

# NATO ENLARGEMENT & CENTRAL EUROPE

## A STUDY IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

JEFFREY SIMON



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by  
Jeffrey Simon

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Institute For National Strategic Studies  
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*To Katherine  
Adam Lee, Jean Paul, and Tamara*

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


## Foreword

The future of the Central European nations will in many ways be linked with the enlargement of NATO to meet the new challenges of the post-Cold War world. As a result of reunification with the Federal Republic of Germany, East Germany has, in effect, become the first of the former Warsaw Pact nations to enter NATO. The four countries discussed in this volume—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia—all have interest in joining the Alliance as well, and all have made commitments in varying degrees toward that goal.

To understand why these nations are striving to meet the criteria for inclusion in a NATO enlargement program, and how well they are succeeding, one needs an appreciation of the political history of each nation since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. In this book, Jeffrey Simon, one of the most experienced and well informed analysts of Central European matters, offers just such a history. He begins with Poland's extremely complex and difficult struggle toward democratic government since 1989, reminding us of the violence done to Polish society and the Polish people earlier this century and illuminating recent political events that otherwise might seem merely chaotic. Then he traces the somewhat easier struggles of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, explaining with admirable clarity how those nations advanced along parallel but different paths, and why the Czech Republic and Slovakia have advanced at different paces since the "Velvet Divorce"—the amicable separation of those two nations.

This invaluable work—which has been completed with the cooperation and encouragement of the nations involved—stands as an authoritative, meticulously documented, and very timely history of the swift transition from socialist to democratic political principles in Central Europe in less than a decade.



ERVIN J. ROKKE  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force  
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# **NATO ENLARGEMENT AND CENTRAL EUROPE**

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# I. PAST AS PROLOGUE

History has forced Central Europe to adjust to politics of the extreme because it has been a region where states have rarely conformed with the nations living within their territorial boundaries. States in the region have merged, disintegrated, disappeared, and even been moved to different locations. Perhaps because of these experiences, Central European nations have demonstrated remarkable resilience and capacity to reassert national will.

During the eighteenth century, Germany comprised more than 350 independent duchies and principalities. By the end of the Napoleonic era, it comprised roughly the 40 states that were finally unified by Otto von Bismarck after the Franco-Prussian war in 1871. Following defeat in World War I, the Treaty of Versailles mandated Germany's loss of the Alsace-Lorraine to France, Poznan West Prussia to Poland, the Hultchin district to Czechoslovakia, and Memel to Lithuania. Danzig became a free city.

Hitler's attempt to establish the Third Reich led to World War II and Germany's second catastrophic defeat, resulting in the four-power occupation of Berlin, the loss of much of its eastern territory, and the division of the remainder of Germany into two states; the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

The German Democratic Republic's brief history was one of dramatic changes. After the German border was moved 125 miles westward to make room for the "new" Poland, the GDR emerged

under communist rule. Because of the communistic Socialist Unity Party's (SED) complete loss of control and legitimacy in the Fall of 1989, the GDR was "unified" (in reality absorbed) on 3 October 1990 to become five "eastern" *laender (states)* in a reunited Germany—and NATO. The GDR thus simply disappeared. In Orwellian fashion, the former cornerstone of the Warsaw Pact found itself in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an organization that had been for 40 years its "enemy" object—and even its *raison d'etre*. Germany's reunification exemplifies Central Europe's return to historical patterns and NATO's ability to enlarge eastward.

Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have also experienced historic transformations. Each has thrown off the yoke of 45 years of communist party domination and regained national sovereignty. Each is attempting to erect liberal democratic political institutions, establish market economies, guarantee civil and human rights, acquire civil control of its military, and join the European Union and NATO. All three have successfully negotiated the withdrawal of Soviet (eventually Russian) forces from their soil, contributed to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)—structures that provided some semblance of economic and political-military order to the region—and observed Germany's reunification and the Soviet Union's disintegration.

Poland's history has also been a study in politics of the extreme. After experiencing three partitions during the eighteenth century, culminating in Poland's total absorption by Prussia, Russia, and the Hapsburg Empire, the Polish state disappeared from the European stage in 1795. Statehood was not resurrected until after World War I, when the Treaty of Versailles established the independent Polish Republic from areas controlled by Russia, Germany, and Austria.

Poland's experience with democratic rule was brief; in May 1926 it ended with Marshall Pilsudski's coup and military dictatorship, which itself ended following the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the German and Soviet attacks on Poland starting



September 1, 1939. With Germany's impending collapse in 1944, Soviet military forces "temporarily" occupied Poland with its Northern Group of Forces. Communist rule followed. Despite popular challenges to communist rule in 1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980-81, Polish democratization did not begin until 1988-89.

**Hungary**, for many years an isolated linguistic and cultural island within the Hapsburg empire, managed to gain a semblance of autonomy from Hapsburg rule after the 1867 *ausgleich*, which created the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. As a successor to the Danubian Monarchy after World War I, Hungary was considered one of the powers responsible for the war. As a result, the Treaty of Trianon greatly reduced Hungary in size by ceding Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine to Czechoslovakia, Croatia-Slavonia to Yugoslavia, Banat to Yugoslavia and Romania, and Transylvania to Romania. Hungary's efforts to develop democratic institutions in the interwar period met a fate similar to that of the rest of Central Europe, ending in Admiral Horthy's dictatorship.

During World War II, because Hungary was aligned with the Axis powers its Trianon-mandated borders remained unchanged. A Communist takeover after the war terminated Hungary's newly acquired, and very brief, independence. Hungary's effort to revolt in 1956 was thwarted by Soviet invasion and resulted in "temporary" occupation by the Soviet Southern Group of Forces. With its revolution in 1989, Hungary, too, has embarked upon a liberal democratic experiment for the third time this century.

**Czechs** lost their statehood after the Battle of White Mountain in 1620, when they were absorbed under Hapsburg rule. After the 1867 *ausgleich*, the Czechs remained under Austrian influence and Slovakia under Greater Hungary. Czechoslovakia, also recreated after World War I by the Treaty of Versailles, was the only Central European state during the inter-war period to maintain democratic rule—under Thomas G. Masaryk and Edvard Benes. Hitler's demands for the Sudeten lands at Munich in September 1938 interrupted Czechoslovakia's brief 20-year democratic interlude. In March 1939, the Third Reich absorbed Czechoslovakia, though

they permitted an independent fascist state to exist in Slovakia between 1938 and 1945.

When Czechoslovakia once again set out to establish liberal democratic political rule after World War II, a communist coup in February 1948 interrupted the experiment. Czechoslovakia's efforts to create "socialism with a human face" in 1968 were thwarted by a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion, resulting in the "temporary" stationing of the Soviet Central Group of Forces in the country. The November 1989 Velvet Revolution marked Czechoslovakia's third twentieth-century effort to establish liberal democratic institutions.

Framed against this tumultuous background, the revolutions of 1989-90 provide a number of challenges for European security. One of the immediate consequences has been unleashing the aspirations of 80 million Central Europeans (16.3 million East Germans, 37.8 million Poles, 15.7 million Czechs and Slovaks, and 10.6 million Hungarians) to "return to Europe." Reflecting this popular will, the new Central European governments have adopted policies designed to join West European political, economic, and military institutions: the European Union and NATO. It is certainly in the interests of Europe and the United States that this process succeed!

Another consequence of the 1989 revolutions has been the unleashing of ethnic instincts and aspirations that had been contained for 45 years by Soviet-imposed instruments of order and control. Likewise, it is in the interests of Europe and the United States that the future of Central Europe does not flow in anti-democratic directions or result in intra- or inter-state conflicts.

Central Europe faced new challenges during late 1991-1992, when post-World War II state-disintegration extended to Europe's east and south. After the failed 18-19 August 1991 Soviet coup, the USSR disintegrated. At the end of 1991, Yugoslavia disintegrated. As a result, Europe witnessed the creation of many "new" independent states: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in the Baltic; Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia in the

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Balkans; Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova in Eastern Europe. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) also emerged as a loose confederation of many of these states. The future complexion of these new states' governments and alliance orientations will also have a profound impact on the security of Central and Western Europe.

European institutions are, in general, important to Central Europe because they legitimize the programs of the political leaders to society. But NATO is especially important because it anchors the United States to Europe and provides additional psychological security to these states that have been so tossed about by history. NATO, with its trans-Atlantic ties, represents not just an Article 5 guarantee against aggression but a stabilizing instrument that ensures continued statehood.

The challenge for the United States and Europe now posed by the historic processes unleashed by *annus mirabilis* is not just to accommodate the aspirations of 80 million Central Europeans to re-establish liberal democratic rule but to ensure that the revolutions succeed. Success is necessary because Central European liberal democracies represent a model—a roadmap—to such nations and states as Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia's and the USSR's successor states—who also seek a return to Europe.

Indeed, one might argue that if liberal democratic experiments fail in Central Europe—in united Germany, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia—the likelihood of, and opportunities for those other Eastern or Southeast European states wanting to re-enter Europe will become quite bleak, if not impossible. If such a denouement were to result, then from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, the revolutions of 1989, rather than representing events of momentous historic proportions, will come to symbolize nothing more than a manifestation of the West's ability to seize failure from the jaws of Cold War "victory." And twenty-first century European history could well be doomed to suffer the descent of another dark, grim, and oppressive iron curtain.

Map 1 - NATO and Central Europe



Source: CIA Map 802377



## II. NATO ENLARGEMENT: BLAZING THE TRAIL

The Central European revolutions of 1989 (*annus mirabilis*) not only captured the attention and imagination of the world, but they have tested and challenged 5 states in the extreme: Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic and Slovakia).

In historical terms, the continuing transformations are much more encompassing and complex than the mere disintegration of communism. The aftershocks of World War I, which saw the disintegration of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires, continue to haunt Central European successor states. Not only do the 1989-90 Central European revolutions have to deal with historical unfinished business,<sup>1</sup> they also test prevailing assumptions about democratic control of the military and civil-military relations in contemporary liberal democratic polities. And most important, the revolutions are likely to provide serious future challenges to U.S. and European security. History has been in fast-forward over the past 6 years. Already 4 distinct periods have been evident since the Central European revolutions of 1989-90. The present period is the one that may prove to be the most critical for Central Europe's future.

The first geo-strategic period, which occurred during 1989-90, was marked by Central European euphoria resulting from the revolutions themselves, optimism about a "Return to Europe" by joining NATO and the European Community (EC), now the European Union (EU). The period witnessed NATO's July 1990 London

Declaration extending a "hand of friendship" to the East. It concluded with the successful "Four-plus-Two (plus-One)" (e.g., the 4 victorious WW II powers—the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union; plus the 2 Germanies; and Poland) negotiations culminating not only in Germany's 3 October 1990 reunification and emergence of a new continental power, but also in NATO's enlargement to the Polish border, incorporating the former GDR in its security guarantee.

The second period, which stretched from German unification through the end of 1991, witnessed the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, withdrawal of Soviet Groups of Forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and a failed coup in the Soviet Union. During 1991 NATO convened North Atlantic Council (NAC) ministerial meetings in Copenhagen (June), which sanctioned developing military ties to the east, and in Rome (November), which resulted in a new Strategic Concept (to replace NATO's policy of Flexible Response) and the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to engage the East. Central Europe's initial euphoria about West Europe's embrace of their "return" turned to more cautious (or realistic) optimism.

State disintegration marked the third period, which opened in January 1992 and continued through 1993. The year 1992 witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia—marking the emergence of more than 20 new states in Europe. It also witnessed the continued withdrawal of Soviet (now Russian) troops from Germany and Poland in Central Europe.

NATO demonstrated its willingness to engage in peacekeeping operations under either the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or United Nations auspices in May and December 1992, respectively. In June 1993, in Athens, the NACC expressed its willingness to support the Alliance in UN and/or CSCE-mandated peacekeeping operations. The same period also witnessed Boris Yeltsin's initial support for, and change of

mind about NATO's enlargement to Central Europe. NATO and EU hesitancy toward enlarging into Central Europe, coupled with Russia's pursuit of a "Near Abroad" policy, and another failed coup attempt in Russia in 1993 increased Central European pessimism about Russia's prospects for democratic political development, and national security east of NATO. Skepticism about support from the West grew.

The fourth period opened with NATO's January 1994 Brussels Summit, which adopted the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), Partnership For Peace (PFP), and committed the Alliance to future enlargement. This period saw the last of the Russian troops withdrawn from Germany and Poland. The fourth period also found NATO (in Bosnia) involved in its first military operation, with PFP members, including Russia, supporting the operation.

Central and East Europeans, initially skeptical, if not cynical, about Western intentions because they perceived the Alliance as bending to Russian opposition to their entry in 1993, have decided to test NATO to determine whether PFP and CJTF represent a real step toward NATO membership. In this regard, and with little doubt, the January 1994 Summit marked a watershed for NATO, but only time will tell whether the future Alliance will prove to be "hollow" or remain relevant to Europe's eastern security problems.

### What NATO Has Done

NATO's responses to developments in the East—first, to the former Warsaw Pact members of Central and Eastern Europe, and second, to the new states emerging from the disintegrated Soviet Union—have been both extraordinary and insufficient. They have been extraordinary in that so many new initiatives have been taken in such a short period of time; yet they have been insufficient in that events have moved at such a fast pace that NATO's responses have not kept up with expectations in the region.

London Declaration, July 1990. Only months after the revolu-

tions of November-December 1989, NATO extended its first "hand of friendship" at the London Summit on 5-6 July 1990. NATO invited the 6 (now former) Warsaw Pact members (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Union) to visit Brussels to address the NAC and invited these governments to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO to share thinking and deliberations and to intensify military contacts during the period of historic change.<sup>2</sup> During the summer, new liaison ambassadors from the Warsaw Pact participated in briefings at NATO headquarters.

**East German Absorption.** East Germany's transformation from a key Warsaw Pact member in November 1989 to a full member of NATO on 3 October 1990 was unexpected but rapid. The Soviet position underwent unforeseen and mercurial twists on the security framework for a united Germany. Mikhail Gorbachev initially refused to accept the Germany-in-NATO framework when he met with George Bush on 3 June 1990. Though Gorbachev wanted a neutral unified Germany, his concession to Helmut Kohl in July indicated that he really had little choice in the matter. In reality, the Soviets ceded control when the former GDR failed to stabilize the domestic situation as a reformed communist state in November 1989; *de facto* reunification occurred on 1 July 1990 with the economic and monetary union of the two German states. The Soviets also decoupled political reunification from the security issue when they conceded that all-German elections could occur irrespective of the Four-plus-Two agreement, which was signed on 12 September 1990.<sup>3</sup>

When formal reunification occurred on 3 October 1990, Germany's five new eastern *laender* (the former GDR) assumed the protection of NATO's Article 5—"an armed attack against one . . . shall be considered an attack against them all". NATO's enlargement eastward occurred without the need to sign a new protocol of association as employed upon the accessions of Greece and Turkey in 1951, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.

According to Article 5 of the 12 September 1990 Treaty, follow-



ing the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Germany at the end of 1994, German armed forces could be stationed in the east, but without nuclear weapons carriers. Conventional weapons systems with dual capabilities, though, could deploy in the east. Non-German Allied forces and nuclear weapons or their carriers could not be stationed in that part of Germany or be deployed there.<sup>4</sup>

**Copenhagen NAC, June 1991.** On 6-7 June NATO took the next step at the Copenhagen NAC session by agreeing to implement a broad set of further initiatives "to intensify...[NATO's] program of military contacts at various levels"<sup>5</sup> with Central and East European (CEE) states. CEE military contacts would be intensified with NATO headquarters, SHAPE, and other major NATO commands, and NATO would invite CEE military officers to NATO training facilities for special programs concerning civilian oversight of defense. Meetings of experts would be held to discuss security policy issues, military strategy and doctrine, arms control, and military industrial conversion to civilian purposes. NATO invited CEE experts to participate in NATO's "Third Dimension" scientific and environmental programs and to exchange views on subjects such as air space management. NATO information programs also expanded to the CEE region.

**NAC Ministerial, 21 August 1991.** Up until August, NATO treated all former Warsaw Pact countries alike. As the August 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union was occurring, the 21 August NAC ministerial statement differentiated, for the first time, the Soviet Union from the other Warsaw Pact countries by suspending liaison "pending a clarification in that country." The statement also noted:

We expect the Soviet Union to respect the integrity and security of all states in Europe. As a token of solidarity with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, we will develop ways of further strengthening our contribution toward the political and economic reform process within these countries. Our diplomatic liaison arrange-

ments with the Central and Eastern European democracies now take on added significance.<sup>6</sup>

**Rome Summit, November 1991: Genesis of NATO's Political and Military Transformation.** At the 7-8 November 1991 Rome Summit, NATO approved the Rome Declaration that broadened NATO's activities with the Soviet Union and Central and East Europe to include the following:

- annual meetings with the NAC at ministerial level in what would be called the NACC
- periodic meetings with the NAC at ambassadorial level
- additional meetings as circumstances warrant
- regular meetings with NATO subordinate committees, including the Political and Economic Committees, and the Military Committee and other NATO military authorities.<sup>7</sup>

In addition to creating the NACC, the November 1991 Rome Summit initiated another major change when it adopted a New Strategic Concept to replace its 1967 strategy of "Flexible Response." The new strategy moved NATO's military emphasis away from massive mobilization toward enhanced crisis management capabilities and peacekeeping operations. It also established the groundwork for NATO's military transformation.

**North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).**<sup>8</sup> On 20 December 1991 the foreign ministers of all the "former adversaries" (including the newly independent Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) met at the inaugural NACC to adopt a "Statement on Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation" that endorsed annual meetings of the NACC at ministerial level; bimonthly meetings of the NAC with liaison ambassadors beginning February 1992; additional NACC meetings as circumstances warrant; and regular meetings of the Political, Economic, and Military Committees with liaison partners. The purpose of the consultations and cooperation would be on security and related issues.

On 26 February, the NACC met at the ambassadorial level to

discuss and adopt a "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation." The 10 March 1992 Extraordinary NACC meeting, which convened to broaden membership to 35 (to include the former Soviet republics except Georgia), endorsed the Work Plan which covered a wide set of activities including defense planning issues, defense conversion, economic issues, science, challenges of modern society, dissemination of information, policy planning consultations, and air traffic management.<sup>9</sup>

While the NACC had laudable goals and its activities have mushroomed, its limitations immediately became apparent. First, the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and the decision to include all its successor states as new NACC members meant that rather than the originally conceived five non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members and the USSR, the NACC would include more than 20 new members. The immense diversity among NACC partners (e.g., between Poland and Uzbekistan) led to Central European demands for differentiation and increasing demands for membership in the Alliance. In sum, despite well-intended goals, the cooperation partner's demands on the NACC made it quite apparent how ill-prepared and limited the organization really was. NATO's recognition of its inadequacy came in January 1994 when in lieu of extending membership, the North Atlantic Council adopted the Partnership For Peace (PFP) program.

### **NATO and NACC as "Out-Of-Area" Peacekeeper**

**Oslo NAC/NACC, June 1992.** On 4 June 1992, the NAC Foreign Ministers session in Oslo agreed "to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with their own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of CSCE [the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe]."<sup>10</sup> Immediately afterward, NATO moved "out-of-area" and with the Western European Union (WEU) dispatched naval units to the Adriatic to enforce the UN embargo. Many NACC members saw this as an opportunity to broaden their cooperation with NATO, so on 5 June the NACC

foreign ministers attached "particular importance to enhancing the CSCE's operational and institutional capacity to contribute to conflict prevention, crisis management, and the peaceful settlement of disputes [and expressed willingness] to contribute."<sup>11</sup>

**Brussels NAC/NACC, December 1992.** In December 1992 the NATO NAC ministerial extended a parallel offer to the UN; it noted the Alliance's readiness "to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council."<sup>12</sup> The NACC then followed by agreeing that NATO and cooperation partners would share experience with one another and with other CSCE states in the planning and preparation of peacekeeping missions and would consider possible joint peacekeeping training and exercises. The same NACC also approved a 1993 Work Plan with specific provisions on peacekeeping and created a NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, to discuss general political and conceptual principles and practical measures for cooperation.

Closer cooperation and confidence among NACC partners became evident in February 1993 when the Military Committee met for the first time in cooperative session. When NACC defense ministers met at the end of March 1993, they recognized the importance "of the ability to act in a cooperative framework" in peacekeeping tasks and "ensure(d) that a high priority be given this work."<sup>13</sup>

On 12 April 1993, under authority of UN Resolution 816, NATO started enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. In late April, the Military Committee again met in cooperation with Chiefs of Defense Staff (CHODs) to discuss the possibility of NATO intervention in Bosnia should a peaceful solution fail.

**Athens NAC/NACC, June 1993.** The 10 June 1993 NAC ministerial communique noted the development of a "common understanding on conceptual approaches to peacekeeping [and] enhancing of cooperation in this field"<sup>14</sup> with Cooperation Partners. The 11 June 1993 Athens NACC adopted the Ad Hoc Group's detailed

Report on Cooperation in Peacekeeping<sup>15</sup> and agreed to accelerate the Ad Hoc Group's practical cooperation to implement the program, including the sharing of experience in peacekeeping planning, training and exercises, and logistics.<sup>16</sup> As a result of the Athens NACC session, Prague hosted a high-level NACC seminar on peacekeeping from 30 June to 2 July to discuss conceptual and doctrinal issues of peacekeeping.<sup>17</sup>

In short, it is evident that NATO has been quite responsive in a very brief period of time. But has its responsiveness been enough? The CEE countries clearly believe that more than meetings alone is necessary, if NATO is to serve an essential role in the protection of European peace and stability. Particularly as the NACC has broadened its membership so rapidly, it suffers the danger of becoming "neutralized" as a credible security institution. And there are uncertainties about what NATO's and NACC's concrete roles in the event of a real crisis will be. These concerns were voiced particularly by the Central European states: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia. All have expressed the desire for a differentiated role within NATO/NACC. They want criteria and time-lines to become full members of NATO and have agreed to accept responsibilities for NATO's security concerns.

**NATO's January 1994 Brussels Summit: A Watershed?** Although it took NATO 24 years to adopt a new Strategic Concept to replace its Flexible Response strategy, one might argue that with the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Russia's recent efforts to reassert influence over the CIS—and resulting insecurities in Central Europe—that NATO now needs a "new" Strategic Concept.

Whether the January 1994 NATO Brussels Summit will prove to be a such a watershed remains to be seen. The Summit did attempt to fuse the more flexible force structure packages for peacekeeping requirements (the so-called CJTF) with NATO's new need to stabilize the east by adopting the PFP program.

In support of the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the strengthening of the European

pillar of the Alliance through the WEU, the Summit agreed that in future contingencies, "NATO and the WEU will consult...through joint Council meetings [and]...stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available...for WEU operations."<sup>18</sup> As a result, the Summit endorsed the CJTF as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including peacekeeping operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.

Although the Summit did not accede to Central Europe's desire for immediate membership, the PFP proposal did establish NATO's long-term commitment to expand, leaving vague both the criteria and time-lines for enlargement.<sup>19</sup> Operating under the authority of the NAC, active participation in PFP is seen as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition to joining NATO. Partner states will participate in political and military bodies at NATO headquarters and in a separate Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons that will:

work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations.<sup>20</sup>

While the goals of NATO's CJTF and PFP are explicit and can be seen as a hedging against possible future problems in the East, their implementation would have immediate, probably unintended, and possibly unwanted regional implications. Initially, PFP had the effect of undermining the following situations: (1) Central East Europe's sub-regional cooperation by turning local actors into competitors; (2) domestic support for the region's democratic reformers; (3) the region's fragile civil-military relations; and (4) sub-regional security by attracting scarce defense resources from Central Europe's real defense requirements.<sup>21</sup>

## What Central Europe Has Done

Immediately after the 10-11 January 1994 NATO Summit initiated PFP and CJTF, that announced that NATO was open to future enlargement, President William Clinton visited Prague (on 12 January) to meet with the presidents of the four Central European (Visegrad) states to explain the program. In advance, the Central European defense ministers (except the Czech Republic, which sent First Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Pospisil) met in Warsaw to prepare for the forthcoming meeting with President Clinton. After the session, the defense ministers declared that they expected the PFP program to open the way to permanent contacts with NATO and to lead to full membership in the Alliance.<sup>22</sup>

**Poland.** Following a 10 January 1994 cabinet session, Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski appraised PFP as "too small a step in the right direction" and President Lech Walesa warned that NATO was committing a "serious error" in bowing to Russian objections. Walesa also harshly criticized the Czechs for failing to support a coordinated Visegrad strategy toward NATO.<sup>23</sup> Though Polish Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk added that he understood the West's difficulty to put forward a precise date for integration, he noted, "We expect NATO to come up with clear criteria in the short term for NATO membership."<sup>24</sup>

After the NATO Brussels Summit, President Walesa went to Prague for talks with the other Visegrad presidents and President Clinton (on 12 January). Because the Czech Republic wanted the talks conducted on a bilateral basis, Walesa expressed anger with the Czech's course of action: "They are making a mistake that will cost us all something."<sup>25</sup> After the session with President Clinton, Foreign Minister Olechowski noted, "[W]e have many promises, political declarations, but we lack specific prospects."<sup>26</sup>

Though Poland had initially exhibited reserve, it responded rapidly. One of the immediate requirements of the Partnership for Peace program was the need to find funding. Defense Minister

Kolodziejczyk estimated that the Army would need an additional 500 billion zlotys (\$23 billion) to participate. (The overall 1994 Polish defense budget was only 47.8 trillion zlotys (\$4.2 billion) or 2.2 percent of GDP).<sup>27</sup> On 2 February 1994, Prime Minister Pawlak signed documents in Brussels stating that Poland intended to participate in PFP. However, Pawlak expressed views unlike those of leaders from Romania and Lithuania whose documents preceded Poland's. Pawlak stated that Poland was not really happy with PFP, but "[W]e can accept it if we are certain that Poland will ultimately be able to become a full member."<sup>28</sup>

Despite its initial reservation, Poland's foreign and defense ministries in conjunction with Parliament's lower house, the Sejm, and upper house, the Senate, committees on defense and foreign affairs worked out a response.<sup>29</sup> On 25 April 1994, Poland became the first partner to hand over a presentation document to NATO outlining the spheres of its intended cooperation with the Alliance. At the 25 May 1994 NATO and PFP defense ministers meeting in Brussels, Kolodziejczyk continued to voice concern that "something is lacking," that the program fails to define clearly how to move from partnership to membership.<sup>30</sup>

Then on 5 July, Poland became the first partner to sign an Individual Partnership Program (IPP). In addition to peacekeeping missions and joint exercises, Poland incorporated additional amendments to its IPP to include air defense, convergence of command, control, and communications systems, and democratic control of the armed forces.<sup>31</sup> The 32-page document contained 60 specific measures covering training, exercises, and information exchanges, which would cost Poland 250 billion zlotys—a significant portion of its defense budget—for 1994.<sup>32</sup>

When President Clinton addressed the Polish Sejm on 7 July 1994, he declared that NATO enlargement is "no longer a question of whether, but when and how."<sup>33</sup> Of the \$100 million he pledged in U.S. support of the overall PFP program, Clinton committed \$25 million (more than 500 billion zlotys) to Poland.

Polish contacts with NATO then began to mushroom. In



mid-May 1994 a 96-soldier company from the British army began a small bilateral peacekeeping exercise with Polish troops at Kielce (Poland), that was billed as being "in the spirit of NATO's PFP plan."<sup>34</sup> The first real PFP ground forces exercise, "COOPERATIVE BRIDGE-94" took place 12-16 September at Biedrusko near Poznan, Poland. Some 920 soldiers (of which 280 were Polish) from 13 countries were divided into five multi-national companies under Polish-American command.<sup>35</sup>

Polish military contacts with Germany also began to flourish, particularly after 1 September 1994 when the last Russian troops had departed Germany and Poland. The *Bundeswehr* sponsored special ties with Polish units and exercises in the Polish border region.<sup>36</sup> On 1 September German General Naumann and Polish Chief of Staff Wilecki signed a partnership agreement for individual units of the two forces.<sup>37</sup> Also during 1994, the Polish, German, and French defense ministers (the so-called Weimar triangle) often met to discuss how to expand cooperation,<sup>38</sup> and German General Henning von Ondarza began to act as an adviser to the Polish defense minister.<sup>39</sup> Culminating the 1994 training year (16-23 September), Polish ground forces, a Danish mechanized platoon, and German air-landing company held a peacekeeping operation, "TATRA-94" in the Krakow Military District.<sup>40</sup>

**Hungary.** Though Partnership for Peace had not become an official NATO policy until 10 January 1994, Csaba Kiss of the Hungarian defense ministry noted (on 13 January) that defense officials had been working on Hungary's plan since October 1993. Kiss suggested that PFP would require Hungarian defense planning and spending to be more open and in line with NATO standards, and under more civilian control. He added that Hungarian soldiers would participate in future peacekeeping operations, that Hungary's air defense and airspace management needed to be converted to NATO formats (with Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) and ground radars overhauled to communicate with NATO aircraft), and that two military planners would go to Brussels.<sup>41</sup>

On 8 February, Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky signed Hungary's PFP presentation document, making it the fifth state to join; on 15 November 1994 Hungary submitted its Individual Partnership Program in Brussels.<sup>42</sup>

The Hungarian Parliament authorized holding a joint British-Hungarian PFP military exercise "HUNGARIAN VENTURE" from 1-25 September 1994 on Hungarian soil. The exercise involved 140 British troops and 228 Hungarian soldiers, including its peace-keeping company.<sup>43</sup> One lesson Hungary learned from the exercise was that differences in staff-level work and linguistic problems rather than incompatibility of weapons hampered cooperation.<sup>44</sup> Because of the shortage of funds, this was the only exercise Hungary held during 1994; Hungary did not participate in the first large-scale PFP exercise "COOPERATIVE BRIDGE-94" in Poland.<sup>45</sup>

Hungary's fiscal constraints limited its participation. Defense Minister Keleti, regretting Hungary's inability to participate in PFP exercises in Poland and the Netherlands, noted the defense ministry would need 493 million forints (\$4.3 million) for the individual tasks undertaken in PFP.<sup>46</sup> On 16 November, when the National Assembly Defense Committee approved the 1995 defense budget, which would increase to 77.1 billion forints (up 8 billion from 1994), the increase was more than absorbed by inflation.

**Czech Republic.** When NATO introduced Partnership For Peace, Defense Minister Antonin Baudys announced that all exercises undertaken by the Czech Army would be subject to the consent of parliament. On 29 April 1994, the Parliament approved the government proposal to permit short-term military training and exercises on Czech soil (5,000 foreign troops for up to 21 days) and for Czech units to participate abroad (700 troops for up to 30 days).<sup>47</sup>

On 10 March 1994, when Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus signed the PFP general agreement making the Czech Republic the 11th country to join the program, Defense Minister Baudys noted that the program "is the maximum possible and the minimum

desired."<sup>48</sup> The Czech's first joint exercise under PFP on Czech soil took place 15-25 March 1994, when 32 Dutch marines participated with 120 troops of the Czech Rapid Deployment Battalion. Then during 29 May 10 June, 130 French troops participated in exercises in the Czech Republic with 120 members of a company of the 23rd Czech Mechanized Battalion.<sup>49</sup> During 9-19 September, a platoon of 40 soldiers of the Czech 4th Mechanized Regiment participated in "COOPERATIVE BRIDGE-94."<sup>50</sup> The training year concluded with the first joint Czech-German military exercise of 400 troops, which took place during 7-11 November on both sides of the common border.<sup>51</sup>

The new Czech Defense Minister, Wilem Holan, summarized the Czech view in reference to NATO membership, "It is possible to anticipate that the conditions for NATO membership will be clearly defined in the near future—that is, certain standards will be drawn up...[adding the warning that] the 'cheap' phase of our decisions is coming to an end, and the phase that will cost us something is beginning."<sup>52</sup>

**Slovakia.** The fundamental orientation of Slovakia is to obtain full NATO membership. The starting point for this objective is participation in NATO's NACC and PFP. It signed its Presentation Document on 25 May 1994.<sup>53</sup> The process of building its defense ministry and armed forces from scratch meant a slow start, and fiscal constraints have limited Slovakia's participation. The internal political struggle and concomitant government instability made it an even slower start.

In addition to small group exchanges, Slovakia participated in "COOPERATIVE BRIDGE-94" in Poland and in a military exercise in the Netherlands in October. Slovakia's first Defense Minister, Imrich Andrejcek, criticized his successor Pavol Kanis' changes to the PFP presentation document as too expensive, arguing that the defense ministry would be required to spend 4.5 percent of its budget on PFP, rather than the one percent originally envisaged.<sup>54</sup>

In sum, although Slovakia evidenced commitment to the PFP,

intra-government problems slowed Slovakia's integration efforts.

### **Developing Principles for NATO's Enlargement**

**NATO Brussels Ministerial, 1 December 1994.** When the NAC met in ministerial session in Brussels on 1 December 1994, 23 countries had joined the Partnership and 10 IPP's had been signed, the Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons was fully operational (11 Partners had already appointed liaison officers to the Cell), and three PFP exercises had been held that Autumn. The Brussels communique reaffirmed that the Alliance:

remains open to membership...[and] expects and would welcome NATO enlargement that would reach to democratic states to our East. [Accordingly, they made a decision to begin an extensive study] to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership.<sup>55</sup>

The study to determine the principles for NATO enlargement was to be discussed at the May 1995 NATO meeting in the Netherlands and would then be presented to the Partners prior to the next NAC meeting in Brussels in the Fall of 1995.

On 2 December 1994, when the NACC foreign ministers convened (along with those members who had joined PFP but were not in NACC), they learned about the NAC decision to initiate a study to determine the modalities for NATO enlargement.<sup>56</sup> Reflecting the general view, Hungarian Foreign Minister Kovacs responded that NATO enlargement should be gradual, predictable, and transparent.<sup>57</sup>

**Noordwijk NAC/NACC, May 1995.** When the NAC met in Noordwijk, the PFP program had expanded to 26 members (having added Austria, Belarus, and Malta since early 1995), implementation of IPPs had quickly progressed, 14 countries had participated in the first cycle of the Planning and Review Process (PARP), the planned number of PFP peacekeeping exercises had

increased to 10 for 1995, and the PFP Status of Forces Agreement had been completed and invitations extended. In reference to the *Study on NATO Enlargement*, the Final Communique noted with satisfaction, "[W]e are well on course and will continue to make steady, measured progress."<sup>58</sup> A general optimism prevailed.

On 31 May, NATO Secretary General Willy Claes informed the NACC about the 30 May NAC ministerial session with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev<sup>59</sup> that had accepted the Russian IPP under PFP and produced the document on "Areas for Pursuance of a Broad, Enhanced NATO-Russia Dialogue and Cooperation."<sup>60</sup> The NACC also decided to publish the latest report from the Political-Military Steering Committee/Ad Hoc Group (PMSC/AHG) on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, which noted the extensive advances achieved in NATO peacekeeping since December 1994 in conceptual approaches and practical cooperation and interoperability in training, logistics, C3, and joint exercises.<sup>61</sup>

*Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995.* The *Study on NATO Enlargement* was briefed to the Partners in September and went a long way to further define the criteria for NATO membership. Chapter 1 openly stated that one purpose of enlargement was to encourage and support "democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military."<sup>62</sup> The Study also made clear that it assumes active participation in PFP and expects new members to accept all rights and obligations of membership under the Washington Treaty.

Chapter 3 outlined how the NACC and PFP would contribute to the enlargement process by developing necessary interoperability:

PFP will help partners undertake necessary defense management reforms as they establish the processes and mechanisms necessary to run a democratically controlled military organization, in areas such as transparent national defense planning, resource allocation and budgeting,

appropriate legislation and parliamentary and public accountability....

The PFP Planning and Review Process and PFP exercises will introduce partners to collective defense planning and pave the way for more detailed operational planning.... While new members will not be required to achieve full interoperability with NATO before joining the Alliance, they will need to meet certain minimum standards essential to a functioning and credible Alliance.<sup>63</sup>

In addition to the need for political and military interoperability, the study also stressed that new members should conform to basic principles such as democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law; and demonstrate a commitment to economic liberty, social justice, and OSCE norms and principles involving ethnic minorities and in resolving territorial disputes. New members would also have to ensure that adequate resources are available to assume the added and considerable financial obligations of joining, and that they should not "close the door" to later candidate members.<sup>64</sup>

**Brussels NAC/NACC, December 1995.** On 5 December 1995, when the NAC foreign and defense ministers convened in Brussels, they appointed Javier Solana as the new NATO Secretary General and prepared for NATO's implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement by endorsing the Implementation Force (IFOR)—JOINT ENDEAVOUR—with participating countries.<sup>65</sup>

The Final Communiqué explained that the NAC had been tasked to provide a report before the Spring ministerial on the resource and staffing requirements for the Partnership and (to enhance the effectiveness of the NACC), to generate, with the partners, a more focused approach to cooperation programs, "with particular importance to...the development of civil military relations and the democratic control of armed forces and good neighbor relations."<sup>66</sup>

In response to many issues raised by the Partners resulting from the *Study on NATO Enlargement*, the NAC decided that the next phase of the enlargement process during 1996 would consist of three elements. First, interested Partners were invited to pursue an intensified dialogue with the Alliance. Second, a practical work program would be adopted to strengthen ties with the Alliance, and for some Partners to assume the responsibilities of membership. Third, the Alliance would consider the resource and staffing implications of enlargement. The NAC also decided that its December 1996 Ministerial would assess progress and consider the way forward.<sup>67</sup>

The next day, 6 December 1995, Acting Secretary General Solana informed the NACC Foreign Ministers about the NAC session, accepted offers by numerous NACC/PFP members to contribute to the IFOR, received status reports on the new NACC Work Plan for 1996-1997, and "stressed the importance of strengthening democratic control of armed forces and developing strong civil-military relations."<sup>68</sup> The trail toward enlargement was clearly opening up.

**Berlin NAC, June 1996.** On 3 June 1996, the Berlin NAC Communique reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to open to new members, following the three-fold process adopted in December 1995. After receiving a report on the ongoing consultations in the individual, intensified dialogues with 15 interested countries, the NAC reiterated its desire for Secretary General Solana's report to the December 1996 session.<sup>69</sup> When the NACC convened on 4 June, its ministers stressed "the necessity of continuing cooperative efforts within the NACC/PFP framework to promote positive civil-military relations and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces, as important underpinnings for democracy, stability and security in the NACC area."<sup>70</sup>

**Criteria for enlargement.** While the Alliance has not precisely defined the necessary criteria for enlargement, the general standards would include: active participation in NACC and the Partnership program, the successful performance of democratic

political institutions, a free market economy, and respect for human rights and good-neighbor relations along the lines of OSCE.

It is also clear that effective democratic control of the military, as well as some minimal degree of military capability and NATO interoperability are necessary conditions. NATO's challenge, though, will be how to define and determine what constitutes "effective" democratic control of the military recognizing that each state has its own history, culture, and unique set of institutions.



The preceding pages have recorded the key events, decisions, and agreements opening the trail for Central European countries to move toward general membership in NATO. The body of the study that follows assesses the current state of democratic control of the military and civil-military relations among those Central European states frequently referred to as the most likely to join NATO first. The study posits the following four (formal and "in-the-spirit of") conditions as being necessary to determine whether a state is exerting "effective" democratic oversight and management of the military:

1. *A clear division of authority between president and the government (prime minister and defense/interior minister) in Constitutions or through public law.* The law should clearly establish who commands and controls the military and promotes military officers in peacetime, who holds emergency powers in crisis, and who has authority to make the transition to war. Underlining these formalities is evidence of the spirit of tolerance and respect for legitimacy between president and government who may often be from different parties or political persuasion.

2. *Parliamentary oversight of the military through control of the defense budget.* Its role in deploying armed forces in peacetime,



emergency, and war must be clear. Underlining these formalities is the need for the Defense and Security and Foreign Affairs Committees to provide minority and opposition parties with transparent information and allow consultation particularly on normal policy issues such as defense budgets and on extraordinary commissions investigating defense/security violations. They need staff expertise and information support to provide adequate oversight and liaison with defense and interior ministries to help develop bipartisan consensus on defense and security. Similarly intelligence oversight committees should provide access to opposition parties.

3. *Peacetime government oversight of General Staffs and military commanders through civilian defense ministries.* Defense ministry management should include preparation of the defense budget, access to intelligence, involvement in strategic planning, force structure development, arms acquisitions and deployments, and military promotions.

In order to accomplish these objectives, defense ministries need "legitimate" civilian defense ministers. Two potential pitfalls need to be avoided: First, some defense ministries have become politicized because the defense minister and state secretary have been of different (majority or minority coalition) political parties. Second, some retired military officers who have become "civilian" defense ministers have permitted the general staff to coopt the defense ministry, rather than providing defense ministry oversight of the military. This situation has come about partly because of the scarcity of legitimate defense experts—civilian or military—who are capable of making the defense and security case to their legislatures and the broader public (though legislative liaison and public affairs).

4. *Restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness and accountability for the armed forces to be effective.* Having emerged from the communist period when the military was

controlled by the Soviet High Command through the Warsaw Pact (and top-secret Statute system) and often used as an instrument of external or internal oppression, society must now be able to perceive the military as being under effective national control. In addition to the necessary institutional and constitutional arrangements, this goal also requires a legal framework and code of conduct for professional soldiers and conscript citizens that would allow soldiers to disobey orders if they are illegal.

Military training levels and equipment must also be sufficient to protect the state. Such sufficiencies require social support and a predictable stream of material resources (defense budgets) that the defense ministry can "sell" to the parliament and the broader society. This sufficiency did not exist in 1996. Most Central European militaries retain only 50-55 percent of their 1988 manpower levels and 40-45 percent of the defense budgets in real terms. Their readiness, training, and modernization levels have deteriorated significantly—in some cases raising questions about their capacity to participate in coalition defense tasks.

If these are the four conditions that NATO deems necessary for effective democratic control of the military, then certain Central European states could be viewed as approaching acceptable norms, but some would not currently qualify. Though Central Europe has already made enormous progress with the assistance of the United States and NATO/PFP in developing democratic control of the military and in achieving more balanced civil-military relations since the 1989 revolutions, it is abundantly clear that continued work remains!

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## Notes

1. This is a point made by Shlomo Avineri, "The Return To History: The Breakup of the Soviet Union," *The Brookings Review* (Spring 1992), pp. 30-33.

2. *London Declaration On a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 5-6 July 1990), Articles 7 and 8.

3. See Stephen F. Szabo, "Federal Republic of Germany: The *Bundeswehr*," in Jeffrey Simon (ed.), *European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1991), pp. 189-206.

4. Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany, 12 September 1990. U.S. Senate, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, Treaty Document 101-20, S-385-13, p. 6.

5. Statement Issued By the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session, Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991 in *NATO Communiqués 1991* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992), pp. 22-23.

6. North Atlantic Council Statement, 21 August 1991 in *NATO Communiqués 1991*, pp. 24-25.

7. *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, NATO Press Communique S-1(91)86, 8 November 1991, Article 11, pp. 4-5.

8. For a thorough overview, see Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership," *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1992).

9. "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation," NATO Press Communique M NACC-1 (92)21, 10 March 1992.

10. "Final Communique issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1 (92) 51, 4 June 1992, p. 4.

11. "Statement Issued At the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Oslo, Norway," NATO Press Communique M-NACC-1 (92)54, 5 June 1992, p. 2.

12. "Final Communique issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communique M-NAC-2(92)106, 17 December 1992, p. 2.

13. "Statement issued by the Meeting of Defense Ministers," NATO Press Communique M DMCP-1(93)28, 29 March 1993, p. 3.

14. "Final Communiqué issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(93)38, 10 June 1993, pp. 2-3.

15. "Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping," NATO Press Release M-NACC-1(93)40, 11 June 1993, pp. 8-11.

16. "Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communiqué M-NACC-1(93)39, 11 June 1993, p. 1.

17. "NACC High Level Seminar on Peacekeeping," NATO Press Release (93)45, 25 June 1993.

18. "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government issued by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Belgium," NATO Press Communiqué M-1(94)3, 11 January 1994, pp. 2-3. The declaration stressed the development of separable but not separate capabilities.

19. NATO's 11 January 1994 Declaration noted: "We expect and welcome NATO expansion that would reach democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe." *Ibid.*, p. 4.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

21. For a discussion of this see my, "Partnership For Peace," *Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)*, No. 5 (Summer 1994), pp. 36-45.

22. Warsaw PAP, 7 January 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-006* (10 January 1994), p. 1.

23. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 6 (11 January 1994), p. 3.

24. Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk interview, Paris *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 10 January 1994, p. 14. *FBIS-EEU-94-007* (11 January 1994), p. 25.

25. Lech Walesa interview, Prague Lidove Noviny, 10 January 1994, pp. 1,5. *FBIS-EEU-94-008* (12 January 1994), p. 23.

26. Prague CTK, 12 January 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-010* (14 January 1994), p. 1.

27. Warsaw *Rzeczpospolita*, 19 January 1994, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-94-012* (19 January 1994), p. 20.

28. Antwerp *Gazet Van Antwerpen*, 3 February 1994, p. 5. *FBIS-EEU-94-024* (4 February 1994), p. 17.

29. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 15 February 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-032* (16 February 1994), p. 25.

30. Warsaw PAP, 26 May 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-102* (26 May 1994), p. 15.

31. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 5 July 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-128* (5 July 1994), p. 22.
32. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 6 July 1994, p. 8. *FBIS-EEU-94-130* (7 July 1994), pp. 17-19.
33. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 128 (8 July 1994), p. 3.
34. *London Financial Times*, 16 May 1994, p. 3.
35. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 173 (12 September 1994), p. 4.
36. Hamburg DPA, 28 July 1994. *FBIS-WEU-94-150* (4 August 1994), p. 15.
37. Berlin DDP/ADN, 1 September 1994. *FBIS-WEU-94-170* (1 September 1994), p. 16.
38. They met in Warsaw in July, and for the fourth time in Bamberg in September.
39. General Henning von Ondarza interview. *Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza*, 9 August 1994, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-94-153* (9 August 1994), pp. 20-21.
40. *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 12 September 1994, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-94-177* (13 September 1994), p. 19.
41. Budapest MTI, 13 January 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-010* (14 January 1994), pp. 9-10.
42. On 5 December the Hungarian Parliament accepted the IPP by a vote of 236 for, and one abstention.
43. Budapest MTI, 1 September 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-171* (2 September 1994), p. 10.
44. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, *Magyar Nemzet*, 15 October 1994, p. 7. *FBIS-EEU-94-201* (18 October 1994), pp. 23-24.
45. Instead, Hungary sent two observers.
46. Gyorgy Keleti interview, Budapest Duna TV, 20 November 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-225* (22 November 1994), p. 18. Hungary committed 400 million forints (\$3.5 million) for the PFP program for 1995. *OMRI Daily Digest*, 4 January 1995, pp. 4-5.
47. *FBIS-EEU-94-117* (17 June 1994), p. 13.
48. Prague CTK, 7 March 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-049* (14 March 1994), p. 8.
49. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 29 May 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-104* (31 May 1994), p. 18.
50. Prague CTK, 3 August 1994.
51. Prague CTK, 12 October 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-199* (14 October 1994), p. 5.

52. Vilem Holan, Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 19 November 1994, p. 5. *FBIS-EEU-94-226* (23 November 1994), p. 2.

53. Pavol Kanis 24 May 1994 interview, Bratislava *Rozhlasova Stanica*. *FBIS-EEU-94-101* (25 May 1994), p. 6; and Defense Doctrine of the Slovak Republic text, Bratislava *Slovenska Republika*, 11 October 1994, p. 10. *FBIS-EEU-94-200* (17 October 1994), p. 8.

54. Prague CTK, 1 June 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-106* (2 June 1994), p. 14.

55. "Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, 1 December 1994," Press Communique M-NAC-2(94)116, p. 3 (emphasis added).

56. "Chairman's Summary of North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 2 December 1994," Press Communique M-NACC-2(94)117 (2 December 1994), p. 1.

57. Budapest MTI, 2 December 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-233* (5 December 1994), p. 11.

58. "Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, 30 May 1995," Press Communique M-NAC 1(95)48 (30 May 1995), p. 3. In marked contrast, in reference to CJTF, the Communique noted that "more remains to be done." *Ibid.*, p. 5.

59. Chairman's Summary of the North Atlantic Council, 31 May 1995. Press Communique M-NACC-1(95)49, p. 1.

60. Building on the NAC's 22 June 1994 agreement with Andrei Kozyrev, the 31 May 1995 three-section document included: (1) Sharing of information in European political-security matters; (2) political consultations on issues of common concern; and (3) cooperation in peacekeeping through ad hoc 16+1 discussions with the NAC and Political Committee.

61. "Report to the Ministers by the Political-Military Steering Committee/Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 31 May 1995," NATO Press Release M-NACC-1(95)50, pp. 1-3.

62. *Study On NATO Enlargement* (Brussels: September 1995), p. 2.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

64. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-25.

65. "Statement On Bosnia-Herzegovina, 5 December 1995," Press Communique M-NAC 2(95)119.

66. "Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, 5 December 1995," Press Communique M-NAC-2(95)18, p. 5.


67. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

68. "Chairman's Summary of North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 6 December 1995," Press Communique M-NACC-2(95)120.

69. "Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, 3 June 1996," Press Communiqué M-NAC 1(96)63, pp. 7-8.

70. "Chairman's Summary, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 4 June 1996," Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)64 (4 June 1996), pp. 1-2.

Map 2 - Germany



Source: CIA Map 802330



### III. GERMANY: ONE PEOPLE, ONE STATE, ONE ARMY

East Germany followed a very different path than Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia because external forces predominantly defined the ultimate course of the revolution. In Communist East Germany the Socialist Unity Party (SED) lost total control of the situation propelling the state toward dissolution. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (and later the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France) created the conditions for Germany's ultimate reunification within the NATO security umbrella.

Erich Honecker, as party and state leader of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from 1971-1989, was responsible for shaping the GDR of the late 1980s. With the help of the Berlin Wall, erected in 1961, he set the GDR on a stable course of political and economic development. During the 1970s, much of the GDR's domestic policy reflected an attempt to raise the standard of living (consumer communism) in return for which East Germans were expected to accept stricter controls on Western contacts and make efforts to neutralize sources of opposition. The end of the GDR's self-imposed isolation commenced when Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* led to the opening of diplomatic relations with Bonn. Honecker's more open foreign policy transformed the GDR from an international outcast to a legitimate member of the international community.

All of this changed in 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union and socialist community dramatically altered

the environment in which the GDR had to operate. When Hungary and Poland began reforms, the East German (like the Czechoslovak) Government became an even more staunch defender of the status quo. In the end, Honecker's unrelenting resistance to domestic reforms undermined his domestic support and his regime's legitimacy.<sup>1</sup>

In May 1989, Hungary dismantled its barbed-wire barrier on the Austrian border, then announced on 10 September that the border would be opened. News of this opening had immediate consequences in the GDR. By the end of September more than 45,000 East Germans had made a frenzied exit to the West,<sup>2</sup> demonstrating that the GDR was in desperate need of reform. When the largest protests since the failed workers' uprising in June 1953 spread in East Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig and elsewhere in early October, the legitimacy of the regime came into serious question.<sup>3</sup> Several opposition groups formed—the most notable among them being the New Forum—but they needed to overcome their divisions and to work openly for alternatives.

The riots kept spreading. On 16 October when 100,000 protesters rallied in Leipzig, the SED ousted Erich Honecker. Two days later Egon Krenz replaced Honecker as head of state, SED General Secretary, and Chairman of the Defense Council.<sup>4</sup> Despite the leadership change, the riots continued. Only after 300,000 protesters had marched in Leipzig on 23 October, did one member of the SED politburo finally meet (on 26 October) with the New Forum for the first time.<sup>5</sup> This concession led to new protests demanding free elections, the ouster of the secret police, and the legalization of the New Forum.

Although Egon Krenz attempted to associate himself with the reform by meeting with Gorbachev and Lech Walesa and promising far-reaching change, he could not stem the revolutionary tide. When thousands of East Germans packed the FRG embassy in Prague to seek asylum, Krenz announced on 3 November 1989 that they were free to travel to West Germany. By 8 November, after 50,000 more East German citizens had crossed the Czechoslovak

border to the FRG (bringing the GDR's 1989 emigration to more than 200,000), the entire 44-member Council of Ministers<sup>6</sup> (led by premier Willi Stoph), and most of the SED politburo, had resigned.<sup>7</sup>

On 9 November, the GDR completely lifted its travel ban. The Berlin Wall was now porous and obsolete.<sup>8</sup> On 13 November, 477 of the 478-member People's Chamber (*Volkskammer*) elected Hans Modrow the new prime minister.<sup>9</sup> The SED then issued an "Action Program" outlining a number of political reforms, including round-table discussions with political parties and the call for free elections, which were held on 18 March 1990.

### Uncompleted Defense Reform

One of East Germany's immediate defense reform requirements was to establish civilian [executive and legislative] command and control over the defense ministry, secret police, and the National People's Army (NPA). This control was essential because during the revolutionary period—in October and again November—the government nearly employed military force against the people. Furthermore, because the lines of authority were unclear, the NPA was not always under lawful control. Adding immense complication and uncertainty to the situation was the enormous (roughly 17-division) Soviet Western Group of Forces (WGF) troop-presence.

During the domestic unrest leading to the revolution in East Germany, Defense Minister Heinz Kessler signed Order No. 105/89 on 27 September 1989, an order increasing the state of combat readiness along the borders, around Berlin, and in Leipzig.<sup>10</sup> During protest demonstrations in early October, Honecker ordered (on 7 October) that rubber truncheons and live ammunition be distributed to the army, to the People's Police, and to State Security Police if necessary.<sup>11</sup> Violence was averted only when Egon Krenz, then SED politburo member in charge of security, flew to Leipzig (on 9 October) and unilaterally canceled Honecker's order, there-

by allowing protesters to march unmolested. Egon Krenz then replaced Erich Honecker as SED secretary on 18 October 1989.<sup>12</sup>


During renewed tension, the SED politburo on 7 November 1989 rejected by only one vote a proposal to put the NPA on the streets. Despite the politburo vote, a group of hard-line NPA officers allegedly put troops and tanks on maximum alert. The situation relaxed only when moderates prevailed and the GDR government announced the opening of its borders and the Berlin Wall on 9 November.<sup>13</sup>

Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann has alleged that when former Defense Minister Heinz Kessler ordered the 1st Motorized Infantry Division in Potsdam to "close" the wall on 11 November 1989, the NPA General Staff withdrew the order.<sup>14</sup> Heinz Kessler rejected Eppelmann's allegation as false.<sup>15</sup> Admiral Theodur Hoffmann supported Kessler, noting that discussions "always revolved around support for the police in the second line, but never around the deployment of the NPA against demonstrators or the people."<sup>16</sup>

Despite reports that the readiness level of units of the Soviet Western Group of Forces had been raised,<sup>17</sup> Soviet Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev went out of his way to make clear that the WGF remained neutral: "Our military were in no way involved. They were instructed not to intervene in any matters pertaining to domestic interrelations in the fraternal countries. Everything that is happening there is the sole concern of each individual country."<sup>18</sup>

When the People's Chamber replaced Willi Stoph with Hans Modrow as prime minister on 13 November 1989, they also elected Guenter Maleuda, of the small Democratic Farmer's Party, to replace Horst Sindermann as People's Chamber president and replaced 27 members of the old Parliament. Admiral Theodor Hoffmann replaced Heinz Kessler as defense minister on 15 November, immediately making it clear that: "I am only accountable to my prime minister and to the People's Chamber" (see Table 3.1 below).<sup>19</sup>

**Table 3.1 - East German Defense Reform, 1989-90**



On 18 November, the People's Chamber confirmed Hans Modrow's new 28-member Cabinet, which included 17 Communists and 11 members from four parties closely allied to the SED. The People's Chamber also established special commissions to consider constitutional changes, work out a law for democratic elections, and investigate abuses and corruption of former Communist officials. The main consideration was to change Article 1 of the Constitution—the article that assigned the leading

role to the Communist Party.<sup>20</sup> Despite these concessions, a new wave of popular anger at the abuses under Erich Honecker arose, the Communist Party was thrown into disarray, and its leadership collapsed on 3 December.

Between mid-November and early December 1989, authority over the Government, the civil service, the police, and the army officially shifted away from the Communist Party to Prime Minister Hans Modrow and his Cabinet. In early December Gregor Gysi replaced Egon Krenz as SED secretary and Manfred Gerlach, of the Liberal Democratic Party, became head of state and thus head of the Defense Council.<sup>21</sup> As a result, control over the NPA now resided solely with the new Government and Defense Minister Theodor Hoffmann. In mid-December the Cabinet announced that it would dissolve the secret police and name a new civilian supervisor, directly subordinate to the prime minister, to head two new intelligence agencies.<sup>22</sup>

The issue of German unification was broached early. In East Germany free elections were increasingly seen as a prelude to some form of national plebiscite for reunification with the FRG. In West Germany, on 28 November 1989, Chancellor Helmut Kohl presented a 10-point outline to the FRG Parliament for creating a German federation that would eventually lead to the reunification of the two German states.<sup>23</sup> The Soviet Union issued a harsh critique of the plan describing it as "fraught with dangerous consequences [and] bordering on outright *diktat*."<sup>24</sup> When East Germany's battered Communist Party held its "first" round-table discussions on 7 December with new opposition political groups led by the New Forum, the SED agreed to adopt a new Constitution, hold free elections by 6 May 1990, and seek a formula for unifying the two German states.<sup>25</sup> When Kohl and Modrow met for the first time on 19 December, they agreed to reopen Berlin's Brandenburg Gate, introduce free movement for all Germans by Christmas, and sign a treaty establishing future forms of cooperation.

During January 1990, it became clear that the Communists had

lost control. Not only had 400,000 (of 16.5 million) East Germans fled during 1989, but protests had continued to spread throughout the country. After several factions within the SED called for its dissolution—claiming that the party had not reformed itself radically enough and therefore posed a threat to East Germany's stability—the SED-Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) executive committee convened an emergency session on 21 January 1990. Though SED leader Gregor Gysi managed to prevent disbandment, he admitted that the SED had been unsuccessful in making the transition from Stalinism to democratic socialism. The SED expelled 14 party leaders, including Krenz.<sup>26</sup>

With the SED's collapse, the East German Government also experienced crisis. Prime Minister Modrow claimed that he could maintain stability only if the opposition joined the Communist-led coalition. On 29 January, the opposition, for its part, agreed to create a "grand coalition" on the condition that Modrow and all cabinet members renounce their party affiliation until after the elections (which were moved up to 18 March from 6 May), that the opposition gain key cabinet posts, and that the round-table approve all legislation.<sup>27</sup>

At the 17 March 1990 Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers session in Prague, all seven members of the Pact agreed to Germany's right to unify, but they disputed the formula for unification. Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze ruled against NATO membership for a united Germany, but Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia argued that a united Germany *in* NATO would benefit European stability!

The 18 March 1990 East German democratic elections to the 400-seat People's Chamber produced a resounding call for quick reunification and a market economy by electing a coalition of conservative parties allied with the FRG's ruling Christian Democrats. Of the 24 political parties in the People's Chamber, the conservative three-party Alliance for Germany coalition—comprising the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Democratic Awakening, and German Social Union—won 193 seats. The Social Democratic Party

of Germany won 87 seats and the PDS (the former SED) won 65.<sup>28</sup> When the new People's Chamber convened on 5 April, it voted unanimously to delete the constitutional preamble defining East Germany as "a socialist state of workers and peasants."<sup>29</sup>

CDU chairman Lothar de Maiziere became prime minister. On 11 April 1990 he created a broad coalition government to change the Constitution (which according to Article 63 required two-thirds majority in the People's Chamber)<sup>30</sup> and hasten unification. De Maiziere named Rainer Eppelmann, a civilian who headed Democratic Awakening, minister of disarmament and defense (Eppelmann accepted the position only on condition that "disarmament" be in his title),<sup>31</sup> and appointed the former defense minister, Admiral Theodur Hoffmann, as the new Chief of Staff.

The drive toward German unification accelerated. On 20 March 1990 the FRG and GDR agreed in principle to draft economic and monetary union plans by the end of April and to implement them on 1 July. The strategy was to sign a treaty in which East Germany would adopt the FRG's tax laws, eliminate price subsidies for consumer goods, and give Bonn's *Bundesbank* authority over monetary affairs.<sup>32</sup> De Maiziere's plan for unification involved invoking Article 29 of the FRG Constitution that allowed East Germany's five separate states (*laender*) to apply directly to Bonn for admission to the FRG.<sup>33</sup> But this action required a change in the GDR Constitution because these states had been abolished by the Communists, so therefore had to be recreated. In July the People's Chamber recreated the *laender* structure to facilitate unification.<sup>34</sup>

Though Lothar de Maiziere supported a unified Germany within the European Community (now Union) and NATO, and agreed with the FRG position that no NATO troops should be stationed on East German territory, the Soviet Union still differed on the formula for a united Germany. On 12 April, the People's Chamber voted to approve NATO membership for a united Germany, but only if NATO were to change its strategy.<sup>35</sup> On 3 June 1990, when President Mikhail Gorbachev met with President



George Bush in Washington, the two were still unable to agree on Germany's role in NATO. Intending to make Germany's membership in NATO more compatible with Soviet interests, Bush suggested to Gorbachev a list of nine points—including expansion of CSCE's functions, a German pledge not to acquire nuclear or chemical weapons, acceleration of arms control negotiations, and revision of NATO doctrine. Gorbachev reportedly argued that these concessions were "not enough."<sup>36</sup>

Although Gorbachev consistently rejected the German-reunification-within-NATO formula, his concession to President Helmut Kohl in July 1990 illustrated that he really had little choice in the matter. In reality, Soviet control had been ceded in November 1989 when the GDR failed to stabilize the domestic situation as a reformed communist state; *de facto* unification occurred on 1 July with the economic and monetary union of the two German states. In addition, the Soviets had to decouple political unification from the security issue when they conceded that all-German elections could occur irrespective of the Two-Plus-Four (the two Germanies, plus the U.S., USSR, U.K., and France) agreement, which was signed on 12 September 1990.<sup>37</sup>

On 20 September, the GDR People's Chamber voted 299-80 and the FRG *Bundestag* voted 442-47 to ratify a treaty<sup>38</sup> by which the GDR would discard its constitution and adopt nearly all the FRG's laws when official unification occurred on 3 October 1990. When the People's Chamber dissolved upon unification, 144 of its 400 members joined the FRG's expanded *Bundestag*<sup>39</sup> until the new all-German parliamentary elections were held on 2 December 1990. Those elections returned Helmut Kohl to power; Kohl's Christian Democratic Union coalition with Hans Dietrich Genscher's Free Democrats controlled 392 of the *Bundestag*'s 656 seats.<sup>40</sup>

### **Armed Forces Reform**

East German armed forces reforms never had a chance to fully develop between the initial riots in October 1989 and unification in October 1990. The Warsaw Pact's May 1987 so-called defensive

doctrine and Gorbachev's 7 December 1988 announcement of unilateral reductions initially powered the NPA restructuring and reductions during 1988-1989. During January-June 1990, the collapse of SED control, free elections in the GDR, and the FRG's drive for reunification filled the vacuum and hastened reform efforts. Little happened between monetary unification on 1 July and the Soviet Union's 12 September 1990 concession to permit a 370,000 total German force within NATO by 1994 (by the Four-plus-Two agreement).

The 12 September 1990 Kohl-Gorbachev agreement set the ground rules for the new military posture and the details of the *Bundeswehr*-NPA merger agreement. The all-German armed forces would be reduced to 370,000 by 31 December 1994, when the Soviet WGF also would have withdrawn from Germany. On 30 June 1991 when *Bundeswehr* Command East disbanded, the personnel strength of the *Bundeswehr* in eastern Germany was 56,000 soldiers. Of the original 32,000 NPA officers in September 1990, only 9,500 were still serving in June 1991. Of these, 6,000 were granted two-year probationary contracts. Only 2,507 would ultimately become permanently assigned to the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>41</sup>

With the 12 September 1990 Treaty, the Soviet Union accepted East Germany's incorporation into NATO, while the FRG agreed to hold back NATO military presence in the former GDR until Russian troops had evacuated the territory in 1994.<sup>42</sup> In addition, according to Article 5:

(3) Following completion of the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces from the territory of the present German Democratic Republic and of Berlin, units of German armed forces assigned to military alliance structures in the same way as those in the rest of German territory may also be stationed in that part of Germany, but without nuclear weapon carriers. This does not apply to conventional weapon systems which may have other capabilities...<sup>43</sup>

In sum, East Germany and its original 175,000-troop National People's Army simply disappeared from the face of the earth. NATO enlarged, but with certain conditions attached. Though the model by which NATO included the former GDR may not be totally applicable to future enlargements, the fact that NATO "accepted conditions" might set a precedent for the future.

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10. *Die Welt*, 20 December 1990, p. 6. *FBIS-WEU-91-013* (18 January 1991), pp. 20-21.

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12. Vienna *Die Presse*, 24 November 1989, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-89-231 (4 December 1989), p. 45.
13. London *Observer*, 10 December 1989, p. 1.
14. Eppelmann interview, Hamburg *Die Welt*, 10 July 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-133 (11 July 1990), p. 24.
15. East Berlin ADN, 11 July 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-134 (12 July 1990), p. 31.
16. Hamburg DPA, 17 July 1990.
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18. *Komsomolskaya*, 7 January 1990, p. 1. FBIS-SOV-90-006 (9 January 1990), p. 41.
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Map 3 - Poland



Source: CIA Map 735600

## IV. POLAND: REFORM BY STAGES

Since 1989, reform of Poland's 1952 Constitution—gradually transforming Poland from a communist to a democratic state—has undergone six stages of development. The process began in 1988 with an understanding reached between the government and the opposition within the framework of round-table talks. The Polish United Worker's Party's (PUWP) recognized political and trade union pluralism in return for the creation of a powerful new office of president. The second stage began with the Communist Party's overwhelming defeat during the June 1989 general parliamentary elections, in which only 35 percent of the Sejm seats were contested and resulting in the 24 August 1989 election of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Poland's first non-Communist prime minister. The third stage commenced with the 9 December 1990 presidential elections which brought Lech Walesa to the presidency and the appointment of Jan Bielecki as the second non-Communist prime minister in January 1991. The fourth stage commenced after the full Sejm and Senate democratic elections held on 27 October 1991, which resulted in the rule of Jan Olszewski and Hanna Suchocka as Poland's third and fourth non-Communist prime ministers. The fifth stage started after the Fall 1993 Sejm and Senate elections, with the return of the socialists, the appointment of Waldemar Pawlak as prime minister, and the constitutional crisis in Poland.

The sixth stage commenced with the 23 December 1995 inauguration of Aleksander Kwasniewski as president.

During the same period, Poland initiated an extensive domestic defense reform—to ensure civilian command and control and extensive restructuring of the military and to return the armed forces to the people. As it was doing so, Poland also had to grapple with a rapidly changing threat environment. Before 1989, Polish military doctrine viewed the West, specifically NATO, as the primary threat. Until the 14 November 1990 Polish-German border treaty, Poland viewed Germany as a threat. Then until the August 1991 failed coup and resulting disintegration of the USSR in December, Poland viewed the Soviet Union as a threat. Since 1992 Poland has come full-circle; it has successfully developed an “all-round” defense strategy and signed agreements with its four less-stable eastern border states: Russia, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine.

### **Stillborn Defense Reform**

To achieve democratic civil-military relations, Poland must establish consensus and law on civilian (president, government, and Parliament) command and control of the defense ministry and the military, the former Polish People’s Army (PPA). Poland’s reform has included amending the Constitution to formalize the round-table agreements to create a new office of the president, an office that for a long period lacked a constitutional basis. Poland still must clarify the lines of authority between the president and government (prime minister and civilian defense minister) and of the government’s control of the military in peace and war. So far, this effort has yet to succeed.

In addition, the Polish reform had to refurbish the image of the military and return the armed forces to Polish society. Because of the extensive use of Polish armed forces in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, in suppressing strikers on the Baltic coast in December 1970, and in planning and implementing



martial law in 1980-81,<sup>1</sup> the military's reputation was tarnished in the population's estimation as well as in its own eyes.<sup>2</sup> To refurbish that image, the reform had to remove PUWP influence from the defense establishment and ensure that Polish military forces are sufficient to guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of Poland. In this part of reform, Poland has been somewhat more successful.

### **First Stage of Constitutional Reform (1988-June 1989)**

Not unlike the challenge in 1918, Poland's new Solidarity-led leadership took on an enormous problem without benefit of an established political structure. As Andrzej Korbonski has argued, when Poland reappeared after World War I (Poland had disappeared from the map of Europe in 1795), Poland's political leadership inherited empty political traditions. Having been formed from three different empires—German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian—and with no more than 60 percent of its population actually Polish, Poland was neither a state nor a nation. The Polish military also played different roles during the inter-war period under the Constitutions of 1921 and 1935.<sup>3</sup>

**Constitutional problems.** Many Poles perceived the system of government imposed by the Soviet Union and led by the Polish Communist government since World War II as contrary to the interests of Poland and its citizens. Although the 1952 Constitution guaranteed democratic rights, as Norman Davies has noted: "All chance of effective democracy was nullified by the extra-constitutional 'leading role' of the Party and its National Front as the 'guardian of the state'...the People's 'Democracy' was a legal fiction. The reality lay in the Party's dictatorship over the people."<sup>4</sup>


When Poland began serious reform, it became immediately apparent how hopelessly outdated its 1952 Constitution was. For example, Chapter 5, entitled "Supreme Organs of State Administration," gave Parliament the power to appoint the Council of Ministers—the Prime Minister, vice-premiers, and ministers—but did *not* provide for a president.<sup>5</sup> Only in April 1989, after two

months of round-table negotiations, did the Mieczyslaw Rakowski government (which was formed in September 1988) and the Lech Walesa-led Solidarity Union agree to restore Poland's second chamber of Parliament—the Senate—which had been abolished in 1946—with 100 members chosen in open and free elections and to liberalize voting regulations for 35 percent of the 460-seat Sejm. In

**Table 4.1 - Polish Defense Reform, 1988-91**

President (Jaruzelski 7/89),  
L. Walesa (12/90)

PM (W. Rakowski 9/88),  
T. Mazowiecki 8/89,  
J. Bielecki 1/91,  
J. Olszewski 12/91



return, Solidarity agreed to institute an office of the president with broad powers for foreign and security policy<sup>6</sup> (see Table 4.1 below).

According to the round-table agreement, 299 of the Sejm's 460 seats were reserved for the PUWP and subservient parties and 161 seats (35 percent) for the opposition. The newly created 100-seat Senate was to serve as a higher deliberative body with veto power over the Sejm (though a two-thirds vote of the Sejm could override the Senate's veto) and, together with the Sejm, to elect the president for a six-year term.<sup>7</sup>

**Defense Council (KOK).** During the Communist period, the Polish Defense Council (KOK) had been responsible for shaping the general guidelines of Poland's defense capabilities, but Poland had a pre-Communist history with such an organ of government. After the May 1926 coup, Marshal Pilsudski signed an executive order appointing a Committee for the Defense of the State to streamline his government. In fact, the ultimate supragovernmental agency to manage Poland's defense against Hitler's Germany was the Defense Committee of the Republic (KOR) created by Presidential decree of 12 May 1936.

Established in 1958 by a Council of Ministers' Resolution and accorded increased powers after 1967, the KOK subordinated the defense and interior ministries to the PUWP.<sup>8</sup> During the Martial Law period, the KOK flexed its power as state administrator by ordering the militarization of many enterprises and mobilization of employees after 13 December 1981.<sup>9</sup>

On 8 April 1989, a Constitutional amendment changed the Defense Council's role; it would no longer be a supragovernmental agency, but a collegial state organ, subordinate to the Parliament (the 460-seat Sejm and 100-seat Senate), working in the area of defense and national security and establishing general principles of national defense, including defense doctrine.<sup>10</sup> The KOK was now chaired by the President of the Republic, with the prime minister, the ministers of defense and foreign affairs as deputies. It also included the head of the President's Office, the

minister of finance, internal affairs, chief of the general staff and minister heading the office of the Council of Ministers.<sup>11</sup>

The 21 February 1990, Polish defense doctrine, now outdated because of the Warsaw Pact's demise, emphasized that the Polish president *and* Parliament control Poland's Armed Forces:

(T)he Superior of the Armed Forces is the President of the Polish Republic. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces...in wartime is appointed by the Sejm.

In the event of war an appropriate operational grouping remaining under national command and acting as part of the Combined Armed Forces...of the Warsaw Pact, is isolated from within the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic. The authorities of the Polish Republic...retain their influence on decisions affecting the use of that grouping in consonance with national interests.<sup>12</sup>

In sum, though this period witnessed a number of amendments to the 1952 Constitution resulting from round-table agreements, many problems remained. First, since 8 April 1989 Poland's president, not the PUWP secretary, has acted as the *de jure* National Command Authority (NCA)<sup>13</sup> and chaired the Defense Council, which became a collegial state organ subordinate to the parliament. Though the April 1989 arrangement initially did not change the *de facto* command situation because PUWP leader Wojciech Jaruzelski became Poland's president, the PUWP's power was curtailed on the Defense Council. (*De facto* control would finally change in December 1990 with Lech Walesa's election as president.) Second, since its emergence Solidarity advisers and leaders had little interest in military affairs. Hence, when they joined the 1988-89 round-table deliberations, they had little understanding of the military. Third, the Martial Law period also helped to contribute to another civil-military problem in that it afforded the middle generation of Polish officers—many who had now become

generals<sup>14</sup>—to oversee party secretaries, enterprise managers, and civil servants. Evidently many came to the conclusion that they were better than civilians at managing the government administration and the economy, and that society and politics can be governed by orders.<sup>15</sup>

### **Second Stage of Reform (June 1989-December 1990)**

**Parliament's revival.** The second stage began with the June 1989 elections, which resulted in a resounding Communist defeat. Solidarity won all of the 161 Sejm seats (35 percent) and 99 of the 100 Senate seats up for election. The PUWP was further humiliated on 19 July when its presidential candidate, Wojciech Jaruzelski, received the absolute *minimum* number of votes in the Parliament to be elected. After the appointment of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Poland's first non-Communist prime minister in August, Poland's Parliament began to exert greater political influence and authority and the Communist Party's disintegration began.

During December 1989 the new Sejm and Senate created separate constitutional committees to draft new versions of the entire charter. They also adopted on 29 December 1989 a Bill of Amendments to the Polish Constitution which restored the name "Republic of Poland" to the state and replaced the descriptive phrase "socialist state" with one describing Poland as a "democratic state." Many provisions of the 1952 Constitution were deleted; among them were those calling for protecting the achievements of socialism, concerning alliances and friendship and cooperation with the USSR, and the leading role of the PUWP.<sup>16</sup>

**Defense Ministry changes.** Concerned about oversight of the military, Solidarity sympathizers also created a number of *ad hoc* oversight bodies to remove the Communist Party's influence and ensure government control over the defense ministry during 1989-1990. First, they created a 15-person Home Defense Committee to oversee the defense ministry. Chaired by the president, it included the prime minister, the ministers of interior, finance, and defense,

and the speakers of the Sejm and Senate.<sup>17</sup>

Second, they created a Sejm Commission for Defense that supervised legislation pertinent to the military. Each of the 20 Sejm Commission members, including many non-communists, had the right to enter any military installation on demand.

Third, in September 1989 the Poles created a ministry of national defense (MON) Social Consultative Council, composed of all the political forces represented in the Sejm. The Council maintained advisory capacity and inspection authority, and supervised the social conditions within the military and the program of civic education.<sup>18</sup>

Fourth, on 11 December 1989 the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution establishing the Political Advisory Committee comprising seven to nine members of Parliament and a representative of the president. Members were appointed by the defense minister and subject to recall by the prime minister. The Political Advisory Committee examined issues and provided opinions and consultations on questions coming within the defense ministry's power. It was an advisory body without the authority to contradict the hierarchical command of the army.<sup>19</sup>

Finally, on 3 April 1990, Prime Minister Mazowiecki appointed Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz—two Solidarity intellectuals—to become Poland's *first* civilian deputy defense ministers, responsible for educational (formerly political) training within the armed forces and international military affairs respectively. Though this extremely important reform represented Poland's first attempt to provide direct civilian oversight over two sensitive areas of defense policy,<sup>20</sup> it would take the two appointees time to familiarize themselves with the personnel, structure, and informal arrangements within the military.

Between December 1989 and April 1990, Mazowiecki dismantled the Main Political Administration (MPA) and created a Central Education Board, which was to depoliticize the military. Deputy Defense Minister Komorowski took over the Central Education Board (renamed Department of Education) in April

1990, and assumed responsibility to depoliticize and supervise educational activities within the Polish Armed Forces. Onyszkiewicz retained responsibility for all defense ministry ties with the Warsaw Pact, which had maintained direct access to Polish forces through the then top-secret Statute. He also had responsibility for all other developing international military bilateral and multilateral ties, including those with the Soviet Northern Group of Forces (NGF) in Poland, Visegrad neighbors Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the WEU, and NATO.

Then, on 7 July 1990, Prime Minister Mazowiecki replaced Defense Minister Florian Siwicki with Vice-Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, an officer rumored to be unsympathetic to the USSR. Another important change occurred in October when General Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Stelmaszuk was the first Polish officer since World War II to hold the post who did *not* attend a Soviet staff college.<sup>21</sup>

Claiming "concern to prevent undesirable public sentiment [and to] promote democracy,"<sup>22</sup> President Jaruzelski, in the second year of his six-year term, notified the Sejm in September 1990 that he wanted to step down. Jaruzelski asked the Sejm to mandate presidential elections by universal vote, an act that required a change in Poland's Constitution.

In sum, the second reform period witnessed the disintegration of the Communist Party and was marked by efforts of the Mazowiecki government to revitalize what had been a moribund Parliament, to grasp the levers of control of the defense ministry and begin to think about military reform.

### **The Third Reform Stage (December 1990-October 1991)**

**Enhanced presidential powers.** The third stage in Poland's reform commenced with the 9 December 1990 presidential elections that brought Solidarity leader Lech Walesa to power. Walesa immediately launched a new phase of reform to strengthen the position of the executive by transferring powers from the still pre-

dominantly Communist Sejm to the president. Hence this stage was marked not just by increasing tensions between President Walesa and Jan Bielecki, who became Poland's second non-Communist prime minister in January 1991, but also between both houses of Parliament. Conflicts between the constitutional committees of the Communist-dominated Sejm and Solidarity-dominated Senate grew to the point that they broke off all contacts with each other.

With the apparent intention of enhancing the president's role in state affairs, Walesa reorganized the presidential staff of 200 into four secretariats and expanded its political department.<sup>23</sup> He then announced he would replace the Defense Council (KOK) with a new organ, the National Security Council (NSC), which the Sejm finally accepted at the end of 1991.<sup>24</sup> The president would be the Council's chairman, strikingly similar to his role in the KOK, the prime minister would be his first deputy, and the foreign affairs and defense ministers would act as deputies. In addition, the ministers of interior and finance and the head of the president's chancellery and office of prime minister were members.<sup>25</sup> To enhance Walesa's control, the President's Office—rather than the defense ministry—now financed the NSC.<sup>26</sup>

The 13 February 1991 inaugural NSC session assessed the security needs of interior and defense and discussed Polish-Soviet relations, focusing on the Soviet troop withdrawal from Poland.<sup>27</sup> On 22 May 1991, NSC director Lech Kaczynski noted that Walesa aimed to expand presidential and NSC powers by legislative means. Walesa sought the powers to appoint a commander in chief of the Armed Forces in times of war and to deploy Poland's Armed Forces not just during periods posed by a foreign threat.<sup>28</sup>

Walesa also created a National Security Bureau (BBN) to replace the Defense Council (KOK) Secretariat. The BBN prepares analyses and forecasts of Poland's internal and external situation, as well as new defense doctrine. In effect, the BBN, which employs between 75 and 85 people in four departments—military, defense systems, research, and legal and organizational<sup>29</sup>—enhanced



presidential authority in those areas ordinarily performed by the defense ministry. Also to provide expert advice, Walesa created an advisory body under the NSC Secretary that included the Polish Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of the Office for State Protection, the commander of the Border Guard, and the undersecretaries from the foreign affairs and finance ministries.<sup>30</sup>

**Parliamentary tensions.** Tensions were also increasingly evident between the President and Sejm and the Sejm and Senate. In April 1991, the (Solidarity-dominated) Senate constitutional committee presented its own draft constitution outlining an essentially presidential form of government. In September the (Communist-dominated) Sejm committee presented its draft, which envisaged a parliamentary system with the President acting as an arbiter rather than as a chief executive.<sup>31</sup> Increasingly frustrated with the Sejm, which still comprised 65 percent Communist membership, President Walesa wanted to acquire a non-Communist Parliamentary mandate for change and called for Sejm elections two and a half years *earlier* than originally planned!<sup>32</sup> Though Walesa's efforts initially met resistance, he prevailed and Poland held elections on 27 October 1991.

During the failed coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 Poland tested its emergency machinery. Though Walesa saw no need to convene the NSC during the crisis,<sup>33</sup> Prime Minister Jan Bielecki created a crisis cell to provide accurate information about unfolding events, increase cooperation between the government and President Walesa, and prepare responses to possible contingencies.<sup>34</sup> Because Poland was the only Central European country then still hosting Soviet troops within its borders, it issued a relatively mild censure of the USSR during the crisis.

**Defense Ministry reform.** In an effort to expand presidential authority in security affairs, in February 1991 Walesa and Bielecki announced plans to appoint a civilian defense minister,<sup>35</sup> as well as plans to restructure the defense ministry. They appointed Krzysztof Zabinski to set up an inter-ministerial reform commission comprised of four teams to: (1) transform the defense ministry

into a civilian body of state administration; (2) restructure the armed forces; (3) rationalize the defense industry; and (4) establish parliamentary oversight organizations.<sup>36</sup> According to Prime Minister Bielecki, the reform's aims were to improve the army's image and credibility, to put the defense ministry under civilian control, and to make the armed forces a separate, apolitical organization.<sup>37</sup>

On 11 March 1991, Deputy Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz outlined the defense reform concept to the inter-ministerial commission. To convert the ministry into a civilian organ of state administration, a civilian minister was needed to head the ministry aided by three civilian deputy ministers to handle administrative matters, leaving the Armed Forces to concentrate on combat readiness. Under the new plan, the president would appoint the military Inspector General/Chief of the General Staff (Chief of Staff) who would report directly to the defense minister. The reform intended that the separate administrative and command functions should stabilize the defense ministry because the chief of staff would not necessarily change with each new government and each new defense minister. Another intended reform was to reduce the number of career servicemen employed in the defense ministry from 3,000 to 1,500-2,000 and redistribute the excess to military units, thereby increasing the percentage of professionals in the forces.<sup>38</sup>

The 22 April 1991 session of the inter-ministerial commission for reforms agreed that the Polish Chief of Staff—General Inspector of the Armed Forces—would become the supreme commander of the armed forces in wartime. In early June, Chief of Staff Stelmaszuk announced the new organization of the General Staff. In peacetime, the Polish Chief of Staff would have three deputies: a first deputy for Strategic and Organizational Planning, a deputy for the Inspectorate of Training, and a deputy for the Inspectorate of Logistics. The General Staff consisted of 1,700 people, 1,200 career military and 500 civilians.<sup>39</sup> On 5 July 1991, Walesa announced that he intended to name Defense Minister Piotr

Kolodziejczyk the new General Inspector of the Armed Forces.<sup>40</sup>

According to the Zabinski Commission defense reform, which the KOK/NSC approved in July 1991, the defense ministry would have the following three civilian deputy defense ministers: (1) a deputy for educational affairs (formerly for social relations and education), responsible for setting educational and cultural policy within the armed forces and for organizing cooperation with the military chaplains' service; (2) a deputy for defense policy and planning, responsible for developing defense policy and a long-range concept for developing the Armed Forces to deal with Poland's external threats; and (3) a deputy for armaments and military infrastructure, responsible for the defense industry and for delivery, repair, and upgrading of weaponry and material.<sup>41</sup>

At the end of the third stage, Walesa and the Sejm were locked in a struggle over election procedures for Poland's first totally free Parliamentary elections scheduled for October 1991. Part of the bitter dispute involved designating the party affiliation of candidates; Walesa wanted Parliamentary candidates identified by name and party while Sejm Communists objected to party identification. On 21 June 1991 the Communist-controlled Sejm rejected the Solidarity-dominated Senate's amendments to the electoral procedures bill. When Walesa vetoed the Sejm's version, the Sejm overturned Walesa's veto. So the Communist-controlled Sejm dug in its heels and exerted its influence.

The legislative-executive confrontation involved the balance of power between the Sejm and the president. The Sejm's 46-member Extraordinary Constitutional Committee had drafted a new Polish Constitution to be considered by the newly elected Parliament. Article 49 of this draft considered the Sejm the "supreme organ [empowered] to make laws, to appoint other State organs and to control their activities."<sup>42</sup> The freely elected Senate draft Constitution supported a presidential form of government. Walesa saw the Sejm as an impediment to his power and wanted its members removed.

### **The Fourth Reform Stage (October 1991-September 1993)**

The fourth stage in Poland's reform commenced with the 27 October 1991 elections of the entire Sejm and Senate, which unfortunately resulted in an extremely fragmented government. Of the 69 political groups participating, 29 won representation in the 460-seat Sejm.

The Democratic Union, 62 seats;  
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD—former Communists), 60;  
Catholic Electoral Action, 49;  
Polish Peasant Party (PSL—former allies of Communists), 48;  
Confederation for Independent Poland, 46;  
Center Alliance, 44;  
Liberal Democratic Congress, 37;  
Peasant Accord, 28;  
Solidarity Trade Union, 27;  
Polish Friends of Beer Party, 16.  
Eleven parties won one seat each.<sup>43</sup>


**Tensions between President and government.** Now totally elected democratically, the new Parliament's coalition government led by Prime Minister Jan Olszewski brought new legitimate tensions between presidential and prime ministerial authority, tensions exacerbated by ambiguities resulting from the absence of a valid Constitution and by the new, fully legitimate but heavily fragmented and weak coalition government seeking to exercise its authority (see Table 4.2 below).

The two draft constitutions were set aside and the new parliament started the drafting process all over again. The crucial difficulty was in constructing a working majority coalition in a parliament fragmented by 29 different parties to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority vote of both houses.

Without a new constitution, Walesa continued to press his executive powers to the limit. On 31 December 1991, he published

a decree outlining the composition and functions of the NSC, which became the forum for exerting and expanding presidential control over defense and security policy. Walesa chaired the Council, the first deputy chairman was Premier Olszewski, and the two deputy chairmen were Defense Minister Jan Parys and BBN chief Jerzy Milewski. Other NSC members included the Sejm and Senate speakers, the foreign, interior and finance ministers, the Chief of Staff, and one of the secretaries of state in the President's chancellery. While the NSC was to consider matters

**Table 4.2 - Olszewski Defense Reform, 1992**



relating to national security (including defense, public security and order, and security of citizens), the BBN was tasked with identifying threats to national security and presenting solutions to eliminate them.<sup>44</sup>

When Jan Parys became the first civilian defense minister in late December 1991, he fired the government's opening salvo challenging Walesa's authority as constitutional head of the Armed Forces. In a move apparently not coordinated with the president, on 31 December 1991 Parys announced major defense ministry house cleaning and reform, adding that he would retire Piotr Kolodziejczyk rather than make him the new Inspector General as Walesa had earlier announced.<sup>45</sup> In early February, Parys added that he would *not* appoint an Inspector General unless "Parliament amend[ed] the Constitution."<sup>46</sup> Parys then dismissed Deputy Defense Minister Komorowski and named Romuald Szeremietiew to replace him.<sup>47</sup> On 11 February, Deputy Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz resigned<sup>48</sup> and Jan Parys named Radek Sikorski—a British subject—to replace him.<sup>49</sup> This appointment was particularly disruptive to the military, who feared that Sikorski would leak secrets to the West. In sum, many military officers were reinforced in the view that civilians were unfit for directing national defense, and military secrets should be kept from them.

As 1992 opened, it was clear that presidential authority over defense and security affairs was steaming a collision course with the government. Taking the offensive in January 1992, BBN director Jerzy Milewski argued that the president's authority over defense and security matters had to be expanded because the president was constitutionally responsible for these matters. Milewski pointed out that, while the civilian defense minister should be concerned with running the army, the president needed:

greater authority at the army command level...during peacetime...[to include] the shape of the armed forces, whether they are to be divisions or corps, how they are to be deployed, and what their combat parameters should

be...[and] to expand the range of general officer positions directly appointed by the president.<sup>50</sup>

These conflicting views led to a crisis over competing interpretations of presidential and defense ministerial authority as well as over policy and personality differences. It ended with the resignation of the new (and first) civilian defense minister, exacerbated Polish civil-military relations, and brought the collapse of the new, though weak, government coalition. The powers of the president, prime minister, defense minister, and Parliament still need to be clarified; until a valid constitution is adopted, Polish defense reform can not be achieved.

Between 19-24 March 1992 the Sejm deliberated on the ways and means of preparing and adopting a new constitution; they finally decided that the Parliament's Constitutional Commission would first adopt a constitution which would then be ratified by national referendum.<sup>51</sup> The arrangement was that over a six-month period the president, the 56 parliamentary members (46 Sejm and 10 Senate) of the Constitutional Committee, or the Cabinet could submit drafts to the Parliament's Constitutional Commission.<sup>52</sup> The draft of the Small Constitution required a two-thirds vote of both houses of the National Parliament, followed by a national referendum.

Unfortunately before the Small Constitution's completion, the debate on relations between the Sejm and Senate, president and prime minister, and Sejm and president erupted into a political crisis on 6 April 1992 when Defense Minister Parys alleged that the president's office had been planning new martial law contingencies,<sup>53</sup> had illegally intervened in defense ministry affairs, and that President Walesa had sought the support of Silesian Military District Commander, General Tadeusz Wilecki by offering him General Stelmazuk's position as Chief of Staff in return for supporting the military's direct subordination to the President.<sup>54</sup>

On 7 April, Prime Minister Olszewski placed Defense Minister Parys on extended leave, and Romuald Szeremietiew became act-

ing defense minister. On 25 April, the Sejm established an eight-member commission to examine Jan Parys' allegations.<sup>55</sup> After the Sejm commission concluded that Parys' allegations about politicians involving the Army in party games were "unfounded and detrimental to the state's interests,"<sup>56</sup> Parys resigned. President Walesa then asked Parliament to replace Olszewski (on 26 May) and the Olszewski government fell.

On 5 June 1992, the Sejm voted 273 to 119 for Prime Minister Olszewski's resignation and 263 to 149 for Waldemar Pawlak of the PSL to form a government. When Janusz Onyszkiewicz became acting defense minister, he replaced Radek Sikorski as deputy defense minister and pledged to "restore good cooperation with the presidential office and the foreign ministry."<sup>57</sup> This cooperation was made evident when Onyszkiewicz and Jerzy Milewski announced on 26 June that they would implement the 1991 defense ministry reform, which included creating the post of General Inspector of the Armed Forces.<sup>58</sup>


After a month of failed attempts by Pawlak to form a coalition government, Hanna Suchocka became prime minister on 10 July. Suchocka retained Onyszkiewicz as defense minister and announced that the defense reform would continue, that the military command would be separated from the civilian administration, and that the general staff would be streamlined (see Table 4.3 below).<sup>59</sup> While Onyszkiewicz implemented the defense ministry reform recommended by the Zabinski Commission, he noted that, though the civilian defense ministry would employ civilians, in the foreseeable future "most employees [would] be military personnel, but work as civilians; that is, they [would] have no power to issue orders for the armed forces."<sup>60</sup>

Better relations between the president and government were reflected on 5 August when President Walesa named General Tadeusz Wilecki as the new Chief of General Staff.<sup>61</sup> Then Wilecki transferred military district commanders to the General Staff and appointed trusted colleagues to key posts in all the reorganized military districts: Maj. Gen. Tadeusz Bazydło to the Pomeranian



MD, Maj. Gen. Julian Lewinski to the Warsaw MD, Maj. Gen. Janusz Ornatowski to the Silesian MD, and Maj. Gen. Zenon Bryk to the new Krakow MD.<sup>62</sup>

On 22 October 1992, Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz signed an order that restricted his activities to political management of the defense ministry and put the general staff in charge of strictly military matters. The defense ministry now had three departments



headed by deputy ministers: training (Bronislaw Komorowski), strategy (Przemyslaw Grudzinski), and military infrastructure (Jan Kuriata). Military intelligence and military courts answered directly to the defense minister.<sup>63</sup> The civilian-military management of the ministry became a fact.

While new Chief of General Staff Wilecki accepted this division, he apparently expected the defense ministry would support the military by seeking funding and more favorable legal regulations. When it became clear that the defense ministry would not become an instrument to serve the needs of the General Staff, misunderstandings and clashes ensued.

Though for the moment the new government seemed to resolve the Olszewski civil military crisis, Onyszkiewicz's predecessor Romuald Szeremetiew correctly criticized the 22 October 1992 reform, arguing that the Polish Chief of Staff had "enormous powers...[adding that the Chief of Staff] has been granted additional powers by the president, so that he can now effectively bypass the defense minister in military matters."<sup>64</sup>

**Constitutional developments.** During this period, significant advances also occurred on the Constitutional front. On 1 August the Sejm mustered a two-thirds vote to adopt a Small Constitution that introduced a provisional presidential-parliamentary system defining relations between the legislative and executive branches of government.<sup>65</sup> On 10 September, the Senate voted not to reject the Small Constitution, and on 17 November 1992, Walesa signed the "Constitutional Act on Mutual Relations Between the Legislative and the Executive of the Republic of Poland."

The so-called Small Constitution voided the often amended 1952 Stalinist Constitution. The basic law set up a framework similar in many respects to the parliamentary model of Germany, although it gave the president many more powers. Elected in general elections (Article 29.2), the President has a veto requiring a two-thirds Sejm vote for override, has the right to approve all top military appointments, is the commander of the armed forces, and

has authority to introduce martial law and declare a state of emergency (Articles 36.1 and 37.1).<sup>66</sup>

The Small Constitution, though, divides executive powers between the president and the cabinet. After Sejm elections, the president designates the prime minister, who appoints the government, which, in turn, must get a Sejm vote of confidence. The president cannot recall the government, and the prime minister must consult with the president on the choice of foreign, interior, and defense ministers. The Cabinet is responsible only to the Sejm, and only the Sejm can dismiss it.<sup>67</sup> In sum, Poland's adoption of the Small Constitution created new rules for dividing power between the legislative and executive, enhanced the powers of the Cabinet, and symbolically abrogated the 1952 Constitution.<sup>68</sup>

When the Small Constitution came into effect on December 8, 1992, it was designed as a provisional measure until a full constitution could be written, enacted by the Parliament, and ratified in a national referendum. In October 1992, the Sejm and Senate held elections to the joint Constitutional Committee of the Parliament comprising 46 Sejm deputies and 10 Senators—representing all the major parties—to begin work on the constitution. Because of broad ideological differences within the committee, its leaders decided not to draft a new constitution themselves, but wait six months for drafts to be submitted to them.

Two months later, in December, Walesa submitted to the Sejm a draft of a 49-article Bill of Rights and Freedoms to be passed as a constitutional law. By the Constitutional Committee's 30 April 1993 deadline, seven draft constitutions had been submitted.<sup>69</sup> The task was to synthesize them into a coherent whole. Unfortunately, before significant progress could be made the Suchocka government lost a parliamentary vote of no confidence. On 28 May, President Walesa dissolved the parliament and empowered the government to act as caretaker until new elections could be held. As a result, all constitutional drafts had to be submitted to the new Constitutional Committee after the elections that were called for on 19 September.<sup>70</sup>

Civil-military issues continued to fester. On 26 February 1993 President Walesa asked the KOK to examine amendments to the law on the common duty to defend Poland and to discuss plans to form a National Guard of 22,000 soldiers subordinate to the President by the year 2000. The formation would come from the 11,000-man special Vistula division under the control of the interior ministry. The bill envisioned liquidating the KOK and establishing the National Security Council, which would be the president's advisory body; it also sanctioned the division of the defense ministry into civil and military departments. The Sejm Defense Committee was on record as objecting to the National Guard, claiming that it could not control it.<sup>71</sup> The deep-seated issue, though, was that of the president's authority versus the government's authority to call-up armed forces.

On 26 March 1993, Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz told the Sejm Defense Committee that the restructuring of the Polish Army and the General Staff was complete enough that now "We are talking about adjusting the structure of troop deployments to new strategic concepts."<sup>72</sup> Elaborating further, he said the ministry planned to redeploy its military forces so that 55 percent (rather than 75 percent) would be in western Poland and 45 percent in the east by the end of 1995 despite the absence of suitable infrastructure there.

Onyszkiewicz also noted that during the next few years the Polish Army would be restructured along NATO lines and that the outdated army-division structure would be replaced by a division-brigade structure. Each division would comprise three brigades—two of them "empty" (filled only on mobilization) with the third fully manned and capable of entering combat within 24 hours. Each brigade would consist of 2,000 to 5,000 men equipped with the most modern equipment of Polish manufacture.<sup>73</sup> The pilot district for the structural reforms was to be the newly-created Krakow Military District (MD), which would have two assault landing brigades; each of the other three MDs would have one rapid-response unit. The Krakow MD's Sixth Assault Commando

Brigade would become the embryo of the so-called Rapid Deployment Forces.

During the first three months of 1993, the defense ministry and General Staff reorganization was completed. Separate financial and personnel services within the defense ministry and General Staff were abandoned, and departments serving both were integrated. Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz noted that adding civilians to the defense ministry would be slow, that he needed expertise, that the military held most of the defense ministry executive posts, and "there are not many civilian counterpart experts."<sup>74</sup> Deputy Defense Minister for Logistics and Armaments Jan Kuriata set up his department, which is responsible for research and development, arms procurement, and maintenance of infrastructure, rather quickly. Kuriata, though, complained that it was difficult to set up this department and separate jurisdictions with the General Staff's Inspectorate for Logistics because "We were creating new structures not known to the defense ministry before."<sup>75</sup> Thus began the defense ministry's efforts to acquire planning and management functions in conjunction with the General Staff.

**NATO relations.** The basic principles of Poland's defense strategy to achieve membership in NATO were established in the document "The Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland" signed in November 1992.<sup>76</sup> Shortly after the second meeting of NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council (December 1992), Onyszkiewicz noted that Poland's "participation in peacekeeping operations is of fundamental importance for bringing military integration closer."<sup>77</sup> (Poland has maintained a 945-soldier peacekeeping battalion in Croatia since March 1992.) In a 28 May 1993 interview on Poland's prospects for joining NATO, Onyszkiewicz further noted, "I believe that there are no doubts about that. The question is only when and what kind of process that would be."<sup>78</sup>

The issue of Poland's joining NATO became a major one when Boris Yeltsin visited Warsaw on 25-26 August 1993. The ensuing joint declaration agreed that the last Russian troops would leave

Poland on 1 October (not 31 December) 1994. In fact, the closing ceremony, which bade farewell to the last Russian servicemen, occurred on 17 September,<sup>79</sup> coincided with the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939, and was two days before the Polish elections. In addition, at the close of his visit, Yeltsin said in a press conference that he understood Poland's desire to join NATO, that it was Poland's sovereign decision, and that taking part in the pan-European integration was not against the Russian interest.<sup>80</sup> Onyszkiewicz publicly noted that Poland's admission to NATO "is almost inevitable."<sup>81</sup> Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka added that "[A] decision on membership and a timetable for Poland's acceptance ought to be taken at the Winter NATO meeting [January 1994 Brussels Summit]...[adding that] if NATO fails to respond to these calls...this would be a failure of the effectiveness of the Western security system."<sup>82</sup>

Problems continued, however. On 15 September, Russia's ambassador to Poland Yuri Kashlev told reporters that Russia's stance on Polish membership in NATO had been "oversimplified and misunderstood...[that the Russian-Polish joint declaration refers to] eventual NATO membership in the larger process of European integration [and suggested that the Alliance would first evolve into CSCE's military arm]."<sup>83</sup>

In letters to the heads of Western states (France, Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States), Yeltsin expressed anxiety over plans for NATO's expansion. This led to a great debate within the Alliance and to the 21 October meeting of NATO defense ministers at Travemunde, Germany, where the issue of membership was deferred and the "Partnership For Peace" (PFP) program endorsed for the forthcoming January 1994 NATO summit. Central Europeans initially interpreted PFP as a NATO effort to placate Russia, derisively referring to it as a "Policy For Postponement."

During the October 1993 crisis in Russia, though a Polish inter-agency team was set up, Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz worried that "the situation is different now."<sup>84</sup> He contrasted the 1993 situ-

ation to 1991, when Poland shared a common border with the Soviet Union, Soviet troops were on Polish soil, and Poland was threatened with a wave of refugees. In response to fragmentary accounts of Russia's new defense doctrine that claimed Poland was bolstering its eastern border with troops, Onyszkiewicz denied the charge, adding that evenly distributed forces made good sense defensively.<sup>85</sup>

In referring to the forthcoming elections, Onyszkiewicz stressed that the Army was apolitical and that every serviceman had the right to run in the elections on the ticket of any party<sup>86</sup> but outside of areas administered by the Army.<sup>87</sup> As the campaign heated up, there were numerous allegations that soldiers violated the election rules against campaigning in military units and garrisons. When Onyszkiewicz threatened to start disciplinary action, the Army backed down.<sup>88</sup>

At the end of the fourth stage, the ambiguity and differences in interpretation over command and control that caused the downfall of Poland's first civilian defense minister and government of Jan Olszewski continued to be embedded in the Small Constitution. Although Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz brought new cooperation between the government and president, and began defense ministry efforts to establish oversight of the military, his efforts were frustrated by the General Staff.

### **The Fifth Reform Stage (September 1993-December 1995)**

Poland's fifth reform stage began with the 19 September 1993 Parliamentary election, which brought a bitter setback for the parties that descended from Solidarity and resulted in the return of former Communists to power. Of the 460-seat Sejm, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), dominated by former Communists, won a clear plurality of 20.5 percent and 171 seats. A former satellite party of Communists, the Polish Peasant Alliance (PSL) finished second with 15.4 percent and 132 seats. The Democratic Union (DU), the party of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronislaw Geremek, Jacek

Kuron, and Hanna Suchocka ran a distant third with 10.6 percent of the vote and 74 Sejm seats.<sup>89</sup> On 26 October a coalition of the SLD-PSL parties, with 36 percent of the vote and 303 (66 percent) of the Sejm seats, chose Waldemar Pawlak of the PSL as prime minister. In the 100-seat Senate the SLD won 37 seats and the PSL, 36.

One of the significant differences in Poland's 1991 and 1993 elections was the change in proportional representation. Poland's 1991 electoral system, with its low electoral threshold and large electoral districts, had produced no fewer than 29 different parties in the Sejm; none received more than 13 percent of the vote. In contrast, Poland's new 15 April 1993 electoral law established thresholds of 5 percent for single parties and 8 percent for coalitions. Hence, the new electoral law succeeded in producing a less politically fragmented Sejm in 1993, since only six parties or coalitions managed to win seats.

Poland's extreme proportional representation did produce a rapid succession of cabinets; from December 1991 to September 1993 it had 4 premiers and governing coalitions. Protracted parliamentary infighting and prolonged executive vacancies were the rule, spelling institutional uncertainty. In contrast, the 1993 elections produced a coalition government of 2 (not 6) parties. But the new electoral system also facilitated the return of former Communists to power and left almost 35 percent of the voters (mostly right-of-center) with no representation in parliament.

**Constitutional developments.** The new electoral system also further politicized and complicated the constitution-making process. Soon after the election, the Parliament formed a new Constitutional Committee. It again consisted of 46 deputies and 10 senators, the majority of whom had entered Parliament for the first time. At its first meeting, the Committee elected as chairman Aleksander Kwasniewski, one of the PUWP negotiators during the round-table talks in February-April 1989 and leader of the post-Communist SLD. Soon after the Constitutional Committee started its work, right-wing leaders questioned its legitimacy and created



an extraparliamentary Constitutional Committee of the Right. In sum, the electoral rules which were used to get a stable cabinet supported by a clear parliamentary majority were insufficient to create a broad-based constitutional assembly.

In January 1994, the Constitutional Committee decided to invite members of political parties, churches, unions, and other organizations to express their opinions. The selection process continued through February and the major parties of the right announced that they would not participate. On 31 January President Walesa proposed that any group of 100,000 citizens should be able to submit a draft constitution and have a representative on the Constitutional Commission, but without voting rights. In an unprecedented act, the Sejm rejected Walesa's proposal (on 18 February) on first reading. Insulted, Walesa left the Parliament and withdrew his draft constitution and his representative from the Constitutional Committee. Kwasniewski claimed that Walesa's actions marked the opening of the presidential campaign.

To moderate the charged political atmosphere, on 25 March the Sejm changed the Constitutional Committee's mandate by endorsing the idea that any group of 500,000 could present a constitutional draft and directing the Constitutional Committee to consider all seven drafts submitted to the 1989-1991 Parliament. When the Senate accepted these changes in early April, so did the President. Then Kwasniewski announced his intention to have the Parliament adopt the Constitution and submit it to public referendum by the end of spring 1995, so that the fall 1995 presidential elections could be held under the new law.<sup>90</sup>

By 20-21 June 1994 six draft constitutions were presented to the Constitutional Committee. On 5 September, the "Solidarity" labor union submitted its own draft signed by nearly one million citizens. On 21-23 September the combined Sejm and Senate preliminarily accepted all seven drafts and sent them to the Constitutional Committee, which was to prepare a constitutional debate then write a unified draft for Parliament's consideration. But problems

immediately developed with Solidarity and with the Catholic Church. The presidential campaign also threatened the constitution-making process.


**Renewed government-presidential problems.** Under Article 61 of the Small Constitution, Prime Minister Pawlak is required to consult with President Walesa regarding the appointment of the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and interior. The coalition, however, had allowed Walesa to make these appointments on his own. Paradoxically, the results of the September 1993 election—namely the reduction in the number of political parties, the triumph of the post-Communist parties, the relative weakness of the center and the elimination of the right wing—enabled Walesa to preserve his strong position.

When Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak began building his government, the three "presidential" ministries of defense, foreign affairs and interior were slated to be assigned to candidates loyal to President Walesa. Defense went to Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, who had already served as defense minister in Poland's first two Solidarity governments before civilians Jan Parys and Janusz Onyszkiewicz. Upon assuming office, Kolodziejczyk said that he was a "civilian minister and would...set an example of how a civilian minister of national defense should work."<sup>91</sup>

Kolodziejczyk noted that the most urgent issue for the Sejm was the new Law on General Defense Duties, which would result in a precise distribution of powers in controlling the state's defense matters. This law would require drafting provisions concerning national security and defense in the new Constitution. The Universal Military Training Act also needed amending regarding identifying the government agencies responsibilities and powers, identifying emergency powers, resolving the question of establishing a National Guard, and developing appropriate legislation for modernization of the national defense system.<sup>92</sup> Kolodziejczyk added that before he accepted his present position, Premier Waldemar Pawlak had committed to back him on this project as a condition of accepting the job (see Table 4.4 below).

On 8-9 November, the entire national security leadership attended a meeting dealing with security and defense. Chief of Staff Wilecki noted that there was an urgent need to define the powers of the bodies that control the Army and to distinguish between the powers of the defense ministry and the General Staff. Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk noted that there was an urgent need to define by law the functioning of the defense ministry and

**Table 4.4 - Pawlak Defense Reform, 1993**



create a clear demarcation between the powers of the General Staff and civilian components. He added that the Armed Forces could not be restructured without a guarantee of necessary resources, nor could Poland join NATO without adequate outlays to cover the costs to modernize the Army.<sup>93</sup> In testimony to the Sejm Defense Committee, Kolodziejczyk suggested that, because relocating troops to the east would require "colossal expenses," it would be better to construct mobile forces.<sup>94</sup> This marked an apparent shift from his predecessor's policy.

At a 17 November press conference, Kolodziejczyk announced three defense ministry changes: (1) Jerzy Milewski, head of the National Security Bureau, would assume a second hat as first deputy defense minister, taking over the tasks of both Grudzinski and Komorowski (ceding the civilian Department of Education back to the military),<sup>95</sup> to "improve cooperation between the defense ministry and the Office of National Security, as well as between Belvedere and the government."<sup>96</sup> With Milewski holding both positions, Kolodziejczyk hoped to avoid duplicate functions in the Army and National Security Office.<sup>97</sup> (2) The size of the defense ministry would be reduced to make it more efficient. (3) Those areas of responsibility that have a bearing on the functioning of the armed forces would be transferred to the General Staff. Not only would the General Staff now consist of four inspectorates: training, logistics, strategic planning, and organization/mobilization, it would also include special services (intelligence and counterintelligence).<sup>98</sup>

Concern about civilian control of the military remained evident when Jerzy Milewski defended the changes in the defense ministry by claiming they would preserve civilian control over the armed forces. Milewski argued that the defense ministry was not ceding control to the General Staff, that the changes were "corrections in the organizational structure" designed to more precisely define tasks and reduce the excessively large administration. He also added that the lack of civilian experts meant that the defense ministry departments would have to employ the military.<sup>99</sup>

On the same day Walesa, Pawlak, Kolodziejczyk, Wilecki and Milewski met to discuss coordinating actions between the president, prime minister, KOK, Council of Ministers and defense ministry.<sup>100</sup> The problem was the need to clarify problems created by existing laws. While the Small Constitution (Article 34) claims the president exercises general leadership in Poland's internal and external security and defines the NSC as his advisory body in security and defense, it does not define how he does this nor how the NSC relates to the KOK. In addition, the Law on the Popular Defense Obligation continues to include the KOK, a legacy of the Communist period. Though the Law states the KOK is the appropriate organ to discuss defense and security, it does not explain how this is to occur in practice.

On 26 November, Walesa then chaired a meeting of the KOK which decided to reorganize itself into the NSC to be the highest organ responsible for defense and security and headed by the president. Once the NSC starts functioning, a government Committee for Defense Affairs (KSORM), headed by the prime minister, would be responsible to execute the NSC's decisions. Since this change would require legislative changes, including constitutional provisions, the KOK asked the government to start the process.<sup>101</sup> But the KOK continued to operate in the absence of constitutional provisions for an NSC.

By the end of January 1994, Kolodziejczyk expressed frustration with "new problems which I can not understand at all"<sup>102</sup> regarding the evolution of security institutions. He argued that the Sejm needed to adopt appropriate constitutional and legal provisions to define the scope of the president's and prime minister's authority. Kolodziejczyk believed that it had been earlier agreed that the NSC would be the instrument where the president could influence the government's activities in the area of defense and that the prime minister should form a Committee of Defense Affairs (from the government's representatives in the NSC) to submit proposals to the Council of Ministers and develop legislation for the Parliament. In addition, it was necessary to amend the

Small Constitution and the Law on General Duty of Defense of the Republic to very precisely divide powers between the civilian defense minister and the General Staff. Kolodziejczyk had hoped that the prepared bills would be submitted to the Sejm in January, but the reform stalled.

Another issue that also tested presidential versus prime ministerial power was Pawlak's desire to introduce deputy ministers from the Polish Peasant Alliance (PSL) and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) to the three presidential ministries. The coalition government had permitted Walesa to choose the defense minister, but then it saw Kolodziejczyk's expansion of Milewski's duties as an attempt to prevent the coalition from gaining access and influence in the defense ministry.<sup>103</sup>

Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk initially threatened to resign if the coalition introduced a political deputy minister in his ministry.<sup>104</sup> As pressure increased, he conceded that he was "open to the coalition's choice of vice minister [but] not a political commissar. I need a man who will be well briefed for the job in substantive terms."<sup>105</sup> In the end, a compromise was struck. The coalition put forth Danuta Waniek, an SLD Sejm deputy to be a deputy defense minister with responsibility to be the ministry's liaison with Parliament.<sup>106</sup>

Kolodziejczyk's frustration with the Parliament continued although he had been promised increases in the defense budget, the Parliament *decreased* defense funding and mandated the ministry to spend 300 billion zlotys for Polish Irydia aircraft for the Army. Preferring to spend the money for Huzar helicopters for the restructured armed forces, the defense minister explained: "If the defense minister is supposed to bear constitutional responsibility for the Armed Forces' readiness....one must not tie his hands with decisions on where and how money should be spent because this way one will not succeed in making anything that would make sense...Under the situation that has emerged, I will submit a complaint before the Constitutional Tribunal."<sup>107</sup>

**Creating a Committee for Defense Affairs (KSORM).** Finally,

on 12 April 1994, the government decided to set up a Committee for Defense Affairs chaired by the prime minister, with defense minister as deputy, attached to the Council of Ministers (KSORM). Kolodziejczyk hoped that this committee would reform the Army command structures to bring them closer to European standards and to put in order the legal foundations for the functioning of the ministry and the Army.<sup>108</sup>

To a closed cabinet session on 4 May, Kolodziejczyk presented a document—"Defense Problems and Military Aspects of the Polish Republic's Security Policies"—that described plans to create a military post of Supreme Commander who would bear constitutional responsibility for strictly military issues such as training, mobilization, and operational planning (which was then under the defense minister's purview). The document presented two supervision options for consideration: the commander would report either to the president or the defense minister. The draft also envisioned creating a National Guard, but subordinate to the defense minister and not the president.<sup>109</sup>

On 19 May 1994, Prime Minister Pawlak presided over the first session of the Council of Ministers Committee for Defense Affairs (KSORM) to review Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk's document on basic defense problems. First, on the issue of organizational changes in the Army, it proposed that the three types of forces—land, naval, and air—would be subordinated to the Chief of Staff, whose title would be changed to General Inspector of the Armed Forces. He, in turn, would be subordinate to the defense minister. This organization would require no changes to the Small Constitution. Second, it agreed to set up a crisis group to monitor threats to national security. Kolodziejczyk noted that the greatest threat to Poland's security was the Russian troop concentration in the Kaliningrad salient. Third, Kolodziejczyk presented a report that assessed the technical condition of the Army as "dangerous" and called for greater budget commitments.<sup>110</sup>

When the government cabinet began to debate the revisions to the military command structure on 24 May, President Walesa

convinced the government to submit the reform plan first to the KOK—which he chairs and sees as the chief body for defense matters—before taking action. Walesa opposed subordinating the General Inspector of the Armed Forces to the defense minister, placing him in direct conflict with Kolodziejczyk.<sup>111</sup> The issue was so fractious that when the KOK met on 7 June, it was unable to reach agreement on which governmental body had constitutional authority over the chief of General Staff.<sup>112</sup>

A few days later, Poland's civil-military relations were further tarnished when defense ministry spokesman Colonel Wieslaw Rozbicki wrote in *Gazeta Wyborcza* that Poland should not have signed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) because it weakened the country and that shifting the Military Information Service (WSI [intelligence and counterintelligence]) from the ministry's civilian structures to the General Staff was good, because it was "better for national security if a civilian minister does not have full information provided by WSI."<sup>113</sup> Kolodziejczyk fired Rozbicki.

**The Drawsko Affair.** In mid-June 1994 Jerzy Milewski resigned his position as head of the BBN, though he retained his first deputy defense ministry portfolio, and President Walesa named Henryk Goryszewski to the post.<sup>114</sup> When the KOK met on 22 June, it recommended the document "Fundamental Problems of the Polish Defense System" to the Council of Ministers. This document was similar to Kolodziejczyk's earlier document with one significant exception; it omitted the contentious issue of to whom to subordinate the General Staff.<sup>115</sup>

Open conflict over civil-military relations erupted between the president and the government at a 30 September 1994 meeting of military cadres at Drawsko Pomorskie training grounds. Chief of Staff Wilecki, who had been offered the chief of staff position without Defense Minister Jan Parys' knowledge in March 1992,<sup>116</sup> supported President Walesa's position to have the General Staff subordinated to the president rather than the defense minister, and he refused to support the defense minister when President Walesa polled the general officers on Kolodziejczyk's competence.



When the issue was investigated by the Sejm Defense Committee, General Wilecki, when asked about carrying out orders of the civilian defense minister, said: "I always have, and will continue to do so." Kolodziejczyk countered, "I reject this statement. I will present to a special commission those cases in which General Wilecki did not carry out my orders." In response to the question whether President Walesa asked the generals at Drawsko to vote for or against Kolodziejczyk, Wilecki said: "I do not think there was a vote." Kolodziejczyk countered: "The president ordered a vote [on the question should the defense minister be dismissed]. All hands except two went up."<sup>117</sup> Later in a letter, Walesa admitted that after he asked the generals about reforms within the army at Drawsko, he decided to make personnel changes and ask Kolodziejczyk to resign.

In an interview after the incident, former Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz charged that the General Staff supports presidential control. He offered as evidence his own experience (after the 1993 elections when parliament had been dissolved) of having various orders that he had issued as defense minister "either blocked or slowed [by the General Staff]. It was stalling for time."<sup>118</sup> Onyszkiewicz urged the prime minister to reject the idea of Kolodziejczyk's possible resignation because it would indicate that the armed forces had successfully exerted influence on the appointment of the defense minister and thus were politicized.<sup>119</sup> In other words, at Drawsko the Army appropriated the powers of Parliament when they voted to recall the minister.

When Walesa asked Kolodziejczyk to tender his resignation, the defense minister, after talking with Prime Minister Pawlak and Sejm Defense Committee members, initially refused.<sup>120</sup> On 12 October, he explained that the importance of the issue at stake (civilian control over the Army) required his standing fast until the investigation of the Drawsko case was completed.<sup>121</sup> Allegedly, Kolodziejczyk provided evidence of instances of military insubordination to include:

- the Silesian Military Commander (General Ornatowski)'s letter to the President critical of civilian defense ministry oversight
- the establishment of a special Inspection Team on the General Staff (to replace the defense ministry Control Department) without his consent
- the General Staff's refusal to turn over the Conference Center in Warsaw to the ministry
- the exclusion of civilian defense ministry officials from military ceremonies in military units.<sup>122</sup>

On 27 October, in the midst of this crisis, Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski resigned over charges that he had broken the law for receiving subsidiary income.<sup>123</sup> When Pawlak asked the Constitutional Court for a decision, Olechowski suspended his resignation.

At the same time, the KOK approved a bill for submission to the Sejm that attempted to clarify the conflict. According to the bill, the president would exercise authority through the defense minister in peacetime on political and administrative matters, but through the General Staff on command matters in peacetime and through the commander-in-chief during war.<sup>124</sup>

On 4 November, the Sejm Defense Committee chairman Jerzy Szmajdzinski announced that the Committee had approved a report on the Drawsko affair by a vote of 18 to 6—a report criticizing all of the sides involved in the dispute. It concluded that, despite discrepancies in individual accounts, the generals at Drawsko had not disobeyed Kolodziejczyk, but they did criticize him and the ministry. Though the report also criticized some aspects of the functioning of the defense ministry and expressed concern about "autonomy of the military command structures," it did not see sufficient grounds for Kolodziejczyk's resignation.<sup>125</sup> The report criticized President Walesa for "violating civilian and democratic control over the military,"<sup>126</sup> adding he should exercise control through the government and the defense minister. Former Deputy Defense Minister and Sejm deputy Bronislaw Komorow-

ski concluded that the Drawsko affair "was very disquieting. It has not assumed the nature of a military coup, but this does not mean its seriousness should be underestimated."<sup>127</sup>

During the next month the tug of war continued. On 8 November the president refused to meet with the defense minister, claiming he had lost confidence in Kolodziejczyk.<sup>128</sup> Then when Kolodziejczyk proposed a list of candidates for military promotion (only the defense minister has the right to suggest candidates), Walesa rejected six of the candidates who were in the civilian defense ministry. Finally, on 10 November Walesa, acting on a request from Prime Minister Pawlak, dismissed Kołodziejczyk for failing to "implement KOK decisions" regarding normalizing the situation in the defense ministry,<sup>129</sup> and Jerzy Milewski became acting defense minister. Looking back at his experience, Kołodziejczyk concluded that the Parliament had "very little effectiveness in reforming the law."<sup>130</sup>

On 30 November, the Sejm Defense Committee approved a defense budget for 1995 of 51.3 trillion zlotys (\$2.4 billion), higher by 1.7 percent in real terms than the 1994 budget—and the first actual increase since 1986. Though 100 billion zlotys were allocated for Partnership For Peace, the committee added 500 billion more for implementing the program.<sup>131</sup>

Tension between the president and parliament over budgetary issues and the evolving presidential campaign for elections in the fall of 1995 became so severe that Walesa threatened to dissolve the Parliament. To head this off, the PSL-SLD coalition sought a truce with the president (to get Walesa to accept the budget in exchange for defense minister appointment) until after the presidential elections.<sup>132</sup> However, the 21 December 1994 meeting brought no agreement because just before the session Walesa vetoed the law on the budget. Feeling betrayed, the coalition then proposed to amend the Small Constitution in order to restrict the president's role in appointing ministers.<sup>133</sup> With 284 votes, the Sejm overturned Walesa's veto on wages; Walesa then placed an appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal.<sup>134</sup>

As 1995 began, in what some saw as the opening of the presidential campaign, the presidential-government feud brought the country to total crisis. When Foreign Minister Olechowski resigned, Walesa demanded that Prime Minister Pawlak refuse to accept his resignation and also to accept Walesa's nomination of Zbigniew Okonski to be defense minister instead of the coalition's candidate Longin Pastusiak, who had been a PUWP (Communist) Sejm deputy during the Martial Law period. The coalition then began to unravel when SLD leader Aleksander Kwasniewski announced on 6 January that it was necessary to restructure the government because of the ineffectiveness of certain ministers. Maneuvering continued when Pawlak met with Walesa on 16 January, the president agreed to Olechowski's resignation after all, but refused to accept Pastusiak for defense. Because he felt the vacancies in these ministries were undermining state stability, Walesa threatened to call for the government's resignation.

On 19 January 1995, Walesa went on the offensive in the Sejm. Arguing that "military people should run the military," Walesa supported draft legislation that would give greater power to the General Staff, reduce the role of the defense ministry, and subordinate military intelligence to the General Staff.<sup>135</sup> The ruling coalition and most of the opposition, however, supported a command structure in which the General Staff would answer to the civilian defense ministry.

On the same day, in a Sejm speech, acting Defense Minister Milewski discussed the need to establish two major defense requirements: (1) legal regulations for the defense ministry, (2) a model for drafting annual defense budgets that would encourage rational planning for Armed Forces development. Milewski then offered three funding variants:

- If the Sejm guaranteed 3.5 percent of GDP, the defense ministry could develop a force of 234,000
- If defense got 3 percent annually, manpower would be reduced to 200,000

- If the budget were set at the 1995 level (about 2.5 percent), the force would be 160,000.


He proposed gradually increasing the budget from 2.5 percent to 3 percent by the year 2000, which would allow an Army of 180,000 in times of peace and adequate reserves for mobilization if necessary.<sup>136</sup> Following on Milewski's argument, on 16 February 1995 the Sejm finally did pass a resolution that defined the role and place of the Armed Forces in a democratic state and committed to allocate a steady growth of funds to defense so that it could ultimately reach a level of 3 percent of GDP.<sup>137</sup>

**Pawlak's Fall and the Rise of Jozef Oleksy.** Taking Walesa's threat of dissolution seriously, on 20 January the Sejm passed a Constitutional amendment that, in the event of a presidential dissolution order, would keep the Parliament in session until after new elections.<sup>138</sup> (Poland had already been without a sitting Parliament for several months following the 1993 no-confidence vote in Hanna Suchocka's government). Walesa responded by demanding that Pawlak appoint new defense and foreign ministers—warning that he would take "decisive steps to prevent the paralysis of government" if the new deadline were not met.<sup>139</sup> Walesa's relentless attack culminated in his claiming he had lost confidence in Pawlak, and in early February the prime minister resigned.

With the Pawlak government collapse, the SLD-PSL coalition began efforts to form a new government. The coalition chose an SLD leader, Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy to head a new coalition government, which adopted a new coalition agreement and program on 15 February. When Oleksy met with Walesa on 16 February, however, they failed to reach an agreement on the "presidential ministries."<sup>140</sup> Nor had they agreed even after a fifth meeting on 28 February.

On 1 March, the Sejm formally adopted a resolution of no-confidence in the Pawlak government (285 for, 5 against, and 27 abstentions) and voted Jozef Oleksy prime minister.<sup>141</sup> Negotia-

tions continued between Oleksy and Walesa on the appointment of the so-called presidential ministers until an agreement was finally struck on 3 March. Oleksy accepted President Walesa's choice of Zbigniew Wojciech Okonski as defense minister. (Andrzej Milczanowski remained interior minister and Wladyslaw Bartoszewski became minister of foreign affairs). On 6 March, President Walesa formally appointed Oleksy prime minister and approved the new Cabinet (see Table 4.5 below). Perhaps as a good-will gesture, he withdrew his constitutional complaint



against the 1995 budget and agreed to sign the budget into law.<sup>142</sup>

President Walesa, though, did veto the 20 January 1995 constitutional amendment that allowed the Sejm to remain in session until new elections in the event of the Parliament's dissolution.<sup>143</sup> Although Walesa asked the new Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych to withdraw the amendment to the Small Constitution,<sup>144</sup> the Sejm voted on 17 March (303 to 11 with 21 abstentions) to overturn Walesa's veto. Under the new amendment the Sejm would remain in session until new elections, but could not alter the Constitution, budget, electoral laws, or adopt legislation entailing major financial commitments.<sup>145</sup>

That the fundamental disagreement between the president and government had not changed became evident on 20 March when President Walesa commented that the Oleksy government "has done nothing,"<sup>146</sup> and that he would give the government only one or two months to solve Poland's problems before he would look for his own solutions. On 21 March, Prime Minister Oleksy expressed amazement with Walesa's criticism and invited the president to present his ideas on how to solve Poland's problems.<sup>147</sup>

**Inherited Defense Problems.** The issue of to whom the General Staff should be subordinate—president or defense minister—remained a fundamental problem under Defense Minister Okonski. Even though the Sejm commission criticized Walesa for events in Drawsko, it remained silent when, after the Drawsko affair, Walesa awarded bonuses to the three top generals who had participated—Chief of Staff Wilecki, Deputy Chief of Staff Leon Komornicki, and Silesian MD commander Zdzislaw Ornatowski.<sup>148</sup> When Walesa promoted nine officers to the rank of general on 8 May 1995, two of those promoted were participants at Drawsko—Admiral Romuald Waga and LTG Edmund Bolo-ciuch.<sup>149</sup>

Yet, while the top General Staff leaders clearly owed their loyalty to President Walesa particularly after the Drawsko affair, the activities of 1994 were apparently taking their toll, making it more uncertain to whom the professional officer corps owed

allegiance. A reason for questioning officer corps support was provided by public opinion research conducted by the Military Institute of Sociological Research twice during 1994. In March, 72 percent of the career military declared that the president's actions served society ill. Only 23 percent gave the president a good grade.<sup>150</sup> In the Summer poll, 66 percent still viewed the president negatively, and 28 percent (a five-point increase) supported him. In the same Summer poll, 65 percent supported Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak.<sup>151</sup> In sum, it appears that the professional military holds views more critical of the president than the General Staff leadership and that a cleavage might exist within the military.

Failure to solve the problem of allegiance of the General Staff to a specific office in the civilian government only aggravated relations between the defense ministry and General Staff. Only days after Zbigniew Okonski became defense minister, First Deputy Defense Minister Milewski offered his opinion, "The military ought to be an instrument of policy; it cannot itself carry out policy [adding that the autonomy of the military is] dangerous for democracy [and could lead to] the deletion of civilian control over the military." Milewski added that the Chief of Staff must be subordinate to democratically chosen civilian political power, stressing that "the logic of our constitutional solutions indicates that this ought to be the [defense] minister."<sup>152</sup> Milewski also suggested that there ought to be a rotation of personnel in military command posts.

After his first meeting with General Wilecki, Defense Minister Okonski reported that "We agreed that there will be no conflicts and that we will cooperate."<sup>153</sup> (Okonski, who had not yet met with Milewski, would soon create a problem for the ministry.) In his meeting with Deputy Defense Minister Jan Kuriata, Okonski determined that there was no conflict between the civilian and military personnel (360 strong) in the logistics directorate. He remained uncertain whether the size of the defense ministry civilian sector—smaller than that of the General Staff—should be further reduced or was just right. But he soon announced that he



and the Chief of Staff would jointly carry out a reorganization of both the civilian and military parts of the defense ministry to reduce general overstaffing.<sup>154</sup> He also tantalized the government by announcing that he had found a solution to the conflict between Parliament and president on the status of Chief of the General Staff. Okonski, though, refused to announce details of the compromise before talking with the prime minister and members of Parliament. Bronislaw Komorowski of the Sejm Defense Committee announced skeptically that he was waiting for details, but that if the Chief of Staff "is subordinated in any way to the president, there will be no compromise."<sup>155</sup>

**Presidential-Parliament/Prime Minister Tensions.** Walesa continued to threaten to dissolve the Parliament "because it does not reflect the spirit of the nation, although it is the outcome of democratic elections."<sup>156</sup>

When Prime Minister Oleksy decided to attend the 9 May 1995 World War II victory celebrations in Moscow, Walesa said that Oleksy could not represent the state, and that if Oleksy attended without Walesa's consent it would violate Articles 28 and 32 of the Small Constitution, and that he would indict the prime minister before the State Tribunal.<sup>157</sup> After Oleksy returned from Moscow, however, Walesa backed down.<sup>158</sup>

On 17 May 1995, a "summit" meeting of Walesa, Oleksy, Okonski, Wilecki, and Sejm and Senate Speakers Jozef Zych and Adam Struzik declared that defense issues should not be a subject of the election campaign. They decided that over the next five years the 850 civilian employees of the defense ministry would be reduced by 20-25 percent and the 1,260 employees of the General Staff by 10-15 percent.<sup>159</sup> The "summit" also acknowledged the 16 February 1995 Sejm Resolution obligation to increase defense expenditures over the next two years to 3 percent of GDP. It decided to retain the Military Information Services (WSI) within the General Staff, since military counterintelligence was limited to protecting the Armed Forces, defense ministry, and arms industry plants.<sup>160</sup>

**Reform of the Defense Ministry.** One month after taking office, Defense Minister Okonski said that, of his goals, "the reorganization of the inner structure of MON [defense ministry] is most important."<sup>161</sup> One of Okonski's first moves was to dismiss Commander Kazimierz Glowacki, the head of military counterintelligence without first informing Prime Minister Oleksy. Okonski "had reservations" that Glowacki was Kolodziejczyk's man, and since WSI was part of the General Staff, Glowacki allegedly had insight into activities that Okonski lacked.<sup>162</sup>

Okonski wanted to "clean" the ministry, but this would require the prime minister's support. On 15 May Deputy Defense Minister Danuta Waniek announced that she would resign to head the campaign committee of SLD presidential candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski.<sup>163</sup> After First Deputy Minister Milewski criticized Okonski for saying in a *Wprost* interview that Poland was "probably not mature enough to adopt West European models of commanding Armed Forces,"<sup>164</sup> Okonski replaced Milewski with Andrzej Karkoszka.<sup>165</sup> In an interview after being replaced, Milewski candidly noted, "[T]he real possibilities of MON [defense ministry] cells to monitor the processes going on in the Armed Forces and to exert influence on them are considerably limited by the omnipotence of the General Staff."<sup>166</sup>

Aside from the increasing imbalance in the size of the General Staff versus the defense ministry staff, a number of issues—military information (intelligence and counterintelligence), personnel policy, financial policy (defense budget and arms acquisitions), and professional military education—continued to challenge Okonski's authority.<sup>167</sup> First, when former Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk had agreed to move the WSI to the General Staff, he had issued an order in February 1994 to establish a special ministerial office under his direct supervision to control WSI. The office was never established; hence military intelligence and counterintelligence remained under Chief of Staff Wilecki's control. Another circumvention of the defense minister involved transferring the powers of the "civilian" Department of Education to the military in

early 1994 under the condition that civilians would control educational activities (through the defense minister).<sup>168</sup> Kolodziejczyk's instructions to remove military attaches from the WSI and subordinate them to the defense ministry Foreign Affairs Department were also never implemented.<sup>169</sup>

Second, a dispute arose over arms sales when Kolodziejczyk claimed that the General Staff had illegally sold 52 BMP-2 armored personnel carriers to an African state without his knowledge.<sup>170</sup> Third, the General Staff's recently created Economic and Financial Board had acquired control of the military budget and had taken over a large share of the prerogatives of Deputy Defense Minister Kuriata's department. The General Staff decides what and where the Armed Services purchase, and on the further development of military formations.<sup>171</sup>

All three issues came to a head in mid-June when Kolodziejczyk charged that not until mid-October 1994 had he learned about the September sale of the 52 BMPs for \$5 million, and then only through an "illegal" WSI wiretap.<sup>172</sup> Justice Minister Jerzy Jaskierna announced in response, that as of 19 June, he would personally examine all applications for wiretapping operations and that a Sejm Commission for secret services would be formed to oversee all operations conducted by the WSI and the Interior Ministry's Office of State Protection.<sup>173</sup>

On 21 June, Defense Minister Okonski reprimanded Generals Julian Lewinski, Warsaw Military District commander, and Tadeusz Jauer, General Staff head of Air Defense Forces, for making political statements, including criticism of disarmament agreements signed by Poland. That Okonski's patience was wearing thin became evident when he admitted that "civilian control in Poland is far from being of the best standard."<sup>174</sup>

In early June, the Sejm Subcommittee rejected Walesa's amendments to the Defense Law that would give the President authority to approve defense assumptions, assign tasks to the defense minister, and provide the Chief of Staff authority to make all changes in the General Staff with approval of the president.<sup>175</sup> On

29 June 1995, the Sejm instead passed a Law on the Office of the Minister of National Defense that would limit the president's prerogatives in defense matters by ruling that the Chief of Staff, National Defense Academy, and Military Information Services (WSI) would be subordinated to the defense minister and not to the president! According to the Act, the defense minister is to be responsible during peacetime for all activities of the Armed Forces to include preparing national defense doctrine, conducting personnel policy related to the armed forces, managing the finances of national defense, and conducting international agreements concerning participation of Polish military contingents.<sup>176</sup> In a joint press conference with Chief of Staff Wilecki, Defense Minister Okonski betrayed irritation that his earlier "compromise solution" had been ignored, but conceded that if the law became effective, he "would observe it." Wilecki noted that he was against subordinating the WSI directly to the minister because it was "the eyes and ears of the Armed Forces."<sup>177</sup>

Public discussion indicated concern that Military Intelligence was not under proper control. Jerzy Szmajdzinski, chairman of the Sejm Defense Committee, noted that the committee had a "lot of trouble supervising the operations of [WSI]."<sup>178</sup> Prime Minister Oleksy concluded that the issue of WSI had still not been "settled as far as conveying information to the government is concerned."<sup>179</sup> Defense Minister Okonski rather defensively replied that he was in control of the ministry and General Staff and that even before the 29 June Defense Law subordinated WSI to the defense minister he "decided on who is to be the next military attache...and on who is the head and deputy head of WSI."<sup>180</sup>

Parliamentary oversight of the defense budget also remained an issue. As Szmajdzinski noted, the Sejm's Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) was becoming more effective and that, because of the NIK's work, "the budget of the Armed Forces is becoming more and more readable."<sup>181</sup> In fact, an NIK audit disclosed that the defense ministry did not always implement its budget properly, that it lost 1.8 billion old zlotys by dismissing employees of the

Military Information Institute and reemploying the same people in the Information Center of the General Staff.<sup>182</sup> In an August interview he speculated that it would probably "take a few more years...until we learn to compile a clear budget in accordance with the standards in democratic countries."<sup>183</sup>

Defense ministry restructuring continued to be an issue. Prime Minister Oleksy complained in a July interview that he had "still not received any project for the restructuring of MON [the Ministry of National Defense]. As for the arms trade, I receive information only when I demand it and only when a scandal breaks out."<sup>184</sup> When the General Staff established a new office for integration with NATO, concerns arose that the defense ministry would lose influence as it had in the past with training and education, secret services, and some personnel issues. When the defense ministry lost oversight of training and education to the General Staff, it took on environmental issues. The concern now was that the defense ministry's Foreign Affairs Directorate would face the same fate. First Deputy Defense Minister Karkoszka, who is directly responsible for foreign affairs, publicly expressed cautious concern: "The attaches are formally under my supervision, but practice is different. I am trying to change this."<sup>185</sup>

**Military effectiveness.** Military effectiveness was also becoming an increasing concern. On 26 July 1995 the fifth military aircraft crash of the year occurred—the fourth crash of Poland's 100 Sukhoi Su22s. By the end of August, 2 more aircraft had crashed. Okonski could do little but accept the accident-investigation commission's conclusion that the causes were "mistakes made by pilots. Instead of thinking about suspending flights, we should work out how to improve training."<sup>186</sup> Little has been done to improve safety. To save on fuel, training flights have been cut back. Pilots spend about 60 hours flying each year compared to 150 in most West European countries and 250 in the United States.

Although CFE limits Poland to 460 combat aircraft, since aircraft costs are so high, in late November the Polish General Staff accepted an air force restructuring plan and decided to reduce the

number of combat aircraft in their inventory to 220. The present air regiments and divisions will disappear. Both the Air Force and Naval Air Force will be divided into two (northern and southern) fighter corps and a third strike corps, subdivided into brigades. These forces and air defense will be subordinated under the Commander of the Polish Air Force.<sup>187</sup> One result of the restructuring was that the number of resignations of pilots soared; as many as 104 left the service by the end of November 1995, with an additional 14 by the end of January 1996.<sup>188</sup>

Despite financial problems, Poland is seeking to buy 100 fighter aircraft since its 220 MIG-21s are aging. Defense Ministry spokesman Eugeniusz Mleczak has announced that Poland will retire 60 aircraft in 1996. To replace them Poland is considering the U.S. F-16s and F/A-18s, Swedish JAS-39 Gripen, French Mirage 2000, and Russian Su-27s or MIG-29s. A short-term fix was announced in December 1995 when Colonel Wieslaw Leszek confirmed that Poland would exchange 11 Sokol helicopters for 10 Czech Republic MIG-29s to add to its inventory of 12.<sup>189</sup>

**Presidential election and politicization of the military.** As the presidential election campaign began to heat up, rumors of an effort to postpone presidential elections and extend Walesa's term for two years caused a stir in Warsaw. Almost immediately, President Walesa claimed that when Prime Minister Oleksy presented Bronislaw Geremek's election postponement idea to him, he immediately dismissed it.<sup>190</sup> Any change in the election date would require an amendment to the Constitution requiring a two-thirds majority vote in the Sejm. To quell the rumors, when Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych promised on 6 September that elections would be held on 5 and 19 November 1995, he added that those candidates who had announced their intention to dissolve Parliament if elected "demonstrated a lack of respect for the law [and] would violate the Constitution."<sup>191</sup>

As might be expected, the armed forces could not avoid politicization during the electoral campaign. In the Interior Ministry's Vistula Military units, for example, Admiral Marek Toczek and

command cadres coerced soldiers into signing petitions for Lech Walesa's candidacy or not receive their pay.<sup>192</sup> Following an internal investigation that indicated signatures had been collected in an organized fashion for President Walesa, Admiral Toczek resigned on 22 August.<sup>193</sup>

Demonstrating his support for President Walesa, at a 27 July Szczecin garrison meeting, Deputy Chief of Staff General Leon Komornicki criticized the current SLD-PSL coalition and previous Solidarity governments for their policies towards the Armed Forces. The Deputy Chief of Staff claimed that only the efforts of General Wilecki and President Walesa had allowed a raise in officers' salaries, and that if Walesa were re-elected a similar raise would occur in the future.<sup>194</sup>

On Armed Forces Day (14 August), General Wilecki publicly criticized the government for having weakened the Armed Forces by 10 years of low budgets, noting: "[T]he Armed Forces have been cut in half, yet modernization has been forgotten."<sup>195</sup> Then on 16 August President Walesa vetoed the defense bill which the Sejm had initially adopted on 29 June 1995 (and amended on 12 July)—a bill that made the chief of staff responsible to the civilian defense minister and not the president. The president wrote Prime Minister Oleksy that he was alarmed with the small amount of money allocated to defense, and reminded the prime minister of the Sejm 16 February 1995 resolution to guarantee an adequate level to defense. Walesa argued that the government had failed to implement the provision to allocate 3 percent of GDP to the Armed Forces by the end of 1997.<sup>196</sup>

On 31 August, the Sejm Defense Committee rejected as inadequate Deputy Defense Minister Jan Kuriata's explanation that the charges against General Komornicki, for his comments at Szczecin were "unsubstantiated allegations."<sup>197</sup> A few days later, when General Wilecki categorized reports of collecting signatures for Walesa as an "isolated incident,"<sup>198</sup> Oleksy and presidential candidates Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz and Adam Strzembosz criticized Wilecki for getting involved in politics, and soon a new

investigation commission headed by Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka was reexamining the case. Karkoszka's first report, although confirming that Komornicki had tackled political subjects at Szczecin, did not conclude this to be agitation. Karkoszka's report, though, did cite an anonymous letter that suggested the opposite. Defense Minister Okonski, refusing to approve the report and wanting it supplemented, noted: "Hold your guns; there is no reason to hurry. This is...a serious investigation that might be decisive for the career of an officer."<sup>199</sup>

**Walesa/Wilecki vs Parliament/Government.** Picking up on his 14 August Armed Forces Day speech, General Wilecki expressed frustration with the government and parliament for not providing resources or enacting laws regarding the health of the Armed Forces.<sup>200</sup> On 26 September the Council of Ministers agreed to increase defense budget expenditures by three percent in real terms per year to the year 2000.<sup>201</sup> This, according to Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko, still represented a significant shortfall; the 1995 defense budget of 2.5 percent of GDP would approximate 2.57 percent in 1996 and not reach the 1997 goal of 3 percent.<sup>202</sup> At his 11 October press conference President Walesa praised Chief of Staff Wilecki for his defense of the Army.<sup>203</sup>

General Wilecki continued his argument on 9 October in Polska Zbrojna, "We have stopped halfway; . . . a wall of impossibility has appeared before modernization. We started the process without almost any capital spending."<sup>204</sup> A few days later he extended his campaign in Rzeczpospolita, arguing, "[T]he fact that the Armed Forces speak openly about their condition does not imply that they want to make decisions on their own."<sup>205</sup>

Wilecki was also bolstering the General Staff. In late August he nominated General Miroslaw Hermaszewski, who had been a member of the Military Council for National Salvation during martial law, to be inspector general of the Air Force on the General Staff. Again moving onto defense ministry's turf, Wilecki appointed General Jozef Chmiel to be the General Staff's plenipotentiary for integration into NATO.<sup>206</sup> When President Walesa nominated



12 Army officers to the rank of general on 11 November, none of the officers came from the civilian directorate of the Defense Ministry.<sup>207</sup>

**NATO and PFP.** The main limitations on Poland's participation in PFP have been financial constraints. As Brig. Gen. Wladyslaw Saczonek, Chief of the Operational Training Directorate of the General Staff, noted, due to lack of funds, only one of four earlier planned projects would be implemented—that of establishing an operational battalion. The 1995 IPP draft contains more than 260 projects to focus on: command and communications, military organizational structures, combat equipment, the Navy, training, and the art of warfare. So far, Saczonek claimed, only 200 billion zlotys of the 500 billion required had been allocated.<sup>208</sup> On 20 April 1995, Poland became the first PFP partner to have its defense plan accepted by NATO's Political and Military Steering Group (PMSC) for PFP.

As Poland engaged more actively in NATO programs, its deficiency in English language training became obvious. Of the 2,000 servicemembers who speak English, only half of them have more than a rudimentary knowledge of the language.<sup>209</sup> It has also become apparent how much needs to be done in the area of Civil Defense. Colonel Janusz Baginski, head of the Polish Civil Defense staff, agreeing that Poland had to adopt Western organizational models to protect civilians in times of war, admitted "In Poland, no one body is responsible."<sup>210</sup> Command confusion exists not only at the national level, but also at the local level because local governments can only follow instructions issued by the central administration and they lack financial resources.

The promise of an increased defense budget for 1996 did not satisfy the General Staff, so additional funds were allocated for medicines for military health care and PFP programs. In addition, the VAT (value-added tax) was preserved for defense acquisitions, and the defense ministry was relieved of the burden of funding Government Strategic Programs. Furthermore, as Brig. Gen. Krzysztof Pajewski, chief of the General Staff Economic and

Finance Board, pointed out "Considering funds earmarked for wages and pensions...the 7.9 billion new zloty will represent 2.4 percent of GDP, which is a far cry from our needs and expectations."<sup>211</sup>


When it became apparent that NATO would deploy IFOR to Bosnia, Poland wanted to send a battalion. According to Defense Minister Okonski, if the defense ministry were to cover this projected cost of 720 billion old zlotys, it "would be ruined."<sup>212</sup> Hence, funding the battalion would require dipping into the state budget reserves.

### **The Sixth Reform Stage (December 1995-Present)**

In the first round of the eight-candidate presidential elections on 5 November, Aleksander Kwasniewski, former chairman of the Constitutional Committee, received 35.11 percent and Lech Walesa 33.11 percent.<sup>213</sup> Since no candidate received more than 50 percent of the valid votes, the runoff took place on 19 November 1995. Of notable interest were random reports from military units suggesting that more soldiers preferred Kwasniewski to Walesa.<sup>214</sup> In the runoff, public opinion polls also suggested that the military strongly supported Kwasniewski over Walesa.<sup>215</sup> The polls and reports proved accurate: in the second round on 19 November, Kwasniewski won with 51.72 percent of the vote.<sup>216</sup> All three "presidential" ministers and National Security Bureau chief Goryszewski immediately tendered their resignations. Chief of Staff Wilecki, however, did not. On 22 December 1995, Oleksy appointed Andrzej Karkoszka acting Defense Minister.

Kwasniewski was inaugurated President on 23 December. On the same day, in accordance with the Constitution, he took over supreme command of the Armed Forces in an evening ceremony at the First Warsaw Air Regiment. Addressing the soldiers in the presence of Wilecki and Karkoszka, Kwasniewski supported the reform and modernization process and promised to seek financial support for the Army.<sup>217</sup>

Initially, Kwasniewski worked carefully with Prime Minister Oleksy in choosing the three "presidential" ministers—including Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski (PSL), who had been secretary of the Council of Ministers Committee for Defense Affairs (KSORM) (see Table 4.6 below). As noted in his inaugural address, Kwasniewski was committed to adopt a new Constitution defining more clearly the spheres of competence for different institutions, and he intended to establish the NSC as the Small Constitution envisioned—bringing together outstanding person-



ages to seek their advice on tackling the most important state problems.<sup>218</sup> This represented a significantly different arrangement from Walesa's. Walesa did not appoint the NSC because he preferred "hands-on" management of the Armed Forces and preferred to work with the KOK, which did not figure in the Small Constitution, as his advisory body.<sup>219</sup> Kwasniewski also appointed former First Deputy Defense Minister Jerzy Milewski to once again head the National Security Bureau.

**Short-lived Tranquility; The Oleksy Crisis.** President Walesa had made a startling statement on 12 December, charging: "Our post-Communist oligarchy has international connections. We are still verifying the documents."<sup>220</sup> On 19 December, Walesa accused Prime Minister Oleksy of having collaborated with foreign intelligence since 1983. Oleksy called the charge a "dirty provocation."<sup>221</sup> Oleksy countercharged that when he had asked Minister of Interior Milczanowski for information about the State Protection Office's interest in members of government, the Interior Minister had refused to provide the information. After the Military Prosecutor's Office began its work, Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych established a Special Extraordinary Commission to clarify the matter.<sup>222</sup>

The crisis progressed beyond President Kwasniewski's inauguration. On 19 January 1996, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) handed a declaration to the coalition claiming that PSL believed, "The present political crisis is a threat to the democratic order...[and called for] a government reshuffle"<sup>223</sup> and a change in the prime minister's post. On 26 January, President Kwasniewski accepted Oleksy's resignation and on 1 February asked Deputy Sejm Speaker Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz to form a new government, which was sworn in on 7 February 1996.

In the end (22 April 1996) the Military Prosecutor closed the case, concluding that the investigation had established no direct evidence against Oleksy.<sup>224</sup> Cimoszewicz, prime minister for less than 90 days, announced his intention to ask the prosecutor to disclose all the evidence in a White Book and to clarify the circumstances under which a groundless accusation against the head of

the Polish Government had caused such serious damage to Poland's international image.<sup>225</sup>

**Defense Reform "Revolution".** The Polish defense reform "revolution" aims to place the civilian defense ministry in charge of Poland's military and to remove certain powers from the General Staff. All the government structures are in agreement with the need for reform—President Kwasniewski (with Head of President's Office Danuta Waniek and National Security Bureau Director Jerzy Milewski, who both had served as deputy defense ministers under Walesa), Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, Defense Minister Dobrzanski, and the Parliament. In sum, the people who understand that the General Staff is the problem are in the right place and agree on what needs to be done.

Kwasniewski's first actions were consistent with his campaign rhetoric. On 8 January 1996, he visited the General Staff to announce that he would withdraw from the Constitutional Tribunal the 29 June 1995 Law on the Minister of Defense. (This was the law that President Walesa had challenged because it subordinated the military prosecutors and courts and General Staff to the defense minister.<sup>226</sup>)

In an interview on 18 January, Defense Minister Dobrzanski announced that he had established a commission chaired by First Deputy Defense Minister Karkoszka to develop two documents: (1) a Defense Ministry Statute outlining the new structures of the ministry; (2) an outline detailing the activities of the defense minister.<sup>227</sup> Dobrzanski noted there would be changes in the General Staff's structure, that he would subordinate the WSI (intelligence and counterintelligence) to the defense minister, set up an entirely new economic section in the defense ministry to take part in acquisitions decisions, and establish a command headquarters of the ground troops that would deprive the General Staff of some powers.<sup>228</sup>

On 19 January 1996, Defense Minister Dobrzanski appointed two new deputy defense ministers—Andrzej Zalucki for Social and Legislative Relations and retired General Tadeusz Grabowski

for Finances. At the same time, Dobrzanski deprived Chief of Staff Wilecki of supervision over the Economic and Financial Directorate, created in 1994 and headed by General Pajewski of the General Staff.<sup>229</sup> Dobrzanski's order not only called for dissolution of the Directorate and decreed that all money would be held by the deputy defense minister, but it instructed General Wilecki to shut down all General Staff units that duplicated the operations of identical units in the defense ministry.<sup>230</sup>

The spearhead of the "revolution" is a new 13-article Law on the Defense Ministry (Legal Gazette No. 10, 30 January 1996) which went into effect on 14 February 1996.<sup>231</sup> The Defense Reform goal is to develop new Defense Ministry structures to subordinate the General Staff and integrate it into the ministry. To achieve this goal, the defense reform must remove from the General Staff many of the powers it had acquired during President Walesa's five-year rule.

The defense reform strategy is to wrest control from Wilecki by empowering the Defense Ministry by restructuring both it and the General Staff, and to acquire control over armed forces reform by gaining control of the budget and acquisitions.

**Restructuring the Defense Ministry.** Defense Minister Dobrzanski's first step would be to re-subordinate the WSI (intelligence and counterintelligence) to the defense minister.<sup>232</sup> (Former Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk had moved it to the General Staff in 1993.) After the new Law on the Office of the Defense Minister came into effect, in accordance with Article 5 (which subordinated the WSI and National Defense Academy to the defense minister), Dobrzanski dismissed WSI chief General Konstanty Malejczyk on 26 March 1996 as part of "normal rotation in top posts,"<sup>233</sup> and appointed Commodore Kazimierz Glowacki as head of the WSI. Glowacki, as head of counterintelligence, had been loyal to Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk during the Drawsko affair.<sup>234</sup> Dobrzanski's decision raised questions in that he "forgot" to ask the Sejm Committee for Control Over Special Services for an opinion.<sup>235</sup>

Also in accord with Articles 2 (para. 16-18) and 4 of the Law on the Office of the Defense Minister, Dobrzanski has set up a new economic section in the defense ministry (Deputy Defense Minister, retired General Tadeusz Grabowski) to take part in acquisitions decisions, and has ordered the dissolution of the Economic and Financial (18th) Directorate of the General Staff which Wilecki had created in 1994.

Grabowski noted in an interview that between 1998-2000 spending on staff would be reduced, outlays on infrastructure would remain unchanged, and expenditures and equipment maintenance would increase slightly. Grabowski indicated that earlier estimates had calculated that technical modernization would reach an estimated 14 percent of the defense budget in 2002; with the changes outlined, however, he hoped that it should grow to 20 percent by 2002 and 30 percent by 2010.<sup>236</sup>

Dobrzanski also noted that all redundant General Staff units were to be dissolved and staffing reduced. This would mean that the General Staff's 30 directorates of 1,800 employees, would remain larger than the Defense Ministry's by 400. Both were to be reduced by approximately 25 percent.<sup>237</sup> One General Staff directorate that would disappear would be the Territorial Defense Directorate, which would be transferred to the Defense Policy Department under First Deputy Minister Karkoszka.<sup>238</sup>

Karkoszka's task was to formulate a concrete plan for Poland's integration into NATO by 31 March 1996. This integration would require changing the defense ministry's system of bookkeeping and costing, and require an inventory of land and military resources—all of which would take three years to complete and a new 36-person NATO Integration Department to execute.<sup>239</sup> Karkoszka hopes that Poland will have the capacity to respond to NATO Defense Planning Questionnaires (DPQs) in two-to-three years. He also plans to enlarge the ministry's Planning and Review Process (PARP) capacity to work more effectively with NATO, and his office is attempting to implement NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs). His Standardization Bureau has grown

from three to 30 people; they have catalogued 600 of the more than 3,000 STANAGs and 2,000 technical regulations. It will take many years to complete this part of the standardization process.<sup>240</sup>

The defense ministry's Armaments and Infrastructure Directorate also had work to do getting basic elements of infrastructure in place in the NATO integration effort. Work here was slow because Jan Kuriata resigned on 12 March 1996. Dobrzanski did not deny that Kuriata's resignation might be linked to the earlier dismissal of Brig. Gen. Henryk Mika, head of the General Staff Armaments and Equipment Department for contract tenders for Army cross country vehicles, the sale of BMP-2 transporters to Angola, and irregularities in trade involving ammunition.<sup>241</sup> (Colonel Antoni Grzedzinski had replaced Brig. Gen. Mika on 1 March 1996.) In June 1996, Krzysztof Wegrzyn became deputy defense minister for armaments and infrastructure.

Further efforts to gain oversight of military acquisitions and sales were evident when on 11 April, the Sejm Defense Committee suggested changes in the public tender law.<sup>242</sup> Also Deputy Defense Minister Grabowski heads the new defense ministry directorate for acquisitions, whose function is to get ministry control (which has not yet been accomplished) of acquisitions policy from the General Staff.

**Civilian Control of the Armed Forces.** Dobrzanski subordinated the General Staff Sixth (Organizational) Directorate—the military posts—to his own Command Department. The most important component of Dobrzanski's new Command Department—which included the General Staff, Air Force, and Navy—was the creation of a new commander—the Chief of Land Forces. Specific responsibilities—such as education, infrastructure, and logistics—will be removed from the General Staff and subordinated to the new Land Forces Commander.<sup>243</sup> The same will apply to the Air Force/Air Defense, and Navy Commanders. On 28 February Kwasniewski appointed at Dobrzanski's motion a new Naval Commander, Vice Admiral Ryszard Lukasik.<sup>244</sup>

The goal, in accord with Article 3 (para. 1-2) of the Law on the



Office of the Defense Minister, is to have the defense ministry plan what the military needs and to have the Commanders of the Forces (directly subordinate to the defense minister in peacetime) execute the plans. Dobrzanski admitted that many of the highest ranking cadres of the General Staff opposed his decisions.<sup>245</sup> When this resistance continued, in early May Dobrzanski had a "very serious talk with Chief of Staff Wilecki...[who] presented concessionary suggestions for the reform."<sup>246</sup>

**Armed Forces Reform through Budget and Acquisitions.** On 20 February 1996, a government meeting was convened with Jerzy Milewski (BBN), the ministers of Finance and Defense, and others to develop a Five-Year Plan on Adaptation of the Polish Armed Forces, Costs, and Integration with NATO. This plan needed to be developed and funded by June 1996 to coincide with Poland's budget cycle. According to Karkoszka, the need to adapt Polish Armed Forces to budget limitations—not vice-versa—was meeting with great resistance and opposition from many forces. Although, if the new plan is successful, it would mean that restructuring the entire military would be necessary (for the third time in five years).<sup>247</sup>

President Kwasniewski has rated the drawing up of a five-year national defense expenditure plan and the choosing of a strategic partner for equipment supplies as the most important issues for the Army.<sup>248</sup> In practice this would mean that the 230,000-man Polish Force would shrink to 180,000 by the year 2000, and then reduce another 20 percent by 2005.<sup>249</sup>

As the defense reform ran into resistance, some coalition deputies began collecting signatures requiring the Defense Committee to investigate the General Staff's resistance to the reforms and to urge President Kwasniewski to recall General Wilecki. When Danuta Waniek of the President's Office noted, "I do not really trust the present Chief of the General Staff," Wilecki retorted: "I do not really like insipid widows."<sup>250</sup> BBN chief Jerzy Milewski joined the dissent by noting that "General Wilecki is not fulfilling this function as fully as it might be fulfilled."<sup>251</sup> President

Kwasniewski then jumped into the fray, claiming that he did "not foresee any changes over the next weeks or months, but no one is irreplaceable."<sup>252</sup>

On 3 May 1996, President Kwasniewski appointed 10 new generals whose backgrounds contrasted sharply with the 12 generals promoted by President Walesa on 11 November 1995, all of whom had come from the General Staff. Of the 10 appointed by Kwasniewski, one was a policeman (Maj. Gen. Janusz Pluta) and one was Orthodox Military Ordinary, Maj. Gen. Archbishop Sawa, four came from the armed forces, and one, Maj. Gen. Kazimierz Madej, from the defense ministry department of social relations. Only three were from the General Staff—General Zbigniew Zalewski, LTG Jaroslaw Bielecki, and Maj. Gen. Stanislaw Stanko.<sup>253</sup>

On 9 May, Andrzej Karkoszka reported on the status of the reform to a closed session of the Sejm Defense Committee. Presumably having run into obstructions from the General Staff, Karkoszka threatened to resign. Chairman Jerzy Szmajdzinski acknowledged the fact that the work of the reform was delayed because of the General Staff's protest to proposed solutions, which included integrating the General Staff with the defense ministry (e.g., Article 7 of the Defense Law) and dissolving directorates that deal with supplies for the armed forces which would result in a "considerable staff reduction."<sup>254</sup>

The reform took two major steps forward in June and July. First, on 14 June the Sejm passed (324-1) a Law on State Civil Service to create a professional, impartial, and politically neutral civil service. The law is to come into effect on 1 January 1997 and require two to three years to implement.<sup>255</sup> (Some concern has been expressed, though, in that old Communist nomenklatura (officials) will likely be assured senior positions in the bureaucracy.)

Second, when the Council of Ministers adopted a decree leading to the restructured defense ministry in July 1996, the General Staff was an integral part (one of five directorates) of the defense

ministry. The reorganization of the defense ministry, which would occur through 1996, would then place the defense minister directly in charge of all that occurs in the ministry. In peacetime the Chief of Staff commands the Army on the defense minister's behalf. The Statute on Martial law and the Constitution will define who commands during war. The number of organizational units in the defense ministry is to shrink from 52 to 32, with 20 percent fewer posts and a reduction of 20-30 positions for generals, leaving a general officer corps of approximately 120.<sup>256</sup> The right-wing Patriotic Camp disagreed with the defense reform establishment of three new civilian directorates, preferring to have the General Staff retain command functions and maintain authority over military education.<sup>257</sup>

**Air and Air Defense Forces Restructuring.** Chief of the Air and Air Defense Forces Maj. Gen. Kazimierz Dziok explained the restructuring of the forces. In place of the current Air Forces and National Air Defense Force, two corps—"North" in Bydgoszcz and "South" in Wroclow—would be established with a brigade-squadron system replacing the old division-regiment system. The 53,500-man force contained 22,000 professionals; by 2005 the force would have 41,500 men with 20,800 professionals. Between 1996-2005, 1,000 professional positions would have to be eliminated and instead of Poland's current 352 aircraft, there would be 230. Dziok noted the continuing major problem of pilots flying only 40-60 hours per year due to fuel shortages and lack of spare parts.<sup>258</sup>

The Polish aviation industry includes the manufacture of W-3 Sokol helicopters, as well as the PZL-130 Orlik, An-28, and I-22 Iryda aircraft. Problems with the Iryda trainer were evident when two pilots were killed in a crash in January 1996 because of a faulty steering system. General Dziok grounded the aircraft and demanded it be improved before being used for training.<sup>259</sup> To solve the dispute, the Mielec Aviation Plant that produces Iryda agreed to modernize 11 older aircraft and to supply six new planes with a modern navigation system, new engines and a remodeled wing by the end of 1997 for Z122 million.<sup>260</sup>

In February 1996, General Wilecki handed-off the 10 MIG-29s (exchanged for 11 Sokol helicopters) from the Czech Republic to the First Warsaw Fighter Air Regiment, raising the Polish complement of MIG-29s to 22.<sup>261</sup> Also in February, the *Bundeswehr* turned over 10 Mi 24D Hind helicopters that had been part of the East German inventory. This brought Poland's inventory to 30 Mi-24s, enough for two helicopter regiments.<sup>262</sup>

Arming these helicopters became a major issue of contention. The Polish Armed Forces need 5,000 modern guided antitank missiles, each costing \$50,000. Companies competing to supply the armor-piercing projectile included the Israeli Elbit, which produces the Rafael, and U.S. Rockwell, which produces the Hellfire II. When the KSORM rejected the U.S. bid on 18 April 1996 because it was tendered after the deadline, the U.S. Embassy<sup>263</sup> and the Polish government raised questions. In Sejm Defense Committee questioning, First Deputy Karkoszka admitted, "The whole issue...was a mess."<sup>264</sup>

On the issue of which fighter aircraft to purchase—the F-16,<sup>265</sup> F/A-18 Hornet,<sup>266</sup> Mirage 2000, MIG-29, or Swedish JAS-39 Gripen—the Poles decided to coordinate their purchase with the Czech Republic in order to save on maintenance costs and to create a common system of air control.<sup>267</sup> On 13 April the Czech and Polish foreign and defense ministers agreed at Vyskov not to compete with each other but to coordinate the modernization of both air forces.<sup>268</sup> By the Spring of 1996 it appeared that the MIG-21s put into retirement would likely be replaced by 40 F-16 A and B models, which would cost \$1 billion including the training of pilots, spares, and missiles.<sup>269</sup>

**Renewed NATO integration efforts.** In March 1996 Poland developed teams from the foreign affairs and defense ministries to prepare a NATO discussion paper that contained topics and questions in preparation for Poland's dialogue with the 16 NATO ambassadors regarding membership in NATO.<sup>270</sup> On 4 April Poland began its bilateral dialogue by presenting a 22-page document that described Poland's expectations and anticipated obliga-

tions.<sup>271</sup> First Deputy Defense Minister Karkoszka noted of the discussions, "We were the ones who 'cross examined' NATO representatives. It took 2.5 hours. Our explanations were far more curt and took 30 minutes, although we would have preferred for the second part of the debate to be longer."<sup>272</sup>

When NATO Secretary General Solana visited Poland on 17-18 April, he praised Poland's document as very constructive and positive noting that the decision on when Poland could join NATO was "very close."<sup>273</sup> Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati noted in June at the Berlin NACC session that Poland would fulfill all the criteria required for NATO membership, including democratic control of the military, and stressed that Poland expects a decision on new members in 1997.<sup>274</sup>

To learn more about NATO command structures, 10 Polish officers went to Joint NATO Air Forces in Central Europe (AIRCENT) in Ramstein, Germany and another 10 to the headquarters of the Allied Forces of the Baltic Straits Area in Karup, Denmark from February to March 1996.<sup>275</sup> In early May, when German General Hartmut Bagger visited General Wilecki in Poland, the two discussed the possibility of establishing an international Danish, German, Polish Corps comprising three divisions after Poland becomes a member of NATO.<sup>276</sup>

Exercise activity also was robust. In late March Poland hosted "BALTIC COOPERATION-96," a PFP exercise for training German, Danish, and Polish staff officers to plan and organize peacekeeping missions.<sup>277</sup> In June PFP naval exercise "BALTOPS-96" comprising 58 warships from the United States, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, and Poland took place in the Western Baltic.<sup>278</sup> Poland's national military exercises also tried to employ NATO standards. "SUMMER 96", which exercised units from the Silesian and Cracow MDs, used computer maps with NATO scale, and the 6th Airborne Brigade (which is designated to participate in NATO peacekeeping operations) used English during the exercise.<sup>279</sup>

**Poland participates in the Bosnian IFOR.** The 624 soldiers of the Polish 16th Airborne Assault Battalion, as part of a Nordic-

Polish Brigade, were subordinated to the U.S. 1st Infantry Division in Tuzla, Bosnia. This was originally planned to cost Z30 million from the defense budget and was the first time a Polish battalion had prepared to operate in combat conditions with technical conditions and organization according to NATO standards.<sup>280</sup>

After implementation, though, a number of problems became evident. First, by March 1996, when operations costs skyrocketed to Z72 million, it was unclear where the money would come from. The defense ministry managed to scrape together Z46 million by cutting expenses on previous purchases. It also decided to cut the number of recruits by 6,000 to save another Z6 million. Its largest savings, though, came by cutting many PFP exercises and programs.<sup>281</sup>

Despite these constraints, Defense Minister Dobrzanski volunteered to send another battalion to build roads in the former Yugoslavia "if funds could be raised abroad, because we cannot find money at home."<sup>282</sup> In the end, however, there would be no second battalion to operate with French units because of a shortage of funds both in Paris and Warsaw.<sup>283</sup>

Second, problems among the ground forces included a lack of telephones for soldiers to call home, problems with sanitary facilities, bullet-proof vests, and P-64 pistols.<sup>284</sup> When Colonel Włodzimierz Sasiadek, deputy commander of the Nordic-Polish brigade, briefed NATO on Poland's IFOR experience, he noted that many problems that had resulted while preparing for teamwork arose because Polish and Western radios operated differently.<sup>285</sup> He also requested that NATO disclose a greater number of NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) to facilitate Poland's cooperation with the Alliance. Thus far, NATO has made available only 850 of the existing agreements.<sup>286</sup>

Polish public opinion support for NATO remains the highest among the Central European states. According to a Public Opinion Research Center poll carried out in late May 1996, 83 percent (compared to 75 percent in 1994) responded favorably to NATO membership. Yet, only 23 percent would be willing to reduce other

budget expenditures to meet the cost of membership.<sup>287</sup> On this issue, the defense ministry had discovered that it could not properly estimate the cost of NATO integration because of the absence of basic information such as the book value of the Polish military and military infrastructure.<sup>288</sup>

**Constitutional Developments.** After Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz became prime minister, he resigned as chairman of the National Assembly's Constitutional Committee. He was replaced by Marek Mazurkiewicz of the SLD on 20 February 1996, who assured President Kwasniewski that the draft Constitution would be ready by the end of June.<sup>289</sup> Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, noting that it was not right that supervision of the secret and intelligence services be under the supervision only of the coalition in parliament, proposed parity representation in the Parliamentary commission for supervising these components.<sup>290</sup> In early May, Mazurkiewicz spoke about progress in the draft Constitution, now noting that the work might be finished as early as the beginning of 1997 with the holding of a Constitutional referendum.<sup>291</sup> Despite his continued optimism, Solidarity spokesmen called on Poles to vote against the draft being developed by the National Assembly.<sup>292</sup>

Defense Minister Dobrzanski also noted that what was most needed in the defense sphere was a Law on Military Duty and Defense Obligations. While a draft had been approved by the Defense Committee of the Council of Ministers, Dobrzanski hoped that it would become law by the Fall of 1996. He also noted that a Law on the State of Emergency and Martial Law was also urgently needed, as were laws on the Military Information Services, the Military Police, and military discipline.<sup>293</sup>

The Constitutional debate embroiled the issues of the President's emergency powers and command of the armed forces. On 21 May 1996 the president submitted draft amendments to the Constitutional Committee that related to the armed forces and a State Protection Committee. The Sejm would have authority to station Polish forces abroad or allow foreign troops on Polish soil.

But in an emergency—such as the danger of external invasion, or international obligation—this could be done by the president at the government's request. If the Sejm cannot convene, in the event of "danger posed to the constitutional system, security of the people, or public order," the president, at the request of the government, can declare martial law or state of emergency. The Sejm must approve the decision within 48 hours, and the period of Martial Law can only last 90 days.<sup>294</sup>

On 19 June 1996, the Parliamentary Committee adopted the final article on the draft Constitution.<sup>295</sup> The final text will be voted on at the end of Summer 1996. It will then be forwarded to the National Assembly for further consideration and a two-thirds majority vote.

President Kwasniewski wanted opposition leaders, not just the SLD-PSL coalition, to join the NSC in order to develop a national consensus on foreign and security policy issues, including entry into EU and NATO. Opposition leaders refused to participate in the NSC. Though the National Assembly Constitutional Committee included a provision accepting an advisory body NSC in the draft Constitution, it rejected on 5 June a Kwasniewski provision for establishing a State Protection Committee, which was an effort to reactivate a Second Republic (1918-1939) institution that coordinated state organs in defense and security.<sup>296</sup>

## Conclusion

Poland's civil-military crisis in 1994 resulted from its failure to delegate authority between the president and government and from the Sejm Defense (commission and committee's) inability to exercise effective oversight. It also has demonstrated the inability of the civilian defense ministry to manage and exercise oversight of the military; hence, the chief of staff and General Staff had remained independent of the defense minister (and government), and the heavily politicized Army enjoys broad popular support.

Poland has not yet developed a consensus on establishing its



defense tenets, to include effective relations between military and civilian authorities. The manner in which the General Staff has played off the president against the prime minister or defense minister has effectively brought the military an independence not found anywhere else in Central Europe. As a result, the General Staff has acquired enormous influence vis-a-vis the defense ministry in personnel policy, financial policy, military information (intelligence and counterintelligence), professional military education, and press.

Poland's military independence has been facilitated, in part, by defense ministry instability at the top. Since August 1992 when General Wilecki became chief of staff, he has dealt with no less than six (four plus two acting) defense ministers—Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Piotr Kolodziejczyk, Jerzy Milewski (acting), Zbigniew Okonski, Andrzej Karkoszka (acting), and Stanislaw Dobrzanski. Wilecki still remains, and no set periodic rotation policy has yet been established.

Since the passage of the February 1996 Law on the Office of the Defense Minister, Poland's attempts to establish responsibility for defense ministry management and oversight of the General Staff can be best judged as admirable in concept and effort, but final judgment must be reserved until the dust has settled. In light of the evident resistance from General Wilecki and the General Staff (and the fact that Wilecki remains in his position), it will take time to distinguish merely formal reform from real reform. Even BBN director Jerzy Milewski has expressed concern. Noting in a June 1996 interview, that while a huge, formal step forward had been made with the Defense Law, Milewski mused that "practically nothing has changed."<sup>297</sup>

In this regard, the Sejm's continued limitations require concern. Since the Sejm Defense Committee's creation in 1989-90, it has neither developed expert support staff<sup>298</sup> nor exercised limited oversight. In April 1992 the Sejm Special Commission investigating Defense Minister Parys' allegations found them unsubstantiated. Then even though the Sejm Defense Commission criticized

President Walesa for events in Drawsko in 1994, the generals who refused obedience to their civilian leadership remained unpunished. In fact, the Sejm Committee remained silent in January 1995 when Walesa awarded bonuses to the three top generals who participated at Drawsko.

Sejm Committee Chairman Jerzy Szmajdzinski has publicly criticized the committee's limitations in supervising WSI and has noted that, though the Sejm's Supreme Chamber of Control has slightly improved its ability to monitor the defense budget, it will take years to develop a more effective method in accordance with developed democratic countries. Although the Sejm Defense Committee rejected the defense ministry report on politicization of the forces during the 1995 presidential election, it has not forced the issue further, almost hoping the issue would go away after the election. Nor did the Sejm Defense Committee make any clear move after General Wilecki's 14 August 1995 speech, which publicly reprimanded civilian politicians for allocating insufficient funds to the Army.

Parliament has exercised some control of the military through constrained defense budgets, though it has been limited. Even though the Sejm passed a resolution in the Spring of 1995 to increase defense expenditures to three percent of GDP, little has been done in practice. In addition, the Sejm has demonstrated little supervision over military administration. For example, it has not established rules on military rotation and term limitation of General Staff assignments. It has also failed to reform the law.

Despite its limitations, the defense ministry has evidenced significant structural and functional differentiation since the Zabinski Reform Commission of 1991. In 1992 under Suchocka the defense ministry created three deputy ministers to deal with specific issues; education, strategic policy, and infrastructure. Changes again were made in 1993 under Kolodziejczyk with two functions (military education and intelligence) moving to the General Staff and a first deputy defense minister for defense and social affairs position being created, plus the position of deputy for

logistics and legislative relations. Finally, as part of the defense reform in 1996, a fourth deputy defense minister position was established to deal with finances, and Chief of Staff Wilecki formally became State Secretary—a fifth deputy defense minister. In sum, the structural differentiation of the ministry has been impressive, though its practice has remained limited by the General Staff.

Military readiness, as in the rest of Central Europe, requires attention. Problems with readiness have been evident in the ground, naval, and air and air defense forces. They have also been evident in Poland's IFOR unit in Tuzla, Bosnia. The defense budget increase in 1995 reversed a slide that had been running since 1986. Though it now represents a commitment of only 2.5 percent of GDP, there is the promise (not yet realized) to increase this to three percent over time.

In contrast to the rest of Central Europe, Poland seems to have developed governmental national security planning institutions (e.g., KSORM) with the capacity to establish priorities among national objectives. Also in marked contrast to Hungary and the Czech Republic, Polish society holds the military in high esteem.

It is clear that a constitution, which effectively limits state institutions in existing law, is the necessary condition to establish proper control of the military in Poland. It is clear that the Polish military does not yet effectively cooperate with the civilian defense ministry and that the military is politicized. The new Polish Constitution must effectively define an apolitical role for the Army. In the end, none of the reform can be achieved until Poland acquires this new constitution, which is unlikely to occur before early 1997.

So the defense reform concept appears right on the mark. Poland's efforts to empower the defense ministry to provide accountability to society, limit the functions of the General Staff and subordinate it to civilian defense ministry authority, and to reform the armed forces through budget and acquisitions are all the right objectives. The defense reform demonstrates that—by

contrast with the situation only two years ago, many Polish leaders now understand what needs to be done in order to acquire democratic control of the military. One can only hope that they will meet with success.

## Notes

1. For a good discussion, see Les Griggs, "The Polish People's Army," in Jeffrey Simon (ed.), *NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1988), pp. 363-366.

2. See Ryszard Kuklinski, "The War Against The Nation Seen From The Inside," *Kultura* (Paris), No. 4 (April 1987).

3. Andrzej Korbonski, "Civil-Military Relations In Poland Between the Wars: 1918-1939," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Winter 1988), pp. 173-176.

4. Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, Vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 580-581.

5. Articles 37 & 39, *Constitution of the Polish People's Republic*, 22 July 1952 (Warsaw: 1978), p. 28.

6. John Tagliabue, "Poland's Senate to Be Resurrected in Election Pact," *The New York Times*, 10 March 1989, pp. A1,9.

7. Voytek Zubek, "Poland's Party Self-Destructs," *Orbis*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 182-183.

8. Leslaw Dudek, "On the Defense Doctrine of the Third Republic of Poland," *Polska Zbrojna*, 10-12 July 1992, p. III.

9. *Tygodnik Solidarnosc*, 16 February 1990, p. 17. *FBIS-EEU-90-070* (11 April 1990), p. 40.

10. Gen. Zenon Poznanski interview, *Trybuna*, 28 March 1990, p. 2. *JPRS-EER-90-086* (18 June 1990), p. 22.

11. *Polish Army: Facts and Figures (In the Transition Period)* (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defense, 1991), pp. 9-12.

12. "Defense Doctrine of the Polish Republic," *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, 26 February 1990, pp. 1-8. *JPRS-EER-90-038* (26 March 1990), p. 30.

13. *Polish Army: Facts and Figures* (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defense, 1990), p. 9.

14. During 1988-89 General Jaruzelski replaced the commanders of

all three military districts with younger generals; Zygmunt Zalewski, Tadeusz Wilecki, and Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk.

15. This observation is made by Wlodzimierz Kalicki and Krysstof Grybos, "The Hat Under the Four-Cornered Cap," (Part I) *Gazeta Wyborcza* (14-15 October 1995), pp. 14-15. *FBIS-EEU-95-207* (26 October 1995), p. 56.

16. *Republic of Poland/Constitutional Changes* (Mimeo: Polish Embassy Washington DC).

17. *Polish Army: Facts and Figures*, (1990), pp. 11-12.

18. Defense Minister Florian Siwicki 18 September 1989 speech, *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, 26 September 1989, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-89-188* (29 September 1989), p. 50.

19. Warsaw PAP, 13 December 1989. *FBIS-EEU-90-003* (4 January 1990), p. 70.

20. For a discussion of the significance of these appointments, see Thomas S. Szayna, *The Military in a Post-Communist Poland*, RAND, N-3309-USDP, 1991, p. 26.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

22. John Tagliabue, "Poland's President To Step Down," *The New York Times*, 20 September 1990, p. A8.

23. Warsaw PAP, 19 January 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-014* (22 January 1991), p. 32.

24. Jerzy Milewski interview, *Warsaw Glob*, 24-26 January 1992, p. 2. *JPRS-EER-92-023* (2 March 1992), p. 13.

25. Warsaw PAP, 24 January 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-016* (24 January 1991), p. 48.

26. Warsaw PAP, 3 January 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-003* (4 January 1991), p. 18.

27. Warsaw PAP, 13 February 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-033* (19 February 1991), p. 38.

28. *Rzeczpospolita*, 23 May 1991, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-91-104* (30 May 1991), p. 16.

29. *Report On Eastern Europe*, 22 February 1991, p. 50.

30. Jacek Merkel address, *Polska Zbrojna*, 31 January 1991, pp. 1-2. *JPRS-EER-91-041* (2 April 1991), pp. 47-48.

31. *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol 1, No. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 2.

32. Warsaw Domestic Service, 22 February 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-037* (25 February 1991), p. 43.

33. Warsaw PAP, 20 August 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-162* (21 August 1991),

p. 20.

34. Jan Bielecki interview, *Le Figaro*, 22 August 1991, p. 10. *FBIS-EEU-91-165* (26 August 1991), pp. 23-24.

35. Lech Walesa interview, *Polska Zbrojna*, 1-3 February 1991, pp. 1,2. *FBIS-EEU-91-024* (5 February 1991), p. 36. Walesa received Sejm approval in July 1991.

36. Warsaw TVP Television, 25 February 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-038* (26 February 1991), p. 27.

37. *Report On Eastern Europe*, 8 March 1991, p. 50.

38. Janusz Onyszkiewicz interview, *Polska Zbrojna*, 26-28 April 1991, pp. 1,3. *JPRS-EER-91-065* (14 May 1991), p. 43.

39. Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk interview, *Polska Zbrojna*, 7-9 June 1991, pp. 1,5. *JPRS-EER-91-104* (15 July 1991), pp. 37-38; 40-41.

40. Warsaw PAP, 8 July 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-131* (9 July 1991), p. 31.

41. Stelmaszuk interview, 7-9 June 1991, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

42. Walter J. Oleszek, "Parliamentary Developments in Poland," *CRS Review* (August 1991), p. 32.

43. Warsaw TVP, 31 October 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-212* (1 November 1991), p. 8.

44. Warsaw PAP, 10 January 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-009* (14 January 1992), p. 27.

45. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 3 January 1992, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-92-006* (9 January 1992), pp. 24-25.

46. Warsaw *Rzeczpospolita* (8-9 February 1992), p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-92-029* (12 February 1992), p. 21.

47. Warsaw TVP, 13 February 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-032* (18 February 1992), p. 23.

48. Warsaw Radio, 12 February 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-030* (13 February 1992), p. 11.

49. Warsaw Radio, 26 February 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-039* (27 February 1992), p. 12.

50. Jerzy Milewski interview, Warsaw *Glob*, 24-26 January 1992, p. 2. *JPRS-EER-92-023* (2 March 1992), p. 13.

51. Warsaw PAP, 24 March 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-059* (26 March 1992), p. 14.

52. Warsaw PAP, 23 April 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-083* (29 April 1992), p. 29.

53. "A New Martial Law?", *Nowy Swiat*, 9 April 1992, pp. 1,2. General Stelmaszuk later verified the text in an interview. See, *Nowy Swiat*, 11-12

April 1992, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-92-075* (17 April 1992), p. 20.

54. Warsaw TVP Television, 9 April 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-070* (10 April 1992), p. 20. General Tadeusz Wilecki noted that Milewski told him that his candidacy was being considered but denied that any political support was demanded in return. Warsaw PAP, 16 April 1992. *FBIS EEU-92-075* (17 April 1992), p. 21. Milewski supported Wilecki's side. See Jerzy Milewski interview, *Rzeczpospolita*, 11-12 April 1992, pp. 1,3. *JPRS-EER-92-048* (20 April 1992), pp. 38-39.

55. Warsaw PAP, 25 April 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-082* (28 April 1992), p. 20.

56. Warsaw PAP, 15 May 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-097* (19 May 1992), p. 10.

57. Warsaw PAP, 8 June 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-112* (10 June 1992), p. 26.

58. Warsaw PAP, 29 June 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-125* (29 June 1992), p. 30.

59. Warsaw Third Program Radio, 15 July 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-137* (16 July 1992), p. 30.

60. Warsaw TVP, 22 July 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-142* (23 July 1992), p. 21.

61. *Polska Zbrojna*, 6 August 1992, pp. 1,2. *FBIS-EEU-92-157* (13 August 1992), p. 24.

62. *Słowo Polskie*, 28 September 1992, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-92-198* (13 October 1992), p. 17.

63. Warsaw TVP, 22 October 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-206* (23 October 1992), p. 23. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 206 (26 October 1992), p. 5. On 30 June 1992 Janusz Onyszkiewicz replaced General Marian Sobolewski with Colonel Boleslaw Izydorczyk as head of military intelligence. Warsaw PAP, 30 June 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-127* (1 July 1992), p. 20. For a good review of the various reforms of military intelligence, see Warsaw PAP, 2 January 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-001* (4 January 1993), p. 49.

64. Romuald Szeremetiew, "Terra Incognita," *Tygodnik Solidarnosc*, 1 January 1993, p. 4. *FBIS EEU-93-010* (15 January 1993), p. 22.

65. *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer 1992), p. 13.

66. For Small Constitution text, see *Zycie Warszawy*, 19 November 1992. *JPRS-EER-93-009* (28 January 1993), pp. 29-35.

67. Warsaw PAP, 1 August 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-149* (3 August 1992), p. 15.

68. "A Little Constitution in Poland," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1992), pp. 12-13.

69. Warsaw PAP, 30 April 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-083* (3 May 1993), p. 33.

70. When the parliament was dissolved in May 1993, the 46-member

Sejm extraordinary commission had only adopted seven of the 49 articles. See Andrzej Rzeplinski, "The Polish Bill of Rights and Freedoms," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 26.

71. Warsaw PAP, 26 February 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-038* (1 March 1993), p. 28; and *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27-28 February 1993, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-93-040* (3 March 1993), p. 30.

72. Warsaw PAP, 26 March 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-059* (30 March 1993), p. 20.

73. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27-28 March 1993, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-93-060* (31 March 1993), p. 20.

74. Janusz B. Grochowski, "The Military Is Getting Restructured," *Polska Zbrojna*, 29 March 1993, pp. 1,5.

75. Deputy Defense Minister Jan Kuriata interview, *Polska Zbrojna*, 27 April 1993, pp. 1-2. Kuriata noted that his department was created from the Main Technology Institute and the Old Quartermaster services. Some of these were integrated into the defense ministry, others dissolved resulting in a reduction of 450 positions. *JPRS-EER-93-053* (10 June 1993), p. 16. An added problem was the scarcity of funds for arms acquisition. In 1993 the defense ministry had funds for only 10 new tanks from Labyed Mechanical Factories. *Polska Zbrojna*, 5 July 1993, p. 3. *JPRS-EER-93-083* (13 August 1993), p. 19.

76. For a good discussion of its goals, see: Krystian Pitkowski, "Poland Courts Western Favor," *Jane's International Defense Review*, 6/1996, p. 34.

77. Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz, *Trybuna*, 31 March 1993, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-93-067* (9 April 1993), p. 17.

78. Janusz Onyszkiewicz interview, Warsaw Radio Zet, 28 May 1993, *FBIS-EEU-93-105* (3 June 1993), p. 20.

79. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 18 September 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-180* (20 September 1993), p. 30. During the previous three years, about 60,000 servicemen and civilians of the Northern Group of Forces were withdrawn.

80. Presidential press spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski, Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 26 August 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-165* (27 August 1993), p. 24.

81. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 26 August 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-165* (27 August 1993), p. 23.

82. Warsaw PAP, 31 August 1993. *FBIS-WEU-93-168* (31 August 1993), p. 36.



83. Warsaw PAP, 15 September 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-187* (16 September 1993), p. 20.

84. Warsaw TVP, 5 October 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-192* (6 October 1993), p. 15.

85. Warsaw PAP, 18 October 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-201* (20 October 1993), p. 25.

86. Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz press conference, Warsaw PAP, 12 July 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-132* (13 July 1993), p. 16. In fact 23 officers and two conscripts ran for Sejm and Senate seats. Thirteen officers ran on the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR), one officer and one soldier for the Coalition for the Republic, two for Democratic Left Alliance, and the rest for Polish Peasant Party and others. Warsaw TVP, 25 August 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-164* (26 August 1993), p. 14.

87. *Poznan Wprost*, No. 30 (25 July 1993), p. 18.

88. Warsaw PAP, 13 August 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-156* (16 August 1993), p. 18; also Zbigniew Skoczylas interview, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 13 October 1994, pp. 10-11. *FBIS-EEU-94-200* (17 October 1994), p. 23.

89. The Union of Labor (UP) won 7.3 percent of the votes and 41 Sejm seats. Not counting the German minority with 0.7 percent, which has a handful of 4 guaranteed seats, only two other parties exceeded the 5 percent threshold and 8 percent for coalitions—the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) 5.8 percent and 22 seats and the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR) 5.4 percent and 16 seats, endorsed by Lech Walesa. For an excellent assessment of the election, see Aleksander Smolar, "The Dissolution of Solidarity," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 1994), especially pp. 72.

90. For a good discussion, see Wiktor Osiatynski, "Poland's Constitutional Ordeal," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 29-38.

91. Warsaw *Rzeczpospolita*, 27 October 1993, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-93-207* (28 October 1993), p. 21.

92. Colonel Stanislaw Koziej of the BBN outlined the defense agenda of the new Pawlak government. *Polska Zbrojna*, 2 September 1993, p. 2.

93. *Polska Zbrojna*, 9 November 1993, pp. 1,2. *FBIS-EEU-93-217* (12 November 1993), pp. 20 24; and Kolodziejczyk press conference, *Rzeczpospolita*, 18 November 1993., pp. 1,2. *FBIS-EEU-93-222* (19 November 1993), pp. 25-26. Kolodziejczyk's position on NATO suggested continuity with the previous government. He noted: "I am not a skeptic as far as our road to NATO is concerned; I was and I still am a realist. We

must strive to achieve that goal because there is no alternative." *Polska Zbrojna*, 2 September 1993, p. 2.

94. *Rzeczpospolita*, 10-11 November 1993, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-93-216* (10 November 1993), pp. 37-38.

95. On the same day both Deputy Defense Ministers Przemyslaw Grudzinski and Bronislaw Komorowski resigned.

96. Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 18 November 1993, pp. 1,2. *FBIS-EEU-93-227* (29 November 1993), pp. 19-20.

97. Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk interview, Warsaw TVP Television, 23 January 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-018* (27 January 1994), p. 28.

98. *Poznan Wprost*, No. 16 (17 April 1994), p. 34. *FBIS-EEU-94-120* (22 June 1994), p. 14.

99. Warsaw PAP, 17 January 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-014* (21 January 1994), p. 6.

100. Warsaw PAP, 17 November 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-221* (18 November 1993), p. 15.

101. Warsaw PAP, 26 November 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-227* (29 November 1993), p. 18. The goal was to amend the Small Constitution to grant executive, not just advisory, powers to the NSC which would replace the KOK. National Security Bureau chief Jerzy Milewski interview, Warsaw TVP, 14 February 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-031* (15 February 1994), pp. 36-37.

102. Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk interview, *Rzeczpospolita*, 26 January 1994, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-94-004* (1 February 1994), p. 25.

103. *Poznan Prost*, 13 February 1994, p. 6. *JPRS-EER-94-011* (30 March 1994), p. 18.

104. Warsaw TVP, 5 January 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-005* (7 January 1994), pp. 15-16.

105. *Krakow Czas Krakowski*, 5-6 March 1994, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-94-051* (16 March 1994), p. 18.

106. Warsaw TV Polonia, 25 April 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-082* (28 April 1994), p. 32.

107. Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk, Warsaw TVP, 26 March 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-062* (31 March 1994), p. 9; Warsaw PAP, 15 June 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-116* (16 June 1994), pp. 16-17.

108. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 12 April 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-071* (13 April 1994), p. 25.

109. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 3 May 1994, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-94-088* (6 May 1994), p. 27.

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110. Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 20-22 May 1994, pp. 1,2. *FBIS-EEU-94-099* (23 May 1994), p. 21.
  111. *RFE/RI Daily Report*, No. 98 (25 May 1994), p. 4. Warsaw PAP, 24 May 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-101* (25 May 1994), p. 8.
  112. *RFE/RI Daily Report*, No. 107 (8 June 1994), p. 5.
  113. Colonel Wieslaw Rozbicki, "We Have Disarmed Ourselves On Our Own," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 9 June 1994, pp. 12-13. *FBIS-EEU-94-116* (16 June 1994), p. 16.
  114. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 14 June 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-114* (14 June 1994), p. 22.
  115. According to BBN chief Henryk Goryszewski. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 23 June 1994, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-94-122* (24 June 1994), pp. 17-18.
  116. See Zbigniew Skoczylas interview, Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 13 October 1994, pp. 10-11. *FBIS-EEU-94-200* (17 October 1994), p. 22.
  117. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 11 October 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-197* (12 October 1994), p. 27; and Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 12 October 1994, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-94-198* (13 October 1994), p. 17.
  118. Janusz Onyszkiewicz interview, Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 6 October 1994, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-94-195* (7 October 1994), p. 37.
  119. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
  120. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 8 October 1994 and Warsaw PAO, 10 October 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-196* (11 October 1994), pp. 21-22.
  121. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 12 October 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-197* (12 October 1994), p. 26.
  122. Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 18 October 1994), p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-94-201* (18 October 1994), pp. 27-28.
  123. Warsaw PAP, 27 October 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-208* (27 October 1994), p. 11.
  124. Warsaw PAP, 27 October 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-209* (28 October 1994), pp. 10-11.
  125. *Ibid.*
  126. Warsaw PAP, 4 November 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-216* (8 November 1994), p. 11.
  127. Bronislaw Komorowski interview, Poznan *Gazeta Poznanska*, 26 October 1994, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-94-214* (4 November 1994), p. 17.
  128. Warsaw TV Polonia, 7 November 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-216* (8 November 1994), p. 25.
  129. Warsaw PAP, 10 November 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-218* (10 November 1994), p. 20.

130. Piotr Kolodziejczyk interview *Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza*, 28 December 1994, p. 13. *FBIS-EEU-95-003* (5 January 1995), p. 15.

131. Interview with Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko. *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 25-27 November 1994, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-94-232* (2 December 1994), pp. 17-18.

132. *Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza*, 12 December 1994, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-94-238* (12 December 1994), p. 22.

133. *Warsaw TV Polonia Network*, 21 December 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-246* (22 December 1994), pp. 21-22; and *Warsaw TV Polonia Network*, 22 December 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-247* (23 December 1994), p. 19.

134. *Warsaw TV Polonia Network*, 23 December 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-248* (27 December 1994), p. 14; and *Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network*, 28 December 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-249* (28 December 1994), p. 12.

135. Lech Walesa address to Sejm, *Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network*, 19 January 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-013* (20 January 1995), p. 16.

136. Jerzy Milewski 19 January Sejm speech, *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 20-22 January 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-014* (23 January 1995), pp. 34-36.

137. Zbigniew Okonski interview, *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 31 March-2 April 1995, p. 3.

138. The Senate with 75 votes approved the amendments to the Small Constitution on 3 February. There were no abstentions nor votes against the amendments. For a good discussion of the speed of the amendment process, see *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 20.

139. *Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network*, 30 January 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-020* (31 January 1995), p. 19.

140. *OMRI Daily Digest*, 17 February 1995, p. 3.

141. *Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network*, 1 March 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-040* (1 March 1995), p. 30.

142. *Warsaw PAP*, 7 March 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-045* (8 March 1995), p. 14.

143. *Warsaw TVP Television*, 6 March 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-044* (7 March 1995), p. 27.

144. *Warsaw PAP*, 7 March 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-045* (8 March 1995), p. 14.

145. *OMRI Daily Digest* (20 March 1995), p. 4.

146. *Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program*, 20 March 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-054* (21 March 1995), p. 11.

147. *OMRI Daily Digest* (22 March 1995), p. 4.

148. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 11 January 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-008* (12 January 1995), p. 19.
149. Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 9 May 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-090* (10 May 1995), pp. 44-45.
150. Warsaw *Polityka*, No. 4 (28 January 1995), p. 7. *FBIS-EEU-95-038* (27 February 1995), p. 48.
151. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 7 February 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-026* (8 February 1995), p. 22.
152. Warsaw *PAP*, 8 March 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-045* (8 March 1995), p. 21.
153. Defense Minister Okonski interview, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 9 March 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-046* (9 March 1995), p. 19.
154. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 16 March 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-051* (16 March 1995), 21.
155. Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 15 March 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-050* (15 March 1995), p. 27. Two weeks later no details had been revealed. Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 30 March 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-061* (30 March 1995), p. 21.
156. Lech Walesa interview, Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 20 April 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-076* (20 April 1995), p. 14.
157. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 10 May 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-090* (10 May 1995), pp. 43-44.
158. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 12 May 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-093* (15 May 1995), p. 28.
159. Poznan *Wprost*, 11 June 1995, pp. 26-28. *FBIS-EEU-95-112* (12 June 1995), pp. 52-53.
160. Warsaw *PAP*, 17 May 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-096* (18 May 1995), p. 19; *Rzeczpospolita*, 18 May 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-097* (19 May 1995), p. 18.
161. Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski interview, Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 31 March-2 April 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-066* (6 April 1995), p. 20.
162. Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 30 March 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-061* (30 March 1995), p. 21; and *Zycie Warszawy*, 7 April 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-068* (10 April 1995), p. 35. Colonel Stefan Janus, the Polish attache to Germany, became the new WSI head.
163. Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 15 May 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-095* (17 May 1995), p. 30.
164. *OMRI Daily Digest*, 9 June 1995, p. 4.

165. Warsaw PAP, 13 June 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-113* (13 June 1995), p. 36.
166. Jerzy Milewski interview, Warsaw *Polityka*, 24 June 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-121* (23 June 1995), p. 31.
167. For an excellent summary, see Włodzimierz Kalicki (with Krzysztof Grybos), "The Hat Under the Four-Cornered Cap," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 16 October 1995, pp. 18-19. *FBIS-EEU-95-202* (19 October 1995), pp. 49-54.
168. *Zycie Warszawy*, 10 January 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-007* (11 January 1995), p. 13.
169. *Poznan Wprost* (12 June 1995), pp. 26-28. *FBIS-EEU-95-112* (12 June 1995), pp. 53-54.
170. Warsaw Third Program Radio Network, 12 June 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-113* (13 June 1995), pp. 36-37. Jerzy Szmajdzinski later claimed that a classified document dated 18 October 1994 presented to the Sejm Defense Committee supported Kolodziejczk's allegations. The document bears the minister's initials but noted that the sale "was handled in tune with the law but without the minister's knowledge." Warsaw PAP, 21 June 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-121* (23 June 1995), p. 9.
171. *Poznan Wprost*, 11 June 1995, pp. 26-28, op. cit., pp. 53-54.
172. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 14 June 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-116* (16 June 1995), pp. 28-29; *Polska Zbrojna*, 16-18 June 1995, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-95-117* (19 June 1995), pp. 45-46. According to regulations, if the General Staff withdraws equipment for sale, the matter is taken over by the defense ministry Armaments and Infrastructure Department headed by Deputy Defense Minister Jan Kuriata, who must inform the defense minister.
173. Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 19 June 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-118* (20 June 1995), p. 27.
174. Warsaw PAP, 21 June 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-120* (22 June 1995), p. 42.
175. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 2 June 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-107* (5 June 1995), p. 55.
176. Mimeo: "Information on the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense," Delegation of Poland, NATO HQ, Brussels, 10 July 1995.
177. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 30 June 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-126* (30 June 1995), p. 40.
178. Jerzy Szmajdzinski interview, *Poznan Wprost*, 9 July 1995, p. 27. *FBIS-EEU-95-129* (6 July 1995), p. 32. He also noted self-critically that

secrecy had been breached by Sejm committee members and that the Sejm should set up a secret services committee of a very small number of members.

179. Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy interview, Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 22 July 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-95-143 (26 July 1995), p. 45.

180. Defense Minister Okonski interview, Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 26 July 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-145 (25 July 1995), pp. 50-51.

181. Jerzy Szmajdzinski 9 July 1995 interview, op. cit., p. 32.

182. Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 18 July 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-138 (19 July 1995), p. 36.

183. Jerzy Szmajdzinski interview, Warsaw *Trybuna*, 14-15 August 1995, p. 8. FBIS-EEU-95-160 (18 August 1995), p. 44.

184. Prime Minister Oleksy interview, *Zycie Warszawy*, 22 July 1995, op. cit., p. 45.

185. Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 24 July 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-143 (26 July 1995), p. 50.

186. London *The Times*, 9 August 1995, p. 9.

187. Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda, GS press spokesman, Warsaw TVP, 6 December 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-235 (7 December 1995), pp. 45-46.

188. BG Jozef Buczynski, Chief of Defense Ministry Cadre Department, *Polska Zbrojna*, 1-3 December 1995, pp. 1,3. FBIS-EEU-95-241 (15 December 1995), p. 32.

189. Warsaw PAP, 14 December 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-241 (15 December 1995), p. 22.

190. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 13 August 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-156 (14 August 1995), p. 46.

191. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 6 September 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-173 (7 September 1995), p. 54.

192. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 10 August 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-154 (11 August 1995), pp. 50-51.

193. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 22 August 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-162 (22 August 1995), p. 40.

194. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 16 August 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-159 (17 August 1995), pp. 33-34.

195. Tadeusz Wilecki 15 August 1995 speech, Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 16 August 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-159 (17 August 1995), p. 35.

196. "Text" of President Walesa's 22 August 1995 letter to Prime Minister Oleksy, *Polska Zbrojna*, 23 August 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-164 (24 August 1995), pp. 36-37.

197. Warsaw PAP, 31 August 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-170* (1 September 1995), p. 50.
198. Tadeusz Wilecki interview, *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 1-3 September 1995, pp. 1-3. *FBIS-EEU-95-172* (6 September 1995), p. 49.
199. *Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17 October 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-202* (19 October 1995), p. 61; *Zycie Warszawy*, 25 October 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-207* (26 October 1995), pp. 57-58.
200. Tadeusz Wilecki interview, *Warsaw Polityka*, 9 September 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-176* (12 September 1995), pp. 32-33.
201. *Warsaw TVP*, 26 September 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-187* (27 September 1995), p. 47.
202. Henryk Goryszewski interview, *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 11 October 1995, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-95-200* (17 October 1995), p. 51.
203. *OMRI Daily Digest*, 12 October 1995, p. 4.
204. General Tadeusz Wilecki, "The Defense Cannot Wait," *Polska Zbrojna*, 9 October 1995, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-95-197* (12 October 1995), p. 46.
205. General Tadeusz Wilecki, "Are the Armed Forces Against Civilian Control?" *Rzeczpospolita*, 12 October 1995, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-95-199* (16 October 1995), p. 59.
206. *Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza*, 26 October 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-208* (27 October 1995), p. 32.
207. *Warsaw TV Polonia Network*, 11 November 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-218* (13 November 1995), p. 68.
208. *Warsaw Rzeczpospolita*, 2 February 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-023* (3 February 1995), p. 9; and *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 2 February 1995, pp. 1,8. *FBIS-EEU-95-042* (3 March 1995), p. 26.
209. BG Jozef Buczynski, Chief Defense Ministry Cadre Department, *Polska Zbrojna*, 1-3 December 1995, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-95-241* (15 December 1995), p. 32.
210. *Warsaw Zycie Warszawy*, 19 November 1995, p. 5. *FBIS-EEU-95-225* (22 November 1995), p. 58.
211. BG Krzysztof Pajewski interview, *Polska Zbrojna*, 13 November 1995, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-95-224* (21 November 1995), p. 58.
212. *Warsaw Zycie Warszawy*, 1 December 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-232* (4 December 1995), p. 63.
213. *Warsaw PAP*, 7 November 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-216* (8 November 1995), p. 45.
214. Pawel Wronski, "Walesa Does Not Seem to Have the Lead in the



Military," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 7 November 1995, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-95-216* (8 November 1995), pp. 49-50.

215. Warsaw *Trybuna*, 16 November 1995, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-95-222* (17 November 1995), p. 62.

216. Warsaw PAP, 20 November 1995.

217. Warsaw PAP, 23 December 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-247* (26 December 1995), p. 43.

218. President Aleksander Kwasniewski Inaugural Address, 23 December 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-247* (26 December 1995), p. 41.

219. Warsaw TVP Television Second Program, 7 December 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-236* (8 December 1995), p. 41.

220. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 13 December 1995, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-95-239* (13 December 1995), p. 43.

221. Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy Address to the Nation, Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 20 December 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-245* (21 December 1995), p. 34.

222. Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych speech, Warsaw Polskie Radio, 21 December 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-246* (22 December 1995), p. 33.

223. Warsaw PAP, 19 January 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-014* (22 January 1996), p. 59.

224. *OMRI Daily Report*, 23 April 1996, p. 4.

225. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 22 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-079* (23 April 1996), p. 51.

226. Warsaw TV Polonia, 8 January 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-008* (11 January 1995), p. 75.

227. Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 15 July 1996, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-96-137* (16 July 1996), pp. 44-46.

228. Warsaw *Rzeczpospolita*, 18 January 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-013* (19 January 1996), pp. 56-57.

229. The legal basis for the change had begun before Dobrzanski took over. In late December 1995 Defense Ministry Legal Department Director General Kazimierz Nalaskowski noted the "drafting of a law establishing the Agency For Military Property, which will serve to relieve the military of superfluous infrastructure." He also added that modern legal foundations were being established for the Military Information Service. Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 28 December 1995, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-96-024* (5 February 1996), p. 49.

230. Warsaw *Sztandar*, 30 January 1996, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-021* (31 January 1996), p. 43.

231. For text, see *Warsaw Dziennik Ustaw*, 30 January 1996, No. 10, pp. 159-161. *FBIS-EEU-96-120* (20 June 1996), pp. 42-44.

232. The 30 January 1996 Law on Defense, which went into effect on 14 February, subordinated the Military Information Services and Academy of National Defense directly to the Defense Minister. *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 14 February 1996, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-96-035* (21 February 1996), p. 57.

233. *Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program*, 26 March 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-060* (27 March 1996), p. 43.

234. *Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27 March 1996, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-061* (28 March 1996), p. 39.

235. *Szczecin Glos Szczecinski*, 2 April 1996, p. 10. *FBIS-EEU-96-079* (23 April 1996), p. 56.

236. *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 9 February 1996, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-96-035* (21 February 1996), p. 55.

237. *Warsaw Sztandar*, 15 February 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-035* (21 February 1996), p. 56; *Polityka*, 2 March 1996, pp. 3-4, 6-7. *FBIS-EEU-96-045* (6 March 1996), p. 38.

238. *Poznan Wprost*, 17 March 1996, pp. 32-33. *FBIS-EEU-96-054* (19 March 1996), p. 60.

239. *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 12 March 1996, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-96-050* (13 March 1996), pp. 51-52.

240. Karkoszka interview, *Polska Zbrojna*, 5 March 1996, pp. 1,4. *FBIS-EEU-96-046* (7 March 1996), p. 42.

241. *Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program*, 12 March 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-049* (12 March 1996), pp. 49-50. General Mika was rumored to be closely connected with former Presidential Chancellery Chief Mieczyslaw Wachowski and Chief of Staff General Tadeusz Wilecki. *Warsaw Zycie Warszawy*, 8 March 1996, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-048* (11 March 1996), p. 43.

242. *Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza*, 12 April 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-073* (15 April 1996), pp. 47-48.

243. *Warsaw Polityka*, 2 March 1996, pp. 3-4, 6-7. *FBIS-EEU-96* (6 March 1996), pp. 40-41.

244. *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 29 February 1996, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-96-042* (1 March 1996), p. 45.

245. Stanislaw Dobrzanski interview, *Warsaw Trybuna*, 24-25 February 1996, pp. 1,7. *FBIS-EEU-96-039* (27 February 1996), p. 49.

246. *Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17 May 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-097* (17 May 1996), p. 55.

247. I believe that much of the concept has already been developed by Jerzy Milewski in January 1995 when he was First Deputy Defense Minister. At that time Milewski argued that if Poland received a budget of 3.5 percent of GDP, the defense ministry could develop a force of 234,000. If 3.0 percent, a force of 200,000; or if 2.5 percent (as at present) then 160,000.

248. Warsaw PAP, 19 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-078* (22 April 1996), p. 34.

249. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 2 April 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-065* (3 April 1996), p. 32.

250. Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 27-28 April 1996, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-084* (30 April 1996), pp. 60-61.

251. *Ibid.*

252. Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 6 May 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-088* (6 May 1996), p. 40.

253. Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 6 May 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-088* (6 May 1996), pp. 40-41.

254. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 10 May 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-093* (13 May 1996), p. 70.

255. Warsaw Third Program Radio Network, 14 June 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-116* (14 June 1996), p. 48.

256. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 9 July 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-133* (10 July 1996), p. 51.

257. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 11 July 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-135* (12 July 1996), pp. 46-47.

258. Maj. Gen. Kazimirz Dziok interview, Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 8 March 1996, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-96-051* (14 March 1996), pp. 46-47.

259. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 20 February 1996, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-035* (21 February 1996), p. 57.

260. Warsaw *Sztandar*, 19 April 1996, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-96-078* (22 April 1996), p. 55.

261. Warsaw PAP, 19 February 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-035* (21 February 1996), p. 57. In April 1995, the Swidnik Polish Aircraft Plant, which produces the Sokol, sold 35 helicopters to the Republic of Korea.

262. Warsaw TVP Television First Program, 13 February 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-031* (14 February 1996), p. 39.

263. Warsaw *Sztandar*, 8 May 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-091* (9 May 1996), pp. 61-62.

264. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 22 May 1996, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-101* (23

May 1996), p. 45.

265. In early February the Netherlands allegedly offered 20 F-16s to Poland for \$6.052 million, while the U.S. was asking \$10 million. *Warsaw Sztandar*, 8 February 1996, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-96-028* (9 February 1996), p. 46.

266. *Warsaw Sztandar*, 24 June 1996, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-96-124* (26 June 1996), p. 45.

267. *Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza*, 8 March 1996, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-047* (8 March 1996), p. 44.

268. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 11 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-072* (12 April 1996), p. 2.

269. Warsaw TVP Television Second Program, 27 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-083* (29 April 1996), p. 50.

270. *Warsaw Zycie Warszawy*, 22 March 1996, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-96-058* (25 March 1996), p. 47.

271. Warsaw PAP, 4 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-070* (10 April 1996), p. 23.

272. First deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka interview, *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 16 May 1996, pp. 1,4. *FBIS-EEU-96-100* (22 May 1996), p. 45.

273. Warsaw PAP, 18 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-080* (24 April 1996), p. 20.

274. *Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program*, 5 June 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-109* (5 June 1996), p. 42.

275. *Warsaw Rzeczpospolita*, 27 February 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-039* (27 February 1996), p. 45.

276. *Warsaw Polska Zbrojna*, 6 May 1996, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-96-089* (7 May 1996), p. 41.

277. *Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program*, 24 March 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-058* (25 March 1996), p. 47.

278. Warsaw PAP, 7 June 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-112* (10 June 1996), p. 52.

279. *Warsaw Zycie Warszawy*, 11 June 1996, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-114* (12 June 1996), p. 52.

280. *Warsaw Rzeczpospolita*, 10-11 January 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-030* (13 February 1996), p. 53.

281. *Warsaw Zycie Warszawy*, 19 April 1996, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-078* (22 April 1996), p. 54.

282. *Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program*, 21 March 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-057* (22 March 1996), p. 59.

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283. Warsaw *Sztandar*, 18 April 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-077 (19 April 1996), p. 44.
284. Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 7 March 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-048 (11 March 1996), pp. 34-35.
285. Colonel Włodzimierz Sasiadek interview, Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 13 May 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-094 (14 May 1996), p. 53.
286. Warsaw PAP, 24 April 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-084 (30 April 1996), p. 8.
287. Warsaw *Trybuna*, 21 June 1996, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-96-123 (25 June 1996), p. 46. *OMRI Daily Report*, 16 June 1996, p. 4.
288. Warsaw *Polityka* (18 May 1996), No. 20, pp. 31-32. FBIS-EEU-96-121 (21 June 1996), p. 38.
289. Warsaw *Rzeczpospolita*, 22 February 1996, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-96-038 (26 February 1996), p. 58.
290. Bratislava *SME*, 21 February 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-041 (29 February 1996), p. 46.
291. Warsaw Third Program Radio, 3 May 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-087 (3 May 1996), p. 23.
292. Warsaw *Zycie Warszawy*, 7 May 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-090 (8 May 1996), p. 54.
293. Defense Minister Stanisław Dobrzański interview, *Polska Zbrojna*, 12-14 April 1996, pp. 1, 3. FBIS-EEU-96-074 (16 April 1996), p. 54.
294. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 5-6 June 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-110 (6 June 1996), p. 58.
295. Draft Constitution, Warsaw *Rzeczpospolita*, 21 June 1996, pp. I-VIII. FBIS-EEU-96-135-S (12 July 1996), pp. 1-23.
296. Warsaw *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 7 June 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-111 (7 June 1996), p. 45.
297. Jerzy Milewski interview, Warsaw *Polityka*, 1 June 1996, pp. 17-18. FBIS-EEU-96-110 (6 June 1996), p. 56.
298. The Sejm Defense and Security Committee employs two experts to provide support and analysis. The Sejm Finance Committee which oversees the entire budget employs five staffers. The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee has no permanent experts. Personal interviews, 23 and 24 July 1996.

Map 4 - Hungary



Source: CIA Map 802212

## V. HUNGARY: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE AND REFORM

Hungary's revolution resembled Poland's six-stage evolutionary process more than the revolutions in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. It differed from Czechoslovakia in that it lacked a politician like Vaclav Havel who had gained the confidence of society through long years of shared battles. Polish reform was led by Lech Walesa and indigenous institutions—the Church and Solidarity—from outside the government with the effective cooperation of a corrupt party apparatus.<sup>1</sup>

In Hungary, with the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP) influence waning as a result of years of deepening crisis within the party apparatus and economic degeneration in the country, Communist reformers inside the system engineered reform in league with outside opposition. When the previously disunited Hungarian opposition reconciled its differences, the HSWP reform leadership committed itself to make the transition to a democratic multi-party system.

A major step toward coming to grips with Hungary's Communist past occurred on 16 June 1989 when over 100,000 people took part in public funeral services for former [Prime Minister] Imre Nagy whom the Communists had executed three decades earlier. That summer Hungary began to dismantle the "iron curtain" on its western border and in September opened the border for East German refugees to travel to the Federal Republic of Germany. This action sparked the exodus of East Germans to the

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West and ignited the revolution in East Germany that created a domino effect in Czechoslovakia.

During the summer and early fall the HSWP's round-table negotiations with eight opposition parties resulted in an 18 September accord clearing the way for multi-party elections. At the 6-9 October 1989 HSWP Congress, the reform wing of the HSWP led by Imre Pozsgay transformed the discredited HSWP by changing its name to the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) and adopting a progressive program that embraced multi-party parliamentary democracy, respect for civil liberties, and a mixed economy.

Most observers anticipated that the March 1990 parliamentary elections would radically reduce Communist HSP representation and result in a coalition government including a number of opposition parties. In anticipation, Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth, in an effort to insulate the military from the political change, announced on 1 December 1989 a major defense ministry and military reform, which included changing the military command.

After the first free parliamentary elections were held in March 1990,<sup>2</sup> the two major winners—the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) with 165 of the Parliament's 386 seats and Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) with 92 seats—formed a pact in late April, and a new non-Communist government was sworn into power on 23 May 1990. Under terms of the agreement, Jozsef Antall, a member of the MDF, became prime minister. The first stage of Hungary's revolution was completed in August 1990, when Arpad Goncz of the AFD was named president.

The second stage of Hungary's revolution commenced as relations between the two major parties deteriorated at the end of 1990 and through 1991. Significant MDF-AFD differences developed over spheres of authority between the prime minister and president; these were challenged and resolved in the Constitutional Court.

The third stage commenced after the government's successful Constitutional Court challenge at the end of 1991. In 1992 a new



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defense reform was implemented to redress the effects of the 1 December 1989 reform, and the MDF significantly tightened its political control over the defense ministry and other key government institutions.

The fourth stage began with the May 1994 parliamentary elections, which returned the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) to power. The new challenge became the need to write a constitution that all the Hungarian electorate would consider legitimate and to unify the General Staff with the defense ministry and civilianize the ministry of defense.

### Step-by-Step Defense Reform

As it was in Poland, the purpose of Hungary's defense reform has been to establish democratic [Parliament and government] command and control over the defense ministry and Hungarian People's Army (now Magyar Honvedseg). The reform also had to clarify lines of authority between the president and government [prime minister and civilian defense minister] in peacetime and in wartime. It had to establish defense ministry oversight and management of the General Staff. Finally, the reform had to remove Soviet and the former Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP) influence from the military establishment to ensure that Hungarian military forces were sufficient to guarantee the integrity of Hungary, and to return the armed forces to the service of Hungarian society.

Under the old system, Hungarian national security policy (as in Poland) has been formulated by a small group headed by the HSWP First Secretary in his capacity as president of the Defense Council, and in the HSWP Central Committee by the secretary in charge of national defense, with perhaps the addition of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the defense minister. In July 1989, Prime Minister Nemeth noted that the new national defense policy needed to make clear that Hungary's national armed forces were in the hands of democratic power under appro-

priate and strict control. When asked at the time who was commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Nemeth answered, "It is not possible at present to give an unequivocal reply to this."<sup>3</sup>


During 1989 the Communist-dominated Ministry of Justice drafted an entirely new Hungarian Constitution (to succeed the 1949 Communist Constitution), based upon the principles articulated at the round-table talks that took place in the spring. The Parliament which passed the Constitution in October 1989 was still dominated by members of the Communist Party.

According to constitutional changes in October 1989, National Assembly representatives are elected for four-year terms, and the president, who is elected by the National Assembly for five years, is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.<sup>4</sup> Only Parliament is entitled to make decisions concerning the use of the armed forces.<sup>5</sup> According to Article 19 of the Constitution, the National Assembly has the power to declare the state of war and conclusion of peace. In the event of war, it declares a state of emergency and sets up the Defense Council. If the National Assembly is unable to convene, the president assumes these powers.

When so empowered, the Defense Council—chaired by the president<sup>6</sup>—has authority to deploy armed forces abroad and within the country.<sup>7</sup> During peacetime, the prime minister, elected by a majority of the National Assembly, and the ministers of the Government "control the operation of the armed forces, the police, and other organs of policing."<sup>8</sup>

On 1 December 1989, Hungary's defense reform divided the defense ministry into two separate entities; a defense ministry subordinate to the prime minister and a Command of the Hungarian Army (HA) subordinate to the president (see Table 5.1 below).<sup>9</sup> When the defense reform was announced, the Nemeth government's intention was to remove the armed forces, which until then were under direct party command, from the direct influence of the future non-Communist government, which was expected to exercise power following the then anticipated March 1990 multiparty elections.

The new reform was clearly intended to put the armed forces under Communist control by relocating the core of the army cadres from the defense ministry to a Hungarian Army Commander subordinate to the president. As a result of the reform, the president—who was expected to be Communist-reformer Imre Pozsgay—became the commander-in-chief of the



army. Whereas in most other parliamentary systems a clear line of authority exists from prime minister to defense minister to the chief of staff, after the December 1989 Hungarian defense reform the line of authority went directly from the president to the Commander of the Hungarian Army to the Chief of Staff, leaving the government basically out of the chain of command, one unfortunate result of which was increased tension between the president and the civilian government. Subordinate to the prime minister (before elections Miklos Nemeth; Jozsef Antall of the MDF after) and Council of Ministers is the defense minister (then Ferenc Karpati; after May 1990 MDF civilian Lajos Fur), who maintains a relatively small staff (138 people) and is responsible for state administration and military policy. After the 1989 defense reform, the defense ministry dealt more with social and political questions, matters which Parliament normally had dealt with.<sup>10</sup>

After the 1989 defense reform, the Army remained subordinate to the President of the Republic (then Matyas Szuros; since August 1990 Arpad Goncz of the AFD), and control over the Army was now exercised by a new (as of March 1990) Commander of the Hungarian Army (I.t. Gen. Kalman Lorincz) who, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, supervises actual military tasks.<sup>11</sup> Under the defense reform, the president has authority to appoint generals.<sup>12</sup> According to Lt. Gen. Laszlo Borsits:

- The higher military leadership is exercised by *the Commander-in-Chief, through the General Staff.*
- The troops are directly commanded by the field army corps staff and the home air defense corps staff.
- On the operational-tactical level of command *the corps, brigade, and battalion staffs* perform the task of leadership.<sup>13</sup>

Concerns about control of Hungarian forces during an emergency and authority to make the transition to war surfaced in the

October 1989 National Assembly debate over the new draft constitution. At the time, only a "qualified majority...in the National Assembly"<sup>14</sup> could declare a state of emergency or war—which condition activates a Defense Council to exert extraordinary measures.

Motivated by somber memories of the Cold War and the Soviet control of Hungarian armed forces, subsequent National Assembly Defense Committee sessions were determined to reform the military. Sensitivity was evident in discussions about the illegality of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the problems of Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP) control over the army, and Hungary's participation in the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion. Bela Biszku, who had been HSWP Central Committee secretary between 1962-1978, told the National Assembly's Defense Committee on 3 January 1990 that the related command for intervention in 1968 was "most certainly" given to the Hungarian defense minister by the Warsaw Pact's Combined Armed Forces CinC.<sup>15</sup> In response, the National Assembly amended the defense law during February 1990 so as to grant itself the authority to decide on the deployment of armed forces abroad or in Hungary.<sup>16</sup> After the Defense Committee blamed the HSWP for the illegal 1968 invasion, it concluded on 2 March 1990 "that party direction of the army must in all events be abolished."<sup>17</sup>

After the March 1990 elections, the governing MDF coalition and opposition Alliance of Free Democrats agreed to many significant amendments to the new constitution. The National Assembly amended the Constitution on 19 June 1990 to change some of the more objectionable provisions of the former Communist government that related to the use of force. For example, Chapter VIII "The Armed Forces and Police" now specifically required a two-thirds (rather than simple) majority of the National Assembly to employ these forces, thereby ensuring parliamentary control over them.<sup>18</sup>

To reform defense intelligence, the Council of Ministers established four offices (two civilian and two military): The National

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Security Office under Maj. Gen. Sandor Simon and the Information Office under Maj. Gen. Kalman Kocsis have nationwide responsibility, are under independent jurisdiction, and are overseen by a civilian minister without portfolio, Andras Galszecszy, who receives directions through the Office of the Prime Minister. The third and fourth offices, Military Security under Maj. Gen. Karoly Gyaraki and Military Intelligence under Maj. Gen. Janos Kovacs are part of the Hungarian Defense Forces, funded through the defense budget, and overseen by Defense Minister Lajos Fur.<sup>19</sup>

On 14 February 1990, the military security function was transferred to the Hungarian Defense Forces from the Interior Ministry III/IV group command, becoming an independent organization commanded by a professional officer. Its functions are to protect against foreign intelligence activities, prevent insurrections and danger to military preparedness, provide physical security for military facilities, and protect persons performing confidential functions.<sup>20</sup> Both the Military Intelligence Office and the (civilian) Information Office have responsibility to operate globally while the National Security Office and Military Security Office are confined to operating only in Hungary.

Essentially the goal of the general defense reform amounted to the reassumption of national control of the Hungarian military from the Soviet Union. But the defense reform also created new problems between presidential and governmental authority. After Parliament elected Arpad Goncz (AFD) president on 3 August 1990,<sup>21</sup> he created a Military Office to liaise with the Commander of the Hungarian Defense Forces. Maj. Gen. Robert Pick who manages the activities of the office, informs President Goncz on subjects related to general military policy and military diplomacy, and acts as the core staff of the commander-in-chief during the transition period between peace and war.<sup>22</sup>

Although the December 1989 reform was successfully implemented, intervening events during 1990—such as parliamentary elections resulting in 6 parties in Parliament and producing a prime minister and president from different political parties—and

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the 1991 collapse of the Warsaw Pact and withdrawal of Soviet forces—created new civil-military problems for Hungary. In fact, one might argue that the 1989 defense reform created more problems than it solved because it contributed to confusion and differences of opinion over span of authority between the commander of the Hungarian Army and the defense minister. Though Lajos Fur replaced Ferenc Karpati on 23 May 1990, becoming Hungary's first civilian defense minister after four decades of Communist rule,<sup>23</sup> by September Fur was expressing concern about limits to his authority—apparently feeling that officer training institutes, the Institute of Military History, and the management of all cultural areas under the military sphere of authority should be under his authority.<sup>24</sup>

In other words, although Hungary was the first Central European state to have a civilian defense minister, no Hungarian civilian exercised the kind of effective oversight or control over military matters exercised by civilian Deputy Defense Ministers Rasek in Czechoslovakia (since December 1989) and Komorowski and Onyszkiewicz in Poland (since April 1990). The defense ministry of 138 people<sup>25</sup> dealt mainly with social and political questions with which Parliament was concerned. The Commander of the Hungarian Army and the armed forces remained separate and beyond Defense Minister Fur's purview.

These problems and political differences soon escalated into significant tension in civil-military relations. An October 1990 transport strike brought these differences to a test. When Fur and Prime Minister Antall wanted to call up military transport to break the strike, President Goncz, as commander-in-chief, refused and threatened a constitutional crisis. Though the prime minister and defense minister backed off, Defense Minister Fur noted in an interview shortly after this incident that the real issue was the relationship of the defense ministry to the armed forces:

[O]ne of the important things to settle is the relationship between the [defense] ministry and the army commanders.

The unclarified questions emerge not so much in the relationship between the commander-in-chief, the ministry, and the Army, but rather in the relationship between the Army and the ministry.<sup>26</sup>

Soon after the blockade the government questioned the president's authority to command the army and initiated a review of the issue in the Constitutional Court.

During the spring of 1991, President Goncz (Alliance of Free Democrats—AFD), Prime Minister Antall, and Defense Minister Fur (Hungarian Democratic Forum—MDF) continued to voice differences of opinion over control of the armed forces. Lajos Fur argued that the leadership of the army was oversized, that it was unnecessary for the Hungarian Army Command and the General Staff to function in parallel, and therefore it would be desirable to adopt a leadership structure consistent with other European democracies.<sup>27</sup>

President Goncz countered, "Attempts are being made to transform the Army by abolishing the command system, which I do not agree with ...[adding that] the argument is not yet closed."<sup>28</sup> Tension reached such a pitch that Lt. Gen. Kalman Lorincz, Commander of the Hungarian Army, submitted his resignation to President Goncz on 29 March 1991. Though neither Goncz, Antall, nor Fur would accept Lorincz's resignation,<sup>29</sup> they recognized this civil-military issue to be a serious problem and mandated a new defense reform that was developed at the end of 1991.

Parliamentary Defense Committee member Bela Kiraly argued that the president is clearly the commander-in-chief but that the Constitution places two restrictions on his command. First, it authorizes the National Assembly to decide on deploying armed forces within Hungary or abroad. Second, it requires the prime minister's countersignature regarding every action involving national defense. Upon the National Assembly's declaration of war or emergency, presidential authority and responsibility expand. In sum, Bela Kiraly felt that, although no constitutional



change was required, the Commander of the Hungarian Army position should be abolished, that its responsibilities should be transferred to the Hungarian Chief of Staff; and that the chief of staff be unconditionally subordinated to the defense minister.<sup>30</sup>


During 1991 two further tests brought the issue of military command to public attention—the failed Soviet coup and increasing problems along the Yugoslav border. The failed Soviet coup in August 1991 only partially tested Hungary's defense machinery because the last Soviet troops had already left Hungary. (In contrast, Poland still had Soviet troops on its soil). When the National Security Cabinet met on 19 August to examine the situation, it noted that the borders were calm and concluded that Hungary was in no immediate danger. Antall met with members of the six legislative parties, who expressed full unity with the approach taken by the Cabinet that Hungary should take a restrained and moderate approach to the affair.<sup>31</sup> Hence, no military orders or special measures, which would have required a National Assembly vote, were issued.<sup>32</sup>

The second test involved the constant overflights of Yugoslav aircraft. Hungary's response also evidenced restraint. Despite the fact that no military mobilization measures had been issued and heightened alert of Border Guard and Hungarian Armed Forces had been handled normally, on 18 September 1991 Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Janos Deak expressed concern to the National Assembly Defense Committee that if an emergency arose—for example if Hungarian barracks were attacked—Lt. Gen. Kalman Lorincz lacked the authority to react rapidly. Deak argued that while Lorincz had mobilization authority, current constitutional stipulations presupposed that the decision either would be obstructed by the National Assembly (which requires a two-thirds vote) or would be made only very slowly.<sup>33</sup>

Due to these external tests as well as increasing internal tensions between President Góncz and Prime Minister Antall, Defense Minister Fur in August 1991 sought an unequivocal Constitutional Court interpretation concerning peacetime direc-

tion of Hungarian Defense Forces. The Court rendered its decision on 23 September, ruling that the president as commander-in-chief may issue only guidelines, not orders, to the military. The Court concluded that the direction of the functioning of the armed forces fell within the authority of the branch that exercised executive power (i.e., the prime minister and defense minister).<sup>34</sup>

In response to the Constitutional Court's decision, at the end of 1991 the defense ministry began a reorganization (see Table 5.2 below) to redress the problems created by the December 1989 defense reform. The new 1992 defense reform, which accelerated personnel changes in the defense ministry, had the dual purpose of subordinating the military command to the defense ministry in



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accordance with the Constitutional Court decision and replacing career military officers with civilians in order to strengthen Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) control over the ministry. The new appointments increased civilian representation by reducing the concentration of staff officers who had been Communist party members in the defense ministry, replacing them in important mid-management positions with civilians sympathetic to the MDF.

President Goncz remains the commander-in-chief of the armed forces with specific duties and responsibilities which though defined by the Constitutional Court, remain untested. Different Hungarian views continue to exist as to whether the president will exert real (as against symbolic) powers during wartime. The debate is exacerbated by the untested role of the Defense Council, which is chaired by the president, but whose members also include the Speaker and leaders of the political parties from the National Assembly and the prime minister, the ministers, as well as the Commander of the Hungarian Army and the Chief of Staff from the Government.<sup>35</sup> Thus the powers of the president may be sharply curtailed by the predominance of political opponents on the Defense Council. Despite these nagging concerns, the 1992 defense reform had gone a long way toward solving many problems that resulted from the 1989 defense reform in peacetime. HDF Commander Col. Gen. Lorincz remains subordinate to Goncz *when* the president is authorized to exercise emergency powers during crisis and war. During peacetime, Defense Minister Fur provides direction to Lorincz, who exercises command and control of the armed forces. Also subordinate to Fur is a political state secretary and an administrative state secretary, who supervises three deputy state secretaries.

By early December 1991, as colleagues to Political State Secretary Erno Raffay and Deputy State Secretary Rudolf Joo, more new civilians had been appointed to mid-management positions in the defense ministry. Dr. Csaba Hende (MDF) became the ministerial parliamentary secretary, Dr. Zoltan Bansagi (MDF) headed the

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ministry's department for legal and administrative matters, and Laszlo Szoke (MDF) took over the department for social relations.<sup>36</sup> Thus, the MDF dominated the defense ministry.

To get further clarification on significant matters of disagreement, the 11-member Constitutional Court has become Hungary's locus of adjudication. Prime Minister Jozsef Antall asked the Constitutional Court on 25 May 1992 to rule on the president's scope of authority in firing government officials, an issue that arose over President Goncz's refusal to countersign Antall's order to fire the director of Hungarian Television, Elemer Hankiss. Antall asked the Constitutional Court to declare Goncz's obstructionism unconstitutional and, indeed, on 8 June 1992, the Court, in a 7-3 decision, ruled that the President could block the Prime Minister's appointments and dismissals only if legal procedures were not followed, the candidates were incompetent, or if—in accepting the government's decisions—Hungarian democracy would be threatened.<sup>37</sup>

In August 1992, a proposed draft national defense bill attempted to eliminate "management duplications" by expanding the government's management authority. The Parliament (or, in case of declared emergency, the Defense Council) would be responsible for approving the basic principles of national defense, directions of military development, and the budget. During peacetime, all other decisions related to army mobilization, location, leadership, and training of troops—as well as partial deployment in case of external threat and until Parliament can decide—would come under government authority. The president would continue to have the title of commander-in-chief with no authority to command the Armed Forces. In peacetime his authority would be limited to approval of defense plans and to appoint and release high-ranking commanders in accord with the responsible minister's recommendation.<sup>38</sup>

In September 1992, the Constitutional Court approved Defense Minister Fur's request to fuse the Commander of the Hungarian Army and the Chief of the General Staff in a single position with-

out a constitutional amendment.<sup>39</sup> In February 1993, Fur submitted two related draft laws on defense to Parliament. One dealt with necessary constitutional changes; the other was the defense law itself.

The first law, which followed an April 1991 Constitutional Court decision<sup>40</sup> (it adds Article 19(e) to the Hungarian Constitution), provides a new power for the prime minister or defense minister. Under the new law, the government may, in three concrete cases (invasion of Hungarian airspace, surprise air attack, or surprise invasion), order immediate military action of not more than two Army brigades (5,000 troops) without specific agreement from the president and without declaration of emergency by Parliament.<sup>41</sup> The government, however, is obliged to inform Parliament of any such decision.

The second law dealt with the organization of the border guard; it defined the circumstances in which it fell within the jurisdiction of the military (as it had) or the police. The decision was significant because of the Yugoslav crisis. If the border guard were under the military, ultimate control would lie with Parliament; if it were under the police, then it would be under the prime minister, or minister of interior. In the bill, the border guard falls under the police (except during a state of war) and is subject to executive control. Both laws were enacted as constitutional amendments, by an overwhelming parliamentary majority on 7 December 1993.<sup>42</sup>

**Armed forces reform.** At the end of 1992, Hungarian Defense Forces comprised 100,000 compared to its 1989 size of 155,700. The number of conscripts declined from 91,900 in 1989 to 51,100; professionals from 30,500 to 22,900 (of which 8,500 were NCOs); and civilian employees from 33,300 to 26,000.<sup>43</sup> During 1992 Hungarian Defense Forces were reorganized; army brigades of a new type were created and the organizing and forming of mobile units began.<sup>44</sup> In addition, a training center for peacekeeping forces was designed to train the first Hungarian peacekeeping company.<sup>45</sup>

In the second phase in the Army's development (which would

last until 1995), the forces would be stabilized and conditions established for modernization after 1995, when funds would become available. The 1993 defense budget of 64 billion forints, which was increased to 66.5 billion forints in 1994, left very little room for modernization because 91.2 percent of the budget was needed for day-to-day operations.<sup>46</sup> Immediate aid for Hungarian Defense Forces came from Germany in April 1993, with its decision to supply spare parts as well as electronic and training aircraft from stocks of the former East German army.<sup>47</sup> Arms also came from Russia, with its decision to supply 28 MIG-29s in October-November 1993 to cover \$800 million of its \$1.6 billion debt to Hungary.<sup>48</sup> As a compensation, the National Assembly earmarked 1.1 billion forints to install 113 electronic Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) systems to the Hungarian Air Force, to be installed during 1994.<sup>49</sup>

On 23 February 1993, Laszlo Szendrei (a Hungarian Democratic Forum member of Parliament) replaced Erno Raffay as political state secretary of defense.<sup>50</sup> On 31 March 1993 Rudolf Joo, an MDF civilian, replaced Lt. Gen. Antal Annus as administrative state secretary, thus placing the defense ministry's top three posts in civilian hands.<sup>51</sup> On 14 April 1993 the National Assembly unanimously approved Resolution No. 27 concerning the Basic National Defense Principles of the Hungarian Republic.<sup>52</sup> Also on 7 December the National Assembly adopted (with 277 deputies for, 1 vote against, and 1 abstention) a new Defense Law to come into effect on 1 January 1994 establishing that civilian service in the military would be 18 months and military service would be 12 months.<sup>53</sup>

When Yeltsin survived the October 1993 coup attempt in Moscow, Lajos Fur concluded that he survived largely because "the Army, with its neutrality...unambiguously committed itself to support Yeltsin."<sup>54</sup> President Goncz said, "I can promise one thing: I will never give the order to shoot on the Hungarian Parliament... [adding that] the struggle in Russia will lead Hungary to work harder than ever for membership in the EU and NATO."<sup>55</sup>

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In October 1993, the 88th Airborne Infantry Battalion was established as part of the Hungarian Defense Forces' restructuring. As Lt. Gen. Bela Gyuricza noted, its function was to make available to the military leadership a rapid deployment unit capable of preventing and managing armed conflicts and suitable to perform UN peacekeeping functions.<sup>56</sup>

On 12 December 1993, Prime Minister Antall died ending the government's legal mandate. The interim government, under Interior Minister Peter Boross, initially operated with reduced powers until the president nominated Boross to succeed Antall. (Failure to appoint a government within 40 days would result in new elections called by the president). Parliament ultimately confirmed Boross by a majority vote.

On 14 January 1994, the Government announced that it would merge the defense ministry and the General Staff of the Army Command in accordance with the 7 December 1993 Defense Law, thereby placing the armed forces under civilian control in peacetime and war. This was scheduled to occur when General Kalman Lorincz reached the mandatory retirement age of 55 in February.<sup>57</sup> Lt. Gen. Janos Deak, the Chief of Staff, assumed the post of Commander of the Hungarian Army on 1 March and was promoted to colonel general on 15 March. According to Lajos Fur, as of 1 March 1994, the defense ministry would have three state secretaries: political, administrative, and chief of staff.<sup>58</sup>

### Post-Communist Return and a New Constitution

On 30 June 1993, the Hungarian Cabinet submitted a draft bill aimed at modifying the Electoral Law of 1989. It raised the electoral threshold from 4 percent to 5 percent and modified the procedure for by-elections. Now all by-elections would be held on the same day once every year, excluding general election years.

Hungary's May 8 and 29, 1994 parliamentary elections (like those in Poland in September 1993) brought the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) back to power; of the 386-seat Parliament, the

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HSP gained 209 (or 54 percent) of the seats with 33 percent of the vote. The second place Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) received 70 (18 percent) seats on a popular vote of 20 percent, followed by the former Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) with 37 seats (9.6 percent of the vote). Although the socialists had secured a parliamentary majority, they decided to enter into negotiations and form a coalition government with the AFD. Thus with 51 percent of the popular vote, the HSP-AFD coalition parties had the necessary two-thirds parliamentary majority to amend the Constitution.<sup>59</sup>

Hungary's 1994 vote-to-seat disproportionality was remarkably similar to 1990's and resulted from Hungary's "mixed" electoral system. Out of the 386 deputies, 176 are chosen in two-round (majority and plurality), single-district elections, while up to 152 seats are filled in proportional votes in 20 regional constituencies. At least 58 representatives are chosen from a national compensation list.<sup>60</sup>

Similar to Poland, one of the consequences of the Hungarian electoral system is that, while disproportionality magnifies the strength of the winning parties and enhances governability, it is wholly ill-suited when it comes to the needs of constitutional politics. The Constitution's amending formula, which allows two-thirds of the Parliament to revise the Constitution, *cannot* be left as it is. Theoretically, the new socialist-liberal (HSP-AFD) coalition could unilaterally act under the inherited amending formula to change the Constitution along with the current two-thirds electoral law and permanently undermine the chances of the weak opposition.

Both the electoral law and the Constitution's amending formula present dangers to Hungary's parliamentary democracy and constitutional stability. One indication of this danger occurred on 30 September 1994 when all four opposition parties walked out when voting began on a constitutional amendment to voting procedures for local elections. But the HSP-AFD coalition, with two-thirds majority, voted to change the Constitution to simplify



procedures for local election and improve the chances of the incumbent left-of-center majority. This vote led to charges of a constitutional dictatorship.<sup>61</sup>

The procedures for amending the Constitution need to be changed to bring the past five-year transition period to a legal close. Though Hungary needs a new procedure to prevent ceaseless parliamentary tinkering with the Constitution, the new socialist-liberal coalition is *not* in a good position to initiate a new phase of constitution making. First, although it holds 72 percent of the seats, its 51 percent electoral base is too narrow to establish anything but a winner's constitution. Second, neither the HSP (whose forerunner HSWP imposed a pseudo-constitution on the country) nor the AFD is well-situated to sponsor a new constitution. But Hungary needs to revise its Constitution to deal with the following problems: it must clarify the role of the president, reduce the Constitutional Court's powers, and redefine the role of the public prosecutor.

During 1995, Hungary planned to draft and pass a new Hungarian Constitution because the coalition parties were committed to this goal. They have formed a 27-member parliamentary committee (HSP will have 10; AFD 5, and opposition parties 10) to draft the new document, working under the minister of justice. Though they planned to present the new constitution for popular ratification by 20 August 1995, when new presidential elections were required,<sup>62</sup> the process took longer than expected and has been pushed well into 1997.

Several items on the constitutional agenda include presidential powers, guaranteeing judicial independence by a National Judiciary Council, redefining the role of the public prosecutor, reforming local government, and trimming the Constitutional Court's functions.<sup>63</sup> A new constitutional amending formula will propose requiring a second parliamentary session to ratify amendments made by a previous one. Finally, a new electoral law will propose abolishing the second electoral round, keeping a mixed system but taking the principle of proportionality into account.

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The six-party parliamentary committee worked throughout the Fall of 1995 preparing the new Constitution. Though the Justice Ministry's draft did not foresee any major changes to the existing Constitution, more precise language needs to be developed for the powers of the president, decide whether the prosecutor's office should be independent or under the government, and whether the Parliament should remain unicameral or become bicameral.

Because the HSP-AFD Socialist-liberal coalition has 72 percent of the seats and only a two-thirds vote is necessary for ratification, in order to achieve a broad-based consensus, the six parliamentary parties have agreed to submit the draft to Parliament *only* if at least five of the six parties can agree. Though the intention was to submit the draft Constitution to Parliament before the end of 1995 so as to be in place in 1996, delays have occurred pushing this date to 1997.


Despite the good intentions, consensus apparently has been elusive. On 6 June 1996 the Parliament ended a debate on the draft Constitution. While the ruling coalition want the final text by December 1996, the opposition parties now just want amendments to the present Constitution and to postpone the draft until after the 1998 elections.<sup>64</sup> When the Parliament began debating the new draft Constitution on 19 June 1996 the greatest divisions involved the inclusion of social rights provisions, with two parties—the AFD and Young Democrats—opposed.<sup>65</sup>

In sum, what had appeared to start out with a clear agenda and a six-party national consensus has turned into a much longer and difficult process. Developing a broad-based consensus constitution that is not perceived as a victors diktat, may be a more difficult task than all sides had originally envisioned.

### **"From Citizens in Uniform to Generals in Suits"**

When the new government was formed after the election, HSP leader Gyula Horn became prime minister (see Table 5.3 below). On 24 June the HSP-AFD coalition signed a government agree-

ment that the AFD would take over three ministries—interior, transportation, and education—and the HSP would take over the remaining 12. Gyula Horn appointed retired Colonel Gyorgy Keleti as new defense minister. Keleti, former press spokesman for the ministry under Fur, had left under a cloud in 1992, allegedly for leaking classified defense ministry information to the HSP. As Keleti noted, he had walked out on former Defense Minister Fur “because the conditions prevailing in the ministry made it impossible to work normally with the minister and several of his employees.”<sup>66</sup> After leaving the military, Keleti had been elected to Parliament twice from an individual electoral district in a 1993 by-election and during 1994.



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Upon Defense Minister Keleti's return on 15 July 1994, he began to replace all the MDF personnel mostly with former colleagues from the Hungarian Defense Forces: he promoted Colonel (reserve) Jozsef Feher to brigadier general on 15 July and appointed him administrative state secretary;<sup>67</sup> he named retired Lt. Gen. and former Chief of Staff Laszlo Borsits and Maj. Gen. Karoly Janza deputy administrative state secretaries. Keleti also appointed Maj. Gen. Csaba Liskai to supervise press and social relations, giving him the rank of deputy state secretary. Military officers also took over departmental-level positions. Colonel Peter Haber, an old colleague of Borsits, became head of the Military Department under Borsits; Colonel Nandor Gruber replaced civilian economist Sandor Kovacs as head of Defense Economic Department; and Colonel Istvan Szekeres replaced civilian sociologist Laszlo Dobos as head of Department on Social Relations and Culture.<sup>68</sup>

One civilian, Andras Toth became political state secretary; but in November when Toth became head of the prime minister's office, he was replaced by Dr. Istvan Fodor. The only other high-ranking civilian was Tibor Toth (an expert on disarmament from the foreign ministry) as one of the three deputy state secretaries. He was replaced by another civilian expert Istvan Gyarmati in May 1996.<sup>69</sup>

Keleti also began an internal reorganization of the defense ministry by cutting it from 317 to 287 people.<sup>70</sup> Defense ministry spokesman Colonel Lajos Erdelyi noted that the reorganization was "an internal affair" adding that, according to law, the defense minister can make such decisions. In response, Imre Mecs, chairman of the National Assembly's Defense Committee, expressed concern about "militarization" of the defense ministry and noted that there was not enough "civilian staff."<sup>71</sup>

In an early interview Defense Minister Keleti noted that he was sure he would have harmonious relations with the generals and that he intended to act as a civil politician and not a "former colonel." He also indicated that he intended to abolish the govern-

ment order that provided deadlines for the organizational fusion of the Army headquarters with the defense ministry. Then, after further study, decide whether or not the proposed fusion was really justified, since "the Army leadership should receive sufficient independence to plan and lead their professional activity."<sup>72</sup> Keleti added that he had met with President Goncz and had agreed to meet with him once a month to inform him about the Army's situation and that he also invited Robert Pick, head of the president's military office, to attend all cabinet sessions of the ministry.<sup>73</sup>

Keleti then reorganized the General Staff, providing it with more authority in military planning, including intelligence. In early September 1994, he recommended to the National Assembly Defense Committee that the defense ministry and Army headquarters *not* be merged.<sup>74</sup> As of 1 November Keleti once again divided the two top Army positions when he appointed Lt. Gen. Sandor Nemeth to become Chief of Staff, while retaining Janos Deak as Commander of the Hungarian Defense Forces.<sup>75</sup> Since Keleti had always been personally and politically close to Nemeth, the division of the post served to contain the commander from above and below.

That Keleti's decision to separate the General Staff from the defense ministry needed to be revisited was stressed by a British study team review of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense in February 1996<sup>76</sup> and also by Keleti in April. Keleti declared "We must put integration on the agenda sooner or later."<sup>77</sup> He then suggested that the first step might be to leave unfilled the position of Commander of the Hungarian Defense Forces and eventually to eliminate the function, create a new headquarters later in 1996, and then perhaps by the year 2000 make the headquarters part of the defense ministry.

Keleti saw his major concern as retention of professionals in the Hungarian Defense Forces. Because the Army cannot be financed from the budget with its current structure, Keleti proposed to reduce personnel by retaining professional officers and to call up fewer conscripts; some 2,000 less in August 1994, with

repeated reductions in February 1995 and 1996 reducing the Army by 12,000 overall.<sup>78</sup> In addition, Keleti promised that he would continue to reduce the intake of conscripts and beginning in 1996 would reduce their national service time to nine months<sup>79</sup> with a more intensive training program.<sup>80</sup>

He noted that the ministry calculates that it needed 69 billion forints in 1994, of which 7.2 billion was not covered by revenue, and that efforts by defense managers could only cut 3.5 billion by cost-saving means.<sup>81</sup> Maj. Gen. Karoly Janza, Deputy State Secretary for Economic and Budgetary Affairs, argued that the financial situation was worse than he expected, citing significant infrastructure expenses of more than one billion forints to maintain the recently acquired MIG-29s. Janza suggested that reducing exercises and conscripts was the only way to reduce the shortfall.<sup>82</sup>

When the defense minister announced in September that he would cut the size of the defense ministry as a cost-saving measure, he explained that he would retain the Army Command size (of roughly 900) because intermediate command levels were to be eliminated and the military zones were to report directly to the General Staff.<sup>83</sup> The reform would reduce Hungary's four military districts to two, resulting in a further reduction of staff.<sup>84</sup> In support of Keleti, retired Colonel Peter Deak added that the military needed fewer levels of command to enhance the military's ability to react rapidly, make communication more rapid, and to create better informed, more independent staffs. Deak also noted that rear services organizations were not functioning properly and that the General Staff was too big and appeared to duplicate the defense ministry.<sup>85</sup>

On arms acquisitions, Keleti also shifted further from his predecessor's policy. After the MIG-29 acquisition from Russia, Defense Minister Lajos Fur had indicated that he also would like to get the S-300 missile air defense system in exchange for some of the remaining \$800 million debt. Keleti rejected this policy; he wanted, instead, to acquire BTR-80 armored personnel carriers for the Hungarian Army and Border Police and spares for the 28

MIG-29s for \$320 million of Russia's \$800 million debt.<sup>86</sup> But Russian deliveries were postponed from November 1995 to the Spring of 1996. In the end, the Hungarian Army was to receive 450 BTR-80s (of which 68 would be used by the Border Police), 400 METIS armor-piercing missiles and 15 mobile launchers, and \$50 million worth of spare engines and spares for the MIG-29s.<sup>87</sup>

Keleti also succeeded in his efforts to acquire military spare parts from the Ukraine in return for Hungarian medicines.<sup>88</sup> Finally in March 1996, despite opposition from some members of the Parliament's Defense Committee, because Defense Minister Keleti had failed to consult with them beforehand and because of increasing dependence on Russian arms manufacturers, the Hungarian Army decided to purchase 100 T-72 tanks from Belarus at a very favorable price.<sup>89</sup> Presumably, the T-72s would be cheaper than modernizing Hungary's T-55s and the Defense Ministry proposed paying for the T-72s with money obtained from selling real estate.<sup>90</sup>

Defense Minister Keleti also stressed that he wanted to pursue modernization in the Air Force, particularly radio-technical modernization (ground-based radar).<sup>91</sup> Keleti was successful in acquiring 20 Mi-24 combat helicopters from Germany inherited from the former East German National People's Army.<sup>92</sup> Although CFE limits Hungary to 108 helicopters, it maintained only 39 Mi-24s. After the German installment, Hungary's inventory increased to less than 59, since some of the German supply were dismantled and used for spare parts.<sup>93</sup>

**Army reform.** When Army Commander Janos Deak presented the Army reform concept to the National Assembly in January 1995, he noted that the program was motivated by the fact that budgetary allocations were inadequate to maintain existing military structures and by the need to modify the Hungarian Armed Forces for integration with NATO.<sup>94</sup> In sum, the reform was being pulled in two directions.

On 1 March 1995, Prime Minister Gyula Horn announced the new organization of the top leadership of the Armed Forces.

Subordinate to the Commander of the Hungarian Army was the General Staff headed by Lt. Gen. Sandor Nemeth and four Division Commands (Maj. Gen. Jozef Wekerle of Land Forces, Maj. Gen. Tibor Szegedi of Air Force and Air Defense, Maj. Gen. Nandor Hollosi of Logistics, and Maj. Gen. Janos Gilicz of Human Resources).<sup>95</sup> On 22 March Chief of Staff Nemeth told the Parliament Defense Committee that the Armed Forces were preparing to establish rapid deployment battalions, comprised mainly of professionals and soldiers under contract, and later would be developed into brigades.<sup>96</sup>

In accordance with National Assembly Resolution 88/1995 on the Direction of the Long and Medium Term Reform of the Hungarian Defense and its Personnel Strength,<sup>97</sup> the defense ministry issued a directive on 15 July 1995. In mid-September Deputy State Secretary Laszlo Borsits briefed the National Assembly Defense Committee that the Command of the Land Forces and the Regional Military Commands would be abolished and replaced by a Mechanized Army Corps Command. In addition, an Air Force and Air Defense Corps Command would be set up and a Central Organizations Command would replace Budapest Regional Military Command by the end of 1995.<sup>98</sup>

One result of the military reorganization was the need to form brigades that could be deployed quickly; the first to be created was the 25th Mechanized Rifle Brigade in Tata. One effect of the reorganization was that between 1996-1998, the defense ministry's 19,200 civilian personnel had to be reduced to 7,800 and military officers from 14,400 to 9,000. This demobilization would cost 3.2 billion forints (Ft) in 1996, Ft1.3 billion in 1997, and Ft1.4 billion in 1998.<sup>99</sup>

Colonel General Deak admitted in a November 1995 report to the Parliament Defense Committee that the effects of reorganization, downsizing, smaller budgets, and reduced training was having an effect upon morale. Deak noted that the professional staff was "particularly critical...[that] the officers' salary is not in proportion with their responsibility. The army does not have



money for technical development, or even for gasoline sometimes."<sup>100</sup>

This problem had still not been resolved by April 1996. After the Parliament's Defense and Security Committee heard from defense ministry and Hungarian Army leaders that 700 professional soldiers—mostly experts—had left the Army since the summer, it concluded that the armed forces' reform needed modification because the present ideas could lead to "crisis."<sup>101</sup>

**Shrinking Defense Forces.** Financial constraints, however, were particularly severe. Defense Minister Keleti noted on 8 March 1995 that during the previous four years the Hungarian Armed Forces had consumed their reserves of fuel, spare parts, and clothing. Replenishing the reserves had become an urgent priority. As a result, the Armed Forces had abandoned military exercises above the company level, the reserves were not called up in the second half of 1994, and air defense missile and air combat exercises had been "scrapped."<sup>102</sup> To save money airmen flew only 45 to 50 hours per year.<sup>103</sup> This paucity of flying hours contributed to the 18 military aircraft accidents in 1994, and others in 1995.<sup>104</sup>

The 1995 defense budget of 77 billion forints (1.5 percent of GDP), was burdened further by Ft2.4 billion carried over from 1994. According to Keleti, the "real value of the Army's budget has decreased by 58 percent since 1990."<sup>105</sup> In order to deal with the constrained budget, the Defense Ministry had to lay off 3,000 civilian employees as of July 1995 and a further 3,000 over the next three years.<sup>106</sup> Deputy State Secretary for Defense Lt. Gen. Karoly Janza noted that in 1996 the defense ministry would need 80 billion forints just to function and a further 10-15 billion to launch the reform process.<sup>107</sup>

Fiscal constraints contributed to very different views about the size of Hungarian armed forces. From a 1989 armed forces strength (civilian and military) of 155,700, the Hungarian Army had shrunk to 93,155 by July 1995, on its way to 81,266 by the end of 1995. The active military comprised 74,500 (53,400 conscripts) at the end of 1995.<sup>108</sup> By the end of 1996, military personnel strength would

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decline to 69,812, requiring dismissal of 5,000 civilian employees, 4,000 enlisted personnel, and 3,000 officers.<sup>109</sup> According to Peter Haber, head of the Military Department of the defense ministry, the long-term reform concept envisions an army of 52,000 soldiers (32,400 conscripts) and 7,800 civilians—a total active force of 60,000 by 1998. The army would thus comprise 0.5 percent of Hungary's population.<sup>110</sup>

But these plans are likely to change. In May 1995, retired General Janos Sebok and member of Parliament offered a very different view: "[The] current size of the Hungarian Army could safely be reduced by at least 50 percent. . . I advocate a reduction of the Army's size to 40,000 men and that the reduction should be implemented by 1997."<sup>111</sup> By May 1996 fiscal constraints appeared likely to continue to drive manpower levels lower. The Hungarian Government's state administration reform plan, which requires further cuts in Government expenses over the next three years, proposes to reduce the Army's peacetime personnel size to 30,000.<sup>112</sup> In sum, while it remains ambiguous just how small Hungary's defense forces will actually become, it is certain that they will become smaller. Also it is clear that their size is not being determined by a mid- to long-term strategic plan.

**Civilian control.** The issue of civilian control of the Hungarian Army surfaced again in the Spring of 1995. Criticizing the de-civilianization and deficiencies in the defense ministry, Parliamentary Defense Committee Chairman Imre Mecs noted: "The executive should control military matters, but this is not done with the necessary effectiveness, so the National Assembly's Defense Committee has to reinforce its supervision in this domain."<sup>113</sup> Keleti responded by noting that parliamentary control over the Army is already strong, but admitted that "we have not really managed to establish the defense ministry's civilian basis in the past four years. At the moment, 40 percent of the ministry's 285 employees are civilians."<sup>114</sup>

Administrative State Secretary of Defense Jozsef Feher added, (noting that there had been much progress made in establishing

civilian control since the change of regime in 1990): "However, the administrative framework of the Army which makes it possible for civilian observers, legislators, state administration employees, and society to see clearly how the Army uses the money entrusted to it and, what is more important, how it uses the people has *not* been created."<sup>115</sup> Feher added that the Army still needed to establish a budget planning system, a military defense planning system, and legal regulations.

Tamas Wachsler (Young Democrat—FIDESZ) of the Defense Committee expressed lack of confidence and also complained that the defense ministry is often unwilling to provide secret information to the members of the Committee, while Imre Mecs argued that the authority of the Defense Committee needed to be expanded.<sup>116</sup> The obstacles to the proper functioning of the Defense Committee lie in the lack of expertise of new members and no professional support staff or advisors on military matters. This leaves great space for maneuvering of the military, which sometimes lacks good will toward Parliament. As Thomas Wachsler noted "unless MPs ask *the* correct question, they will not get the answer they are looking for."<sup>117</sup> As result, they are hardly able to initiate legislation; usually the Defense Committee follows the Army's and defense ministry's initiatives.

When Defense Minister Keleti discussed draft legislation on the rights and obligations of conscripts and announced in April 1996 that at some time in the future conscription would be reduced from one year to nine months, Imre Mecs of the Defense and Security Committee announced that this would *not* occur because the country's defense capability needed to be considered and that such a move would require more money.<sup>118</sup>

Hard on the heels of the controversial T-72 acquisition from Belarus, during May 1996 another major issue arose regarding the Parliament's lack of oversight in the deployment of 8 MIG-29s to a NATO-PFP military exercise in Poland. Apparently the Defense Ministry Aviation and Air Defense Command and deputy state secretary failed to check and meet the constitutional conditions for

deploying forces abroad. Hence, the state secretaries and defense minister were not informed. Amid parliamentary opposition leaders' cries for Defense Minister Keleti's dismissal, Gyula Horn defended his defense minister claiming that Keleti shared no personal responsibility in the matter.<sup>119</sup>

At the end of June, Defense Committee Chairman Imre Mecs complained that the "defense ministry was not fully aware of the Parliament's importance [adding that] the purchase of T-72s should have been coordinated with the Committee in advance, and not presented with a *fait accompli*."<sup>120</sup> Some of these differences were worked out in early July with parliamentary approval of Hungarian troop participation in exercises through 1996.<sup>121</sup>

Although the Defense Committee's oversight of the defense budget still remains limited, it remains one of the most active parliamentary defense committees in Central Europe. It comprises five subcommittees, with varying degrees of activity and effectiveness. First, the Special Investigations subcommittee has investigated secret service operations, the MIG-29 deployment to Poland, defense ministry treaties with foreign governments, and contract tenders. Second, the Budgetary subcommittee has held hearings on contract tenders for radars, short-range missiles, fighters, and IFOR procurements. Third, a Supervisory subcommittee oversees legal implementation of economic and social issues. Fourth, a Foreign Affairs subcommittee that has remained somewhat inactive. Fifth, an Ombudsman subcommittee to investigate complaints of internal violations.<sup>122</sup>

**Armed Forces Reform.** On 27 July 1995, Jozsef Feher expressed optimism with progress on the Bill on the Legal Status of Armed Forces professional personnel. He indicated that the long-awaited bill would be put before Parliament in October and could become a legally binding statute in January 1996. The bill would reconcile service status and the legal system; it would also provide a framework for interest representation within the armed forces, resolve anomalies of qualifications and promotions, clarify the rights of professional soldiers, and establish salaries and retirement benefits

in line with those of other public employees.<sup>123</sup>

On 5 October 1995, the government discussed the bill on professional soldiers and began coordination talks. However, when the bill got bogged down, professional soldiers collected signatures for a petition to Parliament protesting the continued delay of the law to settle their legal status.<sup>124</sup> When the law was finally passed in early May 1996, 4,000 professional soldiers in the Interest Protection Body (e.g., a form of a soldiers' trade union) expressed dissatisfaction with the law, claiming that it excluded them from public life, that they could not even take on deputy posts in the local government, and that the government kept delaying the deadline for introducing a new army wage table and pay raise.<sup>125</sup> Even though the salaries of soldiers had been raised 19.5 percent in January 1996, many soldiers continued to leave the Army.<sup>126</sup> Jenó Poda (MDF) of the Parliament's Defense Committee described the "personnel and technical conditions of the Hungarian Army as tragic,"<sup>127</sup> criticizing the fact that more than one-half of the defense ministry budget was spent in Budapest and that most reductions in personnel had occurred in the provinces and in combat units.

**"Two-Track" Force Modernization.** On 19 September 1995 the National Assembly unanimously approved two proposals on air defense to improve radars in two phases (phase one to the year 1998 would cost Ft20 billion) and low-altitude air defense missile systems in two phases (15 air defense units to 2000 would cost Ft10-11 billion; 30 air defense units to 2005 would cost Ft20-21 billion).<sup>128</sup> According to Keleti, the 1995 staff reduction made it possible for the Army to implement a Ft10 billion development during 1996 compared to the Ft2 billion spent in 1995.<sup>129</sup>

The United States agreed to assist in the modernization of radars with \$6.25 million in the framework of PFP.<sup>130</sup> After Westinghouse won the Ft10 billion contract for the radars, there were allegations of corruption. The Parliament's Defense Committee investigated the charges, but had still not made much progress by April 1996.<sup>131</sup>

The new air defense system would reduce energy and staff requirements by a few thousand soldiers.<sup>132</sup> To maintain 1,000 soldiers cost about Ft300 million a year, so the 5,000 soldiers serving in the air defense radar system cost Ft1.5 billion annually. According to Col. Gen. Deak, since the modern radar system would reduce manpower requirements by 25-33 percent (1,250-1,650 soldiers), the Ft1 billion annual savings would help amortize the costs of the system.<sup>133</sup>

Aircraft acquisitions would also have an impact upon the defense budget and force structure. While CFE permits Hungary to have 180 combat aircraft, Hungary plans to keep only 70-90 by the end of the decade. Decisions were to be made in December 1996 for the purchase of 30 combat aircraft from among Swedish JAS-39 Gripens, U.S. F-16s or F-18s, or French Mirage-2000s.<sup>134</sup> The issue was further complicated when the Israeli Aircraft Industries in May 1996 offered to refurbish 28 of Hungary's aging MIG-21s for less than 10 percent of the cost of buying new aircraft.<sup>135</sup> In the end, when the Finance Ministry concluded that no deal could be concluded because the money was not available, the government decided to postpone the decision until mid-1997.<sup>136</sup>

Keleti noted that Hungary's modernization was on "two channels." The Air Force and Air Defense modernization would likely be Western to better fulfill NATO compatibility requirements. Modernization of Land Forces, though, was another matter. There was no NATO standard for tanks and APCs, only for the built-in electronic and telecommunications systems. Hence Keleti justified the acquisition of 100 T-72s (for five percent of the cost of a new tank) from Belarus as enhancing Hungarian independence, since T-72 spares are produced in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and Slovakia.<sup>137</sup>

**General Staff (GS) Rejuvenation.** Toward the end of 1995, Keleti noted that the defense ministry was preparing for comprehensive leadership changes in the coming year. On 1 December 1995 11 generals retired at the mandatory age of 55 years—among them were Administrative State Secretary Maj.

Gen. Jozsef Feher, and Deputy State Secretaries Lt. Gen. Karoly Janza and Maj. Gen. Csaba Liskay. All three, however, would remain in their present positions, but as civilian employees in the defense ministry.<sup>138</sup>

During 1996 another 10 generals would retire because of mandatory age limits—among them Army Commander Col. Gen. Deak and Chief of Staff Nemeth. In accordance with the Parliament's decision to reorganize the Hungarian Army, the two positions would again be fused as they had been under Defense Minister Fur.<sup>139</sup> Lt. Gen. Ferenc Vegh, who had been trained at the U.S. Army War College, became First Deputy Chief of Staff in December 1995 and assumed command of the new fused position of Army Commander/Chief of Staff in May 1996.<sup>140</sup> In addition, Maj. Gen. Lajos Fodor, who had also been trained at the U.S. National War College, became First Deputy Chief of Staff on 1 July 1996.

General Vegh would be responsible for restructuring and reorganizing the General Staff with the goal of developing a simpler and more efficient structure and reform the military. The staff would be reorganized with the involvement of civilian experts, scholars, and NATO specialists.<sup>141</sup> In his testimony to the Parliament Defense Committee, Vegh noted that an Army of 45,000 would be enough to defend the country.<sup>142</sup> He also openly noted that the Army staff and leadership of troops was "hamstrung by customs and centralization [which he characterized as] dangerous." Vegh expressed concern that among the troops "pessimism reigns supreme" and impatience in that he could "not see clearly whether the generals really want changes to happen."<sup>143</sup>

Ferenc Vegh opened his tenure on 6 June by noting that the Hungarian Army has no more reserves and could no longer meet its obligations. Vegh noted that the annual cost of the army structure adopted by Parliamentary Resolution 88/1995 should be Ft143.5 billion; and that the Army was in such bad condition because it had only been allotted one-half that amount. Therefore, the political decision-makers needed to decide whether they want

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to have an effective defense force or an operetta army.<sup>144</sup>

Ten days later Vegh made clear the challenge to the politicians. The Chief of Staff noted: "We will face unpaid bills this year. A political decision is needed to determine the types of tasks the Army should be capable of fulfilling and the budget needed for this. If we have this, we soldiers will tell what kind of Army we are capable of activating under the given circumstances."<sup>145</sup> In apparent agreement, Defense Ministry Deputy State Secretary Istvan Gyarmati admitted that: "Maintaining an Army of 60,000-70,000 will require about twice as much money as the current budget. For this reason it does not appear realistic."<sup>146</sup>

**NATO: Peacekeeping, PFP, and, IFOR.** At the end of March 1995, Keleti pointed out that training of the first Hungarian peacekeeping force had been completed and it would be available to deploy to Cyprus in the second half of 1995.<sup>147</sup> In the Fall, 39 Hungarian troops joined an Austrian peacekeeping unit in Cyprus under the UN. By the Spring of 1996, the Hungarians had increased their contribution to the staff to 120.<sup>148</sup>

Based upon the PFP exercise experience and military exercises with NATO states, Parliamentary Defense Committee chairman Imre Mecs has noted, "We have a long way to go to catch up in the fields of telecommunication, organization, and cooperation, including the knowledge of languages. [Nevertheless, he concluded that] the Hungarian Army would be suitable for NATO membership around 1998."<sup>149</sup>

During 16-20 October 1995, a German-British-Hungarian PFP exercise (code-named COOPERATIVE LIGHT) was held. The exercise cost Ft150 million, with Hungary putting up Ft90 million, included 1,200 Hungarian and 350 foreign troops, and provided Hungary with the first opportunity to participate in the planning of a NATO exercise.<sup>150</sup> Also during 22-24 July 1996 a 15-nation search and rescue PFP exercise (COOPERATIVE CHANCE-96) comprising 540 foreign and 600 Hungarian soldiers, took place in Hungary. Hungary covered Ft100 million of the exercise costs.<sup>151</sup>

When the Balkan conflict flared with the Croatian offensive



launched on 4 August 1995, the Hungarian Government strengthened border defenses and heightened the Air Force's readiness, to include placing their MIG-29s in readiness.<sup>152</sup> After the Dayton agreement, Hungary permitted the United States to set up an army service corps of 1,000-2,000 troops from a logistics unit in the vicinity of Pecs in southern Hungary to service Bosnia for one year.<sup>153</sup> The United States would pay rent for the Army establishments and their refurbishment at Kaposvar and Taszar, as well as the costs of making the Taszar airport NATO-compatible.<sup>154</sup> Parliament approved this move on 28 November 1995. Defense Minister Keleti openly expressed his hope that the facilities would remain in Hungary after the IFOR mission ends—as an “advance” for the time of “even more intensive contacts with NATO.”<sup>155</sup> State Secretary Istvan Fodor added that the U.S. presence had important economic benefits for Hungary and facilitated the modernization of the army.<sup>156</sup>

In addition, on 27 March 1996, the United States signed an agreement, in line with NATO's SOFA program, that would cover 75 percent of the costs of damage caused while serving in Hungary, while the Hungarian Defense Ministry would sustain 25 percent.<sup>157</sup> Relations between the American (IFOR) and Hungarian troops at Kaposvar and Taszar remained conflict free,<sup>158</sup> though some problems appeared with civilians. Hungarian employees formed a trade union and complained of unpredictable work conditions and low wages,<sup>159</sup> as well as of sexual harassment.<sup>160</sup>

On 5 December 1995, Parliament passed a separate decision to send 500 bridge-building troops to Bosnia for one year though with some political opposition from the Smallholder Party. Costs estimated at Ft1.5-2.0 billion ultimately limited the Hungarian contingent to 400 troops.<sup>161</sup> The troops left Hungary for Bosnia in two groups on 30-31 January 1996. In addition, 35 Hungarian policemen went to Bosnia as part of an unarmed UN peacekeeping mission.<sup>162</sup>

In April 1996, Hungary presented its document to NATO

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outlining its position on enlargement issues, steps taken in the field of military reform, and formulated questions regarding accession. When NATO Secretary General Javier Solana visited Budapest on 18-19 April, he described the document as "very positive and constructive."<sup>163</sup> Shortly afterward, Defense Minister Keleti proposed, to neutralize Russian opposition, that Brussels could declare in advance that NATO would not deploy nuclear weapons on former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members' territory. In response Jenő Poda of the Parliament's Defense Committee criticized Keleti's proposal as damaging and could lead to mistaken interpretations.<sup>164</sup>

To facilitate the integration process, a NATO integration department headed by Ambassador István Gyarmati was established in the Hungarian defense ministry on 1 June 1996.<sup>165</sup>

Although Hungarian politicians pursue NATO integration, it appears that public support is less enthusiastic. In a Public Opinion poll conducted in April 1996, 48 percent supported joining the European Union, while 18 percent did not feel that membership was so important. In contrast, when asked about NATO only 38 percent supported membership, while 27 percent had a negative opinion.<sup>166</sup> Internal surveys of the Hungarian Army also indicated that opinion was divided. Whereas a 1990 survey of regular soldiers indicated that 63.5 percent did not see NATO membership as a good security solution, in 1993 73 percent believed that NATO was a good solution declining to 66.5 percent in 1994.<sup>167</sup>

## Conclusion

In summary, Hungary has come a long way. The existence of a constitutional and legal framework has resulted from Constitutional Court decisions effectively addressing the problems caused by the October 1989 Constitution and 1 December 1989 Defense Reform. The Court's decisions have been respected, and they were incorporated in the 1993 National Defense Act and sub-

sequent legislation. Continued wrangling over the constitutional draft since 1994 and the delaying of its acceptance could become a source of concern, as it increasingly appears that the six-party parliamentary consensus is fraying.

The National Assembly through its 19-member Defense Committee has been slowly attempting to develop oversight of the military through budget, approval of the Basic Principles of National Defense and Defense Bill, and deployment of armed forces. The Defense Committee has opposition representation (with six members), and continuity with seven members remaining from before the 1994 elections. It includes former Defense Minister Lajos Fur and two retired generals. In addition, parliamentary members of Parliament can not be members of the military, thus ensuring civilian control.<sup>168</sup>

The Parliament Defense Committee, though, lacks staff support and could be more effective. Its limitations have been most apparent in oversight of the defense budget as manifest by Defense Minister Keleti's unilateral decision to buy T-72 tanks from Belarus with funds derived from the sale of defense real estate, and his decision to send MIG-29s to a PFP exercise in Poland without proper consultation. In other words, the Parliament was denied the opportunity to deliberate as to whether T-72s was the best way to expend public funds and if those funds could be better directed to other priorities, such as readiness and training.

But Hungary still has other tasks to achieve effective civilian oversight of the military—to adopt a new constitution that has broad-based national consensus and clarifies some outstanding issues such as the president's wartime authority. Work to re-write the Constitution, initially intended to conclude in 1995, is taking much longer. Guidelines for general debate were published during 1996, and now passage is expected to be completed some time in 1997.

Hungary needs an interagency organization (a National Security Council) that could formulate national security policy.

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Such a body under the Prime Minister (e.g., similar to KSORM in Poland) could bring together ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Finance, and Industry to formulate policy and provide clear direction to the armed forces. The already existing National Security Cabinet could form the basis for such a body, but a permanent supporting staff would need to be created.

In addition, it is necessary to ensure that the Hungarian Defense Ministry maintains *real* civilian oversight of the military. The problems and shortcomings in the defense ministry are manifold. First, the defense minister is required by parliamentary regulations to report to Parliament every year on the defense policy and state of the Hungarian Defense Forces. Though such a report is prepared on a confidential basis, no public report is presented, which is unfortunate because such a report would be necessary to build parliamentary and public support for defense programs.

Second, the General Staff's separation from the defense ministry creates problems. The General Staff maintains its own chain of command to the Defense Minister; hence, there is a duplication of functions and no formalized means for cross-fertilization between action officers in the General Staff and defense ministry. While personal contacts and communication sometimes exist between the defense ministry and General Staff there are very few horizontal communication levels between the working levels of the defense ministry and General Staff.

The fact that most of the positions in the defense ministry are filled by military officers does not improve communication with the General Staff. Military officers tend to stay in the defense ministry for long periods, often with no idea of when, or if, they will rotate to other military positions. The fact that many retire and stay in defense ministry positions as civilians tends to widen the gap. This situation can be improved only if military officers are routinely rotated into the defense ministry and back to the General Staff. The continued separation of the General Staff and defense ministry could lead to isolation of the Armed Forces.

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Third, the defense ministry has yet to implement a mid- and long-term planning mechanism, which is presently under development. This deficiency has been exacerbated by Hungary's participation in PFP, problems faced in restructuring the Hungarian Defense Forces, and the need to participate and develop a Planning and Review Process. This planning mechanism needs to be developed if Hungary becomes a NATO member in order to develop a Defense Planning Questionnaire. Though the defense ministry is attempting to develop a modified Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Defense Resource Planning Group is attempting to develop a Defense Resource Management Model for Hungary, difficulty has resulted because in Hungary resource allocations run from top of the hierarchy down, rather than from bottom up.

Though procurement has been virtually non-existent because of fiscal constraints, the defense ministry recently transferred the Equipment Procurement Branch from the General Staff. But the defense ministry lacks an Operational Requirements Branch to assess and compare the technical capabilities of weapons and systems.

Fourth, intelligence is collated and prepared in the Hungarian Defense Forces, thus controlling what the Defense Minister gets to see, rather than having an outside group act in behalf of the minister to make that determination. Under present arrangements the Defense Minister and defense ministry staff could be denied some intelligence information.

Hungary needs to restructure its defense ministry. An integrated defense ministry would link the Defense Minister (and his administrative and policy advisers) directly to the command structure. It could also act to facilitate the flow of defense needs from the armed forces to the Government, opening up defense policy and activities to public scrutiny and accountability. In sum, it would be more efficient and would provide more effective oversight of the Hungarian Defense Forces.

The defense ministry's problems are burdened by having

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become a "retirement home" for military officers; it has not and is not yet cultivating civilian specialists; and it is not effectively developing a defense constituency in Parliament or in Hungarian society. These difficulties need to be overcome if Hungary is to develop the necessary political-military planning processes in order to integrate with NATO.

Finally, though the military has evidenced significant reform and been restructured to accommodate NATO, force modernization continues to be greatly restrained by scarce resources. Since the main contact between society and the armed forces is through conscripts (roughly 40,000 enlistees annually) and their families, the conscription experience becomes very important in building social support for defense. If no meaningful training takes place and society views conscription as a waste of time, as at present, then social support is undermined. But if training takes place during conscription and conscripts feel they have learned something from the experience—be it language training or a trade—then social support should be positive. Unfortunately, public opinion does not hold the Hungarian Defense Forces in high esteem and a vicious circle prevails.

Military training and force modernization needs significant attention and development to meet NATO standards. Hungarian defense expenditures of 1.4-1.5 percent of GDP remains the lowest of all its Central European neighbors. It is just not enough, and reflects the fact that the defense ministry has been unable to develop sufficient public understanding of the costs of NATO integration and failed to develop parliamentary support for adequate defense budget levels.

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## Notes

1. According to Janos Kis, the founder and leader of the Alliance of Free Democrats, this makes it more difficult for Hungarian leaders to establish their legitimacy. Hence, the new Government must demonstrate economic success in order to be accepted. See, Janos Kis, "Postcommunist Politics In Hungary," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 4-5.

2. For discussion of the election and party positions, see Barnabas Racz, "Political Pluralism in Hungary: the 1990 Elections," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (1991), pp. 107-136; John R. Hibbing and Samuel C. Patterson, "A Democratic Legislature in the Making: The Historic Hungarian Elections of 1990," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (January 1992), pp. 430-454.

3. Radio Budapest, 1 July 1989, cited in Zoltan D. Barany, "East European Forces In Transitions and Beyond," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (March 1992), p. 18.

4. *Heti Világazdaság* (28 October 1989), pp. 4-5. *FBIS-EER-89-138* (9 December 1989), p. 6. Also see Section 29.(2) and Article 29/A (1), *The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary*, p. 5.

5. Keith W. Crane, Steven W. Popper, Barbara A. Kliszewski, *Civil-Military Relations in a Multiparty Democracy: Report of a RAND Conference*, R-3941-RC (August 1990), p. 25.

6. Aside from the president, the Defense Council's membership includes the Speaker of the National Assembly, the leaders of the parties in the National Assembly, the prime minister, the ministers, as well as the Commander of the Hungarian Army and the Chief-of-Staff.

7. Article 19, *The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary*, pp. 2-3.

8. Article 35.(1)h, *The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary*, p. 8.

9. Zoltan D. Barany, "Major Reorganization Of Hungary's Military Establishment," *RFER* (7 December 1989).

10. MG Jozsef Biro interview, Zagreb *DANAS*, 9 January 1990, pp. 58-59. *JPRS-EER-90-045* (4 April 1990), p. 8.

11. Budapest Domestic Service, 1 December 1989. *FBIS-EEU-89-231* (4 December 1989), pp. 57-58. On 1 March 1990, further amendments to this process were discussed and supported by Ferenc Karpati in the National

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Assembly. Budapest Domestic Service, 1 March 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-042* (2 March 1990), pp. 50-51.

12. Ferenc Karpati, Budapest MTI, 22 March 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-057* (23 March 1990), p. 48.

13. Lt. Gen. Laszlo Borsits, Statement to Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar, 19 January 1990, p. 8 (emphasis in original).

14. 18 October 1989 National Assembly session, Budapest Domestic Service. *FBIS-EEU-89-201* (19 October 1989), p. 33.

15. Budapest MTI, 3 January 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-006* (9 January 1990), p. 47.

16. 20 February 1990 Parliament Defense Committee session amending Defense Law. *FBIS-EEU-90-036* (22 February 1990), p. 60.

17. Budapest Domestic Service 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-043* (5 March 1990), p. 41.

18. Article 40/A (1), *The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary*, p. 9. Also see *Magyar Kozlony*, No. 59, 25 June 1990, pp. 1269-1279. *JPRS-EER-90-125* (31 August 1990), especially p. 14.

19. Gabor Juhasz, "Proposed Rules for Secret Services," *Heti Vilaggazdasag*, 8 February 1992, pp. 76-78. *JPRS-EER-92-031* (13 March 1992), pp. 21-22.

20. Interview with Col. Karoly Gyarak, chief of Military Security Office, *Magyar Honved*, 19 October 1990. *JPRS-EER-90-161* (7 December 1990), p. 38.

21. Goncz had been interim president since May 2, 1990.

22. Personal interview, 12 April 1991; and *Tallosz*, No. 35, 31 August 1990, pp. 1673-1674. *JPRS-EER-90-137* (3 October 1990), pp. 24-25. According to Defense State Secretary Erno Raffey the exact authority of the office is "nowhere...defined...a legal gap [adding] authority should be defined by Goncz." *Tallosz*, No. 33, 17 August 1990. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

23. Hungary had a civilian defense minister before the Communist takeover; Peter Veres (National Peasant Party) was defense minister in 1946-1947.

24. Lajos Fur interview, *Nepszabadsag*, 10 September 1990, pp. 1,5. *FBIS-EEU-90-178* (13 September 1990), p. 36.

25. *Review of Parliamentary Oversight of the Hungarian MOD and Democratic Control of the Hungarian Defense Forces*, Study No. 810 (London: Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services, February 1996), p. 32.

26. Lajos Fur interview, *Tallosz*, No 4 (25 January 1991), pp. 162-163.



JPRS-EER-91-039 (28 March 1991), p. 4.

27. Ferenc Mernyo, "Army Crisis: Self-Centered," *Heti Vilaggazdasag*, 13 April 1991, pp. 77-79. JPRS-EER-91-083 (14 June 1991), p. 31.

28. Budapest Domestic Service, 24 March 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-058 (26 March 1991), p. 35.

29. Budapest Domestic Service, 2 April 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-064 (3 April 1991), p. 22.

30. Bela Kiraly, "Military Reform: What Should Be Done?" *Nepszabadsag*, 13 April 1991, p. 6. JPRS-EER-083 (14 June 1991), pp. 33-34.

31. Budapest MTI, 19 August 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-161 (20 August 1991), p. 21.

32. Budapest Kossuth Radio, 19 August 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-161 (20 August 1991), p. 21.

33. Maj. Gen. Janos Deak interview, Budapest Kossuth Radio, 18 September 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-182 (19 September 1991), p. 20.

34. *Magyar Kozlony*, No. 103 (26 September 1991), pp. 2,111-3,125. JPRS-EER-01-168 (13 November 1991), pp. 14-16. It also ruled that the president is obligated to endorse candidates for state positions put forward by the government unless "the democratic operation of the institution in question is seriously threatened." *Ibid.*

35. Article 19/B.(2), *The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary*, p. 3.

36. *Nepszava*, 3 December 1991, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-91-234 (5 December 1991), p. 17.

37. Budapest MTI, 25 May 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-103 (28 May 1992), p. 12.

38. "National Defense Draft Bill," *Heti Vilaggazdasag*, 15 August 1992, p. 15. JPRS-EER-92-128 (14 September 1992), p. 39.

39. Budapest Kossuth Radio, 14 September 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-180 (16 September 1992), p. 11.

40. The Constitutional Court held that powers, which were not assigned explicitly either to Parliament nor the president, should be assigned by default to the government. See *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 11-12.

41. Amendment to the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic passed by the National Assembly on 7 December 1993. *Magyar Kozlony*, No. 186, 24 December 1993, pp. 11129-11130. JPRS-EER-94-009 (16 March 1994), p. 87.

42. Budapest MTI, 7 December 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-236 (10 December 1993), p. 26.

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43. Budapest *Uj Magyarorszag*, 3 December 1992, p. 5. *JPRS-EER-93-001* (5 January 1993), p. 14.
44. Lajos Fur interview, *Bulgarska Armiya*, 15 March 1993, pp. 1,4. *FBIS-EEU-93-052* (19 March 1993), p. 19.
45. Budapest MTI, 17 March 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-053* (22 March 1993), p. 34.
46. Lajos Fur statement. Budapest MTI, 26 November 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-228* (30 November 1993), p. 30.
47. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 67 (7 April 1993), p. 4. By March 1994, Germany had supplied 150 million DM worth of military supply parts. On 9 March Germany agreed to provide supply parts for Hungary's helicopters free of charge. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 48 (10 March 1994), p. 5.
48. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 2 June 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-105* (3 June 1993), p. 15.
49. According to defense ministry spokesman Colonel Lajos Erdelyi, the equipment would be installed on 28 MIG-29s, nine MIG-23s, 65 MIG-21s, and 11 Su-22s. Budapest *Nepszabadszag*, 27 December 1993, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-93-002* (2 January 1994), p. 9.
50. Budapest MTI, 16 February 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-030* (17 February 1993), pp. 18-19.
51. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 49 (12 March 1993), p. 5.
52. Budapest MTI, 14 April 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-074* (20 April 1993), p. 22. For text, see *Magyar Kozlony*, No. 48 (23 April 1993), pp. 2701-2705. *JPRS-EER-93-061* (1 July 1993), pp. 28-32.
53. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 7 December 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-234* (8 December 1993), p. 23; and Laszlo Szendrei interview, *Uj Magyarorszag*, 9 December 1993, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-93-239* (15 December 1993), pp. 25-26.
54. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 4 October 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-191* (5 October 1993), p. 22.
55. Arpad Goncz interview, Amsterdam *De Volkskrant*, 5 October 1993, p. 4.
56. Budapest *Magyar Honved*, 8 October 1993, pp. 26-28. *JPRS-EER-93-128* (10 November 1993), pp. 30-31.
57. Budapest MTI, 14 January 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-010* (14 January 1994), p. 9.
58. Lajos Fur interview, *Pesti Hirlap*, 15 January 1994, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-94-015* (24 January 1994), p. 24.

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59. *Hungarian Review*, Newsletter of the Embassy of Hungary (9 June 1994), p. 2.

60. In 1990, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) gained 42.5 percent of the parliamentary seats on the basis of 24.7 percent of the vote. For a discussion of Hungary's reelection law, see Andrew Arato, "Elections, Coalitions and Constitutionalism in Hungary," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 3, Nos. 3&4 (Summer/Fall 1994), pp. 26-32.

61. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 188 (4 October 1994), pp. 4-5; and Budapest MTL, 5 October 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-195* (7 October 1994), p. 8.

62. Budapest *Magyarország*, 19 August 1994, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-94-178* (14 September 1994), p. 11.

63. Jan Zielonka perceptively observed that one of the reasons why parliaments and executives have agreed to delegate so much authority to small groups of jurists is because these courts represent for the new political elites a guarantee that their constitutional rights will still be protected even if they find themselves on the losing side of political conflicts. See Jan Zielonka, "New Institutions in the Old East Bloc," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 1994), pp. 94-95.

64. *OMRI Daily Report*, 7 June 1996, pp. 4-5.

65. *OMRI Daily Digest*, 20 June 1996, p. 5.

66. Defense Minister-designate Gyorgy Keleti interview. *Magyar Nemzet*, 13 July 1994, p. 7. *FBIS-EEU-94-135* (14 July 1994), p. 13.

67. Colonel Jozsef Feher acted as head of the defense ministry's Administrative and Legal Department until 1992 and then as a staff member of the Institute of Military History.

68. *Heti Vilaggazdasag*, 12 November 1994, pp. 103-104. *FBIS-EEU-94-222* (17 November 1994), p. 22.

69. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 15 May 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-096* (16 May 1996), p. 23.

70. Keleti noted that the structural reorganization and reduction of the defense ministry would result in an increase in the percentage of civilian employees from 35 to almost 40 percent. Budapest *Nepszava*, 29 March 1995, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-95-061* (30 March 1995), p. 12.

71. *Heti Vilaggazdasag*, 12 November 1994, pp. 103-104. *FBIS-EEU-94-222* (17 November 1994), pp. 21-22.

72. Defense Minister-designate Gyorgy Keleti interview. Budapest *Nepszabadsag*, 30 June 1994, pp. 1-4. *FBIS-EEU-94-127* (1 July 1994), p. 15.

73. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview. *Magyar Hirlap*, 25 July 1994, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-94-144* (27 July 1994), p. 14.

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74. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 7 September 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-174* (8 September 1994), p. 13.
75. Budapest MTV, 31 October 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-211* (1 November 1994), p. 14.
76. *Review of Parliamentary Oversight of the Hungarian MOD and Democratic Control of the Hungarian Defence Forces*, Study No. 810 (London: Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services, February 1996), pp. 45-46.
77. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, Budapest *Magyar Nemzet*, 20 April 1996, p. 7. *FBIS-EEU-96-079* (23 April 1996), p. 22.
78. During 1995 the number of conscripts was reduced by 5,000. In February 2,000 fewer conscripts were called up, and in August, 3,000 fewer. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 29 June 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-126* (30 June 1995), p. 21.
79. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 21 January 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-014* (23 January 1995), p. 27. On 31 January 1995 18,000 soldiers were discharged from service after having served only 11.5 months. Budapest MTV, 31 January 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-021* (1 February 1995), p. 12.
80. Budapest MTV, 13 July 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-135* (14 July 1994), p. 13; and Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 20 August 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-162* (22 August 1994), p. 15.
81. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 27 July 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-145* (28 July 1994), p. 8.
82. Budapest *Nepszabadsag*, 3 August 1994, pp. 1,4. *FBIS-EEU-94-150* (4 August 1994), p. 11.
83. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview. *Nepszabadsag*, 8 September 1994, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-94-175* (9 September 1994), p. 16.
84. Budapest MTL, 2 January 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-001* (3 January 1995), p. 9.
85. Peter Deak, "Armed Forces' Reform," Budapest *Figyelo*, 10 August 1995, pp. 17-18. *FBIS-EEU-95-194* (6 October 1995), p. 21.
86. Groot-Bijgaarden *De Standard*, 14-15 May 1995, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-95-094* (16 May 1995), pp. 25-26. The border guard was to receive 60 BTR-80s and the Army 40.
87. Budapest *Magyar Hirlap*, 7 February 1996, pp. 1,4. *FBIS-EEU-96-027* (8 February 1996), p. 17.
88. Budapest MTV Television Network, 29 August 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-168* (30 August 1994), p. 18. Keleti cleverly proposed to Ukraine that Hungary would be willing to destroy some of their military vehicles pre-

scribed to Ukraine by CFE. Ukraine would give these vehicles to Hungary which, in exchange, would destroy its less modern vehicles. Budapest *Magyar Nemzet*, 5 January 1995, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-95-006 (10 January 1995), p. 15. On 13 December 1995 Keleti acquired agreement with Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov. Budapest MTI, 13 December 1995.

89. One article criticized Defense Minister Keleti for not consulting the Parliamentary Defense Committee. It argued that Keleti should apologize to the Parliamentary Defense Committee and the Committee should thank the Minister. See, Budapest *Magyar Hirlap*, 15 April 1996, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-96-074 (16 April 1996), p. 19.

90. Budapest *Nepszabadsag*, 30 March 1996, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-96-064 (2 April 1996), p. 20.

91. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 9 November 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-218 (10 November 1994), p. 18.

92. Budapest MTI, 2 May 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-085 (3 May 1995), p. 18; Munich *Focus*, 19 June 1995, p. 11. In addition, Germany had trained 118 Hungarian soldiers and delivered 300 wagon-loads of military spares and equipment. Ibid. In 1993 Germany also provided 20 L-39 training aircraft free of charge. Budapest MTI, 26 July 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-151 (7 August 1995), p. 18.

93. Budapest *Nepszabadsag*, 9 November 1995, p. 27. FBIS-EEU-95-218 (13 November 1995), p. 27.

94. Budapest MTI, 6 January 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-005 (9 January 1995), p. 22.

95. Budapest MTI, 1 March 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-044 (7 March 1995), p. 8. Also Gyorgy Keleti interview, Budapest *Magyar Honved*, 24 February 1995, pp. 6-7. FBIS-EEU-95-060 (29 March 1995), pp. 23-24.

96. Budapest MTI, 22 March 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-057 (24 March 1995), p. 8.

97. *Reform of the Armed Forces: 1995-1998-2005* (Budapest: Ministry of Defense, 1995), p. 4.

98. Budapest *Magyar Honved*, 15 September 1995, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-95-224 (21 November 1995), p. 20. Also see *Reform of the Armed Forces: 1995-1998-2005*, Ibid., pp. 12-13.

99. Lt. Gen. Sandor Nemeth interview, Budapest *Magyar Hirlap*, 7 December 1995, p. 9. FBIS-EEU-95-236 (8 December 1995), pp. 14-15. The number of NCOs would increase from 9,700 to 10,800 and conscripts would decline from 38,000 to 32,400. See, *Reform of the Armed Forces: 1995-*

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1998-2005, op. cit., p. 11.

100. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 30 November 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-230* (30 November 1995), p. 17.

101. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 24 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-081* (25 April 1996), p. 11.

102. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview. Budapest *Nepszava*, 8 March 1995, pp. 1,8. *FBIS-EEU-95-047* (10 March 1995), p. 12.

103. Brig. Gen. Attila Kositzky interview, Budapest *Magyar Hirlap*, 8 December 1995, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-95-239* (13 December 1995), p. 13.

104. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, Budapest *Nepszava*, 18 September 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-183* (21 September 1995), p. 16.

105. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, *Heti Vilaggazdasag*, 1 April 1995, pp. 47-48. *FBIS-EEU-95-064* (4 April 1995), p. 25.

106. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 4 April 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-065* (5 April 1995), p. 30; Defense Minister Keleti interview, *Nepszava*, 19 April 1995, p. 12. *FBIS-EEU-95-076* (20 April 1995), p. 13.

107. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 10 May 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-090* (10 May 1995), p. 23.

108. *National Defense '95* (Budapest: Ministry of Defense, 14 July 1995), p. 13.

109. Budapest *Magyar Honved*, 15 September 1995, p. 7. *FBIS-EEU-95-224* (21 November 1995), p. 20.

110. Budapest *Magyar Hirlap*, 15 May 1995, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-95-094* (16 May 1995), pp. 29-30; Budapest MTI, 27 June 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-126* (30 June 1995), p. 7.

111. Budapest *Magyar Hirlap*, 4 May 1995, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-95-087* (5 May 1995), p. 5.

112. Budapest *Nepszabadsag*, 8 May 1996, pp. 1,5. *FBIS-EU-96-091* (9 May 1996), pp. 38-39.

113. *Magyar Hirlap*, 17 March 1995, p. 8. Cited in Rudolf Joo, *The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces*, Chaillot Papers 23 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, WEU, February 1996), p. 47.

114. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, *Heti Vilaggazdasag*, 1 April 1995, pp. 47-48, op. cit.

115. Jozsef Feher interview, Budapest *Nepszabadsag*, 20 May 1995, pp. 1,8. *FBIS-EEU-95-100* (24 May 1995), p. 18.

116. Budapest *Magyar Hirlap*, 12 June 1996, p. 9. *FBIS-EEU-96-115* (13 June 1996), p. 27.

117. "Behind Declarations: Civil Military Relations in Central

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Europe," *Defence Studies: Special Edition* (Budapest: Institute For Strategic and Defence Studies, 1996), p. 18.

118. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 18 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-077* (19 April 1996), p. 19.

119. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 21 May 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-100* (22 May 1996), p. 19; *Nepszabadsag*, 29 May 1996, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-96-105* (30 May 1996), pp. 17-18.

120. Imre Mecs interview, Budapest *Magyar Nemzet*, 29 June 1996, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-96-128* (2 July 1996), p. 15.

121. Budapest *Nepszava*, 4 July 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-131* (8 July 1996), p. 29.

122. Thomas Wachslar personal interview, 25 June 1996.

123. Budapest *Magyar Honved*, 4 August 1995, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-95-187* (27 September 1995), p. 14.

124. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 12 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-073* (12 April 1996), p. 19.

125. Budapest Kossuth Radio, 5 May 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-089* (7 May 1996), p. 21; Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 16 May 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-096* (16 May 1996), p. 24.

126. Budapest MTI, 22 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-084* (30 April 1996), p. 4.

127. Budapest *Reform*, 2 April 1996, p. 29. *FBIS-EEU-96-068* (8 April 1996), p. 10.

128. *Magyar Nemzet*, 31 August 1995, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-95-170* (1 September 1995), pp. 16-17; Budapest Kossuth Radio, 19 September 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-182* (20 September 1995), p. 20. Two radars would be set up on the summits of the Bukk and Mecsek Mountains to detect aircraft at altitudes between a few hundred meters and 30,000 meters with a range of 400-500 kilometers and a digital communications link to pass signals automatically to the control center and air defense. The new radar uses less energy and would reduce the requirement for a few thousand soldiers. Budapest *Magyar Hirlap*, 3 October 1995, p. 5. *FBIS-EEU-95-193* (5 October 1995), p. 24.

129. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 1 November 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-212* (2 November 1995), p. 9.

130. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, 21 September 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-184* (22 September 1995), p. 16.

131. Budapest MTV Television Network, 9 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-071* (9 April 1996), p. 15.

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132. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, *Budapest Magyar Hirlap*, 7 May 1996, p. 10. *FBIS-EEU-96-090* (8 May 1996), p. 18.
133. Col. Gen. Janos Deak interview, *Budapest Magyar Nemzet*, 11 November 1995, p. 7. *FBIS-EEU-95-219* (14 November 1995), p. 24.
134. *Budapest Magyar Nemzet*, 6 February 1996, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-96-026* (7 February 1996), p. 17.
135. *OMRI Daily Digest*, 17 May 1996, pp. 4-5.
136. *Budapest Nepszabadsag*, 10 May 1996, p. 5. *FBIS-EEU-96-094* (14 May 1996), pp. 21-22; *OMRI Daily Report*, 31 May 1996, p. 4.
137. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, *Magyar Nemzet*, 20 April 1996, p. 7. *FBIS-EEU-96-079* (23 April 1996), p. 20; and *Magyar Hirlap*, 7 May 1996, p. 10.
138. *Budapest Nepszabadsag*, 2 December 1995, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-95-234* (6 December 1995), p. 21.
139. Defense Minister Keleti interview, *Budapest Magyar Hirlap*, 27 October 1995, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-95-211* (1 November 1995), pp. 18-19.
140. *Budapest Magyar Honved*, 8 December 1995, pp. 6-7. *FBIS-EU-96-030* (13 February 1996), p. 11.
141. Budapest MTI, 9 February 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-033* (16 February 1996), p. 8.
142. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 30 May 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-105* (30 May 1996), p. 18.
143. Maj. Gen. Ferenc Vegh interview, *Budapest Nepszava*, 11 May 1996, pp. 1,8. *FBIS-EEU-96-098* (20 May 1996), p. 16.
144. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 6 June 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-111* (7 June 1996), p. 22.
145. Ferenc Vegh interview, *Budapest Magyar Nemzet*, 15 June 1996, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-96-118* (18 June 1996), p. 22.
146. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 8 June 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-112* (10 June 1996), p. 28.
147. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 31 March 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-063* (3 April 1995), p. 11. Keleti noted that 40 Hungarian soldiers would join Austrian peacekeepers in Cyprus. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 10 May 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-091* (11 May 1995), p. 25.
148. Budapest MTI, 1 May 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-087* (3 May 1996), p. 13.
149. Imre Mecs interview, *Budapest Nepszabadsag*, 21 January 1995, pp. 1,7. *FBIS-EEU-95-015* (24 January 1995), p. 36. On 1 September 1995 a language training center was scheduled to open in Budapest. Also 12-15 billion forints would be necessary over many years to modernize the



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Army's telecommunications center. Budapest MTV Television, 14 February 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-031* (15 February 1995), p. 9.

150. Maj. Gen. Lajos Urban interview, *Magyar Nemzet*, 6 October 1995, p. 8. *FBIS-EEU-95-196* (11 October 1995), p. 12. Urban noted the difficulty of preparing the Hungarian staff commanders for six months for the exercise.

151. Budapest MTI, 7 June 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-114* (12 June 1996), p. 10.

152. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, Kossuth Radio Network, 13 August 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-156* (14 August 1995), p. 14; Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 1 September 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-171* (5 September 1995), p. 19.

153. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 18 November 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-223* (20 November 1995), p. 20.

154. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, Budapest *Nepszava*, 5 December 1995, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-95-234* (6 December 1995), pp. 17-18.

155. Vienna *Kurier*, 6 May 1996, p. 4. *FBIS-EU-96-089* (7 May 1996), p. 21.

156. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 13 May 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-093* (13 May 1996), p. 25.

157. Budapest MTI, 27 March 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-064* (2 April 1996), p. 13.

158. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 9 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-070* (10 April 1996), p. 22.

159. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 3 April 1996. *FBIS-EU-96-065* (3 April 1996), p. 8; Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 28 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-083* (29 April 1996), p. 18.

160. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 9 May 1996; and *Nepszabadsag*, 9 May 1996, p. 20. *FBIS-EEU-96-092* (10 May 1996), pp. 19-20.

161. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 16 December 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-244* (20 December 1995), p. 15.

162. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 29 February 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-042* (1 March 1996), p. 14.

163. Budapest MTI, 18 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-080* (24 April 1996), p. 16.

164. Budapest *Uj Magyarország*, 10 May 1996, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-96-094* (14 May 1996), p. 21.

165. Budapest MTI, 23 April 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-084* (30 April 1996), p. 5.

166. Budapest *Magyar Nemzet*, 6 May 1996, pp. 1,4. *FBIS-EEU-96-089* (7 May 1996), pp. 21-22.

167. Budapest *Nepszava*, 20 May 1996, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-96-100* (22 May 1996), p. 19.

168. *Review of Parliamentary Oversight of the Hungarian MOD and Democratic Control of the Hungarian Defence Forces*, Study No. 810 (London: Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services, February 1996), p. 14.



Map 5 Czechoslovakia

## VI. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: FROM UNITY TO FEDERATION AND DIVORCE

The movement toward democratic government in Czechoslovakia did not have a powerful set of opposition forces like the Catholic Church and Solidarity in Poland, or reformers within the Communist Party in Hungary. Nor did Czechoslovakia experience by November 1989 a mass popular movement like the one that toppled the wall and the seemingly immovable Honecker in East Germany. Despite a lack of these favorable elements—and because of population expectations and lack of support for the Communist Party—Czechoslovakia’s “Velvet Revolution” was extremely swift. Peaceful demonstrations and revolt, which erupted suddenly on 17 November 1989, quickly ended the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS)’s dominance, President Gustav Husak’s rule, and led to the naming of a federal government dominated by non-communists on 10 December 1989.

Within days after the Communist government used security troops to suppress a large public demonstration in Prague on 17 November, Vaclav Havel united opposition groups to create an umbrella organization, Civic Forum, to press their demands. After five days of strikes, the Communist government led by Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec held its first meeting with Civic Forum representatives.<sup>1</sup> Then after only one week of mass demonstrations, Communist reformer Karel Urbanek replaced Milos Jakes as CPCS leader on 25 November 1989 and 10 of the 13 members of the Communist Party presidium resigned.<sup>2</sup>

On the following day, Civic Forum issued a political program entitled "What We Want." Citing the deep moral, spiritual, ecological, social, economic, and political crises resulting from the ineffectiveness of Czechoslovakia's existing political and economic system, the Civic Forum political program set forth a number of objectives. Regarding the political system, it called for all political parties to have equal opportunity to participate in free elections and called upon the CPCS to abandon its constitutionally guaranteed leading role within society. To make relations more precise between the citizens and state, the program called for a new constitution to be adopted by a newly elected legislative assembly. Regarding the economy, the Civic Forum program called for abandoning existing methods and creating a developed market.<sup>3</sup>

On 29 November, the Federal Assembly voted unanimously to abolish the constitutionally guaranteed "leading" role of the Communist Party in government and society.<sup>4</sup> As pressures continued to deepen between Civic Forum and Premier Adamec over the formation of a new government that would include Civic Forum representatives, Adamec resigned in frustration on 7 December to be replaced by Marian Calfa, a Slovak.<sup>5</sup> When the new government was finally formed on 9 December, for the first time since 1948 the Communists became a minority, holding only 10 of 21 Cabinet posts. The ministry of interior post was left vacant. Slovak dissident Jan Carnogursky, recently released from prison, became deputy prime minister and headed a new commission overseeing the secret police. Jiri Dienstbier, a dissident who had been imprisoned with Vaclav Havel, became foreign minister. Vaclav Klaus, a Civic Forum strategist, became finance minister.<sup>6</sup>

When President Gustav Husak resigned on 9 December, Civic Forum and its Slovak counterpart Public Against Violence announced that Civic Forum leader, Vaclav Havel, was their candidate for president, which according to the Constitution, the Federal Assembly had to elect within two weeks upon a vacancy.<sup>7</sup> On 29 December 1989, the Federal Assembly elected Havel—a distinguished playwright and essayist and one of the spiritual leaders

of the opposition to Communist rule—President of the Republic. As president he assumed the role of commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

In his new year's address to the Czechoslovak people, President Havel set the tone for Czechoslovakia:

My dear fellow citizens. For the past 40 years on this day you have heard my predecessors utter variations on the same theme:

how our country is prospering...

Our country is not prospering...

We have become morally ill...

I mean all of us, because we all had become accustomed to the totalitarian system...

None of us is merely a victim of it, because all of us helped to create it.

As the supreme commander of the defense forces, I intend to guarantee that the defense capability of our state will never again be a pretext to thwart courageous peace initiatives...

People, your government has returned to you!<sup>8</sup>

On 29 March 1990, the Federal Assembly approved the state's name change from Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) to the Czechoslovak Federal Republic (CSFR). Under Slovak pressure the name of the state was again changed on 20 April to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR). Czechoslovakia's free elections on 8-9 June 1990 resulted in Civic Forum majorities to both Parliamentary Houses. In the 150-seat House of the People, the Civic Forum/Public Against Violence Coalition received 88 seats; the Communist Party, 22; and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 21. In the 150-seat House of Nations, Civic Forum received 82 seats; the Communist Party, 22; and the CDU, 24.<sup>9</sup> Hence, by

June 1990, a full democratic mandate existed in Czechoslovakia, completing a revolutionary process that had started only seven months earlier.

### **Hastily Concluded Defense Reform**

The purpose of Czechoslovakia's defense reform was to establish federal presidential, governmental and Parliamentary command and control over the defense ministry and the Czechoslovak People's Army (CSPA). In addition, the reform sought to remove Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS) influence from and establish civil control over the defense establishment and armed forces, and to ensure that the forces were sufficient to guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. Finally, the defense reform aimed to restore the armed forces' prestige in Czechoslovak society. In contrast to Poland, Czech society (like Hungary's) held the military in low esteem because the armed forces had: (1) remained passive during the Munich crisis in 1938, the February 1948 Communist coup, and the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia; (2) twice been used against its citizens in Pilsen in June 1953 and Brno in August 1969 during the Communist era;<sup>10</sup> and (3) apparently played a role in supporting counter-revolutionary activities during November 1989.

**Constitutional Development.** Czechoslovakia's 1960 Stalinist Constitution, which replaced the 1948 Ninth-of-May Constitution that severely limited the autonomy granted Slovakia,<sup>11</sup> declared the National Assembly the supreme organ of state power.<sup>12</sup> According to Articles 49 and 50.3 of the 1960 Constitution, the National Assembly has the power (by vote of three-fifths of the delegates) to elect the President of the Republic, to amend the Constitution,<sup>13</sup> and to declare war in case of an attack or in the fulfillment of international treaty obligations. The Constitution names the President of the Republic the head of State, and Article 62 grants him the power to: appoint and promote generals, act as

commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and proclaim a state of war on the recommendation of the Government (premier, the vice-ministers, and ministers) or declare war in pursuance of a National Assembly decree, if Czechoslovakia is attacked.

Because of the concentration of Communist governmental authority in Prague, there had been growing discontent in Slovakia. As a result, on 27 October 1968, a new Constitutional Law of Federation amended 58 of the 1960 Constitution's 112 Articles that mainly concerned Slovak autonomy. The 1968 Constitutional Law federalized the government and declared the Czechoslovak State "two equal fraternal nations."<sup>14</sup> It replaced the unicameral National Assembly with a bicameral Federal Assembly (see Table 6.1 below). The two bodies—the Chamber of the People based on proportional representation; and the Chamber of the Nations, which contained an equal number of Czechs and Slovaks—shared equal authority.


Despite the 1968 Constitutional Law of Federation, political power remained highly centralized in the hands of the Communist Party after the Warsaw Pact invasion. In addition, further constitutional amendments in July 1971 authorized the federal government to interfere with and invalidate measures of the national governments. In other words, although the 1968 reform had remained intact through the 1989-90 revolution, federalism in reality, remained little more than a facade after the 1971 constitutional amendments and under unitary Communist Party rule. After the 1989 revolution, the Federal Assembly passed a series of amendments to address these problems. In December 1990 it passed an act on division of competencies between the two republics; and in July 1991 debated a law giving the federal and republican parliaments the right to declare a referendum on the form of the state.<sup>15</sup>

On 9 January 1991, the Federal Assembly passed a Constitutional Act which instituted a six-chapter, 44-article, Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms protecting the individual from the State. In addition the new Act amended Article 5 of the 1968



Constitutional Act granting equal rights to citizens of both republics and the Federation and guaranteeing the status of nationalities in the CSFR.<sup>16</sup>

Concerns over subordination of the Czechoslovak People's Army (CSPA) to the CPCS were clearly evident during the period



of revolutionary change in Czechoslovakia. On 17 November 1989, Defense Minister Milan Vaclavik gave orders for possible use of force and urged the CPCS leadership to put the militia and CSPA on alert (OPERATIONS "VLNA" (Wave) and "ZASAH" (Hit)).<sup>17</sup> The CSPA's response was a strongly worded statement asserting that it would "defend Communism [and the] achievements of socialism."<sup>18</sup> On 24 November Gustav Husak resigned as CPCS leader, and the order was never issued.<sup>19</sup>

In response to the question of subordination, Defense Minister Vaclavik announced to the Federal Assembly on 29 November 1989, "We identify ourselves, above all, with those who think well of socialism and who are not misusing emotions to exert pressure to de-stabilize the political and economic situation in our society."<sup>20</sup> Apparently the ambiguity in Vaclavik's statement caused enough parliamentary concern to name Miroslav Vacek the new defense minister on 3 December 1989. When the same Federal Assembly asked Vacek the same question on 12 December 1989, he responded: "From the very inception of the Czechoslovak Republic...the CSPA has always been subordinated in accordance with the Constitution, above all, to the president of the republic...[who] has been the commander-in-chief. I assure you, esteemed deputies, that the CSPA will not be misused against the process which is taking place in our Republic."<sup>21</sup> Then on 19 December 1989, Prime Minister Calfa appointed Maj. Gen. Anton Slimak the new Czechoslovak Army (CSA) Chief of Staff. He was promoted to lieutenant general on 3 May 1990.

Another civil-military issue was the need to ensure the defense ministry's control of the military and guarantee that the CSA would remain subordinate to the government. This was a legitimate concern because of the existence of the then top secret Statute system that provided the Soviet Union direct access to Czechoslovak armed forces and the fact that most of the CSA officers had been trained in the USSR. To achieve this end, during the December 1989 revolution the CSFR changed the composition of the State Defense Council, which was responsible for exercising

the general guidelines of the CSFR's defense capabilities. Rather than being chaired by the communist party secretary, the federal president (Vaclav Havel) became the Defense Council chairman, and the premier, members of the two national governments, plus the foreign, defense and interior ministers, and the chairman of the State Planning Commission became its members.<sup>22</sup>

On 29 December 1989, Civic Forum civilian Antonin Rasek, who had been cashiered from the military in 1969, became deputy defense minister for education and culture with responsibility for abolishing the CSPA's political apparatus. In March 1990, outside experts proposed that the Federal Assembly create a General Inspectorate of the Czechoslovak Army, independent of the defense ministry. At first nothing was done because the defense ministry opposed the concept, claiming that it already had its own inspectorate. Later the defense ministry capitulated and accepted the creation of a General Inspectorate with the proviso that it be created from the reinforced defense ministry inspectorate.

During August 1990, new pressures developed to create a real Inspector General (IG) chosen by parliament to ensure observation of laws and to monitor control of the Army.<sup>23</sup> The reform effort took on new life on 18 October 1990 when Lubos Dobrovsky, a civilian, became defense minister. On 6 December 1990, the Federal Assembly finally enacted the proposal to create an Inspector General who oversees the armed forces, performs inspections, and prepares parliamentary reports on implementation of constitutional provisions, expenditures, level of preparedness, and implementation of military strategy.<sup>24</sup>

During 1989-1990, the CSFR also established a number of oversight bodies to ensure military renewal and defense ministry subordination to state control. First, Civic Forum became dominant in an Association of Military Renewal [Vojenska Obroda (SVO)]—consisting of more than 1,000 former soldiers of the 6,000 who had been discharged from the military after the 1969 Communist purges.<sup>25</sup> SVO was established in December 1989 to participate in the development of CSFR military doctrine and to

democratize the CSPA.<sup>26</sup> That this was an uphill battle became evident on 20 September 1990 when the SVO Central Committee criticized Defense Minister Vacek, the army leadership's lack of cooperation, and the slow pace of military democratization and restructuring.<sup>27</sup>

Second, on 19 January 1990, a Union of Professional Soldiers was founded to defend the social welfare of servicemen and to participate in cadre issues.<sup>28</sup> Third, in early September 1990 the founding Congress of the Free Legion [Svoboda Legie] convened in Prague. In opposition to the Army leadership, the Free Legion promoted goals of reducing Army enrollment, professionalizing the force, and 12-month military service. The Free Legion also demanded Defense Minister Vacek's resignation because of his role in the November 1989 counterrevolution.<sup>29</sup> (Both the Union and Free Legion played less important roles by 1992).

Concerned about the Army's role during the 17-24 November 1989 revolutionary period, President Havel set up an investigation commission on 18 September 1990 comprised of two members from the Federal Assembly Defense and Security Committee, two from SVO, two from the defense ministry Inspectorate, two from the President's Office, and one from the Military Office of the President.<sup>30</sup> On 16 October 1990, Havel received the commission's report, which concluded that Vacek and the Army Command had made preparations—under the code-word OPERATION "VLNA" (Wave)—for actions against demonstrators.<sup>31</sup> The aim of the later abandoned operation had been to install army specialists in radio and television and gain control over broadcasts.<sup>32</sup> On the same day that Havel received the commission report, he recalled Miroslav Vacek, then (on 18 October) named a civilian, Lubos Dobrovsky, defense minister.<sup>33</sup>

In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, a serious civil-military issue in Czechoslovakia had been the question of secrecy of military affairs. Because of previous secret police abuses, military counterintelligence, which had been under the dual supervision of the defense and interior ministries, was transferred as of

1 April 1990 to the defense ministry as "military defense intelligence."<sup>34</sup> The first stage of the reorganization of military counterintelligence into military defense intelligence had been completed at the end of June 1990 when the security service was transferred to the defense ministry. Some 16 percent of the former military counterintelligence officers did not pass Civic Forum and Military Renewal screening. Though the second stage was to be completed at the end of 1990,<sup>35</sup> on 1 October Vacek reported to the Federal Assembly that military counterintelligence was now subordinated to him—and that as of 1 January 1991 an "army security service" of 40-50 percent of the CSA's 800 military counterintelligence members would be in operation.<sup>36</sup>

One of Lubos Dobrovsky's first actions was to suspend the activity of the military defense intelligence service (on 26 October 1990), placing all 827 employees on coerced "leave." Dobrovsky did this because he felt Vacek had not been thorough enough since 72 percent of the former members of the military counterintelligence service subjected to evaluations had been deemed fit for further service. In justifying his action, Dobrovsky said, "I believe that the staff of the former counterintelligence service ought to be subjected to screening...identical with those undergone by the staff of the State Security Corps...[adding that] Even people who passed the screening should not work in the military defense intelligence service in the future."<sup>37</sup> Deputy Defense Minister Antonin Rasek added that in the future military defense intelligence would function with only about one-fifth of the present staff and would also take over military police tasks, including those of the crime squad.<sup>38</sup>

In December 1990, Dobrovsky was quite forthcoming in his views. Following the dissolution of military defense intelligence, he intended to create a new unit subordinate to the defense minister to "protect the Army against any kind of destructive act on the part of anyone."<sup>39</sup> In early December this unit had a staff of 80 people, and was envisaged to grow to 180 (compared to the original 827 on coerced leave). An all-professional 1,000-man military

police force charged to deal with Army criminal activity and traffic control began operating in April 1991.<sup>40</sup> In addition, Dobrovsky greatly eased secrecy laws so that publication of troop size, deployment, and budget were made public, though mobilization plans and everything connected to them remained classified.<sup>41</sup> Parliamentary and governmental oversight of the military had advanced further through the appointment of a civilian defense minister, the establishment of the Inspector General (IG), organizations such as the SVO and Free Legion, and implementation of screening laws and campaigns.

President Havel, in December 1990, sought an expansion of his emergency authority during periods of serious social unrest, natural disasters, and international incidents. Havel sought the state-of-emergency bill because the CSFR Constitution—which had been changed after the November 1989 revolution to prevent interference in internal affairs—limited presidential authority and because of concerns about Saddam Hussein's threats of terrorism and the Soviet crackdown in the Baltic.<sup>42</sup> Havel sought powers to employ the Army, if circumstances warranted, to secure basic food stuffs and telecommunications to prevent state collapse.<sup>43</sup>

During the Spring of 1991, the restructuring of the Czechoslovak federal ministry of defense—as the supreme body of the Army—was completed (see Table 6.2 below). The political administration section controlled by Defense Minister Dobrovsky was separated from the direct command of the troops, led by the chief of the general staff. Directly subordinate to Dobrovsky was a secretariat and four organizations—the minister's inspectorate, health administration, personnel administration, and the courts.<sup>44</sup>

The reformed defense ministry comprised four elements:


(1) *A deputy defense minister for social and humanitarian questions*, led by a civilian Antonin Rasek, headed directorates on social management, legal service, higher educational institutions, and military institutes for Sociological Research, History of the Army, and Culture.

(2) *A deputy defense minister for strategic management and develop-*

ment headed by Gen. Imrich Andrejcek dealt with long-range planning and matters of doctrine.<sup>45</sup>

(3) A deputy minister for economic management headed by Ivan Balaz, dealt with budgetary issues, ecology, and private enterprise. This deputy minister had acquired great political importance since the CSFR's military industrial base was disproportionately positioned in Slovakia where 80,000 people were employed. The CSFR's depressed military industry meant higher Slovak unemployment rates, contributing to state tension (and disintegration).

On 25 April 1991, Balaz announced that he would soon present a plan to alleviate the consequences of military industrial unemployment, especially in Slovakia. Balaz mentioned the need not only to involve the Czechoslovak Army (CSA)'s special facilities—the 12,000-employee Military Engineering Works and 28,000-



employee Czechoslovak Army Repair Works—in civilian sector “entrepreneurial activity,” but also the need to maintain Czechoslovakia’s foreign military sales, specifically citing Syria, Iran, Algeria, and Latin America.<sup>46</sup> Balaz also noted that the earlier announced CSA troop redeployment to Slovakia would *not* take place unless the defense ministry were to get three billion crowns (kcs), which the redeployment was expected to cost and “which the Army does not have.”<sup>47</sup>

(4) *The CSA’s Chief of General Staff* headed the armed forces. Czechoslovakia was able to gain control of the General Staff more effectively than Hungary and Poland because 6,000 former military officers who had sympathized with the 1968 Prague Spring reform and been cashiered after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia provided a pool of former military officers who were politically reliable and available for duty. One such officer was Maj. Gen. Karel Pezl, an SVO member and adviser to Lubos Dobrovsky, who replaced Lt. Gen. Anton Slimak as CSA Chief of Staff on 29 April 1991.<sup>48</sup> On 15 May, Pezl noted that his most important tasks were to: “[C]hange the whole image of the Czechoslovak Army in a short period of time and change it from an offensive into a defensive army.”<sup>49</sup> Further military shakeups occurred on 1 June 1991, when Dobrovsky recalled the deputy commander of the General Staff, commander of the Main Logistical Support Branch, and head of the Main Administration of Ground Forces.<sup>50</sup>

During the failed coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 when Czechoslovakia tested its emergency machinery, it (like Hungary) felt less threatened than Poland because Soviet troops had already vacated its territory. On 19 August 1991 the federal interior ministry set up a special security staff, comprising representatives from foreign affairs, defense, transport, the federal intelligence service, and from the republican ministries. The staff met around the clock, issued orders to carry out certain measures on the borders, evaluated incoming information, and prepared proposals for the Defense Council.<sup>51</sup> On 20 August the Defense Council approved measures for the defense of the state, securing



continuous supplies for the CSFR, and reinforcing the borders against migration.<sup>52</sup>

The CSFR's greatest test came with the 6 June 1992 Federal Assembly democratic elections, whose results sealed the CSFR's fate and brought disintegration. Though Slovak demands for autonomy were realized, they opened a new era in relations between Czechs and Slovaks, and created new challenges for Central European security. During the next six months, the power of the federal government began to decline while the two republican governments began to assume more and more authority with the impending 1 January 1993 split.

### **Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce**

**Constitutional Divorce.** When the new Federal Assembly was elected in June 1990 as a constituent assembly, it created a self-imposed mandate to complete a new constitution within its two-year term. By far the most contentious issue facing the constitution drafters was the structure of the federal state and the respective competencies of the two member republics. As the 1992 elections approached, talks stalled while all parties awaited the results of the elections. On 11 May, well before the 5-6 June 1992 elections, Vladimir Meciar, head of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, told Havel that following a declaration of sovereignty, Slovakia would adopt a new constitution for itself, then hold a referendum to decide if Slovakia should remain in the federation.<sup>53</sup>

In the elections for the Federal Assembly there was an 85 percent turnout in the Czech Republic and 84 percent in Slovakia. The 5 percent threshold to win representation allowed Czechoslovakia to avoid the Polish 1991-fragmentation problem and reduced the number of political parties from more than 20 to 6 from each republic to the Federal Assembly, with Vaclav Klaus' Civic Democratic Party (ODS) getting 34 percent of the vote in the Czech Republic and Vladimir Meciar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) getting 34 percent of the vote in Slovakia.<sup>54</sup> On

7 June Vaclav Havel charged Klaus with forming a new federal government.

Czech and Slovak differences were immediately apparent after the 5-6 June elections. Klaus's espousal of rapid and radical market reforms clashed with Meciar's more cautious, socialistic economic agenda and penchant for nationalistic proclamations. After meeting with Meciar on 9 June, Klaus noted "deep and fundamental differences in views on the future setup of Czechoslovakia."<sup>55</sup> Meciar wanted a sovereign Slovak state with weaker links to Prague; Klaus favored a strong federation or split. After two weeks of discussion, Meciar and Klaus agreed to negotiate a division of Czechoslovakia into two states by 30 September. When the Slovak Parliament convened on 23 June, Meciar pushed it to declare sovereignty in July and adopt a Slovak Constitution in August.<sup>56</sup>

On 26 June, the CSFR Prime Minister Marian Calfa and government resigned to make way for a new interim Cabinet, which would have only ten members; five Czechs and five Slovaks.<sup>57</sup> When Jan Strasky (ODS) became the new prime minister instead of Klaus, it was clear that split was imminent; Slovaks took over the ministries of foreign affairs, interior, and defense.<sup>58</sup> CSFR President Havel and Vaclav Klaus, leader of the Czech Civic Democratic Party wanted the next federal defense minister to be a civilian whereas Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia wanted a professional soldier.<sup>59</sup> In the end, Lt. Gen. Imrich Andrejcek, an independent Slovak, became the new CSFR defense minister after going into the reserve. Jiri Pospisil assumed Andrejcek's position as deputy defense minister for strategy, and Antonin Rasek was replaced by Igor Urban as deputy defense minister for social and humanitarian affairs.<sup>60</sup>

When the Slovak National Council adopted a declaration of sovereignty with a margin of 113 to 24 (with 10 abstentions and three deputies absent) on 17 July,<sup>61</sup> Vaclav Havel announced he would resign as president. Following his resignation on 20 July 1992, Jan Strasky, the CSFR prime minister, assumed the presi-

dent's powers except the power to appoint and recall the Federal Government. That the federal premier had now assumed the duties of commander-in-chief of the armed forces was confirmed by Chief of Staff Pezl.<sup>62</sup>

A decision followed to divide the property of the CSA on a ratio of 2:1 among Czechs and Slovaks, with a special consideration for the Air Force and Air Defense. On 23 November 1992 the Czech and Slovak Republics signed a 21-article Treaty of Good Neighborly Relations, Friendship, and Cooperation, which contained guarantees on security consultation (Article 5) and ethnic minority rights (Article 8).<sup>63</sup> Then on 25 November 1992 the CSFR Federal Assembly approved, by the necessary three-fifths vote, the constitutional bill ending the CSFR.<sup>64</sup> The Constitutional Law On the Termination of the CSFR, which became effective immediately, vested powers in the two republics' legislatures, governments, and courts.<sup>65</sup>

### New Constitutions

At the end of July both the Slovak and Czech National Councils began preparations to draft new constitutions. Though constitutional development of the CSFR had been remarkably advanced, the disintegration of the federation would create new and different problems for each of the successor states. In some ways, particularly for Slovakia, both returned to the 1989-90 stage of development. Still, the advances toward democracy had been remarkably cooperative and speedy by contrast with other Central European states.

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## Notes

1. Mary Battiata and Blaine Harden, "Premier Holds First Talks With Czech Opposition," *The Washington Post*, 22 November 1989, p. A1. As late as 1 November 1989 Communist Party leader Milos Jakes had categorically refused to engage in dialogue with opposition groups.

2. Blaine Harden "Prague Ousts Leaders," *The Washington Post*, 25 November 1989, pp. A1, A17.

3. For the Civic Forum Program, see *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 125-127.

4. Blaine Harden, "Shame, Regret Pervade Legislature In Prague," *The Washington Post*, 30 November 1989, p. A54.

5. Dan Morgan, "Czechoslovak Premier Steps Down," *The Washington Post*, 8 December 1989, p. A1.

6. Dan Morgan and Stuart Auerbach, "Czechoslovak Cabinet Installed With Communists In Minority," *The Washington Post*, 11 December 1989, pp. A1, A28.

7. On 19 December the Federal Assembly extended the deadline by 40 days. Mary Battiata, "Communists Back Havel Candidacy," *The Washington Post*, 20 December 1989, p. A27.

8. Vaclav Havel, "People, Your Government Has Returned to You!" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 99-105.

9. Prague CTK, 9 June 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-112* (11 June 1990), p. 31.

10. Stefan Sarvas, "Civil-Military Relations in the Czech Republic," mimeo, p. 6.

11. The executive branch of the Slovak government was abolished and its duties assigned to the Presidium of the Slovak National Council, thus combining executive and legislative functions in a single body. The federal government National Assembly had the authority to overrule decisions of the Slovak National Council, and central government agencies took over the administration of the Slovak local government.

12. *Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic* (11 July 1960) (Prague: Orbis, 1964).

13. On 28 December 1989 the Federal Assembly voted to amend the Constitution to allow the appointment of the 23 new deputies to replace the 23 hard-line Communists who resigned. On 29 December the Federal

Assembly elected Vaclav Havel president. Sydney Rubin, "Ousted Reformer Dubcek Heads Prague's Assembly," *The Washington Post*, 29 December 1989, p. A1.

14. *Czechoslovakia: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1989), p.193.

15. *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 3.

16. Sections 4 & 5, *Constitutional Act of 9 January 1991* (CSFR Embassy Mimeo), pp. 1-2.

17. CTK, 6 November 1990.

18. *The London Times*, 24 November 1989.

19. Zoltan D. Barany, "East European Armed Forces In Transitions and Beyond," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (March 1992), p. 13.

20. Prague Domestic Service, 12 December 1989. *FBIS-EEU-89-239* (14 December 1989), p. 27.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

22. Col. Gen. Miroslav Vacek 15 December 1989 interview, *Rude Pravo*, 16 December 1989, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-90-002* (3 January 1990), p. 33.

23. *Respekt*, 14 August 1990, pp. 4-5. *JPRS-EER-90-148* (26 October 1990), pp. 18-19.

24. Prague CTK, 6 December 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-238* (11 December 1990), p. 16.

25. The purge lasted in several waves between 1969 and 1975 and is estimated to resulted in 6,000 discharged professional soldiers. See Condoleezza Rice, *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-1983* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

26. Bratislava *Pravda*, 29 December 1989, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-90-002* (3 January 1990), p. 31. Also, *Rude Pravo*, 11 January 1990, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-90-010* (16 January 1990), p. 38.

27. Prague CTK, 20 September 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-185* (24 September 1990), p. 28.

28. Prague Domestic Service, 19 January 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-018* (26 January 1990), p. 35.

29. *Narodna Obroda*, 12 September 1990, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-90-185* (24 September 1990), p. 28.

30. *Svobodne Slovo*, 19 September 1990, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-90-190* (1 October 1990), p. 23.

31. *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 19 October 1990, pp. 1,2. *FBIS-EEU-90-205* (23

October 1990), p. 15; Prague Domestic Service, 18 October 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-203* (19 October 1990), pp. 15-16.

32. *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 19 October 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90* (23 October 1990), p. 15.

33. Prague CTK, 16 October 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-201* (17 October 1990), p. 8. In his first order Dobrovsky banned the Free Legion until it could be investigated. On 30 October Dobrovsky lifted his order suspending the Free Legion's activities.

34. Col. Gen. Miroslav Vacek interview, 9 February 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-029* (12 February 1990), p. 18.

35. Prague *Svobodne Slovo*, 12 July 1990, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-90-139* (19 July 1990), p. 17.

36. Prague CTK, 1 October 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-193* (4 October 1990), p. 20.

37. Lubos Dobrovsky interview, *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 30 October 1990, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-90-215* (6 November 1990), p. 11.

38. Prague Domestic Service, 28 November 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-230* (29 November 1990), p. 21.

39. Lubos Dobrovsky interview, *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 13 December 1990, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-90-245* (20 December 1990), p. 23.

40. Prague CTK, 17 April 1991. *JPRS-EER-91-053* (25 April 1991), p. 2.

41. Col. Eng. Josef Ocnas interview, *Prace*, 24 March 1990, pp. 1, 2. *FBIS-EEU-90-064* (3 April 1990), pp. 23-24.

42. Prague Domestic Service, 22 January 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-015* (23 January 1991), p. 15.

43. Vaclav Havel 15 December 1990 interview, Prague Domestic Service, 16 December 1990. *FBIS-EEU-90-242* (17 December 1990), p. 29.

44. Antonin Rasek interview, *Narodna Obroda*, 2 April 1991, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-91-066* (5 April 1991), p. 18.

45. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 6 April 1991, p. 2. *JPRS-UMA-91-011* (23 April 1991), p. 51.

46. *Hospodarske Noviny*, 25 April 1991, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-91-085* (2 May 1991), p. 9.


47. *Rude Pravo*, 25 April 1991, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-91-085* (2 May 1991), p. 9.

48. Prague CTK, 29 April 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-082* (29 April 1991), p. 14.

49. Prague CTK, 15 May 1991. *JPRS-EER-91-070* (23 May 1991), p. 13.

50. Prague Federal 1 Television, 24 May 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-103* (29 May 1991), p. 17.
51. Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas, 19 August 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-161* (20 August 1991), p. 16.
52. Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas, 20 August 1991. *FBIS-EEU-91-162* (21 August 1991), pp. 11-12.
53. Prague CSTK, 11 May 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-092* (12 May 1992), p. 8.
54. *FBIS-EEU-92-110* (8 June 1992), pp. 14-18.
55. Prague CSTK, 9 June 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-111* (9 June 1992), p. 14.
56. Prague CSTK, 23 June 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-124* (26 June 1992), p. 9.
57. On 16 July 1992 the Federal Assembly approved a "CSFR Government Policy Statement" that outlined the new reduced Federal Government structure and stated how powers would be divested to National Councils which were to reach agreements by the end of September. For text, see *Hospodarske Noviny*, 22 July 1993, p. 7. *FBIS-EEU-92-144* (27 July 1992), pp. 10-14.
58. Vaclav Havel news conference, Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio, 1 July 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-128* (2 July 1992), p. 8.
59. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 122 (30 June 1992), p. 4.
60. Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio, 17 September 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-182* (18 September 1992), p. 7.
61. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 136 (20 July 1992), p. 8.
62. Prague CSTK, 20 July 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-140* (21 July 1992), p. 5.
63. Treaty text, *Hospodarske Noviny*, 8 December 1992, p. 8. *FBIS-EEU-92-240* (14 December 1992), pp. 20-23.
64. In the Chamber of the People, 92 voted in favor, 16 against, and 28 abstained. In the Czech part of the Chamber of Nations, 45 voted in favor, 7 against, and 11 abstained. In the Slovak part, 46 voted in favor, 7 against, and 16 abstained. Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio, 25 November 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-228* (25 November 1992), p. 4.
65. Text, *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 26 November 1992, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-92-232* (2 December 1992), pp. 8-9.

Map 6 The Czech Republic






## VII. The Czech Republic: Advancing Toward Democracy

**T**he Czech National Council passed a resolution assuming responsibility for affairs of the Republic on 19 November 1992 and adopted a Constitution on 16 December by vote of 172 to 16 with 10 abstentions. Its Preamble, in contrast to Slovakia's Constitution, emphasizes the civil rather than national aspect of citizenship. Legislative power is vested in a bicameral parliament—a 200-member Chamber of Deputies with 4-year terms, and an 81-member Senate elected for 6-year terms (one-third every 2 years). Since the Czech Parliament rejected the proposal that federal deputies be transferred to the Senate, it remains unoccupied through 1996. Constitutional amendments require a three-fifths majority of all deputies of the Chamber of Deputies and of all members of the Senate present.<sup>1</sup>

The President, as commander-in-chief, is elected by simple majority of both chambers of Parliament for a 5-year term. The powers of the Czech president, in contrast to those of the strong CSFR president, are more like the German-model: the president represents symbolic and moral authority. The government is the supreme executive power. Although the president appoints members of the government, appointment is at the suggestion of the prime minister, who determines the government's composition (see Table 7.1 below). The president appoints the Constitutional Court of 15 judges for 10-year terms with Senate approval. Constitutional amendments require three-fifths of all deputies.<sup>2</sup>

On 26 January 1993, 109 (of 200) Parliamentary deputies elected Vaclav Havel the Czech Republic's first president.<sup>3</sup>

Havel's actual powers as president of the Czech Republic are much more limited than those he held under the former CSFR Constitution in that he no longer has the right to put forth legislative initiatives. Article 62 of the Constitution outlines his independent powers, which on close examination are quite limited, and Article 63 outlines those powers limited by prime ministerial



signature. One potential Constitutional problem is Article 63(c) which declares the president "supreme commander of the armed forces" but still requires him to get prime ministerial approval for his actions as well as authority to commission and promote generals [Article 63(g)].<sup>4</sup> In sum, the Czech president's powers are limited and can become the cause of confusion during an emergency.

Despite the fact that the State Defense Council (ROS) had no legal basis in the Czech Constitution, the President's office initially named members anyway. These include the prime minister, ministers of finance, foreign affairs, defense, interior, industry and trade, environment, and military officers from the Office of the President, Government, and General Staff. President Havel noted that: "According to Article 63 of the Constitution, the President has the right to exercise legal powers which are not expressly defined in a Constitutional law, if the law so stipulates."<sup>5</sup> In March 1993 the Government Office for Legislature and Public Administration declared that the State Defense Council could not exist as a state agency, but that it could act as a consultative body to the president.<sup>6</sup> As a result, the State Defense Council no longer exists.

**Constitutional politics.** In contrast to Slovakia, Czech constitutional politics have been relatively calm. This was, in part, due to the ongoing strength of the ruling Civic Democratic Party (ODS) led by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, which controlled 105 seats of the 200-seat Chamber of Deputies. (Deputies from the June 1992 Czech National Council were reassigned to the Chamber of Deputies). The Senate, though, was not filled, because of a difference of opinion as to whether senators from the CSFR Senate should be coopted to fill the body (failed a vote because it required a two-thirds Chamber of Deputies majority), or abolish the Senate (which was rejected on March 24, 1993). The Chamber of Deputies therefore fulfills the duties of the Senate until that body will be elected (Article 106, Secs. 2-3).<sup>7</sup>

During the first months of 1994 the Senate remained a political issue. The opposition Social Democrats and the Communists

wanted to abolish the Senate. Klaus's Civil Democratic Party (ODS) wanted the Senate elections to take place in 81 single-member districts; the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) as well as 2 Christian parties [Christian Democratic Party (KDS), which later merged with the ODS, and Christian Democratic Union (KDU)] wanted to organize 27 electoral districts, with the top 3 vote-getters in each district to become senators. Despite these differences, the ODS-ODA-KDS-KDU coalition remained stable. On 27 September 1994 the Parliament rejected a constitutional amendment abolishing the Senate.

In late January 1995, when the Parliamentary committees did not approve the draft constitutional law on defense, Defense Minister Vilem Holan indicated concern and noted that: "[A]t the moment, opinion on who declares a state of emergency is not unanimous."<sup>8</sup> President Havel again called on the Czech Parliament on 14 March to fill the "holes" in the Czech Constitution before they became an issue in the 1996 election campaign and renewed his call to create the Senate.<sup>9</sup>

On 27 September 1995, after more than 2 years of bitter disputes, the Parliament finally voted for the electoral law that includes a method for filling the 81-seat Senate prescribed by the Constitution. Hence, the Chamber of Deputies will be up for re-election once the Senate is filled. Senators will be elected for 6-year terms by majority (on a 2-year rolling basis). President Havel, with Prime Minister Klaus's grudging agreement, announced the date of the election would be 15-16 November 1996.<sup>10</sup>

**Defense reform.** On 4 January 1993, Antonin Baudys (of the Christian Democratic Union) became the Czech Republic's first defense minister. He immediately announced that no major changes had been made in the Army since 1989<sup>11</sup> and radical steps would be needed to adjust the structure and size of the defense ministry and Army to meet needs of integration into the European defense system. Defense Minister Baudys also retained former CSFR Chief of General Staff and Deputy Defense Minister Karel Pezl in the Czech defense ministry and established a commission

to work out a Concept for the Czech Army, which was to be prepared on the basis of a new military doctrine and on the future integration of the Czech Republic into European defense structures.<sup>12</sup> Baudys promised that the draft would be made available for the Parliament to debate and consider.

Defense Minister Baudys wanted to delineate responsibility between the General Staff, which needs to be concerned with command, and the civilian defense ministry, which is concerned with equipment allocation and supply, management of production enterprises, and foreign contacts. Also noting that many qualified younger officers had been leaving the military, Baudys charged First Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Pospisil to establish a new personnel system within the Army.<sup>13</sup>

Baudys envisaged that, with Parliament's participation, "screening" or interviews and tests of aptitude would be necessary for service in the new Czech Army. Citing examples of past screening failures, Baudys mentioned that former Defense Minister Miroslav Vacek and Chief of Staff Anton Slimak had destroyed files on the army's preparations in November 1989.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, on 17 May 1993, the defense ministry issued the order to begin screening of 28,000 professional soldiers by the end of the year. Baudys indicated that officers who participated in the purge of the armed forces after 1968 or in the clampdown on demonstrations in 1989 would be fired. In addition, personnel reductions would require 8,000 to 10,000 professionals to leave the armed forces or retire.<sup>15</sup> Though the Parliament's Defense and Security Committee criticized the process and results, when the screening had been completed in the Spring of 1994, it concluded that the majority of the Army's officers would defend the sovereignty of the Czech Republic.<sup>16</sup>

On 1 January 1993, the Czech Republic Army comprised 106,447 (69,488 in the Army and 36,959 in Air Force and Air Defense).<sup>17</sup> In his first meeting with the Czech Parliament Defense and Security Committee, Baudys argued that the army's weapons needed to be replaced to approach Western standards and noted

that the ministry was drafting a concept for re-equipping the Army.<sup>18</sup> At its first (29 April 1993) session, the State Defense Council (ROS) recommended that the government approve a draft of the new Czech Army structure, which it did on 9 June. The goal was to reduce those forces to roughly 65,000 and to restructure them according to a brigade system.<sup>19</sup>

According to the draft, the Czech ground forces were to be restructured by the end of 1995. The 28,000-man brigade-based Army would be divided into an Expedition Army Force, a 15-brigade Territorial Defense Force, and a Rapid Deployment Brigade that would train for specific cooperation with foreign (specifically NATO) forces.<sup>20</sup> In addition, there would be Air Force and Air Defense troops.

The Czech forces would use different equipment than Hungary and Slovakia, which acquired MIG-29s from Russia as part of their debt consolidation.<sup>21</sup> The Czechs made a conscious decision neither to buy MIG-29s nor to re-equip their Army with Russian or Ukrainian equipment. In fact, during 1994 they decided to ground their 10 MIG-29s, use MIG-23s until 1999, and modernize their 36 MIG-21s.<sup>22</sup> To eventually replace its MIG-21 and MIG-23s, the Czech Army also intends to buy 72 Czech-made L-159 interceptors to be produced by Aero Vodochody between 1998-2004.<sup>23</sup>

On 1 July 1993, Maj. Gen. Jiri Nekvasil replaced Karel Pezl as Chief of the General Staff of the Czech Army. In contrast to all other Central European general staffs, the Czech General Staff had been so transformed that Nekvasil could say in a July interview, "There are none of the original principal officers anymore."<sup>24</sup> In an effort to return the Army to the people, on 19 August 1993 Nekvasil apologized to the citizens of the Czech Republic for the role played by the Army in suppressing demonstrations in August 1969. Nekvasil openly conceded that the Army had been used against the people by the former Communist Party and that he would declassify pertinent secret documents on 20 August.<sup>25</sup>

During September 1993 when Yeltsin dissolved the Russian

Parliament, Defense Minister Baudys cautioned that the situation should not be dramatized or exaggerated. Baudys argued that a normal development could be expected, as long as armed forces did not intervene. Although Jiri Nekvasil announced at a 23 September news conference that he had ordered the intensification of military intelligence,<sup>26</sup> as the Russian situation later degenerated, President Havel, Prime Minister Klaus, and Defense Minister Baudys all went on public record noting that Russia posed no direct threat to the Czech Republic.

**NATO and Czech Military Reform.** With NATO's introduction of Partnership For Peace (PFP), Baudys promised that all military exercises undertaken by the Czech Army would be subject to the consent of Parliament because Article 43 of the Czech Constitution allows for Czech forces to operate outside Czech territory only with consent of both houses of Parliament. Article 39 requires foreign troop presence on Czech soil to be approved by majority of Senate.<sup>27</sup> On 29 April 1994, the Parliament approved the government proposal to permit short-term military training and exercises on Czech soil (5,000 foreign troops for up to 21 days) and for Czech units to participate abroad (700 troops for up to 30 days).<sup>28</sup>

On 10 March 1994, Klaus signed the PFP general agreement making the Czech Republic the 11th country to join the project. Though Defense Minister Baudys called the program, "the maximum possible and the minimum desired,"<sup>29</sup> active Czech participation immediately ensued. The first joint exercise with a Western Army under PFP took place 15-25 March 1994 when 32 Dutch marines participated with 120 members of the Czech Rapid Deployment Battalion on Czech soil. On 29 May-10 June, 130 French troops participated in exercises in the Czech Republic with 120 members of a company of the 23rd Czech mechanized battalion.<sup>30</sup> During 9-19 September, a platoon of 40 soldiers of the Czech 4th mechanized regiment participated in COOPERATIVE BRIDGE-94 in Poland.<sup>31</sup> Finally, the first joint Czech-German military exercise of 400 troops took place during 7-11 November on both sides of the

common border.<sup>32</sup> On 9 May, the Czech Republic signed its associated partnership agreement with the West European Union (WEU).

**Armed Forces Restructuring.** Although the Czech Parliament increased the 1994 defense budget to 27 billion korunas (Kc) from Kc23.77 billion in 1993, because of inflation it only represented Kc24.55 billion in real terms and remained a constant 2.6 percent of GDP.<sup>33</sup> The 1994 defense budget, though, did reorient priorities and included new line-item expenditures of Kc800 million for creating the Rapid Deployment Force, Kc50 million for restructuring the logistics system, and Kc300 million for modernizing communications.<sup>34</sup> The Rapid Deployment Brigade, which was to comprise some 3,000 men and become operational on 1 July 1994, represented the model of the Czech Republic's future forces. The equipment of this brigade would be compatible with NATO and its units will participate in NATO exercises.

By Spring 1994 the former six-tier organization of the Army began merging into three levels—General Staff, army corps, and brigades. General Nekvasil noted that the Rapid Deployment Brigade would be completed on 30 June 1994, adding that training with Dutch soldiers in PFP was useful in developing standards for the Brigade.<sup>35</sup>

The Air Force also went through significant change; one-third of its 400 aircraft—77 combat aircraft (including the 10 MIG-29s), 20 trainers, 10 transports, and 20 transport helicopters—were put out of service. According to Czech Air Force Chief General Pavel Strubl, this "shock therapy was necessary because without radically limiting the bloated Air Force, where almost all costs are expenditures on the operation of the aging fleet, the Air Force would gradually become extinct."<sup>36</sup>


Even after the United States allowed the purchase of modern weapons in 1995—to include the F-16—this feeling continued. In the words of Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Air Defense Colonel Jaroslav Hudec, "Even if Parliament were to approve a budget several times higher...we would never agree to purchase



the most modern aircraft."<sup>37</sup> Hudec argued that it was more important for the Czechs to first train technically first-class and linguistically accomplished pilots, than install NATO-standard IFF systems in aircraft and ground radars, and finally make radio stations and automated command systems compatible with the West. Maj. Gen. Jiri Nekvasil noted that a switch to NATO communications standards, rather than acquiring new tanks or jets, remained the first priority.<sup>38</sup>

**A New Defense Minister.** On 22 September 1994, Vilem Holan (Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party—KDU-CSL) succeeded Antonin Baudys as defense minister (see Table 7.2 below). Shortly after assuming office, Holan criticized the Army screening that occurred under Baudys, claiming that only 60 people did not pass.<sup>39</sup> He argued that his priorities would be military education and to change the structure of the officers corps because "there are too many high-ranking officers."<sup>40</sup> After a few months in office, Holan identified challenges in two areas. First, he continued to see the need to change the personnel management system, noting that he had set up a personnel board to establish criteria and guidelines for career paths and for military promotion. Second, he wanted to break through the "impediments in legislation" and adopt a Law on the Army, a Law on the conditions of service, and a new Defense Law.<sup>41</sup>

Intelligence remained another area of concern, particularly since the military had been involved in counter-revolutionary activity during the revolution. During 1994 the military intelligence group (VZS) had been established by merging the Military Defense Intelligence and the Intelligence Services of the General Staff (which until 1992 had been directed by their pre-November 1989 chief General Kozojed). Now directed by former political prisoner Radovan Prochazka, the 800 VZS employees—including military and air attaches—are subordinate to the Defense Minister and in the defense ministry.<sup>42</sup> On 20 April 1995 the Chamber of Deputies amended the law and established a seven-member committee to oversee and control military intelligence.<sup>43</sup>



In mid-December 1994, the government approved a three-part document entitled "Military Strategy of the Czech Republic." The first section described "political instability in the East" (read Russia) and local risks such as the war in Yugoslavia and terrorism. The second section noted that while the Army must be able to face danger on its own, a small Army has its limits. Thus, the Czech Republic seeks membership in alliances, specifically NATO. The third section described the structure of the armed forces—that the army should be deployed for circular defense, nonpartisan,

semi-professional, and subject to public and parliamentary control.<sup>44</sup>

Summing up the developments in late January 1995, President Havel noted, "I realize that, after all these complicated changes, the Army is led by a relatively good team of younger generals who are willing to build the democratic army of a democratic state."<sup>45</sup>

**Acquisition policy.** In November 1994 the government also adopted an "Acquisition Plan of the Czech Republic Army for 1995-2005," which projected costs of modernization beginning 1995 to the year 2005 of 120 billion korunas (Kc) (or \$4.4 billion). This would include Kc15 billion for small arms and anti-tank weapons, Kc33.6 for Air Force acquisitions (to include 72 L-159 aircraft from Aero Vodochody for Kc15 billion),<sup>46</sup> Kc10 billion for Air Defense spending, and Kc10 billion for radars and computer equipment.<sup>47</sup>

In reference to NATO membership, Defense Minister Holan concluded, "It is possible to anticipate that the conditions for NATO membership will be clearly defined in the near future—that is, certain standards will be drawn up...[adding] the 'cheap' phase of our decisions is coming to an end, and the phase that will cost us something is beginning."<sup>48</sup> He further noted, "[T]he new system of planning of programming and budgeting makes it possible...not to plan for a single year, but for a 10-year period."<sup>49</sup> The 1995 defense budget of Kc27 billion represented a decline from 1994 both in real terms (Kc2.1 billion) and as a percent of GDP (from 2.6 to 2.3 percent).<sup>50</sup> Of the Kc4.06 billion of its Kc27 billion 1995 defense budget, apart from improving the linguistic ability of the officer corps, the immediate priority is to acquire a computer system that would be capable of communicating with NATO.<sup>51</sup> While 1995 acquisitions represented 15 percent of the defense budget compared to 7 percent in 1994 (acquisitions of Kc 1.7 billion), the longer-term goal is to reach 30 percent for future acquisitions.<sup>52</sup>

The strategy for the Air Force is first to modernize 24 MIG-21s to carry through the end of the century then to purchase Czech-made sub-sonic L-159s beginning in 1998. Then, after the year

2000, to purchase a new supersonic aircraft. In late November 1994, though, deputies of the Parliament's Defense and Security Committee asked Holan to freeze the modernization of the 24 MIG-21 aircraft. Deputy Committee Chairman Tomas Fejfer stated, "To be able to...give so much money for the project, we need complete and exhaustive information on this... matter."<sup>53</sup> In Spring and early Summer 1995, Maj. Gen. Jiri Nekvasil and Minister Holan continued trying to convince the Defense and Security Committee to approve plans to modernize the MIG-21 aircraft.<sup>54</sup>

The fundamental issue was whether the \$135 million needed to modernize the MIG-21s would be better spent repairing decommissioned aircraft and helicopters, airbases, and barracks, purchasing telecommunications equipment, and for language or management training. The Air Force Chief, General Pavel Strubl, argued that the modernized MIG-21s would allow struggling pilots to fly jet aircraft in preparation for the next generation aircraft that the Army could not yet afford.<sup>55</sup>

At the end of July 1995, the defense ministry made plans to modernize two fighters as prototypes, then decide whether to modernize all 24 MIG-21s.<sup>56</sup> In early September these plans again were put on hold when the United States announced that it might make F-16 or F-18A aircraft available to the Czech Republic.<sup>57</sup> Then after U.S. Defense Secretary Perry visited Prague in late September, Holan announced that he had suspended plans to modernize the MIG-21s until an expert commission could study the advantages of purchasing U.S. F-16 aircraft. By the late Fall of 1995 it was also clear that the L-159 purchase was to be re-evaluated in light of the F-16 offer.<sup>58</sup>

In early 1996, a U.S.-Czech commission prepared four options:

- lease and purchase used F-16As
- purchase new aircraft
- modernize the MIG-21s
- postpone the decision on modernization for another five years.<sup>59</sup>

Because of limited economic resources, Holan leaned toward the F-16s or MIG-21 modernization options. General Strubl noted that the F-16s would be "the first Western fighters in post-Communist states" and would mark a "quality" improvement.<sup>60</sup>

By the Spring of 1996, the Czech and Polish defense ministers had agreed (on 13 April) to establish a commission to coordinate modernizing hardware and purchasing fighter aircraft,<sup>61</sup> and the Czech Army made it clear they were leaning toward F-16s. Under the plan, in the first phase starting in 1997 the Army would lease 7 unmodernized F-16A aircraft to train pilots and ground personnel for Kc2 billion over 5 years. Later the Army would purchase 18 modernized F-16A or F-16B fighters for Kc6 billion. Finally, after 2007 the Army would buy another 18 aircraft.<sup>62</sup> The fact that the Czechs had not yet abandoned the goal of incorporating 72 L-159 Aero aircraft was evident by its guaranteeing Kc1.5 billion for their development and in choosing U.S.-Taiwanese (ITEC) F-12 engines for the aircraft.<sup>63</sup>

**Holan's Defense Reform.** In early 1995 when Defense Minister Holan outlined his reform goals, he stressed that he wanted to draft a career structure for the military, transform professional military education, take steps toward NATO, and emphasize discipline in the units.<sup>64</sup> These goals were constrained by the 1995 defense budget of Kc27 billion which represented a decline to 2.3 percent of GDP.

Since increasing resources from the state budget for modernization was unlikely, Holan sought to achieve maximum savings and efficiency of management as a source of revenue. So, on 1 January 1995, Holan introduced a system of double-entry book-keeping management to coincide with the Army's adoption of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), to identify waste and shortages. The purpose of PPBS is to allocate an untouchable 30 percent of the budget to Army investments for modernization. Holan also looked for supplemental state resources from outside the defense budget to fund the modernization of barracks and acquiring air defense armaments.<sup>65</sup>

Prime Minister Klaus has consistently argued that the Army budget should *not* be increased until it is more transparent. Defense and Security Committee Chairman Vladimir Suman (ODA) complained: "The Army ignored the double-entry accounting, so it has been impossible to determine where the funds went."<sup>66</sup> By February 1996, though, the Army had implemented the double-entry bookkeeping system and could state how much money was being spent on specific activities.<sup>67</sup> Holan, admitting that the introduction of double-entry booking had been slow in the Army, nevertheless was able to say, "We won this battle and the information systems have worked since February."<sup>68</sup>

Holan also attempted to lower operating costs by decreasing the number of professional military personnel by 12,900 and basic service soldiers by 21,500 compared with 1994. Though this would bring the Armed Forces down to its goal of 65,000 by the end of 1995 (on 1 January 1996 it comprised 63,346),<sup>69</sup> it would not solve the inherited problem of imbalance in the personnel structure, frequently characterized as being a ratio of 2,000 lieutenants to 7,000 colonels. The ratio of Army officers to warrant officers is 2.2:1. In the mixed (professional/conscript) armies of NATO countries the ratio is 1:3; and in professional armies, as much as 1:7. The mix of professional Czech soldiers in mid-1995 was 20,000 officers to 8,000 warrants. According to Defense Minister Holan, after the year 2000 the Czech Army needs to achieve a reverse ratio—that is, 10-12,000 officers and 18,000 warrant officers.<sup>70</sup>

Holan has noted that although the renewal and rejuvenation of the command corps was a high priority, overturning the pyramid is to be a 10-year program; each year one-tenth of the program would be addressed. This would result in very few promotions while retirements continued. As an example, Holan claimed that of the 130 generals in the Army in November 1989, only 30 were left in September 1995, and 25 by the end of the year.<sup>71</sup>

Strengthening the warranted and non-commissioned officers corps side of the pyramid, though, was easier said than done. Holan admitted that because of the Army's low social prestige,

"Filling these posts was a far greater problem than filling the officers posts." As a result, the defense ministry was "setting up recruitment centers...to obtain people for warrant and non-commissioned officer functions."<sup>72</sup>

If one adds to the shortage of NCOs and lower-ranking officers, the effect of shortening compulsory military service to 12 months, during which it is difficult to provide quality training, Czech doubts about the army's combat capability are justified.<sup>73</sup> Holan's decision to halt automatic advancements and to require postgraduate studies as a condition for further promotion only serves to prevent a further intensification of negative tendencies.

By the Spring of 1996 little had changed. First Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas argued that it was essential to fill the posts of junior commanders and weapons specialists with longer-service professionals, whose duty period lasted 3-to-5 years. Necas argued that 14,000 professional junior officers were needed before the Czechs could think about any reductions in conscript time from the current 12 months to 9 or 10.<sup>74</sup> Holan, though, did not rule out the possibility of cutting basic military service.<sup>75</sup>

Lack of adequate training was also manifest in the Air Force. According to General Strubl, over the past 5 years an inadequate amount of resources had been set aside for the purchase of spare parts and gradually all depot stocks were exhausted. Since the Air Force received only 25 percent of the resources that it requested for operations, its operating capacity was greatly reduced. According to 1995 plans, Czech pilots were to fly 90 hours per year, with increases by 10 hours per year so that, over time, pilots would be able to fly 140-150 hours per year.<sup>76</sup>

The reality, though, was different. Because of lack of funds for spare parts and fuel, pilots were flying only 50 hours per year. When at the end of 1995, flying had to be further curtailed, the General Staff obtained Kcs 50 million for fuel by calling off purchases of office equipment<sup>77</sup> and the Air Force resorted to "cannibalism" from mothballed aircraft for spares.<sup>78</sup> All this caused Holan to admit for the first time, "If we were to work out

the balance of the army's technical capabilities, we would ascertain that it has a substantial deficit."<sup>79</sup> As a result, during 1996 the defense ministry allocated Kc1.5 billion for the purchase of spares for the Air Force, which, according to General Strubl, should guarantee at least 50 hours of flying time for pilot training.<sup>80</sup>

**Defense Ministry Reform.** As of 15 September 1995, the defense ministry created a new Defense Policy and Strategy Section that took over some important powers and activities of the General Staff. Directly subordinate to the defense minister, the Defense Policy and Strategy Section, headed by Colonel Jaroslav Svabik, would devise military strategy for the Czech Republic and evaluate the risks and requirements for defense. Previously the General Staff performed these functions. In addition the new section was to influence the Army's organization and deployment and coordinate emergency activities with other ministries and state bodies. It also included a three-person standardization bureau that deals with NATO STANAGs (Standardization Agreements) and integration.<sup>81</sup>

Finally, as of 23 November 1995, Holan appointed the first woman, former Pardubice Mayor Hana Demlova (Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party), Deputy Defense Minister for Social, Health, and Housing Affairs.<sup>82</sup> (See Table 7.2 above) One reason for this new directorate originally was the need to find adequate housing for 3,000 military officers and their families. Another, according to Holan, was a decline in discipline and increase in criminality among draftees, and the Army's constant affliction of bullying.<sup>83</sup> Discipline problems had increased, in part, because military jurisdiction over discipline issues had been abolished in the second half of 1994 and because many of those released by the lustration of the armed forces had been responsible for solving bullying problems in the military.<sup>84</sup>

Pre-election politics disrupted defense ministry continuity on 25 September 1995 with the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) decision to replace First Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Pospisil with Petr Necas (ODS) because of dissatisfaction with certain things in the



Army. But, as noted, Minister Holan argued, "[T]he situation is quite opposite. The Czech Army has made marked progress."<sup>85</sup>

In his first interview First Deputy Defense Minister Necas noted that among his priorities were assigning public tenders for contracts to Czech firms (with the T-72 modernization tender and another for night sights in mind) and to separate some Army projects from the defense ministry budget. He also argued that the Army command system needed a higher percentage of junior officers.<sup>86</sup>

One major acquisition problem had been that Czech Army modernization contracts procedures had created public controversy. First, the Ministry for Economic Competition halted in mid-September 1995 the bid for night-vision devices for small arms by Pramacon Corporation pending an investigation of the Kc250 million contract.<sup>87</sup> After the Army appealed the decision and the dispute was examined by the appropriate commission, the January 1996 conclusion was that the Army had erred in the announcement of the tender and incorrectly defined the criteria.<sup>88</sup>

Then in the case of the T-72 fire-control system and gearbox modernization tenders, Defense Minister Holan's investigation team proposed that Deputy Defense Minister Kalousek be disciplined for mistakes made by his subordinates. Holan, though, maintained that the controversial results would not be overturned and that the Italian firm Offcine Galileo and Israeli firm Nimda remained winners of the tenders.<sup>89</sup> Finally, the Parliament's Defense and Security Committee on 15 November 1995 recommended halting reconstruction of the T-72s and not modernizing the MIG-21s.<sup>90</sup> Though the Parliament recommended halting both projects on 19 December 1995, in early April Kalousek confirmed that the T-72 modernization was continuing.<sup>91</sup>

The controversy over arms acquisitions led Prime Minister Klaus to demand from Defense Minister Holan a report on economic management in the ministry.<sup>92</sup> On 17 November Unisys won a Kc3.7 billion contract for army computer systems. However, Holan agreed with protests from losers who claimed that the com-

petition was unfair and that Unisys systems were not NATO compatible, and canceled the results on 5 December 1995.<sup>93</sup> In early January 1996, though, the Ministry for Economic Competition claimed that Holan had acted improperly by canceling the tender, taking the position that only it had the authority to investigate and threatening Holan and the defense ministry with fines.<sup>94</sup> In early March, further accusations appeared that First Deputy Defense Minister Necas had attempted to cancel the Unisys contract in order to accommodate Electronic Data Systems (EDS), which had placed second in the competition, in return for a \$1 million commission to the ODS.<sup>95</sup> It later became public that Deputy Defense Minister Kalousek (KDU-CSL) recommended that Holan cancel the tender and that Petr Necas had no authority in the decision-making.<sup>96</sup>

In early April, Necas noted that because finance is the basic means of civilian control over the armed forces, the defense ministry needed a maximum effort to make the Army's economic management transparent and that it was "still necessary to do many things...that a new mechanism should be drawn up for the selection procedures, that key projects should be considered from a broader perspective."<sup>97</sup> In essence, Necas argued that foreign political and domestic industrial considerations needed to be taken into account, and, therefore, the decision-making circle for acquisitions had to be wider than just the defense ministry.

Holan came to the same conclusion when he argued in April 1996 that the Army needed a supra-departmental commission—Council of National Security—that would, among other things, supervise army tenders.<sup>98</sup> In a May interview, he argued that the new government should consider establishing a supreme national defense body—comprised of select ministers and the President—that would deal with issues that lie partly outside the defense ministry, such as developing a national strategy or crisis-management. Holan also suggested that the Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee establish a subcommittee to deal only with military issues.<sup>99</sup>

On 10 May, the Army's modernization problems deepened when the Ministry of Economic Competition canceled yet another tender for bulletproof jackets because of the army selection procedures' lack of transparency and administrative shoddiness. About this issue, Defense and Security Committee Chairman Vladimír Šuman complained: "The defense-budget process isn't clear enough to know where the money is going. When they finally bring in better accounting techniques, we'd be willing to raise the defense budget."<sup>100</sup>

**Pre-Election Politics and Defense Reform.** After a 13 November meeting of the economic ministers, Prime Minister Klaus noted that he did not want to resolve the difficult financial situation in the Army by merely increasing the budget, but that he "want[ed] a new concept for the Army" with specific cost figures by mid-December 1995.<sup>101</sup> The concept was to play a fundamental influence on the plan for modernizing the Army.

Defense Minister Holan initially expressed optimism that the Army concept "is actually ready and only needs to be complemented into an understandable form."<sup>102</sup> The issue of what the ultimate size of the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) should be was now re-opened. From 106,447 troops on 1 January 1993, the ACR has been in continuous reduction. On 1 January of 1994 it was 92,893, in 1995 it fell to 67,702, and in 1996, to 65,000.<sup>103</sup>

Holan's new proposal suggested lowering the number of troops from 65,000 to a combat core of 50,000,<sup>104</sup> decreasing the equipment proportionately while still modernizing it, and spending money on more effective training of the reserves.<sup>105</sup> When the revised concept was presented to an economic ministerial meeting on 2 January 1996, Prime Minister Klaus again rejected it, saying, "The draft would have to be written seriously. . . if we do not begin with a serious analysis. . . we can not get off the ground and continue further with a meaningful concept."<sup>106</sup> Klaus felt that politics was involved, noting that Defense Minister Holan (KDU-CSL) had not consulted First Deputy Minister Petr Necas (ODS) on the concept, and so he charged the ministry with not functioning

well. Holan's response was that the concept did not require fundamental redrafting, only finishing touches to some of the analysis before its resubmission.<sup>107</sup>

By early March 1996, Holan was arguing that the new concept would likely be discussed in the new government after elections. He noted that a great deal had happened since submission of the initial concept, that an Air Force Concept had been drafted, and that work was under way as well on a Ground Forces Concept. The Defense Minister also noted that talks would commence with NATO between April and November 1996, and that the results of those talks would be worked into the concept.<sup>108</sup> He added that the Czech Republic's new aircraft acquisition decision would be coordinated with Poland.<sup>109</sup>

Holan's political problems with the Prime Minister continued. In April, Klaus again rejected a concept for the development and utilization of military districts, arguing that the military districts' size was too large and that the material presented was not adequately interesting and conceptual. Therefore Klaus tasked Holan to submit a completely new and conceptual document.<sup>110</sup>

Electoral politics continued when Holan (KDU-CSL) publicly admitted that the General Staff had continuously resisted reducing the size of the Army and cutting its operational costs, describing Chief of Staff General Nekvasil as one of the exceptions who played an enormous role in the changes made, but who was isolated in his endeavors to bring the Army closer to NATO standards.<sup>111</sup> The opposition's response was that during the 4 years the KDU-CSL controlled the defense ministry, it had not managed to secure the loyalty of the officer corps for social reform.<sup>112</sup>

Continued sensitivities about the extent of lustration were evident when Defense and Security Committee Deputy Chairman Tomas Fejfar (ODS) alleged that at least four General Staff officers had been in contact with former Defense Minister General Miroslav Vacek—who had been involved in the coverup of November 1989 counterrevolutionary activities and was connected with the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)—

and therefore they should be separated from the Army.<sup>113</sup>

Even after the elections, Minister Holan's problems continued. Following the twice rejected Army transformation concept, when Holan presented a report on the activity of military intelligence to the government, the Cabinet rejected that document also for lack of information.<sup>114</sup>

**NATO and Peacekeeping in Croatia and IFOR.** Shortly after President Havel addressed SHAPEX-95 participants in Mons, he noted in an interview that, although the Czech Army had accomplished much in its internal transformation and adjustment to NATO standards, they faced a new challenge: "What should change faster is the attitude of the public to the Army and the attitude of the soldiers to themselves. It is necessary that service in the Army become an honor, that the citizens view soldiers as people who protect our freedoms rather than as parasites. That will require a lot more work."<sup>115</sup>

NATO's PFP COOPERATIVE CHALLENGE-95 was the largest exercise in the Czech Republic since November 1989. Comprising 679 soldiers from 14 countries, the exercise was an effort to demonstrate multinational peacekeeping activity under NATO leadership. The exercise cost Kcs 21 million, of which Kc 6.5 million was covered by the Czechs. The Czech UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces in Croatia started in April 1992 as part of the then Czechoslovak unit. After the division of the country, a combined Czech-Slovak unit remained for three months. In April 1993 an independent Czech unit of 500 soldiers was formed; by 1995, the Czech UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) comprised 874 troops.

Problems were evident in the forces, the majority of which were volunteers from the reserves.<sup>116</sup> The Defense Minister's allegations of lack of discipline, poor military training, and incompetence<sup>117</sup> necessitated the early relief of its commander LTC Vojtek Seidl.<sup>118</sup> Up until 1 July 1995, the unit had been subordinated to Jaromir Novotny, head of the Defense Ministry Foreign Affairs Directorate; after 1 July the unit was subordinated

to Maj. Gen. Kuba, Ground Forces Inspector under Chief of Staff Nekvasil. According to Novotny, this change had been planned in advance—when Nekvasil had assumed command of the General Staff in June 1994—in order to give Nekvasil time to restructure the Czech Army's command.<sup>119</sup>

During the Croatian offensive in August 1995, 2 Czech soldiers were killed and 3 injured in an attack on their observation post. Despite these losses, the Czech performance was evaluated positively. The UN Command Conference decided to gradually withdraw Czech troops beginning at the end of October 1995.<sup>120</sup> On 24 October 1995, 200 troops withdrew from Zagreb to South Bohemia, followed by another 200 troops on 30 October. In the end, the UN owed the Czech Republic \$22 million (Kc 600 million) for costs associated with the UNPROFOR and UNCRO peacekeeping operations.<sup>121</sup>

With the signing of the Dayton Accord on 1 November 1995, the Czech Government expressed preliminary and noncommittal interest in participating in the Bosnia IFOR, for which they would have to sustain the costs. Parliamentary Defense Committee chairman Vladimir Suman noted that to send a 1,000-man Czech force might cost Kc2 billion (\$70 million), that the money could not be taken from the defense ministry budget but could come from the Government's reserves.<sup>122</sup>

Having learned lessons from their Croatian UNPROFOR-UNCRO experience (where two-thirds of the troops were reservists), when the Czechs established their 850-man IFOR contingent, they decided to staff one-half of it with reserve officers who were either veterans of UNPROFOR, the Rapid Deployment Brigade, or the Prostějov elite airborne brigade.<sup>123</sup> The Government approved participation in Bosnia IFOR on 29 November 1995, as did the Parliament on 8 December along with approval for transit of NATO-led peacekeepers across Czech territory to Bosnia.

The Czech Army contributed Kc250 million to the mission. Though it was supposed to supply armaments and equipment

worth Kc560 million, which were to be purchased in advance against future budget items,<sup>124</sup> Maj. Gen. Karel Kuba noted that the battalion's equipment was "average...That the troops took with them what [was] currently available."<sup>125</sup> Shortly after the first 200 Czech troops deployed to Bosnia in January 1996, 26 soldiers at the Cesky Krumlov training base in the Czech Republic quit during the preparation period because of an argument over their salaries.

By April 1996, complaints could be heard from the field about problems with equipment, special hardware, and training for clearing mines and distributing humanitarian aid. Of the 90 trained sappers, only 8 were able to work on mine clearance because of equipment problems.<sup>126</sup> Czech contingent commander Colonel (later Brigadier General) Jiri Sedivy also noted that the representatives of the town of Prijedor (on Bosnia's Serb territory) were suspected of having carried out ethnic cleansing and remained opposed to IFOR, and that the Czech troops were "under stress and tension at the local post; [where the Czechs] seize some arms almost every day."<sup>127</sup> By early May, 17 soldiers had left the battalion prematurely; some were removed for repeated misbehavior, others left voluntarily because the mission was too stressful for them.<sup>128</sup>

Another IFOR problem related to command. The Czech battalion was incorporated within a Canadian brigade that was subordinated to a British division. Although the Czech battalion had detained the most men and seized the most weapons in the sector, the British included Canadians, but would not permit a Czech representative, in the British IFOR sector Command in Zagreb.<sup>129</sup> This apparent unfairness—resulting in part, from the Czechs' lack of experience operating in multinational commands—was ultimately resolved.<sup>130</sup>

All these problems contributed to civil-military tensions. One Czech General Staff officer noted that Defense Minister Holan liked to boast about the unit's successes and give medals and watches to the troops, but that the battalion would prefer greater concern for its basic needs. He then offered as examples the fact

that coal ordered by the troops in January did not arrive until May and that the wait for spares for personnel carriers had been protracted by two months.<sup>131</sup>

By late Spring, many of these initial IFOR problems seemed to be resolved. In early June additional supplies reached the battalion's logistics base in Bosnia, and in late July, rotation of 350 scheduled troop replacements occurred.<sup>132</sup> It has become clear, though, that the deployment of a battalion-strength unit was financially and physically stressful for the Czech Army.

**NATO membership issues.** Though Czech leaders recognize that NATO membership will not come cheaply if the Czech Republic is admitted into the Alliance, they believe membership probably will be less costly than if the Czech Republic had to plan its own defense alone. In 1996 the defense budget was set at Kcs 30 billion, a decline from 2.3 to 2.2 percent of GDP. According to the Defense Ministry, if the Czech Republic had to plan its defense alone, it would have to spend Kc 45 billion annually.<sup>133</sup> First Deputy Defense Minister Necas argued that he was in favor of increasing the defense budget from the present 2.2 percent "to 2.5 percent of GDP to be the minimum outlay"<sup>134</sup> with the caveat that the budget would be transparent so the public could know how their money was being expended.

One of the issues that arose in early January 1996 was government approval of a law prohibiting any kind of nuclear weapons on the Czech Republic's territory. Since the language in the bill raised questions about whether this restriction would have a negative impact on the Czech Republic's ability to join NATO,<sup>135</sup> when the Parliament's Budget Committee approved the law on 28 March, it added an amendment "unless an international treaty states otherwise."<sup>136</sup>

On 15 March 1996 the Czechs established a special committee of Foreign and Defense Ministry personnel—supplemented by representatives from finance, industry and trade—to coordinate all activities regarding NATO integration and to produce a "National Plan of Compatibility with NATO."<sup>137</sup> This Committee drafted



and submitted the Czech Republic's two-part document to NATO. The document's first part responded to all 49 points of the *NATO Enlargement Study*; the second part contained six sections raising specific questions that the Czechs wanted to discuss with NATO.<sup>138</sup>

Though Czech political elites support NATO membership, Czech (like Hungarian) public opinion evidences greater reserve. For the first time in 3 years, Institute for Public Opinion Research polls indicated that only 46 percent of the Czech public supported (54 percent opposed) NATO membership when linked to the purchase of fighter aircraft. Furthermore, only 18 percent supported NATO membership, if it meant deploying nuclear weapons on Czech soil.<sup>139</sup>

**1996 Elections.** When elections were held on 31 May-1 June 1996, they resulted in uncertainty. With 76.4 percent of the electorate casting ballots, the ruling coalition only won 99 of the Chamber's 200 seats. Vaclav Klaus' Civic Democratic Party (ODS) won 29.6 percent; Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL) won 8 percent; and Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) gained 6.3 percent. Milos Zeman led the opposition Social Democrats (CSSD) with 26.4 percent, followed by the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) with 10.3 percent, and the Republican Party (SRP) with 8 percent.<sup>140</sup> In effect, this meant that a weak coalition would rule, that CSSD support would be necessary, and that new elections would likely be convened within a year.


The ODS, KDU-CSL, and ODA signed a Coalition agreement on 27 June that included a policy section reiterating that the Czech Government's "key foreign policy objective" is to join NATO and EU.<sup>141</sup> On 2 July President Havel accepted the government's resignation and appointed Vaclav Klaus as prime minister of the new Czech Government (see Table 7.3 below). On 4 July, when Klaus officially introduced KDU-CSL Miroslav Vyborny as defense minister, the prime minister noted the Army's four main tasks:

- Maximum communication between the Army and society

regarding defense issues.

- Completion of the transformation process.
- Acquisition of important weapons.
- Preparation of the Army for NATO membership.<sup>142</sup>

The new Parliament evidenced limited continuity and expertise on defense and security policy. On the positive side, on 4 July former Defense Minister Vilem Holan (KDU-CSL) became chairman of the Chamber of Deputies (20-member) Foreign Affairs



Committee, and former First Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas (ODS) became chairman of the (20-member) Defense and Security Committee.<sup>143</sup> These appointments were significant not just because of bringing expertise to the Parliament, but because Necas and Holan recognize the need for coordinating Army acquisitions within a broader national priority perspective. On the negative side, only 3 other members of the Defense and Security Committee, aside from Necas, remained from the previous Parliament; and aside from Holan only 2 holdovers remained on the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Although the new Government remains committed to NATO integration, the coalition composition may create some complications. Although the 3 coalition parties unconditionally support NATO membership by a vote in Parliament, the Social Democrats (CSSD) have some qualifications in their policy. Their party platform proposes barring permanent stationing of foreign forces and nuclear weapons on Czech soil, and they want the decision on NATO membership to be made by popular referendum.<sup>144</sup> Considering the weak Czech public support for NATO, this could create problems for the new government, particularly should the issue be linked to the need to increase defense expenditures, which according to Necas might need to be 3 percent of GDP (or Kc40 billion compared to the Kc30 billion at present).<sup>145</sup> Necas notes, however, that an independent defense posture would be even more expensive.

## Conclusion

On dealing with democratic control issues, the Czech Republic still has an unresolved constitutional issue regarding Article 63(c) on emergency powers and the empowerment of the president in transition to war. The earlier issue of filling the Senate appears to have been resolved.

The Parliament Defense and Security Committee, as well as the Budget and Foreign Affairs committees, execute limited oversight

of the military.<sup>146</sup> This limitation was evident earlier with investigative commissions that had been established to investigate "ZASAH" (Hit) and "VLNA" (Wave) counterrevolutionary operations. The Defense and Security Committee in April 1994 approved the "screening" conducted in the military and debated the Concept of the Czech Army; in November 1994 it had requested a temporary halt to defense ministry plans to modernize MIG-21s. In February and April 1995 Parliamentary committees were established to oversee military intelligence (VZS) and the Security and Information Service (BIS). This provided opposition parties with access to intelligence oversight.

Adhering to Articles 39 and 43 of the Constitution, in April 1994 the Parliament approved the Czech Army's participation in military exercises abroad and for foreign NATO troops to exercise on Czech soil. In November 1995, the Defense and Security Committee recommended halting T-72 and MIG-21 modernization projects and Parliament recommended canceling both projects in December. In sum, though the Defense and Security Committee's limitations have been highlighted in Defense Minister Holan's suggestion that it create a military affairs subcommittee and in Vladimir Suman's complaints about lack of transparency in budget expenditures, the Parliament has been relatively effective in making progress in its oversight and management of the military.

Civilian oversight of the Army has been executed by the Defense Ministry. Also the Finance Ministry has sought compliance in the sphere of financial regulations, the Ministry for Economic Competition in the sphere of state orders, and the Supreme Control Administration checks how the Army handles state property and the budget.

Although the defense ministry has provided evidence of some politicization in the buildup to the 1996 elections, it has also demonstrated significant structural differentiation, adaptation, and development in recent years. In 1994 military intelligence was subordinated to the defense minister and placed in the defense

ministry. Though the defense ministry established a double-entry bookkeeping management system under Deputy Defense Minister Kalousek to coincide with the Army's adoption of PPBS to identify waste and shortages in January 1995, it did not begin to operate until February 1996.

In September 1995 the arrival of Petr Necas as First Deputy Defense Minister signaled the need for improvement in the personnel management system and the arrival of politics into the defense ministry, particularly in acquisitions policy. Also the creation of a new Defense Policy and Strategy Directorate under Colonel Jaroslav Svabik signaled the movement of significant powers from the General Staff to influence the organization and deployment of the Army and to coordinate its emergency activities with other ministries. In November 1995 a new Deputy Defense Minister for Social, Health, and Housing Affairs position was created, in part to deal with social problems in the armed forces and a housing shortage of 3,000 units for officers and families.

Over the same period, the General Staff reacquired some powers from the defense ministry. On 1 July 1995, the power of command of Czech UNPROFOR-UNCRO and IFOR units was moved from the defense ministry Foreign Affairs Directorate under Jaromir Novotny to the General Staff Operations Directorate under Maj. Gen. Kuba.

Increasingly the Czechs have been discussing the need to establish a supra-departmental agency (like a National Security Council) to coordinate aspects of Czech national and defense policy that transcend one ministry. This need has become apparent in such issues as developing a national security strategy, acquisitions policy (e.g., possibly coordinating the aircraft buy with Poland), NATO integration, and crisis-management. In March 1996 they did create an interagency NATO Integration Committee to produce a National Plan and coordinate all integration activities.

Finally, it is clear that the Czech Army remains in a greatly weakened state. Its readiness and training levels and morale are

low. Its professional officer corps pyramid is greatly out of balance. Though its flag officer corps has been greatly reduced from 130 to 24 (compared to 70 in Hungary), its number of senior officers greatly exceeds those of the junior officer corps. NCOs and warrant officers are also in very short supply and very difficult to recruit. All this is rhetorically recognized by the appropriate Parliamentary and Government authorities, but until budgetary commitments are increased, little improvement can be expected.

Bullying of conscripts, who are the Army's major link to Czech society, still remains in evidence. The Czech Army's image in the broader society, as in Hungary, remains very low. As Vaclav Havel has noted publicly, what is needed is not just a change in the way Czech citizens view the military, but also in the attitude of soldiers themselves. Not only must these changes begin to occur before joining NATO, but the Czech Government has some significant work to do with Czech society on the issue of NATO membership.

Despite these limitations, the Czech Republic has made enormous progress on the road to achieving democratic control of the military. With a weakened coalition government remaining committed to NATO integration, it seems that one of the Czech Government's most difficult tasks will be to "sell" NATO to Czech society in order to generate what are likely to be greater national obligations and resource requirements for defense.

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## Notes

1. Pavel Mates, "The Czech Constitution," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 10 (5 March 1993), pp. 53-57.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-57.
3. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 17 (27 January 1993), p. 3.
4. Vojtech Cepl and Mark Gillis, "Czech Republic," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 66-67.
5. Prague CTK, 10 March 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-046* (11 March 1993), p. 13.
6. *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 13 March 1993, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-93-051* (18 March 1993), p. 12.
7. Vojtech Cepl and David Franklin, "Senate, Anyone?" *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 58-60.
8. Defense Minister Wilem Holan interview. Prague *Respekt*, No. 6 (6-12 February 1995), p. 12. *FBIS-EEU-95-030* (14 February 1995), p. 5.
9. *Open Media Research Institute (OMRI) Daily Digest* (15 March 1995), p. 4.
10. Prague *Pravo*, 28 September 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-192* (4 October 1995), p. 7.
11. Prague CTK, 7 January 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-005* (8 January 1993), p. 11.
12. Antonin Baudys interview, Prague *Telegraf*, 2 February 1993, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-93-026* (10 February 1993), p. 10.
13. Antonin Baudys interview, Prague *Respekt*, No. 4 (30-31 January 1993), p. 9.
14. In a March 1993 interview, Defense Minister Baudys argued for screening. Prague *Telegraf*, 23 March 1993, pp. 1,9. *FBIS-EEU-93-057* (26 March 1993), pp. 11-13.
15. Prague CTK, 17 May 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-096* (20 May 1993), pp. 6-7. During 1993, 6,594 individuals left the Army, including 113 NCOs, 1,856 warrant officers, 4,607 officers, and 18 generals. At the same time, 1,821 individuals joined the Army, including 438 NCOs who joined UNPROFOR. General Jiri Nekvasil press conference, *A Report*, 22 February 1994, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-94-084* (2 May 1994), pp. 8-9.

16. Chairman of Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee, Vladimir Suman interview, *Cesky Denik*, 11 April 1994, pp. 1,2. *FBIS-EEU-94-074* (18 April 1994), pp. 15-16.

17. *Prague Report*, 3 January 1993, p. 3.

18. Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 12 February 1993, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-93-031* (18 February 1993), p. 23.

19. Prague CTK, 29 April 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-083* (3 May 1993), p. 18.

20. Defense Minister Baudys interview, *Lidove Prace*, 23 April 1993, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-93-079* (27 April 1993), p. 19. Some of the last mechanized brigades were transformed from divisions by early 1995. During the first week of 1995, the 6th and 7th Mechanized Brigades in Brno and Kromeriz. The last one, the 8th, was scheduled to start on 1 July 1995, rather than the end of the year. *Hospodarske Noviny*, 4 January 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-007* (11 January 1995), p. 5.

21. In July 1995 the Czechs and Russians agreed to permit Czech companies to buy part of Russian enterprises' property for implementing joint projects to "capitalize" Russia's \$ 5 billion debt. Moscow Interfax, 14 July 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-136* (17 July 1995), pp. 13-14.

22. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 121 (28 June 1994), pp. 4-5.

23. Prague CTK, 10 July 1994.

24. Maj. Gen. Jiri Nekvasil interview, *A Report*, 27 July 1993, pp. 8-9.

25. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 12 August 1993, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-93-163* (25 August 1993), p. 14.

26. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 23 September 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-184* (24 September 1993), p. 5.

27. Prague CTK, 26 January 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-018* (27 January 1994), p. 3.

28. *FBIS-EEU-94-117* (17 June 1994), p. 13.

29. Prague CTK, 7 March 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-049* (14 March 1994), p. 8.

30. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 29 May 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-104* (31 May 1994), p. 18.

31. Prague CTK, 3 August 1994.

32. Prague CTK, 12 October 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-199* (14 October 1994), p. 5.

33. *White Paper: On Defence of the Czech Republic* (Prague: Ministry of Defense, 1995), Figure V/4.

34. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 5 April 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-065* (5 April 1994), p. 4.



35. General Jiri Nekvasil interview, *Denni Telegraf*, 6 April 1994, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-94-072* (14 April 1994), pp. 9-10.
36. Prague *Lidove Prace*, 20 October 1994, p. 9. *FBIS-EU-94-207* (26 October 1994), p. 5. Colonel Frantisek Padek, the deputy Air Force chief, noted that one intended result of the cut was to move up from "the suicidal 50 flying hours annually to 90 hours." *Ibid.*
37. Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 3 March 1995, p. 16. *FBIS-EEU-95-045* (8 March 1995), p. 5.
38. *Prague Post*, 14 March 1995, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-95-064* (4 April 1995), p. 7.
39. Though Holan may have had some initial reservations, within a few months his assessment had changed. In a December 1994 interview, Holan noted: "I believe that the officer corps is loyal. Its members are soldiers through and through." Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 10 December 1994, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-94-239* (13 December 1994), p. 4. In fact, in 1990 the Czech Armed Forces had 6,500 political instructors. In 1994 it was 2,000, and by the spring of 1995 it had declined to 1,600. *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 13 February 1995), p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-032* (16 February 1995), p. 9.
40. Prague CTK, 10 October 1994.
41. Defense Minister Vilem Holan interview, Prague *Mlada Fronta*, 21 November 1994, p. 7. *FBIS-EEU-94-228* (28 November 1994), p. 11.
42. Jaroslav Spurny, "Czech Intelligence Services," Prague *Respekt*, 13-19 February 1995, p. 10. *FBIS-EEU-95-063* (3 April 1995), p. 6. The Czech Republic has two other intelligence services: (1) The Security and Information Service (counterespionage) [BIS] was preceded by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (1990) followed by the Federal Security Information Service (1991) and (2) The Office for Foreign Contacts and Information (espionage) [UZSI], was formed in 1991 and directly subordinate to the Minister of Interior.
43. Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 22 April 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-079* (25 April 1995), p. 12. A similar commission was established to oversee the Security and Information Service (BIS) in February. Bratislava *Mosty*, 28 February 1995, p. 9. *FBIS-EEU-95-077* (21 April 1995), p. 5.
44. Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 29 December 1994, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-95-004* (6 January 1995), pp. 5-6; also Prague *Respekt*, No. 1 (28 January 1995), p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-95-008* (12 January 1995), pp. 7-8.
45. Vaclav Havel interview. Prague Radiozurnal Network, 29 January 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-019* (30 January 1995), p. 6.
46. Rockwell International won the contract for supplying on-board

electronics for the L-159. Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 22 November 1994, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-003 (5 January 1995), p. 6. The defense ministry signed a letter of intent to sign the contract in April 1995.

47. Prague *Rude Pravo*, 23 November 1994, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-94-229 (29 November 1994), pp. 8-9.

48. Vilem Holan, Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 19 November 1994, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-94-226 (23 November 1994), p. 2.

49. Prague *Hospodarske Noviny*, 7 February 1995, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-95-029 (13 February 1995), p. 7.

50. See Figure V/4, *White Paper: On Defence of the Czech Republic*, op. cit.

51. Prague *Respekt*, 12-18 December 1994, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-94-242 (16 December 1994), p. 5.

52. Deputy Defense Minister Miroslav Kalousek interview. Prague *Rude Pravo*, 15 March 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-95-057 (24 March 1995), p. 4.

53. Prague *Mlada Fronta*, 30 November 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-239 (13 December 1994), p. 4.

54. Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 26 April 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-103 (30 May 1995), p. 17; Prague CTK, 8 June 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-112 (12 June 1995), p. 12.

55. Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 28 June 1995, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-95-127 (3 July 1995), pp. 6-7.

56. Prague *Malda Fronta Dnes*, 24 July 1995, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-95-144 (27 July 1995), p. 6.

57. Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 2 September 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-173 (7 September 1995), p. 13.

58. Brig. Gen. Pavel Strubl interview, Prague *Rude Pravo*, 26 October 1995, pp. 1,4. FBIS-EEU-95-218 (13 November 1995), pp. 14-15.

59. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 2 February 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EU-96-025 (6 February 1996), p. 5.

60. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 30 January 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-023 (2 February 1996), p. 7.

61. Prague *Pravo*, 16 April 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-075 (17 April 1996), p. 7.

62. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 21 March 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-058 (25 March 1996), p. 5.

63. Prague *Pravo*, 9 April 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-070 (10 April 1996), p. 18.

64. Defense Minister Vilem Holan interview, Prague *Mlady Svet*, 19

- January 1995, pp. 22-23. FBIS-EEU-95-022 (2 February 1995), p. 3.
65. Prague *Hospodarske Noviny*, 7 February 1995, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-95-064 (4 April 1995), pp. 9-10.
66. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 3 May 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-089 (7 May 1996), p. 13.
67. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 4 May 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-090 (8 May 1996), p. 11.
68. Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 3 May 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-089 (7 May 1996), p. 14.
69. *Armadni Rocenka: 1995* (Praha: Ministerstvo obrany CR, 1996), p. 38.
70. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 22 May 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-098 (22 May 1995), p. 6.
71. Defense Minister Vilem Holan, *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 4 September 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-173 (7 September 1995), p. 14.
72. Defense Minister Vilem Holan interview, *Denni Telegraf*, 11 May 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-095 (15 May 1996), p. 17.
73. Vaclav Smejkal, "Where Are the Four Wheels of the Army Headed?" Prague *Ekonom* (January 1995), pp. 27-32.
74. Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 20 April 1996, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-96-079 (23 April 1996), p. 10.
75. Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 20 April 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-080 (24 April 1996), p. 8.
76. General Pavel Strubl interview, *Hospodarske Noviny*, 22 August 1995, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-95-205 (24 October 1995), pp. 7-8.
77. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 18 November 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-226 (25 November 1995), p. 3.
78. Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 5 December 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-236 (8 December 1995), p. 9.
79. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 5 December 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-235 (7 December 1995), p. 5.
80. Prague *Hospodarske Noviny*, 28 February 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-041 (29 February 1996), p. 5.
81. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 19 September 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-192 (4 October 1995), p. 9. The article also noted that under the new system now the Defense Ministry could decide on its own whether to employ secretaries in its offices. Until now, it had to request the Chief of the General Staff to appoint them.

82. Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 21 November 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-227 (27 November 1995), p. 11.

83. Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 20 April 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-080 (24 April 1996), p. 8.

84. *Democratic Control Over Security Policy and Armed Forces* (Prague: Institute of International relations, October 1995), pp. 33 and 44.

85. Prague CTK, 27 September 1995.

86. First Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas interview, Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 27 September 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-196 (11 October 1995), p. 4.

87. Prague *Hospodarske Noviny*, 19 September 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-218 (13 November 1995), p. 14.

88. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 27 January 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-023 (2 February 1996), p. 6.

89. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 13 October 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-202 (19 October 1995), p. 14; *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 9 November 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-95-219 (14 November 1995), pp. 13-15.

90. Prague *Hospodarske Noviny*, 16 November 1995, p. 2.

91. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 8 April 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-070 (10 April 1996), p. 18.

92. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 1 November 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-216 (8 November 1995), p. 14.

93. Prague CTK, 22 December 1995. FBIS-EEU-96-001 (2 January 1996), pp. 16-17.

94. Prague CTK, 10 January 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-011 (17 January 1996), p. 14; *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 23 February 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-041 (29 February 1996), p. 5.

95. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 2 March 1996, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-96-045 (6 March 1996), pp. 6-7.

96. Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 14 March 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-053 (18 March 1996), p. 8.

97. First Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas interview, Prague *Pravo*, 13 April 1996, pp. 1,4. FBIS-EEU-96-075 (17 April 1996), p. 5.

98. Prague CTA, 16 April 1996 and *Denni Telegraf*, 20 April 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-080 (24 April 1996), p. 8 and 13.


99. Defense Minister Vilem Holan interview, Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 11 May 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-095 (15 May 1996), p. 17; Prague *Tyden* (13 May 1996), No. 20, pp. 18-20. FBIS-EEU-96-096 (16 May 1996), pp. 10-12.

100. Prague *Prague Post* (5-11 June 1996), No. 23, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-96-

- 123 (25 June 1996), p. 11.
101. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 14 November 1995, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-95-224* (21 November 1995), p. 11.
102. Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 24 November 1995, p. 5. *FBIS-EEU-95-230* (30 November 1995), p. 5.
103. Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 15 November 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-008* (11 January 1996), p. 12.
104. General Nekvasil in a meeting with Slovak counterpart General Tuchyna admitted that there were almost one-third fewer than the planned 65,000 soldiers in the Czech forces. *OMRI Daily Digest* (21 March 1996), p. 4.
105. Prague *CTK*, 19 December 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-247* (26 December 1995), pp. 6-7.
106. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus interview, Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 5 January 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-008* (11 January 1996), pp. 10-11; *OMRI Daily Digest* (4 January 1996), p. 4.
107. Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 19 January 1996, p. 5. *FBIS-EEU-96-016* (24 January 1996), p. 10.
108. Vilem Holan interview, Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 11 March 1996, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-050* (13 March 1996), p. 14.
109. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 9 March 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-049* (12 March 1996), p. 5.
110. Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 11 April 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-072* (12 April 1996), p. 10.
111. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 23 April 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-081* (25 April 1996), p. 6.
112. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 24 April 1996, p. 12. *FBIS-EEU-96-082* (26 April 1996), p. 11. It appears from public opinion polls among Army officers, most support the Social Democratic Party (CSSD). Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 13 June 1996, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-96-116* (14 June 1996), p. 16.
113. Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 30 April 1996, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-96-088* (6 May 1996), p. 6.
114. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 20 June 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-122* (24 June 1996), p. 13.
115. President Vaclav Havel interview, *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 29 April 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-085* (3 May 1995), p. 11.
116. Karel Pezl noted that two-thirds of the 1,000-troop UNPROFOR unit consisted of reservists. General Karel Pezl interview, Prague *Tyden*, No. 25 (19 June 1995), pp. 32-35. *FBIS-EEU-95-125* (29 June 1995), p. 4.

117. During the three years of UNPROFOR, approximately 100-110 Czech troops were sent home early. Prague *Rude Pravo*, 14 April 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-075 (19 April 1995), p. 5.
118. *Lidove Noviny*, 20 April 1995, p. 5. In May three Czech UNPROFOR soldiers were taken hostage by Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
119. Jaromir Novotny, personal interview, 25 July 1996.
120. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 19 October 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-203 (20 October 1995), p. 8.
121. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 16 March 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-054 (19 March 1996), p. 4.
122. Prague CTK, 23 October 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-208 (27 October 1995), p. 16.
123. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 17 November 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-225 (22 November 1995), p. 7.
124. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 7 December 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-236 (8 December 1995), p. 8.
125. Prague CTA, 25 January 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-019 (29 January 1995), pp. 4-5.
126. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 22 April 1996, p. 8. FBIS-EEU-96-081 (25 April 1996), pp. 5-6.
127. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 20 April 1996, p. 9. FBIS-EEU-96-080 (24 April 1996), p. 7.
128. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 13 May 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-094 (14 May 1996), p. 10.
129. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 24 May 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-103 (28 May 1996), p. 13.
130. Maj. Gen. Rostislav Kotil, personal interview, 25 July 1996.
131. Prague *Respekt* (3-9 June 1996), No. 23, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-96-112 (10 June 1996), p. 17.
132. Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 8 June 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-113 (11 June 1996), p. 11; Prague *Pravo*, 4 July, 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-130 (5 July 1996), p. 7.
133. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 24 October 1995, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-95-207 (26 October 1995), p. 9.
134. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 15 March 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-055 (20 March 1996), p. 4.
135. *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 5 February 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-026 (7 February 1996), p. 8.

136. Prague CTA, 28 March 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-064* (2 April 1996), p. 10.
137. *OMRI Daily Digest*, 19 March 1996, p. 4.
138. Jaromir Novotny interview, 2 April 1996, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-96-066* (4 April 1996), p. 3.
139. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 23 May 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-102* (24 May 1996), p. 6.
140. Prague *Hospodarske Noviny*, 4 June 1996, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-110* (6 June 1996), p. 12.
141. Prague *Pravo*, 28 June 1996, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-96-129* (3 July 1996), pp. 11-17.
142. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 4 July 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-130* (5 July 1996), p. 8.
143. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 8 July 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-132* (9 July 1996), p. 10.
144. Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 2 July 1996, p. 7. *FBIS-EEU-96-130* (5 July 1996), p. 7.
145. Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 1 July 1996, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-96-129* (3 July 1996), p. 9.
146. The Defense and Security Committee staff includes two typists and one executive secretary.



Map 7 Slovakia




## VIII. Slovakia: Instability and Special Problems

Slovakia is the only Central European state that really had to build its institutions from scratch because of its long history as part of Czechoslovakia with a government based in Prague.

The Slovak National Council approved the Slovak Constitution on 1 September 1992 by the necessary three-fifths majority (114 of 150).<sup>1</sup> It was signed by Slovak Parliament chairman Ivan Gasparovic and Premier Meciar on 3 September. By its introductory words, "We, the Slovak nation," the nine-chapter, 155-article Slovak Constitution stresses national rather than civil aspects of citizenship<sup>2</sup> and outlines the Slovak government. The unicameral National Council has 150 delegates elected for four-year terms (see Table 8.1 below). The president, elected by three-fifths of the deputies, serves for a five-year term and is the national command authority. The government—prime minister, deputies, and ministers—is appointed and recalled by the president, who also appoints judges to the Constitutional Court for 7-year terms.<sup>3</sup>

In contrast to the Czech Republic, which elected Vaclav Havel on the first ballot, it took the Slovaks many weeks and a number of ballots to elect Michal Kovac president on 15 February 1993. (Alexander Dubcek, the leading presidential candidate had been fatally injured in an automobile accident.) Kovac, one of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia's (HZDS) co-founders, won votes from 106 deputies, and he was inaugurated on 2 March 1993.<sup>4</sup>



On 16 December 1992, the Slovak National Council had approved the creation of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (with about 47,000 troops) and a new defense ministry. The Slovak Constitution binds the armed forces to maintain all treaties and agreements made by the Czechoslovak Federal Republic (CSFR). All Slovaks (including those who had served in the Czechoslovak Army) had to swear allegiance to Slovakia by 31 January 1993, if they wished to serve in the new Slovak Army.

**The first Meciar government (January 1993-March 1994).** Almost immediately, disputes within the governing Movement for a Democratic Slovakia dominated constitutional politics. In January a personal conflict arose between two of the movement's

founders—Prime Minister Meciar and Foreign Minister Milan Knazko—when Meciar accused Knazko of persuading deputies not to vote for Meciar's candidate in the fractious presidential election. When tension between the two escalated, Meciar asked Knazko to resign as foreign minister on 7 February, but President Kovac expressed reluctance to oust Knazko. The 1993 Constitution limits the authority to remove a cabinet member only to the president. But it also suggests that the President ought to so act at the request of the prime minister or if the Parliament withdraws its confidence. President Kovac, therefore, announced on 10 March that he would turn to the Constitutional Court to determine if he was obliged to fire Knazko. When Meciar threatened to resign unless Knazko was removed, Kovac removed Knazko without waiting for a Court ruling, and he appointed Jozef Moravcik foreign minister on 19 March 1993. Ironically, on 2 June 1993 the Constitutional Court ruled that, according to Article 116.4 of the Constitution, the president has no duty to accept a prime ministerial motion of dismissal of a minister. Though Kovac had already fired Knazko, the decision did serve as a final interpretation of the vague constitutional article.

Knazko, stealing away 7 of the HZDS's 74 members in the 150-seat National Council, then formed a parliamentary caucus of his own—a new Alliance of Slovak Democrats (ADS). On 19 March, Ludovit Cernak, Chairman of the Slovak National Party (SNS), also bolted the HZDS coalition, allegedly in protest over Imrich Andrejcek's appointment as defense minister. As a result, Meciar was now in a minority with 66 seats. Throughout June he attempted to create a new alliance with the SNS (which would bring his total to 81 seats), but the discussions broke down. The failure of coalition talks further threatened early elections.

Not until 19 October 1993 was Meciar able to form a coalition with Ludovit Cernak, leader of the SNS—the new HZDS-SNS coalition holding 80 of the 150 parliament seats. After two weeks of negotiation, Meciar submitted a list of 7 proposed ministers to President Kovac on 5 November, but Kovac accepted the nomina-

tion of only 6, refusing the name of Ivan Lexa as privatization minister. Meciar withdrew the list and on 9 November re-submitted it as a list of only six.

**The Defense Challenge.** The challenge of constructing a new defense ministry in Bratislava, an Army command in Trencin, and a new Army was daunting. On 16 March 1993, President Kovac appointed General Imrich Andrejcek, former CSFR defense minister, as Slovakia's new defense minister. At the end of May, the government approved a bill that created a National Security Council to replace the State Defense Council.<sup>5</sup>

The Army's most urgent task was to create an Army of the Slovak Republic, which meant redeploying troops, which, in turn, required the construction of apartments for officers and families, transformation of the military educational system, and preparation of military doctrine—in short, creation of an Army compatible with Western-style military systems.

Almost a year later, on 1 March 1994, the Slovak government approved two key documents: The first, "*Principles of Slovakia's National Security*" confirmed Parliament's civil control of the military by establishing the Republic's national defense system; the second, "*Slovak Republic's Defense Doctrine*," committed Slovakia to international agreements limiting forces and arms, emphasized maintaining good neighbor relations, and expressed interest in joining NATO and the WEU.<sup>6</sup>

**Ethnic Issues.** Disputes with its Hungarian minority had a negative impact on Slovakia's international image. In June 1992 Hungarian deputies to the Slovak National Council had boycotted the vote on the new Constitution because they felt it failed to protect the rights of ethnic minorities; and in December they had cited numerous violations of Hungarian rights in Slovakia, further straining relations with neighboring Hungary. By April 1993 Meciar, wanting to enter the Council of Europe, indicated his willingness to amend the Constitution if necessary and set up an independent watchdog commission on human rights. In addition, Slovakian-Hungarian interstate relations had been frayed over the

problem of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dam on the Danube.

However, the ethnic issue continued to fester. Hungarians continued to lodge accusations of minority discrimination when the transportation minister removed Hungarian language road signs. Claiming that their pleas for dialogue had been ignored, on January 8, 1994 about 4,000 local mayors and politicians gathered in Komarno to declare a self-governing province in the region where a significant Hungarian ethnic minority resided.<sup>7</sup>

**Continuing Political Instability.** Despite the tentative 19 October 1993 coalition agreement, further turmoil characterized the last months of 1993 and early 1994. Tension in the HZDS-SNS coalition escalated in December when Mečiar delivered a highly controversial speech behind closed doors to HZDS party followers. He called for early elections (in June 1994) and criticized SNS coalition partners. When the speech leaked to the press, it caused domestic political turmoil. The months of political wrangling led to the creation of a faction—the Alternative of Political Realism (APR)—within the HZDS. Backed by Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kováč and Foreign Minister Jozef Moravčík plus nine other deputies, the APR's goal was to form a government coalition without Mečiar. These efforts resulted in the March 1994 dismissal of Kováč and Moravčík from the HZDS and their resignation from the cabinet.

As a result Mečiar now led a minority government, and he began to push for elections in June. Though the Parliament rejected the idea as impractical, Mečiar began to collect 350,000 signatures (under Article 95 of the Constitution) to call a referendum for early elections and to dismiss those deputies who had switched party affiliation after the last election. President Michal Kováč, deciding that he could not call a referendum on dismissing deputies who had changed their party affiliation, in a 9 March speech to Parliament criticized Mečiar and his government as inefficient and incompetent. After two days of stormy debate, Parliament toppled the prime minister in a vote of no-confidence on 11 March 1994.<sup>8</sup> On 16 March President Kováč announced that

Meciar's petition for early election, submitted 2 March, was invalid. In a unanimous vote, all deputies (including Meciar) voted to hold elections on 30 September and 1 October 1994.

**The Moravcik Government (March-December 1994).** On 16 March 1994, President Kovac named Jozef Moravcik as prime minister. Moravcik quickly called for restoring public confidence in the new state naming Pavol Kanis (of the Party of the Democratic Left) the first defense minister with civilian background, (and Maj. Gen. Andrej Sabol as defense state secretary.) During the Spring of 1994 one major issue was the need to eliminate tensions between the defense ministry in Bratislava and the Army Command in Trencin, tensions that existed in part, because the Army Command had been established first, and in part because of differing political and military responsibilities between the Army Command and the defense ministry.<sup>9</sup>

The new Moravcik government initiated significant changes in Slovakia's defense and security policy, reworking the draft Slovak Republic's Defense Doctrine, which had been approved in March 1994, amended on the basis of discussions with the parliamentary committee, then approved by the National Council on 30 June 1994.<sup>10</sup> Defense Minister Kanis noted that the new revised Slovak Defense Doctrine placed greater emphasis on Slovakia's developing closer relations with European and transatlantic security structures; it stressed the WEU's Associate Partnership program<sup>11</sup> and clearly stated that Slovakia's fundamental orientation was to obtain full NATO membership. Participation in NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership For Peace (Slovakia signed its Presentation Document on 25 May 1994) was the means to achieve this objective.<sup>12</sup> Although former Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcek was a strong supporter of NATO integration, he criticized Kanis' changes to Slovakia's PFP Presentation Document as being too expensive, arguing that the defense ministry would now have to spend 4.5 percent of its budget rather than the one percent originally envisaged.<sup>13</sup>

Another change was the recognition that creating a separate

Army Command from the former CSFR Command East facilities was not workable. In early June, Slovak Army Commander General Julius Humaj announced transformation of the command into a General Staff along the lines of Western European Armies.<sup>14</sup> On 26 August the Slovak National Council approved amendments to the Law on the Army to create such a General Staff, whose chief is subordinate to the defense minister but appointed (and recalled) by the president at the defense minister's recommendation.

Then Defense Minister Kanis announced that as of 1 September 1994 both the defense ministry and Army High Command (to be renamed the General Staff) would be restructured and significantly reduced in size to prevent overlap and inefficiency. The new defense ministry would have 20 generals and 143 colonels, as against 31 and 354; its total work force would be roughly 300. The Army Headquarters would reduce from 31 generals and 359 colonels to a General Staff of 14 generals and 233 colonels; its total number of employees would be roughly 400.<sup>15</sup> The new defense ministry, in addition to a Defense Ministry Office and Inspectorate, would comprise five sections: Defense Policy and Army Development (Maj. Gen. J. Pancik, replaced in early 1996 by Col. Milan Stranava), Logistics (Maj. Gen. Leopold Bilcik), Economic Policy (Col. Jozef Zadzora), Foreign Relations (Col. Ludovit Gal), and Social and Humanitarian Affairs (Col. Petr Bartak, replaced in December 1994 by Col. Milan Stegena).<sup>16</sup> On 1 September, Col. Gen. Jozef Tuchyna, adviser to the defense minister and former interior minister, became the new chief of General Staff, with General Humaj as his deputy.<sup>17</sup>

Building a new Army would be very expensive. During 1994 Slovakia (like Hungary, but in marked contrast to the Czech Republic) had acquired 6 additional Russian MIG-29s (worth \$180 million) as part of the Russian debt to Slovakia to supplement its original inventory of 10. In a 26 October press conference Chief of Staff Tuchyna argued that the Slovak Army would need more than 19 billion Slovak crowns (\$600 million) in 1995 (more than twice its budget of 9.9 billion crowns in 1994) to cover shortfalls of the

previous 2 years. Tuchyna noted that the command of Military Intelligence had been transferred to the General Staff<sup>18</sup> and that he had signed the order to establish Army Corps (to replace existing divisions) as of 1 November 1994 and to transform the regiments into brigades during 1995.<sup>19</sup> On 31 October, Tuchyna named Colonel Milan Cerovsky to command the 1st Army Corps, Colonel Jan Cmilansky to command the 2nd Army Corps, and Colonel Jozef Pivarci to command the 3rd Air Force and Air Defense Corps.<sup>20</sup> Defense Minister Pavol Kanis added that it would also be necessary to develop a modern system of management and command within the headquarters and Slovak Army during 1995.<sup>21</sup>

The new Moravcik-coalition government also attempted to moderate outstanding ethnic tensions. The National Council passed a bill on women's surnames (Hungarian women would not have to add the Slovak suffix "ova" to their last name) in May, and another in July requiring bilingual road signs in towns where at least 20 percent of the residents are of an ethnic minority in July.

Preparation for the new elections also required changes in the electoral law to prevent debilitating fragmentation (at the time 64 political parties). The electoral law set a 5 percent threshold for political parties; 7 percent for coalitions of 2 or 3 parties; and 10 percent for coalitions of 4 or more parties.

When the elections were held on 30 September-1 October 1994, seven parties returned to Parliament. Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in coalition with the Slovak Farmers' Party gained the largest number of votes.<sup>22</sup> (See Figure 8.1)

Before the election, the Moravcik-coalition government with Hungarian parties held 85 seats in the 150-seat National Council; after the election it had only 68. Therefore President Kovac, who had not met with Vladimir Meciar since February 1994, asked Meciar (whose HZDS had 61 seats) to try to form a government on 27 October.<sup>23</sup> When Prime Minister Moravcik submitted his resignation to President Kovac on 3 November, Kovac asked him to carry on until Meciar could form a new government. But forming



**Figure 8.1**  
**Slovakian Parliamentary Elections**  
**30 September - 1 October 1994**


Party	Seats	Percent of Votes
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia(HZDS)/Slovak Agrarian Party (Coalition) (Meciar)	61	34.96
Common Choice (A coalition of 4 left-wing parties)	18	10.41
Hungarian Coalition	17	10.18
Christian Democrats	17	10.08
Democratic Union (Moravcik)	15	8.57
Association of Workers (ASW)	13	7.34
Slovak National Party (SNS)	9	5.40

a government would prove to be more difficult and time consuming than originally imagined, complicated by Prime Minister-designate Meciar's statement that he would announce a new cabinet only after the Parliament had debated the new budget on 12-13 December 1994.

**Meciar's Return (December 1994-Present).** On 11 December, Meciar signed a coalition agreement with the extreme-right Slovak National Party (SNS) and the left-wing Association of Slovak Workers (ASW). The Slovak Agrarian Party, an HZDS-satellite, also joined the coalition. Together the four parties held 83 seats of the 150-seat Parliament.<sup>24</sup> When Meciar announced the new government on 13 December, it included Jan Sitek (SNS) as

defense minister and Jozef Gajdos (HZDS) as defense state secretary (see Table 8.2 below).

**Prime Minister-President Conflict.** As 1995 opened, the old feud between Prime Minister Meciar and President Kovac erupted



again. Meciar began his offensive by slashing the president's budget by 50 percent, criticizing the Constitution as being unclear in its division of powers, and claiming that the National Council and people lacked proper supervision over the president. First, Meciar defended the 50 percent budget cut forcing the President's Office staff (which according to 1993 plans should include 160 people) to be cut from 127 to 60, by noting that the National Defense Council had a total of only 120 staff members.<sup>25</sup> In February 1995, Meciar again reduced the President's Office budget to Sk9.75 million (from Sk12.5 million) rendering it unable to provide severance pay to those employees it had released. Jan Klepac of the President's Office warned that Meciar was setting a Catch-22 "trap" for, if the Office did not pay severance, it would violate the labor law and if it did pay severance, it would violate the budget law.<sup>26</sup>

Second, Prime Minister Meciar indicated that he would like either increased governmental powers or adoption of a presidential model whereby the citizens would directly elect the president. President Kovac, on the other hand, was opposed to changing the Constitution.

Third, Meciar proposed and the National Council passed a so-called jurisdiction law on 10 March 1995 that would endow state secretaries with the rights and duties of Cabinet ministers in their absence.<sup>27</sup> President Kovac vetoed the bill as not being in conformity with the Constitution, but the National Council overrode his veto on 6 April 1995.<sup>28</sup>

The Prime Minister argued in the National Council that since its creation the Slovak Information Service (SIS) had opposed his HZDS party and had shadowed him, that President Kovac was cognizant of that fact, and that Parliament should therefore call Kovac to task.<sup>29</sup> Jan Findra, head of the President's Office, called Meciar's address "a pitiful example of how presumptions and disinformation can be confused with incontestable reality or facts" ...[and accused Meciar of] setting up illegal parallel intelligence structures aimed at the president as well as others.<sup>30</sup>

Acting on a government proposal, the National Council removed the President's power to appoint the head of the intelligence service, transferring it to the government.<sup>31</sup> On 4 April 1995 SIS Director Vladimir Mitro requested to be relieved of his position, and on 18 April 1995 Ivan Lexa—an HZDS delegate and close supporter of Meciar who President Kovac denied appointment as Privatization Minister in the first Meciar government—became the new SIS director.<sup>32</sup>

President Kovac also returned to Parliament a Law on the Slovak Information Service that called for creating a Special Supervisory Body (OKO) in the National Council because the OKO did *not* include representatives from the opposition to monitor the SIS. The National Council overturned the President's veto by a vote of 81 of the 150 deputies.<sup>33</sup> As bound by law, Kovac signed the SIS law on 11 April 1995.

On 5 May 1995, when the National Council heard HZDS deputy Igor Urban's report on SIS activities, it declared that there was proof the SIS had overstepped the law during the Moravcik period and that President Kovac had been continuously informed. Then 80 deputies voted a resolution of no confidence, which President Kovac rejected as unconstitutional.<sup>34</sup>

Events in Slovakia were then influenced—for a time—by the 1 July 1995, visit of Pope John Paul II to Bratislava. On this occasion Kovac and Meciar shook hands, and on 6 July Kovac insisted that his handshake had been a sincere effort at reconciliation, but that the responsibility remained Meciar's. President Kovac, did, however, express concern about two weaknesses in the Slovak Constitution. First, in the event of a government crisis, there is no simpler solution but to call new elections, which requires 60 percent (or 90) of the National Council's deputies. But if 60 percent cannot be reached, the President does *not* have the power to call for elections. Second, although the President can return bills to the National Council, the National Council can override the bill by the same number of votes. No higher quorum is necessary as in other countries. The result has been an important limitation of presiden-

tial powers by the passage of ordinary law.<sup>35</sup>

The temporary truce between Kovac and Meciar was soon broken—in fact, it was shattered when the prime minister demanded that the president resign, threatening that if the president did not, then he would. President Kovac refused on the grounds that it would be counter to state interests.

On 30 August, President Kovac's son, Michal Jr., was abducted from Slovakia, roughed up, and taken to Austria where he was detained by Austrian authorities on the basis of an international warrant in Germany in connection with an embezzlement case. After a September 4 interview where President Kovac accused Prime Minister Meciar and Slovak Information Service (SIS) Director Ivan Lexa of having attempted to initiate criminal proceedings against his son, the Cabinet invited the President to attend a special meeting in connection with the interview. When Kovac refused, the Government on 19 September called on the President to resign. Kovac refused.

When Major Peter Vacok, a Bratislava Police Department investigator of Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction, publicly expressed suspicion that SIS equipment and certain SIS employees were involved,<sup>36</sup> a conflict erupted between the police and the intelligence service. Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek was quoted as saying that responsibility for adjudicating the conflict should lie with the prosecutor general and not with him.<sup>37</sup>

The opposition parties—Democratic Union, Christian Democratic Movement, and coalition of Hungarian parties—attempted unsuccessfully to convene an extraordinary session of the National Council to deal with this conflict between the SIS and police. Of the 141 MPs present, 62 voted to convene the session, 69 voted against, 9 abstained, and one did not vote.

After British Foreign Minister Malcolm Rifkind expressed concern about Slovak political developments to Foreign Minister Schenk, the European Union handed Prime Minister Meciar a *démarche* on 25 October expressing "concern [with] the present political and institutional tension existing in the country...and

alarm by the difficulties encountered by non-governmental organizations and bodies in performance with their work,"<sup>38</sup> and on 27 October U.S. Ambassador Theodore Russell passed a message from President Clinton expressing concern about the mysterious kidnapping of Michal Kovac, Jr.<sup>39</sup> According to Jozef Moravcik, these *demarches* were clear signals that Slovakia's opportunities for Euro-Atlantic integration were being threatened.<sup>40</sup>

The political feud also carried over into the 1996 budget. President Kovac had declining budgets of Sk 159.9 million in 1994, Sk 121.4 million in 1995, and Sk 99.9 million in 1996. Meciar's Office of the Government on the other hand received Sk 118.5 million in 1994, Sk 150.4 million in 1995, and Sk 422.9 million in 1996.<sup>41</sup> This forced President Kovac to reduce his staff from 95 to 65 between 1994 and 1995, and would require another reduction of 10 in 1996.<sup>42</sup> The SIS was another major winner; its budget jumped from Sk 516.5 million in 1995 to Sk 759.6 million in 1996.<sup>43</sup>

In early February 1996, former Interior Minister and Christian Democratic Movement deputy Ladislav Pittner noted that because the opposition was not represented in the Special Supervisory Body (OKO), he felt the need to turn to the Prime Minister about problems with Ivan Lexa and the SIS and have the SIS come under the opposition's supervision too.<sup>44</sup> An extraordinary meeting of the OKO on 20 February ordered Ivan Lexa to submit a written report on the recent activity of the SIS. Though Lexa had been requested to submit a written report to the OKO in November 1995, he had not yet done so; furthermore, at the February 20 session, Lexa only responded orally.<sup>45</sup>

On 27 February, Ivan Lexa filed a libel suit against President Kovac over assertions in a Vienna court hearing about SIS involvement in the kidnapping of his son Michal, Jr. At the same time, it became public that the SIS had begun an investigation of all the President's speeches and public pronouncements since 1993.<sup>46</sup> Frustrated with official foot-dragging, Pittner launched an independent investigation of the Michal Kovac, Jr. abduction, claiming that his evidence pointed to SIS participation.<sup>47</sup>

On 14 May, Pittner delivered a report concluding that, because the kidnapping was plausibly a criminal act, the resignations of Interior Minister Hudek, Prosecutor General Michal Valo, and SIS Director Lexa were in order.<sup>48</sup> In marked contrast, on 20 May the official investigator in the case, Major Jozef Ciz, decided to shelve it for lack of evidence.<sup>49</sup>

When SIS Director Ivan Lexa presented his side to the National Council<sup>50</sup> on 22 May, he was booed by the opposition. The next day the President's Office issued a statement claiming that because Lexa's own report proved that the SIS had gone markedly beyond the activities allowed by law and had engaged in illegal activity, Lexa and Interior Minister Hudek should resign. Although the National Council did not pass a vote of no confidence on Hudek on the same day,<sup>51</sup> some cracks in the coalition began to appear. In early June, SNS Chairman Jan Slota had the SNS adopt a resolution that demanded the OKO supervisory body for the SIS be expanded to include representatives of the opposition.<sup>52</sup> And in early June, Frantisek Gaulieder (HZDS), a member of the OKO, concluded that both Hudek and Lexa should resign.<sup>53</sup>

**Politics in the Defense Ministry.** Defense Minister Sitek believed that it was necessary to amend once again the Law on the Army No. 3/93 because of vagueness in the defense minister's jurisdiction over the General Staff. Though the defense minister is responsible for the military, his powers to appoint or recall functionaries and his links to the General Staff and ability to coordinate their activities in Trencin remained limited.

In May 1995, the Cabinet approved an amendment to the Law on the Army that stated the Army "is to be guided and its organization secured"<sup>54</sup> by the defense ministry. On 23 June 1995 the Parliament approved the amendment by 76 votes.<sup>55</sup> In effect this transferred the power of appointing and dismissing the Chief of the General Staff from the President (who remains commander-in-chief with power to declare a state of emergency) to the government, at the proposal of the defense minister, and the government would be able to decide about the composition of the

Army.<sup>56</sup> Now Meciar could recall Chief of Staff Tuchyna if he desired.

This amendment further curtailed the President's powers, so, on 12 July, the president refused to sign it, arguing that it contradicted the Constitution (Paragraphs 102 and 119), and he sent it back to the National Council for debate. On the following day (13 July) the Parliament again voted in favor of amending the law.<sup>57</sup>

Shortly after taking office, Defense Minister Sitek (SNS) noted that he planned to create a *Domobrana* [Home Guard] within the overall system of Slovakia's strategic defense. To be staffed by former Army members and remain subordinate to the Chief of Staff, Sitek noted that the Home Guard: "will be employed for the protection of strategic objects in case of mobilization."<sup>58</sup> Prime Minister Meciar began to push vigorously to establish the Home Guard under his direction, raising some concerns that he might use the Home Guard for internal security problems.<sup>59</sup>

As the project moved along, Defense Minister Jan Sitek met with Norwegian Defense Minister Jorgen Kosmo for assistance and operational advice based on the experiences of Norway's 90,000-man Home Guard.<sup>60</sup> Plans emerged to have the first Home Guard units operational by the end of 1995. The Home Guard would have six mobile brigades and 37 companies comprised of officers called up serving in the regions (District Military Administrations) where they live.

According to Maj. Gen. Pancik, director of the Defense Ministry Defense Policy and Army Development Section, during peacetime only the organizational cores of the brigades would exist with the company commanders being detailed in the regions. Only during emergency would they be called up. The units were to be armed with light weapons and limited to defense of the territory of the region in which they were deployed.

According to Jan Carnogursky, the Home Guard formation was a political concession to the Slovak National Party and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia.<sup>61</sup> By 1 October 1995, a Home Guard training center had been created at Zilina to train



specialists to serve in Home Guard units. The first group of 90 specialists finished training at the end of the year.<sup>62</sup>

As tension between Prime Minister Meciar and President Kovac escalated during the Fall of 1995, politics extended to the defense ministry. The political dispute became a civil-military issue when Defense State Secretary Jozef Gajdos (HZDS) publicly stated in regard to President Kovac, "I do not find anything that would support his authority as commander-in-chief of the Slovak Armed Forces."<sup>63</sup> Gajdos' statement publicly extended the party-political battlefield of the government against the president to the Defense Ministry and to the Army, which had remained publically bipartisan to that point.

**Defense Ministry-General Staff Relations.** As in the case of the Czech Republic, continued restructuring of the defense ministry was also necessary to deal with problems of bullying conscripts. The defense ministry reorganized its Social and Human Affairs section and established a Provision and Development of Human Resources section that is working to eliminate this problem. By 1 September 1995 a chaplaincy service also was to be working directly in the units.<sup>64</sup>

According to Colonel Jozef Zadzora of the Defense Ministry Economic Policy Section, budgetary oversight, as of 1996, does not yet exist. It is not yet possible to determine how much money is allocated per soldier, platoon, or company; that "this will be possible only next year...Double-entry bookkeeping will be introduced on a trial basis next year, and in 1998 it will probably be introduced fully."<sup>65</sup>

Defense Minister Jan Sitek, noting that 23,000 young men had refused regular military service, called on the government to adopt some legal measures because "if this continues, there will be no one to draft."<sup>66</sup> In September 1995 the National Council approved a bill on civilian service. Now the defense ministry would organize alternate civilian service rather than the Ministry for Labor, Social Affairs, and Family. Civilians would exercise without weapons or uniforms for 24 months, rather than 12 months and could work in

defense ministry establishments.<sup>67</sup>

According to Colonel Jozef Zadzora, the 1996 defense budget of Sk13.588 billion represents 2.6 percent of GDP. The Army, though requires Sk24 billion to improve training, equipment, and the system of command. Because of the shortfall, Zadzora noted "there is nothing left for us but to make cuts."<sup>68</sup> Another serious problem facing the defense ministry was the need to secure more than 3,000 apartments for career soldiers and civilian employees of the Army. In fact the major capital spending in the 1996 defense budget—Sk500 million—is to be spent on housing.<sup>69</sup>

According to Defense Minister Sitek, the only acquisitions occurred by redemption of Russian debt. He noted, "We have nothing for development programs. We have to look for other funds to bring in the Zuzana howitzer, the modernized T-72 tank, and other projects."<sup>70</sup> The Slovaks would not modernize their MIG-21s, but just let them finish their service life. From the sale of surplus equipment, the Defense Ministry did recover enough funds to allocate an extra Sk27 million for apartments.<sup>71</sup>

**Armed Forces Reform.** The long-term (year 2000) development of the Slovak Army is to reduce Army personnel to 35,000. The plan would reduce its 10,000 officers by one-half, but increase its 3,400 warrant officers to 10,000, and its 400 NCOs to 5,000.<sup>72</sup> The rest of the force will comprise conscripts, resulting in a professional force approaching 55 percent.

Chief of Staff Tuchyna was candid in his assessment of the 1994 training year, specifically noting certain shortfalls: There had been "no specific improvements in the quality of the entire system of command and control... shortcomings [remained] in relationships between soldiers in basic service... regimentation and discipline at the lowest levels of command, and housing."<sup>73</sup> In April 1995, Tuchyna concluded that the major tasks for 1995 would be reorganizing regiments into brigades, that as of 15 November the army should have 46,667 soldiers, and that reducing basic military service from 24 to 12 months had increased demands on the entire command corps.<sup>74</sup>

The Air Force, the most expensive component of the defense budget, was hit especially hard—particularly by reductions in hours of pilot training. Third Army Air Corps Commander Jozef Pivarci noted that for 2 years no aircraft had been repaired and that spares would be exhausted at the end of 1995. As a result combat pilots would fly 70 hours and practice 20 hours on a trainer. Rated pilots assigned to staff would fly 20 hours on a jet and 20 hours on a trainer.<sup>75</sup> Following the 1993 acquisition of 5 MIG-29s from Russia to eliminate debt, in the Fall of 1995 Slovakia announced that Russia, in exchange for a portion of its \$1 billion debt, would provide another 8 MIG-29s, bringing Slovakia's total to 23.<sup>76</sup>

The Army of the Slovak Republic initially requested Sk19.4 billion for 1995, which would have permitted development programs and investment. The second version, which would have covered only operating expenses and no investment, was Sk16 billion. The final approved version earmarked only Sk12.9 billion (\$403 million), did not consider inflation, and represented only a survival defense budget.

Chief of the Economic Policy section of the defense ministry Colonel Jozef Zadzora verified that the budget would not permit any development programs.<sup>77</sup> As a result, the defense ministry began considering the untraditional method of leasing (rather than purchasing) a number of 155-mm Zuzana howitzers from ZTS [Heavy Machine Tool Enterprises]. As State Secretary for Defense Jozef Gajdos noted, "I really do not see any other way because the Army has no funds."<sup>78</sup>

It also became necessary to reconsider whether to extend the Slovak UNPROFOR engineer battalion in Yugoslavia, which had cost Slovakia almost Sk1 billion (\$31.3 million) through Spring 1995.<sup>79</sup> In June, defense ministry spokesman Frantisek Kasicky announced that Slovakia was not considering enlarging its 606-member UNPROFOR contingent because of such financial constraints.<sup>80</sup>

At the end of the 1995 training year, Tuchyna's assessment of progress recognized that in the year since the General Staff had

been established on 1 September 1994, the General Staff had been organized, the Army Corps Commands created, and the Air Force and Air Defense structures put in place. The Military Police and other components were reorganized as of 1 February 1995.<sup>81</sup> Reorganization of the ground forces continued. Tuchyna was pleased with the reduction of crime within the Army but regreted that the effort to issue a new Slovak Army Code of Service was yet to be completed.<sup>82</sup> On 1 October 1995, the second part of the first stage of the ground forces' reorganization was completed. Six brigades had been set up, two of which are on a permanent state of alert.<sup>83</sup>

In assessing plans for the 1996 training year, Chief of Staff Tuchyna noted that transformation of the Army would continue and that commanders and staffs would be prepared to participate in multinational forces and peace operations. He promised also that a rapid deployment battalion would be introduced. He did note that the problem of criminality in the forces, though reduced, needed to be analyzed and eventually eliminated.<sup>84</sup> In March 1996, the First Higher Academic Course was inaugurated at the Slovak National Uprising Military Academy. The first class of the three-term course was attended by 14 students; brigade commanders, MOD functionaries, and staff of military education establishments.<sup>85</sup>

Efforts to solve many of the Slovak Army's deficiencies were made during 1996. During May 1996 the National Council amended the Defense Law so that a member of the Slovak Army serving in UN peacekeeping operations no longer would have to spend two to five years in the armed forces. According to Defense and Security Committee Chairman Imrich Andrejčák, "This was too long a commitment, which was unsuitable."<sup>86</sup> The amendment reduced the amount of time to which a soldier must commit. Also during May, for the first time in five years, training of reserves was renewed. During 1996, 2,036 soldiers would be recalled for 12 days to participate in military exercises.<sup>87</sup>

Observing a three-day exercise of the 2nd Army Corps,

President Michal Kovac noted that it drew his "attention to the weaknesses of the Army, and its needs."<sup>88</sup> He specifically noted the problems with combat hardware and use of manual maps, while NATO exercises employ computers and state-of-the-art equipment. Despite these problems, the Army remains the most trusted of 12 institutions in Slovakia. According to one recent Slovak Radio poll, 70.2 percent of the respondents trust the army, compared to 44.8 percent for the Prime Minister (ranking ninth) and 42.9 percent for the Government (12th).<sup>89</sup>

**NATO Integration.** At the June 1995 meeting of the NACC in Brussels, Defense Minister Jan Sitek announced that as of 1996 Slovakia would allocate one reinforced mechanized 600-soldier self-sufficient battalion which would be ready by the end of 1996 for cooperation with NATO. In addition, he offered 6 MIG-29 aircraft which would be capable of deployment within 10 days of request.<sup>90</sup>

The first international military exercise "DETERMINATION-95" to take place in Slovakia since independence occurred 6-14 September 1995 within the Partnership For Peace program. Soldiers from neighboring Austria, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia participated under command of Maj. Gen. Emil Vestenicky, who is responsible for setting up the professional Rapid Action unit which is garrisoned in Martin.<sup>91</sup>

Shortly after the Study on *NATO Enlargement* was briefed to the Slovaks, Jan Slota, Chairman of the coalition's SNS partner, publicly questioned whether Slovakia should join the Alliance because deployment of NATO nuclear weapons on its soil would be targeted against Russia. Slota argued that this would pose a threat to Slovakia if it accepted this NATO condition and Slovakia should seek neutrality.<sup>92</sup> This position was also supported by Jan Luptak, leader of the Association of Workers of Slovakia.<sup>93</sup> Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk, though, retorted that NATO entry was a consistent goal of the government and that Slota's statements were "unfortunate and premature."<sup>94</sup>

At the 5 December 1995 NACC, Foreign Minister Schenk wel-

came the results of the Dayton agreement and offered transit rights and 400 engineers from Slovakia's forces.<sup>95</sup> Slovakia had maintained an engineer battalion for 31 months in Croatia under UNPROFOR. On 14 December 1995, the Government approved an agreement with NATO to transfer the engineering battalion from Croatia to Eastern Slavonia for one year.<sup>96</sup> As a result the Slovak unit would remain under UN, rather than NATO command, and the costs would be repaid by the UN.<sup>97</sup> According to its commander, Colonel Rostislav Smehlik, the transfer of the 593-man Slovak battalion to Eastern Slavonia would be completed by mid-May 1996.<sup>98</sup>

On the basis of a National Council Defense and Security Committee initiative, the Government approved a bill that transferred jurisdiction from Parliament to the government, to permit some troop participation in peacekeeping missions and military exercises within and outside the framework of Partnership For Peace for a maximum period of 30 days.<sup>99</sup>

Despite the 1996 defense budget squeeze, Slovakia's financial commitment to PFP remained impressive. In 1994, the year PFP was announced, Slovakia committed one percent from the defense budget for the program. This doubled to 2 percent in 1995; and again doubled to 4 percent in 1996. Colonel Ludovit Gal of the Defense Ministry Foreign Affairs section noted that during 1996, Slovakia would organize "COOPERATIVE DRAGON" on Slovak territory and that Slovakia would participate in 11 other command and staff exercises.<sup>100</sup>

Western concerns about Slovakia's political system continued to have an impact upon Slovakia's prospects for joining NATO. When the U.S. House of Representatives debated a NATO expansion bill that excluded Slovakia, Foreign Ministry State Secretary Jozef Sestak noted that the "situation is serious."<sup>101</sup> On 30 April 1996 when Secretary General Solana visited Bratislava he stressed that NATO is a democratic organization that "associates countries that respect democratic values, human rights, and differences between ethnic minorities."<sup>102</sup>

Of corresponding interest (and similar to Hungary) was the apparent declining public support in Slovakia for NATO membership. In April 1996 a FOCUS Agency public opinion poll indicated that only 37.8 percent agreed with Slovakia's joining NATO, compared to 42.5 percent in December 1995. In contrast, 25.3 percent would oppose NATO entry, compared to 21.9 percent in December 1995, and 19.2 percent in June 1995.<sup>103</sup>

**Ethnic Issues.** Ethnic issues also reemerged during 1995. Although the Hungarian-Slovak Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Cooperation was signed on 19 March 1995, Hungarians rallied again in late April in Komarno, threatening a civil disobedience campaign if the Meciar Cabinet did not drop its plan to introduce bilingual education (which they saw as a new version of linguistic imperialism) in southern Slovakia, and if it did not raise subsidies for ethnic culture.<sup>104</sup>

The 15 November 1995 passage of Slovakia's Law on the State Language<sup>105</sup> with a majority of 108 votes drew a protest from Hungary and a threat to raise an objection in international fora. Meciar warned: "If the Hungarian Government and Parliament take steps that we consider offensive, this could prolong the ratification process. However, we will ratify the basic [Hungarian-Slovak] treaty in any case."<sup>106</sup> On 28 November President Kovac signed the law.

The State Language Law and resulting criticism from Hungarians inside Slovakia and the Hungarian Government in Budapest had an impact on Slovakia's ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Cooperation. On 30 November the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council refused to ratify the agreement because of reservations concerning the inclusion of EU Parliamentary Assembly Resolution No. 1201—that all ethnic minorities be granted the right to autonomous bodies—in the Slovak-Hungarian treaty.<sup>107</sup> On 20 December 1995 the National Council decided to postpone the debate and ratification to the next session.<sup>108</sup>

In January 1996, OSCE High Commissioner on National

Minorities Max van der Stoel criticized the language law. One of his most serious objections was the fact that the law terminated the act which regulates the use of minority languages in offices in Slovakia.<sup>109</sup> At the same time, on 7 February 1996, the Slovak opposition Christian Democratic Movement and Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement agreed to take the Language Law to the Constitutional Court.

When the Slovak National Party (SNS) altered its opposition to the Basic Treaty on the condition that the government accept draft laws on the protection of the Republic, on the state of emergency, as well as changes in local election laws,<sup>110</sup> Prime Minister Meciar publicly noted that he supported their passage and that he expected the Hungarian Treaty to be ratified in March 1996.<sup>111</sup> On 26 March, 119 deputies in the National Council passed the Treaty with this stipulation: "The Slovak Government fully respects... standards and norms that are based on individual civic rights as an integral component of universal human rights."<sup>112</sup>

The domestic cost of passage, though, was great. The controversial amendment to the Penal Code, which replaced the Law on the Protection of the Republic and was passed on 22 March, would permit the arrest of people for writing or organizing "anti-state" demonstrations. When the EU expressed concern on 3 April 1996 that this Law could harm freedom of expression and other democratic rights, Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk "expressed regret over this EU manner of reaction in Slovakia's internal affairs."<sup>113</sup> President Michal Kovac refused to sign the controversial amendment on 9 April and sent it back to the National Assembly because "the modifications contradict the Constitution and the Declaration of Human Rights."<sup>114</sup> Rather than overriding the President's veto, on 8 May 1996, Meciar said that the law would not be debated again by the National Council because a "wider public discussion" was needed to ensure that the law complied with international human rights conventions.<sup>115</sup>

After the Slovak National Council finally submitted the basic Slovak-Hungarian Treaty to President Kovac on 2 May, he signed



it on 6 May. The Foreign Ministry noted on 9 May the Treaty would be ratified without the appendix added by Slovak nationalists and that the final exchange of documents would only consist of the original treaty and Kovac's approval of it.<sup>116</sup>

That Meciar appeared to be getting frustrated with increasing challenges to his attempts to alter the Constitutional powers of the president and of the SIS was evident at the sixth HZDS National Assembly session in March 1996. Meciar now announced that he did *not* want to change some Constitutional articles, but to revise the entire Slovak Constitution opening the question of whether Slovakia should have a presidential, parliamentary or chancellor's system.<sup>117</sup> It appears that Meciar is leading Slovakia down a path fraught with dangers not unlike those evident in Poland under Walesa.

## Conclusion

Slovakia's defense reform has been hampered by political instability that resulted in three governments and three defense ministers in three and one-half years. Slovakia's defense reform differs from the other Central European states in that Slovakia had to create defense institutions from scratch. Though initially slow in starting in the first Meciar government, the Moravcik coalition-government did initiate significant defense and military reforms, which continued under the new Meciar-coalition government. But defense and military reforms have really become subordinate to other, more significant issues that ultimately threaten Slovakia's effort to establish democratic control.

First, and most prominent, are the prevailing Constitutional issues. The Slovak Constitution's stress on nationality versus civil rights has contributed to problems with Slovakia's Hungarian minority. This civil rights issue emerged initially by the Hungarian minority boycott of the new Constitution in June 1992 and has been manifest in the long tortuous road toward ratification of the Good Neighborliness Treaty between Hungary and Slovakia. It

took Slovakia one year to ratify the treaty, but only after major domestic concessions on Language Law, martial law, and administration were made to the HZDS' SNS coalition partner. That this has aggravated ethnic relations inside Slovakia and with Slovakia's external relations with Hungary has been clear.

A major weakness of the Constitution is that in the event of a Government crisis, it is useful to have the power to call for new elections. But the President does not have the power to call for new elections unless he can get 60 percent (90) of the National Council deputies to support him.

Another major weakness of the Constitution has been the manner in which the President can return bills to the National Council, and the way the Council can then continuously override his veto with no higher quorum necessary. In effect, Prime Minister Meciar has used this deficiency to dismantle the Constitution by undermining the powers of the President. One glaring example was the June 1995 amendment that removed the President's power to appoint and dismiss the Chief of General Staff giving it to the Government. In short, not only has the power of the President been thoroughly undermined, but Meciar has now raised the issue of perhaps writing an entirely new Constitution. In sum, the respect for law and tolerance of opposition remains ill defined and poorly developed in Slovakia.

The National Council has been active, and its Defense and Security Committee of 12 members has experience and expertise. The Committee is headed by former Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcek (HZDS), and also comprises former Defense Minister Pavol Kanis, State Secretary Igor Urban, and Danko, head of the Office of the Defense Ministry under Andrejcek. The National Council's Special Supervisory Body (OKO), which oversees and monitors the Slovak Information Service (SIS), though, does *not* include opposition members. This is a fundamental weakness especially because of the allegations of HZDS manipulation of the SIS for political purposes. How the opposition will resolve this problem remains unclear.

Defense Ministry reform, however, has made enormous progress for such a short period of time. Since Spring 1994, tensions existed between the defense ministry in Bratislava and the Army Command in Trencin, partly because the Army Command had been created first, then by the recognition in June that the Command was not workable and would be transformed into a General Staff in September 1994.

Although the Defense Ministry was structured in September 1994 to include five sections, it has yet to develop a modern system of management. Additional restructuring and differentiation was necessary to deal with significant social problems, such as the need for officers' housing units, problems related to the bullying of conscripts, and the desire to provide alternate civilian service. In 1995, for example, 23,000 conscripts refused to serve thus threatening the viability of the forces.

Concerns about politicization have been evident in the Defense Ministry. State Secretary Gajdos (HZDS) competes with Defense Minister Sitek (SNS) for influence within the ministry and on policy (regarding the role of the Home Guard, NATO, and Russia). He has publicly questioned the President's capacity as commander-in-chief.

Transformation of the Army Command to General Staff was important and necessary, but its continued presence in Trencin and separation from the defense ministry in Bratislava is hampering coordination and defense ministry oversight. Though the military (as in Poland) enjoys high respect in Slovak society, military readiness and modernization have a long way to go to meet NATO standards. Modernization has been non-existent, except for the acquisition of MIG-29s in settlement of Russian debt. MIG-21s will be used until they reach the end of their service life, but creative efforts have been devised to "rent" some equipment from Slovak defense industry. Of the Sk13.6 billion 1996 defense budget, the major capital expenditure (Sk500 million) will go for military housing units.

Nevertheless, the major stumbling block to Slovakia's candi-

dacy to NATO arises from questions about the most fundamental criterion—the shared democratic values of respect for the rule of law and tolerance of ethnic (human) rights. Certainly clarification of Slovakia's commitment to these principles will be necessary before assessing its defense ministry and military institutions for political compatibility and military interoperability with NATO.

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## Notes

1. Prague CSTK, 1 September 1992. *FBIS-EEU-92-171* (2 September 1992), p. 4.
2. For example, Article 34.3 exemplifies that what applies to one group does not apply to another. According to it, if a nationally homogeneous territory is formed, its right of self-determination is constitutionally outlawed. See, Pavol Hollander, "The New Slovak Constitution: A Critique," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1992), pp. 16-17.
3. Constitution of the Slovak Republic, *Hospodarske Noviny*, 8 September 1992, pp. 15-18. *FBIS-EEU-92-179-S* (15 September 1992), pp. 1-16.
4. Prague CTK, 15 February 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-029* (16 February 1993), p. 17.
5. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko, 25 May 1993. *FBIS-EEU-93-100* (26 May 1993), p. 13.
6. For text, see Bratislava *Informacny Bulletin*, No. 35/94, pp. 1-11. *FBIS-EEU-94-053* (18 March 1994), pp. 9-13.
7. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 8 January 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-007* (11 January 1994), pp. 10-11.
8. With many deputies absent, and 56 HZDS-SNS coalition members abstaining, 78 of 150 supported the ouster. Prague CTK, 11 March 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-049* (14 March 1994), pp. 11-12.
9. Pavol Kanis 31 March 1994 speech, Trencin. Bratislava *Pravda*, 2 April 1994, p. 2.
10. Defense Doctrine of the Slovak Republic text, Bratislava *Slovenska Republika*, 11 October 1994, p. 10. *FBIS-EEU-94-200* (17 October 1994), p. 8.
11. As of 9 May 1994 Slovakia began to participate on the WEU Council and working group.
12. Pavol Kanis 24 May 1994 interview, Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica. *FBIS-EEU-94-101* (25 May 1994), p. 6.
13. Prague CTK, 1 June 1994. *FBIS-EEU-94-106* (2 June 1994), p. 14.
14. Bratislava *Pravda*, 3 June 1994, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-94-110* (8 June 1994), p. 12.

15. RFE/RL *Daily Report*, No. 156 (18 August 1994), p. 4; also Bratislava *Obrana*, 27 August 1994, p. 3.
16. Bratislava *Obrana*, 17 September 1994, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-94-181 (19 September 1994), p. 8; also *Slovakia: Ministry of Defense* (Bratislava: Ministry of Defense, 1995), p. 12..
17. Bratislava *SME*, 3 September 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-176 (12 September 1994), p. 14.
18. Bratislava *SME*, 27 October 1994, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-94-216 (8 November 1994), p. 18.
19. Bratislava *Pravda*, 27 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-216 (8 November 1994), p. 17.
20. Bratislava *Pravda*, 2 November 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-218 (10 November 1994), p. 15.
21. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 22 November 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-226 (23 November 1994), p. 12.
22. Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 3 October 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-193 (5 October 1994), pp. 10-11.
23. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 27 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-209 (28 October 1994), p. 10.
24. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 11 December 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-238 (12 December 1994), p. 11.
25. Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar interview, Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 30 December 1994. FBIS-EEU-945-001 (3 January 1995), pp. 9-10.
26. Bratislava *SME*, 23 February 1995, pp. 1,2. FBIS-EEU-95-041 (2 March 1995), p. 14.
27. Jozef Gajdos (HZDS) became Defense Ministry State Secretary in December 1994 and reflected Meciar's influence in the defense ministry.
28. Bratislava *SME*, 25 March 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-061 (30 March 1995), p. 9; *Open Media Resarch Institute (OMRI) Daily Digest*, 7 April 1995, p. 4.
29. Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar address, Bratislava STV 1, 5 April 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-066 (6 April 1995), pp. 9-10.
30. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 6 April 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-067, 7 April 1995, pp. 8-9.
31. President Michal Kovac 11 May interview, Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 12 May 1995, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-95-094 (16 May 1995), p. 12.
32. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 18 April 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-075 (19 April 1995), p. 7.
33. Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 6 April 1995, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-95-069

(11 April 1995), p. 6.

34. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network, 5 May 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-089* (9 May 1995), p. 13.

35. President Michal Kovac 6 July interview, Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 7 July 1995, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-95-132* (11 July 1995), p. 9.

36. Peter Vacok interview, Bratislava *Slovenska Republika*, 29 September 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-191* (3 October 1995), pp. 9-10.

37. Ludovit Cernak interview, Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 14 October 1995, p. 9. *FBIS-EEU-95-201* (18 October 1995), p. 14.

38. For Full Text of 25 October 1995 *demarche*, see Bratislava *Slovenska Republika*, 8 November 1995, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-95-218* (13 November 1995), p. 19.

39. Bratislava *SME*, 30 October 1995, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-95-211* (1 November 1995), pp. 11-12.

40. Jozef Moravcik interview, Bratislava *Pravda*, 3 November 1995, pp. 1,4. *FBIS-EEU-95-216* (8 November 1995), p. 15.

41. Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 7 November 1995, p. 2. The Czech Government showed a reverse pattern. Havel's Office of the President received Kc 290 million in 1995, and 307 million in 1996. Klaus's Office of the Government operated on a budget of Kc 232 million in 1995 and Kc215 million in 1996. *FBIS-EEU-95-218* (13 November 1995), p. 25.

42. Michal Kovac interview, London *Financial Times*, 20 December 1995, p. 2.

43. Bratislava *SME*, 15 November 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-222* (17 November 1995), p. 9.

44. Ladislav Pittner interview, Bratislava *SME*, 9 February 1996, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-96-031* (14 February 1996), p. 8.

45. Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 27 February 1996, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-96-041* (29 February 1996), p. 8.

46. Bratislava *SME*, 28 February 1996, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-96-043* (4 March 1996), p. 13.

47. *OMRI Daily Digest*, 5 March 1996, p. 4.

48. Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 15 May 1996, p. 5. *FBIS-EEU-96-097* (17 May 1996), pp. 16-20.

49. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 20 May 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-099* (21 May 1996), p. 16.

50. "Report on the Work of the Slovak Information Service," delivered by SIS Director Ivan Lexa. Bratislava *Slovenska Republika*, 23 May 1996, pp. 8-9. *FBIS-EEU-96-104* (19 May 1996), pp. 12-20.

51. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 23 May 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-102* (24 May 1996), p. 8.
52. Bratislava *Novy Cas*, 3 June 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-108* (4 June 1996), p. 18.
53. Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 5 June 1996, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-96-111* (7 June 1996), pp. 18-19.
54. Prague CTK, 2 May 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-085* (3 May 1995), pp. 28-29.
55. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network, 23 June 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-122* (26 June 1995), p. 12.
56. Though this would not have any immediate impact on Chief of Staff General Tuchyna, who served as Interior Minister under Meciar and is considered to be his ally. Now Meciar could recall Tuchyna if he is ever unhappy with his performance.
57. *OMRI Daily Digest*, 14 July 1995, p. 4.
58. Vienna *Kurier*, 27 January 1995, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-95-019* (30 January 1995), p. 11.
59. *Prague Post*, 21 March 1995, p. 4.
60. Bratislava *Pravda*, 7 July 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-132* (11 July 1995), p. 11.
61. Bratislava *SME*, 24 August 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-166* (28 August 1995), p. 17.
62. Bratislava *Slovenska Republika*, 29 December 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-002* (3 January 1996), p. 10.
63. Jozef Gajdos statement, Bratislava *Slovenska Republika*, 25 October 1995, p. 3. *FBIS-EEU-95-209* (30 October 1995), p. 10.
64. Defense Minister Jan Sitek interview. Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 11 February 1995, pp. 1,3; and Bratislava *Pravda*, 11 February 1995, pp. 1,5. *FBIS-EEU-95-034* (21 February 1995), pp. 18-19.
65. Col. Jozef Zadzora interview, Bratislava *Obrana*, 16 March 1996, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-96-055* (20 March 1996), p. 11.
66. Bratislava *Pravda*, 9 August 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-156* (14 August 1995), p. 13. This was confirmed by Chief of Staff Tuchyna in discussions with Czech Chief of Staff Nekvasil on 19 March 1996. Tuchyna noted that the Slovak military was "deep under the figure of 47,000 troops it should have." *OMRI Daily Digest* (21 March 1996), p. 4.
67. Col. Jan Dendes interview, Bratislava *Pravda*, 8 January 1996, pp. 1,3. *FBIS-EEU-96-011* (17 January 1996), p. 19.
68. Col. Jozef Zadzora interview, Bratislava *Obrana*, 16 March 1996, p.



6. FBIS-EEU-96-055 (20 March 1996), p. 11.
69. Bratislava *Pravda*, 7 December 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-238 (12 December 1995), p. 17.
70. Defense Minister Sitek interview, Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 29 February 1996, p. 9. FBIS-EEU-96-043 (4 March 1996), p. 10.
71. Jan Sitek interview, Bratislava *Pravda*, 22 December 1995, pp. 1,4. FBIS-EEU-96-004 (5 January 1996), p. 8.
72. Bratislava *Slovenska Republika*, 10 March 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-049 (14 March 1995), p. 23.
73. Col. Gen. Jozef Tuchyna interview, Bratislava *Apologia* (January 1995), pp. 4-6. FBIS-EEU-95-068 (10 April 1995), pp. 19-20.
74. Col. Gen. Jozef Tuchyna interview, Bratislava *Slovenska Republika*, 27 April 1995, p. 11. FBIS-EEU-95-083 (1 May 1995), pp. 8-10.
75. Col. Jozef Pivarci interview, Bratislava *Slovenska Republika (Obrana Supplement)*, 14 January 1995, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-95-069 (11 April 1995), p. 10.
76. Bratislava *Pravda*, 29 September 1995, p. 17. FBIS-EEU-95-193 (5 October 1995), p. 15.
77. Bratislava *Obrana*, 25 March 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-061 (30 March 1995), p. 9.
78. Bratislava *SME*, 8 March 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-047 (10 March 1995), p. 10.
79. Chief of Staff Jozef Tuchyna, Prague CTK, 27 March 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-062 (31 March 1995), p. 15.
80. Bratislava *SME*, 2 June 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-109 (7 June 1995), p. 7.
81. Col. Tomas Svec interview, Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 13 October 1995, p. 8. FBIS-EEU-95-200 (17 October 1995), p. 17.
82. Col. Gen. Jozef Tuchyna interview, Bratislava *Pravda*, 6 September 1995, pp. 1,4. FBIS-EEU-95-177 (13 September 1995), p. 12.
83. Bratislava *Pravda*, 2 October 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-193 (5 October 1995), p. 15.
84. Col. Gen. Jozef Tuchyna interview, Bratislava *Rozhlasova Stanica*, 16 January 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-011 (17 January 1996), p. 11.
85. Bratislava *Slovenska Republika*, 5 March 1996, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-96-046 (7 March 1996), p. 13.
86. Imrich Andrejcek interview, Bratislava *Zmena*, No. 22 (29 May-4 June 1996), p. 9. FBIS-EEU-96-106 (31 May 1996), p. 13.
87. Bratislava *Pravda*, 9 May 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-092 (10 May 1996), p. 18.

88. Bratislava *Praca*, 31 May 1996, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-EEU-96-111* (7 June 1996), p. 18.
89. Bratislava *SME*, 9 May 1996, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-96-092* (10 May 1996), p. 18.
90. Defense Minister Jan Sitek 9 June interview. Bratislava *Obrana*, 24 June 1995, pp. 1,6. *FBIS-EEU-95-124* (28 June 1995), p. 9.
91. Bratislava *Pravda*, 14 September 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-180* (18 September 1995), p. 16.
92. Bratislava *Pravda*, 5 October 1995, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-196* (11 October 1995), p. 6.
93. Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 21 October 1995, p. 6. *FBIS-EEU-95-206* (25 October 1995), pp. 11.
94. Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 18 October 1995, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-95-204* (23 October 1995), p. 14.
95. Bratislava *STV 1*, 6 December 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-235* (7 December 1995), p. 1
96. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network, 14 December 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-241* (15 December 1995), p. 12.
97. Bratislava *SME*, 18 December 1995, p. 4. *FBIS-EEU-95-243* (19 December 1995), p. 8.
98. Bratislava *Narodna Obroda*, 17 February 1996, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-96-035* (21 February 1996), p. 9.
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# IX. Prologue as Future: What Central Europe Needs To Do

**H**istory has tested Central European nations and states in the extreme. The revolutions of 1989-1990 marked the third time in the 20th century alone that Central Europe has embarked on a "return to Europe." In the 6 years since those revolutions, Central Europeans have made enormous progress, but they still have much to do.

NATO has been developing principles for enlarging the Alliance in accordance with decisions made at NATO's 10-11 January 1994 Brussels Summit on enlargement, implementation of the Partnership For Peace (PFP) program, 1 December 1994 Brussels NAC ministerial, September 1995 *Study On NATO Enlargement*, and June 1996 Berlin NAC ministerial. NATO has determined that the necessary conditions for membership will include active participation in NACC and PFP, reasonable demonstration of the successful performance of democratic political institutions, privatized economies, and respect for human rights and good, neighborly relations.

In addition, "effective" democratic control of the military, as well as some minimal military capability, and political compatibility with NATO will be necessary conditions. Although defining these standards may appear to be difficult because each state has its own history, culture, and unique set of institutions, this study has postulated the following four (formal and "in the spirit of") conditions as being necessary for aspiring Alliance members to

exert "effective" democratic oversight and management of the military:

1. **A clear division of authority** between president and the government (prime minister and defense/interior minister) in Constitutions or through public law. The law should clearly establish who commands and controls the military and promotes military officers in peacetime, who holds emergency powers in crisis, and who has authority to initiate the transition to war. Underlining these formalities is evidence of the spirit of respect and tolerance between president and government (prime minister) who may often be of different parties or political persuasion.

2. **Parliamentary oversight of the military** through control of the defense budget. Parliament's role in deploying armed forces in peacetime, emergency, and war must be clear. Underlining these formalities is the need for the Parliament's Defense and Security and Foreign Affairs Committees to provide minority and opposition parties with information (transparency) and allow consultation particularly on normal policy issues such as defense budgets and on extraordinary commissions investigating defense/security violations. Committees need staff expertise and information in order to provide adequate oversight and liaison with defense and interior ministries and to help develop bipartisan consensus on defense and security. Similarly intelligence oversight committees should provide access to opposition parties.

3. **Peacetime government oversight of General Staffs and military commanders** through civilian defense ministries. Defense ministry management should include preparation of the defense budget, access to intelligence, involvement in strategic planning, force structure development, arms acquisitions and deployments, and military promotions.

In order to accomplish these objectives, defense ministries need "real" civilian defense ministers. Two potential pitfalls have plagued Central European defense ministries: First, some defense ministries have become politicized because the defense minister and state secretary have been of different (majority or minority

coalition) political parties. Second, some retired military officers who have become "civilian" defense ministers have been ineffective in providing defense ministry oversight of the military—in effect, allowing the General Staff to coopt the defense ministry. This situation has resulted, in part, from the scarcity of legitimate civilian or military defense experts in the defense ministry who are capable of making the defense and security case to their legislatures and broader public (though legislative liaison and public affairs).

4. **Restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness, and accountability** for the armed forces to be effective. Having emerged from the communist period when the military was controlled by the Soviet High Command through the Warsaw Pact (and the then top-secret Statute system) and often used as an instrument of external or internal oppression, society needs to perceive the military as being under effective national control. In addition to the necessary institutional and Constitutional arrangements, this perception also requires a Legal Framework and Code of Conduct for professional soldiers and conscript citizens which would allow soldiers to disobey orders if they are illegal.

Military training levels and equipment must also be sufficient to protect the state. This goal requires social support and a predictable stream of material resources (defense budgets) that the defense ministry can "sell" to the Parliament and the broader society. Today's (1996) reality is different. Most Central European militaries retain only 50-55 percent of their 1988 manpower levels and 38-42 percent of the defense budgets in real terms. In sum, their readiness, training, and modernization levels have deteriorated significantly, in some cases raising questions about their capacity to participate in coalition defense tasks.

NATO has come to define these four conditions as necessary for exercising "effective" democratic control of the military. Over the past two years, three Central European states—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—have come closer to meeting these standards; one—Slovakia—has *not*. When examining Central

Europe's progress in developing "effective" democratic control of the military since the 1989-90 revolutions, it is clear that much has already been achieved. It is equally clear that much remains to be done!

### What Has Been And Needs to Be Done?

#### Germany

NATO has already enlarged into the area previously known as the Warsaw Pact. On 3 October 1990, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) became five "eastern" *laender* in a united Germany and part of NATO.

As a result of the 12 September 1990 Kohl-Gorbachev agreement, ground rules for the new military posture of a united Germany were set. The treaty stipulated that the united *Bundeswehr* would comprise 370,000 troops in 1994. In return, the Soviet Union accepted the GDR's incorporation into NATO, while the FRG agreed to hold back military presence in the former GDR until Russian troops had evacuated the territory in 1994. According to Article 5 of the Treaty, following the completion of the Soviet (then Russian) armed forces withdrawal in 1994, German armed forces units attached to NATO could be stationed in the eastern *laender*.

Since the 175,000-troop East German National People's Army disappeared, and the model by which NATO included the former GDR is not totally applicable to future enlargements, the fact that NATO accepted conditions for the GDR's inclusion might provide a precedent in future NATO enlargements.

#### Poland

Efforts to establish democratic control of the military in Poland has been marked by a six-phase evolutionary process and by the presence of Soviet (then Russian) troops on Polish soil until 1994.

*In the initial 1988-June 1989 phase* of round-table discussions, Poland effectively wrested the National Defense Council (KOK), which controlled the defense and interior ministries, from the

Communist Party placing it under *de jure* control of the newly-formed institution of president (Communist Party leader Jaruzelski became president). Since 8 April 1989 the KOK was no longer a supra-governmental agency, but a collegial state organ subordinate to Parliament—of immense importance because of Poland's historic experience with the Defense Council during the Marshal Jozef Pilsudski and 1980-81 martial law eras.

*In the second phase*, after the June 1989 elections, Parliament began to exert greater moral authority (reformers now controlled the Senate; and one-third of the Sejm) and some oversight of the military. Ad hoc Solidarity reformers and Parliament established oversight groups in the defense ministry. Two Solidarity civilians (Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz) became deputy defense ministers and began efforts to eliminate the Main Political Administration (Communist Party) from the military and control contact with foreign states and international institutions (in part, to ensure that the Soviet Union could no longer command Polish armed forces through the Warsaw Pact's top secret Statute system). Piotr Kolodziejczyk, an independent-minded admiral, became defense minister in July 1990; General Zdzislaw Stelmazuk, who never attended a Soviet staff college, became Chief of the General Staff. Since President Jaruzelski's moral prestige had greatly diminished after the elections, he resigned and requested that new presidential elections be held two-and-one-half years early.

*The third phase* began after Lech Walesa was elected president by popular mandate in December 1990. Power began to shift from Parliament (the Sejm still had two-thirds communist membership) to the president. Not only did President Walesa now chair the KOK, which provided reformers with *de facto* control of the military and police, but Walesa exercised oversight of the defense ministry through the National Security Bureau (BBN). Walesa put the BBN under presidential financial control, and expanded his authority over the BBN, which developed Poland's military doctrine, developed threat analyses, and drafted the reforms to



reorganize the defense ministry and restructure the General Staff. Poland's efforts to write a Constitution during this period were frustrated by tensions between the communist-dominated Sejm on the one hand, and the Senate and president on the other. Frustrated with the Sejm, Walesa pushed for parliamentary elections two-and-one-half years earlier than planned.

The October 1991 parliamentary elections marked *the fourth phase*. Though Poland's legislative and executive institutions were now fully legitimate in democratic political terms, a heavily fragmented and weak coalition government hampered by the absence of a Constitution became its Achilles heel. Debates over a new Constitution brought tensions and political showdown between the Parliament (Sejm and Senate) and the president.

Ambiguity in authority and differences in interpretation over command and control of the military caused the downfall of Poland's first civilian Defense Minister Jan Parys, and then Prime Minister Jan Olszewski and his government. When the Sejm Commission examined Defense Minister Parys' allegations that President Walesa had been planning martial law contingencies and offered Silesian Military District commander Tadeusz Wilecki the position of Chief of Staff for his support, it exonerated the president.

Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz (and Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka) initially brought new cooperation between the government and the president and some progress in defense ministry efforts to establish oversight of the military. On 22 October 1992 Onyszkiewicz implemented the inter-ministerial Zabinski Commission's reform of the defense ministry. The defense ministry now had three departments (strategy, education, and infrastructure) and military courts and intelligence were subordinated to the civilian defense minister. Though Onyszkiewicz attempted to fuse the civilian defense ministry financial and personnel services with the General Staff, and Deputy Defense Minister Jan Kuriata attempted to set up an independent department to oversee military infrastructure and acquisition, these efforts were frustrated by

the General Staff which had been restructured to correspond with the defense ministry's three departments.

But these defense ministry efforts were further limited by the fact that President Walesa did appoint General Wilecki to be Chief of the General Staff and Wilecki continued to arrogate power by bringing his military district commanders to the General Staff. In sum, the General Staff effectively maintained autonomy by playing off civilian defense ministry oversight against the president.

Though the so-called Small Constitution (November 1992) was a provisional effort to clarify legislative and executive authority and define president and government powers, it failed because of continued ambiguity. Lack of consensus was evident in the seven Constitutional drafts submitted to the Constitutional Commission, the Sejm Defense Committee's opposition to the president's oversight of a National Guard, and in differing views of the president's role in appointing ministers of defense, interior, and foreign affairs.

*The fifth period* began with the post-Communist SLD-PSL-coalition victory in the September 1993 Parliamentary elections. Once again, the absence of a Constitution contributed to lack of effective civilian oversight of the military and to governmental crisis and collapse. The defense ministry's reduced role was evident in Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk's early actions. In November 1993 he reduced the defense ministry staff and restructured the ministry by unifying the strategy and training directorates under First Deputy Defense Minister Jerzy Milewski, who retained his BBN position, and created a deputy defense minister for legislative affairs. He gave the General Staff more authority by transferring the civilian Department of Education back to the military, creating a fourth organization/mobilization directorate, and placing intelligence and counterintelligence under its purview. In the September 1994 Drawsko affair, when the president undermined the defense minister's authority, the military gained greater autonomy.

As a result of Drawsko, not only did the defense minister have

to resign (contributing to the Pawlak government's ultimate collapse), but the Sejm Defense Committee's investigation commission also equivocated in its findings. Though the Sejm Committee criticized the president for his behavior at Drawsko, it failed to react even after the president presented awards to General Wilecki and other top military commanders after the incident. Walesa also continued to challenge the defense minister's list of general officers for promotion and the government's authority to appoint so-called "presidential ministers," causing the collapse of the Pawlak government. In effect, the government had lost effective control and oversight over the military.

Poland's civil-military crisis in 1994 resulted from its failure to delegate authority between the president and government and from the Sejm Defense (commission and Committee's) inability to exercise effective oversight. It also has demonstrated the inability of the civilian defense ministry to manage and exercise oversight of the military; hence the Chief of Staff and General Staff had remained independent of the defense minister (and Government), and the Army had been heavily politicized and continued to enjoy broad popular support.

*The sixth phase* opened with the inauguration of President Aleksander Kwasniewski (SLD) in December 1995 and the initiation of a defense reform "revolution." The passage of the February 1996 Law on the Office of the Defense Minister is testimony to Poland's recognition of its problems; the law established a fourth deputy defense minister to deal with finances and the Chief of the General Staff formally became the State Secretary, a fifth deputy defense minister. The purpose of the "revolution" is to wrest control from the General Staff and subordinate it to the defense ministry. In sum, the structural differentiation of the ministry has been impressive, though its practice has remained limited by the General Staff.

Clearly Poland is still attempting to develop a consensus on establishing its defense tenets, to include effective relations between military and civilian authorities. The manner in which the

General Staff has played off the president and prime minister/defense minister has effectively brought the military an independence not found anywhere else in Central Europe. As a result, the General Staff has acquired enormous influence *vis-a-vis* the defense ministry in personnel policy, financial policy, military information (intelligence and counterintelligence), professional military education, and press.

Poland's military independence has been facilitated, in part, by defense ministry instability at the top. Since August 1992 when Wilecki became Chief of the General Staff, he has dealt with no less than six (four plus two acting) defense ministers—Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Piotr Kolodziejczyk, Jerzy Milewski (acting), Zbigniew Okonski, Andrzej Karkoszka (acting), and Stanislaw Dobrzanski. Wilecki still remains, and no set periodic rotation policy has yet been established.

Poland's attempts to achieve defense ministry management responsibility and oversight of the General Staff can be best assessed as admirable in concept and effort, but final judgement must be reserved until the dust has settled. In light of the evident resistance from General Wilecki and the General Staff (and the fact that Wilecki remains in his position), it will take time to distinguish the merely formal from the truly real reform.

In this regard, the Sejm's continued limitations require concern. Since the Sejm Defense Committee's creation in 1989-90, it has not yet developed an expert support staff and has exercised only limited oversight. The Sejm Special Commission investigating Defense Minister Parys' allegations about politics in the General Staff in April 1992 found them unsubstantiated. Though the Sejm Defense Commission criticized President Walesa for his actions at Drawsko in 1994, the generals who refused obedience to their civilian leadership remained unpunished. Finally, the Sejm Committee remained silent when Walesa awarded bonuses in January 1995 to the three top generals who participated at Drawsko.

Sejm Committee Chairman Jerzy Szmajdzinski has publicly noted the committee's limitations in supervising military intelli-

gence (WSI) and has noted that though the Sejm's Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) has slightly improved its ability to monitor the defense budget, that it will take years to develop a more effective method in accordance with practices in developed democratic countries.

Although the Sejm Defense Committee rejected as inadequate the defense ministry report on politicization of the forces during the 1995 presidential election, it has not forced the issue further, almost hoping the issue would go away after the election. Nor did the Sejm Defense Committee make any clear move after General Wilecki's 14 August 1995 speech, which publicly reprimanded civilian politicians for allocating insufficient funds to the Army.

Although Parliament has exercised some control of the military through constrained defense budgets, it has been limited. Even though the Sejm passed a resolution to increase defense expenditures to 3 percent of GDP 18 months ago, little has been done in practice. In addition, the Sejm has demonstrated little supervision over military administration. For example, it has not established rules on periodic rotation of high military officials nor established term limitations for General Staff assignments.

On the military side, Poland's armed forces have been significantly cut from 405,000 to 234,000. Military readiness, as in the rest of Central Europe, requires attention. Problems with readiness have been evident in the ground forces, navy, and air and air defense forces. They have also been evident in its IFOR unit in Tuzla, Bosnia.

In contrast with budgets in the rest of Central Europe, however, the defense budget *increase* in 1995 reversed a slide that had been evident since 1986. Though it represents a commitment of 2.5 percent of GDP, there is the apparent (though not yet realized) commitment to increase this to 3 percent over time. Also, Polish society—in marked contrast to Hungary and the Czech Republic—holds the military in high esteem. Finally, in contrast to the rest of Central Europe, Poland has developed inter-governmental national security planning institutions such as KSORM with the capacity

to establish priorities among national objectives.

It is clear that a Constitution, which effectively limits state institutions in existing law, is the necessary condition to establish proper control of the military in Poland. It is also clear that the Polish military does not yet effectively cooperate with the civilian defense ministry and that the military has been politicized. In the end, real reform can not be guaranteed until Poland acquires a new constitution, which is unlikely to occur before early 1997.

Despite this uncertainty, the 1996 defense reform concept appears right on the mark. Poland's efforts to empower the defense ministry to provide accountability to society, limit the functions of the General Staff and subordinate it to civilian defense ministry authority, and reform the armed forces through budget and acquisitions are all the right objectives. The defense reform demonstrates that, compared with only 2 years ago, many Polish leaders now understand what needs to be done in order to acquire democratic control of the military. One can only hope that they will meet with success.

### **Hungary**

The October 1989 Constitution, which replaced Hungary's 1949 Constitution, was written by reform communists and established authority between the president, government, and National Assembly, which only by majority could declare a state of emergency or war. Most important, the Hungarian National Assembly amended the Defense Law in February 1990 to assume authority (from the Defense Council) to deploy Hungarian armed forces at home or abroad. This power effectively terminated the Soviet Statute system, which, as in Poland, had provided the USSR direct access to Hungarian armed forces. The Hungarian Parliament had reassumed national control of Hungary's armed forces.

Reform Communists, though, promulgated a Defense Reform (1 December 1989) that created many problems between presidential and governmental authority. The reform separated the armed forces from the defense minister and placed them under the presi-

dent who the communists originally thought would be their reform leader Imre Poszgay. Thus, when Hungary became the first Central European state to appoint a civilian defense minister (Lajos Fur, chairman of the MDF, in May 1990), the Commander of the Hungarian Army was not subordinate to him, but to the president, who had authority to appoint and promote generals.

After the March 1990 elections, which resulted in a Free Democrat (AFD) president (Arpad Goncz) and Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) government (Jozsef Antall), the new Hungarian government had to undo the problems created by the December 1989 communist legacy. Indeed, most of Hungary's defense reform has involved amending the Constitution (e.g., In June 1990 it was amended to require a Parliamentary two-thirds rather than simple majority to employ armed forces) and/or testing it in the Constitutional Court.

Civil-military problems arose over the issues of control of professional military education and military institutes (defense minister or Army Commander), the use of the armed forces during domestic transport strikes (president or defense minister) and during Yugoslav air-space violations (Parliament or government). Differences became so tense, that Hungarian Commander Kalman Lorincz resigned in frustration and the government during 1991 sought Constitutional Court decisions on presidential and governmental authority over the Hungarian armed forces during peacetime and crisis.

The Court's decisions in favor of the government led to the 1992 Defense Reform that restructured the defense ministry so the defense minister could assume oversight of the armed forces, military intelligence, and recommend military promotions for presidential approval. During 1993 a Defense Law gave Defense Minister Lajos Fur the authority to fuse the positions of Hungarian Army Commander with the Chief of the General Staff, and on 7 December Constitutional amendments placed the border guard under the police in peacetime (hence, under government control) and gave the government authority to call up to 5,000 troops in an

emergency without specific agreement of the president or declaration by Parliament. Parliament retained authority to approve the principles of National Defense, military development, and the budget.

Though the Main Political Administration was eliminated from the armed forces, Defense Minister Fur packed the defense ministry with MDF civilians, creating a new form of political influence. This created problems after the May 1994 elections which returned the post communist Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) in coalition with the AFD to power by two-thirds majority. Under the new government, the defense ministry was subordinated to retired Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, who had been relieved by Fur as defense ministry spokesman. Keleti now replaced MDF civilians with retired or acting military officers, reorganized the defense ministry and reduced its staff, provided the General Staff more authority in military planning (to include intelligence), and reversed an earlier decision to separate the position of Chief of the General Staff from Hungarian Army Commander. Keleti's actions raise questions about "effective" civilian defense ministry oversight of the military.

On the military side, the armed forces have been significantly cut from 120,000 to 65,000 and are being restructured for NATO integration. But financial resources have greatly constrained Hungary's armed forces restructuring, modernization, and PFP-exercise participation, and the total forces could decrease to 45,000-50,000.

But in the greater scheme of things, Hungary has made enormous progress. The existence of a constitutional and legal framework has resulted from Constitutional Court decisions that have effectively addressed the problems caused by the October 1989 Constitution and 1 December 1989 Defense Reform; the Court's decisions have been respected and been incorporated in the 1993 National Defense Act and subsequent legislation.

Continued wrangling over the Constitutional draft since 1994 and the delaying of its acceptance could become a source of concern, as it increasingly appears that the six-party Parliamentary



consensus is fraying. A new constitution that has broad-based national consensus and clarifies some outstanding issues such as the president's wartime authority is needed. Work to re-write the Constitution was initially intended to be completed in 1995, but it is taking much longer. Guidelines for general debate were published during 1996 and now passage is expected to be completed some time in 1997.

The National Assembly through its 19-member Defense Committee has been slowly attempting to develop oversight of the military through the budget, approval of the Basic Principles of National Defense and Defense Bill, and the deployment of armed forces. The Defense Committee has opposition representation (with six members), and continuity with seven members remaining from before the 1994 elections. It now includes former Defense Minister Fur and two retired generals. In addition, to ensure civilian control parliamentary members of Parliament can not be members of the military.

The Parliament Defense Committee, though, could be more effective and lacks staff support. Its limitations have been most apparent in oversight of the defense budget as manifest by Defense Minister Keleti's unilateral decision to buy T-72 tanks from Belarus with funds derived from the sale of defense real estate and decision to send MIG-29s to a PFP exercise in Poland without proper consultation.

Hungary needs an interagency organization (e.g., National Security Council) that could formulate a national security policy. Such a body under the Prime Minister (e.g., similar to KSORM in Poland) could bring together ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Finance, and Industry to formulate policy and provide clear direction to the armed forces. The already existing National Security Cabinet could form the basis for such a body, but a permanent supporting staff would need to be created.

In addition, it is necessary to ensure that the Hungarian Defense Ministry maintains real civilian oversight of the military. The problems and shortcomings in the defense ministry are mani-

fold. *First*, the defense minister is required by Parliamentary regulations to report to Parliament every year on the defense policy and state of the Hungarian Defense Forces. Though such a report is prepared on a confidential basis, no public report is presented. This is unfortunate because such a report would be necessary to build Parliamentary and public support for defense programs.

*Second*, the General Staff's separation from the defense ministry creates problems. The General Staff maintains its own chain of command to the defense minister; hence, there is a duplication of functions and no formalized means for cross-fertilization between action officers in the General Staff and defense ministry. While personal contacts and communication sometimes exist between the defense ministry and General Staff there are very few horizontal communication levels between the working levels of the two organizations.

The fact that most of the positions in the defense ministry are filled by military officers does not improve communication with the General Staff. Military officers tend to stay in the defense ministry for long periods, often with no idea of when, or if they will rotate to other military positions. The fact that many retire and stay in defense ministry positions as civilians tends to widen the divide. This situation can be improved only if military officers are routinely rotated into the defense ministry and back to the General Staff.

*Third*, the defense ministry has yet to implement a mid- and long-term planning mechanism, which is presently under development. This has become highlighted by Hungary's participation in PFP, problems faced in restructuring the Hungarian Defense Forces, and the need to participate and develop a Planning and Review Process (PARP). This planning mechanism needs to be developed if Hungary becomes a NATO member in order to develop a Defense Planning Questionnaire. Although the defense ministry is attempting to develop a modified PPBS system and the Defense Resource Planning Group is attempting to develop a Defense Resource Management Model for Hungary, difficulty has

resulted because resource allocations run from top of the hierarchy down, rather than from bottom up.

Although procurement has been virtually non-existent because of fiscal constraints, the defense ministry recently transferred the Equipment Procurement Branch from the General Staff. But the defense ministry lacks an Operational Requirements Branch to assess and compare the technical capabilities of weapons and systems.

*Fourth*, intelligence is collated and prepared in the Hungarian Defense Forces. They control what the defense minister gets to see, rather than having an outside group acting in behalf of the minister making that determination. Under present arrangements the defense minister and defense ministry staff could be denied some intelligence information.

Hungary needs to restructure its defense ministry. An integrated defense ministry links the defense minister (and his administrative and policy advisers) directly to the command structure. It also can act to facilitate the flow of defense needs from the armed forces to the Government, opening up defense policy and activities to public scrutiny and accountability. In sum, it is more efficient and provides more effective oversight of the Armed Forces.

The defense ministry's problems are burdened by having become a "retirement home" for military officers; it has not and is not yet cultivating civilian specialists—nor is it effectively developing a defense constituency either in Parliament or in Hungarian society. These difficulties need to be overcome if Hungary is to develop the necessary political-military planning processes in order to integrate with NATO.

Finally, although the military has evidenced significant reform and been restructured to accommodate NATO, force modernization continues to be greatly restrained by scarce resources. Since the main contact between society and the armed forces is through conscripts (roughly 40,000 enlistees annually) and their families, the conscription experience becomes very important in building social support for defense. If no meaningful training takes place

and society views conscription as a waste of time, as at present, then social support is undermined. But if training takes place during conscription and conscripts feel they have learned something from the experience—be it language training or a trade—then social support should be positive. Unfortunately, public opinion does not hold the Hungarian Defense Forces in high esteem and a vicious circle prevails.

Military training and force modernization need significant attention and development to meet NATO standards. The Hungarian defense expenditure of 1.4-1.5 percent of GDP remains the lowest of all its Central European neighbors. It is just not enough, and reflects the fact that the defense ministry has been unable to develop sufficient public understanding of the costs of NATO integration and failed to develop Parliamentary support for adequate defense budget levels.

In summary, Parliament has been effective in exerting control of the defense budget and deploying Hungarian armed forces. The Constitutional Court's decisions have been respected and have led to major defense reforms allowing the government (prime minister and defense minister) to take control of the military in peacetime and emergency. However, Hungary still needs a constitution (that is not a two-thirds majority victor's mandate) to define the president's wartime powers. Also in light of recent defense ministry and General Staff changes, Hungary needs to reassert effective "civilian" defense ministry oversight of the military and to commit more resources to defense.

### **Czechoslovakia**

Both Czech and Slovak successor states benefitted from the three years of reform in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia's revolution was swift. By the end of December 1989 the Federal Assembly had elected Vaclav Havel president. The fact that Havel wielded national command authority was particularly important for Czechoslovakia not only because of the Warsaw Pact's Statute System, but also because its military, in contrast to Poland and

Hungary, had been involved in failed efforts at counter-revolution (OPERATIONS "ZASAH"--Hit and "VLNA"--Wave).

By the end of 1989, the president (not the party secretary) chaired the Defense Council, General Vacek had replaced General Vaclavik (who had given orders to prepare to use force) as defense minister, and a Civic Forum civilian Antonin Rasek became deputy defense minister. During 1990 Parliament created an Inspector General to oversee the defense ministry, and various Civic Forum and government oversight bodies were attached to the armed forces to screen military cadres and monitor democratization. After a Commission concluded that General Vacek also had been involved in OPERATION WAVE, Lubos Dobrovsky became Czechoslovakia's first civilian defense minister in October.

When Defense Minister Dobrovsky took over, he demanded another screening of cadres and he assumed control of (military and interior) intelligence and counterintelligence. During Spring 1991 the defense ministry was restructured into three directorates (strategy, economics, and social and human affairs) to strengthen civilian oversight, and Karel Pezl, who had been cashiered from the armed forces in 1968 and therefore deemed politically reliable in 1990, became chief of staff of the armed forces. Widespread screening of senior officers then ensued.

Elections in June 1992 sealed the disintegration of the federation. During the last half of 1992 Czech and Slovak attention turned to preparing new constitutions and planning to divide their armed forces and property. While both successor states had the benefit of three years of Czechoslovak defense reform, each faced different problems as 1993 opened.

### **Czech Republic**

The Czech Republic has enjoyed political stability and has accomplished much in the area of defense reform since independence. On dealing with democratic control issues, the Czech Republic still has an unresolved constitutional issue regarding Article 63(c) on emergency powers and the empowerment of the

president in transition to war. The (German-model) president, as "supreme commander of the armed forces," must get the prime minister's approval for employing forces and to commission and promote generals. Since the president's emergency powers can cause confusion during a crisis, this needs to be rectified. An earlier issue of filling the Senate appears has been resolved.

The Parliament Defense and Security Committee, as well as the Budget and Foreign Affairs committees, execute limited oversight of the military. The Defense and Security Committee in April 1994 approved the "screening" conducted in the military and debated the Concept of the Czech Army; in November 1994 it requested temporarily halting the defense ministry's plans to modernize MIG-21s. In February and April 1995, parliamentary committees were established to oversee military intelligence (VZS) and the Security and Information Service (BIS).

Adhering to Articles 39 and 43 of the Constitution, in April 1994 the Parliament approved the Czech Army's participation in military exercises abroad and for foreign, NATO troops to exercise on Czech soil. In November 1995, the Defense and Security Committee recommended halting T-72 and MIG-21 modernization projects and Parliament recommended canceling both projects in December. In sum, though the Defense and Security Committee's limitations have been highlighted in Defense Minister Holan's suggestion that it create a military affairs subcommittee, and in Vladimir Suman's complaints about lack of transparency in budget expenditures, the Parliament has been relatively effective in making progress in its oversight and management of the military.

The defense ministry appears to have established "effective" control of the military. Antonin Baudys, a civilian, became the first Czech defense minister. He initially retained Karel Pezl as Chief of Staff, who was then succeeded by Jiri Nekvasil, a colonel promoted from the ranks. First Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Pospisil attempted to develop a personnel management system for military careers, initiated further "screening" of military cadres (for political reliability and military competence), and the General Staff has

no holdover from the Communist period. The armed forces have been greatly reduced in size (from 106,400 in January 1993 to 63,346 by end of 1995) and has been restructured to corps-brigades into accommodate integration into NATO.

Though the defense ministry has provided evidence of some politicization in the buildup to the 1996 elections, it has also demonstrated significant structural differentiation, adaptation, and development. In 1994, military intelligence was subordinated to the defense minister and placed in the ministry, and in September Vilem Holan replaced Baudys as minister. In January 1995 the defense ministry established a double-entry bookkeeping management system under Deputy Defense Minister Kalousek to coincide with the Army's adoption of PPBS to identify waste and shortages.

In September 1995, the creation of a new Defense and Strategy Policy Directorate, under Colonel Jaroslav Svabik to influence organization and deployment of the Army and coordinate its emergency activities with other ministries, signaled the movement of significant powers from the General Staff. At the same time, the General Staff reacquired some powers from the defense ministry. On 1 July 1995, the power of command of Czech UNPROFOR-UNCRO and IFOR units was moved from the defense ministry Foreign Affairs Directorate under Jaromir Novotny to the General Staff Operations Directorate under Maj. Gen. Rostislav Kotil. In addition, a special interagency committee was established to help achieve NATO integration.

In September 1995, the arrival of Petr Necas as First Deputy Defense Minister signaled the need for improvement in the personnel management system and arrival of politics into the defense ministry, particularly in acquisitions policy. In November 1995 a new Deputy Defense Minister (Hana Demlova) for Social, Health, and Housing Affairs position was created, in part to deal with social problems in the armed forces and a housing shortage of 3,000 units for officers and families.

Increasingly, the Czechs have been discussing the need to establish a supra-departmental agency (like a National Security

Council) to coordinate aspects of Czech national and defense policy that transcend one ministry. This need has become apparent in such issues as developing a national security strategy, acquisitions policy (e.g., possibly coordinating the aircraft buy with Poland), NATO integration, and crisis-management. In March 1996 they did create an interagency NATO Integration Committee to produce a National Plan and coordinate all integration activities.

Finally, it is clear that the Czech Army remains in a greatly weakened state. Its readiness and training levels, and morale, remain low. Its professional officer corps pyramid is greatly out of balance. Although its flag officer corps has been greatly reduced from 130 to 24 (compared to 70 in Hungary), its senior officers greatly exceed its junior officer corps. NCOs and warrant officers are also in very short supply and very difficult to recruit because of low salaries and the low prestige of the Army. All this is rhetorically recognized by the appropriate Parliamentary and Government authorities, but until budgetary commitments are increased, little improvement can be expected.

The bullying of conscripts, who are the Army's major link to Czech society, still remains in evidence. The Czech Army's image in the broader society, as in Hungary, remains very low. As Vaclav Havel has noted publicly, what is needed is not just a change in the way Czech citizens view the military but also in the attitude of soldiers themselves. Not only must these changes begin to occur before joining NATO, but the Czech Government has some significant work to do with Czech society on the issue of NATO membership.

Despite these limitations, it can be stated that the Czech Republic has made enormous progress on the road to achieving democratic control of the military. With a new, weakened coalition government remaining committed to NATO integration in 1996, it seems that one of the Czech Government's most difficult tasks will be to "sell" NATO to Czech society in order to generate what are likely to be greater national obligations and resource requirements for defense.



In sum, of the four Central European states, the Czech Republic seems to have made the most progress in developing "effective" civilian defense ministry control of the military. The president and Parliament have deemed the armed forces to be reliable, and the armed forces have publicly apologized for previous interferences in Czech society.

### Slovakia

In contrast to the Czech Republic, political instability has characterized Slovakia, which is now on its third government in four years, and that instability has hampered its more daunting military tasks and reform efforts. In many ways Slovakia's January 1993 independence has thrown the country back in time. Slovakia must build its institutions from scratch—a new defense ministry, an Army command (now general staff), and its armed forces.

During the first Vladimir Meciar-coalition government (January 1993-March 1994), military reform was hampered by government instability and crisis. Nevertheless, it created a National Security Council, and approved two key documents: the Principles of National Security, and a Defense Doctrine.

Military reform efforts were evident during the Jozef Moravcik-coalition government (March-December 1994) which named a civilian defense minister (Pavol Kanis) and revised Slovakia's Defense Doctrine (placing greater stress on NATO integration), changed the Army Command to a General Staff, restructured and reduced the size of the defense ministry and General Staff (to reduce tensions that had developed because the larger Army Command had been formed first), and restructured the armed forces into corps and brigades.

The key hope—that these initial reform efforts would continue under the new Meciar coalition government (that emerged from the October 1994 elections)—has not come to fruition. Prime Minister Meciar's campaign to unseat President Kovac has contributed to renewed political instability and potential constitutional challenges.

Constitutional issues prevail. The Constitution's stress on nationality versus civic rights has contributed to problems with Slovakia's Hungarian minority. This issue, exploded by the Hungarian minority boycott of the new Constitution in June 1992, has been manifest in the long, tortuous road toward ratification of the Good Neighbor Treaty between Hungary and Slovakia. It took Slovakia one year to ratify the treaty on 26 March 1996, but only after major concessions on language law, martial law, and administration were made to the HZDS' Slovak National Party (SNS) coalition partner. That this has aggravated ethnic relations inside Slovakia and with its external relations with Hungary has been clear.

Another weakness of the Constitution is that, in the event of a government crisis, the president should have the power to call for new elections. But the president lacks that power unless he can get 60 percent (90) of the National Council deputies to support him.

A further weakness of the Constitution is that it allows the National Council to override presidential vetoes with no higher quorum than in the original vote. Prime Minister Meciar has used this loophole to dismantle the Constitution by undermining the powers of the president by overriding continuously the president's veto of normal laws. One example was the June 1995 amendment that removed the president's power to appoint and dismiss the chief of General Staff giving it to the government. Not only has the power of the president been thoroughly undermined, but Meciar has now raised the issue of perhaps writing an entirely new constitution. In sum, respect for limits of law and tolerance of opposition remains ill-defined in Slovakia.

The National Council has been active and its Defense and Security Committee of 12 members has experience and expertise. The Committee is headed by former Defense Minister Imrich Andrejčák (HZDS), and also comprises former Defense Minister Pavol Kanis and State Secretary Igor Urban.

The National Council and its Defense and Security Committee has approved the Defense Doctrine and fundamental elements of

defense reform. Unfortunately, the National Council's Special Supervisory Body (OKO), which oversees and monitors the Slovak Information Service (SIS), does *not* include opposition members. This is a fundamental weakness because of allegations that the HZDS has manipulated the SIS (under Ivan Lexa) for political purposes. How the opposition will resolve this problem remains unclear.

Defense Ministry reform has made enormous progress for such a short period of time. Since the Spring of 1994, tensions existed between the defense ministry in Bratislava and the Army Command in Trencin, because the Army Command had been created first partly by the recognition in June that the Command was not workable and would be transformed into a General Staff in September 1994.

The Defense Ministry was structured in September 1994 to include five sections, but it has yet to develop a modern system of management. Additional restructuring and differentiation was necessary to deal with significant social problems; the need of 3,000 housing units for officers, dealing with problems related to the bullying of conscripts, and providing alternate civilian service. In 1995, 23,000 conscripts refused to serve, threatening the viability of the forces.

Concerns about politicization, though, have been evident in the Defense Ministry. State Secretary Gajdos (HZDS) competes with Defense Minister Sitek (SNS) for influence within the defense ministry and on policy (regarding the role of the Home Guard, NATO, and Russia), and has publicly questioned the President's capacity as Commander-in-Chief.

Transformation of the Army Command to General Staff was important and necessary, but its continued presence in Trencin and separation from the defense ministry in Bratislava is hampering coordination and defense ministry oversight. Although the military (as in Poland) enjoys high respect in Slovak society, military readiness and modernization have a long way to go to meet NATO standards. Modernization has been non-existent, except for the

acquisition of MIG-29s in settlement of Russian debt. MIG-21s will be used until they reach the end of their service life, but creative efforts have been devised to "rent" some equipment from the Slovak defense industry. Of the Sk13.6 billion 1996 defense budget, the major capital expenditure (Sk500 million) will go for military housing units.

Nevertheless, the major stumbling block to Slovakia's candidacy to NATO arises from questions about the most fundamental criterion—the shared democratic values of respect for the rule of law and tolerance of ethnic (human) rights. Certainly clarification of Slovakia's commitment to these principles will be necessary before assessing its defense ministry and military institutions for political compatibility and military interoperability with NATO.

### The Way Ahead

As NATO has determined that "effective" democratic control of the military is a necessary condition for Alliance membership, it might be concluded that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have made great progress and met the minimal conditions for establishing democratic control of the military. They do, though, have significant work to do to make that control "effective" and ensure the reform process is irreversible. Slovakia has not yet met minimal standards.

The common problem of resource scarcity has uniformly limited the development of Central Europe's armed forces modernization and compatibility with NATO. Also the lack of effective Parliamentary expertise and oversight plagues the region.

Poland and Hungary (and Slovakia) need new constitutions to address fundamental civil-military problems that still exist, notably presidential and governmental powers in peacetime and war must be clarified. Only with this constitutional clarification, can real governmental (civilian defense ministry) control of the military occur in Poland to ensure the "irreversibility" of the defense ministry "revolution."

Hungary's major attention needs to focus on how to assert "effective" defense ministry oversight and management of its armed forces and how to allocate more resources to defense (1.4-1.5 percent of GDP is just not enough). Social support for the military in Hungary (and similarly in the Czech Republic) is very weak and needs serious attention.

Slovakia has not fulfilled the necessary elements and clearly has the most work to do. It has been undermining its "flawed" Constitution in ways that raise concerns about what new constitution might be developed. Its Parliament's intelligence oversight committee and signs of politicization of defense policy raise concerns. Although the defense ministry reform has made some significant progress, coordination with the General Staff is necessary. In sum, as long as there remains a lack of tolerance between the president and prime minister, Slovakia's defense reform process will remain cloudy.

Overall, the movements toward democratic government with civilian control of the military throughout Central Europe have been remarkably—historically—successful despite a variety of daunting challenges. The attempted coup in Russia, the division of Czechoslovakia, the absorption of East Germany into the FRG (and therefore into NATO) have not thwarted the advance. Economic, labor, political, and ethnic-minority problems have complicated and slowed the march in different places but stopped it nowhere. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the bloody conflict that followed has not deterred the advance. That so many states have emerged so successfully from four decades of political domination is without question a triumph of will and a signal accomplishment to set against the often brutal history of twentieth century Europe.

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*NATO AND CENTRAL EUROPE*

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