


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Editor in chief:

Miroslav Hadžić

Professor, Faculty of Political sciences
– University of Belgrade

Co- editors:

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Filip Ejodus, Assistant Lecturer,
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Svetlana Đurđević Lukić

Timothy Edmunds

Editors' contact:

Gundulićev venac 48

office@ccmr-bg.org

tel/fax +381 11 3287 226

Translation:

Vesna Podgorac

Design:

Saša Janjić

Computer typesetting:

Časlav Bjelica

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DCAF

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development and
the rule of law

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy promotes public and responsible participation of civil society in increasing citizen's and national security on principals of modern democratic society, as well as improvement of security cooperation with neighbors and integration of Serbia in Euro Atlantic community.

Contact

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Gundulicev venac 48, 11000 Belgrade

phone/fax: +381 (0) 32 87 226
+381 (0) 32 87 334

www.ccmr-bg.org
office@ccmr-bg.org

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The effectiveness of today's security policy of Serbia may be measured and tested in different ways and using different survey methodologies. Depending on the survey subject matter and goal, different sets of indicators and parameters will be created and then used. Important insights can be obtained, for example, through a comparative analysis of the discourses of ruling and/or security elites in a particular time period. This will reveal, among other things, what methods and what linguistic acts the mentioned elites used to construct the threats to the security of Serbia and its citizens. At the same time, it will be seen how and according to what parameters have the central actors in the prevailing discourse named and classified, along the line: friends – enemies, those Other (states, nations, religions, cultures, etc) that are important for Serbia.

The next step should be, for example, to see whether, and to what extent and in what way, was the mentioned discourse decanted into the official policies of current government, including the strategy of national security, namely that of foreign policy. After that, it should be examined whether the national security system and the government's enforcement apparatus are shaped and organised in accordance with the proclaimed strategic goals and interests of the Serbian state and citizens, but also with their socio-economic abilities. But what should be checked in the first place on this occasion is whether the above policies and their governmental implementing parties meet their true security needs. From this point in research, it may be proceeded in different directions. Following one of them, one should definitely measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the government authorities in charge of providing adequate level of security to the citizens and the state.

By shaping and applying its security and foreign policies, Serbia and its leaders send many messages to different sides and to a large number of addresses. That is why it is important to know how those to whom these messages are intended accept and understand them. As is well known, the participants of international and bilateral traffic have on their disposal a large number of channels for sending the feedback messages. However, it is also important to see how the citizens of Serbia, being the central recipients on the inside, understand and accept these messages. This is even more important considering that, regardless whether they are willing to or not, they not only suffer the consequences of any pol-

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icy that is instituted, but also, if by force of law only, serve the state and its security apparatus.

Every government, the present Serbian government included, will claim that the only valid judgment of their security policy will be the one that is passed by the citizens on the first elections to ensue, as well as that it ultimately depends on those who rule in what way they will (in the security area, in this case) make use of the mandate period they were given. It should be noted, however, that security developments in Serbia, the same as in other countries, does not follow the electoral rhythm. Moreover, the effects of any consequences that a security policy may have cannot be postponed until next elections, just the same as the thunderous reassurances or promises of those in power will not remove any security threats to individual citizens or free them of the uncertainty related to the fate of goods and values that are important to them.

Every government, the Serbian one included, wants to know what its subjects think about it and the way it rules. A major part of relevant data is collected, processed, and delivered by the security services and police. As required by them, the flow and content of the ideas, attitudes, and intents of the participants in public traffic and media is monitored and analysed by different press and marketing companies. There is no doubt that the findings of different public opinion surveys are among the sources of information used by the representatives of the government; no wonder then that the authorised persons of the state of Serbia commission for their own needs, or arrange themselves, surveys of the citizens' attitudes and beliefs about important political issues, as well as current and fundamental social problems and tensions. At the same time, a large number of public opinion surveys take place in the organisation of non-governmental and independent institutions and organisations. Of course, the public and the users of these surveys are absolutely free to interpret the findings obtained in this way. It is reasonable to expect that, in doing it, qualified researchers would be primarily led by the best professional practice. It is just as reasonable not to be surprised that the government will interpret the findings of public opinion surveys as it suits its, current or permanent, needs and interests. That is why it is very important that Serbia not only has a market for public opinion surveys, but also the room and the need for competition in interpreting its state of affairs.



The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (formerly the Centre for Civil-Military Relations) and its researchers have been taking part in this competition for many years. They were motivated to do it primarily by the fact that other public opinion researchers showed little interest for the security policy of Serbia, or for the reform of Serbian security sector. Thus, in the period 2003 – 2005, for example, the Centre researched, in seven cycles, the attitudes of the citizens of Serbia (and Montenegro) towards the reform of the Armed Forces, but also the other security issues. The findings that the researchers obtained in each respective cycle were successively made publicly available in seven separate publications. Then, in 2006, the summaries and respective debates were presented in the compilation of papers entitled “The Public and the Armed Forces” (CCMR, Belgrade). It was not before the beginning of 2011 that the Centre had the opportunity to organise any similar research.

Wishing to obtain reliable information whether the citizens of Serbia now feel that they are adequately safe, at their personal level, and what are their preferences and expectations, the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, in April - May 2011, in accordance with the best professional practice,¹ surveyed their opinions and attitudes. Within this endeavour, the citizens were asked to, among other things, express and grade their (dis)satisfaction with the security services of the state and its apparatus, and to present the level of their (dis)trust, not only in them, but in their leaders as well.

The intention of the research was, among other things, to find out how citizens see and interpret (value) the correlation between the national security and their own, group and/or collective, identity. Citizens' views on this was followed along two, interconnected, thematic lines. Along the first one it was examined how the citizens connect the situation in Kosovo and Metohija and their, personal and national, security. The analysis and interpretation of collected data was tackled by Mr Filip Ejodus. His main findings are presented in his paper entitled “Cognitive Dissonance and Security Policy of Serbia”, with which this issue of Security of Western Balkans magazine starts its overview of the findings of Serbian public opinion survey on security.

The intention of the second line was not only to learn what is the attitude of the citizens towards Serbian potential accession to the EU, or NATO, but also whether they expect to see any appertaining security benefits for themselves or for the nation (the state),

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¹ See the research data in the paper that follows

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or only the damage. The main focus, however, was on finding out whether the surveyed people see the above integrations as a threat to the preservation of national identity. The data obtained in this regard were analysed by Mr Zoran Krstić, who presented his findings to the interested members of public in his paper entitled "Relationship between the National and European Identity of Serbs".

At the same time, the public opinion survey that is addressed here offered an opportunity for the Centre researchers to additionally check whether there are any closer links between the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents and their attitudes with regard to security, and even more so for the reason that Serbia and its citizens are still held in the turmoil of slow and costly transition with uncertain outcome. For this purpose, Messrs Predrag Petrović and Marko Milošević constructed a personality of an average 'loser in transition' in this country and then, each of them independently, analysed how and to what extent this 'loser's status' is connected with the attitudes that the respondents took towards different aspects of their security.

Moreover, interested readers will find enclosed to this issue of the magazine a tabular overview of the respondents' attitudes distribution across selected socio-demographic characteristics. This, among other things, offers an opportunity for them to learn more about what the citizens of Serbia think about their security, but also to make a critical analysis of above authors.

Mr Miroslav Hadžić



Main data about the survey

Zoran Krstić¹

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy

Original scientific paper

May 2011

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Abstract

In the paper that is in front of you the author attempted to explain methodological postulates of the survey the findings of which were published in this issue. The survey was implemented in the period April – May 2011. It was composed of a survey and focus groups. Field survey was made on a representative sample of the citizens of Serbia, without Kosovo and Metohija, whilst focus groups took place with so-called 'losers in transition'. Enclosed to this paper is an overview of the questionnaire used in the survey.

Key words: survey, focus groups, sample, citizens of Serbia, security

* * *

Although a thorough and comprehensive longitudinal survey of security sector which would contribute to the better understanding of this sector is vitally necessary in Serbia, no such surveys are conducted, at least not at this moment. The public opinion surveys that have been thus far implemented were mostly reduced to measuring the trust that the citizens of Serbia have in institutions, or measuring the general support to integrations (into EU or NATO).

The survey that is in front of you attempted to remedy the above deficiencies. It continues the good practice of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) which, by implementation of empirical survey², takes a thorough and comprehensive approach to learning, analysing, and explaining the Serbian citizens' attitude towards different security topics, institutions, and problems.

Main goal of the survey "What Serbian Citizens Think about Their Own Security and the Security of Serbia?" was to collect and analyse the citizens' attitudes and perceptions of personal, local, and

¹ Contact: zorankrstic@sezam-pro.rs

² Public and the Army (2005), Mapping and Monitoring of the Serbian Security Sector (2008), Security of Young People (2008), Private Security Companies in Serbia – Friends or Enemies? (2009), Democratic Oversight of the Use of Special Authorisations (2009), Gender and Security (2011)..

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national security, as well as the performance of security sector institutions, and to see the extent to which the citizens are informed about the security sector, and to identify their main sources of information. Besides, we were interested to see the respondents' viewpoints about security cooperation and integrations (with EU, NATO, and neighbouring countries), the level of their trust in security sector, and their opinion about the security sector reform. Finally, our goal was to identify and analyse the ways in which core values, identities, attitudes, and personal experiences of Serbian citizens influence their perception of the security situation in the country. A part of the survey is dedicated to the issue of Kosovo and Metohija, its connection with national identity and influence on the feeling of personal and collective security of the citizens of Serbia.

The public opinion survey, the most important findings of which are in front of you, was conducted by the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID) for the requirements of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP). It was made on a representative sample of 1,198 respondents in a part of the Republic of Serbia (without Kosovo and Metohija) during the first week of April 2011, using the 'face to face' technique. The questionnaire had 114 questions – 106 survey questions and eight questions related to the respondents' socio-demographic characteristics.

The structure of the sample was the following:

Gender: men – 49%, women – 51%.

Age: 18–29 years – 18%; 30–39 years – 16%; 40–49 years – 16%; 50–59 – 19%; 60 and more – 31%.

Level of education: primary school or less – 22%; occupational school – 10%; secondary school – 43%; college or university – 21%, still at school/university – 4%.

Occupation: farmer – 8%; housekeeper – 12%; blue-collar worker with low skills – 8%; blue-collar worker with higher skills – 24%; technician – 15%; school/university student – 8%; clerk – 10%; professional – 15%.

Average monthly income (per member of household, in RSD): up to 10 thousand – 29%; 10–20 – 30%; 20–40 thousand – 17%; 40–60 thousand – 4%; more than 60 thousand – 2%; does not know or refuses to answer – 18%.

Nationality: Serbs – 88%; other – 12%.

The obtained data were analysed using the standard statistical techniques – frequencies and correlations.

It is important to note that, before conducting the main part of the survey, the researchers conducted a pilot survey (at a suitable



sample of 200 respondents) the purpose of which was to see how legible and valid the questions were.

Moreover, an integral part of the survey was a qualitative survey that included setting up five focus groups³ in four cities of Serbia (Sombor, Valjevo, Zaječar, and Belgrade⁴). The main goal of this part of the survey was to obtain a deeper insight of the attitudes, fears, and the problems that the citizens actually face with regard to security issues, as well as to confirm some findings that were obtained, particularly with regard to the losers and winners in the transition process in Serbia.

In the pages that follow, the BCSP researches will meticulously study a number of new, interesting, and unexpected, but also some widely known and repeatedly confirmed findings. The texts that follow are an attempt of the authors of the survey to study and explain the obtained findings in more detail, to place them in the context of overall security system, but also in the context of personal, collective, and national security relationships. We believe that the presented analyses can be valuable both for the persons employed in security sector institutions and the political representatives, and to other researchers and academic community, as well as to media and non-governmental sector.

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³ Although it was originally planned that focus groups be formed from the ranks of respondents who belong to the largest minority communities in Serbia (Bosnjaks, Albanians, Hungarians, and Roma), this plan was given up so that we can better explain the impact of economic status on the views and perception of security issues. Namely, we wished to see whether the citizens' impression of themselves (losers or winners in the transition process) has any influence on, and how it influences, the perception of security issues.

⁴ Two focus groups took place in Belgrade, one with the citizens who see themselves as losers in transition and one (control group) with those who see themselves as winners in transition.

Research and questionnaire designed by

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy

Gundulićev venac 48, +381 11 3287 226, office@ccmr-bg.org

Conducted by CESID – Beograd, Hadži Milentijeva 14, 011/ 241918 Check point..... Questionnaire No.....

Public Opinion in Serbia on Security – Spring 2011

Please Evaluate to Which Extent You Feel Safe:	1=Really unsafe , 2=Mostly unsafe, 3=Do not know, have no opinion, 4=Mostly safe 5=Completely safe				
1. Your own physical safety	1	2	3	4	5
2. In your house/apartment	1	2	3	4	5
3. In your neighborhood	1	2	3	4	5

4. If you feel safe, what is the main reason for that?

- 1) I live in a good environment 2) State institutions are doing their job well
 3) I am capable of protecting myself 4) I live normally and I obey law and order

5. Which state institution most contributes to your perception of safety?

- 0) None *) Write one institution's name _____

6. When have you personally felt the most safe?

- 1) before 1990 2) from 1990 to 2000 3) from 2000 until today

7. If you feel unsafe, what is the main reason for it?

- 1) Increase in street crime and violence 2) Hooligans and other extremist groups
 3) Bad economic situation and poverty 4) Drug addiction problems 5) Poor performance of state institutions

8. Which state institution affects your feeling of a lack of safety the most?

- 0) None *) Write one institution's name _____

9. How pleased are you with the performance of the police? (from 1 to 5): 1 2 3 4 5
 0) no opinion

10. What do you disapprove of most as regards police work?

- 0) Nothing *) I disapprove most of _____

11. What do you approve of most as regards police work?

- 0) Nothing *) I approve most of _____

12. Who do you rely on the most to secure the safety of you and your family?

- 1) Ourselves 2) Friends 3) Neighbors
 4) Police 5) the Army 6) Private security 7) I do not trust anybody

13. Is the performance of the police better or worse in comparison to the period before 2000?

- 1) Much worse 2) Mostly worse 3) Same 4) Mostly better 5) Better

Do the police treat equally people of different:	1= they do ; 2= they do not; 3= do not know		
14. Nationality	1	2	3
15. Religion	1	2	3



16. Sex	1	2	3
17. Material Status	1	2	3
18. Sexual Orientation	1	2	3
19. Political Orientation	1	2	3

To what extent do the police...?	1= Always , 2= Often 3= Sometimes, 4= Rarely , 5= Never, 0=Do not know, do not have an opinion				
20. Use excessive force	1	2	3	4	5 0
21. Take bribes	1	2	3	4	5 0
22. Serve political interests	1	2	3	4	5 0
23. To what extent are they connected to organized crime	1	2	3	4	5 0

24. How can citizens help the police increase safety?

- 1) Submit anonymous reports about suspicious people 2) Submit personal reports about suspicious people
 3) By our own testimony at the police station 4) Acceptance of an undercover role
 5) No opinion

25. If people from your environment are not ready to approach the police, what is the reason for that?

0) People are ready for it *) Reason: _____

In which way does the employment of the following group affect your safety?	1= It would jeopardize my safety 2= It would be the same , 3= It would increase my safety , 0= Do not know				
26. National minorities	1	2	3	0	
27. Women	1	2	3	0	
28. Sexual minorities (e.g. homosexuals)	1	2	3	0	

In your opinion what should be changed about the police so that citizens are safer?	1= It should be done, 2= It should not be done, 0= Do not know		
29. Decrease the number of police officers	1	2	0
30. Increase the number of police officers	1	2	0
31. Increase the salaries of police officers	1	2	0
32. Increase the authority of the police	1	2	0
33. Reduce the authority of the police	1	2	0
34. Prevent the influence of political parties on the police	1	2	0
35. Increase oversight and control over police work	1	2	0

How satisfied are you with the work of the following institutions in the security domain?	(School grade, 1= Very unsatisfied , 5=Very satisfied , 0= Do not know, do not have an opinion)					
36. Army	1	2	3	4	5	0
37. Police	1	2	3	4	5	0

38. Security Information Agency (BIA)	1	2	3	4	5	0
39. Judiciary	1	2	3	4	5	0
40. National Assembly	1	2	3	4	5	0
41. Government of the Republic of Serbia	1	2	3	4	5	0
42. Private security companies	1	2	3	4	5	0
43. Your religious group (church)	1	2	3	4	5	0
44. Political parties	1	2	3	4	5	0
45. President of the Republic of Serbia	1	2	3	4	5	0
46. National Security Council	1	2	3	4	5	0
47. Military security services (Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency)	1	2	3	4	5	0

48. What poses the main threat to the security of your ethnic group?

- 0) Do not know
- 1) Secession of Kosovo and Metohija 2) Reduced population growth (“the white plague”)
- 3) Emigration and internal migration 4) Globalization and modernization
- 5) Strengthening of nationalism and inter-ethnic tensions
- 6) Disappearing into another ethnic group and loss of identity

49. By what means should your ethnic group address its safety?

- 0) Do not know *) (Enter number from Card 1) _____

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?	1=Do not agree at all, 2=Mostly disagree, 3=Do not know, do not have an opinion, 4=Mostly agree, 5=Completely agree
50. The security of national minorities in Serbia is under threat	1 2 3 4 5
51. The security of Serbs in Serbia is under threat	1 2 3 4 5
52. The majority population (Serbs) threatens the security of minority groups	1 2 3 4 5
53. Minority groups threaten the security of the majority population (Serbs)	1 2 3 4 5
54. The security of Serbs outside of Serbia is threatened	1 2 3 4 5

55. Compared to your personal security and the security of Serbia, the security of your ethnic group is?

- 1) The most important 2) Equally important 3) Less important 4) Do not know

56. In your opinion, to what extent is the security of Serbia threatened?

- 1) Very threatened 2) Mostly threatened 3) Do not know, do not have an opinion
- 4) Mostly not threatened 5) Not threatened at all

57. When was, in your opinion, Serbia most secure?

- Before 1990 2) From 1990 to 2000 3) From 2000 until today



58. Evaluate what endangers the security of Serbia from the *inside*? (write down the number from Card 2)

59. Evaluate what endangers the security of Serbia from the *outside*? (write down the number from Card 3)

Which three countries pose the greatest threat to the security of Serbia? 0) Do not know
60. _____ 61. _____ 62. _____

Which three countries are Serbia's closest allies? 0) Do not know
63. _____ 64. _____ 65. _____

To what extent can the following factors contribute to the preservation of the security of Serbia?	1= Cannot contribute, 2= Can contribute partially, 3= Do not know, 4= Can contribute a lot, 5= Can contribute crucially
66. Preservation of military neutrality	1 2 3 4 5
67. Strengthening of the alliance with Russia	1 2 3 4 5
68. European Union membership	1 2 3 4 5
69. Increasing the budget for defence and security	1 2 3 4 5
70. Restoring general military service	1 2 3 4 5
71. NATO membership	1 2 3 4 5

In your opinion, is our military...?	1=Yes, 2=No, 3=Do not know
72. well trained	1 2 3
73. reformed enough	1 2 3
74. affected by corruption	1 2 3
75. well equipped	1 2 3
76. able to defend Serbia	1 2 3
77. large enough	1 2 3
78. mainly serving the interests of political parties	1 2 3

79. How does the abolition of general military service and the establishment of a professional army impact the security of Serbia?

1) Very negatively 2) Negatively 3) Do not know 4) Positively 5) Very positively

How do you judge the work of persons who manage our security institutions? (grades from 1 to 5, 1 being the worst, 5 being the best; 0=Do not know)

	1	2	3	4	5	0
80. President of the Republic of Serbia (Boris Tadić)	1	2	3	4	5	0
82. Minister of Defence (Dragan Šutanovac)	1	2	3	4	5	0
83. Minister of Internal Affairs (Ivica Dačić)	1	2	3	4	5	0

84. Should Serbia become an EU member? 1) Yes 2) No 3) Do not know

If Serbia joins the EU, it will...?

1= Strongly disagree, 2= Mostly disagree, 3= Do not know, have no opinion, 4= Mostly agree, 5= Totally agree

	1	2	3	4	5
84. ... further impoverish it	1	2	3	4	5
85. ... cause a loss of national identity	1	2	3	4	5
86. ... cause a loss of its national sovereignty and independence	1	2	3	4	5
87. ... force Serbia to renounce Kosovo and Metohija	1	2	3	4	5

88. ... increase its security	1	2	3	4	5
89. ... successfully suppress corruption	1	2	3	4	5
90. ... reduce the danger of organized crime	1	2	3	4	5
91. ... increase the living standards of Serbian citizens	1	2	3	4	5

92. Should Serbia become a NATO member? 1) Yes 2) No 3) Do not know

93. What is NATO for You?

- 0) Do not know, have no opinion
 1) A defensive alliance 2) An instrument in the hands of the United States
 3) The protector of rich countries' interests 4) A guarantor of peace
 5) An organization which has lost its purpose 6) A guarantor of the security of small countries
 7) A pillar of democracy

If Serbia joins NATO, it will...?					
1= Strongly disagree, 2= Mostly disagree, 3= Do not know, have no opinion, 4= Mostly agree, 5= Totally agree					
94. ... further impoverish it	1	2	3	4	5
95. ... cause a loss of national sovereignty and identity	1	2	3	4	5
96. ... pull Serbia into conflicts and increase the risk of terrorism	1	2	3	4	5
97. ... disrupt our relations with Russia	1	2	3	4	5
98. ... reduce the risk of attacks from outside	1	2	3	4	5
99. ... increase the inflow of foreign investments	1	2	3	4	5
100. ...modernize the Army of Serbia	1	2	3	4	5
101. ... help the military industry to work more and to export	1	2	3	4	5

102. What should NATO do to improve relations between Serbia and the alliance?

- 0) Do not know
 1) Apologise publicly for the bombardment 2) Pay war reparations
 3) Transform itself 4) Make Russia a member

103. What would the accession of Serbia to NATO say about Serbs as a nation?

- 1) That we are smart 2) That we have sold ourselves
 3) That we have betrayed our ancestors and our history
 4) That we are weak 5) That we have short memories 6) That finally we have a vision

104. The Declaration of Independence by Kosovo and Metohija in February of 2008 for you represents ...?

- 1) A threat to the security of Republic of Serbia
 2) A threat to the national identity of Serbian people
 3) Does not represent a threat at all
 4) Do not know, have no opinion

105. When it comes to the independence of Kosovo and Metohija, Serbian authorities ...

- 1) Should not recognize it at any cost 2) Should recognize it, if this leads to EU membership
 3) Should recognize Kosovo's independence immediately 4) Do not know, have no opinion

106. If the authorities of the Republic of Serbia recognized Kosovo, for you this would be:

- 0) Do not know, have no opinion
 1) A reasonable political act 2) A shameful treasonable act 3) An insignificant political act

107. For whom did you vote in the last parliamentary elections in 2008?

- 1) „For a European Serbia“ list (DS, G17...) 2) SRS 3) DSS-NS Coalition
 4) SPS-PUPS-JS Coalition 5) LDP 6) National minority parties

Cognitive dissonance and security policy of Serbia

*Filip Ejduš*¹

Faculty of Political Science, University in Belgrade

Original scientific paper

May 2011

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Abstract

We often hear about deep political divisions in Serbia. Contrary to this, the April – May 2011 public opinion survey showed that, with regard to several key areas of foreign and security policy, the attitudes of large majority of citizens coincide with the official policy. Firstly, most citizens believe that Serbia should join the EU. Besides, vast majority of citizens believe that Serbia should never recognise the independence of Kosovo. Finally, a prevailing majority of Serbian citizens oppose Serbian membership in NATO and agrees with the policy of military neutrality. On the other hand, the survey also showed that citizens are aware that these two attitudes are mutually exclusive; this creates collective ‘cognitive dissonance’. In the absence of any change in foreign and security policy, there are three strategies to overcome the cognitive dissonance: denial, abandonment of one or more dissonant attitudes, and finding new convictions.

Key words: cognitive dissonance, integrations, security, public opinion, EU, NATO

1. Introduction

In Serbia, public discourse is often associated with ‘deep divisions’ that allegedly exist within the Serbian society.² We hear about the divisions into patriots and traitors, nationalists and democrats, Chetniks and Partisans, traditionalists and modernists, or the division into the First, the Second, and the Third Serbia. A thesis about deep symbolical clashes within the Serbian society is present across political, popular (Kovačević 2008), and academic discourse (Čolović/Mimica 1992, Matić 1998, Antonić 2009, Konečni 2009). These discourses on divisions have almost flooded the Serbian pub-

¹ Contact: ejdusf@yahoo.com

² This paper is a result of working in the project entitled *Political Identity of Serbia in Regional and Global Context* (179076) implemented within the Faculty of Political Science, the University in Belgrade, and financed by the Republic of Serbia of the Ministry of Education and Science, and the project of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy;



lic in the past two decades. Although the divisions were mostly only ‘noticed’ and ‘analysed’ in these discourses, they have actually (re)produced them. These discourses did this even when they criticised the very idea of deep societal divisions. In other words, the more was said about different divisions in the Serbian people, the heavier sediment they left as a ‘societal fact’ which is hard to dispute. It would be therefore particularly interesting to make a genealogical overview of the origins of this idea of divisions in the Serbian society. This, however, is not the matter dealt with in this paper.³ Besides, even if we say that these symbolic divisions are the social constructs, this does not mean that it makes them less real.

For the sake of illustration, the existence of many symbolic divisions in the Serbian society impeded the achievement of basic political consensus after the 2000 democratic changes. This is particularly visible in the area of security policy about which the surveys have already been made (Ejdus 2007/8, Brozović 2010). How the citizens of Serbia see the key challenges of security policy, however, was never a matter of systematic academic survey. This will be a task of this paper. The central question in this paper was how well founded in 2011 was the thesis about alleged divisions within Serbian society, at least with regard to security policy. Since the area of security policy can be quite extensive, in this paper it will be reduced to its three aspects – Serbian policy towards the EU, policy towards NATO, and Kosovo policy. Empirical material that will be used in the paper was collected in a field public opinion survey that was, for the requirements of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), conducted by the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID). The survey was made on the representative sample of 1,198 citizens of Serbia (without Kosovo) in the period 1 – 7 April 2011. Besides, in the period 25 – 27 May, five focus groups were organised, each of them with eight respondents – two in Belgrade and one in each of Valjevo, Sombor, and Zaječar. The four groups were organised with so-called losers in transition, and, out of them, two were composed of the citizens between 30 and 60 years of age, in Valjevo and Zaječar, and two of the respondents between 18 and 30 years of age (Belgrade and Sombor). The fifth focus group was organised in Belgrade; it was a control group. It was made up of so-called winners in transition, namely the respondents above 30 years of age, with a higher income and better education. Based on the analysis of the findings, a conclusion was derived that Serbia does not have only a political consensus, but a social consensus as well, with regard to these three important elements of security policy. The survey, however, also showed that the citizens of Serbia do not believe that the elements of this consensus

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³ One of the first among them to, according to the information available to the author, speak about the deep divisions in the Serbian society was Dobrica Ćosić. In a lecture entitled “How to Create Ourselves” that he held in 1967 in Kolarčev narodni univerzitet, Ćosić suggested that there existed a deep division between two *Serbias* – the one personified by Vuk and the other represented by Dositej (Ćosić 1988).

are in mutual agreement, which suggests that a collective cognitive dissonance is in place.

The paper consists of three parts. First to be presented will be the key elements of the cognitive dissonance theory developed by social psychology, and its implementation in the science of international relations. The second part will present the results of the above survey of public opinion about three key goals of foreign and security policy of the Republic of Serbia. This part will demonstrate that the thesis about the existence of deep divisions within the Serbian society and the absence of basic consensus among the citizens is not sociologically founded, at least not with regard to the above three analysed goals of foreign and security policy. Quite to the contrary, the results of empirical public opinion survey clearly show that, when it comes to the Serbian attitude towards NATO, EU, and Kosovo, there is a consensus between the citizens and political elites.⁴ Thirdly, the paper will demonstrate that a contradiction exists not only among the citizens, namely between the citizens and political elites, but also among the convictions shared by their vast majority. In other words, the citizens feel that the strategic convictions with regard to which the consensus has been reached are mutually exclusive, which creates a collective "cognitive dissonance" (Festinger 1957). Starting from the theory of cognitive dissonance, this paper will present possible ways to overcome this state of affairs.

2. Theory of cognitive dissonance

The theory of cognitive dissonance was developed by the social psychologist Leon Festinger in the 1950s. Together with his associates, Festinger was observing the behaviour of the followers of an apocalyptical cult who believed that a cataclysmic flood will ensue on 21 December 1955. Moreover, they expected that, on the eve of the flood, a spaceship will appear out of the space and rescue them. When this did not happen, the followers of the cult 'received a message' in which they were explained that it was only thanks to their diligence and devotion that the supreme deity spared the humankind from ruin. Based on these insights, Festinger made a deduction that people have a strong need to eliminate concurrent existence of knowledge and convictions. He named this condition, which people strive to overcome, 'cognitive dissonance' (Festinger 1956, 1957). Festinger's insights made up the foundations of the cognitive dissonance theory which became one of the most dynamic areas of social psychology, and social science in general (Cooper 2007). Joel Cooper

⁴ The word 'consensus' here means the agreement of vast majority.



defines cognitive dissonance as a state that occurs when “people believe that two of their psychological representations are inconsistent with which other” (Ibid: 6). According to the cognitive dissonance theory, people have a need to eliminate, or at least alleviate, this state of unpleasant tension between different convictions. This can be done by denying that there is any dissonance at all, by changing the behaviour and convictions, or by strengthening the consonant convictions, namely by reducing the importance of dissonant convictions. If the inconsistency occurs between the attitudes and conduct, the theory supposes that there is greater probability that the attitudes will change (Ibid: 8).

Within the science of international relations, the theory of cognitive dissonance was first introduced at an individual analysis level as a framework for understanding the makers of foreign policy decisions (Jervis 1976; Rosati 1995; Finnemore/Sikkink 1998). In recent period, individual authors suggested that this theory is useful at the collective analysis level in the international relations (Sucharov 2005; Lupovici 2011). Amir Lupovici calls the cognitive dissonance that is reached at collective level ‘ontological dissonance’ (Ibid: 6). If the ontological dissonance is not reduced, collective actors come into the state of ontological uncertainty and are either disgraced or humiliated (Steele 2008). Considering that the change of behaviour and attitudes, namely the identity at collective level, is a slow and often demanding process, collective cognitive dissonance is usually diminished by the ‘evasion’ mechanism. This means to either avoid the exposure to dissonant information, leading to its denial, or to put the accent on such information, which increase confusion and ambiguity with regard to the dissonance between existing beliefs (Lupovici 2011:10–11, Zarakol 2010).

The text below will show that the citizens of Serbia, judging by the results of above survey (April-May 2011), suffer from collective cognitive dissonance because of the priorities of foreign and security policy. More precisely, just as their political representatives did it, the citizens too have built a consensus that Serbia should join the EU, that it needs to remain militarily neutral, and that it should never and not at any price recognize the Kosovo independence. The survey also showed, however, that citizens see clearly even that which their representatives largely omit to say, at least in public. They see that, if it wishes to become an EU member state, Serbia will have to renounce its present policy towards Kosovo. Moreover, the citizens support the policy of military neutrality, primarily because of the overall role of NATO in the bombing campaign on FRY and, later, in the Kosovo secession. But it is just as reasonable to presume that citizens know

that NATO is mostly composed of those same states that constitute the EU which they wish their country to accede. Cognitive dissonance that the existence of these mutually discordant beliefs creates in citizens may be overcome in several different ways which will be addressed in the conclusion.

3. Public opinion and foreign and security policy

In the first several years of democratic transition in Serbia, there was no consensus between the strongest political parties about what its security policy should look like. The outlines of this consensus, however, started to appear in the end of 2006.⁵ Today ruling and opposition political parties principally agree on the priorities of official foreign and security policy Republic of Serbia: membership in the EU, military neutrality, and diplomatic battle for non-recognition of Kosovo independence. The question is, however, whether, besides the political, there also exists a social consensus about these critical principles and goals of foreign and security policy. This section will outline the results of the public opinion survey in Serbia, clearly demonstrating that not only political, but also the broader social consensus about above principles and goals of foreign and security policy is in place in Serbia.

Serbia and the European Union

Since the beginning of democratic changes in 2000 to this date, the achievement of membership in the EU has been one of the foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, until 2008 the consensus about this was absent among the largest political parties, the same as among citizens, since the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), which was the strongest opposition party at that time, was against Serbian integration to the EU. In 2008, however, the Serbian Progress Party (SNS) broke away from SRS-a. According to public opinion survey, not only did the Serbian Progress Party soon become the strongest opposition party but it accepted, in its political programme, a possibility of Serbian EU integration.⁶ With this, for the first time after 5 October 2000, a consensus about Serbia's joining the EU was reached among the strongest political parties in Serbia.

As regards the public opinion, ever since the beginning of the democratisation process in 2000, it was mostly of pro-European proclivity (admittedly, with slight oscillations and with the tendency of


⁵ Critical moments for reaching the consensus were the adoption of the Serbian Constitution in December 2006, the Serbian National Assembly's Resolution declaring military neutrality in December 2007, separation of the pro-European Serbian Progress Party from the anti-European Serbian Radical Party in October 2008, and the adoption of the Strategy of National Security in April 2009.

⁶ The Statute of the Serbian Progress Party <<http://sns.org.rs/??/2010-06-05-00-10-55/statut-srpska-napredna-stranka.html>> 1 October 2011



gradual decrease in support).⁷ According to the BCSP survey conducted in the spring of 2011, only 59.3% of citizens supported Serbia's integration into the EU, which was at that time the lowest percent that was seen since the surveys of this kind are conducted.⁸ In the focus groups, citizens identified the EU with better living standards, enhancement of economy, and general prosperity. The associations they had with regard to this Organisation were both positive (such as: order, diligence, cooperation, export, prosperity, living standards, etc), and negative (e.g., blackmailing, scum, gold-snatchers, hustlers, hypocrisy, subordination, etc).⁹

Graph 1: The citizens' attitude towards the integration of Serbia into the EU



Slightly more men (60%) than women (58.4%) opted for integration into the EU. Moreover, the support to the EU integrations decreased with the fall of the respondents' level of education and financial standing. Finally, the members of national minorities were more enthusiastic about joining the EU (79.7%) than the citizens who identified themselves as the members of Serbian nation (56%). A much larger number of citizens gave positive (47%) than negative (23%) answers to the question whether Serbian integration into the EU would compromise the independence and sovereignty of Serbia. Slightly less than a half of respondents were convinced that joining the EU would enhance the national security (46%), whilst 28% of citizens agree with this statement. In short, a large majority of respondents believe that Serbia should continue its process of European integrations and, in the end, become an EU member state.

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⁷ September 2002 – 68%, December 2003 – 72%, September 2004 – 70.6%, September 2005 – 64%, September 2006 – 69.9%, June 2007 – 69.3%, December 2008 – 61%, December 2009 – 65%. Source: Government of the Republic of Serbia, Office for European Integrations. <<http://www.seio.gov.rs>> 21 September 2011

⁸ In the period May – September, the support continued to decrease, first to 53% in June, and then to 46% in September. Source: <<http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovn/a/aktuelno.69.html:347245-Pada-podrska-priključenju-EU>> 1 October 2011

⁹ CESID, Final Report on the Activities of Focus Groups.

Serbia and NATO

Since the beginning of democratic transition, the number of Serbian citizens supporting the NATO membership has never even drew close to a half.¹⁰ After ten years of almost complete absence of public debate on Serbian accession to NATO, the discussion about this issue was intensified on the eve of ten-year anniversary of bombing campaign against Yugoslavia and Serbia. This, however, did not result in any increase of support to the integration into NATO. According to the BCSP survey, two thirds of the respondents opposed Serbian accession to NATO (66.3%), 18.1% was unable to make up their mind, and only 15.6% was in favour of the accession to NATO. This was actually the lowest level of support to the accession to NATO ever since these surveys have been conducted. Women are far more indecisive (23.9%) than men (12.2%) in respect of the accession of Serbia to this Alliance. The largest share of those opposing the accession to NATO was among the oldest citizens (69.7%), as well as among the wealthiest ones (69.8%). Finally, whilst the members of Serbian nation are in vast majority against the accession to NATO (69.4%), the members of national minorities are of mixed opinion in this respect (41.3% for accession, 42.8% against accession).

How can this be explained when we know that the campaign that was supposed to bring Serbia closer to NATO intensified in 2009?¹¹ There could be three reasons for this. Firstly, ten-year anniversary of the bombing campaign against Serbia has revived the memory of the 78-day long NATO intervention against FRY and, consequently, recharged and promoted traumas and self-victimisation. Theoretical and comparative survey of the policy of the memory of traumatic events suggests that in other communities, too, traumatic feelings do not fade over time but rather intensify (Edkins 2003; Burg 2008). Secondly, the unilateral declaration of Kosovo independence, and its international recognition (Kosovo was recognised by a vast majority of NATO Member States), and the central role that the US played in this process have further encouraged negative attitude of the citizens of Serbia about the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, in March 2011, the international community, headed by NATO, started air strikes against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. In Serbia, the news about this 'humanitarian intervention' has fast revived the memory of the 1999 bombing campaign. The impression was that public opinion far better discerned the similarities than the differences between these two interventions. That is why Serbia was among the rare countries in the world in which Muammar Gaddafi still enjoyed enormous support.¹²


¹⁰ April 2006 – 31%, September 2007 – 26%, September 2009 – 25%. Source: CESID. February 2010 – 20%. Source: Medijum galup <<http://www.vesti.rs/Politika/TNS-Medijum-galup-DS-i-SNS-najjaci.html>> 21 September 2011

¹¹ About the role of the US Embassy in Belgrade in initiating a debate about NATO, see the leaked Serbian diplomatic mail: "Recipe for a NATO Debate – Let Stand 10 Years Then Stir", dated 26 February 2010. Source: <www.cablegatesearch.net> 21 September 2011

¹² Martinović, Iva. „Masovna podrška Gadaffiju iz Srbije.“ ("Vast Support to Gaddafi from Serbia") *Danas*, 25 March 2011 <http://www.danas.org/content/srbija_libija_gadafi/3537308.html> 28 September 2011



Graph 2: The citizens' attitude towards the accession of Serbia to NATO



The survey suggests that citizens have a predominantly one-sided picture of NATO. As much as 38.5% believes that this Alliance is only an instrument in the hands of USA, and 22.3% of citizens see this Alliance as a protector of the interest of rich countries. Only 5.7% of respondents see NATO as a defensive alliance of states. In their work in the focus group, the respondents had very negative associations with regard to NATO. This Alliance was mostly attributed the following: aggressor, dictatorship, violence, strong-arm organisation, even SS troops. Moreover, the survey of the opinions of the focus group showed that the citizens do not see a connection between NATO and their current or future security, or between NATO and economic welfare. This military alliance is significant for them primarily because the 1999 bombing campaign. Also, it is indicative that as much as 50.4% of citizens believe that, with the accession to NATO, Serbia would expose itself to a greater risk of terror attack. In line with its scepticism towards the accession to NATO, a vast majority of citizens (64.8%) is of the opinion that militarily neutrality is the optimal national security policy. Men, the elderly, and the uneducated support the policy of militarily neutrality to a larger extent than women, the young, and the educated.

When the respondents were asked specific questions about potential benefits from possible Serbian membership in NATO, however, their frame of mind changed, although not in any extreme measure, and turned in favour of Euro-Atlantic integrations. As much as 31.3% of respondents, for example, believe that the membership in

this military organisation would increase the national security of Serbia. The belief that the integration in NATO would increase the number of FDIs, as it is often underlined by local advocates of Euro-Atlantic integrations, is shared by 25% of respondents. Besides, 29.9% of surveyed citizens believed that, by the accession to NATO, Serbian military industry would be busier than it was before. Finally, as much as 30.2% of respondents believe that the integration into NATO would reduce the danger of attacks from outside. The respondents were most enthusiastic (38%) when they were asked whether the membership in this Organisation would modernise the Serbian Armed Forces. The answers to the question what should NATO do to improve the relationship between Serbia and this Organisation were also interesting. As much as 47% of respondents believe that it would be best if NATO paid for war damages, whilst 16% of them think that NATO should first apologise for having bombarded FRY in 1999. Serbia's accession to NATO, as it is shown in Table 1, would be perceived by the citizens as a political amnesia, selling out, or betrayal.

Table 1: Accession to NATO and the national identity

What would Serbian accession to NATO say about Serbs as a nation?	Percent
Does not know, unable to decide	18.7
That we are smart	5.8
That we have sold ourselves out	20.2
That we have betrayed our ancestors and our history	16.1
That we are weak	10.8
That our memory is short lived	20.9
That we finally have a vision	7.5
Total	100

Serbia and Kosovo

Finally, a large majority of citizens support the official security policy towards Kosovo. Firstly, citizens' attitudes with regard to security threats coming from Kosovo are very similar to those in the official documents. In the *Strategy of National Security* from 2009, Kosovo secession was described as the "largest threat to the security of the Republic of Serbia".¹³ Similarly, according to the BCSP survey, 16.7% of respondents believe that Kosovo secession is major threat

¹³ National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. *Strategy of National Security*. April 2009: 7.



to national security, whilst as much as 36.4% believe that lower birth rate is the major threat. The number of those who believe that Kosovo secession is the main threat is larger among the respondents of Serbian nationality (17.6%) than among the national minorities (10.2%). The largest number of those who believe that Kosovo secession is major threat to security (22.5%) are among the oldest respondents (60 years or more). The younger the respondents are, the less they feel threatened by Kosovo secession (only 8.7% of respondents with 30 to 39 years of age). It is interesting, however, that this does not apply to the youngest respondents (between 18 and 29 years of age), among whom 17.9% believe that Kosovo is the main threat for national security. Moreover, the perception of Kosovo secession as the major security threat is in positive correlation with educational level (without school – 24%, secondary school – 16%, college – 11%). Among the youngest population of school and university students, however, the percent is somewhat higher (20%).

In the answers to the question what is threatening the security of Serbia from inside, Kosovo is second-ranked (20.4%), after financial over-indebtedness (25.2%). The correlation between social and age structure of respondents and answers to this question is similar to the correlation present with regard to the previously mentioned question. The older and less educated the respondents are, more inclined are they to see Kosovo secession as something that is threatening Serbia from inside. The only exception from this rule is the youngest (18 – 29 years of age) and student population which has more concerns about the secession as internal threat than others.

Table 2: Respondents' educational structure and perception of Kosovo secession

Kosovo secession is an internal threat to the security of Serbia?	
<i>Education</i>	<i>Percent</i>
No school/primary school	27.5%
Occupational school	21.2%
Secondary school	18.7%
College or university	16.5%
School / university student	14.8%
Total	20.2%

Table 3: Respondents' age structure and perception of Kosovo secession

Kosovo secession is an internal threat to the security Of Serbia?	
<i>Age</i>	<i>Percent</i>
18–29 years	18.4%
30–39 years	14.1%
40–49 years	15.6%
50–59 years	19.6%
60 years or more	27.2%
Total	20.3%

When asked what Kosovo declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 means for them, 35.8% of respondents answered that it is a threat to the security of the Republic of Serbia, and 35.9% that it is a threat to the national identity of Serbian people. Only 12% of respondents saw no threat in this. The correlation between social and age structure and the perception that Serbia is threatened by Kosovo unilateral declaration of independence is similar to above correlations. As opposed to the members of Serbian people who believe that this is a threat to the security of the Republic of Serbia (36%) and a threat to the national identity of Serbian people (38%), national minorities are not that unanimous. Among those who did not identify themselves as Serbs, 34% believe that this was a threat to the security of the Republic of Serbia, whilst only 16.7% perceived it as a threat to the national identity of Serbian people.

4. Cognitive dissonance and security policy

It could be concluded from the results presented above that, at least judging by the disposition of public opinion in April and May 2011, ten years after democratic changes, a basic consensus among most citizens and political parties about main orientation of foreign and security policy of the Republic of Serbia was reached. This consensus features three standpoints: Serbia should become an EU member state, should remain militarily neutral, and should never recognise the Kosovo independence. In the past several years the citizens, the same as the government in Serbia, could hear that these standpoints are mutually inconsistent. Thus, for example, it is quite often argued that none of the European post-communist countries became a member state of EU without previously acceding NATO.¹⁴ Besides,


¹⁴ „LDP: NATO prečiča ka EU.“ (LDP: NATO - Shortcut to EU) RTS, 30 October 2010 <<http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Srbija/787728/LDP%3A+NATO+p rečiča+ka+EU.html>> 13 November 2011



the warnings arrive from different sides that Serbia cannot accede the EU unless it previously regulates its relations with Kosovo and recognizes Kosovo independence, at least *de facto* if not *de jure*. Such messages arrived from both the international community¹⁵, and individual political parties¹⁶ or analysts¹⁷. The question is how the citizens perceive the relations among these three standpoints that make up a crux of the national consensus about foreign and security policy of Serbia.

It is possible to, based on the BCSP survey, say that citizens are aware that there is an inconsistency between their views of Serbian accession into EU on one hand, and Kosovo policy on the other. It is often speculated in public whether Serbia needs to choose between Kosovo and EU, and whether it would need to renounce its demands regarding the “breakaway” south province. Although a prevailing majority of political parties attempt to reassure the citizens that the policy: both EU and Kosovo is plausible, the BCSP survey showed that most citizens (54%) think that Serbia will need to give up Kosovo if it wants to become a member state of EU.

Graph 3: Correlation between so-called ‘Kosovo’ policy and so-called ‘European’ policy



However, 13% of the population believes that the Government of the Republic of Serbia needs to recognise Kosovo independence if this would lead it to the integration into EU, whilst only 4% is of the opinion that Serbia should do this right away. A vast majority (61%) holds that Serbia should never and not at any price recognise the independence of this territory. If any government does this, 55% of

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¹⁵ In December, Serbian media published a confidential mail in which a French diplomat confirmed that Serbia cannot get back Kosovo and accede EU at one and the same time. “Wikileaks: ne može i EU i Kosovo.” (Wikileaks: It Is Not Possible to Have Both EU and Kosovo), *Kurir*, 8 October 2010 <<http://www.kurir-info.rs/m/vesti/wikileaks-ne-moze-i-eu-i-kosovo-63558.php>> 13 November 2011.

Similar viewpoints could be heard coming from the representatives of the European Commission and the European Parliament. See: „Ren: dobrosusedski odnosi sa Kosovom.” (Rehn: Good Neighbourly Relations with Kosovo) <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=04&dd=23&nav_category=11&nav_id=295374> 13 November 2011 „Kacin: Srbija može i da čeka Kosovo.” (Kacin: Serbia May Also Wait for Kosovo) <<http://www.naslovi.net/2010-02-06/b92/kacin-srbija-moze-i-da-ceka-kosovo/1531047>> 13 November 2011 „Srbija ne može u EU ako ne prizna Kosovo.” (Serbia cannot Accede EU Without Previously Recognising Kosovo) *Danas*, 27 May 2010 <http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/politika/srbija-ne-moze-u-eu-ako-ne-prizna-kosovo.56.html?news_id=191364> 13 November 2011

¹⁶ „Jovanović: ne može i Kosovo Evropa.” (Jovanović: It Is Impossible to Have Both Kosovo and Europe) *Tanjug*, 6 September 2010 <<http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/79908/Jovanovic-Ne-moze-i-Kosovo-i-Evropa>> 13 November 2011

¹⁷ „Slecinger: Srbija ne može u EU i da zadrži Kosovo.” (Schlesinger: Serbia Cannot both Integrate into EU and Keep Kosovo.” *Blic*, 28 July 2010 <<http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/200396/Slecinger-Srbija-ne-moze-i-u-EU-i-da-zadrzi-Kosovo>> 13 November 2011

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¹⁸ Judging by the current situation, it is hard to believe that other circumstances could drastically change. It is extremely hard, although not impossible, to expect any significant change in the positions of the countries which have already recognised Kosovo independence. It is even less realistic to expect Priština to change its position, or a fast change in the balance of power that would favour the countries which did not recognize Kosovo independence.

¹⁹ Other surveys reveal an increasing number of those who see the change of Serbian Kosovo policy as a condition for joining EU. See: <http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnenja/javno_mnenje_jun_2011.pdf> 1 October 2011. Since 2008 it has become increasingly harder to avoid dissonant information considering that the number of states, particularly EU member states, which recognised Kosovo independence grew continuously. Besides, there was a gradual increase in the number, intensity, and frequency of messages arriving in Serbia from the international community with regard to the need to have Serbian Kosovo policy aligned with the reality in Kosovo.

²⁰ Unilateral embargo of Priština towards Serbia, incapability of the state to prevent the taking over of Jarinje and Brnjak checkpoints, Angela Merkel's messages during her visit to Serbia, putting up the barricades on the North of Kosovo, and the violence that ensued, etc.

²¹ It seems reasonable to suppose that most decision-makers refuse to publicly accept this information, but not because they privately still believe that it is possible to join EU and still continue with current Kosovo policy. The reason for this public denial is most probably a product of combining two things. The first thing is reckoning that such an attitude increases the price of compromise that could be made in future negotiations about future status of Kosovo. The second thing is the fear from being condemned by domestic public as a traitor, considering that Kosovo has a strong symbolical and emotional meaning.

citizens would perceive it as shame and betrayal, and only 13.4% would deem it politically reasonable. These results reveal not only that citizens have opposing views regarding EU and Kosovo, but also that they are aware of this cognitive dissonance.

According to the theory of cognitive dissonance, the tension between inconsistent convictions and conduct creates unpleasant feelings, namely feelings of shame and humiliation. Citizens of Serbia as individuals, as well as the state of Serbia as a collective actor, will have a need to overcome this dissonance to such extent to which the dissonance of these views becomes more obvious. If all other circumstances remain unchanged, the question is how the Serbian public will overcome this dissonance.¹⁸

Considering that the citizens have become aware of above inconsistency, it can no longer be overcome through denial.¹⁹ More precisely, as revealed by the BCSP survey, most citizens have already accepted the dissonant information that Serbia, if it wants to accede EU, must give up Kosovo. It is reasonable to suppose that, despite the ruling elites persistently trying to avoid and deny it, further developments in the second half of the year additionally confirmed this information.²⁰ Key decision-makers in the country, however, did not accept this publicly yet.²¹ The currently prevailing discourse: 'both EU and Kosovo' will, in the measure in which citizens become more aware of the inconsistency between European and Kosovo policy, become less and less a way to overcome the cognitive dissonance.

Since the strategies of denial can no longer offer a suitable response to cognitive dissonance, citizens of Serbia are left two options. First option is to let go of one of the two convictions, either the one with regard to EU or the one with regard to Kosovo. Although main political parties, both those in power and those in opposition, did not abandon the goal to accede EU, in September public support to this goal dropped to the historical minimum of 46%. This clearly indicates what direction the overcoming of cognitive dissonance could take.²² It is expected, however, that Serbia will be awarded EU candidate status in March 2012, which could 'recuperate' public support to EU integrations. After that, majority support to accession could be sustained through periodical making of progress in the EU integration process (e.g., beginning of negotiations, opening and closing individual chapters in negotiations, use of EU structural funds, conclusion of negotiations, etc). On the other hand, if it is impossible to deny the dissonance, or abandon any of dissonant convictions, there is only one psychological mechanism left: a possibility to create new convictions which will shrink the significance of dissonance. A new conviction could be created for this



purpose; namely, domestic elites could accuse EU that, in actual fact, it is not sincere when saying that it wants Serbia in its ranks.

Other important dissonance revealed by the survey is created between the Serbian wish to become a member state of EU and its wish to remain militarily neutral. At first sight, these two standpoints should not be dissonant, even more so if we know that some EU member states are militarily neutral.²³ When one analyses the deeper reasons for which citizens prefer military neutrality, it is clear that it is actually based on the negative image of NATO as such. Let us be reminded, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia declared military neutrality in December 2007, precisely because of the 'overall role of NATO' with regard to Kosovo, starting from the bombing campaign against Serbia through to the Ahtisaari plan which identified NATO as the 'ultimate governmental authority'.²⁴ The BCSP survey showed that citizens, for identical or similar reasons, believe that military neutrality is preferable. Main reason for negative feelings towards NATO, as it is clearly demonstrated by the results of surveying the focus group, is the memory of the 1999 bombing campaign. The survey likewise demonstrated that citizens see the EU and NATO member states (with the exception of Greece), and some neighbouring countries such as Croatia and Albania, as a threat, whilst they see Russia, China, and Greece as friends. It is, however, possible to suppose that the citizens are aware that memberships in these two organisations overlap and that the same European countries that have bombarded Serbia as NATO member states are at the same time EU member states. The exceptionally negative view on NATO will in future be an additional factor that may influence the citizens to give up their support to the EU integrations. Specifically, a change of the view on EU, which will shift from the positive towards the negative, will diminish both the cognitive dissonance with regard to the view on Kosovo and the cognitive dissonance with regard to the negative image of NATO.

5. Conclusion

This paper analysed the public opinion in Serbia with regard to the priorities of security policy. The paper primarily rested on the findings of the survey that BCSP and CESID conducted in April and May 2011. Several conclusions could be made based on the presented findings.

Firstly, the support of Serbian citizens to EU integrations of Serbia is on a decline. This can be explained by the citizens being disappoint-

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²² The same positions are taken by strongest political parties which announced that, if Serbia is forced to choose between Kosovo and EU, they will choose the first option. See the interview with Tomislav Nikolić: <<http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.69.html:337186-Nikolic-Biramo-Kosovo-pre-Evropa>> 1 October 2011. The message of Boris Tadić was similar: <<http://sundaytimes.lk/world-news/10265-serbia-wont-concede-on-kosovo-for-eu-tadic-says.html>> 1 October 2011

²³ Specifically: Sweden, Finland, Austria, Ireland, Cyprus, and Malta.

²⁴ "National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia Resolution on the Protection of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia." 26 december 2007

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ed because of economic and social policy of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, whose last European integrations related achievement (at the time of survey) was the December 2009 visa regime liberalisation, and possible suspension of it was increasingly more mentioned on the eve of the survey. Great expectations which the citizens had with regard to the European integrations process did not come true, and the ruling coalition's policy 'both EU and Kosovo' was repeatedly on the edge of ruin. This policy suffered a complete failure in December 2011 when the EU Council did not award candidate status to Serbia, because of its Kosovo policy. It seems reasonable to suppose that all this has reduced the support for membership in EU to even lower historical minimum.

Secondly, the support of Serbian citizens to the accession to NATO is likewise falling. It can be supposed that it has fallen due to current NATO operations in Libya which revived Serbian citizens' memory of 1999 bombing campaign. In accordance with this, large majority of citizens believe that the policy of military neutrality best protects the national security of Serbia. Although only 15% of citizens support the accession to NATO, more citizens believe that, in some ways, Serbia would benefit from the accession to NATO. For instance, 38% of respondents think that the accession to NATO would modernise the armed forces, which is not irrelevant.

Thirdly, the correlation between the respondents' social structure and their answers is mostly what could be expected. Young people, students, and well-educated people are more in favour of security cooperation and integration processes than the elderly, unemployed, and uneducated. As opposed to EU integrations which can be recuperated if the candidate status is acquired, nothing like that can be expected with regard to the accession to NATO.

Fourthly, the survey showed that there is a cognitive dissonance among the citizens, namely the awareness of the existence of discordant and mutually contradictory viewpoints. Thus, a vast majority of citizens believe that Kosovo will never again be an integral part of Serbia, as well as that Serbia will have to recognise the independence of Kosovo if it wants to join EU. Leaning on the theory of cognitive dissonance, developed within the framework of social psychology and within the science of international relations, the paper presented three presumptions about how to overcome this situation. First way is to deny this cognitive dissonance. Considering that most citizens, at least according to this survey, already believe that Serbia will have to give up Kosovo if it wants to become a member state of EU, it is clear that it is highly unlikely that this strategy will work. Moreover, although this was not specifically investigated within the survey, it



seems reasonable to suppose that citizens know only too well that the European countries which have themselves bombarded Serbia as NATO member states are at the same time the EU member states. Accordingly, since denial can no longer be an effective instrument to overcome the cognitive dissonance, only the other two ways are left on our disposal. It can be overcome by abandoning one of inconsistent standpoints. This could be either the abandonment of the standpoint that Kosovo is Serbia, or the abandonment of the goal to join the EU. Bearing in mind the symbolical significance of Kosovo and current consensus of the political elite that Kosovo should never be recognised as an independent state, it can be hardly supposed that this standpoint would be abandoned any time soon. Besides, by rejecting the standpoint that Serbia should become an EU member state, cognitive dissonance is simultaneously being diminished with regard to the viewpoint on Kosovo and with regard to the negative view on NATO. If this strong incentive is weakened in future through the periodic, and well-covered in media, progress in the process of European integrations, and if citizens still support both the pro-European and the pro-Kosovo policy, their cognitive dissonance will need to be resolved in a third way. And this means finding new convictions that could lower the importance of the existing dissonance. One of such viewpoints that could develop in future as the exit from the condition of collective cognitive dissonance, would be that the European Union actually does not want to accept Serbia in its ranks. Since public opinion is often accompanied with the decision-makers' dominant discourse, it would be beneficial if future surveys focused on the way in which cognitive dissonance in foreign and security policy are perceived and overcome by those who shape the policy and make decision in the Republic of Serbia.

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National vs. European Identity of Serbs

Zoran Krstić¹

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy

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Abstract

The relation between the national and European identity is quite a fertile field that attracts much attention from a large number of authors throughout Europe. The intention of this paper is to look at this problem from the perspective of the state of Serbia, which is only now making its first steps towards the integration into EU. Studying the relation between two identities we have found a number of similarities with other countries throughout the European continent (here we principally mean a considerable percent of citizens who have a developed 'dual identity' – both the national and the supranational European identity). Analysing the findings of the BCSP May 2011 research, we have identified an important point of discord, namely a problem that is, at least in case of most Serbian citizens, seen as a major obstacle for co-existence of these two identities – the issue of Kosovo and Metohija, southern Serbian province which a considerable number of Serbs considers a vital, inseparable part of Serbian national identity.

Key words: national identity, European identity, dual identity, integrations, EU, NATO, Kosovo and Metohija

Introduction

A very important issue for Serbia today, but also for Serbia in coming years (or decades), pending the possible full membership in EU, also includes that which appertains to the relationship between the national and the supranational – European identity. Although some analysts consider these two levels of union, namely identification and loyalty, to be compatible, still there are some that say quite the opposite, arguing that these two identities cannot have a peaceful

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¹ Contact:
zorankrstic@sezampro.rs

coexistence, namely that one can subsist exclusively to the detriment of the other. Only too often were such viewpoints expressed without being previously verified in a serious scientific research (Jimenez 2004). Indeed, the researches that mostly address this relation are for the most part lagging behind a number of texts and a pile of pages with theoretical discussions put on paper about this important issue. Worldwide as well as in Serbia, the number of empirical researches that addressed the relation between the national identity and the European identity is not that large. One gets the impression that many questions with regard to this, in many aspects specific, relation have remained unanswered, and that a number of ambiguities still prevents us to get a clear picture of it.

Even though the BCSP research that was conducted in May 2011, the findings of which will be by and large used in this paper, did not primarily deal with the identity or a relation between the national and supranational identity, it still provides some interesting findings with regard to this area, too. This research was mainly conducted with a goal to see what citizens of Serbia think about security issues. Besides, it has provided important information about what citizens think is the position of Serbia today, where would citizens like to see it in future, what is their attitude with regard to Euro-Atlantic integrations, what challenges are to be faced on the road to the integration(s), and whether and how the viewpoints about these dilemmas are connected to the identity.

About national and European identity

What is national identity?

Although the identity, as one of more important determinants of a personality, may be defined in many different ways, it seems to us that the most appropriate definition is that which considers the identity a permanent and unchangeable part of our personality, namely a set of “characteristics, feelings, or beliefs that distinguish people from others”².

In addition to personal identity, every person is characterised by an identity that is built and shaped by being present in different groups. Every individual is at the same time a member of a larger number of different social groups which are necessarily different with regard to their importance and the influence they have on the life of such individual. Every one of us values our affiliations differently. Thus, for one person affiliation with the supporters of a football

² Available on: <<http://www.oxfordadvancedlearnersdictionary.com/dictionary/identity>>



team is something that is of utmost importance, something that is determining him essentially as a human being and something that has a strong effect on his behaviour. Contrary to this, such person's next door neighbour, completely indifferent to sports, is honoured to have been born in a beautiful and affluent region that is unjustifiably neglected in the state to which it belongs. Such person will happily, both in public transport or when visiting friends and at the meeting of a political party, underline the importance of his regional identity.

Considering the above stated, we can say that we all, in addition to choosing our profession, a spouse, or a car model, have another hard choice to make, the one that requires us to decide to which group we belong and to what extent we will offer a part of ourselves to such group. One, for many people incomprehensible, redundant, even harmful identity, which persistently refuses to lose the weight it has, is the national identity. A very often quoted definition of national identity is the one made by Schieber (Schieber 1988). He defined the national identity as a feeling of affiliation to a particular group, acquired in the process of socialisation within which language, tradition, and culture of a national group are being adopted and the individual identifies with the group values and interests, as well as with the group as a whole.

This identity that, as Smith described with much regret, today “exerts a more potent and durable influence than other collective cultural identities... Today, national identity is the main form of collective identification.” (Smith 2010: 270).

What is European identity?

European identity, which is an aspect of supranational identity, could be defined as a feeling of union with other states and nations in the European continent, namely as a feeling of affiliation to the same civilisation (values and culture) which materialises today, among other things, by joining one's own state (political community) to the European Union.³

European identity is that which was once a dream of those who pioneered the idea of the United Europe, that which the officials in Brussels still hope for today even if they are aware that the marriage based on self-interest - regardless how long-lasting, conflict-free, or beneficial it may be - becomes a real community only when emotions are there. This emotion (affection, love) is something that would bring further legitimacy to the project called “United Europe”. The impression is, however, that the emotion is important, but that the

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³ Often two types of affection, to Europe and to the European Union, are mistaken one for another. In one of the surveys that will be discussed on the following pages (Jimenez 2004), as well as in the questionnaire as such, the difference between them was not made at all. Rather, the researchers became aware of them only when some of the respondents, in the qualitative segment of the survey, started drawing attention to it by distinguishing between them. Further in the text the European identity shall mean the attachment to EU. Europe as a much wider, geographically and symbolically, concept will be put aside, regardless how important it may be in this case.

intensity of that emotion is also important (or even more important). A citizen of a little village near Cordoba who, when asked a question from Eurobarometer, said that he feels as a citizen of Europe, in actual fact did not give the best possible answer. It is only his full agreement with the statement “I am very proud to be a citizen of EU” that would be a desirable, or right, answer. Therefore, even if the goal (to create a strong supranational identity that will be very important for overall population) was clear from the very beginning, the road to its achievement was not lacking dilemmas, meanderings, and challenges. So, when in the 1980s EU tried to create the European identity using the traditional instruments that were used in the development of national identity (education, symbols, etc), at one point of time the member states feared that their respective national identities and loyalty of their citizens for their home states could be undermined (Höjelijd 2001).⁴ As a result, national governments did not do much with regard to promoting the development of such European identity, and the Maastricht Treaty was incorporated a clause according to which EU is under obligation to respect the national identities of the Member States (Article F, item 1).⁵

Also, in the very beginning, the opinions of scientific community divided over the question whether it is at all possible to develop one common supranational European identity. Thus, some insisted that non-existence of a common language, heritage, myths, and symbols – of all that which played a role in building the national identity – is an unsurpassable problem and that the development of European identity is impossible (see Smith 1992, 1995, 1999; Røsterud 1999). Others came to the same conclusion but took a completely different route. To develop supranational identity, it is necessary to first put *ad acta* the national identity which have already proven itself as a resilient opponent. Or, as Carey (Carey, 2002) said, “the stronger the national attachment and national pride of an individual is, the less likely he is to support (justify) the measure that diminish the influence of nation on the economy and policy”. Some authors, however, such as Such (Such 2000), believed that “even today you can predict the spheres of social life to be included in European identity, and which will never be”. On the other hand, there were some who believed in the common European identity, counting on “rational calculations and individual self-interests”, or on “voluntary agreement over rules for peaceful, political coexistence, shared cultural norms and beliefs” (Jimenez 2004).

Analysing the relation between national and European identity, Mihić (Mihić 2009) offered three possible types of their interrelation: “Firstly, identities could be embedded in such a way that one of the

⁴ That similar attempts were seen before is illustrated by the case of Stojković (Stojković 2008: 44). He wrote that it was already in the EC Ministerial Council Meeting in 1974, entitled “About European Identity” that the most important body of this Organisation suggested that it is necessary to urge on the building of a common identity matrix that would interconnect the citizens of Member States, but also serve as the foundations for building the common European foreign policy.

⁵ See: Jimenez (2004: 16).



identities is a core identity and that other identities are distributed around it in concentric circles. In such a constellation, national or regional identity would be at the centre, and other identities would be spaced around it, with the European one being probably the largest, outside circle of the identity seen as this.

Second option is that the identities overlap and that most, although not all, members of one group are at the same time the member of other group. Such a division of identity means that some members of one national group are at the same time attached to Europe.

Third direction in the contemplations on European and national identity is the one that resembles a marble cake. Namely, both national and European identities are parts of the same cake and are therefore interwoven and inseparable. It is not possible to draw a clear line where the national identity stops and the European identity begins.” (Mihic 2009: 207–208)

Finally, from all these divisions and disagreements there crystallised three different paths, three approaches to discussing and researching the development of European identity. It can be said that three different theoretical approaches subsist today:

1. *Cultural theory*, according to which European identity may develop in the same way the national identities developed in the 19th century, namely on the common heritage, language, culture, symbols, and myths. Major objection to this approach is that it presents a very difficult, probably unachievable task. Large differences between the Member States, caused by different linguistic, economic, or geopolitical factors, do not promise a happy end to this story. Besides, cultural diversity is among the most important and most recognisable characteristics of Europe (Smith 1992, 1995, 1999; Rsterud 1999).
2. The basis of the *instrumental theory* is a simple cost-benefit analysis made by each individual citizen. If an individual feels that EU is a project that is beneficial for him personally, namely if, in such surroundings, he would be able to satisfy his interests better than within the national state, then he would strive to identify with this group and to feel to be European. Accordingly, the worse are the living standards in a country (economic standing, situation with human rights, feeling of security, etc), the easier it will be to develop the European identity (Gabel 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Kaltenthaler and Anderson 2001; Olsen 1996; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Fernández-Albertos and Sánchez-Cuenca 2001). This position is contrary to the research con-

ducted by Marks and Hooghe (Marks & Hooghe 2003: 29). Namely, although admitting that economic factors play an important role, they stressed that the role of national identity still prevails.

3. Third, so-called *civic theory* underlines that European identity is built on the agreement over “rules for political coexistence, shared cultural norms, and common beliefs” (Jimenez 2004). In the opinion of these theoreticians the quintessence of European identity lies in the devotion to common values of the Union, presented in its constitutive documents, in the dedication to the rights and duties of civic society, commitment to taking part in the policy which can be seen as a direct opposite to classic ethno-nationalism (Mancini 1998; Weiler 1999; Kersbergen 1997; Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1995).

As it was already stated, these theories often saw the light of the day without being based on any facts obtained through surveys. This has changed over time. As the time goes by, there appear more survey researches with the aim to thoroughly reassess the relation between the national and the supranational (European) identity, both in the EU Member States and in the countries undergoing the process of association with the European Community. Some of them will be presented on the following pages.

Researches of the relation between the European and the national identity

The above three theories of building the common European identity were tested by Jimenez in two researches that will be briefly discussed on the following pages. In these researches the author looked to find out to what extent the national loyalty and identification with Europe (and/or EU) are mutually exclusive, namely to what extent they are compatible and interlinked. Moreover, she examined the content of national and European identifications, assessing the importance of different elements in the presentation of both a nation and Europe.

First research was based on the results of Eurobarometer (Standard Eurobarometer 57.2). It was targetedly created to be instrumental in testing the theoretical premises about the relation between the European and the national identity. The questionnaire includes a string of questions aimed at measuring the feelings of allegiance to different internal and external groups (including the nation, EU, Europe, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe). It was accompa-



nied with two strings of texts composed of 14 items, each of them related to different component of identity. Authors of the research linked the questions related to national identity, shared culture, customs and traditions, common language, common predecessors, history, and fate, to the *cultural* concept of identity. Shared rights and duties, as well as shared legal and political system, were linked with the *civic* theory, and common system of social welfare and security with the *instrumental* theory, which would also include the items related to national economy, armed forces, and common border (Jimenez 2004).

As opposed to some of earlier Eurobarometers when respondents answered the questions related to their nationality, support to EU integrations, or the level of “pride in being European”, in this one, “affiliation with other groups” was used as an indicator to measure the identity. Key question which the researches wanted to answer is whether European and national identity are mutually exclusive or their coexistence is possible. This relation was discussed based on the number of the respondents who manifested both attachments at the same time (to their respective nations and to Europe), but also based on the intensity of this attachment in both cases. A part of the obtained results is presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Relation between national and European identity

	A	B	C
Western Germany	47	-6	0.715
Eastern Germany	45	-10	0.792
Austria	51	2	0.689
Great Britain	36	-28	0.758
Italy	64	28	0.669
Spain	61	22	0.718
Greece	40	-20	1.099
Hungary	54	8	1.043
Poland	46	-8	1.012
Czech Republic	54	8	0.748

A – population with dual identity (both European and national)

B – population with dual identity minus the population manifesting national identity only

C – intensity of attachment to nation

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What we see first when we take a look at this Table is that national and European identity are mutually compatible, namely that in almost all surveyed countries a high percent of respondents manifest dual identity (Column A), i.e., are attached to both EU and their own nation (about 50%). When we take a look at the other column (Column B) which was produced by deducting the percent of the respondents who manifest national identity only, the difference between these countries becomes clearer. In both cases the citizens of Spain and Italy manifest, more readily than others, the importance of both European and national identity, whilst the citizens of Great Britain and Greece are much less inclined to do so. Quite interestingly, it was found that the intensity of attachment to nation (Column C) in Great Britain (0.758) where exclusive national identity predominates equals that in Spain (0.718) where the number of respondents who have developed a dual identity exceeds that of those who have national identity exclusively. Attachment to national identity, therefore, even in the states where most respondents manifest dual attachment, is still high, higher than attachment to European identity. In other words, there is no correlation between the greater existence of dual identity and diminished importance of national identity. Namely, it can be said that the development of European identity does not contribute to the weakening of national identity.

Based on the findings of the second research, implemented only in Spain, Jimenez (Jimenez 2007) drew a conclusion that a considerable number of Spaniards with a strong national identity would readily identify with the EU identity (90%). Moreover, there is a statistically significant correlation (0.277**) between the views of the respondents who are proud to be Spanish and the views of those who are proud to be European. She then deduced not only that national identity is compatible with European identity, but also that “European identity requires the existence of national identity”⁶.

The same as Medrano and Gutierrez (2001)⁷, Jimenez believes that there is enough evidence in favour of the thesis that (at least in the case of Spain), loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the EU are “absolutely compatible”. The reason for this, in the opinion of these authors, lies in different sources of these two types of identification. In the case of nation, ethnic-cultural elements are main pillars of identification, whilst the foundations of European identity are made from the “instrumental factors”. Such findings are contrary to those presented by Smith (1995, 1999) who is of the opinion that the European identity will be hard to build, almost impossible, if national-cultural-ethnic identities remain strong! Likewise, the presented findings are contrary to the hypotheses developed by Fernández-

⁶ See: Jimenez (2004: 12).

⁷ Ibid, p. 24.



Albertos and Sánchez-Cuenca⁸ (Fernández-Albertos and Sánchez-Cuenca 2001). According to them, “the birth of European identity requires the erosion of national loyalty and identity (Davies 1996; Seton-Watson 1985; Wallace 1990; Papcke 1990; Lobera 1994, Deflem and Pample 1996; Carey 2002)⁹”.

Marks and Hooghe (Marks & Hooghe 2003) believed that exit from the situation created due to such (contradictory) findings should be looked for in further analyses. Namely, it should be examined under what conditions national identity can be politically mobilised and turned into nationalism that fully resists European integrations (Marcussen et al. 1999). They believe that, in some cases, national identity can exist in parallel with supranational, namely it can even support European integrations, whilst in other cases they are consistent with the statements that EU constitutes a threat to national institutions, that it weakens the national being and undermines the national sovereignty (Risse 2001).

Characteristics of the relation between the national and European identity of Serbs

Will Serbia confirm above stated findings about the compatibility of national identity and European identity or will its specificity¹⁰ leave trace again and produce some unexpected result?

Summing up the findings of several domestic surveys that attempted to figure out the nature of the relation between these two identities, we can say that the obtained results are in no way uniform and that they require a more thorough analysis.

The results achieved in the research entitled “Relation between national and European identity and the citizens’ of Zagreb and Novi Sad views on European integrations” (Kamenov et al. 2005, according to: Puhalo 2005), with the participation of 800 respondents (400 from Novi Sad and 400 from Zagreb) between 15 and 46 years of age, demonstrate that the respondents from both groups have a relatively clearly manifested national identity, but also that neither of these two groups displays a statistically significant connection between national and European identity. In other words, this research confirmed once again the earlier expressed hypothesis that national and European identity may be seen as two independent dimensions.

Moreover, it seems to us that two researches conducted by CESID in two periods, in December 2009 and February 2010, are also very important. In the latter research, the researches came to the conclu-

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⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid, p. 24.

¹⁰ Arising partly from painful historical experience, partly from hardly less painful recent past (1990s), and in part from the specific current situation, caused by illegitimate secession of a part of the territory that was followed by recognition from a large number of the EU Member States.

sion that a “medium developed European identity” existed in Serbia at that time (index of European identity ranged between 1 and 5 amounts to 2.65). Interestingly, it was 2.83 only three months earlier.

At the same time this research registered also that as much as 79% of citizens state that they have a strong affiliation to the nation, and only 2% did not have such affiliation.

Table 2: Affiliation to own nation and affiliation to Europe

	Affiliation to Europe		Affiliation to nation	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Strong	68	6	593	49
Quite strong	229	19	363	30
Middling	375	31	198	16
Slight	279	23	39	3
Not at all	250	21	19	2
Total	1202	100	1213	100

This research also provides interesting information about interrelation between these two identities. Namely, 54% of respondents feel, at the same time, the affiliation with national and European identity (at least with middling intensity), whilst 42% of them feel (at least middling) affiliation to national identity, with slight or non-existent affiliation to European identity.

*Table 3: National and European identity in 2009
(% of total number of respondents)*

December 2009	Strong national identity	Middling national identity	Poor national identity or no national identity	Average
Strong EU identity	23	4	1	28
Middling EU identity	23	8	1	32
Poor EU identity or no EU identity	31	7	2	40
TOTAL	77	19	4	100



Table 4: National and European identity in 2010
(% of total number of respondents)

February 2010.	Strong national identity	Middling national identity	Poor national identity or no national identity	Average
Strong EU identity	20	3	2	25
Middling EU identity	23	8	0	31
Poor EU identity or no EU identity	36	6	2	44
TOTAL	79	17	4	100

Summing up the findings of two researches of theirs, the CESID team concluded that “simultaneous acceptance of both identities (including the primacy of one over the other and vice versa) dominates in two thirds of Serbian citizens. On the other hand, exclusive identities (or, actually, national identity, in almost all the cases) are present in every fourth citizen of Serbia.”

Moreover, important data about the relation between these two identities are obtained from a research that dealt with the past 20 years of transition in Serbia.¹¹ Here follows some interesting data highlighted by Vasović (Vasović 2010). According to her, although “it was only on the eve of open interethnic conflicts in the territory of Yugoslavia that the nation became a dominant base for identification of Serbian citizens” (Vasović 2010: 74), it still plays quite an important role today. When you analyse average ratings of the importance attributed to individual identities (if the answers are shown on a 5-point scale), the results suggest that the affiliation to their own nation or the place or region in which they live is more important for the respondents than is the identification with supra-national identities.

Table 5: Average ratings of how strong is the feeling of affiliation
(Vasović 2010: 81)

Statements about affiliation	
Affiliation to Serbia	3.97
Affiliation to the place and region in which I live	3.95
Affiliation to Europe	3.17
Affiliation to the world	3.13
Affiliation to former Yugoslavia	2.84

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¹¹ Group of authors. *Kako građani vide tranziciju (How Citizens see the Transition)*. Belgrade, 2010

Referring to the results of the research conducted by Jimenez (Jimenez, 2004), Vasović saw nothing out of the ordinary in such findings since, as he said, “preponderance of national (parochial) over supranational identities is not something that is specific for the citizens of Serbia“.

The BCSP research

Some of the reasons for relatively low degree (importance) of European identity in the citizens of Serbia are revealed by the results of the BCSP research that was conducted in May of current year. Namely, repeating the question that CESID earlier asked its respondents, we have examined how many citizens believe that joining the EU will contribute to losing the national identity and we have obtained the identical data. Almost every third respondent believes that such danger is real.

It is important to also note that national affiliation of respondents, as expressed in the answers to this and to other analysed questions with regard to identity, plays an important role (see Table 6). Since there is only a small number of members of national minorities (in this otherwise representative sample), it is not possible to draw any precise conclusions about their attitudes. For this reason, the data presented on following pages will relate solely to those respondents who stated that their nationality is Serbian.

Table 6: Joining EU and loss of national identity

85. Serbian joining EU will lead to its losing national identity	average	Serbs	Hungarians	Roma	Albanians	Bosnjaks	Other
Does not agree	47.1	44.4	65.3	41.1	100	90.7	56.8
Does not know, cannot decide	20.3	20.8	20.8	29.4		3.2	18.8
Agrees	32.6	34.8	13.9	29.4		6	24.3



If we go back to the obtained data, we will see that our respondents take a similar position with regard to sovereignty and independence.

Table 7: Joining EU and losing sovereignty and independence (citizens of Serbia who have Serbian nationality)

86. Serbian joining EU will lead to the loss of sovereignty and independence	%
Does not agree	44.4
Does not know, cannot decide	22.2
Agrees	33.4

These findings are in line with the position taken by Marks and Hooghe (Marks & Hooghe 2003: 6) who believe that EU as an emerging state “inevitably compromises not only the autonomy of national institutions but also key values of national sovereignty and identity“.

From the perspective of the development of supranational identity, it was very interesting that we found that possible Serbian joining NATO is seen as a huge threat to national sovereignty and identity (Table 8). This finding is even more important when we know that, after 2000 (and for a long time too), Serbian political elite have used the term Euro-Atlantic integrations to intimate at the approximation to, to be followed by Serbian joining of, both EU and NATO. Even today you can hear an official or other claiming that you cannot have one without the other, namely that the accession to NATO is a precondition of joining EU. Even though a signatory to these lines sees in this rhetoric only a cheap attempt at having a part of the citizens’ support for the EU idea overspill onto their view of this, in Serbia quite out of favour, military alliance, we still deem it justifiable to have any opinions they might have on NATO, namely its doubtless effect on how we see ourselves, included in the debate on national and supranational identity with regard to Serbia.

Although merging the identity and sovereignty into a single question considerably impedes a proper analysis of respondents’ answers, the results still suggests that more than a half of surveyed citizens see our military integration into NATO as a threat to, at least one or even both, values.

Table 8: Accession to NATO and los of national sovereignty and identity

95. Serbian accession to NATO will result in its losing the national sovereignty and identity	%
Does not agree	21.5
Does not know, cannot decide	26.7
Agrees	51.7

Further clarification of the relation between Serbian national identity and NATO can be found in the answer to the question: *What would Serbian accession to NATO say about us as a nation?* The most frequently received answer – that our memory is short-lived (22%) – suggests that the 1999 military conflict with the Alliance is of utmost importance, whilst the answer of every sixth respondent (17.2%) who believes that with this we would betray our predecessors and our history is important with regard to the issue of identity.

Table 9: What is accession to NATO saying about Serbs as a nation

103. What would Serbian accession to NATO say about Serbs as a nation?	%
That we have a short memory	22
That we have sold ourselves out	20.7
Does not know, cannot decide	17.8
That we have betrayed our predecessors and our history	17.2
That we are weak	11
That we finally have a vision	6.5
That we are smart	4.7

Table 10: What citizens of Serbian nationality think about (EU and NATO) integrations

	83. Should Serbia join EU?	92. Should Serbia accede NATO?
Yes	56.6	12.2
No	25.4	69.4
Does not know	18	18.4



As it can be seen from the above findings (Table 10), NATO is, to a higher degree than EU, threatening the national identity of the citizens of Serbian nationality. It should be further examined whether this is a reason for a rather large difference in the support for accession to these two organisations (12.2% vs. 56.6%).

Kosovo and Metohija as an important point of discord

That Kosovo and Metohija (K&M) is of utmost importance for Serbian citizens is suggested by the findings of the research that CESID conducted in September 2007 and January 2008, as well as by the 2011 BCSP research. Namely, although a vast majority of citizens would surely like Serbia to join EU and keep Kosovo, when they need to choose between these options, most respondents give advantage to keeping the southern Serbian province. The CESID researchers explain their findings by “EU still being something that is far away for Serbian citizens, whilst they have strong attachment and express emotional reactions with regard to Kosovo”.

However, even though at the time when these surveys were made, the issue of choosing between EU and K&M could have been called a false dilemma, namely taking a middle road: ‘both Kosovo and EU’ could have been used for pre-electoral purposes, today no such thing is possible. That which was forecasted by those respondents (Table 11) who believed that, at some point, Serbia will be forced to make the hard choice: to recognise and learn to live with a loss of 15% of its territory, or to give up its “long journey to Europe”, proved to be true. Therefore, until only several months ago almost half of citizens could opt for living in ignorance or being unrealistically optimistic, but today (after much honoured Mrs Merkel paid us a visit¹²) this is no longer possible.

Table 11: European Union and giving up K&M

87. If Serbia joins EU, it will be forced to give up Kosovo and Metohija	%
Does not agree	20.8
Does not know, cannot make their mind	26
Agrees	53.2

The same as much publicly present ambassadors (mostly from those Member States which are ‘more equal than others’), some EU

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¹² We refer here to the German Chancellor's visit to Belgrade, on 23 August 2011, on the occasion of which she told the local officials that there can be no continuation of European integration for Serbia if there are no “results in the dialogue between Belgrade and Priština, facilitation of EULEX mission's work in Kosovo, and removal of parallel structures in the North of Kosovo”.

officials,¹³ too, see the European Serbia as (by one sixth) smaller than what it is according to UNSC Resolution 1244, a majority of Serbian citizens refuse to internalise this European identity that directly requires it to change, erase, namely to renounce the established national identity.

Many authors have pointed at the strong link between Serbian national identity and K&M (Bandić 2008; Dejzings 2005; Mojsilović 2010). While some considered it to be “worship of death or cult of the dead”¹⁴, an irrational attachment or unnecessary burden, others defined it as a significant, valuable, and fully compliant with the accepted European values.

The most recent developments, such as declaration of Kosovo and Metohija independence in February 2008 did not change the essential nature of this relation. Thus, in the BCSP research too we see that respondents perceive this primarily as a threat to national identity (38.5%), and only then as a threat to security (36%).

Table 12: What does the declaration of K&M independence mean to you?

What means should the nation to which you belong use to take care of its security?								
	Does not know	Diplomatic means	Military means	Membership in international organisations	Economic means	Stricter laws	Remaining disengaged	Other means
Farmers	17.2	28.0	9.7		19.4	15.1	4.3	6.5
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	21.4	21.4	13.3	2.0	22.4	11.2	4.1	4.1
Skilled or high-skilled workers	13.7	26.4	9.4	3.6	24.9	16.2	2.2	3.6
Technicians	21.8	23.9	11.3	0.7	21.1	14.1	2.8	4.2
Clerks	11.8	34.7	1.2	2.9	22.4	17.1	3.5	6.5
Professionals	13.9	28.7	7.0	2.6	22.6	20.9	0.9	3.5
Housekeepers	6.8	34.7	4.5	4.5	28.4	17.6	1.7	1.7
School/university students	23.0	24.1	3.4	5.7	27.6	8.0	3.4	4.6

¹³ Such as Herman Van Rompuy at the Serbia – EU Forum, see: <http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2011/09/12/feature-02>

¹⁴ Slapšak, see: <http://www.danas.org/content/most_kosovo_mit/1620087.html>

It is interesting that the BCSP research suggests, indirectly, the level of importance of K&M. Namely, the states that the citizens see



to be a threat have all recognised the illegal Kosovo conception, whilst none of the countries that citizens perceive as being friendly (with the exception of Japan) did this and, maybe even more importantly, does not intend to recognise the new independent state. Is this only a coincidence?

Table 13: Friendly countries and hostile countries

Friendly countries	Hostile countries
Russia	USA
Greece	Albania
China	Great Britain
Japan	Turkey
Other EU Member States	Croatia
Romania	Germany

When above findings are summed up, it becomes absolutely clear that the K&M issue is of utmost importance for Serbs. It is so important that the feeling of state security depends on it and that it directly affects the desire for integrations (both in EU and in NATO). Moreover, it may have a decisive effect on the perception which countries are friendly and which seem hostile. We are inclined to look for a reason for such huge importance of this issue in the fact that K&M is closely linked to national identity. On the other hand, it becomes clear that supranational, European identity stands on the direct opposite side from national identity, namely that it requires one of its most important characteristics to be changed. Our position is that the fact that so many citizens had a manifested European identity was chiefly a result of their belief that the European integrations of Serbia and finding a solution for K&M issue are two separate processes. Now, when it is absolutely clear that Serbia will never be inside EU in one piece, our opinion is that we can expect further fall in the support to integrations, namely a drop in the manifestations of supranational, European identity.

Conclusion

To sum up the above stated, we can say that, in the modern, globalised world, national identity is still an important source of identification for an individual. In the case of EU citizens, the attachment to

their respective nations remains stronger than their attachment to Europe, even in those countries in which the population has prevalently dual identity. In most of the EU Member States, however, the feeling of European identity is still manifested by a considerable number of citizens (about 50%). These two identities mostly exist independently from each other, namely high intensity of one does not mean low intensity of the other. These findings are confirmed both by the surveys conducted in old and new EU Member States, and those implemented in our neighbouring states.

Moreover, main findings suggest that national identity is mostly based on cultural elements (most often mentioned were language and culture), whilst European one is mostly based on *instrumental* considerations (a common currency and the right of free movement and residence are among the first five items of European identity in all countries).

One of the most interesting conclusions is that respondents who do not have a developed national identity find it harder to develop and manifest European identity. This finding could have a special importance in Serbia where, we believe, effort is being made to disintegrate and lessen the importance of national identity so that it can be replaced with a 'proper', globalised, 21st century-ready supranational, European identity. With regard to parallel existence of European and national identity, Serbia is not – or has not been thus far – much different from other analysed countries. However, when forced to choose: K&M or EU, namely to reconstruct their national identity to a considerable extent, the citizens of Serbia gave, in practice, answers to the theoretical questions from the beginning of this text on compatibility or unfeasibility of coexistence of national and supranational identity.

Be it as it may, many interesting questions still remain open. The questions concerning national and European identity, particularly in Serbia, require additional research and analysis. These could include:

- The relation between and the importance of cultural, instrumental, and civic elements in building the Serbian citizens' European identity
- Specific characteristics of Serbia vs. other countries in the region and/or EU
- The importance of K&M for national, as well as for European identity of the citizens of Serbia
- The importance and intensity of European identity in the national minorities in Serbia
- The importance of national pride for national, as well as for European identity of the citizens of Serbia.



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What 'losers of transition' think about the security sector reform

Marko Milošević¹

Predrag Petrović²

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to find out whether there exists any connection between the characteristics of the respondents and their viewpoints about the reform of security sector in Serbia. Based on this, as well as based on other surveys, the authors attempted to operationalise so-called 'losers of transition' in Serbia. Then they analysed how and to what extent this loser's status is connected with the respondents' viewpoints on different aspects of their security. In analysing these statements, the authors used the data obtained in a public opinion survey, the data from the focus groups with losers of transition, as well as the data of other relevant researches, and, finally, the Statistical Office data. The paper provides a cue for a discussion about how extensive is the violence potential of the losers of transition and whether this population threatens to 'hold up' reform endeavours in the security sector.

Key words: losers of transition, security sector, military, police, populations, integrations, development

Introduction

After eleven years of socio-political and economic reforms, Serbia concluded its 'first' and started its 'second' transition. According to Guillermo O'Donnell, this is how the road to 'second transition' is opened after democratically elected government is established. The presumption is that the democratically elected government becomes institutionalised, which is a prerequisite for the establishment of consolidated democracy. However, consolidation is only too often a

¹ Contact:
markomilosevic@ccmr-bg.org

² Contact:
predragpetrovic@ccmr-bg.org

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³ See more details in: Orlović, S. Problemi demokratske konsolidacije Srbije (Problems of the Democratic Consolidation of Serbia). In: Pavlović, Dušan & S. Antonić. (Ed.). *Konsolidacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji: godinu dana posle (Consolidation of Democratic Institutions in Serbia: One Year After)*. Beograd: Sluzbeni glasnik, 2008: 85.

⁴ See more about different dissonances in Serbia and their impact on political divisions in: Spasojević, D. Odblokirana tranzicija – političke podele u Srbiji nakon 2000. godine (Transition Unblocked – Political Divisions in Serbia after 2000). In: Vujačić, I. (Ed.). *Godišnjak 2011*. Beograd: FPN, 2011: 119–139.

⁵ See more about who are the losers in transition on the following pages.

⁶ According to the indicators of the National Statistical Office, the number of employed persons in Serbia is 2,281,909 compared with 3,368,907 occupationally inactive persons. National Statistical Office. *Stope aktivnosti, zaposlenosti, neaktivnosti i nezaposlenosti, 2011* (Activity, Employment, Inactivity, and Unemployment Rates, 2011) . <<http://webzrs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Public/ReportResultView.aspx?rptKey=indld%3d240100IND01%2635%3d6%266%3d1%2c2%2c3%2c4%262%3d%23last%232%2640%3d15%2cL15-64%26sAreaId%3d240100%26dType%3dName%26lType%3dSerbianCyrilic>>

⁷ Educational structure of the population, according to the results of the 2001 census, suggests that 21.8% of Serbian citizens have not finished a primary school and 23.9% of them have finished a primary school. Secondary school was finished by 41.1% of citizens, whilst college (4.5%) and university (6.5%) education were obtained by 11% of the citizens of Serbia. Medić, S. I. K. Popović, Milanović, M. *Nacionalni izveštaj o razvoju i stanju obrazovanja i učenja odraslih (National Report on the Development and the State of Affairs in Adult Education and Learning)*. Beograd: Ministarstvo obrazovanja RS, 2008: 4. <http://www.mp.gov.rs/resursi/dokumenti/dok233-srp-Nacionalni_izvestaj_confintea.pdf>

longer and a more complex process than the process of the transition of society from authoritarianism to democracy (O'Donnell 1994: 56), and there is no guarantee that the second transition will take place or that it will not regress to authoritarianism. The negative consequences of the road leading from autocracy to democracy, along with the difficulties of surpassing the heritage of authoritarian regime, are all in support of what was stated above.³ Thus, different disagreements in the society⁴ present a considerable restricting factor in the consolidation of democratic institutions. Among the most important is the economic disagreement between citizens and their polarisation to losers and winners in transition since 'by default, the larger number of citizens who are losing are the ones that resist reforms' (Stojiljković 2007).

The existence of a large number of losers of transition Serbia⁵ is suggested by some of the objective indicators of social development according to which there are more unemployed than employed, whilst the unemployment rate is 22.2%⁶. The educational structure of the population is very unfavourable⁷ and, in May 2011, average net salary in Serbia was 35,362 dinars⁸. These three elements – occupation, level of education, and level of income – are the objective indicators of social position which we will analyse in this paper, considering the contextual framework of transition losers and winners. Based on a rough overview of these indicators (level of education, occupation, and level of income) one may conclude that a significant part of Serbian population falls under the category of the losers of transition (considering the worsening of overall social position compared to that in the period before transition). Unfavourable global⁹ and local economic trends¹⁰ may only contribute to a further increase in the number of members of this category.

Taking into account the above stated, and the fact that security sector reform (hereinafter SSR) is one of key elements of overall democratisation of society¹¹, it is important to analyse what are the positions of losers of transition in this process. This analysis will enable us to answer the question whether the losers of transition constitute an obstacle for the SSR, and whether they could be the central actors in violent manifestation of discontent in Serbia. An added value of this analysis is in the fact that there are only a small number of researches of the losers of transition and they are mostly focused on examining the relation between the members of this population and the political preferences, whilst public opinion surveys pertaining to security issues are almost non-existent.¹²



However, before starting to analyse how the losers of transition see the SSR, we shall present the findings made in some of earlier sociological and politicological researches, which will help us explain and operationalise the terms *losers of transition* and *security sector reform*.

Who are losers of transition?

To understand the category of the *losers of transition*, it is important to first look at the main findings of the sociological and politicological survey. In this paper we therefore start from the findings made by Anđelka Milić and Mladen Lazić, according to which “*the viewpoints of actors in a sub-system of economic reproduction of society (at the labour market) influences the creation of identity, values, viewpoints, and interests*” (Milić 2004; Lazić 1995; Lazić 2010). Moreover, according to the researches (Komšić at al., 2003: 102) citizens’ viewpoints and their polarisation in the society are greatly influenced by their levels of education and income, as well as by their age. Accordingly, people with a lower level of education, lower income, and of older age will more commonly support the traditional values, and vice versa: the higher the level of education, the level of income, the younger the surveyed are, the more intensely manifested are their modern values. Opposite from the cultivators of modern values, traditionalists find it much harder to accept the changes and reforms. The losers of transition are generally inclined to support the traditional values, considering that “*from the perspective of ideology and values, the former (losers of transition, author’s comment) are closer to the system we are leaving behind, and the latter (winners of transition, author’s comment) are closer to the system we are entering*” (Mihajlović 2006: 51). Relying on previous surveys, Zoran Slavujević offered a more complex determination of the category of the losers of transition. The determinants of this position, according to his findings, may thus be either objective or subjective (Slavujević 2003: 13). Objective determination of the ‘state of losing’ is the socio-economic standing of the member of a social group, defined by the gender, place of residence, age, level of education, and level of income per a member of household. Subjective determinant arises from the self-perception of one’s own position and the position of the affiliated social group.¹³ It should be mentioned, however, that no clear criteria and indicators are in place to use in defining this position, since the per-

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⁸ See more on the National Statistical Office website <<http://webzrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/public/PublicationView.aspx?pKey=41&pLevel=1&pubType=2&pubKey=596>>

⁹ Global Business Barometer, The Economist, 12 November 2011 < <http://www.economist.com/node/21538185>> 13. 11. 2011.

¹⁰ Since 2007 the GDP in Serbia has been evidently falling (from 6.9% in 2007 to 1.6% in 2010), and it is the same with FDIs (from USD 2.523 million in 2007 to USD 1.364 million in 2010). See more in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 2010 Report, Transition Report 2010 Recovery and Reform, p. 140 <http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/transition/tr10.pdf>

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¹² Public opinion surveys in Serbia generally cover the citizens’ viewpoints regarding the security sector institutions (military and police) and their order-givers (the Ministers of Defence and Interior, President, etc). The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy is the only organisation that, in the period 2003 - 2005, in the seven rounds of survey, have systematically examined what the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro think about the reform of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, namely the Armed Forces of S&M.

¹³ According to the findings of the 2010 public opinion survey conducted by Friedrich Ebert, Centre for Free Elections and Democracy, and the Centre for Studies of Social Democracy, 30% of Serbian citizens see themselves as the losers of transition. Mihajlović, S. *Kako građani Srbije vide tranziciju (How Serbian Citizens See the Transition)*, Beograd: FES, CESID, 2010: 154.

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sons participating the surveys often describe their position as being worse or better than the one suggested by objective indicators. The losers of transitions are also mentioned by Peter Mateju (Mateju 2003: 308). He found that typical losers of transition include the population of blue-collar workers and less educated people.¹⁴ Such findings are confirmed in Serbia by Lazić who claimed that the position of blue-collar workers worsened in the post-socialist transition, but also that this category undergoes a fragmentation process: the position of highly-skilled and skilled workers has relatively improved, whilst the position of low-skilled workers, unemployed people, and people employed in the informal sector, has radically exacerbated (Lazić 2010: 231).

Relying on above mentioned findings, in this paper we have looked at the category of the losers of transition from the perspective of different categories of occupation. The population of losers of transition therefore includes the members of following occupations: *farmers, housekeepers, and unskilled, low-skilled, skilled, and high-skilled workers*. We believe that this approach is reasonable since the type of occupation is largely connected with the level of income, and with the level of education, and we shall come back to this issue further below. The respondents who belong to above categories of occupations (which we classify under the losers of transition) have, typically, the lower income and the lower level of education at the same time. Moreover, within the May 2009 survey that CESID conducted for the requirements of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, under the name of “Social Exclusion in Serbia – Intensity, Causes, and Types”, a high level of correlation was determined among these categories.

Before we take a look across these categories, however, it should be noted that, in this survey, the category of occupations did not directly include “the unemployed”, “the pensioners” (as typical losers of transition), or “entrepreneurs”, “directors, and “politicians” (as typical winners in transition), although some of these categories appear under other determinants (e.g., a housekeeper who has finished a secondary school may be an unemployed woman with secondary school degree, etc).

In order to provide a better visibility of the viewpoints taken by the losers of transition, the variable *occupation* was taken as the main indicator of this position. Moreover, we will prove that other two variables of the social position of losers – the level of income and the level of education – are relatively firmly connected with the variable measuring the *occupation*. Using the statistical measures of

¹⁴ Mateju, P. and Rehakova B., Simonova N. “Transition to University under Communism and after Its Demise: The Role of Socio-economic Background in the Transition between Secondary and Tertiary Education in the Czech Republic 1948–1998.” *Czech Sociological Review*, Vol. 39, No 3, 2003: 308.



the chi square test and contingency coefficient, we will prove that these variables are interdependent and find out how strong the connection among them is.

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Table 1: Relationship between the occupation and the level of income

Cross-tabulation table of occupation and payment categories							
			Payment categories				Total
			Up to RSD 10,000	RSD 10,000–20,000	RSD 20,000–40,000	More than RSD 40,000	
Occupation	Farmer	No of respondents	49	19	3	1	72
		Share of respondents	68.1%	26.4%	4.2%	1.4%	100,0%
	Low-skilled or medium-skilled worker	No of respondents	39	33	8	2	82
		Share of respondents	47.6%	40.2%	9.8%	2.4%	100,0%
	Skilled or high-skilled worker	No of respondents	81	97	43	8	229
		Share of respondents	35.4%	42.4%	18.8%	3.5%	100,0%
	Technician	No of respondents	42	52	47	8	149
		Share of respondents	28.2%	34.9%	31.5%	5.4%	100,0%
	Clerk	No of respondents	19	44	24	7	94
		Share of respondents	20.2%	46.8%	25.5%	7.4%	100,0%
	Professional	No of respondents	16	42	60	26	144
		Share of respondents	11.1%	29.2%	41.7%	18.1%	100,0%
	Housekeeper	No of respondents	71	39	9	5	124
		Share of respondents	57.3%	31.5%	7.3%	4.0%	100,0%
	School/university student	No of respondents	19	25	11	4	59
		Share of respondents	32.2%	42.4%	18.6%	6.8%	100,0%
	Total	No of respondents	336	351	205	61	953
		Share of respondents	35,3%	36.8%	21.5%	6.4%	100,0%

Chi square 188,242; p 0,000; contingency coefficient (C) 0,406; p 0,000

In the cross-table analysis of the occupation and the level of income per a member of household¹⁵, using the chi square test, we rejected the hypothesis about the two characteristics being independent from each other (when the value is less than 0.05). Hence, the level of income depends on the occupation, and using the statistical measure of contingency coefficient (to see how strong the connection is), a relatively strong connection between these two variables (C=0.406) was found. It can be rightfully said that, when we look at the losers of transition following the variable of their occupation, there is a considerable level of probability that these respondents belong to low-income categories – below the level of average income in Serbia.

¹⁵ In the statistical database, this determinant was named *payment category*.

In the cross-table analysis of occupation and the level of education, we will see similar overlaps to that in the case of the cross-table of the occupation and the level of income. The fact that the level of education as such cannot constitute a precise indicator of a division to losers and winners is illustrated by the following example: almost a third of housekeepers finished a secondary school – either a three-year or a four-year secondary school. The fact that they declare themselves as housekeepers speaks to an extent about their working status, namely about the fact that they are unemployed. If otherwise, they would declare themselves as “workers”, “clerks”, etc. Moreover, it can be noted that the workers population includes a certain number of respondents (almost a fourth are low-skilled and more than a half are high-skilled workers) who have finished a four-year secondary school. The presumptions about lower level of education of the losers of transition should not be observed separately from, but rather linked to, other indicators, in this case with occupation and level of income. Thus, this cross-table showed the interdependence between the category of occupation and the category of the finished school (value of the significance testing, chi square test, is less than 0.05). Contingency coefficient shows a strong link (0.8) between these two categories. This actually means that, based on occupation, it is relatively easy to determine the respondent’s level of education, but this is not true for the opposite case: the level of education often is not a sufficient indicator of overall social position. Taking this into consideration, it becomes obvious that, based on the category of occupation *low-skilled worker*, the respondent’s level of education can be reconstructed with a high level of certainty. In this case, it is a three-year secondary-school education.



Table 2: Relationship between the occupation and the level of education

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Cross-table of the occupation and the finished school								
			Finished school					Total
			No school/ primary school	School for blue-collar occupations	Sec- ondary school	College or university	School/uni- versity student	
Occupation	Farmers Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	No of respondents	76	6	10	2		94
		Share of respondents	80.9%	6.4%	10.6%	2.1%		100,0%
	Skilled or high- skilled workers Technicians	No of respondents	62	10	24	1		97
		Share of respondents	63.9%	10.3%	24.7%	1.0%		100,0%
	Clerks Professionals	No of respondents	23	77	161	16		277
		Share of respondents	8.3%	27.8%	58.1%	5.8%		100,0%
	Housekeepers	No of respondents	1	5	155	9		170
		Share of respondents	.6%	2.9%	91.2%	5.3%		100,0%
	Farmers Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	No of respondents	2		79	34		115
		Share of respondents	1.7%		68.7%	29.6%		100,0%
	Skilled or high- skilled workers Technicians	No of respondents	1		7	168		176
		Share of respondents	.6%		4.0%	95.5%		100,0%
	Clerks Professionals	No of respondents	86	15	38	3		142
		Share of respondents	60.6%	10.6%	26.8%	2.1%		100,0%
	Housekeepers	No of respondents			23	9	54	86
		Share of respondents			26.7%	10.5%	62.8%	100,0%
	Total	No of respondents	251	113	497	242	54	1157
		Share of respondents	21,7%	9.8%	43.0%	20.9%	4.7%	100.0%

Chi square 2090, 504; p 0,000; contingency coefficient (C) 0,802; p 0,000

Taking into account above cross-tables, we believe that it is justifiable to, in further analysis, look at the losers of transition primarily relying on the variable of occupation. Thus, the losers of transition will be hereinafter deemed to be the respondents falling under the categories of occupations: *farmers, housekeepers, and low-skilled, medium-skilled, skilled, and high-skilled workers*. Within the framework of samples covered by this survey, this is 50.82% of respondents, or, in absolute numbers, 588 out of 1,157 of the respondents who have declared themselves with regard to occupation and education.

Moreover, consulting the CeSID's earlier surveys (which, for the requirements of this project, conducted the survey of focus group), similar indicators may be noted. Namely, in a survey conducted in

May 2009 for the requirements of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (“Social Exclusion in Serbia – Intensity, Causes, and Types”) correlations were noted in the operationalisation of these populations. Namely, in this survey again, the population of blue-collar workers, housekeepers, and farmers, polarised on one end of the scale of the socially excluded. This survey used a larger number of the indicators of social position: in addition to education, occupation, and level of income, the dimensions of consumption, food, clothes, availability of public services, etc. were also taken into account. The mentioned survey found that every third citizen with work capability does not have a job (30%), and that the level of education has a high impact on unemployment. Thus, this survey found that most vulnerable are the workers population and population of persons with lowest levels of education (e.g., farmers). For instance, among those with finished primary school, less than a third have a steady job. Moreover, this group includes above-average number of those who are unemployed but do not look for a job. It may be said that the respondents who have finished the schools for blue-collar occupations are below-average in respect of the employment rates – the number of full-time employed is 46%. Within this category, there is an above-average representation of those who are unemployed and look for a job. This is how the created population of the losers of transition is confirmed by the data from other researches, collected using the same methodology on a representative sample of the citizens of Serbia.¹⁶

Finally, the data used in the analysis of the losers’ of transition viewpoints about SSR included, in addition to the data obtained in a survey conducted on a representative sample of the citizens of Serbia, the answers of the participants of focus groups (also organised within this project). Based on the occupation, levels of income and education, and place of residence (towns in Serbia, Belgrade suburbia), four groups of the “losers of transition” were formed. Fifth group was the control group from Belgrade that consisted from the members of middle class, with average income and a higher level of education. It was construed as a group of the “winners of transition”.

Security sector reform

According to Timothy Edmunds, security sector reform is a process “through which security sector actors adapt to the political and organisational demands of transformation” (Edmunds

¹⁶ The data obtained from CeSID: Report about the Public Opinion Survey: Social Exclusion, 14 September 2009



2007: 16), while the reformed security sector “provides security within a state in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control” (Edmonds, 2003: 37). Edmonds believes that the effects of security sector reform reflect on five dimensions: good system of government, economic development, professionalization, prevention of conflict, and integration with western institutions (Edmonds 2003: 37). In the analysis below, we will attempt to, in line with these dimensions, show the degree of the group’s of the “losers of transition” (dis)agreement with the security sector reform.

It should be noted in the beginning that, when analysing the answers to the question about whether the armed forces have been sufficiently reformed, a relatively even distribution of answers was found with regard to all offered items. Thus, almost one third of respondents believed that the armed forces has been reformed to a sufficient degree, one third said that it is not sufficiently reformed, and a third did not know how to answer this question. We therefore consider it justifiable to focus our survey on the effects of reform and the degree of citizens’ agreement with the statements that measured the effects of security sector reform on the five dimensions mentioned above. Taking this into consideration, it will be possible to precisely determine the degree of support that the public is providing to the ruling elite with regard to particular reform actions and solutions.

What do losers of transition think about SSR?

Good system of government

The good system of government is the most complex dimension we have researched. We have tried to determine the viewpoints of this dimension using a larger number of empirical statements. Thus, the intention of asking the citizens how secure they feel, thanks to whom they feel secure or insecure, when they felt most secure, was to have the subjective perception of security and responsibility that the respondents attribute to the institutions linked with the self-estimated degree of security. Moreover, we have taken into account the questions about the trust in institutions and have used them as a control question about the work of these institutions.

When asked how secure they feel in their neighbourhood, over 70% of respondents from all categories of occupation said that

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they feel secure. On the other hand, when they were asked about the reasons for not feeling secure, more than a half of respondents mentioned reasons such as: “I respect law and order” and “I am capable of protecting myself”. This reveals that, as perceived by respondents, government authorities, generally, do not contribute to their feeling secure. In the answers related to “good work of government authorities” as guarantors of security, there is a slight dissension between the losers and the winners of transition. Namely, losers of transition are in a somewhat larger numbers inclined to claim that government authorities do their job well, whilst this number is somewhat lower in the categories of winners (professionals, clerks, and technicians).

Table 3. Respondents' subjective assessment of the feeling of security

If you feel secure, what is the main reason for such feeling?						
	Don't feel secure	Living in a good environment	good work of government authorities	I am capable of protecting myself	I respect law and order	Total
Farmers	12,6%	22,1%	8,4%	12,6%	44,2%	100,0%
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	20,6%	24,7%	7,2%	11,3%	36,1%	100,0%
Skilled or high-skilled workers	18,3%	21,9%	7,2%	10,4%	42,1%	100,0%
Technicians	16,0%	16,6%	4,1%	13,0%	50,3%	100,0%
Clerks	14,8%	22,6%	5,2%	7,0%	50,4%	100,0%
Professionals	18,1%	15,8%	5,6%	7,3%	53,1%	100,0%
Housekeepers	14,7%	28,7%	7,0%	3,5%	46,2%	100,0%
School/university students	12,5%	20,5%	3,4%	9,1%	54,5%	100,0%
Total	16,4%	21,3%	6,1%	9,3%	46,9%	100,0%

When asked about the reasons for feeling insecure, answers of the respondents in these two groups were again polarised; specifically, the losers of transition were less than other categories critical about the work of government authorities.



Table 4. Subjective assessment of reasons for feeling of insecurity

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If you feel insecure, what is the main reason for such feeling?							
	I feel secure	Increase in street crime and violence	Behaviour of sport club supporters and other extremist groups	Poor economic situation and poverty	Drug abuse related problems	Unsatisfactory work of government authorities	Total
Farmers	75.8%	8.4%		9.5%		6.3%	100.0%
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	55.7%	18.6%	2.1%	18.6%	3.1%	2.1%	100.0%
Skilled or high-skilled workers	58.8%	15.4%	2.2%	16.5%	2.2%	5.0%	100.0%
Technicians	58.2%	14.1%	1.2%	14.7%	4.7%	7.1%	100.0%
Clerks	65.8%	13.2%	.9%	11.4%	2.6%	6.1%	100.0%
Professionals	62.5%	9.7%	1.7%	13.1%	4.0%	9.1%	100.0%
Housekeepers	59.9%	16.2%	0.7%	16.9%	2.1%	4.2%	100.0%
School/university students	59.8%			12.6%	8.0%	3.4%	100.0%
Total	61.3%	14.0%	1.3%	14.6%	3.2%	5.7%	100.0%

When asked which government authorities mainly contribute to their feeling of security and insecurity, almost 60% of the losers, and nearly 70% of the winners of transition did not identify a single authority. On the other hand, among those in the category of losers who stated that the government authorities are guarantors of their security, almost 30% identified the police, and only 5% mentioned the military. It should be noted that, for the winners of transition, these shares are slightly smaller (about 25% for the police and about 2% for the military).

Table 5. Assessment of the government authorities' contribution to the feeling of security

Which one among government authorities is mostly contributing to your feeling of security?										
	None	Police	Military	Judiciary (courts, prosecutor offices, etc)	RS Government	RS National Assembly	RS President	National Security Council	Other government authorities	Total
Farmers	61.7%	33.0%	4.3%				1.1%			100.0%
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	61.2%	28.6%	7.1%	2.0%					1.0%	100.0%
Skilled or high-skilled workers	61.5%	30.9%	6.1%	1.1%		0.4%				100.0%
Technicians	73.5%	24.1%	1.2%		0.6%				0.6%	100.0%
Clerks	74.8%	20.0%	1.7%	0.9%			0.9%		1.7%	100.0%
Professionals	68.2%	27.8%	4.0%							100.0%
Housekeepers	60.8%	35.0%	2.8%				0.7%		.7%	100.0%
School/university students	63.2%	31.0%	3.4%					1.1%	1.1%	100.0%
Total	65.6%	28.9%	4.0%	0.5%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%	0.5%	100.0%

Only one fourth of losers, when asked whom would they trust to protect their security and security of their families, mentioned the statutory actors – military and police. Most respondents rely on themselves and on informal structures – friends and neighbours.



*Table 6: Upon whom citizens rely
for protection*

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Upon whom you mostly rely to protect you security and security of your family?								
	Myself	Friends	Neighbours	Police	Military	Private security services	Nobody	Total
Farmers	50.0%	5.3%	10.6%	21.3%	5.3%		7.4%	100.0%
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	45.4%	5.2%	8.2%	24.7%	9.3%	2.1%	5.2%	100.0%
Skilled or high-skilled workers	50.7%	10.1%	6.9%	18.5%	7.2%	0.7%	5.8%	100.0%
Technicians	47.4%	5.3%	9.4%	19.3%	2.3%		16.4%	100.0%
Clerks	50.0%	7.8%	1.7%	22.4%	2.6%	0.9%	14.7%	100.0%
Professionals	57.6%	6.2%	6.2%	17.5%	5.6%		6.8%	100.0%
Housekeepers	42.3%	12.0%	14.8%	23.2%		0.7%	7.0%	100.0%
School/university students	60.9%	16.1%	1.1%	12.6%		2.3%	6.9%	100.0%
Total	50.4%	8.4%	7.6%	19.7%	4.4%	0.7%	8.7%	100.0%

Although the losers, to a somewhat lesser extent than winners, hold the police responsible for their feeling of insecurity, the prevailing impression (over 80%) is that none of the government authorities is responsible for citizens' feeling of insecurity.

Table 7: Contribution of government authorities to the feeling of security

Which government authority mostly contribute to your feeling of insecurity?												
	None	Police	Military	Statutory security services (SIA, military services, "secret services")	Judiciary (courts, prosecutor offices, etc)	RS Government	RS Assembly	RS President	Parliamentary Committee for Security	National Security Council	Other government authorities	Total
Farmers	75.5%	12.8%	2.1%		3.2%	3.2%			1.1%		2.1%	100.0%
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	73.7%	14.1%	2.0%		7.1%	1.0%					2.0%	100.0%
Skilled or high-skilled workers	82.7%	6.5%	2.2%		5.8%	0.4%		0.4%			2.2%	100.0%
Technicians	74.0%	15.4%			5.9%	1.2%		0.6%		0.6%	2.4%	100.0%
Clerks	82.5%	11.4%	0.9%		1.8%	2.6%					.9%	100.0%
Professionals	73.7%	10.9%	0.6%	0.6%	8.0%	3.4%		.6%			2.3%	100.0%
Housekeepers	83.2%	9.1%			3.5%	2.1%	0.7%				1.4%	100.0%
School/university students	87.4%	4.6%	1.1%	1.1%	3.4%			1.1%			1.1%	100.0%
Total	79.1%	10.3%	1.1%	.2%	5.2%	1.6%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	1.9%	100.0%

The degree of citizens' trust in the security sector institution varies. Namely, when asked for military and police, the losers and the winners gave somewhat different answers, whilst their replies concerning the Government, the President, and the National Assembly were very similar. It is evident from this that those which citizens hold responsible for their (in)security include such government authorities with which they are directly in contact (police, military, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, judiciary), whilst the executive and legislative branches are almost never associated with the security sector.

*Table 8: Assessment of the work of military and police*

Military			
	Does not know, refuses to answer	Grade 1 or 2	Grade 3, 4, or 5
Farmers	9.6	12.7	77.7
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	9.3	8.3	82.4
Skilled or high-skilled workers	8.7	18	73.3
Technicians	12.6	12.6	74.8
Clerks	15.3	15.3	69.4
Professionals	17.4	16.6	66
Housekeepers	11.9	19.8	68.3
School/university students	19.5	9.1	71.4
Police			
	Does not know, refuses to answer	Grade 1 or 2	Grade 3, 4, or 5
Farmers	9.5	22.1	68.4
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	4.1	23.4	72.5
Skilled or high-skilled workers	5.8	22.3	71.9
Technicians	7	19.7	73.3
Clerks	6.5	30.3	63.2
Professionals	6.1	28.7	65.2
Housekeepers	2.8	22.2	75
School/university students	4.6	27.5	67.9

Even if citizens do not see the security sector as a party responsible for their feeling of security, the trust that the losers of transition have in traditional security sector actors – military and police, is somewhat higher. The lack of critical attitude towards the security sector may be an argument that reforms are not all that necessary, and that present situation is satisfactory. On the other hand, the fact that respondents see themselves, and not the institutions, as most deserving for their feeling of security, intimates at the defective government which is not capable to provide the services which it had undertook to provide, security services included.

Economic development resulting from SSR

Within this survey, citizens were given a possibility to express their opinion about the correlation between security sector reform and economic development; as a rule, this was when they answered the

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questions related to the security integrations into EU and NATO. The impression is that citizens do not detect a sufficiently clear connection between security sector reform and economic development, as it is obvious from a large number of questions to which citizens did not know answers or refused to answer (“does not know/refuses to answer”), which sometimes amounted to as much as 40% of answers to the questions.

When asked whether joining EU would further impoverish Serbia, approximately 30% of losers of transition gave a positive answer, below 30% of them abstained, whilst more than 40% answered negatively. On the other hand, winners were less reserved and about 13% of them refused to answer, whilst more than a half believed that EU membership will not impoverish Serbia. Moreover, although 42% of the losers believed that EU membership will contribute to raising living standards of Serbian citizens, 30% of respondents abstained, and 28% did not agree with this statement.

Table 9: Citizens' viewpoints on EU integration and impoverishment

If Serbia joins EU, it will be further impoverished						
	Absolutely does not agree	Mostly does not agree	Does not know, is undecided	Mostly agrees	Completely agrees	Total
Farmers	23.4%	13.8%	26.6%	13.8%	22.3%	100.0%
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	30.6%	11.2%	30.6%	14.3%	13.3%	100.0%
Skilled or high-skilled workers	28.0%	14.7%	25.4%	11.5%	20.4%	100.0%
Technicians	30.2%	19.5%	16.6%	16.0%	17.8%	100.0%
Clerks	34.2%	26.3%	14.0%	11.4%	14.0%	100.0%
Professionals	38.1%	25.0%	8.0%	21.0%	8.0%	100.0%
Housekeepers	17.6%	23.9%	34.5%	7.7%	16.2%	100.0%
School/university students	33.3%	27.6%	19.5%	8.0%	11.5%	100.0%
Total	29.4%	19.8%	21.6%	13.3%	15.9%	100.0%

Citizens' attitudes with regard to the accession to NATO show that citizens have similar arguments with regard to economic development and membership in this Organisation. Namely, almost a half of the losers of transition believe that membership in NATO may contribute to the impoverishment of the country, whilst about 20% do not agree with such statement. Moreover, almost a third of



respondents refused to declare themselves about the issue. Twenty percent of the losers think that entry to NATO will result in the inflow of foreign investments, whilst this possibility is rejected by more than 40% of losers. A slightly higher percent of winners believe that inflow of foreign investments will increase – almost a third of this population. Significant abstention (nearly 40%) was manifested by the losers when they answered the question about whether Serbian accession to NATO will increase the military industry business and export volumes. Almost one fourth of respondents in this population agreed with this statement, whilst a third did not accept this statement. In the case of the winners of transition, the distribution is identical – a third agrees, a third does not agree, and a third is abstinent. We can therefore say that the losers of transition have a mottled attitude with regard to NATO.

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Table 10: Citizens' attitudes on NATO integration and impoverishment

If Serbia accedes to NATO, it will be further impoverished						
	Absolutely does not agree	Mostly does not agree	Does not know, is undecided	Mostly agrees	Completely agrees	Total
Farmers	12.6%	3.2%	32.6%	15.8%	35.8%	100.0%
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	17.5%	9.3%	28.9%	17.5%	26.8%	100.0%
Skilled or high-skilled workers	12.2%	9.7%	31.7%	12.6%	33.8%	100.0%
Technicians	20.6%	6.5%	25.3%	16.5%	31.2%	100.0%
Clerks	16.5%	13.9%	30.4%	14.8%	24.3%	100.0%
Professionals	21.7%	8.6%	26.3%	19.4%	24.0%	100.0%
Housekeepers	5.6%	5.6%	34.3%	20.3%	34.3%	100.0%
School/university students	15.9%	8.0%	43.2%	17.0%	15.9%	100.0%
Total	15.2%	8.3%	30.8%	16.4%	29.3%	100.0%

Theoretically, economic development should arise out of the security sector reform. Although the losers deem that EU membership will contribute to raising the living standards for citizens and do not expect further impoverishment, they still reason that membership in NATO would lead to the impoverishment of citizens. Most citizens did not declare themselves with regard to the military industry's capacity for development.

Professionalization

The losers' of transition attitudes with regard to professionalization was measured by asking two questions that are control questions to each other. First question related to the assessment of the level to which the return of general military obligation will contribute to the maintenance of Serbian security. Second question was asked from the other end of the matter and citizens were expected to answer whether the introduction of professional army influences the security of Serbia.


Table 11: How do the return of general military obligation and the introduction of professional army influence the security?

Return of general military obligation and its effect on the security of Serbia			
Answer	No effect	Does not know/ Refuses to answer	There is effect
Occupation			
Farmers	29.7	22.3	47.8
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	24.5	26.5	48.9
Skilled or high-skilled workers	40.3	21.9	37.7
Technicians	26.8	35.9	37.3
Clerks	48.3	23.5	27.2
Professionals	45.6	29.8	26.5
Housekeepers	56.2	13.6	30.2
School/university students	39.5	24.4	36.1

Are there any effects of professional armed forces on security			
Answer	No effect	Does not know/ Refuses to answer	There are effects
Occupation			
Farmers	53.2	24.5	22.3
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	38.1	29.9	32
Skilled or high-skilled workers	38.5	29.9	31.7
Technicians	35	45.5	29.6
Clerks	33.2	24.9	42
Professionals	43.9	21.1	35.1
Housekeepers	32.2	21.6	47.2
School/university students	39.5	24.1	43.7



Graph 1: How does the return of general military obligation influence security




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The first question measured how particular populations assess the level to which the return of general military obligation will influence the increase of Serbian citizens' security. The answers of the losers and that of the winners of transition clearly polarised. The losers are convinced that the return of recruitment system will contribute to greater security of Serbia. One interpretation may be that the losers of transition have this attitude because they are influenced by traditional values (M. Lazić and S. Cvejić 2004: 63). Joining the army, according to traditional norms, is an important step in life that helps the realisation of other social connections (job, marriage), and acquirement of other social recognitions. On the other hand, better-off populations, namely the winners of transition, do not share this view; for them, joining the army means the thwarted career, pointless interruption of employment.

Citizens were then asked about the consequences of introducing the professional army. The distribution of answers is similar to that with regard to previous question, which further confirms the findings that the losers of transition do not see that professionalization influences the increase of security. The strongest "resistance" to professionalization comes from farmers with more than 50% of the members of this population disagreeing with professionalization. Moreover, almost a half of housekeepers abstained even though, among those who declared themselves in this respect, the ones that oppose the professionalization of army prevail.

Graph 2: How is the introduction of professional army influencing the security



Indirectly we have tried to identify citizens' viewpoint about the achievements of military reform. How some of the effects of reform are manifested and is it clear to citizens that those are the effects of reform? It was indicative that citizens greatly abstained, on occasion more than a half of answers were not given. Among those who did declare themselves, a larger number of losers of transition believed that the military is influenced by political parties (about a third of respondents), whilst almost a third believed that the military is corrupted. More than a half of losers of transition think that the military is inadequately equipped, whilst about 40% of them believe that the military is not numerous enough. On the other hand, losers of transition believe that the military is capable of defending Serbia, and that it is sufficiently trained (more than a half of losers of transition share this opinion). Accordingly, this population doubts that material resources are adequate and believes that human resources are at a satisfactory level. The government could be blamed for material resources (corruption), whilst human resources reflect the trust in the institution of the military (which may be served, at one and the same time, by a son, a spouse, a relative, a neighbour, etc). The viewpoint prevailing with regard to corruption and politicisation is that these phenomena are now wide-spread in the military too. This is confirmed by earlier results of CeSID surveys (2005 - 2010) which show



that normally high level of trust in the military is divided into two components: the armed forces as an institution in which the recruits are serving their military duty is much more trusted than are the managerial bodies of the army (the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister, the military leadership).

A conclusion may be drawn from the above answers that the professionalization of armed forces is not desirable for the losers of transition. This population does not see any interconnection between the reform – democratic and civilian control – and the decreased influence of political parties and corruption on the military.

Prevention of conflict

When asked whether they feel secure, losers of transition mostly replied that they feel secure (about 60%). The list of threats to personal security of citizens is dominated by economic threats. In order to feel secure, the majority of these respondents primarily rely on “their own selves” (about 50% vs. almost 20% of those who rely on police), which suggests the possibility that they “take law into their own hands”. The former possibility was tested in focus groups in which citizens’ readiness to take violent action was investigated. Such a result may be interpreted based on their position of the losers of transition and their perception of dominant threats, i.e., economic threats: citizens would take part in violent social protests and industrial actions but they would not take part in (although they would silently support) the violence against minority populations. Moreover, these populations of workers and housekeepers, in a much higher percent than other categories, see the cause of insecurity in adverse economic situation and poverty (Table 4).

On the other hand, economic factors provoke fear even in citizens with above-average income (more than RSD 60,000 din); they, more than those with lower income, fear social protests, strikes, and financial over-indebtedness of Serbia. It is reasonable to presuppose that this population is “naturally more sensitised” to economic causes of insecurity since they can compromise their social-economic position.

Social polarisation is evident in this case, too: the losers of transition fear adverse economic situation and poverty; they are willing to take active part in violent social protests. It is this type of protests that worries the population of the winners of transition.

With regard to achievement of national security goals, citizens give priority to peaceful means. Accordingly, about one fourth of losers think that the nation should use diplomatic means to take care of

its own security. Contrary to this, a third of the winners of transition declared themselves like this. The primacy to economic means was given by almost one fourth of surveyed losers. Although they give primacy to the economy and diplomatic means, the losers of transition are very different when they answer the question about the use of military means. More than 10% (on average) of losers of transition think that these means are legitimate, whilst about 3% of the winners of transition were for this option.

Table 12: What means should a nation use to take care of its security

What means should the nation to which you belong use to take care of its security?								
	Does not know	Diplomatic means	Military means	Membership in international organisations	Economic means	Stricter laws	Remaining disengaged	Other means
Farmers	17.2	28.0	9.7		19.4	15.1	4.3	6.5
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	21.4	21.4	13.3	2.0	22.4	11.2	4.1	4.1
Skilled or high-skilled workers	13.7	26.4	9.4	3.6	24.9	16.2	2.2	3.6
Technicians	21.8	23.9	11.3	0.7	21.1	14.1	2.8	4.2
Clerks	11.8	34.7	1.2	2.9	22.4	17.1	3.5	6.5
Professionals	13.9	28.7	7.0	2.6	22.6	20.9	0.9	3.5
Housekeepers	6.8	34.7	4.5	4.5	28.4	17.6	1.7	1.7
School/university students	23.0	24.1	3.4	5.7	27.6	8.0	3.4	4.6

Analysis of the answers reveal that citizens are more willing to resort to violence with the aim to achieve socio-economic interests, but they give primacy to peaceful means when the aim is to achieve national security goals.

*Integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions*

The interpretation of the last dimension of security sector reform was attempted based on citizens' viewpoints about EU and NATO. Generally speaking, with regard to the integration into western institutions, there is a somewhat lower degree of acceptance and a somewhat higher degree of rejection between the losers and winners of transition. The losers and winners of transition are more inclined towards the integration into EU, whilst a high degree of disagreement with the integration into NATO was observed.

Table 13: Should Serbia join EU?

Should Serbia join EU? (in %)			
	Yes	No	Does not know
Farmers	38.9	34.7	26.3
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	51.0	24.5	24.5
Skilled or high-skilled workers	57.9	26.3	15.8
Technicians	45.8	28.2	26.1
Clerks	63.5	21.2	15.3
Professionals	66.1	21.7	12.2
Housekeepers	77.8	15.9	6.3
School/university students	66.7	20.7	12.6

Although they give primacy to EU integrations, a much small number of losers (almost 20%) support this type of integrations. Moreover, the losers were reserved (about 10%) when answering this question. When asked whether joining EU would enhance the security of citizens, about 40% of the losers agreed with this statement, and as much as a third gave a negative answer to this question.

The answers to the questions about integration into NATO were evenly distributed. Both populations are explicitly against the accession to NATO, which we can reasonably believe to be a consequence of 1999 NATO bombing campaign. Thus, 54% of losers and 58% of winners do not think that the membership in this Organisation would contribute to the enhancement of the security of Serbia. Quite to the contrary, when asked whether the strengthening of alliance with Russia would contribute to enhancement of Serbian security, the losers of transition supported this statement by 58%, and only 18% did not support it.

Table 14: Should Serbia become a NATO member state?

Should Serbia become a NATO member state? (in %)			
	Yes	No	Does not know
Farmers	12.8	72.3	14.9
Low-skilled or medium-skilled workers	18.2	58.6	23.2
Skilled or high-skilled workers	16.5	69.4	14.0
Technicians	8.5	64.1	27.5
Clerks	21.2	60.6	18.2
Professionals	9.6	70.2	20.2
Housekeepers	21.0	65.3	13.6
School/university students	12.5	67.0	20.5

It is hard to establish the degree to which citizens are willing to support the joining of western institutions considering that both populations reject the integration into NATO and, at the same time, even though the losers of transition are reserved, agree with EU integrations. Again, the willingness for alliance with Russia is incongruent with the theory proclaimed with the indicator of willingness for integrations into western institutions and, in this respect, the population of losers is a potential inhibitor of reforms.

When you look at the five dimensions of the security sector reform manifestation, you can see, to a lesser or greater degree, the polarisation between the viewpoints taken by the losers of transition and those taken by the winners in transition. Losers of transition have negative attitudes with regard to integrations and professionalization, and they do not have sufficient trust in economic development which would be a result of the SSR. This suggests that they can be a barrier to further reform of security sector. A matter of further concern is the willingness of citizens to resort to violence in order to realise their socio-economic interests. Although in a number of cases the values that were measured were not extreme and only slightly exceeded the values measured in the winners of transition, the indicators of the Statistical Office worryingly show that this population encompasses the majority of Serbian population. A note should also be taken of the fact that current negative global and local economic trends can only increase the number of losers of transition. These indicators also indicate the partial success of the post-socialist trans-



formation project and the insufficient legitimacy of the government. It then stands to reason to wonder what direction and pace Serbian government will take to implement the SSR. Will the government, with the aim of gaining a wider support of voters, postpone the reforms, or give them up completely?

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Dichotomy between what was promised and what has been achieved

*Miroslav Hadžić*¹

Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade

Professional paper

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For many years already Serbian citizens have been preoccupied worrying about their security and the security of their families. Their troublesome reality is everyday increasing and multiplying the uncertainty with regard to their personal and family survival. Irrecoverable loss of basic economic and social security is flavoured with the growth of legal insecurity, broadening of the area of discretionary and arbitrary use of power. To make the things even worse, although a decade has passed since the old regime was overthrown, local population cannot reliably say where Serbia is heading or how it should be regulated. They know even less about who, where, how, and why makes the decisions that are of critical importance not only for their homeland and nation, but for their life as well.

Troubles of the subjects of this state are increased by constant worries about the survival of their nation and state. For years now have those in power been frightening them with numerous domestic traitors and outside enemies, and inexhaustible threats to their – individual and collective – security. Besides, it becomes less and less likely that they will see any benefits and improvements any time soon. What is more, it seems that some further losses are pending and they can no longer reliably say what is that they have already lost, or why, or how much it costs them. It hardly matters since they have to pay the compensation for the damage incurred whether willing to do that or not.

There is no wonder then that they still cannot resolve the dilemma, for instance, whether, in Kosovo, they and Serbia have lost – temporarily or irretrievably – only the territory and a part of population, or they were deprived of their roots and very crux of their identity on that occasion. That is why they still do not know whether Serbia and they themselves can survive without Kosovo. Additionally, the until-

¹ Contact: ambar@scnet.rs



yesterday dreamed-of and promised European safe haven is now being put down and made distant by those same politicians who are not offering any other or better solution. Moreover, the government and its opponents have brought their poor electoral body to its wits' end by further confusing them with Serbian relations with NATO. Firstly, it was suddenly and without any debate whatsoever that a by-the-way sentence of military neutrality – coming from one of many National Assembly of Serbia declarations and resolutions dealing with Kosovo – grew into strategic orientation of the state. This is, however, not even mentioned in the National Security Strategy that followed, although the above sentence should have made up its foundations. Moreover, the government still has not informed the taxpayers here, particularly those who are actually paying the taxes, about the costs of such an endeavour, nor has it presented to them the security benefits, or shortcomings, of this choice which they have silently made.

The renewal, in a drastically changed context, of the policy of strategic alliance of Serbia with all most powerful states of the world is what introduced citizens to the last round of perplexity. A note should be taken here that, because of its size and strength (weakness), Serbia is not able to be a strategic ally or partner to any of these countries. Regardless of this, however, Serbia cannot be ally to all of them at the same time even it wants to. The reason for this is that these countries see themselves in the first place as global competitors and only then as potential opponents (enemies). Thus, it remains to be seen whether Serbia could have any visible and measurable benefits from the desired alliance with the countries such as USA, Russia, China, Great Britain, Germany, France, etc, particularly bearing in mind that our rulers and their competitors hold that most of these countries are guilty for the institution of a new state in Kosovo. This is also the main reason they mention when avoiding any (public) talk about potential accession of Serbia to NATO; and all this despite its sizeable economic and financial, as well as security and military, cooperation with key members of this Alliance.

If, however, they do not see the reality in which they live in that way, our citizens are absolutely free to (dis)trust that the leaders of their country have capability and willingness to (soon) ensure a peaceful, secure, and prosperous life for them. They are daily reassured about this by, among others, the ministers who are in charge of government enforcement apparatus. But of course, every belief, this one included, relieves the believer from the obligation to ask and wonder.

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A contemplative believer, in this case, may find it convincing when the rulers claim that, for example, the inherited and renamed security services have been properly reformed, or that it is possible to have them radically changed without previous lustration and opening of secret files they kept, or maybe still keep, about the citizens of Serbia; namely, without judicial and political sanctioning of those members of services who are responsible for numerous and bloody misdeeds, including the assassination of Zoran Đinđić. This believer would then find it reasonable that the services want to, supported by the political order-givers, increase their authorisations, and narrow down the space of protected privacy and freedom for the citizens; all this, indeed, so as to enhance their security. It is therefore not impossible that a legislative arrangement in which these services have the right to, without court order, control the electronic traffic among the citizens, will be soon further elaborated and improved. It might happen, for example, that the law-writers soon name the services as the exclusive Internet providers in Serbia, and bind the citizens to correspond with each other through an agent that is assigned to them. Such an arrangement would be beneficial in many ways; with this, among other things, additional funds would be raised for the activities of the services and the services would finally be able to ensure that their dream about all citizens being their associates, even if unwilling, comes true.

Through pink coloured glasses, it may even seem normal that the present-day minister of defence is more involved in the trade and exportation of armaments, which are normally outside the minister's scope of competences, than in the reform of subordinated ministries and armed forces. Maybe this is his hobby, namely he does this in his free time, considering that he claims that he had already successfully reformed those sectors. The minister's progress has surely escalated after he got rid of the disruptive factor embodied in Zdravko Ponoš. It was at that time that the objections the latter made were irretrievably forgotten. It then seems reasonable that, within the application of NATO standards, he imported the American concept of civil-military relations, which, by the way, was made for the needs of the occupationary army.

It may also seem irreproachable that, recently, the development strategy of MoI and police until 2014 has been adopted without previously establishing the state of affairs in them and whether they perform their job properly. When you know this, the present-day minister of internal affairs may sound overly emotional when he complains about lack of the operational members of police. This despite the fact that the MoI's manpower (the data about which is, by the



way, inaccessible to public), is constantly expanding. If, however, the requests for the community policing to acquire additional authorisations are accepted, two parallel and competing enforcement apparatuses will be taking care of citizens' (in)security, and, what is more, the relevant costs will be borne by citizens. Until this happens, they have available a host of private providers of security services, the services which are, parenthetically, not regulated legislatively and are outside any control.

Added to all that was stated above should be a commendable effort made by the holders of power to deny the citizens any concerns about how the government guardians of their safety and security spend the funds they were awarded from the budget. Accordingly, the National Assembly and its committees do not make use of their powers to control and oversee budget affairs of the government holders of the means of enforcement. Moreover, the State Auditor still hesitates to have a peak at the military treasury, or that of police or services, to, on behalf of citizens, see what they do with citizens' money. The truth be said, the reservations of the auditors may be explained, to an extent, by their fear from the unknown. Namely, what if, for example, they (again) stumble across yet another satellite, or, possibly, war reserves of bullet-proof trousers, Zippo lighters, or drugs.

It is far from impossible that, if presented by a more skilful writer or a better connoisseur of our reality, above indicated security profile of Serbia and the list of matters for concern (fear) of their citizens would look much different. It is also highly likely that citizens would take away from, or maybe even add to, the picture painted here, just the same as they would do it with any other picture. There is no doubt, therefore, that the government leaders and their advisors would not agree with the picture created here, regardless to what extent it is erased, and this is particularly true for those in charge of their everyday, media, and marketing, promotion.

Despite of this, it is reasonable to again wonder based on what the competent authorities shape, and then apply, the security policy of Serbia and its numerous accompanying strategies. Namely, based on what do they know which personal and national interests and values would be protected by the citizens of Serbia, in what order and at what price. Likewise, how do they determine and verify what and whom our citizens fear. Or they maybe think that the list of threats they have incorporated in the National Security Strategy, although boundless and unexhaustive, is the right measure of things. We should not exclude a possibility that they reckon that, whenever they need to, they can provoke targeted fear in citizens. This is accompa-

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nied by the question about the basis on which they determined the size and the type of armed forces, or police, or service, that is needed in Serbia. There is no doubt that those who have political power rather accurately know, or are convinced that they know, how to use the government enforcement apparatus for their discretionary needs and desires. For this purpose they have at their disposal, in the first place, the facade political system, the ultimate purposes of which exhaust themselves in the legitimisation and legalisation of the decisions made in the arcane precipices and secluded places of the participatory state. There can be no doubt either that military, police, and secret-service elites know only too well how to, at any point in time, flesh out and protect their – personal and corporate – values and interests.

The experience, including the experience of Serbia, suggest that, in an undemocratic system, all above listed questions, as well as many other questions which are yet to be asked, would be rejected and those who asked them would attract attention of competent authorities. The reason is that security in them belongs to a zone of so-called high politics and is therefore under the exclusive competences of the state, its leaders and security elites. Since a rather large number of our citizens believe that Serbia does need a genuine democratic system, security in Serbia needs to be awarded the status of a public asset. For this to be achieved, citizens, among other things and first of all, should have a guaranteed and free access to all information of public interest that are important for their security and for the security of the country to which they belong. This in turn would require the abolishment of the monopoly that political-security elites have in identifying the security needs of citizens and their home state. The next step would necessarily be to legislatively remove the risk from these elites modelling and using the government enforcement apparatus in an arbitrary and discretionary manner. However, the latter goal would remain unattainable for as long as Serbia does not develop the political (and political parties') elites that are accountable and dedicated to achieving public interest. For these to be developed, it is necessary that the Constitution and the laws provide, among other things, the procedures and resources to ensure full and effective political, as well as judicial, accountability of the government for their (non)action in the field of security.

Considering that accountable political parties and politicians are not indigenous plants here, citizens need to (even before the elections) plant them, water them, and, if necessary, prune them back. They should take this occasion to remove weeds from their shared political garden. To do this, they need knowhow but also they need to join



their forces together because only by exerting synergic pressure they can rescue their chosen ones from the temptations and enticements of being in power.

For the citizens of Serbia to, whether individually and/or collectively, address the issue of their security, it would be good if they could learn, among other things, what their fellow-citizens think about it. Very valuable for them in this respect would be the results of different public opinion surveys, and in the first place those which specifically examine the Serbian citizens' viewpoints about security. Let's not even mention that those who are here in power should base their policies and strategies, among other things, on the results of those same surveys, rather than only having them commissioned and used solely to learn about their chances to remain in power or how to come to power (at long last). But of course, nobody can prevent the above mentioned to commission the surveys with predefined results which will make their image in the mirror be constitutive and even more beautiful.

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Western Balkans Security Observer is a journal established by the academic community of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. The papers that we publish in this magazine deal with regional security issues, but they also focus on national and global security problems. The editors especially encourage papers which question the security transformations from an interdisciplinary perspective and which combine different theoretical starting points. A special column is dedicated to reviews of the newest sources from the fields of security studies, political sciences, international relations and other related scientific disciplines.

When writing the papers, the following criteria must be observed:

- Desirable text length: from 1.500 to 3.000 words
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 1. Title page that contains the title of the paper, first and last name(s) of the author(s), name of the institution(s) where the author(s) is/are employed, occupation, address and telephone number for the purpose of possible contact. Below the title of the paper, first and last name of the author should be written (and optionally his/her title), name of the institution where the author is employed and its address. The summary should be up to 120 words long and in it the author should point out the most important hypothesis on which the paper is based. Below the summary, the author should specify 4-5 key words.
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
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Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Gundulićev venac 48
11000 Beograd
tel/fax 381(0)11-32 87 226
381(0)11-32 87 334
www.ccmr-bg.org
office@ccmr-bg.org