



Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed  
Forces (DCAF)

Occasional Paper - №7

**Restoring Policing Systems in Conflict Torn Nations:  
Process, Problems, Prospects**

*Otwin Marenin*

Geneva, June 2005



GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF  
ARMED FORCES (DCAF)

OCCASIONAL PAPER - №7

**Restoring Policing Systems in Conflict Torn Nations:  
Process, Problems, Prospects**

*Otwin Marenin*

Geneva, June 2005

### **About the Author**

Otwin Marenin is Professor of Political Science and Criminal Justice at Washington State University. He has written extensively on comparative policing, police reform and democratisation processes. Recent publications in this area include books edited with Marina Caparini, *Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe: Process and Progress*, and with Dilip Das, *Challenges of Policing Democracies: A World Perspective*, as well as numerous journal articles and seminar papers.

Copyright © 2005 by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

ISBN 92-9222-026-8

---

DCAF Occasional Papers are essays contributing to the policy dialogue on issues pertaining to the core mission of DCAF. These essays are commissioned by DCAF. The views and opinions expressed are, however, those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of DCAF.

# Table of Contents

<b>Abstract</b> .....	i
<b>1. Introduction</b> .....	1
<b>2. Ideational and Policy Contexts for Reforms</b> .....	3
2.1. The Development-Security Nexus.....	3
2.1.1. The Multiple Meanings and Conditions of (In)Security .....	3
2.1.2. Justifying Concepts for International Reform Projects .....	6
2.1.3. Security Sector Reform as a Policy Field .....	11
2.1.4. The Police in SSR.....	16
2.2. The Human Factor in Reform Projects.....	22
2.2.1. Donors .....	23
2.2.2. The Transnational Policy Community .....	23
2.2.3. Local actors .....	25
2.3. Discourses and Policy Arenas in Policing .....	27
2.3.1. Police and Policing as Fields of Action .....	27
2.3.2. The Production of Democratic Policing Regimes.....	28
2.3.3. Understanding Organizational Reconstruction and Reforms .....	31
<b>3. Lessons Learned</b> .....	32
3.1. Domestic Contexts.....	32
3.1.1. Historical Trajectories .....	33
3.1.2. The Contours of Insecurity .....	35
3.1.3. Local Needs and Capacities .....	36
3.2. Strategic Lessons.....	37
3.2.1. Deal with the Complexities and the Simplicities of Policing .....	38
3.2.2. Expect to Be Blind-sided by Local Contexts .....	41
3.2.3. Develop an Integrated Approach to Local Resilience .....	41
3.2.4. Be Aware of Sequencing Dynamics .....	42
3.2.5. Focus on Process and Reproduction.....	43
3.2.6. Take a Long-term View as Well as a Short-term View of Reforms .....	44
3.2.7. Think Circularly, not Linearly.....	45
3.2.8. Learn from Positive as Well as Negative Experiences .....	47
3.3. Tactical Lessons .....	48
3.3.1. Consider the Targets of Implementation.....	48
3.3.2. Develop an Implementation Capacity .....	49
3.3.3. Go Looking for Local Owners and Help Build Their Capacity .....	50

3.3.4. Deal with Non-state Actors .....	51
3.3.5. Focus on Creating a Functioning Police Organization .....	52
3.3.6. Stress Principles and Goals, not Models .....	53
3.3.7. Start from Insecurity .....	54
3.3.8. Develop Transitional Justice Mechanisms .....	54
3.3.9. Pay Attention to the Whole Security Field .....	55
<b>3.4. Pragmatic Lessons .....</b>	<b>55</b>
3.4.1. Select the Right People .....	55
3.4.2. Allow for Flexibility by Implementers .....	56
3.4.3. Talk ‘Police Talk’ .....	56
3.4.4. Exploit the Luck and Good Fortune which Comes Your Way .....	57
3.4.5. Not Everything Will Turn Out Perfect.....	57
3.4.6. Avoid Drift to Minimal Competencies .....	57
3.4.7. The Payoff Is in the Streets .....	58
<b>4. Concluding Thoughts .....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>References.....</b>	<b>62</b>

## **Abstract**

The goal of reconstructing policing systems which embody and embrace democratic norms has achieved an honoured place on the global security agenda. The need to secure minimal levels of security in transitional, developing, war-torn and post-conflict societies, and to keep local violence and conflicts from spilling over into regional arenas, has led to numerous efforts by international actors and donors to help local states and societies construct effective and fair public security systems. The paper examines efforts by the UN but also by regional organizations, NGOs, bilateral donors and domestic political and police actors to promote and structure reforms. Sufficient examples now exist to extract and suggest lessons on the process required to establish functioning and democratic policing systems. The paper will draw on existing academic literatures, reports by governments, international organizations and NGOs, and personal interactions with actors in this field to summarize what we know, and what we still lack information on, about how to plan for and implement the restoration of policing systems.





# Restoring Policing Systems in Conflict Torn Nations: Process, Problems, Prospects

*Otwin Marenin*

## 1. Introduction

Reforming, transforming and reconstructing policing and public security systems which provide effective and humane protection against crime, violence and civic strife has gained an honoured place on the global policy agenda, has led to much discussion in domestic and transnational policy making fora about the need for and the means to bring about greater levels of security in states and societies beset by violence, and has engendered numerous international and regional efforts which seek to deal with the consequences of political and social instability and prevent their reoccurrence. Security and the necessity of establishing at least minimal levels of social order have come to be seen as prerequisites for political and economic development, good governance and the achievement of human security, broadly defined (Broszka, 2003; DFID, 2002; UN, 2002; Winkler, 2002).

A number of societies and states have experienced extensive periods of violent conflict and insecurity - ranging from genocidal mass killings, massive intercommunal violence, the collapse of the state and its security apparatuses, prolonged civil strife, rampaging state and non-state armed forces, warlordism, normal and organized crime, to a pervasive sense among civic society that their persons, properties, routines of life and hopes for the future are consistently at risk. These post conflict societies - the victims of the intersecting forces of globalization, new forms of war and violence, and histories of domestically generated instability, conflicts and insecurity - are a threat to their own people (by their failures and inabilities to construct and sustain functioning security systems and by the corrupt, arbitrary and repressive behaviour of state security organizations), to regional and international stability and security, and to the possibility of establishing a global system of governance (or a stable system of interrelationships among states, societies and cultures) which protects the rights and needs of all states and their civic societies.

Numerous cases and projects where domestic and international actors have sought to create, reconstruct or reform public security systems in post-conflict states can provide a basis for assessing their consequences. The basic question addressed here is this: what lessons have been learned from past attempts to restore functioning public security and policing systems in conflict torn societies (e.g., Afghanistan, the Balkans, Cambodia, East Timor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa) through international assistance and domestic reform efforts; and how can those lessons be adapted and applied to new situations.

More specifically, one can ask: what has been learned about the process which has to be engaged in to establish effective and democratic security policing systems in conflict torn nations?

What have been the goals and what have been the indicators and measures used to assess the successes and failures of reforms and reconstruction? What factors influence whether reforms and reconstruction will be come institutionalized, legitimized and sustained (or not) in domestic settings once international support efforts cease?

The histories of specific reforms projects have been much written about, and have been discussed and dissected in multiple domestic and international fora, with the ultimate goal of extracting best practices and lessons learned which will provide guidelines or templates for future interventions and projects (which everyone assumes will be needed, given the nature of the global state system at the beginning of the twenty-first century). Extracting the right lessons and avoiding wrong ones has required detailed and complex analyses of how specific reform efforts have been planned, implemented, and assessed by observers, policy planners and implementers, as well as of the objective and ideational international/regional and domestic contexts which have both enabled and constrained the process of carrying out reforms and have shaped the likelihood of success or failure of reform programs.

The description of contexts, the assessment of lessons available and learned or not learned, and recommendations/suggestions for further policy innovation in this paper are based on existing academic literatures, reports by governments, international organizations and NGOs, public media stories, and personal interactions - in conferences, workshops, and chats over a beer - with actors in this field.

I argue that police reform projects have been influenced by two parallel but diverse discourses, policy streams and contexts at the international, transnational, and regional levels: one might be called the discovery of the development-security nexus, leading, in turn, to policy discussions on the need by the global community and transnational actors to be involved in peace-building, the promotion of human security broadly defined, and security sector reform (SSR); the second policy stream has centred on and responded to developments in the field of police and policing, including the emergence of international democratic policing regimes, and general approaches to reform and innovation of policing organizations and policing and public security systems.

Lessons from peace-building and SSR, and from projects seeking to change policing in diverse societies and states, collide and coalesce (sometimes) in various patterns within the specific contexts of post-conflict societies and in specific police reform, transformation or reconstruction projects sought to be implemented there. Though there have been a large number of police reform projects, lessons specifically learned from and targeted to policing issues (analogous to SSR lessons) have not been consolidated (but see discussions by Neild, 2001, 2002). This paper will attempt to do so and will assess, as well, the strengths and weaknesses of lessons in both policy streams, in terms of their relevance and applicability to police reform in post-conflict societies. The best lessons ultimately gained from specific reform projects partake of the general lessons learned from SSR and policing reform projects, suitably modified to fit specific local contexts in which they are implemented.

The definitions of goals and the planning and implementation of strategies and tactics for producing reforms in local policing systems are not givens, obvious to any observer. They are the consequences of human agency, choices made or foregone by considerations of values, interests and knowledge of the actors involved in reform projects at the international and the local levels. The coming together of lessons from

both policy streams and their adaptation to the particular circumstances and requirements of police reform projects in a society is the work of the transnational policy community (TPC) - working in partnership with local actors - whose members are routinely involved or called upon to theorize and carry out what needs to be done. The TPC is the connecting link between the international or global community and its priorities and local needs and demands. The lessons ultimately discussed here, about what needs to be done to create effective and democratic policing systems, are based on the work and reports of the TPC and their local counterparts.

## **2. Ideational and Policy Contexts for Reforms**

Police reforms on the ground - in post-conflict societies, in their towns, villages and communities - are carried out within a set of nestled objective and subjective contexts all of which, in their reciprocal interactions, shape the perceived needs and goals of reform; lead to the involvement of specific actors; preference particular ideologies and modes of thought by which to understand and frame the basic problems and dilemmas of reform; establish the basic goals, strategies and tactics to be pursued in the process of reform and implementation; constrain the practical possibilities and dynamics of reform efforts; and help determine whether and to what degree reforms will be sustained and legitimated at the local level.

### **2.1. The Development-Security Nexus**

#### **2.1.1. The Multiple Meanings and Conditions of (In)Security**

Ways in which security needs and their dimensions and causes in post-conflict societies have been conceptualized, as well as the increasing awareness at international and domestic political and policy levels of the impacts of global conditions on the opportunities and prospects for improving local security, achieving governance reforms, and economic progress swirl around broad understandings of the causes of insecurity and the nature of post-conflict societies. The pervasive insecurity characteristic of pre- and post-conflict societies (weak state structure, the emergence of non-state (in)security actors, a lack of capacity by civil society to confront the state or deal with conditions of insecurity) has become an issue on the global agenda, an issue which extends far beyond the question of security and has become linked to a larger set of political and economic priorities for the global community.

#### ***The Globalization of Insecurity***

Globalization, the “dynamic process of change characterized by the growing cross border flows of trade, investments, finances, technology, ideas, cultures, values, and people” (Kugler and Frost, 2001: 4), has created new dilemmas for achieving peace and prosperity from the local to the global levels. Public and private economic entities compete worldwide for control of resources and profits; the line between domestic and international politics has been blurred if not erased; borders are more difficult to fortify as security threats are increasingly transnational, fluid, networked, changing and

facilitated by new technologies; cultures clash; and people move - legally, illegally and as refugees and asylum seekers to safer political and economic havens. Peace and security require a global response (Duffield, 2001; Kaldor, 1999, 2001; Worcester et al, 2002).

The failure to achieve economic development and political stability for over four/fifth of the world's states, the increasing interconnectedness of domestic and global concerns, and the emergence of contesting power centres outside the state - all have led to much disillusionment and uncertainty, in all societies, about the ultimate nature of the global system and the values enshrined in new institutions, practices and policies. Democracy is bandied about by some as the emergent victorious hegemonic value and all-purpose solution on the global scene; while others argue for the superiority of cultural and religious value systems; while others, still, bow to the inevitability and utility of technological progress. What is missing among these contesting views is a sense that the new order is or will be a just one, that a widely held conception of justice can overcome the simultaneous fragmenting and integrating impacts of globalization. The world has become smaller physically, culturally and psychologically, yet no consensual conception of legitimate global governance to replace the nation-state system nor of how state to state and global and local interactions are to be structured has emerged.

One consequence of the failures of development, the availability of arms and identity-based motivations to use them, and the weakness of traditional control mechanisms mostly centred on states has been an explosion of massive episodes of inter-communal violence, civil wars, warlordism, organized crime, transnational state to state aggression, chaotic violence in the form of terrorist attacks, and the explosion of transnational organized crime. The concept of security has little meaning in such conditions beyond physical survival until violence ebbs and minimal order is restored (Dziedzic, 2001; Oakley et al, 1998).

Many efforts have been undertaken to deal with the devastating consequences of large and small insecurities, to prevent their re-occurrence, and to seek to reconcile and reassure participants that they will be treated on the bases of what they have done, and in a just and fair manner, in some states following extended periods of state repression (such as truth and reconciliation commissions in South Africa, Guatemala or Argentina), in societies which have experienced intercommunal violence reaching genocidal levels (as with the gacaca process in Rwanda), in failed states when the complete collapse of the state required international interventions to keep and build the peace, or in transitional/developing societies seeking a way forward (Stedman et al, 2002).<sup>1</sup>

A common goal in all these societies as they seek to deal with recent history have been programs to reform, transform or reconstruct functioning security and policing systems. Given the weaknesses of many states, the transnational and diffuse nature and dynamics of insecurity, and the desire by states and communities to be both safe and accepted within the international community, much of the impetus for achieving higher levels of security have come, unavoidably, from state and non-state actors working at the global and sub-national levels.

---

<sup>1</sup> See Alert 2004 (2004) for an extensive and comprehensive list of conflicts and international interventions.

## *The Conditions of Post-conflict Societies*

Domestic contexts are unique in their specific histories and current insecurity configurations and dynamics; yet post-conflict societies also share similar traits with other 'post-conflict' societies and with other categories of states, e.g., 'transitional societies'. The empirical demarcations among between types or categories of states are probably less clear than analytical frameworks and theories posit. Rather than devise categories of countries it may be more useful to "approach the problem of inadequate security sector governance in terms of contextual criteria" (Ball, 2002: 14), such as political, normative, institutional, societal capacity, economic and geopolitical contexts. Post authoritarian, post-conflict or developmental countries can be ranged along various axes which describe the most important characteristics which led to classification and categorization, hence are heuristic and useful exercises (see Hänggi, 2004: 10 for a very well laid out example). Yet not thinking about contexts for security within defined categorizations, thinking of types of states as having (fairly) unique or at least distinct traits, allows learning lessons which are appropriate for post-conflict societies from all states in which security reforms and innovations have been attempted. Lessons about post-conflict societies, though profoundly shaped and dependent by contexts, can be learned from all societies in which states, civic society and transnational actors have grappled with security issues. Though I will focus primarily on post-conflict societies for lessons on how to reconstruct policing systems I will use, as well, examples from all states where international and domestic efforts to promote security and police reforms have been undertaken.

The general conditions of post-conflict societies which necessitate reform, and lead to agreements by local leaders to accept assistance from the outside, are histories of violence and current conditions insecurity which are pervasive, massive and persistent.

Hänggi's (2004: 13-14) summation captures the basic aspects of state, civic society and security typically found in post-conflict societies as they are "emerging from internal or inter-state conflict [and are] embarking on a process of reconstructing all parts of the public sector which had been destroyed or become dysfunctional." Such states are "characterised by weak state institutions, a fragile inter-ethnic and political situation, with influential armed security forces, both statutory and non-statutory, and precarious economic conditions." At the same time there generally exists a "strong will to accept external support for all kinds of reforms, even in the most sensitive areas such as the security sector." Local and global actors must "deal with specific legacies of the past, such as "oversized armed forces which need to be downsized or right-sized; surplus weapons that need to be removed, antipersonnel mines that need to be removed, large numbers of perpetrators that need to be prosecuted," as well as the "disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration needs of former combatants" and the need for "judicial capacity building to permit transitional justice." Largely as a consequence of the destruction wrought by conflict and the availability of weapons and ex-soldiers with no jobs, there is an immediate need and demand for public security which, if not addressed effectively, will undermine local will and the capacity to achieve reforms which last.

As Duffield notes (2001: 171), a shadow economy is typical of post-conflict societies and regions, such as a trade in "small arms [which] are regularly circulated and recirculated from conflict to conflict through networks in the shadow economy", leading to interconnections between state and non-state regulated systems of trade which have drawn favourably located state officials (border officials, contract government

functionaries, customs officials, police) into a vast network of complicity in the trade, and “into a huge process of reclassification and falsification [or paper work] without which the shadow economy would not be possible” (p.171). Instability, security threats, weak state agencies and corruption go hand in hand, and will spill over into regional arenas.<sup>2</sup>

Violence and fear in post conflict societies are generated by state and non-state actors; there has been an extensive diffusion of threats away from the state. What people fear are organized crime, normal crime, civic violence, local militias acting without the law and with little conscience. The state and its agencies continue to be part of the insecurity generating elements in society through arbitrary, brutal and corrupt actions, but non-state actors are free to roam and inflict violence on people. In response, to the failure of the state to provide for security, or restrain its own coercive agencies, people have taken security into their own hands, through vigilante actions, the creation and support for non-state security providing groups (such as ethnic militias), or, in the case of those who can afford it, the hire of private security guards from local and international companies (the so-called PSCs and PMCs).

Many of the obstacles obstructing the creation of a more effective provision of security in post-conflict states arise from the persistence of non-state actors engaged in the security sector. Not only do privatized and community based security actors complicate the dynamics of security and solutions which are state based, the issue of whether and how to absorb, disband or eliminate non-state actors, that is whether to return the monopoly of legitimate force to a revitalized state, vastly increases the domain of security which must be reformed.

Yet, at the same time, post-conflict societies provide greater opportunities to rebuild security systems from the ground up. Post-conflict societies are seen by the international community as more amenable to reform than other states, since few state institutions have survived and much of the normal apparatus of government has to be reconstructed. The field is more open and the options are more extensive (Brzoska, 2003: 32). “War-torn societies often offer unparalleled opportunities to reconceptualize and to reshape policing institutions and doctrines” (Neild, 2001: 38). The need and demand for global and regional interventions is salient as is the receptivity of local elites to international financed reform projects.

### 2.1.2. Justifying Concepts for International Reform Projects

#### *Peacebuilding*

Peacebuilding has joined the international lexicon of justifications for international and bilateral intervention in unstable and conflict ridden societies, expanding conventional understandings of the reasons for and the roles of interveners in peacekeeping interventions, while human security has replaced state security as a more encompassing goal and criterion for the need and success of assistance projects. The needs for

---

<sup>2</sup> For example, former combatants in the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, who have failed to find jobs, are now being actively recruited to join secessionist fighting in Guinea and Ivory Coast, and many respond, “lured by the short-term promise of what ever benefits they can get from looting” (Sengupta, 2004).

reconstruction following successful peacekeeping operations, which stop the violence but do not address or encourage changes in the underlying conditions which led to conflict in the first place, has become obvious. Merely stopping the fighting is not enough. In the absence of strong states or 'state-analogous' actors, the responsibilities for creating conditions favourable to long term stability and the tasks of reconstructing functioning security systems have fallen to international donors, the transnational policy community, and humanitarian NGOs, working with local actors, until such time as the local state and civic society can assume greater responsibilities for their own security and good governance. Being a new policy arena, many basic problems have not yet reached satisfactory conclusion, such as: what are the proper relationships between international and domestic (sovereign) actors, and among international actors (donor agencies and people working in international/regional organizations), or what are the minimal conditions when assistance and advice for reforms is necessary (e.g., humanitarian interventions) are invited and accepted (ICISS, 2001), and what forms of participation in decision-making, policy planning and implementation, and impact assessments will legitimately reflect the values and interests of all relevant actors.

What makes peacebuilding and its linkage to development noteworthy is not that conventional development issues are "truly novel phenomena but that they are 'securitized', which means that they are explicitly characterised and treated as security concerns" (Hänggi, 2004: 5). Peace-building, at its core, challenges the notion of national sovereignty and argues the responsibility to intervene in humanitarian crises, which are by nature complex emergencies, making it impossible to state precisely when and how interventions should be done. But, so it is argued, it should not be left up to the state, or rather the controllers of the state to determine when global governors decide to step in. For example, the recent history of brutal violence and conflicts in West Africa "brings into clear relief the [weaknesses of the] modern nation-state in Africa and the importance of consistently generating regional responses. The responsibility to prevent, manage and transform conflict should not be hobbled by the Westphalian logic of state sovereignty" (Fayemi, 2004: 200). Globalized insecurity, and its international and domestic consequences, require no less.

Additionally, in a reciprocal manner, the "association of conflict with underdevelopment" has led to connecting security and development, such that now "the promotion of development has become synonymous with the pursuit of security. At the same time, security has become a prerequisite for sustainable development" (Duffield, 2001:37). In response to new wars and this conflation, "development has emerged reinvigorated. It has been given a new sense of purpose and international role, despite a half-century of failure" of development efforts (p. 118).

Yet despite over ten years of experience, the "results of peacebuilding policy and practice have been as hoc, tentative, and uneven" (Tschirgi, 2004: i). One of the persistent obstacles to more effective peacebuilding outcomes is "the chronic inability of international actors to adapt their assistance to the political dynamics of the war-torn societies they seek to support. The external-internal disconnect manifest itself at the conceptual, policy, operational and institutional levels" (p. i). Peace, security, stability cannot "be imposed from the outside but need to be nurtured internally through patient, flexible, responsive strategies that are in tune with domestic political realities" (p. ii). That major lesson is clear, yet how it should guide the development of a process for peacebuilding and security enhancement is less so.

A major drawback in thinking about peacekeeping is that it tends to be conceived of in policy rather than political terms, as a rational policy response to a specified, if complex, problem (e.g., Ball et al, 2003). The basic approach consists of a sequence of steps which, if properly enacted, will lead incrementally to the desired goal. Step one will lead to step two and so on. That was the logic which underlay policy planning by the US before in the invasion of Iraq. Defeat the enemy, establish order, go on to political stability and then to democratic transformation. Little in the way of contingency planning, or the notion that things might not go smoothly, seems to have entered the thinking of policy makers. The planning looks forward rather than backwards, from a problem and what to do next, than from a desired endstate, which is clearly spelled out in some detail, to what it would take to get there and how to deal with things which will go wrong, which they always do. Whatever flexibility exists to adjust to circumstances is left to the unguided, except by the broadest criteria, discretion of the implementers. Yet what happens is that adjustments on the fly in step one or two or three will undermine the neatly laid out sequence of expected events in succeeding steps.

### *Human Security*

Human security has emerged in recent years as a key concept - both as a goal to be achieved and as the standard for judging success or failure - in discussions of political and economic development; the unsettling impacts of globalization on people, communities and states; the processes by which domestic order, stability and safety may be guaranteed to citizens, communities, and regimes; the attainment of a just global order; and the peaceful resolution of fears, anger, resentment, revenge and hatreds which led to conflicts. 'Human security' redefines and broadens the meaning of what people need and want to be and feel secure. "Security is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing." (OECD, 2004: 16). In addition, the "shift in focus to human security also highlights the importance of scrutinizing global pressures that may impact on, even jeopardize, security and the global governance structures which drive these processes" (Thomas, 2000: 9).

This broader conception of security was first introduced in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, and had two foci: one was a redefinition of threats to security, to include other-than-military threats to a state's or nation's survival; and the second was that the "objective of security policy should not be the security of the state - the main unit of concern in traditional security policy - but the security of individuals" (Brzoska, 2003: 19). Human security as a policy goal has infiltrated the thinking of policy elites at the international and domestic levels, and has led to a variety of institutional arrangements which support the planning and implementation of policies to that end. Development aid and assistance offered by international, regional and bilateral donors and through a large variety programs delivered by NGOs, frequently and specifically use the notion human security as the criterion for what needs to be done (or what is the problem) and how progress can be measured.

The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) (2000) recommended greater emphasis in peace-keeping operations on peace-building,



the rule of law, and the need for greater security measures. Individual states have also developed agencies within their foreign policy bureaucracies to support reforms in the security field, such as the Office of Transition Initiatives in USAID and in 2004, following the chaotic insecurity conditions in Iraq and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State (US Department of State, press release, 2004)<sup>3</sup> – a more comprehensive and detailed description of security assistance projects done by US agencies can be found in Isacson and Ball (2003); the Department for International Development in the UK; the creation of a Peacebuilding Fund by Canada, jointly managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian aid agency, CIDA; the Directorate of Crisis Management and Humanitarian Assistance by The Netherlands; or the Post-Conflict Unit in the World Bank. All these initiatives took place in the late 1990s (see Tschirgi, 2004: 5-7, for a more detailed discussion).

The concept of human security provides a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of the problems faced and the ultimate goals to be achieved than does a more narrow focus on economic development, political stability, the control of violence, or the promotion of human rights. Being as broadly conceptualized as has been the practice, the concept encompasses a bundle of cognate values and goals which, as a whole and when coherently linked, provide a broad framework for analyzing the sources of insecurity and likely means to deal with these. Human security suggests and points to objective conditions in the current world which create insecurities, but also to the meaning such objective conditions have for people, communities and states, that is to their subjective interpretations of threats. People may be secure but they must also feel that they are secure. Objective and subjective dimensions of security and insecurity are essential aspects of human security.

Cognate values and processes incorporated into discussions of human security, or terms commonly mentioned, include the protection of vital first, second and third generation human rights; the effective and roughly equal empowerment of all people and communities in society; the goal of good governance as a remedy to corruption, violence and inefficiency; a legitimate, effective and just security sector architecture; a vibrant civic society; a set of public and private mechanisms for conflict resolution, prevention and reconciliation; and an institutionalized system for promoting global governance which is sensitive to the variety of cultures and values across the globe.

Security means more than being protected against physical harm. The notion of human rights points to the importance of conditions of life which allow for the full development of an individual's potential, that is access to the minimal levels of resources,

---

<sup>3</sup> The rationale for the new office is “the challenges presented by crises in failing, failed, and post-conflict states. In the absence of effective international engagement, failed, failing, and post-conflict states can become breeding grounds for terrorism, organized crime, humanitarian catastrophes and other threats to our national interests. Post-Cold War experience teaches us that ad hoc responses are not enough. We must have ready response mechanisms to speedily identify appropriate financial and personnel resources for reconstruction and stabilization. The United States must be prepared to work with the world community to anticipate state failure, avoid it where possible, and help post-conflict states lay a foundation for lasting peace, good governance and sustainable development.” The USA approach to peace-building and SSR is disaggregated, reflecting the large number of agencies in the federal government which have a stake in international policing programs. Even the notion of SSR has not been prevalent in policy thinking. Instead, as with for example the approach to security assistance in Africa (US Department of State, INL, 2004), the strategy (if it can be called that) consists of a number of insulated projects dealing with parts of security systems different countries.

opportunities, and responsibilities which make for a meaningful life. Third generation rights assert, in similar fashion, the importance of autonomous cultural and social communities as counterpoint and balance to individual aggrandizement and as a source of support and barrier to insecurity.

Good governance (almost a fad term by now) will empower people and is the advocated remedy for the corruption, violence, inefficiencies and partisan performance seen as typical of regimes in many countries. Endemic corruption leads to violence by the state (normally the police, military and private armies of the powerful) against citizens. Inefficiencies and waste which have led to what Joseph (2003: 13) has called “catastrophic governance, [to] endemic practices that steadily undermine a country’s capacity to increase the supply of public goods,” sustain economic inequality and massive poverty, and enshrine private self interest as the governing principle for decision making in the state. Bad governance is as bad, or worse, than no governance at all.

Yet the goal of human security, and the policies which seek to promote it, has not gone unchallenged. As noted by Hutchful (2004:38), there has been “the temptation to regard human security as a substitute for, rather than a complement to, state security,” which in real life are intimately “intertwined and cannot be separated” (p.40). He also argues that conflating human security and development, “in a context characterized by weak civil authority and democratic institutions, and where ‘security’ and securocrats already have a suffocating grip on national policy and discourse” can lead to unwanted consequences. “Mainstreaming security as a development issue and development as a security issue, has tended to blur civil-military boundaries, inducing growing militarism of the development sphere on the one hand, and dilettantism in the management of security on the other”(pp. 37-38), and has had a hand in “provoking the current crisis of security paradigms. The failure, too often, of human security advocates to take the security sector - and thus the issue of coercion and control - seriously has contributed directly to the resurgence of neo-realist doctrine...The concept of ‘human security’, too, can be abused in unexpected way, For example, this begs the question of the ‘responsibility to protect’. It can be argued that the concept is double-edged and has opened a Pandora’s box of militarism and cynical manipulation” and has led to a neglect of ‘hard’ security needs” (p. 31).

In sum, being as widely defined and focusing on long-term and ‘soft’ security (to use a term familiar in discussion of power and leverage in the international relations field), human security has diverted attention and resources away from what really bothers people during and in the immediate aftermath of conflicts. People want and need jobs and deserve empowerment, but they also need protection against normal criminal and organized violence. The issue of what to address first in post-conflict reconstruction has no obvious answer, except to say that local civic society needs to have a strong voice in determining priorities and the sequencing of reconstruction projects, and that civic society and the state have both soft and hard security needs.

### ***The Absence of “State-like” Actors in Security Projects***

Almost by definition, post-conflict societies are not capable of providing the minimal services expected of a state, nor does civic society have sufficient social capital to support reconstruction, including in the public security field. International aid is a necessity, and international advisors and implementers of projects, in effect, can become the temporary

substitute for a collapsed state machinery (even when local political leaders occupy the formal seats of power). The global community, hence, will be drawn automatically into the political and social conditions which encouraged conflict in the first place and will be judged on how equitably it carries out a job the local state cannot. “Tensions between external imposition and local ownership ... [will arise] because more often than not physical security will have to be provided by international actors while sufficient local capacity is gradually being built up” and by the proliferation of “private security actors [who] throw into question the state’s or, in the transitional phase, the international authority’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force” (Hänggi 2004: 14), such as the remnants of the KLA in Kosovo, warlords in Afghanistan, or local militias in Sierra Leone. The work of outsiders will have long term impacts, as the process started by outsiders will shape the processes of legitimation and the capacity to sustain of reforms.

Interventions which, in effect, supplant the state or take over one of its major theorized functions - the capacity to use legitimate force for the public good - raise the memory of colonial rule and international trusteeship, neither a currently acceptable options in a world of sovereign nation-states, even if the international intervention has the imprimatur of being invited by the local government. The appointment, for example, of a British police officer to head the Sierra Leone police force being set up with British assistance after 1999 does not bring back fond memories to local elites. The indigenization of the police at the highest ranks was typically one of the last changes implemented following political independence in most former colonies. In the same way, the take-over of executive policing in Papua New Guinea by the Australian police, at the invitation of the government, is seen as ‘recolonisation’ by many locals. Peacekeeping and human security are worthwhile goals, but so is a process of reform owned and conducted with or by local actors.

### 2.1.3. Security Sector Reform as a Policy Field

Security sector reform (SSR) connects ideological justifications for interventions to local needs for security and policing. SSR has been carried out under different auspices: as part of UN or regional organization supported peace-keeping interventions, in which operations the notion of peace-building as the next stage after stopping conflict has become, incrementally and slowly, part of the overall strategy for reestablishing political stability and minimal conditions of order which, in turn, can lead to political and economic development and, ultimately, democratic governance. Other reforms efforts, even if undertaken under an international mandate and having some participation by other countries, have been largely bilateral in nature (such as the initial US intervention in Haiti or Australian intervention in the Solomon Islands). And some have been eclectic mixes of national and international mandates, donors and actors, often changing over time, such as the OSCE led rebuilding of the police in Serbia which has depended on heavy participation by regional, state and NGO actors.

The notions of SSR and security sector governance (SSG) have emerged in the development and security assistance fields as the theoretical lens and policy relevant framework or lens through which to analyze what needs to be done and how to measure success and failures. SSR concretizes peace-building and human security as particular patterns of institutional development and practices. Since crime and fear destroy democracies (Keane, 2002) and undermine the legitimation of democratic reforms

(Perez, 2003-2004: 642), SSR is perceived by the global security and development community as an “indispensable measure in the following areas: democratisation of the state, ...establishment of good government practices, ...economic development, ...internal and regional conflict prevention, ...post-conflict recovery ...and professionalisation of the armed and security forces,” (Karkoszka, 2003: 14-15), the protection of electoral reforms and processes (Fisher, 2002), and provides a structural vehicle for the transfer of norm, such as in the Balkans where SSR propagated regime notions of democratic policing and the need for parliamentary oversight of the military (Fluri and Cole, 2003: 123).

Security Sector Reform (SSR) or Security System Reform (OECD, DAC, 2004) takes a holistic and integrated view of the dynamics and needs for human, civic society and state security within the contexts of societal change. In the words of the British government, “SSR describes the process for developing professional and effective security structures that will allow citizens to live their lives in safety” (DFID, 2003: 2). SSR is based on an analysis of the capacity and contribution of all governmental and private security providing agencies within a society - conventionally labeled the security sector architecture (SSA). The basic goal of SSR is creating a security sector architecture which can sustain the effective protection and promotion of security (in all its dimensions) balanced against dominant normative values, e.g., democratic politics, good governance, accountability to civic society (Edmonds, 2002: 2). The goal is an effective, legitimate, accountable, and sustainable security system and a sense of safety among all citizens. The normative core concept of SSR is human security, broadly defined. The policy and practical question is how best to protect citizens and communities against insecurity or threats to their security from all sources.

SSR arose from practical and theoretical concerns about the nature of civil-military relations and the need to establish oversight and control of the security apparatus (mainly the military) as a prerequisite for political democracy; about the impacts of insecurities on human and state security and on the capacity and prospects for economic and political development; and an emphasis on good governance of political systems, and the concomitant notions of transparency, accountability and integrity. (General discussions of peace-keeping and SSR can be found in Anderson, 2004; Ball, 1998, 2002; Bryden and Fluri, 2003; Bryden and Hänggi, 2004; Brzoska, 2003; Brzoska and Law, 2005; Caparini, 2002; Cawthra and Luckham, 2003; Chalmers, 2000; Chanaa, 2002; Clegg, et al, 2000; DFID, 2002; 2003; Dwan, 2002; Edmonds, 2002; Hänggi and Winkler, 2002; Hansen, 2002; Hendrickson, 1999; Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2002; Hurwitz and Peake, 2004; Hutchful, 2003; Karkoszka, 2003; Nathan, 2004; OECD, 2000, 2004; Perito, 2002, 2004; Swiss Foundation, 2004; UN, 2002; Vera, 2003; Winkler, 2002).

A core concern of civil-military studies has been democratic control of the armed forces and related agencies, namely how to prevent the power of the gun from subverting the integrity and stability of the state and the capacity to undermine the governance of society by civic institutions. Unless the military, and other coercive agencies of the state, can be kept in their barracks and garrisons, prospect for democracy and economic development are dim.

Foreign aid and economic development agencies (World Bank, foreign aid offices in donor countries, NGOs interested in economic and political development) have realized that economic foreign aid, even if effectively utilized in the recipient countries, will not sustain economic development unless the impacts of aid are distributed in a somewhat

equitable manner and unless threshold conditions of domestic security have been stabilized, such as reducing the likelihood of military coups or the incidence of crime and disorder. If people have no faith that what they have struggled to acquire through aid and hard work will be stolen by corrupt officials or destroyed by crime or violence, and they themselves are not safe, then economic aid means little. Security and development go hand in hand; “democratization, human rights and poverty-reducing economic development cannot be sustained in the absence of security forces which are both effective and accountable” (Hutchful, 2003: 4; also, ICHRP, 2003; Inter-American Development Bank, 1997, 2003).

There are, as well, more practical reasons to seek reform. A large security sector is a drain on the limited resources of transitional and developing countries. Far better that those resources be invested in productive ways that improve the lives of people. SSR is a central precondition for the efficient use of limited resources in developing countries, most of which have a limited need for large armed forces.

Good governance means minimal levels of integrity (or non-corruption) in government agencies, transparency of governmental decision-making and outputs (e.g., budgets and policy directives), responsiveness to public demands, accountability to civic institutions (or a clear hierarchy of democratic civilian control over the state’s coercive agencies), and adherence by security forces to domestic and international norms and the rule of law which safeguard the human rights of all (Ball, 2002: 3). Misgovernance, in contrast, leads to social conflicts, can encourage outbursts of massive violence, allows criminal activities to flourish, creates insecurities, sustains corruption, wastes scarce resources, leads to violations of human rights, and protects authoritarian and dictatorial regimes.

SSR requires a notion of what is to be included under the label ‘security sector,’ a quite flexible concept (e.g., Hutchful, 2003). At the minimum, the security sector includes the agencies of coercion controlled by the state who are charged with the physical protection of civic society and the state (armed forces, police, border control systems, intelligence agencies, co-opted informal control mechanisms) as well as other agencies whose work is essential to sustain the effectiveness and accountability of the agencies of control (courts, legal systems, oversight mechanisms, budget agencies, etc.). A more inclusive conception of the security sector, such as that offered by DFID (2003: 3), adds to the directly responsible coercive agencies: “civil management and oversight bodies (the President/Prime Minister, the legislature and legislative committees, national security advisory bodies, statutory civil society organisations, the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance and Foreign Affairs); Judicial and public security bodies (the judiciary, justice ministries, defence and prosecution services, prisons and corrections services, human rights commissions and customary and traditional justice systems); Non-state security bodies (private security companies, political party militias, liberation armies, civil defence forces); and civil society bodies (Non-governmental organisations, advocacy, media, professional and religious organisations.”

Some analysts include even natural threats to human security (floods, earthquakes), or rather agencies and policies designed to minimize or prevent such events and respond to emergencies when they occur, in the security sector.

The question of what should be included in the Security Sector has some analytical interest but is of less relevance to policy or the practice of reform. The broad definition used by DFID basically includes all society; very little of social life is left out; and that

means any coherent and integrated approach, which is the stated goal, to SSR is vitiated by that definition. In practice, a broad definition will lead to very different policies that matter for SSR or the governance of the security sector than does a more narrow definition targeted at security providing agencies.

More important than a fairly fruitless argument about what should be included and what should be left out of the security sector or system, would be an emphasis on the process by which policies can be created and sustained, by domestic and international actors, which will lead to democratic reforms of the conventional elements of the security sector (armed forces, police, intelligence, border security). Of course, in the long run, all aspects of a maximal conception of the security sector matter but one cannot wait until everything in the security sector architecture has been or can be changed before starting on the most pressing concerns. At best, a maximal conception is useful to remind reformers that contexts matter in SSR, and what should be avoided, at least at the level of long range planning and thinking, is a focus on policing systems at the neglect of its connections to other security needs and agencies.

Of main practical import is the theoretical and policy relevant notion that minimal levels of security are a prerequisite but not a guarantee for the very possibility of having good governance, the rule of law, or democratic accountability. The coercive agencies of the state have the power to subvert development, stability and democracy but they are, at the same time, a necessary foundation for achieving stability and development. They are needed but they are also a potential threat.

The meaning of reform, what needs to be done, clearly depends on the conception of the security sector used. A narrow definition will lead to different needs and demands for resources and skills, while a broad definition can, in policy terms, only lead to an inability to reform the sector, since everything that is political, economic/financial, or cultural in the local context will be targets for reform. A broad definition of the sector makes analytical sense and stresses the importance of contexts, but also vitiates any coherent or integrated policy for SSR.

At the same time, one needs to be careful not to conflate civil with democratic control. The coercive agencies of the state, in authoritarian and in many transitional countries, were and are under the control of civilians, but that does not and did not constitute democratic oversight and control. The relations between civic society, the state and coercive agencies are reciprocal. "There is a corresponding link between democratisation and security sector reform in the opposite direction. Without the functioning of democratic institutions, governance of the security sector will be prone to hostage-taking by particular interest groups" (Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder, 2004: 126).

Yet one cannot expect the security sector to become the catalyst for democratic change or carry the transformational load. "Police reform is necessary to allow the resumption and flourishing of democratic process, but it can neither create democracy nor succeed in an undemocratic environment. Police reform are dependent on, and not a determinant of democracy" (Neild, 2001: 35). SSR may be a necessary condition or element in achieving democratic forms of societal life and politics, but it is not a sufficient one.

Security sector reform also embodies a strong normative component, mostly Westernized notions of democratic governance, offered or suggested or imposed (such as in Iraq) on recipient societies with little attention paid to its cultural congruence. SSR,

in that sense, seeks to bridge the gap between what is deemed to be legitimate (at the global level) and the practicalities of policing which will be influenced by local contexts and cultures. Not an easy task.

The basic principles which should guide SSR have been stated by the DAC Committee of the OECD (OECD, DAC, 2004)<sup>4</sup>, the only international forum in which potential donor countries meet together on a regular basis. These “broad principles encapsulate the critical challenges and norms involved in SSR work” and offer a starting point among donors on how” security related assistance should be provided” (p. 18). (DAC prefers the phrase security system reform.) The five principles are worth citing in full:

1. The core values for SSR are to be people-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms and internationally accepted human rights principles and the rule of law. They should seek to contribute to an environment characterised by freedom from fear.
2. SSE should be seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing populations and states through more integrated development and security system reform policies.
3. Donor should provide their assistance within strategic frameworks that are multi-sectoral. They must be developed jointly with partner governments and civil society and based on an assessment of the security needs of the people and the state. Women’s organisations, in particular, play a major role in ensuring that needs assessments capture the security concerns of vulnerable groups. This should involve broad consultation among donor government departments as well as close co-ordination with other donor governments and international organisations.
4. The security system should be managed according to the same principles of accountability and transparency that apply across the public sector, in particular through greater civil oversight of security processes.
5. As far as possible, SSR processes should address the three core requirements of a well - functioning security system:

Developing a nationally owned concept of security and the policy of the security frameworks states require to handle development and security as distinct but integrated areas of public action.

Establishing well-defined policies and strengthening the governance of the security institutions that are responsible for formulating, executing, managing and monitoring security policy.

Building the institutional mechanisms for implementation and capacity throughout the security system.

The DAC guidelines are infused with a policy approach to security, that is an emphasis on proper planning and the effective articulation among policy donor interests and reform objectives. They provide general standards and goals which are appropriate and legitimate for police reform projects, but fail to reach far enough into the policy process to get into the specifics of implementation. As well, though the discussion is of the security system as a whole, the security agency the writers of the policy have in mind is clearly the military, which then colours some of the more specific recommendations, e.g., for civil oversight. Yet as Tschirgi (2004: 9) has remarked, the principles are not developed as part of a comprehensive approach to and theoretically based understanding of the connections between peace-building, security and development but are derived

---

<sup>4</sup> The DAC guidelines are being rewritten, by Dylan Hendrickson, to take critical comments by people with some experience in reform projects and responses to national surveys into account. (For findings from the surveys, see Hendrickson, 2004.)

from the history and experience of promoting reforms, and the normal failures of such reforms, with “the result that practice has come to substitute for doctrine”. In effect, it has been the implementers of programs, as they write up their work and infiltrate their ideas and experiences into policy documents, who have shaped the “set of operational principles that can be said to constitute a shared ‘post-conflict peacebuilding paradigm’” (p. 9).

She notes the paradigms’ basic elements: peacebuilding is a multi-dimensional enterprise which will lead to the “creation of a legitimate political authority that can avoid the resurgence of violence”; security is key; practice needs to “be guided by a hierarchy of priorities established in response to the specific needs and political dynamics in a given context”; local people must own the reconstruction process, from setting the agenda to implementing projects; donors need to come together and arrive at a common strategy; a “commitment to local capacity building from the earliest stages is vital for sustainability”; early, even “opportunistic and quick-impact interventions are critical in influencing outcomes” but not sufficient for long term success; funding must be adequate, predictable and flexible; approaches to reconstruction need to occur at local, national, regional and international levels; and a commitment to do no harm is an essential principle of accountability (p. 9). These principles overlap, and expand on, the DAC guidelines, stressing the necessary greater specificity of projects. The principles, in various forms, show up in practically every report on peacebuilding, SSR or police reform and reconstruction (e.g., Hurwitz and Peake, 2004).

#### **2.1.4. The Police in SSR**

Much of the discussion of SSR has focused on the military and intelligence sector, with the police, and other criminal justice and support activities nominally included under the security sector, yet little discussed as a separate and distinct policy issue and security and development problem having dynamics distinct from other elements (but see Ferguson, 2004; Green, 2003; Mani, 1999; Neild, 2001; or more generally, Cawthra and Luckham, 2003; Holm and Eide, 2000; Ziegler and Neild, 2002). The emphasis on the national and state security and military forces is not surprising, given the policy and theoretical origins of SSR. Yet the neglect of policing, the major coercive force people confront and experience in most countries in their daily lives, has led to conceptions of what is needed to assure reforms and sustainability and oversight which can be inconsistent with the nature and dynamics of policing or be misleading about what needs to be done in reforms.

For example, much effort has been exerted to assure civic society oversight of the armed forces, which can only be directly achieved through parliamentary oversight by committees which have the knowledge and willingness to confront the armed services as a body, as an organization. That makes sense given the nature of command and control and the organizational cultures of the military. Yet parliamentary oversight (except for setting basic standards and guidelines and overseeing the budgets) may not be relevant at all to policing delivered within society, at which level community input and oversight will be much more important.



### *Strengths of SSR for Police Reforms*

The police - or rather, reforms of policing systems in countries which have failed, are in disarray, in transition to more democratic forms of political and economic life or on the road to development - are an essential elements in devising, establishing and controlling an effective and democratic security architecture. Considering police reforms within the context of SSR cast the difficulties and opportunities for reforms in a different light than a focus on the police alone provides.

SSR points to the systemic connections of the police to wider security concerns and other security providing mechanisms; it views reform as a process rather than an outcome; it stresses the inherently political basis and nature of policing systems, especially by the notions of democratic control and good governance; it highlights the politics of reforms; it argues the importance of legitimating new forms and means of coercion and the autonomous capacity of the police to affect their own futures; it points to the importance of rights as a counter-balance to demands for security in a democratic system; and expands conceptions of and standards for judging the quality of policing beyond conventional measures of crime and order.

A focus on the governance of the security sector (however the sector is defined) automatically shifts empirical and theoretical attention to all the means and processes by which security is sought. The police are part of the security sector and reforms of other agencies in the security sector will necessarily affect the police. Reforms of policing systems will be caught up in the wider discourse of the securitization of societies and the globalization of risks and threats to domestic order (Loader, 2002). The jobs, roles, authorities and domains of policing will need expand to reflect broader conceptions of security and insecurity, as will the articulations of policing to other security agencies.

Reform is a process for which each outcome is only a way station to further reform. Policing, as does SSR as a whole, has to be adaptive and respond to changing domestic and transnational threat conditions, reconceptualisations of goals and standards for democratic policing, and fluctuations in the political contexts and civic society-state relations within which policing is delivered.

Policing and reforms of policing are inherently political processes. The linking of policing to broader security threats and other security providing agencies and the notion of human security stress an aspect of policing which is frequently downplayed in the search by the police to gain the status of a professional occupation. The democratic requirements for accountability, transparency and the goal of good governance point to this unavoidable enmeshment of the police in the SSA and the concomitant need to involve civic society, the police and the state in a negotiated understanding of the limits of police authority and powers when balanced against the rule of law and the protection of human rights. Democratic policing is policing which balances competing yet equally legitimate, or defensible, values.

The behaviour of the police will help determine levels of in/security experienced by civic society but will, as well, have de/legitimizing consequences. Police reforms are not self-sustaining but require civic legitimation, both to be effective and to be accorded a normative status. Yet the legitimacy of governments, the identity and social status of groups, and the sense which people have that their lives can be lived with some assurance that they can depend on promises made, rewards earned and a somewhat stable future

will be influenced by what the police do. The manner and substance of policing experienced, which is shaped by the police themselves, will legitimise or delegitimise social orders, sustain changes or undermine these, enable reforms not just in the security sector but in other salient sectors of social and political life as well.

Reforming policing systems is a fundamental requirement for human security, the stability of democratic governance, and the attainment of justice. Placing the police within the ambit of SSA and SSR reemphasizes that policing is about more than enforcing laws, providing services or doing public order maintenance. Contexts matter and reforms require political skills, as well as organizational and functional knowledge. Policing is part of the governance of security (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2000) and good policing is part of good governance and the promotion of democratic forms of societal life.

### ***Weaknesses of SSR for Police Reforms***

The strengths of the SSR for understanding and implementing police reforms are balanced and offset by countervailing weaknesses and gaps. It must be said, though, that the gaps are narrowing as discussions of the police have begun to be incorporated into the rhetoric of SSR.

- Attention gap in peacebuilding and SSR

The lack of systematic attention paid to policing weakens the capacity to plan for and evaluate SSR. Though, semantically, the police are included in the rhetoric of SSR, the focus still remains largely on issues relevant to the military and intelligence services with less attention paid to border control agencies, and the police almost an afterthought. One outcome is little growth in knowledge about policing within the policy community concerned with SSR, nor an increased sense of how the police matter in SSR and how policing affects the human security of a population. There is a paradox here. In the lives of most communities in most states, it is the police who matter for the security of members of society (by their protection and control efforts and by their depredations when they abuse their powers) with the military standing in the background; the armed forces matter to the state and civic society but in a less direct way than do the police. If (hard) human security is the goal, the police should be first in line when SSR reaches the active policy agenda, rather than be in last place.

Call and Stanley (2002) phrase the point in this manner. “International actors need to engage in ambitious agenda-setting during peace negotiations to help warring parties envision new ways of policing rooted in human rights, ethnic tolerance, and citizen service, and to help the parties incorporate such a vision into peace accords” (pp. 304/05). But that is not often done, even though needed to insure an immediate increase in security and the long term institutionalization of reforms. They found that in 23 transitions to democracy in Latin America, only ten included explicit references to police reforms (p. 304).

In short, conceptions of security have, in policy terms, remained focused on the state and large scale insecurity - organized state or anti-state violence - at the neglect of the insecurity promoting conditions which bother people the most in their daily lives - being victimized by criminals, gangs, predatory state agents, or the chaotic disorder which

surrounds them. In many countries, post-conflict and developing, people have profound sense of insecurity which, as it is based on objective experience, has a debilitating impact. This pervasive fear and unease that things are not well and that one's daily routines of living are at risk, which are policing problems, are typically not addressed by conventional analyses of security threats and proposals for reform in the SSR literature.

- Knowledge gap on the police in SSR

Much of the discussion of SSR seems to have been unaware of the large and exiting body of knowledge on the structure and nature and the practices and cultures of policing, the processes of reform, or the comparative effectiveness of accountability mechanisms.

As noted by Brzoska (2003: 41), “generally speaking, there is a specific lack of analysis of how security sectors in many countries function, their role in society, their behaviour in crisis situations and their relations to other elites, etc. Up to now, most research that has been done has focused on the military along with certain aspects of behaviour, such as human rights violations. As a rule, the greatest lacunae relate to institutional and sociological aspects of policing and other non-military security forces.”

The lack of knowledge about how policing is done leads to treating the police as a black box. Resources, advice, commands and expectations are the inputs which, mysteriously, are converted into effective and fair policing outputs. Yet without an understanding of the dynamics of decision-making, internal structural, operational and personal constraints, or operational and organizational cultures within the black box, there is little capacity to predict what will happen when particular reforms are advocated, suggested and imposed nor what leverage can be utilized to promote reforms nor what obstacles will impede progress. It is as if one can understand and control the military without knowing how they operate and why.

David Bayley (2001: 76) argues that, “at the moment, the most underused [experts] are the practitioners themselves, both outside change agents and the police officials with whom they worked. The people who do assistance work, both at home and abroad, know a great deal about what works and what doesn't, but this knowledge is not being captured.” His point is well taken and should be followed. But it seems that policy people prefer talking to other policy people and not to the experienced implementers and police officials on the ground. It could be because of status differences and the grubbiness of field work; it could be because of educational differences and the notion that police may know what they are doing but are not sophisticated enough to understand their work as part of a larger democratization project (which is probably true for some police but not for all).

SSR planning and rhetoric, while keeping a holistic view of the sector as whole, needs to break down specific policies by the sectoral elements of the security sector addressed, and their interconnections.

For example, one of the recommendations made by practically all observers of policing systems is that they should be demilitarized, be detached organizationally from the armed forces (if they are part of that sector), be trained in occupational skills and outlooks on their work which should be distinct from those of the of the military, and conduct their work separately from the military (except in unusual circumstances).The goals of the military and the police are simply too different, and leaving the police attached to military

structures and thinking will weaken their commitment of the police to service, the rule of law and the protection of human rights (e.g., Bayley, 1995, 2001; Downes, 2004; Neild, 2001, 2002; WOLA, 1995). Given those essential differences, basic issues in democratizing the police cannot be the same as those for the military, but have to be suited to the nature of police work.

- Implementation gaps

The biggest gap in SSR framework is the almost complete lack of attention to the practicalities of implementation and the likelihood that things will not go as planned, which they never do. SSR thinking is dominated by policy planning paradigms and the political rhetoric that justifies interventions, yet “while policy may make perfect sense when devised in headquarters, it does not permeate down to the field officers charged with implementation,” quite frequently “leading to a disconnect between what is envisioned in international assistance programs and what transpires on the ground.” (Hurwitz and Peake, 2004: 9, 8). This is a case of too much policy thinking and not enough political and common sense thinking.

SSR provides few guidelines on what to do in practice and in implementation, except in the most general terms, such as to be aware of local contexts and the importance of local ownership - advice which has no specific practical policy implications. In the absence of more detailed guidelines on what should be done and, more importantly, how the process should be done, implementation is left to the ingenuity, wisdom (or lack thereof), and the technical and people skills of implementers. For example, Hood (2004: 31, note 9) recalls that, “while heavily involved in the East Timor policing sector in 2002-04, [he] was only dimly aware of SSR as a concept. SSR was never invoked by any of the UN police officers, UN staffers or diplomats engaged in building the PNTL,” the *Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste*, the new police.

The SSR discourse is replete with buzz words without specificity, with short hand concepts such as political will, local ownership, capacity building, institutionalization, civic society, even the notion of the state. Not that these are not relevant concepts, they are, but that their meaning is subject to a variety of interpretations and can only be discerned within the always unique contexts in which projects are being carried out. Mobekk (2004: np) notes that “local ownership is currently at the top of the agenda in policy circles dealing with international policing. Nevertheless, it has only haphazardly been translated in practice in policing missions...International police forces are notoriously bad at consulting the local population regarding any issue,” possibly because the term has little meaning in a specific context. Who are the local owners and who is entitled to ownership is not obvious, and one would guess that knowledgeable implementers will be working with local people in any case, even when they have no familiarity with the concept ‘local ownership’.

In addition, there is no common view among the donor community or donor and recipient communities on how to do reform. And some observers think, based on their experience with donors, that the “donor community is in the main uncoordinated and basically ignorant of what is needed to modernise and transform a police organisation so that it is accountable, transparent and understands compliance with human rights” (Mathias, 2004). Hutchful (2004: 34) argues, in his critique of SSR projects in Africa, that these are “often donor driven and lacking local ownership; underfunded and ill-adjusted to domestic institutional capacities and resources; piecemeal in approach and lacking in

coordination (this is often the result of the absence of a national security policy framework); driven by political expediency and a desire for limited institutional re-engineering rather than fundamental change in the security sector; and usually lacking in transparency and public participation.”

He acknowledges some exceptions to these generalizations, specifically Sierra Leone and Mali.

- Unqualified implementers

Since implementers on the ground are the crucial link between aspirations and achievement, between democratic ideals and democratic practice, it would make sense to pay careful attention to the proper selection of implementers. They should be vetted as much as police are vetted during reconstruction to weed out the unqualified, the obnoxious, and people with a record which should disqualify them. And implementers should be trained, so they can train the local trainers properly, in a common implementation framework and language. Yet that is not done, largely since projects are owned by countries, or coalitions, which have their own national styles and preferences.<sup>5</sup>

Little distinction seems to be made, in hiring implementers by donors or by recipient countries, between sales people and implementers who know the importance of linking principles and contexts. Sales people sell a model, often of dubious utility, for that is what they know.<sup>6</sup> Skillful implementers will adjust the principles embodied in a model, such as community oriented policing, to local realities. Evans (2003: 39) thinks the reasons why wrong or inappropriate models are sold “can be found in the background and experience of many of those that introduce them. Many consultants, civil servants and soldiers who have found themselves involved have limited international experience or a development background. Few have a complete understanding of the security sector reform canvass and its practical application and even fewer have experienced work in developing countries. Most, quite naturally, fall back on models, processes and structures with which they are familiar back home without validating them in the local contexts. Others find it easier to take on a function or complete a task rather than help to develop a counterpart and build local capacity. Some will fail to understand and adapt to local culture and norms.”

The attention, knowledge and implementation deficits on the police and policing in SSR will not be remedied by further elaboration of SSR (especially if done by experts on military and intelligence services), but require the introduction and inclusion of knowledge on policing, on police reforms and on implementation practices typical within the policing field, as elaborated by scholars, policy makers, and the police themselves. That is the combined lesson of gaps in SSR thinking - pay attention to the police and

---

<sup>5</sup> Peake (2004: 42) thinks that current deployment practices pay insufficient attention to prior training, and that the resulting “international officers’ unfamiliarity is accentuated by rushed and inadequate deployment briefings, suggesting little importance is attached to a good understanding of the policing environment” in which they will work. He suggests that “greater weight should be given to this, especially to basic training in the local language(s), which should continue during the deployment of international personnel in theatre.”

<sup>6</sup> The basic notion is that “external support should be as demand driven as possible and take the local socio-economic environment into account. Projects are too often externally generated and then ‘sold’ to the recipient country without needs assessment by independent experts or the recipient government,” leading neither to sustainability or legitimation (Brzoska and Heinemann-Gruder, 2004: 137).

include knowledge of the ways of the police and of how to implement policy and organizational reforms in the planning of policy.

## **2.2. The Human Factor in Reform Projects**

Thinking about, planning for, implementing and evaluating reform projects does not occur by itself, but is done by donors agencies and bureaucrats, by an emerging transnational policy elite or community (TPC), comprised of academics, national and transnational policy makers, international and local NGOs, and political and police leaders, who make a living creating transnational regimes and norms, thinking up goals, strategies and tactics for reform; are engaged in the planning and implementation of reforms; and seek to give a surrounding ideological gloss to these efforts (why they are needed, worth it, and what lessons are to be gained for future reform work).

The planning for and the delivery and implementation of reforms involves three groups: donors and their political constituencies at home which will fund the assistance; recipients of assistance - political leaders, security officials, communities; and the transnational policy community which links donors to recipients and transforms plans into actions being implemented on the ground.

It is human agency which links international and domestic contexts; translates, by policy advice and preferences, international security regimes and national priorities into specific institutional arrangements, policies and practices; suggests the processes and standards for evaluations of successes and failures; and responds to contingent circumstances which hinder the execution of projects. Much of what happens in reform projects is unanticipated and accidental, and that requires flexibility, a sense of the pragmatic and of what is feasible, and creativity to deal with events and issues not foreseen in the plans.

The recipients, as the beneficiaries of planned changes, have a stake in what will happen to them, will interpret and assess reforms through lenses of personal and group based ideologies, interests and values.

In short, reforms and policies are not self-executing once put down on paper. Plans and goals will be re-interpreted as they are being executed. This seems completely self-evident, and it is. In the end, what appears as policy in its concrete manifestations will reflect the interplay of plans and human agency executing those plans. Plans and policies will always be distorted to some degree as they are being executed by the preferences, values and occupational norms of implementers (Cottam and Marenin, 1989). This should not come as a surprise to planners, but surprise is what seems to happen. Put differently, planners should expect some deviations from plans, on legitimate grounds, such as feasibility or local preferences, but they should also expect and built into their goals and expectations for success, some sense that implementers will, unavoidably as they make routine decisions in running a project, be influenced by national styles of policing, by organizational experiences they have lived with and through, or by a personal common sense of what will work best in the contexts they are working in.

### 2.2.1. Donors

Since numerous donors, international and transnational organizations, and NGOs typically are involved in any reform project, a common problem is how multiple non-local actors (with different expectations, priorities and skills) can be coordinated into an effective policy group for a specific project (Papsworth and Wihata, 2001).

Donors will have their own priorities, national styles, responsibilities to political leaders and governments back home, budgetary constraints, and expectations of what counts as success and can be justified back home as an efficient, effective and legitimate expenditure of public money. The result is as much competition as cooperation among donors, even in joint support of SSR and police reform in one country, a competition that is typically solved by stovepiping, by doling out authority and responsibility for different security sector activities to different country contingents. In Afghanistan, for example, the Germans are in charge of police reform, the Americans oversee the military, the British teach drug control, judicial reform is the task of the Italians, and the Japanese are charged with conducting DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants) (Sedra, 2004a: 209; on DDR see Pouligny, 2004), all overseen by an elected local government whose existence depends on external support and whose reach barely extends beyond the capital. No wonder that the process of reform has experienced “coordination deficits” at four levels: donor to donor, donor to local government, intra-governmental, and inter-agency, “has fragmented reform efforts and triggered ‘turf wars’ among the donors” (pp. 221-222). Whatever was holistic in an approach to SSR has fallen by the wayside.

Police reform suffers from similar lack of coordination and agreement on a particular model of policing, which “means that the police are trained in numerous different ways reflecting different national standards and styles of policing. The result can be a local police force which applies different policing styles throughout the country, or due to confusion reverts to other non-democratic non-civilian policing methods” (Mobekk, 2004: np).<sup>7</sup>

### 2.2.2. The Transnational Policy Community

The transnational policy community is comprised of actors engaged in promoting democratic police reforms in countries desiring or seen as needing reforms. Reform programs may spring from a number of motivations by donors and recipients and may be channelled through a variety of bi-lateral, regional or international institutional arrangements. Yet irrespective of why reforms across borders are promoted, the process for carrying out reforms will have similar dynamics and demands, and will be done by members of the TPC. (The discussion below follows Marenin, 2005.)

Members of the TPC work in private and government policy shops and think tanks; in security and human rights focused NGOs; in academic settings; in transnational policy setting agencies; and as high level police administrators. They work as consultants for donors, international agencies, NGOs, and recipient states, offering their expertise to

---

<sup>7</sup> For example, in one city in Macedonia, international advisors offered three different models of community based policing, not an efficient or effective recipe for sustaining reforms in the long term (Peake, personal communication).

those in need. They help devise and run reform project for such agencies as the Law Enforcement Department of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe); ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program), the unit in the Department of Justice most directly involved in policing assistance programs conducted by the USA; the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force of DFID (Department for International Development), the foreign aid office of the British government; the Development Assistance Commission of the OECD; the UNDP and DPKO of the UN; or as police liaison officers among state governments (e.g., Bigo, 2000). And they can become involved in monitoring local police and in executive policing by their association with peacekeeping missions. (For writings and reports by TPC members see, for example, ASDR, 2001, 2002; Call, 2003a, 2003b; Dahrendorf, 2004; Douma and de Zeeuw, 2004; Downes, 2004; Dwan, 2002; Gbla, 2004; Groenewald and Peake, 2004; Horn, 2004; ICG, 2002; Mendelson-Forman, 2004; Peake, 2004; Sedra, 2004a, 2004b; SEESAC, 2003; Wilton, 2004; or WOLA, 1999-2000.)

Individual members of the TPC specialize in some aspect of the reform process, from thinking about what should be the goals and standards, to planning and organizing international projects, to implementing reforms on the ground, to assessing the consequences and impacts of reform projects on security and the well-being of local populations. Despite this division of labour, the transnational policy community is becoming more cohesive. Individual members move through and work in different organizational settings and by that shuttling from job to job, interest to interest, become enmeshed in organizational and occupational networks. They come to know each other as persons and personalities; they talk to each other; they share experiences and lessons; and they praise and condemn projects and processes of reform. They are assuming the character of a free floating transnational intelligentsia and policy community which, in effect, shapes the discourse and the practices of SSR and police reform and creates the policies which matter for achieving democratic security and policing systems.

The transnational policy community has become quite knowledgeable about how to conduct reform projects and, as it shares that knowledge among its members, increases the stock of ideas and lessons and best practices learned among the global community and with local stakeholders. The specific contours of security arrangements and institutional developments (e.g., personnel, training, internal and external oversight policies, managerial styles and strategies, evaluation capabilities) will be largely determined by them. If they have been in the field, and listened to implementers and local actors, or have done the implementing work themselves, they are attuned to the political realities and resource constraints which hamper reforming or reconstructing policing systems. They are not naive about what people will do or not do, as most police officials who have time under their belts are not, and they practice both the rationality of policy thinking and the use of common sense to figure out what works and what will not.

Reforms of the security sector or the police are not reforms in the abstract but are targeted at defined ideas held by and practices engaged in by people who carry out security tasks. General ideas infuse reform efforts, but success or failure is always measured by the performance of specific tasks, be these the treatment of citizens in encounters, or managerial practices which enforce accountability, or forms of participation (are these real or symbolic?) in decision-making and planning. The objectives of reforms are not to make things better in some general way, but to have the people doing security think, talk about and act in specified ways. The measure of the success of reforms is whether they do or not. Of course, one also needs to assess, in the



longer term, whether the way in which security providers do their job has an impact on stated goals. But there can be no impact, at least one that is planned, unless security agents do their job as it was designed to be done.

This argument applies to specific issues as well. General goals such as accountability or integrity in performance or representativeness of personnel only take on life and achieve an effect in and through the policies and practices actually. There is no accountability of security systems in the abstract; there are accountability policies, mechanisms and practices and the processes in place to sustain these over time. Accountability, or any other norm, is achieved when the practices are in place, are properly managed, and effectively accessible to people.

Of course, not all members of the TPC are equally good at thinking about and doing reforms, but the best, and these will rise to the top as past performance leads to further employment, have the capacity for creativity, the willingness to spend the time needed to learn about local contexts, the technical and people skills to talk to actors from the highest political level to the lowliest police constable, the sophistication to understand the vagaries of reform projects at all stages, and the commitment to see the need for security balanced by attention to rights and justice.

I stress the importance of the transnational policy community since they define what reforms mean as a practical matter. They connect transnational regimes to structural and operational reforms of policing at the local level; the link general principles to contextual modification, theory to practice, norms to policy, and the global to the local. Regime norms and principles can be implemented in a variety of ways, and they are. For example, there is no one model of democratic policing which fits and can be done anywhere. The security sector or policing systems of democratic countries, from Japan to the UK, from Australia to the USA, are organized quite differently, have widely diverse powers and roles in society, have developed varied occupational cultures, and are subject to a wide variety of oversight mechanism. But they all qualify as 'democratic', not by their specific arrangements, roles and cultures, but because they incorporate in their specific structures and policies general democratic norms and principles.

And conversely, the transnational policy recirculates lessons from practice into policy thinking. Knowledge derived from implementation knowledge will reflect back on transnational policing regimes which are disciplined and reconfigured by the experience of trying to implement them.<sup>8</sup>

### 2.2.3. Local actors

In the end, whether reforms work within, and certainly beyond, the period when external advisors are on the ground, will depend on the commitment and willingness of local actors, including the police, to continue with reforms. One threat to reforms arise from the political nature of policing, its power and capacity for coercion, which it always tempting to local political leaders. In most post-conflict societies, the police have never

---

<sup>8</sup> A similar argument is made in Stedman et al (2002) in discussing lessons learned from studies of implementing peace agreements, and by the authors of the various chapters in the book he co-edited. Studies of the implementation process are a useful lens through which to view the problems and processes of transforming of ideas into practice.

experienced political neutrality, even had they wanted to do their job without partisanship, since political leaders have sought to use them for their own ends - in political contests, for personal protective services, and for the suppression of rivals to power and the control of the government. And police have always been subject to demands by local political elites who speak for often ethnically divided communities. Reforming the police is one side of a social equation (and hard to do since the police are not used to nor have they experience in doing apolitical work), getting political and local leaders to let go of operational control over the police, is the other.

“The key challenge for democratic control in each country and republic considered here is not civil control over the military, but rather safeguards to prevent misuses of security sector agencies by civil political authorities...Decentralization of authority is a key agenda in post-authoritarian transition, particularly in relation to policing. However, this needs to go hand in hand with efforts to strengthen local and provincial democratic institutions if it is not to endanger democratic oversight and control of the SSR” (Green, 2003:10, 11).

The experience of reform projects through international assistance and aid show quite clearly that what donors want is not always what the recipients want. Aid is frequently seen as another resource whose use will be determined locally by those who control policing. The motives and the reasons for reform can be quite different for donors and recipients, the local actors who are enmeshed in histories of cooperation and conflict with other local actors. Aid does not enter a political or social vacuum. Such political games may be regrettable, and will undermine the thrust of reform, but they are a reality in most reform projects.<sup>9</sup> One can change the police but unless their political environment is changed as well reform will be captured. Hence, speaking about Africa, Fayemi (2004: 195) comments that to create “a service culture, and not a regimented force arrangement, accountability to the ordinary citizen is central to public order. The police cannot be trusted within the community if it retains a structure that is only accountable to the President.”

The police and other agencies which have the capacity to coerce will always be sought to be used, in the same way that security issues will always be used in electoral campaigns and as justification for military interventions. That is the nature of the political process, anywhere, and it only fluctuates in intensity and salience by countervailing pressures. International assistance should not be naive about the multiple and complex motivations of people they are helping, but be on guard against “praetorian ambitions for power, feigned commitment to democracy, and the practice of clientelism,” the “emphasis on informal, personalized relationships among office-holders and between them and members of the populations they serve” (Sesay and Hughes, 2005: 121, 122). Such ambitions, grounded in long histories of personal and inter-communal relations will not disappear by themselves but have to be checked by the creation and support for countervailing capacities in civic society and state structures.

---

<sup>9</sup> Neild (2001: 29) observes that in El Salvador and Guatemala local actors, trying to undermine or evade personnel changes at the top of the police hierarchy recommended or imposed by international advisors, responded “with a ‘shell game’, placing real power with individuals in other positions in the force or even outside of it, weakening the chain of command and responsibility,” and allowing discredited officials to continue their influence over the organization.

## 2.3. Discourses and Policy Arenas in Policing

A fundamental requirement for seeking reforms of policing which will be effective and sustainable is knowing what it is one is seeking to reform, that is, what is the current state of thinking about the nature and practices in policing, as this thinking reflects and responds to changes going on in policing systems? How do these changes in the objective conditions of policing and in their subjective interpretations shape the potential for reforms?

### 2.3.1. Police and Policing as Fields of Action

The capacity of the Weberian state, through its putative monopoly of the legitimate means of coercion, to provide safety, security and protection against crimes, disorders and deviance for its citizens and community, has weakened dramatically (Kaldor, 2001:4-5), leading to a shift of the control and legitimacy of coercion to groups below (communities, private corporations, vigilantes) and above the state (regional security arrangements, international regimes). The reasons for the decline of the state can be argued but the decentralising of control of violence away from the state is a development that cannot be denied (Bayley and Shearing, 2001; Cawthra and Luckham, 2003; Johnson and Shearing, 2003).

In response to objective changes in the provision of security, thinking about the nature of policing has undergone a profound shift in recent years. The main shift has been from thinking of policing as work done by an authorized agency of the state which executes out the state's legitimate monopoly of force within domestic settings in order to promote social control and order to policing as a field of activity engaged in by many actors (of which state police are one), having diverse bases of authority for their capacity to use force, being engaged in a large variety of practices, and being motivated by organizational cultures which differ widely among groups and providers.

Conventional notions of policing have lost theoretical credibility (and policy relevance) as policing has changed in response to changing circumstances, such as increasing inability of the state, even in advanced societies, to provide for everyone's security or the rise of corporate, private and community based security systems. The clear distinctions between public and private and between domestic transnational policing are increasingly blurred. What matters for police reform projects is that policing systems have to be more widely conceptualized than a focus only on state authorized policing allows (e.g., Bayley and Shearing, 2001; Dupont, et al, 2003). Two consequences of rethinking the policing field which matter for police reform projects are that measures and indicators of success and failure or reforms will have to be more complex than is currently done and include all policing actors; and, second, non-state security providers will not be, *prima facie*, considered illegitimate actors who must be suppressed and disbanded. That could and should be an option, but it should not be assumed that non-state actors will have no legitimate role to play in the provision of security at the local levels.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Some observers (e.g., Horn and Olonisakin, 2004) argue that one of the goals of police reforms is returning the monopoly of legitimate force to the state (which is itself being reconstructed). That argument, and the need to empower the state, is valid at the beginning stages of reconstruction when security threats, which often come from non-state actors, must be neutralized. Yet as the policing system becomes more established and local

Policy planners and implementers, hence, are faced with a much wider security field than conventional conceptions of policing as work done by agents of the state. The normal democratic issues - such as control of the use of force, transparency in operations, or oversight and accountability - will have to be organized and conducted differently if the field of security is legitimately populated by state and no-state actors. Ideally, all actors will be integrated into a national strategic plans, balanced by local inputs and oversight. It is pretty well established how state agents can and should be controlled, namely by some forms of state governed or instigated activities; yet the locus and forms of control of non-state security providers, which is a built-in mandate in the widely used model of community based policing, is less clear. As the field of policing has expanded, so have the options and opportunities and needs to create mechanisms for oversight and control which fit the nature of the security providers and respond to democratic norms of participation by all in decisions which affect their lives. That will require creativity, political skills and knowledge of the means to motivate security providers to abide by expectations and constraints.

### 2.3.2. The Production of Democratic Policing Regimes

A second change in the field of policing, which has had a deep impact on the goals and means of doing reforms is the emergence of a transnational regime on the meaning and practices of democratic policing. Regime norms have become, slowly and incrementally, entrenched in international/transnational agreements and understandings (Das and Palmiotto, 2002), such as UN Codes of Conduct for law enforcement or the use of force by the police; the Council of Europe codes of conduct for police; European Union guidelines for reform of the policing systems of potential accession countries; or guidelines for democratic policing in post-conflict societies (e.g., UN, 1997), or reform commission reports in societies seeking to end or lessen sectarian violence and conflicts (e.g., Independent..., 1999).

The goals, values and goals commonly embedded in transnational codes and guidelines reflect a large body of largely academic thinking, leavened by the insights of practitioners, on the meaning of democratic policing (e.g., Amir and Einstein, 2001; Bayley, 2001, 1995; Council of Europe, 2000; Das and Marenin, 2000; Goldsmith and Lewis, 2000; Kádár, 2002; Law Commission, 2002; Loveday, 1999; Luckham, 2003; Marenin, 1998; Neyroud and Beckley, 2001; O'Rawe and Moore, 1997; Perez, 2000; Stone and Ward, 2000; UN, Mission, 1996).

Typically, conceptions of and policies for democratic policing centre on a set of core values and norms, though these are expressed and elaborated in slightly different ways and levels of complexity. Democratic policing is characterized by an orientation to service for civic society, rather than the state; transparency and accountability; the representativeness of personnel as measured by the distribution of salient identities in society; integrity management as a central function of police administration; a semi-autonomous status of the police organization and system; the treatment of police as citizens; and the possession of skills needed to perform their tasks efficiently and effectively, as indicated by the degree of professionalism at all ranks of the organization

---

ownership becomes a reality, especially under some notion of community based policing, limiting the monopoly of legitimate force to state agencies makes less sense.

and across specific functional tasks (e.g., managerial skills at the higher ranks, technical skills in investigations, or people skills by street level police in encounters with citizens).

These values are considered non-negotiable in the sense that without all of them, or processes which seek to move the police towards their achievement, police organizations cannot be considered to be democratic in their structure, culture or performance. The core values are pretty much self-evident in their conceptual and policy relevant meanings. The difficulty is largely the practical one of converting core values into effective policies, which can be done in different ways, depending on the constraints imposed by local contexts and the creativity of people charged with reforming the system, including the police themselves.

The representativeness of personnel has been in issue in any society which is divided by class, race, gender, or ethnic and religious identities which have cultural and political salience. This is true of any system, whether in the USA where the gender, ethnic and racial composition of the police force has soured relations between the police and identity groups excluded by law or habit from service in the police, or Northern Ireland where the composition of the RUC was one of the major flashpoints and symbols in sustaining sectarian conflicts and violence, to transitional society where ethnic minorities and despised outgroups (such as the Roma in CEE states) have little chance of entering the police, to former colonial countries which inherited systems of staffing which favoured particular ethnic groups. A disproportionate personnel selection and promotion process sustains two non-democratic consequences. The public will always perceive incidents of abuse of power, mistreatment, or discourtesy by the police as having been motivated by their identity rather than their behaviour, completely undermining the notion that the law in action is fairly applied; and the occupational culture of the police will continue to be replete with stereotypes about groups which are excluded from the police, which can quite often lead to differentiated treatment in encounters and lack of service for those groups.

Integrity management points to the need for managers and administrators of a police force to actively and persistently enforce the normative standards which are to govern the behaviour of the police. It is not enough to have policies in place, written up nicely in terse language and posted in procedural manuals. Unless actions are taken by managers, or unless integrity is a managerial priority, violations of integrity will creep into the behaviour of officers under the pressures of peer, public and state demands or the corrupting pull of opportunities to gain material and symbolic rewards.

The value of semi-autonomy refers to the need to balance demands on and accountability by the police with their need to be able to perform their job as demanded by law and considerations of the needs and rights of people they deal with in their daily work. In democratic societies, the police cannot be force unto themselves, for then they would be unaccountable. But they also cannot be overly responsive to the demands which come to them from civic society, local communities or the state, for then they would be slaves to the changing shifts of power and opinion in society. The police have to be detached enough from external pressures on them to be able to do their job according to legal and professional norms, but they have to be attached enough to societal expectations about what their job is and how it should be done to remain accountable. The capacity for balancing legitimate demands on them rests mainly with the police, because such demands are likely to occur in police-citizen encounters, and that requires the discretion granted by semi-autonomy. Semi-autonomy grants the police

agency in their own creation and reproduction. Of course, if the balance goes off kilter, civic society and the state need to step in.

Democracy should extend to the police themselves. They are citizens as well as police officers (Bruce and Neild (2005: 41-43, 67-68). They are entitled, in their work, to due process in cases of being investigated; non-discrimination in hiring; reasonable conditions of service; clearly stated guidelines for promotion and pay which the organization abides by; procedures, training and equipment to help maximize their safety while working; group representation in negotiations with management and outsiders; and democratic speech and participation rights which do not conflict with their mission and tasks. If the police are not treated democratically, within the constraining conditions of their work, why would they believe in democratic values and act on them when their work brings them into contact with the community?

Efforts to specify more precisely and concretely what democratic policing should pay attention to, what are valid indicators that democratic policing is being practiced, and what standards can be used to make those judgements have been elaborated as partially to guide and evaluate reforms and reconstructions projects in post-conflict and transitional societies (e.g., Ball and Fayemi, 2004; Bruce and Neild, 2005; Clegg, et al, 2000; Vera, 2003).

Transnational regimes provide the standards and justifications for reform projects in post-conflict societies, suitably modified to fit the practicalities of local conditions. The desired endstate of reforms, once reforms are sustained and institutionalized and legitimized, is expected to look very much like the policing typical of Western democracies. In recent times, the preferred endstate has been some form of community oriented or community based policing (SEESAC, 2003), the model international advisors and implementers are most familiar with and one which is flexible enough to be adapted in many contexts. Community oriented policing, with its emphases on partnership, problem solving, decentralization, crime prevention and commitment to service embodies many of the normative expectations which define democratic policing and responds to practical lessons learned from specific SSR and police reform projects, such as local ownership and stakeholders, community accountability and oversight, and a focus on the smaller threats to life, property and routines as much as on large scale violence and conflicts. COP and CBP (Community Based Policing) are seen as responding to the wishes and expectations of local communities, which want “local, responsive, targeted, partnership policing,...[which] answers their needs, works to an ethic of openness and consultation; sets itself standards of service, measures those standards and publishes the results; reaches-out to those most marginalised - the poor, vulnerable and disadvantaged; is much more concerned with relations with the people it serves than with its image alone” (SEESAC, 2003: 26).

Regime creation has been an almost circular, self-contained process. The norms and standards built into regimes have been defined, elaborated and justified by members of the TPC who then apply standards which they had a hand in creating as the goals and criteria for planning and evaluating reforms. This self-contained and self-regenerating circle of advice, planning, implementation and evaluation is broken into occasionally by donor elites, who keep an eye on domestic constituencies and concerns back home, and by local actors who are being selected and developed or who impose themselves as stakeholders. There is an almost occupational dynamic at work here - the people doing the work see themselves as engaged in a particular type of work requiring specific skills,

having a common culture and developing an incipient identity - as norms and lessons travel through the networks of the TPC (Dixon, 2000; Karstedt, 2001). The TPC is still largely populated by citizens of the Western world, and that can lead to the exclusion of norms and advice from other societies. Norms still travel basically on a one-way street, since the TPC has, “in the main, not chosen to invite learning from other countries” (Mathias, 2005). A two-way street would be preferable to learn relevant lessons as the reciprocal movement of ideas would combine the knowledge of general practices and lessons ‘owned’ by the TPC with knowledge of how the specifics of local contexts impinge on the capacity to apply general principles such that they are converted into effective practices. (Of course, police reform actors from other countries will know about the general principles as well, or learn them very quickly.)

### 2.3.3. Understanding Organizational Reconstruction and Reforms<sup>11</sup>

Reinventing government, planning for reforms and organizational change, implementing innovations occurs in all societies as an ongoing process. There is nothing unusual about promoting change in police organizations anywhere. The differences are the starting points. In post-conflict societies, where no police existed to start with (such as in East Timor or Haiti) or had completed collapsed (such as Sierra Leone or Cambodia), there is nothing to reform. Yet whatever will be created can usefully include lessons learned from any organizational change effort anywhere. The goal of having a functioning police organization and an articulated policing system is more efficiently and effectively achieved if organizational reforms are not re-invented in each case but adapt lessons learned elsewhere.

Thinking about what it takes to successfully establish, reconstruct, transform or reform large organizations and networks and produce the requisite managerial and administrative practices and policies which will allow that organization to function well (in terms of its stated goals), have the capacity for adaptation, the interests and skills to assess its own performances and respond to such evaluations, and embody in their formal and informal cultures the values of service, accountability and integrity - that thinking is infused with lessons learned from reforming, managing and reinventing large scale organizations, such as the police, in any society.

For example, to take a case which seems about as far removed as can be from the conditions of post-conflict societies - the USA - lessons on how to do organizational reforms, and what management and administrative strategies should be incorporated into reforms of police agencies, have been accumulating as many police agencies have sought to transform themselves into Community Oriented Police departments (e.g., Greene, 2000; Rinehart, et al, 2001; Schneider, 2003; US Department of Justice, 2002). Much of the language in these ‘advice guides’ and tool kits is similar to SSR and police reforms language: benchmark local resources and needs, identify stake-holders, ensure local ownership, engage in long range thinking, develop an implementation capacity.

---

<sup>11</sup> The generalizations about reform and implementation knowledge in this section are based on numerous assessments of domestic and transnational reform programs, some cited earlier. I have included studies which discuss the difficulties of police reform in stable democracies since the dynamics of organizational innovations in policing are far better researched and understood there than in societies which have experienced political instability, massive violence, and failures of state performance.

One important lesson learned from past failures and successes in implementing COP is the powerful role of mid-level managers. They can stop progress, or they can enable innovations (Geller and Swanger, 1995). Yet in the development and reform literature, mid-level managers are hardly mentioned. Most of the attention is at the top level, the police leadership, and some at the bottom of the police hierarchy, the need to train new police in the most basic aspects of police work. Noting wrong with that. But from an organizational, rather than a policy or skills transfer perspective, mid-level managers, the linkage between top and bottom in any hierarchic structure, are the crucial echelons in creating a sustained and sustainable organization.<sup>12</sup>

### **3. Lessons Learned**

The impact of contexts on success or failures of reforms, hence the lessons learned on what to do and what not, on how to conduct the process and what to avoid doing, on who should be involved and what should be the articulations which must be established among the people involved in a particular project (donors, TPC, local actors) will be discussed at three levels of the reform process: strategic, tactical, pragmatic and within the need to always keep local contexts in mind. This categorization of levels is not as clean in reality as it is in analytical terms, but serves to point out the multiple levels at which reform has to be approached, and the need to connect large scale policy thinking to specific and pragmatic actions on the ground.

Analyses of reform projects, which provide the empirical basis for many of the lessons, can be found in collected edition, such as Brzoska and Law (2005); Call (fc); Peake and Sheye (2005); or in country studies, such as Ball (2002), Sedra (2004a, 2004b) or USIP (March 2004) on Afghanistan; Dahrendorf, (2004), Hood, (2004) or Mobekk (2003) on East Timor; Call (2003b), Call and Stanley (2002) or Stanley and Call, 1996) on El Salvador; Neild (2001) or Stanley (fc) on Guatemala; Beidas et al (fc), Mendelson-Forman (2004), or WOLA (1995) on Haiti; Cottam and Infranco (2004) or Salas (2002) on Rwanda; Downes (2004 and OSCE, 2004) on Serbia; and Douma and de Zeeuw (2004), Fayemi (2004), Gbla (2004), Horn (2004), Horn and Olonisakin (2004), Munu (2003) or Sesay and Hughes (2005) on Sierra Leone; Jabar (2004) or USIP (April 2002) on Iraq.<sup>13</sup> The list could be easily multiplied.

#### **3.1. Domestic Contexts**

The most fundamental requirement for success is that reform projects are intimately informed by the local contexts in which they will be implemented. Reformers need to understand the contingencies of development and the need for peace-keeping and SSR, and they will have to be knowledgeable about developments in the policing field. But

---

<sup>12</sup> Neild (2001: 29) has argued “academy training will not substitute for standards set by immediate supervisors and commanders. Nor will good behaviour last long if bad practices go unchecked....It is important to develop procedures and operational manuals grounded in national law and international standards.” Without a mid-level echelon committed to reform values and their incorporation into procedural and operational policies, effectively enforced, norms will wither under the pressures of work, demands from the public and the powerful, and by the encouragement from fellow officers.

<sup>13</sup> USIP has also commissioned, as part of its Iraq Experience Project, three reports to identify lessons learned in Iraq which will be published in 2005.



those are only enabling factors for the success of reform, not sufficient ones. In the end, the general understanding of larger global developments in policies and norms in the policing field and in SSR will have to be translated in such a way that lessons become operative at the local level - and that requires intimate knowledge of the historical trajectories of the state and its agencies and of state-society relations, the needs and the capacities for social control available, and the specific contours of insecurity. Normative conceptions of good policing cannot be adapted to local contexts unless good knowledge exists. Needed are benchmarking studies of the security landscape and baseline studies of security threats; analyses of existing security actors and providers, both state and non-state (e.g., police, militias, PMCs and PSCs); likely and essential local stakeholders, widely defined to include state, private and civic society actors, who have to be incorporated into the process of advocating and implementing reforms; existing domestic and likely international resources which will support reforms and the means to mobilize these; and, likely spoilers or opponents to reform efforts.

### 3.1.1. Historical Trajectories

The specific historical trajectories of stability/instability, security/insecurity, civic society-state relations, and intra civic society groups relations will be unique for each country. The need for reforms, the goals which are desired, and the feasibility of reforms (promoters, supporters and opponents of reforms, resources and capacities available) will reflect the trajectories which led to conflict and will constrain the options available and the likelihood of success.

As Ebo (2004: 66, 67) points out, “the security sector in West African security is not people oriented, often disarticulated from larger society, and anachronistic in structure and is under challenge from militia and insurgent groups, criminal gangs and networks, and structurally weakened by the call of the World Bank and the IMF to ‘roll back’ the state, much of Africa has lost the monopoly over the means of coercion, making statutory security forces one of the *many* security actors rather than *the* security actor. The significance of the weakness of the state and its increasing incapacity to provide security as a public good, is the increasing privatisation of security services at both formal and informal levels” (emphasis his).

Aid enters into a security arena governed by its own, locally determined dynamics. Changing the police will mean changing the existing security field as well.

For one, the history of recent violent and brutal conflicts will be alive in the minds of people, the victims and the perpetrators. Reforms need to address the “embedded legacies of violent conflict, for example the psyche of militarism that is etched in the ethos, values and actions of ordinary people in society” (Fayemi, 2004:194). Perpetrators of atrocities will be known; people with blood on their hands may have been brought back for political reasons, as happened with Taylor in Liberia and Sankoh in Sierra Leone, to the dismay of human rights NGOs and domestic victims; victims of violence, still traumatized by what was done to them, will be stakeholders in reform processes. These sentiments and the knowledge of who did what to whom is knowledge will not go away easily. Events will not be forgotten and will not be easily forgiven, but unless confronted head-on, resentment and anger will simmer in public consciousness and provide the fuel for future conflicts.

The police forces in post-conflict societies are in a dismal state. Examining police forces in West African states, for example, during pre-, conflict and post-conflict periods, and even in relatively stable societies, such as Ghana, yields a dismal picture of policing systems beset by poor service conditions, political interference, dysfunctional organizational cultures from top and bottom, and limited resources in everything, from pencils to computers, from bicycles to cars, from uniforms to arms, and lack of community support. Recent reports on the police in Ghana find these problems, which are probably generalisable to other police forces in pre- and post-conflict societies. (These characterizations are culled from comments made by police participants at all rank levels in workshops conducted across Ghana, but could be replicated anywhere; see ASDR, 2001, 2002; Aning, nd, 2002. I have used the Ghana data, not to single out Ghana, but because such data, especially the views of lower level police officers on the conditions of their work, are almost impossible to find for other post forces.)

Comments can be divided into those dealing with conditions internal to the force and those which characterize relations with the outside. External relations problems include: little knowledge by outsiders of the culture and decision-making dynamics within the police; lack of community support, trust or cooperation; corruption and abuse, real and perceived and talked about; lack of legitimacy of policing and governing structures among other state actors and in civic society; no effective, visible or accessible oversight and accountability mechanisms; terrible police community relations - the image of police is that they serve the state, the powerful, the well connected first and themselves second (that ranking could be reversed), but certainly the community last; retrogressive familism, that is being responsive to kinships and communitarian demands to do work along ascriptive and particularistic lines; organizational and operational ties to the military and vice versa - at top and bottom, such as in joint patrols; vague and excessive functions specified in law; links to criminal groups; political interference in operational police work at all rank levels, from both state and community leaders; and a general acceptance by the public that the police are an object of political affection (which is not surprising, since that has not been the experience of the public).

Internal conditions which undermine their ability and commitment to provide good service, especially as perceived by the rank and file find, include: a big divide between rank and file and higher level ranks - indicating the absence of a salient common occupational identity; ineffectiveness, as little knowledge of impact of police work on order/crime exists within the organization or by outsiders, nor are data available to conduct a decent evaluation of what is going wrong or what could be done to improve the level and quality of performance; little knowledge by superiors of what police officers do with their time; lack of resources, pay, equipment, travel, on the job training; distorted deployment and use policies - VIPs attendance, GRA patrols, being used as personal servants to help the wives of high officials for shopping; prebendal policing - a severe lack of public service consciousness in all levels of the police - the authority of the office is seen first and foremost as a private income generating opportunity; little sense of community service or professional norms and values; untrained mid-level management and no follow-up training for lower ranks; a sense among the police that career advancement is achieved on the basis of non-merit criteria; no job descriptions, for any of the existing 17 rank levels in the force; non-regular promotions and no transparency of criteria used; non-adherence by the police to mandated requirements, e.g.. annual performance reports (and no external demand that they do); irregular transfers, for criticism of the organization and its policies or the behaviour of higher officers; a general milieu of uncertainty about the conditions and rewards for work done among the rank

and file - transfers, promotion, training, streetwork seem to be arrived at by no discernible rule oriented decision-making within the organization; top heavy and rigid hierarchy; non-distribution of decision-making to lower ranks or regions - no devolution; no updating of colonial era operations manuals; very limited resources, even essentials such as telephones, cars or information technology (police have to use personal phone cards to call each other); regional resources distribution inequities. The list goes on. In effect, there is no functioning police organization having a common identity, ethos, culture, consistent policies, effective managerial strategies, or a capacity to plan, execute and evaluate operational policies.

Practices are done which seem to have no crime control or service justification or where the justifications offered are transparently inaccurate, self-serving and not the reasons why the practice continues to exist, such as, for example, the pervasiveness of roadblocks manned by the police (and the military). Roadblocks are typically justified as enforcing vehicle safety and certification; by their crime prevention impact - their alleged purpose is to catch criminal as they move around; or by providing a known access point for citizens in need. The claim of certifying vehicles as safe and getting unsafe vehicles off the road is clearly false, because when and as done (“give me your particulars”) only leads to corruption, as anyone who has ever driven West African roads- and probably many roads elsewhere - can testify; the crime catching claim cannot be tested at all since there are no data; and the availability argument is unconvincing since many roadblocks are in non-urban areas and it is difficult to imagine officers leaving their lucrative roadblocks to go to assist citizens in need. In other states, e.g., in Mexico, roadblocks are justified on national security ground and as protection for local economies by preventing the smuggling of arms and prohibited consumer goods into Mexico. As elsewhere, roadblocks can be bypassed or smugglers will be waived through for a fee agreed to beforehand. In India and Nigeria, roadblocks are opportunities for the police and military who staff them to exact specified ‘road taxes,’ a system so well entrenched that newspapers occasionally publish a schedule of taxes for different types of vehicles along certain inter-city roads. All of this is well known by everybody, including police administrators. In fact, in Nigeria, roadblocks typically have higher ranked officers sitting by the side of the road who observes the ‘tax collecting activities’ done by their subordinates.

The one use of roadblocks that does seem to bear some relationship to official duties and roles are roadblocks established for national security reasons, as in Zambia in the 1908s to stop the smuggling of arms from South Africa into Zambia by groups seeking the overthrow of the Kaunda regime. Such roadblocks, though, only work as intended if there is consistent oversight of the police doing the work to ensure that they are not paid off to not search cars, and incidentally letting the arms go through.

### **3.1.2. The Contours of Insecurity**

The problem of security - its structures, levels, contours, dynamics and actors - will be country specific (and often involve regional actors), as will be the goals of reform and the understandings of local actors of what would be considered success or failure. Assistance enters the specific dynamics of insecurity at the local levels. Dealing with child soldiers will be different from dealing with warlords; standing up a police system which has

collapsed completely will be different from transforming a policing system which functions, but badly.

Insecurities have their own trajectories in each post-conflict society and will require adapted responses, which need to be continuously re-adapted as conditions change. In Sierra Leone, for example, the contingent existence of the state, protected and propped up for years by private security companies and ECOWAS soldiers, and the fluctuating strength of a rebellion inflicting brutal harm on the population in its fight against the government, created insecurity conditions which have a self-perpetuating inertia that has to be confronted. In El Salvador, even though the peace process created a national strategy for reconciliation and stability, and the creation of police forces which integrated former rebels into its ranks and vetted out human rights violators, the explosion of crime led to public demands for more effective policing which undermined many of the personnel and due process oriented policies being instituted within the police. In Haiti, the collapse of the political and policing systems instituted after the earlier interventions, the re-emergence of endemic corruption among all government actors, and the invasion of drug financed rebels did away with social order, leaving people, vigilante gangs and communities to fend for themselves as best as they could. In Iraq, the unwise decision by the Provisional Authority to disband the existing 'contaminated' security forces, and the absence of any significant Phase IV plan for creating post-conflict stability, led to chaos and continuing conflict. In short, the dynamics of the production of insecurity are part of the problem, and they need to be understood if they are to be dealt with by local actors and external agencies.

### **3.1.3. Local Needs and Capacities**

Benchmarking the security landscape in some depth and detail should be part of pre-planning for interventions, to establish the nature and patterns of the insecurity problem which have to be controlled, managed and reduced, and to provide a baseline against which progress can be measured. But a census of local capacities is just as important.

Reforms must strike a balance between the pragmatic and the principled, between what should be done and what can be done. Local resources (e.g., social capital; traditional order maintaining practices; financial resources which can be attached to reform projects; political commitment which can be sustained; the persistence of self-help, communitarian practices to deal with disorder and crime; or the functionality of state security agencies) are as much a necessary part of the overall descriptive assessment of the local contexts as are security needs.

Social capital - the ability of a community or group to organize itself for the promotion of its interests - is generally in short supply in conditions of violence and conflict, and when done normally takes the form of vigilante actions or flight. It is likely that conflicts will have changed the distribution of social capital. For example, in Sierra Leone, the authority of elders and age groups and their hold over the normative and practical mechanisms for maintaining social order has been challenged by younger members who have experienced leadership and hardships while fighting and will be reluctant to go back, once conflict ceases, to their less powerful and exciting lives within the local communities (World Bank, 2004; for a different take on social capital and local capacity, the enumeration of Civil Society Organizations, see ARD, 2001).

Baselining the problem, its trajectories, and current needs and resources leads to the understanding of what has to be and what can be changed (within the ambit of resources available to meet security needs) and what should be the goals. Existing security needs are the mirror in which reformers and implementers can discern the faint outlines of policy goals desired by local communities, civic society and the state. I say faint, because security needs are the negative image of goals, but are not specific enough to guide reforms in the long run.

### **3.2. Strategic Lessons**

Given the historical trajectories and current state of insecurities and security providers, reformers have to decide on two basic issues and questions: what are the factors for police reform which are beyond the control of the police or police advisors and implementers; and, second, what factors can be controlled or influenced by the police themselves. The first question raises issues of strategy, political leverage and the capacity to influence developments in societal contexts which impinge on police performance (such as resource allocations, the political will or commitment by relevant stakeholders to support reforms in the short and long term, the absorption of non-state threats to security into civic society after war and conflict; or the legitimation of new forms of policing by communities and the state). The second question deals with tactics available and under the control of implementers and the police, such as demands and expectations about job performance which police managers can set and enforce, (for example, effective internal accountability mechanisms or training policies which will counteract the pull of informal police cultures which are likely to develop).

Tasks beyond the capacity of implementers, advisors and the local police point to the importance of contexts. To help create the necessary supportive contextual conditions which will enable advisors and the police to go forward with reform projects will take political skills to convince local state and civic society actors to agree to and accept certain pre-conditions for democratic policing, such as the willingness to leave the police alone in their operational work. For such tasks the police need help from other actors.

Tasks under the control or influence of the police point to skills and commitments by local police to accept and continue reforms. In the end, the police will control the concrete manners of policing experienced by the community and they have to accept responsibility for those actions. They are not just pawns to be pushed around at will by political and social forces, pieces on a chess board moved by the intentions of others. They will insist on semi-autonomy and reject attempts to control their work, but they also need to accept that they will and should be held accountable for what they do.

The distinction between tasks largely under the control of the police and their advisors and those beyond their control (in practice a continuum) helps set priorities of what to concentrate on and helps determine the sequence in which to move the process of reform along. Implementers should focus on where their meagre resources can be applied to best effect rather than what they wish would happen if other people just pitched in.

Analyzing the character of existing police organizations and of the policing policies and practices which undermine effectiveness and legitimacy helps clarify the goals of reform. Reformers will have a clear picture of what needs to be changed, or reconstructed from

the bottom up, such as new police culture and common occupational ethos attuned to service; structures and policies in place to ensure effective, fair, accountable policing; training of sufficient length suited to the tasks and roles expected of the police, as well as on-the-job follow-up training throughout an officer's career; some autonomy from political and community interference; recruitment policies seeking representativeness of police personnel judged by the salience of group identities in society; reward and sanction oriented management styles, not just punitively oriented and personalized decision-making; rule oriented decision-making within the organization; proper treatment of people the police come in contact with as guided by professional norms and legal mandates; and effective anti-corruption policies, including abolishing practices which encourage corruption (See Neild, 2001: 27-31 for a similar list of reforms needed to establish a police organization that does a decent job).

Strategic lessons on how to approach reforms of policing can be grouped into these categories: understand the nature of policing; appreciate the generality and the specificity of local contexts; develop a strategic approach to the resilience of local histories and conditions; be aware of sequencing dynamics - needs and demands will change as reform become institutionalized; focus more on creating and sustaining a process of change and innovation and less on creating organizational structures; think long term as well as short term - international assistance will disappear by the priorities of donor not the needs of recipients; think circular and not linear; and learn from positive as well as negative experiences.

### **3.2.1. Deal with the Complexities and the Simplicities of Policing**

Four generalizations about the police and the potential and capacity for police reform seem non-controversial at this time.

One, the police are workers and managers doing a job which is defined for them by the political system and, to a lesser extent, by the society in which they work. Policing is at its core an occupation, not a mission or a vocation. Being a job, the tasks of policing are set by forces external to the police, in legal and ideological notions (what are their powers and authority), in substantive terms (what are they expected to do), and procedurally (what are the limitations or constraints they must work under). Hence, there is nothing unusual, suspect or illegitimate to expect the police to abide by rules imposed on them and to be held accountable to the proper performance of their jobs and tasks. Like any worker or manager, the police have an authority granted to them by others and are responsible for the proper execution of the powers given to them. The police may not like this, and may argue that they should have large areas of discretion in how to do their work, but that argument misses the point. As with any worker, if one does not like the conditions of the job, including the obligation to be responsive and accountable to outsiders, there is always the option of doing something else. In a democracy, the value of accountability cannot be compromised.

Two, the police are agents and agencies with their own interests, values, goals and desires. They have a substantial capacity for discretion and autonomous action, an autonomy supported and justified by the rhetoric of professionalism and expertise, and by the unavoidable discretionary and obscured nature of much of police decision-making and work. No policy directives issued to the police will be carried out without deviation

or distortion; nor will efforts to reform a policing system be effective unless these take into account the working world and capacity for autonomous actions by the police.

At the core of police behaviour, affecting all they do by shaping the interpretations of events and justifications for their work, lies the police culture. Though the specific content of the culture will vary by individual officer, organization and country (each enacting a style peculiar to itself), what matters is that the culture is not created by outsiders or individual officers or the organization but arises from the complexities of work, to which it offers safe and convenient solutions. The force of culture will complicate reform efforts, for if an occupational culture or some remnants exist, such as in CEE states, reforms will not fall on empty soil, and if a culture will be created anew, it will over time become integrated into the thinking of the new police and develop its own force. Existing cultures are not transformed by new training or formal instructions to abide by normative constraints. In short, reform efforts will only be one of the factors in shaping or creating a police culture which, once it has become accepted within an organization, will act as an interpretive, cognitive and affective lens through which reforms will be interpreted. Reforms, hence, must deal with the culture and seek to co-opt it to the planned formal culture. If not done, the new ways of doing policing will not be sustained by the police even when they are demanded by the state and civic society.

Reformers, by paying attention to the internal dynamics of decision-making, at all levels of the organization, avoid the inevitable failure which follow from seeing police organizations as a 'black box' into which advice and resources are poured and policies and operational practices emerge as planned. No plan or mission will be implemented as desired unless the motivations and views of the implementers are included in the design, advocacy and execution of reforms.

Three, the police are a political institution, symbolically and in practice. In democracies they should not be partisan in their work (that is, support the interests of specific sub-national groupings, including themselves, in their society) but they cannot be a-political. Their work will always have differentiated political consequences, and will be seen to have by the state and civic society, even when they enforce law, maintain order and carry out all ancillary tasks effectively and according to rules, for social order is never neutral in its impacts on the life chances of individuals and groups. The work of the police will force them to take sides in societal disputes and will affect the distribution of resources and rewards among groups and individuals. This is true for western democracies as it was for South Africa under apartheid.

The fact that the police and reforms will be critically evaluated by the police, by the state and by civic society is a legitimate activity and criterion in a democratic society; as is the reality that the police will be an object of desire for they can be powerful and useful to those who can control them. In terms of reform, this implies that changing the police is never a purely technical exercise, though there are aspects to policing which are less political than others, such as how to write a traffic ticket. Yet whether to write one or, on larger scale, whether the police will participate in the oppression of a population or join in violence against outgroups, those choices are political in outcomes and will so be seen and judged by observers (Marenin, 1982).

The major reason why reformers, especially external donor and implementers need to be informed about contexts is that they need to understand the pitfalls of local politics

which will seek to draw the police and reformers into conflicts which may have along history and will continue to bedevil society.

Four, policing occurs in specific contexts and has been shaped by, and to some degree shapes, those contexts. The historical origins and the current economic, political, cultural, and ideational contexts will have a profound impact on reform efforts, both in what is possible and can be sustained over time and what will stymie reforms. Reforming a policing system will always be difficult because reforms cannot be only of the police but require changes in contexts which will support and sustain policing reforms, be these in legal regulations and authorizations, of the other agencies of the criminal justice system, or the willingness of the state and civic society to accept policing practices which may go against one's immediate interests.

Since much of advice and assistance on reform comes from outside the society, and the lessons offered to post-conflict have been learned from policing systems which were shaped by particular national histories, the aid offered may not fit the contexts into which they are introduced (that is obvious), even if it is good advice, or may not work in the same way as they did in the contexts from which the lessons were extracted (which is less obvious). Unless he forces and reasons why, for example, community based policing worked well in one society may not exist in another. As numerous commentators have pointed out, CBP assumes the existence of sufficient local capacity (social capital and will) to partner with the police, yet it is precisely that capacity which is lacking, and which was the reason for intervention and aid in the first place, in post-conflict societies. Neild (2002: 32), for example, cautions that "enthusiasm for translating developed country models of 'community policing' must be tempered by a realistic consideration of the ongoing weakness of local accountability mechanisms, even as these models may offer some interesting strategies for making the police more locally accountable, responsive and effective."

These generalizations stress an essential yet mundane aspect of reform which are often neglected in the welter of high flown rhetoric, plans and aspirations, namely, that policing is a job. Thinking about policing and reforms can be much too over-complicated. Policing is an important job, it is a complicated job, it is a powerful and political job, it is a necessary job, in the sense that without minimal levels of social order further reforms will not have the security environment in which they can be carried out - but it is still just a job. The goal of managing the work of policing is to structure the choices made by workers in the security field through proper management of training, incentives and sanctions, and within the context of a functioning organization supported by at minimally effective state. Formal (state centred) policing is work done by people hired, trained, paid, and managed within government agencies. As employees, the police can be and should be told what to do, how to do it, how to be rewarded materially and symbolically, and how to be held accountable and sanctioned if they engage in improper or criminal conduct; and they should be judged by how well they deliver what they are being paid for - a "quality service" (Mathias, 2005).

One implication of thinking of policing as a job which, in the end, will have to be visible in 'the street', is that planning for reform needs to combine top down and bottom up strategies. A focus on finding the right leadership and on top down planning and implementation will not lead to a functioning organization unless the folk at the bottom of the organization are included in the process and their views, knowledge and concerns are given a hearing and legitimacy.



(These characterizations of the nature of policing are based, selectively, on interesting and relevant samples of the general literature on policing; e.g., Bayley, 1997; Brodeur, 1998; Chan, 1997; Hills, 2000; Klockars, et al, 2001; Lab and Das, 2003; Loader and Walker, 2001; Pagon, 1996, 2000; Reiner, 1992; as well as other sources cited elsewhere.)

### **3.2.2. Expect to Be Blind-sided by Local Contexts**

Tschirgi (2004:15) has pointed to the “uneasy fit between externally driven policies and fragile conditions in post conflict countries... Donor programs in democracy assistance are generally skewed in favour of boiler plate favourites, such as elections, human rights promotion and media - which do not necessarily correspond to local needs. Moreover, the donor preference for time-bound projects is at odds with the need for building and nurturing sustainable domestic political processes... [Experience] demonstrates that democratization processes depend more on domestic/regional factors (such as political power structures, socio-economic conditions, historical experiences, leadership and regional neighbourhood) than on donor-led democracy assistance models.”

Contexts will determine whether imported ideas, models and practices will become legitimated, and contexts will destroy any chance that cookie cutter projects will succeed. Outsiders, rarely, will have the time or inclination to become intimately familiar with local contexts, and where the pitfalls for reform lurk. Local actors, who are brought into the reform process as stake holders, can also function as informants. But care has to be taken in the selection of owners to gain a representative slice of the spectrum of opinions in a society, and not just the words and views of the powerful or the local leaders.

Baseline studies to determine the contours of insecurity, opinions and wants should be one of the first step taken in the reform process. Donor may not always see the need for extensive studies nor do local actors, since the basic problems are ‘known to everyone’ and the need is to do something quickly. But, in the long run, collecting the information up front will be useful for the continual tinkering necessary in implementation in response to assessments of the impacts of earlier step in the process. Plus instilling the notion that information, properly collected and validated, is an essential tool for managing an organization is an idea that should be insinuated early in the process.

But implementers should prepare for the expected unexpected. The confluence of events, donor interests, societal contexts, insecurity dynamics and innovations achieved will always alter the security landscape in unpredicted ways. At that point, planners and implementers will be confronted with new situations which were not part of the plan and will have understand the leverage points for dealing with the unexpected. That means thinking ahead on what could go wrong - and what then? - as well on what is likely go well. Hope and cynicism will have to be kept in necessary balance.

### **3.2.3. Develop an Integrated Approach to Local Resilience**

Reformers need to achieve a strategic vision of the process required to approach the persistent resilience of local conditions which can stymy reforms which do not grow naturally from the wishes and interests of local actors.

Local histories will not go away. Normal activities and cultures will still be there. In Kosovo, the memory and membership of the KLA will still be there; Serbs will still be afraid of Kosovars and their memories; conflicts among ethnic communities will still break out; and organized crime will grow. In Afghanistan, opium will still be the most attractive and effective income producing crop for most farmers in poor agricultural areas; warlords will continue to try to hold on to power; ethnic identities, with a centuries old history, will not be erased; Islamic fundamentalism will continue to be the religion of choice for many; leftover armaments and weapons, some dating back to the Soviet invasion, will still be easily available. In Sierra Leone, the colonial origin and image of the police will still dominate public consciousness; ethnic identities and cultural practices will continue; diamonds will remain a major source of income; perpetrators of atrocities will be known and will be living among the population. In East Timor, the memory and membership of the struggle against Indonesian rule will remain salient in political discourse, and members of Falintil, the resistance movement, will expect that their participation in the struggle will be rewarded by political appointments and work in the new security forces (Dahrendorf, 2004). In Iraq the Kurds will still dream of having their own state; the Shiites will seek their 'rightful' majority position in the new government; women will still be subject to restrictions in fundamentalist Islamic areas; Sunnis will ruefully remember their days in the political sun. These are givens which have to be dealt with and taken into account in any reforms. Speaking about the basic lessons learned from the Haitian experience, Beidas et al (2004: 123) comment that it "must be borne in mind that the roots of conflict and of institutional collapse do not disappear with the signing of a peace accord or the imposition of a political solution. Rebuilding institutions in such contexts is a complex and daunting task. It requires considerable ingenuity, sensitivity, patience and determination from both local and external actors" - and even then reforms may fail.

Reforms will be attempted in contexts of cultural and political dynamics which cannot be wished away, and they will complicate efforts at reform. Reforms are foreign implants, even with local ownership in place, into contexts which will be the determining factors for success or failures, much more than will be the good intentions and support of donors. Donors should not be naive or overly optimistic about the many ways in which resilience can jump up and bite you. The goal is to integrate local resilience which supports reform into the process and seek to neutralize, for that is the most feasible option, resilience which stands in the way.

#### **3.2.4. Be Aware of Sequencing Dynamics**

Reforms are not of one piece but a sequence of steps which, if properly ordered, lead to the desired goal. The important point to keep in mind is that, as reforms succeed, needs will change by stages of transition from insecurity to security. Reformers need to ask themselves "where are we at in the reform process, and what do we need to do differently now?" Are all efforts on track? What is needed is an "overseen, systematic and cumulative process which involves confidence building, legal, cultural (values) and institutional elements; each of which may [be] needed to be interpreted differently at different stages of the process, from utter local lack of existing security structures to functional local ownership of public security management" (Geneva Centre, 2004: 6). In El Salvador and Guatemala, as reforms became institutionalized, needs and expectation for policing changed, as did stakeholders and external donors. "Reforms which were first

designed and evaluated on the basis of their ability to overcome past problems [were] now measured by their ability to confront very high rates of crime and violence” (Neild, 2002: 32). As reforms become more established or fail, the process and priorities for reform will have to be constantly rethought.

The normal sequence of steps includes firefighting (attention to immediate security and the need to stop ongoing violence), pacification (getting some sense of normality and a minimal threshold of order back into the situation), stabilization (beginning a process of reform), institutionalization (creating minimal levels of performance and effectiveness), and legitimation (achieving self-reproducing support from local contexts). The ultimate goal is to replace the initial external push and support for reform with internal factors and forces which support reforms, within the security sector itself and within societal contexts. Congruent and parallel reforms in both arenas need to be developed. Donors will leave when their time frame is exhausted, and the “sustainability of externally driven reform efforts [can be] called into question by the likelihood that a withdrawal of the international security presence would result in a resurgence of violence, re-enforcing the premise that SSR cannot outpace political and institutional reform”(Bryden, 2004: 268) in the criminal justice system (legal reforms, court and judicial practices, correctional policies and institutions for both juveniles and adults).

One issue frequently discussed in the reform community is the question of what to do with non-state actors. The common argument is that the legitimate monopoly of force should be returned to the state or, conversely, that non-state actors should lose the right and ability to use force or participate in the provision of security. The continuance of non-state actors having the capacity to use force is seen as a substantial obstacle to police and security sector reform, and rightly so. That proposition is most valid at the beginning stages of the reform sequence, but much less so at later stages. At the beginning the goal is to disengage non-state actors from the security field and at the later stages the issue is how to re-articulate non-state actors back into a cohesive and comprehensive national security sector and police reform strategy and process. For one, non-state actors will continue to exist and be available for work in the security field and, secondly, non-state actors are a basic element in rethinking forms and models of policing, such as community based policing. What is likely to happen is that the non-state actors who will be asked and expected to participate in the more mature stages of reform, as regular policing capacities and dynamics kick in, will be the same people who were threats to security at the beginning stages. Reform, as related to non-state actors, hence should set in motion a process which de- and re-articulates non-state actors from formal institutions of policing rather than a process which leaves non-state security actors out in the cold (or, more properly in most cases, out in the heat).

### **3.2.5. Focus on Process and Reproduction**

Most donors judge success by establishing and leaving behind an institutional framework for the security field. Effective institutions are the legitimate goal, yet care must be avoided that reform do not create ‘empty institutions’ (Schmitz and Sell, 1999), institutions which look like functioning organizations (and have the organizational charts, job descriptions, and policy statements to prove that they are indeed an organization), but lack the personnel committed to formal goals and the informal organizational and occupational cultures which would lead to their pursuit and achievement. Institutional

frameworks are essential but they are not enough. One can create a police force on paper, with all the nice accoutrements which characterize an organization, but then calling new personnel members staffing that organization - who may have had four weeks of training, no practical field experience but wear a uniform - 'police' seriously mistakes rhetoric for reality. They are police in name only since they lack, something which requires extensive training, re-training, on the job training and long term experience and work, the cultural values appropriate for democratic and effective police officers.

Creating a process of reform continually forces people involved to raise questions about progress, problems still faced, and whether further steps need to be taken. A focus on institution building can lead to standstill, especially if there is a short time frame in which to achieve success (the typical constraint on reform projects - they are never open ended). In a sense, 'organizing' an institution, such as a police organization, is the easy part. The hard part is staffing the organization - and bringing it to life and giving practical meaning to promises made - with the right people who have the attitudes and values and, more generally speaking, the occupational culture which will sustain democratic reforms. The difference between a democratic and an authoritarian police force will not be found in their organizational set-ups, which will be bureaucratic in form and function (the most rationalistic form of organizing many people for a common goal), but in their informal cultures, their commitment to forms of decision-making and behaviour which reflect democratic norms

A similar argument applies to the creation of accountability. Accountability is the end state of a process of reform requiring multiple decisions, and only becomes effective when the process was done correctly, and is sustainable over time only if the process which led to accountability is routinised. The goal, hence, is not accountability in some general way, but the creation and continuance of the many steps and characteristics of a process which produces the capacity and willingness for oversight on the part of the state and civic society and the acceptance of the obligation to accountability on the part of the police.

### **3.2.6. Take a Long-term View as Well as a Short-term View of Reforms**

Reformers need to focus on sustainability and legitimation - the need for long term thinking and the politics as well as the technicalities of reform. Sustainability becomes largely a question of local owners taking over the process of reform and the administration of institutions which were created, which requires sufficient resources, local capacity, such as technical skills or the will to participate in accountability practices. Legitimation is a much more difficult process as it has a strong normative element built into it. One can argue that the basic ways in which legitimacy is achieved and sustained is through effective performance in the control of insecurity as judged against the expectations of communities -what they see as their local needs and priorities; fair treatment; and symbolic reassurance.

The main reason that justice concerns have to be incorporated into reform plans - that is policies stressing effectiveness have to be carried out through a process which is seen as fair (fair being defined by transnational norms and by local notions) - is that without fair treatment of all by the police and the criminal justice system effectiveness policies will be tolerated but are not likely to be legitimated. In the long run, policies pursued by the

police which are considered legitimate by the majority of a population or community are more efficient in maintaining the authority of the police and the willingness of the public to consent to that authority. Acceptance of policies based on fear, personal interests (more safety), or pragmatism will be more costly, inefficient and harder to sustain since they must be proven and re-enforced by the police on a consistent basis. Symbolic manipulation, though manipulative in intent and impacts, can strengthen legitimation processes engendered by performance. People are not immune to the seductions of a good PR campaign.

The argument sometimes made by reformers and local actors, that justice or due process or concern for human rights and fair treatment needs to be placed on the backburner, at least temporarily, while effective, harsh and draconian solutions to insecurity are being pursued, that argument is misleading in any case. Security and justice are not a zero sum game. It is just as easily argued that effective policing requires fair policing to be sustained, an argument that is supported by empirical evidence. In the short and certainly in the long run, unfair policing destroys any chance that new reforms will become legitimated.

By their very nature, sustainability and legitimation are goals which take a long time to achieve and which have to be reproduced on an almost daily basis. As noted by one regionally based effort to develop community oriented policing, or CBP - Community Based Policing (SEESAC, 21-25), “introducing the police back into society is a first step in a very long process of trust building and has been incrementally and with sensitivity to ensure long term success, ” requires “continuous improvement,” must be adaptable to local conditions and “any implementation plan for CBP needs to be country specific,” has to accept the “the importance of involving NGOs and other grassroots organisations in any CBP strategy,” and must support the “patient and determined development of community activities.”

The difficulty of achieving long-term successes frequently leads reformers into quick fixes and projects which can be exhibited as ‘wins’, with only a faint hope rather the conviction that they will last. The temptation is to use existing technical, organizational or organizing technologies, with which reformers are familiar with rather than techniques tailored to local contexts, because these promise a quick win. Yet as Fayemi (2004: 200) notes, “sustainability and ownership issues will continue to persist unless security sector reconstruction is fully integrated into the wider institutional reform agenda. As currently conceived in these states, security sector reconstruction attempts to re-engineer and resuscitate often decrepit and discredited institutions and to re-centre the state in the security game, not initiate fundamental rethinking of security/strategic concepts and frameworks, governance institutions, and relations of power.”

### **3.2.7. Think Circularly, not Linearly**

Policy thinking should recycle back on itself. For one, policy as it is made and implemented needs to be conceived as a cycle of problem definition, policy selection, planning, implementing, evaluating and, depending on the findings of the evaluation, further redefinition of the problem, an altered calculus of available and feasible policy options, and changes and adjustments in policy and practice, and renewed evaluations, which then feed back again into the cycle. Doing policy has to be adjusted when the policy makes a difference for the problem and when it does not. The feedback can be

fine-tuned, so that it occurs at the various stages of the cycle. A problem definition will itself be recycled a number of times even as the other steps initially decided on are being carried out. Implementation can be adjusted on the fly. Doing policy is a continuous process, not a one time carrying out of a preplanned set of steps. Evaluations do not have to be a systematic social science type of evaluation requiring complicated data collection methods and complicated analysis. Common sense conditioned by experience will do in most cases, and is often the only feasible method for rethinking the policy as it is being done. What matters is that conducting policy is seen as a contingent process.

Two, learning what needs to be adjusted as the policy is being carried out implies that all actors at all stages of the cycle should be talked to before, during and after the life cycles of a project. In many ways, the implementers who have been charged with carrying out a policy will know more about the successes and failures, and why they occur, of any policy than will be the agenda setters, planners or evaluators. Yet implementer are often the last and the least consulted, because they are seen (in a classic division of labour familiar to public administration theorists) as the executors of policy, having little interest and certainly little capacity to think about the important aspects of policy making. They are just doing what they are told, and talking to others in other offices who tell implementers what to do is more informative than talking to the policy actors in the street. That sentiment completely misses the dynamics of what actually happens to policies as they are being carried out, and loses a lot of information that could be useful in improving policy. Instead, donors should adopt a practitioner based approach to policy development.

And three, if policy is a cycle it is important that all actors in the cycle, even though they do different tasks, participate at all stages of the cycle. Policy will not work well if agenda setters set agendas, and planner plan, and evaluators evaluate, and implementers implement. A policy which is decided on without including implementers, or those likely to be tasked with implementation, faces the problem that implementers may have thought quite differently about what needs to be done to address a problem, and may disagree with the way they are told to carry out a policy, with the results that the policy will not be carried as planned. In police reforms, this means including the police, at all rank levels, into discussion of plans and policies from the beginning. If planners decide on changes in the working routines of the police and then tell the police doing the job, 'oh, by the way, you will now to a new job and you will do it this way', that is a recipe for failure.

The main cause for linear thinking in reform projects lies with the interests of donors, who typically see projects as having a limited duration being funded by limited resources - as something they get into, do and get out of - leaving little leeway for adjustments as the projects is carried out. Every adjustment, every rethinking of plans, practices or goals, every evaluation of how things are going leads to delays, is likely to cost more, changes established relations with local participants, and is a small admission of failure (the planning was not done well enough to meet the needs and goals of the project). These are consequences donors are reluctant to embrace, and that reluctance will lead to ineffective policies.

### 3.2.8. Learn from Positive as Well as Negative Experiences

Most lessons are derived from analyses of policy failures of the past. Moving forward toward new goals is moving away from what has become discredited, ineffective, illegitimate or harmful. Reform projects cannot have any other direction.

The danger is that any movement away from current conditions will be judged a success but, also, that the critical capacity to correctly and objectively assess one's work will be weakened. And if stated goals are not achieved, or are achieved more slowly and a greater cost, that is still success, albeit not quite as envisioned, and reformers can walk away from their project with a sense of achievement and a job well done. And such failures as are acknowledged will be attributed to factors over which reformers had little control - not enough political will, a lack of local capacity, local owners who turn out to be just as ambitious, devious, corrupt and interested in power as were former police leaders and politicians. Lessons drawn from analyses of why reform did not work will be useful, in a negative and limited way, as policies and decisions to avoid, but will not suggest what could be done to be more successful. What options are there after one has said, 'don't do it this way, or pay attention when you plan an implement to political will, local ownership, etc.?' This is not to suggest that failure based lessons are not useful; only that they are not useful and specific enough to develop and guide new policies.

For example, assessments of efforts to reform the policing systems of CEE states reach these general conclusions: rhetorical knowledge and pronouncements flourish but are not often translated into practice (police reformers know how to talk the language of democratic policing but have great difficulty transforming words into organizational and occupational practices and norms); changes in political styles and commitment and in the contexts needed to support police effectiveness are not happening or happening too slowly (if the police arrest criminals and judges will not deal with them fairly or quickly and few correctional facilities exists, crime control will suffer); accountability is crucial for legitimation; and practically all reforms stress the trinity of demilitarization, depoliticisation and decentralization (the main features thought to have contributed to the non-democratic aspects of policing under communist/socialist systems). In short, the lessons point to what needs to be avoided, what to get away from and stress the basic norms of democratic policing which should be the goals for reforms, but say much less on what should be done and how (Caparini and Marenin, 2004: 327-339).

An assessment by knowledgeable and experienced observers of eight years of donor interventions in Haiti (Beidas et al, *fc*) concluded that "very few sustainable gains were visible" and that "Haiti had already slipped back into familiar patterns of winner-take-all politics supported by the selective oppression of opponents" (p. 118). To blame were a "lack of continuity at the highest policy-making level," "donor sensitivity and understanding of local contexts [which] was often lacking," "very few 'bottom-up strategies had been undertaken," and that, "ultimately, security and justice reforms in Haiti foundered for political reasons" (pp. 120-122). That analysis is accurate, but what does it tell you for doing reform?

Reforms which are generally considered to have been successful, or more than others, include El Salvador at the earlier stages; or Sierra Leone, or South Africa. In El Salvador, the inclusion of the police as an item for discussion in the peace process led to extended and detailed discussion of what a new police force should be like, created commitment with both government and rebel leaders to create such a force, the subsequent emergence

of civic society stakeholders in reforms, enhanced a greater understanding of the nature of policing, and included the police in the national security strategy from the beginning. That the process was subverted later, by demands to deal with crime and the political manipulation of staffing and use, does not detract from the positive lesson learned before and how to start reforms.

In Sierra Leone, reforms are seen as successful, so far, for (I would argue) three reasons. The government was willing to be politically incorrect and accept outsiders as executive leaders; there was one major donor, obviating many of the problems associated with maintaining cooperation, coordination and focus typical of a multi-donor project; and the implementers on the ground were familiar with policing and recent thinking about democratic policing, as they had practical experience as police officers and in reform projects, thought about reforms in ways sophisticated and pragmatic, and were attuned enough to the complexities of reform to understand the need to deal with contexts as they found them and were flexible enough in their thinking to be creative. In South Africa, police reform was from the beginning part of the larger transformation of the South African polity and society, leading to police reforms which were both integrated into security needs and thinking at the local levels and reflected the wish by police leaders to be accepted within the international 'brotherhood of the police'. The police knew, from the numerous donor projects offered and carried out in South Africa, the international thinking on how to do policing well and effectively.

### **3.3. Tactical Lessons**

Lessons of past reform efforts, taking into account the required understanding of goals, policing local and international contexts and implementation difficulties, have included or focused on these themes:

#### **3.3.1. Consider the Targets of Implementation**

As noted, reforms do not happen - they are done. It is important to know who are the security actors involved in the various stages of the police reform process and what are their skills and motivations. To reform or transform or reconstruct policing systems requires an understanding or even empathy on how and why the police behave as they do, such as the pressures of the occupational cultures in which they are enmeshed, their personal interests and values, and their views of the legitimacy of demands which emanate from the organization and the community. Understanding that gives reformers insights into why police officers will respond to demands on them to change entrenched and valued way of doing their work. Showing, even convincingly, that reforms will make society and the police better off is not enough. Reformers have to see policing through their (policy) eyes but also through the eyes of the police whose behaviour they are trying to change.

The basic and ultimate goal of reform is to change the attitudes, skills and behaviour of people, whether local stakeholders or police. They are agents in the production and reproduction of security and insecurity. Trying to get people to think and behave differently from how they act now will require taking their motivations and reasons into account. Telling the police that they will be better off is fine but that will be only one of



the many incentives which will shape their actions. The basic question is always: why would people do what they are asked to do? What is their incentive?

A second consideration is that people being asked to do things differently will be working in organizations, of various levels of coherence and competence, which will have dynamics and cultures which will affect, though not determine, thought and actions. In short, reformers should not start with an idealized version of policing but with what they find on the ground.

For example, training and education, the attempt to instill formal democratic values and necessary skills, has to take account of what the individuals being trained want. In thinking about training, the focus should not be so much (which is the typical pattern) on how to teach or train, but on how and why individuals learn (Marenin, 2004). Teaching democratic values in a way which lacks meaning in the working world of the police will, mostly likely, be written down, repeated on tests, and forgotten. Training has to be realistic, meaningful and needs to address, directly and forcefully, typical problems, now and in the past which have beset the police, For example, in Northern Ireland, this has meant talking to the new police about past abuses within the Royal Ulster Constabulary, what they were and why they occurred (O'Rawe, 2004, personal communication).

As another example, accountability will not exist even if only the most honest and self aware people become police officers for their integrity will be challenged and may be overridden by peer pressures, or formal rules of the organization, or demands arising from societal contexts. Reformers have to move beyond the professionalism fallacy, namely that good police will do good policing.

Sometimes police will do the unexpected, In Somalia, after the withdrawal of international troops in Mogadishu and in the ensuing chaos, police officers of the former state put on their uniforms and started showing up at intersections directing traffic. No-one had ordered them to do this and no police organization existed anymore, but they were police and that's what you do when you are a police and so they showed up (Interview with ICITAP official).

### 3.3.2. Develop an Implementation Capacity

Effective implementation requires an "implementation framework," developed as part of the overall strategy for reform, which should "include four phases: pre-engagement analysis and assessment; design and planning, managing the implementation; and evaluation and feedback" and should be based on as "as wide and consultative [a process] as possible to ensure that the police, government, and civil society feel meaningfully involved" (Groenewald and Peake, 2004: i, also 9-17).

Implementation cannot be the afterthought to planning. Developing an implementation capacity must be built into the planning process from the outset; it can't be an add-on - "now that we know what we want to do we will tell someone else to do it." If that happens, the implementers will not know what are the justifications and reasons for changes, lack a desire to see them implemented (for reforms mean they will have to do their work differently from what they have become accustomed to), or may lack the requisite skills. Planning for an implementation capacity in reforms projects requires the

vertical (top to bottom) and horizontal (beginning to end) inclusion and integration of all stakeholders into the process.

This requires persistent effort and routine managerial strategies to overcome the thrust of informal police cultures. “Changing deep-rooted cultural perspectives takes many years - perhaps a decade or a generation before the full benefits are felt. But the way police officers behave, (as distinct from what they think) can be changed and enforced more effectively” (Clegg et al, 2000: 77). It is easier to change the behaviour of cops by telling them what to do than by telling them how to think. Managers can control behaviour and that is what matters.

Implementing reforms normally require a functioning organization, operating at least minimal threshold levels of organizational identity and identification by all with that organization; a clear specification of roles and rules; a managerial capacity for control; a work and performance evaluation capacity and an internal knowledge system to do this; plus, of course, the minimal resources required. But that is not always found to be and, hence, has to be one of the first tasks of implementers.

In some circumstances, reform may simply mean a return to the basics. As Horn (2004: 5, 4) notes, commenting on his experience with police reform in Sierra Leone, “in a nutshell, the SLP had forgotten, or never knew, the basics of professional policing,” and “SLP’s operational capacity was severely handicapped by a lack of management information, a reactive rather than a pro-active approach and the inefficient use of human and material resources.” In similar fashion, participants at a recent conference (Wilton, 2004) argued that community policing (often the preferred idea and model in transnational police reforms programs) may not be the best starting point of goal of reforms. From the perspective of the local population, good investigative work and effective patrol may be more desirable.

### **3.3.3. Go Looking for Local Owners and Help Build Their Capacity**

Local ownership is the mantra of reformers. But local ownership is not found; it has to be created and supported, and it has to be the right ownership. It cannot be the people who caused much of the trouble in the first place. It should be the local community and its representatives who were the victims of insecurity - but then who speaks for the community and for change? At the minimum, there has to be wide open process of consultation and participation to ensure that speaking for the community does not slip back into familiar patterns of status and authority and norms which are antithetical to democratic notions. It will be difficult to include formerly excluded groups (women, the young or marginalized groups) into the categories of local ownership, but unless done the process of reform will be captured and distorted and revert to traditional patterns of exclusion and inclusion.

One facet of local ownership not often considered is that “if local ownership of security system reform processes is taken seriously, international support should help increase the capacity of partner country policy-makers and civil society to analyze, understand and debate their own security problems” (OECD, DAC, 2004: 35). Local owners are often quite unprepared to convert their sentiments into policies which account for the public good and are based on systematic information. That capacity to look beyond one’s own immediate needs and wants has to be developed and emphasized, and can be done most

effectively by incorporating local actors into the process of evaluating needs and progress (Groenewald and Peake, 2004: 15-16).

One resource for capacity building are international and local NGOs. They are skilled in assessing needs and progress; they tend to be close to the ground and see informally how reforms affect security conditions; they have some international pull and connections which can be drawn on; they have no commitment to a specific project which would weaken their objectivity in evaluating success or failure; and they are often engaged in research and the running of projects themselves. It is interesting that many of the concrete descriptions of local security conditions, the state of the security sectors, and of the progress of projects are done by NGOs rather than international donors or local reformers as, for example, the description of the Ghanaian police force discussed earlier, or the description and critique of the Nigerian police found in Alemika and Chukwuma (2000), Centre for Law Enforcement (1999), or World Organization, (2002).

#### **3.3.4. Deal with Non-state Actors**

A reality in most post-conflict societies is the existence of non-state security actors who both threaten and can be used to support reform. Non-state actors fall into two basic categories: those created by local communities for self protection or as coercive forces against presumed enemies, and private or corporate security agencies, available for hire to those who can afford their services. As a general rule, community based groups can be incorporated into reform projects, if properly integrated into an overall strategy. That may be a necessity, in any case, as such groups have legitimate grounding in community support hence will not fade away easily. Private security companies, on the other hand, can be fired once sufficient gains in establishing minimal levels of social order have been achieved. Until that time, PSCs may have to be kept since they provide the only organized force which can protect against threats to the survival of the existing government. But once their utility has passed, PSCs cannot be integrated into SSR in any meaningful way since they lack the legitimacy of community based support. PSCs should be allowed, but under conditions set by local actors and if properly articulated as complements to public security systems.

As noted earlier, the field of policing has expanded significantly in terms of actors and auspices, a trend which is not likely to be reversed. As part of that rethinking of the security field, the notion that states are defined in the Weberian sense, as the agencies with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, will be difficult to sustain. That conception never held true, completely, in any case. The goal now is not to return the alleged monopoly of legitimate force back to the state, but to distribute the authority for force in such a way that the security needs of the population are met, without bias or discrimination, within a rule of law framework. The strategy for achieving security can include a mix of state and no-state security providers if that is the wish local communities, openly expressed by participation in the planning and implementation of security reforms.

In all societies, social order and social control is maintained through formal and informal means. In most developed, the donor countries formal control mechanisms dominate (though there is some slippage even there towards harnessing informal means to formal ones). In transitional, post-conflict and developing countries that balance has tilted towards informal means. The goal of reform, in a most fundamental way, is to tilt the

balance back towards formal means or an effective state. Yet informal means will continue to be used and should be seen as local resources which should not be abandoned but should be properly utilized (Dupont et al, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2000).

### 3.3.5. Focus on Creating a Functioning Police Organization

The important goal for police reforms are organizations producing a product, a service which is effective and fair in controlling crime, lessens fears and a sense of insecurity among the public, and shores up social order. At the minimum, the new police organization will have to be managed in a professional manner by trained and skilled administrators who are committed to democratic policing norms. That includes the standard bureaucratic notions that the jobs and roles of the police be defined in mission statements, procedural manuals and the like; the proper assessment of the work done by all in the organization, as stated in job descriptions which are made know and adhered to; the assignment of personnel on the basis of their qualifications and local needs; managerial policies in place to deal with allegations and complaints against officers; recruitment and promotion policies which follow merit based criteria; a willingness to stand up to illegitimate demands from outsiders on how to do the job; and a capacity and willingness to assess the performance of individual officers and the organization by criteria linked to strategic and tactical goals, including a willingness to adjust policies when needed. Organizations will function well only if they are managed well.

One important aspect of democratic police organizations is that they are capable of frequent, critical and informed self-reflection, the analysis and evaluation of adopted practices, and the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. There has to be an institutional capacity for self-examination and organizational change - and not by necessity, for self-protection when events go wrong or when forced to - but as part of the normal operating philosophy and organizational culture of the police. That capacity has to be instilled as part of the reform process, as well as the awareness that collecting data and information is the lifeblood of any organization, even if done by external researchers.

Contexts will change. It could be changes in domestic and transnational crime patterns; or in societal values and expectations about what the police should be paying attention to; or in legal restrictions on the use of force by police; or in political ideologies which appeal to the public; or in the salience of group identities. A police organizations which fails to perceive changes which impinge on its mandate and powers, does not know how to adapt to them, and cannot assess the effects of its own innovative responses will lose touch with the public. The police are in the business of social control and order, but as an organization they must be in the business of change and innovation.

This is true for domestic reforms as it is for transnational efforts. For example, lessons drawn from attempts to introduce community oriented policing (COP) in the USA reach similar conclusions. "Perhaps the most powerful lesson from the [COPS grant] program is that one of the most important elements of successful organizational change is careful attention to the process of change, as opposed to focusing solely on the intended results" (US Department of Justice, 2003: np).

One unavoidable task in post-conflict and transitional societies is deciding who should be excused from serving in the new force. Vetting applicants has to be done at the beginning of reforms but has to be continued over time. It is not a one time obligation. An assessment of reforms in Serbia concludes that some form of lustration of a “segment of the police which has a vested interest in hampering the movement towards a more accountable and open police service. Until some form of lustration takes place there will remain a perception amongst the public that the police service is a lingering inheritance from the previous regime” (OSCE, 2004: 80).

Another crucial task to ensure success is training mid-level managers. The experience of attempted police innovations point to mid-level managers, who connect administrators to street level work, as the crucial link in the hierarchy of command and information flows. Without support from mid-level managers, reforms are almost guaranteed to fail. Yet this is the most neglected group in efforts to establish a functioning organization. Attention is typically paid to the highest and the lowest ranks - to the highest to convince them of accepting the new ways of doing policing and to the lowest so they possess the minimal skills needed for police work.

A priority in reforms, hence, is to train the trainers and the managers who will take over once outsiders leave. Reforms should leave behind a staff committed to and capable of changing the organization when needed.

### 3.3.6. Stress Principles and Goals, not Models

It has become accepted in the reform community that models cannot be bought off the shelf and implanted unchanged into new contexts. Yet that is the temptation by familiarity with models which have worked well in their contexts, and frequently done. Evans (2003: 39) remark is on target, that “western experience and models inappropriate to developing country conditions that have informed these technical solution. Such models range from ideas about the size, shape and role of the armed forces [and the police], to the application of human resource management policies that are at odds with national and institutional culture. Enormous effort and resources will be wasted in creating institutions, structures and processes that are not ‘owned’ by counterparts, will not work in the local environment, will be unaffordable, and not sustainable in the long term.”

What can be and should be transferred are principles of good policing. As noted by Clegg et al (2000: 2), “there is no universal formula of good policing. It is, however, possible to identify a range of principles and criteria which DFID could promote, together with repertoires of practices which have been found helpful in one place or another. It is also possible to identify pitfalls which have blocked or hindered good practice.” Assistance and advice must be crafted “so that it not only draws on relevant models, but also adapts itself to the local realities and builds upon positive policing and justice traditions” (Call, 2003: 5). In any case, that is what will happen once local owners become the real owners. They will retain what fits local conditions and disband or alter reforms suggested, urged or (semi)-imposed by external donors which they find unsuitable.

The same argument applies to specific ‘models or ideologies of policing, such as CBP or COP. Clegg et al (2000: 88) observe, quite correctly, that “community policing is a

concept. It is not a particular model which can be transferred mechanically from one context to another. It is a series of principles which underpin policing and the application of those principles will differ from place to place, even within one country, to take account of the different cultures, religions, social mores, traditional and informal structures". The need for local knowledge and the capacity for implementers to be creative are essential preconditions for the translation of principles into locally acceptable and sustainable practices.

Not being aware of local cultures can lead to frustrating results. The experience of ICITAP in Albania is an illuminating example. US reformers set up a model police station in Tirana to show the police and the public the meaning of COP. As part of publicizing the new station, the public was urged become involved with the police (the partnership notion in COP) and to not be hesitant or afraid to report their problems to the police. In short time, the station was overwhelmed with people informing on others. What the Americans had said was 'we want you to be comfortable with the police and talk to them; we need your input'; what the Albanians had heard is 'we want you to spy and report on your neighbours' (which had been the obligation under the dissolved communist system). The model police station was abandoned quickly, but the concept lingers (Interview with ICITAP official).

### **3.3.7. Start from Insecurity**

Reform projects commonly are justified by the goals they seek to accomplish - more democratic policing systems, effectiveness on crime control, transparency and accountability to the public and the state, etc., with such justifications based on general assessments of security conditions. In terms of implementation, it makes more sense to start with the goal of lessening the patterns of insecurity which characterize the local context rather than with the goal of establishing more security. Not that security should be left out, but that it should be seen as a long range goal. Policies to lessen insecurity lead to a focus on the specific conditions of insecurity and which insecurities bother people the most, which aspects can be addressed most easily, what practices are most feasible, which will have largest pay-off in the sequencing of reforms, or which leads to better sequencing of reforms. Lessening insecurity gives reformers and local owners a better handle on what needs to be done right away, what can be postponed for a while and what can await the influx of resources and the progressive institutionalization of reforms.

### **3.3.8. Develop Transitional Justice Mechanisms**

In post conflict societies, not everyone is culpable of the past violence. There needs to be a system or process of classifying and identifying past offenders, such as done in Rwanda (Salas, 2002), and those with blood on their hands should not receive impunity for their actions in the past, but others can be forgiven. The legitimation of reforms will not be achieved unless perpetrators are brought to justice, even if only symbolically, such as admitting their guilt to Truth Commissions or in equivalent fora. Dealing with the past is prelude to achieving a better future.

A USIP (April 2004: 16) report makes this point more forcefully, in relation to Iraq. "The capacity to restore order and bring the perpetrators of politically motivated violence[, or any violence], to justice will always be indispensable for an enduring peace to begin to take hold. Securing the environment is dependent, therefore, on a system of justice capable of incarcerating the most ruthless and violent elements in a society struggling to emerge from conflict."

### **3.3.9. Pay Attention to the Whole Security Field**

In the end, the police will be part of criminal justice or public security system and will be included in some form of national security strategy thinking an documents. Police reformers cannot do everything, but they should, at the very least, see if someone else is paying attention to where the police will fit in later on. Thinking of the police in isolation from other security actors will undermine their effectiveness. Neild (2002: 31) argues that "a conceptual problem of police reforms in Central America [was and] is the overwhelming focus on the police institution itself, with only very limited engagement of policy-making and broader civilian sectors." As argued before, in every policy report and here, without supporting criminal justice, political and societal contexts police reform has no grounding and will not work.

## **3.4. Pragmatic Lessons**

### **3.4.1. Select the Right People**

The best laid plans go oft awry unless the people doing the job of reform are "the right people, with the right skills, in the right place at the right time" (Horn, 2004: np). This phrase, part of the policy map developed for police reform in Sierra Leone, seems a pretty obvious admonition but is frequently ignored nonetheless. One reason is that not too many people have the experience of skills to be good reform planners and, an even more difficult skill, to be good implementers. Nor is it clear what criteria should be used to select the right people. In addition, many reformers have their sight set to the donor agency for which they work, and report back to, more than to their local counterparts, a not unreasonable perspective given that the donor agency has hired the implementers and pays their salaries. And, a further addition, there seems to be a consensus among observers that reformers working for international agencies, such as the UN, are not often the most qualified, being selected for the job by political criteria which govern the distribution of UN employment.

The qualities desired in the 'right people' are, probably a mix of personality and professional experience in police work or organizational reform. In terms of personality, at the minimum, some sense of adventure, curiosity, openness to new experiences, and people skills are essential. But whether that will be enough to be sensitive to the needs of local communities and skillful enough to adapt principles and norms to local conditions will only be seen in retrospect. The best lesson here is to hire only reformers who have done a good job before, as judged by donors and by local actors.

### 3.4.2. Allow for Flexibility by Implementers

Reforms change on the fly. There is no cookbook approach to reform - mix the ingredients, stick in the oven and presto, success. Implementers, the 'street level bureaucrats', have to be granted some discretion on how they wish to deal with local conditions. These are hard to predict, especially in how they will change during the process of reform.

For example, in Sierra Leone, implementers developed the notion of 'local needs policing' as the most appropriate form of community policing, after consultations with local actors at all levels of society. Local needs policing, defined as a "system of policing that meets the expectations and needs of the local community and reflects national standards and guidelines" (Horn, 2004: np), in turn led to the setting up of a decentralized police organization, with local command units as the central organizational focal point for local input.

### 3.4.3. Talk 'Police Talk'

Plans for reforms are accepted and implemented by the police when they have meaning in their working world, at both management and street levels. It is the job of reformer and managers to translate recommendations into concrete, meaningful and operationally clear directives for the street cops. Street cops will want to know what they have to do; how their performance will be judged, and what are the rewards and penalties; and whether they will be supported by the managers if they do creative things (take risks) or make discretionary decisions. Planners and implementers have to talk the (abstract) language of democratic policing but also the occupational language of the police who will do the work.

Police officers are quite reluctant to talk about their work in philosophical terms (except when in their canteens and police bars, or on the rare occasions when they are asked to participate in the deliberations of the TPC). Advice should be stated in terms which is accepted by the police. As Mathias (2005) notes, "the term 'police reform' in itself has negative connotations and tends to switch people off - particularly the police - rather than switch them on. They better relate to terms like 'improving their professionalism' and 'improving their service to the public.'" Don't talk about human rights, but talk about protecting the victims of crime. Don't talk about community oriented policing, but about smart policing. General and abstract concepts will have little traction in police culture and discourse until and unless they are converted to language which the police will find meaningful, a language they can use themselves without being embarrassed. The main reason to include police officers into the implementation of reform projects is because they understand and can talk the language.

Related to the need to talk the proper language is a comment by Mastrofski (1999: 7) that the police "are far more receptive to training which tells them what to do rather to training that tells them what to believe. Departments must still persuade officers to use and develop the skills imparted by the training, but that is best done by showing them how it will accomplish things they already care about." In that sense, the police, even if newly recruited and without experience, will quickly get a sense of what matters to their work, as they see it and will respond to directives and training which makes their job easier, safer, and more convenient, rather than more accountable, transparent, oriented to



the protection of human rights or committed the rule of law. The police should have those values and carry them into actions, but the way to do so is to translate those imprecise normative demands into specific rules for working which make sense to the police in the conditions under which they work.

It can be argued that what is often interpreted by management as resistance to implementation of new programs is actually due to the reluctance of the rank and file officers to do a job when they are not sure how it will affect their performance evaluations by their superiors. Expectations and reward criteria are simply not clear enough, so they will hesitate and wait. As workers, they want to know what this will mean to their careers in the force. It is up to management to make clear what the rules are and how they will be enforced.

#### **3.4.4. Exploit the Luck and Good Fortune which Comes Your Way**

In the same way that the expected unexpected can complicate progress, opportunities chance which were not foreseen arise by chance, and can create openings. There will be obstacles and there will be opportunities. A common occurrence is that implementers find a local actor or police officers who is smart, committed, wants to work, but lacks the proper status credentials within society or the police. She is too young and he lacks rank. Use them anyway and give them a title which is acceptable within their contexts but allows them to be integrated into the process.

#### **3.4.5. Not Everything Will Turn Out Perfect**

No project will come out as planned or achieve all its stated objectives. Reformers and local actors have to decide what levels of achievement are sufficient for the expenditures and time invested. Success, no matter how measured, will experience a decreasing marginal rate of return. At what point are the cost for further improvement not worth the costs is a question implementers and planners will have to deal with. Related to this is the question of what counts as enough success at different stages of the project. There will be a certain hit and miss quality to progress which has to be tolerated.

There may be a consensus among reformers and local stakeholders what policing should be about in a society, but there will always be disagreements about priorities, the manners of performing the various tasks which make up policing, or about the specific articulations of informal to formal control. Reforming policing creates losers and winners, in their own estimation at least, who will judge what has been done quite differently. As the saying goes, you can't please all the people all the time, so reformers have to decide which some of the people they should and can please some of the time.

#### **3.4.6. Avoid Drift to Minimal Competencies**

One of the most frequent critique of complaints about police reforms is that the training offered to new recruits in post-conflict conditions is likely to be quite short and cannot possible teach recruits anything but the most minimal skills, but certainly can do little to instill in them the cultures and norms which are the hallmark of democratic policing.

Even the police will admit that this critique has merit, but will also argue that extended training is not possible at the beginning of reforms, given the need for immediate action, rising crime and instability, an absence of resources, and the knowledge that each project has a deadline for completion set by donors. The need is to get some police presence, some uniforms into the streets, at least for the time being. What is likely to happen, though, is that that temporary deployment will become permanent and the need to train and retrain becomes overwhelmed by the pressures of public demands and the security needs of the moment.

### **3.4.7. The Payoff Is in the Streets**

The ultimate pay-off for reforms in policing is in the streets, in the villages, in each encounter between the police and the community. Everything done in reforms has to lead to that. There is a practicality and materiality to police reforms which in the end is not a question whether principles are known but of proper decisions being made and actions being taken by the police.

The final measure of success is actually quite simple. Do citizens get proper service, as mandated by law and professional norms, and do they walk away from encounters satisfied enough and without apprehension – whether they asked for help, were stopped and questioned, arrested and interrogated, or came forward to complain about the behaviour of an officer. If citizens walk away from that encounter thinking they were treated with respect, their needs were taken seriously, and they are not afraid to contact the police the next time, then democratic policing is at work.

On the part of the police, the quality of encounters is determined by their formal training and supervision and their informal culture, and for the public by its willingness to demand from the government a service which is crucial to their well-being, but do so politely. “For the public the visible changes in police culture represent the main litmus test for the whole reform process. In this respect, police education is the determining factor for defining the future culture of the police service” (OSCE, 2004: 71).

## **4. Concluding Thoughts**

Police reform is one of the more complicated tasks which can be attempted. The contentious and powerful normative and political qualities embodied in police work, the organizational complexities of doing a process which will involve numerous actors, and the conflicting expectations by members of society about what should be the main priorities of the job have no easy solutions. Policing is a complicated and difficult job, and reforming policing is even more so. But, as another saying goes, if the job is worth doing it is worth doing right.

Stepping back somewhat from the specifics of policy making and implementation, some general impressions about the complexities of police reforms can be stated. These are not lessons in any specific sense but rather admonitions to keep in mind when thinking about planning and doing police reforms.

It is pretty clear from the experience of many international interventions that the police cannot function at all unless a minimal level of social order has been reestablished following mass violence and civil strife. It has been the experience of CIVPOL officers that they, or the local police they have trained, will not be capable of maintaining order or ensure even their own safety. The need the military as back-up, to call upon when trouble flares up again. Their capacity for creating social order is limited to those situations where local society and outside interventions have laid enough of a foundation to built on.

Restoring effective and democratic police forces can mean reconstructing, transforming or reforming policing systems. Each process will have different dynamics and requires different priorities and resources. Other than the common mantras and buzz words, the extent of changes needed in the security sectors and in society just are not the same. Reformers and local actors have to be pretty clear what the magnitude of the tasks they are taking on and adjust their expectations accordingly. Successes will look different and failures will have different causes.

Reconstruction appears to work with a blank slate, but that is deceiving, for even if institutions have collapsed or been replaced by non-state actors, memories remain and attitudes continue and will place limits on what can be done. Yet constraints will be different from those which characterize reforms, such as in CEE states, for then one basic obstacle is the existence of traditions, habits and cultures within the existing police which will continue to exert influence. Some personnel will be expelled but most will continue as police and carry habits and attitudes acquired under a non-democratic system into the new organizational setup.

One has to be struck by the importance of people in these processes. Much depends on their abilities, skills, commitments and philosophical outlook. Skills and abilities, knowledge and creativity, empathy and tolerance are obvious qualities. Yet the need for one trait which is little discussed comes to the fore in those situations when international actors have basically taken over the government at high and low levels and their decisions are constrained only by the mandate of the mission (typically worded quite broadly) and their own sense of fallibility. Officials such as the High Commissioner in Bosnia, or UN officials running local districts in East Timor, have tremendous power, and they need a philosophical intuitiveness of the limits and temptations power. Good international administrators know what they are doing is good and aims for decent ends, but they also appreciate that their power can tempt them into shortcuts, the neglect of local owners, or violations of due process. Doing that right takes a philosophical balance.

In short, selecting the right people is as important as having good plans and sufficient resources. Yet right now, it is not very clear how people have been selected for these missions and on the basis of what criteria. Many, if not most, hires for the reform job, seem linked to informal and organizational networks within which members of the TPC circulate. That could be good and that could be not so good. But it is hard to tell, except in retrospect, and one can only hope that the incompetent and domineering will be weeded out or weed themselves out.

Related to recruiting the right people is the realization how unavoidable and necessary discretion and flexibility are in reform projects. Reforms cannot be spelled out in any detail up front. It is not clear, though, how much such flexibility is recognized or

rewarded in bureaucratic organizations typically in charge of interventions. Yet unless rewarded, flexibility will wither and reformers will revert to safe models and practices.

One problem many projects run into is the difficulty of coordinating donors and getting them to agree on some common ground rules, expectations and processes. It would be more effective if one donor ran a project but that is unlikely given the global system of how donors in international interventions are recruited for participation in projects. The experience of reform in Sierra Leone where the British did quite well enforces that point. As does the experience in Serbia where the OSCE Law Enforcement Department basically was contracted by the government to take over the reform of the policing systems, was able to develop, in consultation with local actors, six priorities for reform needed within the country, and then went out to solicit for assistance and resources (OSCE, Law Enforcement, 2002).<sup>14</sup> It is not likely that a process as systematic and coordinated as done there could have been achieved under multi-donor conditions.

Another impression from reading numerous reports and analyses of reform projects is that implementation has to be part of the process of policy planning from the very beginning. This has been especially true, and absent, from most UN led interventions for which the endgame of stabilization and creating the capacity to sustain reforms has not been the highest priority. Yet the end is part of the policy cycle as much as is the beginning. One solution which has been advocated in many places is the creation of standby CIVPOL contingents in member countries, contingents who are trained in international and peace-building work. Trained contingents should be included in mission forces from the very beginning of interventions. Right now, CIVPOL officers, who constitute the most common form of police interventions and assistance in post conflict states and whose role has changed from observing, training and monitoring local police to doing executive policing, are of widely varying quality and integrity - and reforms suffer thereby.

And, lastly, it is a little surprising how little attention seems to be paid to the practical aspects of creating functioning organizations having a common identity which has emotional salience for people working within it. Institutions seem to be perceived of in largely mechanical terms, as systems of arrangements rather than as living, dynamic networks linking people in a common enterprise. The stress is mostly, and that is perfectly legitimate, on teaching the new police officers who will deliver the service and force experienced by the public, the needed skills and attitudes to do a minimally professional job. And there is some training in managerial skills, no doubt. But what is lacking is an awareness of how policing organizations in many of these counties have been not been bureaucratized, but incorporate many more motivations for acting than adherence to rules and roles. Public and private organizations, including the police, are not only divided by rank and functional role, but also by status and social group identities, with the result that there is little in common between street officers and management, especially the top levels who are connected to the seats of power at the national level. Much of this fragmentation in occupational identity between managers and rank and file, and the resulting lack of esprit de corps and loyalty to the occupation, has to do with recruitment being done at different entry levels, based on the formal educational qualifications of applicants. There is something to be said for working your

---

<sup>14</sup> The six priority areas were: police education and development; accountability and internal control; organised crime; forensics; border policing; and community policing.

way to the top through the ranks (and something to be said against that). But the occupational identity which results from common work is simply not there in post-conflict societies. Many admonitions in the rhetoric of reform, such as the need for greater participation by lower ranks in decision-making within the force, will simply fall on educated and deaf ears. In addition to managerial training, higher echelons should be trained away from status consciousness. But that makes for complicated political and cultural problems.

It is the common practice in societies divided by strong social identities that people who are willing to or have to contact a government bureaucracy will normally not go to the person who has authority by virtue of occupying a role or office. They will look for someone in the organization who is from their own group to help guide them through the intricacies of getting a drivers licence or filing a crime report. Of course, this habit violates the spirit of efficiency and impartiality which is supposed to characterize the way the organization and the people within it work.

Thinking about policing spans the gamut from theoretically sophisticated analyses of the roles of legitimate coercion and the police in the reproduction of social order to the most practical aspects of how to manage and do the job. It is the very practicality and materiality of policing which is the most neglected element in reform projects, in the sense that once planning has been done, carrying out the tasks which are defined in the plans can be left safely to the discretion and aptitudes of lower level implementers. That emphasis on what matters in reforms should be reversed.

## References

African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) (2001), "Roundtable on Police and Policing," Ghana, Legon: author.

African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) (2002), "Key Issues in Contemporary Ghanaian Policing: Identifying Reform Priorities," Ghana, Legon: author.

Alemika, Etannibi E.O. and Innocent C. Chukwuma (2000), Police-Community Violence in Nigeria, Lagos: Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN) and Abuja: National Human Rights Commission; at [www.kabissa.org/cleen](http://www.kabissa.org/cleen)

Alert 2004. Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace-Building (2004), Barcelona: School of Peace Culture; at [www.reliefweb.int/w/lib.nsf](http://www.reliefweb.int/w/lib.nsf)

Amir, Menachem and Stanley Einstein, eds. (2001), Policing, Security and Democracy. Volume 1: Theory and Practice; Volume 2: Special Aspects of Democratic Policing, Huntsville, TX: Sam Houston State University, Office of International Criminal Justice.

Anderson, Anthony W (2004), "Enhancing the Role of Military Peacekeepers in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Revisiting the Center of Gravity," *Sicherheit und Frieden/Security and Peace*, 22, 1, 1-7.

Aning, Kwesi (n.d.), "A Comparative Analysis of Policing in West Africa: An Analysis of Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ghana," downloaded from <http://www.africansecurity.org/staff-security.html>

Aning, Kwesi (2002), "An Overview of the Ghana Police Service," downloaded from <http://www.africansecurity.org/staff-security.html>

ARD, Inc. (2001), West Africa: Civil Society Strengthening for Conflict Prevention Studies. Anglophone Civil Society Organization Assessment: Ghana and Nigeria Synthesis Report, Burlington, VT: ARD, Inc.

Ball, Nicole (1998), "Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government," London: Saferworld.

Ball, Nicole (2002). "Democratic Governance of the Security Sector," paper prepared for the UNDP Workshop on "Learning From Experience for Afghanistan," New York.

Ball, Nicole, Tsjeard Bouta and Luc van de Goor (2003), Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: A Institutional Assessment Framework, The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs/The Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'; at [www.minbuza.nl](http://www.minbuza.nl)

Ball, Nicole and Kayode Fayemi (2004), Security Sector Governance in Africa: A Handbook, London and Lagos: Centre for Democracy and Development.

Bayley, D. H. (2001), Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice.

Bayley, D. H. (1997), "The Contemporary Practices of Policing: A Comparative View," in *A Role for Democratic Policing, Civilian Police and Multinational Peacekeeping - A Workshop Series*. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice.

Bayley, D. H. (1995), "A Foreign Policy for Democratic Policing," *Policing and Society*, 5, 2, 79-94.

Bayley, David and Clifford Shearing (2001), *The New Structure of Policing*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice.

Beidas, Sandra, Colin Granderson and Rachel Neild (forthcoming), "Intervention and Institution Building in Haiti," in Charles T. Call, ed., *Constructing Justice and Security After War*, manuscript.

Brodeur, Jean-Paul, ed.(1998), *How to Recognize Good Policing. Problems and Issues*, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998.

Bruce, David and Rachel Neild (2005), *The Police We Want. A Handbook for Oversight of Police in South Africa*, Johannesburg: The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

Bryden, Alan (2004), "Understanding Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction," in Bryden, Alan and Heiner Hänggi, eds., *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 259-275.

Bryden, Alan and Philipp Fluri, eds (2003), *Security Sector Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Bryden, Alan and Heiner Hänggi, eds. (2004), *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Bryden, Alan and Philipp Fluri, eds (2003), *Security Sector Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Brzoska, Michael (2003), *Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform*, Geneva: DCAF, Occasional Paper No. 4.

Brzoska, Michael and Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (2004), "Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Reconstruction under International Auspices," in Bryden, Alan and Heiner Hänggi, eds., *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 121-142.

Brzoska, Michael and David Law, eds. *The Reconstruction of the Security Sector in Post-Conflict Societies*, Nomos: Baden-Baden, forthcoming.

Call, Charles T. (2003a), "Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability," IPA Policy Report, New York: United Nations; also see [www.ipacademy.org](http://www.ipacademy.org)

Call, Charles T. (2003b), "Democratization, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 35, 1, 827-862.

Call, Charles, ed. (2005), *Constructing Justice and Security After Wars*, manuscript, forthcoming.

Call, C.T. & Stanley, William. (2002). "Civilian security," in S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild, & E. Cousens (Eds.), *Ending civil wars: The implementation of peace agreements*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Caparini, Marina (2002), 'Lessons Learned and Upcoming Research Issues in Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Security Sector Reform,' in H.Born, M. Caparini, and P.Fluri, eds., *Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 207-216.

Caparini, Marina and Otwin Marenin (2004), "Process and Progress in the Reform of Policing systems," in Caparini, Marina and Otwin Marenin, eds., *Transforming the Police in Eastern and Central Europe*, Lit Verlag/Transaction: Münster, Germany/Somerset, NJ: Transaction.

Caparini, Marina and Fred Schreier (2005), "Privatizing Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies," paper, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Cawthra, Gavin and Robin Luckham, eds. (2003), *Governing Insecurity. Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, London: Zed Books.

Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN) and National Human Rights Commission (1999), *Policing a Democracy. A Survey Report on the Role and Functions of the Nigeria Police Force in a Post Military Era*, Lagos and Abuja: author.

Chalmers, Malcolm (2000), "Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An EU Perspective," London: Saferworld.

Chan, J. B. L. (1997). *Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chanaa, Jane (2002), *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects*, London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 344.

Clegg, Ian, Robert Hunt and Jim Whetton (2000), "Policy Guidelines on Support to Policing in Developing Countries," Centre for Development Studies, University of Wales.

Cottam, Martha.L and Infranco, Michael.P. (2004), "Crossing the threshold: An exploration of the escalation of violence in inter-communal conflict," paper presented at the 27th meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Lund, Sweden, July 15, 2004.

Cottam, Martha and O. Marenin (1989), "Predicting the Past: Reagan Administration Assistance to Police Forces in Central America," *Justice Quarterly*, 6, 4, 589-618.

Council of Europe, European Committee on Crime Problems (2000), *Police Powers and Accountability in a Democratic Society. Proceedings. Reports Presented to the 12th Criminological Colloquium (1999)*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Dahrendorf, Nicola (2004), "Security Sector Reform in East Timor," paper presented at the BICC-DCAF Publication Project on PCR of the Security Sector: Authors' Workshop, Montreux, October 6, 2004. (BICC stands for Bonn International Conversion Center; DCAF for Geneva Centre for the Control of Armed Forces. The papers will be published in Brzoska, Michael and David Law, eds., *Post Conflict Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft).

Das, Dilip and O. Marenin, eds (2000), *Challenges of Policing Democracies: A World Perspective*, Newark: Gordon and Breach Publishers.

Das, Dilip and Palmiotto, Michael J (2002), "International Human Rights Standards: Guidelines for the World's Police Officers," *Police Quarterly*, 5 2, 206-221.

DFID (Department for International Development) (2002), "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," London: DFID.

DFID (2003), "Security Sector Reform Policy Brief," London: produced by Global Facilitation Network-Security Sector Reform. Available at [www.gfn-ssr.org](http://www.gfn-ssr.org)



Dixon, Bill (2000), "The Globalisation of Democratic Policing: Sector Policing and Zero Tolerance in the New South Africa," Cape Town: Institute of Criminology, University of Cape.

Dupont, Benoît, Peter Grabosky and Clifford Shearing (2003), "The Governance of Security in Weak and Failing States," *Criminal Justice*, 3, 4, 331-349.

Douma, Pyt and Jeroen de Zeeuw (2004), "From Transitional to Sustainable Justice. Human Rights Assistance to Sierra Leone," CRU Policy Brief, 1 August (Published by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael" Conflict Research Unit.

Downes, Mark (2004), "From Securing the Peace to Ensuring Stability: Police Reform in a Multi Ethnic, Post-Conflict and Transition Environment - the Experience of Serbia," paper presented at Workshop on "Implementing Community Based Policing in Transitional Societies," organized by the International Peace Academy and Saferworld, New York, 22 March 2004.

Duffield, Mark. (2001). *Global Governance and the New Wars. The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Press.

Dwan, Renata (2002), *Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, SIPRI Research Report No. 16.

Dziedzic, M.J. (2001), "Peace Operations: Political-Military Coordination," in Kugler, R.L and Frost, E.L. (eds.), *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 315-334.

Ebo, Adedeji (2004), "Security Sector Reform as an Instrument of Sub-Regional Transformation of West Africa," in Bryden, Alan and Heiner Hänggi, eds., *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 65-92.

Edmonds, Timothy (2002), "Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation," Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. (available at [www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch))

Evans, Roderick (2003), "Security Sector Transformation from a Development Donor Perspective," in United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), *Security Sector Reform: Its Relevance for Conflict Prevention, Peace Building, and Development*, Presentations made at the first joint seminar of UNOG and DCAF, held on January 21, 2003, Geneva: United Nations, 35-40.

Fayemi, J.Kayode (2004), "Governing Insecurity in Post-Conflict States: The Case of Sierra Leone and Liberia," in Bryden, Alan and Heiner Hänggi, eds., *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 179-205.

Ferguson, Chris (2004), "Police Reform, Peacekeeping and SSR: The Need for Closer Synthesis," *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 3,2, 1-13.

Fisher, Jeff (2002), *Elections and International Civilian Policing: History and Practice in Peace Operations*, Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems.

Fluri, Philipp and Eden Cole (2004), "Security Sector Reform in South Eastern Europe: A Study in Norms Transfer," in István Gyarmati and Scott Vesel, eds. *Security Sector Governance in the Western Balkans 2004*, Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 67-83.

Geller, W.A and G. Swanger (1995), *Managing Innovation in Policing: The Untapped Potential of the Middle Manager*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice.

Geneva Centre for the Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (December 2004), Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes (PfP-C), Working Groups on Security Sector Reform (SSR-WG), "After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies - from Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership," 4th Newsletter, 6-7; also available at [www.dcaf.ch/pfpc-ssr-wg](http://www.dcaf.ch/pfpc-ssr-wg)

Gbla, Osman (2004), "Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Reconstruction Under International Tutelage: The Sierra Leone Case Study," paper presented at the BICC-DCAF Publication Project on PCR of the Security Sector: Authors' Workshop, Montreux, October 6, 2004. (BICC stands for Bonn International Conversion Center; DCAF for Geneva Centre for the Control of Armed Forces. The papers will be published in Brzoska, Michael and David Law, eds., Post Conflict Reconstruction of the Security Sector, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft).

Goldsmith, Andrew and Colleen Lewis, eds. (2000), *Civilian Oversight of Policing: Governance, Democracy and Human Rights*, Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing.

Greene, Owen (2003), "On Themes and Comparisons," in Time Edmunds (ed.), *Security Sector Reform in Croatia and Yugoslavia*, Proceedings of the Third Geneva Centre for the Control of Armed Forces - IISS Workshop, London: Institute for Setategic Studies, 9-14.

Groenewald, Hester and Gordon Peake (2004), *Police Reform through Community-Based Policing. Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation*, New York: International Peace Academy.

Hänggi, Heiner (2004), "Conceptualizing Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction," in Bryden, Alan and Heiner Hänggi, eds., *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*. Münster, Germany: LIT Verlag, 3-18.

Hänggi, Heiner and Theodor. H Winkler, eds. (2003), *Challenges of Security Sector Governance*, Münster: Lit Verlag.

Hansen, Annika (2002), *From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper no. 343.

Hendrickson, Dylan (1999), *A Review of Security Sector Reform*, London: Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, University of London, Working Paper No. 1.

Hendrickson, Dylan (2004), "Introduction. Overview of Regional Survey Findings and Policy Implications for Donors," in OECD, DAC, *A Survey of Security System Reform and Donor Policy: Views from Non-OECD Countries*, Paris: OECD; available at [www.ipacademy.org/ssr/PDFs/](http://www.ipacademy.org/ssr/PDFs/)

Hendrickson, Dylan and Andrzej Karkoszka (2002), 'The Challenges of Security Sector Reform', in SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Stockholm: SIPRI, 177-201.

Hills, A. (2000), *Policing Africa. Internal security and the limits of liberalization*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Holm, Tor Tanke and Espen Barth Eide, eds. (2000), *Peacebuilding and Police Reform*, London: Frank Cass.

Hood, Ludovic (2004), "UN Peacekeeping Approaches: East Timor," paper presented at Authors' Workshop, West Point, New York; will appear in Peake. Gordon and Eric Scheye, eds., *Arresting Insecurity: Security Sector Reform - Police and Practice*. New York; International Peace Academy.

Horn, Adrian (2004), "Background Paper: Sierra Leone, Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project " paper presented at Workshop on "Implementing Community Based Policing in Transitional Societies," organized by the International Peace Academy and Saferworld, New York, 22 March 2004.

Horn, Adrian and 'Funmi Olonisakin (2004), "UK lead nation approaches - Sierra Leone," paper presented at Authors' Workshop, West Point, New York; will appear in Peake, Gordon and Eric Sheye, eds., Arresting Insecurity: Security Sector Reform - Police and Practice New York: International Police Academy.

Hurwitz, Agn s and Gordon Peake (April 2004), Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice Since the 1990s, New York: International Peace Academy, Conference Report.

Hutchful, Eboe (2003), "Security Sector Governance in Africa," draft concept paper for the African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR)/Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN/SSR) "Workshop on Security Sector Governance in Africa" held at Elmina, Ghana, November.

Hutchful, Eboe (2004), "Developing Concepts of Security in Africa," in United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (2004), State and Human Security in the 'Age of Terrorism': The Role of Security Sector Reform, Presentations made at the second joint seminar of UNOG and DCAF, held on January 26, 2004, Geneva: United Nations, 31-45.

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2002), Policing the Police in Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda, Balkans Report No. 130, Sarajewo/Brussels: ICG; available at [www.crisisweb.org](http://www.crisisweb.org)

ICHRP (International Council on Human Rights Policy) (2003), Crime, Public Order and Human Rights. Draft Report for Consultation March 2003), Geneva: ICHRP.

Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (Patten Commission) (1999), A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, available at [www.belfast.org.uk/report.html](http://www.belfast.org.uk/report.html)

Inter-American Development Bank (1997), Studies of the Magnitude, Costs and Policies Against Violence in Six Places: Lima, Rio De Janeiro, San Salvador, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, Washington, D.C.: I-ADB.

Inter-American Development Bank (2003), Guidelines for the Design of Violence Reduction Projects, Washington, D.C.: I-ADB, Best Practices Series. Sustainable Development Department.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre; available at <http://dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf>

Isacson, Adam and Nicole Ball (2003), U.S. Military and Police Assistance to "Low-Income Poorly Performing States, Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, Report prepared for the Center for Global Development Project on Poorly Performing States.

Jabar, Faleh A. (March 2004), Postconflict Iraq. A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy, Washington, D.C.: USIP, Special Report 120.

Johnston, Les D. and Clifford Shearing (2003), Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice, London: Routledge.

Joseph, R. (2003). "State, Governance and Insecurity in Africa," *Democracy and Development*, 3, 2, 7-15.

Kádár, A., ed. (2001), *Police in Transition. Essays on the Police Forces in Transition Countries*. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Kaldor, M. (1999,2001). *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Karkoszka, Andrezej (2003), "The Concept of Security Sector Reform,": in United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), *Security Sector Reform: Its Relevance for Conflict Prevention, Peace Building, and Development*, Presentations made at the first joint seminar of UNOG and DCAF, held on January 21, 2003, Geneva: United Nations, 9-15.

Karstedt. S. (2002), "Durkheim, Tarde and Beyond. The Global Travel of Crime Policies," *Criminal Justice*, 2, 2, 111-123.

Keane, J. (2002), "Fear and democracy," in K. Worcester, S. Avery Bermanzohn, & M. Ungar, (eds.), *Violence and politics: Globalization's paradox*, New York: Routledge, 226-243.

Klockars, Carl, Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic and M.R. Haberfeld (2003), *The Contours of Police Integrity*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Kugler, R.L and Frost, E.L. (2001), "Introduction: Policies for a Globalized World," in Kugler, R.L and Frost, E.L. (eds.). *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 3-5.

Lab, Steven P. and Dilip K. Das, eds. (2003), *International Perspectives on Community Policing and Crime Prevention*, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall

Law Commission of Canada (2002), *In Search of Security: The Roles of Public Police and Private Agencies*, Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada; at [www.lcc.gc.ca](http://www.lcc.gc.ca)

Loader, Ian (2002), "Policing, Securitization and Democratization in Europe," *Criminal Justice*, 2, 2, 125-153.

Loader, Ian and Neil Walker (2001), "Policing as a Public Good. Reconstituting the Connections Between Policing and the State," *Theoretical Criminology*, 5, 1, 9-35.

Loveday, B (1999), "Government and Accountability of the Police," in R.I.Mawby, ed., *Policing Across the World. Issues for the Twenty-first Century*, London: UCL Press, 132-150.

Luckham, R. (2003),. "Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict," in Cawthra, G. and Luckham, R (eds.), *Governing Insecurity. Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*. London: Zed Books, 3-28.

Mani, R. (1999), "Contextualizing police reform: Security, the rule of law, and post-conflict peacebuilding," *International Peacekeeping*, 6, 4, 9-26.

Marenin, Otwin (2005), "Building a Global Police Studies Community," *Police Quarterly*, forthcoming.

Marenin, Otwin (2004), "Police Training for Democracy," *Police Practice and Research*, 5, 2, 107-123.

Marenin, Otwin (1998), "The Goal of Democracy in International Police Assistance Programs," *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*, 21, 1, 159-177.

Marenin, Otwin (1982), "Parking Tickets and Class Repression: The Concept of Policing in Critical Theories of Criminal Justice," *Contemporary Crises*, 6, 3, 241-266.

Mastrofski, Stephen D. (1999), *Policing for People*, Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation.

Mathias, Graham (2005), personal communication (Mathias is Senior Police Advisor to Saferworld).

Mendelson-Forman, Johanna (2004), "Security Sector Reform in Haiti: What Prospects for a Shadow State?", paper presented at the BICC-DCAF Publication Project on PCR of the Security Sector: Authors' Workshop, Montreux, October 6, 2004. (BICC stands for Bonn International Conversion Center; DCAF for Geneva Centre for the Control of Armed Forces. The papers will be published in Brzoska, Michael and David Law, eds., *Post Conflict Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft).

Mobekk, Eirin (2003), *Law-enforcement; Creating and Maintaining a Police Service in a Post-conflict Society: Problems and Pitfalls*, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional paper.

Mobekk, Eirin (2004), "International Policing as Part of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace-Building: The Challenges of Ensuring Effective Linkages," Background paper, International Conference on International Post-Conflict Policing Operations: Enhancing Coordination and Effectiveness, Wilton Park January 2004.

Munu, Francis Alieu (Senior Assistant Commissioner of the Sierra Leone Police) (2003), "Police and the Community" paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Police Executive Symposium, Bahrain, October; at <http://208.184.9.173/bahpre/bahpre.htm>

Nathan, Laurie (2004), "Obstacles to Security Sector Reform in New Democracies," *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 2, 3, 1-7.

Neild, Rachel (2002), *Sustaining Reform: Democratic Policing in Central America*, Washington, D.C.: WOLA, Citizen Security Monitor.

Neild, Rachel (2001), "Democratic Police Reforms in War-Torn Societies," Washington, D.C.: WOLA (Reprint from the *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*); available at [www.wola.org](http://www.wola.org)

Neyroud, Peter and Alan Beckley (2001), *Policing, Ethics and Human Rights*, Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing.

Oakley, Robert B., Michael J. Dziedzic and E.M.Goldberg, eds, *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press.

O'Rawe, Mary (2003). "Transitional Policing Arrangements in Northern Ireland: The Can't and the Won't of the Change Dialectic," *Fordham International Law Journal*, 26, 4, 1015-1073.

O'Rawe, M. & Moore, L. (1997). *Human rights on duty. Principles for better policing - International lessons for Northern Ireland*. Belfast: Committee for the Administration of Justice.

OECD Development Assistance Committee, Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation (2000), "Security-Sector Reform and Development Co-Operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence"; on oecd website.

OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, DAC (2004), Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice. A DAC Reference Document. Preliminary Edition, Paris: OECD.

OSCE (2004), Police Reform in Serbia. Towards the Creation of a Modern and Accountable Police Service, Draft, Belgrade: OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro, Law Enforcement Department. Written by Mark Downes.

OSCE, Mission to FRY, Law Enforcement Department (2002), Project Proposals for Police Reform, Sponsorship Conference - 5 June 2002, Republic of Serbia, Belgrade: author.

Pagon, Milan ed. (2000), Policing in Central and Eastern Europe. Ethics, Integrity and Human Rights, Ljubljana: College of Police and Security Studies.

Pagon, Milan (1996), Policing in Central and Eastern Europe. Comparing First Hand Knowledge with Experience from the West, Ljubljana: College of Police and Security Studies.

Papworth, Thomas and Sharon Wihata (2001), Policing Europe: European Policing? The Challenge of Coordination in International Policing, Stockholm, 4-5 May 2001, Workshop Report, Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Peake, Gordon (2004), Policing the Peace: Police Reform Experiences in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia, London: Saferworld.

Peake, Gordon and Eric Scheye, eds., (2005), Arresting Insecurity: Security Sector Reform - Police and Practice. New York; International Peace Academy, forthcoming.

Perez, Orlando (2003-2004), "Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala," Political Science Quarterly, 118, 4, 627-644.

Perez, Thomas E. (2000), "External Governmental Mechanisms of Police Accountability: Three Investigative Structures," Policing and Society, 10, 1, 47-77.

Perito, Robert (2002), The American Experience in Peace Operations, Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Training Center.

Perito, Robert (2004), Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Post-Conflict Stability Force. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Pouligny, Béatrice (Septembre 2004), The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary "Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration" Programs, Paris: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales Sciences Po/CNRS.

Reiner, R. (1992). The Politics of the Police. Second Edition, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Rinehart, Tammy A, Anna T. Lazlo and Gwen O. Briscoe (2001), Collaboration Toolkit: How to Build, Fix and Sustain Productive Partnerships, Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, COPS.

Salas, Luis (2002), "Reconstruction of Public Security and Justice in Post Conflict Societies: The Rwandan Experience," International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 26, 2, 165-201.

Schmitz, Hans Peter and Katrin Sell (1999), 'International Factors in Processes of Political Modernization. Towards a Theoretical Integration', in Jean Grugel, ed., *Democracy without Borders. Transnationalization and Conditionality in the New Democracies*. London and New York: Routledge , 23-41.

Schneider, Andrea (2003), *Community Policing in Action. A Practitioners's Eye View of Organizational Change*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, COPS.

Sedra, March (2004a), "Consolidating an Elusive Peace: Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan," in Bryden, Alan and Heiner Hänggi, eds., *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*. Münster, Germany: LIT Verlag, 207-229.

Sedra, March (2004b), "Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: Panacea or Problem," paper presented at the BICC-DCAF Publication Project on PCR of the Security Sector: Authors' Workshop, Montreux, October 6, 2004. (BICC stands for Bonn International Conversion Center; DCAF for Geneva Centre for the Control of Armed Forces. The papers will be published in Brzoska, Michael and David Law, eds., *Post Conflict Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft).

Sengupta, Somini (2004), "Turmoil in Ivory Coast: Once Again, Things Fall Apart," *The New York Times*, A5 (November 15).

Sesay, Mohamed Gibril and Charlie Hughes (2005), *Go Beyond First Aid. Democracy Assistance and the Challenges of Institution Building in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone*, The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Working Paper 34; available at <http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/project/>

Shearing, Clifford and Wood, Jennifer (2000), "Reflections on the Governance of Security," *Police Practice and Research*, 1, 4, 457-476.

Sheptycki, James (2000), "Policing and Human Rights: An Introduction," *Policing and Society (Special Issue on Policing and Human Rights)*, 10, 1, 10.

South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) (2003, "Philosophy and Principles of Community-Based Policing," Belgrade: SEESAC.

Stanley, William (forthcoming), "Business as Usual? Justice and Public Security Reform in Post-War Guatemala," in Charles T. Call, ed., *Constructing Justice and Security After War*, manuscript.

Stanley, William and Charles T. Call (1996), "Building a New Civilian Police Force in El Salvador," in Krishna Kumar, ed., *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Stedman, S.J., D. Rothchild and E.M. Cousens (eds.) (2002), *Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Stone, Christopher E. and Heather Ward (2000), "Democratic Policing: A Framework for Action," *Policing and Society*, 10, 11-45.

Swiss Foundation for World Affairs (2004), "New Challenges: Post Conflict Reconstruction of the Security Sector," *For the Record*, March 4 (Rapporteur Report on an International Seminar sponsored by the Swiss World Foundation for World Affairs, held in Washington, D.C., March 4 2004).

Thomas, Caroline (2000), *Global Governance, Development and Human Security. The Challenge of Poverty and Inequality*, London: Pluto Press.

Tschirgi, Neclâ (2004), *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges*, New York: International Peace Academy.

United Nations Development Programme (1994), *Human Development Report*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

United Nations (1997), *Human Rights and Law Enforcement. A Manual on Human Rights Training for the Police*. Professional Training Series No. 5. Geneva: High Commissioner for Human Rights. Centre for Human Rights. Sales No. E.96.XIV.5.

United Nations (2000), *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Brahimi Report)*, UN Doc A/55/305-S/2000/809, New York: UN.

United Nations (2002), "Justice and Security Sector Reform: A Conceptual Framework for BCPR," (written by Nicole Ball), New York: United Nations. (BCPR stands for Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.)

United Nations, Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, International Police Task Force, Sarajevo (1996), "Commissioner's Guidance for Democratic Policing in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina," mimeo. (available at [www.unmibh.org](http://www.unmibh.org))

U.S., Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (2002), "Problem Solving Tips. A Guide to Reducing Crime and Disorder through Problem-Solving Partnerships," Washington, D.C.: COPS; also available at [www.cops.usdoj.gov](http://www.cops.usdoj.gov)

United States, Department of State (September 29, 2004), "Subject: Creation of New Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization," press release.

United States, Department of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), (2004), "Strategic Plan for /Africa Regional," mimeo; also at [www.usstate.gov/inl/](http://www.usstate.gov/inl/)

United States Institute of Peace (2003), *Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq*. Special Report, Washington, D.C.: USIP.

United States Institute of Peace (USIP) (March 2004), *Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan*, Washington, D.C.: USIP, Special Report 117.

United States Institute of Peace (USIP) (April 2004), *Building Civilian Capacity in U.S. Stability Operations*, Washington, D.C.: USIP, Special Report 118.

Vera Institute of Justice (2003), *Measuring Progress toward Safety and Justice: A Global Guide to the Design of Performance Indicators Across the Justice Sector*, New York: Vera Institute.

Wilton Park (2004), *International Post-Conflict Policing Operations: Enhancing Co-ordination and Effectiveness*. Conference Summary and Conference Proceedings, Conference held at Wilton Park, 26-30 January 2004; organized by the International Policing Unit, Foreign Commonwealth Office; Centre for International Co-operation and Security, University of Bradford; and Wilton Park; [www.wiltonpark.org.uk](http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk) - FCOIntPolicesummaryfinal.doc and FCOIntPoliceproceedingsfinal.doc

Winkler, Theodor H., Dr. (2002), "Managing Change. The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order," Geneva: DCAF, October. Occasional Paper. Available on [www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)

WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America) (1999-2000), *Themes and Debates on Public Security Reform. A Manual for Civil Society*. Washington, D.C.: WOLA. (This is a series of



seven pamphlets on various aspects of reform. The focus is mainly on Central America and the Caribbean.)

WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America) (1995), *Demilitarizing Public Order. The International Community, Police Reform and Human Rights in Central America and Haiti*, Washington, D.C.: WOLA.

Worcester, S., Avery Bermanzohn and M. Ungar, (eds.), *Violence and politics: Globalization's paradox*, New York: Routledge.

World Bank (2004), *Social Capital and Survival: Prospects for Community Driven Development in Post-conflict Sierra Leone*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Social Development Paper 12.

World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) and Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN)(2002), *Hope Betrayed. A Report on Impunity and State-Sponsored Violence in Nigeria*, Geneva and Lagos: author; available at [www.omct.org](http://www.omct.org) or [www.kabissa.org/cleen](http://www.kabissa.org/cleen)

Ziegler, Melissa and Rachel Neild (2002), *From Peace to Governance. Police Reform and the International Community*, Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America.

Some relevant websites:

[www.gfn-ssr.uk.org](http://www.gfn-ssr.uk.org) (Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform)

[www.policeaccountability.co.az](http://www.policeaccountability.co.az) (An Open Society Project)

[www.un-globalsecurity.org](http://www.un-globalsecurity.org)







### **Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)**

Established in October 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) encourages and supports States and non-State governed institutions in their efforts to strengthen democratic and civilian control of armed and security forces, and promotes security sector reform conforming to democratic standards.

The Centre collects information and undertakes research in order to identify problems, to gather experience from lessons learned, and to propose best practices in the field of democratic governance of the security sector. The Centre provides its expertise and support, through practical work programmes on the ground, to all interested parties, in particular governments, parliaments, military authorities, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and academic circles.

Detailed information on DCAF can be found at [www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF):  
rue de Chantepoulet 11, PO Box 1360, CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland  
Tel: ++41 22 741 77 00; fax: ++41 22 741 77 05; e-mail: [info@dcaf.ch](mailto:info@dcaf.ch);  
website: [www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)