventional methods of coping with irregulars, partisans, or guerrillas. The soldier who tries to fight guerrillas with their own methods is often misunderstood by his conventional counterparts; frequently, he and his associates share qualities that run counter to conventional norms. These qualities were summed up during the American Revolution by a frustrated British officer who was being hounded by the American partisan Marion, known as the "Swamp Fox." The British officer, unsuccessful in pursuing Marion's forces, noted in exasperation, "Marion would not come out and fight like a gentleman and a Christian."

In addition, it has been difficult for American officers to establish an orderly career service pattern in unconventional units. This service pattern can be a critical factor from the standpoint of promotions. For example, during the ascendancy of Special Forces (up until approximately 1963), to be an A-Team commander was a coveted assignment among young officers. However, as conventional operations began to dominate in Vietnam, traditional assignments were then sought by officers who recognized that promotion boards were more likely to favor a commander of a conventional rifle company over the leader of a 12-man special operations force.

Yet, we must not be too critical of the American Army in this regard. Such ambivalent attitudes regarding unconventional as-

signments are probably traditional in all armies. Indeed, one can point to some notable exceptions in the American Army, wherein special operations and unconventional warfare have figured prominently in our wartime operations.

Today, the professional climate toward special operations in the American Army is changing, and for the better. One reason for this change is the reality of the world scene and the proliferation of unconventional threats. Another reason, as noted earlier, is the 1981 Defense Guidance. Finally, we should remember that the senior leaders in the Army today were young majors and lieutenant colonels in Vietnam, and their experience in that conflict has had a profound impact on their perspectives relating to the Army's mission today.

Many high-ranking, influential officers still serving in the Army have distinguished special operations backgrounds in Vietnam, a number of whom are participants at this conference. It is also important to note that the civilian leadership of the Army, including the Secretary of Defense and key officials in the National Security Council, recognize the need for special operations. We have been fortunate that, as Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer was a forceful advocate of special operations. He and others like him understand the concept and appreciate its role in the Army mission. As a consequence of these developing attitudes, there is a new and real emphasis in the Army on special operations. This emphasis appears in statements and, more importantly, in policy.

Moreover, there have been five structural developments following upon this policy. These are the drafting of doctrine; the development of tactics; the awareness of training requirements; the value of career recognition; and, finally, a growing understanding of the importance of intelligence and intelligence operations, which are vitally linked to special operations.

As noted earlier, the term "special operations" is a broad one. We must never forget that special operations forces have the capability of augmenting and complementing conventional forces. Although capable of self-sustained missions, they nevertheless can support conventional operations. They are not competitors, nor should they be isolated from conventional forces. In an era of collective security, their capabilities in the field of military assis-

tance and training are exceedingly important. I would also stress certain guidelines for planning purposes, as well as some crucial doctrinal principles and operational requirements.

First, it is essential to recognize the role that intelligence plays in all special operations endeavors. Second, the roots of insurgency are not military in origin, nor will they be military in resolution. In most insurgency operations, military approaches are not the total answer. Special operations personnel must be highly intelligent, highly skilled, dedicated, courageous, highly motivated, and extremely well trained people. They must be in excellent physical condition. A greater emphasis must be placed on language training, and we must explore different approaches to language training for active-duty and reserve components. This effort can include drawing upon the linguistic diversity of our ethnic population. However, we should think in terms of incentives, particularly for the reservists, to develop and maintain a language skill.

A premium must be placed on flexibility, on imaginative planning, and on decisive execution. There must be mutual understanding of the capabilities of both special operations forces and conventional forces, by commanders of both, and an understanding of their mutual limitations.

The National Guard and the Army Reserve must play a vital role in these endeavors, and special attention should be given to their organization, mission, and capabilities. The reserve forces can be a talent bank in many areas where there is a need for expertise beyond the normal military boundaries—for example, the field of municipal operations, requiring expertise in transportation, sanitation, health, police, and other nation-building skills. Special consideration must also be given to Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs, in both the active and reserve components.

General Washington was always attuned to the psychological aspects of war and diplomacy. In early April 1783, when he received a copy of the Treaty of Paris ending the Revolutionary War, he did not immediately announce the news to his troops. Washington waited until April 19 to inform the men of the historic document, as that date was the eighth anniversary of the beginning of the American Revolution.

Communications are a vital and necessary asset to special operations, and therefore our communications capabilities should represent the state of the art. Considerable effort must be made to define SOF roles. I am referring to Ranger and Special Forces activities, Civil Affairs, Psychological Warfare, and countless missions ranging from raids and ambushes to stay-behind operations and unconventional warfare. This capability also includes the organization and development of guerrilla activity.

Anti-terrorism is another significant dimension of the SOF mission. As we begin to focus more on light conventional units—and that is the direction in which the Army is going—there will be a definite trend toward reconnaissance units and long-range reconnaissance capabilities within major conventional units. We must always remember that in this particular special operations field there are limitations on military or government involvement. In fact, the military role is even more limited than that of our government.

We must assume that the twilight battlefield of low-intensity conflict includes not only unconventional warfare in the military sense, but also economic, political, and psychological warfare. This is an enormous area in which private-sector resources can be used. We must find a way to incorporate into a grand strategy the total resources of our society, so as to address those needs essential to our security beyond the limitations of our current defense structure. We live in a nation that has been the global pioneer in industrial development, marketing, advertising, and communication. We must harness these resources in a common security endeavor.

The sands of time have nearly run out in the hourglass of the 20th century. Indeed, we live in the twilight moments of the second millennium. Within the next decade, we shall observe the bicentennials of the Constitutional Convention, the ratification and adoption of the Constitution, and the adoption of our Bill of Rights. It is the Western values manifested in these documents which are really at stake, and there must be greater public understanding of this fact.

Relying upon our technology, but, more importantly, drawing upon our able and dedicated people, we must build a force which,

although small, will be structured and conditioned in such a way that it will be perceived as a force whose strength is far greater than its numbers. We must look at the year 2000, because the die for our society may well be cast within the next few years. On a larger scale we are being revisited with the violence of the barbarian invasions of old. The Visigoth and the Vandal are with us yet. The stakes are high, the challenge is great.

In Shakespeare's words, when King Henry V was in desperate straits on the eve of the Battle of Agincourt, he observed his task and said, "This story shall the good man teach his son . . . we few, we happy few, we band of brothers; For he today that sheds his blood with me shall be my brother." Let us not discount courage, nor professionalism, imagination, and dedication. Let us remember the motto of the British SAS, "Who dares, wins." Let's dare. We will win.

CHAPTER ONE

Special Operations and the Threats to United States Interests in the 1980s

Paper

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Discussants

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The term "special operations" immediately brings to mind a variety of images and controversial issues. The issues are important, and the convocation of a conference to identify and examine them reflects recognition of that fact. For too long the subject has been either ignored or put on display in the manner of an exposé. Neither approach adequately addresses the subject or the issues that arise from it. This paper will attempt to provide a conceptual framework for special operations. In the first part of the paper, the term "special operations" will be defined, with the objective of providing commonly agreed assumptions from which relevant discussion can proceed. The second part of the paper will identify the objectives of US national security strategy and the potential threats or obstacles to achieving those objectives.

Definitions and Concepts

The purpose of a definition is to clarify. The term or concept in question should be more understandable once its definition has been presented. Generally, the ideal definition should leave little or no room for ambiguity. Of course, some concepts defy precise definition, and it must be admitted that "special operations" may be just such a concept.

Many Western analysts confront a conceptual quandary in attempting to define special operations. They work within a Western philosophical framework which has tended to draw clear distinctions between peace and war and, quite mistakenly, between political and military affairs. There is almost always a tendency to define special operations solely in military terms. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) has drafted its own definition of special operations as follows:

> Military operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DOD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic or psychological objectives. They may support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible. Sensitive peacetime operations, except for training, are normally authorized by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and conducted under the direction of the NCA or designated commander. Special operations may include unconventional warfare, counterterrorist operations, collective security, psychological operations, and civil affairs measures.[1]

This definition may be perfectly adequate for DOD purposes. On the other hand, "military operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DOD forces against strategic or tactical targets" could, in the broadest sense, describe some very conventional operations—a B-52 bombing raid or an airmobile operation by an air assault division. In both cases, the operations would be military and would involve "specially trained, equipped and organized DOD forces." Yet, surely, this is not what is meant by special operations. Furthermore, although DOD forces inlcude some units trained for and assigned to psychological operations and civil affairs measures, these are not "military operations" in the strictest sense. Moreover, DOD forces may not be the only resources available; the definition does not include action by non-military organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States Information Agency (USIA), the Department of State, and the Agency for International Development (AID). Inasmuch as the definition was written to serve the purposes of DOD, the omission of other agencies is understandable.

For the purposes of this inquiry, however, it presents a problem. Finally, the cited definition indicates nothing of the nature of special operations—what makes them "special." Nor does it specify why certain missions, such as counterterrorist operations, should be so designated. It is probably fair to suggest, then, that the DOD definition is not adequate for the purposes of this paper.

Nor is much help to be found in Executive Order (EO) 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," which defines "Special Activities" as "activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. . . ."[2] This definition includes functions that support such activities, but specifically excludes diplomatic and intelligence collection and production. What is emphasized here is the covert nature of these special activities. Otherwise, this definition tells the reader little about what makes such activities or operations "special." Of course, EO 12333 was written to provide guidelines governing the activities of US intelligence agencies. The designation of "Special Activities" as noted is probably intended as a euphemism for "covert action," which in turn might encompass certain categories of special operations, including military operations.

The Soviets, with their ideology of permanent struggle and Clausewitzian appreciation of the continuum of politics and war, make no clear distinction between war and peace or between purely political and purely military measures. Consequently, they possess a range of concepts to cover a wide spectrum of special operations applicable to a variety of political/military situations.[3] "Active measures" in the Soviet sense embrace military and nonmilitary activities, overt and covert operations, violent and nonviolent methods. The purpose of conducting active measures is political—to support and enhance Soviet foreign policy objectives. Active measures are applied "hand in hand" with other foreign policy instruments, "even during periods of reduced tension or detente."[4] Under this umbrella, active measures operations could range from political influence, *agitprop*, and deception and disinformation activities in peacetime; to "wet affairs" (assassinations), sabotage, and assistance to underground rebel groups in

the "grey area" of low-intensity conflict; to highly sensitive military and paramilitary operations against vital targets in enemy rear areas in limited and general war.[5]

Clearly, the Soviet active measures concept transcends the scope we are seeking to delineate here. In the West, much of what the Soviets consider to be active measures passes under the rubric of diplomacy. Only in its low-intensity, military, and paramilitary dimensions does the Soviet concept relate to the subject at hand. Yet it is instructive to note Soviet awareness of the essentially political nature of special operations in both war and peace. It may also be salutary to observe that the British, who have a long history of conducting active measures/special operations, have absorbed the idea of the continuum of war and politics while preserving their democratic traditions. When appropriate, they place their special operations resources (MI6 and the Special Air Service Regiment) at the direct service of foreign policy, under the auspices of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices.[6]

Special operations, as we have noted above, cannot be simply equated with covert action—"the attempt by a government to influence events in another state or territory without revealing its involvement."[7] This definition of covert action corresponds closely to the EO 12333 definition of special activities, and to some aspects of active measures. In some respects, covert action may be viewed as an element of diplomacy. After all, as some practitioners have observed, seeking to influence the politics of other governments and societies is "the stuff of foreign policy . . . it is synonymous with it."[8]

Thus far, this study has focused on what special operations are *not*. To gain a clearer idea of what they are, it may be useful to provide some examples of known special operations. From such a record, common characteristics may be extracted, giving substance to the concept and its definition. A partial list of special operations might include the following:

1. Unconventional Military Operations in Conventional War. Typical operations of this sort would include the German capture of Fortress Eban Emael; the Bruneval Raid; the Israeli capture and removal of an Egyptian radar station; and the Special Air Service (SAS) attack on Pebble Island during the Falklands War.

2. Combat Rescue Missions. Examples are the German rescue of Mussolini; the rescue of European hostages at Stanleyville in the Congo; and the operations at Son Tay, Entebbe, Koh Tang Island (*Mayaguez*), Mogadishu, Kolwezi, Desert One, and the Iranian Embassy in London.

3. Paramilitary Operations. These would include operations conducted by the United States or its allies such as those reported to have been undertaken in Albania, Guatemala, Cuba (Bay of Pigs), and against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The Soviets conducted similar operations in the initial stages of intervention in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

4. Counterinsurgency. This includes many forms of special operations, such as civic action/civil affairs programs and advisory/training assistance programs. It might also include psychological operations and political warfare, "counter gangs" (used by the British in Palestine and Kenya), and war by proxy (for example, the Cubans in Angola).

5. Peacekeeping. Good examples are the most recent operations carried out by the US Marines in Lebanon and those operations conducted under United Nations auspices in Cyprus, the Middle East, and elsewhere.[9]

It should be stressed that civic action/civil affairs programs, advisory/training assistance, psychological operations, and war by proxy might be undertaken as special operations in their own right, outside the context of counterinsurgency. American material assistance to the Afghan rebels would fall into this category of distinct special operations, as would advisory/training assistance programs undertaken with friendly regimes not necessarily threatened by insurgency, such as Liberia in 1981.[10]

Characteristics of Special Operations

The operations listed above appear to share a number of characteristics which set them apart from routine military activities. In attempting to define special operations, Edward Luttwak and his colleagues recently advanced their own description: "self-contained acts of war mounted by self-sufficient forces operating

within hostile territory."[11] They emphasize that special operations "are not just ordinary military operations writ small; they are *qualitatively* different."[12] The nature of that qualitative difference is captured by M.R.D. Foot, a British historian of the wartime Special Operations Executive (SOE), in his description of special operations as, "unorthodox coups . . . unexpected strokes of violence, usually mounted and executed outside the military establishment of the day, which exercise a startling effect on the enemy; preferably, at the highest level."[13] Taken together, these two efforts point the semantic quest in the right direction, especially within the context of conventional war. However, even these definitions may be too confining for this study. Special operations undertaken in peace or in low-intensity conflict do not always involve the use of violence; nor are they always "self-contained," if that term is taken to mean short-term and of limited scope. Still, it is clear that there is a fundamental qualitative difference between special and conventional operations. This difference may be explained in the following way:

1. Special operations might be described as "parapolitical," rather than paramilitary. The ultimate objective is political and the political stakes and risks are frequently very high. But the intermediate objectives and the chosen instruments range from the political into the military and paramilitary fields. They may, but more often do not, involve a declared state of war. They represent diplomacy conducted by other means, and as such are usually subject to strict political or military control at the highest levels.

2. Special operations are frequently described as unorthodox or unconventional. But the distinction between special and conventional military operations becomes less clear as the tempo of conflict approaches general war and the military component of conflict increases. Yet, even in conventional war special operations remain qualitatively different, by virtue of the scale, sensitivity, and potentially decisive nature of the missions and the specialized nature of the assigned forces. The military stakes and risks are usually high.

3. Secrecy is generally desirable, at least up to a point, but is not always possible. Special operations, therefore, are usually cov-

ert or clandestine. To ensure that they remain so, they are frequently small-scale and limited in objective. Economy of force is the operative principle.

4. Successful special operations are often characterized by simplicity, enhanced by innovation, imagination, and subtlety. Some operations are direct, but more often they are based on the strategy of the "indirect approach." Some special operations rely on skill, speed, surprise, flexibility, and deception; those in the political and paramilitary spheres (such as counterinsurgency) usually require patience, time, and careful cultivation.

5. Special operations may involve the use of violence. Such use of violence is selective.

6. Military or civilian personnel may be employed on special operations. They may come from the initiating country, or they may be recruited elsewhere. They may be acting legally, extra-legally, or illegally within the target country.

7. Special operations generally require intelligence assets and support of the highest quality.

Revised Definition

To distill these characteristics into a concise, inclusive, and usable definition of special operations remains a daunting task. But a working definition may be developed by selecting and highlighting the most significant aspects of the characteristics described above. Hence, a new definition of special operations might be synthesized as follows:

> Small-scale, clandestine, covert or overt operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant political or military objectives in support of foreign policy. Special operations are characterized by either simplicity or complexity, by subtlety and imagination, by the discriminate use of violence, and by oversight at the highest level. Military and nonmilitary resources, including intelligence assets, may be used in concert.

This definition is unlikely to satisfy all practitioners or students of special operations. It is, however, flexible and broad enough

to include those special operations which might be undertaken by the United States during the remaining years of this decade.

US National Security Strategy: Objectives and Threats

A detailed analysis of American national security strategy falls outside the scope of this study. But it is essential, at the very least, to explore the broad objectives of this strategy in order to identify political and military threats to US interests. These are complex issues, and US foreign policy concerns fluctuate in substance and detail over time. But there are some fundamental underlying principles which are consistent. In an address at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies in May 1982, National Security Advisor William P. Clark identified the following principles in the context of national strategy:

> To preserve our institutions of freedom and democracy, to protect our citizens, to promote their economic well-being and to foster an international order supportive of these institutions and principles.[14]

Few would argue with these principles. Debate focuses on the means to achieve them, and such pluralistic debate underlies the dynamic nature of foreign policy.[15] Clearly, the fluidity of democratic policymaking also places constraints on the execution of the military component of national security strategy. Speaking at the National Defense University in July 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger defined US military strategy for the 1980s.[16] He began, of course, with national strategy, which involved the protection of basic national interests—maintaining sovereignty, remaining a global power, and defending and supporting a stable, peaceful international system. Weinberger went on to describe the military component of that strategy. This component, he believed, had to protect national interests by recognizing threats and countering them. In light of the threats posed by Soviet military power and military doctrine, the Secretary of Defense defined the following US national security objectives:

1. To prevent the coercion of the United States, its allies, and friends.

2. To be capable of protecting US interests and US citizens abroad.

3. To maintain access to critical resources around the globe, including petroleum.

4. To oppose the global expansion of Soviet political control and military presence, particularly where such presence threatens the American geostrategic position.

5. To encourage long-term political and military changes within the Soviet empire that will facilitate building a more peaceful and secure world order.

It is one thing to state national security objectives; it is quite another to define credible threats to those objectives. No strategic analyst can say with a high degree of certainty what those threats might be. It is possible only to make an "informed speculation." The first observation which can be made is that potential "threats" tend to be diffuse, rather than specific. Although Soviet capabilities to project power improved markedly in the 1970s,[17] direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union is probably the least likely contingency, especially in the all-important Central Front of Western Europe.[18] Outside Western Europe it is possible to visualize situations where the United States and Soviet Union might clash, for example, protecting respective clients or allies in the context of a major war in the Middle East. But it is difficult to estimate how likely or realistic such scenarios might be. The United States has invested considerable resources and prestige in the development of the Central Command (CENTCOM), formerly the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, to counter a potential Soviet threat to the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf.[19] While such a threat cannot be ruled out, it is probably less likely now in view of the Soviet difficulties in completely subduing Afghanistan; Moscow may be hesitant to intervene again in an Islamic country in the near future.

There may be other reasons to postulate a less aggressive Soviet global posture stance; but Sovietology remains an imprecise art, and no one in the West can predict with certainty the direction of Soviet foreign policy under the current leadership or its succes-

sors.[20] Consequently, the most likely threats to US interests may arise from local and regional conflicts and internal instability of US allies or clients. Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea—American or Western allies to some degree—are all vulnerable to internal unrest and to external attack. The extent of any given threat is usually a matter of opinion and interpretation, and the immediacy of any threat may increase or decrease over time. Except for Israel, direct attack by an external enemy is usually the least likely threat. Internal instability, possibly leading to revolution, is a more conceivable scenario in many of these countries. As the causes of instability are often rooted deeply in the political and social fabric of the state, this kind of security threat is one the United States would appear ill-suited to resolve unilaterally. It is not simply a question of force structures or doctrine; it is a question of determining whether or not the application of US power is appropriate in the circumstances.

Depending upon location and circumstances, local or regional conflicts could pose tangible threats to US military bases, access to important resources, a friendly government, American business investments, or the lives of US citizens abroad. Southern Africa and the Persian Gulf immediately come to mind in this context. Occasionally, the threat might be of a qualitatively different nature. For example, the United States could conceivably coexist with "revolutionary" regimes in Central America, provided that those regimes were not merely Soviet or Cuban clients or proxies. But a Soviet military presence on the isthmus or a Soviet client actively involved in destabilizing its neighbors clearly would constitute a direct and serious threat to US security and interests in the hemisphere. Fortunately, that scenario is not a foregone conclusion, even given the destabilizing situation in the region.[21]

Terrorism is another problem the solution to which eludes easy analysis. Through the 1970s, international terrorism intensified annually, and US citizens and installations were consistently the most frequent targets. It may be premature to assess with certainty, but there is some evidence to suggest that the nature of the terrorism problem may be changing. The number of incidents may not increase indefinitely. Moreover, state-sponsored terrorism,

such as that ascribed to Libya and Iran, rather than terrorism by independent political groups, may prove to be the predominant terrorist problem in the 1980s.[22] The extent to which the United States and other Western nations remain vulnerable to terrorist attack is unclear, but there is some reason to believe they are improving their ability to respond effectively to the problem.[23]

In any case, it would be a mistake to confine national security strategy to the defensive mode, responding only to threats. As an important aspect of foreign policy, national security strategy has a role to play in promoting national interests and objectives. Under certain circumstances, appropriate, positive action can prevent threats from developing. This, of course, is the essence of deterrence. In other cases, national security strategy might involve the promotion of revolutionary activity. For example, Secretary Weinberger's list of national security objectives included the encouragement of long-term political and military changes within the Soviet empire. Aid and assistance to Afghan freedom fighters might fall within this category.[24]

To sum up, a synthesis of national security objectives and the threats posed to those objectives should elucidate the development of appropriate measures to pursue those objectives successfully. Much, of course, depends upon available capabilities, but the definition produced earlier suggests some capabilities which might be developed to fulfill national objectives by special means. Related to Secretary Weinberger's national security objectives, they are:

1. Objective: To prevent the coercion of the United States, its allies, and friends.
   Capabilities: a. unconventional warfare operations in conventional war (as a deterrent);
   b. counterinsurgency operations;
   c. peacekeeping operations.

2. Objective: To be capable of protecting US interests and US citizens abroad.
   Capabilities: a. counterinsurgency operations;
   b. combat rescue missions;
   c. peacekeeping operations.

3. Objective: To maintain access to critical resources around the world, including petroleum.
   Capabilities: a. paramilitary operations;
   b. counterinsurgency operations;
   c. peacekeeping operations.

4. Objective: To oppose the global expansion of Soviet political control and military presence.
   Capabilities: a. unconventional warfare operations;
   b. paramilitary operations;
   c. counterinsurgency operations.

5. Objective: To encourage long-term political and military change within the Soviet empire.
   Capabilities: a. paramilitary operations;
   b. counterinsurgency operations.

The extent to which these activities could or should be undertaken is not addressed here. These aspects are dealt with elsewhere in this volume. It is important to note, however, that special operations capabilities appear to be relevant to the fulfillment of certain US national security objectives.

Conclusions

A positive approach to national security strategy as an "offensive" foreign policy tool can be applied to the concept of special operations. It represents a great deal more than counterinsurgency or reacting to terrorist incidents. To confine the concept to a defensive mode would be to limit options considerably. Moreover, to do so might invite the temptation and the risk of applying special operations as a weapon of last resort to prevent a disaster.[25] Nothing could be less desirable. Special operations can be used effectively to preempt or to resolve political and military problems, but they are no substitute for effective foreign policy and military decisionmaking (hence, the relatively broad definition of special operations developed earlier). Our definition is intended to imply that special operations have an important place among the foreign policy options of the state, extending its diplomatic powers into the military and paramilitary spheres.

Essentially this has been an exploratory paper, probing the nature of the subject and relating it to the objectives and problems of US national security strategy. It is not intended to advise or endorse any particular course of action, but rather to provide an intellectual framework for understanding the concept of special operations.

Notes

1. US Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Publication 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: June 1979, Revised).
2. *Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities"* (48 *Federal Register*, 59947, 1981), quoted in full, in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Elements of Intelligence* revised edition (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1983), appendix 2.
3. In Russian, *Activnyye Meropriyatiya.* See US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Hearings: Soviet Active Measures* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 32.
4. Ibid., pp. 31-33.
5. Ibid.; see also the paper by John J. Dziak, chapter 3 in this volume, as well as his "Soviet Intelligence and Security Services in the 1980s: The Paramilitary Dimension," in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Counterintelligence* (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1981) pp. 169-73; C. N. Donnelly, "Operations in the Enemy Rear: Soviet Doctrine and Tactics," *International Defense Review,* vol. 13, no. 1 (January 1980), pp. 35-41; Capt. Henry S. Whittier, "Soviet Special Operations/Partisan Warfare: Implications for Today," *Military Review,* vol. 59, no. 1 (January 1979), pp. 55-57; and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., *Soviet Military Strategy in Europe* (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 96-99.
6. Tony Geraghty, *Who Dares Wins: The Story of the Special Air Service 1950-1980* (London: Arms and Armour, 1980), pp. 165-66, 169, 171, 183; Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1978), pp. 85-86, 98-99; M.R.D. Foot, "Britain: Intelligence Services," *Economist,* 15 March 1980, p. 54; Christopher Andrew, "Whitehall, Washington and the Intelligence Services," *International Affairs,* vol. 53, no. 3 (July 1977), p. 390; Geoffrey Moorhouse, *The Diplomats: the Foreign Office Today* (London, 1977) pp. 337-38.

7. Roy Godson, *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action* (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1981), p. 1. Covert operations may be described further as involving activities which are observable by those immediately at hand, which have an identifiable instigator, but which conceal the identity of, or permit plausible deniability by, the actual sponsor. Covert actions themselves cannot be secret, but the programs should be. Paramilitary operations cannot be kept secret. See Adda B. Bozeman, "Covert Action and Foreign Policy," in Godson, *Covert Action,* pp. 18–19.
8. Ibid.
9. Edward Luttwak et al., *A Systematic Review of "Commando" (Special) Operations 1939-1980* (Potomac, MD: C & L Associates, 1982), pp. I-1-6, and the lessons of individual case studies; see also Centre for Conflict Studies, *Special Operations: Military Lessons from Six Case Studies* (Fort Bragg, NC: Joint Special Operations Command, 1982), pp. 259–60, and the lessons of individual case studies; and M.R.D. Foot, "Special Operations, I and II," in Michael Elliott-Bateman, ed., *The Fourth Dimension Resistance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970), pp. 19–51.
10. See *The Washington Post*, April 2, 1981.
11. Luttwak et al., p. I-1.
12. Ibid., p. S-1.
13. Foot, "Special Operations, I," p. 19.
14. Honorable William P. Clark, "National Security Strategy," text of address before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 21 May 1982.
15. See, for example, articles by Stephen S. Rosenfeld and Andrew Knight in "America and the World 1982," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 3 (1983); and "American Security in the 1980s," Parts 1 and 2, *Adelphi Papers*, nos. 173, 174 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982).
16. Caspar W. Weinberger, "U.S. Military Strategy for the 1980s," in *The 1980s: Decade of Confrontation?* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1981), p. xi.
17. Dennis M. Gormley, "The Direction and Pace of Soviet Force Projection Capabilities," *Survival*, vol. 24, no. 6, (November/December 1982), pp. 266–76.
18. William J. Taylor, *The Washington Papers No. 94, The Future of Conflcit: U.S. Interests* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1983), pp. 41–45.
19. See Jeffrey Record, *The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf,* (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1981).
20. Michel Tatu, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: a Turning Point?" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 3 (1983), pp. 602–10; Taylor, pp. 59–65; Roger E. Kanet, ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s* (New York: Praeger, 1982).
21. See Robert S. Leiken, *The Washington Papers No. 93 Soviet Strategy in Latin America* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982); and Centre for Conflict Studies, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Central America* (Ottawa: Department of National Defense, 1983).
22. "Patterns of International Terrorism 1981," *Department of State Bulletin* (August 1982), pp. 9–21; "Terrorism in Decline," *Washington Times,* February 11, 1983, citing State Department figures for 1982.

23. These issues are debated extensively in Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection* (New York: Crane Russak, 1984); Yonah Alexander and Charles K. Ebinger, eds., *Political Terrorism and Energy: the Threat and Response* (New York: Praeger, 1982); William Regis Farrell, *The US Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Policy*, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982); and Neil C. Livingstone, *The War Against Terrorism* (Toronto: D.C. Heath/Lexington Books, 1982).
24. See, for example, Centre for Conflict Studies, *Low Intensity Conflict and the Integrity of the Soviet Bloc* (Fredericton, 1981), pp. 19-24, 27-28.
25. Arthur H. Bair, Jr., et al., "Unconventional Warfare: a Legitimate Tool of Foreign Policy," *Conflict: An International Journal*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1983), pp. 68-69.

Discussion

General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)

I have no problem whatsoever with the definition of the special operations problem; I think it is of relatively minor import in the larger framework with which we have to deal. I tend to agree that it deserves the broadest possible definition. Special operations capabilities need be limited only by our ingenuity.

I would like to say a few words about where special operations fit, or should fit, into the overall geostrategic competition. The Department of Defense will never be able to field special operations capabilities adequate to cover the entire spectrum of contingent missions. The Department of Defense is, in my view, basically the defensive platoon of a two-platoon system, which together represent, or should represent, an adequate national security posture.

The basic job of the Department of Defense overall, and the array of forces that it must maintain, is to preclude the use of violence in the international world competition, so that our offensive platoon—that is, our government as a whole, led by the President, operating through our instruments of diplomacy—can exploit initiatives and take action to capitalize on our strengths in all sectors of national policy. Curiously enough, as indicated in Drs. Tugwell and Charters' paper, and as I think we all appreciate, special operations, whether military or not, really have a role in both platoons. I think it is that point which tends to get obscured. The greater role, in my view, is in the offensive platoon.

I too share Drs. Tugwell and Charters' concern with the constraints that the US government faces each and every day in attempting to pursue its national security objectives. Those constraints are enormous. They really add up to one thing: a lack of adequate appreciation by the American public, the American Congress, and, to a very large degree, the incumbent administration, of the nature of the competition between the Soviet bloc and its surrogates and the world that we call "free." In the absence of that understanding, I am very pessimistic about the future.

The Department of Defense has recently produced a revised edition of *Soviet Military Power*. It sets forth—with great help from the intelligence community in sanitizing material—the relentless growth of Soviet military power in every dimension. The last page underscores the point that while those forces are ready for war at any level, and at any time, their main operative role is to ensure that the Soviet Union wins without war, except for that which might be necessary to complete the rape of Afghanistan. Their real function in the Soviet operational methodology is to undergird the step-by-step advance of Soviet influence, control, and hegemony by political, psychological, and economic means. And that function is what we face today.

If we experts in the business have any task, it is to ensure somehow that we communicate, through ever-widening circles, a full appreciation of the nature of the struggle. Wherever we are—Vietnam, El Salvador, or wherever—our adversary is involved in total war, an effort unconstrained by resources, time, or geography. This adversary cannot be adequately confronted by a United States that is only willing to react when there is a so-called "clear and present danger" to the national security. We must convey the understanding that we are confronted by a group of powers for whom intervention is the password of the day. We are not going to accomplish very much until we recognize that a total effort, however small the base from which it springs, cannot be adequately dealt with by counterefforts surrounded by constraints, limited in time, and measured against a calculus of risk which must be minuscule.

In this conference we are discussing definitions of "special operations," coming up with ideas on how they might be better organized, how better command and control arrangements might be

engineered, and how they might be better equipped. But what we all must recognize is that unless we can develop an understanding that translates into policy and removes this complex of constraints which precludes the United States from utilizing some excellent existing resources, we will not even begin to realize the US potential. We have the potential to exploit an enormous array of capabilities in peace, war, or crisis—some military, some economic, many political and psychological—which in sum would facilitate an effective synergistic approach to a mounting problem.

At this conference, we should be thinking about Central America. We ought to look at El Salvador, where there is an insurgency that is not constrained by resources, geography, or time. It involves a sophisticated linkage between the insurgents and Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. And it has been further internationalized by participants from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Vietnam, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The insurgency's psychological operations center is in Mexico City, giving it absolutely magnificent command and analysis of the world media. Thus, the insurgents can influence the media, and that has a tremendous effect here in the United States. That is not the kind of problem that will be effectively countered by raising our total number of advisors in El Salvador from 55 to 70—if that is all we plan to do.

In conclusion, I would stress above all that our problem is to muster the additional capabilities to be found in the part of the US national security apparatus that I have called the offensive platoon.

Brigadier General Joseph C. Lutz, USA

I have very little disagreement with Drs. Tugwell and Charters' paper. I would add, however, that a paper of this nature, written under the prescribed parameters, cannot go far enough or deep enough. The first problem is, of course, that of definition. I agree that the definition of "special operations" should be broadened.

When we first went to work developing the new JCS statement, the former definition of "special operations" read as follows:

> Secondary or supporting operations which may be adjunct to various other operations and for which no one service is assigned primary responsibility.

We went to work, and we submitted to JCS a proposal, which was modified and became the definition quoted in the paper. Our own definition, before it was modified by JCS, included overt, covert, and clandestine operations, and mentioned specialized techniques employed by small, specially trained and configured formations capable of independent operations where the use of general purpose forces is either inappropriate or infeasible.

I think that more appropriately describes what special operations might be. In any event, having struggled with the definition of special operations, I am still amazed at the lack of understanding in the community of what it is we are actually talking about.

One day I wrote on a chalkboard some of the special operations terms that are so intermingled, so interwoven, that we cannot seem to get beyond them. I wrote special forces, special operations, special warfare, unconventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, paramilitary operations, revolutionary warfare, proxies, surrogates, low-intensity conflict, and escape and evasion. They seemed clear enough. But what about SERE—survival, evasion, resistance, and escape? These are altogether different concepts.

Then we came to internal development and internal defense and development (IDAD); and, after that, reconnaissance, human intelligence (HUMINT) resources, strategic reconnaissance, strategic intelligence, operational intelligence, long-range intelligence, deep intelligence, long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP), rural development, anti-terror, counterterror, and on and on. We have serious problems with definitions. I would submit that many of those terms are used inaccurately when describing special operations.

In the definition proposed by Drs. Tugwell and Charters, I note the omission of the term "clandestine." A covert operation has as its primary intent to attempt to conceal the sponsoring country. A clandestine operation attempts to conceal the operation. There

is a big difference. Those two terms are often used interchangeably and incorrectly.

I have some difficulty with the term "parapolitical." While I would fully agree that we should be practicing the kinds of operations that bear on our national interests and political objectives, as a military operator I think we should focus on the military part of the equation. We must of course recognize that the latter influences other factors in a country either being destabilized by or involved in an insurgency. For example, psychological operations conducted by a US Army psychological operations unit are a military operation. That is not to say that there are not other agencies that can conduct psycyological operations. I would hope that all such efforts would be complementary, and certainly not at odds with each other.

I think that in a democratic society it is not entirely plausible to accept at face value the Clausewitzian thesis that war is simply diplomacy by other means. The military should be versatile enough to play a role, even in a destabilized environment, that would contribute ultimately to stability within that particular region.

I agree that quality should be an indicator in defining special operations. I do not think that the paper goes deeply enough into the threat. This is a difficult problem to wrestle with. We did it on simplistic terms. We looked at the classic spectrum of conflict. We looked at the Chief of Staff's White Paper of 1980, where he says we cannot afford to draw down the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but must be able to meet threats in other areas of the world. I asked our analysts and those working on mission area analysis to look at what the Soviets have done globally, starting with 1959 in Cuba. There have been 17 successful insurgencies since 1959 resulting in new governments leaning toward the Soviets.

My approach is simplistic. Inasmuch as we are limited in terms of how we can respond through NATO and the use of strategic deterrents, we must be able to act independently. And if some of the constraints that General Stilwell discussed could be removed, this might enable us to act preemptively, particularly in the Third World, where there is much that we usefully can do.

As we analyze priorities, we realize that the Soviets have made enormous gains in terms of proxy and surrogate warfare through-

out the world. Their *Spetsnaz* forces alone have reached huge figures [see Dziak paper, chapter 3]. They have effectively begun an encirclement of the Persian Gulf. Their gains in Central and South America are well known to everybody here. And I agree with the comment that everywhere oil is in jeopardy. What can we do about that? Well, it seems clear to me that special operations forces, however we define them, offer some important answers to that question.

By sending security assistance teams to those countries that realize their region is being destabilized and ask for assistance through the State Department or through the Department of Defense, we play a role in foreign internal defense that is vitally important at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

Indeed, at that lower end of the conflict spectrum there are many countries at war right now. Our analysis shows 21 countries involved in active insurgencies at this moment [March 1983].

Given that situation, special operations forces of all services must be prepared to act preemptively in order to protect the national interests of the United States. Peacetime to us is not peacetime globally; we should be able to meet challenges wherever they arise.

I recognize that the constraints, not only EO 12333 but also the War Powers Act of 1973 and other legislative constraints, may, as General Stilwell indicated, preclude any of this from happening. And I am not very optimistic about our prospects for getting around those constraints.

In discussing peacetime and wartime, we are dealing with something vague and intangible. The point I would make is that in the special operations forces we have the capability of being introduced into a given country, being established on the ground with contacts, maybe even with our own intelligence networks. If war ultimately breaks out within that region, there are people on hand who understand the region and are available to go there. That is the secret of the peacetime to wartime transition.

Finally, I endorse the concept of the force multiplier. The Special Operations Forces performed extraordinarily well in Vietnam in 1966, on a $100 million annual budget which included beans, bullets, everything. There were 83 camps deployed in Vietnam, with 2,700 Special Forces soldiers, leading, advising, and con-

trolling 63,000 indigenous personnel. The end result—in words nobody wants to use—can be found in the body counts. The average enemy body count per year was 10,000. The loss in Special Forces lives was 83 per year. That is a force multiplier. That is economy of force.

The Special Forces not only trained 63,000 to fight for South Vietnam; they kept 63,000 from being recruited by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. They established 83 areas where we knew the enemy could not be. That performance cannot be called unsuccessful, and it needs no apology. The force multiplier capability is worth noting as we go on to explore this vitally important subject.

General Discussion

Dr. Tugwell, in his general remarks on the subject, made it clear that although his definition of special operations was obviously weighted toward activities primarily military in nature, it was nonetheless designed to encompass a much broader field of endeavor. Special operations, as he views them, embrace a spectrum of government assets ranging from military strikes to intelligence collection, to propaganda and deception, to include even diplomacy—in short, any means which are legal and sanctioned by the political leadership. Dr. Tugwell endorsed the notion of special operations as instrumentalities to be used actively in support of government objectives—not merely to counteract perceived threats. Constraints exist, of course, and must be acknowledged. Those in authority must understand the practical implications of the action they have initiated, while operators must not assume that they have a free hand to act as they see fit. He suggests that US special operations "proceed with caution."

A participant, alluding to the restraints that make it difficult for a democracy to defend itself in the face of danger that, far from appearing "clear and present," is likely to be ambiguous and camouflaged, wondered how our society will ever gird itself effectively against a totalitarian challenge. In response, Dr. Tugwell conceded that the problem is serious, and has always been so in democracies. Short of becoming an Orwellian state, it is almost

impossible to mobilize public opinion and keep it at a fever pitch as the Soviets attempt to do. We have no single ideology, to be forced on everyone by political commissars. On the other hand, as Dr. Tugwell sees it, Afghanistan may yet prove to be the catalyst that will bring even the most "liberal" to consider soberly Soviet policies and actions. But it will take time.

Frank R. Barnett cited the experiences of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis just before World War II, and more recently of the Committee on the Present Danger, as prototypes of private efforts to arouse a lethargic public. He suggested that the present environment offers the opportunity for similar endeavors.

A speaker then took exception to the Tugwell-Charters definition of special operations as being too broad, and more likely applicable to what the American government has traditionally called "covert action." The present exercise, as viewed by the speaker, called for concentrating attention on guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency, anti-terrorist operations, and unconventional warfare—all of which call for development of a unilateral US capability. General Stilwell agreed, but argued also for special operations as one of many necessary tools of American power, and urged that we crusade continuously for their development. He applied this equally to strategic forces, where improvements are required in order to deny the Soviets an edge of superiority.

The problem of definition continued to evoke discussion. Dr. Tugwell conceded that his definition of special operations was probably too broad for strictly military purposes, whereas Dr. Charters saw a good case to be made for including covert action under the special operations rubric. It was agreed that while special operations resisted concise definition, they were quite recognizable when they occurred. One speaker advocated finding a more benign-sounding definition than the ones usually encountered, in order to avoid some of the less pleasant connotations that have a negative impact on the public, particularly on university campuses. General Lutz offered the example of the Special Warfare Center, now called the Institute for Military Assistance.

General Stilwell advocated making the case to the public not on behalf of special operations as such, but rather on the premise that the entire US value system is threatened, and that it is time to

defend it with all the arrows in our quiver. A sustained effort has to be made to eliminate the self-imposed limitations on US capabilities—that is, the use of military mobile training teams (MTTs) to support beleaguered friendly governments and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, which have been used to bring personnel of friendly armed forces to this country.

The absence of a national commitment to respond to the "continuing" conflict spectrum was generally deplored. Several participants explained failure to communicate effectively with the American public on this subject as a reflection of lack of seriousness. The logical corollary of this condition would seem to be a permanently reactive US posture. One speaker attributed this problem to the absence of a clear concept of objectives, or sense of what we wish to accomplish through special operations.

Dr. Tugwell saw merit in the latter point, and noted that in the paper he and Dr. Charters had attempted to key special operations tasks to specific national policies. He agreed that it is important to explain special operations not simply in terms of possibilities, but rather within the framework of what "ought to be done."

It was apparent from the general discussion that, although minor differences in the approaches to definition of special operations existed, most participants were more concerned with the lack of understanding of special operations, both within government as well as in the general public, as a viable instrument of national policy.

CHAPTER TWO

Special Operations in the 1980s: American Moral, Legal, Political, and Cultural Constraints

Paper

William V. O'Brien

Discussants

William Kucewicz
John S. Jenkins

Special operations are carried out under two kinds of normative constraints. First, there are moral and legal constraints on special operations that arise out of traditional American values and normative commitments. These constraints should be observed as a matter of moral and legal obligation. Second, there are other constraints that are peculiar to American politics and culture. Whether these constraints are based on valid moral and legal grounds is often a matter of profound disagreement. They may be what we call "moralistic" and "legalistic." Nevertheless, if such constraints have force in American politics as reflective of American culture, they are objective factors limiting the options of the American government.

It is typical for political-cultural constraints to appropriate the language and prestige of moral-legal constraints, so that the latter are diffused in the popular conventional wisdom. Thus, it became an accepted judgment of American politics and culture that the war in Vietnam was "illegal and immoral," whereas, in fact, it was both legal and moral. However, the fact that the Vietnam War could reasonably be defended as legal and moral did not help much in the face of the consensus that developed to condemn it. Whatever else may be learned from the Vietnam experience, it is

clear that in a free society such as the United States, legal and moral issues, both real and spurious, are central to the successful conduct of a war, intervention, or other extraordinary initiative of the kind involving special operations.[1]

The government of a free society should not undertake such initiatives without being clear as to the moral and legal justifications of the enterprise. A government must also anticipate from the outset the kinds of moral and legal objections, many of them unfounded but potent, that will predictably be raised by critics of special operations. It is impossible to fend off all such criticism with sound moral and legal arguments, since much criticism may be unfair or based on invalid or over-simplified normative concepts; but the government that makes a solid normative case for its actions and perseveres with it has contributed importantly to the success of a controversial operation.

This paper addresses the problem of moral and legal constraints on special operations from the perspectives of just war doctrine and positive international law as interpreted by the United States. The political and cultural restraints will be discussed in terms of their appropriation of moral and legal issues, as well as other issues typically raised when Americans react to special operations. The paper does not attempt to suggest arguments to offset the whole range of political-cultural restraints operative in the field of special operations. It focuses on the role of moral-legal issues as they typically surface in political-cultural trends affecting special operations.

The types of special operations considered in this discussion are based on Drs. Tugwell and Charters' paper.[2] From their enumeration of the kinds of special operations to be discussed, three categories may be distinguished for normative analysis as well as for estimates of typical political-cultural reactions to special operations. They are:

1. Special operations as aid to a friendly government faced with security problems.
2. Special operations as co-belligerent action on behalf of a friendly government engaged in revolutionary war or counterinsurgency.

3. Special operations as independent action involving extraordinary intervention or recourse to armed coercion.

Special operations as aid to friendly governments include political and psychological support; economic and technological assistance; supplying of weapons, transport, and materiel; and covert action. This kind of aid would usually occur in a situation at the brink of or in the early stages of "Phase I" in the Maoist-Ho Chi Minh three-phase model of revolutionary war.[3]

Special operations such as co-belligerency would be likely in the second or third stage of revolutionary war, following the Maoist-Ho Chi Minh model. The intensity of the hostilities would be such that US personnel would be obliged to participate to some degree, if only in self-defense. Additionally, they might be engaged in such active advisory and support roles in combat environments as to make them *de facto* participants in the hostilities.

As in Vietnam, c. 1957–1965, this co-belligerency might very well be undeclared and unacknowledged by the US government.[4] This is itself a major issue, normatively, politically, and culturally. "Belligerency" in this context means actual participation in hostilities rather than a recognized or acknowledged status of belligerency in international or domestic law. In these circumstances, all of the activities previously initiated as aid to the incumbent friendly government would continue and would be supplemented by varying degrees of American participation in the conduct of counterinsurgency or counterterrorist operations.

Special operations as independent action may involve objectives that are uniquely national, for example, a rescue mission to save hostages or stranded nationals; or they may be carried out independently for the purpose of aiding an ally. Measures in the latter category could range from air and sea blockades and interdiction of insurgents' supply lines to other forms of economic coercion, including embargoes, boycotts, freezing of assets, blocking of international credit, and the like. All of these measures might be undertaken, for example, against a country like Cuba to deter and prevent it from assisting insurgents challenging a friendly government in Latin America. Independent special operations, unlike varying degrees of assistance or co-belligerent activity in a foreign

country, stand out clearly as acts of the United States and are particularly subject to critical appraisal.

Moral and Legal Constraints on Special Operations

The categories of moral and legal constraints on special operations are drawn from two sources. The moral perspectives applied are based on the Christian just war doctrine and on its underlying natural law concepts of man, the state, and the international community. The legal perspectives are those of international law as interpreted and applied by the United States. It is well known that there are many other moral and legal approaches that could be used. It is believed that the sources from which this analysis is derived are most consistent with the traditional values of the United States, and most properly applied to a formulation of normative issues to be addressed by the US government and the American people.

Having stated this, it must be acknowledged that some of the normative analyses necessary to evaluate special operations address problems which have not been authoritatively treated in relevant moral and legal doctrines. The very nature of special operations has often discouraged discussion of, much less authoritative pronouncements on, the more controversial aspects of special operations. For this reason, some of the discussion that follows is based on extrapolation from the basic concepts of the Christian just war and American international law doctrines.

While many of the special operations under consideration do not necessarily occur in time of war, they all contribute either to preparations for, deterrence of, or conduct of war. That being the case, it is important to bear in mind the conditions of just war doctrine as supplemented by positive international law.

Just war doctrine begins with a presumption against war. War is an extreme, a last resort when all else has failed. Just war conditions are seen as requirements that must be met to overcome the presumption against war. These conditions are divided into two related parts, the war decision law (*jus ad bellum*) and the war conduct law (*jus in bello*).[5] They may be summarized as follows:

War decision law

1. Competent authority: The war must be authorized by those having the right to commit the state to war.

2. Just cause: The society of the just belligerent must represent and defend the values of fundamental human dignity. There must be a particular just cause necessitating recourse to war. Under modern just war and international law doctrine only individual and collective self-defense is permitted; no offensive wars may be initiated, even for a just cause. In the light of the probability of success, the expected costs and evils of the war should be a proportionate price for the good to be achieved by defending the just cause. All reasonable peaceful alternatives must have been exhausted.

3. Right intention: The use of force must be limited to pursuit of the just cause, untainted by hatred and a desire for vengeance, with a just and lasting peace as the ultimate goal.

War conduct law

1. Proportion: Particular actions should be proportionate to the requirements of legitimate military necessity and should not involve needless suffering or destruction.

2. Discrimination: Direct intentional attacks on noncombatants and nonmilitary targets are prohibited.

3. Positive law of war: The positive international law of war as reflected in convention and custom, general principles of law and legal decisions, and the writings of authoritative publicists are to be observed.

Applied to special operations, these moral-legal constraints fall into categories:

1. A presumption against supporting immoral and/or illegal regimes.

2. A presumption against intervention generally and against intervention in civil wars particularly.

3. A presumption against recourse to armed coercion except in individual and collective self-defense.

4. The regulation of the conduct of armed hostilities by just war and international law rules of warfare.

Nature of Regime Supported

The just war doctrine assumes a just society. While tyrannies are not totally devoid of moral rights, there is little disposition to argue the details of a supposed just cause pursued by a state such as Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Soviet Union. The just cause is not simply a matter of the particular *casus belli*. It involves the deeper question of the good that will result from a given regime taking up arms over that particular cause. Thus, while it may be difficult, it is not impossible to make a case for just use of force by an unjust or dubious regime.

This is a major problem in cases where the US government is engaged in special operations to assist an incumbent government in another country. The kinds of regimes requiring such assistance are usually in trouble or headed for trouble. Some of this trouble may be caused by revolutionary action supported from abroad. But many problems may be endemic and may well result from the inefficiency, corruption, undemocratic character, and repressive behavior of the regime. The specific just cause of preventing the imposition, by revolutionary force supported from abroad, of communist tyranny is eminently valid. However, the preservation in office of an inept, corrupt, undemocratic, repressive regime is not self-evidently a just cause. It may at best be the lesser of two evils. Such a case is approached differently in just war doctrine and in international law.

In a just war analysis, the good of preventing the imposition by force of a communist tyranny would be balanced against both the probable costs of the counterinsurgency effort and the evil of continuing a bad government in power. The latter part of the calculus might be modified to take into account prospects for necessary reform by the incumbent government. Indeed, there might well be no probability of success without substantial reform. Nevertheless, there is a vast difference in the just cause calculus between counterinsurgency intervention on behalf, say, of the present governments of Venezuela or Haiti. If the prospects for counterinsurgency success were dim in any event, a just war analysis might conclude that the costs of supporting a very bad government that was disinclined to reform were disproportionate.

It is always possible, of course, that geopolitical and strategic reasons would preclude conceding success to a communist or communist-supported revolution in a country where the incumbent regime is very bad. In such cases, an irreversible communist takeover would not be strategically acceptable. On the positive side would be the prevention of forcible imposition of a communist regime and the maintenance of US strategic interests critical to other free world countries. On the negative side would be the perpetuation in power of a bad, recalcitrant regime that would continue to mismanage and oppress the country courtesy of US support. In such circumstances, the geopolitical and strategic vital interests would have to be demonstrably great to make a persuasive just cause case.

In international law analyses, these difficulties do not arise. The presumption of sovereign equality of all states supports the acceptance of incumbent regimes as legitimate recipients of assistance.[6] Thus, for purposes of this discussion, there is no international law constraint on assisting an incumbent government, particularly in the early stages of insurgent activity. Certainly international aid would be dramatically reduced if it were confined to regimes that could not plausibly be charged with being inefficient, corrupt, undemocratic, and repressive. The exception is a government which has been singled out for condemnation, censure, or international sanctions by the United Nations (UN) or some regional organization such as the Organization of American States (OAS) or the Organization of African Unity (OAU). While there might be some embarrassment in opposing an international or regional consensus, the United States would, of course, be free to cooperate with or defy such measures without violating international law. Measures short of war under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter could only be ordered by the UN Security Council with the concurrence of the United States. Apart from such a case, there would be no legal obligation to comply with, for example, an embargo enjoined by the UN General Assembly.

It may be concluded that there could well be a moral problem in aiding a regime that was inefficient, corrupt, unrepresentative, and repressive if the costs of so doing were too great when viewed in the light of poor prospects for success and for the regime's re-

form. If the country in question were really vital to US geopolitical/strategic interests, concern over the character of the regime defended might have to be sacrificed to higher national necessities. The geopolitical/strategic arguments would have to be very strong and would have to be considered case by case.

Intervention

Intervention is extraordinary interference in the internal or external affairs of another state in such a manner as to affect its government's exercise of sovereignty and alter the normal relationship between the parties involved.[7] There is a general presumption against intervention in just war doctrine and its underlying political-legal theory and in international law. The heart of just war doctrine is the recognition of the rights and duties of the state to govern and protect its citizens. International law is based on the assumption of sovereign equality of states and the principle of nonintervention is considered a corollary of sovereign equality. There is no developed just war doctrine on intervention generally, only on military intervention as war. Accordingly, this analysis proceeds on the basis of international law concepts against the background of just war assumptions about man, the state, and the international community.

The difficulties of reconciling the theory of absolute sovereignty and equality of states with the realities of disparate power and circumstances extend throughout the range of international interaction. In the kinds of situations calling for special operations, the divergence between nonintervention as a legal principle and the actual practice of states is particularly noticeable. The resulting collision of moral and legal prescriptions with state behavior patterns could easily justify jettisoning the unrealistic nonintervention principle. However, despite the contradictions and hypocrisies intrinsic to the application of the principle of nonintervention, that principle continues to be a major constraint on international behavior generally and on the employment of special operations in particular.

States, particularly communist and Third World states that profess doctrinaire adhesion to the principle of nonintervention, are

not embarrassed to apply it vigorously in international diplomacy and propaganda against states such as the United States, while excusing their own blatant violations of the principle with euphemisms such as "fraternal assistance." These cynical manipulations of the principle of nonintervention often have mischievous effects in Western public opinion and cannot, therefore, be dismissed.

There exists, then, an international law presumption against intervention of any kind. The language prohibiting intervention in international conventions, some of which are adhered to by the United States, and in the frequently invoked international organization declarations is so sweeping that it includes friendly, altruistic intervention. Moreover, in any situation in which an incumbent government is being challenged, it will be alleged that the intervention is being given to support an unrepresentative regime that could not otherwise survive. In such cases, it is also usual to distinguish the incumbent government from the people. Intervention is branded as a violation of the right of self-determination. Accordingly, the most altruistic assistance, for example, humanitarian aid, will be labeled as imperialist, neocolonialist intervention.

In addition to the general principle of nonintervention, there is supposed by some publicists and practitioners to be a presumption against intervention in civil wars. Presumably the original rationale for such a rule, the existence of which today is dubious, was based on the concept of self-determination. A people should have the right to work out, and if necessary fight out, the question of political supremacy in their own country without foreign interference.[8]

There are at least two reasons why this alleged rule of nonintervention in civil war, which would bar a healthy swath of the special operations being discussed here, should not be accepted. First, since modern civil wars have often followed the models of Lenin and Mao rather than those of John Adams or Jefferson Davis, it is difficult for the most scrupulously neutral third party to judge whether a civil war has a popular base or is essentially a conflict between a self-appointed vanguard of the proletariat with a very modest minority power base and an unrepresentative and

ineffectual incumbent regime. It will usually be unwarranted to view civil war in these circumstances as a fair fight of popular factions. No great blow against popular government and self-determination will have been struck if an intervening force props up an incumbent government to which the people are resigned, instead of permitting the triumph of a dedicated communist or other ideological minority that will establish a totalitarian government with more efficient instruments of repression.

Second, in the contemporary period one need not be obsessed with communist threats to notice that a very large number of civil wars are promoted, encouraged, supplied, directed, and sometimes participated in by external communist states, organizations, movements, and individuals. It is a rare revolution or civil war today that occurs in a country so obscure and of so little geopolitical importance that a communist intervention in one or more of its factions will not be forthcoming. In other words, irrespective of whether a state such as the United States will choose to intervene in a civil war today, the odds are overwhelming that there will be communist intervention of some kind. Sometimes it will be of a competetive character between rival communist factions.

In the light of these general remarks about the principle of nonintervention and its particular application to civil wars, the exceptions to the principle should be seriously considered. These exceptions have been established to the satisfaction of some authorities and not of others. It is fair to say that they are recognized by the older advanced industrial states, and that they are viewed as imperialist colonial remnants by many Third World and communist critics.

The exceptions to the principle of nonintervention, particularly as concerns military intervention, recognized by the traditional Western international law authorities are:

1. Counterintervention, usually by invitation.
2. Intervention by treaty right.
3. Intervention to protect the lives and property of nationals and other aliens.
4. Humanitarian intervention to protect a people from its own government.[9]

By applying these exceptions to the general categories of special operations, the following judgments could be supported as matters of just war principles and international law. Assistance to a friendly government faced with security problems that have not yet reached the stage of revolutionary or civil war is not intervention and need not be defended under the exceptions to nonintervention. The government of a sovereign state has the right to ask for and receive such assistance.

Where opposition to a government has been raised to the level of a revolution, for example, Maoist model Phase II or III, military and other assistance to that government constitutes intervention in the war. If there is virtually no significant foreign intervention on behalf of the revolutionaries, a just war and international law approach would consider intervention wrong, a usurpation of the right of the people to determine their own rulers. If the revolutionaries have significant foreign assistance from communist or other totalitarian states, parties, organizations, and individuals, there is a right of counterintervention if the incumbent government requests it. In such cases it will not be unusual to find that the friendly government has already been receiving assistance from an external power such as the United States prior to the escalation of the civil war. An intervening power can move from the posture of giving friendly aid to that of active intervention in what has become a civil war, for example, the United States in Vietnam, c. 1958–1965.[10]

Counterintervention, usually by invitation of the incumbent government, involves two difficult judgment calls. First, it is necessary to establish an antecedent intervention by another foreign power on the revolutionary side. Since the term intervention is imprecise, reflecting arbitrary slices of a continuum of interaction, the question, "Who intervened first and who counterintervened?" is difficult to answer. In a typical counterinsurgency situation both the revolutionaries and the government receive assistance, overt and covert, in an ascending scale, usually from a time well before the clear commencement of armed conflict. The issue then becomes one of thresholds. Which intervening power crossed a major threshold, escalating its contribution to the conflict, thereby justifying a proportionate counterintervention on the other side?

The problem is well demonstrated by the US experience in Vietnam. There are, for example, good grounds for arguing that the North Vietnamese consistently increased the level of their intervention in the civil war in South Vietnam before the United States increased its level of intervention. However, reasonable people differ on this.

Such critical thresholds are recognized, albeit without much precision, in international law. They are called indirect aggression. When the degree of assistance given to a revolutionary movement challenging a foreign government reaches the stage where it is materially the equivalent of an outright armed aggression, it is called indirect aggression. Indirect aggression engenders the right of individual and collective self-defense, which will be discussed in the next section.[11]

The second problem is to defend the authority of the invitation to intervene or counterintervene from the incumbent government. Foreign and domestic critics will argue that the government is unrepresentative, corrupt, and repressive; that it has no legitimacy; and therefore it has no warrant to invite in a foreign power to prop it up.

Michael Walzer goes so far as to argue that to the extent that the revolutionaries are successful in the field they have proved that the incumbent government lacks legitimacy and popular support. Therefore it has no right to invite outside assistance.[12] But given the disparity between success in revolutionary war, which is often achieved by terror, intimidation, and other methods not related to popular support, this argument is not a valid approach to the question of legitimacy of an invited counterintervention. A better view would be that the incumbent regime is the lawful one until it is deposed. And, as long as that regime continues to compete for control of the country, it has the right to invite external assistance to respond to indirect aggression in the form of externally supported civil war.

Intervention by treaty right, as in the case of provisions for US assistance to the government of Panama in defense of the Panama Canal, may be a right and duty.[13] Again, critics will claim a distinction between either the government that made the treaty or the government that invokes it and the people, as allegedly repre-

sented by the revolutionaries. Since the United States makes treaties with governments of sovereign states and not with "the people" of those states, much less with their self-appointed revolutionary leaders, such criticism should be rejected on legal grounds but recognized as a potential problem on political grounds.

In revolutionary situations where the incumbent government does not exercise adequate control, intervention to protect the lives and property of a state's nationals, as well as other endangered aliens, is a traditional moral and legal right. In the post-colonial period, however, it is rarely invoked. The best example would be the 1964 Belgian-US rescue of aliens endangered by the civil war in the Congo.[14] Frequent overuse and abuse of this right in the days of "gunboat diplomacy" gave it an imperialist colonial label in the Third World. Nevertheless, it is still a legitimate and necessary part of international law as interpreted by the United States and other Western states.

Intervention to protect nationals and other aliens is sometimes referred to as "humanitarian intervention." The better usage is to reserve the term "humanitarian intervention" for cases where foreign powers intervene to protect elements of a population from their own government's repressive or even genocidal behavior. This might have been the rationale had there been foreign intervention in Nigeria during the Biafran Civil War, or in East Pakistan during the Bangladesh Civil War. The essence of humanitarian intervention is that it is carried out to protect the indigenous population, not aliens. Perhaps for this reason it is a concept that is not utilized in contemporary examples. No one intervened in the Biafran War. The Vietnamese communists' intervention in Cambodia is so blatantly hegemonial and aggressive that the effects of driving the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime from power do not constitute humanitarian intervention. The patent self-interest involved in all stages of India's intervention in the Bangladesh Civil War vitiate whatever humanitarian concerns motivated Indian behavior. Tanzania seems to have invaded Uganda because of Idi Amin's constant aggressions rather than to relieve the Ugandan people of his repressive policies. There is no good example of contemporary humanitarian intervention.[15]

Armed Coercion

Special operations involving use of armed force fall under the just war doctrine and the international law of war. The relevant moral-legal principles form the war decision law or *jus ad bellum*. This will be discussed in this section, followed by a separate section on the war conduct law, the *jus in bello*, as it applies to special operations.

The war decision component of just war doctrine was outlined above. It is important in a discussion of special operations to emphasize that this war decision doctrine is integrally connected with the war conduct doctrine. The just belligerent must fight justly. Accordingly, any major violations of war conduct law will imperil the just war justification even if the just cause and other conditions are met.

Just war doctrine is not unrealistic. It is possible to fall short of full compliance with its requirements and still have an overall record that meets just war standards. This does not mean, of course, that the failures do not constitute immoral or illegal conduct, only that such conduct in itself may not necessarily bar the claim that just war standards have been met generally. However, repeated, cumulative violations of the war conduct law could well become sufficiently important to bar claim to just war status.[16] This is an important point in special operations involving extraordinary, controversial means not normally used in regular conventional operations.

As outlined above, the contemporary just war law incorporates the war decision law. Both emphasize the right of self-defense as the basis for permissible recourse to armed coercion. Several points should be emphasized about the contemporary concept of self-defense. First, self-defense is collective as well as individual (UN Charter, Article 51).[17] If a state is subject to armed attack by an aggressor, other states may come to its assistance. Both just war doctrine and international law would justify collective defense against indirect as well as direct aggression. This means that if it can be established that a government supported by the United States is confronted by an internal revolution incited and supported as indirect aggression by a foreign power, the United States has the right to join in the defense of that government both against

the indigenous rebels and the foreign aggressor. In such cases, the counterintervention discussed above is justified as collective self-defense.

The crucial material issue in such cases is whether there is in fact sufficient external intervention on the revolutionaries' side to amount to indirect aggression. In my view this was incontestably the case in the Vietnam War from the outset. North Vietnam's direction and support of the Viet Cong insurgency provides a classic case of indirect aggression, to which was added progressive direct aggression by North Vietnamese regular forces. The fact that this indirect aggression was not universally acknowledged in the United States and the free world demonstrates how difficult it is to make this case when a substantial segment of the public is determined to view a conflict as a civil war in which the United States should not be intervening.[18]

A good example of an exaggerated claim of indirect aggression was that made to justify the 1965 United States/Organization of American States intervention in the Dominican Civil War, in which there was no foreign intervention remotely comparable to that of North Vietnam in South Vietnam.[19]

A second point to be emphasized, highly relevant to special operations, is that the right of self-defense is not limited to reaction after an aggressor has struck. Anticipatory self-defense is permitted if circumstances are such that only some kind of preemptive strike will give the potential victims of aggression a reasonable chance to exercise their rights of self-defense (for example, Israel in the 1967 Six Day War and the 1982 war with the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon). The requirement is that there be a clear and present danger of aggression warranting preemptive measures.[20]

War Conduct

The two basic principles of war conduct law, both in just war doctrine and the international law of war, are proportion and discrimination. Proportion refers to the proportion between military means and military ends judged in terms of legitimate military necessity. Disproportionate means which cause unnecessary suffering and destruction are not permitted.[21]

The principle of discrimination or noncombatant immunity prohibits direct, intentional attacks on noncombatants and nonmilitary targets. Since collateral damage is unavoidable in most forms and circumstances of modern warfare, discrimination should be interpreted to mean that collateral damage should not be disproportionate to the military damage, the objective of the military means.[22]

There is a highly developed body of conventional international law of war based on the 1907 Hague Convention IV, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on Armed Conflict, and the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. The 1977 Geneva Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions are under review within the US government prior to possible ratification action.[23]

There are, of course, many issues that could arise in special operations concerning interpretation of the principles of proportion and discrimination as well as the hundreds of specific provisions of the international law of war. This discussion will address briefly typical issues that arise in counterinsurgency and surgical strike operations.

Special operations as part of a co-belligerent role in counterinsurgency will present difficulties in defining and observing the limits of proportionality. These difficulties arise from the differences between the military and political objectives of counterinsurgency war. An action that is completely justified in terms of ordinary military necessity may cause effects that are contrary to the political goals of the war. For example, too many "search and destroy" missions causing too much collateral damage may contribute significantly to the disaffection of the population, a political loss that may outweigh military gains. This is a central dilemma of counterinsurgency. It must be addressed seriously for political-military as well as moral-legal reasons.

Discrimination is likewise a difficult and critical objective in the conduct of counterinsurgency war. Combat may often occur in populated areas and revolutionary forces will routinely hide behind the population. At best, modern firepower tends to be indiscriminate when employed extensively in populated areas. There is no ideal solution to this dilemma but the greatest importance should be attached to the disciplined, limited use of firepower in circumstances where noncombatant deaths and damage are likely.

Among the issues raised by the customary and conventional international law regulating war conduct, the following have been particularly important in wars requiring special operations:

1. Denial of quarter and prisoner of war (POW) status and treatment.
2. Torture and mistreatment of POWs, collective punishment, taking of hostages, terrorism, outrages against personal dignity, slavery, pillage, and threats to do these things.
3. Denial to internees and detainees of reasonable treatment and due process of law.
4. Starvation of civilians as a method of combat.
5. Forced movement of civilians.
6. Use of chemical-biological weapons.[24]

The key to the issues relating to captured enemy military personnel and to civilian internees and detainees is that they usually will be in the custody of the incumbent government. However, responsibility for compliance with just war and international law standards is shared by the United States as a matter of morality and of law.[25] This is also very definitely a responsibility that will be scrutinized on the domestic and international political scene and in public opinion forums. Many of the issues are obscured by the fact that in a civil war the opposing parties do not always recognize the relevance or binding character of international law, claiming direct domestic jurisdiction over nationals of the state. The best rule is simply stated: observe the highest practicable standards of just war and international law irrespective of the legal status of participants in or victims of the conflict. That is good morality and law, good policy and public relations.

A brief set of prescriptions relating to these issues would require the following:

1. All fighting personnel should be permitted to surrender (quarter) and be given the equivalent of the basic POW treatment required by international law.[26]
2. Torture should be prohibited effectively, in interrogation or any other circumstances. The other practices mentioned in 2 above are not justified by legitimate military necessity and have been

repeatedly shown to cause more harm than good in counterinsurgency operations.[27]

3. Civilian internees and detainees should be given treatment commensurate with minimal international standards as prescribed for the protection of civilians in international law.[28]

4. Starvation, as a result of systematic destruction of crops and food sources or interdiction of food supplies, should not be used as a method of combat.[29]

5. Relocation of civilians should be done only for reasons of military necessity and for their protection. Adequate facilities must be provided for them.[30]

6. Use of nonlethal chemicals, for example, riot control agents and herbicides, should be avoided as a method of combat. Use of riot control agents in civil disturbances is permissible.[31]

Generally, reprisals involving use of the means discussed above and other means prohibited by international law should not be permitted, even as retaliation in kind.[32]

Special operations in surgical strikes (for example, rescue missions) are a special case. Three considerations may support exceptions to the normal moral and legal constraints on such operations. First, they are discrete and, accordingly, do not present the problem of cumulative violations of just war international law standards. Second, they may be presumed to be justified by a high and urgent necessity that may require sacrifice of other values such as some of the normal moral-legal constraints. Third, as a practical matter, surgical operations may be subject to intrinsic limitations rising out of the capabilities of the force and the circumstances of its deployment. It may not be possible to give quarter, detain, or care for prisoners and civilian detainees. An argument may be made that torture in exceptional circumstances may be required to obtain vital information from prisoners or detainees. Many innocent lives and the success of the mission may depend on such information being obtained in time. Civilians may have to be relocated forcibly, abruptly, and under harsh conditions. The use of nonlethal riot control agents may be justified. The best way to evaluate such issues would be to make a comprehensive just war analysis in which all of the potentially im-

moral and illegal actions were included in the evil effects of the operation, to be balanced against the just cause in the light of the probability of success. It might be possible to come out with a legitimate finding of overall proportionality, even though a number of clearly immoral or illegal actions were contemplated from the outset and carried out in the operation.

Political and Cultural Constraints on Special Operations

The political and cultural constraints on US special operations will be considered jointly in terms of the four categories addressed in the moral-legal analysis. While there are other political-cultural issues, those that focus on the moral-legal issues are the most central.

Nature of Regime Supported

A democratic society is a critical society. It criticizes and questions everything, including its government and itself. Naturally, a democratic society will question the character of a foreign government that is receiving extraordinary assistance from the United States. The critical, questioning process will usually be exacerbated by unresponsive and hostile reactions from the government receiving US assistance. The kinds of regimes supported in special operations are usually vulnerable to criticism, accustomed to suppressing opposition and debate, and inclined towards a siege mentality because of their dire circumstances. It should never be forgotten that the simultaneous pursuit of nation-building and of counterinsurgency in the face of a destructive, protracted revolutionary war is a *tour de force* that few governments of developing countries can conduct successfully.

This is all part of the problem of special operations involving assistance to or co-belligerency with foreign governments. It is the task of US decisionmakers to determine whether the government to be aided can stand the scrutiny of the American people, starting with the media. If it cannot, it is hardly relevant that the government's "image" is unfair. What was said about the morality of aiding bad governments may be repeated with respect to the prudence of aiding governments that are perceived by the American

public as bad. There is no point in extending aid to such a government unless some overriding strategic justification can be made acceptable to the American people.

Intervention

Intervention is considered as aberrant in domestic politics as it is considered extraordinary and potentially illegal in international politics and law. Unimpressed with the ubiquity of intervention in international politics, the domestic front tends to see intervention as an unwarranted interference in other peoples' business. There is also an abiding conviction in the American society that US intervention—whether economic or technical assistance or outright military co-belligerency—sacrifices resources that ought to be exclusively devoted to the American people and their domestic problems. Every time that there is pressure for a cut in domestic spending, the rumor circulates that "our money" has gone to an undeserving foreign country, notwithstanding the fact that foreign assistance of all kinds has always amounted to tiny percentages of the budget. So there is a political-cultural presumption against US intervention.

Intervention in civil war often arouses American sympathies for the underdog, invariably the revolutionaries, and insistence that the foreigners should fight it out for themselves. US government claims that revolutionaries are being directed and assisted by communist states and agents have, in recent times, usually been met with skepticism. There is, moreover, little spontaneous interest in protecting foreign populations from the imposition of Gulag societies. Senator J. William Fulbright's dictum that a jungle that has gone communist is still a jungle is widely accepted. All of these political-cultural propensities tend to be enhanced by the media's coverage of revolutionary wars in countries in which the United States is aiding the incumbent government.[33]

The skepticism of American society with respect to intervention in foreign civil wars is not limited to cases of Third World countries where residual ethnocentric prejudices play a part. The recent failure of most of the American public, but particularly those constituencies adversely affected, to support Solidarity and the Polish

people against their repressive communist government and its Soviet overlords shows that there is a reluctance to sacrifice and to become involved even on behalf of a nation with which the American people identify strongly. Thus, various forms of economic coercion theoretically available to support special operations may not be feasible because important domestic constituencies will not tolerate loss of business profits, markets, and jobs.

Armed Coercion

In the post-Vietnam era there is a strong political-cultural presumption against the United States taking an active, co-belligerent part in a foreign counterinsurgency operation or revolutionary war. To start with, there is great skepticism about the threat to the United States implied by a revolutionary communist victory in another country. Whether this skepticism will vanish if there are communist revolutionaries in Tijuana remains to be seen.

Second, there is no sufficient political and cultural will to resist threats unless they are more "clear and present" than are most of the threats posed by the success of communist or communist-supported revolutions in the Third World, even in Latin America. Thus, the combination of the tendency to ignore or discount the threat to US and free world security from successful communist revolutions in Third World countries and the reluctance of the American people to face and resist anything short of the most undeniable threat has produced a political-cultural climate hostile to special operations.

This climate is reinforced by two other strains in contemporary American political and cultural life. These are the anti-war/anti-military and the anti-economic imperialism strains. The experience of the Vietnam War and its impact on the whole society, not just elites, has been profound. This has been in large measure the result of television coverage of wars and revolutions which brings their bloody and tragic results to every man, woman, and child. The result is a violent reaction against war, any war, but particularly against wars in which the United States and its allies are involved. This was bitterly demonstrated in the reaction to Israel's war in Lebanon in the summer of 1982. Wars between states not related to the United States often are largely ignored.[35]

An unrelenting anti-militarism also persists in the United States. It is neither so pervasive nor so vicious as it was during the Vietnam War and immediately thereafter. However, any US involvement in military operations not occasioned by a direct attack on the United States will predictably engender anti-militarist sentiments, particularly in the media.[36]

Anti-war/anti-military attitudes are closely related to simplistic economic explanations of US foreign and defense policy. A Marxist-Leninist line regarding the inevitable imperialist policies of capitalist states in the grip of historical contradictions is well represented in contemporary American universities and other centers of elite formation and expression. There are those who believe, for example, that the United States fought the long, costly war in Vietnam for economic, imperialist reasons. It is impossible to imagine any special operations scenario that is not vulnerable to charges that the real rationale for the action is US economic imperialism.[37]

The upshot is that the odds are against intervention generally, and military intervention in particular, in the battle of opinion on the home front. Modern history has shown that interventionary wars by Western powers tend to be lost on the home front.

War Conduct

Political-cultural reactions to the conduct of a counterinsurgency war tend to exaggerate violations of the principles of proportion and discrimination. The anti-war bias at work in public opinion, especially elite opinion, raises a heavy presumption against the proportionality of any substantial collateral damage caused by military operations. This tendency is further exacerbated by the impact of television. A reasonable person might concede that some collateral damage is inevitable in a battle for a population center. But if the same person is shown on television the mangled bodies of the victims of the "collateral damage," as well as the weeping mothers holding their dead or wounded children in front of the ruins of their homes, the image of the war will be of disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks on innocent people. This is multiplied and magnified by dozens or even

hundreds of similar viewings of similar scenes on television and in newspapers, often further accentuated by media comments.

The result of this tendency in public reactions to a war covered by the media is to establish a standard of behavior with respect to the observance of the principles of proportion and discrimination that is utterly unrealistic. This tendency is pernicious for several reasons. It undercuts the war effort. It ignores the casualties and risks that US and friendly government forces are taking in the conduct of the war. Indeed, it is entirely possible that US and friendly government casualties and risks in a joint counterinsurgency war may have resulted from efforts to avoid collateral damage that were frustrated by the enemy's deliberate policy of hiding behind innocent people. Thus, the women crying in front of the ruins of their homes with their children in their arms may be only one sad part of the story. It is very possible that the reason the women's homes were in ruins and their children killed was that the revolutionaries were using their homes for strong points from which they took the lives of many friendly government and US troops before it was destroyed.

Another pernicious consequence of unfair and unrealistic criticism of counterinsurgency forces on grounds of disproportionate and indiscriminate measures is that, over time, the military may become hardened and immune to such criticism and reduce or discontinue whatever efforts have been made to observe just war and international law standards.

All of the law of war issues identified as particularly salient in special operations have important, negative repercussions in political-cultural reactions at home. Denial of POW status and adequate POW treatment is a favorite subject for media investigative reporting. It fits into the image of the incumbent regime as totalitarian, ignoring the fact that many of the POWs and internees/detainees are genuinely dangerous people who are important to the revolutionary movement. Torture is the single favorite subject of media muckraking, followed closely by "tiger cage" atrocity stories about outrages against human dignity in the regime's prisons.[38] Attacks on the revolutionaries' leadership and infrastructure, including terrorist or alleged terrorist methods used as anti-terror instruments, are generally viewed with repugnance on

the American home front, as the media and anti-war movement campaign against the Phoenix operation in Vietnam demonstrated.[39]

Starvation as a means of combat is another source of popular revulsion in domestic and world opinion.[40] Forced movement of civilians, often genuinely required for their own safety or because of legitimate military necessity, is the source of endless criticism, culminating typically in congressional investigations.[41] The use of chemicals is at the top of the list of means that may be theoretically justified but which place such an onus on the user as to make their utility questionable.[42]

The unfairness and irresponsibility of much of the reporting and bias engendered by these subjects does not alter their significance politically and culturally. If the moral-legal prescriptions against these kinds of activities do not recommend themselves to counterinsurgents on normative grounds, the mischief that even vague reports of such behavior causes should argue for their avoidance on political and cultural grounds.

Justification of Special Operations

Justification of special operations should be based on honesty and candor insofar as possible. The US government may not be able to explain or justify all that it is doing, but it should refrain from misrepresenting its actions.

Nature of Regime Supported

With respect to the character of the regime supported, the US position should be that the incumbent government is the best presently available and that support for it is vital in order to prevent the imposition of a communist or communist-supported government on the people. It should be emphasized that, while Third World regimes come and go, communist takeovers tend to be irreversible. Efforts at reform by the incumbent government should be explained but not over-sold. When necessary, the American public may have to be told that US interests cannot permit a country to fall to communist forces and that the Monroe, Truman, Eisenhower, and other doctrines are not dead.

Intervention

The key to justification of intervention is a persuasive case for characterizing the action as counterintervention. It must be established that the civil war is not a domestic "fair fight" but a rigged conflict controlled by foreign forces that have "exported" the revolution. Emphasis should be placed on the coercive and repressive measures employed by the revolutionaries and their foreign allies to force the cooperation of the people.

American interest in the intervention should be explained explicitly and persuasively. The issue should be US and free world security, rather than whether a particular regime in a foreign country should be maintained in power.

Armed Coercion

The best argument for direct US participation in a shooting war is that it may preempt other, more difficult wars that would have to be fought under less favorable conditions.

War Conduct

The basis for justification of measures employed by US and indigenous government forces in the conflict should be established by making comprehensive, realistic provisions for the enforcement of the international laws of war and the observance of appropriate rules of engagement. If that is done, publicity should be given to efforts to apply the rules of engagement and to ensure compliance with international law.[43] And along with that publicity effort, the violations of the laws of war by the enemy should be made known at every opportunity. If all these recommended measures are taken honestly and efficiently, it will be much more difficult to brand the US and allied forces with the kinds of charges that emanate from what Guenter Lewy has called the "war crimes industry" that operates in American and world opinion.[44]

In conclusion, it must be acknowledged that the odds are against public acceptance today of special operations in most scenarios. Surgical operations, such as rescue missions, are an exception to this estimate. They will, in any event, tend to be carried out so

quickly and discreetly that criticism of them will be belated. The real problems of ensuring compliance with moral-legal standards and coping with political-cultural objections in the course of special operations are that when they are prolonged, particularly in counterinsurgency efforts, they will often be *very* prolonged. Long duration of special operations permits more time for criticism and opposition to accumulate force. It also means that the perception of stalemate or defeat is likely. It is a hard, but true, fact of life that success overcomes a lot of moral, legal, political, and cultural scruples; stalemate or defeat turns them into irresistible political trends that lose wars on the home front. It is often impossible to speed up the process of winning conflicts in which the US special operations occur or to guarantee their success. The best line for the American government to follow in such circumstances is one of conscientious adherence to its own moral-legal traditions, honesty in its pronouncements on the course of the conflict, and steadfastness in its pursuit of the goals that justify US involvement.[45]

Notes

1. The influence of moral and legal issues in the Vietnam War is emphasized in the most comprehensive and authoritative book yet to appear on that war, Guenter Lewy's *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), particularly Chapters 7-11, pp. 223-417. These issues are also dealt with in William V. O'Brien, *The Conduct of Just and Limited War* (New York: Praeger, 1981), chapters 5 and 11, pp. 91-126; 257-76.
2. See Tugwell and Charters Paper in chapter 1.
3. See Samuel B. Griffith, ed. & trans., *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961); Sir Robert Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969* (New York: Taplinger, 1970).
4. See Lewy's account of the evolution of US involvement in Vietnam, Chapter 1, pp. 3-41. Table 1-1 gives statistics on US personnel, casualties, aircraft lost etc., 1960-64, p. 24.
5. For an overview of modern just war doctrine see O'Brien, *Conduct of Just*

and Limited War, Chapters 2 and 3, pp. 13-70.
6. "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all of its Members." United Nations Charter, Article 2 (1). This principle and its consequences for the principle of nonintervention is discussed in William V. O'Brien, *U.S. Military Intervention : Law and Morality* (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University; *The Washington Papers,* No. 68, 1979), pp. 15-25.
7. O'Brien, *Conduct of Just and Limited War,* 167-174. See also authorities cited ibid. chapter 7, notes 22-39, pp. 405-7.
8. On intervention in civil wars see Wolfgang Friedmann, *The Changing Structure of International Law* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); Tom J. Farer, "Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Intervention in Civil Strife," in *The Vietnam War and International Law,* Richard A. Falk, ed. 4 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969-76) 2:1089-1115; John Norton Moore, "Intervention: A Monochromatic Term for a Polychromatic Reality," in Falk, *The Vietnam War and International Law,* vol. 2:1061-88; Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic, 1977), pp. 98-101.
9. On the traditional exceptions to the principle of nonintervention see O'Brien, *Conduct of Just and Limited War,* pp. 170-174, and authorities cited therein.
10. See Lewy, *America in Vietnam,* pp. 3-41.
11. On indirect aggression see William V. O'Brien, *The Law of Limited International Conflict* (Washington, DC: Institute of World Polity, Georgetown University, April 1965), pp. 50-53. This study was prepared under Contract SD 179 DOD for the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).
12. See Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars,* pp. 98-101.
13. See Panama Canal Treaty of September 7, 1977, entered into force October 1, 1979, Article IV; also Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty, effected by an Exchange of Notes at Panama, October 1, 1979, entered into force October 1, 1979.
14. On the Stanleyville, Congo, Belgian-US intervention see Marjorie M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law,* 15 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968-73) 5:475-76.
15. On humanitarian intervention see O'Brien, *Conduct of Just and Limited War,* p. 173, and authorities cited therein.
16. See the discussion of the relationships and comparative weights of the just war conditions in ibid., pp. 35-36.
17. UN Charter Article 51 provides:

> Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

18. On North Vietnam's indirect and direct aggression against South Vietnam see Lewy, *America in Vietnam,* pp. 3-41; O'Brien, *Conduct of Just and Limited*

War, Chapter 5, pp. 91-126. The official US position is stated in US Department of State, "Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam," (Memorandum of legal adviser of Department of State, March 4, 1966) *Department of State Bulletin* 54(1966):474-89. A typical example of the rejection of the US legal justification for participation in the Vietnam War is Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam, *In the Name of America* (Annandale, VA: Turnpike Press, 1968).
19. On the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 see O'Brien, *U.S. Military Intervention : Law and Morality*, pp. 39-61, and authorities cited therein.
20. On Israel's anticipatory self-defense action in the June 1967 Six Day War, see William V. O'Brien, "International Law and the Outbreak of War in the Middle East," *Orbis* 11(1967):692-723. On the 1982 fighting in Lebanon see William V. O'Brien, "Israel in Lebanon," *Middle East Review* 15 (Fall 1982): 5-14.
21. On proportionality in the war-conduct law see O'Brien, *Conduct of Just and Limited War* pp. 38-42, and authorities cited therein: *AFP 110-31*, 1-5-6.
22. On the principle of discrimination and its interpretation see O'Brien, *Conduct of Just and Limited War* pp. 42-56 and authorities cited therein: *AFP 110-31*, 1-6, 5-1-14.
23. Geneva Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), December 12, 1977 (UN Doc. A/2/144 [1977]); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), December 12, 1977 (UN Doc. A/32/144 [1977]).
24. I treat these issues in the light of established conventional and customary international law as well as of the as-yet-unratified 1977 Geneva Protocols I and II in *Conduct of Just and Limited War*, pp. 59-60 and 182-201 (other issues listed).
25. Ibid., pp. 110-114, treats the issue of US responsibility for South Vietnamese treatment of POWs and detainees.
26. Ibid., pp. 184-89.
27. Ibid., pp. 189-92, discusses the difficult issue of torture, prohibited but not defined in common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
28. Ibid., p. 196-97.
29. On the difficult issue of starvation as a method of warfare see Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, pp. 160-75; O'Brien, *Conduct of Just and Limited War*, pp. 197-98.
30. On relocation of civilians in Vietnam see Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, pp. 25, 65, 107-14, 152, 226-30; O'Brien, *Conduct of Just and Limited War*, pp. 115-18. See ibid., pp. 198-201.
31. On the status of chemical warfare (CW) generally and nonlethal means in particular see ibid., pp. 59-60; on use of CW in Vietnam see ibid., pp. 105-10; Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, pp. 248-266.
32. On war conduct law concerning reprisals see O'Brien, *Conduct of Just and Limited War*, pp. 67-70; regarding reprisals in revolutionary/counterinsurgency war, p. 203. Note that a large number of categories of possible reprisals are specifically prohibited by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Geneva Protocols I and II.
33. For examples of the substance and impact of media coverage on the Vietnam

War see Don Oberdorfer, *Tet!* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971); Philip Braestrup, *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington* 2 vols. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview/Freedom House, 1977); Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, pp. 433-36.
34. See Lewy's reflections on the nature and significance of opposition to the Vietnam War, ibid., pp. 426-41.
35. See Joshua Muravchik, "Misreporting Lebanon," *Policy Review*, pp. 11-66.
36. See Ernest W. Lefever, *TV and National Defense : An Analysis of CBS News, 1972-73* (Boston, VA: Institute for American Strategy, 1974).
37. See the revisionist views of William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (rev. ed.; New York: Dell, 1962); Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War:The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York: Random House, 1968).
38. On media and anti-war group accusations of inhuman treatment of POWs and detainees/internees in Vietnam see Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, pp. 307-24.
39. On the Phoenix program see Lewy's account, ibid., pp. 279-85; William Colby and Peter Forbath, *Honorable Men* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), pp. 266-70, 289, 311-12, 347-48, 428.
40. On starvation as a method of warfare see O'Brien, *Conduct of Just and Limited War*, pp. 197-98; David P. Forsythe, *Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 184-96; John L. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 238-52, 334-39, 376.
41. See, for example, the critical treatment of South Vietnamese forcible population transfers in Henri Meyrowitz, "The Law of War in the Vietnamese Conflict," in Falk, *The Vietnam War and International Law* 2:568-70. Lewy explains the difficulties of assessing such charges in *America in Vietnam*, pp. 317-21.
42. On criticism of US use of nonlethal riot control and herbicide agents in Vietnam see Wil D. Verwey, *Riot Control Agents and Herbicides in War* (Leiden, Netherlands : Sijthoff, 1977), pp. 41-43, 66, 73-154; Richard A Falk, "Methods and Means of Warfare 1," in *Law and Responsibility in Warfare: The Vietnam Experience*, ed. Peter D. Trooboff (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), pp. 45-47.
43. On the importance of good, well-publicized, seriously implemented Rules of Engagement see Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, pp. 233-242; O'Brien, *Conduct of Just and Limited War*, pp. 309-13.
44. Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, pp. 311-21.
45. Domestic political constraints on US military intervention, including special operations, are reflected in the 1973 War Powers Resolution and Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981. However, as US practice from the *Mayaguez* and Iranian hostage rescue expeditions to the deployment of the Marines in Lebanon and of US forces in Grenada have demonstrated, the potency of these legal provisions lies in their political rather than in their legal force. Historical experience shows that such legal provisions will seldom prevent a President from exercising his foreign policy and Commander-in-Chief powers in whatever manner he determines to be necessary in the national interest. See War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. 1, No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973); The President, *Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, "United States Intelligence Activities," Federal Reg-*

ister 43 (No. 235, December 4, 1981); President Nixon's veto message of October 24, 1973, "War Powers Veto Text," *Congressional Quarterly* 31(October 27, 1973):2855-56; Statutory Comments, "The War Powers Resolution: Statutory Limitation on the Commander-In-Chief," *Harvard Law Journal on Legislation* 11(1974):181-204.

Discussion

Mr. William Kucewicz

I would like to concentrate on Professor O'Brien's analysis of the political and cultural constraints on special operations. I was struck particularly by his observation that a democratic society is a critical society, which criticizes and questions everything, including its government and itself.

That penchant for self-criticism goes to the heart of political and cultural constraints on special operations, as well as on most other foreign policy issues. That critical aspects of American society and polity provides us with a great deal of inherent strength, such as making us choose with care among foreign policy options, restraining any potential adventurism abroad, and providing a tremendous physical and emotional resource when an effort is made to mobilize the collective will of the American people. Self-criticism, however, can be carried too far in a nation, just as in an individual. Too much self-criticism can be debilitating, destructive, even suicidal. Unfortunately, some members of America's elite, particularly in the news media and in academia, have created a profession based on a super-critical assessment of American policy and interests.

We have seen this most recently in the attack on President Reagan's approach toward arms control. The United States is being blamed for inflexibility and bellicosity, but few people question the Soviet Union's record of duplicity on compliance with existing arms control treaties. We see a similar pattern of super-criticism

with regard to our policies in Latin America. There are critics aplenty of our support of El Salvador, but there is relatively little criticism of Soviet-backed Cuban activities there or in Nicaragua.

Too frequently, this intense self-criticism implies a willingness to overlook or even countenance the transgressions of hostile powers encroaching upon interests important to the United States and the rest of the free world. We have seen this in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, and now in Latin America. Often, these Soviet-supported activities are defined in such jargon as "socialist revolution," "liberation movements," and "people's armies." Such terms may make these transgressions palatable to members of America's elites, but they certainly are no justification for disavowing or relinquishing our own foreign policy interests.

Alexander Haig, then Secretary of State, focused on the same theme in an eloquent speech in Berlin in 1981, entitled "The Democratic Revolution and Its Future." Secretary Haig noted the double standard developing in the West toward appropriate norms of international behavior. On the one hand there is the super-critical standard applied to those who cherish diversity, tolerate dissent, and seek peaceful change. The other is a more tolerant standard, and is applied to those who abhor diversity, suppress dissent, and promote violent change. Secretary Haig went on to say that, under this double standard, democracies are impugned and criticized for the least questionable behavior, while forgiving and accepting eyes are turned toward their adversaries. By way of illustration, he raised the issue of "yellow rain," that is, the use of biochemical warfare by the Soviet Union and its allies in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. He revealed for the first time that the United States possessed proof of the use of these deadly toxins, which are banned by international treaties. Secretary Haig's observations on these double standards were prescient; because even many months after his first revelation about yellow rain, there are still many skeptics who reject the evidence and maintain that the Soviets are not violating these agreements.

Such a tendency does not mean that we will be incapacitated. However, it will require a determined effort on the part of the administration to muster popular support and overcome this super-critical attitude. This must include candor, as Professor

O'Brien mentioned. We must be clear and straightforward, and avoid giving ammunition to critics. We must explain again and again the nature of the threat and the rationale for our actions.

Often we have seen efforts that initially had popular support later undermined simply for a lack of adequate follow-up efforts. This is happening now in terms of President Reagan's general approach toward increased arms spending. He had that support when he came into office, but the administration failed to follow up on that theme. And people have simply forgotten about the rationale for increased defense. I think the administration is now trying to recoup its losses. There have been more and more speeches by major members of the administration on the nature of the threat and why the United States requires a military buildup in order to maintain its security.

The necessity for public support raises the problem of secrecy. The intelligence community has an inherent and understandable desire to maintain the security and the secrecy of its sources, particularly its human sources. However, when the President has to make a foreign policy decision, there often comes a time when some of that information has to be made public in order to gain support for the initiative. But where do you draw the line? How much information can be released before you endanger your sources? And if you hold back too much, are you then in jeopardy of losing popular support?

From the standpoint of the nation, this super-critical attitude toward US policy may cause the righteous critics to feel that they are on the side of the angels; but they may end up among the angels a lot sooner than they would like.

Rear Admiral John S. Jenkins, USN (Ret.)

I want to approach this subject from what I admit is a myopic point of view—that of a lawyer.

Our policymakers and those who make the ultimate decision on special operations need to consider first the moral and legal constraints; secondly, the political and cultural constraints.

In my opinion, the first constraint to be considered is the legal constraint. My experience indicates that it is unlikely that we are

going to get political or cultural agreement in our society unless there is at least a general agreement that the course of action upon which we are about to embark is legally acceptable. This is not to suggest that every operation that has a legally supportable basis is going to receive a political-cultural imprimatur. I would suggest rather, that unless there is a legal basis for the operation, it is extremely unlikely that we are going to have the political and cultural approval that we seek.

It also seems to me that it is misleading to suggest that a single determination can be made with respect to moral and legal constraints on special operations. If I were teaching a seminar in jurisprudence, I would agree with Dr. O'Brien on natural law and the fact that our legal system devolves through natural law, and that there is a close relationship between morality and legality. But in the practical world, I think we should separate the two. For example, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a series of decisions, has held that under certain circumstances abortion is legal. It is obvious, however, that there is a serious question with respect to the morality of abortion. As another example, it is my view, based on accepted principles of international law, that possession and storage of nuclear weapons in specific circumstances is perfectly legal. But the action of the Conference of Catholic Bishops in the United States, and the recent action of the Bishops of the Church of England in London, certainly point out that the morality of nuclear weapons is in doubt.

I stress that distinction, which I think for our purposes is significant, between what is legal and what is moral. I suggest that when we address the kind of operations we are talking about here, we first consider the question of legality.

We must also make the distinction between domestic law and international law. The basic question ought to be the question of domestic law. If you are found in violation of a tenet or principle of international law, you may be in some trouble. If you are found in violation of certain principles and tenets of domestic law, you may go to jail. Thus the first question to be considered is how the operation measures up in terms of domestic law. When we plan and execute an operation, the "threshold" question must be, how does it comport with domestic law? The next question to be an-

swered is, what principles of international law are involved?

The War Powers Resolution is the law of the land. We may disagree with it, and in my former incarnation I found myself disagreeing with it, but it is the law of the land. Dr. O'Brien feels more strongly than I that there is a serious question of its constitutionality. I would say that it is constitutional, and that we must plan our operations and conduct our operations in accordance with the provisions of the War Powers Resolution. As members of the Executive branch, we must also take heed of Executive Order 12333, which is the policy guidance of the President and Commander-in-Chief with respect to the intelligence community.

This does *not* suggest that lawyers ought to have a veto over any operation. But it is our responsibility as lawyers to provide to the decisionmaker (whether at the National Command Authority level or somewhere down the chain of command) our very best analysis of the domestic and international law applicable to the situation. Once that analysis is before the decisionmaker, only he can decide where he goes next. It is totally appropriate that he consider the morality and the political, cultural, and other aspects of the decision he is about to make. He may decide not to act on the basis of any one of those. But I reiterate, the "threshold" question to be answered is that of legality. It needs to be answered both in terms of domestic law and international law. A system which does not address that "threshold" question is going to find itself in serious trouble.

General Discussion

In his preliminary remarks, Dr. O'Brien stressed the importance of understanding the values that infuse American society, and the threat posed to those values in the world today. After summarizing the restraints—moral and legal, as well as political and cultural—which affect our ability to defend our values, Dr. O'Brien acknowledged the difficulty faced by US officials in applying certain of these considerations to special operations. As regards existing legal restraints, he contended that the continuing dialogue between the Presidency and the Congress will probably result in a workable pattern of cooperation that will facilitate implemen-

tation. In this context he stressed the necessity of a central, unified organization and command structure, without which there cannot be continuity of policy or method.

Moral issues will inevitably emerge in situations where special operations seem to be indicated. While they can be abused and made into moralistic or legalistic issues, Dr. O'Brien argued that they may still be valid moral issues, and as such they have to be dealt with. Some may be intractable. These must be confronted honestly, and their political and cultural importance must be recognized. Unless this is done, it will be impossible to sell our case to the American public.

The first point made in the general discussion was that the political and cultural climate underlying public acceptability of special operations is a changeable thing. Successful operations are likely to evoke more positive public attitudes. Unfortunately, the public has witnessed little to arouse its enthusiasm. The Iran rescue attempt is a notable case in point.

It was also agreed that the public needs more information than it receives concerning the nature of our adversaries. A greater awareness of our involvement in a struggle for cultural survival over and above the threat of Soviet military hardware would contribute to a more favorable climate for special operations. One speaker felt that this in effect was the crux of both the legal and moral issue.

The super-critical attitude described by Mr. Kucewicz was explained as characteristic of the "heroic wimp"—the man who imagines himself crusading and fighting for something important against a malicious adversary, but not wanting to do anything dangerous. Such inaction is then justified by assessing our own Western society as incorrigibly evil, which in turn makes it easy to ignore the behavior of the Soviets. Mr. Kucewicz took exception to this approach. He saw the problem as deriving essentially from a certain intellectual paralysis, possibly stemming from the Judeo-Christian ethic and an excessive sense of guilt concerning our own actions. Thus we tend to be apologetic about capitalism, on grounds that it is selfish, and should not be imposed on other countries. The fact is that the socialist economic model does not work; the only countries around the world that prosper are the ones that follow a capitalistic system.

Mr. Kucewicz also addressed the earlier point about making clear the nature of the Soviet regime. He cited this as the reason why *The Wall Street Journal* had focused for the last 18 months on the yellow rain issue. It was a case of Soviet violation of two of the most widely recognized international treaties—a case of using truly hideous weapons. This, from an arms control point of view, highlighted the obvious question of whether we dare trust the Soviets to abide by Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), or any other agreements, when we know they are violating the ban on chemical warfare. Mr. Kucewicz held that the present administration has not done enough to publicize the situation—probably because the administration itself is still wrestling with the dichotomy. How, after all, do you negotiate a new arms control agreement with a country you know is violating existing ones?

Special operations, Mr. Kucewicz noted parenthetically, have not helped much on yellow rain. Although the reports go back to 1975, it took 6 years to determine what the active agent was that was killing people. In some quarters, of course, there is still criticism on grounds that there is not enough evidence. People want to see a canister, or a shell, and to know exactly where it was manufactured. One would think it might have been possible to go into Laos where the weapons were stored and bring out specimens—a suitable task for special operations. But we lacked the will to do it. The administration hesitated to sound propagandistic, or to appear confrontational. Finally, in November 1982, Secretary of State George P. Shultz sent a report to Congress, and the State Department held a press briefing to show some of the hard evidence. Skepticism on the part of the press evaporated.

On the legal and moral questions, another speaker cited a symposium 3 years earlier in which DOD was involved, together with a group of international lawyers. The subject was the rules of land warfare as applied to guerrilla warfare. The speaker was present and described his own experience in the Philippines during World War II, when military expediency and survival resulted in many actions that were both morally and legally questionable. The speaker made the point that in guerrilla warfare these problems are common; they are intimately linked to questions of survival, whatever their legal or moral implications. What then are to be

the instructions and guidance given to persons engaged in guerrilla warfare or other forms of special operations?

In response, Dr. O'Brien reiterated a point made earlier—that there are many complex questions for which there are no precise answers. Exceptional cases exist in any body of law, even the most advanced, and international law is a very primitive body of law, particularly with respect to the conduct of military operations. But it would be helpful if people could separate the hard cases of overriding necessity from the routine things. For example, if torture is the only way to get information that is absolutely indispensable for a mission, many of us might agree, *ex post facto*, that it was necessary. That is a different proposition from routinely torturing every prisoner of war over a 15-year period. Not all prisoners have critical information. There is a great difference between special cases, particular cases, and a routine amoral approach to things. The distinction, of course, is often a hard one to make.

Another aspect of the problem, Dr. O'Brien noted, is that there are many things that are illegal and immoral, and that are also both stupid and counterproductive in terms of military and political objectives. My Lai did more "to lose" the Vietnam War than 75 tactical defeats which never occurred. In the first place, from the military point of view it was an aberration, the absolute opposite of legitimate military necessity. On the other hand, the point made earlier is important. Special situations will inevitably arise when things seem to be called for on the part of heroic individuals that run counter to our convictions, our normative restraints. But these can be narrowed down considerably, and the generality of operations probably can conform to legal and moral constraints.

Next, a question was raised regarding the treatment of guerrilla insurgents under international agreements currently being negotiated. Dr. O'Brien noted that two Geneva protocols of 1977 are now under consideration within the US government. The first is on international conflict. The second is on conflicts of an internal nature, and it reflects the double standard of Third World nations. It excludes all serious limitations on suppression of revolutionaries. Many regimes, having achieved power through revolution, are not interested in further challenges to their authority. They see no point in giving any kind of protection to peo-

ple rebelling against their regime. Thus the second Geneva Protocol has no provision for prisoners of war.

O'Brien noted that the treatment of adversaries is something we have to address in our own planning for operations. His recommendation is to treat them decently, as prisoners of wars. On the other hand, some of these people may indeed be terrorists, activists in a foreign-directed movement. The indigenous government we are collaborating with may have good reason to want to treat them as terrorists, as criminals, rather than as enemy soldiers.

Dr. O'Brien was then asked if he could define more precisely the moral grounds for intervention by the United States in a Third World country. It was noted that the feeling is already widespread in Europe and in the United States that by propping up Third World dictators, one is in fact driving the people toward communism as an alternative to the ruling dictators.

The crux of it, as seen by Dr. O'Brien, on either moral or legal grounds is that a plausible argument can be made for counterintervention against an antecedent intervention by foreign powers or forces that have, as it were, tipped the scale in an essentially domestic strife, thus giving the insurgents an unfair advantage. He noted that this was clearly the case in Vietnam, but was not so in the Dominican Republican affair in 1965.

On the other hand, Dr. O'Brien observed, it might be necessary under certain conditions to intervene in the Dominican Republic, and such an operation could be justified under the Monroe Doctrine. But if the essence of the argument is that we are counter-intervening in an attempt to balance out the right of an incumbent government to handle civil strife aided by indirect aggression from outside, it is essential to make a plausible case to the public. The classical model for this, notwithstanding its discreditation in American history, is North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. Rarely has there been such a clear-cut case of external aggression that warranted our support for the side under attack.

Reference was then made to the British experience with its Special Air Service (SAS) regiment, particularly during its early days. The critical problem of that time was to define the role and the objectives of the SAS. This had to be done by the SAS itself, because the Ministry of Defense was busy doing other things. A re-

tired British officer noted that the toughest thing that the British SAS has ever done was in marketing the concept to Whitehall and to Britain as a whole. That took 11 years. Americans face a similar problem today. The concept of special operations as required today, must be marketed and sold—in a subtle way, perhaps—to generals, admirals, cabinet members, congressmen, and ambassadors. Political leaders must be persuaded. This is not easy to accomplish, but it can be done if approached systematically over the long term. The free world needs an American capability in special operations geared realistically to today's requirements.

There was no dissent on the need for an effective capability, and for its judicious deployment in situations important to the security of the United States. Serious questions remained, however, on whether the American public would be persuaded to support it in the face of attitudes prevailing widely in the wake of the Vietnam experience.

CHAPTER THREE

The Soviet Approach to Special Operations

Paper

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Discussants

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In early 1980, shortly after Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in conjunction with a "special operation" against then-President Hafizullah Amin, this writer called attention to a little-appreciated element of Soviet military power which we can expect to see more of in the next decade.[1] That element was the "Special Purpose" or "Special Designation" (*Spetsalnaya Naznacheniya* or *Spetsnaz*) units subordinated primarily to the intelligence and security services of the USSR. Since the publication of that article, we have had the opportunity to observe more than 3 years of Soviet military operations in Afghanistan in which Soviet *Spetsnaz* forces played a critical role. In addition, Western interest in these forces has been heightened by planning requirements for the US Rapid Deployment Force (or Central Command—CENTCOM) and by growing NATO concern over the threat to its rear from Soviet special operations. It is appropriate, therefore, to revisit the subject of Soviet special operations and associated *Spetsnaz* forces in the light of both Soviet military-historical experience and insights available from recent events in Southwest Asia and elsewhere.

Historical Precedents

Specialized military/security units have been a common feature of the Soviet system from its inception. Beginning with the Latvian riflemen, followed shortly by Vecheka combat detachments, the Communist Party has always seen fit to maintain discrete units of politically reliable troops to carry out sensitive assignments which, for a variety of reasons, it chose not to entrust to regular military formations. At first, the paramount mission of such units was the preservation of the minority Bolshevik faction's monopoly of political power. This was especially evident in the prominent role that special Cheka troops played in crushing the Kronstadt uprising in March 1921—Cheka detachments comprised a high proportion of the assault force and deployed blocking units of machine gunners in the rear of that force to discourage retreat or would-be deserters.[2] Special units formed by the Cheka during the civil war were later institutionalized as standing units subordinate to state security under its various titles (Cheka, GPU, OGPU, GUGB/NKVD, etc.). The tendency to form elite units from broader categories of existing specialized forces was evident as early as mid-1919, when a separate structure of Cheka troops called "Detachments of Special Purposes" (*Chasti Osobogo Naznacheniya* or CHON) were created following a Central Committee resolution.[3] Thus, by the time the Party embarked on its "second revolution" in the late 1920s with collectivization and industrialization, there were several categories of specialized forces subordinate to state security, comprising Frontier Troops, Internal Troops, and specialized CHON formations such as the OGPU's Dzerzhinskiy Division.

With the passing of the more serious internal threats to Party rule following the Bolshevik victory in the civil war, the Party's use of these forces took a somewhat different direction. During collectivization, it was soon realized that the expropriation of the kulaks was beyond the ability of Party activists. Similarly, an operation of such high political sensitivity could not be exclusively entrusted to the Red Army, whose conscript base was drawn from the peasantry. Soviet sources openly acknowledge that the campaign against the kulaks was conducted by special units such as

the Dzerzhinskiy Division, which served as the Party's cutting edge for the imposition of its radical programs.[4]

In another kind of special operation, the OGPU prosecuted counterguerrilla operations against Moslem Basmachi rebels in Soviet Central Asia, who had been resisting Soviets rule throughout the 1920s. Soviet accounts admit that a special force, the Khorezm Group, had to be created in the Central Asian Military District as late as August 1931, when "the situation became complicated."[5] In addition to regular military and aviation units, the Khorezm Group comprised special OGPU cavalry and artillery units plus mechanized detachments of the OGPU Dzerzhinskiy Division. A Western account claims that the 63d OGPU division was involved in the recapture of Krasnovodsk in June 1931, which had been taken by the rebels in the previous month.[6] In effect, the operation was a precursor to World War II and contemporary combined-arms operations in which elite *Spetsnaz* detachments conducted specialized actions not entrusted to the regular military. An operational style was being forged which gave such special troops a certain primacy of mission over the Red Army, particularly when Party control in a given region was in jeopardy.

As for special purpose forces in the regular Soviet military between the Revolution and the outbreak of World War II, the record is not quite as clear. In the heyday of the Comintern and especially after the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, Moscow assumed that until the USSR was strong enough to help propel the world revolutionary process, it would be endangered by a capitalist encirclement determined to crush Soviet communism in its formative stages. It was against such a political background that Soviet military theorists conceived ways of linking Soviet military operations with insurrections by workers in capitalist countries. Such linkages with the enemies' rear areas were not really unique, since they fed on the earlier experiences of the Russian civil war. Flushed with victory over a variety of internal foes and so-called "interventionists," civil war heroes such as the future Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskiy saw the Red Army as an exporter of revolution, capable of aiding and abetting insurrection in the capitalist countries as well as in their restive colonies. Indeed, following the failure of revolutions in the industrial West, Moscow

placed great emphasis on the colonies as the new and vulnerable rear of capitalism.

A principal beneficiary of Stalin's frenetic industrialization program was the Soviet military, which, in addition to its concentration on traditional combat arms, conducted ambitious experiments with new military concepts and structures, such as the world's first airborne forces. The first parachute detachments appeared in 1929[7] and by the early 1930s were taking part in major field exercises. While such forces were primarily intended to destroy the enemy in his entire depth in conjunction with long-range armored units, other purposes of a more clearly political nature were envisioned by such leaders as Tukhachevskiy. Part of Tukhachevskiy's concept of the "nonstop" offensive involved the advancing Red Army linking up with a rebellious proletariat during the process of liberation.[8] The main body of airborne forces, operating in advance of the Red Army, would employ Special Purpose battalions trained to conduct special operations in foreign countries and cities. Their missions, in addition to linkage with insurgent workers, apparently included direct action against enemy leadership and facilities. By 1938 the Red Army had five airborne corps, four in the western USSR and one in the Far East. Each corp had three airborne brigades and one or two Special Purpose battalions.

How these unique forces might have been used in the kinds of operations conceived by Tukhachevskiy cannot be determined. Tukhachevskiy and many of those responsible for the new concepts and organizational developments in the Red Army in the late 1920s and 1930s were eliminated during the purges of 1937–38. Imagination and initiative were not qualities to be touted by the survivors. In the early stages of the German invasion in 1941, the bulk of the airborne elements were destroyed fighting as infantry, along with most of the Special Purpose battalions. While an unbroken link between these battalions and some of the contemporary *Spetsnaz* forces of the USSR cannot be established, the former may be viewed at least as a conceptual forerunner.

Another example of special operations experience is evident in the Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. Once Stalin realized that the Nationalist rebellion had developed into a protracted civil war, he decided to intervene with direct military

aid as well as with more subversive instruments. To head the Soviet military aid effort Stalin dispatched Jan Berzin, up to that point the Chief of Military Intelligence. Berzin was given three main tasks by Stalin: to help in the defense of Madrid with Soviet advisors, armor, and aircraft; to advise the Republican General Staff on operational planning; and to hold aside a select group of Soviet officers and men, directly under his command, to seize military control of Madrid as a "key point" for the USSR should the Republicans win the civil war.[9] This last task was a calculated contingency designed to help turn Spain into a communist state. Berzin maintained this select group in complete secrecy and away from the fighting, following Stalin's strict admonition to be discreet—"keep out of the range of artillery fire."[10] Berzin was assisted in this by allowing the International Brigade and its commander, General "Kleber", to bear the brunt of publicity.

In addition to the duties mentioned, Berzin also provided leaders/advisors to Spanish commando and guerrilla groups operating behind Nationalist lines. One such group had as its advisor Colonel Konstantin K. Rokossovskiy, who later rose in prominence as a Soviet Marshal and then as Defense Minister of Poland.[11] Aleksandr Orlov, who at one point headed the NKVD presence in Spain, has stressed how such direct action commando/guerrilla operations were critical complements to regular military operations in Spain.[12] He characterizes sabotage and guerrilla warfare as the "eighth line of activity of KGB intelligence."[13]

Berzin necessarily had to work closely with Orlov's large NKVD contingent, who in turn conducted special operations which included, among other things, spiriting Spain's gold reserves to Russia and liquidating Trotskyites, anarchists, and other "enemies." The NKVD also maintained its own network of informants among Berzin's entourage, a practice maintained to this day by the KGB in its penetration of the GRU and the Soviet military in general. Berzin was recalled to Moscow in June 1937, and disappeared soon thereafter, a victim of the Great Terror. His NKVD counterpart, Aleksandr Orlov, defected to the West in 1938 to escape the purges.

The Soviet experience in the Spanish Civil War is worth studying because it highlights the main Soviet principles in planning and

executing special operations. Above all, these principles included secrecy and the compartmentalization of a small elite group (Berzin's third main task) for the seizure of a "key point" during a delicate political-military operation. Spain also provides early evidence of the role of military intelligence (GRU) in planning and commanding special operations, the access of the GRU to regular military personnel in carrying out its mission, and GRU involvement in military assistance groups. Spain also illustrates the working relationships between military intelligence and state security (NKVD), with their separate yet parallel and sometimes redundant operations. It demonstrates the clearly superior position of state security in terms of access to the political leadership. And it points up the strong rivalry and hostility between the two, a situation especially owing to the penetration of military intelligence by state security. Though more than four decades have passed, some of these same principles, attitudes, and practices characterize contemporary Soviet approaches to special operations.

As noted earlier, Tukhachevskiy's Special Purpose battalions and regular airborne forces were expended in infantry operations during the early days of the German invasion in 1941. Attempts to reestablish regular airborne forces for special operations with GRU participation were abandoned because of the logistical problems in maintaining such units behind German lines.

Instead, specialized state security forces (NKVD, NKGB, and "SMERSH," the Armed Forces Counterintelligence Directorate) were expanded into the hundreds of thousands to ensure the loyalty of the military, to prevent "unauthorized" retreats, and to serve as special shock units (and even armies). As the war progressed in Moscow's favor, they were also intended to serve as the Party's "action arm" for reimposing Party control in the reconquered territories and for imposing communism in newly annexed territories and in Eastern Europe.[14] The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) authorized a "Central Staff of the Partisan Movement" for conducting guerrilla, espionage, sabotage, and assassination operations behind German lines. Forces involved were drawn from the NKVD, the GRU, and the GUKR, NKO, or SMERSH, the latter headed by NKGB General Viktor Abakumov, who reported directly to Stalin. Central political control was, therefore, an operational reality.

Moreover, the thorough permeation of partisan detachments by NKVD and SMERSH personnel ensured that state security retained critical operational leverage, despite the military focus required by coordination between Red Army operations and partisan activities.[15] At any rate, day-to-day partisan operations were in the hands of state security General-Major Pavel Sudoplatov, known as the "master of special detachments" in the German rear areas.

The Soviets view their partisan experience in World War II as a highly effective unconventional adjunct to their regular military operations:

> During the war the partisans killed, wounded or took prisoner hundreds of thousands of German troops, collaborators, and officials of the occupation administration. They derailed more than 18,000 trains, and destroyed or damaged thousands of locomotives and tens of thousands of railway cars and cisterns (tank cars). The partisan war affected the morale of the German Army, keeping the German troops in a constant state of fear.[16]

While such claims, especially those concerning German morale, have been disputed by the Germans, there can be no doubt that such Soviet special operations deflected needed resources from German frontal operations.

The partisan experience also had a profound impact on subsequent Soviet planning and organization for special operations against the newly designated enemy following Germany's defeat—the United States. The Ministry of State Security (MGB) carefully drew upon the talents of officers who served in Sudoplatov's "special detachments" to help build an in-place underground infrastructure "to establish combat operations for weakening the network of military bases of the American command in Europe."[17] However, the bulk of this activity was probably vested in the "executive action," or "wet affairs," element of the MGB's First Chief Directorate (Foreign Operations). Little information is available relating to militarily-connected *Spetsnaz* elements in the immediate post-war years. While it is true that the airborne forces were reconstituted in the Moscow area, it is not known if the new divisions included "special designation" units under GRU or airborne subordination. Most "direct action" operations seemed to focus on kidnappings and assassinations directed against

defectors, emigrés, and anti-Stalinist opponents throughout Europe. Until the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, no evidence surfaced indicating an increased GRU/military role in the field of special operations.

The Role of Special Operations in Contemporary Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy

The strategic significance of the latest (early 1960s to the present) Soviet military expansion is underscored by the end of the US strategic nuclear monopoly and by the addition of a power projection capability to the traditional continental focus of the Soviet armed forces.[18] Soviet spokesmen have obscured the fact that a shift in the strategic balance has contributed to a change in the "correlation of forces" in Moscow's favor, resulting in a much greater "external" role for the Soviet military.[19]

The utility of general purpose forces under an improved strategic nuclear umbrella is significantly increased in the view of Soviet political-military planners. This applies to operations against NATO as well as in distant areas, whether such operations are nuclear, conventional, or a combination of the two. Soviet doctrine does not rigidly compartmentalize types of wars but calls for plans and force structures based on the premise that a conventional war could quickly develop into a nuclear war. Hence, general purpose forces must be prepared to exploit political-military opportunities offered by Moscow's improved strategic nuclear position, and they must be configured to carry out nuclear battlefield missions with a minimum of organizational disruption.

Soviet special purpose, or *Spetsnaz*, units, normally catalogued under general purpose forces, must operate under the same premises. Though they are frequently regarded by Western analysts as a third force element—after nuclear and conventional forces—due to their elite nature, their operations must be carefully coordinated with other force components in typical combined-arms fashion throughout the theater of operations. *Spetsnaz* troops also must be prepared to execute missions in both conventional and conventional-nuclear environments with all the critical timing, command and control, logistics, and other requirements which

these entail. Soviet doctrinal writings offer only limited insights into this aspect of military affairs because of the stringent security requirements associated with sensitive *Spetsnaz* missions. However, the close relationship of *Spetsnaz* missions to the political-military objectives of broader military operations necessitates careful planning at the national command level, and undoubtedly involves collaboration between the KGB, the GRU, the General Staff, and the Supreme High Command (VGK). World War II experience demonstrates that such planning and coordination indeed occurred at the highest leadership levels: General Staff and *Stavka* (headquarters of the VGK), with a direct state security role and participation of Stalin through his role as Supreme Commander and his personal oversight of SMERSH.

In the fulfillment of the requirements of Soviet military doctrine and strategy, *Spetsnaz* missions may be categorized as strategic, operational, and tactical.[20] These missions include espionage, reconnaissance, sabotage, assassination, partisan warfare, interdiction of lines of communications, and other direct action operations of a clandestine nature to weaken the political-military capabilities of the target country and to assist associated or follow-on military operations. Strategic *Spetsnaz* missions conducted deep in the rear of enemy territory are aimed at reducing the enemy's overall ability to prosecute the war. They apparently have a significant political flavor in that demoralization, chaos, and disruption of national cohesiveness are among their goals. Teams for such missions may be drawn from the KGB, airborne forces, the GRU, or various combinations thereof. Operational *Spetsnaz* missions are most likely to fall within front and subordinate commands to a depth of 350 to 1,000 kilometers and would involve airborne, GRU, and army-level units with a focus on intelligence and sabotage of a more clearly military nature. Tactical *Spetsnaz* missions would be of less depth (to 100 kilometers), on a smaller scale, and at a lower level of organizational support (divisional). Finally, naval *Spetsnaz* units would support fleet elements and ground operations spanning strategic, operational, and tactical categories.

As seen earlier, Soviet spokesmen began to stress in the early 1970s that a greater "external" role for the Soviet military was a

new reality. Actually, the third edition (1968) of Marshal Vasiliy D. Sokolovskiy's *Military Strategy* gave an indication of this change, adding "military support" to the political and military aid which the USSR would render "to people subject to imperialist aggression."[21] These prominent authorities were proclaiming that Moscow intended to become more active militarily in so-called "national liberation" struggles beyond the traditional confines of the USSR's immediate periphery and its satellites. This doctrinal modification may have preceded a respectable power projection capability, but it did coincide with Moscow's perceived attainment of strategic nuclear parity with the United States and with the general-purpose force expansion already underway. Capability would soon follow doctrinal prescription, and both Sokolovskiy and General Aleksey A. Yepishev (Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces) were confident that the capability was forthcoming. Under its new nuclear umbrella, the General Staff could deploy its projection forces in a highly visible manner, freed from the constraints of an earlier period (e.g., Cuba, 1962).

The nature of many Third World conflicts, in which the interposition of even modest military capability could influence the outcome, offers unique opportunities for the Soviets to employ special operations for lucrative political-military benefits. The Soviets often have demonstrated that quick, decisive military aid or interference in a volatile situation—surrogate Cuban special operations in Angola in 1975, Soviet-Cuban-East German infusions into Ethiopia, Soviet military support to the Seychelles, etc.—could decide the issue in Moscow's favor. The adroit and bloody *Spetsnaz* operation against President Amin and Afghan forces in Kabul in December 1979 was a contemporary manifestation of the guidance Stalin gave to Berzin during the Spanish civil war—seize military control of the capital as a "key point" preparatory to wresting control of the country.

Such experiences presage other possibilities as well. The increased assertiveness of Soviet military actions in the Third World must, perforce, cause US military planners to calculate the possibility of Soviet interventional elements, led by *Spetsnaz*, engaged in a region critical to US interests before or concurrent with the

arrival of lead elements of the Rapid Deployment Force. Yepishev's "external" mission, coupled with emerging strategic realities, has affected the geopolitical ground rules in the resource-rich Third World.

Soviet Capabilities for Special Operations

The forces available for Soviet special operations span several institutional boundaries and are not limited to the regular military. As noted in the history of these operations, primacy of place has belonged to the intelligence and security services and still does today. Traditionally, state security figures uniquely in Soviet military power; it operates an armed force in its own right, and it performs a Party-assigned role of military counterintelligence through penetration and informant networks overseen by the KGB's Third Directorate. Through such instruments, the KGB retains a capability to conduct it own special operations and maintain a Party-sanctioned oversight of special operations assigned to the military. Therefore, it is appropriate to begin this survey of available special operations forces with the KGB.

KGB

The Committee for State Security, or KGB, deploys armed forces larger than those of many advanced industrial states. For instance, the United States Marine Corps numbers approximately 196,000, while available figures for KGB troops range from 250,000 to over 300,000.[22] The bulk of these forces, subordinate to the Border Guards Directorate, are equipped with tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and ships. Considered to be a politically reliable, elite force, the Border Guards answer directly to KGB headquarters in Moscow and are independent of the Ministry of Defense and its General Staff. Historically, in addition to sealing Soviet frontiers and fighting in major operations in World War II, they have been assigned politically sensitive "special missions"—deportations of suspect populations, counterinsurgency operations, and, as John Barron observes, advisory duties in North Vietnam during the

Vietnam War.[23] Rumors persist that KGB Border Guard elements are heavily involved in special operations of an unknown sort in Afghanistan. A hint of their activities was provided by a recent Afghan secret police defector, a KGB-trained general, who claimed to have heard from Soviet advisors of Mujahiddin raids into the USSR at Tadzhikistan.[24] Defense against these raids would clearly be a KGB Border Guard responsibility, and the KGB would be authorized to conduct counterguerrilla actions into Mujahiddin redoubts on the Afghan side of the frontier.

Other KGB troop elements with actual or probable special operations missions are the Ninth, or Guards, Directorate; the Third Directorate (Armed Forces Counterintelligence); and the First Chief Directorate. Defectors and emigrés have consistently reported that the Guards Directorate controls elite formations of regimental to divisional size. Peter Deriabin, a former KGB officer, identifies the Dzerzhinskiy Division as one such unit.[25] Though listed as an MVD unit in Soviet literature,the Dzerzhinskiy Division is believed to revert to KGB control in special circumstances, such as for the suppression of internal rebellion or special operations outside the USSR. Deriabin also states that little-known KGB security troops number five divisions and have long been under the oversight of General Georgiy Tsinev, currently KGB First Deputy Chairman.[26]

The Third Directorate is charged with the penetration of the military from senior command levels through operational and tactical units. It accomplishes this through a series of "special departments" (Osobyy Otdel or "OO") attached to all armed forces elements—including the KGB's own troops and those of the MVD. Its World War II predecessor, SMERSH, carried out special combat missions of particular sensitivity.[27] Whether the Third Directorate specifically controls *Spetsnaz* elements today is not clear; however, because their presence is generalized throughout all troop formations, a *Spetsnaz* role of at least an oversight nature must be ascribed to them. It is worth noting the extensive KGB and KGB Third Directorate backgrounds of prominent personalities whose names came to the fore in the post-Brezhnev leadership succession:

Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU—KGB chief for 15 years.

Gaidar Aliyev, Full Politburo member—28 years KGB service before becoming Azerbaijan Party 1st Secretary, and then Politburo member under Andropov.

General Viktor Chebrikov, KGB chief—KGB First Deputy chairman with Tsinev following the death of Gen. Semyon Tsvigun in early 1982. Succeeded Fedorchuk in December 1982 as KGB Chief.

General Vitalij Fedorchuk, MVD Chief—KGB Chief in May 1982, before transfer to MVD in December 1982; former Ukrainian KGB Chief; former Third Directorate Chief.

General Georgiy Tsinev, 1st Deputy Chairman, KGB—supervised military counterintelligence as KGB Deputy Chairman for 12 years; supervised KGB's protection of ballistic missiles and nuclear and other special weapons of the armed forces.

In addition, the Chief of military intelligence (GRU), General Pyotr Ivashutin, and the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces, General Aleksey Yepishev, both have KGB Third Directorate backgrounds and personal connections to Fedorchuk and Tsinev.[28] It seems appropriate, therefore, to posit KGB involvement in special operations, whether conducted by KGB troops or by regular military units. As will be shown, events in Afghanistan would seem to bear this out.

Finally, within the KGB, still another element is intimately involved in special operations. Within the First Chief Directorate (Foreign Operations), a "wet affairs," or "executive action," department has been connected with assassinations, kidnappings, sabotage, and other direct action operations for decades. Ranging from the notorious "mobile squads" of the 1930s through the murky connections with contemporary international terrorists, the KGB has maintained a highly secretive yet active capability for "diversionary" operations subject to strict Party control. Infrequent yet consistent defector reporting over the years points to a distinct KGB role in direct action, separate from but complementing *Spetsnaz* activities of the military.[29] These operations ap-

pear to be more of a strategic nature, involving direct action missions by small teams against civilian targets, while *Spetsnaz* efforts would have a more clearly military focus. Again, however, operations in Afghanistan suggest the lines are not finely drawn.

It is virtually impossible to calculate the number of KGB personnel, units, or teams dedicated to special operations. As previously noted, KGB troop elements number in the area of 250,000, from which special units may be drawn—or in which they may be hidden.

MVD

The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) commands approximately 260,000 Internal Security troops organized along the lines of Motorized Rifle Divisions, Regiments, etc.[30] Like KGB formations, they are not subordinate to the regular military but serve as a Party praetorian guard, deploying such elite units as the aforementioned Dzerzhinskiy Division. Former Soviet citizens persistently link such units to the KGB, glossing over the titular distinction between the MVD and KGB. The periodic historical fusing of the two security organizations indicates this organizational propinquity—a tradition recently reinforced by the transfer of Fedorchuk from the KGB to the MVD. MVD units reportedly have been engaged in special operations over the years—World War II, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in more recent years. Indeed, the First Deputy Chairman of the MVD, General Viktor S. Paputin, was reported killed in a special operation against Afghan President Amin in December 1979.[31] Was he there as a Moscow plenipotentiary to try to rein in Amin, or was he an on-the-scene coordinator of a joint KGB-MVD-military *Spetsnaz* action ordered by the Politburo? A recent KGB defector has described the Kabul action in detail, yet he makes no mention of either Paputin or the MVD.[32]

As with the KGB, both the size of the MVD unit pool and the elite honorifics attached to a number of its units make the MVD a probable source of talent for selected special operations. Its overall mission for Party security, however, suggests a geographical limit to its use not exceeding the fringes of the empire (that is, Eastern Europe, Afghanistan).

The Military

The regular Soviet military maintains several categories of forces which are either specifically structured for special operations or *Spetsnaz* missions, or may be designated for special operations missions by the Supreme High Command on an as-needed basis. Such missions would include reconnaissance, espionage, sabotage, assassination, destruction of enemy nuclear storage and means of attack, interdiction of lines of communications, diversionary attacks, and creation of panic in the enemy's rear area.[33]

The Soviet military maintains seven to eight airborne divisions subordinated directly to the Supreme High Command with operational control exercised by the General Staff.[34] Either full divisions or units thereof may be designated by the Supreme High Command as Special-Purpose Airborne Troops (*Spetsnaznacheniya Vozdushno-Desantnykh Voysk*) and targeted against key political, military, command and control, transportation, and industrial targets in the enemy's rear. Depending on the sensitivity of the operation, KGB control or a high degree of KGB oversight would come into play. The most likely KGB candidate for this role would be the Third Directorate (Armed Forces Counterintelligence).

Naval infantry, maintained in each of the USSR's four fleet areas and by Poland and East Germany, would be used in special missions to seize beachheads or in commando raids with missions and tactics similar to those of regular *Spetsnaz* units.

The most clearly identifiable *Spetsnaz* formations belong to the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff. According to a former Soviet army officer, each front has a *Spetsnaz* brigade consisting of a headquarters company and three diversionary battalions.[35] Because a military district is a peacetime configuration of an operational wartime front (according to this source), he is then positing a *Spetsnaz* brigade for each district. In addition, he credits each of the four fleets with a Naval *Spetsnaz* brigade subordinate to the Intelligence Directorate at Naval Headquarters.[36] However, a Western analyst states that "there are four commando platoons, one for each fleet," and that these are part of the Naval Infantry. He does not identify them as *Spetsnaz*

per se, but their missions—long-range reconnaissance, sabotage, and raiding—bear a *Spetsnaz* signature.[37]

Assuming that each group of forces outside the USSR (Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Mongolia) follows the military district pattern, four extra *Spetsnaz* brigades may be added. A worst-case figure would, therefore, total 24 brigades; however, it is not at all certain that each of the less critical military districts (especially the interior ones) would deploy a full brigade.

At full strength, each *Spetsnaz* brigade is credited with between 900 and 1,200 men.[38] Assuming the worst-case figure of 24 brigades, a total of between 21,600 and 28,800 officers and men may be calculated as approximate strength totals for GRU *Spetsnaz* forces (excluding reserves). It cannot be determined if GRU *Spetsnaz* elements fighting in Afghanistan should be included in these totals or if they represent added elements. The same source states that in addition to the *Spetsnaz* brigades of the fronts, there are *Spetsnaz* Long-Range Reconnaissance Regiments subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of each Strategic Directorate (which may equate to a Theater of Military Operations or TVD), thus adding to the possible totals.[39]

The main tasks of such units would be to operate as small groups in the enemy rear for reconnaissance and intelligence reporting on nuclear delivery means and other vital targets; preparation for the landing of aircraft units behind enemy lines; the possible use of weapons of mass destruction; and sabotage, disruption, and neutralization of key political or military personnel.[40] For the latter task, the headquarters company of a *Spetsnaz* brigade, one that is specially compartmentalized from the rest of the brigade, has the designated responsibility.[41]

Assisting in these tasks are networks of agents in the target countries, trained as political agitators, intelligence collectors, and saboteurs.[42] Just prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the various *Spetsnaz* elements described above would covertly deploy and link up with their indigenous agent assets to commence operations in the target area. It is expected that KGB agent assets would likewise be activated for KGB-directed special operations. Local communist, leftist, and possibly terrorist elements also might be activitated to complement these operations.

To the Soviet airborne and *Spetsnaz* formations must be added similar units of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. At least 20,000 of such specialized troops, mainly from Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, are available for rear-area *Spetsnaz* operations.[43] It must be assumed that their organization and missions reflect Soviet doctrine and guidance. Indeed, a recent Polish source explicitly states that "sabotage groups as well as reconnaissance resources" form critical elements of a "combined service operation."[44]

Still another category of Soviet forces with missions involving high political sensitivity as well as high reward is that of military and security aid to elements in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest and Southeast Asia. There are approximately 20,000 Soviet military personnel stationed abroad outside the Soviet bloc (in addition to the 105,000 in Afghanistan). Most of these are military aid personnel centrally controlled by the General Staff's Main Directorate for Foreign Military Assistance.[45] They are complemented by GRU and KGB cadres along with intelligence and security personnel from several East European countries. The political entree offered by such a presence transcends traditional military aid considerations. As Boris Ponomarev, Politburo candidate member and *de facto* chief of the Central Committee's International Department, put it,

> Experience confirms that the position adopted by the army largely determines whether a particular regime can remain in power or not.[46]

Access to ruling or powerful military elites in Third World areas not only provides the Soviets with political leverage, but also offers them the opportunity to penetrate governments, movements, or parties; spot and recruit local nationals for future Soviet use; and create replicas of Soviet/East European intelligence and security services with all the advantages that these offer for the creation or perpetuation of desired "revolutionary" political systems. Once ensconced with a client military-revolutionary regime, Soviet and allied military and security personnel are then in a position to help precipitate or support "revolutionary" struggles in nearby states, as we are currently witnessing in Central America, the Caribbean, and Africa.

Surrogates such as Cuba add numbers, geographic advantages, and plausible denial as useful complements to the special operations capabilities of the Soviet Union and its East European allies. For example, a commando unit from the Cuban Ministry of Interior was reported to be among the first Cuban troops airlifted to Angola in 1975; it was replaced by regular Cuban units after suffering heavy casualties at the hands of the South Africans.[47] In addition, both the KGB and GRU maintain links with and training facilities for so-called "liberation groups" and foreign terrorists.[48] In view of the rear-area missions discussed above, the wartime value of such links is not difficult to calculate.

Soviet Experiences in Conducting Special Operations

Earlier in this paper it was observed that many special operations in the first several decades of Soviet history were closely linked to problems relating to political control. As Soviet-style socialism spread to Eastern Europe and beyond, preservation of Party control in those regions became as axiomatic as within the USSR itself. An operative definition of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine has become, where socialism is once implanted it may not revert. The two most vivid examples of the use of special operations by Moscow in recent years derive from that definition—in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Afghanistan from 1979 to the present. Although both instances were triggered by the Soviets' desire to preserve their gains, they offer instructive clues for operations against future target countries.

In Czechoslovakia in 1968, the seizure of the Prague airport and of "key points" in Prague was carried out by military *Spetsnaz* units under KGB orders and direction.[49] These units not only secured "key points" until relieved by the slower ground forces, but also arrested Czech Party leader Aleksandr Dubcek and dispatched him, as a prisoner, to Moscow. Similar missions were carried out against other "enemies" on KGB lists.

The KGB was assisted in these actions by its agents within the Czechoslovak Communist Party.[50] Many of these agents had been trained in intelligence and diversionary work (sabotage and as-

sassination) in KGB schools in the USSR, and they were used by the KGB in a manner similar to the way resident agents would be used by Soviet *Spetsnaz* teams in Western target countries. One agent, a Czech captain, prepared plans for the KGB for the occupation of the Central Committee building and Prague Military Headquarters, including plans of the secret exits through the city sewer system.[51] The same man then led a KGB assault detachment to the Central Committee building, disarmed the Czech guards, and arrested the Czech leadership—with the exception of the pro-Soviet members, such as Bilak and Indra.[52] The KGB had instructed their Czech agents not to touch President Ludvik Svoboda, as he was considered to be loyal to Moscow.

In short, the operation was audacious but highly successful. A combination of KGB and military (probably airborne) *Spetsnaz* elements struck with little notice, achieving full surprise even though prolonged Soviet political and military pressure should have alerted the Czech leadership. "Key points" were quickly seized, and local agents were activated who were then teamed with KGB elements in securing political control throughout the country. Other agents helped to sow confusion and doubt, especially among the military, thus limiting the possibility of a coordinated and meaningful Czech military response—a possibility Soviet leaders took seriously and actively planned against.

Very similar tactics were repeated in Kabul in December 1979. Months before the December action, *Spetsnaz* elements from airborne and GRU formations were already in-country. Working with Soviet military advisors assigned to the Afghan Army, they devised a number of strategems to neutralize or limit Afghan military capability in the capital.[53]

In the meantime, according to a recent KGB defector, a decision was taken by the Soviet Politburo to kill Afghan President Amin, a task assigned to the KGB.[54] Following a failed poisoning attempt, an assault group of several hundred commandos, spearheaded by a contingent of KGB officers, attacked Amin's palace on December 26, 1979. According to this source, the leader of the assault, one Colonel Bayerenov, had previously directed the KGB terrorist training school.[55] Both he and his target, President Amin, were killed in the operation.

This source confirms earlier accounts of military *Spetsnaz* troops, led by the KGB under Politburo orders, attacking the palace and shooting Amin. John Erickson, for instance, felt that the Soviets staged a more sanguinary version of their Prague operation. Erickson identified a "special assignment" brigade of the 105th Airborne Division "under the direction of the KGB" as the spearhead of the Kabul operation.[56] However, the latest defector account makes no mention of the role of MVD General Paputin and the controversy surrounding his death in the affair.

Following the tumultuous December events, Soviet *Spetsnaz* forces settled into an older pattern reminiscent of the Basmachi rebellion of the 1920s and 1930s. Their Afghan involvement soon adopted the characteristics of a lengthy counterinsurgency campaign. The increasing temptation among Western commentators has been to promote the Vietnam analogy, with images of a giant superpower bogged down by primitive yet determined insurgents. For a variety of reasons, worthy of a separate study, this comforting view is wide of the mark. Afghanistan, while costly, is considered by the Soviet military to be the first real operational laboratory for Soviet armed forces since World War II. This applies to *Spetsnaz* operations no less than it does to larger "search and destroy" forays by larger formations. And it is in the area of special operations that the Mujahiddin are registering Soviet improvements and sophistication:

> Here was the "combat laboratory" at work, and at least one guerrilla leader could testify to the results. His camp, high in inaccessible hill country, was suddenly attacked by black uniformed commandos charging out of the night to inflict severe casualties. A young doctor in Leningrad, back from active service, told friends how Soviet special forces would penetrate deep into guerrilla territory to surround suspect villages, then "go in with cold steel." All this assumed an unprecedented degree of responsibility for [military] leaders on the spot.[57]

Thus, in both Prague in 1968 and in Afghanistan today, the Soviets have had test beds for employing special operations in a mode and intensity absent since World War II. In the former, the actual special operation itself virtually achieved the Soviet strategic objective. In the latter, the operation speedily achieved its

tactical purpose; the failure to secure a strategic resolution was not the fault of the operation itself, but a misreading of the depth of the insurgency. The account quoted above suggests that Soviet special operations forces are beginning to take the measure of that problem.

Conclusions

Having revisited the subject of Soviet special operations following my initial examination in 1980, I see no reason to alter a major judgment made at that time:

> For the first time in Soviet history, Moscow has the *military* capability to propel the "historical process" in regions well beyond its continental confines. Marshal Tukachevskiy may have dreamed of employing Soviet arms as a revolutionizing force in foreign territories; Brezhnev gave the dream substance. At the leading edge of this new capability is an older tradition: special purpose forces linked to the security services.[58]

The experience generated by Soviet operations in Afghanistan and Third World crisis areas provides the new Soviet leadership a greater degree of operational confidence to assert themselves in confrontations which they would have avoided in a previous era. It can no longer be assumed that conservatism will characterize Soviet power projection; indigenous revolutionary elements could quickly be supplemented by an on-ground Soviet *Spetsnaz* presence before the arrival of US or friendly rapid deployment forces. In addition, a new Soviet leadership is now in place which has played a large role in both building and operating the kinds of forces necessary for such strategems.

For NATO, the problem remains acute. The primary missions of Soviet special operations in that theater will be to neutralize NATO's nuclear systems, thereby helping Soviet forces to achieve surprise and to exploit superior margins of conventional military power. Secondary missions are designed to maximize disruption in the rear areas before effective security measures can be implemented. Lack of both time and operational depth in these circumstances work in favor of the offensive.

Notes

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2. George Leggett, *The CHEKA: Lenin's Political Police* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 329.
3. P. G. Sofinov, *Ocherki istorii Vserossiyskoy chrezvychaynoy komissiy (1917-1922 gg.)* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960), p. 152. See also I. G. Belikov (et. al.), *Imeni Dzerzhinskogo* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1976), pp. 5-36.
4. Belikov, ibid., pp. 46-56.
5. Ibid., pp. 58-61.
6. Martha B. Olcott, "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan 1918-24," *Soviet Studies* (July 1981), p. 362.
7. John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1962), p. 327.
8. Ibid., p. 351.
9. Ibid., pp. 429-430. Walter G. Krivitskiy, *I Was Stalin's Agent* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1939), pp. 99-100.
10. Krivitskiy, ibid.
11. Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War,* rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 759.
12. Aleksandr Orlov, *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), pp. 164-183.
13. Ibid., p. 38.
14. The bulk of the material on World War II is drawn from the author's earlier piece cited above. New data is referenced as appropriate.
15. Kurt DeWitt, "The Role of Partisans in Soviet Intelligence," *War Documentation Project*, Research Study no. 6, vol. 1 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and Development Command, 1954), passim. See also *Voennoistoricheskiy zhurnal* 11 (1979):22-26, for a recent account of how partisan operations were conducted in conjunction with the Rovno-Lutsk operations in early 1944.
16. Pospelov, et. al., *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-45,* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p. 459.
17. Nikolai Khokhlov, *In the Name of Conscience* (New York: McKay, 1959), p. 127. Khokhlov served under Sudoplatov in WWII and subsequently moved into MGB "wet affairs" activities.
18. For an examination of Soviet military doctrine in more detail, see John J. Dziak, *Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: the Interaction of Theory and Practice* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1981), chaps. II and III.
19. *Pravda*, April 23, 1975, and February 25, 1976; *Isvestiya*, February 13, 1975; Gen. A. A. Yepishev, "The Historic Mission of the Army of the Socialist State", *Kommunist*, No. 7 (May 1972), p. 62; Marshal A. A. Grechko, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society", *Voprosy Istorii KPSS,* No. 5 (May 1974), pp. 30-47.
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thur A. Zuehlke, "Unconventional Warfare Operations," *Review of the Soviet Ground Forces* (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1981), pp. 3-6; and "ACSI View Point: Soviet use of Unconventional Warfare," *Military Intelligence* (Oct-Dec 1982), pp. 3, 54-55.
21. V. D. Sokolovskiy (ed.), *Voyennaya strategiya*, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968), p. 222.
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25. Peter Deriabin, *Watchdogs of Terror* (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1972), p. 265.
26. Peter Deriabin with T. H. Bagley, "Fedorchuk, the KGB, and the Soviet Succession," *Orbis* (Fall 1982), p. 633.
27. See S. Ostryakov, *Voyennye Chekisty* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1979), chap. 3.
28. Deriabin, op. cit., pp. 611-635.
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31. *Washington Post,* January 4, February 14, March 14, 1980.
32. "Coups and Killings in Kabul," *Time* (November 22, 1982), pp. 33-34.
34. Williams and Zuehlke, "Unconventional Warfare Operations," p. 3; Maj. James H. Brusstar, *The Soviet Airborne Forces* (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1982), p. 4.
35. Suvorov, *Inside the Soviet Army,* p. 76.
36. Ibid., p. 86.
37. "Infantry," *Defense* (March 1983), p. 154. The article included an unusual photo of a "Fleet Commando platoon" mustered on the deck of a Soviet naval ship. They are attired in apparent wet suits plus frogmen's breathing apparatus and hold folding stock AK-47s (p. 156).
38. Ibid., p. 76.
39. Ibid., p. 97.
40. Williams and Zuehlke, op. cit., p. 4.
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42. Ibid., p. 97; Williams and Zuehlke, loc. cit.
43. C. N. Donnelly, "Operations in the Enemy Rear," *International Defense Review,* No. 1 (1980), p. 37.
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47. Alfonso L. Torabochia, *A Red Axis in the Caribbean?* Vol. VII, Bureau of Operations and Research, International Association of Chiefs of Police (No Date), p. 4.
48. Barron, *KGB; Time,* loc. cit.
49. Aleksei Myagkov, "Soviet Sabotage Training for World War III," *Soviet Analyst,* December 20, 1979, pp. 2-6; Zdenek Mlynar, *Nightfrost in Prague* (New York: Karz Publishers, 1980), chap. 3.
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Discussion

Mrs. Harriet Fast Scott

Dr. Dziak mentioned the *Spetsnaz* role in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. That brings to my mind the groundwork done by General Sergey Shtemenko in the special operations field. Shtemenko was chief of the GRU in the 1956–1957 period, and we learned from Penkovsky that in 1957 Shtemenko organized a sabotage school near Moscow, where about 200 cutthroats were being trained as saboteurs, agents, and terrorists. Penkovsky said Zhukhov knew about this, but had not told Khrushchev that it existed. That, indeed, is one type of special operation.

A few years ago, while looking over the vast number of Soviet military schools that prepare the officer corps for the Soviet armed forces—there are 140 of them—I came across a service school in Krasnodar, in the northern Caucasus. As a rule, Soviet schools always have something in the title to identify them. They are called tank schools or artillery schools, or they are for pilots or the like. But this one was just a higher military school, with no indication of its purpose.

After General Shtemenko died, the school took on his name. Thus, recalling Penkovsky, it is reasonable to assume this is probably where they train officers for special operations.

Another name mentioned by Dr. Dziak was General Yepishev, once deputy to Beria, and since 1962, head of the Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces. Some say that Khrushchev brought him to Moscow in 1952 and obtained a deputy position

for him in the MVD in order to keep an eye on Beria. In Yepishev's book, noted by Dr. Dziak, he discussed the enlarged mission of the Soviet armed forces, the modifications that became doctrine in the mid-1970s. It was declared then that the armed forces were no longer restricted to defense of the homeland, but would now go to any part of the world where socialism might be threatened.

In a 1982 Military Publishing House book edited by General Yepishev, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Structuring of the Military,* the final chapter is entitled "The Defense of Socialism: The Internationalist Obligation of Marxist-Leninist Parties." There Yepishev lists the "successes" that the Soviet Union has had in foreign operations in the 65 years since the Bolshevik Revolution.

The first was the civil war, which started as a very tiny movement around Leningrad and eventually encompassed all of Soviet Russia. Next was the dispatch of Soviet advisors to China. One of these, later to emerge as Marshal Blyukher, had the pseudonym of General Galen. In time he was killed in the purges, but the Japanese were not sure that Blyukher and Galen were the same man. They became worried during World War II when there were rumors that General Galen was directing operations against them again in China.

The next "success" Yepishev claims is Soviet involvement in Spain during the civil war. Although it was a failure in their terms—their side lost—still, they were fulfilling their internationalist obligation. From there he moves to Khalkin-Gol, the little known battle fought in the summer of 1939 in Outer Mongolia, when the Soviets went to the support of Mongolian troops fighting the Japanese. The commander was General Stern, whom Dr. Dziak has mentioned.

Curious about Stern, I looked him up and found that he had been shot in 1941, 4 or 5 months after the war started. Stalin had begun another round of purges because of failures at the front, and he picked on several prominent generals. Most of them were Spanish Civil War veterans, including Stern and the head of the Soviet Air Force.

The next "successes" were the Baltic Republics, taken over one

by one after 1940. World War II, of course, enabled the Soviets to "liberate" half a continent and set up their socialist world system. During the Korean conflict, Soviet volunteer pilots took part, and Soviet divisions were ready to go in if necessary. The formation of the Warsaw Pact, intervention in Hungary in 1956, the building of the Berlin Wall, and the defense of Cuba in 1962 are listed as great "successes." Then came Soviet support to Vietnam, and later the "rescue" of Czechoslovakia from imperialist forces trying to take it over. Yepishev mentions Vietnam again in the context of the Chinese invasion in 1979. He cites the defense of socialism in Poland when it was threatened in 1979, and later, Afghanistan. Those are some of the things the Soviets are very proud of—their own list of special operations.

Andropov was mentioned, and I would like to note that he was once first secretary of the Komsomol in the Karelian-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic. After the Winter War with Finland in 1940, the Soviets annexed about 17,000 square miles, the border from Leningrad up to the Arctic Sea. But most of the Finnish residents had moved out with the retreating troops. The Soviet government called on Finns living in Estonia and in Leningrad, and invited them to resettle and reclaim their homeland. Solzhenitsyn tells us the Finns were required to turn over their internal passports. They were loaded on buses, and dropped off on the empty land to fend for themselves. This area remained a republic in the Soviet system until 1958, when it was absorbed by the Russian Federated Republic. It was there that Andropov cut his teeth.

Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs that the Soviet ambassador in Budapest warned him the Hungarian Party leader, a Stalinist, would have to be replaced to prevent a popular revolt. After the Stalinist chief was replaced, the ambassador wrote again that the new man was equally retrograde and inadequate. That ambassador was, of course, Yuri Andropov. The Hungarians did as predicted. They selected Imre Nagy as their leader, and his idea was to pull out of the Warsaw Pact and declare Hungary neutral. Andropov soon got to him, reinforced by Mikoyan and Suslov, who were brought in from Moscow. They set up Janos Kadar with another government, arrested Nagy, and recognized Kadar. Then the special forces came in to crush the rebellion.

I will conclude by noting what Walter Laqueur has said—namely, that the Soviets will always expand until they meet resistance. If they feel no resistance, they will continue to expand. I hope that we can get our own special forces organized, so that we may offer them a little resistance in various parts of the world.

Mr. Arthur A. Zuehlke, Jr.

There are several features of Dr. Dziak's paper that I want to re-emphasize. First, these very formidable special forces that the Soviet Union maintains have a long historical legacy. They are not just products of World War II, although that was a formative period. They have a real tradition, heavily political in nature. Their *modus operandi* is very similar to that of Soviet partisan operations in World War II, and their controlling mechanisms are the Soviet intelligence and security services. The missions of Soviet special forces are both internal and external, and they operate in peacetime and wartime. By Soviet standards they are elite units. And to be an elite unit in the Soviet Union requires absolute political reliability.

Briefly, there seem to be three types of Soviet special purpose forces associated with the KGB, the MVD, and the GRU. There is excellent information available on Department Eight, the wartime sabotage component of the KGB's First Chief Directorate. Formerly known as Department Five, this element's role was described by Oleg Lyalin, who defected in 1971. He provided us with good insight into the sabotage functions of the KGB. These activities—primarily sabotage of civilian targets—would be coordinated with other KGB activities in a pre-war period and continued into wartime. The Ministry of Internal Affairs special purpose assets are found within the vast internal troops structure that Dr. Dziak described. These forces consist of what the Soviets call "special designation" units, some of them elite praetorian guard units such as the Dzerzhinskiy First Motorized Rifle Division in Moscow. Others are heavily armed and manned regiments scattered throughout the USSR, available primarily for political security missions within the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.

Finally, we come to what I regard as the main threat entity, the GRU special purpose force brigades, also known as diversionary brigades and *Spetsnaz*. These are associated with the front or fleet level, that is, what the Soviets describe as a strategic formation. They are assigned to the fleets, military districts, and groups whose forces form wartime fronts.

This large standing force differs significantly from its Western counterparts. Its size provides the Soviets with a vast pool of trained and experienced personnel. It gives them the flexibility to conduct a variety of operations, both around the Soviet continental periphery and further away. We have seen them operate in Prague during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. We have seen them operate in conjunction with the KGB's Department Eight in Kabul in 1979, destroying the regime of Hafizullah Amin and paving the way for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And, of course, a major portion of this formidable GRU-controlled force is positioned opposite the NATO Central Region as a continuing threat to NATO's nuclear deterrent.

The GRU brigades are intelligence service components—not regular airborne units tasked specially, but special purpose units to perform special operations. Their association with intelligence has great significance. Can you imagine US special forces being subordinate strictly to the J-2 function? These Soviet forces work for the front or fleet intelligence directorate, a subcomponent of the GRU, because their mission is "special reconnaissance," loosely defined as intelligence collection, direct action, and sabotage. Their activities are fully integrated within the combined-arms operation of the front and designed to support theater objectives. They are component parts of the Soviet theater battle plan, performing a key portion of the operation, with well defined, standardized missions and targets, against which they train. Missions range from what Dr. Dziak described as the operational-strategic level (that depth of operation associated with fronts or fleets, out to 1,000 kilometers), to the truly strategic ones which could be intercontinental. And they have very large supporting agent networks to back up their operations, another uniquely Soviet feature. They do not inject their special purpose forces into hostile territory without having agent support prearranged. Indig-

enous agent assets are augmented by the infiltration of additional Soviet agents for support of *Spetsnaz* operations.

The Soviets believe in economy of force. They do not waste weapons, nor do they over-expend ordnance on targets or troops. But they believe in a concept of mass employment. Perhaps because of this, they do not favor uniquely trained and selected individuals comprising a small but extremely effective special-force capability, as is attractive in the West. Instead, the Soviets try to train their special purpose forces beyond the capability and reliability of regular troops. They employ them on a mass scale, expecting high levels of attrition; to the Soviets, achieving the mission is the ultimate concern.

It is important to look at these forces and the threat they pose to the West in a variety of conflict contingencies. Most frequently discussed is, of course, theater war involving the use of *Spetsnaz* in a Warsaw Pact invasion of the NATO central region. Their principal target is US/NATO nuclear capability. Soviet *Spetsnaz* would be inserted very early in the conflict.

Considering how important NATO's nuclear capability is in the Soviet calculus for victory, the employment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles is a real threat to Soviet objectives. *Spetsnaz* is an excellent device for neutralizing those weapons systems very early in the scenario.

I agree, too, that we must examine the role of *Spetsnaz* as a tool of power projection, particularly in the Third World arena. It enables the Soviets to swiftly inject (well before the arrival of regular troops from either side) limited but decisive force which would probably be superior to any local troops, at least for a short period of time. *Spetsnaz* brigades thus pose a potential threat to our rapid deployment capabilities, to our forces stationed abroad, and to our oversea bases and facilities. They can attack and degrade our command and control facilities and our logistics and staging bases.

We also face, as Dr. Dziak indicated, a potential threat from Soviet-trained surrogate special purpose forces in the Third World—specially recruited cadres, trained up to *Spetsnaz* qualifications. They can operate against Western-oriented regimes or strategic installations and provide the Soviets plausible denial.

We can expand or contract this list of possibilities at will. In addition to studying the theater environment in Europe, why should we not consider these forces as a potential threat to the continental United States and Alaska? If a theater war is being waged in the Central Region of Europe, with US ground forces engaged and naval units being attacked on the seas, why rule out the vulnerability of the United States to attack by *Spetsnaz* forces? There are many very good targets in North America and they are generally quite vulnerable to assault by these capable special purpose forces.

We should remember that no matter what the scenario, GRU *Spetsnaz* brigades are elements in a wide spectrum of Soviet threat capability, ranging from subversion, espionage, propaganda and disinformation at the low end, up through special purpose force operations involving sabotage and direct action, all the way to the use of strategic nuclear forces. In this spectrum, KGB special operations are low intensity, but aimed at key political and strategic targets. They would probably get under way well ahead of general hostilities, whereas the GRU *Spetsnaz* role would be more traditional; most of it would begin at H-hour or thereafter.

To sum up, Soviet offensive capabilities in special operations are very impressive. They are the product of careful planning and development over the entire history of the regime, and honed to a sharp edge in the last decade or so. We will probably see further improvements of these capabilities as a counter to Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile deployment.

Perhaps because of their emphasis on offensive special operations, the Soviets also place a premium on defense against hostile special forces. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has a very large force with a major mission to defend against foreign commando units. While a large portion of those MVD units would probably deploy forward with the regular forces in wartime, many would remain to protect the rear area, which includes the entire USSR. If the West contemplates wartime special operations against targets in the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries, this defensive capability should be taken into consideration. Because these MVD internal troops are not regular ground force units, we tend to over-

look their importance to Soviet wartime operations both in the USSR and in various theaters of military operations.

General Discussion

To open, a question was raised regarding vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the Soviets in the context of special operations. It was noted that anti-Soviet feelings today continue to run high, particularly among ethnic groups in the United States who have vivid memories of the Katyn massacre of Polish officers in 1940, and of Operation Keelhaul after World War II when thousands of Soviet prisoners of war were forcibly repatriated to be executed or condemned to slave labor camps. It was noted also that as bad as Adolf Hitler was, the Russian General Vlasov had close to a million men who had defected and fought with the Germans against the Soviets throughout the war.

This would surely suggest that considerable vulnerability exists even within the Soviet forces themselves, to say nothing of the satellite countries, in the face of a possible conventional confrontation in Europe in the future. Drawing upon Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, to say nothing of American public opinion, there must exist ways to tip the scales even further. In other words, we should not be intimidated by the unquestioned size and strength of the Soviet special forces.

Dr. Dziak acknowledged the validity of these observations, and observed that the Katyn massacre was probably perpetrated by the state security forces. Regarding Vlasov, however, he suggested that we have perhaps been overtaken by history. The primary motivation for people like Vlasov, a Soviet military hero until his capture, was his personal and professional disgust with the recent purges. But even more important, among the rank and file of peasants who fought for Vlasov in his legions, was the general loathing of Stalin's collectivization brutalities.

It has been a long time since then, and Dr. Dziak doubted that we could strike the same kind of chord and achieve the kind of popular response Hitler initially received, despite his insane racist ideology. Think of the wellspring Hitler could have tapped, based

on the massive disaffection manifested in 1941 and 1942, sentiments which lingered even until 1944 and 1945. The Germans were getting voluntary recruits, not just the unfortunates who were dragooned into service, and it is not likely that we could tap the same thing today. Dr. Zuehlke, on the other hand, argued that the potential is still there, perhaps even more so in some areas than ever before. The question for us is how to exploit an observable, potential vulnerability. This requires specialized assets, and a continuing access to the target—something that has been neglected for a long time and is not easy to resurrect.

Expanding on this point, Dr. Dziak noted that the Germans had good potential for exploiting their situation. There were cadres of people from the Baltic provinces, Germans who had been expelled either by the Russians or by those new republics. They understood Russian and Soviet psychology and Soviet history, and how to turn them to German advantage. They were excellent at the operational level. At the strategic level, with Hitler and the other madmen in charge, the Germans squandered the opportunity.

Another speaker questioned the criteria used for measuring Soviet success or failure in their special operations forays. Categorizing China in the 1920s and Madrid in the Spanish Civil War as successes seemed ironic when both, in the end, failed utterly. Hungary and Czechoslovakia were successes, due to the Red Army in full array behind the special operations units. The Soviets have been in Afghanistan for some time now, and they are still being fought off by a few thousand poorly armed guerrillas in the mountains. It is not clear what really constitutes success.

Dr. Dziak explained that his point was to illustrate not whether the Soviets did or did not gain their objective in Madrid. What is important to consider is the kind of doctrinal guidance given by Stalin for reaching a political and military objective, acting through a small group of operatives clandestinely protected from the other open elements of his military aid mission. The group, if it appeared that the Republicans were going to be successful, was then expected to seize Madrid as a "key point." The technique thus employed is an example of a type repeated again several times, most notably and most recently in Prague in 1968 and Kabul in 1979.

No one has contended that the Soviets are a raging success in Afghanistan. On the other hand, they probably did not expect an immediate victory. They are in it for a long haul, the same point made earlier in connection with the Basmachi. The Soviets fought the Basmachi for more than 10 years, and they fought them in a very carefully prepared, protracted campaign, with no concern for economy of force. They expended a great many lives—not only among the regular military units and the special purpose units from the security services, but also among the indigenous Moslem population. All of this was in an area isolated from world public opinion. In those days few people cared about Soviet Central Asia. The analogy with Afghanistan should be noted. The Soviets, in Dr. Dziak's opinion, will probably stay there as long as necessary.

Being exempt from domestic political considerations of the kind the United States must take into account, the Soviets do not have to show dramatic results. By applying the kind of force they have thus far, and through a process of attrition coupled with very assertive political programs, they may go through several changes in the type of regime they deem suitable for Afghanistan. This, of course, presupposes the absence of adverse world publicity, and the absence of any assertive program of military assistance to the indigenous Moslem rebels.

Mrs. Scott interjected the comment that the main goal of the Soviet Union in such undertakings is to protect its own terrain. By going into Spain, they were turning the German forces in that direction. When they sent pilots into China in 1939 and 1940, they fought and drew the Japanese forces away from the Siberian border, and tried to reorient them to the south. Their fighter pilots did an excellent job in that theater.

So the primary objective, which may have been only partially successful in many cases, was to mislead and redirect the attacks that they could see coming against the Soviet Union, and to try to steer them off in other directions. The aim is always to defend the socialist homeland.

Concern was then expressed that amid such attention to the historical aspects of Soviet activities, we may be neglecting Nicaragua, Cuba, and Angola, where they are opposing us right now, and doing so effectively. This was acknowledged by the discus-

sants, but with the caveat that the topic is not one that can be studied easily from open sources. Historians must use what is available. In this instance the specific subject under review is Soviet special forces, not the panorama of Soviet subversion and strategy in the Third World. It was generally agreed that the historical approach was both necessary and useful.

A speaker requested further clarification of the political as opposed to the military role of the Soviet special forces during the Spanish Civil War and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Dr. Dziak explained that in Spain the objective was basically political. Berzin was to seize control of critical "key points" in the city against noncommunist or non-Bolshevik leftist forces fighting on the side of the government. It might well have become a civil war within the civil war. The plan was shrouded in absolute secrecy. The targets, moreover, were not limited to "key points"; they also would have been key political figures among the noncommunist, non-Bolshevik leadership in the Spanish Republican Government itself.

Berzin would probably have teamed up with Orlov to handle this mission. It is one of the first major instances we know of when the Soviets used their special forces for such a mission, well outside of Soviet territory, before World War II. Comparing it with the Prague example, Dr. Dziak noted that the KGB officers who led that operation came in with the first airborne units, before the ground units arrived in Prague. They had the plans, the layout of the city, the floor plans of the Prague Central Committee Building of the Czech Communist Party, and the layout of the sewer system, which was intended by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia as an escape route of last resort.

The Soviets carried out their mission, seizing most of these key points. They were frustrated by some Czech stratagems, but by and large, using resident agents from the Czech security service who were controlled by the KGB, they accomplished successfully a mission similar to that given to Berzin in the late 1930s by Stalin.

Discussion then turned to ways of exploiting the rivalry known to exist between the GRU and the KGB. Mr. Zuehlke took exception to the popular idea that the KGB and GRU are at each other's throats. Acknowledging that competition between the two cer-

tainly exists in the field of intelligence collection, he observed that the KGB's function is nine-tenths internal and one-tenth espionage. The GRU is more collection oriented, but has a distinct role in supporting the operational forces. It is a different entity than the KGB; the two seemed to work very nicely together in the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, and they continue to do so at present. Bureaucratic disputes between them probably exist, and they should be explored to determine if there are vulnerabilities worth exploiting. One way might be to develop a special purpose or *Spetsnaz* capability of our own, directed at the Soviet Union, under an avowed US policy that in war such activities are to be expected.

Dr. Dziak agreed that vulnerabilities probably exist, and might be exploitable, but felt also that the differences between the KGB and the GRU may be more apparent in practice than real in substance. Specifically, he cautioned against accepting John Barron's characterization of the GRU as an adjunct completely subordinate to the KGB. The GRU is actually a General Staff directorate in its own right, answerable to the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of Defense, with a somewhat different mission than the KGB.

On the other hand, at the leadership level there may be a potential for strain in the days ahead. For the first time in Soviet history, with the possible exception of a few years under Stalin, there is a galaxy of KGB people at the top of the leadership structure, both within the party and within the KGB, MVD, and GRU. The latter is headed by a former KGB officer who ran the Third Directorate, which was the Armed Forces Penetration Directorate. Many of these leading figures can draw upon their personal experiences in state security, which is the most repressive organ of the Soviet system. Also, as Gary Auden points out in a recent issue of *Orbis,* a lot of these people have long experience in military counterintelligence. They know how to control and work with the military, and they understand the kind of missions we are talking about because they have been personally involved in them.

The idea of KGB-GRU cooperation at the operational level was reinforced by Mrs. Scott. She cited Penkovsky's identification of the Administrative Organ Department of the Central Committee

as the body controlling such matters and ensuring that the KGB and GRU do in fact cooperate. The Administrative Organs Department also directs the work of the MVD and the courts. At present, it is headed by a man named Sapulkin. Thus, there is a firm hand on the bureaucratic machinery, and it enables the Party Secretariat to iron out whatever minor rivalries develop and to ensure that a single purpose is served.

One of the participants, in a concluding reference to the Soviet special forces role in the Spanish Civil War, suggested that in at least one respect the operation was an outstanding success—namely, in the removal of the Spanish gold. Dr. Dziak agreed, and observed that the Spanish state gold reserves were spirited out of the country by Aleksandr Orlov, with a couple of agents in the Republican Government who were Orlov's people. The gold has not been returned to this day, a point of contention between the current Spanish government and the Soviet Union. Afterward, Orlov himself saw danger ahead, and he fled. Most of the key people associated with the Spanish experience were eliminated when they returned to the Soviet Union. Only Rokossovskiy survived the purges.

The substance of this discussion did not lend itself readily toward conclusions of a general nature. Participants were clearly impressed with the import of Dr. Dziak's presentation, and its picture of a formidable Soviet capability for projecting power through the special operations medium—on a scale far greater than anything the United States and its allies can match at this time.

CHAPTER FOUR

Military Capabilities and Special Operations in the 1980s

Paper

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Discussants

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The factors that shape the US defense posture can be discerned in a diverse array around the globe. Most immediate is the threat posed by a burgeoning Soviet military establishment, the Soviet Union's ability to prosecute war at multiple levels of conflict, and Soviets' determination to project power into regions once considered beyond their reach. Beyond Afghanistan, even if the Soviets and their surrogates cannot be credited with directly inciting the current upheavals in the Middle East and Africa, they are unquestionably active in supporting and promoting the terrorism, insurgency, and open warfare which characterize local unrest in those regions. Central and South America, as well as Asia, reflect similar tensions that threaten to become more serious.

Against this backdrop, the US armed forces face greater challenges than ever before. Preventing war is, of course, the central and overriding goal of US national security policy. But should deterrence fail, the paramount aim is to limit the conflict or, if American interests are critically involved, to win it. Between these extremes, US armed forces units designated to conduct special operations are likely to play a key role in foreseeable and exceedingly challenging situations. Under current conditions, these missions will bear the additional burden of intense public scrutiny and even public criticism, both at home and abroad.

The Problem of Definition

There is a divergence of opinion among military practitioners and analysts regarding the nature and the definition of special operations. Not long ago, many uniformed personnel would have defined special operations as night or river operations. Today, still others would equate special operations with Ranger operations—those mounted in the past, as well as those conducted within the present Ranger mission. Another interpretation posits special operations as Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP).

Within special operations units themselves, there are different views on the meaning of the term. For example, there is a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) with a quite limited mission; there is also a Joint Special Operations Support Element (JSOSE) that has a very broad mission. There are not many US Army special operations personnel who would include traditional tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of conventional units under the rubric of special operations. Yet, US Air Force special operations officers would probably consider them as such.

If the US armed forces are to develop sound special operations doctrine and capabilities to execute the missions assigned to them in the 1980s, it will be necessary to arrive at a consensus on what constitutes special operations activities. The revised Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 definition of special operations indicates that current thinking recognizes a need to refine the term and broaden its scope of application. (See chapter 1, page 30.)

The Experience Factor

In developing US capabilities for special operations in the 1980s, it is useful to examine the historical record. It is striking to note that comparatively little experience has been accrued in utilizing military forces for special operations. The use of Rangers and deployment of conventional forces on special missions must also be re-examined to fully benefit from lessons learned over the years.

In general, notwithstanding some brave deeds by famous soldiers in American history, the use of military forces for special

operations is a relatively new concept. Special operations on a large, organized scale in the US armed forces began during World War II. That experience had its high and low points, both in terms of the way special operations units were employed and the results achieved. The experiences of the Rangers serve as a good example of this varying record of success.

There has been extensive criticism of both the type and duration of missions assigned to the Rangers, for example, the employment of Ranger troops as regular infantrymen, or the failure to withdraw them from combat when their highly specialized assault missions had been accomplished. Such criticism persisted throughout World War II and the Korean conflict when Ranger units were deployed. On the other hand, the criticism was matched by the praise Ranger units received on the basis of their performance in action.

Detachment 101, the only real military unit in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, perhaps typifies the overall conduct of military forces in special operations. Detachment 101 performed a general unconventional warfare mission; an indigenous Asian people, the Kachins, comprised most of the fighting force. The introduction of the unit into action was a painful process. General Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, the commander in the China-Burma-India theater, had little regard for irregular warfare, and opposed use of the Kachins in his area of responsibility. However, Major General William J. Donovan of the OSS "force fed" Detachment 101 into the theater, and the unit ultimately conducted successful operations in Burma.

Developing a special operations capability within the US armed forces has never been an easy task. The road has always led through a minefield of doctrinal differences, intra- and interservice rivalries, conflicting resource priorities and limitations, and a general lack of understanding by the military at large. General Douglas MacArthur did not permit OSS operations in his theater of operations. It is ironic to note, however, that one of the largest, best-organized, and most successful of US guerrilla forces operated in General MacArthur's theater. It was not an OSS detachment or a regular military unit, but rather a group under the direction of a few US Army officers in the Philippines who re-

fused to surrender and eluded capture by the Japanese. They withdrew to the mountains to organize resistance activities in various parts of the country.

US Army PSYOP and Special Forces units have travelled the same difficult road in their development. A number of officers who served in the OSS or in the Philippines during World War II managed to maintain enough determination and vision to surmount the frustrations of the post-war years. As the Korean War got underway, these veteran officers were able to organize the forces needed to conduct PSYOP and unconventional warfare. Radio broadcasting and leaflet operations were initiated, and Special Forces units were successfully deployed in the waning months of the Korean conflict. On the other hand, comparatively little use was made of military special operations units in that action, notwithstanding significant pressure from Washington. Most special operations activity during the war in Korea was conducted by the comparatively new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which, after the fashion of the OSS, maintained a number of military personnel but organized no military units able to conduct operations.

The original charter written for Army special operations units (PSYOP and unconventional warfare) specifically limited their missions to wartime. Thus, for several years following the Korean conflict, their activity was limited to further organizational work and preparatory training. It is interesting to speculate whether, on a higher strategic plane, the deployment of Army Special Forces units to Europe in 1953, together with their "marriage" to certain Air Force units, was not part of a carefully orchestrated special operations campaign designed to support national policy. After all, the 1950s were the years of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the height of the Cold War, when the "roll-back" of restless Soviet satellites was considered feasible. By 1956, there was turbulence in Poland, East Germany, and Hungary.

During that same period, the Ranger companies which had served in Korea were disbanded; later, the newly created Special Forces units were reduced. Many of the manpower "spaces" which had belonged to the Special Forces went to so-called "foxhole troops," a move that reflected the thinking of major commanders in 1956–1957 and presaged attitudes that emerged once again in

1973. It is ironic that the Rangers were "reborn" in 1973, in the wake of Vietnam and at the time of the Mideast oil crisis, reflecting the Army's perception of its emerging strategic and tactical needs within budget constraints and manpower ceilings. In that same process, Special Forces units were substantially reduced.

It is a fact that, since they were conceived in 1952, the military capabilities to conduct unconventional warfare have not been used for that purpose. The members of a few Special Forces teams operating in Laos under the White Star program between 1959 and 1962 might suggest an exception to that statement, but in a general sense it is true. The Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group-Vietnam (MACSOG-V), which touted itself in its briefings as the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF), by definition, conducted no guerrilla warfare in denied areas. Moreover, for some reason, MACSOG-V did not conduct all military special operations in the theater and did not have special operations units assigned or attached to it. The Army 5th Special Forces Group was not a part of MACSOG-V. The Air Force special operations units were dedicated to MACSOG-V in practice, but technically they were not assigned or attached. The fact that full-scale unconventional warfare was not conducted throughout the history of MACSOG-V (that is, between 1964 and 1972) raises some difficult issues. The short tour of duty, with its inevitable effect on unconventional warfare, was undoubtedly a major reason for the lack of special operations in Vietnam. On MACSOG-V's behalf, it must be said that the missions it performed—strategic reconnaissance and other covert operations not yet declassified—it did well. Its strategic reconnaissance operations were considered highly effective by Commanding General Creighton W. Abrams.

Indeed, the strategic reconnaissance aspect of MACSOG-V's operations can and should serve as a basis for building the strategic reconnaissance mission into US special operations planning for the future. The tactics and techniques developed in the cross-border operations provide valuable lessons, as do the coordination methods and special channels of communication.

The MACSOG-V experience also points up certain basic organizational and operational problems. For example, at the theater

level, the CIA was not part of a team effort in collaboration with MACSOG-V. This stemmed from established command arrangements, but the effect was to limit the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), in his overall prosecution of special operations.

The most numerous, and perhaps most effective, of all special operations conducted by US armed forces to date are the activities of Air Force, Navy, and Army special operations units in collective security (advisory) operations. Since they were first undertaken in Laos and Vietnam in the late 1950s, these collective security operations—variously known as counterinsurgency, Internal Defense and Development (IDAD), and foreign internal defense—have exploited the skills inherent in unconventional warfare training and capability. In Vietnam, the concepts of organizing, equipping, training, and directing indigenous forces were focused almost entirely on the hill tribes as part of the overall war effort. Even the somewhat visionary concept of guerrilla warfare organization, which Brigadier General Russell Volckmann set forth in his initial doctrine and planning for Special Forces units, proved effective in organizing and equipping these irregular hill tribe forces, known generally as Montagnards.

In addition, Army Special Forces were organized almost precisely according to the tenets of unconventional warfare doctrine—from the country level down through local levels. Significant parts of their total effort were the civic action and PSYOP programs. Another large undertaking, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program, was initiated by the CIA in 1961, using Army Special Forces. It was turned over to the military as Operation Switchback in 1962-63, and was highly effective. However, its impact was lost when the basic principle of working closely with the indigenous peoples was ignored. The hill tribes were moved to lowlands, promises made to them were forgotten, and their cultural beliefs were violated. The Montagnards thus rapidly lost their motivation.

Collective security activities are still being conducted in many parts of the world by military mobile training teams (MTT) which train and advise host country regular units, militia, reserve forces, and security units. A major part of all MTT activity is carried out

by US military special operations units. The training of these units encompasses a wide range of activity from ordinary military combat and counterguerrilla operations to building bridges and counterterrorist operations. The utilization of the US armed forces in such collective security activities reached peak effectiveness during the 1960s and 1970s.

In addition to the extensive MTT program, two very large-scale recovery operations have been attempted by special operations units—both without success. The Son Tay raid into North Vietnam in 1970 and the Iran hostage rescue attempt in 1980 are the cases in point. The Son Tay raid was executed flawlessly, but the US prisoners had already been moved. The Iran raid suffered serious difficulties en route to the target area and was subsequently aborted.

Looking Ahead in the 1980s

The United States and its allies are being tested almost everywhere around the world by the Soviet Union and its proxies and surrogates. That is true of the present volatile era and promises to remain so for some time. In most instances to date, the test has entailed an attempt to achieve control of a nation without risk of major war at the lowest cost possible, and without visible Soviet participation.

In some countries, such as El Salvador, the United States must work with what is available to help the Salvadorans defeat the guerrillas. At the same time, the United States is trying to influence social change and improvement through civic action at the lowest level, and through diplomatic pressure at the highest level. In other countries where the threat is less immediate or is only at the incipient insurgency stage, special operations units are also appropriate for use. If time permits, great care can be taken to influence institutions and key people in order to achieve greater security. Timely decisions for assistance activities in a country are decisions that should be made before an insurgency develops strength. Moreover, collective security commitments should not fluctuate. If a commitment is not made with evident determination, the opposition forces can always wait. The insurgent forces

are aware of and prepared for conditions of protracted war, and they receive doctrinal and tactical guidance from people who support their objectives.

Terrorist activities will continue to occur throughout the world until nations learn how to cope with them, especially in terms of handling publicity problems and of acceding to demands under coercion. In such circumstances, the ability to carry out counterterrorist surgical strikes will be extremely important. The unfortunate Iran hostage experience, in which the US Embassy was seized with the acquiescence of the host government, could be repeated elsewhere. In some cases, the appropriate US reaction might involve use of major military forces instead of a surgical strike. The country involved, its neighbors, and the estimated impact of various options in the near and long term would be important considerations in determining the proper course of action. In some situations, the United States might require special operations capabilities other than the counterterrorist strike force (for example, in the Sudan in 1973 when the US ambassador-designate, the chargé d'affaires, and one other person were taken hostage.) In some cases, only advice and material assistance may be requested, such as aircraft, sighting devices, surveillance devices, weapons, incapacitating agents, or training. In addition to its basic mission, a special operations counterterrorist unit should have an assigned wartime mission, under which it could conduct sensitive operations consistent with its training.

The prevalence of the nuclear threat in national security thinking, together with the increase in Soviet-sponsored wars of national liberation, has caused many to believe that unconventional warfare is passé. This notion is derived from the fixation on a short war scenario, which leaves no time to organize a guerrilla force along World War II lines. Yet, various Soviet satellites in the Warsaw Pact have demonstrated strong resistance to Moscow's domination. While Poland is the most recent example, each of the bloc countries, with the exception of Bulgaria, has indicated a desire for more independence. The presence of potential fighters in the Soviet rear area demands attention, particularly since comparatively little effort in manpower and material resources on the NATO side would be required to make such a force a reality in

wartime. Under such conditions, dissidents within the Soviet Union itself might also rise up against the regime.

Unlike the French resistance during World War II, today's freedom fighter in Eastern Europe would not have to wait endlessly for special operations units to return to the continent, or wait for a build-up and the order to strike. Some units are on the continent, others are only a day away. The biggest problems would be penetrating enemy lines and making safe contact with friendly elements (which might be largely Bloc military personnel), in addition to organizing the overall effort operationally and logistically with speed and security.

Special operations units trained in the arts of unconventional warfare might also be used in areas contiguous to, at some distance from, and even within selected areas of the Soviet Union (such as Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Siberia), in order to draw off Soviet resources. Friendly special operations units in those locations could seek out and strike at targets by guiding long-range missiles, aircraft, possibly naval gunfire, and even by direct action to inflict damage. Initially, they might operate alone or with a minimum number of indigenous personnel, building the force and diversifying operations as circumstances permitted. Such forces could wage war at low cost and make a real contribution to the overall effort, both strategically and tactically.

The principal point is that unconventional warfare must not be judged unrealistic due to the general postulation of a short war in modern conditions. On the contrary, serious study, planning, and preparations should be carried out on how to capitalize on the potential manpower that might become available rapidly in the enemy rear.

The Spread of Contingencies

Because of the drastic expansion of the US Army corps commander's area of influence and interest, his responsibilities include developing an improved capability to find, fix, and kill targets. This has evoked a series of solutions designed to give the corps commander additional pairs of eyes on the battlefield: more aviation assets, a corps reconnaissance unit, and a Ranger unit. At the

same time, and coincident with the growth of the nuclear threat and the loss of interest in unconventional warfare in the classic sense, there has been a corresponding increase in the desire for direct action by ground forces against selected targets. Logically, those ground forces are the Army special operations units. In effect, resources capable of a potentially fruitful long-term impact through unconventional warfare would be utilized to accomplish an immediate but short-term impact. It takes years to train for the former mission, only weeks for the latter. But targeting of high-priority units is a must. The real problem is to achieve both results: the long-term and the short-term.

Just over 20 years ago, there emerged a minor movement, probably not entirely new, to rebuild the Ranger units and place them in the Army Special Forces Groups. The purpose of placing the Special Forces and Rangers together was to revalidate the theater commander's broad need for both direct action/deep reconnaissance and unconventional warfare operations, and to provide appropriately trained personnel for both tasks. In addition to meeting the wider operational requirements, this would have provided a fresh recruitment pool for the Special Forces program. Such recruits, given proper developmental training might have qualified for the more complex mission requiring unit-level leadership, instructor ability, and a somewhat different psychological profile. Even though that merger attempt failed, there is another opportunity to accomplish the same purpose and more, as the Rangers have been allied with the 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM).

Ranger skills, which coincide with special operations in a widening range of tasks, can be included in special operations planning. Capabilities for the Rangers should involve selected aspects of counterterrorist operations, advance operations for the Rapid Deployment Force or Central Command (CENTCOM), short-term combat and field reconnaissance operations against selected priority targets facing the corps, and other selected direct action missions.

There is almost no limit to the types of contingencies which might necessitate a US armed forces capability to respond. Most of these would develop in situations short of war—collective se-

curity operations, counterterrorist operations, the demonstration of a military presence in an area, or very carefully controlled combat operations as an adjunct to diplomatic measures. All such operations should be designed to avoid major conflict and to prevent war if possible, and their importance cannot be overemphasized.

Special operations units are ideally suited for "peacetime" activities designed to prevent war. Their relatively small size, training, general separation from divisions and corps, and unique personnel distinguish special operations units in the minds of potential adversaries. A special operation can be recognized as a measured response, a careful statement on the part of the United States. Its employment can still leave room for diplomacy, as such employment would fall far short of a major commitment of larger military forces which could lead to undesired accidents or irrevocable involvement. At the same time, the capacity for a high level of professionalism in special operations units can assure that the desired impact is achieved when they are committed.

To perform properly in strategic operations under "peacetime" rules, special operations units must work effectively with other government agencies: the Departments of State and Justice, the US Information Agency, and the CIA. Participation at interdepartmental meetings requires organization, planning, and selected personnel. This has long been recognized as important, but it seems to materialize only in time of crisis. In the 1980s, interdepartmental coordination is a must on a day-to-day basis. Active interdepartmental interface can be costly, but not nearly as costly as a missed opportunity to prevent the unwanted escalation of a crisis or the failure of a mission.

Unique Requirements—Unique Capabilities

In both peacetime and wartime, special operations units are comparatively inexpensive and represent great force-multiplier capabilities. Still, despite these elevated purposes and capabilities, the practical development and retention of special operations units will be extremely difficult.

Resources for these capabilities demand special consideration. It has often been argued that any good infantryman will make a

good Special Forces soldier. That is simply not true. Recognizing the special skill factors on both sides, the difference between a good infantryman and a good Special Forces operator is one of psychological make-up, which in turn affects mission acceptability. Not everyone is suited to operations in denied—that is, hostile—areas, or prepared for long periods of duty with predominantly indigenous forces and without artillery, helicopter, or fighter air support. Not every good infantryman can perform well in a counterterrorist unit. Therefore, these highly specialized and sensitive operations must be assigned to people who can conduct them effectively. New concepts of recruitment should be considered to broaden the potential base and source of the best candidates. It may be desirable to enter the civilian manpower market with a recruitment profile of a potentially successful special operations candidate. It would probably be cheaper than the current practice of minimum entrance requirements, which suffers from a high attrition rate among trainees. It is not even certain that today's trainee in special operations is up to the standard of the "good infantryman," inasmuch as he lacks the requisite experience.

Another reason for upgrading the personnel recruitment and selection program is the need for skill requirements, particularly in operational detachments. The Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) of individuals recruited must be carefully calculated to reflect the special characteristics needed to perfom in the basic missions of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, such as operations, intelligence, use of weapons, demolitions and construction, communications, and medical aid. These skills are important in order to ensure the necessary leadership and instructor ability.

Most of the experienced weapons personnel in special operations units today, as well as many of the other MOS personnel, have trained and led indigenous companies in combat. Many operations/intelligence sergeants have actually led indigenous battalions in combat. Most detachments would not have made the grade in Vietnam, Laos, and elsewhere without their highly skilled medics. During operations in denied areas, the team medics become vital, indeed critical, to the mission. "A" Detachment and

Navy SEAL Detachment organizations are the most basic, and yet the soundest, of all organizations developed to date; and they will remain that way until they are replaced by technological developments. To change them substantially for anything except a special mission requirement would be a high-risk venture.

That is not to say that Ranger squads or counterterrorist teams should be organized into "A" Detachments. Even if a composite Special Forces Group were developed, these elements (Ranger, counterterrorist, or other specialized elements) should be organized in such a way as to retain their discrete missions.

The special operations soldier is normally sent on difficult assignments in difficult places. Technology can help him accomplish his mission, whether it is clandestine penetration or successful exfiltration. For example, elements seeking enemy units on target acquisition missions need the means to help find the target, positively locate it, communicate the data, and mark or help guide the strike weapon to the target. However, there are more targets than special operations soldiers. The men are to be afoot in enemy territory, so their tools need to be practical, light, silent, and reliable—the best that technology can provide. This same concept of support pertains to every element in special operations, from air support and underwater gear to the wiretapping device or the eating untensil. On the other hand, one can write extensively about special operations capabilities, but people are still the ultimate measure of both capabilities and successful operations.

Obstacles to Achievement

It was noted earlier that the road to special operations development in the US armed forces led through a minefield. Experience with OSS revealed that many senior military commanders considered the "dirty" tactics practiced by special operations units as simply not part of the military arsenal. Vestiges of that attitude still exist today. It is argued that special operations units draw off the best people from the services, thus, formation of these units is resisted by regular force commanders. The word "special" or "unconventional" seems to run counter to military tradition in which things are "uniform," "regular," and "conventional."

These attitudes reflect human nature, and as such are understandable. While special operations units are very small compared to conventional forces, their very size often makes them vulnerable to further cuts or elimination when forces are redesigned or budgets reduced. The age-old question of staff responsibility—Intelligence (G-2), Operations (G-3), and Civil-Military Operations (G-5)—creates problems which impinge on the successful development and retention of forces. These are only some of the internal service difficulties encountered at every step in the budget cycle.

Interservice problems can be just as troublesome for special operations force development, if not more so, than intraservice problems. In the early days, the CIA may not have been anxious to see the Army develop a special operations capability. Although the Air Force appreciated CIA operations, they were not anxious to see the Army involved. These rivalries revealed themselves in the development and coordination of Command Relationship Agreements and the Contingency Support Agreement between the DOD, the services, and the CIA. Those documents spell out the interrelationships between the CIA and the DOD special operations units both in peacetime and wartime, and provide for exchanges of training and equipment. They are vital to routine collaboration and transition from peacetime to wartime responsibilities in a theater of operations.

Other interservice rivalries became evident when the Army decided to develop a Scuba (Self-Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus) capability for operations in inland waterways, to include caching and other activities. The Navy questioned that program because underwater work is normally the domain of the Navy's Sea, Air, Land Team (SEAL) and Underwater Demolition Team (UDT). Similarly, the Army wondered why the Navy SEAL had to be a parachutist. The growth of Army aviation assets may have alarmed the US Air Force somewhat in Vietnam, particularly with the increasing size and numbers of Army transport aircraft. The Army looked askance at the Air Force need for certain types of helicopters. Army Special Forces and Air Force Air Commandos (Special Operations Forces) were very much in the middle of that worrisome problem. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had to reconcile the issue personally. Yet, at the unit level,

it should be noted that such interservice problems rarely surfaced. Air Force and Army special operations units were collaborating and conducting effective clandestine air operations training for years while "official" procedures were still being worked out at the headquarters level. There is always cooperation in action at the working level; the symptoms of interservice rivalries are more noticeable, and indeed real, at senior echelons.

Interservice cooperation is probably more vital in special operations than in most other areas of military activity. Special operations, by their nature, are almost always joint or collaborative undertakings. It is difficult to envision a ground/surface special operations mission of extended duration that does not require Air Force support, CIA input, and so on. Because joint operations can be very complex, they demand organization, teamwork, planning, and practice—preferably, all on a continuing basis as part of an integrated joint force.

Progress Through Collaboration

Despite some continuing differences, it must be stated that great progress has been made recently in establishing and operating joint staffs and organizations in the field of special operations. This momentum, if that is what it proves to be, should be exploited to achieve a joint special operations organization at the national level that is capable of long-range planning, interdepartmental coordination, and effective response to direction from the National Command Authority in order to perform selected missions. No existing organization can accomplish this task: the JSOC is limited in mission and force; the JSOSE is in the wrong place organizationally, and it is also mission- and force-limited. If and when such a national level joint special operations organization is achieved, the United States can start to think positively about an overall strategy for special operations to contribute to national security objectives.

In the meantime, it is essential that farsighted people with the courage of their convictions carry the torch in the continuing development of special operations capabilities. During the balance of the 1980s and into the 1990s, special operations units must be

capable of flawless joint performance in peacetime and at all levels of war, whether in foreign internal defense (collective security), counterterrorist operations, advance operations, unconventional warfare, direct action, or strategic reconnaissance.

Discussion

Dr. Edward N. Luttwak

Searching for viable definitions of special operations activities, I have concluded that they can be divided into a number of broad categories. These include a first group which can be performed by regular forces of high quality: deep scouting, that is, the ability to penetrate by stealth into somebody else's territory to gather intelligence; and sabotage, that is, the destruction of undefended targets, which requires some engineering skills, but little more. Then there is the assault raid, which requires the previously mentioned skills plus high-grade combat capabilities.

A second type was highly developed during World War II, and since used by the Israelis—the diversionary penetration. This is extremely difficult, but its results can sometimes be very spectacular. It requires a body of men with enemy uniforms, enemy equipment, very highly developed language skills and behavior simulation skills, and a great deal of *sang froid*. The idea is to penetrate the enemy military system and join it as an additional unit, normally in the guise of special forces, an intelligence detachment, or security troops. The Germans had an organization exclusively for this purpose during World War II. This sort of action clearly demands very special skills, which cannot belong to the repertoire of any normal military force, however special or elite.

A third group covers both guerrilla organization and counter-revolutionary warfare. Guerrilla organization presupposes that

there are people already fighting or predisposed to fight against an objectionable government or occupying power. Upon going in, it is necessary to recruit, motivate, control, and supply. For those purposes one needs general organizing skills, plus some modest combat skills, certainly nothing spectacular. The main requirement is nonmilitary—real knowledge and sensitivity about the cultural milieu, and also political skills, of course. These capabilities clearly cannot be expected in regular military forces, however elite they might be.

Counterrevolutionary warfare includes the above plus something new. Revolutionary warfare includes a clandestine element, that is, fighters hiding in the mountains or the forest; they are guerrillas. And there is also a covert element, that is, people who are not hidden at all but living among the peasants or citizenry at large; they are in fact the propagandists and the terrorists.

In order to fight counterrevolutionary warfare, it is therefore necessary to operate both in a clandestine mode, which any elite (or indeed any competent military organization at all) should be able to do by various techniques, depending on its quality. But the covert enemy must be fought by the techniques of espionage and counterespionage.

Having studied the history of these special and irregular forms of warfare, I arrive at an extremely negative conclusion as to the US capability to be effective in this realm. If one takes all the activities we would describe as commando activities, what are the requirements? A small body of troops, very well trained (primarily in fieldcraft), able to move and fight in all types of terrain. This obviously calls for prolonged basic training periods—for example, 32 weeks. Then, in order to retain this level of training, the troops must be kept in units for long periods of time. That is difficult but not impossible. The really impossible part is that in order to be successful in commando operations, the same officers must both plan and lead the operation. One cannot have a group of planners sitting somewhere in an administrative setting, who then hand over a plan to the commandos saying, "Do it." The same people who plan must also lead in action.

Now, the problem is that when one looks for people in the military establishment who can both plan very intricate operations

and then lead the troops in these very difficult operations, there are not many available. The officers so defined are, of course, the very best, and the ones who are going to become generals very fast. That in turn means that the only way one can have a really successful commando force is to ensure that the overall military organization treats the commando force as a high-quality center for the forces as a whole, a center where accelerated promotion can take place. Only this will attract the sort of officers that are needed by a competent commando force.

Let us assume that an officer goes from line duty into the commando forces. He should serve perhaps 4, 5, or 6 years with the commandos, because it is imperative that he acquire the full range of expertise. He may fall behind a bit in rank; but when he comes out he should regain all the lost ground, and in fact get a bonus of extra promotion.

The reason for my pessimism is this: a military establishment primarily focused on administration, bureaucrcy, major weapons-system acquisitions, management, and office politics can only regard commando activities as deviant. The sort of officer who is actually interested in tactics, leadership, and operational planning tends to be seen as an unusual fellow, not the type of officer whom the generals will want to promote at all. He is seen as an oddball who will rise up to colonel, and then be thrown out.

When a bureaucratized and engineering-oriented military establishment attempts commando operations, it is always "unlucky." (And, by the way, it might also be unlucky in large-scale warfare.) I will give you two examples; first, Son Tay. The action starts with the information that was received on May 9, 1970: American POWs in Ap Loy and Son Tay. Had this information gone to a commando organization—consisting of, say, 30 or 40 officers who have spent 5 or 6 years doing only commando work—their own self-contained planning group would have said, "Right. This is where they are. What's the most prosaic vehicle that will get us there?" Then they would have gone in to take the POWs out.

When a bureaucratized establishment receives the same information, it sets up a planning committee. When the planning committee advises how to go and get the POWs out, the establishment sets up a feasibility planning group or an assessment group. This

is followed by an evaluation group, and so on. Then, after 6 months or so, all concerned are finally ready for the operation, which has been planned and prepared as a very small-scale D-Day. Then they go in, and of course they discover that the POWs are not there anymore. Son Tay was a crushing failure of the planning system. The Israeli raid at Entebbe was planned and executed in 5 days.

Second—perhaps the ultimate example—there is Desert One, an operation that ought to be studied very carefully because it reflects all the maladies of the command structure. There was much interservice accommodation, very apparent in a plan clearly designed by people without a clue as to the realities of war. Most of you have seen the Holloway Report, so I need not go into it in any detail.

My own reflections on this report lead me to a pessimistic conclusion. In effect, if one accepts that commando activities are important, one must use the commando organization as the center of excellence for the armed forces as a whole, as a place of accelerated promotion, in order to attract the very best people who can both plan and command. Only then will one have a successful commando organization, a place where one educates the kind of people who should be in charge of the armed forces; because commando warfare is pure warfare, real warfare in its essence. In other words, one cannot "fix" the problem under the existing system; rather, one must fix the system.

In counterrevolutionary warfare the problem is even more acute, owing to the peculiar nature of such warfare. One is dealing with a contested situation in which two parties are involved, one being the government—one's enemy if the task is guerrilla organization, or one's friend if the task is counterrevolutionary warfare.

The two sides are involved in a political contest. Each tries to pull the people to its own side, using ideology, fear, and rewards. This is the kind of war that one cannot expect to win half-heartedly. In conventional warfare one can sometimes win even if one is uncertain or half-hearted in one's approach. But in counterrevolutionary warfare, if the people in that country feel that we are not totally committed to victory, then they cannot possibly take the risk of joining the side that we are supporting.

It is an exercise in reciprocity. We want the people to join our side. They hesitate because they sense that we are half-hearted, that we have not really made up our mind to stick to it till victory. In the end there is a great mass of people who join the other side or else remain passive, and we cannot enlist their support. And we cannot blame them because, after all, when we finally decide that we cannot win, we pull out and go home, and distribute medals to one another. They stay there and suffer.

Here too, the problem has no solution unless one can fix the system. The operations I am talking about are small in budgetary terms, but they reflect an issue which permeates the entire system. Incidentally, if one looks at who has been commanding the Israeli Army for all these years, one finds that after a brief experiment with the administrative and logistic types, it has always been led by what I would call "commando officers."

If one looks at the British Army, one will note that a conspicuous number of people get to the top after periods of service in the Special Air Service (SAS). The SAS does not have its own corps of officers. Its officers are drawn from line regiments. They spend enough time with the SAS to become expert and then they go back to their own line regiments. Among British officers, service in the SAS is recognized as a fast track for promotion. This means that the system takes it seriously, and therefore it functions successfully.

Now a final word. As an analyst of these things, I note a very interesting phenomenon of our own day with regard to counterrevolutionary warfare activities. There are two wars going on in Central America, one in El Salvador and one in Guatemala. If the press wants to talk to a Salvadoran guerrilla, the journalists check into the local hotel and a friendly local taxi driver will take them for a short ride outside town. They meet the guerrillas, photograph them, and so on. If they go to Guatemala to look for the guerrillas, the only ones they will find are in the mortuary. They can never encounter a live guerrilla.

The war in Guatemala is being won; the war in El Salvador is being lost. And the two wars are in the same part of the world, in similar cultural milieux. The one big difference is that the Guatemalans are apparently determined to win, and their determina-

tion to win is very clear. Secondly, the Guatemalans are extremely modest in terms of how they conduct their operations. They conduct them on the assumption that they have a third-rate army; they are not attempting, as we are doing in El Salvador, to get a third-rate army to function as if it were a first-rate army. Even a bad army can win a guerrilla war if it uses the appropriate tactics and methods systematically. We are, of course, training and advising the El Salvador Army. The Guatemalans are denied our help—and they are winning.

Major General Michael D. Healy, USA (Ret.)

Whenever you discuss special forces, special operations, and the attendant military disciplines, you are talking primarily about the soldiers who accomplish these tasks. Such activities that have been successful have succeeded because the soldiers were carefully selected, properly trained, and well led. Even when mission planning from on high was obviously weak, and support and cooperation from conventional forces lacked the proper selection, training and leadership carried the day. The quality of these special operations soldiers, sailors, and airmen that Colonel Pezzelle discusses in his paper is crucial for special operations of the 1980s. They represent the largest, best trained, immediately available reservoir of talent to exploit the fleeting opportunities for special operations in the 1980s.

My comments on the use of special operations in the 1980s will be in, part, by way of reflections on Vietnam, observed attitudes, and the type of special operations that seem to have currency for the 1980s. Special operations missions can be successful only under the tightest security. That fact must be accepted by everyone. Ours were done in secrecy, even from some of our own senior field commanders in Vietnam. Missions, plans, methodology, and execution were formulated and carried out on a strict need-to-know basis. This caused serious resentment in field headquarters of conventional forces, and a critical lack of coordination, cooperation, and trust resulted. For the 1980s an education program both inside and outside of special operations units must be undertaken to preclude inadvertent impediments to mission accomplishment.

Regarding attitude, I know of no question ever being raised by participants regarding morality or legality of the mission. There was simply a dedicated determination to win on the part of the officers and soldiers to whom these tasks were assigned. Despite petty detractors, they went out and got the job done. On occasion, some people got in trouble, not because of hesitancy or inactivity, but rather for overzealous actions and sometimes because of misunderstanding. Our Special Forces have been severly criticized from within the Army, mostly by the uninformed or ill-informed and envious second guessers. To the informed observer, a basic knowledge and reasonable explanation of what we are all about will still most of the criticism. In Vietnam, the Special Forces made some mistakes, mostly traceable to improper tasking of these superb soldiers in low level intelligence operations that rightfully should have been accomplished by tactical units. Special Forces did them because no one else was available.

On the other hand, they controlled up to 69,000 Montagnards and other ethnic and religious minority peoples in Vietnam, thus providing the only semblance of central government control over such groups. Remember, when we arrived, the North Vietnamese had already begun to proselytize and to put some remote area Montagnards into their logistical chain, carrying ammunition and supplies south along the "Ho Chi Minh Trail." The plans for impressing these minorities into service were well advanced, and they posed a severe threat to the Republic of Vietnam. Our young Special Forces sergeants, lieutenants, and captains went to work, at first under the tutelage of highly trained and knowledgable case officers. They succeeded in inducing the minorities to make a commitment against the invasion, if not to the central government. Later they assumed full responsibility for initial contact and recruitment. However, the case officers were always available to assist. This relationship is vital in the 1980s and beyond.

At their peak, less than 2,300 US Special Forces soldiers skillfully controlled and led about 69,000 indigenous fighters, denying their use to the enemy, and precluding what otherwise would have been classified as genocide if control had slipped to the other side. There would have been no other alternative but to wage an antilogistical, primarily air campaign against them as these peoples

supported the enemy. That in and of itself was a most successful special operation—control and denial of a remote population to the opposition.

It did not matter that the enemy knew where our base camps were. We purposely placed them astride enemy lines of communication, initially for intelligence as well as for population control. Later, as it developed, we could generally disrupt their freedom of traverse with organic firepower and maneuver. When we could, we caused enough trouble to entice them into a critical mass to attack us in strength. When they were clearly fixed we called in air strikes, including B-52s, and bloodied them time and time again. Our successes can be measured by what happened to many North Vietnamese Army assault units destined for numbered fronts in South Vietnam. Some were lost from radio contact and never surfaced again, all because of a handful of special operations soldiers wearing little green hats, who went out beyond the end of the road with a couple of hundred Montagnards and held on to those "meaningless pieces of real estate" (as the unknowledgable called our Civilian Irregular Defense Camps), and allowed themselves to be taken under siege. On occasions too numerous to mention, when we convinced the other side through various methods of deception that relief forces were not coming to our rescue, they quickly formed to make a target of their final assault formations for us. And God bless the Air Force and Army aviation—we laid waste to them with every ordnance delivery capability available. That was a successful special operation—carefully thought out, deliberately and superbly executed by 10 to 12 US Special Forces soldiers with several hundred ethnic/religious minority troops at a cost of $3.16 a day per fighter. The cost of a US PFC rifleman in Vietnam was over $100 a day, prorated cost, plus pain at home.

It is inconceivable to me that anyone in our government or our nation does not understand the Soviet Union's basic premise of ideological commitment. As late as 1976 Mr. Brezhnev said, "Although war should be banned from all future human activity, uprisings by the people to throw off the yoke of the imperialists and to adhere to our way of life is inevitable." Their commitment to

foster, enhance, and support that "inevitability" is an announced policy. Somehow, we must convince the American people, especially those who make our policy, to meet the enemy and defeat him at this level. Failure to do so will only encourage a continuation of misadventures and eventual entry into a different kind of battlefield at a much higher level of lethality where the cost will be horrendous. The special operations battlefield is the least painful contest to the least number of active participants, and it will do more to exacerbate the already worsening situation in the camps and outposts of the opposition.

The first challenge for the future is to create a new vested-interest attitude and sense of patriotism and urgency, especially among our youth and in general throughout the body politic of this nation. It cannot be done by the people in government alone. Morris Janowitz, in his book *The Reconstruction of Patriotism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), cites the rebirth of patriotism in the United States as the required first step toward an understanding by our people as well as the leadership of what is necessary, not only for special operations but for all national initiatives that will call for commitment in the 1980s and beyond. This book is a must for those who would gird us for the special operations battles of the future.

I also call another book to your attention. Theodore Shackley's *The Third Option* (New York: Reader's Digest Press/McGraw Hill, 1981) is one of the best small volume accounts of how we must analyze and deal with situations such as those facing us in Guatemala or El Salvador. *The Third Option* identifies the three phases of special operations planning: cadre, incipient, and operational. The countermeasures to be taken in each instance are listed. Considering all options, I submit that we should also take a hard look at whom we are supporting in some contested areas. Perhaps we should become engaged not only in countermeasures, but, as appropriate, in assuming a special operations initiative to support those who would free themselves from oppression before they look for help in all the wrong places, regardless of whether the established government is perceived as a friend or not. In whichever mode we may find ourselves, there is an absolute re-

quirement for a coordinated, joint, and combined effort—a unity of command and a unity of purpose—where interservice and interagency squabbles are unacceptable.

On the question of the national will or ability to prosecute our interests through special operations, there is another excellent appraisal I have read recently by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983). On page 1 he quotes General Weyand, former Chief of Staff of the Army:

> "Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the American Army and the American people. The American Army really is a people's army, in the sense that it belongs to the American people, who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement . . . . When the Army is committed, the American people are committed. When the American people lose their commitment, it is futile to try to keep the Army committed."

In the final analysis, the conventional military establishment is not so much an arm of the executive branch as it is a property of the American people. The Army, therefore, cannot ever be committed with a chess-game attitude, whether it is in special or conventional operations. The conventional military forces of the United States should never again be told to enter a battlefield and not be allowed to win, whatever the mission cites as the objective(s). As for our unconventional forces, winning, as such, need not be so clearly defined—their success can be achieved by merely participating—at the proper time, in the right place, and at the correct level of intensity; without over-control, fanfare, or hype. The options, even after such involvement is undertaken, are open-ended and unrestrictive. You may stay or you may quietly fold your tent and leave—whatever is in the best interest of the United States of America.

There is no question that, as in the past, we must now conduct successful special operations. And again, I reiterate that these necessary, vital tasks will require the most carefully selected, most carefully trained, and best-led men and women in our armed forces. As an aside, I might comment that promotions do not make those horses run—no, they are a special breed motivated by a much

higher calling. They are our greatest reservoir of immediately available, cost-effective talent. The services must prepare them, establish career fields, fence them from misuse, and cooperate fully in this effort to provide the United States with the best Special Operations Forces possible for the battle of the 1980s and beyond.

General Discussion

Colonel Pezzelle, after summarizing the principal points made in his paper, deplored the many instances in recent years when the United States has faced crises involving terrorist or other hostile action against its citizens but lacked the capability for an effective response. He saw grounds for encouragement, however, in the slow evolution of the US Special Forces and psychological operations capabilities, coupled now with the inclusion of the Rangers as part of a larger elite organization suitable for a wide variety of special activities. The United States is now in a better position to use minimum force as an adjunct to diplomacy. Through merger with the Rangers, the Special Forces have acquired new versatility. Specialists can be obtained without cutting into conventional infantry resources. Conversely, direct action can be undertaken using Rangers without depleting our unconventional warfare capability, which is so expensive to acquire, train, and develop. The US special warfare repertoire has thus been expanded significantly. The traditional Special Forces roles of strategic reconnaissance, target acquisition, unconventional warfare, and internal defense retain their importance, and they are now supplemented by a realistic direct action capability, to be deployed as necessary.

During the 1980s, as Colonel Pezzelle sees it, these capabilities will mature, and the occasions for their application will multiply. Greater refinement in the US approach is important—not only in definition of roles, but equally in acquisition of people uniquely suited to performance of the tasks at hand. Beyond this—and truly imperative if the United States is to meet the challenges of the 1980s—a joint organization at the senior level of the military establishment must be erected and made permanent. It must oversee the full range of special operations, plan and prepare for them,

look after the personnel involved, and respond systematically to national policy on a daily basis in contrast with the traditional ad hoc approach to crisis situations. Finally, Colonel Pezzelle urged that ways be found to end internal rivalries and overcome the prevailing public indifference—even hostility—toward unconventional warfare, which stand in the way of a joint endeavor to meet the needs of the nation.

General Yarborough opened the discussion by questioning whether promotion was a serious factor in attracting military personnel to the Special Forces. Dr. Luttwak clarified his earlier point by stressing not promotion as such, but continuity of experience as the critical factor. Special operations must be viewed as a central rather than deviant career track, and outstanding officers and soldiers should be allowed to pursue it professionally. Promotion would thus follow in more or less normal fashion, and the service as a whole would be leavened and strengthened by the experience. This would be particularly true if, as foreseen during the 1980s, more extensive and frequent special operations are to be mounted.

A speaker then asked both General Yarborough and Dr. Luttwak to comment on the combining of Rangers with Special Forces. General Yarborough conceded that he had no objection to Rangers and Special Forces being under the same command, as long as it was clearly understood that their missions were fundamentally different. Dr. Luttwak agreed, and noted further that as the Rangers and Special Forces missions were different, so too were the personnel qualifications required for each. If the two are to exist under the same command roof, great care must be taken to avoid both functional and terminological confusion.

Discussion shifted then to the evident lack of understanding on the part of many senior military leaders of the need for special operations capabilities. Numerous participants expressed themselves on this subject. The joint approach to special operations organization was stressed; it should not be viewed solely as an Army mission. Inherent capabilities of all services should be melded effectivley, with specific forces designated (not dedicated) to a joint command. The concept of a joint force, of course, is not new, but doubts were voiced as to whether or not it had yet come into being in the halls of the Pentagon.

Several speakers then took exception to Dr. Luttwak's description of the Son Tay raid as having taken excessive time in the planning and preparation phase. Among the former were several retired military officers who had played key roles in the Son Tay operation. Sharp views were exchanged on the adequacy of the intelligence and on the performance of the system as such. No consensus was achieved, and discussion turned to the need for a senior-level entity capable of addressing special operations issues, presenting timely options to the President, and in turn issuing direction to a Joint Force Command. The traditional ad hoc US approach to such problems was deplored, as was the ponderous inflexibility that has often accompanied it.

Another speaker questioned the apparent proliferation of US special operations organizations—Special Forces, Rangers, SEALs, and others. Colonel Pezzelle conceded that there were numerous organizations involved, and that they might appear excessive. He explained, however, that they represented a necessary response to actual needs for specialist skills, knowledge, and experience covering a broad operational spectrum. Moreover, he added, progress has been made in defining the concepts and codifying the rules that govern those organizations. There is, of course, some distance to go before the joint organization referred to earlier can ride herd on all such activities, amalgamating them along centrally directed lines, as opposed to the fragmented approach we follow today.

The discussion closed with an extended comment by a former senior British military commander regarding the British Special Air Service (SAS). He underscored that SAS success, particularly in Borneo during the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation, was predicated upon access to good intelligence and an ability to cultivate the good will of the indigenous people. He also urged preparedness well in advance of confrontation as the *sine qua non* for coping with the flash points that occur in so many parts of the globe.

CHAPTER FIVE

Intelligence Assets and Special Operations

Paper

B. Hugh Tovar

Discussants

Samuel Wilson

Theodore G. Shackley

Intelligence is to special operations—any type of special operations—as water is to fish. The one is unthinkable without the other.

The same can and will be said about conventional military operations. Intelligence, obviously, is critically important to the success of all military endeavors. But in special operations, there is a difference—a special affinity, a symbiosis, a natural intimacy between the two that adds up to a unique and quite special relationship. This is reflected in the fact that US special operations received their earliest and most sustained conceptual and practical impetus from two intelligence organizations, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Any decision to undertake operations in the "special" category is derived ultimately from a policy position adopted by appropriate authority. If that policy is not predicated on sound intelligence, trouble is guaranteed. If the operation is designed to achieve a military, political, or psychological objective, the quality of its intelligence underpinning is no less important than the quality of the forces (men and equipment) employed. In other instances intelligence may become an end in itself, such as when special operations are focused on intelligence collection as the primary objective.

The Need to Know

Before addressing the various kinds of special operations the United States has conducted in the past and may undertake again, it should be noted that there are certain assets that are in almost universal demand:

1. Basic knowledge—the body of bedrock information pertaining to the target country, region, or place; that is, the ethnic, geographic, political, economic, and military facts of life.

2. Knowledge in depth—an understanding of the social, cultural, political, and societal conditions that distinguish the target area from all others.

In the first instance, one must ask, does the information exist? If so, where is it? Is it valid, organized, and accessible to personnel involved in the prospective operation? Affirmative answers may be available. Delving further, however, the picture is sure to be less encouraging. The experience factor becomes critical. Who has been there? Who speaks the language? With time and effort, all of these considerations can be dealt with at the operating echelons. At the senior levels, the picture has been, is, and probably will remain grim. Commanders and policymakers are rarely in a position to educate themselves beyond the realm of superficiality in foreign operations, much less to achieve what one scholar has termed the capacity for "strategic thought and vision."[1] Yet it is precisely these officials who make the overriding decisions, barely aware of their dependence upon others who are perhaps only slightly better versed in the issues at hand.

In order to expand the breadth and depth of knowledge pertaining to the target area, new assets are required. These must include:

1. Human sources within the area in question—indigenous or foreign, responsive to guidance and direction.

2. Human sources outside the area who have direct or indirect access to it.

3. Technical sources, capable of "covering" the target from within or without.

These, however, are often a luxury not readily available in most areas of special operations. Lastly, there is the *sine qua non* among intelligence assets:

4. Means of communications—they are as important within the target area, once the engagement has begun, as they are between the latter and the exterior directing authority.

It is easier to generalize along the lines suggested above than it is to key the types of special operations to the intelligence asset combinations that each is likely to require. The ad hoc aspect reflected so often in special operations—no situation seems to have an exact parallel or precedent—may indeed call for unique intelligence assets in order to meet a threat at hand. But the point of departure in almost all instances is the same—a viable, which means functioning, capability for acquiring and distributing the intelligence required to make the operation run. This in turn means that the operational entities must possess their own collection, analysis, and dissemination mechanisms—or they must be plugged into another, presumably larger and more diversified structure which can respond to their demands for information.

Both arrangements call for full implementation in advance of deployment, that is, throughout the training and planning phases of development. If the special operations units are to be active collectors of intelligence—presumably in addition to numerous other responsibilities—they must be trained to a level of proficiency substantially higher than their counterparts in conventional forces. And of course, training is not enough. They must have field experience to achieve even minimum effectiveness.

Assets and Contingencies—A Long View

Let us assume that the foregoing is feasible. In what situations, then, is this basic intelligence capability likely to be employed, and how may it have to be adapted? To answer this question, we must search for a definition of special operations and the conditions under which they may be undertaken. The Department of Defense (DOD), being primarily concerned with the prospective commitment of US forces in unconventional situations, has developed an

explicit and detailed definition of its own (see chapter 1). Without derogating from the validity and applicability of the DOD definition, the question might usefully be approached along somewhat different lines. The 1980s, as viewed perhaps simplistically by this observer, will resound with cries for help, with demands for US response in the face of either necessity or opportunity. The majority of these calls will be in the categories of defensive measures, usually in reaction to situations instigated by rivals or adversaries; offensive measures, wherein the US may see fit to expand an initially defensive program into one of aggressive action; promotion of insurgency operations, or guerrilla warfare in territory occupied by hostile forces; special operations supporting conventional military action; and rescue or counterterrorist operations against discrete targets.

Defensive measures will entail military and other forms of security assistance to governments of interest or concern to us which are under internal or external threat of disruption or attack. In the counterinsurgency tradition, assuming the challenge is accepted, these measures will be shoring-up operations, designed primarily to enable the host government to defend itself while addressing the internal weaknesses that undermine its resistance. The potential range of effort is vast. And so is the potential for increasingly deeper involvement.

If the US response is to assign a uniformed military unit to the operation, the gradations of involvement are readily discernible. Training and material assistance, then possibly civic action in various forms, will absorb much of the initial effort. Then, assuming the worst—and depending of course upon how the "worst" is viewed—this may evolve in the direction of an advisory role vis-à-vis the regular or paramilitary forces of the host country. An eventual combat role is a continuing possibility.

US forces engaged in military assistance activities have been hitherto proscribed from intelligence collection. This is an unfortunate and unrealistic limitation, long overdue for correction. In any event, somebody has to collect the information, because without it the program runs serious risks. Involvement with the host government along military assistance lines will almost certainly entail liaison with local military intelligence and possibly with the

police. Liaison under such circumstances may well result in a flow of intelligence information of some utility, but in the absence of an independent ability to verify it or double-check the quality of the donor, the liaison may result in dangerous dependence. The forces deployed must, in effect, rely upon their own association with their local counterparts, and upon whatever resources the US Mission makes available to them, for the information they must have if they are to function effectively. If the Mission is able and willing to meet their needs, well and good. Otherwise, a strong case can be made for an independent collection capability.

In any case, it is imperative that the intelligence picture be developed beyond the level of informality. A central point of information control and management must be established, and it must exploit all sources—military and civilian—for collection, collation, and evaluation. It must also ensure effective dissemination—downward as well as upward. The alternative is confusion and competition, and often monumental inefficiency. Much will depend upon the quality and composition of the Mission, on the performance of its country team or operations group under ambassadorial direction, and on the quality of support provided by Washington.

Support from Washington, to be sure, has inherent drawbacks, particularly when it takes the form of tactical direction of day-to-day operations. This is exceedingly distasteful from the field viewpoint, even though it is almost inevitable in an age of instant communications. It is sometimes—by no means always—less of a hindrance to the conduct of offensive measures, a category of special operations which arouses opposition in many quarters, lay and professional.

Offensive measures sometimes develop out of the conditions noted above. An essentially defensive situation deteriorates, and US involvement spreads and deepens. The transition from defensive to offensive measures may occur very rapidly as pressures mount. At all stages, there is a very great need for intelligence on the part of the forces committed. At the local level, they must have a finger on the political and social pulse of the country. They must know their military and police counterparts better than the latter know themselves. They must understand the society in which they

are working, and at the same time, they must share with that society the need to know the enemy. For all practical purposes, their only eyes and ears are the intelligence and security services of the local military or police with whom they work. Clearly, the latter must be assisted in their role. They are *the* intelligence assets upon which both host government and supporting ally depend. Experience indicates that this is rarely a satisfactory arrangement from the US standpoint. It can be made workable, however, if the inevitable gaps in the intelligence picture can be filled by assets available through other channels on the American side. To be sure, the more ramified the US presence, and the more deeply committed the special operations force becomes—even, for example, to the extent of playing a role in covert political operations against local targets—the more difficult it will be for that force to rely upon intelligence resources over which it has no control.

A quite different situation would prevail if the United States were to support or foment insurgency operations or guerrilla warfare in territory occupied by a hostile power. Though perhaps unthinkable not too many years ago, offensive measures of this type should be considered as within the realm of the possible during this decade. It would not be totally unreasonable to speculate that conditions in, say, Afghanistan could cause the Soviet position to deteriorate to the point that it could be exploited by guerrilla forces leavened by US surrogates; or, carrying it a bit further, Yugoslavia, invaded by Soviet forces; or Poland, with Jaruszelski acceding to a Soviet occupation. Insurgency operations in these countries are at least fair game for planning purposes.

In all three instances, intelligence would be of overriding importance. Assets within the countries, well placed and capable of expanding their coverage, plus established and tested communications channels, are prerequisites. Once contact is effected and the US intrusion takes place, the guerrilla forces become, *ipso facto,* an intelligence collection mechanism. There is no question of their reliance upon external sources. They must, moreover, function as a counterintelligence mechanism as well—aggressive and pervasive, with penetration of the government and occupying force as an immediate and continuing objective. Whatever disruptive activity the insurgency might seek to conduct, it is clear

that intelligence would—or at least should—play a co-equal part in the action.

This dictum would apply with similar force in special operations carried out in support of conventional military action. While these might encompass a variety of offensive and defensive efforts, as in the case of the US Special Forces in Vietnam, the importance of their intelligence role cannot be overstated. Each operational group (unit, detachment) becomes, perforce, its own intelligence agency—recruiting its agents, exploiting the resources of the indigenous population to which it is attached, and protecting itself from penetration.

Finally, there is the field of special operational effort that has commanded primary attention in recent years, and which is more than likely to figure high on the list of unconventional threat-responses the United States will be obliged to consider during the 1980s: surgical strikes against discrete targets—generally rescue missions or counterterrorist actions. These operations are often conducted over long distances and under circumstances fraught with danger, political sensitivity, and potentially high visibility. They require maximum intelligence input before being mounted. They have, as a rule, few assets of their own, although they may gain access to vital information by direct observation after they are committed or via local sources when they reach the target area. This is more likely to be the case in a large-scale operation, such as that carried out by the French at Kolwezi, which was of more than batallion size.

Under "normal" circumstances, forces engaged in so-called surgical strikes are totally dependent upon a steady flow of information from their directing authorities. How these authorities obtain the information varies widely. Ideally, it should be possible to draw upon sources reporting from the target area, supplementing those reports with information obtainable from technical intelligence channels. The critical factor is the speed with which current intelligence is fed into the operational unit and disseminated through it to the men who need it. As in all such situations where intelligence is to be acted upon, some viable compromise must be achieved between security and the protection of sources, and operational requirements.

Two Centuries in the Field

American experience in special operations poses an interesting dichotomy between theory and practice. From its earliest days, the United States has had a penchant for a variety of foreign-targeted activity of a military or quasi-military nature, often aggressive and conducted with great vigor and skill. There is much in common between frontiersmen of the past and today's Special Forces. It can also be argued that the Lewis and Clark Expedition was the nation's first paramilitary endeavor, one of the most daring and probably the most successful ever conducted. Lest we forget, the expedition of 1803, mounted before the Louisiana Purchase, was a military operation; its aim was to collect intelligence. It was charged with secretly penetrating the territory of a foreign state with which the United States was at peace. It is ironic that in the face of such robust origins, and notwithstanding an element of continuity in the Civil War, the Indian Wars, and the 3-year struggle to suppress the Philippine Insurrection, the concept of special operations has yet to achieve a fully acknowledged status in the US military lexicon. As a factor in our strategic thinking, it is even less established.

Who is to blame for this—if indeed blame is the proper term? Responsibility lies with senior military leaders, whose education followed other lesson plans and whose conceptual approach to war is geared to "classical" conflict on the plains of central Europe. (The mountains of the Iberian Peninsula might have suggested some useful alternatives.) It is also intriguing to note that pressure to incorporate special operations in military thinking, planning, and practice has come largely from civilians, many of them—though by no means all—associated with the intelligence community.[2]

The intelligence facet of special operations stands out under the most casual scrutiny. It may be pertinent, and no exaggeration, to suggest that special operations bear the same relationship to conventional military thinking that intelligence enjoys vis-à-vis diplomacy. Each is viewed largely as a nuisance or a distraction from the real business of war and diplomacy, though perhaps each can be useful at times. Most general officers would dispense with spe-

cial operations, just as most ambassadors—given a free choice—would rejoice at being relieved of the importunities of hyperactive intelligence officers.

Today, against the spread of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and in the context of recognizing special operations as a critical factor bearing on war planning and diplomatic responsibilities, the harsh edges of these attitudes have been rounded off. The need for both intelligence and a tailored operational response to the unconventional threats that plague us in many parts of the world is more readily conceded. There is still a question in the minds of senior government officials, military and civilian, as to how effective these approaches are likely to be. A look at the record over the past 40 years, while by no means all-inclusive and probably less than satisfying to critics of both special operations and intelligence, suggests that the two have exploited their mutual affinity with considerable effectiveness.

The Philippines

Close on the heels of the disintegration of the American position in the Philippines in mid-1942, guerrilla forces were formed on most of the major islands. They were led by Americans, mostly US Army officers but including some civilians, and were supported directly or indirectly by large elements of the Filipino population. Whether this phenomenon developed systematically or by chance is problematic; so, too, is the question of whether the guerrilla forces—which eventually attained substantial numbers and local strength—were employed effectively by the Far East Command to which they looked for direction and support.

Unquestionably, they served as rallying points for the oppressed population. They caused the occupying Japanese forces much trouble and embarrassment. Most important, they provided a steady flow of intelligence on all aspects of the Japanese presence. In the later stages of the war, they fought the Japanese with surprising effectiveness, and they were a helpful force-in-being in the Philippines as MacArthur fought his way back onto the islands in early 1945. The guerrillas constituted an insurgency, not an insurrection.

OSS Operations in Europe and Asia

Drawing heavily on British experience and methodology, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) set out to organize a national capability for the conduct of both intelligence collection and, in the words of its chief, Major General William J. Donovan, unorthodox warfare.[3] In the latter category, Donovan included psychological warfare—a field which he was obliged to share with the Office of War Information and to some extent with the Department of State—and various forms of unconventional military operations. The uniqueness of Donovan's enterprise consisted in the incorporation of the three "unorthodox" disciplines under one organizational roof.

Two sectors of OSS endeavor lend themselves to appraisal for purposes of this essay. The organization and deployment of Detachment 101 in Burma, 1943–1945, stands as an important landmark in US special warfare. This unit functioned initially as a collector of intelligence in Japanese-occupied territory. Then, as contacts became well established with the Kachin population in northern Burma, guerrilla warfare was organized and expanded with small teams of American personnel serving as nuclei. The Detachment supported a series of allied offensives in Burma by providing an intelligence screen and fielding a substantial guerrilla army deep in enemy territory. Its forward assets supplied a major portion of allied bombing targets, and they rescued over 200 Air Force personnel. The performance of the Detachment (consisting of a maximum of 549 Americans and 9,200 indigenous personnel) was acknowledged by Commanding General Joseph Stilwell as an outstanding contribution to the war effort.[4]

In Europe, in 1944, occupied France was the major target of OSS efforts. Prior to June of that year, the overriding concern had been collection of intelligence. The imminence of Operation Overlord, however, caused a major shift in emphasis to coordination of underground resistance in support of the forthcoming invasion. Two types of units were deployed in occupied territory. Three-man "Jedburgh" teams (two officers and a radio operator) were parachuted into France to organize and train French resistance elements; intelligence collection was a secondary objective. Op-

erational groups, somewhat larger than the Jedburghs, were introduced directly into the resistance to promote active guerrilla warfare and sabotage in support of the advancing allied forces. The substantial contribution of these operations to the allied effort was acknowledged by Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower and other senior commanders. It should be noted that the majority of personnel participating in these OSS operations were US Army officers and enlisted men.

The 5307th Composite Group (Provisional)

Better known as "Merrill's Marauders," the 5307th Composite Group is an interesting example of a US military unit—in itself highly "irregular" in both composition and mission—collaborating with another unit more irregular than itself. The Marauders were a long-range penetration force, directed to operate 15 to 20 miles behind the Japanese lines with the objective of capturing the Myitkyina airfield. Kachin scouts from Detachment 101 were utilized extensively as guides, and other Kachin units maintained an intelligence screen in advance of the main bodies, also ambushing and harrassing the Japanese Army very effectively. Ultimately, a Kachin battalion was integrated in the Marauder force, and took part in the successful assault on Myitkyina.[5]

The Korean War

US military involvement in special operations grew significantly during the Korean War, but the effectiveness with which intelligence assets were used is difficult to assess. More immediately apparent, and much more interesting, is the role played in Korea by US intelligence in the larger sense. On the one hand, the services conducted psychological operations and unconventional warfare activity of various types—tactical raids, ambushes, amphibious maneuvers—in enemy territory. The CIA did likewise. It placed agents in enemy territory, assisted pilots in escape and evasion, conducted sabotage, and organized indigenous forces for intelligence collection and guerrilla warfare. Both military and CIA operations were overseen by a single organization controlled by G-

2, Far East Command. The CIA, however, retained a large measure of autonomy. Notwithstanding various modifications of this arrangement, and still under staff supervision of G-2, the activities of the CIA and the armed services showed a continuing lack of effective coordination. Operational emphasis was largely placed on intelligence collection; guerrilla warfare activities were criticized as "minor in consequence and sporadic in nature."[6]

Indonesian Rebellion, 1957-1958

When Indonesian Army units in Sumatra and Sulawesi rebelled against President Sukarno and the central government, they were given encouragement and support by the United States through the CIA. Two intelligence angles affected the decision to engage in this action. First, the intelligence resources of the government as a whole were never brought fully to bear upon it. The larger questions—What are the odds for or against success? How will the central government respond? How will the Army leadership react?—were addressed by senior officials who lacked in-depth knowledge of the issues at stake. Those questions were never scrutinized by the intelligence community at a high level. Second, the assets relied upon most heavily in planning and evaluating the action were the rebel leaders and their spokesmen—hardly disinterested observers. A similar intelligence failure, of even more massive proportions, occurred 3 years later.

Bay of Pigs, 1961

Although the scale of the operation, as well as that of the ensuing disaster, was much greater than in the Indonesian effort, a striking parallel is discernible on the intelligence side. Once again, secrecy dominated planning; assumptions were made and never scrutinized in nonoperational quarters. The assets drawn upon were in the main committed to the course of action being pursued. Thus it was easy to overlook history and postulate a spontaneous uprising as the assurance of success. There were other and perhaps larger factors in this disaster, but they do not alleviate the inexcusably weak intelligence underpinning.

Vietnam—Special Forces Operations, 1961–1967

When originally deployed in South Vietnam, the US Special Forces were charged with "area development" responsibilities on behalf of the US Mission. Later this fell under the authority of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). The Special Forces were charged with organizing the Civilian Internal Defense Group (CIDG) among the population of the highlands, in cooperation with the Vietnamese Army Special Forces. Much of their activity was in the category of civic action, and much of it was focused on the collection of intelligence on the Viet Cong. At the beginning, there were no established procedures for intelligence procurement. Each Special Forces unit had to work out its own arrangements with its Vietnamese counterpart—no easy thing, given language barriers and sometimes incompatible outlooks on the task at hand. Slowly, this was transformed from a fragmented effort into a coordinated countrywide program, though it continued to be plagued by inadequate structures and procedures for handling the increasing volume of intelligence. Improvements continued in collection, analysis, and dissemination, and at one time (1966–1967) the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), received approximately 50 percent of its combat ground intelligence from the Special Forces and the latter's civilian irregulars.[7]

Son Tay Raid, 1970

The Son Tay raid was the first operation of its type ever undertaken by the United States—a long-range penetration by helicopter, deep into enemy territory, targeted against an installation in which US prisoners of war were believed to be held. From the tactical standpoint, it was an outstanding success. Its mission, of course, could not be accomplished because the prisoners had been moved to another site. Intelligence was a major factor in the planning and execution of the operation. Well in advance, the collection and analysis resources of the entire intelligence community were focused on the problem under carefully controlled conditions in view of its extreme sensitivity. It would seem that the information developed and the conclusions reached were valid. That

the prisoners were transferred shortly before the raid does not derogate from the quality of the analytic performance. By the same token, it points up sharply the vital importance of having reporting intelligence assets within the target area. Had such assets been available, the effort would probably have succeeded. Intelligence assets of another type figured in the operation. When the US helicopters were in transit toward North Vietnam from their base in Thailand, they were in a position to count on support from friendly guerrillas at a controlled site deep within enemy territory, where fuel had been prepositioned for possible emergency use.

Mayaguez Rescue, 1975

The professionalism that characterized the Son Tay raid was missing in the attempt to rescue the crew members of the *Mayaguez* after the ship was seized by the communist government of Cambodia. Intelligence assets were conspicuous by their absence in all phases of the operation. Not even maps of the target area were available for tactical planning. Communications were effective enough to allow the White House "command post" real-time control over every step of the operation, but the local commander had no direct link to the troops participating in the action. Nor was there contact with the US Mission in Bangkok, which had a large political stake in the operation, having already denied to the Thai government that the rescue attempt was taking place. The only intelligence available to the Marines on the ground was what they could see and hear, and that was coming from an enemy stronger and more aggressive than they had been led to expect. The Marines were not effectively supported with the intelligence available to the massive and complex command and control structure overseeing their efforts. Thus, they were left to continue fighting a tough enemy, unaware that the *Mayaguez* crew had been released by the Cambodians.[8]

Iran Rescue Attempt, 1980

As stated in the report of the commission established after the Iran rescue attempt to assess performance, "intelligence drove the

operation from the outset."[9] Many of the details, of course, remain classified, but it is reasonable to speculate that only the availability of intelligence assets within Iran made it possible to plan the operation with realistic prospects of success. Those assets must have been quite close to the objective, that is, the hostages; and they must have been able to communicate with the outside.

We may also assume that all resources of the intelligence community were concentrated on the problem, and that there was some form of joint task force, representing all contributing agencies, set up to collect and analyze available information. Once the rescue force was underway, and therefore dependent upon observation and base support for new information, certain anomalies became apparent. The dust storms surprised the participants. Yet, they are common local occurrences, and are treated in detail in the readily available National Intelligence Survey. More current weather intelligence would have been welcomed. Communications en route within the task force were deficient, and as a consequence, the internal intelligence flow left something to be desired. Indeed this may have affected the outcome of the operation. Communications security was undoubtedly a factor. According to the Holloway Report, a central intelligence control and evaluation channel was needed, given the complexity of the mission and the diverse elements comprising it.

Challenge and Opportunity

The challenges of the 1980s that might call for special operational responses are likely to be no less varied than the prototypes outlined above. The world is, if anything, more turbulent than it has been since 1945, and the forces threatening US interests and areas of concern are more volatile and prone to violence than most of us can remember. Already, in Central America, the United States is conducting a number of operations which fit the traditional counterinsurgency patterns. Although there is no current evidence that guerrilla warfare programs are being developed, the possibility cannot be excluded. Rescue operations are still fresh in people's minds, especially since they represent a standing challenge. They are a field of endeavor in which failure still haunts us

and in which there is a widespread craving for a taste of success. It is not easy to look back upon the French at Kolwezi, the Germans at Mogadishu, and the Israelis at Entebbe without a twinge of envy as well as admiration.

While the global confraternity of terrorist groups has been rather quiet as of this writing, its menace remains potent. The next strike may necessitate an American response—a response that we are not now in a position to render effectively. Much more important, because of its scale and the political and strategic consequences, is Soviet-sponsored warfare by proxy. This stands out as the number one challenge to US freedom of action on at least three continents. No effective response has been devised to date to counter the Soviet-backed deployment of Cubans, East Germans, and Vietnamese, which provides training and military assistance to regimes hostile to US interests and promotes revolutionary guerrilla warfare in countries still friendly toward the United States.

Certain aspects of the problem appear susceptible to treatment via special warfare techniques already well known and tested. But conditions today require that the US response be made in full public view, and measures that once seemed feasible, if predicated on at least a degree of "privacy," are now very difficult to implement in the face of advice, interrogation, and opposition from competing quarters at home and abroad.

It is unnecessary to weigh the kinds of intelligence assets that should be marshalled to meet each and every threat-response situation foreseeable through the decade. The important consideration is which agency or element of government will be charged with addressing the situation, and upon what intelligence resources it can draw to carry out its mission. If the mission is in the rescue category or against a "hot" terrorist target, it may be expected that the intelligence community can and will be galvanized into action to supply most of its needs. If, however, the mission is of long duration, in a foreign country, and likely to entail insurgency or counterinsurgency activity (or psychological operations in support of either), there are different problems to be faced, and they pose many difficulties.

Assume, for example, that Country X is coming apart at the seams, and that a policy decision is about to be made to shore it up with US military support. What preparations can be made on the intelligence side?

Can Army intelligence develop the encyclopedic background information necessary to approach the problem? The answer is yes, through the use of its own existing resources and by drawing upon the data base of the intelligence community at large.

Can the Army cope with the language barrier? Again, the answer is yes, as its record is very good in that field.

Can the Army develop good working relationships with the military of Country X? The chances are that a foundation already exists in the framework of defense attaché contacts or previous military assistance and training arrangements.

Can the Army maintain liaison with the intelligence services of Country X? This is a normal part of the relationship with the host military services. However, the extent to which that liaison can be exploited may be limited. There is a prevailing danger that the host service will control the flow of information for its own reasons or that it will be weak and ineffective, and therefore ignorant of what is happening in its own body politic.

Can the Army develop its own clandestine operations, including controlled sources within the host government, that will permit it to see beyond the limitations of its liaison counterpart? It is highly unlikely, and almost out of the question under normal circumstances. A clandestine collection capability is very difficult to develop without time and continuity, and without a substantial institutional framework within which it can be nurtured and protected.

If, then, the Army—say, via a Special Forces contingent or some other appropriate forces—were to enter Country X to begin its work, it would not be ideally equipped intelligence-wise to do its job. The situation would probably compare with the one confronting the Special Forces in Vietnam in 1961. With time it would improve and possibly achieve a high degree of effectiveness.

Another fact of life should be noted within the hypothetical circumstances posed above. It is far from certain that the Army

would have the field entirely to itself in Country X. Certainly, as far as intelligence collection is concerned, it would not. It must be assumed that the CIA would be operating there, and perhaps other agencies as well. The need for an effective country team is manifest.

Looking beyond intelligence collection toward paramilitary activity, that field too will probably have to be shared. We have noted above that civilian agencies have been prime movers in such endeavors over the years. And although the classification barrier makes it difficult to assess the current level of Agency interest, it seems unlikely that the CIA will abjure its traditional activist role. Each side, military and civilian, offers a unique mix of assets and liabilities.

The US military has unmatched personnel, material resources, and training capability, and at the working level it has a high degree of both experience and enthusiasm. On the other hand, senior level personnel in the Army and Navy—less so in the Air Force—have resisted development of special warfare capabilities, and the pattern of continuity has been rather uncertain. The CIA's disadvantages focus on personnel. The Agency has had to rely heavily, as did the OSS before it, on the military for much of its qualified manpower. On the plus side, the CIA has much greater flexibility, especially in support and procurement. (Some argue that it displays a casual attitude toward logistics, but this may be one of the Agency's strengths.) It has also had, at least until recently, a fair amount of accumulated experience in special operations at the working and middle management levels. Its institutional memory is good. Finally, it is in a position to exploit, directly and systematically, its own extensive intelligence resources.

One would think it somehow possible to meld the assets of both sides to joint advantage. Perhaps it is now being done. Past experience suggests several areas which have potential for better coordination, or even integration, of effort. Pooling of information in the field would be a good place to start. This could be done by establishing joint intelligence centers to collate, analyze, and disseminate all data bearing on the problem. Security clearance levels

and the need-to-know problem would complicate it, but there are ample precedents—Laos, Vietnam, and elsewhere—that indicate it can be done.

Intelligence dissemination patterns generally need improvement, particularly in the field. The downward flow of intelligence has always left much to be desired, probably more so on the military side than on the civilian side. Requirements systems need better synchronization. The military often wants and uses information that the CIA collects and disseminates, but the Agency may be unwilling to accept an official requirement for the same data for reasons of priority. Thus the military cannot be certain its legitimate needs will be filled.

Adverting once again to the field, and assuming the effort to shore up Country X is going full blast, the performance of the country team will be a critical factor in determining the success or failure of the operation. The burden is on the State Department to ensure that its chief of mission takes effective control of his resources and exerts both leadership and authority. How well the Army and the CIA cooperate may depend in large measure on the way the ambassador directs his program.

Exchanges of personnel between the military and the CIA have been effective in the past and should be augmented. Military intelligence officers have often supported the Agency by working in operational capacities. The results have varied from excellent to bad, with both sides sharing the responsibility. Amidst the tensions certain to characterize the US Mission in the Country X situation, this approach to improving military-civilian coordination could be very salutary. Conversely, military officers operating unilaterally sometimes run afoul of the ambassador, who will generally look to the CIA station chief to coordinate the military intelligence effort.

Sending military personnel to the CIA for extended periods—that is, 4 to 6 years—would permit them to acquire a depth of experience not otherwise feasible. In the framework of a collective response to unconventional threats to US security, this approach could have the double effect of improving coordination on the intelligence side of special operations, and eventually returning to

the military some experienced personnel who could contribute significantly to development of an effective intelligence collection system to meet a broad range of military requirements.

Sharing Responsibility

The major obstacle to developing and integrating intelligence assets into an overall strategy for special operations is that no such strategy exists. And, of course, intelligence has its own problems of recognition and acceptance which hamper it in both military and civilian quarters. Add to this the factors that have plagued military special operations over the years—the need to project an image and compete for attention and dollars in an uphill struggle for survival. It has been a stepchild, along with psychological warfare, of Army intelligence for long periods. Clearly, special operations seem certain to face a future of continuing insecurity within the military establishment.

When the day arrives, as inevitably it will, for a policy decision to be threshed out in the face of a threat to security or a challenge to the projection of US power, the lack of a fully understood and accepted special operations role within a broad strategic framework will make that decision more difficult to reach. If and when they are required to make a pressing and urgent choice, policymakers are not likely to come to grips with the pervasive problems of coordination and competition which have characterized special operations from the beginning. The armed forces will dominate the resources sector—manpower, materiel, and possibly money as well. The CIA will wish to pursue the activist role it has inherited. Objections to a paramilitary responsibility for CIA have been voiced on various grounds over the years from within and without the Agency—as indeed they have been about other forms of covert action. But that has not deterred Agency leadership from accepting such assignments. Nor should it, in the opinion of this writer. And so the problem will be to develop a proper military-civilian "mix."

Considerations of cover and clandestineness in this connection are, and will remain, very troublesome. But they can be managed.

The real issues to be grappled with are those of policy and public image, and they apply with no less force to US military involvement in special operations—whether these be open and visible or protected by comforting fig leaves.

Granted the likelihood that responsibility for conducting special operations will be shared in the future as it has been in the past, it would seem reasonable to expect that in the face of years of experience, the old jurisdictional rivalries could somehow be obviated. Perhaps, behind the veil of "classification," things are indeed much better today than in the past. In any case, there is undoubtedly room for improvement.

Given the prospect of continuing US government interest in a viable capability for special operations, and assuming positive steps toward resolving the issues of policy, public image, internal opposition, and budget, a constructive operational approach then would be to combine on a substantial scale the forces of the two major protagonists. Integration during peacetime of the operational and intelligence resources of the Army and the CIA, as they relate to special operations, could be effected along lines pioneered by the OSS. An infusion of Army personnel (or, for that matter, Air Force and Navy personnel) from special components would strengthen the CIA in an area where it is weak. It would permit the development of common ground and genuine collaboration through training and shared experience over the long term. It would afford maximum flexibility in deploying forces in response to an unconventional threat. It would give the military a solid boost toward developing its own intelligence collection capabilities. Finally, it would facilitate realistic planning for wartime conditions under which the CIA's field operations would presumably be transferred to Joint Chiefs of Staff and theater control.

As a concluding note on special operations and the intelligence assets which make such activity viable, a cautionary thought is in order. Assets are people, and they are drawn from the indigenous populations, frequently from the ethnic minorities, of the country at issue. It is indeed necessary, if we are considering support to resistance groups, counterintervention, or other forms of intrusion in local conflict, to weigh the legal and moral correctness of our action. Thus, Professor O'Brien in his paper (see chapter 2)

states his opinion that support for the Afghan rebels, as an example, would be both moral and legal.

This calculus, however, should be carried further. As we consider the indigenous population in its "raw material" context—and this applies even more so to the ethnic minorities which are already so fragile within their own societies—it behooves us to give long and serious thought to the depth of commitment on both sides. It is one thing to help them fight the invader or internal enemy; it is still another to push them, for policy reasons of our own, beyond their capacity either to sustain the action or to extricate themselves. A decision at that point to cut our losses may—as we know only too well—prove catastrophic for the indigenous elements that have been drawn steadily deeper into the vortex.

Notes

1. Adda B. Bozeman, "Covert Action and Foreign Policy," in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action,* (National Strategy Information Center, Inc., Washington, DC, 1981), p. 16.
2. For a useful and interesting account of this interaction, see Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare—Its Origins,* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), pp. 19, 31, 35, 51, 61, 70, 86.
3. *War Report of the OSS,* History Project, Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, War Department, Washington, DC, Kermit Roosevelt, ed., Vol. II, preface by Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan. (Walker & Company, 1976.)
4. Ibid., pp. 357-392.
5. Ibid., pp. 284-286.
6. Paddock, op. cit., pp. 100-107.
7. Col. Francis J. Kelly, *U.S. Special Forces, 1961-1971,* Vietnam Studies, Department of the Army, 1973, p. 87.
8. *Special Operations,* Joint Special Operations Command. Ft. Bragg, NC, November 1982.
9. See the unclassified version of the report of the Special Operations Review Group, pp. 27, 38-47, 56, 60; known as the "Holloway Report," it was sanitized within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 1980.

Discussion

Lieutenant General Samuel Wilson, USA (Ret.)

I would begin by addressing a problem which, as I see it, continues to plague the military and policymaking communities—namely, definition. I agree with Mr. Tovar's citation of Detachment 101 and Merrill's Marauders for their special operations successes, and I would note that the North Burma Campaign itself was won only because those successes were appropriately exploited by larger conventional forces. This is what we must recognize concerning the role of military special operations. They never win wars by themselves.

Military special operations cover a wide range of activities outside of conventional operations. They include unconventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, terrorist activity, counterterror activity, and direct action missions such as raids, rescues, heists, assassinations (in wartime), diversions, and deceptions. I deliberately exclude psychological operations and civil affairs operations from this list. The association of special operations and psychological operations is an historical happenstance, and for us today it is an organizational convenience. But this sometimes detracts from the development, sustenance, training, and readiness of both forces. To me, special operations and psychological operations are not indissolubly linked. I consider psychological operations sufficiently important as a phenomenon in itself that it does not require association with Special Forces. This is a question that should be addressed.

In lectures to my students, I describe special operations not by defining them, but by listing their characteristics, the principles applicable to their conduct, and the requirements peculiar to them. I would ask your indulgence as I mention these, because they may provide us with more specific parameters than we have been using hitherto in these proceedings.

Military special operations are a form of military judo. They are not a gentleman's game, and frequently no holds are barred. They are seldom intended to seize and hold territory. To put it simply, special operations of the direct action type involve three basic steps: get there, do it, and get back. Doing it may be relatively easy. Getting there and getting back can be tougher problems.

Military special operations characteristically are high risk, high gain operations. They invariably involve pitting a smaller force against a larger one. As Mr. Tovar has indicated, special operations are completely dependent upon intelligence resources. In the conventional arena, we sometimes can do things with poor or faulty intelligence, take our losses, and possibly still succeed. That can rarely, if ever, be the case in a special operation. Also, in special operations there normally is a limited number of people playing direct roles, although there may be many in the supporting cast, some of whom may be unwitting.

Military special operations often entail trying to do something which has never been done before. And there is no such thing as a typical special operation. Most are in response to a requirement for extraordinary capabilities. They are especially demanding on communications and logistics. Simplification of special operations may be a laudable objective. But invariably they become complex and resist efforts to simplify.

As noted earlier, special operations are often supplemental to the main action, a kind of a military sideshow. They rarely win the battle, and they never win the war. This is possibly one of the reasons why promotions are so few and so long in coming in the special operations arena, even though a special breed of people is required.

Now let us look at the principles of special operations. To me, effective special operations involve emphasis on several elements.

The first is surprise. Only with surprise can a smaller force expect to confront a larger force and emerge victorious. In addition, there is the issue of security, to which we have already alluded. I have also cited effective intelligence. Then there are the principles of speed, mobility, and timing, all of which are critical. There is the principle of coordinated teamwork, without which the operation frequently will fail. Finally—and I cite this in a day when micromanagement from the top is the name of the game (and those of you who have served in the Crisis Action Conference Room in the Pentagon know exactly what I mean)—there is the principle of maximum delegation of authority and a streamlined chain of command.

Out of these characteristics and principles emerge certain requirements peculiar to military special operations. Number one is the requirement for elite forces with multiple capabilities. Because multiple capabilities are required, no single service has them all. This means that a special operations unit has to be a joint unit to maximize effectiveness. The Army, for example, does not by itself possess all of the capabilities necessary for full-scale, across-the-spectrum operations. Further, the need is for elite forces, people who have volunteered and who have demonstrated extraordinary capability, because extraordinary performance will be expected of them.

I would note in this connection that the US armed forces are not overly tolerant of an elite, nor is our society as a whole. While we can enjoy the elites of the entertainment world and not begrudge them their high fees, and we can also be fairly tolerant of professional athletes and not envy them their salaries, we generally want to pull everyone else down to the lowest common denominator. In the Army that little green beret is an infuriating symbol to some of the senior officers of the mainstream. This is the price to be paid for having a military elite, and we should be aware of it.

Secondly, I emphasize again the requirement for security, for the ability to protect secrets and to handle cover and deception. Then there is the requirement for a force projection capability, the lack of which led to the failure at Desert One. Next, there is the requirement for secure and redundant communications. And

finally, there is the requirement for special weapons and equipment, frequently of a nonstandard variety.

I've taken the time to list these points—albeit in incomplete and overly simplified fashion—because they suggest, as far as military special operations are concerned, parameters within which we may see the subject more clearly.

As an important aside, if I may venture an observation, I think it is quite clear to all of us today that there is little likelihood of a strategic nuclear confrontation with the Soviets. And as long as we maintain something approaching strategic parity, I believe that situation will probably hold for a long time. It is almost as unlikely that the Soviet Warsaw Pact forces will come tearing through the Fulda Gap in a conventional thrust. But we live today with conflict of a different sort down at the lower, less violent end of the spectrum and with the reality of a resource war, declared to us first by Khrushchev on January 6, 1961.

The low-intensity warfare strategy of the Soviets seems quite clear. They recognize that the United States is a maritime nation and that we depend upon things which come to us in ships' bottoms. This means that the world's major shipping lanes are vital to us. And the Soviets are keenly sensitive to the vital choke points on those shipping lanes. As we come down the China Sea past Cam Ranh Bay and down to the Straits of Malacca, across to the approaches to the Suez Canal, the Cape of Good Hope, the Panama Canal, we find that the Soviets are steadily moving closer to these vital choke points. You can see it on a map, and I suggest you compare one from 20 years ago with one today. The pattern is obvious. Since 1975 when we came out of Vietnam, declaring "never again," we have left this field to the Soviets by default.

This is where special operations of the highest quality are required. It is high time that we get our definitions, our concepts, and our doctrine straight. We must convince our bosses that there are roles for us to play, and we had better get on with the ballgame.

Mr. Theodore G. Shackley

I found that Mr. Tovar's paper made four significant points in bold, broad strokes, which I heartily endorse. First, policy deci-

sions to harness special operations in pursuit of national objectives must be based on sound intelligence estimates. Second, these special operations, if they are to achieve policy goals, have to be supported in both the planning and implementation phases by in-depth, timely, quality intelligence. Third, special operations as an instrument for projecting American power will consist of guerrilla warfare and its counterinsurgency antidote, as well as anti-terrorist operations and unconventional warfare capabilities. The fourth point is that caution, coupled with the perceived liabilities of Vietnam, the flawed Iranian hostage rescue mission, and an innate dislike for special operations by the mainstream of American political life, will, perforce, limit Washington to a defensive mode in considering irregular warfare options.

I think that leaves it to the insurgents to pick the next battlefield. If that assumption is correct, it must be accepted that counterinsurgency and anti-terrorist operations are the likely techniques that will dominate our thinking. In other words, we are going to be counterpunchers in the area of special operations throughout the 1980s.

Less precise, unfortunately, was Mr. Tovar's articulation of a formula which would bring about an integrated special operations effort between the Department of Defense and the CIA. Granted, this is not a task that lends itself to quick fixes. Many of us sitting in this room have toiled to find a solution, but to no avail.

It would appear, therefore, that the time is ripe to view this problem from a broad, long-range national perspective. And I suggest for your consideration that there is no better way to achieve this desired result than by having the President appoint a panel to recommend how the nation should organize itself to deal with insurgency and terrorism in the 1980s.

We can only speculate as to how that panel would do its work, or what its findings might be. It might decide that we need simply to improve the institutions and techniques that we now have—the proverbial band-aid approach. That would mean rebuilding the CIA's ability to deal with guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, and to build the intelligence infrastructure needed to support such programs. It would also require that the Pentagon enhance its anti-terrorist capability, while simultaneously ensuring that the command structure needed to manage the commitment

of military manpower to an unconventional warfare campaign exists on more than just paper. Alternatively, the panel could opt to establish a new mechanism to control all special operations and their assets. A special element of government dedicated to the multiple tasks of counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare, and antiterrorist operations might bring a fresh and dynamic approach to these pressing needs. It would require establishing new lines of communications to provide national-level intelligence support for the organization erected.

More exciting from my perspective would be the prospect that a blue-ribbon panel would conclude that insurgency and terrorism are the weapons of the weak. If that occurred, intelligence might well be asked to identify where Soviet expansionism, direct or via proxies, could be rolled back or blunted. The intelligence focus could then be applied to apparent opportunities in Mozambique, Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and perhaps even the Western Sahara.

But getting back to today's reality, and addressing intelligence needs for special operations at a tactical level, I would like to augment some of Mr. Tovar's ideas with the following points. First, a decision to initiate special operations should not become frozen. It should be seen as a judgment call to be reviewed periodically from the intelligence and program points of view. The reassessment should evaluate progress, the level of human and material resources committed to the program, financial costs, and the probabilities of success. It should be understood that there is a limit on our flexibility, so that when and if costs and risks exceed the prospects of success, the policy can be changed in a prudent and prompt manner.

We must continue our periodic intelligence assessments. I would stress that analysis and collation of intelligence must be done at a tactical level, for operational purposes. In that way, aerial photographs, maps, and intelligence from agents, refugees, captured documents, liaison, and signals can be used to isolate the opposition's combat choices.

Let us use our mechanisms to narrow some of these things down. For example, in a counterinsurgency situation, the potential insurgent bases can be pinpointed by harnessing all sorts of data. Waterholes, trails, and potential escape routes can be located.

Once this information is put on maps, we can identify the future battlefield before the enemy does. Having done that, we can do our planning by looking at potential drop zones, helicopter landing areas that we can select and reconnoiter for later use. In this way, we will have prepared the battlefield to our liking, and not to that of the insurgents. This is the role of intelligence.

The next point that I would make is that military assistance personnel should have a passive watching brief to collect intelligence in their country of assignment. We've been arguing, fighting, and discussing that problem for 20 years. Let us bite the bullet and correct it. These people should also be systematically debriefed by intelligence professionals. Had that been done in Iran, there is evidence to suggest that some critical developments in the Shah's armed forces would not have taken Washington by surprise as much as they did. The information was there and in the hands of knowledgeable, competent Americans. But it was not put in the system because of restrictions that we ourselves imposed on the system.

In-place agents in the enemy's camp are worth their weight in gold when they support special operations. The difficulty lies not in establishing them, but in communicating with them. Much also remains to be done to harness miniaturization, even if it means bringing in the Japanese to solve this problem. Funds should be committed to this task promptly by the CIA.

I would stress that supply pipelines are the insurgents' and terrorists' single greatest weakness. Intelligence must concentrate on either cutting them or exploiting them to destroy the opposition. We can do that with the kind of technology that we already have on the shelf.

Finally, the struggle must be taken to the enemy. Insurgents and terrorists cannot stand sustained pressure, particularly when they are being pursued. If we are aggressive and use our intelligence to keep pressure on the enemy, we can cause them to surrender or defeat them outright on the battlefield.

Intelligence must also be the basis for talking people out of the insurgency. It should serve as the cornerstone for psychological warfare projects designed to keep the pro-government flame of resistance alive in those areas where the insurgents have gained temporary control.

General Discussion

The unique importance of intelligence in special operations was acknowledged by most participants. There was less agreement on the mechanisms that should be developed to insure quality and accessibility of intelligence assets.

Addressing the problem of public understanding of the issues bearing on special operations, a speaker asked if there was not some appropriate way to follow up the proceedings of the conference by concerting the efforts of groups known to be concerned. General Wilson suggested that until the nature of the issues is better defined, it will continue to dog the policymakers. It is imperative, he averred, that we move beyond the doctrinal legacy of World War II. Perhaps the route to be followed is that proposed by Mr. Shackley—via a presidential commission charged with addressing the problem in its totality.

Mr. Shackley interjected a point on the opportunism characterizing Soviet policy, in contrast to American uncertainty regarding goals and methods. Although their product may be more unattractive than ours, they do not hesitate to push it. We, though we have a good product, are often reluctant to push it, even where an opportunity is ripe for the plucking—as in Mozambique today, to cite one example. General Wilson agreed, noting that, as a consequence, the field is left open to the Soviets to export their revolutionary doctrine at will in the Third World.

Another speaker asked if there is not a danger of excessive competition among the intelligence agencies under present circumstances, and whether it might be better to create a separate agency to conduct special operations instead of doing so through an intelligence agency such as the CIA. Mr. Tovar conceded that the competition problem indeed exists, but he held that it can be, and has been, dealt with systematically. Inasmuch as special operations have been conducted through intelligence agencies in the past (and with some success, notwithstanding many vicissitudes), there are reasonable grounds for continuing to work through those mechanisms. The advantages which thereby accrue include more existing access to intelligence information, greater familiarity with the oversea environment, and sometimes the immediate availability of operationally viable assets.

It was agreed that the hypothetical presidential panel could profitably address such questions. Mr. Shackley interposed the point that, given the biased range of options open to us in this field, the United States ought to approach the problem by drawing upon our uniquely characteristic methods and experience. A panel of the type suggested would probably come down in favor of a solution akin to what we have today—specifically, a primarily uniformed-military approach to unconventional warfare, with all civilian agencies subordinate to it in time of war or crisis. The subject clearly requires close and continuing study.

A cautionary note was introduced regarding the use of intelligence by policymakers, on grounds that its availability does not necessarily constitute knowledge. A solid data base is imperative, and intelligence methods should probably be modernized. Many of them are out of date. Drawing on an intelligence background, a speaker argued for greater analyst involvement in the decision-making process, and especially for an analysis of our adversaries' methods of operation.

Some doubts were voiced on the position taken earlier by General Wilson that psychological operations should not be included in the special warfare repertoire. It was argued that psychological preparation of the arena is fundamental in unconventional operations, and that to surrender that vital capability by institutional separation of the two might seriously debilitate the unconventional warfare side of the house. General Wilson held that psychological operations are all-pervasive; they apply to any type of military action. By subsuming the psychological operations under the wing of the unconventional warriors, the former are restricted in terms of concept and doctrine development essential to support of all military activities. He cited the 1959–1960 period, where service schools (including Leavenworth) sought to draw upon the cerebrations of the young Ft. Bragg military intellectuals, and the latter resisted. Understandable though this was, it prevented the new concepts from getting into the mainstream and did us a disservice. He conceded the danger of "throwing out the baby with the bathwater," but argued that the separation could be carried out to the advantage of the system as a whole.

The discussion closed on the issue of conventional military attitudes toward both intelligence and special operations. Vietnam

was cited as a glaring case in point—the Special Forces and their indigenous counterparts in January 1968 reported large-scale enemy troop movements through their areas heading southward. The reports were dismissed by higher echelons as unreliable. One speaker contended that attitudes would not be much different today, given the paucity of representation at this conference on the part of senior levels of the active military establishment. If public attitudes are to change, internal military attitudes have to change first. US special operations capabilities today, he noted, are largely confined to the reserves; the active military establishment does not believe in what we are doing.

Addressing the intelligence credibility problem in Vietnam mentioned earlier, a speaker attributed it in part to the lack of continuity among military personnel assigned there—the absence of an institutional memory, which resulted from a policy decision on the use of manpower. Once again, the British experience with the SAS was cited as an example the United States might do well to emulate in addressing these problems.

CHAPTER SIX

Economic/Security Assistance and Special Operations

Paper

Douglas S. Blaufarb

Discussants

John Michael Kelly

David A. Decker

The objective of this paper is to describe the role of economic and security assistance in special operations. The experience of the US government and others has shown that both economic and security assistance can be of major importance in support of special operations, particularly in dealing with rural insurgencies of the type advocated and elaborated by Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh. Economic aid, broadly interpreted, has often been of value in strengthening local government in the countryside, as well as in its more obvious contributions to rural health, education, agricultural improvement, and public works. In most instances, the purpose of such programs has been to improve the government's control of the countryside and to bolster the support of its cause by the rural population.

Security assistance bears even more directly on special operations, where its purpose is to transfer skills to a threatened foreign government and provide resources that would enable that government to conduct its own effective special operations. Both the police and the military forces, particularly the army, are or should be involved. There are many difficulties to be surmounted in programs of this sort, which will be described in more detail below. These difficulties, stemming from the political and bureaucratic obstacles to engaging in an unaccustomed form of warfare, obstruct both the United States and the government being aided. For simplicity of presentation, we will deal separately with the two forms of assistance, without neglecting the strong connections between them.

Economic Assistance

Although the official description of economic aid directs it toward economic development, the US government has fortunately not felt constrained by formal categories. Over the years, many kinds of aid have been provided which had no identifiable economic purpose or payoff. In this category, some of the least conforming programs have been developed to support special operations, particularly pacification (also called counterinsurgency). Thus in Vietnam, the Agency for International Development (AID) at one time was responsible for an immense refugee support and resettlement program, a police program, a defection inducement program, and even an effort to disentangle the Vietnamese system of criminal justice so that communists, once apprehended, would be convicted and remain in jail. For the purposes of this paper, then, we define economic aid as the official transfer of nonmilitary resources (for example, commodities, skills, services, or even cash) to other governments or their peoples. Intelligence or information aid programs will not be discussed, inasmuch as they are dealt with in other papers.

Needs and Opportunities

The definition suggested above is useful because it emphasizes the need for maximum flexibility in nonmilitary transfers that are intended to support special operations. Anything and everything that can be transferred from one government to another may become important at a particular time or place. It may prove self-defeating to tie one's hands with an inclusive definition.

Special operations also represent a highly flexible concept, ranging from dispatch of a single Special Forces training team to direct intervention by US military forces in various unconventional modes. In most situations where special operations come into play, their purpose is to assist a beleaguered friendly government under attack by unconventional means, usually by guerrilla insurgents operating in the countryside following a pattern laid down by the Chinese and adopted in numerous other countries. Special operations may also be required in armed uprisings which the United States wishes to support, and in the struggle against terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare, to name some of the more likely situations. Communist-supported guerrilla insurgency, however, is the

most common of these threats, and the one in which economic assistance has a vital role to play.

Among the important reasons why certain governments have been selected for attack is that they are vulnerable in a variety of ways, be they political, social, or merely geographical. Most often their vulnerability is a condition of underdevelopment—political, social, and economic—which heavily constrains the ability to mobilize their human and material resources to cope effectively with an insurgency. In the typical underdeveloped country, the government concentrates its presence and activity in a large capital city and displays little presence and activity in the countryside. It provides few services to the rural population and does not place heavy demands on that population. Thus, when assaulted by a relatively sophisticated insurgency focusing its attack in the countryside, the government is at a considerable disadvantage. It has neither institutions nor personnel that can readily move into the affected areas, establish a presence, and begin to meet the threat by the elementary strategy of "governing". And this entails reporting accurately the true situation, analyzing the vulnerabilities being exploited by the insurgents, and acting effectively to deal with them.

Very often, the requirement is not for elaborate or costly programs. Instead, the need is for a responsive presence to give the population evidence of government concern, a willingness to listen and try to understand and, finally, an ability to muster resources to meet some of the obvious needs.

As one well-known analyst of special operations has put it, "an administration will function effectively only if it has the respect and cooperation of the people. This respect and cooperation must be earned, not compelled, by the behavior and helpfulness of all officials in their dealings with the public."[1] All of this sounds quite simple, but it depends on two factors that often are in scarce supply. The first of these is a modicum of security to permit government officials to move about freely and conduct their business without fear for their lives. The second—equally important—of these is the matter of adequately skilled personnel, working in a responsive institutional framework.

The personnel problem begins with the fact that frequently the government is not only concentrated in the capital city, but that it also recruits from the educated middle classes of the cities—who

have no experience or understanding of life in the countryside, and who look on the rural population with contempt or, at best, with an attitude of remote superiority. Often, the officials sent to man the rural apparatus do not speak the language of the population they are supposed to govern. A major need, then, for effective rural government is personnel with some understanding for and empathy with the people who are their official responsibility. Elementary, indeed, but such people are not readily or speedily available.

In addition, of course, the government providing aid quickly perceives the need for specialist skills in education, public health, agricultural improvement, and small-scale public works. Unfortunately, the normal human tendency is for the educated bureaucrats to assume in all cases that they know what is best and how much of any particular improvement is needed. The most difficult aspect of the effort to make improvements in the rural environment is developing a process whereby the people affected have a share in the decisionmaking. Some structure of local government is essential for this purpose, and it must be one that responds to ordinary people and not merely to the land-owners and merchants who frequently dominate the local economy and society. The local structure must also be linked to the national government in a reasonable way that permits two-way communication—orders and instructions coming down, but also information, suggestions, and requests going up. It is to be hoped that a desire exists at higher levels for honest information about local situations, whether or not it makes for pleasant reading and flatters the powers-that-be.

This model of needs suggests areas that will require for outside assistance. Training in rural administration is a priority requirement. If a training school already exists, it may need assistance in developing appropriate recruitment criteria or changes in its philosophy and approach. Retraining incumbents is another line of development, together with enlargement of the total cadre to reduce workload and make an improved level of performance possible. The concept of "training the trainers" is a wise approach, emphasizing the need of the foreign advisers to work themselves out of a job as soon as possible.

Specialist skills cannot be ignored, but these are far easier to develop than the art of rural government. Here too, emphasis

arrival of lead elements of the Rapid Deployment Force. Yepishev's "external" mission, coupled with emerging strategic realities, has affected the geopolitical ground rules in the resource-rich Third World.

Soviet Capabilities for Special Operations

The forces available for Soviet special operations span several institutional boundaries and are not limited to the regular military. As noted in the history of these operations, primacy of place has belonged to the intelligence and security services and still does today. Traditionally, state security figures uniquely in Soviet military power; it operates an armed force in its own right, and it performs a Party-assigned role of military counterintelligence through penetration and informant networks overseen by the KGB's Third Directorate. Through such instruments, the KGB retains a capability to conduct it own special operations and maintain a Party-sanctioned oversight of special operations assigned to the military. Therefore, it is appropriate to begin this survey of available special operations forces with the KGB.

KGB

The Committee for State Security, or KGB, deploys armed forces larger than those of many advanced industrial states. For instance, the United States Marine Corps numbers approximately 196,000, while available figures for KGB troops range from 250,000 to over 300,000.[22] The bulk of these forces, subordinate to the Border Guards Directorate, are equipped with tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and ships. Considered to be a politically reliable, elite force, the Border Guards answer directly to KGB headquarters in Moscow and are independent of the Ministry of Defense and its General Staff. Historically, in addition to sealing Soviet frontiers and fighting in major operations in World War II, they have been assigned politically sensitive "special missions"—deportations of suspect populations, counterinsurgency operations, and, as John Barron observes, advisory duties in North Vietnam during the

nel, and control of local government are highly political matters, as they can be seen to determine who gets what under a given dispensation. The government in power will try to prevent the aid process from disturbing the arrangements it makes to ensure its continued hold on power. This, in turn, may obstruct or entirely thwart the foreigners' efforts to improve matters in the countryside.

Guenter Lewy, in his study *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), points out that between 1961 and 1968 the United States provided nearly $3 billion in aid to South Vietnam, plus an elaborate civic action program carried out by the US military. This large and costly effort, much of it focused in the countryside, had little effect in improving the Saigon government's standing with its rural population. He quotes an American provincial advisor:

> One reason that the South Vietnamese government does not receive the support of the people is that it doesn't operate correctly toward these people. Too often its administrative machinery is disorganized and inefficient. It dispenses graft, corruption and favoritism. It does not receive the support of the people because only a small minority of these people feel any identification with it.[2]

The problem is noted here, recognizing that there is no easy remedy. Those responsible for managing an involvement should be aware and be prepared for it, lest they be taken by surprise if it occurs.

A government under insurgent attack will often develop major economic problems related to its balance of payments, to inflation caused by large budget deficits, or to a mass exodus from the countryside. These difficulties will call for development aid or other forms of economic assistance essential to the survival of the regime, but only indirectly involving support for special operations. Such aid may eventually form a major part of an overall economic aid program.

In brief, then, such are the purposes and role of economic aid in support of special operations. The question of where responsibility should be assigned in the US government for administering such programs is not a difficult one. It should be in the hands of

the group that specializes in the transfer of nonmilitary resources to other countries, namely, the Agency for International Development (AID), where the experience, skills, and developed procedures already exist. To attempt to duplicate them in some new group focused specifically on special operations support would be wasteful and likely to produce bureaucratic rivalry and infighting to no particular purpose.

On the other hand, AID's current focus on traditional economic development is an obstacle to the flexibility required. Support for special operations at present has little or no standing in AID, and that situation is unlikely to change unless impetus comes from higher levels of the government and persists until the point is effectively made. Such a change cannot be brought about by simple *ukase*. It must be pressed forward and monitored by a centrally-placed authority that will coordinate and energize special operations.

The Record—US Experience

The question may be asked how statements such as these concerning economic aid in the countryside can be made with apparent assurance. The answer is that all of this has been tried before, particularly in Southeast Asia, and lessons can be distilled from that record. Space does not permit a full account of the elaborate panoply of aid programs deployed in Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos in support of special operations. We have already listed the more important ones in Vietnam.

In Laos, the role of economic aid was an even more startling departure from the norm. AID became an active partner with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in supporting a large tribal guerrilla movement in combat with the Laotian communists and the North Vietnamese. A sizeable civilian population was involved. These were relatives and dependents of the fighting men, who became refugees as the fighting swept back and forth across northeastern Laos. Because of the inability of the Laotian government to deal with the problem, AID became committed to feeding and meeting other subsistence needs of these people, a program which continued even after their resettlement on the

grounds that the absence of the fighting men required a continuation of outside aid for the dependent families. To ensure continued popular support for the resistance effort, AID also developed programs to deliver services that no government had ever provided in the history of the tribal peoples. The main elements were an emergency medical program and educational and agricultural programs, all entirely dependent on the movement of material and personnel by air because no roads existed in the area. Very close coordination was maintained in the field with the CIA, which was responsible for supporting the paramilitary side of the program.

All of this was done under the formal rubric of refugee emergency assistance and resettlement and of rural development, in order to conform to AID categories of approved activity. In actual fact, it constituted the civilian front of an unconventional war which could not have been prosecuted without the aid program. Thus, given the limited objective of the tribal activity—to mount a guerrilla war of resistance against communist occupation of a strategically important area of Laos—the aid program was a success. Unhappily, the underlying military concept of equalizing primitive tribal fighters with North Vietnamese regulars by arming, training, and advising them, and by providing heavy air support and eventually large numbers of Thai auxiliaries, ultimately failed. The North Vietnamese concentrated very heavy forces amounting to two regular divisions to suppress the tribesmen. The end finally came when the United States withdrew from Vietnam and stood down all military activity elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Although from the limited perspective of this paper the aid program was a success, the program as a whole was nothing short of a disaster for the tribesmen, who suffered heavy casualties both from the fighting and from the constant flight and resettlement of thousands of dependents and villagers—and ultimately the loss of their homelands.

The tribal aid program in Laos was *sui generis*. Aid to special operations elsewhere (for example, in Thailand) conformed to a considerable degree to the pattern described earlier—training of rural administrators; support for local government to improve its capabilities; construction of rural roads and other small public

works; and training and support for specialists to improve rural services in education, agriculture, and the like. Over more than a decade, such programs greatly improved the Thai government's ability to govern in the countryside.

To cite one example, the Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) program was undertaken jointly by the Thai and US governments as early as 1964, and continued for a dozen years. The purpose was to help fill the governmental vacuum in large areas of the countryside where provincial governors had almost no staffs or funds to carry out developmental activity. As a result of about 12 years of ARD operations, one observer stated, "the governors . . . have up to 250 people on their staffs, a million dollars or so worth of equipment and a vastly increased budget . . . [ARD] has also expanded its activities to include Mobile Medical Teams, a District Farmer Group Program (cooperatives), a youth program, a Potable Water Program and an information effort."[3] At the same time, the Thai insurgent threat had diminished. One cannot draw a direct causal relationship between the joint US-Thai programs and the latter, since many factors were at work to reduce the insurgents' morale and numbers. Nevertheless, better government may well have been one factor among others.

The program undertaken jointly by Thailand and the United States is of interest for another reason. It was launched quite early in the insurgency, at a time when no emergency existed and when indications of an incipient communist "armed struggle" were highly ambiguous. A sizeable military civic action program was begun as early as 1961, and the ARD program described above was begun in 1964 (whereas the communists' open armed struggle did not actually begin until 1965.) The early beginning of counterinsurgency activity may or may not have made the insurgents' task more difficult. The lack of direct evidence makes it impossible to develop a strong case for either view. In any event, early preventive action is certainly to be preferred to a reaction delayed until after open violence has broken out. Nevertheless, one must be realistic about the chances of any particular less developed country undertaking costly and politically difficult reforms in its rural administrative apparatus prior to events which demonstrate a clear and present danger. Governments, like people, tend to put

off difficult tasks until the need is undeniable. When that happens, of course, minds become concentrated on the clear priority of action which once seemed theoretical and anything but clear. In other words, preventive action is highly desirable, but it takes an unusually farsighted leadership to perceive the need and accept the costs.

To conclude our scrutiny of US economic aid as it has related to special operations, we must note that the record is hardly one of unalloyed success or failure. We have already quoted a comment suggesting the deficiencies of the effort in Vietnam in terms of the South Vietnamese government's inability to control and manage its apparatus in the countryside. That, however, is not the complete story. Returning to the same source for a view of the later period, we find Guenter Lewy stating that by 1971, "The Government of Vietnam (GVN) had established a strong presence in many areas previously under Vietcong (VC) control, and the VC appeared to be on the defensive." He quotes a long-time observer as saying, "What were isolated enclaves of population in insecure territory, then, by 1971 had become major centers as the locus of the war shifted. The VC by 1971 occupied roughly the position that the GVN had in 1967." To this, Lewy adds,

> In much of the country, tractors and Hondas were ubiquitous and marketplaces were bustling. By 1970, nationwide, 82 percent of the primary-school-age children were attending school . . . . A substantial number of refugees had been resettled in new villages and hamlets; during the years 1969–71, more than one million refugees had returned to their original homes.[4]

The success of pacification was far from complete, but there is a significant contrast in results between the two periods. It is accounted for by two factors: first, greatly improved security as a result of communist mistakes plus strengthened GVN security programs; and second, improved organization on the part of both the United States and the Government of Vietnam.

Security Assistance

If competently administered and well-calculated aid programs are important, other aspects of special operations are also fun-

damental. There is indeed an intimate relationship between economic aid as we have described it and security assistance. The two aspects must mesh closely, so that environmental improvement and improvement of the security situation go hand in hand. By security assistance, we mean US assistance to the security organs of a threatened regime. For the purposes of this paper, this excludes aid to foreign intelligence services and focuses primarily on aid to police and military services.

Weakness Under Pressure

Security assistance supports a wider range of special operations than does economic aid. For the police, there are threats of terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare as well as rural insurgency. Both police and military may be involved in protecting frontiers against incursions by hostile groups, and both may also be committed to the suppression of production and trafficking in drugs, which might involve special operations of interest to the United States. Finally, there is the threat of rural insurgency as currently waged in El Salvador and Guatemala, and elsewhere on several continents.

In such situations, the police in underdeveloped countries are often at a serious disadvantage. They tend to be too few in number, undertrained, and concentrated in the cities. Their priority task is often to provide physical protection to regime leaders and notables, a task which does not require a high degree of training or sophistication. The ordinary constable is likely to be underpaid, and he may supplement his salary by petty graft and bribery. This type of police force is entirely inadequate to meet the challenges of the situations noted above, especially those of a well-led insurgent force in the countryside. In an ideal scheme for support of special operations, programs to improve the professionalism and the size and competence of the police are an essential ingredient. Being closer to the population and more familiar with its needs, the police are the first line of defense against subversion and are the best suited of the various security forces to carry out population or resource control programs.

In the past, very sizeable police training and assistance programs were mounted by the United States in Asia, Latin America,

and Africa. In large part they focused on "institution-building," that is, professionalizing the police function. This included developing improved capabilities for record keeping, communications, and logistics; improving recruiting and training; and strengthening the career system as a whole. In some countries, Vietnam and Thailand among them, emphasis was placed on expanding and improving the rural police and on giving them a paramilitary capability to deal with large armed insurgent bands. AID also maintained an International Police Academy in the Washington area to which, over a period of years, several thousand police officers came for training. One section of this academy was able to conduct its entire instructional program in Spanish.

In reaction, however, to such public relations disasters as the "tiger cages" run by the Vietnamese National Police on Con Son Island and the kidnapping and murder of AID police advisor Don Mitrione in Uruguay, the police training and assistance capability of AID was entirely dismantled. Congress has forbidden assistance to foreign police forces which have internal surveillance duties and no such resource exists any longer in the civilian arm of the government. The US military, in turn, are specifically forbidden to use military aid funds to assist civilian police.

Whether AID was the appropriate agency to administer police programs was always a matter of controversy. Many in AID were uncomfortable with the function. Yet no existing US government agency is any more suitable. The problem arises because of our federal system and the fact that we have no national police force corresponding to the national police services that exist in most other countries. AID remains the most convenient location for such a program if it is ever revived, because—as noted earlier—it contains the procedures and support apparatus for the transfer of resources to foreign governments. Our ability to assist threatened regimes will remain severely handicapped until we have resurrected our capability to assist foreign police forces.

Responses to Distress

The capstone of any security assistance program in support of special operations, of course, is provided by military assistance.

In most countries the military remains the principal bulwark of the threatened regime for defense against insurgency, and also plays a role in some of the other types of special operations noted above. Of these, the threat of insurgency is most dangerous.

As in the case of the police, the armed forces of underdeveloped countries are likely to be poorly prepared to cope with the challenge posed by a sophisticated insurgency; external assistance will probably be essential. That assistance may begin with training, which is conducted either in the host country or at bases in the United States or elsewhere. This would normally be accompanied by supplies of weaponry and equipment appropriate to the need, and by advisers assigned to work at various levels of the armed forces being assisted. In a "worst case" situation, all of this might escalate in scope and intensity until the United States confronts the need to introduce its own combat forces. We may note in passing that if such an involvement were actually decided upon—difficult to imagine at this point, but it cannot be ruled out—then we are not likely to witness the type of combat that can be described as special operations. The reason is that the US military has no infantry trained for combat of this character. The army recently created a new and enlarged Special Forces command, but its functions are limited to working with host country elements. There is also an Army manual called *Low-Intensity Conflict* (FM 100-20), updated in January 1981. Presumably, if infantry units are again deployed in counterinsurgency combat, the commanders will be expected to read the manual before closing with the enemy.

To return to the matter of military assistance, short of direct intervention by US combat forces, the training, equipment, weaponry, and advice rendered ought to be of the most elementary and basic nature. Small unit tactics, intense day and night patrolling, ambushes, long-range patrols, and reconnaissance—these are the essence of the matter. The use of artillery and airpower, tanks, and similar heavy equipment should be entirely eschewed. Civic action by the military, together with psychological operations, certainly have importance along with techniques of population control emphasizing good behavior by the troops.

The first reason for this reversion to a primitive form of combat is that the arena of the struggle is the populated countryside. More

than a modicum of popular support is essential to the government side. As noted earlier, a loyal population can provide the government with vital intelligence on insurgent movements. It can also give other forms of support which, by the same token, are denied to the enemy. Thus, one realizes the reason for the worn but still applicable adage of counterinsurgency combat: "The people are the target." If that is accepted as definitive, then it follows that to destroy homes and property, to kill and maim the civilian population, is counterproductive.

A second reason for emphasizing a primitive form of combat is that the enemy is lightly armed and elusive. Heavily armed units are roadbound and clumsy to maneuver. The conventional tendency to prepare the battlefield with artillery and aerial bombardment, and to concentrate all available firepower, usually means that the nimble enemy will be alerted and will evade the assault when it finally comes. This is the essence of guerrilla warfare and the only effective way to counter it is to adopt the tactics of the guerrilla.

Training the army of an underdeveloped country in these tactics is easy enough, but assuring that the training is actually followed in combat is more difficult. Armies in combat like to use all their firepower in the belief that the heavier their fire, the lower their casualties are likely to be. Heavy guns also make a comforting noise and give a feeling of security to those who shoot them. Primitive combat with handheld weapons is dangerous to life and limb, and it calls for courageous unit leaders and well-led troops. Often such qualities are in short supply; the armies of underdeveloped nations tend to be led by commanders who owe their positions to their connections rather than their professional competence. Often in such countries, the military forms the political base of the regime, and jobs are distributed for political reasons. The army's first duty is to protect the regime against *coups d'etat*. It deals with dissent by a show of force and brutality, but it is unprepared to conduct a serious military campaign against a tough and determined enemy. Reform of such an army is a difficult proposition, because proposals for reform appear to the regime to threaten its political base and therefore its hold on power. The result of this combination of factors is a military force with low performance standards, and poorly led soldiers whose morale

is low and whose attitude toward the rural population is hostile.

The problems faced by the United States when it attempts to assist the armed forces for a government of this character can be seen in El Salvador today, where the results of our security assistance continue to disappoint us. One commentator with considerable knowledge of that country notes, "The high command continues to shun U.S. military advice because it fears its implementation would tear the web of political and economic patronage that holds the current army together."[5]

Further discussion of this problem would take us too far afield. We will simply point out that, while there are certainly exceptions, this phenomenon is common enough to pose very serious problems for a training and advisory mission. Americans assigned to such duty should not be surprised to find that the regime they are attempting to assist will often turn out to be the most serious obstacle to their success.

In our discussion of military assistance thus far, we have focused on the role of the US Army and the host country's ground forces. In the past, especially in Vietnam, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines also had roles to play, and the Marines in particular pioneered effective counterinsurgency techniques. At present, only the Air Force maintains interest in the subject. Airpower indeed has a limited role to play in special operations, particularly in the movement of troops by helicopter to gain surprise and the insertion of long-range reconnaissance teams. Close support by low-flying and slow aircraft, notably helicopter gunships, also can be useful. Nevertheless, the brunt of the battle must be borne by foot soldiers, which is a fortunate coincidence inasmuch as the forces of the host country will not as a rule have a capability to master high technology weaponry. The naval role too is ancillary, focusing on interdiction of waterways and seaborne supply and relying on small vessels. It poses no serious problems for the Navy which, with two naval special warfare groups, maintains some capabilities in the skills and facilities required.

The Record—US Military Assistance

If we turn now to the historical record of military assistance for special operations, we find that it is not particularly impressive.

Assistance of this type has been provided in many countries, especially in Latin America and Southeast Asia. In the former, emphasis in the early years (that is, the 1960s) was placed on training for civic action as a means of countering insurgency before it reached the stage of armed struggle. After a while, and as a result of the growing controversy over Vietnam, the urgency behind these programs evaporated and they were terminated. Their impact is not easily measured.

In Southeast Asia, of course, military assistance was lavishly deployed from the early 1960s until the mid-1970s, particularly in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand, and to a lesser extent in Laos. Only a limited portion of this can accurately be described as support for special operations. Most of it went to build up and strengthen the host government's conventional forces. In spite of verbal concessions to concepts of unconventional combat, the armed forces of Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia were trained and advised in accordance with the conventional principles that governed the US armed forces, and the result was a mirror image—or in some cases a caricature—of American military methods. It was explicitly stated at the time that counterguerrilla operations were well within the capability of a well-trained, well-prepared force, and that there was no need to deal with it as a different kind of combat with different requirements. This was called by some the theory of "the lesser included capability."

Some exceptions, however, should be noted. In Vietnam, the most important of these was CORDS, a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) staff directorate composed largely of civilians, whose function was to guide and support the GVN's pacification effort. (The acronym stands for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.) Beginning in 1967, CORDS finally provided centralized management for all the numerous and scattered pacification activities of the United States in Vietnam. It energized and focused them and translated the theoretical priority of pacification into actuality. Just as important, it helped to galvanize the pacification effort of the Vietnamese government to the higher levels that were essential for some modicum of success.

The CORDS effort was large and complex, and a full account is not possible here. Suffice it to say that as far as its authority

reached it was able to coordinate a sizeable and varied program, so that the "people were the target." Among the most important of its accomplishments was the retraining and rearming of the neglected paramilitary forces of the GVN. Together with GVN decisions increasing the authority and resources of local government noted above, this assistance had a definite and noticeable impact upon security and development in the countryside. CORDS had its flaws and failures, notably in the famous Phoenix program, but its net accomplishment was positive.

Another positive program was the Marine Corps' experience with Combined Action Platoons, which—in a daring departure from MACV's standard practice—combined Marine platoons of selected personnel with Vietnamese paramilitary companies, and deployed them successfully in guerrilla-style combat in the villages of Central Vietnam. The Special Forces could also claim a degree of success with their tribal programs in the mountains and along the frontiers with Cambodia and Laos.

All of these efforts together, however, represented but a fraction of the assistance program. The rest was largely devoted to supporting the South Vietnamese in conventional operations with concentrated forces and firepower, which impacted heavily upon the civilian population and which the enemy was largely able to evade, thus controlling the pace of combat.

Much the same would have to be said of US military assistance in Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia. In the first two countries, support for special operations was largely in the hands of the CIA. Although much valuable help to the CIA was provided by the military, the assistance programs of the latter were largely of a conventional character.

On the other hand, the CIA-directed tribal activities in Laos were a noteworthy example of military assistance for special operations. They were not so much counterinsurgency operations as they were a resistance activity of a population against a communist occupier. As in the case of CORDS, these tribal operations were large and complex and cannot be described in detail here. It is sufficient to note that the CIA, with considerable assistance from Thai paramilitary personnel, organized and sustained over a period of about 12 years a tribal paramilitary force of about

30,000 men which successfully harassed and diverted the Laotian Communists and their North Vietnamese allies and caused them heavy losses in men and material. It was an activity of a size and character which normally would be carried out by US Special Forces, but for policy reasons it was assigned to the CIA. Although, as pointed out earlier, the effort ultimately failed before overwhelming North Vietnamese ground forces, it remains an important example of what can be accomplished by the United States in special operations in the role of guide, advisor, and provider of resources.

The Future

What must be done now to digest and implement the lessons of this very uneven experience? The single most important initiative that should be undertaken in this field is to establish a multi-agency center where planning, policies, and programs suitable to the current and prospective needs can be developed and implemented. At present, a few scattered efforts, limited in large part to the CIA and the Special Forces, are underway, but little is being done by other agencies. Moreover, what activity exists is not centrally coordinated at a sufficiently high level. A permanent staff is necessary to develop combined doctrine and planning and to oversee program activity. It probably would have to be located in the White House staff, which means the National Security Council, to command the necessary authority.

Here, long overdue attention could be given to such questions as the need for a revived police program and a revived US Information Agency (USIA) capability to provide assistance to the information activities of besieged governments. The record of past activity could be reviewed, establishing an institutional memory and deriving lessons from that record. From such a center a means should emerge for monitoring ongoing programs to ensure internal consistency and appropriate vigor. Where oversea programs have been launched, such a center would also be empowered to review the state of coordination and management in the field, and if necessary call for the creation of a counterpart center within the US Mission in the country concerned.

To the extent possible, a departure of this type should be kept low key, with a minimum of fanfare. No immediate crisis exists and it would be a mistake to attempt to repeat the high-profile approach of the Kennedy administration. To do so would not only arouse false expectations but would also immediately attract the opposition of those in Congress and the media whose philosophy consists of repetition of the slogan, "No more Vietnams." As program proposals emerge, the question of funding would certainly come to the fore, but it is not likely that—in the absence of a crisis—the relatively modest amounts involved would of themselves arouse serious resistance. Opposition can also be expected from some of the agencies involved, who might regard such a center as a challenge to primacy in their own fields of competence. Indeed, such opposition might well prevail unless the highest authority, namely the President, gives his strong support to the proposed center.

In this way, with a renewed and strengthened commitment at the policy levels of the government, we may finally begin to cover the considerable distance that currently exists between the needs likely to arise in the 1980s and our ability to fill them.

Notes

1. Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 80.
2. Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 95.
3. George K. Tanham, *Trial in Thailand* (New York: Crane Russak, 1974), p. 75.
4. Lewy, op. cit., pp. 190-91.
5. Robert S. Leiken, "They're Tired of War, They Want to Talk," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1983, section C.

Discussion

Mr. John Michael Kelly

I agree heartily that special operations are critically important adjuncts to conventional military operations. We ignore this at our grave peril. But I would go still further. Conventional military operations may at some point be a useful and necessary adjunct to special operations. The critical battlefields in the "Third World War" are precisely those we have defined here in the areas of intelligence, civic action, and psychological operations. If we ever reach the point of shooting it out with conventional Red Army formations, we will already have lost. What we are talking about at this conference is the real war.

A second thought that strikes me is that special operations—all types—are part of a synergistic whole. We have basically two tools with which to wage war, a carrot and a stick. The carrot is what Mr. Blaufarb described under the rubric of civil affairs and economic assistance. We have discussed the stick at considerable length at this conference. Intelligence should tell us whether to apply the carrot or the stick, on whom, in what degree, and at what time. Psychological operations, ranging from public affairs on the one end through black propaganda on the other end, is the advertising and marketing of our product. These approaches cannot be dissociated from one another.

Now, clearly, there has to be an overall structure to guide and direct this mechanism. And it has to have a head. We have violated the principle of unity of command consistently and egre-

giously throughout our national security structure. We cannot afford to do so any longer. If we are to have an organization to direct special operations, it should have one head, someone who can give marching orders rather than mere guidance. The National Security Council (NSC) itself is the logical place for it to be, and it should be an integral element of the NSC structure.

Now, as to implementation, I agree that a critical element of the special operations mission should be the role of AID. The bulk of the psychological operations effort falls in the purview of the US Information Agency (USIA).

But there is a problem here. If we are to create a sound and effective organization with which to approach the problem, civilian-dominated bureaucracies will have large inputs. With allowances for many honorable exceptions, the typical AID or USIA bureaucrat does not view himself as a soldier on the front line of one of the most critical battlefields of the "Third World War." By and large, those bureaucrats lack understanding of the problem we face. And so, in addition to organizing for special operations, there has to be training for special operations. There must also be recruiting for special operations organizations.

These issues need to be addressed. But I think the most critical special operations mission we have in the United States today is to persuade the American people that the communists are out to get us, and that we have to help other countries to do the things that have to be done in order to keep the communists away from our doorsteps. The task is mind-boggling.

In a democratic society, this cannot be done by the government. But it is critically important that the American people somehow be persuaded to think seriously of developing private means to carry on the information war, to send out the message about the nature of Soviet society, and to recognize that by engaging in low-intensity conflict, we avoid high-intensity warfare.

Mao Zedong said that all power comes from the barrel of a gun. Power comes from the ideas in the minds of men that cause them to take up guns in the first place. If we win the war of ideas, we will win everywhere else. If we do not win the war of ideas, if we cede this field to the enemy, then whatever else we do is so much dross and sounding brass.

Major David A. Decker, USA

I would like to ask all the senior officers present to put themselves in the position of an instructor addressing senior first lieutenants or junior captains in the United States Army who are studying at our School of International Studies. How do you talk to them about the current problems facing Special Operations Forces? The question I ask my students is whether there is a role for our military and for the militaries of the Third World in assuaging internal instability (which is ultimately a political problem) with military civil action type projects. This is not an easy concept to communicate to military people, who very soon may be going out on Mobile Training Teams or Military Assistance and Advisory Groups, and who have been exposed to more traditional training.

The militaries of the Third World, as pertaining to military civic action, should interact with their local populations for two reasons: first, to improve their image, and second, to bring the people and their government closer together. The object there is long-term internal stability. Before we can begin to talk to host countries about that mission, we had better get a bit more sophisticated about it ourselves. And we had better get more serious about unconventional warfare itself. It is time for the US Army itself to get serious, and give those of us who are interested in special operations the opportunity to become sophisticated and then pass that sophistication on to the militaries of the Third World.

I do not see the armed forces of this nation being allowed by either a skeptical press or by our own society to meet the challenge (in the form of US combat forces) once the insurgency has started. And so it remains for us, I think, to approach the problem from the standpoint of prophylaxis—preventing the insurgency. This is what viable military civic action is designed to accomplish. In order to get the militaries of the Third World in such a posture, we have to develop individuals capable of the analysis and communication required.

Some way has to be found to reach the foreign militaries who invite us in or who send officers to this country, and to make them understand and accept the concept of military civic action which brings the people and their government close together.

So when I tell my young captains and lieutenants in class that they are not good enough to go on civil affairs or military assistance and advisory group missions, I mean that even if they have had the very best of training available today and can do all the sorts of escape and evasion, can lead small units, and even can speak the language, they are still not good enough, because they are analytically and culturally deficient. What is a possible answer? Select individuals who have cross-cultural proclivities, or who are amenable to developing those proclivities in order to communicate with our foreign counterparts, whether they come to the United States or we go to their countries. Not everyone can achieve real sophistication or creativity on a level suitable for communicating with their military counterparts in the Third World, so let us cease deluding ourselves that any "school trained" Army officer will suffice.

Now, I think military civic action ultimately needs to be perceived as an art form. Much of the mechanical and technical structuring that relates to current training is fine. Beyond that, we need to begin to educate our people in that cross-cultural way to which I have already referred.

One way to approach this would be to send personnel for several years to study a target country—in civilian clothes perhaps, to live with a family while accomplishing formal study. There would be culture shock, but there is no easy way to achieve the sort of cultural sophistication which is needed. We have to look inside and see our own frailties, the cultural factors which preclude us from communicating with other peoples. Language is important, but again, it does not ensure that people can communicate. This proposed route does not represent a panacea, but it is critical if we are to do more than just beef up our special forces and continue the same things which have not worked over the last 20 or 30 years. Yes, there have been successes, but let us not get nostalgic in wanting to fight all the battles over again; instead, we should recognize and meet the real challenges of the 1980s and 1990s.

At the root of this argument is the precept that, prior to direct action, real understanding and empathy on a cultural level is necessary. The only way to achieve this end is a selection and education process that will allow us to develop the human expertise

required. This expertise must then be applied in such a way that individual problem scenarios or potential problem scenarios are identified and properly analyzed. Equally important, this expertise must be retained so that there is an effective institutional memory. This will obviate the need to "reinvent the wheel" each decade or so.

General Discussion

The first speaker broached the question of giving assistance to a government lacking significant defense forces of its own, and whose existence is precarious at best. It was noted, for example, that Zanzibar and the Seychelles were effectively "hijacked" overnight by small, even miniscule forces. Zanzibar and the Seychelles are typical of many states in the world that have very small populations, very small police forces, almost nonexistent armed forces, and can effectively be taken over with about the same amount of effort that it takes to hijack a large airliner.

But we know, on the whole, what to do when a large airliner is hijacked. We do not know what to do when a country is suddenly hijacked. And this problem is going to increase somewhat in the next few years as mini-states go forth into the international community without any proper defense arrangements. This is particularly a problem for Britain, which has in fact created a great many of these mini-states, and Britain does not have the restrictions on quick movement that clearly inhibit a rapid US response in so many parts of the world. Obviously, a rapid response is what is needed in this sort of case. The speaker argued, however, that this is not exclusively a British problem. The United States has an interest in the continuing peaceful existence of a substantial number of these mini-states. It was agreed that this is one of the many problems which will require careful thought if the United States is to adapt its special operations capability to the needs of the day.

Addressing the cross-cultural communications problem, one speaker described his own experience, both in training and in the field, which pointed up the continuing deficiencies in US military efforts to cope. Although area studies and language programs involving the best people available in the US academic and govern-

ment communities, the use of television, written materials, film strips, and the like, were adopted and applied in training, it was nevertheless established that many Special Forces soldiers operating in their particular units for lengthy periods lacked real knowledge of their areas of responsibility. Much more had to be done to prepare those soldiers, whether for combat operations or for work on mobile training teams, to address cross-cultural communications problems they were certain to face every day. This is particularly true of those working in the Middle East.

Another speaker, agreeing with this contention, cited the various courses at Army, Air Force, and Defense and State Department schools which, while professing concern with cross-cultural communications, actually provide little instruction and almost no practical training in that field. Deploring this state of affairs, he observed that the resulting weakness in the preparedness and capability of Special Forces training teams in US security assistance programs is particularly serious in the Arab world. It shows up among both officers and enlisted men.

Defensive voices were raised on the subject of cross-cultural communication and on the record of US performance in that respect. Special Forces activities in Colombia were cited as one of the best programs the United States has ever had. It succeeded because the ambassador directed it in an outstanding manner, and because he enlisted the support of the Colombian government at the top level. US agencies cooperated effectively, and as the program developed it was turned over to the Colombians to run.

In this context, it was noted that there may also be a danger of becoming excessively identified with certain categories of host-country nationals. If, as in the case of the Montagnards in Vietnam, the latter develop local allegiance to their American counterparts, problems with the host government are likely to develop. This was conceded by Major Decker, but in his view it should not be allowed to impede emphasis on special effort in the communications area, which even soldiers well equippped for guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency require if they are to succeed in their mission.

The final exchange among participants focused on command and control of security assistance programs. It was agreed that this

was a critical area of concern. Mr. Blaufarb's view of the importance of White House leadership was generally endorsed. Only thus could the entire resources of the government be brought to bear. In response to the question of whether the problem was likely to be addressed today any more effectively than in 1965, the consensus was decidedly pessimistic on grounds that the public has little interest in the subject and the government has disbanded many of its centers of instruction, research, and expertise.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Psychological Operations, Special Operations, and US Strategy

Paper
Alfred H. Paddock

Discussants
George Bailey
E. Frederick Bairdain

The psychological dimension of the Soviet threat to the United States has been stressed with increasing vigor of late in both government and academic circles. There seems to be little doubt that propaganda is regarded by the Soviets as an important element of their long-range political strategy. It ranks along with other instruments of statecraft, is centrally coordinated and directed, and is employed on a global basis.[1]

This paper addresses one aspect of the US response to the Soviet deployment of its propaganda instruments—namely, psychological operations, or PSYOP as it is called in general military parlance. Specific emphasis will be on the relationship between PSYOP and special operations, the latter being primarily any of a number of military responses to contingencies developing at the low-intensity end of the spectrum of conflict.

PSYOP may be defined broadly as the planned use of communications in order to influence attitudes or behavior. If used properly, PSYOP will normally precede, accompany, and follow all applications of force. This will, of course, be carried out under the broader umbrella of US national policy, and the military aspects of the overall effort will be coordinated fully and carefully with other agencies of government which have related responsibilities.

There is no doubt that in any conceivable situation wherein US Special Operations Forces are to be employed, there will be an important—perhaps even predominant—PSYOP dimension. This, however, does not represent grounds for incorporating PSYOP within the organizational mechanism which is responsible for planning and supporting special operations. Such, in fact, is the case today. The 4th Psychological Operations Group, which represents the US Army's active capability in this field, is subordinate to the 1st Special Operations Command. For reasons to be discussed, this is not a salutary arrangement. It may also be viewed as symptomatic of a larger problem, the limited US capability at the national level for the conduct of psychological operations in either peace or war. While some progress has been made in recent years to enhance that capability, major changes are required, both within the Department of Defense and at the interagency level, to ensure that PSYOP resources available throughout the government are effectively organized and melded to support US strategy. Among these are the formal dissociation of PSYOP from special operations within the military services and the creation of a separate center dedicated to the long-term development of the psychological instrument.

US National Organization for PSYOP

Beginning at the top, there is no US national-level organization for PSYOP. We need a program of psychological operations as an integral part of our national security policies and programs.[2] Psychological planning should be conducted on an integrated, worldwide basis, in response to national policy. Ad hoc committees created in reaction to regional crises are not the answer. The continuity of a standing interagency board or committee to provide the necessary coordinating mechanism for development of a coherent, worldwide PSYOP strategy is badly needed. In addition, a knowledgeable PSYOP specialist should be added to the National Security Council staff, and should play a key role in the interdepartmental committee created.

This coordinating mechanism should also provide the Department of Defense with the national policy upon which unified com-

mand PSYOP plans are to be based. Because strategic-level PSYOP plans must be coordinated with other agencies and frequently require the use of their assets, the lack of an interagency coordinating mechanism results in inefficient, time-consuming, and incomplete coordination of theater PSYOP requirements and plans.

The present administration appears to recognize this perennial weakness in our PSYOP apparatus. The US Information Agency (USIA), which has the principal responsibility for peacetime international communication, launched an aggressive program in 1981 called "Project Truth," designed to portray a more favorable image of the United States abroad and to actively counter Soviet propaganda and disinformation. This new approach has not been without its detractors, however, including some members of Congress. Their concern has been that "Project Truth" might take on a too-apparent propaganda edge, and could destroy the credibility of the Voice of America and its parent agency, USIA.[3] Under the leadership of Director Charles Z. Wick, USIA has also been more receptive to interagency cooperation, a welcome change for those who remember a much more reticent attitude on this subject under previous administrations.

Another major development was the Reagan administration's announcement in the summer of 1982 that the President's national security strategy would have four basic components: diplomatic, economic, military, and informational.[4] In his address to the British Parliament on June 8, 1982, President Reagan announced the intention of the United States to make a major effort to help "foster the infrastructure of democracy . . . which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means." A second and related theme of the President's address was his exhortation to the Western allies to engage more vigorously in a peaceful "competition of ideas and values" with the Soviet Union and its allies.[5] A $65 million program named "Project Democracy" was announced in early 1983 to promote democratic institutions abroad. The program was intended to focus on leadership training, education, and strengthening of institutions such as labor unions, churches, political parties, and the media. It was also intended to

convey ideas and information through radio stations like the Voice of America, in order to develop personal and institutional ties.[6]

To strengthen the organization, planning, and coordination of communication activities, the President signed National Security Decision Document 77 on public diplomacy in early 1983. The decision established an interagency Special Planning Group (SPG) under the chairmanship of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Membership consists of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the Director of the US Information Agency. Four interagency standing committees were established and will report regularly to the SPG: the International Information Committee, chaired by a senior representative of the USIA; the International Political Committee, chaired by a senior representative of the Department of State; the International Broadcasting Committee, chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and the Public Affairs Committee, co-chaired by the Assistant to the President for Communications and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.[7]

The President's initiatives have not been received with open arms by Congress and the media. Secretary of State Shultz encountered considerable skepticism when he outlined "Project Democracy" to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations in February 1983. Doubts were expressed by several subcommittee members about the feasibility and propriety of the United States trying to train young leaders and foster the growth of such democratic institutions as labor unions, political parties, news outlets, businesses, and universities in countries where democracy is not permitted. "The more we look at this thing, the more nervous I become over it," said Representative Joel Pritchard, Republican of Washington. "I don't see how this program can possibly do anything but get us into trouble," said Representative Peter H. Kostmayer, Democrat of Pennsylvania, who labelled Project Democracy as "basically a multimillion dollar American propaganda effort."[8]

In March 1983, USIA Director Wick encountered similar tough questioning by several skeptical members of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee. Former Senator J. William Fulbright made an eloquent plea to committee members, asking that they not mingle the administration's short-term propaganda efforts with long-term oversea programs such as student exchanges, which have a nonpolitical tradition. Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, asked that Wick return to the Committee with proposed legislative guidelines for Project Democracy. "If you wish this program to survive, you had better establish some parameters for behavior. I can see what's going to happen before it starts—this is just going to be perceived as a propaganda tool," Dodd said.[9] Indeed, most of the proposed $65 million program for "Project Democracy" has been cut by Congress.[10]

This congressional skepticism is vivid evidence of the obstacles which inhibit the United States ability to communicate its beliefs to other nations. Sensitive to this, the White House does not want its programs to be construed as a propaganda effort similar to campaigns waged by the Soviet Union. The President, for instance, has said it is "not propaganda—it's public relations."[11] Thus, the jury is still out on the Reagan administration's peacetime "public relations" program, and there is little evidence that centralized policy direction is being given to the Defense Department that would enable it to plan more effectively for wartime strategic-level PSYOP. One would also hope that overt and covert propaganda efforts are being carefully coordinated. Yet, there is no CIA representation on the SPG or its four interagency subcommittees. Nonetheless, the steps taken by the current administration are signs of improved national-level guidance and coordination of US psychological efforts.

PSYOP Within DOD

Within the Department of Defense, the picture of our PSYOP capability is not very encouraging. At the "supporting superstructure" level, our PSYOP expertise is minimal. There are few personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) with extensive PSYOP experience; and those with the requisite experience are often burdened with other duties and thus unable to devote their full ener-

gies to PSYOP matters. The same is true among the service staffs in the Pentagon. The Army, with by far the bulk of forces and responsibilities dedicated to PSYOP, now has only one fully qualified officer working full-time in this specialized area. Even this is an improvement—in 1981 there were no PSYOP-qualified officers on the Army Staff. The situation is no better at the unified and major commands. With the exception of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), formerly the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), few of these commands—which will direct the employment of military forces in their theaters during conflict—have trained full-time PSYOP staff personnel. Significantly, there are no general or flag officers with PSYOP experience in positions where this experience can be brought to bear most effectively. In sum, PSYOP efforts are fragmented and too frequently ineffectual, largely because PSYOP expertise is isolated from those who require it and from the mechanisms required to apply it effectively to every level of command.

Among the military services, our PSYOP capability is likewise limited. The Navy has a radio and television production capability in its reserves which is very good, plus a few mobile radio transmitters. The Air Force has a National Guard squadron of specially fitted C-130 aircraft for support of psychological operations, as well as other duties; it also has a handful of officers with PSYOP expertise, primarily as a result of experience as instructors at the 1-week familiarization course on PSYOP given at Hurlburt Air Force Base, Florida, or service in PSYOP staff positions in unified commands or in the Pentagon. Only the Army has active duty forces dedicated solely to PSYOP.

The Army's PSYOP Forces

The 4th Psychological Operations Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is all that remains of the Army's active PSYOP capability after PSYOP units in Okinawa, Panama, and Germany were disbanded following the US withdrawal from Vietnam. Today, its many missions and responsibilities are worldwide in nature. The Group provides support to all levels, from the unified command through the division. It provides support to both conventional

forces and unconventional warfare forces. In addition, it is often called upon to provide support directly to national level agencies and organizations, including the Department of the Army Staff and the OJCS.

Essentially, military PSYOP consists of two broad categories of activity: research and analysis, and operations. The first activity consists of continuously monitoring and assessing the psychological environment in specific foreign nations, in order to determine how those environments affect the formulation and execution of US policies and actions. This research and analysis culminates in the publication of studies and assessments unique within the interagency arena. These studies and assessments provide the foundation for establishing psychological objectives to support US goals related to foreign nations or groups. Research and analysis, therefore, is essential to accomplishing the second broad category of activity—planning and executing specific PSYOP campaigns which employ communications media and other resources with the goal of causing selected foreign groups and individuals to behave in ways which support US national and military objectives.

Thus, the lion's share of peacetime activities for a PSYOP unit, is devoted to research and analysis of specific geographic regions and target audiencies; development of PSYOP plans to support conventional and unconventional warfare units; and participation in field exercises which employ these plans. Because of the paucity of PSYOP expertise at unified commands, the 4th Group also provides staff assistance and advice to those headquarters and to other major commands.

It should be clear that one active duty PSYOP organization consisting of a group headquarters, a radio section, and three battalions is insufficient to support all unified command requirements in mid- or high-intensity conflict. The reserves are therefore a vital component of the "PSYOP community"; fully 80 percent of the Army's PSYOP mobilization capability lies in its reserve component (RC) unit. The RC also provides some assistance in peacetime research and analysis support. Serving as the Army's Forces Command (FORSCOM) planning agent under the Capstone program (which links RC units with the units they would support during mobilization), the 4th PSYOP Group coordinates the wartime planning efforts of RC units and provides training assistance.

Generally speaking, then, the active component 4th PSYOP Group acts as a "strategic nucleus" for the PSYOP community. It provides the bulk of peacetime research and analysis support, responds to peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements, provides direction and guidance to the PSYOP community for wartime planning and peacetime exercise participation, and provides the active component command and control nucleus for general or partial mobilization of reserve component forces. The RC assists in peacetime research and analysis efforts, performs its planning and training responsibilities under the Capstone program, and prepares for general or partial mobilization in support of the unified commands.

One of the real success stories in the improvement of the US PSYOP capability has been the unification of the Army PSYOP community under the aegis of the Capstone program. PSYOP supporting plans for unified commands have been developed, and subordinate-level supporting plans are being completed. Every unit in the PSYOP community has a specific wartime mission, and they have established liaison with the units they will support upon mobilization. In many instances, groups have conducted field exercises with the supported units. These missions allow PSYOP units to focus on specific geographic regions, essential for the RC due to the relatively limited time available for developing campaign plans and conducting training. Such assignments also give individual units a basis upon which to recruit linguists. Working together in these mission-oriented planning and training activities, this PSYOP community has achieved a sense of cohesion and camaraderie that might well serve as a model for the "Total Army" concept.

Paradoxically, the success achieved under the Capstone program underscores one of the PSYOP community's most glaring weaknesses: its limited capability to respond to peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements. As has been stated, for mid- and high-intensity conflict requirements, either partial or general mobilization of the RC is required. Conversely, the active component must be relied upon for almost all peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements. These are increasing in scope, and many observers see them as the more likely threats to international sta-

bility during the 1980s. The most probable demands on PSYOP resources in this environment will be for support to DOD and non-DOD agencies, staff assistance to unified commands, unscheduled studies and assessments oriented to crisis areas, and advisory Mobile Training Teams (MTT) for Third World nations. These demands, in addition to the vital task of continuing to plan and train for mid- and high-intensity contingencies, will strain to the utmost the 4th PSYOP Group, which is already the most over-committed and under-resourced colonel-level command in the Army. Recognizing this dilemma, the Army approved a program in 1981 for a modest enhancement of both personnel and equipment needs of the 4th PSYOP Group, while also addressing some critical equipment requirements of the RC. Implementation of this program, unfortunately, has become bogged down and little real improvement in overall capability has resulted to date.

Lack of Understanding of PSYOP Among The Services

While personnel and modern equipment are the most visible requirements for enhancing the Army's PSYOP capability, the paucity of these resources is only symptomatic of a larger problem—the lack of understanding and appreciation of PSYOP within the Army and, indeed, throughout the military services. Some improvement in this critical area has occurred as a result of frequent briefings of senior commanders and staff officers by PSYOP personnel, the professionalism of PSYOP units in contingency planning and support of conventional units on field exercises, and the steady improvement in quality of PSYOP studies and assessments (the latter aided considerably by the increased hiring of high-quality civilian intelligence analysts). Within the Army, the change in PSYOP staff designation from G-5 (Civil-Military Operations) to G-3 (Operations) should encourage commanders and staff officers to integrate PSYOP as a weapons system in their planning rather than treat it as an afterthought, as has been the case so often. Within the Air Force, a few dedicated officers are working to formulate a PSYOP operational doctrine for their service.

The momentum of these improvements will not be sustained, however, unless steps are taken to institutionalize PSYOP in the

appropriate field manuals and to teach its doctrine in our service school system. The Army's 10-week PSYOP Staff Officers Course, taught at Fort Bragg, reaches a very small audience, mostly foreign officers and US personnel scheduled for assignmment to the 4th PSYOP Group. Similarly, the Air Force's 1-week course, although it provides a valuable overview, reaches only a limited audience. As was the case before Vietnam, PSYOP instruction in our service school system—where our future commanders and staff officers are trained—is limited or nonexistent. Its absence not only makes the PSYOP community's job more difficult in educating supported units on the capabilities and limitations of this unique weapons system, but also, quite naturally, has a negative effect on setting priorities for equipment modernization and personnel resourcing.

Most conventional force officers are not consciously anti-PSYOP; they simply have never been exposed to its value. Therefore, they tend to put more emphasis on areas with which they are more familiar. For the same reasons, many quality officers shun assignments to key PSYOP staff positions in active duty units or on high-level staffs. This out-of-the-mainstream image can be reversed only if PSYOP is institutionalized as a permanent and valued member of our family of weapons systems, rather than one that is resurrected only when a crisis occurs.

PSYOP and Special Operations

An important factor contributing to this lack of understanding and appreciation of PSYOP is its continued association with, and subordination to, the special operations command and staff structure. Including the 4th PSYOP Group in the Army's recently formed 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM) perpetuates and exacerbates this problem for the PSYOP community. The 1st SOCOM, using as its nucleus the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, has assigned to it all Special Forces units (including those stationed overseas), the two Ranger battalions, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, and the 4th PSYOP Group. Assigning the 4th PSYOP Group to the 1st SOCOM will only further confuse those who previously believed PSYOP units

to be part of Special Forces. The uninformed will perceive the 4th Group to be focused primarily on support of other special operations forces, when in fact the Group's missions and responsibilities are much broader.[12]

This confusion over PSYOP and other special operations roles and missions is not a new problem. Indeed, the "spiritual father" of special operations forces, William J. Donovan, initially envisaged the psychological dimension of warfare as his overall organizational theme when he formed the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941:

> Donovan's concept of psychological warfare was all-encompassing. The first stage would be 'intelligence penetration,' with the results processed by R&A [Research and Analysis], available for strategic planning and propaganda. Donovan called propaganda the 'arrow of initial penetration' and believed that it would be the first phase in operations against an enemy. The next phase would be special operations, in the form of sabotage and subversion, followed by commando-like raids, guerrilla actions, and behind-the-lines resistance movements. All of this represented the softening-up process, prior to invasion by friendly armed forces. Donovan's visionary dream was to unify these functions in support of conventional operations, thereby forging 'a new instrument of war.'[13]

Less than a year after COI's creation, it was dissolved. It did, however, provide the nucleus for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Still, Donovan and OSS lost control of the overt propaganda function, which went to the newly created Office of War Information (OWI). The Army psychological warfare units that were formed during World War II primarily supported conventional ground forces, as was also the case during the Korean conflict.

There is a certain irony to this issue of PSYOP association with special operations when one considers the origins of the Army's Special Forces. With the impetus of the Korean War, the heightening Cold War tensions, and the persistent pressures of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, the Army moved in late 1950 to create an unprecedented staff organization in the Pentagon—the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). The first head

of this organization was Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, General Eisenhower's Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF), who thus emerged from World War II as the Army's foremost expert in this new field.

With Pace's support, Brigadier General McClure created a staff with responsibilities for both psychological and unconventional warfare. It was largely as a result of McClure's status and foresight that the Army developed its first capability to conduct unconventional warfare. Including a Special Operations Division in OCPW and having McClure select the key personnel for that office gave officers like Colonel Russell Volckmann and Colonel Aaron Bank the opportunity to form plans for unconventional warfare and the creation of Special Forces. Notwithstanding a "hot war" in Korea, the primary influence behind the Army's interest in unconventional warfare was the desire for a guerrilla capability in Europe to help "retard" a Soviet invasion, should it ever occur.

After some initial experimentation with the organizational machinery needed to carry out this "new concept" of warfare, the unit that emerged was clearly designed to organize, train, and support indigenous personnel in behind-the-lines resistance activities. It was primarily based on Donovan's OSS Operational Group concepts—not those of the Rangers or Commandos. In order to provide the necessary training, material, and doctrinal support for both Special Forces and psychological warfare units, McClure was able to sell the Army on a separate center at which the functions of the "whole field of OCPW" would be located. The Psychological Warfare Center, created in 1952 at Fort Bragg, was that center. It was there, in the same year, that the Army created its first formal unconventional warfare unit, the 10th Special Forces Group.

Cold War tensions fueled interest in both psychological and unconventional warfare, but there was a crucial difference in the receptivity to each on the part of the Army. Notwithstanding some of the "characters" associated with "sykewar," psychological warfare organizations gradually attained increased respectability in the Army during World War II and in Korea. On the other

hand, the Army continued to view unconventional warfare with a certain distaste. This reluctance to accept "special" forces resulted from the legacy of the OSS-military rivalry during World War II, and from a lack of appreciation of unconventional warfare on the part of officers trained for conventional war. Other contributing factors were the Army's continuing reservations about "elite" forces, and the absence of a formal precedent in the Army's history for Special Forces units. Most important of all, however, were the constraints of manpower and money in what was, notwithstanding the Cold War, a peacetime Army.

In the face of resistance from within the Army, the Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Special Forces nonetheless became a reality owing to the support of General McClure and the persistent efforts of Colonels Volckmann and Bank. But the bargaining positions of unconventional warfare advocates were weak in 1951–52; therefore, those in OCPW who wanted a separate Special Forces entity found it necessary to compromise. Because psychological warfare had a formal lineage and tradition—and unconventional warfare had neither—it was expedient to bring Special Forces into existence under the auspices of, and subordinate to, psychological warfare. This, plus the security restraints placed on the publicizing of Special Forces activities, explains the apparent ascendancy of psychological warfare over unconventional warfare at that time.

General McClure's rationale for combining these two activities within OCPW in 1951 and at the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952 can be partially attributed to the heritage of General William J. Donovan's organizational philosophy, and to the fact that the other military services and the JCS had the same combination in their staffs. In allowing McClure to have his way, the Army may simply have found it convenient to lump these two relatively new, out-of-the-mainstream (thus "unconventional") activities together while attempting to sort out both ideas and weapons.

To be sure, this marriage between psychological and unconventional warfare had its detractors. Some psychological warfare officers believed that the kinds of background, education, training, and experiences required for their field were inherently different from those needed to handle special operations. Colonel Donald

P. Hall, who had psychological warfare experience in both World War II and Korea, expressed the view that there were few individuals who would have wide experience in both psychological and unconventional warfare. He feared that if the two fields were combined, one of them "may suffer as a result of particular emphasis given to the function in which the controlling personnel are especially interested and experienced." This, of course, was part of the anxiety suffered by Special Forces adherents in 1952. At that time the "controlling personnel," both at OCPW and at the Psychological Warfare Center, were those with psychological warfare background.[14]

Colonel Hall's fears were prophetic, but the roles have been reversed since 1952. The tendency has been to combine these functions in a single staff element at every headquarters level, including the Department of the Army, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified commands. Over the years, these staff elements have usually been headed by Special Forces officers, strongly oriented toward their field of expertise. In such an organizational environment, it has been difficult for even the most conscientious PSYOP staff officer to give full attention to the broader responsibilities of PSYOP, rather than to those oriented specifically toward special operations.

At Fort Bragg, a similar trend has occurred. The Psychological Warfare Center became the Special Warfare Center in 1956, then the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance in 1969, and most recently, the 1st Special Operations Command. Through the years, key staff elements at the Center headquarters have invariably been headed by officers with Special Forces backgrounds.

An Air Force officer with long experience in PSYOP stated the problem for his service in 1977:

> First the Air Force must put its own house in order by . . . removing PSYOP from the enigma [sic] of being grouped only under Special Operations, specifying the all-encompassing nature of PSYOP regarding *all* Air Force actions, and delineating responsibilities as applying to all forces . . . .[15]

The problem, therefore, is not simply one of misperceptions by personnel outside the special operations community; rather, it is

that under the 1st Special Operations Command concept, the 4th PSYOP Group may tend over time to focus its limited resources on special operations at the expense of its broader missions and responsibilities. This tendency should be vigorously resisted. Increased acceptance of PSYOP by the military services will be achieved not with special operations as its primary focus, but through recognition by military and civilian leaders of its value as a weapons system that can be used throughout the conflict spectrum, including support of conventional forces.

Wartime Command and Control of PSYOP

A closely related issue is that of wartime command and control relationships of PSYOP units under the 1st SOCOM concept. Consolidating the diverse capabilities represented by Special Forces, Ranger, PSYOP, and Civil Affairs units under one headquarters for peacetime management is one thing. It is quite another to propose that this headquarters—or a portion of it—deploy to a theater, report directly to its commander, and direct the activities of all special operations units during wartime. If the latter course is being seriously considered, some perplexing questions emerge:

1. Are current command and control provisions for special operations forces—as outlined in unified command plans and supported by the Army's Capstone program—deficient?
2. What common thread links Special Forces, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, and Rangers to justify the requirement for a separate wartime headquarters to direct these diverse capabilities?
3. Does the 1st SOCOM headquarters represent another "layer" between the theater commander and the individual special operations capabilities? Have the costs vs. benefits of this been thoroughly considered?
4. What size headquarters will be required for the Commander, 1st SOCOM, to prepare for simultaneous deployment to multiple, geographically distinct theaters, provide the command and control nucleus for special operations forces, and maintain an adequate training and sustaining base in the United States? How will this affect his span of control?

These questions should be thoroughly examined as planning for employment of the embryonic 1st SOCOM continues, because the answers might have significant implications for the use of PSYOP. Current doctrine envisages a Theater PSYOP Command or Task Force reporting directly to the theater (unified) commander. The operational goal is centralization of all PSYOP policy within one body to avoid duplication of effort, contradictory propaganda, and propaganda contrary to national policy. PSYOP units, while considered "special operations forces," are combat support forces which must be trained simultaneously to support both special operations and conventional missions. This distinction is important because over 90 percent of PSYOP units, both active and reserve, are assigned to support conventional forces; the remainder support special operations forces (primarily Special Forces units). Under current doctrine, Special Forces units operate under the control of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Command (JUWC) or task force. (JUWTF). Thus, in the transition from peacetime to wartime, most of the PSYOP community aligns with a chain of command separate from other special operations forces. PSYOP units are routinely employed at both strategic and tactical levels from theater to division. The other special operations forces are employed primarily as strategic assets on an exceptional basis.

While placing the Ranger battalions under the command and control of the Commander, 1st SOCOM, might be rationalized (depending on how they are employed), it is difficult to envision the conditions of employment for Civil Affairs units—particularly in high- or mid-intensity conflict—that would justify placing them under the 1st SOCOM in wartime. PSYOP units may support Civil Affairs during consolidation operations (those operations directed toward populations in either liberated or occupied areas to facilitate military operations and promote maximum cooperation with the liberating or occupying power), but the only time that Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP units might conceivably work together as a "package deal" is during some conditions of peacetime—for example, where Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) are part of a military assistance program—or during certain levels of low-intensity conflict.

Assuming that the 1st SOCOM is not designed solely as a response to low-intensity conflict, the insertion of this headquarters

between the unified command and the disparate capabilities now embraced by the special operations label does not appear to offer many advantages. Indeed, it may be counterproductive to the close relationship that must exist between the senior PSYOP commander and the theater commander in translating national policy to theater-level psychological operations objectives. Therefore, any such change in current doctrine and contingency plans needs to be carefully analyzed and articulated, within both the Army and the staffs of the theater commanders.

Separation of PSYOP and Special Operations

The time has come to consider a formal separation of PSYOP and special operations. It has been observed that PSYOP is a phenomenon in itself, so "all-pervasive" that marriage with Special Forces results in a case of mistaken identity, making it difficult for PSYOP units to apply their doctrine and support other forces.

I believe that psychological operations are sufficiently important to warrant the creation of a separate center dedicated to the long-term development and nurturing of this unique capability. This center should have both an operational component and an educational, doctrinal, and research and development component. The active duty operational component should initially consist of the Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group. Educational, doctrinal, and research and development responsibilities, and resources for psychological operations, should be transferred from the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (formerly the Institute for Military Assistance) at Fort Bragg to the new center.

Ideally, such a center should be joint in nature, with representation from the other military services. It might include, for example, the personnel currently assigned to teach PSYOP at the Air Force's Special Operations School at Hurlburt Air Force Base. Also, it should include representatives from those governmental agencies with responsibility for information and communication, such as USIA. Thus a variety of courses, tailored to fit the needs of active and reserve PSYOP units and to train PSYOP staff officers for the services, the Joint Staff, and the unified commands, could be offered. The center should serve as the intellectual foun-

dation and clearing house for PSYOP research, doctrine, education, and operational techniques that would benefit all services and interested agencies.

To be fully effective, PSYOP and special operations should be separate at every major headquarters and staff level among the services, in the OJCS, in OSD, and in the unified commands. This is particularly important at the unified commands, because, as a rule, the only PSYOP officers in these headquarters are located in the special operations staff elements, thus detracting from their broader responsibilities of planning PSYOP support for the theater commander's total contingency requirements. The unified command provides one of those vital nodes, or bridges, between military PSYOP and US national-level policy and strategy. It is here that much of the detailed planning must occur between the PSYOP staff officer and representatives from other governmental agencies whose resources would be made available to the theater commander to assist him in carrying out his psychological operations campaigns during wartime. This aspect of detailed contingency planning for the transition from peace to war requires a great deal more attention. Separation of PSYOP from special operations at the unified command would facilitate this task.

Conclusions

Although the efforts of the Reagan administration to enhance the informational and public diplomacy component of its national security strategy are encouraging, there is still no effective, standing interagency board or committee that can provide the necessary coordinating mechanism for developing coherent, worldwide PSYOP strategy. Serious deficiencies exist in our military PSYOP capability; therefore, the program initiated within the Army in 1981 to enhance both the personnel and equipment needs of the 4th PSYOP Group should be pursued vigorously, for the likelihood of increased peacetime and low-intensity conflict demands on the active component will remain high during the 1980s. The accomplishments of the Capstone program should provide the foundation for continued PSYOP planning and training for mid- and high-intensity conflict in support of the unified commands.

Yet, strenuous efforts are needed to provide the reserve component with modern equipment. While improvements in the understanding and appreciation of PSYOP have been made within the Army, this momentum will not be sustained until PSYOP is institutionalized in our doctrine and taught in the service school system.

Including the 4th PSYOP Group in the 1st SOCOM is likely to result in further isolation of the Group from the rest of the Army and the unified commands, and possible dilution of its ability to accomplish its broader missions. In particular, the wartime command and control relationship of PSYOP units under the SOCOM concept requires thorough examination. Indeed, serious consideration should be given to the formal dissociation of PSYOP and special operations at every level within the Department of Defense. A separate center dedicated to the long-term development and nurturing of military PSYOP is needed to enhance the understanding and appreciation of this unique capability, and to improve its effectiveness in support of US strategy.

In sum, the changes suggested here would significantly enhance both the organization and the effectiveness of the PSYOP resources available to the United States. To fail to implement them would be, in effect, to ignore an important and cost-effective dimension of strategy.

Notes

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7. National Security Council Fact Sheet, "Public Diplomacy," February 8, 1983.
8. Bernard Gwertzman, "Skeptics Pelt Shultz with Queries on Reagan's 'Project Democracy'," *The New York Times*, February 24, 1983; Don Oberdorfer, "Lawmakers Voice Skepticism on U.S. 'Project Democracy'," *The Washington Post*, February 24, 1983.
9. Patrick E. Tyler, "USIA Chief Questioned on 'Project Democracy'," *The Washington Post*, March 13, 1983; Mary McGrory, "Promoting the 'Infrastructure of Democracy', with Charts," *The Washington Post*, March 3, 1983.
10. Jeff Trimble, "Reagan's Drive to Win World Opinion," *U.S. News and World Report*, August 1, 1983.
11. Lou Cannon, "U.S. to Fund 'Democracy' Institutes," *The Washington Post*, January 21, 1983.
12. As an example of the media reporting that contributes to misunderstanding of PSYOP, consider the headlines on the following newspaper accounts about creation of the 1st SOCOM: "Warsaw Pact Harassment: Military is Directed to Revitalize Behind-the-Lines Forces," *The Washington Post*, June 20, 1982; "Elite Green Berets Hope to Recapture Their Glory Days," *The Washington Post*, September 17, 1982; "Army Establishes Green Beret Headquarters," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, September 16, 1982 (the latter article stated the following concerning the role of PSYOP: "The command is expected to cover a number of Army units with expertise in special operations, including *psychological warfare* [emphasis added] and civic action with the Green Berets acting as the core."); "Comeback Eyed for Green Beret," *Harrisburg Patriot*, September 16, 1982; "Better Days for Green Berets?" editorial, *Harrisburg Patriot*, September 18, 1982; "General for a Special Force," *The New York Times*, October 4, 1982; "Return of America's Secret Warriors," *U.S. News and World Report*, November 15, 1982. In only two of these articles is PSYOP mentioned, with no explanation of the broad nature of its responsibilities. Similarly, the July issue of *Defense 83*, a publication of the Department of Defense, contains a cover story devoted to special operations (with photos of Special Forces soldiers) which explains very little concerning the broad range of PSYOP responsibility (pp. 8–13); the same lacuna is apparent in an article by the CG, 1st Special Operations Command, entitled "Special Forces: To Help Others Help Themselves," (complete with photos of "Green Berets" in action), in the widely read October 1983 "Green Book" issue of *Army* (pp. 246–252).

13. Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), p. 6. Original source—Kermit Roosevelt, ed. *War Report of the OSS* (New York: Walker & Co., 1976), vol. 1, p. 16.
14. The documentation for this historical digression is provided in the author's *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982).
15. Fred W. Walker, "PSYOP is a Nasty Term—Too Bad," in Ron D. McLaurin, ed., *Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 264.

Discussion

Mr. George Bailey

Colonel Paddock's paper stresses the importance of a reserve component in psychological operations, and the probability that low-intensity conflict requirements will be the most important security concern in the 1980s. I agree, and I would like to consider the subject of psychological warfare in the broadest possible context.

The Soviet Union regards information in general as the most sensitive form of matter; Soviet authorities take infinite pains with its collection, evaluation, preparation, and dissemination. Before an ordinary news item appears in print in the Soviet Union, it goes through some ten stages of control. The Soviets stand in awe of the printed and broadcast word. This accounts for the comparative dearth of printed matter and spoken text in the Soviet media across the board. Thus, censorship conveys the impression that anything in print or broadcast must be accepted as being officially sanctioned.

In a totalitarian regime, the public domain is strictly the province of the state. Ownership of the means of production includes the production of ideas and opinions, and their dissemination. The communications media of the Soviet Union report only good news, that is, news favorable to the regime and its policies. Bad news is shunned like the plague. Airplane crashes, train wrecks, even earthquakes, are totally ignored. The Soviets adhere strictly to the Bolshevik concept of socialist realism—reporting not what is but what should be.

The editorial policy of the Soviet media is thus the opposite of that of the Western media, the American media in particular. In the West good news is generally confined to the original good news, the Gospel. In the West, no news is good news, and good news is no news. It was the largely passive stance of Western media that caused Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to remark in Stockholm at a press conference, "Gentlemen, where were you when I needed you?"

Unfortunately, the Western press leaves itself open to exploitation by any and all. Even the sophisticated British press will pick up the usages of terrorists. Murders are reported and headlines are created with such terms as "executions," "people's trials," and sentencing by so-called people's courts; a case in point is the *Evening Standard* reporting of the murder of Aldo Moro, former Prime Minister of Italy. Advertising is thus available to terrorists, free of charge, and a process of legitimization thus begins.

I would note here that the Soviets, whom I do not generally admire, are very good political sloganeers. I would add that the Soviet writer and advertising man is a political huckster whose product is a blurb designed to popularize the regime; the American advertising man's blurb is a product to be sold. The communist is out to sell the system; the capitalist is out to systematize the sell. Increasingly, in the Western democratic press, there are no causes—there is only news. While in the Soviet press and in the communist press in general, there is no news—there are only causes.

When two demented women made a pathetic attempt to assassinate President Gerald Ford, each made the covers of *Time* and *Newsweek*. I could quote a dozen editors I know in New York on

the necessity of highlighting such stories. Each affirmed that he would have no choice but to do it again, because if he didn't, he would be outsold by his competitors. One friend of mine, a bureau chief, said, "I wouldn't have done it. But maybe that is why I am not editor-in-chief."

It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of the press to modern terrorism. Governments in the last four decades have shamefacedly concealed their executions, thus making nonsense of the classic justification of the death penalty as a deterrent. But today's organized terrorists do everything they can to achieve maximum publicity for their "executions," as they call them. Never in history has the spectacle of public execution achieved anything like its present dimensions in the hands of terrorists.

These terrorists exploit the publicity provided by an indiscriminately sensationalist Western press to use murder as an element of political power, and with increasing effectiveness. The coverage (particularly by American television crews) afforded the hostage-takers occupying the American Embassy in Tehran did more than any other factor to increase the political leverage of the hostage-takers and to weaken the position of the US government.

There is, however, one cause that American journalism sustains. Journalists see their role as that of independent and fearless monitors of public servants. This is the primary function of the press in America. To see to it that the state is held accountable, the press exposes the government and its workings to the public eye. The press insists on immunity for the articles and the right not to reveal its sources, thus maintaining a corner on secrecy, which constitutes its independence from the state.

Thus, the press endows itself with the same sovereign quality it attributes to the CIA. This has come to be known as adversary journalism. The press need not concern itself with the moral, political, social, or economic effect of its reporting. Therefore, it should not decide what is good and what is bad for people, because that would deny people the information that democracy entitles them to have.

An example of this is the Sakharov hearings held in Washington a couple of years ago. Most Americans did not learn from the media that they were being held. Rarely did the moving and fright-

ening testimony of those hearings get to the printed page. *The Washington Post* had decided that the hearings were not news. This occurred not because the editors of *The Washington Post* are leftists, but because the East European dissidents are allied with the American establishment, hence their doings are of little interest to the American press. The American press aims to criticize the government, not to popularize it. When American journalists bewail the inability of the American government to define its foreign policy in a way that would bring America's allies toward effective joint effort, they should reflect on their own role, and on the general American inability to define issues and achieve a national focus.

Dr. E. Frederick Bairdain

I would like to stress some important points made in Col. Paddock's paper and offer an explanation of why psychological operations may be in their current state, plus some suggestions for enhancing PSYOP's image.

The point was made that there is a lack of understanding and acceptance of PSYOP among the very people whose endorsement and support is vital to its existence. As a consequence, PSYOP suffers undeservedly from a continuing lack of trained personnel, equipment, adequate training support, and career opportunities for its personnel.

This rather grim picture, unfortunately, is quite accurate. It can be explained by several interrelated factors, which are not to be blamed on any individual or group. First, and perhaps most important, is the very wide net represented by the current official description of psychological operations. There is no broadly shared understanding or agreement on even the fundamental questions of what PSYOP is, what kinds of objectives are feasible and realistic for a psychological operation and—perhaps the most important one—what unique benefits can be obtained through the use of PSYOP.

Second, just as there is no useful definition of what PSYOP is, there is no authoritative definition of what it is not. This has allowed almost anything to be done in the name of PSYOP, and

has placed no restriction on the variety of activity which is referred to as, or is claimed to be, PSYOP.

A third major factor is the difficulty of proving PSYOP's effectiveness. Throughout its history, claims regarding the effectiveness of PSYOP have not been supported by convincing proof of success. Therefore, its credibility has suffered. This does not mean, however, that PSYOP is without value. Indeed, there has to be something there. In its peak-and-valley existence over many years, PSYOP keeps bouncing back. Interest revives again and again.

Another key factor making it difficult to prove PSYOP's effectiveness is the lack of a PSYOP-specific body of scientific knowledge, principles, and axioms. Empirically-derived rules-of-thumb are also lacking. Restated, no specific, basic body of PSYOP-pertinent knowledge is available to be shared by "psy-operators." In this connection, both professionally qualified clinical psychologists (who specialize in the unconscious dynamics of human behavior and motivation) and cultural anthropologists (who specialize in values and customs of different cultures) have little or no involvement in PSYOP. This is surprising since PSYOP is simply an attempt by people of one culture to communicate with and to influence the thinking and actions of people of other cultures.

In summary, these considerations—the lack of a controlling definition, the lack of boundaries and limitations, the absence of proof of effectiveness, the lack of a shared body of knowledge, and under-utilization of appropriately and adequately trained professional specialists—have resulted in a decreased regard for the value of PSYOP.

But does this view reflect an accurate assessment of the value of PSYOP across the political spectrum, from stable peace to all-out conflict? I would argue that some of the basic and applied research conducted in South Vietnam and the results obtained there represent convincing proof of PSYOP's effectiveness in specific situations. This being the case, there should be a very important role for PSYOP to play in the future.

Perhaps it is time to rethink the subject—to define it anew in a way that enables it to be seen in proper perspective.

I suggest that we consider the approach that would be taken by a businessman seeking to increase sales of a product which has not been selling well. In practice, he would first want a clear, specific description of the product along with evidence showing what it is and what it can do, as well as what it is not and what it cannot do. Next, he would identify where and how it can be used, as well as how it cannot be used. He would use this information to survey and analyze the market. Then, he would look for proof of any unique or superior features, in order to develop marketing and sales policies which emphasize the proven advantages. During this time, the name for the product would have been researched and evaluated for good or bad connotations.

Relating this approach to PSYOP as a product, the first step a businessman might take would be to identify better the substance and specifications of his product. This means creating a definition that describes PSYOP in a way that is coherent even though limiting. We might begin with the existing official definition of psychological operations and try to improve upon it. In any event, the important thing is to spell out what PSYOP is, and what it is not. I would also recommend developing a classification matrix to identify and interrelate specific dimensions or aspects of PSYOP. Emphasis would be focused on the various types of PSYOP, and on the objectives that are appropriate and feasible for each type of PSYOP. In the past, PSYOP has been given undeserved black marks because impossible or inappropriate objectives have been set for the activity in question.

In the second step, we might also list the political and social conditions in which different types of psychological objectives and operations are feasible or applicable, and the activities involved in planning and conducting PSYOP. At some point, the substance that will actually be used to influence other people must come into existence: selection of a culturally appropriate and effectively persuasive concept and value-based theme is the heart of any PSYOP. It seems to me that it is this substance which receives the least attention. Emphasis is usually on the initiating, planning, facilitating, and executing steps, but not on the heart of the matter.

The third major action would be to collect and organize all available material to date that represents proof of PSYOP effec-

tiveness. The reports that we produced of the work in South Vietnam do not appear to have had very wide distribution. They would be a starting point. There are others that could be reviewed and reworked; and new research design procedures could be imposed retroactively on data previously reported. Given this more rigorous treatment, there are probably some reports whose value is now hidden by narrative or impressionistic reporting, but which could be studied for evidence of the effectiveness and value of PSYOP.

The presence of the term "psychological" in the title "Psychological Operations" may create unnecessary problems. Attitudes among the general public, and perhaps within the military community, include some reservations that may extend to suspicion or distrust regarding psychology and all things psychological. Since nothing can be gained by continuing to use a term that is known to be disadvantageous, it seems desirable to shift to a name with greater current appeal. For example, suppose we select the name Multimedia Information Dissemination Department. We would then conduct multimedia information dissemination operations. These four words describe what is actually done but have no negative implications. We use different forms of media, and different forms of communications: we transmit a message. The acronym would then become MIDOPS. MIDOPS doesn't mean anything, but it would not evoke negative reactions among the listeners we are trying to impress.

However this suggestion might sound, it is not an attempt at humor. Consider how the Department of War has progressed since it became the Department of Defense, and what has happened to Standard Oil of New Jersey since it became Exxon. I think they have both done very well, notwithstanding the change of name.

General Discussion

As a point of departure in the general discussion, Col. Paddock deplored the absence of a sense of history in the United States—a weakness which militates against our ability to learn from experience. Notwithstanding some encouraging recent advances, plus indications of an improved atmosphere in senior government echelons, the basic problems affecting PSYOP persist and have yet

to be dealt with seriously. These problems reveal that the United States today remains ill-equipped to cope effectively and concertedly with those problems in peacetime, much less under conditions of low-intensity conflict. In Col. Paddock's opinion that situation will not improve significantly unless and until US military and civilian leaders recognize the value of PSYOP as a "weapons system" usable throughout the conflict spectrum.

Building upon that recognition, it will then be essential to establish a national-level military organization for PSYOP, and to proceed with other critical steps—that is, developing a better supporting superstructure; strengthening both the active and reserve components; clarifying doctrine and command relationships of psychological operations within the special operations command; institutionalizing these and other gains through promulgation of doctrine and teaching in the senior service schools; and, finally, increasing the available resources of equipment and systematizing the employment of this unique weapons system.

The first question from the floor, addressed to Mr. Bailey, bore on the effectiveness of Radio Liberty (RL), Soviet efforts to jam it, and possible ways to strengthen it in the years ahead. Mr. Bailey noted that RL has been reduced in size by about 33 percent over the past 12 years, and has thus lost some of its effectiveness. The Soviets jam its Russian service around the clock, at a cost to themselves four times that of the actual cost of the broadcasts. And, despite the jamming, the broadcasts can be picked up, at least on the European side of the Urals, for about 2 hours before and after midnight. Jamming is generally ineffective in the countryside, and indeed almost anywhere outside areas of concentrated population.

To strengthen Radio Liberty would be expensive, but there is hope that the pattern of budgetary attrition can be reversed. Mr. Bailey observed further that the Radio falls into two parts: the Russian language service, which is strong and very professional, and the other fourteen services which are addressed to the ethnic minorities. The latter are tragically weak at a time when their intrinsic importance is greater than ever.

Another speaker questioned the feasibility of trying to sell democracy—via propaganda—in the same way cigarettes are adver-

tised. Mr. Bailey conceded the analogy, but argued that there was much to be said for initiatives of that kind in "ballyhooing" democracy. They might have the desirable effect of stimulating discussion of democracy and enhancing interest in political theory, something which Americans are reputed to care little about. On the other hand, in Mr. Bailey's view, the prevailing attitude within the American press, which distrusts government automatically and instinctively, will make such initiatives difficult to carry out.

Col. Paddock also acknowledged this difficulty, citing the fine line between propaganda on the one hand, and public relations, information, and even education on the other. Our best hope, he said, was in stressing education along psychological dimensions—both in peacetime and wartime. This view was supported by other participants. One, however, cited the acute dilemma faced by the United States in its efforts to explain its objectives and programs in troubled areas, such as Central America, where many of the participants want neither our nation-building nor our propaganda, only help. It is not easy to be persuasive when faced with the emotional intensity evoked by wars of insurgency.

Shifting the emphasis somewhat, a speaker deplored the free access to American audiences enjoyed by leading Soviet scholar-propagandists. They seem to have no restrictions on their movements while in the United States, and they find sympathetic audiences and willing cooperation among American academics. The Soviets are thus directing special operations against us, and we are cooperating fully. The views and analyses conveyed to us by the Arbatovs have more impact on US decisionmaking than do the National Intelligence Estimates published by the intelligence agencies. In marked contrast, when Americans visit the Soviet Union, they are shown Potemkin villages under well-staged conditions. The speaker noted that in Western Europe the same pattern is evident, with similar impact upon the thinking of well-intentioned European.

Several participants noted the divergence of position between Col. Paddock and previous speakers with respect to the incorporation of PSYOP within the 1st Special Opertions command. Some observers view this as a step forward, whereas Col. Paddock takes exception to it for reasons set forth earlier. The issue was discussed at some length, but no consensus was reached.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Organizational Strategy and Low-Intensity Conflicts

Paper

Sam C. Sarkesian

Discussants

Kenneth P. Bergquist

George K. Tanham

Although the United States has been involved in a variety of what we now call unconventional conflicts since the Revolutionary War, it was only in World War II that a formal organization was established to plan and conduct guerrilla warfare. Throughout its history, the United States Army responded to the unconventional warfare of the times with ad hoc organizations, such as Rogers' Rangers in the French-Indian Wars and the 1st Special Service Force in World War II. These were quickly disbanded after the various conflicts.

The activation of the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1952, represented the first formal Army organization with a permanent mission of unconventional operations. In 1982, the activation of the 1st Special Operations Command gave the Army's effort a more meaningful posture, with the inclusion of Special Forces, Ranger units, and civic affairs and psychological warfare units in the new command.

Regardless of the most recent developments, however, the American political system and its military have always been uneasy with unconventional conflicts and unconventional or special organizations. Indeed, there has been a constant resistance, by military professionals as well as elected officials, to establishing elite units within the military.

In the post-Vietnam period, the United States has belatedly recognized the need to be better prepared to respond to non-nuclear wars in non-European areas and to a host of contingencies currently labelled "low-intensity conflicts." But the preparation is beset by a number of problems which evolve principally from the nature of the American political system, the characteristics of low-intensity conflicts, and the traditional bureaucratic/military professional mind-set.

The purpose of this paper is to study the substance of these problems, to identify possible solutions, and to analyze the organizational strategy and professional posture necessary to respond to low-intensity conflicts. It provides a broad-based study of the low-intensity conflict landscape; identifies the key features of this landscape, and relates them and their impact to American strategy and capabilities; and analyzes American strategy and capabilities, and draws conclusions regarding a feasible American command system that integrates the major components of low-intensity conflict.

Historical Overview

American experience with unconventional conflict dates back to at least the Jacksonian age, although before independence Americans had fought in an unconventional fashion during the French-Indian Wars and during the Revolutionary War. The Creek and Seminole Wars of the Jacksonian era marked the beginning of a long line of unconventional conflicts engaged in by the United States as an independent nation. Such conflicts occurred in a variety of environs and ranged from the Seminole Wars in Florida, to the Spanish-American War and the Filipino insurrection in 1898, to the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in 1916, to the Vietnam War in the 1960s.

During these conflicts, the United States was involved as a force countering the unconventional operations of the "enemy." In World War II, the roles were virtually reversed; America was involved in a number of guerrilla operations, and the enemy's aim was to counter such operations. "The First American experience with modern, sophisticated large-scale guerrilla movements took

place during World War II . . . (it was) a civilian-led U.S. agency, the OSS, and not the military services, (that) stepped in to capitalize on the potential for guerrilla warfare . . . ."[1]

The formation and activities of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) in World War II met with resistance within the American government and the military services. Indicating future attitudes, the traditional military structure resented the relative freedom of action of the OSS and its apparent disregard for standard operating procedures. Similar resistance was encountered by the Special Forces in Vietnam. As Colonel Francis J. Kelly observed,

> An elite group has always appeared within the Army during every war in which the United States has been engaged . . . . As surely as such groups arose, there arose also the grievances of the normally conservative military men who rejected whatever was distinctive or different or special . . . . If a new military program or unit is being developed in order to meet new needs, new threats, or new tactics, consideration should be given to the use of elite US Army units despite the customary resistance to change or elitism usually found in conservative establishments.[2]

In any case, the accomplishments of elite units in World War II did not prevent their disbandment after the war. The response by the military services to unconventional warfare was more an attempt to co-opt a possible area of military involvement than a serious commitment to special operations or to special units for this type of warfare. As one authority has shown, concern over the military response to guerrilla operations led to an Army effort to develop a psychological warfare capability. This effort was concentrated primarily in the General Staff and the Plans and Operations Division.[3] Thus, in response to unconventional warfare, instead of military operations, the focal point became psychological warfare and propaganda. The outbreak of the Korean War again focused Army attention on guerrilla operations. Unconventional warfare units were established, but in an ad hoc fashion. Attempts were made to conduct a variety of unconventional operations to support the United Nations effort, but their impact was minimal. Indeed, with respect to one such effort, "as the organization grew larger and more conventional," according to one

participant, "the effectiveness of its operations decreased accordingly."[4]

The operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Korea, combined with unconventional Army operations, created problems in command as well as missions. The Army's unconventional operations included activities aimed at developing and directing partisan warfare, training indigenous groups and individuals to engage in sabotage both within allied lines and behind enemy lines, and supplying partisan groups and agents opérating behind enemy lines by means of water and air transportation. CIA operations included placing agents to collect intelligence, assisting downed pilots in escape and evasion, organizing small groups for sabotage, and conducting selected tactical operations along both coasts in Korea. The CIA also conducted some guerrilla warfare.[5]

Although there were attempts to coordinate such activities by activating an overall command structure—Covert, Clandestine, and Related Activities in Korea (CCRAK) under the Commander-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE)—the separate missions and organizations of the CIA and the Army remained generally unaffected.[6] By early 1953, Special Forces officers were being assigned to units such as the United Nations Partisan Forces in Korea (UNPFK) and the 8240th Army Unit, which was engaged in intelligence and clandestine operations. But there were no operational Special Forces units as such in Korea.

While the rather haphazard unconventional warfare activities in Korea did not have much impact on the overall American war effort, they did motivate some movement within military circles to develop a permanent special operations capability. During the early part of the Korean War, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) was established. At the same time, efforts were expanding in Europe to develop a psychological warfare capability against the increasing Soviet threat. In a separate development, Ranger units were activated and used in Korea as long-range penetration patrols.

The activities in the immediate post-World War II period and at the outbreak of the Korean War were the prime forces behind the establishment of the 10th Special Forces Group under the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Up un-

til the Vietnam War, however, the Special Forces remained an oddity and did not enjoy a professional reputation within traditional military circles. As one observer concluded, "The manner in which psychological and unconventional warfare evolved from 1941 until their union as a formal capability in 1952 suggests a theme that runs throughout the history of special warfare: the story of a hesitant and reluctant Army attempting to cope with concepts and organizations of an unconventional nature."[7]

Developments in the national security establishment preceded those in the military services, although the developments were parallel. "Three months after he disbanded the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) President Truman on 22 January 1946 created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG)—the direct predecessor of the CIA."[8] The National Security Act of 1947 created the formal national security establishment and the CIA. Most are familiar with the general role of the CIA and its function as part of the national security establishment. Nonetheless, it is useful to review some of its known characteristics and operations.

While much remains unknown about CIA operations, there have been a number of revelations in published literature that permit us to draw some conclusions.[9] Briefly, the CIA is organized around four directorates: one each for Intelligence, Science and Technology, Administration, and Operations. The latter includes responsibility for unconventional operations. The Directorate of Operations, according to one source, has been renamed the Clandestine Service.[10] The CIA's basic structure has remained generally unchanged over the years. It seems clear, however, that there have been, and still are, tensions within the organization, caused primarily by the scope of its activities and the presumed freedom of maneuver of its field agencies, versus the requisities of democracy. There has been some disagreement between those who would rely primarily on human resources (field operatives and agents) and those convinced of the primary utility of science and technology. There is also some tension between the CIA and the intelligence agencies of the Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Among the various government agencies, the status of the CIA and its role in covert operations remain matters of debate.[11]

Most of America's experience prior to World War II was in countering those conducting unconventional warfare; in the broadest sense, America was a counterrevolutionary power. The first systematized effort to conduct guerrilla warfare was made in World War II. Until the Korean War, there was no formal command system or organizational strategy for military capability in unconventional warfare. Until the Vietnam War, capability in unconventional operations and the creation of special units for this purpose was resisted and resented by the traditional establishment, both civilian and military. While more enthusiasm was shown for Special Forces during the Kennedy era, and to some extent during the Vietnam War, the concept of Special Forces and special operations remained contrary to the mainstream of professional thought and careers. This is true even today, despite efforts of the military to make special operations an established career field that can lead to general officer rank or to a variety of senior schools and assignments as prestigious as the standard command and staff career patterns.

Vietnam

Vietnam represents a key reference point for the development of American unconventional war strategy and doctrine, as well as for organizational strategy. Unfortunately, there remains a pressing need for a systematic and analytical assessment of the Vietnam experience. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of material on Vietnam that can be used as the basis for preliminary assessments and for future projections. In terms of command systems and overall direction of the Vietnam War, there are sources within the military and the national command structure that provide useful commentary on problems of unity of command and policy coherence.

The Command System

There is general agreement that the command system for the Vietnam War lacked unity and coherency. While this may not necessarily reflect the failures within various bureaucracies, the nature of the war was such that any chance of reasonable success

necessitated an integrated response crossing bureaucratic lines and encompassing military and nonmilitary organizations. Although some observers felt that the American system worked so well in Vietnam that it reaped what it had planted, others argue that there was a total lack of unity of command and a divergence of purpose.[12]

According to one view, the command system was affected at the highest level by the constant interplay between the President and his inner circle, the CIA, the military, and the Foreign Service. Thus, "U.S. stakes in Vietnam were determined from the top down, not the bottom up. The top—the inner circle of President, White House staff, and cabinet-level appointees—remains the only place where military, diplomatic, and domestic political imperatives are brought together, and this is what made the stakes in Vietnam so high."[13] Additionally, each of the major bureaucracies and their top officials pressed to shape the war according to their own organizational posture. Moreover, the command system, although seemingly cohesive and unified at the top, moved in divergent directions at different operational levels.

Former Ambassador Robert W. Komer writes, "The bureaucratic fact is that below Presidential level everybody and nobody was responsible. . . ." With several exceptions, "not a single senior-level official above the rank of office director or colonel in any U.S. agency dealt full-time with Vietnam before 1969."[14] A review of *The Pentagon Papers* also suggests a number of disagreements, divergent views, and conflicts within the command structure and about the conduct of the Vietnam War.[15]

At the highest levels, a variety of committees, subcommittees, and task forces were periodically established and disbanded to deal with the Vietnam War. All were attempts to integrate the various aspects of unconventional warfare in Vietnam and to coordinate the conduct of the war. Unfortunately, these committee systems did not have corresponding command structures or line units. But more importantly, the committees ultimately reflected the power plays, disagreements, and differing perceptions of the organizations represented in the committees. The committee system could not serve as a central directing headquarters. Thus, during some of the most difficult years in Vietnam, the American effort was

dissipated. Furthermore, the individuals and organizations at the highest levels that could have served as a central command system were unable to concentrate on the American effort in Vietnam because the issues of the Great Society, European defense, and domestic politics were intermingled with the war effort.

The chain of command at the theater and national levels was particularly awkward. According to General William C. Westmoreland,

> MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam)functioned not directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington but through CINCPAC . . . . The White House seldom dealt directly with me but through the Joint Chiefs . . . . What many failed to realize was that not I but [Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command] was the theater commander in the sense that General Eisenhower, for example, was the theater commander in World War II. My responsibilities and prerogatives were basically confined within the borders of South Vietnam.[16]

The South Vietnamese armed forces suffered even more from unity of command problems. What aggravated the American command system was that General Westmoreland had to deal on an equal basis with the South Vietnamese high command in the planning and conduct of the war. General Maxwell Taylor argues that one solution would have been to give General Westmoreland operational control of the South Vietnamese forces.[17] But this was not feasible, given the nature of the war, the lingering concerns about imperialism and colonialism in Southeast Asia, and the general character of the South Vietnamese political system.

The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also frustrated a proper command system capable of conducting low-intensity operations. As one observer points out, "The Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff were modeled for the conduct of total war where all our energies were focused on a single objective. It was neither organized nor designed for the conduct of limited war where our focus was diffused."[18]

General Westmoreland, moreover, had to deal with a variety of important US government agencies not directly under his command and control, with views on the war and the manner of im-

plementation which differed from MACV. Even within the military system, there were some differences, such as Marine Corps operations in the North. Russell Weigley viewed the Vietnam War command problems as follows:

> In 1965 and 1966 General William C. Westmoreland commanded the American forces in Vietnam, subordinate to the joint Southwest Pacific Command of Admiral Ulysses Grant Sharp. Like Korea, Vietnam required an intimate cooperation among Army and supporting Air Force and Navy elements, and like Korea it tested the Defense Department's arrangements for interservice command. Various questions could be and were raised about the Vietnam command system. A very important one concerned the absence of a supreme allied commander without whom the South Vietnamese forces did not always cooperate with the Americans as closely as they might have. In another important respect however, the American command system was considerably stronger than it had been in Korea: the Southwest Pacific Command was under the firm and direct control of the Secretary of Defense; no Army, Navy or Air Force headquarters interposed to impair its qualities as a joint, interservice, functional command.[19]

Nonetheless, the nature of the Vietnam War posed a greater challenge to the command system than the conventional character of the Korean War. In addition to the issues of unity of command and the degree of coherency of organizational strategy in the Vietnam War, a number of other considerations evolved which are important in understanding organizational strategy.

Importance of the Vietnam Experience

A considerable body of opinion, in both military and civilian quarters, places little value on the US experience in Vietnam for the conduct of future low-intensity conflicts.[20] To forget the lessons of Vietnam is to invite similar results in the future. In the history of the US military operations against the Seminole Indians (1836–43), in the Philippines (1898–1901), and in Vietnam (1964–72), one is struck by their similarities with respect to political-military problems, military operations, and insurgency forces. Unfortunately, there has been little historical analysis for the de-

velopment of doctrinal guidelines. Indeed, the military has a singularly short institutional memory. It has had to relearn lessons that should have been historically ingrained in its institutional posture. To reduce the gaps between past experience and current operational contingencies, there is a pressing need to examine the doctrinal relevance and irrelevance of the lessons of the Vietnam War, both political and military, and to assess their applicability to policy and program guidelines for future low-intensity conflicts.

There are a variety of studies on the US involvement in Vietnam, ranging from international issues to tactical operations. Without belaboring these, it is necessary to make several observations as a basis for this paper.

1. The Vietnam War developed into an asymmetrical relationship between the United States and the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. While the United States conducted a limited war, the revolutionaries conducted a total war.

2. Conventional military wisdom and training, and traditional professional education, were apparently inadequate to meet the challenges of the political-military dimensions of a revolutionary war.

3. American domestic political attitudes were crucial in affecting the American military role in Vietnam. The crescendo of criticism from domestic political groups had a decided effect on the policy options available to the political leadership. Each of these three factors compounded the asymmetry of the relationships in Vietnam.

4. American military intervention in support of a governing elite, or a political system that does not have some minimum level of internal support, is likely to erode further indigenous public support for the existing system.

5. The American experience in Vietnam remains an important influence in the world perspective of military and civilian leaders, and as such, has a decided impact on political-military strategy. The result is a very cautious approach that borders on a "never-again" attitude.

6. The Vietnam involvement stimulated military preoccupation with the "conventional" environment of European wars. This is manifested in hardware and tactics as well as in professional military education and training. A further consequence is that perceptions of military capability and of the imperatives of political-military policy appear to have become closely wedded to a "conventional" mind-set, where issues appear clearer and military capability and policy seem to have a more understandable goal.

Regardless of recent events, therefore, the American military intervention still weighs heavily in the minds of important political actors. As Robert Osgood notes,

> The popular disaffection with the Vietnamese war does not indicate a reversion to pre-Korea attitudes towards limited war. Rather it indicates serious questioning of the premises about the utility of limited war as an instrument of American policy, the premises that originally moved the proponents of limited war strategy and that underlay the original confidence of the Kennedy Administration in America's power to cope with local Communist incursions of all kinds.[21]

Most important, as demonstrated in Vietnam, the employment of force for any length of time requires popular support. Without it, military intervention of any type will quickly lose its legitimacy.[22]

This is best reflected in an observation by General Fred C. Weyand. Writing in 1976, he noted,

> Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the American Army and the American people. The American Army really is a people's Army in the sense that it belongs to the American people, who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement. When the Army is committed the American people are committed, when the American people lose their commitment it is futile to try to keep the Army committed. In the final analysis, the American Army is not so much an arm of the Executive Branch as it is an arm of the American people. The Army, therefore, cannot be committed lightly.[23]

In sum, the involvement in Vietnam indicated that American policymakers (civilian and military) had difficulty in understanding and appreciating the nature of revolutionary and counterre-

volutionary war. Moreover, the conventional posturing of American forces and the assessment of the conflict through conventional lenses precluded the effective designing of tactical operations or formations aimed at the "essence" of revolutionary conflict. Additionally, the democratic socialization process and the linkages between the military and American society made it extremely difficult to provide the necessary training and conflict analysis appropriate for counterrevolutionary involvement.

In this context, the Clausewitzian notion of war, with its center of gravity on the destruction of the enemy armed forces, is open to question in the conduct of counterrevolution. Yet, such a notion is at the core of American military doctrine. As the Vietnam War showed, revolution and counterrevolution are the most difficult conflicts for the United States and its military. To develop appropriate operational guidelines and command systems requires, in the first instance, a degree of conceptual clarity about the essence of revolution and counterrevolution.

Conceptual Considerations

Underlying all of these observations is the problem of concepts and definitions. While we do not wish to belabor the subject, it is necessary, nevertheless, to establish a basis for an operational concept.

Low-Intensity Conflict[24]

The conflicts most likely to occur in Third World areas are of the low-intensity variety. They are limited geographically in the number of participants, and in the nature and scope of military operations. If "visible" intervention from external sources should occur in low-intensity conflicts, nationalistic passions are likely to be aroused, with a high propensity for the development of a "People's War." A "fluid" battle area, unbound by conventional considerations enmeshed in the political-social fabric of the political system, is likely to create difficulties for the intervening power. These difficulties may be insurmountable in terms of "conquest" or "victory." Moreover, combat can include both rural and urban

areas, and can occur against forces possessing sophisticated weapons. In these circumstances, the political-psychological dimensions of military operations predominate over tactical considerations. Conventional means of ascertaining military progress may be irrelevant, as may also be the case with conventional military training and doctrine. In broad terms, low-intensity conflicts are usually limited wars or revolutionary/counterrevolutionary wars. They are more than isolated acts of terrorism; and they may become as serious as the Vietnam War.

Concepts of Revolution

Literature provides a variety of perspectives on the conceptual dimensions of revolution. This is due primarily to the variety of disciplinary perspectives and the purposes of those studying revolution. Along with the increasing scholarship on the subject, there has also evolved a variety of categories, concepts, and definitions, such as revolutionary war, civil war, people's war, wars of national liberation, and low-intensity conflict. Within this array of terms, three stand out as major reference points: guerrilla war, revolution, and insurgency.

Guerrilla War. Guerrilla war has become the most common label for a variety of conflicts within political systems. Although the term was coined in the early 19th century, it has taken on a modern connotation. As Walter Laqueur points out,

> The old term "guerrilla warfare" has been used in this study because there is no better one. Newer theoretical concepts such as "modern revolutionary warfare" or "people's war" can be of use only with regard to a few countries and applied elsewhere they are misleading; not all guerrilla movements are led by a monolithic political party, or a Communist party, or are either a people's war or a war of national liberation.[25]

Douglas Pike, in an analysis of the Viet Cong, provides a more encompassing definition of revolutionary guerrilla warfare:

> Revolutionary guerrilla warfare should not be confused with older concepts of a similar nature . . . . Revolutionary guerrilla warfare was

> a way of life. Its aim was to establish an entirely new social order, thus differing from insurgencies whose objective is either statehood or change of government . . . . It was an imported product, revolution from the outside; its stock in trade, the grievance, was often artificially created; its goal of liberation, a deception.[26]

Thus, guerrilla warfare embraces a number of factors associated with revolution. To bridge the gap between the "old" concept of guerrilla war and a modern one, the term revolutionary guerrilla warfare has been coined.

Insurgency. The confusion in the literature is compounded by the term insurgency. According to an early Department of the Army definition, insurgency is

> a condition of subversive political activity, civil rebellion, revolt, or insurrection against a duly constituted government or occupying power wherein irregular forces are formed and engage in actions, which may include guerrilla warfare, that are designed to weaken and overthrow the government or occupying power.[27]

One author suggests that the term insurrection should be limited in its usage to armed violence in "initial stages of movements of opposition to government." He goes on to say that the terms rebellion and revolution should be employed only when a "substantial portion of the armed forces of the established government" must be used in defense. "In this sense an insurrection may be thought of as an incipient rebellion or revolution still localized and limited to securing modifications of governmental policy or personnel and not yet a *serious threat* to the state of the government in power."[28]

Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarky offer the following definition:

> A revolution may be said to exist when a group of insurgents illegally and/or forcefully challenges the government elite for the occupancy of roles in the structure of political authority. A successful revolution occurs when as a result of a challenge to the governmental elite, insurgents are eventually able to occupy principal roles within the structure of political authority.[29]

Robert Thompson, a noted British authority, incorporated several concepts in examining the Vietnam conflict. Ignoring traditional definitional boundaries, he writes,

> The point to be stressed is that the war has always remained basically an *insurgency*, boosted by infiltration and aided, to a certain but limited extent, by both invasion and raids . . . . *People's Revolutionary War* is therefore by nature a *civil* war of a very sophisticated type and using highly refined techniques to seize power and take over a country. The significant feature of it, which needs to be recognized, is its immunity to the application of power.[30]

In essence, some observers argue that insurgency is an integral part of revolution, stressing the military dimension. Others stress the importance of the political-social dimension as the most important part of internal conflicts.

Revolution. A number of characteristics of guerrilla war and insurgency are intermingled, complicating the conceptual basis of revolution. While there is a great deal of overlap between all of these terms, and many authors use them synonymously, some distinctions are evident in the literature. Such distinctions appear to be based on the degree of attention given to either armed conflict or the political-social dimension. In this respect, guerrilla warfare is perceived primarily as armed conflict, revolutions as political-social phenomena, and insurgency as somewhere between the two concepts.

Revolution is primarily a phenomenon evolving out of political-social issues, aimed at changing the political-social order. According to one scholar, revolution is

> an acute, prolonged crisis in one or more of the traditional systems of stratification (class, status, power) of a political community, which involves a purposive, elite-directed attempt to abolish or to reconstruct one or more of said systems by means of an intensification of political power and recource to violence.[31]

Broadening the dimensions of revolution, some authors subdivide revolutions into categories. Distinguishing between social

and political revolution, Theda Skocpol, for example, defines social revolution as

> rapid, basic transformations of society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below. Social revolutions are set apart from other sorts of conflicts and transformative processes above all by the combination of two coincidences: the coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social transformation . . . . What is unique to social revolution is that basic changes in social structure occur together in a mutually reinforcing fashion. And these changes occur through intense sociopolitical conflicts in which class struggles play a key role.[32]

Like guerrilla war, the concept of revolution connotes many things to many people. One author observes,

> We simply cannot isolate from the extraordinary diversity of history a *single* denominator that is common to and valid for all of these situations and would stand for structure . . . . We must look at all of them together and in relation to one another in order to see the true conditions under which revolt and revolution have been possible and fomented.[33]

While much of the literature obscures distinctions between guerrilla war and revolution, two fundamental dimensions emerge in the writings of Bernard Fall.

> Just about anybody can start a "little war" (which is what the Spanish word guerrilla literally means), even a New York street gang. Almost anybody can raid somebody else's territory, even American territory, as Pancho Villa did in 1916 or the Nazi saboteurs in 1942 . . . . But all this has rarely produced the kind of revolutionary ground swell which simply swept away the existing government.[34]

In developing the political-social dimension of revolution and distinguishing it from guerrilla war, Fall states,

> It is . . . important to understand that guerrilla warfare is nothing but a tactical appendage of a far vaster political contest and that, no matter how expertly it is fought by competent and dedicated professionals,

> it cannot possibly make up for the absence of a political rationale. A dead Special Forces sergeant is not spontaneously replaced by his own social environment. A dead revolutionary usually is.[35]

Using Fall's analysis, several observations are in order. First, revolutions are a fundamental challenge to the existing political order and to those who hold power in the system.[36] Second, armed conflict is an essential characteristic of revolution, but it is not necessarily the most important in revolutionary success. The center of gravity of any revolution is the political system and its psychological coherency. In this respect, the armed conflict is usually tangential to the revolutionary purpose. Third, insurgency refers primarily to an armed group whose use of guerrilla war may be the first phase of a revolution, but it does not necessarily follow that insurgencies and revolutions are synonymous. While insurgency may denote an attempt to correct an immediate policy issue or problem, revolution focuses on long term political-social change. Nonetheless, all three terms are closely linked and are often used to describe the same phenomena.

Military Posture and Low-Intensity Conflicts: Conclusions

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this study. The following are specifically limited to the concerns about organizational strategy and the character of low-intensity conflicts that affect such strategy.

1. The training, planning, preparation, and operational implementation of low-intensity operations necessitates a command system whose primary mission is to conduct low-intensity conflict. This cannot be done on an ad hoc basis, particularly during a period of time when major sources of tension and conflict are endemic in Third World systems and in a non-European conflict environment.

2. Low-intensity conflict, as used here, has two components: the conduct of low-intensity conflict against an enemy within his own country or in areas occupied by the enemy, and the conduct of counteroperations against low-intensity conflict being con-

ducted by the enemy. Capability in one does not necessarily lead to capability in the other; missions differ, intelligence requirements differ, and targets differ.

3. A command system and effective operational response to low-intensity conflict is not solely a military or a civilian mission. The characteristics of low-intensity conflict, in both countering and conducting operations, intermix civilian and military capabilities. Thus, both civilian and military organizations must develop a sensitivity to each other's missions, understand the character of low-intensity conflicts, and recognize the need for an integrated response.

4. Given the nature of the American political system, the character of the American military profession, and the existing intelligence and bureaucratic perspectives and power bases, the primary need is to develop a conceptual synthesis of views and interpretations regarding low-intensity conflict. Without some degree of conceptual harmony, organizational strategy will become fragmented and reflect the incongruity between and within various organizations and units whose missions include some aspects of low-intensity operations.

5. Based on the experience of the Vietnam War and the prevailing doctrines for the conduct of low-intensity conflict, a distinction must be made between the missions and capabilities of organizations designed specifically for low-intensity conflicts and conventional forces. During the course of countering low-intensity operations, for example, the situation may require a commitment of conventional forces in support of civilian and military low-intensity operational organizations. Thus, conventional forces need to develop some capacity for conducting low-intensity operations. In this respect, serious attention must be given to planning and implementing "withdrawal." At some point, American involvement may be phased down or ended completely. Under what conditions is withdrawal to be implemented? What political-social environment is to be created and what governing elite is to be in place before implementing withdrawal? How should withdrawal be conducted if the target state remains in turmoil? Finally, serious attention must be given to types of withdrawals. For example, it is one thing to withdraw special units and another to

withdraw general purpose forces. In sum, withdrawal from low-intensity conflict is an important part of the overall strategy and must be seriously considered even before there is a commitment of any units into a low-intensity conflict environment.

6. In addition to the conceptual synthesis, a professional military understanding of and capacity for the conduct of low-intensity operations must be developed. This requires training and operational capability. Next to developing a conceptual synthesis, this is the most difficult to accomplish, since it requires revised curricula in military service schools and revised techniques in regular training for conventional units. But equally important, it requires operational attention to the character of low-intensity conflict and a professional commitment and sensitivity to the policy and operational needs of low-intensity operations, to include support and assistance to special units, both civilian and military.

7. The military profession must acknowledge that skills and professional competence in the conduct of low-intensity operations are an inherent part of professionalism. As such, career structures, professional reputation, and professional recognition must be given to individuals whose professional commitment is to low-intensity operations. This is necessary if quality officers and professional doctrines are to be an inherent and institutionalized part of professionalism in the American military.

These observations underscore an issue that is infrequently addressed but is fundamental to American military effectiveness in all conflicts, particularly low-intensity conflicts. This has to do with the degree of public awareness and understanding of revolution and counterrevolution. For a realistic appraisal of such conflicts, the major political actors in the American policy process—that is, key members of Congress and mass media personalities—need to be educated or need to educate themselves on the characteristics of low-intensity conflicts. This should include an appraisal of American military capabilities, limits of American political-military instruments, and the costs and consequences of policy alternatives. The important factor is that these must be addressed not through traditional or conventional lenses, but in accordance with the realities of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary war.

General Weyand's observation in this respect is particularly appropriate:

> As military professionals we must speak out, we must counsel our political leaders and alert the American public that there is no such thing as a "splendid little war." There is no such thing as a war fought on the cheap. War is death and destruction. The American way of war is particularly violent, deadly and dreadful. We believe in using "things"—artillery, bombs, massive firepower—in order to conserve our soldiers' lives. The enemy, on the other hand, made up for his lack of "things" by expending men instead of machines, and he suffered enormous casualties. The Army saw this happen in Korea, and we should have made the realities of war obvious to the American people before they witnessed it on their television screens. The Army must make the price of involvement clear *before* we get involved, so that America can weigh the probable costs of involvement against the danger of non-involvement . . . for there are worse things than war.[37]

Organizational Strategies

Several organizational strategies can be designed which reflect the major points of these conclusions. It must be emphasized that organizational strategy as conceived here is not intended to be a table of organization or an operational plan.

Continuation of Existing System (Minimum Change)

The existing command system at the national level, within the military establishment and within the intelligence system, can be used to develop a capability for low-intensity conflict. Its advantages are a minimum need for organizational reorientation and restructuring, and little personnel turbulence. Additionally, preparation for low-intensity conflict could be subsumed within existing systems with minimum bureaucratic resistance.

There are, however, theoretical and practical problems associated with this organizational strategy. The foremost is an inability or reluctance to detract from other purposes considered more important. Institutionalizing existing missions and professional/bureaucratic mind-sets also tends to perpetuate the status quo and conventional perceptions, making it difficult to adapt in-

novative responses to low-intensity conflict. This type of organizational strategy does not facilitate the integration of all the major resources required for effective low-intensity operations. Finally, as history has shown, without a continuing focus on low-intensity conflict, it is unlikely that the United States can rapidly and effectively respond. Under such an organizational strategy, any response will evolve from ad hoc reorientation and internal military and civilian readjustments, which in themselves are difficult to achieve; and they preclude the development of a systematic and long-range civilian/military posture.

Establishment of a Separate Command System (Maximum Change)

A separate command system can be established based on the premise that low-intensity conflicts create a unique challenge, generally divorced from conventional systems and from other types of threats and contingencies. This approach envisions a coordinating unit at the highest command level, that is, the National Security Council, with parallel structures in the military, intelligence, and political systems. In brief, such a system can establish a single channel for the integration of all aspects of low-intensity conflict (particularly with respect to revolution and counterrevolution), including military and civilian capabilities. While this may be an ideal way to ensure a continuing and central focus on low-intensity operations, this organizational strategy is likely to serve as a major threat to the existing system by competing for resources, power, and missions. Perhaps more important, the nature of the American political system and the character of existing military/bureaucratic systems have entrenched a degree of power and created a sense of legitimacy, which militates against the establishment of a single-channelled and centralized system exclusively aimed at low-intensity operations.

Variations

There are several variations on these approaches, usually reflecting a bias toward one or the other system. A feasible strategy that attempts to avoid the major problems of the two earlier ap-

proaches is a hybrid, combining the strength of the existing system with a degree of flexibility and freedom of maneuver required for the effective conduct of low-intensity operations. This envisions a centralized command at the highest levels, a pluralistic system between the various military and nonmilitary organizations, and a centralized command within the various organizations and at the operational level.

This system includes a senior coordinating unit at the level of the National Security Council, supported by a joint planning and operations center and staffed by representatives from the political, intelligence, and military organizations. Not only will this joint center be charged with planning, preparing, and operational implementation of low-intensity operations, but it will also establish criteria for designating a single command focus in the area of operations—that is, it will determine whether the civilian or military component will have primary responsibility for a particular low-intensity operation.

At the political, intelligence, and military levels, a position equivalent to an Assistant Secretary should be created with primary responsibility for low-intensity operations. Within the military, this envisions an Assistant Secretary of Defense and the establishment of a new agency within the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-6?), with a primary mission of low-intensity operations. At one level removed from this, a Unified Special Operations Command should be established, directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Components of this command should include the existing US Army 1st Special Operations Command and Navy and Air Force equivalents. The unified command should also be organized around two separate commands: the Special Command for Low-Intensity Conflicts and the Special Command for Counter Operations.

In this context, organizational strategy must consider the distinction between the conduct of low-intensity conflict operations and the countering of such operations. The conduct of low-intensity operations is more likely to be undertaken by civilian-directed and -led command systems, since the nature of these operations is primarily covert operations, psychological warfare, and propaganda, which must appeal to a largely civilian target. While it is

conceivable that such civilian-led systems might be logistically and administratively supported by military services as well as in some instances by special types of military penetration operations, the center of gravity is with civilian command systems.

Countering low-intensity conflicts is also more likely to be done by civilian-led command systems, since this requires a major counterintelligence effort as well as nation-building. In later stages, assuming the conflict expands and develops with the emergence of a reasonably effective revolutionary armed force, the center of organizational strategy shifts to the military command system. What can develop is a command system that is military-heavy, with civilian input. This does not mean the cessation of civilian-led systems. Rather, it means that the military dimension of low-intensity operations takes temporary priority in order to prevent the revolutionary armed forces from disrupting the political-social efforts of the counterrevolutionary system. In addition, striking at the revolutionary armed forces will assist in uncovering the revolutionary political system which, after all, should be the main focus of counterrevolutionary operations.

In conceptualizing low-intensity conflict, it must be made clear that the characteristics and nature of the problem change as the conflict progresses or contracts. In the initial phases, the conduct of counter operations may be best undertaken by civilian-led organizations involved in nation-building missions. Later, if the action of revolutionary armed forces has become particularly threatening, the military system may take on a more prominent role, supported and assisted by civilian-led organizations. In any case, both civilian and military systems must be sensitive to the limitations of their own capabilities and the need for integration of the capabilities of others. Equally important, they must be aware of the multiple causes of revolution and the need for multiple options of response. Thus, it is conceivable that even at the theater level or strategic headquarters level a prominent role is necessary for civilian organizations. It may well be that, at the operational level, combined civilian-military operations may be led by civilians. The national command system, therefore, must be flexible enough to integrate civilian and military efforts at the highest as well as the operational levels.

Conclusions

Whatever the organizational strategies contemplated, the fundamental problem of integrating American capabilities rests not solely or primarily with organizational restructuring, but with conceptual synthesis. It is clear, from the most recent historical experience, that organizations and agencies involved in the conduct of unconventional operations disagreed on causes and solutions. But most important, they disagreed on the concepts. The programs, policies, and command systems reflected these disagreements.

The importance of conceptual synthesis is also recognized for the effective functioning of the Presidential Office. As Arnold Kanter has written,

> As Neustadt (1960) showed nearly two decades ago, the power to issue orders is not enough. Although the president has a monopoly of formal authority within the executive branch, it has never proved sufficient. The record of interactions between postwar administrations and the military services provides recurring demonstrations that subordinate compliance cannot be commanded. As leaders in every large organization inevitably discover, even unlimited formal authority cannot eliminate the intrinsic problems of organizational control. These problems have at least two sources. First, the inescapable delegation of tasks inevitably diffuses influence and diminishes control: the behavior of bureaucratic subordinates cannot be completely directed.[38]

Any reasonably effective command system and operational implementation requires some basic agreement on the nature of the conflict and a conceptual synthesis of its causes and solutions. Conceptual synthesis is not easy to achieve in the American political system and within bureaucratic structures. Adding to this difficulty is the disagreement among scholars and practitioners on the definition of low-intensity conflict and its causes. This is particularly true in the study of revolution and counterrevolution.

In the final analysis, there is a need to devise an organizational strategy that is linked to the existing system, but one that provides enough freedom of maneuver for developing flexible and imaginative responses. This necessitates a command system whose primary mission is to plan, prepare, and implement low-intensity

operations. But even more than an organizational strategy, there must be a conceptual synthesis regarding low-intensity conflict that reaches out to all organizations, civilian and military, and through all levels of command. It is through such a synthesis that unity of command and coherency emerge. Organizational strategy without a conceptual synthesis cannot overcome bureaucratic tendencies, status quo power plays, and organizational mind-sets. Nor can organizational strategy alone respond to the requirements of a democratic political system involved in low-intensity conflict.

Notes

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3. Paddock, pp. 39-66.
4. Ibid., p. 103.
5. Ibid., p. 101.
6. Ibid., pp. 101-109. The author served in one of these units during the period 1953-1954 and has personal knowledge of some of the successes and failures.
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15. Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, *The Pentagon Papers* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1971).
16. William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1976), pp. 75-76.
17. Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (New York: Norton, 1972), p. 350.
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19. Weigley, p. 547.
20. This section is a revised version of what appears in Sam C. Sarkesian, "American Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: An Overview," in Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Scully, eds., *Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s: U.S. Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), pp. 7-8.
21. Robert E. Osgood, "The Reappraisal of Limited War," in Eugene Rosi, ed., *American Defense and Detente: Readings in National Security Policy* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1973), p. 466.
22. Whether the American invasion of Grenada in October 1983 (shortly following the terrorist attack on the Marines in Lebanon) signals a change in American political-military posture or is a passing phenomenon remains to be seen. At this writing, it is difficult to ascertain what the long-range impact will be with any degree of certainty.
23. Summers, p. 7.
24. This is a revision of a section in Sarkesian, p. 4.
25. Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1976), p. x. See the distinction made between revolution and revolt in J. Bowyer Bell, *On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 3-9.
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Discussion

Mr. Kenneth P. Bergquist

I would suggest that Dr. Sarkesian may have understated the problem of bureaucratic resistance to organizational change. I do not by any means wish to imply that the objectives underlying the changes advocated by Dr. Sarkesian cannot or should not be accomplished. But perhaps we can achieve the underlying objectives by a phased program of organizational change and, more importantly, by adaptation carefully tailored to the existing organizational environment.

I agree that the United States must have an organizational command and control structure that enables it efficiently and effectively to meet the challenges of low-intensity conflict. But I do not believe that a unified civilian/military command for prosecution of low-intensity conflict is necessarily the best means in present circumstances to enhance the capability to face such challenges.

The prosecution of any level of conflict is now directed by the National Command Authority. But responsibility for execution of the directed effort is vested in the appropriate military Commander-in-Chief (CINC) or appropriate country team or teams. This system is not perfect, but it can work very well whenever the key players involved have had the wisdom to understand how the system works and to command and control it effectively.

No organizational change that any of us can propose will facilitate the effective prosecution of special operations or low-intensity conflict unless our leadership at every level understands how best to use the organizational command and control structures at its disposal. Organizational change should be designed to facilitate command and control. There is no substitute for leadership that understands the available command and control and operational assets, and shares a mutual trust with the infrastructure of those organizations.

At the highest level, the organization of our vast national assets in the face of a challenge rests with the National Security Council (NSC) and its associated staff structure. The effectiveness of the NSC in achieving the coordination and integration of policy direction is primarily a function of leadership and the integration of personalities involved. The organization of the NSC staff is relatively less important, since it will normally adapt itself rapidly to accommodate requirements. The key here is not so much organization as it is informed leadership and the availability of staff with functional expertise broad enough to facilitate effective coordination and integration of policy direction. Permanent, semipermanent, or temporary policy planning centers may or may not be appropriate within the NSC, but organizational flexibility and a lack of bureaucratic inertia is essential.

Below the level of the NSC, I believe that the creation of a mixed military and civilian joint command for the conduct of low-intensity conflict under the direct control of the NSC would be fundamentally unworkable. Such an integrated command and control element would not be regionally specific, thus it would not be in a position to properly focus on the peculiarly regional character of the variety of low-intensity challenges that it would face.

If a national amalgamation of effort is desirable, why not have a consolidation of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency in one organization? I am an avid proponent of unity in any effort that requires the integration of diverse assets. But I believe that in this case it can be accomplished just as effectively—perhaps more so—by the utilization of in-place civilian and military assets under the command and control of a regional and country-specific task force with clearly defined objectives.

Depending upon circumstances, this task force can receive policy directly from the NSC or through the department or agency with the greatest degree of involvement in the effort. Proponent responsibility for the effort can and should change between departments, and between a department, an agency, and the NSC, as circumstances may dictate. Support requirements and responsibilities can be assigned by the NSC to each of the departments and agencies involved to ensure viability of the effort.

The chain of command should be clearly defined and consistent with the level of effort involved. Such a system would emphasize the unity of an integrated civil and military effort, and at the same time take full advantage of the established resources of the departments and agencies involved. As a practical matter, resources already in place, when appropriately integrated and augmented, are far better prepared to meet the regional or local challenge than any organization far removed from the scene.

Now, in a strictly military sense, I do believe that the disparate special operations assets of each service based in the United States require the coordination of doctrine and continued sponsorship of a joint special operations headquarters. I agree that the service assets need not be dedicated to this headquarters, except under specific contingencies. The headquarters, however, would exercise doctrinal guidance for joint special operations, as well as supervision of joint special operations training and joint special operations exercises. The same headquarters would also assume responsibility for those joint special operations elements at Fort Bragg and MacDill Air Force Base. As its principal responsibility, the headquarters would be prepared to recommend joint special operations force packages designed to support the various CINCs under the contingencies they face, and to augment a CINC's joint unconventional warfare task force as may be necessary in given circumstances.

As a final note, Dr. Sarkesian correctly identifies a glaring need for the development of a conceptual synthesis regarding low-intensity conflict. I could not agree more. And I believe this problem can be attacked head on. Indeed, I believe the leadership of our government and our military services are rediscovering the synthesis we began to develop in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It

will take more time, but I believe that we will achieve this synthesis and it will eventually permeate the appropriate elements of our government structure. It will take longer than we would all like, but I think it will come in the near term.

Once we've achieved the synthesis, we are then in a position for our National Command Authority to issue coherent and realistic policy directives in response to the challenges of low-intensity conflict, enabling our existing regional and local command and control elements to implement such policy with properly trained and integrated resources.

Dr. George K. Tanham

It seems to me that we are involved in what I would call a total conflict. Special operations involve psychological, political, and economic activities. It adds up to total conflict for political power. So I find it a bit difficult to talk about negotiating with people obsessed by power. As we note in Henry Kissinger's memoirs, he learned this while dealing with the Vietnamese. Le Duc Tho had been in prison for 10 years. He had one goal in life, and that was to take over Indochina. There was really nothing to negotiate.

This is true elsewhere. I happen to put the Vietnamese at the top of the "tough" list in the world. But others have very similar goals and aims, and we kid ourselves when we talk about negotiation. Those people are out for total control of these various countries. I may be an old cold warrior, but as I look around the different continents I see what mischief the Soviets and their allies are up to. I do not say they initiate or determine all the issues; many already exist—religious conflicts with the Muslims, regional conflicts, and old historical rivalries. But in the conflicts that affect us primarily, the communists are generally involved. We do not have to look very hard to find them.

It seems difficult to get across to some congressmen and to some citizens that we are engaged in a struggle, a serious struggle. To me, our most pressing problem is not in the Third World, but here at home in the struggle for the minds of people. We have to have a firm base here in this country that believes in what we in the private sector are doing and in what the government is doing. But

the media are not very helpful. They pick on our government and our friends more than they do on the other side. How often do we see the atrocities in Afghanistan reported?

I have no great panacea for dealing with the media. Somehow, we have got to get over the antagonism that developed during Vietnam. Somehow we have to achieve a more balanced presentation of the news. Also, it seems to me we have already missed some opportunities in the broad, psychological areas. I will name a few. Instead of complaining about the refugees, it seems to me we should point up the fact that almost all the refugees—whether from Latin America, Africa, or Asia—want to come to the United States. That is something that deserves emphasis, but I have seldom seen it given any real attention. Instead, when we hear about the refugees, the talk is all on how many we should let in and how much it is going to cost.

We are having our troubles in El Salvador. And we have lost Nicaragua. But there is a nation in Central America called Costa Rica. And it is immune to the "anti-militarism" of the communists, radicals, and all the others, because they did away with their military in 1948. It is not a military dictatorship, because there is no military. The distribution of wealth is reasonably even, and there is no great gap between the rich and the poor. Moreover, it has a working democracy. The president cannot succeed himself, nor, I think, can the deputies.

Now, what are we doing to ensure that Costa Rica is not the next target for communist infiltration and subversion in Central America? Are we doing anything to forestall an attack on a country that has about as much going for it as any I can think of?

Take a look at the elections in El Salvador. We sent observers down there. They said, "Ho-hum; yes, they're going pretty well." Well, it went very well. People stood in line for hours against the threats of the guerrillas. The guerrillas refused to participate in the democratic process. Now they want to negotiate. But their refusal to take part in the election received very little press play.

Consider the Soviets in Afghanistan. We ought to try to get more propaganda value out of that. The Cubans are all over the world in roles that could be emphasized by television. So I think the country is not aware that there are some things going for us,

about which we could blow our own horn. We could also help countries that are struggling along lines compatible with our own.

I realize the next question is the one that we are trying to grapple with at this conference. Who is going to orchestrate whatever propaganda, or information campaign, or actions, or whatever? I simply do not know. USIA is prohibited from taking any action in this country. The CIA is proscribed from doing virtually everything. It is not really a military problem. So whose problem is it? I suppose it is an NSC problem. But the NSC does not have much staff, and it has no executive capabilities.

But it seems to me this is a critical issue—developing the capability on the part of some element of government, probably the NSC, which can seize these opportunities, take action to exploit them, and begin to head off some of the attacks on democracies.

We have a tendency, I regret to say, to worry a lot about organizations and actions. In Vietnam we counted sorties flown and bombs dropped. But we never really asked what effect they had on the war.

Activities are important, but they are supposed to have a purpose and a goal—but these are very hard to evaluate. The Rand Corporation has done a lot of work trying to evaluate how much artillery means, how much infantry means, and how much airpower means. We have yet to find the answers—probably because, in the final analysis, leadership, training, morale, and tactics are really very important in small wars.

But what I cannot overemphasize is that we are engaged in a struggle for the minds of people, including our own citizens. That is the most important thing there is. If we lose our citizens, we will not have much going for us. We also have to have some goals and ideals and ideas. Propaganda and organizations are not enough. We must have a purpose, and we must integrate the purposes of special operations, psychological operations, shows of military force, economic programs, and all the rest. We had better have an integrated effort. And we had better know what it is we are trying to achieve.

So it seems to me that as a result of this conference, which I have found very useful, if frustrating at times, we should probably urge a blue-ribbon panel to look at the government apparatus in

this quiet, shadowy area. While that is going on, there should be studies in DOD, the CIA, and other agencies on how they can improve their special operations capabilities and work with each other better.

Last but not least, I think groups like the National Strategy Information Center should start right now to study and to work on the private sector as well as with the government, and aim at a better definition of some of these problems—who can do what, how they can work together, and so on. The point I would like to end with is that unless the public is aware of the threat—this unforeseen, quiet threat that is developing around the world—and unless we have strenuous action and leadership, there will be no integration of special operations within a national strategy. There will probably be no national strategy.

General Discussion

Dr. Sarkesian, in his introductory commentary, laid heavy stress on the need for perspective in grappling with problems of low-intensity conflict. A conceptual synthesis is essential if Americans are to overcome the conventional posture and mind-set that have traditionally dominated our thinking about war in general and, more specifically, about revolution in the Third World. Agreement on concepts is difficult to achieve, but there are three prime reference points which can serve to provide us with philosophical underpinning and intellectual guidance, and to suggest directions and boundaries. These are guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and revolution. The relationships among the three, and the differing political objectives each entails, must be understood if we are to organize and plan, either to foment or to counter them.

The United States, as seen by Dr. Sarkesian, has generally functioned as an interventionist third power, engaged in asymmetrical conflicts—limited for us, total for the revolutionaries. Under these circumstances, both sides frequently misunderstand the political and philosophical differences between them. For Americans, it is particularly difficult to develop a consensus on the nature of the perceived threat. It is even more difficult to visualize the center of gravity in such wars as being in the political/social milieu rather

than on the battlefield. While we stress—understandably—the need for a unified command, a joint civilian/military structure, and a viable organizational strategy right down to the grassroots level, we will err if we fail to grasp the distinctions between the conduct of revolution and the countering of revolution. The nature of the Third World, the problems of modernization, the demands of an awakened populace—all of these must be weighed realistically if we are to muster the military professionalism, the skills in political/social engineering, and the political/psychological strategies needed to cope with them. Concomitantly, the American political system must be understood, and our objectives as applied to the Third World must be articulated and integrated within both policy and strategy with maximum flexibility.

Finally, Dr. Sarkesian reiterated that the American military is rooted in the polity; the Army is a people's army. It cannot legitimize itself. There is a moral and ethical dimension whenever and wherever it is committed. The perspectives of both military and civilian leaders must be broadened to encompass these realities if we are ever to be able to deal with special operations without repeating the mistakes of the past.

A participant from Britain endorsed Dr. Sarkesian's presentation, and then described an experience of the SAS in Dhofar, between 1971 and 1975, which he felt illustrated a point made often during the conference—namely, that by adhering to a fairly simple set of counterrevolutionary warfare principles, it is possible to enable a beleaguered government to defeat the communists. Small groups of the SAS, over a period of 5 years, were able to strengthen the tribal structure and reinforce the society, thus winning the people away from the militant and well-organized communists. Local leadership was trained and led in combat as irregular forces, giving the regulars breathing space to rearm and reorganize. Meanwhile, a civil aid program was developed. All action was geared to the attitudes of the indigenous people, and the areas taken back from the enemy were never relinquished. By grasping the nettle early, and by making a small but carefully targeted investment in people, rewards reaped were out of all proportion to costs. The pattern has wide application.

Another speaker addressed the point made by Dr. Sarkesian and contested by Mr. Bergquist, namely, the need for a joint operational command. Citing his own experience with the National Security Council and its small staff, he saw the latter as incapable—even with strong support from the president—of doing more than setting broad policy and issuing decision documents. Serious coordination of the myriad intelligence agencies and State and Defense Department components is beyond their capability. Nor can the regional CINC with his joint unconventional warfare staff do the job adequately.

Harkening back to the Paddock paper, the same speaker urged also that psychological operations and psychological warfare, which cut across the entire spectrum of conflict, become part of the proposed joint operational command; they should not, as at present, be subsumed under the Special Forces.

This evoked a rejoinder by Mr. Bergquist, who said he personally favored the joint operational command concept, but considered it unrealistic to try to stuff it down the throat of the existing system in the face of inevitable resistance. Until there is a wider perception of the need, the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and other affected entities are certain to oppose the type of amalgamation suggested. Under such conditions, Mr. Bergquist felt that we should work within the system—if necessary, by expanding the size and resources of the NSC.

The pros and cons of this position were discussed further, with considerable sympathy shown for the idea of strengthening the existing system instead of attempting to superimpose a radically new one. It was argued that if the existing principles on which the JCS is predicated—namely, centralized direction, decentralized execution, and common doctrine—are valid, it should be possible to make the system work. Washington ought to be able to formulate policy and global strategy; the JCS should translate, coordinate, and integrate that global policy into regional strategy which the CINCs would then implement by tasking the operational commanders under their command. The advantages of the existing system must be weighed carefully to determine whether, and how, special operations can be carried out and supported. The various bureaucratic and service concerns that affect these pro-

cedures must also be studied as part of the equation. Needless to say, everyone endorses the principles of unified command. The problem is how to achieve it.

Dr. Sarkesian interjected that he was not advocating a specific plan of organizational strategy. If organizational change, as such, should prove impossible to accomplish, he would then urge the gadfly approach—the insertion of specialists within the existing system to goad and pressure those in command to make the right decisions. Mr. Bergquist said this approach was realistic. By using special operations techniques on the system, the system could probably be made to work without cutting State, DOD, or the CIA out of their legitimate responsibilities.

The Chairman, Dr. John Norton Moore, then asked General Yarborough to comment on the trend of the discussion. The General stressed the relevance of history in approaching all aspects of low-intensity conflict and the special operations problems it may entail. He cited many instances over the years in which our reading of the situation has been faulty, and where we have failed to learn the lessons implicit in the events themselves. Examples noted were the US expeditionary force in Siberia, World War II guerrilla operations in the Philippines, the collapse of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia, the *Pueblo* affair, and the Iran rescue attempt. Each can teach us something if we are willing to learn from our mistakes. He recalled Vietnam and its unworkable command and control structure. All such case histories point up the joint nature of the endeavors and argue for improved control mechanisms, and often at levels above those of the armed forces.

General Yarborough noted further that to wage war under conventional conditions is extremely difficult. Special warfare is an esoteric art unto itself—a hybrid, the property of specialists who only rarely confront the professionals of conventional warfare. The latter ought not to be blamed if they fail to understand it as well as we think they should. The Army, after all, has sustained its considerable resources of psychological operations and special forces over many years. They can and will remain viable, even in the nuclear age. We have plenty to build on, and we should begin by studying and weighing our experience in order to determine what we need today and how we should go about obtaining it.

Dr. Moore then interjected a note of emphasis on a point made earlier by Mr. Tanham—that we are dealing with a problem that transcends the battlefield, namely, a war of psychology, of information, and of ideas. The problem begins at home, with the public and with Congress. As a prerequisite to any action in the realm of special operations responses to low-intensity conflict, we must intelligently, honestly, and truthfully explain the reasons why the United States needs to undertake such a role. He cited the statements of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher during the Falklands crisis, backed by our own President, in the defense of the United Nations Charter against the use of force, as an outstanding example of that type of explanation. On the issues of self-determination, nonintervention, and stability and world order, it is the West that supports these as fundamental principles. And this should be made clear to all concerned.

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SYMPOSIUM ON THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN US STRATEGY FOR THE 1980s

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
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