

**T**his special issue on peacekeeping comes two years – almost to the month – after the release of a report from the panel of experts on United Nations (UN) peace operations – the so-called Brahimi Report. In this issue, we will look at what progress has been made since this landmark report was released. We will take a snapshot of the current missions in Africa, and will also ask what major trends and issues could shape the future of peacekeeping in Africa during the next decade.

We are extremely privileged to introduce this special issue by way of an interview with the secretary-general of the UN, Mr Kofi Annan. It is no secret that we Africans are extremely proud of Mr Annan. He reminds us of the value system, dignity and potential that Africa has to offer the rest of the world. As an African, as the former under-secretary-general for peacekeeping and as the secretary-general of the UN, we asked him several questions, ranging from the progress being made with the implementation of the Brahimi Report recommendations, to the state of peacekeeping in Africa.

The secretary-general interview is followed by an article from the current under-secretary-general for peacekeeping, Mr Jean-Marie Guehenno. Mr Guehenno is leading the transformation of peacekeeping at the UN, and he provides us with an overview of the history of peacekeeping, as well as the major issues being dealt with by the UN at the moment.


Over and above the normal updates on conflict resolution, constitutional developments and peacekeeping which are regular features in Conflict Trends, this issue will also report on each of the four UN peacekeeping missions currently underway in Africa.

Peacekeeping is no exception when it comes to the turbulent and ever-changing conflict landscape in Africa. During the last few weeks, between finalising the content and printing of this special issue, two major developments have occurred that are not reflected in our overview. The first is the establishment of a new UN mission in Angola – UMA. It is no secret that UN peacekeeping has a long history in Angola, which

started with UNAVEM I. However, the new mission comes in the wake of UNITA's demise, and will primarily be a civilian peace-building mission aimed at assisting the Angolan government with the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. It will also be involved in de-mining and other tasks aimed at the post-conflict recovery and normalisation of society in Angola. The second development involves changes to the scope and structure of the peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which will be necessary in order to implement the new peace agreement signed between the DRC and Rwanda – an agreement which was mediated by South Africa and the UN.

This special issue will also detail ACCORD's contribution – through its Peacekeeping Programme – to peacekeeping capacity-building in southern Africa, as well as the role of Norway through its support of the Training for Peace in Southern Africa Project. This is an interesting case study of how a government (Norway) is supporting peacekeeping capacity-building in southern Africa through a non-governmental organisation (NGO) partnership that includes the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) and ACCORD.

We end this special issue with a step into the future. ACCORD has experienced, first-hand, how difficult it is to plan and implement a peacekeeping capacity-building programme in Africa, particularly when nobody can say for sure what kind of capacity we need, and how and where we will need it. By trying to identify the major trends and issues that could shape the future of peacekeeping in Africa during the next decade, we hope to arrive at a better understanding of the type of capacities we need to build.

We have designed this issue to serve as a signpost. Most of our readership are practitioners within the broad conflict resolution and peace and security field, and we hope that this issue will be a meaningful reminder of where we currently stand with regard to developments in the peacekeeping field, how we got there and what we can expect in the immediate future. 

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Disputes



BY VASU GOUNDEN

FOREWORD

**T**he bane of the ordinary African man, woman and child is conflict. The truism in this statement is reflected in the ongoing carnage from the Mano River Union in West Africa to the killings fields of Somalia in the Horn of Africa. In this context, there can be no effective governance, little sustainable development and the marginalisation of Africa will continue apace. To put it both simply and brutally: conflict undermines the vision of an African Renaissance. Clearly this is an untenable state of affairs and there is a desperate need for African states to develop and sustain a viable peacekeeping capacity. The need for this was recently highlighted by a further 1,500 South African combat troops preparing to join MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo following the successful signing of a peace agreement between Presidents Kagame and Kabila.

This being said, we are mindful of the wise words of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in this special issue of *Conflict Trends*: 'Even where favourable conditions exist for UN peacekeeping, success can only be assured if the operations concerned are provided with all the political, financial, materiel and human resources required to fulfill the mandated tasks'. In a resource-strapped continent such as Africa these words hold special resonance. In this context, there is a special need for strategic partnerships to develop between Africa and the international community. Whilst African actors should take primary responsibility for peacekeeping, they need the technical and financial support

of the more developed countries. A good example of this is the extensive financial and personnel support that the Norwegian Government has given to ACCORD over the last five years and for another five years to develop civilian peacekeeping capacity in the SADC and East African regions through the Training for Peace Project. This idea of partnership lies at the essence of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

Peacekeeping, however, should not be seen to be the primary response of Africa to conflict. As any medical practitioner knows, prevention is better than cure. The emphasis should remain on conflict prevention rather than conflict management and this necessitates a strong conflict prevention system to exist. We at ACCORD are therefore happy to see the building blocks of this prevention regime being rapidly put into place. The NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism, the proposed Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the strengthening of the capacities of sub-regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Community and the Economic Community of West African States in the areas of conflict resolution all serve as important facets of a broader continental conflict prevention regime. Recent successes of preventive diplomacy in both the Great Lakes Region and Sudan emphasize that Africa refuses to play the role of the helpless victim anymore. The dawn of the African Renaissance is upon us!

# TRENDS

## in preventive action



### INTRODUCTION

The cliché that we live in interesting times seems to have direct relevance to the changing nature and pattern of African conflicts. The continent is witnessing a number of interesting changes. At the same time, it would appear that no changes are taking place at all. This is the paradox by which we live and, within such a context, the task of identifying preventive action trends is not made any easier. However, what we know for certain is that a number of significant political events have occurred in Africa. These events have convinced us that the grueling attempts to end the brutish and nightmarish life of many Africans is bound to continue.

This short review is being written at a very interesting time, when the world has converged once again on African soil in order to discuss the issue of sustainable development, as well as how to save the earth from mostly human made (and therefore preventable) catastrophes. The relevance of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) to what we are writing about, is based on it being an attempt to construct and identify preventive measures aimed at ensuring the survival of the entire human race. Such an event is even more relevant to Africa, where we know that issues of poverty, hunger, human and sustainable development should not be divorced from the conflicts facing the continent. Indeed, NEPAD has acknowledged that these issues are intricately

linked, and that the survival of African states rests primarily on political stability, human development and economic recovery. Consequently, It is hoped that workable and pragmatic resolutions will be the outcome of such a gathering.

### THE GREAT LAKES REGION

#### *Focus on DRC, Rwanda and Burundi*

During the last three months, most of the continent's political drama emerged from the Great Lakes Region. Within the region, signs of progress and hope are still mingled with those of fear and uncertainty. Efforts by the South African government – as well as cooperation between the heads of state from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi – led to the two countries concluding a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). In terms of this MoU, the DRC and Rwanda agreed to cooperate in order to end hostilities between the two states. They also agreed to assist each other in their attempts to secure their respective territorial integrity.

The agreement stipulates, inter alia, that the DRC will put into place measures aimed at disarming the negative forces within the DRC – particularly the Interahamwe and Ex-FAR. In return, the government of Rwanda pledged to institute a process whereby its forces would withdraw from



areas under its control – areas that mainly fall within eastern DRC.

The successful implementation of this agreement would have been one of the most important steps (in recent times) towards bringing about peace within the entire Great Lakes Region. However, serious challenges have emerged that could prevent the parties from implementing the agreement. The challenge that faces Africa in general – and the Great Lakes Region in particular – is how to come up with workable agreements based on confidence and trust between the signatories. On a more positive note, the announcement that the Zimbabwean government would withdraw its troops from the DRC, should be taken as an indication of the progress being made towards finding a durable solution to the Congo conflict.

In Burundi, the process of consolidating the transition has not been very smooth due to a number of factors, including the absence of a ceasefire between the government and the mainly Hutu rebel movements. Within this context, the current efforts to bring about a cessation of hostilities need to be commended. They also need to be seen within the context of a region that is striving towards peace and stability. The talks in Tanzania saw a parallel process of negotiations taking place between the government and individual rebel

movements, such as the two factions of the CNDD-FDD. The Dar-es-Salam process culminated in the signing of a MoU between the government and the CNDD-FDD faction, which is led by Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye. This should be hailed as a positive outcome. However, more challenges still lie ahead. For instance, the recent split within the FNL has weakened the movement. It is a well-known fact that weaker negotiating partners lead to a weaker negotiation process, and thus weak outcomes. Consequently, the key question in Burundi is how to bring on board all the various factions involved in the conflict.

Democratic Republic of Congo President Joseph Kabila (R), his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame (L) and South African President Thabo Mbeki during the signing ceremony of the DRC-Rwanda MoU

## HORN OF AFRICA

### *Focus on the Sudan*

The conflict in the Sudan resembles the changes that are being experienced in the Great Lakes Region. The talks in Kenya have progressed relatively well recently. There are hopes that they might lead to a workable agreement which could lay the foundation for the end of this protracted conflict. As in the Great Lakes, the Machakos agreement would have to be matched by concrete political commitments in order to ensure its successful implementation. It seems, at this stage,

that the situation on the ground has not yet reflected a commitment to end the conflict. Witness, for instance, the recently reported aerial attacks carried out by the Khartoum regime in southern Sudan. At the very same time, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) captured the town of Torit, which is considered one of the key strategic town.

Consequently, the Machakos negotiation process (and the agreement thereof) would remain nothing but a hollow shell if there is no national and international commitment to guarantee its implementation. The positive signs that have thus far been shown by the involvement of international players is appreciated, and should be taken as a sign of renewed efforts aimed at ending this conflict. However, these signs need to be coupled with real commitments, such as the deployment of troops which could monitor the full implementation of the agreement.

## WEST AFRICA

### *Focus on Liberia*

Political stability in the West African region has depended on, among other things, the internal peace and stability of two key countries: Liberia and Sierra Leone. The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone have always had a spill-over effect to other countries within the region. In Liberia, the government of President Charles Taylor is still engaged in military activity against the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). The government of Liberia is in a precarious position in its war against the LURD, particularly because it is still under an arms embargo imposed by the United Nations (UN) after it was accused of supporting the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone.

Secondly, Liberia has been involved in a series of attempts to bring about reconciliation and peace between the country's political parties and other key players. The most recent attempt to forge unity and level the playing field was in the form of a Peace and Reconciliation Conference, which was held in Monrovia at the end of August. The conference was attended by organs of civil society, the private sector, Liberian diplomatic representatives and representatives of the African Union (AU) and the UN.

The aim behind the conference was to build bridges between the various political players.

However, the absence of key opposition parties suggests that peace processes need to be more inclusive. Such inclusive efforts at peace need to continue, as there is no other way of arriving at a peaceful existence in Liberia – the only option is a cooperative framework among all major players, including civil society and the private sector. The support of the international community is crucial in order for this process to succeed.

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### *Focus on Zimbabwe and Swaziland*

The political woes in Zimbabwe seem to have taken a new turn, with the announcement of a new cabinet. The country's new leadership has been dubbed by President Mugabe as the 'war cabinet or council'. The announcement of the new cabinet comes at a time when the country is confronted with tremendous political and economic strain. There is also fear that political tensions will further intensify with the upcoming local government elections.

In Swaziland, the country's political system continues to draw criticism from different actors and institutions within Swaziland. For instance, organs of civil society – as well as human rights groups who have been critical of the monarch – have come up with a framework for what they call an alternative constitution for Swaziland. This move is seen as a reflection of their opposition to a new constitution, which is supposed to be presented in October.

## CONCLUSION

The Summit on Sustainable Development serves as a clear indication that the people of the world are willing to come together and cooperate in dealing with the challenges confronting humanity. This is not an easy task, especially when it requires more than statements. What is needed is the political will to invest and a willingness to make available all the necessary resources in order to meet the goals of sustainable development. The same applies to the continent of Africa – the resolution of conflict is an on-going process, without any predetermined success. Such a process requires that we, as Africans, have to invest ample time and resources in finding pragmatic and workable approaches when meeting some of the challenges that we must confront. ▀

# TRENDS



## in constitutional and political developments

### **WEST AFRICA**

A total of three West African countries held elections during June: namely Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Guinea.

#### *Cote d'Ivoire*

During the last three months, a series of 'firsts' were witnessed in terms of elections and party representation within the Cote d'Ivoire government. On 30 June 2002, the country held its first local council elections since it gained independence in 1960. The ruling Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), and former ruling Parti Democratique de Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI), won 18 seats each. The opposition Rassemblement des Republicains (RDR) won 10 seats, and the former junta leader, General Robert Guei's Union pour la Democratie et la paix en Cote d'Ivoire (UDPCI) won three. The remaining 58 seats were won by independent candidates and coalition parties. The run up to the elections was marred by reports of violent clashes, and the main opposition and ruling party questioned the results of the local elections, amid allegations of fraud and voter rigging.

Following a reshuffling of the cabinet, a new government of national unity was established on 5 August, with all the main political parties represented in government for the first time. The ruling FPI (led by President Laurent Gbagbo) has 20 ministers within the new 37-minister cabinet. The opposition RDR is represented for the first time

since the October 2000 elections, and has four ministers in the cabinet. The former ruling party – the PDCI – has seven ministers, the Parti Ivoirien du Travail has two ministers and the UDPCI has one.

#### *Cameroon*

Legislative and municipal elections were held on 30 June 2002, after they had been postponed for a week due to incomplete preparations. A total of 48 parties signed up for the legislative polls, while 26 candidates put themselves forward for the municipal elections. The legislative elections did not run smoothly – the Supreme Court ruled that the results of nine constituencies had been cancelled, and that fresh elections for these constituencies had to be held on 15 September 2002. This decision was taken after 127 post-election petitions were filed by parties which alleged the tampering of ballot boxes and the intimidation of voters. Of the 180 seats available, 163 seats were decided, with the remaining seats falling under the nine rejected constituencies. The ruling Ressemblement Democratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC) increased its seats from 116 to 133. The Social Democratic Front reduced its seats from 43 to 21. The Union de'mocratique du Camaroun (UDC) retained its five seats. The Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) increased from one to three seats. The Union Nationale pour la De'mocratie et le Progre's was the biggest casualty – it only clinched one seat in comparison to 13 seats in 1992 and 68 seats in 1997.



### **Guinea**

Guinea held legislative elections on 30 June. They were only the second multi-party elections since independence – the first were in 1995. The elections were considered peaceful. However, allegations of electoral irregularities by the independent press and opposition parties have raised some concern. Irregularities cited include a claim that the officially reported 72% participation rate far exceeded voter turnout as reported by independent sources. Instances of multiple voting and lack of neutral administration were also reported. Of the 114 parliamentary seats available, the ruling Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès won 85 seats. Five seats were won by two allied parties, and the 'moderate opposition' won 24 seats. The major opposition parties boycotted the election.

### **Togo**

Two West African countries – Togo and Gambia – have adopted media bills that effectively restrict independent media.

On 4 September 2002, the Togolese parliament passed a new media bill. The bill places severe restrictions on the media and imposes heavy penalties on journalists that defame the head of state, other government officials and top civil

servants. Togo's press laws are already considered repressive, despite its media reform policy that began in 1998, in which the government started to decriminalise press offences. However, the new bill reverses the reform policy. The penalty for defaming the president is five years in jail. A monetary fine of up to five million CFA (about US\$7500) can also be charged for defaming the president, as opposed to the maximum penalty of six months under the existing code. Offences against parliamentarians, the prime minister and other state officials incur penalties that range between three months and two years in jail. The code also allows for the interior minister to seize copies of any publication whose content may be considered a threat to public order and security.

### **Gambia**

The Gambian parliament passed a National Media Commission Bill on 24 July 2002. The bill was passed by 53 voted to three, with members of parliament rebuking the independent media for being unpatriotic towards the government. The bill established a media commission, with authority equivalent to that of a high court. The bill states that the commission will 'ensure the impartiality, professionalism and independence of the media, promote the establishment and maintenance of the



highest journalistic standards in the mass media and facilitate the registration of newspaper journals and broadcasting stations in accordance with the constitution'. The bill requires the registration of all reporters, the disclosure of all their sources and allows the imposition of heavy fines for the publication of all stories not authorised by the government. Non-compliance with these orders could result in journalists being sentenced to jail, as well as the closure of media houses. By contrast, commentators have argued that provisions in the bill challenge the Gambian constitution, and are also incompatible with Gambia's international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. Since its implementation in July, a number of reporters have been arrested.

## **SOUTHERN AFRICA**

Constitutional issues dominating southern Africa include the current constitutional reform processes in Malawi and Swaziland.

### *Malawi*

There are allegations that President Bakili Maluzi is attempting to find a way to stay in power for a third term, despite the fact that the constitution provides for only two terms of office. The next elections are in 2004. The ruling United Democratic Front (UDF) has 96 seats in the 193-seat parliament. It requires a two-thirds majority in order to amend the constitution. A private member's bill – which proposes an amendment to the constitution in order to allow Muluzi to run for a third term – failed by three votes. The bill proposed to amend section 83 (3) of the constitution, which would have enabled any president of Malawi to serve a maximum of three terms. The aim of this amendment was to restrict any future amendment of section 83 (3) of the constitution. However, that could only have been achieved through a majority vote of the people of Malawi in a referendum. The president accepted defeat, and promised to abide by the outcome of the July deliberations. However, he is now attempting to take a newly reworked Open Term Bill to parliament. He has received strong resistance from opposition leaders. A recent public discussion showed the electorate was unhappy with the processes and procedures undertaken in most of the amendments to the constitution.


### *Swaziland*

King Mswati III is attempting to alter the constitution in order to permanently enshrine the absolute monarchy. He also hopes to ban political opposition through certain constitutional changes. The constitution that the king wants to implement is based on recommendations put forward by the National Constitutional Commission. The commission was established in 1996, and is headed by the king's brother, Prince Mangaliso Dlamini. The king established the commission in order to fend off accusations that he was preventing the spread of democracy within Swaziland. The commission also represented a willingness to undertake political reform. In response to the king's constitutional reform attempts, an assembly of pro-democracy forces – including human rights lawyers, labour unions and banned political opposition parties – have put forward a blueprint for an alternative national constitution. The proposed constitution calls for the retention of the king as head of state. However, he would merely function as 'a symbol of unity'. The king's executive powers would be exercised in consultation with an elected prime minister, whose administration would determine government policy. Legislative and judicial powers would revert back to the arms of government. In addition, a bill of rights would be required in order to ensure human rights – particularly those of women.

## **HORN OF AFRICA**

### *Djibouti*

President Ismael Omar Guelleh announced the introduction of multi-party politics in Djibouti. The announcement coincided with the 10th anniversary of the country's constitution, which was celebrated on 4 September 2002. The country has moved from a one-party state – when the Popular Rally for Progress (PRP) ruled the nation – to the inclusion of three more parties in 1992. In future, all parties will be recognised, subject to the interior minister's approval.

West African states have taken positive steps towards multi-party elections, and broader-based parliamentary participation. Concerns have been raised regarding restrictions on the media, open political participation, and political rights and freedoms, as well as constitutional reform procedures. 





UN peacekeeping has been a very specific and limited form of treatment for only a fraction of the world's armed conflicts

UNITED NATIONS

BY JEAN-MARIE GUEHENNO

# united nations peacekeeping

**T**he United Nations (UN) has run 54 peacekeeping operations since 1948. That amounts to an average of one new operation per year.

Today, there are 15 UN peacekeeping operations throughout the globe: four in Africa, six in Asia and the Middle East, three in the Balkans, one in Georgia and one in Cyprus. Combined, these operations consist of more than 46,000 military and civilian police personnel contributed by member states and more than 4,000 international civilian personnel and 9,000 local staff recruited by the UN.

The question is have all 54 of these operations – including the 15 operations now in existence – ‘succeeded’? The answer to this question varies greatly,

depending upon how you interpret the question.

One interpretation of the question might be whether UN peacekeeping has managed to reduce the incidence of major armed conflict. Such an interpretation would be like trying to evaluate the effectiveness of insulin on the reduction of all diseases known to humankind. This obviously would be nonsensical, as insulin is intended to assist those suffering from diabetes – it is not supposed to cure AIDS, or even the common cold. Similarly, UN peacekeeping has been, and remains, a very specific and limited form of treatment for only a fraction of the world's armed conflicts in the post-World War II era, as a brief examination of the past 50 years of UN peacekeeping demonstrates.



## THE FIRST GENERATION OF TRADITIONAL UN PKOs

Whether or not a UN peacekeeping operation is to be undertaken is decided by the 15 members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). During the first 40 years of UN peacekeeping – between 1948 and 1988 – the operations were generally not deployed in response to civil wars. Instead, they were largely restricted to the interposition of unarmed observers (or lightly armed peacekeepers) between warring states, but only once three *sine quo non* conditions had been met: firstly, that a ceasefire agreement was in place, secondly, that the parties to the conflict concerned had fully consented to their deployment and thirdly, that the Western and Soviet blocs had agreed on the need for third party involvement, in the form of the UN, to which they both belonged.

The unarmed observers, or lightly armed peacekeepers, would occupy buffer zones between the warring armies. These peacekeepers were not equipped (or mandated) to fight fire with fire. Rather, they simply observed and reported


impartially on the violations of the ceasefire agreement. Their mere symbolic presence raised the political costs of one or more of those armies violating the agreement – thus buying a bit more time and breathing room for the possibility of diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing the underlying causes of the conflict.

On the subject of ‘success’, the question is therefore not if the operations were successful, but if the parties concerned were successful in taking advantage of the breathing room and time afforded to them by the international community. Did those countries that had influence on them exert such influence to maximum advantage? These traditional peacekeeping operations were, and continue to be designed as only one element of a broader political strategy aimed at helping resolve a conflict.

## THE SECOND GENERATION OF UN PEACEKEEPING: THE EARLY 1990s

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new generation of multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations. Their presence was no longer merely

Army troops listen to their commander at Bangladesh's Zia International Airport, prior to joining UNAMSIL



JEWEL SAMAD/AFP

symbolic, or restricted to an ‘eyes and ears’ role. Rather, their job evolved to include implementing comprehensive peace agreements signed between former protagonists of protracted civil wars.

Tens of thousands of military, police and civilian peacekeepers found themselves treating deep-rooted sources of wars within such states as Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique. At the height of UN peacekeeping in 1993, more than 70,000 troops were wearing Blue Helmets in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. This boom in peacekeeping precipitated the 1992 creation of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which is now observing its 10-year anniversary.

By and large, the initial UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations of the late 1980s and early 1990s were very successful, insofar as they provided a vehicle for the people of El Salvador and Mozambique (for example) to travel down the path to self-sustaining peace. Almost a decade has now past since the UN concluded its missions in both countries, and they are both still at peace, working hard to strengthen their democratic institutions.

### **THE SETBACKS OF THE MID-1990s: SOMALIA, RWANDA AND BOSNIA**

Unfortunately, the early successes of the initial post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations – including the more ‘robust’ ones – gave rise to false expectations that UN peacekeeping could be a panacea for most of the world’s conflicts. As a result, UN peacekeepers were also deployed to places like Somalia and the former-Yugoslavia, where no peace agreements – or even durable ceasefire agreements – were in place, and where there was no real consent for the peacekeepers’ presence.

In 1994, the international community stood by as hundreds of thousands of Rwandans became victims of genocide. The member states’ political will was absent to substantially reinforce the meagerly equipped and relatively small UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda – to a large extent the political will was absent because the memories of Mogadishu were still very fresh.

And so, by 1996, almost 50 years of UN peacekeeping was suddenly seen through the sole perspective of three tragic experiences: Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. Instead of recalling the recent ‘successes’ of Namibia, El Salvador and Mozambique, many were now understandably questioning the viability and utility of UN peacekeeping altogether.

### **1996 TO 1998: RETRENCHMENT AND TRENDS TOWARDS REGIONALISATION**

A period of retrenchment in UN peacekeeping operations then ensued between 1996 and 1998, and the notion of ‘regionalising’ peacekeeping tasks gained prominence. At the end of 1995 and at the beginning of 1996, NATO deployed a 60,000-strong peacekeeping force to Bosnia, with the ultimate aim of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. The deployment was undertaken at a time when the last shots of the war had been fired three months earlier. In contrast, UNPROFOR – in the midst of a full-blown war – was only about half the size, and not even half as well equipped.

Chapter 8 of the UN Charter explicitly encourages cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. It also supports the maintenance of international peace and security. Furthermore, NATO is better suited to take on certain peacekeeping tasks than the UN.

However, the problem is that there are no NATO equivalents in Africa, or anywhere else in the world. It is a misnomer to talk about regional vs. UN peacekeeping, because it implies that all regional organisations and their peacekeeping capacities are monolithic. They are not, as we observed from ECOWAS’s peacekeeping activities in West Africa.

The other impediment to the regionalisation of peacekeeping tasks is that, sometimes, the regional players are part of the problem, either because they are a party to the conflict and/or are fueling it in one way or another.

### **A PERIOD OF RESURGENCY: 1999 TO THE PRESENT**

The recognition of these realities, as well as the fact that no organisation, other than the UN, had yet developed certain civilian and policing capacities, led to a resurgence in UN peacekeeping activity in 1999 and early 2000. We were faced with taking over the peacekeeping tasks from ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, and then launched a major new operation in the Congo, followed by the interposition of UN peacekeepers – in the ‘classic sense’ – between Eritrea and Ethiopia. A brief look at the case of Sierra Leone is worthwhile.

**SIERRA LEONE (UNAMSIL)**

Sierra Leone is one of the poorest countries on the planet, and during the past decade, its people have been victim to mass killings, torture, rape and mutilation. On 22 October 1999, the UNSC authorised the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone. No less than 6,000 military personnel – including 260 military observers – were sent to assist the government and other parties in carrying out the provisions of the Lome Peace Agreement. However, it soon became clear that the rebels were not going to abide by the agreement, and were not going to disarm. The UN peacekeeping force was neither sufficiently strong in size, nor properly configured and/or equipped to pose a credible military deterrent to them. By May 2000, the mission was in crisis, with hundreds of peacekeepers having been taken hostage.

Fortunately, the crisis did not lead to the mission being terminated. Rather, it served as a catalyst for the international community to take drastic steps in order to ensure that it did not fail. The UNSC authorised an increase of troops to 17,500. The force underwent a major management

overhaul, and adopted a clear strategy for its phased deployment throughout the country. In parallel, the United Kingdom (UK) deployed crack troops at a critical juncture, which sent the important signal that UNAMSIL would not be abandoned in the face of crisis. The UK also stepped up its efforts to train the national army and police. Pressure was simultaneously applied on Liberia, thus weakening the rebels' access to assistance. In addition, Guinea dealt the rebels a decisive military blow on the Sierra Leone-Guinea border.

With this backdrop, it is remarkable that in May of this year, millions of Sierra Leoneans went to the polls to elect a national government – for the first time in six years. The elections passed without any violence, and without any major irregularities or fraud. Meanwhile, the disarmament process has been completed, with about 70,000 fighters having demobilised and laid down their arms. For the first time, the people of Sierra Leone have a reason to be hopeful and believe that peace is attainable.

Certainly, many risks remain. Government structures are still weak; the reintegration of ex-combatants has been very slow, and has been

Moroccan UN trucks, loaded with humanitarian aid, get ready at Kigali airport in Rwanda. They will go to the DRC the UN begins distributing food aid.



MARCO LONGARI/APP



ANTHONY MORLAND/AFP

plagued by a lack of adequate resources, the government has yet to regain full control over the diamond mining, the army and police do not yet have the capacity to take over responsibility for the security of the country from UNAMSIL and the escalating conflict in Liberia constitutes an ominous threat.

Consequently, the continued presence of a significant UN peacekeeping force will be necessary in order to consolidate peace. During this period, the government should make significant strides towards regaining full control of the country's national resources. It must also strengthen state authority throughout the country and address the root causes of the conflict, including corruption and unemployment.

### WHAT MAKES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE?

Given the challenges, the decision to deploy a peace operation is not an easy one, as there are risks involved which must be weighed carefully. In so doing, one must note that the prospects for a successful peace operation are maximised when a number of key factors are in place. A total of 10 factors are critical, and can make the difference between the success or failure of an operation:

*First*, the international community must make sure that it has correctly diagnosed the problem before prescribing peacekeeping treatment. Peacekeeping is not the same thing as war-fighting or enforcement. If the latter is required, then the UN is not the right organisation to run such operations;

*Second*, the majority – if not all of the key parties to the conflict – must have reached the conclusion that they cannot achieve their objectives through military means, and thus are willing to stop fighting;

*Third*, all the key parties to the conflict must consent to the UN's role in helping them resolve their dispute;

*Fourth*, members of the UNSC – its permanent members in particular – have to agree on the desired outcome of the operation, and ensure it's a clear mandate;

*Fifth*, members of the UNSC have to ensure that the mandate is achievable. By achievable, I mean that you cannot say the operation will protect thousands of civilians from slaughter, with only a lightly armed battalion on the ground. By achievable, I also mean that you cannot authorise a mission with tens of thousands of troops, if you know that member states will not then come forward with sufficiently trained and equipped troops (or will not agree to pay for them);

Two United Nations peacekeepers watch the ceremonial burning in Kinshasa of more than 1 000 weapons used by forces from Rwanda



*Sixth*, speed of deployment is often critical. The credibility of an operation can be lost at the outset, if the troops, police, civilian personnel and/or money required trickles in a piecemeal fashion;

*Seventh*, the peacekeeping operation must be treated as part of an overall strategy aimed at resolving a conflict. This requires a myriad of political, economic, developmental, human rights and humanitarian efforts to be conducted in parallel;

*Eighth*, many of today's conflicts must be seen from a regional perspective. What happens in Liberia impacts upon the prospects of peace in Sierra Leone. Similarly, the Congo is greatly affected by developments within the entire Great Lakes Region. Consequently, political and economic attention must be stepped up within the region or sub-region concerned, in order to ensure that the progress made in the country to which the operation has deployed does not get undermined by problems across its borders;

*Ninth*, the international community has to be prepared to stay the course. The wounds of war rarely heal overnight, particularly when so much blood has been shed. It takes time for former

warring factions to regain each other's trust;

*Tenth*, international civil servants who work for the UN – whether in the field or at headquarters – have to perform the tasks entrusted to them with professionalism, competence and integrity.

## PEACEKEEPING REFORM: THE SREBRENICA, RWANDA AND BRAHIMI REPORTS

The fact remains that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations is a relatively young department. Immediately following its creation, the few hundred staff were working around the clock to manage (simultaneously) mammoth crises on several fronts. They were understaffed, overstretched and under immense scrutiny from member states, the press, and non-governmental organisations.

Unfortunately, the decline in UN peacekeeping activity during the latter part of the 1990s was accompanied by a downsizing of the department's professional workforce – it was reduced by nearly

Soldiers of the UN  
peacekeeping force in  
Sierra Leone  
(UNAMSIL) stand at  
a checkpoint as  
local women pass  
by in Freetown





ALEXANDER JOE/AP

25 percent. By 1999, just as the aforementioned downsizing had been effected, the department was hit with a three to four-fold increase in activity.

Both 1999 and 2000 represented key turning points for DPKO, and there were several reasons for this. Firstly, the resurgence of UN peacekeeping activity drove the point home that the need for UN peacekeeping remained very much alive. It also made clear to the membership that some key investments needed to be made in order to strengthen the UN's peacekeeping capacities over the long-term. However, secretary-general, Kofi Annan, realised that before seeking such investments from member states, there had to be a clear road map detailing where the organisation was heading. Furthermore, that road map had to begin with a clear understanding of what had gone wrong in the past.

Consequently, at the end of 1999, he issued a major report describing the events leading to the Fall of Srebrenica. He accepted – and made public – the findings of an externally commissioned report on the genocide in Rwanda. Both reports are

important documents in the history of UN peacekeeping, because of their level of candor, self-criticism and precision in identifying what was meant by the 'UN's shortcomings'. The fact is that members of the UNSC are 'the UN'. The 189 member states of the General Assembly are 'the UN'. The secretary-general and the international civil servants of the UN secretariat – of which DPKO is a part – are 'the UN'. In addition, the military, civilian police and civilian experts in the field are 'the UN' too. The Srebrenica and Rwanda reports helped to clarify that each of the constituent parts of the UN bear responsibility for the success and/or failure of an operation.

These two reports were then followed by the issuance of the Brahimi Report in August 2001. That report contained 57 explicit recommendations for the UNSC, the General Assembly, member states, the UN secretariat and peacekeepers in the field.

The 10 factors that contribute to the success of an operation (noted earlier) very much encapsulate the spirit of the Brahimi Report's recommendations.

UN soldiers hold a defensive position during a patrol in the south western Kibeho refugee camp where 2000 Hutus are held as hostages in a school and hospital complex



A UN officer walks in front of the MONUC headquarters that were looted in Goma

The report also focused a great deal on the subject of performance, highlighting the need for greater care and attention to be paid in the selection of mission leadership, as well as the quality and speed of recruitment of international civilian peacekeepers. It called for a greater delegation of authority to the field, and cautioned against micro-management from headquarters. It placed considerable emphasis on measures aimed at enhancing rapid deployment, including the establishment of a strategic reserve of equipment at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. It noted that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations would need more staff in order to effect many of these enhancements. At the same time, it stated that any request for more staff should be informed by an objective management review. Finally, it nonetheless cautioned that all of these enhancements would still not change the fact that there would remain many cases where UN

peacekeepers should not go, as they would be ill-suited for the job, or the conditions for success simply would not exist.

### IS UN PEACEKEEPING WORTH THE INVESTMENT?

The horrific 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States made all of us reconsider the state of the world – and its conflicts. Afghanistan has been engulfed in war for the last 23 years. This war-stricken state provided fertile ground for the seeds of terror to be sown. The breakdown of the rule of law also enabled poppy fields to be harvested in staggering numbers, making Afghanistan one of the world's leading suppliers of heroine. Consequently, preventing failed states from emerging – or helping to re-build those that have collapsed – is an



investment in the promotion of global stability and security.

Of course, not all states engulfed in war end up serving as a safe-haven for terrorist groups. They nonetheless have the potential to wreak havoc within any region or sub-region of the globe, as millions of refugees pour across borders, destabilising neighbouring countries which might be in the early and painful stages of democratisation and institution-building. Indeed, the conflict in the DRC has affected several sub-Saharan countries, and it threatens the stability of much of the African continent as a whole.

Such instability prevents many poor countries from harnessing the means – and in some cases, the rich natural resources – to lift themselves out of poverty, forcing them to continue to rely on billions of dollars in foreign aid.

There are ample reasons for the international community to try and resolve these conflicts, and UN peacekeeping operations have the specific tools required to end them – provided the conditions for its success exist. As an investment, UN-led peacekeeping operations – as opposed to those conducted by ad-hoc coalitions – have the distinct advantage of a built-in mechanism, which enables their costs – in terms of money, material and personnel – to be shared globally. By contrast, a few (or just one) countries end up shouldering the entire burden of sustaining operations run by ad-hoc coalitions, as was the case for the US-led MNF in Haiti, or the Australian-led INTERFET in East Timor. These operations were deployed more quickly (and in force) than a UN peacekeeping operation. However, they were eventually handed over to the UN when the immediate crisis had been stabilised.

Furthermore, some of the UN peacekeeping operations – the ‘traditional’ ones in particular – do not cost that much financially (in relative terms), nor is their utility restricted to the African continent.

Take, for example, the long-standing conflict in Cyprus. Some might question the utility of keeping the UN peacekeeping operation there for the last three decades. However, the fact remains that UNFICYP costs a little more than US\$40 million per year – of which nearly half is paid for by Cyprus and Greece. The US\$20 million per year is a relatively modest insurance premium for keeping this conflict from further exacerbating tensions between key NATO allies. UNFICYP’s presence has yet to be accompanied by a political settlement to the dispute. However, it has helped to avert war for more than a quarter of a century.

## WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES THAT REMAIN?

Firstly, we have to recognise that by being more judicious in the decision to deploy an operation, we run the risk of providing an excuse for abdicating responsibility entirely. There are inherent risks in peacekeeping, and we must be prepared to assume some of them to a reasonable degree. That having been said, we will still be faced with difficult choices and ‘grey-zone’ cases, where the conditions for success are not 100 percent. The choices are all the harder when faced with the prospect of having to do business with some despicable characters, who have been responsible for the ruin of their country and the needless deaths of thousands. While we can fully subscribe to the notion of ‘no peace without justice’, we must also remain cognisant of the harsh realities that often a war-weary population wants justice – but not at the cost of peace.

Secondly, one of the ways of mitigating risks is by deploying with staggering and overwhelming force. However, we do not have this at our disposal. There is a dwindling supply of properly trained and equipped troops to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, even when the political will to get involved is there. Many armies around the world are downsizing, yet they are faced with competing demands to participate in enforcement operations – such as the coalition’s campaign in Afghanistan – or in other UN-mandated operations run by regional organisations and arrangements – such as SFOR and KFOR in the Balkans. There is a severe commitment gap, which precludes deployment with overwhelming strength, and threatens our ability to pose an even reasonably credible military deterrent in certain circumstances.

Thirdly, countries in the developing world are presently filling the gap. Our top contributors now come from countries like India, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Bangladesh, rather than from Europe, which had provided the lion’s share of UN peacekeepers during the last 50 years. However, the current contributors, in heeding the call from the West for ‘burden-sharing’, want greater ‘power-sharing’ in the UNSC’s decision-making. Since their personnel are taking the risks on the ground, they understandably would like to have a greater say in the crafting of the mandates for these operations. Consequently, there is a need to strike the right balance between respecting the prerogatives of the UNSC members, on the one hand, and the



Children heading to Freetown pass by a Jordanian soldier of the United Nations mission in Sierra Leone

legitimate interests of the troop contributing countries, on the other. Furthermore, many of the current contributors are saying that they may diminish their future participation, unless the industrialised countries demonstrate their willingness to deploy their troops to UN peacekeeping operations too.

Fourth, the provision of international troops is only one part of the equation. The long-term requirement in most of these situations is to help establish national security structures capable of maintaining peace, law and order, once the international peacekeeping operation has withdrawn. Most donors have severe restrictions on the provision of financial aid for national militaries. This money is vital, as we now see in Afghanistan. Many of the countries emerging from war simply lack the funds to pay the newly recruited soldiers and police – even US\$1 per day is stretching it. Furthermore, the UN does not train and equip national armies, and there are few countries in the world that have the experience and capacity to do so.

Fifth, effective peacekeeping often needs to include, or be accompanied by, a wide range of peace-building related tasks that have still not received enough attention. This is particularly true with regard to the promotion of good governance and measures to curb corruption, a respect for and adherence to the rule of law and human rights (especially for vulnerable groups), attention to gender issues and the inclusion of women in the peace

process and assistance with the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions.

To conclude, UN peacekeeping is a specific form of treatment that should be applied to only a portion of the world's conflicts. When UN peacekeeping operations are deployed at the right time, in the right circumstances, with the resources commensurate to the tasks assigned, and with the necessary political and economic support, they can make a significant contribution to promoting a stable, secure and peaceful world. **E**

## Endnote

- \* This is an version of an address delivered by Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at the Better World Campaign in Washington, DC on 12 June 2002.
- 2 UN. 2000. 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,' Report of the Secretary-General to the 55th Session of the General Assembly, A/55/502, 20 October 2000, United Nations: New York.

A profile of prominent  
peacekeeping centres in Africa



BY NICKY HITCHCOCK

CAPACITY BUILDING

# building capacity for African Peacekeeping

**T**he United Nations (UN) secretary-general, Kofi Annan, expressed concern for African security in his November 1995 report entitled 'Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa'. In it, he suggested Africa 'should seriously endeavour to develop and enhance its capacity to participate in the field of peacekeeping'. The report was released in the wake of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when little international response to the crisis was received. Added to this, African governments and armies were besieged with challenges due to a lack of experienced personnel, insufficient material resources and a slow deployment of troops. Consequently, Annan appealed to the international

community to help enhance the capacity of African peacekeepers. According to the report, 'the most important element of any peacekeeping operation on the ground is trained and adequately equipped personnel'.

During the African peacekeeping training strategy session held on 26 May 1998 at the UN headquarters, a plan to improve the training capacity of African nations was proposed. One of the long-term goals of the strategy involves the need to develop regional training institutions and joint peacekeeping exercises, as well as partnerships between countries whose contingents require equipment and donors. Added to this, the report from the panel on UN peace operations<sup>1</sup> identified



and addressed the problems with UN peacekeeping missions – problems that individual governments and regional organisations should take heed of. The secretary-general's report of March 2001 – which focused on the protection of civilians in armed conflict – also encouraged governments, in their individual and collective capacities, to pay more attention to aspects that would positively influence the protection of civilians during armed conflict. In part – and as a response to these developments – a number of peacekeeping training centres have been established throughout Africa, which respond to and address some of the issues raised in these reports and sessions. These centres have developed very ambitious objectives for themselves, and although they are not all fully developed and functioning, they are an encouraging development in the quest to improve Africa's capacity to participate in peacekeeping. This article offers a brief profile of some of the most prominent peacekeeping training centres in Africa, as well as the work they are involved in.

### THE ZAMBAKRO PEACEKEEPING SCHOOL – COTE D'IVOIRE

Under the authority of the Ivorian Army Chief of Staff, Zambakro is made up of two sections: namely a National Centre and an International Centre. The International Centre is the peacekeeping school. The Peacekeeping School of Zambakro was established and inaugurated on 7 June 1999. It acts as one of the three pillars of the French concept RECAMP (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities). The aim is to enable African soldiers to participate in international, regional and sub-regional peacekeeping

operations. Introduced in 1997, the French RECAMP concept responded to its African partners' desire to enhance their capacity in order to prevent conflict in Africa. It also came about as a result of the observations and recommendations which appeared in the secretary-general's 1995 Report. RECAMP entails providing instruction, training and partial equipment for an African peacekeeping capability at a sub-regional level, together with the aid of donor countries. A significant portion of RECAMP's Ffr 200 million (US\$32 million) annual budget has gone towards Zambakro. The peacekeeping school consists of a command and communications centre, classrooms and mess halls. Zambakro's mission is 'to provide Africa with executives and military African experts perfectly trained to be involved in peacekeeping operations planned by international organisations under the mandate of the UN'.

Zambakro accepts students from throughout Africa. The school has Ivorian and French instructors, and other instructors from around Africa are regularly invited to participate in training. They instruct officials and military officers – of captain's rank and above – in international humanitarian and human rights law, logistics, communications, intelligence-gathering, codes of conduct, rules of negotiation, civil affairs and the role of military observers. Battalion- and brigade-level headquarters training concentrates on operational matters such as area control, logistics, relations within the chain of command and language training in operational English. Having observed and learnt from the previous limitations of African governments and militaries to adequately translate their commitment to peacekeeping through logistical provision, the school includes logistical training in their curriculum.



Zambakro offers three separate courses: a Multinational Brigade-level HQ Staff Officers Course, a Battalion-level HQ Staff Officers Course, and a Military Observer Officers Training Course. Since the date of its first course in August 1999, the Peacekeeping School of Zambakro has conducted 13 Military Observer courses, eight Staff Officers Courses and four Training-of-Trainers Courses. Courses include modules focusing on the UN structure, as well as UN philosophy regarding peacekeeping, de-mining, refugees and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).

The school has also responded well to courses organised by other role players, including the sub-regional body known as the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS). It also co-hosted a course on the rights of children during armed conflict – this was done in collaboration with Save the Children, and took place in Sweden in June 2000. By November 2001, more than 400 officers from 33 countries had graduated from the school.

Furthermore, the school has also played host to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training and Assistance Team. A course, entitled the '13th United Nations Training Assistance Team (UNTAT) Peacekeeping Training Course', was conducted from 20 May to 7 June, 2002. It was undertaken by the DPKO Training and Evaluation Service (TES), as well as the Pearson

Peacekeeping Centre, and was supported by the governments of Cote d'Ivoire and France. The TES was responsible for the UN sphere of the course, while the Pearson Centre conducted the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) aspect, as well as the CIMIC elements. Zambakro is possibly the most prominent French peacekeeping training centre in Africa.<sup>2</sup>

## THE CAIRO CENTRE FOR TRAINING ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA (CCCPA) – EGYPT

The CCCPA was established in 1995, and aims to qualify specialised African corps in predicting, managing and solving crises in Africa. Its courses are attended by senior military officers and diplomats, as well as other military officers. Although the courses cater specifically for African participants, the centre has a policy of diversifying its resource person base from other countries on the continent and beyond – including representatives



from the UN and OAU. The focus and methodology of the courses are not exclusively academic in nature. They are, in fact, mostly geared towards experiential learning.

The uniqueness of the Cairo centre lies in the fact that it combines training in peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy within a single course, although the focus varies depending on the composition of the trainees and their training needs. The CCCPA's intention is to train 200 students on four courses each year. The aim is also to bring together students from both Francophone and Anglophone countries. The idea is that they attend the same courses, with a view to enhancing cooperation, while at the same time providing the identical level and amount of training to both linguistic constituencies on the continent. The centre is also developing cooperative arrangements with other peacekeeping/conflict resolution institutions throughout the continent (and beyond) in an effort to ensure its outputs meet world standards. There is a protocol between the ministries of foreign affairs and defence that requires the capacities of both ministries to be utilised for the presentation of courses.

Courses offered include an advanced course in Peacekeeping Operations for Senior Officers, a training session on Preventive Diplomacy, a UN Training-of-Trainers Course and a Military Observers Course. The curriculum includes aspects such as preventive diplomacy, peace-building, disarmament, peacekeeping, conflict analysis, negotiation and humanitarian law. The CCCPA operates in cooperation with the OAU/AU, as well as with African and international centres of similar activities.<sup>3</sup>





### KOFI ANNAN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTRE – GHANA

Ghana is perceived to possess much peacekeeping experience, with its peacekeepers having served in many peacekeeping missions. Ghanaians have served in 29 UN peacekeeping operations. They also served as part of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It was on this basis that Ghana conceived of establishing a centre of excellence in 1998. The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) was established in order for the country to share its experience and expertise with the rest of Africa.

Training provided at the centre has a specialist nature, as it provides core skills training in peace support operations (PSO) for units and selected participants. Courses available include a Core Skills Course for junior officers and SNCOs, a Military Observer Course, a Military Police Course, a Logistics Course and a Staff Officer's Training Course.

At the inaugural meeting of the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission in July 2000, the Ghana centre was designated as one ECOWAS' Monitoring Observer Group Standby Units – there is only one other training establishment in the sub-region that has been assigned this responsibility. At the commissioning, Kofi Annan remarked that 'Africa needs well-trained and well-equipped peacekeepers to meet the challenge of the crisis in Africa... outside governments are exploring ways to help Africans improve their peacekeeping capacity... I believe this centre can play an important role in facilitating such assistance. I trust that donor countries will seize this opportunity to provide the necessary support, so that Ghana's vast experience in peacekeeping is used to the benefit of Africa and, ultimately, to the cause of world peace'. With this

support and linkage to the sub-regional body, the centre will play a crucial role in facilitating the cross-fertilisation of peacekeeping experiences gleaned from a fertile peacekeeping-oriented region.<sup>4</sup>

### SADC REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTRE (RPTC)

Southern Africa, like most of Africa, is faced with both economic and political problems, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has evolved in such a way that its purpose is now to address some of these issues. Under the auspices of the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), the SADC aims to achieve regional security cooperation, and its operations sub-committee aims to enhance cooperation among members within the area – the ultimate aim is to



create effective peacekeeping capacity within the region. A regional peacekeeping capacity in southern Africa has always been considered an important facet in order for the sub-region to contribute to resolving its problems.

It has been recognised that training cooperation between forces in southern Africa is an essential element in order to enhance peacekeeping capacities. It would also enable the region to respond more quickly and effectively to conflicts. In the background of a number of training cooperation endeavours, a SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) was established in Harare in 1997, with Danish funding. On 14 May 1997, the governments of Denmark and Zimbabwe signed an agreement, which resulted in Denmark funding most of the activities at the centre. The RPTC has been the most advanced peacekeeping centre. It has run the most courses and is the only centre that has official legal regional status. The mission of the RPTC is to study the theory and practice of peace

support operations, and to coordinate peace support training within the SADC region, as mandated by the ISDSC. During the first three years, part of the Danish funding was allocated to the actual construction of a centre building, which consists of an auditorium, syndicate rooms and office facilities. The building was completed in mid-1999, when the RPTC was disengaged from the Zimbabwe Staff College.

The RPTC conducts several typical peacekeeping courses, intended not only for officers of all ranks and functions, but also for civilians. Courses include UN modules designed for military observers, staff officers, commanders, company commanders, and logistics officers. A UN Trainers Course is also offered. Besides the UN courses, an ACCORD Advanced Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers, a peacekeeping workshop for specialist officers and civilians, and a training seminar with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research have also been conducted. The courses have the capacity to instruct 40-50 participants. However, the presentation of UN courses is the main activity of the RPTC. Since 1995, this activity has constantly expanded from one annual course in 1995, to seven in 2001. During the centre's first phase (1995-1999), 12 courses were organised and 520 people were trained – all of whom were from SADC countries, as well as other African countries. Since November 2000, the RPTC has run four courses, having trained 135 students in total. In the spirit of

regional cooperation, the staff compliment at the centre includes officers from the broad spectrum of SADC member states. By maintaining a 'clearing house' function, the RPTC keeps a record of all persons who have attended training. It also keeps a record of other peacekeeping activities within the region. One of the immediate objectives of the RPTC is to assist in the planning of any SADC peacekeeping formation. It also assists in the formulation of SADC peace support exercises. The RPTC has contributed to the planning, preparation and execution of two multinational peacekeeping exercises within the region.<sup>5</sup>

### PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTRE, DEFENCE STAFF COLLEGE – KENYA

The Defence Staff College of Kenya plays host to the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC), which was established in August 2001. Kenya has extensive experience in peacekeeping, and the PSTC aims to contribute to East African peacekeeping capacity, as well as peacekeeping capacity elsewhere. After Nigeria, Kenya is currently the second largest troop contributing country in Africa. To date, Kenya has contributed to 17 UN peace operations in Africa and abroad.

In their peacekeeping training, emphasis is placed on providing troops with a thorough



knowledge of the environment and background to a conflict prior to deployment. The importance of training the military in human rights is also emphasised. Consequently, International Humanitarian Law is built into all training programmes, at all levels. Dedicated peace operations training consists of approximately three months pre-deployment training for all units and personnel. The emphasis is on re-orientation, impartiality, negotiation and mediation.


The PSTC's vision is to provide the East African community with a regional school for the training of peacekeepers. The PSTC has international cooperation from the UN, as well as from the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Its mandate is to train senior military officers, from throughout Africa, in peacekeeping missions. The centre hosts 40 students at a time, with the focus being on mid-level officers responsible for training their units. Courses offered at the PSTC include a PSO Foundation Seminar, a Military Observers Course, a Staff Officers Course and an advanced programme for all ranks of officers, from lieutenant colonels to brigadiers. According to commander of the staff college, Major General Julius Karange, 'the goal is to prepare young officers for peacekeeping missions and to standardise training across armies. The purpose of the courses on offer is to concentrate on becoming a UN-certified centre of excellence for training in the region'.<sup>6</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The responsibility to respond to conflict, and maintain global peace and security, is one of the key challenges facing members of the international community, particularly in Africa. The change in gear – towards emphasising and relying on a sub-regional response – is more relevant to this era of African responses to conflict. The inauguration of the African Union (AU), and the conceptual and policy focus on sub-regional organisations undertaking most conflict management efforts, is evidence of this reality. Without a doubt, the centres outlined above will form the operational basis for Africa's response to this reality.

Besides the specific peacekeeping training centres mentioned previously, most other countries in Africa also conduct peacekeeping training within their departments of defence. Some even include it in the general training of their defence forces at their respective staff colleges.

For example, pre-deployment training for peace operations is conducted in Botswana, under the authority of the Botswana Defence Force. In Nigeria, a Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution (CPRCR) was developed in 1996, and operates out of the National War College. The syllabus includes a profile of the mission and host country, briefings on the customs of the host country, a general introduction to the UN's agencies and its peacekeeping philosophy, mine awareness; and rules of engagement. Training courses for personnel – aimed at preparing them for UN peacekeeping operations – are also conducted by Ethiopia, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa and Zambia.

The involvement and support of individual governments, through a patronage of sub-regional peace centres, is indicative of the indispensable role they could play in shaping and responding to the peacekeeping needs of sub-regions. Striving for human security, building the capacity to focus on small arms non-proliferation, dealing with child soldiers, tackling the issues of gender and peacekeeping, protecting human rights – all these subjects are central to the ongoing development of these centres. 

## Endnote

\* Nicky Hitchcock is the Programme Officer for the Peacekeeping Programme at ACCORD.

1. Known as the Brahimi Report, released in August
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Norway's contribution to a coherent approach to peace-building, crisis management and conflict prevention

NORWAY

BY JON BECH

# Norway's role

## in supporting capacity-building in Africa

**O**ver the past seven years, Norway has made a major contribution to the development of peacekeeping and peace-building in southern Africa through the Training for Peace (TfP) Programme. The southern Africa TfP was launched by Norway in 1995, following consultations with the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and regional governments.

The programme is aimed at developing regional cooperation within the southern African region. Norway has helped stimulate the emergence of a substantive training and research capacity within the region through cooperation with, and financial support to, its two southern African partners – the

African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). This has been underpinned by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), which has acted as coordinator of the programme.

Under the TfP, a substantial pool of personnel (particularly civilians) have been trained and are prepared to contribute to peace operations. These individuals have been trained both in southern Africa and Norway. A database of personnel is being created so that a ready pool of qualified personnel can be deployed rapidly when required. Work on a peacekeeping manual is also being undertaken. The TfP is contributing to the creation of a local capacity within the SADC region aimed at reacting to conflicts and other challenges within

the area. It is also contributing to human security and development.

The TFP has undertaken policy work and research on a broad range of peacekeeping and peace-building issues, including doctrine, regional capacities in peacekeeping, justice, policing, security-sector reform and development. Findings from this research have been fed into policy debates and training within the region, thus further contributing to the development of an African capacity in this field.

The importance Norway attaches to the TFP, as well as to the enhancement of regional capacities within the SADC region, has been demonstrated by the recent projected extension of the programme for another four years. This commitment has been backed by Norway's determination to keep the challenges facing Africa on the international agenda during its membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In October 2000, Norway was elected by the General Assembly to serve a two-year term, which started on 1 January 2001.

Now, more than ever, Norway believes it is vital to keep in the spotlight the challenges that face the African continent. Opportunities are emerging through mechanisms such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU), as well as the strengthening of the SADC. These mechanism can begin to address some of the complex challenges that face the continent. However, it will be hard to overcome them without external support. Norway believes that the TFP could make a major contribution in assisting Africa to help itself.

## CAPACITY-BUILDING IN AFRICA

Looking to the future, it is clear that there are some critical challenges which will have to be grappled with in order for a state of security and development to be achieved on the continent. These include a need to strengthen peacekeeping capacities, a need to create the ability to act more preventively, the challenge of how to deal with the impact of small arms, the need to protect civilians more effectively from the impact of conflict, the challenge of how to deal with terrorism and the problem of refining conceptualisations regarding security and peace-building, so that they take into account the root causes of conflict and the complex nature of civil conflicts. With regard to the aforementioned challenges, the TFP will be a key pillar

of support in terms of investigating, researching and training during the next four years.

### *Strengthening peacekeeping and peace operations*

One of Norway's main goals has been to strengthen the UN's peacekeeping and peacemaking role in Africa. Another objective has been to strengthen African regional organisations, with a view to ensuring that African countries themselves – in close cooperation with the UN – can assume a greater share of the responsibility for preventing and resolving conflicts on the continent.

Norway will keep up its efforts aimed at influencing the international community to provide adequate resources so that African countries (and African organisations) can play a more central role in peacekeeping. We must seek to ensure that the nations of Africa have at least the same opportunities as others to take responsibility for peace and security on their own continent

Norway believes that peacekeeping in Africa needs strengthening, and sees the Brahimi Report on UN peace operations as providing an excellent road map for improving peacekeeping capacities. Norway plans to follow the report's recommendations in its future work. If peacekeeping is to make any headway, it will require clear goals and mandates. In addition, it must be ensured that peacekeeping mandates are appropriately formulated in order to fit the contexts to which they are applied.

Also, adequate resources must be provided. The UNSC should not initiate operations without adequate preparations being undertaken, including the organisation of sufficient numbers of peacekeepers and related resources.

Finally, the involvement of the UN in peacekeeping operations should run seamlessly, from preventive measures and peace operations, right through to post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building.

Norway remains firmly committed to UN peacekeeping. More than 1,200 Norwegian soldiers are serving in UN-mandated peace operations today. Almost one percent of Norway's total civilian police force now serve in international peace operations. In fact, the role of civilian police in peace operations is especially important, particularly given the increasing priority assigned to civil aspects of peace operations – hence current efforts within the TFP to train police to participate in peace operations.

### ***African capacities and conflict prevention***

It is vital that the challenges of Africa remain in the spotlight, and that the mechanisms are in place to act before conflicts erupt or escalate. Too often in the past, the international community has been reactive in Africa.

During its time with the UNSC, it has been Norway's priority to help develop more effective means of preventing and resolving conflicts in Africa. In recent years, nearly two-thirds of the matters dealt with by the UNSC have been related to issues involving the African continent.

Norway welcomed the secretary-general's report on conflict prevention (S/2001/274) and shares his vision regarding the need to move the UN system from a 'culture of reaction to a culture of prevention'. The report's observation – that 'most of the factors that stopped the UN intervening to prevent genocide in Rwanda remain present today' – is something that Norway finds deeply disturbing. The report provides a clear rationale for why conflict prevention must continue to be high on the UNSC's agenda. There is a need to act more decisively in order to address looming conflicts, where the UN can work in concert with regional organisations and initiatives. Too often the signs of escalating conflict have been clear to the international community, but no action has been taken.

An understanding of the local and underlying causes of conflicts is a fundamental premise for successful prevention. The UN presence at a country level is important for the early prevention of conflict. However, it is also important that preventive strategies are based on local initiatives and participation. Continental and regional organisations – such as the AU and ECOWAS – are developing their own capacity for conflict prevention. These are measures that should be actively supported by the international community.

Norway, for its part, has provided support to the OAU's mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Within the broad mandate of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the UN should seek to strengthen its cooperation with regional organisations in the area of conflict prevention. This is one reason why Norway is encouraging the construction of a database detailing trained southern African personnel who could be readily and speedily available for deployment.

We believe that preventive action should be initiated at the earliest possible stage of a conflict cycle in order to be effective. The UNSC needs to

address conflict prevention in a more systematic manner. We support the recommendation of more active use of preventive deployment in order for this to happen. Financial resources for preventive measures must be available so that swift action can be taken. Norway has supported the Trust Fund for Preventive Action, and continues to appeal to other donor countries to provide financial resources for this fund.

### **CIVILIAN PROTECTION**

The true victims of today's conflicts are the countless number of civilians who are subjected to appalling human suffering. Millions of people have lost their lives or been injured, and an unknown number of civilians have been uprooted from their homes or separated from their families. Civil protection has long been a weakness of peacekeeping operations. The international community has frequently been unable to prevent civilian atrocities and suffering. In March 2002, under Norway's presidency, the UNSC outlined 13 core objectives aimed at protecting civilians in conflict situations. The notion of civilian protection will be integrated into much of the TFP's training and research work during the coming years.

#### ***Small arms and DDR***

Norway also believes that it is vital to take steps aimed at countering the illicit trade and spread of small arms and light weapons in Africa. It also believes that it is vital to support disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Practical disarmament measures – such as weapons for development – and DDR are important tools for preventing conflict. Norway has supported a wide range of practical disarmament measures and has also contributed to the establishment of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Trust Fund on Small Arms. In our view, the UN should increase its support for regional measures in order to curb the illicit trade in small arms. Norway has also urged donor countries to provide the necessary funding for such projects. In Norway, efforts are being made to train personnel on how to implement DDR programmes effectively during peace missions, and the TFP is supporting these efforts with policy and research on the lessons learnt from DDR operations in settings such as Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Improved

DDR practices are also being incorporated into the TFP training courses in southern Africa.

### ***NEPAD and regional mechanisms***

Norway welcomes the more active role being taken by continental and regional organisations in Africa. Given their first-hand knowledge of the situation on the ground, as well as their vested interest in seeing conflicts resolved, they have a crucial role to play in this field. The UN, for its part, has expertise and resources that can assist regional efforts. Hence, their efforts could be complementary.

Norway welcomes the establishment of NEPAD, under which African leaders are assuming a lead responsibility in, for example, developmental issues. The NEPAD process recognises that peace, democracy, human rights and good governance are all pre-conditions for sustainable development. However, Norway acknowledges that there is still potential for further enhancing continental and regional capacity. It also believes coordination between the UN and such bodies could be improved. Norway will continue to promote such coordination. Moreover, we are encouraged by the fact that several African leaders have become actively involved in the search for solutions to complex regional conflicts. This demonstrates that Africa is increasingly assuming responsibility for resolving its own conflicts.

### ***The police, the ICC, and justice issues***

The TFP has placed an increasing emphasis on the training of police for peace operations. An effective police force, together with an effective judicial system, are important components required for not only promoting long-term stability, but also for the reconstruction of a society following conflict. Reform of the justice and police sector in countries that are being reconstructed in the wake of conflicts is essential. Only a just peace will provide lasting peace.

The establishment of separate international criminal tribunals has been an important milestone in the efforts to promote peace and reconciliation following conflict. The formation of an International Criminal Court (ICC) – which has been ratified by more than 70 states – is a major step forward.

Norway will maintain its strong commitment to developing international criminal law. This means that we will assume our share of the responsibility


within the UNSC for maintaining the existing criminal tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. We will also seek to promote cooperation between the UNSC and the ICC.

## **FINAL REFLECTIONS**

### ***The broader security concept and integrated peace-building***

The need for a broader security concept is particularly evident in Africa. One feature common to many of the recent conflicts that have taken place in Africa is that they are extremely complex, with deep roots in historical, economic and ‘ethnic’ problems. Many of these conflicts have their origin in poverty, as well as the individual’s lack of opportunity to improve his or her situation. Although a number of African countries are rich in natural resources, this has not always fueled development and growth. Instead, it has often been the cause of violence and civil war, and has also prolonged and exacerbated conflicts.

Norway believes there is a need to link peace-keeping measures, emergency relief, long-term development assistance, and efforts to promote peace and reconciliation. In these areas, Norway has a substantial role to play, given its position as one of the most important contributors to development and humanitarian initiatives internationally, as well as its role as a facilitator in a number of peace processes.

Norway will continue to give high priority to ensuring that humanitarian considerations and a respect for human rights are given due consideration when dealing with crises and complex peace operations. Norway is particularly keen to contribute to a coherent approach to peace-building and crisis management, and to prevent conflicts, manage crises better when they have arisen, and stop conflicts that have been resolved from breaking out anew. It is especially important to strengthen the UN’s ability to assist countries that are undergoing the difficult and often protracted transition from war to peace. 

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## **Endnote**

\* Jon Bech is the Ambassador of Norway to South Africa



Imparting conflict management skills to military and civilian participants earmarked for deployment

ACCORD

BY KWEZI MNGQIBISA

training tomorrow's

# peacekeepers today

## ACCORD's peacekeeping programme

**T**he ACCORD Peacekeeping Programme is part of the overall vision of contributing to the organisation's quest for African solutions to African challenges. Two years after the inception of the organisation in 1992, plans were underway to expand the organisation's contribution to South Africa's integration into the continent and sub-region. To give meaning to this intention, the concept of a School of Peacekeeping was developed. The school was conceived as a capacity-building response that would pay attention to skills empowerment of decision-makers in the governmental departments of foreign affairs, defence, police and others, including their civil society counterparts.

The objectives of the school were operationalised when, in 1995, the Royal Norwegian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) launched an investigation into the feasibility of a project aimed at enhancing capacity for conflict management and peacekeeping in southern Africa. The Training for Peace Project (TfP) came about following the identification of the following partners: the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) – which later became known as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) – and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).

The TfP operated over a five-year period – from 1995 to 1999 – pursuing a number of very ambitious objectives. These included the training of a stand-by capacity of civilians for southern Africa, the undertaking of civil-military, cooperation-based training sessions and facilitating collective

training of participants from southern African.

Over time, the majority of the project’s training component became the primary focus of ACCORD’s peacekeeping programme. A principal reason for this was that ACCORD had already developed capability for capacity-building through training.

## ACTIVITIES

One highlight of the programme was its contribution to the drafting of the White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Support Operations, which is legislation that provides guidance for participation in peace support operations. As the programme’s focus was on civilian peacekeeping, its contribution was prominent regarding the utility and organisation of civilian participation in peace support operations.

The programme was responsible for the design and organisation of the civilian component of Exercise Blue Crane – a Southern African Development Community (SADC) brigade level, peacekeeping capacity-building exercise. The programme coordinated the inclusion of civilian roles within the exercise scenario, and organised a seminar aimed at preparing both military and civilian exercise leadership for civilian roles in peacekeeping. Overall, the coordination effort included facilitating the involvement of 35 participants, who were drawn from throughout the sub-region. Consideration had to be given to the most minor of details, in order for a pleasant and fruitful participation to take place. *(See table 1.)*

In an ongoing focus on efforts aimed at developing policy-oriented responses to conflict management and peacekeeping, the programme has organised and hosted a number of seminars. In 1998, the programme arranged the first African seminar on the Role of Civilian Police in Peace Support Operations. In an effort to contribute to the debate on collective security and peacekeeping in the sub-region, the programme also organised a seminar on the Operationalisation of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security – this seminar took place in 1999. During the year 2000, the programme organised and hosted a seminar on the Training of Civilian Specialists for United Nations (UN) Missions, with the aim of bringing together those institutions that deploy civilians and those that train them. In 2001, the programme hosted a seminar on the Role of the Media in Peacekeeping in Southern Africa. Media

**Table 1**

<b>Exercise Blue Crane 1999 (participants breakdown)</b>	
<b>NGOs</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Foreign Affairs</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Academic</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>International Organisation</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Regional Organisation</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Media</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>

practitioners, and representatives of governmental departments responsible for peacekeeping, shared ideas on the role of the fourth estate. It is important to stress that all these initiatives were conceptualised and convened in order to facilitate the exchange of views and ideas between governments of the sub-region, and between governments and civil society.

With a sub-regional focus on the TFP project, the programme (during its first phase) has conducted training in all but two countries within the sub-region. The programme must be able to use existing professionals on the continent, and train them into specialist civilian peacekeepers – such as civilian administrators, engineers and so on. Approximately 700 southern Africans have been exposed to civilian peacekeeping training, principally through the TFP. The programme has trained the military, diplomats, police, government officials and personnel from non-governmental and international organisations, as well as others. *(See table 2.)*

The programme represents a resource to other peacekeeping capacity-building initiatives in southern Africa. Programme staff have been used for training and presentations in all the courses run by the British Military Advisory and Training Team in Southern Africa. The programme also conducts modules in conflict management and civil-military



**Table 2**

<b>Training for Peace Workshops (participants breakdown)</b>						
<b>Country</b>	<b>Civil Society</b>	<b>Foreign Affairs</b>	<b>Academic</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>1997</b>						
Botswana	9	6	4	1	5	23
Namibia	7	7	4	6	5	25
Malawi	7	6	2	6	5	24
<b>1998</b>						
Swaziland	9	4	-	5	3	22
South Africa	7	4	2	9	4	25
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>119</b>

cooperation at the SADC's Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre. In addition to this working relationship, the programme has, since 2000, run an Advanced Conflict Management Course for peacekeepers, which is aimed at imparting conflict management skills to military and civilian participants earmarked for deployment. (See table three.)

In an effort to contribute to the conceptual development of peacekeeping issues within the sub-region, the programme has published a number of researched works through an ongoing series of occasional papers, as well as other publications. Since the inception of the programme, it has published about 20 titles in the series. A conscience effort is made to invite African academics and practitioners to contribute to the series, in order to make it both conceptually and practically relevant. In documenting Exercise Blue Crane, the programme published a report titled 'Exercise Blue Crane: Lessons Learned from Southern Africa'. It contains direct feedback from all the various components which participated in the exercise, including military and international advisors.

As a conscience effort to become assimilated within the global community of peacekeeping training, the programme was one of the founding organisations of the International Associations of Peacekeeping Training Centres in 1997. The association is made up of government and non-governmental organisations, whose common bond is to expand peacekeeping knowledge, as well as the peacekeeping network. The decision that the programme would host the first annual general

meeting of the association in Africa – in its capacity as the president for the year 2000 – was received with great excitement. The meeting saw more than 78 participants – from more than 24 countries worldwide – convene at the Kruger National Park. The theme of the meeting was 'Regional Cooperation and Partnership for Peacekeeping Training'.

In 2001, the programme organised the first UN Civilian Specialist Course, which was co-hosted by the Botswana defence force in Gaborone. This course, which was attended by 20 participants from the military, police and mainly civilian spheres, represented one of the first meaningful examples of how a civil society organisation and military partnership can organise a programme focused on civilian peacekeeping. The course was conceived from the results of a wide range of consultations with other civilian peacekeeping training centres. It also received input from particular deploying organisations during a seminar on Civilian Peacekeeping Training. The highlight of the training was a simulated peacekeeping mission – an environment was specially created, in which all the participants had to live for the last five days of the course.

Over and beyond the standing training commitments, the programme has supported individual requests from countries for training and presentation. Over the years, support has been given to the South African Army College (Exercise Zenith and Pegasus), Zimbabwe Defence College (Joint Command and Staff Course) and the Norwegian Defence International Centre (International Commanding Officers' Course).

## FUTURE FOCUS

At the end of the first phase in 1999, the TFP project was evaluated by the MFA through an independent evaluation team. The team was made up of internationally recognised individuals from academic and policy backgrounds, all with a specific focus on peacekeeping. The most salient of the evaluation observations was the utility and need for continuation within a project. A number of observations and recommendations were made regarding how best to position the project in terms of developments within the sub-region. Acting on this and other conclusions, the MFA decided to initiate a second phase of the project, which will start in 2002 and end in 2006.

Over the next few years, the programme will invest both time and effort in canvassing for an initiative aimed at standardising and developing a manual for civilian peacekeeping. In partnership and consultation with both training and deploying organisations, this goal is within reach, particularly considering the vast network already in existence.

In the immediate future, we shall be running our second UN Civilian Specialist Course in partnership with a southern Africa country. Derived from the lessons learned – and positive feedback received from the first course – the curriculum will contain lengthier field exercise periods in order to achieve greater familiarisation with the peacekeeping environment. The programme will still respond positively to requests for training support from member countries within the sub-region, and beyond.

In recognition of the need to expend more effort contributing to knowledge creation and dissemination – both to and from Africa – the programme will become part of initiatives aimed at creating an African chapter of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres. Through this chapter, it is envisaged that those organisations dealing with peacekeeping capacity-building will have a forum through which to exchange views on peacekeeping developments, and evolve strategies for cooperation beyond training.

The programme has conceptualised two policy round tables on peacekeeping, which it plans to co-host with South African government institutions in South Africa. The plan is to give a wider regional focus on peacekeeping during the second phase of the TFP project. The focus of policy round tables is to engage the legislative and executive tiers of government in discourse about peacekeeping challenges.

The programme will still publish occasional

Table 3

<b>Conflict Management and Civil-Military Co-operation Training: 2001</b>	
<b>UN Staff Officers Course</b>	42
<b>UN Military Observers Course</b>	34/24
<b>UN COMM Course</b>	38
<b>UN COY Course</b>	31
<b>Advanced Conflict Management Course</b>	20
<b>UN Civilian Specialist Course</b>	20
<b>UN Training of Trainers Course</b>	35
<b>UN Logistics Course</b>	37
<b>Total</b>	281

papers and other publications in an effort to continue contributing to the debate on regional collective security. The programme's contribution will specifically emphasis developments in the conflict management and peacekeeping spheres of the African Union.

The programmatic definition of our policy development focus is the need for accelerated introduction and adaptation of peacekeeping concepts within existing organisational structures – structures which have been charged with conflict management within our region. What is of great importance to the programme is the advocacy of civilian peacekeeping as a viable and effective response to disputes which do not require military intervention. This means conceptualising and organising platforms which would facilitate a common understanding of the objectives and functions of these structures, particularly with regard to their role in the deployment of civilians where and when it is appropriate. This strategy is relevant to our



A trainee from Exercise Blue Crane, which was held in South Africa in April 1999

keen relationship with sub-regional organisations which are focused on the operationalisation of structures created for conflict management and peacekeeping.

## CONCLUSION


In conclusion, this article presents an opportunity to reflect, with gratitude, on the spirit of partnership expressed by funders, intergovernmental organisations, peacekeeping centres and other civil society organisations whose aim has been (and continues to be) focused on building peacekeeping capacity. In summary, the programme is committed to the vision that its activities must rejuvenate the idea of peace missions being one of the key, realistic options for continental and sub-regional structures involved in responding to conflict. **█**

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## Endnote

\* Kwezi Mngqibisa is the Programme Manager for the Peacekeeping programme at ACCORD.

Interview with the  
United Nations Secretary-  
General Kofi Annan



INTERVIEW

**Conflict Trends:** Under your leadership, the UN has undertaken self-critical studies of its performance in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and it has commissioned and considered the so-called Brahimi Report. What are the primary lessons that the UN has drawn from these various studies?

**Kofi Annan:** These reports confirmed what many of us have been saying for some time. The success of a UN peacekeeping operation in any conflict region depends on several factors. First and foremost, the parties to the conflict concerned must be ready to put the fighting behind them and abide, in good faith, by the commitments that they have made. Where such will is absent, then the circumstances are not appropriate for the introduction of a UN peacekeeping operation.

Even where favourable conditions exist for UN peacekeeping, success can only be assured if the operations concerned are provided with all the political, financial, material and human resources required to fulfill the mandated tasks. This requires unanimity within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the desired outcome of the UN's involvement. It also depends upon countries – particularly those that are in a position to do so – to contribute qualified, well-trained troops and civilian police. The support of neighbouring nations and influential regional actors is equally critical. And, lastly, the men and women deployed in the operations, as well as at UN headquarters, must perform their functions effectively and efficiently.

**Conflict Trends:** This special issue of *Conflicts Trends* appears two years after the Brahimi Report was released in September 2000. Have the recommendations of the Brahimi Report been implemented?

**Kofi Annan:** I am pleased to say that substantial progress has been made in implementing the Brahimi Report's recommendations. On an operational level, the secretariat engaged external management consultants who conducted an objective review of the structures and staffing levels at headquarters required to support UN peacekeeping operations more effectively. They confirmed the Brahimi Report's preliminary assessment that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was woefully understaffed, relative to the daily challenges it is required to face. It proposed a 50 percent increase in staffing levels, which the General Assembly approved. Furthermore, member states have generously approved more than US\$100 million in order to strengthen the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. This will make an enormous difference in enhancing our rapid deployment capabilities.

The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is the only new peace operation that has been established since the Brahimi Report's issuance. UNAMA was designed and has been deployed very much in the mould envisaged in the Brahimi Report. In fact, Lakhdar Brahimi himself is heading the mission, with the authority to integrate all the UN political, humanitarian and

developmental activities under one umbrella.

**Conflict Trends:** It would sometimes appear as if peacekeeping in Africa is particularly challenging. Does the UN approach peacekeeping in Africa differently from the way it would approach peacekeeping elsewhere in the world?

**Kofi Annan:** Peacekeeping is an intrinsically challenging undertaking, whether in Africa, Europe or Asia. The UN does not approach African peacekeeping any differently from its tasks elsewhere. However, it is true that in some instances, African peacekeeping faces additional hurdles. In particular, we have seen that some operations in Africa have had the added challenge of trying to attract the necessary resources in order to help ensure success.

In some instances, African peacekeeping operations have suffered from a lack of troop contributions or resources commensurate with their mandates. Let me take, for example, the UN operation in Sierra Leone, which faced a grave military challenge from the RUF in May 2000. That situation was turned around through the efforts of many actors. Certainly, a large part of the solution lay in bolstering the number of troops and their logistical support, while at the same time ensuring that they had a clear and robust mandate. With the necessary commitment and support, peacekeeping can do a great deal in Africa.

Peacekeeping in Africa also benefits when there are diplomatic efforts at regional and international levels to complement the work of the peacekeeping operation, since many of the conflicts in Africa, as elsewhere, have regional dimensions which fuel them.

**Conflict Trends:** What is the role of the African Union and the African sub-regional organisations when it comes to UN peace operations?

**Kofi Annan:** The African Union, and sub-regional organisations, can and should play a variety of important roles. They can provide vital diplomatic and political support to complement the work of the UNSC and its UN operations on the ground. They can help ensure that regional peace efforts are closely integrated with the approach of a peace operation, and they also develop long-term peace-building strategies aimed at stabilising the situation after the immediate work of a peace operation. They can help identify civilian, police and military personnel who can be deployed to peacekeeping operations at short notice. And, of course, they can build their own peacekeeping capacities.

**Conflict Trends:** How does the UN view peace-

keeping capacity-building initiatives in Africa, such as the Norwegian-funded Training for Peace in Southern Africa Project?

**Kofi Annan:** The UN very much supports bilateral efforts aimed at building African capacity in peacekeeping. In addition to the project you mentioned, the American Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT), and the French Renforcement des Capacite's Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) are all worthwhile efforts which can help provide much-needed training and resources to potential African peacekeeping partners. For our part, the UN works with peacekeeping training institutes in Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire in order to provide standardised UN peacekeeping training packages. In addition, we also help train troops while they are participating in peacekeeping operations.

**Conflict Trends:** We have moved from traditional peacekeeping to complex peacekeeping, and more recently, we have also seen the UN undertaking transitional administration missions. In what direction do you think UN peacekeeping will develop in the future?

**Kofi Annan:** It is true that there has been a major resurgence in 'complex' UN peacekeeping, both in 1999 and at the beginning of 2000. We were asked to take over the administration of East Timor and Kosovo, while we concurrently launched a major complex mission in Sierra Leone. I am proud to say that we have done extremely well under the circumstances. East Timor has secured its independence after centuries of colonial rule and over a quarter of a century of occupation. A considerable measure of stability has returned to the Balkans, following the successive wars of the 1990s. In Sierra Leone, the disarming of tens of thousands of rebel soldiers has been completed, and a new government has taken office after remarkably peaceful elections.

At the same time, the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia has also demonstrated that the need for 'traditional' peacekeeping operations has, sadly, not gone away either. I believe that the UN must continue to build its capacity in order to respond to a variety of conflicts. At the same time, it must remain nimble enough to adjust its approaches to each unique circumstance. It would be a mistake to assume that one approach will continue to be the norm, just as it would be imprudent to declare 'classic' models of peacekeeping involvement obsolete. ♣

UNAMSIL made significant  
strides towards achieving  
its goals following its  
May 2000 setback



BY THEO NEETHLING

SIERRA LEONE

the UN in the

# aftermath

of the

# crisis

in Sierra Leone


In May 2000, the international community looked on in dismay and horror as United Nations (UN) 'blue helmets' came under violent attack in Sierra Leone. Not only did the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attack and kill four UN peacekeepers, they also captured almost 500 others, including observers in an incident unprecedented in the UN's history. Consequently, the fragile peace process was shattered. Moreover, observers were swift to criticise the world organisation. The UN peacekeeping system specifically came under fierce attack.

Generally speaking, observers and analysts were *ad idem* in their assessment that the 'Sierra

Leone fiasco' challenged fundamental aspects of the Sierra Leone peace process. Importantly, it also called into question the will of the world powers to stop atrocities in conflict areas, and highlighted a basic flaw in UN peacekeeping missions: namely that UN troops are often ill-equipped and ill-prepared for actual fighting or peace enforcement. Furthermore, it was generally accepted that the UN problems in Sierra Leone demonstrated the danger of sending a weak and inadequately trained peacekeeping force into a country where a fragile peace process prevailed.

However, the UN's difficulties and limitations in Sierra Leone did not really come as a total surprise.





In March of that year, the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, appointed a panel of experts on UN peacekeeping operations to assess the shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping system. The panel was requested to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change. It was set up after the secretary-general published two reports which focused on the UN's failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994, as well as its inability to protect the inhabitants of Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1995.


In August 2000, the panel published a very important and significant report detailing recommended reforms for UN peacekeeping operations – it became commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report. This report could be regarded as the first systematic and comprehensive effort to identify and address the technical problems surrounding UN peacekeeping missions. Today, two questions come to the fore: has the UN peacekeeping system changed in any way since the tabling of the Brahimi Report two years ago and is the UN now better able to deal with the challenges in conflict-stricken Sierra Leone?

## SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BRAHIMI REPORT

The Brahimi Report explicitly states that during the last decade, the UN has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge of peacekeeping. It also states that it can do no better today. Ostensibly informed on and influenced by events in Sierra Leone, the core and unambiguous message of the report is that the UN could not perform the principal mission for which it was created – that being the maintenance of peace.

The report contains some detailed and fairly technical recommendations with regard to the organisational ability of the UN to perform tasks in the fields of conflict prevention, peace-building and peacekeeping. In addition, it targets two groups in its recommendations for reform: the member states and the UN secretariat. It also contends that without significant institutional change, increased financial support and renewed commitment on the part of member states, the UN will not be capable of executing critical peacekeeping tasks. With regard to the responsibility of member states, the report makes the point that reform would not occur unless member states genuinely pursued it.

Importantly, the report specifically cites financial constraints as a factor which seriously impairs



GEORGES GOBET/AFP

the UN's ability to conduct peace operations in a credible and professional manner. Consequently, the drafters of the report urged member states to uphold their treaty obligations and pay their dues in full – on time and without condition. The report also reminds member states that the secretary-general requires clear, strong and sustained political support from their side. The panelists bluntly state that the UN had repeatedly discovered during the last decade, that no amount of good intentions could substitute for the fundamental ability to project a credible force. They also specifically stated that the need for change had been rendered even more urgent by events in Sierra Leone, and by the daunting task of the UN in the Democratic

Sierra Leone citizens stand in line at a Red Cross camp for displaced people in Loungi, southern Sierra Leone

Pakistani United Nations greet each other in Kailahun, eastern Sierra Leone as the National Commission for Disarmement, Demobilization and Reinstatement (NCDDR) started the preparations for the disarmement of the Kailahun district

Republic of the Congo (DRC). In this way, the panelists attempted to address many of the compelling needs for change within the UN system, and specifically reflected on the need 'to give the UN system the opportunity to be an effective, operational, twenty-first century institution'.

However, it must also be mentioned that the main focus of the Brahimi Report was on peacekeeping missions where parties consented to and abided by the rules of the mission. In this regard, the report displays a few limitations and omissions.

the need to assist poorer countries with the requisite logistic and training support required for participation in UN peacekeeping operations, it does not address the shortcomings – on the part of African countries and role-players – to muster a credible multinational peacekeeping or enforcement capability.

However, generally speaking, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) indicated that it wanted to strengthen the central role of the UN in peacekeeping. On 7 September 2000, the UNSC specifically reaffirmed its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and, by adopting the resolution, reaffirmed its determination to give equal priority to the maintenance of international peace and security in every region of the world. Given the particular needs of Africa, it committed the UN to give special attention to the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, and to the specific characteristics of African conflicts. In view of the above, one question comes to mind: what has changed in the UN peacekeeping system since the international community looked on in dismay and horror as UN 'blue helmets' came under violent attack in Sierra Leone during May 2000?

**Table 1**

<b>Uniformed Personal Deployed by the UN on 31 March 2002</b>	
UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)	17 455
UNTAET (East Timor)	7 687
UNMIK (Kosovo)	4 510
UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea)	3 956
UNIFIL (Lebanon)	3 642
MONUC (DRC)	3 633
UNMIBH (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	1 602
UNFICYP (Cyprus)	1 239
UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait)	1 103
UNDOF ((Syrian Golan Heights)	1 040
MINURSO (Western Sahara)	244
UNTSO (Middle East – Jerusalem)	455
UNOMIG (Georgia)	409
UNMOGIP (India and Pakistan)	43
UNMOP (Croatia)	27

Some analysts rightly argue that the report does not venture beyond the improvement of consensual peacekeeping operations in fairly benign security situations – peacekeeping operations that are the least likely to occur in African environments. Furthermore, the Brahimi Report confirms the fact that where enforcement action is required, this continues to remain the exclusive preserve of 'coalitions of willing states'. At the same time, it is important to note that while the report recognises

### **HAS ANYTHING CHANGED?**

An analysis of UN peacekeeping operations<sup>1</sup> indicates that from the total of 15 missions that went underway on 15 January 2002, four were deployed in Africa, two in Asia, five in Europe and four in the Middle East. An assessment of the strength of the respective UN missions indicates the following, in terms of uniformed personnel (including civilian police) deployed by the UN on 31 March 2002: (See table 1.)

In view of this, a total of 46,445 uniformed UN peacekeepers were deployed on 31 March 2002. This means that there was a substantial increase in the number of uniformed personnel assigned to UN peacekeeping operations since the sharp decline in the mid-1990s<sup>2</sup>. Furthermore, where the UN's peacekeeping budget was decreased towards the end of the 1990s – reaching US\$1 billion in 1998 – it was again increased in 1999-2000, and was projected to reach US\$2,5 billion in the peacekeeping budgetary cycle of July 2000 to June 2001. The approved budget for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 was about US\$2,74 billion.

The aforementioned may create the impression that UN peacekeeping operations are on the rise,

as a result of more political commitment on the part of the international community. Yet, it can be asserted that Africa is still on the receiving end of the so-called Somalia effect. In other words, there is reluctance – on the part of Western nations in particular – to commit their troops to UN peacekeeping efforts.

If Africa's position is viewed within the international context, it needs to be noted that the increase in troop contributions to the UN has mainly been effected through contingents supplied by developing countries. At the beginning of 1991, only two of the top 10 contributors were developing countries: namely Ghana and Nepal. However, in recent years, the overwhelming majority of the top 10 contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations worldwide were developing countries, of which three were African states: namely Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya. Consequently, the UN's profile of contributions to UN peacekeeping operations indicates the following, with regard to the top 10 positions on 31 March 2002: (*See table 2.*)

By comparison, contributions from the five permanent members of the UNSC were as follows: (*See table 3.*)

Interestingly, back in 1993, France was the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, with around 6,000 troops. By contrast, the United Kingdom's contribution has increased fivefold since the end of the Cold War – its troops amount to 3,700.

It could be suggested that Western governments have almost been falling over their own feet to send troops to Eritrea and Ethiopia. For example, in May 2000, the nations involved in the European-based Multinational UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)<sup>3</sup> were approached to commit the brigade to the peacekeeping effort in Ethiopia and Eritrea – and they immediately responded positively. However, it should be mentioned that the peacekeeping effort in Ethiopia and Eritrea was different to that in Sierra Leone and the DRC. Firstly, the war was over and the UN was not asked to find and impose a peace, as has too often been the case in Africa during the past decade. Secondly, the peacekeeping objectives were clear, and there was far less danger than in Sierra Leone and the DRC.

In view of this, it is interesting to note that troop contributions to UNAMSIL are mainly made up of troops from developing countries, with significant contributions from African countries. On 8 March 2002, the following countries

**Table 2**

<i>The UN's profile of contributions to UN peacekeeping</i>				
<i>Country</i>	<i>Observers</i>	<i>Civilian police</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Bangladesh</i>	66	169	5771	6066
<i>Pakistan</i>	77	326	5052	5455
<i>Nigeria</i>	45	103	3332	3489
<i>India</i>	35	625	2217	2877
<i>Ghana</i>	49	300	2141	2490
<i>Jordan</i>	46	726	1095	1867
<i>Kenya</i>	53	71	1707	1831
<i>Ukraine</i>	27	239	1278	1544
<i>Australia</i>	28	92	1371	1491
<i>Portugal</i>	–	213	920	1133

**Table 3**

<i>Contributions from the five permanent members of the UNSC</i>				
<i>Country</i>	<i>Observers</i>	<i>Civilian police</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>United States</i>	34	695	1	730
<i>United Kingdom</i>	36	253	424	713
<i>France</i>	45	200	241	486
<i>Russian Federation</i>	98	171	113	382
<i>China</i>	51	65	1	117

were making substantial troop contributions to UNAMSIL: (*See table 4.*)

Contributions from the permanent members of the UNSC were as follows: (*See table 5.*)

It is evident from the above that, with the exception of the Russian Federation, not one of the permanent members of the UNSC are playing any significant role in the Sierra Leone peace process. In fact, the burden of peacekeeping rests squarely on the shoulders of developing countries. Even so, the UN secretary-general reported (on 14 March 2002) that UNAMSIL managed to extend its deployment throughout Sierra Leone, resulting in the provision of 'umbrella security'. After the disastrous encounter with the RUF in May 2000, it would also seem that UNAMSIL was better led – and much better equipped – than at any other time since its inception. Specifically, analysts reported that a Pakistani brigade, as well as a Russian air wing, provided the mission with a powerful deterrent capacity.



**Table 4**

<b>Contributions to UNAMSIL</b>	
<b>Country</b>	<b>Troops</b>
Bangladesh	4269
Ghana	921
Guinea	793
Kenya	1084
Nepal	815
Nigeria	3325
Pakistan	4,280
Ukraine	626
Zambia	833

**Table 5**

<b>UNSC members contributions to UNAMSIL</b>	
<b>Country</b>	<b>Total</b>
China	6
France	1
Russian Federation	128
United Kingdom	22
United States	–

In his report of 14 March 2002, the secretary-general noted the following with regard to the peace process:

- The overall security situation in Sierra Leone was generally stable;
- The disarmament process had been completed, with a total of 47,076 combatants disarming between 18 May 2001 and 17 January 2002;
- About 1,723 ex-combatants had been selected for reintegration into the Sierra Leone army;
- Substantial progress had been made in preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections;
- Political parties could continue to prepare for the scheduled elections.

The secretary-general also reported that the completion of the disarmament process, and the deployment of UNAMSIL throughout the country,

had created a relatively more secure environment, which provided the opportunity for Sierra Leone to hold free, fair and credible elections. It also enabled the country to concentrate on national reconciliation and recovery, as well as building sustainable institutions. In view of these developments, the UNSC welcomed the official completion of disarmament, as well as the significant progress made in the Sierra Leone peace process. However, the body also resolved that the situation in the country still constituted a threat to international peace and security.

On 15 May 2002, Sierra Leoneans turned out in large numbers to vote in peaceful elections. About 2,3 million voters registered to cast their ballots at approximately 5,000 polling stations throughout the country. A few days later, the secretary-general welcomed the elections, describing them as an important milestone in the peace process.

## CONCLUSION

From the above, it is clear that UNAMSIL made significant strides towards achieving its goals following its serious setback in May 2000. The UN has rapidly moved to increase the capacity of UNAMSIL – there are now more than 17,000 uniformed personnel, and the mission appears to be better organised and equipped than ever before. To this end, UNAMSIL was able to play a meaningful role in helping Sierra Leone's war-ravaged population move toward an election process. However, it is commonly known that the eventual success of any peace process depends on more than the security aspect. More important is the progress made within the fields of democracy, good governance, transparency in public administration, human rights, the rule of law, and development. Thus, although UNAMSIL has succeeded in deploying throughout Sierra Leone – and thereby providing a national security umbrella – it will be interesting to see whether UN personnel can also be instrumental and successful in ensuring a much-needed process of post-conflict peace-building.

An important aspect of the Brahimi Report is the call for increased financial support, as well as renewed commitment on the part of UN member states. The authors of the Brahimi Report sketched a vision of the UN 'ending a mission well accomplished, having given the people of a country the opportunity to do for themselves what they could not do before: to build and hold onto peace, to find reconciliation, to strengthen democracy, to secure



human rights'. They also see 'a UN that has not only the will, but also the ability to fulfil its great promise, and to justify the confidence and trust placed in it by the overwhelming majority of mankind'. Whether the UN would be able to live up to this challenge remains to be seen. Peacekeeping operations are, by definition, challenging endeavours, and involvement in African conflicts has been amongst the most important and challenging endeavours of the UN during the post-Cold war era – specifically where peacekeepers are confronted with armed aggression. Be that as it may, it would seem that the crisis in Sierra Leone has initiated a serious call for change, and a stronger commitment to the UN peacekeeping system – a need that was reiterated and specifically addressed by the authors of the Brahimi Report. It is trusted that all this will inspire renewed commitment on the part of member states (in the words of the report) – with specific reference to some of the industrialised and wealthy nations. After all, even

the UN is no more than the sum of its members and available resources. **L**

Pakistani United Nations soldiers deploy in Kailahun as the NCDRR prepares for the disarmament of this district

## Endnote

- \* Theo Neethling is an associate professor in the school for Security and Africa Studies in the Faculty of Military Science at the University of Stellenbosch.
- 2. Information obtained from the UN Department of Public Information and other UN sources.
- 3. As of January 1996, the total deployment of uniformed personnel stood at approximately 29 000, less than half the previous level. The numbers continued to decline from 1996 until the middle of 1999, by which time they had dropped to 12 000.
- 4. SHIRBRIG was established by several Western nations to create a multilateral high readiness potential with a view to improving the UN's conflict management capacity.





The need for capacity-building within the conflict resolution and peacekeeping fields are as apparent as ever

PEACEKEEPING

BY CEDRIC DE CONING

peacekeeping in

# africa

the next decade

**W**e end this special issue with a step into the future. ACCORD has experienced, first-hand, how difficult it is to plan and implement a peacekeeping capacity-building programme in Africa, where nobody can say for sure what kind of capacity we need, and how or where we will need it. By trying to identify the major trends and issues that could shape the future of peacekeeping in Africa during the next decade, we hope to arrive at a better understanding of the type of capacities we need to build.

Nobody can predict the future. However, by studying the changes that occur in the conflict systems we try to influence, and by analysing the international trends in conflict resolution and

peacekeeping which occur in response to these changes in the conflict systems, we should be able to extrapolate some major trends and issues that could shape the path that African peacekeeping may take during the next decade.

## CONFLICT SYSTEMS

Conflict systems continue to change and adapt to the geo-political environment and economic context within which they are grounded. Most analysts argue, for instance, that the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on America have once again radically changed the world order, and by implication, the nature of conflict.



It is too early to say for certain to what degree the international terrorist threat – and the war on terror that follows in response – could change the nature of conflict. However, there is little evidence to suggest, at this stage, that the current dominant phenomena of small-scale civil wars would suddenly disappear. Most current conflicts in Africa – such as those in the Mano River Union conflict system (Liberia, Guinea and so on), as well as those in the Great Lakes conflict system (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe, Sudan, CAR and so on) – are likely to remain on the international agenda during the next decade.

If anything, the international terrorist threat seems to thrive on the chaotic statelessness that many of these conflicts create. The international terrorist threat also creates new avenues for conflicting parties to internationalise their cause. This may result in more international attention on those conflicts associated with the terrorist threat, while neglecting others. An overly narrow focus on the role of terrorists in these conflict systems may ignore the real causes of the conflicts.

The basic tenets and characteristics of modern small-scale civil wars, and the focus on the human and civilian (as opposed to combatant) aspects of conflict, are likely to continue to dominate the conflict resolution, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief and recovery fields during the next decade or


two. This new conflict paradigm can be characterised as internal (as opposed to between states), non-statutory (in that at least one party to the conflict uses irregular forces and militias) and civilian (where civilians are both perpetrators and victims within these conflict systems).

This implies that the large-scale humanitarian disasters, high-level of human rights abuses, and the refugee and displaced persons populations that are produced as a result, will continue to be high on the agenda of the international community's response to violent conflict. From a humanitarian and human rights perspective, improving our ability to respond to complex emergencies – and developing the necessary policies aimed at addressing the moral dilemmas that have resulted from the increasing pressure on humanitarian relief organisations to be impartial, as well as the increasingly blurred definition of innocent civilians – are likely to remain important themes during the next decade.

The United Nations' (UN) comprehensive response to complex emergencies – as undertaken through its conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building response matrix – will continue to be refined, it will develop into more complex specialisations and sub-divisions. This complexity is due to the large number of variables at play, and the turbulence inherent in the conflict systems it is responding to.

The international community will continue to

UNAMSIL soldier guards as Sierra Leoneans queue at a polling station in Freetown



GEORGES GOBET/AFP



ERIC FEFERBERG/AFP

try to shift its focus – and hopefully more resources – to preventing conflicts. The focus will be on improving early warning systems and preventive measures. The goal is to improve our ability to generate the political will necessary to authorise preventive action much earlier in the conflict cycle. This can be achieved by improving our ability to estimate the potential future cost of inaction. However, this is, in turn, influenced by the way in which we bring the necessary information to the attention of decision-makers. It will also continue to be necessary to undertake what is now known as peace-building. However, there should be an effort to reach a much greater understanding of the relationship between peace and development. In so doing, it should be possible to detect potential root causes much earlier. Consequently, it should also be possible to direct development assistance – in the form of preventive peace-building – much more effectively to identified problem areas.

## INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN PEACEKEEPING

The UN is likely to continue to play a primary role when it comes to consensual peacekeeping missions. In other words, in peacekeeping missions where the UN role is agreed to by the conflicting

parties. In some cases, regional organisations may work with the UN, thereby taking some responsibility for the security aspects of such operations. The trend seems to be that regional organisations are favoured when there is a need for peace enforcement, or enforcement operations. This trend is likely to continue during the next decade, although there is growing skepticism regarding the role of regional organisations and their ability to honour international law. Their ability to undertake such operations in an impartial manner is also being questioned.

### *Enforcement and Peace Enforcement Operations*

In Europe, and in its immediate sphere of influence, peace enforcement and enforcement-type operations are likely to be undertaken by NATO, or the new EU crisis management structures. Elsewhere, peace enforcement and enforcement operations will be undertaken by a coalition of the 'willing' – constituted as a multinational force (MNF) – under the leadership of a strong lead nation. However, it is important to note that the UN will still be called upon to lead and coordinate all the non-security aspects of these operations. The post-11 September 2001 situation in Afghanistan

SPLA soldiers show their weapons on the market square of Thiet in a region controlled by the christian rebels

is a good example. Once the United States-led coalition had defeated the Taliban (enforcement), it turned to the UN to deal with the political, security, transitional and reconstruction needs of post-Taliban Afghanistan.

### *Peacekeeping*

Peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN are likely to have more robust forces, and more authority to use force than was the case in the preceding decade. This does not imply a new willingness on the side of the UN to undertake peace enforcement-type (non-consensual) operations. Rather, it reflects a new policy – which has been further strengthened by the Brahimi Report – that UN peacekeeping missions must have credible force to deter would-be spoilers. It must have the capacity to defend itself – as well as civilian members of the mission and innocent civilians – should the conflict situation take an unexpected turn and consensus is withdrawn, even if only at the tactical level or in a certain geographical location. Credibility – defined in this context by the ability to project force, if necessary – is thus an important new benchmark for future UN peacekeeping missions. The logic is (as experienced by NATO in the Balkans and the UN in Sierra Leone) that the more credible the force – a combination of capacity and willingness to use it if threatened – the less likely it is that one would need to use it.

Peacekeeping operations during the next decade are likely to take on many forms. There is still a need for classical or first-generation peacekeeping missions, such as those in Cyprus, Kashmir and the Middle-East. And, as was shown in the case of Ethiopia-Eritrea, it is still possible that more new first-generation peacekeeping missions may be needed during the next decade. However, it is likely that the bulk of the peacekeeping missions that will be undertaken by the UN (and others) during the next decade would be peace operations in the civil-war context. In other words, the type of new generation or complex peacekeeping operations that have typified peacekeeping during the mid to late 1990s.

Although the current, common wisdom suggests otherwise, it is also possible that more transitional administration-type missions – such as those in Kosovo and East Timor – may be authorised during the next decade. These missions have proven to be among the most successful. These long-term (three to five years) interventions

suspend the control that warlords and other conflict entrepreneurs have over the means of war. They break the conflict cycle, and give the conflicting parties the breathing space necessary to establish trust.

### *Complex Peacekeeping*

There was a growing realisation during the past decade that multidimensional peacekeeping operations should be understood as complex systems. All of the mission components are interconnected, and interact with each other and other outside elements in a complex relationship in order to achieve an overall objective. All functions overlap in time and space, so that the actual activities of a modern multidimensional peace operation will have, in varying degrees, tasks that represent activities such as preventative diplomacy (conflict prevention), negotiations (peacemaking), stabilisation and security operations, humanitarian relief, disarmament, demobilisation, de-mining, electoral assistance, civilian police assistance, human rights monitoring, and reconstruction and development assistance programmes (peace-building). These activities all combine, interact and influence each other in the self-organising patterns typical of any complex system. Complex peacekeeping should be understood as an attempt to influence a conflict system. Consequently, the campaign plan should not be approached as a linear or binary progression of actions aimed at reaching an end-state (as defined by time). Rather, it should be viewed as an intervention aimed at influencing a system developed around a set of multidimensional benchmarks, which monitor the conflict system across the spectrum. Feedback mechanisms need to be established in order to carefully monitor progress, both across the spectrum and at the overall system level. In so doing, the intervention can be continuously adjusted according to the changes within the conflict system.

The implication for peacekeeping is that the level of complexity is likely to continue to increase as the international community's response to the new conflict paradigm (as well as complex emergencies) continues to become more specialised and refined. This will, in turn, place an even greater burden on the UN to establish mechanisms aimed at coordinating the various components, which together constitute the integrated mission. There will also be increased pressure to create imaginative ways in which it can informally muster the energies of those non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and other organisations that do not formally fall under the authority of the UN mission, but which can potentially contribute to the overall aims and objectives of the international response. Mission coordination, or civil-military-police coordination in the broadest sense of the word – which involves the ability to establish networks and nodes among those working alongside each other within the conflicting country – will become a key success factor in future complex peacekeeping missions. In this sense, peacekeeping may start to take on more post-modern characteristics during the next decade.

## AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

Over the years, African countries and institutions have developed various conflict resolution tools, and have experimented with various forms of peacekeeping. However, only since 1993, with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, have these efforts started to take an identifiable shape and form at a continental level. In fact, as was seen from the uncoordinated, yet largely consistent response the

international donor community received from African countries in response to their various peacekeeping capacity-building initiatives, a broad degree of policy confluence and common understanding has developed in Africa during the past decade. This is certainly applicable at a macro-policy level.

### *Macro-Policy Framework*

That having been said, there are still many very important issues that cry out for official policy formulation and clarification. In addition, there is still a large dichotomy between those principles commonly accepted at high-level policy platforms in Africa, and those practiced on the ground. Thus, during the next decade, one of the major priorities for Africa is for the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organisations – perhaps in close cooperation with the UN – to assume responsibility for formulating a common African conflict management and peacekeeping policy framework. Although the need for policy is currently driven by pressure to respond to donor-driven, capacity – building initiatives, what Africa needs to address first is its macro-policy on conflict resolution and

An Ugandan soldier gets down off a UN armoured vehicle on the tarmac of Entebbe airport, as the United States suspends air drops to Rwandan refugees



ALEXANDER JOE/AFP





One of the hundreds of people displaced from the unrest in Burundi sleeps in a church in Kinama, a suburb of Bujumbura

peacekeeping operations. Africa needs to be clear on the role it wants the AU and sub-regional organisations to play. It must also be clear on what the relationship between the AU, sub-regional organisations and the UN should be, as well as the type of interventions it might undertake and how those interventions should be authorised.

Consequently, the primary need is for Africa to develop the basic policy framework necessary to regulate conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations on the continent. Once that is in place, the next step would be to develop an implementation plan – this is where donors can play a crucial role in assisting Africa to achieve its objectives. The AU, and its principle organs and institutions in the peace and security field, should be focused on addressing this primary need during the next decade.

Over the years, various OAU decisions – including the founding documents of the new AU, and developments at a sub-regional level in organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – have resulted in the development of

a broad African consensus regarding some aspects of conflict management and peace and security. This common understanding rests on the following five principles:

- (a) The acceptance and recognition that the UN is the primary body responsible for global security. Africa will not agree to this global responsibility being regionalised – in other words, with each region responsible for its own security,
- (b) The recognition of the need to enhance Africa's capacity to contribute to peace operations on the continent, and beyond,
- (c) The recognition that peace operations in Africa should be undertaken with UN authorisation, and that there should be close co-operation between the AU and the UN in this regard,
- (d) The acceptance that in exceptional circumstances – when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is unable or unwilling to assume its responsibility – Africa may have to undertake peace operations on its own,
- (e) That the various initiatives from the donor community, aimed at enhancing African

capacity in this area, should be coordinated by the UN, in close cooperation with the AU.

Although this broad, common understanding is in place, there is a need to make progress regarding the development of a more detailed policy framework that will govern conflict management and peacekeeping practises in Africa. For example, one key issue involves policy decisions regarding the type of peacekeeping missions that the AU and sub-regional organisations should undertake. At the moment, this issue is simply left unanswered, with the result that military and civilian planners and trainers are continuing to prepare themselves for any eventuality.

### ***What type of interventions should the AU undertake?***

A more detailed policy position would enable all concerned – including the AU Conflict Management Division, the various sub-regional organisations, the individual countries, the UN and the various donor countries interested in assisting Africa in this field – to focus their policy development and capacity-building efforts on those modalities, mechanisms, equipment, training and preparation that would best enable the AU to undertake missions within its chosen framework and scope. This should result in a much more focused approach which, in a resource-weak continent like ours, would have a bigger impact and result in a greater chance of success.

The UN has recognised that it is only able to undertake consensual peacekeeping operations. If a situation requires an enforcement action, or a peace enforcement operation, the UN has recognised that it would need to seek recourse to a coalition of the 'willing', which can form a multinational force to undertake the task. Similarly, in the African context, bodies such as the AU, SADC and ECOWAS have to clarify what kind of missions they could or should undertake, and what kind of missions are best left to others.

Perhaps the most crucial make-or-break policy issue that the AU needs to take a decision on, is the issue of how AU peace operations will be financed. Peace operations are, by their very nature, costly affairs. They usually require the movement of heavy equipment and large numbers of people, as well as costly supply lines designed to maintain them during hostile circumstances. The OAU experience is that even its own relatively small and less logistically intensive military

observer missions – such as OMIB in Burundi and OMIC in the Comoros – were still too expensive for the OAU to maintain. Thus far, the OAU has had to rely on donor funding in order to finance these types of missions.

The AU's lack of resources (particularly financial ones) denies it the freedom to unilaterally decide on the strategic, operational and tactical aspects of the peace missions that it wishes to undertake. If it is unable to fund such an operation itself, it follows that whoever funds it for the AU will have a large influence on the objectives and operationalisation of the mission. This situation is untenable, and needs to be resolved. The AU needs to develop clear and transparent policies, which describe under what circumstances it would accept donor support in order to undertake peace missions. At the same time, such policies should attempt, as far as possible, to build a firewall between the need to receive donor support for such operations, on the one hand, and any undue influence on the organisation's ability to execute those operations as it sees fit, on the other.

During the next decade, the only viable option for complex peacekeeping operations in Africa are UN-funded peacekeeping operations. This is based on the realisation that:

- (a) The UN will not fund MNF or any other non-UN operations;
- (b) Neither America, nor any of the other developed countries, are likely to fund AU peace operations. In fact, many of these countries are constitutionally prohibited from doing so;
- (c) Even if it was likely that donors would be willing to fund an AU operation, it would be highly undesirable to undertake such a mission with donor funding, as reliance on foreign funding means that donors could influence which missions the AU could undertake, based on their own national interests. Donors can determine the duration of a mission, and can influence a mission's mandate by placing terms and conditions on continued funding, or by withdrawing funding if they no longer agree with the scope of the mission;
- (d) Neither the AU, nor any of the sub-regional organisations in Africa, have the financial resources to fund large peace operations on their own.

This is also an important reality check for those who advocate a greater role for regional and sub-regional peacekeeping in Africa. If the UN, or the international community in general, would like to see the

delegation of more conflict management responsibilities to the AU and sub-regional organisations, it would have to, at the same time, provide it with the necessary resources to carry out such a mandate.

The funding issue lies at the heart of the AU's capacity to undertake certain types of peace missions. If the AU, after a thorough process of analysis, found that it was unable to undertake large-scale peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions without undue reliance on donor funding, it would be wise to concentrate its efforts on conflict prevention and peacemaking, which could be backed up by limited civilian-military-police peace observer missions.

### ***Civilian-Military-Police Peace Observer Missions***

Civilian-military-police peace observer missions are small-scale peace operations that deploy unarmed civilians, military officers and/or police officers to observe a peace process, assist with the implementation of a peace agreement, or carry out other conflict prevention and peacemaking tasks, depending on its mandate. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has used these civilian operations very successfully in the Balkans and the Caucasus. The OAU had success with such small-scale military observer missions in Rwanda, Burundi, the Comoros, Ethiopia-Eritrea and the DRC. The UN has also successfully used such smaller missions in various parts of the world. The combination of unarmed military officers, unarmed police officers and various civilian specialists – such as human rights observers, election observers and political affairs officers – provide the sending organisation with a multidimensional presence within the conflict zone. Such missions have a dual impact. They give the sending organisation a visual presence on the ground, and they also provide the sending organisation with direct information regarding the conflict system. The operational capability on the ground implies that the sending organisation – for instance the AU – can use its field presence in order to undertake a range of actions, such as engaging the conflicting parties, investigating specific allegations, mediating in disputes, and coordinating the AU effort with other actors in the field, such as the UN and NGOs. In today's world, information is power and the capacity that the AU would gain from having its own, independent source of information on the ground would greatly enhance its ability to

have an impact on the conflict system that it is trying to influence.

Considering the limited resources available to the AU and other sub-regional organisations in Africa, it may be advisable to focus their initiatives around their ability to train, manage and sustain limited civilian-military-police peace observer missions. A focused effort in this area would result in a specialised capacity that could greatly enhance the AU's ability to prevent or resolve conflicts on the continent.

### ***Peacekeeping***

If we agree that the AU and sub-regional organisations do not have the financial capacity to undertake peacekeeping (deploying armed, formed units in the field) missions, then it would follow that the AU's peacekeeping efforts are best focused on enhancing the UN's capacity to undertake such missions in Africa. This can be done by coordinating African and international efforts aimed at developing Africa's capacity to participate in UN peace operations. Together with the UN, the AU could herd these initiatives into a coordinated effort aimed at achieving a set of African capacity-building objectives that could serve AU and UN needs.

The OAU's coordinating role, with regard to peacekeeping, has thus far focused on two issues: the strengthening of Africa's capacity in the field of peacekeeping under the aegis of the UN, and the modalities for limited peacekeeping operations undertaken by the OAU/AU itself. With regard to the first issue, there is general agreement that Africa should further develop its peacekeeping capacity through improved regional coordination, the standardisation of peacekeeping training along UN norms, and the improvement of interoperability through the use of compatible equipment and the development of standard operating procedures. However, much remains to be done in order to move from this common agreement to practical cooperation.

On the other hand, the issue of limited peacekeeping, under the aegis of the AU, remains more ambiguous. Some countries have rejected the concept in principle, arguing that the UN should be the only institution responsible for peacekeeping. Others have questioned the AU's capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations, citing its lack of financial resources to fund such operations. It is important for the AU to address these macro-level policy issues as soon as possible. If it is decided



PEDRO UGARTE/AFP

that Africa should continue to develop such a capacity at the level of the AU and sub-regional institutions, then detailed policies, procedures and doctrine need to be in place before the human and physical resources can be identified, trained and prepared in order for such limited peacekeeping missions to be operationalised. This paper suggests that it would be best if the AU developed a capacity to undertake small-scale civilian-military-police peace observer missions on its own, that it should support and coordinate capacity-building initiatives aimed at preparing African troops, police and civilians for participation in UN peacekeeping operations and that it should leave any enforcement and peace enforcement operations – whether authorised by the UN, AU or sub-regional organisations (taking into account Chapter VIII of the UN Charter that requires UNSC authorisation for any enforcement action) – to coalitions of the ‘willing’.

## CONCLUSION

During the last decade, the fast pace of developments within the conflict management and peacekeeping arena – particularly in Africa – has complicated the ability of the policy-making and research communities to develop a common understanding and shared knowledge base of these phenomena. Without some basic certainty about

the direction that African peacekeeping might take, it is difficult – if not impossible – to develop a coordinated and coherent policy framework that would enable the peacekeeping community – whether governmental, multinational or non-governmental – to plan, train and prepare themselves for the kind of peacekeeping operations that they would probably have to undertake during the next decade. The lack of certainty impacts negatively on the planning, training and preparation of civilians, soldiers and police for future peacekeeping missions. In this paper, we tried to highlight some of the major trends and issues that could shape African peacekeeping during the next decade. The need for capacity-building within the conflict resolution and peacekeeping fields are as apparent as ever. Hopefully this kind of study will help us direct these efforts to areas where they can have the greatest possible constructive impact. **E**

Captured ex-Interahamwe Hutu militias listen to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in the Nkuba Camp, Ruhengeri province in Rwanda

## Endnote

- \* Cedric de Coning is an ACCORD associate and he is currently with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. This paper is an extract from a masters thesis on the same subject. It is written in his personal capacity and does not reflect the views of either ACCORD or the United Nations.

## Partner to History: The US Role in South Africa's Transition to Democracy

Princeton N. Lyman (2002). United States Institute of Peace Press. Washington, D.C. ISBN 1-929223-36-6

In the early 1990s, South Africa was a *cause ce'le'bre* of the early US-centred 'new world order'. Amid fratricidal war and communal conflict in settings as diverse as Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Kashmir, South Africans themselves – who were actively supported and encouraged by foreign political actors – negotiated an end to *apartheid* authoritarianism, as well as its ignominious exclusionary practices. The pariah state of the Cold War years soon emerged as the paragon and 'miracle' of the 1990s.

South Africa has always been a focus of international censure and concern. However, the role of Britain and the US in the 1980s – particularly during the Reagan-Thatcher era of constructive engagement – has been even more controversial. In *Partner to History*, Lyman – who was Washington's ambassador in Pretoria during the post-1990 period, which has often been described as the most poignant and promising period of South Africa's 'new' history – details how Washington policy-makers and the Pretoria embassy employed US influence, economic assistance and political support to help end *apartheid*, without sparking the dour predictions of a racial civil war. To its credit, the book reveals the hidden face of diplomacy, and *implicitly* evaluates – from a US perspective – the contribution of South Africa's motley assortment of leaders (including reformers, nationalists, reactionaries, radicals and Africanists) to the transition.

Lyman arrived in South Africa as United States Ambassador in 1992. His arrival coincided with the most poignant and ominous period of the transition, and he was immediately thrust into the crisis. It was the time of deadlocked negotiations, mass action campaigns, threats of violence, and the clash of egos. Lyman details, in easy and accessible prose, the constructive nature of the US's public and private diplomacy, which managed to

ameliorate tensions, facilitate dialogue and dissuade potential spoilers (such as the far right and left, as well as Chief Buthelezi). In doing so, the book provides some rich insights into the role foreign political actors played in shaping the contours and outcome of the transition – a dimension of that period which has been neglected and overlooked.

At the time, De Klerk and Mandela insisted that South Africans would 'own' the transition process. As a result, several offers of direct mediation from Washington were politely rejected. However, notes Lyman, 'This did not mean that the US, and the international community in general, did not have a vital role to play. What it did mean is that we had to fashion our assistance to this process [in order] to facilitate it, to help it through several crises, and encourage it in a multitude of ways... It was an active intensive involvement. And it made a difference' (p4).

Part one of the book details the international community's confrontational approach to South Africa: the so-called 'world of telegrams and anger'. Part two shifts the scene to the US's cooperative involvement – both politically and economically – in the South African 'miracle'. Part three discusses the US's involvement in South Africa's post-*apartheid* reconstruction, as well as the lessons learnt from the transition. Lyman concludes with the ringing comment: 'Living the American dream is the best policy for the US to follow, at home and abroad. It is a lesson we can take away from South Africa' (p283).

The book represents an intellectual call to arms. South African negotiators, policy-makers and community activists who were engaged in the struggle and transition, should be similarly inspired to chart and preserve the institutional memory of this heady era in South Africa's history. 