



Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces (DCAF)

Policy Paper

**Defence Reform in the Western Balkans:
The Way Ahead**

Milan Jazbec

Geneva, April 2005

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Defence Reform in the Western Balkans: The Way Ahead

Milan Jazbec

1. Introduction

This text aims to present and analyse defence reform processes in the European subregion of the Western Balkans. For this reason, it will also take a look at the countries concerned, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Macedonia and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (S-M).¹ This will be done by recognizing trends in the defence reform process and, consequently, in generalizing their characteristics. As a follow up, recommendations for the way ahead will be produced and laid down, having in mind *first*, the specifics of the subregion and its countries, and *second*, the substance of the text and the method of reaching conclusions. We can presume that this would provide us with a better understanding of the similarities and differences of the countries concerned, and enable us to draw useful general conclusions.

Therefore, this paper will focus on understanding the reform process and its various elements (like adoption and implementation of strategic-doctrinal documents, rightsizing and modernisation of armed forces, etc), with a brief look at the changes of the South East European security environment (stabilisation of the region, the effects of dual enlargements, stockpiles, etc).²

This would mean that we understand the reform process within the overall post-Cold War context, which provided us with a fundamentally changed security environment, and threats, challenges, as well as vulnerabilities deriving from it.³ Among the most important changes which concern armed forces, one could surely list the following: the end of the era of bipolarity and the disappearance of the known enemy; the need to form reaction forces (particularly during the first Gulf War), which resulted in the process of changes in

¹ The following references support the mentioned listing of the Western Balkans countries: Caparini, 2004:251; Ifantis, 2001; Jazbec, 2004; Pantev, 2001; Watkins, 2004a, etc. Regarding the name 'The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', it should be pointed out that the name 'Macedonia' or the 'Republic of Macedonia' is used in formal proceedings within DCAF. Therefore, the same approach is applied in this paper.

² 'Rightsizing' seems to be the focal point of each defence reform case. It enables us to define, understand, implement, and adapt the whole process. Therefore, it is up to each country to find out what is the right size of its armed forces. This understanding has to include the country's history, tradition, social environment, welfare, as well as its security environment. Once defined and articulated, this term should constantly be checked in its concrete adequacy referring to the changes in the environment. Hence, rightsizing would have a different notion in different circumstances and in different periods of time. Its substance is therefore not easy to cope with, thus requiring careful and flexible defence planning and evaluation.

³ Today's threats are primarily unconventional, combined, dispersed and more diverse, less visible and less predictable, difficult to address, etc. Following a recent UN Report, "[t]here are six clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead: economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; inter-state conflict; internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime" (United Nations, 2004:2). According to a recent EU Report, Europe's security "...is confronted by a number of key threats: terrorism, in particular catastrophic terrorism that acts worldwide and seems willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in particular in combination with international terrorism; regional conflicts, which become themselves a source of other threats like extremism, terrorism, state failure, organized crime and WMD proliferation; state failure, often due to bad governance, creating the breeding ground for other threats like organized crime and terrorism; organized crime, which has developed an important international dimension" (European Union, 2004:9-10).

size and structure of the armed forces; the decrease in defence spending, with a consequent decrease in military research activities and their applications, providing the growing technological gap between Europe and the USA; the surplus of military manpower, and a drastic decrease in interest of youth for military service. Armed forces of new or newly established countries were, generally speaking and apart from this, faced with the following problems in particular: large numbers of territorially-bound forces which were overstructured and oversized, drastically lacking resources, and with a decreasing living standard; and which were also psychologically as well as linguistically unprepared to start cooperating with the former enemy (Jazbec, 2002:38-42). In return, all this has definitely changed the understanding and operationalising of security as one of the most complex social terms.⁴

Further implementation of defence reforms in the Western Balkans will without any doubt encourage integration of the subregion and its countries in the international community as well as the stabilisation of the only remaining hotspot in Europe. The countries of the Western Balkans have to play an active role in this process and show constant progress. They have to enhance the role of their institutions and further implement modern standards in the defence area. This will bring them further away from the danger of becoming failed states. This paper should evaluate how far the reform process has come and what still has to be done.

Therefore, our intention is *first*, to summarize and generalize the achievements and processes of defence reforms in the Western Balkans, and *second*, to try to show the way ahead in this endeavour. For these reasons, the author draws heavily from various and numerous sources, including from his own broad experience while serving as State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, having had an opportunity to contribute to the process discussed.⁵ Hence, this paper is a product of a theoretician and an empirical insider. It is the author's strong belief that a comparative approach with the aim of generalizing both experiences and further steps in the defence reform process is both advantageous and instructive.

It should be pointed out a how important it is to bear in mind the fact that defence reform is only part of security sector reform (including civil-military relations, which we will not touch upon in this paper). Discussing the former we go deeper in the substance, while remaining firmly within the context of the latter. This complexity does not make our task easier, though it may well take us to a more comprehensive and valid outcome.

⁴ We could speak about collective security, which "...rests on three basic pillars. Today's threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today's threats" (United Nations, 2004:1). Therefore no player can achieve and guarantee durable security alone, but has to rely on an interagency cooperation: "[m]ilitary instruments can and do play a role, but in most cases intelligence, police, judicial, economic, financial, scientific and diplomatic means will be at least as important" (European Union, 2004:10).

⁵ From the methodological point of view the author draws significantly from using the method of 'observing with one's own participation' (Gilli, 1975).

2. Presentation of the Reform Process and its Elements

2.1. The Defence Reform Process

The issue of defence reform in the Western Balkans is complex and important. It presents a huge challenge for all countries concerned and is a test of capability and willingness to adopt and implement the rules of behaviour and functioning along the current, not only but primarily, Euro-Atlantic standards in the field of the defence. Conceptualisation and implementation of these reforms is a practical necessity on their way to integration with the international community.

There could be no question whether or not the reform process is a demanding, resource intensive, constant and painful effort to establish the defence system, and the armed forces in particular. It must be carefully planned, sensitively shaped in its implementation, and during the course of time constantly adapted, accompanied by strong political support. It requires clear understanding of the security environment, capability of translating threats and challenges into adequate force plans as a part of an overall strategic assessment, and the ability to achieve full governmental and parliamentary support, the latter being expressed primarily in providing sufficient resources to address threats and challenges. Perhaps these could serve as a basic formula for understanding the process: *first*, recognize the threats; *second*, conceptualise plans for the force structure needed to address these threats; and *third*, provide sufficient means to implement these plans. The process as such – dynamic, ongoing, and depending on changes in the security environment and on the inflow of resources – comprises our understanding of defence reform.

It would, of course, be difficult to say there is something like a clearly accepted and agreed upon definition of defence reform. Nevertheless, one can certainly develop a clearer understanding of the process discussed and its basic elements from different sources.⁶

If we presume that NATO (through its programmes like Partnership for Peace) is among the main promoters of defence reform in the Euro-Atlantic area, we can clearly state that defence reform is “...as one of the top-priority objectives for both NATO members and Partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace (EAPC/PfP) community”, and even more so “...in the case of Membership Action Plan (MAP) Partners [where] defence reform is considered to be [the] top-priority” (Katsirdakis, 2002:189). Although it is understandable that reform is perceived differently in different countries, at least “NATO members usually refer to three 'baskets' of ideas, or three areas of consideration, of defence reform” (ibid, p. 190):

⁶ Two primary sources for the following conceptualisation of the defence reform and its elements should be mentioned here. First, Katsirdakis (2002) presents a highly useful picture of reform, its various elements, aspects and actors. Second, the author's own experience from his MoD period, when as State Secretary he shared in an opportunity to create the process with which Slovenia achieved membership in NATO (e.g. see 2005b). This in particular would mean that his theoretical and empirical expertise are combined and merged in this paper. During 2000-2004 the author has met in person most of the decisive actors and foreign experts on the defence reform area in the subregion, discussed the process and shared experiences with them. A number of them are quoted in the country presentations (e.g. Bučkovski, Davinič, Edmunds, Gareljić, Ilievski, Katsirdakis, Polić, Shalamanov, Simić, Turković, Watkins, etc). For an overview of the reform process characteristic in Central and Eastern Europe see also Donnelly (2002).

- defence restructuring and reform of defence management practices and institutions;
- development of defence capabilities required to meet both new and traditional defence-related challenges; and
- action that will increase countries' ability to contribute to NATO-led crisis response operations.

Broadly, one could understand defence reform as a process "...which implies a change in the ways of doing business, of mentality on defence related issues, of objectives, of resource allocations, and of priorities" (ibid). Thus understood, we could put down that "[t]he main objective of the defence reform is to increase the overall capabilities of the armed forces, [while] the main characteristics are: downsizing, modernisation, integration, interoperability, [and] its aim is to create a small, modern, effective, deployable, interoperable force" (Watkins, 2004a:6). The views presented here could serve as a suitable starting point for the understanding and analysing the topic of our interest in this paper.

2.2. Basic Elements of the Process

In discussing various elements of the defence reform process we will focus our attention on presenting four primary aspects: *first*, the strategic and other documents necessary to develop a conceptual orientation of the whole defence reform; *second*, issues or areas where the reform is being implemented; *third*, the characteristics of armed forces achievable through the reform; and *fourth*, some basic principles for executing the process.

First, the point of departure for the reform process is without any doubt the need to define strategic and defence-related documents. This includes above all security strategy, defence strategy, a long-term development plan of armed forces, the financial aspects of the process (budgeting), as well as a strategic defence review. The latter is an umbrella document, complex in its structure and general in approaching the substance of reform. It could only be concluded after the most important documents are adopted and the whole process is laid down in its interdependence. The evaluation of the security environment and its translation into necessary and appropriate legislation is the starting point of the defence reform process. This also includes the "...adaptation of existing legislation to meet new understandings" (Katsirdakis, ibid), and the careful monitoring of further changes in the security environment.

Second, there is practically no area which will not be touched or dealt with during the reform process. If we try to list the most important ones we will have to include an appropriate defence planning system; adequate, affordable resource allocation; a proper and efficient budgetary system; clear, transparent and efficient procurement procedures; modernisation of the armed forces; changes in size and structure of the armed forces; human management systems; appropriate social programmes to deal with the potentially adverse effects of the reform; adequate public communication strategies to develop understanding and public support of the defence reform efforts; a simple and efficient decisionmaking system in defence related issues; etc. Many of these lead quite naturally to the conclusion of establishing professional armed forces, as opposed to conscript-based forces (including mixed approaches). This goes along with the changes in the current

security environment; with ever-advancing military technology, which demands highly skilled and educated soldiers to master it; and the decreasing interest of young generations in participating in military service.

Third, through this process the armed forces, being the most important target of reform, achieve a new shape and evolve. If we sum up the various references used in this paper, the aim is to achieve an affordable, deployable, educated, effective, equipped, interoperable, modern, skilled, small, well-trained force.⁷ One of the primary means in achieving this is the process of *rightsizing*. It comes mainly in the form of downsizing, accompanied either with reestablishing or establishing the armed forces.⁸

Fourth, the reform process should be guided by basic, proven principles. The most important include a coordinated interagency approach (hence the reform process should be designed as a national project), transparency (particularly in planning, budgeting, procurement, and personnel issues), proper management of socio-economic issues of reform, and democratic control of the armed forces. Within this context one should add two brief remarks. First, the process depends highly on the amount of defence expenditures, and second, it is even more important how efficiently and rationally these resources are allocated.

As regards the success of defence reform in the Western Balkans, it is important to keep in mind that so far they have been driven to an important, if not primary, extent by involvement of the international community. NATO's outreach has played an indispensable role and reforms are one of the priority issues, carried out in particular through its various programmes (EAPC; PfP; MAP; and the Planning and Review process, known as PARP). These programmes are "...a vehicle to promote essentially the same vision of defence reform, depending on each Partner's [needs]" (Katsirdakis, 2002:193). Also, in the two countries from the subregion which are not PfP members, namely BiH and S-M, NATO is present through different forms of assistance and cooperation.

⁷ The author is of the opinion that some of these terms express more the political ambition rather than the rational and clearly measurable force characteristic. In his opinion the criteria to amount the force should stem from the country's specific needs (environment, resources, and goals) and not from a rather abstract way of comparison (like efficient vs. inefficient, modern vs. outdated, small vs. big, etc). From this point of view terms like affordable, adequate, deployable, and interoperable are more appropriate, because they draw from single country specifics.

⁸ Katsirdakis (2002:193-194) speaks about the following forms of defence restructuring: *first*, building armed forces where none exist (for example in the Baltic nations); *second*, downsizing forces where their size is disproportionate to current security and resource realities (for example, Russia, Ukraine); *third*, rebalancing forces where the ratio of regular officers to NCOs and soldiers is highly skewed and unrealistic, or the constitution of the forces does not reflect the ethnic or other makeup of the population (for example, in Central Asia), or the existing structures represent odd formations put together for specific reasons that should be corrected eventually (for example the forces in BiH); *fourth*, tailoring defence structures to new defence perspectives and priorities in the cases of countries where the role of the defence forces is perceived differently now compared to the past, and where new structures are created and former structures are dropped (for example, Romania, Bulgaria); *fifth*, making forces affordable where current economic realities can no longer support the structures from the past (for example, Albania); and *sixth*, some Partner countries may have to undergo more than one form of defence restructuring, depending on their circumstances.

3. A General Overview

3.1. Trends and Characteristics

Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War and almost a decade after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), the subregion of the Western Balkans remains the only, at least in security terms, unfinished business in Europe:

Macedonia seems now on a better track but the large demonstrations recently against the decentralisation law show that NATO and the EU must still keep a careful eye on the situation. Serbia and Montenegro as well as Bosnia are not yet members of NATO's Partnership for Peace and Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are still wondering when they will be able to join an Alliance which has taken in no fewer than ten new members over the last five years. The Balkans thus has not yet been either fully stabilised or integrated. (Shea, 2004)

If the already mentioned should be taken as a starting point for a general overview of the results reached so far, there are plenty of reasons to continue with the defence reform process. Having in mind the fact that only five years ago the subregion was a mixture of introverted and isolated states, with a number of conflicts and open issues unsettled, this is even more important. The shadows of the Bosnian war were still reflecting the past decade of disaster, isolation and conflict. With the death of the Croatian leader Tadjman and the imprisonment of the Serbian leader Milošević at the turn of the century, stakes rose higher and expectations brightened. However, the events that followed showed the whole spectrum of difficulty regarding the execution of overall reform, defence reform included. The latter managed to start a process of reengineering defence structures and armed forces in particular, which were still under the influence of both an outdated heritage from the former socialist Yugoslavia (and Albania), and the Bosnian war (Albania and Macedonia excluded, although each having their own similar and dominantly negative experiences).

Several patterns emerge from this matrix: BiH, Croatia and S-M were in the midst of the Bosnian war, consequently also parties in the DPA; while Macedonia remained outside, although on the edge of a civil war; and Albania, still recovering after almost a decade of collapse, with its armed forces brought to the brink of dismantlement. However, Croatia recovered rather quickly and managed in spring 2002 to join Albania and Macedonia in the Adriatic Charter group of NATO candidate countries. BiH and S-M remained behind due to difficult, though inevitable, tasks to be done – in particular establishing one ministry of defence and military as well as providing full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Due to a highly complicated state structure in both cases, defence sectors included, reform processes have taken a rather slow and inefficient path.

Apart from being marred by current security challenges (organised crime, trafficking, drugs, and corruption), the subregion also suffers from past military burdens. The area is full of military forces and matériel, which together with international forces exceed figures from times of the former socialist Yugoslavia (Albania excluded). These old, useless, and partially destroyed stockpiles and installations present a heavy burden, having no future utility (Jazbec, 2002:223). To sum up, the heritage of both the Cold War and the Bosnian War is disastrous, leaving huge surpluses of weaponry, infrastructure, and personnel. This usually stalls the beginning of a reform process, which manifests

itself in the unwillingness and unpreparedness of "...the armed forces' leadership [because they] rally to protect and preserve their military systems, striving to retain as much of the old force structure and infrastructure as possible" (Donnelly, 2002:37). Such cases have resulted in situations when "...all too often, the military establishment closed ranks to protect itself" (ibid). It is all the more difficult to start a thorough and difficult, albeit necessary, defence reform process in such circumstances.

Defence reform processes in the Western Balkans, however difficult and complex, will also have to deal with these problems. This presents a huge burden not only for the defence sector alone, but also for the whole society, the environment, and the international community. Before proceeding to the country presentations, one also should ask the question 'what is the de facto driving force behind the intention of these countries to approach defence reform?' Is it a genuine desire or rather the pressure from the West, or merely shortage of resources?⁹ Whatever the true answer is, reform processes are a given, yet long-term success will, to a major extent, depend on the answers to the previous question.

3.2. Country Presentations¹⁰

3.2.1. Albania¹¹

During the last decade of the previous century, Albania witnessed an extremely difficult transitional period and "...has experienced every sort of crisis that a state could possibly undergo..." (Pasha, 2002:173). This has exposed the weakness of democratic institutions and their building process as the major security challenge to the country. Due to several crises and structural shocks the wider social environment could not possibly support defence reform, in particular having in mind the fact that "...the events in 1997 and 1998 resulted in widespread looting of military establishments, and as a result, the mass possession of weapons is a particular problem" (Turković, 2002:211). It is not surprising that "...defence reform has not gone very far" (Katsirdakis, 2002:202-203). This again has not been so much influenced by the events in the closer security environment as it has been by "...frequent changes of defence, a lack of any realistic resource management system, and a tendency to develop plans for force structures that try to save the jobs of the existing officer corps..." (ibid).

The situation has changed in the first years of this decade, when "...[with] assistance of the international community experts and advisors, Albanian politicians and security experts changed quickly and willingly their views on national security..." (Starova,

⁹ The intent of country presentations is not to give a full and detailed account of each country, but merely to point out some of the most important evolutionary characteristics related to the issue of defence reform. From one point of view, we try to focus on those aspects which would lead us to a generalisation of the issue discussed in order to show the way ahead, and from another point of view, there is already a number of solid, useful and in-depth case studies, some of which are also listed in the references. The author of this paper would not like in any case to compete with the latter, but would, however, like to present a text in the full meaning of the former.

¹⁰ Figures and data for the country presentations are picked out from various references, which sometimes differ for several reasons. The author follows the opinion that, as far as the defence expenditure figures are concerned, SIPRI (2004) is the most reliable source.

¹¹ For more on Albania see: Caparini, 2004:259-262; Ifantis, 2001:108-109; Katsirdakis, 2002:189-204; Ordanoski, 2002:159-171; Pasha, 2002:173-182; Starova, 2004a.:125-139; Starova, 2004b.:241-255; Turković, 2002:211-231.

2004b.:241-245). Basic strategic documents were adopted, like the National Security Strategy and the Defence Policy (both in February 2000), the Military Strategy (August 2002), while the White Book is still being prepared. These have provided plans for the implementation of the reform process up to 2010 and have paved the way for the approximation of the defence-military legal background with the NATO, following changes in the security environment and current trends in the PfP area. The Military Strategy set three main goals of defence reform, namely "...to develop a professional army, reducing the number of conscripts and increase defence budget per 0.1% of GDP annually till 2010" (Caparini, 2004:260).

As far as changes in force size and structure through 2010 are concerned, "[t]he total number of the Albanian Armed Force in peacetime will be 16.500 soldiers out of 31.000, which is the present number of soldiers. In wartime, the respective number is 35.000 out of 120.000" (Starova, *ibid*). According to these plans, the present military budget (1.3% GDP) will amount to 2% in 2010. It amounted to 2.5% in 1994, then steadily decreased to 1.1% in both 1998/99, and then began to increase and reached 1.2% in 2002 (SIPRI, 2004:359). The structure of defence expenditures for 2003 showed that "[o]perational expenses cover 91% of the defence budget, out of which 76% are allotted for the personnel, 15% for maintenance and 9% for equipment" (Starova, *ibid*). During that period the following areas received most of the resources: training of the military forces, support with modern equipment, and doctrine development (*ibid*).

This brings our attention to the three most important characteristics of defence reform during the last years: the downsizing of the armed forces, the increase in defence expenditures, and the increase of operational capability. There is no doubt that the reform process is being strongly supported by the MAP activities and Adriatic Charter cooperation.

3.2.2. Bosnia and Herzegovina¹²

It seems that the most complex state structure in the subregion lays at the foundation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Created by the DPA, the country consists of three nations and two entities, numerous local authorities, and a three-member state presidency. This has also reflected itself in a no less complicated organisation of the defence sector: "[b]y the end of war, BiH *de jure* had two armies, and *de facto* three."¹³ This resulted in two separate defence systems, originating from classical territorial defence doctrine, none of which were capable of defending anything but merely maintaining a rough equilibrium among the three armies. Due to the slow establishment and evolution of state functions, both deriving from the previously mentioned complexity, real defence reform processes were only initiated as late as spring 2003.

¹² For more on Bosnia and Herzegovina see: Caparini, 2004:262-267; Katsirdakis, 2002:189-204; Pejanović, 2003:204-214; Šolaja, 2004:205-214; Turković, 2004:141-156.

¹³ The Army of the Federation of BiH consisted of the BiH Army, mostly a Muslim-Bosniac national armed component, and the Croatian Defence Council (the HVO), an armed component of Croats. The army of the Republika Srpska almost completely consisted of Serbs from the Republika Srpska. The armies did not have any contact, except those indispensable within the Standing Committee for Military Matters (SCMM), Standing Military Commission, inspection controls consistent with Regional Arms Control Agreement, and periodical activities initiated and organized by the international community (Šolaja, 2004:206).

The presence of the international community in BiH, SFOR in particular, encouraged slowly growing cooperation in the defence sector, which was supported by an emerging ambition for PfP and also NATO membership (expressed by the Presidency in June 2001). The crucial step forward was the decision of High Representative Ashdown in May 2003 to establish an internationally composed Defence Reform Commission with the aim to prepare the necessary laws, to harmonise defence structures with PfP standards, and to unify the armed forces command structures. Additional efforts were made towards achieving "...proper state-level command and control over the armed forces; effective parliamentary oversight of the armed forces; and, a state-level budget for defence" (Turković, 2004:141). As far as force size is concerned, "...by the end of the year 1995, the armed forces numbered 430000 troops. By early 2004 they had been reduced to a total of 21000 regulars, 12600 conscripts and 360000 reserves, with further cuts expected in the future" (Caparini, 2004:263, footnote 55). Referring to the latter, the authorities "...announced in February 2004 that it would make major reductions to the BiH armed forces, downsizing to 12000 professional soldiers in three ethnically based brigades: 8000 in the Federation Army and 4000 in the Bosnian Serb Army" (Caparini, 2004:265). However vague and restrained, the reform process had obviously begun, with downsizing as the focal point and including related activities, such as restructuring defence expenditures.¹⁴

In September 2003 the Commission managed to reach an agreement

...on recommendations for a legislative solution that will keep two entity armies, but also one headquarters commanded under the supervision of the Presidency of BiH. The state will have, in accordance with these recommendations, its own Ministry of Defence, and a common command of the armies at the state level. (Turković, 2004:150)

In the same year the BiH Defence Policy document was adopted. It is hardly imaginable that any of these changes would occur without constant, firm and strict pressure and guidance of the international community. However, having in mind the extremely difficult recent years, the progress achieved so far is clearly encouraging and could stimulate development in other areas as well. This also gives additional meaning to the issue of PfP membership, which "...is important to us because it is a recognition of certain achievements and motivation for reforms in other areas" (JDW, 2004a:34).¹⁵

The future path of an overall reform process, defence included, will depend from one point of view on simplifying and strengthening the complex federal system of government, and from another point of view on encouraging Bosnia's own elected institutions to take over greater responsibility for the process. The EU should, particularly now with Operation Althea underway, spend additional resources to support

¹⁴ SIPRI (2004:359) refers to a figure of 9.0% GDP for the year 2000 as the defence expenditure amount, which is the result of an OSCE audit. One should also bear in mind that "...the country has spent more than 5 percent of GDP in defence every year since the conclusion of the 1995 DPA" (Caparini, 2004:263).

¹⁵ The evolution and results of defence reform so far could be summed up as follows: "[t]he armed forces consist of 12,000 professionals and some further 60,000 reservists. There are also up to 10,000 conscripts very year. The ratio between forces in the Federation and Republika Srpska is two to one. That means there are 8,000 soldiers on the Federal side, and 4,000 in Republika Srpska. The same ratio, more or less, also applies to the reservists and to the number of generals. We now speak of the Army of Republika Srpska and the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as two elements of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are more and more elements of jointness rather than of division. There is now, for example, one law on defence and a whole range of different policies, covering areas such as resource and personnel management, as well as training and doctrine, which are either already being applied everywhere or will be very soon. We can still identify differences, but there are more and more common elements" (Radovanović, 2004).

positive development of defence reform (integrating the Bosnian army into Euro-Atlantic security structures, and attaining military and functional interoperability). Having in mind that the integration process is the most effective tool for consolidating and strengthening the Bosnian state, this is even more important.

3.2.3. Croatia¹⁶

Croatia's defence reform process started roughly five years ago, after the death of the country's first president Tudjman and the political change, brought about by the parliamentary election, which followed. Conditions for defence reform at first seemed appropriate: “[a]lthough Croatia became a member of PfP in May 2000, it was only in 2002 that it intensified its defence reform programme, having received unsatisfactory signals from Brussels” (Watkins, 2004a:5). The process was encouraged with admission of Croatia to MAP in May 2002 and simultaneously receiving the NATO candidate country status. A move from plans to concrete steps followed with more radical reform under the first female defence minister in the subregion, Željka Antunović, who came into office in July that year.

While an increase in capabilities had been set as the main aim of the reforms, the areas which needed immediate attention were personnel, budgetary and procurement procedures (particularly in the medium and long-term), and policy implementation (ibid). It seems that a lack of expert staffing in the form of foreign advice hindered the efforts of previous years, while the depoliticisation of the military and a difficult, but improving, economic situation proved not to be main obstacles. During last few years basic strategic documents were adopted, for example the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy (both in 2002), the Military Strategy (in 2003), and several laws on defence issues – among them the Law on Defence and the Military Service Law, both in 2002, as well as the Long-term Development Plan for the Croatian Armed Forces (CAF) and the Government Working Plan for the period 2004-2008. The size of the CAF was defined by the Decision on the Size, Composition and Mobilisation Development of the CAF in 2002. It set down approximately 30,000 peacetime personnel, including 8,000 conscripts, which together with 110,000 wartime personnel make a total strength of some 140,000 (Watkins, 2004a:8). Also the first Defence Review and the Study on the Professionalisation of the CAF are being prepared; the former scheduled to have been completed in 2004 (Caparini, 2004:269). These documents “...are based on the principle of conceptual and legal order in the area of national security and defence” (Tatalović, 2004:152), which makes a solid background for preparing the Strategic Defence Review.

Institutional reform of the defence ministry followed; it was restructured, reduced in size, and the General Staff (GS) was brought under its command. Nevertheless, personnel issues seemed to dominate the reform process, due to the oversized CAF and high personnel expenses. They amounted to over 65% of the defence budget, leaving no more than 5% for modernisation. Defence expenditures on the whole have been continuously decreasing in recent years: from 9.4% of GDP in 1995 to 5% in 1998, and 2.5% in 2002 (SIPRI, 2004:360), with 2.2% as a target figure for the coming years.

¹⁶ For more on Croatia see: Caparini, 2004:267-270; Edmunds, 2003c; Gareljić, 2004:217-233; Polić, 2003:17-20; Staničić, 2004:157-164; Tatalović, 2004:149-161; Watkins, 2004a; Watkins, 2004b:136-148.

Although in recent years Croatia "...fulfilled important preconditions to improve its security status and initiated armed forces reorganisation" (Tatalović:159), the following seem to be the main challenges in the future: the continued reform of legislative documents; addressing the continued 'confusion' in institutional relationships (especially between the MoD, the GS and the president); the improvement in education in military-security issues (including English language proficiency); addressing civil-military relations; and raising public awareness and interest in defence issues (Watkins, 2004a:11).

Defence reform in Croatia obviously is progressing, but perhaps without enough strategic vision and most probably being driven primarily by outside pressure and short-term goals. However, reform potentials seem to be sufficient, receiving strong support and expertise from internationally binding frameworks (MAP, PfP).

3.2.4. Macedonia¹⁷

The ambition to establish a defence system following current Euro-Atlantic trends and to become part of the wider transcontinental integration process was incorporated into the very beginning of the Macedonian state. The aim has been to build its own defence system and to incorporate its defence strategy into collective defence and security (Bučkovski, 2004:195). From this point of view the reform process started early and has been, though rather slow in the first decade, constant. It was characterised in the past decade by the fact that Macedonia was not involved in the war in Bosnia, but found itself on the edge of the civil war during 2001.

During the last few years the reform process has advanced, partly due to the successful incorporation of various and numerous foreign assistance as well as PfP and MAP activities. The government decided in May 2003 to conduct a Strategic Defence Review, which was reflected in the adoption of the new National Security and Defence Strategy as well as the Policy Framework that same year. This legal framework aimed to reshape the military from territorial defence to deployability and sustainability. The areas of main concern were the reduction of personnel, the adequate representation of ethnic minorities in the military in accordance with the Ohrid Agreement, the full equipping and training of personnel, as well as modernisation (Bučkovski, 2004:200-203). The issue of force restructuring is dealt with in the Resolution on Defence and Armed Forces Transformation, adopted in the parliament in May 2004, which aims to "...have an active component of about 8,600 including a reserve component of about 5,000" (ibid). Plans also include a fully professionalised army by 2008 (Caparini, 2004:271). According to governmental decision, the defence budget will in the future amount to between 2.3% to 2.6% GDP and is expected to decrease by 4.4% in real terms. It amounted to 3% in 1996, was steadily decreasing to 1.8% in 1999, and began slowly to increase to 2.8% in 2002, with an unexpected, but logical jump to 6.6% in 2001 (SIPRI, 2004:360). Personnel expenditures are to be about 50% of the available funds, operations and maintenance are to be reduced to about 30%, and equipment expenditures are to be increased to about 20% of the available budget (Bučkovski, 2004:203).

¹⁷ For more on Macedonia see: Bučkovski, 2004:195-204; Caparini, 2004:270-273; Ilievski, 2004:165-174; Ordanoski, 2002:159-171.

One could get a strong impression that the high level of intensive cooperation with the international community has paid off well for Macedonia. With the successful outcome of the EU-led Operation Concordia in late 2003, when the Berlin Plus formula was activated for the first time, defence reform process should be well on its way. It has been strongly driven by NATO's Open Door policy, reconfirmed at the Alliance's Istanbul Summit, and by the dynamic cooperation of the three MAP and Adriatic Charter countries. Additionally, the issue of defence reform and NATO membership enjoys high support in public opinion. It seems that after the crisis experienced during 2001, the activities on defence sector were enthusiastically resumed (Compare Katsirdakis, 2002:203).

Therefore it may easily be that the defence reform process, at least on a mid-term basis, could turn out as a success. This would, without any doubt, send a strong message to the subregion and to countries on their way to integration with the international community. A clear understanding of, and broad support for, the reform process makes Macedonia a highly positive example within this context.

3.2.5. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro¹⁸

The turning point towards serious defence reform was the removal of former president Milošević in 2000. Still, the complex characteristics of the Union (an increasingly loose federation, ongoing internal political rivalry in Serbia between progressive and conservative nationalistic forces, economic and social pauperisation, and the issue of Kosovo) present major reasons for the very slow pace of the reform during the last years.¹⁹

However, it looks like that crucial step forward was achieved during the service of Defence Minister Tadić, before he was elected as the President of the Union in spring 2004. Being faced with the fact that early reforms were "...mainly aimed at downsizing, with little impact on operational capacity" (Watkins, 2004a:14), he managed to place "...the GS and the military security services under the jurisdiction of the MoD, thus contributing to civilian and democratic control" (ibid). But practically, the MoD structures remained to a large extent "...unchanged, characterised by an oversized, bureaucratic and complex system of command and control with significant segments of duplication and competition" (Watkins, 2004a:16). There is a strong impression that most of the structures are in the hands of military personnel, with only a few civilian ones, who are handicapped by a lack of expertise and are marginalised in the decisionmaking process (ibid).

The reforms aim to shorten the conscription period; reduce the armed forces; and solve the question of navy; all within the framework of downsizing, restructuring, and

¹⁸ For more on Serbia and Montenegro see: Caparini, 2004:273-276; Davinić, 2004:215-226; Edmunds, 2003c; Mišković, 2004:256-262; Simić, 2004:175-187; Watkins, 2004a.

¹⁹ "The loose state union between Serbia and Montenegro provides a special factor of uncertainty. The Agreement on the Union of Serbia and Montenegro of March 2002 [known also as the Solana Paper - M.J.] transformed the state into a union of two semi-independent entities, with common foreign and defence policies and a federal presidency, but separate economic systems, currencies and customs services. However, both republics are entitled to review the status of the federation within three years and hold the option of withdrawing from the arrangement. [...] So long as Kosovo's final status remains unsolved, the constitutional composition of Serbia, and hence of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, will be uncertain" (Caparini, 2004:275).

modernising (Davinić, 2004:219). While the S-M military remains organised on the territorial principle, improvements in its organisation follow the aim of developing more flexible and operationally independent forces ('a smaller, better equipped and better paid army' – JDW, 2004b:34). Still, the military remains large and outdated, and the modernisation process is jeopardised by the shortage of money and surpluses of old equipment. Related to this is the issue of a large and also outdated defence industry, which nonetheless still employs some 30,000 personnel (Davinić, 2004:223). The current military force amounts to approximately 78,000 personnel, out of which there are 30%-35% conscripts and 20% civilians (Watkins, 2004a:17-18). For the past few years, defence expenditures averaged 3.5% GDP (from 4.8% in 1997 to 4.5% in 2002 – SIPRI, 2004:360), aiming at 2.9% in 2007, currently with over 70% personnel expenses and under 10% for modernisation (ibid). As far as strategic documents are concerned, the Constitutional Charter did not change much. Nevertheless,

...a number of key documents are now being revised, including, at the federal level, a new version of the Defence Strategy, completed at the end of February; a revised Military Doctrine; and a White Paper on defence sector reform, due in the spring 2004. National security strategies are also expected to be developed and adopted by the republic parliaments. (Caparini, 2004:274)

But the main obstacle for the further advance of reform is not part of the defence sector. It is primarily the political arena where a lack of support is obvious and constant. For the benefit of overall reform, the international community will further prioritize and insist on increased cooperation with the ICTY. But there seems to be a sufficient core understanding within the MoD (also in the officer corps), within some parts of the government, as well as within a small portion of the political leadership. They are ready to continue with reform. One could even argue, "...that defence reform, although slow, is one of the most significant areas of change in S-M, when compared to other sectors as justice, finance, etc" (Watkins, 2004a:21). Striving for PfP membership as a priority clearly demonstrates this trend, which should be more obviously encouraged and also recognised by the international community (NATO in particular). This would strengthen a fragile democracy, support radical change in the defence sector, and provide more trust in progressive forces.

3.3. Comparison

As we have seen from the presentations above, there are some important aspects, which dominate the shape of defence reform in the Western Balkans at this current stage.

First, it is the historical reasons: the military heritage of both former socialist Albania and Yugoslavia, as well as the leftovers from the Bosnian war.²⁰ The former is reflecting primarily in the structural problems of the S-M defence system and armed forces in particular, while the latter is primarily noticeable in the case of BiH, struggling to establish one single MoD, military, and chain of command. Both countries also present complex and complicated state structures, where outside pressure so far has played an important role in achieving any progress. Perhaps the issue of PfP membership is the

²⁰ Historical background is highly important. It is the military, political and social traditions which primarily determine the behaviour of individual actors. In times of immense change this impact is obvious and effective, and it may easily prove to be a burden.

most illustrative one. Croatia seems to almost have overcome, or at least is well on the way to doing so, what it inherited from the Bosnian war.²¹ For the three MAP participants as a whole, the situation is more promising because of being part of a well-functioning framework of mechanisms, which encourage and drive the reform tempo.

Second, it is the strong intention and ambition of the countries concerned to integrate with the international community. Successful implementation of defence reform offers perhaps the most important tool and opportunity for achieving this goal, after a decade of war devastation and de facto isolation, when the presence of the international community was more or less reduced to various forms of intervention. This membership ambition, or the prospect of integration, is connected with the double role which the international community has in the subregion. This ambivalence "...is inclined or obliged to push reforms not fully willed or even understood by the local population, because it is motivated in large part by its own security concerns regarding a region so close to European heartland" (Caparini, 2004:280-281). There are at least two instruments with which the international community imposed its will and intention to either end the war or prevent it in the subregion, and highly influenced the institution building process, namely the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Both crucially influenced the situation in the countries concerned and at least in the subregion as a whole, serving from one point of view as a means of regulating terms among formerly warring parties, and from another point of view as a procedural framework that governs future development (ibid).

Third, there are important similarities and differences in how defence reform has been pursued. In all five countries concerned the decisive push for real reform occurred in the beginning of this decade. It has primarily come as a consequence of regime changes in Croatia and S-M which directly resulted in changed security conditions. However, significant progress only came later during 2002-2003. Basic strategic documents were adopted in various countries, which influenced the process of rightsizing (primarily downsizing, and in some cases combined with the reestablishment of the armed forces). The realistic approach to reform still seems to be difficult everywhere, hence there are often delays in adopting these documents and implementing tasks according to plan (which often used to appear in the form of promises to outside actors). There is still no sufficient influx of budgetary resources guaranteed, while we can at the same time witness the decrease of defence expenditures in practically each country's case. This is primarily a structural paradox: too high expenditures exhaust national economies and too much money goes for personnel costs of oversized armies, which lack modern equipment. The necessary political, as well public, support for defence reform varies in different countries. It seems, however, that in some cases there is already enough core political understanding and support, with at least sufficient support and preparedness within military circles. This influences the need to keep in mind the necessity of constant adaptation of mid- and long-term reform plans according to changes in the security environment.

²¹ However, full cooperation with the ICTY remains to be the condition: "To be sure, challenges remain that should not be underestimated. Individuals indicted for war crimes from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro remain at liberty and undermine their countries' prospects of further Euro-Atlantic integration. Serbia and Montenegro's international rehabilitation may only become irreversible when it has met all the requirements for PfP membership, including surrendering the most notorious war-crimes suspects on its territory, and is admitted into the programme" (Serry, Bennett, 2004).

Fourth, it is quite obvious that membership ambitions and activities are the main driving force of the reform process. This means practically that the reforms so far have been primarily the result of constant pressure from the international community, combined with both the decreasing amount of defence expenditures and changes in the security environment. It is important to bear in mind that the mentioned external pressure has been accompanied with constant donations (resources, expertise, and support) pouring into the subregion as well as in the countries concerned.

4. The Way Ahead

It is our guess that two starting points would make the way ahead possible. From one point of view it is strong awareness that all of the five countries' problems and concerns are closely interconnected and relate heavily to "...the region's complex and rapidly changing security environment" (Ifantis, 2001:115). This will have to influence more the behaviour of local actors and drive them strongly towards closer cooperation – not posing a threat to each other anymore but instead being willing to address risks and challenges together. From another point of view, it seems that after last year's dual enlargement, the subregion is more strongly than ever bound in a firm security structure which should be able to produce more security than was the case in the past.²² One could suppose that the security ring which NATO and EU members form around the Western Balkans would produce more stability and security in the subregion, and would help to prevent that increasingly lesser degree of instability and insecurity which is generated and spread out of the subregion. This enhances our strong belief that there can be no development without integration and that further stability will rely even more on the successful implementation of defence reform. It would also underline the importance of the relationship between development and security, which are 'inextricably linked' (United Nations, 2004:viii).

Having in mind the subregion's complex and still uncertain stability, this may also be stated in another way: positive and continuing progress of defence reform (and security sector reform as whole) in the subregion, regulated through democratic political means, will surely have a positive effect on the overall situation; whereas any clearly articulated negative trends in whichever country will adversely affect the situation in each country and in the subregion as a whole. This is even more important, bearing in mind the subregion's security environment is more susceptible to negative effects than it is to positive influences. The former unfortunately still far outweigh the latter. It is, therefore, obvious that the Euro-Atlantic perspective gives an extremely powerful and crucial momentum to the development of these countries, irrespective of their existing political configuration. Since defence and other reforms are mainly driven by the Western Balkan states' membership ambitions, it will be important also in the future to tie these ambitions to the fulfillment of the membership criteria. For the three countries which were involved in the war in Bosnia full cooperation with the ICTY is of utmost importance. Extradition of persons who have been indicted for war crimes shows the ability and willingness to comply with the mission of the Tribunal. Additionally, this issue may also provide insight into the sustainability of the overall reform process, especially if the criteria are weakened in the interest of smooth integration.

The way ahead has two sides, one for the international community and one for the countries concerned. The international community should continue applying pressure, though this should gradually evolve in its form and substance. It is questionable if the pure form of conditionality (Compare Lunn, 2003) is still suitable and acceptable, while more cooperative and stimulating approaches could be implemented ('more patient and focused and better coordinated' – Watkins, 2004a:21). This would mean that at the same

²² At this point we could bring our attention to various characteristics of European security processes. Their complementarity stands out, having in mind that it can certainly be described as the basis for the enlargement processes, and be explained in the following way: the more subjects are included, the wider is the area of security and stability, and the wider is the network of security institutions which have a positive effect on releasing tensions and reducing generated conflicts (Jazbec, 2002:35).

time, the international community needs to gradually reduce the sponsorship function where some of its bodies act as more or less de facto authorities (as in BiH). Consequently, such an approach should coincide with more tangible strengthening of the local administrative and democratic authorities, i.e. with the institution-building processes. It is also the case in the Western Balkans that reform processes, defence included, "...[are] not only to identify suitable policy content but also to ensure the political process by which it is developed, implemented and sold to key stakeholders and the public opinion is one that strengthens democracy itself" (Caparini, 2004:282). Having in mind last year's transition from SFOR to EUFOR in BiH and the Berlin Plus operation in Macedonia, it is advisable to further strengthen the passage from the hard security approach to the soft security approach. This goes well with the possibly increased role of the EU, PfP and NGOs in the subregion.

With the presented approach one could expect that the countries concerned would finally not only understand but also accept the necessity to replace all types of confrontation with cooperation. The international community needs to be able to contribute to this fundamental change of values as well: "[p]articipation in IFOR/SFOR and in KFOR missions provided the best lessons in co-operative security and the evolution of the regional strategic culture of the European and Euro-Atlantic type – a fundamental prerequisite for improved homogeneity of the states in the region" (Pantev, 2001:130). This would mean that they would no longer be willing to rely on conflict as a historically proven means of solving disputes, but would be ready to progress and accept all possible types of cooperation. It is also upon the international community to help face this challenge, to introduce the customs of addressing open issues through political means, and through consensus building as a way of finding solutions.

Finally, some concrete recommendations should be mentioned for the further orientation of the defence reform process in the Western Balkans. They primarily draw from the efforts of the countries in transition and NATO members as well, who have been facing this major post-Cold War undertaking for some time already (Katsirdakis, 2002:203-204).

First, after coping with and accepting the urgent need to create the conceptual basis for reform, these strategic documents, including the legal framework, have to undergo regular updating. This part of reform is under constant influence of changes in the security environment and should be undertaken consequently.

Second, an effective defence planning system, once established, should remain the basic framework for pursuing reform. It should be constantly adjusted and updated.

Third, a constant influx of resources should be provided and guaranteed. Hence the reform process is a long-term one, at no stage easy nor comfortable.

Fourth, public support remains among the most important conditions. This requires political understanding, constant transparency in the decisionmaking and budgeting, as well as full information availability.

To sum up, one should strongly recommend that, as far as the defence reform process is concerned, the *a) Croatia*, being already out of the critical stage and midway on the success path, sustains and spills over the positive effect to other countries in the subregion; *b) that Macedonia, and Albania in particular manage to fully keep in touch*

with the quickening pace of cooperation, stemming from MAP, PfP and related activities; *c)* that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro both fully adopt the PfP framework and then proceed step by step up its scale, constantly strengthening their institutions at the same time; and, *d)* that all the five countries, while absorbing provided experience and expertise, fully demonstrate the necessary willingness to learn from each other.

5. Conclusion

We could state that the group of the Western Balkans countries, while being strongly and decisively pushed by the international community, began implementing an "...overall defence system and armed forces reform due to [their] recognition of changes in the security environment, reduction of defence resources and new international commitments" (Tatalović, 2004:157). Generally speaking, the countries concerned pursue this endeavour with "...the aim to develop modern, capable, well equipped and cost-effective armed forces" (ibid). The latter also could be described as the goal of defence reform *per se*. With the adoption of strategic documents and legal frameworks, and with rightsizing already going through its beginning stages, the first phase of reform is most probably finished. One can not say it was easy, and much remains to be done.

The constant adaptation of strategic documents to changes in the security environment; the task to incorporate into them the current trends of NATO, EU, OSCE, UN and other international players; and the constant evaluation of the force structure and the defence system organisation are only a few of challenges that stand out. This goes well with the necessity of maintaining the continuous process of long-term planning for the defence sector, as well as the need of adapting, reviewing and implementing these plans. Also, the international community faces additional challenges, while increasing its sensitivity to events on the ground.

The general and basic desire of the Western Balkan countries remains clear: a gradual and certain integration of the entire area into the system of Euro-Atlantic establishments.²³ This depends on compliance with the criteria and the constant demonstration of progress, as well as on substantial support from and participation of the international community. However, political oversight by international representatives should not undermine the developing democratic institutions, but rather encourage them strongly in assuming their role and responsibility. This even more, having in mind some of important characteristics of the current year: 2005 is the first year of the EU-led operation in BiH, but also the first year after the 2004 dual enlargement of both NATO and the EU; it is the year of expecting evident progress towards PfP membership of both BiH and S-M; for the latter it is also a strong reminder to tackle soon the question of a loose federation's future; and last but not least, the year when the future of Kosovo and its formula 'standards before status' are expected to be addressed. The atmosphere of a 'post-conflict stabilisation' (Caparini, 2004:251) period marks the broader political and security framework which determines the future tempo and dynamic of the overall reform process. Hence, there are no reasons that this should discourage the advance of defence reform in the subregion.

However, it could stimulate this process, having in mind its importance for the internal development in each country concerned, as well as its integration potential for the subregion as a whole. Defence reforms have already proved themselves as one of the most important and influential parts of the overall reform process in the countries discussed. Further successes of the latter will also in the future undoubtedly depend on the continuous progress of the former.

²³ This would be even more clear having in mind that the crucial question "...that has to be asked is: will keeping the country outside Euro-Atlantic integration processes aid or hinder the further development of peace and stability in the region?" (Watkins, 2004a:25).

With an ambition to wrap up the discussion on the subject presented, three groups of main conclusions seem to be appropriate to point out.

First, only after the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement were the circumstances to initiate the process of defence reform present, although two countries in the subregion were not involved in the war in Bosnia.

The following years brought the necessary political will as well as outside pressure, which pushed reform forward in particular during 2002 and 2003. This has contributed to the stabilisation of the subregion, and has resulted in the first tangible returns from establishing a defence sector according to modern standards. All of the five countries adopted basic strategic and legal documents, and all started with rightsizing their oversized armed forces.

Second, cooperation among countries, MoDs, and their militaries has increased and contributed to improved regional networking.

Consequently the enhanced confidence has helped to decrease tensions between the countries. Outside instruments, in particular MAP, PfP and numerous NGOs have decisively contributed to this changed configuration. The need to replace conflict with cooperation and consensus-building is being experienced increasingly, and is supported by the international community.

Third, a tangible contribution to the new security, political and defence environment of the subregion has been made. Countries of the region no longer present a threat to each other, but instead are beginning to cooperate on an interagency level in order to address current security risks and challenges.

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