



## Uprising in Tunisia

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Author: Ben Smith and Modupe Oshikoya

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This note describes the background to the riots in Tunisia, the recent series of events leading to the flight of the president, the interim government and progress towards elections.

### Summary

- President Ben Ali deposed his predecessor in 1987, promising democratic reforms
- Tunisia remained a police state under his rule, which lasted for 23 years
- Despite respectable levels of economic growth, corruption and economic exclusion were severe problems, and there was no democratic opening
- The self-immolation of a fruit and vegetable seller in December 2010 started a wave of protests which led to the deposition of the president in January 2011
- Protests in Tunisia inspired similar uprisings in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world
- Protesters were not satisfied with the new government, in which Mohammed Ghannouchi remained prime minister, although some ministers were taken from the opposition.
- Further clashes between protesters and the security forces resulted in deaths of at least five in February
- This led Mohammed Ghannouchi to resign, to be replaced by Beji Caid-Essebsi, another former minister from the Ben Ali government
- Elections will now be held on 23 October 2011
- Tunisia has made the most progress towards democracy of any the 'Arab spring' countries.

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**1 Background**

Tunisia was ruled from independence from France in 1956 until 1987 by Habib Bourgiba, an autocratic secularist credited with advancing the rights of women in Tunisia. His grip on power was in the end loosened by ill health and, in 1987, he was replaced by Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, who promised to liberalise the country and introduce democratic reforms.

Economic stability and firm opposition to Islamists remained the foundations of Tunisian policy, but no serious democratic reforms were introduced. Human rights activists say that, while some press restrictions were eased and some political prisoners were released, the regime in Tunisia did not tolerate any serious dissent.

Several suspected Islamists were killed in gun battles with Tunisian forces in 2006 and 2007. Local activists allege that hundreds of people were arrested on suspicion of links with terrorist groups after 2003, when the law was changed to make arrests easier for the security forces.

## 2 The Ben Ali regime

### 2.1 Elections

Tunisia has a bicameral parliament, with members elected to the lower house for a period of five years. The governing party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, received 84% at the last legislative election in 2009. Its nearest rival, the Mouvement des Démocrates Socialistes (MDS), received 5%. Similarly, at the 2009 presidential election, Mr Ben Ali, for the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD), took 89.6%, against 5% for his nearest rival. The victory gave Mr Ben Ali his fifth consecutive term as president.

The Economist Intelligence Unit's 2010 democracy index put Tunisia at position 144 out of 167. That would make the country less democratic than Morocco or Algeria and, indeed, only one place ahead of Zimbabwe.<sup>1</sup>

### 2.2 Human rights

Human Rights Watch reported in 2010 that Tunisia imposed arbitrary restrictions on independent trades unions, including restricting their right to assemble and harassing activists. The restrictions were particularly harsh on labour, student and journalists' unions that expressed criticism of the government. The government denied the allegations.<sup>2</sup> Despite a relatively benign environment for women, certainly in comparison with neighbouring countries, political freedoms in Tunisia were almost non-existent.

### 2.3 Economy

A relatively stable and relatively market-orientated economic policy has contributed to a more prosperous society in Tunisia than in Algeria or Egypt, for example. In the United Nations Development Programme index, Tunisia takes 81<sup>st</sup> place, below Iran but above Jordan. The same source puts Tunisian GDP per head at US\$8,509 per head, a figure comparable to energy-rich Algeria's and well above Morocco's figure of US\$4,638.<sup>3</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy index 2010*  
<sup>2</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Tunisia: Union Voices Silenced"  
<sup>3</sup> "Database: living standards", *Economist Intelligence Unit*

Nevertheless, economic problems remain serious and are thought to be one of the main reasons for the disturbances. Trade between the countries of North Africa is minimal (only 5% of Tunisia's trade is with its oil-rich neighbour Libya).<sup>4</sup> Nepotism is another restraint on economic growth, and one which causes particularly sharp resentment.

A US diplomatic cable revealed to Wikileaks talked of the corruption:

Corruption in the inner circle is growing. Even average Tunisians are now keenly aware of it, and the chorus of complaints is rising. Tunisians intensely dislike, even hate, first lady Leila Trabelsi and her family. In private, regime opponents mock her; even those close to the government express dismay at her reported behaviour. Meanwhile, anger is growing at Tunisia's high unemployment and regional inequities. As a consequence, the risks to the regime's long-term stability are increasing.<sup>5</sup>

Illustrating the degree to which the economy was controlled by associates of the president, it is reported that Ben Ali's son-in-law, aged 28, owned a shipping cruise line, dealership concessions for Audi, Volkswagen, Porsche and Renault cars, a pharmaceuticals manufacturer and property companies.<sup>6</sup>

The regime's favoured economic model was to offer cheap labour for European markets, and to promote tourism and agriculture.

The result of economic inadequacies is that jobs are relatively menial and unemployment is rife: 13% of Tunisians are officially out of work. Twice that many young people and even more recent graduates are out of work.<sup>7</sup>

### 3 Riots

High levels of education and computer literacy have contributed to the grass roots political movement in Tunisia, which was partly coordinated through the internet, despite an effective programme of censorship on the government's part. Sheer anger among ordinary Tunisians, at the president and his wife, at corruption, economic and political disenfranchisement seems to have been sparked off by the Wikileaks cables and then by the death of the fruit seller.

Unrest had been mounting for some time in. In 2008, miners from the south staged a series of demonstrations calling for an end to nepotism and poverty. The leaders of the demonstrations were treated harshly until, in a show of presidential generosity, most of the activists were released, although one journalist remained in custody, allegedly for reporting on the events.<sup>8</sup>

The decisive uprising began in the town of Sidi Bouzid, in the interior, in December. An unemployed graduate, Mohammed Bouazizi, set himself on fire when police confiscated his fruit and vegetable stall because they said he did not have a permit. He later died. Violence was most severe in the poorer inland areas, but gradually spread to coastal towns. By 11 January it had spread to the capital, Tunis.

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<sup>4</sup> Claire Spencer, *North Africa: The Hidden Risks to Regional Stability*, Chatham House briefing paper, April 2009, p3

<sup>5</sup> "The US embassy cables North Africa: Tunisia: Repressive regime blocks US account of president's corrupt lifestyle", *Guardian*, 8 December 2010

<sup>6</sup> "The US embassy cables North Africa: Tunisia: Repressive regime blocks US account of president's corrupt lifestyle", *Guardian*, 8 December 2010

<sup>7</sup> "Tunisia's troubles", *Economist*, 8 January 2010

<sup>8</sup> "Tunisia: where solidarity brings sanctions", *Le Monde*, 9 November 2010

Amnesty International said that at least 23 were killed just during the weekend of 8-9 January.<sup>9</sup> The violence is reported to be most severe in the city of Kasserine. According to Amnesty International, scores are reported to have been detained, including lawyers, journalists, students and bloggers, often in night time raids.<sup>10</sup> In May, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture said that the total number killed during the uprising was about 300, with 700 injured.<sup>11</sup>

The president's reaction was erratic. On January 10th he promised to create 300,000 jobs for unemployed graduates within two years, without saying how. On 11 January, he sacked his interior minister, Rafik Belhaj Kacem, and ordered the release of most of those detained during the riots. The ambassador to the UK later added that those guilty of criminal acts would *not* be released.

At the same time, the Prime Minister, Mohamed Ghannouchi, said that the president had "announced the creation of a committee of investigation into corruption and to assess the mistakes of certain officials".<sup>12</sup>

Mr Ben Ali announced in a televised address on 13 January that he would not be standing at the next presidential election, due in 2014.<sup>13</sup> He also said that he had instructed Tunisian security forces not to use firearms against protesters and announced further controls on the price of basic foodstuffs, which had risen sharply. But Ben Ali had lost the confidence of the army. It was the army's backing that allowed him to stage a coup and remove his predecessor; the loss of it signalled the end of his presidency.

On 14<sup>th</sup> January, thousands took to the streets of Tunis calling for Mr Ben Ali's immediate resignation. A general strike was also called. Later that day, Mr Ben Ali left the country.

It is reported that he first applied to France for asylum but was refused, so he turned to Saudi Arabia.

The sitting prime minister said that Ben Ali's departure was temporary and announced that he, Mohammed Ghannouchi, would be the interim president but, a few hours later, it emerged that the then speaker of the parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, would be president. Ghannouchi, a technocrat who owed his career to Ben Ali and whose economic policies were partly blamed for the crisis, formed an interim government. Talks with opposition parties were held about forming a government of national unity, and Mr Ghannouchi promised that the new government would "open a new page in the history of Tunisia".<sup>14</sup> The unity government included official opposition figures, although the genuine support that these figures have is not clear, with distorted election results and the repression prevalent in the country for so many years.

Meanwhile, there were clear signs of certain groups attempting to foment disorder. It was reported that looters had been encouraged to ransack shops and homes. Gunfire was reported to be continuing and there were reports of clashes between armed groups loyal to

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<sup>9</sup> Amnesty International, "Tunisian authorities urged to protect protesters following deadly weekend", Press release, 10 January 2010

<sup>10</sup> Amnesty International, "Tunisian authorities urged to protect protesters following deadly weekend", Press release, 10 January 2010

<sup>11</sup> "Tunisia uprising toll was 300: UN", *Australian Associated Press*, 22 May 2011

<sup>12</sup> "Tunisia protests: President sacks interior minister", *BBC News Online*, 12 January 2010

<sup>13</sup> "Tunisian president says he will not seek re-election in 2014", *Guardian*, 14 January 2010

<sup>14</sup> "Regime battles to restore order", *Financial Times*, 17 January 2011

the Ben Ali regime and the army, which has taken control of much of the capital. A gun battle was reported near the presidential palace, as groups of men in unmarked cars fired weapons at random while driving through Tunis.<sup>15</sup> Ali Seriati, head of the special presidential protection police, was arrested, as the elements of the regime still in post attempted to restore their legitimacy. It was alleged by a former regime figure that Muammar Qaddafi, leader of neighbouring Libya, was cooperating with pro-Ben Ali elements to foment unrest.

Further demonstrations were reported on Monday 17. Protesters calling for the party of Ben Ali, the RCD, to play no part in the formation of the new government were dispersed with water cannon. Army tanks protected the headquarters of the RCD.

#### **4 Political groups in Tunisia**

On 15 January, elections were promised within 60 days, which led opposition parties to complain that this was not enough time to prepare for free elections.

After many years of effective repression of opposition voices, civil society, trade unions and Islamists, Tunisia did not have a ready-made opposition which could take over power. Indeed, one of the remarkable characteristics of the revolt is that it was not led by any organisation.

The biggest parties in parliament tend to support the president and the official RDC party. These “satellite parties” are:

- Mouvement des Démocrates Socialistes (MDS), which had 16 seats out of 189 in the parliament. Mustafa Ben Jaafar
- Parti de l'Unité Populaire (PUP), with 12 seats
- Union Démocratique Unioniste (UDU) (9 seats)
- Parti Social Libéral (8).
- Parti des Verts pour le Progrés (6)

The genuine opposition parties, one of which was represented in parliament, are:

- Mouvement de la Rénovation-Ettajdid (Ettajdid) (2). Created out of an old communist party, the party participated in elections and is the vehicle for the left-wing vote in Tunisia. Party leader Ahmed Ibrahim.<sup>16</sup>
- Parti Démocrate Progressiste (no seats in parliament- the party boycotted the 2009 parliamentary election). Leader Najib Chebbi.<sup>17</sup>

Several leading figures from the Ben Ali government, including the foreign minister, the finance minister and the interior minister, remained in post. Some economy jobs went to leaders of the UGTT trade union confederation.<sup>18</sup> Ministers were chosen for their personal integrity, lack of close association with Ben Ali and for technical competence in their proposed jobs, as the interim government tried to strike a balance between rejecting the old

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<sup>15</sup> “Regime battles to restore order”, *Financial Times*, 17 January 2011

<sup>16</sup> “Recherche opposition désespérément”, *Jeune Afrique*, 19 October 2010

<sup>17</sup> “Première liste non officielle pour un gouvernement en Tunisie”, *Jeune Afrique*, 16 January 2010

<sup>18</sup> Première liste non officielle pour un gouvernement en Tunisie”, *Jeune Afrique*, 16 January 2010

regime and re-establishing its own legitimacy, essential for the restoration of order and preparations for elections.

#### **4.1 Islamists**

The Islamist parties Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Nahda were outlawed under the BEN Ali regime, (along with the Parti Communiste des Ouvriers Tunisiens).

The former leader of the Nahda (renaissance) party who was exiled in London, Rachid Ghannouchi, said that he would return to Tunisia.<sup>19</sup> Nahda is an Islamist party that was repressed by Ben Ali in the 1990s. It claims to be in favour of political pluralism and dialogue with the west, although some doubt its commitment to democracy. It is not clear, however, how much support Nahda retains. It has no organisational structure in Tunisia and Islamists' loyalties may have moved to newer and more radical underground movements in the country.

Since Ben Ali's suppression of even moderate Islamism during the 1990s, there were a few incidents pointing towards radical, Salafist Islamic activity. The regime, however, operated an effective anti-terrorism regime and was fully committed to fighting Salafist terrorism.<sup>20</sup>

#### **4.2 Trade unions**

The official trade union body in Tunisia is the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT). The government has traditionally kept a very firm grip on the union movement.

At the beginning of the protests in December, the leadership of the confederation was in favour of dialogue with the government over unemployment and prices. Smaller unions that are part of the confederation staged protests in the capital city without the leadership's permission claiming that the UGTT leadership was "appeasing" the government.<sup>21</sup> The central leadership of the UGTT shifted its position over the week of 10-14 January, as it was becoming clear that Ben Ali could not survive and, on 14 January, it called for a limited general strike. On 15 January, the president of the union said that it was "not normal" to respond to protest with bullets.

### **5 The interim government of national unity**

On the morning of 14 January, when Ben Ali and his family fled, his wife is reported to have personally taken one and a half tonnes of gold from the country's central bank.<sup>22</sup> Shortly after arriving in Saudi Arabia, stories emerged that the former president had been hospitalised after suffering a stroke that left him in a coma.<sup>23</sup>

A few days later, acting interim Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi, who had been the Tunisian prime minister since 1999, pledged to free all political prisoners and lift restrictions on human rights groups, in particular, the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights.<sup>24</sup> A new deadline of 15 July 2011 was announced for the election. However, many former Ben Ali allies clung to key posts within the newly formed Cabinet, which led to further street protests and resignations by opponents to the Ben Ali regime.

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<sup>19</sup> "Anxious west fears return of Islamists". *Financial Times*, 17 January 2011

<sup>20</sup> Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, Tunisia, Counter Terrorism Environment [accessed 17 January 2011]

<sup>21</sup> "Divisions in Tunisia's main union over role in social protests", *BBC Monitoring*, 30 December 2010

<sup>22</sup> "The Tunisian job: How president's wife 'fled with \$60m in gold bullion'", *Independent*, 18 January 2011

<sup>23</sup> "Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in a coma", *Guardian online*, 17 February 2011

<sup>24</sup> "Four ministers quit new Tunisia government", *Independent*, 18 January 2011

The new interim government sought to distance itself from the previous administration while trying to institutionalise the protest, known as the 'Jasmine Revolution'. It set up commissions to examine what happened during the uprising, including an inquiry into the actions of the security forces; it also opened investigations into corruption and possible political reforms.<sup>25</sup> However street protests continued against the new Cabinet, which struggled to establish an identity separate from the Ben Ali regime. Protesters were frustrated by the slow pace of political reform. Ghannouchi himself was specifically targeted as he was a prominent member of Ben Ali's previous administration and his economic policies were partly blamed for the crisis.

The activities of the RCD were suspended on 6 February,<sup>26</sup> to help maintain public order, and the party was formally dissolved on 9 March, by a court order.<sup>27</sup> The party's assets were taken over by the state.

### **5.1 Resignation of Ghannouchi**

Mohammed Ghannouchi resigned as interim Prime Minister on 27 February in the face of continued protest about his proximity to the Ben Ali regime. The interim president, Fouad Mebazaa, named the former government minister Beji Caid-Essebsi as Ghannouchi's replacement.

### **5.2 Elections postponed again**

Originally scheduled for March, then July 2011, the first democratic election was postponed again in June, with the new date set for 23 October. The Independent Electoral Commission worried publicly that it would be impossible to complete voter registration and organise polling by July.<sup>28</sup>

The election will create a constituent assembly that will write a new constitution and prepare for legislative elections. Nahda, the moderate Islamist party that bases itself on Turkey's ruling party, has a good chance of being the largest single party in the assembly, while the leading liberal party is the Parti Démocrate Progressiste, which boycotted the 2009 election. The postponement may, however, favour the creation of new parties.

In a sign of Tunisia's very liberal attitude towards women's rights, all parties at the election will be required to field an equal number of female and male candidates.<sup>29</sup>

The interim government has been in financial difficulty, particularly because of a slump in tourism. At the end of May, the G8 offered a package of loans to the government to help it get through its difficulties. Some economists say that painful reforms, such as cutting subsidies, will be necessary to increase economic growth.

Tunisia has been strongly affected by the situation in Libya, with 471,000 refugees crossing the border, according to the Tunisian government,<sup>30</sup> and fighting sometimes spilling over into Tunisia. Ex-President Ben Ali is in exile in Saudi Arabia, but his trial *in absentia* will begin on 20 June.

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<sup>25</sup> "Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution: a domino effect across the Maghreb?" by Jon Marks, *RUSI - Chatham House*, 18 February 2011

<sup>26</sup> "Tunisia suspends Ben Ali's RCD party", *BBC News Online*, 6 February 2011

<sup>27</sup> "Former Ruling Party (RCD) dissolved" *Tunisie Agence de Presse*, 9 March 2011

<sup>28</sup> "Tunisia Postpones Election, Possibly Aiding New Parties", *New York Times*, 9 June 2011

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*



## 6 Reaction

### 6.1 EU

The EU maintained relatively close relations with Tunisia under the government of Ben Ali. Tunisia was the first country to have an Association Agreement with the EU, under the Euromed part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Association Agreement offers to create a free trade area between Tunisia and the EU, along with political, social and cultural dialogue. The agreement also foresees “financial cooperation to accompany reform measures in Tunisia”.<sup>31</sup> Tunisia has been pressing recently for an upgrade of relations to “advanced status”. This involves negotiating a new European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan and further expands cooperation,

opening up new opportunities in economic and trade relations via a progressive liberalisation in services and the right of establishment, facilitation of market access, progressive regulatory convergence and preparations of future negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, as well as reinforced cooperation with certain European agencies and programmes.<sup>32</sup>

Member states on the EU’s southern flank have traditionally been associated with a pro-Tunisia policy within the European Council. The Spanish Presidency of the EU Council (January to June 2010) is reported to have pushed hard to conclude negotiations for advanced status before the term ended but it turned out that Jordan pulled ahead of Tunisia to be granted advanced status in October 2010 while Tunisia’s negotiations are ongoing.<sup>33</sup>

The pro-regime stance of the Mediterranean countries has been attributed to their desire to maintain the stability of, and cooperation with, North African countries in relation to immigration. Counter-terrorism cooperation and trade, particularly in energy, also loom large in Spanish, French and Italian strategies.

A generous approach towards the regime was evident in public comments from some governments well into the Tunisian crisis. The French minister of agriculture said as late as 13 January that Ben Ali had been “misjudged”:

Before judging a foreign government, better to know the situation on the ground and know exactly for which reasons such and such a decision has been taken. President Ben Ali is someone who is often misjudged. One can criticise certain aspects, to be vigilant regarding human rights, but it’s not a country that has known any real difficulties.<sup>34</sup>

It was reportedly not until the next day that France changed its policy and refused Ben Ali permission to flee to France.

The French President Nicolas Sarkozy sacked the foreign minister Michèle Alliot-Marie for misleading Parliament about her ties to a businessman linked to the former President Ben Ali. According to media reports, she went on holiday to Tunisia with her parents and partner during the popular protests, and offered President Ben-Ali the use of France’s police and Special Forces to help quell the pro-democracy protests.<sup>35</sup> Her parents also profited from the

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<sup>31</sup> European External Action Service, [The EU-Tunisia Association Agreement](#),

<sup>32</sup> “The EU agrees to grant Jordan “advanced status” partnership”, EU press release, 26 October 2010

<sup>33</sup> “The EU agrees to grant Jordan “advanced status” partnership”, EU press release, 26 October 2010

<sup>34</sup> “Mediterranean EU states block stronger action on Tunisia”, EU Observer, 14 January 2011

<sup>35</sup> “France faces criticism over soft touch with Tunisia”, *France 24.com*, 13 January 2011

post-Christmas visit by doing a business property deal with Aziz Miled, a close friend of the Ben Ali family, who flew them around Tunisia on his private jet.<sup>36</sup>

The enlargement and neighbourhood policy commissioner, Stefan Fuele, is said to have been sympathetic to the complaints of Tunisian human rights organisations after visits last year, and to have been “exasperated” by the position of certain EU member states.<sup>37</sup>

## 6.2 USA

In January 2011, Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, attended a conference in Qatar as part of a tour of the Gulf. She took the opportunity to make some unusually blunt remarks about political and social development in North Africa and the Middle East, saying that leaders needed to open up political spaces, end corruption and provide a better climate for business, because, “in too many places, in too many ways, the region's foundations are sinking into the sand.” She went on:

Those who cling to the status quo may be able to hold back the full impact of their countries' problems for a little while, but not forever. If leaders don't offer a positive vision and give young people meaningful ways to contribute, others will fill the vacuum. Extremist elements, terrorist groups, and others who would prey on desperation and poverty are already out there, appealing for allegiance and competing for influence. So this is a critical moment, and this is a test of leadership for all of us.<sup>38</sup>

## 7 Outlook

In a prescient briefing paper for Chatham House, Claire Spencer criticised authoritarianism in North Africa and called for political and economic reform that would allow for the societies in the region to develop. To support such reform, she said that the EU and the US should modify their concentration on terrorism:

Success depends on renegotiating the social contracts on which North Africa's states are based. A broadening of participation, above all through the extension of legal employment, targeted investment on education, health and skills, and the establishment of independent legal and regulatory frameworks, will go some way towards addressing socio-economic stresses.

A change in the political environment, however, requires a re-evaluation of how the region's security climate is seen from outside, with adjustments in the kind of support given to regional governments by its key international partners, the European Union and the United States.<sup>39</sup>

Algeria was already in the grip of disturbances before the end of 2010. On 12 January, a man set himself on fire. Two other instances of attempted self-immolation were reported in Algeria subsequently, although none of the individuals died. On 17 January, another case was reported in Cairo, Egypt. Another man covered himself with petrol, also on 17 January, in Nouakchott, capital of Mauritania.

It was events in Tunisia that seem finally to have broken the fear barrier, and this clearly had a profound effect on people throughout the region. There were sympathy demonstrations in

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<sup>36</sup> “Nicolas Sarkozy sacks foreign minister after Tunisia row”, *Daily Telegraph*, 27 February 2011

<sup>37</sup> “Mediterranean EU states block stronger action on Tunisia”, *EU Observer*, 14 January 2011

<sup>38</sup> US Department of State, [Travel Diary: Secretary Clinton's Remarks at the Forum for the Future Partnership Dialogue](#), 13 January 2011

<sup>39</sup> Claire Spencer, [North Africa: The Hidden Risks to Regional Stability](#), Chatham House briefing paper, April 2009

many neighbouring countries. Analysts were confident that, for the authoritarian regimes of the region, things would never be quite the same, and it was not long before the spark lit by Tunisian demonstrators set Egypt alight. Tunisia's neighbour to the west, Libya, soon followed Egypt into an uprising, with other countries such as Bahrain and Syria similarly affected.

The western focus on al-Qaeda and violent jihadism has already been blurred in the region by the simple fact that such groups were not involved in the momentous events of 2011.

Of all the countries where uprisings took place in 2011, however, Tunisia's revolution is making the most progress. It may be that Tunisia's high levels of educational achievement and long record of stability (albeit bought at the cost of stifling repression), coupled with relative prosperity and an exceptionally progressive attitude to women, turn out to be the necessary pre-conditions for the most complete transition to democracy in the region.

## North Africa: transparency, freedom and business competitiveness

Name	Year	Algeria		Morocco		Tunisia		Libya	
		Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
Freedom House Index	2009	5.5/7	Not Free	4.5/7	Partly Free	6.0/7	Not Free	7.0/7	Not Free
Bertelsmann Transformation Status Index	2008	4.72/10	84/125	4.65/10	86/125	5.37/10	73/125	4.24/10	97/125
Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index	2009	56.6	107/179	57.7	101/179	58.00	98/179	43.5	171/179
Economic Freedom of the World Index	2008	5.57/10	124/141	6.24/10	95/141	6.44/10	82/141	N/A	N/A
World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index	2008	3.71/7	99/134	4.08/7	73/134	4.58/7	36/134	3.85/7	91/134
Milken Institute Capital Access Index	2008	N/A	N/A	4.08/10	71/122	4.6/10	59/122	N/A	N/A
World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index	2008	N/A	132/181	N/A	128/181	N/A	73/181	N/A	N/A
UNDP Human Development Index	2008	0.748/1	100/179	0.646/1	127/179	0.762/1	95/179	0.840/1	52/179
Transparency International Corruptions Perception Index	2008	3.2/10	92/180	3.5/10	80/180	4.4/10	62/180	2.6/10	126/180

Sources: various. Compiled in Claire Spencer, *North Africa: The Hidden Risks to Regional Stability*, Chatham House briefing paper, April 2009, p4