

The Social Bond, Conflict and Violence in Haiti

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Design: Studio 7 www.studio7.no
ISBN 978-82-7288-455-9
ISBN 978-82-7288-456-6



Remains of the port facilities at
Wharf Reynolds, near Miragoâne,
Nippes, southern Haiti. Photo
taken by Mackenson Thelisma



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Acknowledgements

This report is an outcome of the project, *Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Haiti: Insight from Marginalized Communities*, funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The report has been translated from French to English with the support of the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) www.peacebuilding.no

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
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ISBN 978-82-7288-455-9 (print); 978-82-7288-456-6 (online)

Cover design: www.studiosju.no

Cover Photo: Mackenson Thelisma

Urban population (thousands)



2012

The Social Bond, Conflict and Violence in Haiti

Alain Gilles

Translated from French by Susan Mutti

Excerpt from the speech given by the Prime Minister, Ms. Michèle Pierre-Louis, at the International Convention of the Haitian Diaspora, Miami, 9 August 2009

Ki sa nou vle di lè n ap pale de inite?

Inite vle di sòti nan sispisyon, nan lè w gade yon Ayisyen parèy ou, anvan menm ou pale avè l, ou gen tan mete l nan yon kategori: sa se yon boujwa, sa se yon piti so yèt, sa se yon peyizan gwo zotèy, sa se yon arivis, sa se yon dyaspora, sa se yon bakoulou, sa se yon gran jipon, sa se yon chanpwèl, sa se yon lougarou ki vole gran jou, sa se yon lavalas, sa se yon makout.

Se konsa nou ye menm. Voye pawòl monte san jistifikasyon, san konesans, san egzèsè jigman nou, paske nan fon kè nou, nou pa kwè nan inite tout bon vre. Se yon mo nou repete san konviksyon paske nou toujou rete nan sa mwen rele “la culture de l’échec et du dénigrement”.

.....
M sonje apre Divalye ale, nan efèvesans kite gen nan peyi an, yo te envite m nan yon reyinyon nan Latibonit kote yon bann ak yon pakèt peyizan te reyini pou yo brase lide sou sityasyon yo. Epi, gen yon gwoup ki rive ak yon pannkat ki te ekri: “nou menm peyizan Janvyè, 5èm seksyon Ti Rivyè, nou nan peyi an tou”. Nou nan peyi an tou.

.....
N ap viv nan yon peyi klwazonen, fraktire, kote nou pa pran tan pou nou rankontre tout bon vre. Sa vle di, moun ki gen lajan yo rete ansanm, sa ki pòv yo rete ansanm, peyizan rete ak peyizan, ouvriye ak ouvriye, sektè prive ak sektè prive, dyaspora ak dyaspora, etidyan ak etidyan, elatriye. Peyi an pa brase ase, li pa melanje ase, pa gen ase deba serye ant dives sektè pou yo echanje, pou yo diskite, pou yo rive fè konpwomi.

Translation

What do we mean by unity?

Unity means an end to suspicion, an end to the practice of labelling our fellow Haitians before a single word is said: he’s bourgeois, he’s a lower-class kid; this one’s a shoeless peasant; she’s a self-seeking careerist whereas he’s out of his element; he’s a bluffer; she’ll do anything; he’s an evil chanpwèl, he’s a werewolf; he’s a lavalas (a partisan of Aristide); he’s a makout (a Duvalier man).

That’s what we do. We speak out loud without call, with no knowledge of what we’re talking about, without using our judgement, because deep down inside we don’t really believe in unity. It’s a word we repeat without conviction. We have settled into what I call “the culture of failure and denigration”.

.....
I remember that after Jean-Claude Duvalier’s departure, in the wave of excitement that swept the country at that time, I was invited to a meeting in Artibonite where very many farmers had come together to talk about their living conditions. The last group arrived with a placard reading, “We, farmers from Janvier, 5th rural section of Petite-Rivière-de-l’Artibonite, we’re also part of the country”. We are also part of the country.

.....
We live in a segmented, fractured country, where no one takes the time to really get to know each other. This has many consequences: the rich meet amongst themselves, the poor meet amongst themselves, farmers get together amongst themselves, so do workers, private-sector people get together with each other, the members of the diaspora meet amongst themselves, students meet amongst themselves, and so on. The country doesn’t mix enough, there isn’t enough debate between sectors for exchange and discussion that will lead to compromise.

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Summary

This study is the second part of a research project on violence in Haiti. The project was started after President Aristide's departure into exile in early 2004 and the arrival of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

Researchers, political analysts, the international community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have generally focused their attention on political violence in Haiti, perhaps because of its high visibility and the human toll it has taken in a relatively brief period. Political violence is nevertheless discontinuous and event-related. Coups d'état, electoral violence and food riots are not ongoing occurrences.

While the first part of the project, conducted in 2007, considered political violence, this part looks at day-to-day social relations in communities in order to enhance understanding of the recurring nature of political violence. Two sets of questions need to be addressed. First, what are the types of relationships between the elites and the masses that allow the former to rely on the latter for the purposes of political mobilization in the form of violent demonstrations? Second, what are the characteristics of the social processes in suburban communities that predispose them to take part in such mobilizations? The present report addresses the second question.

Our point of departure is the intense urbanization of the country, which has led to the appearance of slum-like *cités*, or neighbourhoods, around urban centres. These neighbourhoods are home to social processes that predispose the inhabitants to violent political participation. Our hypothesis is that weaker traditional social bonds resulting from rural migrations and the absence of trust in the newly emerging social relationships and in formal institutions have deprived the inhabitants of mechanisms for resolving the conflicts that have become part of their daily lives. Those conflicts are likely to be solved through a form of social violence that is "incidental" but nevertheless sets in motion learning processes that make violence a practical way of solving problems. Political leaders find it convenient to rely on this culture to pursue their own agendas. Trust and social bonds are thus the two main independent variables used to explain the probability that social unrest will turn violent in various neighbourhoods.

Our findings show that weak social bonds and low trust in both social relationships and formal institutions, such as the state, NGOs and MINUSTAH, are traits shared by most neighbourhoods, slums, urban areas and rural villages. Slums are weaker when it comes to vertical indicators, those that link individuals from different social backgrounds or from different neighbourhoods. Weak vertical social bonds are a stronger determinant of the probability that social conflicts will evolve into violence.

Trust in social relationships is more important than trust in formal institutions when it comes to the probability that personal conflicts will turn violent. In the slums, there is less trust in social relationships than in formal institutions. It is also in the slums that social unrest is more likely to be resolved by violent means.

Finally, commercial activities linked to the import of consumer goods (cars, electronic devices, etc.) may generate large-scale population movements that affect social bonds and trust. Urban centres such as Miragoâne, in the Nippes region, create more anomic social relationships that are more prone to conflict and violence.

In terms of policy recommendations, initiatives should be considered that reinforce social cohesion and the level of trust among people in the communities. The study shows that private-sector teaching and the sale of mostly imported goods are the main activities of the less than 30 per cent who report that they have a job. These are service activities that depend on revenue transfers from abroad. Productive activities require greater cooperation in terms of planning and management. Such activities should be fostered by encouraging people to make joint investments.

The political leadership should be capable of renewing its relationships with the urban masses. This requires that political groups be made aware of what is at stake and be willing to take the risk. In the past, initiatives have been launched to work with political parties. Such initiatives would be more objective and legitimate if they were based on research. Research findings such as these should be reproduced in forms that are accessible to people and groups involved in Haitian politics.

MINUSTAH is a dilemma. The potential for violence remains strong in Haiti. The national police, by various estimations, cannot yet meet the challenge of securing the country both internally and externally. The current government has made it known that a new armed force is necessary. The international community, as appears from public declarations, is not in favour of the idea. MINUSTAH, in the present situation, looks like it is still necessary. The population places little trust in it, however, as shown by the study and in press reports (a sample of which is to be found on page 48). The same holds true for other institutions, like the state and NGOs. This makes the situation complex. Again, people should know about research findings like these. More study may be needed in this field of inquiry.

Introduction

The daily generation of violence

This study is the second part of a research project initiated by the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) under the guidance of Dr. Wenche Hauge, working with Dr. Rachele Doucet, in respect of the United Nations stabilization missions sent to help Haiti cope with rampant violence. The first part was conducted in 2007 and 2008 in the Artibonite region and basically examined the issue of political violence.

The fundamental idea underpinning the second part of the study is that political violence – a subject of interest to political leaders and groups, the international community and analysts of the Haitian political scene because of its impact on society as a whole – consists essentially in the exploitation of the social violence spawned by the multiple social relationships discernable both at the micro level (interpersonal relations) and at the relatively more complex level of relationships between neighbours or neighbourhoods. The slums, or peripheral neighbourhoods more generally, are the perfect breeding ground for social relationships of a kind that is prone to exploitation for violence. It is important to understand the various risk factors in terms of the development of violent behaviour. We believe that account must be taken of the various types of social bonds in Haitian society, in the peripheral neighbourhoods in particular, and their relationship to violence in order to engage in a more comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of violence in Haiti.

Studies of violence in Haiti generally tend to focus on the political dimension. The titles of Robert D. Heins's book, *Written in Blood* (1996), of Bernard Diedrich's more recent two-volume *Le prix du sang* (2005, 2011) and of Alain Turnier's *Quand la nation demande des comptes* (nd) clearly refer to the violence that has marked the history of political life in the country. The first part of this study on violence (Gilles, 2008), the results of which are presented in *État, conflit et violence en Haiti*, also centred on the political dimension of violence in Haiti. The focus on political violence and its by-products (infrapolitical violence) is partly due to the central role of politics in Haitian society. Throughout the country's history, low economic output has made control of political power the means of access to the distribution of earnings from the export of agricultural goods and, since the 1980s, from international aid and contraband (see, for example: Mintz, 1995; Lundahl, 1989; Gilles, 2012). The post-Duvalier violence, especially that which broke out after the military institution established by the 1915 American occupation was dismantled in 1994, in the international context of the post-Cold War, privatization and globalization of violence, served as justification for the United Nations peace and stability missions and lent an obvious international dimension to the Haitian situation, compared as a rule to the civil wars in countries of Asia, Africa or Central Europe. The recurring nature of the political violence in Haiti sufficed to make it a major concern in the country's international relations and in recent analyses of the Haitian problem. Indeed, the preface to the 2011 World Development Report (World Bank, 2011) reads:

In 1944, delegates from 45 countries gathered at Bretton Woods to consider the economic causes of the World War that was then still raging, and how to secure the peace. They agreed to create the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the original institution of what has become the World Bank Group ... Over 60 years later, the “R” in IBRD has a new meaning: reconstructing Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, and other lands of conflict or broken states.

In time of explosive non-violence

But what happens between eruptions of collective violence? What is it that allows a political leader or person occupying a key position in the Haitian social structure or in illicit trafficking to mobilize, when the time comes, dozens, hundreds, even thousands of individuals who burn, pillage and rampage? How are the ties between the masses and their leaders in the slums, on the one hand, and those instrumentalizing them, on the other, forged, maintained and reproduced? This is a question that has not been studied and therefore allows us to forget that an army is not formed the day it mobilizes to go to war. I believe the answer has to do with the way in which Haitian society is integrated. Is violence one of the mechanisms by which the elites and the masses interact? We know that in the coded language of Haitian political society, “the capacity to mobilize”, when used with reference to leaders or political parties, often means the capacity to bring the masses out onto the streets so as to intimidate the adversary with violence. This is a constant of Haitian political life. Most of the country’s statesmen were well-known revolutionary leaders (*chef Caco*) heading groups of peasants armed with pikes or other weapons. The last *chef Caco* was Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, a lawyer and doctor in Europe. In his country he had to become a *chef Caco* to be well considered, “to wear a frock coat, a panama hat, a revolver tucked into his belt, a machete or *couline* slung around his neck” (Gaillard, 1987, p. 62). During the post-1986 period, members of the political class, addressing the masses in the slums who had rallied to their cause, spoke in defence of necklacing in terms that send shudders down spines to this day. In short, how are the networks of violence formed, maintained and reproduced?

Another question is what happens in the environments inhabited by the masses, in the social sectors that participate at various levels in the collective explosions that violent political demonstrations represent? Here, I believe Haitian society has to be considered from the point of view of factors of change first felt in the 1980s: population movements from rural areas to towns or urban, market-oriented villages brought about by geographical location, and a social movement, a sort of downward social mobility, driving the lower middle class into peripheral neighbourhoods in which living conditions are steadily deteriorating. The movement is therefore twofold: demographic (migration from rural areas to slums) and social (the “slumification” of urban residential neighbourhoods). Urbanization in Haiti takes the same form as in most other towns in underdeveloped countries. It is not the urban population that is growing, but the population in the slums and peripheral neighbourhoods. In fact, contrary to one representation of Haitian social reality – the result of Cité Soleil’s widespread fame - Port-au-Prince is not the only town gradually becoming a slum. All the country’s towns, small and medium-sized, have peripheral neighbourhoods that, combined with the lack of urban infra-

structure, are taking shape in a way that does not always serve to delimit areas defined in terms of living conditions. A sort of continuum of precarity has resulted in the few areas that are relatively urbanized being swallowed up in a whole characterized by a lack of urban services.

In fact, the two questions raise the issue of the Haitian social order, which is so often described in terms of chaos, drama or failure. Indeed, how, despite the frustrations stirred by centuries of inequality and inhuman living conditions, does Haitian society manage to maintain and regenerate itself? Of course, the country's political history is steeped in violence and revolt, but it is as though the violence and revolt were themselves integrated into that history to the point of being the mechanisms by which society is structured and evolves. Our questions echo those running through the work of Pierre Bourdieu, who asks how it is:

that the established order, with its relationships of domination, its rights and prerogatives, privileges and injustices, ultimately perpetuates itself so easily, apart from a few historical accidents, and that the most intolerable conditions of existence can so often be perceived as acceptable and even natural. (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 7)

From violence fuelled by a rural population to violence driven by the urban masses

Contemporary political violence in Haiti has characteristics relating to the intense rural migration that contributed to the formation of slums most everywhere in the country. The violence that led to the downfall of the Duvalier dictatorship was essentially urban, as was the violence that marked and followed the fall of the Aristide government in 2004 and served as the grounds for the latest United Nations mission, MINUSTAH. It is a far cry from the nineteenth-century uprisings that preceded the arrival of the Americans and relied on troops recruited from among the peasantry. Both Haitian society and its violence have been urbanized. In other words, the political violence bears the hallmarks of the society generating it. Nineteenth-century Haitian society was essentially rural, both demographically (most of the population lived in rural settlements dispersed throughout the territory) and economically (output was essentially agricultural). The political violence of the time was spearheaded by notable men from the main towns, major landowners who mobilized regional armies of foot soldiers who were for the most part landless peasants.

At the end of the twentieth century, the drop in agricultural output brought about by a policy aimed at subcontracted industries, the import of foodstuffs and the ensuing deteriorating living conditions of the peasantry pushed the rural population towards the urban centres. In the absence of an industrial sector able to absorb them, the migrants settled in socially and physically marginalized neighbourhoods, known as slums, that became perfect sites for smuggling and drug trafficking. They provided a training ground for the "born leaders" willing to direct the violence characteristic of the political scene during the post-Duvalier period. Haiti therefore witnessed a shift from

violence fuelled by a poor rural population, the wretched, the barefoot, the *cacos*, as they were known during the “period of the bayonets”, to urban violence driven by the urban masses resulting from rural migration and the pauperization of the lower middle class.

The social structure of violence

The common and persistent physical hardships of life in many early societies of course explain in part the high evidence of violence in early verbal art forms... But violence in oral art forms is also connected with the structure of orality itself. When all verbal communication must be by direct word of mouth, involved in the give-and-take dynamics of sound, interpersonal relations are kept high – both attractions and, even more, antagonisms. (Ong, 1982, p. 45)

Political violence, as expressed by “the threat or use of physical force or power” against the adversary for the purpose of political conquest or maintaining the status quo, except in situations of civil war, is episodic in nature. In a given country, palace revolutions in the form of coups d’état, elections won by intimidation and the use of force are not ongoing in nature. Repeated, recurrent political violence, which cannot be attributed to circumstance alone, nevertheless presupposes that the violence is integrated into the social structure as reproduced in daily social relationships, but not necessarily in a violent form. According to Walter Ong (1982, p. 45), orality can itself produce violence. It cannot be said, however, that orality is in and of itself violent. In other words, a society’s structure can have traits that make it violent, but that may not necessarily be indicative of social inequality or marginalization in the manner of Johan Galtung’s structural violence (1969).

In this study, we seek to understand how social processes such as population movements can affect social bonds, the trust that people have in social relationships and in institutions, such that town peripheries become training and breeding grounds for violence. We stress not only collective violence, of which political violence is a specific type, but also the violence that is a part of the everyday lives of people in the slums and in downwardly mobile neighbourhoods. Such violence is discernable both at the micro level of interpersonal relationships and in relationships involving larger groups or entire neighbourhoods. Our position is that political violence, which differs in its objectives from other forms of violence, mobilizes different means and has different destructive effects, can be fed by acts of low-level violence looked on as incidental news items. Daily interpersonal or interneighbourhood violence provides learning, leadership training and recruitment opportunities for the larger-scale operations that constitute political violence.

Outline of the report

This report has five parts. In the first, we present the concepts of social bond and trust which, when applied on the ground, furnish the independent variables for the research hypothesis.

Part II presents the study methodology: the data collection instruments and operation, and the features of the samples studied.

Part III presents the social bond variable, analysed from the affective and historical points of view. The social bond is examined in various contexts: the departments, the neighbourhoods.

In Part IV we study the trust variable, starting with trust in immediate social relationships, then moving to trust in the institutions involved in the organization of collective life.

The fifth and last part presents the importance of social unrest in the neighbourhoods and the probability that it will turn violent. The social bond and trust variables are used to interpret the data constellation.

Part I

The research concepts Social bond and trust

After *Bringing Men Back In* (Wrong, 1961; Homans, 1964) and *Bringing the State Back In* (Evans et al., 1985), it would seem we are now *Bringing Society Back In* (Zimmer and Freise, 2006); we have to take account of what constitutes society. According to Zimmer and Freise:

There are many reasons why social scientists and policy experts alike are increasingly turning to society in their search for reform concepts, new ideas and progressive initiatives. In times of globalization and Europeanization, traditional nation-states have lost power and steering capacity. The state-centered reform concepts of the 1970s focusing on management and social engineering are therefore out of date. However, the so-called Washington consensus emphasizing exclusively the power of the market also did not prove to be successful... Against the background of high rates of unemployment, growing social inequality and the uncertain future of the welfare state caused by a combination of market and state failure, society-centered approaches regained importance in the social sciences.

In our case, a society-centred approach is of even greater resonance because in Haiti, institutions such as the state are characterized by their incapacity to act in such a way as to have a substantial impact on society's traditional way of functioning.

The concepts of relevance to this approach, which looks for the determinants of social life in society rather than in the state or in individuals, are civil society, social capital, social bond and trust.

1. The concept of social bond

The concept of social bond is a good entry point to the Haitian social universe as we endeavour to understand the daily lives of the people in the various communities, towns and villages.

According to Serge Paugam (2008, p. 6), "The purpose of the social bond, down through history, has been to unite individuals and social groups and to ensure their peaceful co-existence through shared rules." If the social bonds are loose and frayed by the harshness of daily life, then the social relationships grow tense and conflicts become recurrent - within families and neighbourhoods, between neighbourhoods - and tend to be managed by violent means.

While "social bond" is a recent term, as attested by Henri Mendras (2001), the concept can be said to lie at the very origin of all thinking on social matters. Émile Durkheim's theory, in which he develops his concept of social solidarity, is quite rightly con-

sidered by Serge Paugam as an “introduction to the social bond”. Indeed, the term "social bond" refers to the concepts of solidarity, integration and socialization, the organizing principles of all social life. For Delphine Desmulier (2002), “the expression ‘social bond’ designates what allows men to live together and to live in society ... consideration of the social bond was the prerogative of those reflecting on the social contract, such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and, of course, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, each of whom sought in his own way to justify ‘living together’.” The concept of social bond has several dimensions. It was already mentioned by Georg Simmel, with regard to interpersonal relationships. These are the types of sociability found in the family, in primary groups more generally speaking. The political dimension encompasses participation in political life in the form of voting, or affiliation with a political group. The economic dimension can be highlighted by the ties of employment.

The institutional factors of the social bond

The universality of the social bond does not prevent it from being a historical product marked by the culture and the institutional framework of the environment from which it emerges. The state can be considered the main institutional factor generating social bonds in modern societies. To reinforce the social bond, the state acts to attenuate social inequality, to ease the distortions that hinder free competition, to produce the goods needed for collective well-being but the costs of which are relatively high. This holds true even if the place of the state as an agent producing social bonds varies depending on the historical circumstances. The case of France is typical of the major role that the state apparatus can play in the construction of a nation (see, for example, Rosanvallon, 1990, pp. 95-135).

This is a crucial element in the formation of Haitian society. Many analysts underscore the relatively destructive role of the state in the establishment of mechanisms that might have helped structure Haitian society (Trouillot, 1990). In Haiti, the state has tended to enrich an urban minority at the expense of the peasant majority (Lundahl, 1989). Its abdication from the task of strengthening social cohesion is easily illustrated: suffice it to remember that the state handed responsibility for education to the Catholic Church. And when one considers that the Catholic Church has itself only served to reinforce the social divisions that are a legacy of the colonial system, it is easy to understand the fragility of Haitian society (Hurbon, 2004; Joint, 2006).

Along with the state, the market has played a paramount role as an institution generating social bonds in modern societies. This is a vision that dates back to Adam Smith, for whom society was based on exchanges between individuals pursuing their own interests. Society can only reach its limits with the distribution of labour, which is itself contingent on market expansion.

The importance of the state and the market in forging social bonds is of particular significance in this study given their frailty in Haitian society. The national market is in fact a series of non-integrated micro markets, each working according to its own logic; supply and demand are confined to relatively closed areas. For their part, traditional institutions like the family and religious groups, which provide the social cement in this society, are being affected by the gradual dislocation of communities subjected to population movements brought about by deteriorating living conditions.

Social bond, conflict and violence

Émile Durkheim first established the relationship between the social bond and types of behaviour deemed deviant by society. In its most recent development report, the World Bank (2011) stresses that intensive urbanization undermines social cohesion and heightens the risk of violence. It also points out that urbanization alone is not responsible for violence, recognizing that:

When state institutions do not adequately protect citizens, guard against corruption, or provide access to justice; when markets do not provide job opportunities; or when communities have lost social cohesion — the likelihood of violent conflict increases.

As social cohesion crumbles, it has become more and more difficult in Haiti to ensure public security and maintain non-violent social order. The World Bank analysis of the country (2006, p. 31) underscores the following:

For most of the rural population, fear is not a major concern. However, the demographic and economic trends described above are undermining some of the foundations of Haiti's traditional social cohesion, and will place heavy responsibilities on the state for maintaining social order in the future.

2. Trust, conflict and violence

For Georg Simmel, trust is probably as important as the social bond, integration and cohesion were for Émile Durkheim. It is to Simmel (1906) that we owe the following considerations:

Life rests upon a thousand presuppositions which the individual can never trace back to their origins, and verify; but which he must accept upon faith and belief... We rest our most serious decisions upon a complicated system of conceptions, the majority of which presuppose confidence that we have not been deceived.

In fact, trust is the cornerstone of social life. Jan Philipp Reemtsma (2012a) writes, “Generally speaking, social trust exists; ultimately it explains why societies are possible

and why life continues”. In his book, *Trust and Violence* (2012b, p. 12), Reemtsma cites Luhmann, who states:

In many situations... one can choose in certain respects whether or not to bestow trust. But a complete absence of trust would prevent him even from getting up in the morning. He would be prey to a vague sense of dread, to paralysing fears ... Anything and everything would be possible. Such abrupt confrontation with the complexity of the world at its most extreme is beyond human endurance.

Referring to David Hume, Reemtsma recalls the difference between interpersonal trust and social trust. Hume calls into question the existence of a continuum between “trust in people” and “trust in political systems”. Reemtsma, for his part, believes:

[T]he absence of a continuum does not mean that there is nothing connecting the abstract with the interpersonal ... There can be no trust in institutions or society in general without a relationship to the individual. It wouldn't make sense to speak of social trust if we didn't assume it affected our behavioural expectations of others.

We take account of these two dimensions of the concept of trust: trust in social relationships, or interpersonal trust or trust in the immediate social environment, and trust in institutions. Logically, it seems to us that interpersonal trust is not necessarily linked to trust in institutions. The historical process by which institutions took shape can prompt individuals in a society in general to feel alienated from or to reject institutions with which they do not identify. Such would seem to be the case in Latin America and Haiti, where state institutions, from constitutional regimes to legal systems, were imported from Europe by political and intellectual elites without any regard for the historical or social conditions. Community social bonds thus developed independently of the institutions by which they are supposed to be governed.

Recent writings give pride of place to the concept of trust, considered as a fundamental tool in the study of social interactions, in terms of both interpersonal relationships and the more complex social relationships of institutions and societies (Peyrefite, 1998; Fukuyama, 1995). For Amartya Sen (2003, p. 263), “Successful operation of an exchange economy depends on mutual trust and the use of norms – explicit and implicit”.

In contemporary analyses, the concept of trust is increasingly crucial to understanding of certain fundamental phenomena, such as development and conflict resolution (Gaborit, 2009). If they have no trust in the institutions of the judicial system, people tend to settle their differences by their own means, and those means are not likely to exclude violence. The state must be trusted if it is to be the only institution society recognizes as able to make legitimate use of violence.

In the case of Haitian society, as opposed to developed societies, the social fabric must be discussed from a completely different perspective. While the countries of Europe and the United States worry about the vanishing or weakening social bond, about the indi-

vidualism wrought by the consequences of a modern society unable to come to grips with its own effects, in Haiti one is struck more by the absence of the basic social bond, the bond that engenders social life in all its initial manifestations. The obstacles to the construction of a strong social bond have been described in various ways by different researchers who have examined the formation of Haitian society.

What made the Haitian revolutionary phenomenon exceptional was the fragility of both the constituent foundations of this new community attaining an independent voice in the chorus of nations and the material and human resources it had to construct a new State ... when the Revolution broke out, most of the colony's population had been present on the territory for just barely a century. During the proclamation of general freedom and of the definitive abolition of the slave trade in the area, almost two thirds of workers having regained their liberty were new arrivals. This entire human congregation had few groups with ties of kinship forged over three generations. In general, its members, who were from a host of West and East African tribes, had been "desocialized" by the violence of trafficking and slavery, spoke various languages and followed diverse customs, found themselves forced to take part, in their new place of settlement and in a very short time, in an entire process of integration within a new community. (Hector and Hurbon, 2009, p. 17)

The question of social bond in Haitian society requires several levels of analysis. But first and foremost, there are the bonds that are formed on the basis of geography and blood ties. These include ties of kinship and those that are found in communities, neighbourhoods and villages. We can say that traditional Haitian society is basically grounded in the solidarity emerging from the social bonds thus forged. Such bonds predominate throughout the Haitian social system.


3. Rural migration and the breakdown of society

As Loïc Wacquant points out (2005, p. 5), all towns everywhere, on all continents, have terms in their topographical list to designate those places "at the bottom of the hierarchical system of places making up the metropolis", where people who have been uprooted, sometimes from distant places, congregate. In the developing countries, such people are usually nationals of the country, migrants from impoverished villages or simple hamlets deprived of all necessities. These population movements, according to Mike Davis (2004, p. 5) will "constitute a watershed in human history. For the first time the urban population of the earth will outnumber the rural." They take various forms and give rise to phenomena bearing the marks of ethnic division, poverty, the precarity of the state and social fractures.

As in most countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia, the urban population in Haiti is steadily growing, thanks especially to migratory flows from rural areas to urban zones. Although still smaller than the rural population, the urban population's relative size continues to increase, as is shown in Figure 1.1. In 2003, the urban population represented 40.4 per cent of the country's population; in 2009, it represented 46.9 per cent.


In fact, it is the slum population that is growing. As is shown in Figure 1.2, the country's slum population did not stop growing between 1990 and 2007. The relative drop observed in 2005, due perhaps to a move to the villages and the countryside in the wake of the urban political violence that broke out in the final days of the Duvalier regime, was reversed in 2007. It is estimated that over 70 per cent of the people in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area live in neighbourhoods that are becoming slums.

Figure 1.1: Changes in Haiti's urban and rural populations 1950 – 2009



Source: Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique and Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, *Carte de pauvreté d'Haïti*, 2004.

Figure 1.2: Index of the slum population



Source of the data used to construct the diagram: United Nations, Statistics Division.

4. Characteristics of rural migration and slum formation

- Rural migration has not been caused by urban industrialization, but by the impoverishment of the countryside as a result of a deliberate policy to import foodstuffs.
- Not only does the slum population exceed that of town residential quarters, and not only do almost three quarters of the population in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area live in slums, the population in the peripheral neighbourhoods (slums) is growing more quickly than that in the residential neighbourhoods as such.
- The slumification of rural areas near urban centres is giving birth to a vast system of unregulated transportation shuttling people between the various slums.
- Urban areas are being transformed into slums as living conditions deteriorate in town as well. Housing is overcrowded, new buildings spring up without planning, existing edifices are squatted. The case of Haiti's Simbi Continental Hotel is one example.


- Increasingly, slums are distributed throughout the urban territory. They no longer occupy just the peripheral areas that once linked them to the villages. They are spreading, and very few residential neighbourhoods are spared. The cost of rented accommodation in the peripheral slums, which are closer to areas with jobs, ports and the business centre and have more direct connections to towns in the provinces, the population increase, the transportation system and mobile phones are among the factors driving the spread of slums to the secondary residential areas (Fermathe, Kenscoff, etc.) of the well-to-do south-east of Pétion-Ville.
- The slums are characterized by high residential mobility. School surveys show that underprivileged children change school frequently and usually attend schools located far from the places where their parents or the people with whom they live dwell. This is because the parents often move for reasons relating to the absence of civil security (no police station), political violence, their belief that they are in a “bad neighbourhood” or may be cursed, rent levels or the availability of jobs.
- The slums of Port-au-Prince, Gonaïves and Cap played an important part in the political dynamics of the post-1986 period. In 2008, food riots in the slums of Les Cayes, in the south, helped precipitate the government’s overthrow. The slum populations are therefore being thoroughly politicized. The born leaders in the various neighbourhoods are being solicited by different groups seeking to influence the country’s politics.
- Because of the deteriorating living conditions of the middle class, the slums are also becoming home to impoverished urban families. This seems to be turning certain slums into places where different social classes mix. While there may be a relationship between environment and level of schooling, used here as an indicator of social status, Table 1.1 shows that the slums are also home to respondents that have gone beyond secondary school. This is in fact a consequence of the drop in standing of the middle class.

Table 1.1
Level of schooling by type of environment (rural, residential or slum)

Level of schooling		Type of environment			Total
		Rural village	Residential neighbourhood	Periphery or slum	
No schooling	Count	60	73	100	233
	% in Type of environment	16.9%	11.6%	15.8%	14.4%
Incomplete primary schooling	Count	50	57	98	205
	% in Type of environment	14.0%	9.0%	15.5%	12.7%
Complete primary schooling	Count	36	65	60	161
	% in Type of environment	10.1%	10.3%	9.5%	9.9%
Incomplete secondary schooling	Count	155	235	263	653
	% in Type of environment	43.5%	37.2%	41.6%	40.3%
Complete secondary schooling	Count	38	85	50	173
	% in Type of environment	10.7%	13.5%	7.9%	10.7%
Post-secondary schooling	Count	17	116	61	194
	% in Type of environment	4.8%	18.4%	9.7%	12.0%
Total	Count	356	631	632	1619
	% in Type of environment	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

- Slums are formed not only by migration from rural regions to towns, but also by the impoverishment of the lower middle class. Urban buildings are squatted and extended to form neighbourhoods not unlike slums. The earthquake of 12 January 2010 also created another source of slums: the camps set up for the tent population will probably become slums. The families living there will continue to be marginalized and engage in temporary livelihoods that will never improve their living conditions.

Figure 1.3 Cité Canaan
A camp for victims of the earthquake of 12 January 2010
The camp already has the look of a future slum.



Source: <http://www.youvalley.com/Levanjiltv/graphics/HAITICANAAN7.jpg>

Figure 1.4
The grounds of the Simbi Continental luxury hotel were vandalized after the fall of the Duvaliers and transformed into a slum



Adapted from: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tqv89NuGO94>

5. Research hypotheses

We want to highlight the place of population movements, in particular the formation of slums, in the new forms of violence characterizing social and political life in Haiti.

The concepts on which we base our analysis of the risk of strife and the likelihood that it will degenerate into violence are social bond and trust, which are interconnected. We view rural migration, in a context marked by the absence of industrialization and the precarity of public services, as leading to the gradual breakdown of traditional social bonds in rural communities and to the formation of urban communities known as slums, in which living conditions do not allow new social bonds and relationships of trust to be built in social relations.

Our fundamental hypothesis is that Haitian society is riven by strong tendencies towards uniformization of living conditions. Rural migration is bringing peasants to a social space that is also being constructed by a downwardly mobile urban population. The slums are not home to rural migrants alone. However, in the absence of a policy that sets construction standards, migrants are also tending to settle everywhere with their lifestyle.

The decline in agricultural output with no concomitant rise in production in other sectors of the economy is gradually turning the country into an addict of international aid and migrant remittances, and of the profits to be made from smuggling and drug trafficking. The entire social system is thus subject to pressure loosening bonds and fomenting mistrust of institutions. In other words, the differences between residential neighbourhoods in towns and slum quarters, if they exist, are not necessarily gaping. Social bonds in general will tend to be weak, as will trust in social relationships and in institutions.




Figure 1.5 Model showing the formation of peripheral neighbourhoods and the risk of violence

Part II Methodology

The study was conducted in southern Haiti, which contains four of the country's ten departments: Sud-Est (capital: Jacmel), Nippes (capital: Miragoâne), Sud (capital: Les Cayes) and Grand'Anse (capital: Jérémie).




Figure 2.1 Map of Haiti
The southern region and the survey sites

As Table 2.1 shows, the region accounts for 29 per cent of the country's territory but holds less than one fourth of the population (20.3 per cent). This is to a large extent because of living conditions there and because of its relative isolation, especially Grand'Anse department. According to the focus groups asked to assess the departments by risk variables, in Sud the risks are higher in terms of access to basic services, infrastructure and communication, and natural threats and disasters. Table 2.2 shows that people believe that southern Haiti is more vulnerable in terms of access to basic services, infrastructure

and communication, and threats and natural disasters than the country as a whole, not just the rest of the country. However, when it comes to socio-political and legal risks, southern Haiti scores better than the rest of the country, reflecting the fact that political violence in all its forms occurs less frequently in the region.

Table 2.1
The south: population and territory (2009)

Department	Population	Surface area in sq. km.
Sud-Est	575,293	2,034
Sud	704,760	2,654
Grand'Anse	425,878	1,912
Nippes	311,497	1,268
Total south	2,017,428	7,868
Percentage of entire country	20.33%	29.07%

Figure 2.2
Population distribution in the country's various regions




Table 2.2
The south and risk variables

Variable	Grand'Anse	Sud	Sud-Est	Nippes	Average in the south	Country average not included the south	Country average
Food availability	10.00	12.00	14.00	12.00	12.00	12.6	12.4
Access to basic services	15.00	13.00	12.00	14.00	13.50	13.0	13.2
Infrastructure and communication	13.00	11.00	13.00	13.00	12.50	11.5	11.9
Natural threats and disasters	13.00	17.00	15.00	14.00	14.75	11.83	13.0
Socio-political and legal risks	4.00	7.00	4.00	4.00	4.75	6.0	5.5

Calculated by the author using data taken from: CNSA (Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire) and Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR), *Haïti: Cartographie de vulnérabilité multirisque*, July/August 2009.

Note: The figures represent the percentage scores obtained by the departments in an evaluation by one focus group for each variable. The list has ten variables and the sum of the scores is equal to 100. The focus group was different in each department.

In each of the four departments, we selected a main town, with its residential and peripheral neighbourhoods, and an average town. The table below indicates the names of the places selected for each department.

Table 2.3
Main towns, peripheral neighbourhoods and villages selected for the study

Department	Main town	Peripheral neighbourhoods in the town	Village
Sud-Est	Jacmel	Kavolf, Maya, Siloé, Ste-Hélène, Volf, Watapana	La-Vallée
Nippes	Miragoâne	Détour, Cité Gonâve, Carrefour La Croix, Morne Blanche, Cité Dorèt, Ti Chodyè, Bas du Fort	Chalon
Sud	Les Cayes	Anba Fò, Cité Casséus, Croix-Martyrs, La Savanne, Dèyè Fò, Anba Veritab, Camp Boyer, Cité Militaire, La Kreyòl	Chantal
Grand'Anse	Jérémie	Ste-Hélène, Makandal, La Pointe, Cadette, Haut Berquier, Kamanyòl, Merlin, Nan Maste, Omelis, Platon, Ròd Bèkye, Source Dommage	Abricòts

Table 2.4
Survey sites

Department	Site	Population	Density (inh./sq.km.)
Nippes	Miragoâne	10,947	9,603
	Chalon	19,691	392
Sud	Les Cayes	71,236	7,933
	Chantal	3,558	1,231
Grand'Anse	Jérémie	34,788	12,121
	Moron	2,816	11,264
Sud-Est	Jacmel	39,643	12,466
	La-Vallée (commune)	33,127	392

1. Data collection

In each department, we selected a main town and a rural village, or one that was relatively non-urbanized in terms of its demographic weight. In the towns, central or resi-

dential neighbourhoods and peripheral areas or slums were identified. Table 2.5 indicates the size of the samples in the various towns (both residential and peripheral neighbourhoods) and in the villages.

Table 2.5
Size of the samples surveyed in towns and villages
of Nippes, Sud and Grand’Anse departments

Department	Town, village	Number of cases	Percentage
Grand’Anse	Jérémie	423	25.2
	Abricôts	136	8.1
Total		559	33.3
Nippes	Miragoâne*	316	18.8
	Chalon	114	6.8
Total		430	25.6
Sud	Les Cayes	579	34.5
	Chantal	109	6.5
Total		688	41.0
TOTAL		1,677	100.0

* The *section communale* of Chalon comprises an urban area, which includes the town of Miragoâne, and Chalon, which is categorized as rural.

The data were collected using a standard questionnaire administered to respondents selected in the various town neighbourhoods and villages surveyed. The questionnaire comprised 68 questions translating into indicators the variables of social bond, trust in institutions and social relationships, awareness of the existence of social unrest in the environment, and the risk that the unrest would turn violent.

For the social bond variable, an affective dimension (support relationship, religious observance) and a secondary dimension (employment status, access to information, associative life) were identified. The trust variable was also handled at three levels: trust in the people in the immediate environment, trust in the community and trust in institutions.

The data were collect in Sud-Est, in Jacmel and La-Vallée, in December 2009, before the earthquake of 12 January. In the departments of Nippes (Miragoâne and Chalon), Sud (Les Cayes and Chantal) and Grand’Anse (Jérémie and Abricôts), they were collected from 27 June to 25 July 2011. Two databases were created, one for Sud-Est, the other for the other departments. The data for Jacmel served as control data. The analysis set out in this report is based essentially on the departments of Nippes, Sud and Grand’Anse.

Systematic samples were selected in the town neighbourhoods, which were the subject of an inventory. The questionnaires were written and administered in Creole by students trained for the purpose.

The data collected were coded, processed and analysed using the SPSS.

2. The characteristics of the population surveyed

The populations surveyed are presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. The respondents included a roughly equal number of women (49.9 per cent) and men (50.1 per cent). This holds true for each department: the percentage of women respondents was 49.8, 49.1 and 50.8 in Nippes, Sud and Grand'Anse respectively.

The respondents tended to be young: 83.8 per cent were 55 or under; 29.5 per cent were under 26, and therefore grew up in the post-Duvalier period. Only 16.2 per cent were over 55. The data structure did not change from one department (Table 2.7) or neighbourhood (Table 2.8) to another. The 26-to-55-year-old cohort represented, as in the entire population surveyed, the majority of respondents in each department and neighbourhood. The next largest cohort comprised those under 26, with 26.2 per cent in Grand'Anse, 30.4 per cent in Nippes and 31.5 per cent in Sud; those under 26 also represented 29.2 per cent of the sample in rural areas, 27.4 per cent in residential neighbourhoods and 32.1 per cent in the periphery. The difference can be explained by the strong tendency of young people to emigrate from rural areas and by the pressure they feel when it comes to rent levels in residential neighbourhoods.

In terms of education, 14.5 per cent of the respondents said they had no schooling. It is important to underline the relatively high number of respondents who had not completed a course of studies. Almost 10.0 per cent of respondents said they had completed primary school, but 12.6 per cent said they had not. Likewise, 10.7 per cent said they had completed secondary school, 40.3 per cent that they had not. Those figures spotlight the thorny issue of school drop-out rates, which compounds that of underschooling. The latter is a greater problem in Miragoâne (Nippes) than in Les Cayes (Sud) and Jérémie (Grand'Anse). Indeed, 21.3 per cent of respondents in Miragoâne and Chalon indicated that they had no schooling, a figure that dropped to 11.6 per cent in Les Cayes and Chantal and to 12.8 per cent in Jérémie and Abricôts. In terms of environment, underschooling (number of respondents who never attended school) and drop-out rates (number of respondents with incomplete primary or secondary education) are almost equally acute in rural areas and in the periphery. In the residential neighbourhoods, 11.6 per cent of respondents said they had no schooling; in rural areas and in peripheral neighbourhoods the figures were 16.9 and 15.8 per cent, respectively. In residential neighbourhoods, 9.0 per

cent had not completed primary school compared to 14.0 and 15.5 per cent in rural areas and in peripheral neighbourhoods, respectively. The terms of comparison were the same for incomplete secondary school: 37.2 per cent in the residential neighbourhoods, 43.5 and 41.6 per cent in rural areas and in peripheral neighbourhoods, respectively. They varied, as we shall see, depending on the case. In some situations, the slum was close on the heels of the town with which it shared a spatial environment and had multiple relations; in others, the slum was much closer to the rural area, the environment providing it with most of its population and with which it might still have bonds of solidarity.

Catholicism, the religion professed by 48.8 per cent of respondents, predominated throughout the population, in the towns of the various departments, in Miragoâne, Les Cayes and Jérémie. It was also the predominant religion in the neighbourhoods. Traditional Protestantism (Baptism) came next, with 30.7 per cent population-wide. The Pentecostal Church of God, usually considered the closest to Haitian cultural practices, is not common in the south, where it is observed by only 2.7 per cent of respondents. The south is also home to few Jehovah's Witnesses, only slightly more than those who said they practice Vodou, 1.4 and 1.2 per cent respectively. In general, people do not say whether or not they are Vodou practitioners, as Vodou beliefs did not preclude the practice of another religion. In that sense, Mircea Eliade (1971: 9) is right by saying that religion should not be the only word to express relations to sacredness. In all, 8.8 per cent of all respondents indicated that they practiced no religion, a figure that rose to 9.0 per cent in Nippes and to 10.2 per cent in Grand'Anse. By saying that they practice no religion, the respondents do not necessarily mean that they have no faith; due to the recent proliferation of sects, it may even reflect the practice of multiple denominations, considered by the respondents to be identical.

Table 2.6
Characteristics of the entire population surveyed

Variable	Category	Number	Percentage	Cumulative percentage
Gender	Female	834	49.9	
	Male	839	50.1	
Age group	Under 26	490	29.5	29.5
	26 to 55	903	54.3	83.8
	Over 55	270	16.2	100.0
Level of education	Never attended school	236	14.5	14.5
	Failed to complete primary school	206	12.6	27.1
	Completed primary school	161	9.9	37.0
	Failed to complete secondary school	657	40.3	77.3
	Completed secondary school	175	10.7	88.1
	Post-secondary	194	11.6	100.0
Religion	Catholic	800	48.8	
	Protestant / Baptist	504	30.7	
	None	145	8.8	
	Adventist	59	3.6	
	Pentecostal Church of God	44	2.7	
	Jehovah's Witness	23	1.4	
	Vodou	20	1.2	
	Other (less than 1.0% each)	45	2.7	

Table 2.7
Characteristics of the samples in Nippes, Sud and Grand'Anse departments

Variable	Category	Nippes (N = 430)	Sud (N= 688)	Grand'Anse (N= 559)
Gender	Female	49.8 %	49.1 %	50.8 %
	Male	50.2	50.9 %	49.2
Age group	Under 26	30.4 %	31.5 %	26.2 %
	26 to 55	53.2	52.1	57.9
	Over 55	16.4	16.4	15.9
Level of education	Never attended school	21.3%	11.6%	12.8%
	Failed to complete primary school	15.1	9.8	14.3
	Completed primary school	9.6	9.0	11.2
	Failed to complete secondary school	34.0	43.5	40.6
	Completed secondary school	15.3	8.4	9.7
	Post-secondary	3.3	17.7	11.4
Religion	Catholic	43.6 %	49.3	52.1 %
	Protestant / Baptist	31.4	32.8	27.8
	None	9.0	7.6	10.2
	Adventist	1.4	3.9	4.8
	Pentecostal Church of God	2.6	3.0	2.3
	Jehovah's Witness	2.8	-	-
	Vodou	2.6	-	1.1
	Muslim	1.7	-	-

Table 2.8
Characteristics of the samples in the various environments

Variable	Category	Rural village (n = 365)	Residential neighbourhood (n = 649)	Peripheral neighbour- hood (n = 653)
Gender	Female	47.3%	49.6%	51.5%
	Male	52.7	50.4	48.5
Age group	Under 26	29.2%	27.4%	32.1%
	26 to 55	51.0	57.1	52.9
	Over 55	19.8	15.6	15.0
Level of education	Never attended school	16.9%	11.6	15.8%
	Failed to complete primary school	14.0	9.0	15.5
	Completed primary school	10.1	10.3	9.5
	Failed to complete secondary school	43.5	37.2	41.6
	Completed secondary school	10.7	13.5	7.9
	Post-secondary	4.8	18.4	9.7
Religion	Catholic	47.9%	48.9%	49.0%
	Protestant / Baptist	35.2	28.1	31.1
	None	6.9	9.4	9.4
	Adventist	2.2	4.9	3.2
	Pentecostal Church of God	3.3	3.0	2.1
	Jehovah's Witness	0.8	1.7	1.4
	Vodou	1.7	.8	1.3
	Muslim	0.8	.5	.3
	Other (less than 1.0% each)	1.1%	2.8	2.1

Part III

The social bond variables

Employment status, associative life, participation in elections

Relationships between individuals are constructed, developed and maintained thanks in part to a series of mechanisms. The representation of the other is key to understanding the structure of conflicts, i.e. the probability that they will be resolved peacefully or degenerate into violence. All the social substructures in which individuals evolve help forge relationships that create and strengthen the ties of solidarity cementing the bonds between them and the groups in a community. In this section, we study the following substructures: employment status, associative life, religious practice, support relationships and political life.

Table 3.1
Social bond indicators in the population surveyed

Social bond indicator		Category	Percentage*
Employment status		Has a job	27.7% (1,671)
Considers him/herself informed		Well informed	14.9% (1,667)
		Somewhat informed	62.2%
		Not at all informed	22.9%
Associative life		Member of an association	12.4% (1,677)
Practices a religion		Often	56.7% (1,507)
		Sometimes	39.9%
		Never	3.4%
Participates in elections		Voted in the last elections	70.1% (1,662)
Support relationships	Has someone to rely on	Yes	54.2% (1,667)
	Is someone to rely on	Yes	45.2% (1,654)

* The number of cases is indicated in parentheses. It varies because some cases were invalid (no response).

In terms of employment, more than 70.0 per cent of those surveyed said they had no job. Among the 27.7 per cent who said they had a job, the most common occupations were teacher (20.4 per cent), commerce (16.1 per cent), crafts (15.7 per cent), or running a business like a shop (retail of consumer goods and other items used in daily life) or restaurant (8.3 per cent). Agriculture, fishing and animal husbandry were mentioned by only 7.4 per cent of respondents who said they had a job, reflecting the decline of agriculture. Crafts were second to teaching and business but were nevertheless relatively common. Most of

the respondents indicated private teaching. Everything seems to point to the emergence of a service economy hinging on income transfers.

Few respondents (14.9 per cent) considered they were well informed, but 62.2 per cent said that they were somewhat informed. The source of information most frequently mentioned was radio.

Only 12.4 per cent of respondents said they were members of an association. Associative life is perhaps one of the key indicators of the bonds forged by individuals. People usually participate in social life through associations that define objectives and lay the ground rules for social participation. Associative life can be a determinant of individual ideological orientation and political choice.

The scores were relatively high for the indicators of religious practice, participation in elections and support relationships. In all, 56.7 per cent of respondents practiced their religion “often”. Nearly half had a support relationship, saying they had someone they could rely on (54.2 per cent) or that someone could rely on them (45.2 per cent). Participation in elections was very high: 70.1 per cent of respondents said they had voted in the last elections. Given the mobilization characteristic of the post-1986 period, the fact that many people said they participated in elections was not necessarily indicative of structured social bonds in the political field. People participate in elections outside political parties, as part of populist relationships, perhaps through kinship or for religious reasons. In this sense, participation in elections is based on the same premise as religious practice or support relationships, which are generally based on ties of kinship. There are therefore two groups of social bond indicators, described below.

- **Affective social bond indicators**

Religious practice, participation in elections and support relationships involve bonds based on resemblance, which maintain individuals in their natural community, in a cultural world made of traditions and beliefs. These are horizontal bonds between the individuals on the same social level. They limit individual resources to those of the group of origin or belonging and tend to foster mistrust. The scores were relatively high for these indicators, demonstrating that Haitian society remains traditional in nature, despite the relative importance of radio, television and mobile telephony. It may be that the new communication technologies, far from creating new bonds of solidarity, simply reinforce those that already exist.

- **Historical social bond indicators**

Employment status, access to information and affiliation to an association are predicated on how respondents project themselves outside traditional social structures, those

built around family or church. The weakness of those indicators reflects a society that is not yet based on relationships of interdependence, on social relationships grounded in historically defined objectives that have to be collectively pursued. The social bonds created by employment, by one's status as a member of an association, are historical bonds that project individuals outside their communities of origin. They are vertical bonds that can lead individuals to act in solidarity with members of social groups different from their own. In the case of Haitian society, such bonds are rare. In most cases, people move in limited social circles that do not renew themselves.

1. The social bonds in the departments

As we saw in the previous section, the three departments are different in terms of demographics, urbanization, geographical isolation and vulnerability as defined by the availability of food, access to basic services, natural threats and disasters and socio-political and legal risks. Nippes differs from Sud and Grand'Anse because of its low population, low urbanization rate, lower rate of schooling and more intense import activities. Table 3.2 indicates that more respondents in Nippes (Miragoâne and Chalon) (67.4 per cent) than in Sud (59.2 per cent) or Grand'Anse (53.1 per cent) stated that they were not from the neighbourhood in which they were living at the time of the survey, pointing to migration to the region. There is reason to believe that the social bonds will be weaker in Nippes (Miragoâne, Chalon) than in Sud (Les Cayes, Chantal) or Grand'Anse (Jérémie, Abricôts), with the possibility that conflict management will also be more difficult and that, as a result, the risk will be higher that social unrest will turn violent.

Table 3.2
Percentage of respondents not from the neighbourhood of residence
at the time of the survey, by department

Department	Percentage stating they were not originally from the neighbourhood
Grand'Anse (Jérémie, Abricôts)	53.1 (559)
Nippes (Miragoâne, Chalon)	67.4 (430)
Sud (Les Cayes, Chantal)	59.2 (688)

Table 3.3 shows that, except in the case of "employment status", there is a statistically significant difference between the three departments for all the indicators used. Respondents from Nippes considered themselves far less well informed (31.7 per cent) than those from Sud (19.0 per cent) and Grand'Anse (20.6 per cent). They had a greater tendency to practice their religion "often" (63.7 per cent) than respondents from Sud (51.8 per

cent) or Grand'Anse (57.2 per cent). They were more likely to take part in elections (79.7 per cent) than those from Sud (66.1 per cent) or Grand'Anse (69.5 per cent). Again, people participate in elections more through their primary groups than through modern structures like political parties. Our study in Sud-Est (Jacmel and La-Vallée) showed that people were guided in their political choices by members of their family or by friends. Support relationships based on ties of kinship were stronger in Nippes than in Sud or Grand'Anse.

Table 3.3
Social bond variables in Nippes (Miragoâne, Chalon),
Sud (Les Cayes, Chantal) and Grand'Anse (Jérémie, Abricôts)

Social bond indicator		Category	Nippes	Sud	Grand'Anse	Significance level
Employment status		Has a job	25.7%	28.2%	28.6%	.554
Considers him/herself informed		Well informed	14.5%	14.6%	15.6%	.000
		Somewhat informed	53.8%	66.3%	63.7%	
		Not at all informed	31.7%	19.0%	20.6%	
Associative life		Member of an association	14.2%	14.7%	8.0%	.001
Practices a religion		Often	63.7%	51.8%	57.2%	.000
		Sometimes	32.2%	43.4%	41.4%	
		Never	4.0%	4.8%	1.4%	
Participates in elections		Voted in the last elections	79.7%	66.1%	69.5%	.000
Support relationships	Has someone to rely on	Yes	50.8%	52.5%	58.8%	.024
	Is someone to rely on	Yes	51.2%	47.5%	37.6%	.000

2. The social bonds in the various environments

The aim here is to ascertain how rural migration has contributed to the breakdown of traditional bonds based on religious practice, the forms of participation structured by the family and community solidarity. In fact, in the periphery, which is where rural migrants usually settle, social bonds tend to be weak. The migrants disconnect from their environment of origin but are not yet integrated into the new host environment; they become marginalized and can draw on relatively few collective resources to cope with day-to-day life. They find it more difficult to enter into an employment bond with an employer, and their associative life remains limited.

This situation can have two consequences: a stronger tendency to resort to violence to resolve conflicts between migrants and those around them, and a greater receptiveness to calls from social players seeking to modify the rules of the political game through violent mobilization. This is why residents from the periphery participate in great numbers in the political violence in the country.

A first observation is that there is no significant difference between neighbourhoods when it comes to the indicators of associative life, religious practice, participation in elections and being there for others. In other words, when it comes to indicators of cohesion based on traditional bonds, the various environments are much more similar than they are different. In all three types of environment, over 90.0 per cent of respondents said they practiced their religion often (52.8 to 60.3 per cent) or sometimes (36.6 to 42.9 per cent), but associative life scored low (only 10.8 to 13.7 per cent of respondents said they were members of an association). Participation in elections was high in all three environments: between 67.8 and 74.9 per cent. Again, participation in elections is guided by family or neighbourhood structures.

However, there was a statistically significant difference between environments when it comes to the indicators of employment status, access to information and being able to rely on others. Table 3.4 below shows that the relation between these indicators and the different neighbourhoods is statistically significant. Fewer respondents said that they had an employment relationship in the periphery (24.3 per cent) than in the residential neighbourhoods (31.3 per cent) or rural villages (26.4 per cent). Obviously, that relation has to be interpreted in the light not only of the decline in agriculture, which has become less and less productive and in which earnings are low, but also of the fact that Haitian society has a very elastic concept of employment and that the labour market is limited and based on personal contacts. The data are nevertheless indicative of a representation of the respondents' activity and provide us with information on how the social bonds to which that activity gives rise are viewed.

Table 3.4
The social bond variables depending on the type of environment (rural, urban, periphery)

Social bond indicator		Category	Rural village	Residential neighbourhood	Periphery	Significance level
Employment status		Has a job	26.4%	31.3%	24.3%	.016
Considers him/herself informed		Well informed	12.1%	19.2%	12.3%	.002
		Somewhat informed	63.1%	61.0%	62.9%	
		Not at all informed	24.8%	19.8%	24.8%	
Associative life		Member of an association	12.7%	10.8%	13.7%	.290
Practices a religion		Often	58.2%	60.3%	52.8%	.088
		Sometimes	39.1%	36.6%	42.9%	
		Never	2.7%	3.1%	4.3%	
Participates in elections		Voted in the last elections	74.9%	67.8%	70.9%	.057
Support relationships	Has someone to rely on	Yes	49.6%	60.2%	50.9%	.000
	Is someone to rely on	Yes	44.8%	46.4%	43.8%	.648

Only 12.3 per cent of respondents in peripheral neighbourhoods considered they were well informed, compared to 19.2 per cent in residential neighbourhoods. Those in peripheral neighbourhoods who considered themselves well informed did not exceed those in rural regions. In peripheral neighbourhoods, 50.9 per cent of respondents thought there were other people they could rely on to cope with the problems of daily life; that figure rose to 60.2 per cent among respondents in residential neighbourhoods.

Generally speaking, the social bond indicators selected reveal a society in which cohesion is relatively weak. The differences observed show a tendency towards uniformity without the institutional bonds being strengthened. However, the significant differences indicate that the social bonds are weaker in the periphery, which is host to migrants from rural areas.

3. Social bond and gender

What are the differences between men and women when it comes to the social bond variables? If we consider the social bond as a social resource underpinning the individual's position in society, then it can be anticipated that the constellation of data will favour men in a society in which women are still confined to a traditional role to which little value is attached.

Except in the case of religious practice, where more women said they practiced often (64.9 per cent) than men (48.0 per cent), Table 3.5 shows that fewer women have access to jobs than men: 32.9 per cent of men said they had a job as opposed to 22.6 per cent of women. More men said they were "well informed" (19.9 per cent) than women (10.0 per cent). The same tendency can be discerned for associative life: 16.1 per cent of men said they were members of an association, but only 8.6 per cent of women. Participation in elections was high in both groups: 73.3 per cent for men and 68.3 per cent for women. The difference here is statistically significant, but negligible for "has someone to rely on". Nearly half of men and women thought that they could rely on someone if they had problems. However, when it came to "is someone to rely on", relatively more men thought that others could count on them.

Table 3.5
Social bond indicators and gender in the population surveyed

Social bond indicator	Category	Sex	Percentage	Significance level
Employment status	Has a job	Women	22.6% (829)	.000
		Men	32.9% (836)	
Considers him/herself informed	Well informed	Women	10.0% (827)	.000
		Men	19.9% (836)	
	Somewhat informed	Women	63.7%	
		Men	60.8%	
	Not at all informed	Women	26.2%	
		Men	19.4%	
Associative life	Member of an association	Women	8.6% (806)	.000
		Men	16.1% (813)	
Practices a religion	Often	Women	64.9% (778)	.000
		Men	48.0% (725)	
	Sometimes	Women	32.0%	
		Men	48.3%	
	Never	Women	3.1%	
		Men	3.7%	
Participates in elections	Voted in the last elections	Women	68.3% (823)	.025
		Men	73.3% (835)	
Has someone to rely on	Yes	Women	53.0% (827)	.322
		Men	55.4% (836)	
Is someone to rely on	Yes	Women	42.2% (818)	.018
		Men	48.0% (832)	

The gender differences observed throughout the population surveyed applied in the departments and environments as well. Table 3.6 shows the relation between gender and membership of an association in the three departments of Nippes, Sud and Grand'Anse. In all three, more men than women stated they were members of an association. The same data structure can be seen in Table 3.7, which shows the relation between gender and association membership in the various neighbourhoods. More men than women said they were members of an association. Table 3.8 presents the partial correlations for the social bond variables as they relate to gender, controlled by department and neighbourhood. As for the entire population, the only relation that is not statistically significant is that observed for "Has someone to rely on", which indicates that there was no difference between men and women, in the departments and the various neighbourhoods, when it came to whether or not they could count on other people in coping with the problems they encountered.

Let us underline that the relations, although statistically significant, are fairly weak. The highest coefficient of correlation is 0.116. The share of variation in the social bond variables (the square of the correlations) explained by gender is therefore negligible.

Table 3.6
Associative life and gender, by department

Department				Respondent's sex		Total
				Female	Male	
Nippes	Member of an association	Yes	Number	17	41	58
			% of respondent's sex	8.3%	20.2%	14.2%
		No	Number	188	162	350
			% of respondent's sex	91.7%	79.8%	85.8%
	Total		Number	205	203	408
			% of respondent's sex	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Sud	Member of an association	Yes	Number	35	64	99
			% of respondent's sex	10.6%	18.6%	14.7%
		No	Number	295	281	576
			% of respondent's sex	89.4%	81.4%	85.3%
	Total		Number	330	345	675
			% of respondent's sex	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Grand'Anse	Member of an association	Yes	Number	17	26	43
			% of respondent's sex	6.2%	9.8%	8.0%
		No	Number	256	239	495
			% of respondent's sex	93.8%	90.2%	92.0%
	Total		Number	273	265	538
			% of respondent's sex	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 3.7
Associative life and gender, by type of environment

Type of environment				Respondent's sex		Total	
				Female	Male		
Rural village	Member of an association	Yes	Number	10	34	44	
			% of respondent's sex	6.0%	18.3%	12.5%	
		No	Number	157	152	309	
			% of respondent's sex	94.0%	81.7%	87.5%	
	Total	Number	167	186	353		
		% of respondent's sex	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
	Residential neighbourhood	Member of an association	Yes	Number	26	42	68
				% of respondent's sex	8.3%	13.2%	10.8%
No			Number	286	275	561	
			% of respondent's sex	91.7%	86.8%	89.2%	
Total		Number	312	317	629		
		% of respondent's sex	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
Periphery or slum		Member of an association	Yes	Number	32	54	86
				% of respondent's sex	9.9%	17.7%	13.7%
	No		Number	292	251	543	
			% of respondent's sex	90.1%	82.3%	86.3%	
	Total	Number	324	305	629		
		% of respondent's sex	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		

Table 3.8
Partial correlation between gender and social bond variables *

Variables	Controlling for department (Nippes and others)	Controlling for neighbourhood (Periphery and others)
Has a job	-.111 (.000)	-.108 (.000)
Participates in elections	-.055 (.014)	-.056 (.013)
Can rely on others	-.020 (.213)	-.019 (.222)
Others can rely on him/her	-.064 (.005)	-.065 (.005)
Member of an association	-.115 (.000)	-.116 (.000)

*The correlations are negative, indicating that from the category “woman” coded “0” to the category “man” coded “1”, the other variable varies on average from “no” coded “1” to “yes” coded “0”. The significance level (unilateral test) is indicated in parentheses.

4. Social bond and age group

There are statistically significant differences in social bond indicators between age groups. In the population as a whole, only 27.7 per cent of respondents said they had a job, a score which barely varied from one *commune* to another, but 37.3 per cent between the ages of 26 and 55 said they had a job, while only 12.1 per cent of those under 26 said they did. The most common jobs – teaching and commerce – may be more accessible to middle-aged adults than to younger people, who may lack experience or funds.

Table 3.9
Social bond indicators and age group in the population surveyed

Social bond indicator	Category	Age group	Percentage	Significance level
Employment status	Has a job	Under 26	12.1% (488)	.000
		26 – 55	37.3% (899)	
		Over 55	23.3% (270)	
Considers him/herself informed	Well informed	Under 26	13.9%	.000
		26 – 55	17.0	
		Over 55	10.4	
	Somewhat informed	Under 26	67.8	
		26 – 55	61.4	
		Over 55	54.9	
	Not at all informed	Under 26	18.2	
		26 – 55	21.6	
		Over 55	34.7	
Associative life	Member of an association	Under 26	15.6	.000
		26 – 55	12.8	
		Over 55	4.7	
Practices a religion	Often	Under 26	53.7%	.006
		26 – 55	54.9	
		Over 55	67.5	
	Sometimes	Under 26	42.7	
		26 – 55	41.4	
		Over 55	30.5	
	Never	Under 26	3.7	
		26 – 55	3.7	
		Over 55	2.1	
Participates in elections	Voted in the last elections	Under 26	60.1%	.000
		26-55	76.8	
		Over 55	69.1	
Has someone to rely on	Yes	Under 26	68.2%	.000
		26-55	49.3	
		Over 55	45.0	
Is someone to rely on	Yes	Under 26	42.8%	.002
		26-55	48.9	
		Over 55	37.2	

In terms of associative life, those under 26 score higher than the population as a whole. In that age group, 15.6 per cent said they were members of an association, compared to 12.4 per cent for the population as a whole, 12.8 per cent for the 26-to-55-year-old cohort, and 4.7 per cent for those over 55. The youngest have other traits that may explain why they are also more active in associations. Only 2.7 per cent of those under 26 said they had “never attended school”. That figure rises to 14.0 per cent among those aged 26 to 55 and to 37.4 per cent among those over 55. Inversely, 16.6 per cent of those under 26 indicated that they had completed secondary school, as opposed to 9.6 per cent for those aged 26 to 55 and 2.8 per cent for those over 55. Associative life scored higher among young people in all departments and all environments.

Part IV

Trust in social relationships and in institutions

Trust in others and in the institutions structuring the social relationships in which individuals are engaged is usually considered to be one of the more decisive cultural variables in the formation of social bonds beyond the limited circle of the family. Trust allows individuals from various backgrounds to form groups so as to create units able to have a greater impact in fields as varied as the economy or politics. It may be key to the achievement of shared objectives, which requires not just substantial material resources, but also a shared vision of what those objectives are. In a context of migration, in which individuals from different regions find themselves in a new place that they have to build and share, trust in others and in the institutions called on to provide the normative framework for the management of social relationships may be decisive.

Table 4.1
Trust in social relationships and in institutions

Social relationships and institutions	Categories	Percentages
Trust in people	A great deal	28.1% (1,670)
	A little	41.6
	None	30.3
Trust between neighbours	A great deal	11.1 % (1,575)
	A little	51.5
	None	37.4
Trust in society	A great deal	16.6% (1,528)
	A little	36.1
	None	47.3
Trust in the state	A great deal	27.2% (1,609)
	A little	23.2
	None	49.6
Trust in NGOs	A great deal	12.8% (1,606)
	A little	26.7
	None	60.5
Trust in MINUSTAH	A great deal	11.9% (1,615)
	A little	23.5
	None	64.6
Trust in the Church	A great deal	68.4% (1,632)
	A little	15.9
	None	15.6

We developed a series of questions that allowed us to measure the degree of trust the respondents had in the people they lived with and in the institutions that, by definition, had to provide the framework for their activities. Table 4.1 shows the data obtained for all respondents. The observations show that mistrust is the rule in social relationships. Over 70.0 per cent of respondents trusted the people around them only “a little” (41.6 per cent) or “not at all” (30.3 per cent). The same data structure emerged when we asked the respondents whether the people in the neighbourhood trusted each other or whether they had “trust in society”.

1. Trust in social relationships

Why did the respondents have such little trust in the people around them? A first factor may be the purely oral nature of transactions in Haitian communities. Trust usually supposes a certain predisposition to confront uncertainty. Geert Hofstede (2001) found that more people trusted each other in societies that scored low on the Uncertainty Avoidance Index. In an oral society, that predisposition is probably relatively high, given the absence of a written record outlining the terms of a contract. The excessive trust required by the oral nature of transactions may also explain why very few people are said to be trustworthy. Mistrust stems from the difficulty of managing trust in an oral society. The cost of trust becomes too high. The absence of written records means that contracts are based essentially on memory and on rules governing respect for promises. In migratory situations, those rules tend to be relaxed. As stakes become higher, and transactions between people coming from different places increase, trust may no longer govern social relationships in a social environment where orality prevails.

A second factor may be the belief that the neighbours are often the source of “misfortunes”. In the business world, people believe that a “customer” can take money from them simply if they agree to change a bill into smaller bills or coins. The business world in Haiti is inhabited by multiple and complex beliefs calling for great vigilance on the part of those who live in it, i.e. great mistrust.

Table 4.2
Trust in social relationships and in institutions, by department

Social relationship and institutions	Category	Nippes	Sud	Grand'Anse	Significance level
Trust in people	A great deal	27.2%	28.7%	28.1%	.000
	A little	34.4	42.8	45.5%	
	None	38.4	28.4	26.3	
Trust between neighbours	A great deal	14.7%	11.6%	7.7%	.000
	A little	38.6	48.5	65.3	
	None	46.7	39.9	27.0	
Trust in society	A great deal	25.5%	13.0%	13.9%	.000
	A little	28.0	35.3	43.3	
	None	46.5	51.7	42.7	
Trust in the state	A great deal	41.2%	21.3	24.3	.000
	A little	17.6	24.6	25.6	
	None	41.2	54.1	50.1	
Trust in NGOs	A great deal	12.8%	12.7%	13.0%	.000
	A little	18.5	26.0	33.8	
	None	68.7	61.3	53.2	
Trust in MINUSTAH	A great deal	12.8%	12.3%	10.7%	.000
	A little	17.4	21.7	30.1	
	None	69.8	66.0	59.1	
Trust in the Church	A great deal	74.8%	71.5%	59.9%	.000
	A little	10.0	16.6	19.6	
	None	15.3	11.9	20.5	

Table 4.3
Trust in social relationships and in institutions, by environment

Social relationship and institutions	Category	Rural vil- lage	Residential neighbourhood	Peripheral neighbourhood	Significance level
Trust in people	A great deal	27.3%	29.0%	28.0%	.215
	A little	45.3	42.1	38.8	
	Not at all	27.3	29.0	33.1	
Trust between neighbours	A great deal	14.4%	10.5%	9.8%	.007
	A little	52.2	54.7	47.8	
	Not at all	33.4	34.8	42.4	
Trust in society	A great deal	17.4%	15.6%	17.2%	.190
	A little	31.5	39.4	35.5	
	Not at all	51.1	44.9	47.3	
Trust in the state	A great deal	29.7%	20.1%	33.2%	.000
	A little	20.9	27.5	20.4	
	Not at all	49.4	52.4	46.5	
Trust in NGOs	A great deal	11.9%	12.0%	14.4%	.000
	A little	24.1	29.5	25.4	
	Not at all	64.0	58.5	60.3	
Trust in MINUSTAH	A great deal	10.0%	11.3%	13.7%	.072
	A little	20.3	26.2	22.6	
	Not at all	69.7	62.5	63.6	
Trust in the Church	A great deal	71.4%	61.9%	73.6%	.000
	A little	11.7	20.6	13.5	
	Not at all	16.9	17.5	12.9	

2. Trust in institutions: the state, NGOs, MINUSTAH and the Church

More than 70.0 per cent of respondents indicated that they trusted the state only “a little” (23.2 per cent) or “not at all” (49.6 per cent). This figure is indicative of the legitimacy of the state and its action; its importance cannot be overemphasized. Given that the state is responsible for public security, the administration of justice, the maintenance of law and order, by mechanisms of both integration and coercion, the lack or absence of trust in the state is a source of instability. In the foreword to a paper published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2008 on state-building, Richard Carey writes that, “Today it is widely accepted that development, peace and stability require effective and legitimate states able to fulfil key international responsibilities and to provide core public goods and services, including security.” In a context marked by the collapse of traditional mechanisms for settling disputes, in particular as a result of rural migration, the non-recognition of the state as a legitimate institution able to replace those mechanisms creates a normative vacuum that only serves to heighten the risk that interpersonal conflicts will run to violence. The observations resulting from the survey are, after all, not too surprising. They confirm the various analyses according to which the state in Haiti does not fulfil its functions to meet the fundamental needs of the population and appears, rather, as an agent of repression and corruption, and an allocator of the rent coming from international aid or the remittances of Haitian emigrants.

Despite the importance of NGOs in the country and the range of sectors in which they work (education, health, food, family, etc.), they apparently do not inspire trust in the population, to judge by the survey data. Most respondents (60.5 per cent) said they did not “at all” trust the NGOs, and 26.7 per cent said they trusted them only “a little”. Only 12.8 per cent of respondents placed “a great deal” of trust in NGOs. It must nevertheless be recalled that those data confirm the representation of NGOs in public opinion as expressed in the press. It is constantly being stressed that NGOs are the main beneficiaries of the international aid given to Haiti, the state being considered unable to administrate it. This was the case long before the earthquake of 12 January 2010. At the same time, there seems to be little or no impact on the population’s living conditions. The failure of the international community to alleviate the suffering and repair the damage caused by the earthquake of 12 January is usually used to underscore the ineffectiveness of NGOs. In people’s minds, the NGOs played a large part in creating distortions in the labour market and in particular in the real estate market, where the rising cost of rented accommodation, especially in towns and above all in Port-au-Prince, exacerbated the housing problem, with apartments becoming an even rarer commodity following the destruction wrought by the earthquake.

MINUSTAH scored no better than the NGOs. More than 85.0 per cent of respondents said they trusted it “not at all” (64.6 per cent) or only “a little” (23.5 per cent). Only 11.9 per cent maintained that they trusted it “a great deal”. Not only does the population

perceive MINUSTAH as an organization with all the features of a super-NGO (powerful means, independent of the state and society), it is also seen by certain sectors of the population as an armed occupation force (see billboard on the next page). Some people hold that the UN mission is responsible for the cholera epidemic that struck the country after the earthquake. A complaint was filed with the institution by thousands of cholera victims. They expect to receive damages from the United Nations. The mission has been accused of being involved in pedophilia (see excerpt from *Le Matin*, on page 48). In December 2011, the National Human Rights Defence Network (RNDDH) published a report condemning the involvement of MINUSTAH members in human rights violations (RNDDH, 2011). The report starts as follows:

On December 14th, 2011, the *National Human Rights Defence Network* (RNDDH) received a complaint in its office, alleging an incident in which *three* (3) Haitian citizens were brutally beaten by officers of *the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (MINUSTAH).

The mission is also used by politicians wanting to vaunt their nationalism, in the belief that this will win them the support of those sectors of the population calling for MINUSTAH's departure.

Paradoxically, the presence of MINUSTAH, a mission created to "stabilize" the country, is in itself a threat to stability. The position of the international community, as expressed both by analysts working within it and by spokespersons of the states that constitute it, tends to conflict with that of the country's workers and students, which is often echoed by politicians running for election and in search of popularity. Eight years after its arrival in the country, MINUSTAH is far from forging a consensus among the country's political elites or, to an even greater degree, among the lower classes.

The only institution the respondents trust is the Church. More than 80.0 per cent said that they trusted the Church "a great deal" (68.4 per cent) or "a little" (15.9 per cent). This is a form of fundamental or primal trust that is not to be viewed as making up for the absence of trust in society and its institutions.

Lastly, relatively more respondents in the periphery trust institutions "a great deal" than those in other neighbourhoods. Inversely, relatively few believe that people in the neighbourhood trust each other. It is as though the mistrust in interpersonal relationships has brought the inhabitants to rely more on institutions. This may reflect a situation of despair, since, after all, most respondents did not trust institutions.



Place du Canapé-Vert, in Port-au-Prince: a billboard for a businessman and possible candidate for mayor of Carrefour. The text reads: MINUSTAH and cholera – no difference. No to the occupation. (Photo: Alain Gilles)

Des soldats pakistanais sous les verrous aux Gonaïves

Des soldats pakistanais de la Minustah déployés dans la cité de l'indépendance seraient impliqués dans le viol de deux jeunes adolescents haïtiens. Selon une agence locale AAP (Agence artibonitienne de presse), des membres du contingent pakistanais de la Mission de l'ONU auraient violé au moins deux mineurs de sexe masculin.
29/01/2012



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L'une des victime a été entendue vendredi au Parquet de la ville des Gonaïves dans le cadre de l'enquête ouverte par la justice haïtienne. Le responsable du barreau des Gonaïves, Me Joseph Néhémie, des jeunes garçons de moins de 18 ans sont la proie des soldats de la Minustah

JCC/LM

Excerpt from *Le Matin*, 29 January 2012 (on-line edition).

Figure 4.1 Billboard and press cutting denouncing MINUSTAH

3. Trust in the departments

Table 4.2 indicates that the respondents in towns or villages encountered in the various departments had, like all the respondents, little trust in their immediate neighbours. In all three departments, over 70.0 per cent of respondents said they trusted the people in the neighbourhood only “a little” or “not at all”. Respondents in Nippes were more numerous (38.4 per cent) than those in Sud (28.4 per cent) and Grand’Anse (26.3 per cent) to indicate that they did “not at all” trust the people in their neighbourhood. They were also more numerous (46.7 per cent) than respondents from Sud (39.9 per cent) and Grand’Anse (27.0 per cent) to believe that the people in their neighbourhood did “not at all” trust each other. The conclusion is that neighbourhood proximity has not led to the emergence of affective trust between people who see each other regularly or who may be called on to perform collective tasks to reduce their vulnerability in the face of phenomena like cyclones. This prompts us to consider residential mobility as a factor that can inhibit the development of lasting relationships between the inhabitants of the same neighbourhood. We have already said that, compared to the towns of Les Cayes and Jérémie, Miragoâne has a relatively large port sector. It therefore has a relatively higher number of migrants from other parts of the country working in commerce, a sector in which interpersonal relationships tend to be marked by suspicion and mistrust.

Respondents in the Nippes region also set themselves apart by the greater trust they placed in the state, but were divided in terms of the degree of trust they said they had in the state: 42.1 per cent said they trusted the state “a great deal” or “not at all”. That polarization may be caused to a certain extent by migration: respondents who were not from Miragoâne trusted the state more than did those who were originally from the neighbourhood in which they lived.

4. Trust depending on the type of environment

One of the study’s hypotheses is that the periphery, or the slums, which are magnets for rural migrants, are characterized by looser social bonds and, consequently, by a lower level of trust in social relationships and institutions. Table 4.3 presents data for comparing the slums (or peripheral neighbourhoods) with the residential neighbourhoods or villages from which some migrants originate. Statistically significant differences were observed for the following indicators: “trust between neighbours”, “trust in the state”, “trust in NGOs” and “trust in the Church”. For other indicators, such as “trust in MINUSTAH”, the level of trust was low in all three types of environment (see Table 4.3). The significant difference observed for the only indicator relating to social relationships shows that 90.2 per cent of respondents in the peripheral neighbourhoods indicated that people in the neighbourhood trusted each other “a little” (47.8 per cent) or “not at all” (42.4 per cent). In the residential neighbourhoods, 89.5 per cent of respondents said that neighbours trusted

each other “a little” (54.7 per cent) or “not at all” (34.8 per cent). In the villages, the respondents thought that people trusted each other “a little” (52.2 per cent) or “not at all” (33.4 per cent). The respondents in the villages were relatively more numerous in thinking that people trusted each other “a great deal”: 14.4 per cent compared to 10.5 per cent of respondents in residential neighbourhoods and 9.8 per cent of respondents in peripheral neighbourhoods.

The conclusion is that, on the whole, and as we have seen, most respondents did not think that the people living in their neighbourhood trusted each other. Initiatives requiring intense cooperation may suffer from a lack of trust. However, respondents in the peripheral neighbourhoods were more inclined to believe that relationships between people were characterized by a lack of trust.

5. Trust, gender and age group

When it comes to gender and social relationships, significant differences (significance level equal to or less than .05) were observed for “trust in people”: a greater proportion of men (31.3 per cent) than women (25.1 per cent) said that they trusted the people in their neighbourhood. More men (19.8 per cent) than women (13.4 per cent) trusted their neighbourhood, viewed as society. This is a weak relation: the relative difference observed between men and women appears negligible but is nevertheless statistically significant, in that no matter how weak, it may be systematic in nature rather than the outcome of pure chance.

When it comes to trust in institutions, the only significant difference observed between men and women was with regard to trust in MINUSTAH: 13.7 per cent of men, compared to 10.1 per cent of women, said that they trusted MINUSTAH “a great deal”. The difference is minor. It may reflect a difference structured on representations related to other issues on which men and women differ. Women, for example, may be more sensitive to the accusations of sexual abuse made against MINUSTAH, or men, more than women, may have political concerns relating to matters of state sovereignty. Men and women alike, however, as shown in Table 4.4 below, place little trust in the state or in NGOs. Both men and women have great trust in the Church.

Table 4.4
Gender and trust in institutions

Institution	Category	Women	Men	Threshold
Trust in the state	A great deal	25.3%	29.0%	.260
	A little	24.1	22.5	
	Not at all	50.6	48.5	
Trust in NGOs	A great deal	11.0%	14.6%	.075
	A little	26.5	26.9	
	Not at all	62.5	58.4	
Trust in MINUSTAH	A great deal	10.1%	13.7%	.044
	A little	22.8	24.2	
	Not at all	67.1	62.1	
Trust in the Church	A great deal	69.6%	67.3	.464
	A little	15.9	16.1	
	Not at all	14.5	16.7	

As concerns age groups, a significant difference can be observed when it comes to trust in people. Relatively more young people under 26 (31.1 per cent) trust the people in their neighbourhood “a great deal” than those in the 26-to-55 cohort (26.2 per cent) or those over 55 (29.9 per cent). Regarding trust between people in the neighbourhood, there is no significant difference between age groups. In all three age groups, more than one third believed that people did not trust each other at all. When it comes to society as a whole, 57.1 per cent of respondents over 55 said they did “not at all” trust society, a view shared by 43.4 per cent of the under-26 cohort and by 46.6 per cent of those aged between 25 and 55.

Except in the case of the NGOs, there is no significant difference between the age groups when it comes to trust in institutions. In all three age groups, as in the population surveyed as a whole, about 50.0 per cent of respondents said they trusted the state “a great deal” or “a little”. The other 50.0 per cent said they trusted the state “not at all”. Trust in NGOs was lower for all three age groups, and lowest among over-55s. Trust in MINUSTAH was even lower: over 60.0 per cent in all three age groups said they did not trust it at all. As always, the Church was the only institution the respondents trusted. In all three age groups, more than 65.0 per cent of respondents said they trusted the Church “a great deal”.

Table 4.5
Age group and trust in institutions

Institution	Categories	Under 26	26-55	Over 55	Significance level
Trust in the state	A great deal	25.5%	27.8%	28.2	.524
	A little	26.0	22.2	21.2	
	Not at all	48.5	50.0	50.6	
Trust in NGOs	A great deal	11.1%	14.9%	9.1%	.044
	A little	27.9	26.6	24.1	
	Not at all	60.9	58.5	66.8	
Trust in MI-NUSTAH	A great deal	9.9%	13.6%	9.8%	.169
	A little	25.5	22.1	23.8	
	Not at all	64.6	64.3	66.4	
Trust in the Church	A great deal	68.7%	67.5%	72.2%	.106
	A little	17.1	16.9	10.4	
	Not at all	14.2	15.6	17.4	

On the whole, this is a population in which trust is low. No more trust is placed in people than in institutions. Significantly, in almost all cases, except for the Church, around 50.0 per cent of respondents or more answer that they trust “not at all”. We should remember, however, that trust in the Church is asocial in nature, in that trust in a supreme being who is above the dealings of everyday life does not reflect the state of social cohesion.

Part V

The representation of violence From disputes and unrest to violence

One of the characteristics of the social strife or unrest that is a part of the daily lives of certain communities, and even the violence that can result, is their categorization as “current events”. Their ongoing, repetitive nature renders them banal. The process leading to the disputes or violence has been completely internalized by the people exposed to them and who must resort to them to settle the least difference, usually with their families, relatives or neighbours.

The question about the existence of collective, family or interpersonal strife in the neighbourhoods shows that, for many respondents, such incidents do not occur in the neighbourhoods they live in. It is worth noting, however, that 33.8 per cent of respondents acknowledged that unrest does occur in their environment. Of those acknowledging the existence of unrest, 40.9 per cent asserted that it turned violent.

Most of the unrest develops in the context of personal relationships involving members of a family (29.9 per cent) or limited to the neighbourhood (40.4 per cent) or the town (21.8 per cent). Only 7.9 per cent of respondents indicated that the unrest occurring in their neighbourhoods could be regional or national in scope. The violence that went hand in hand with the unrest more often than not resulted in lives lost.

Table 5.1
Percentage of respondents having acknowledged the existence of unrest in their neighbourhood, by department

Existence of unrest in the neighbourhood	Department			Total
	Nippes	Sud	Grand'Anse	
Yes	199	206	156	561
	46.4%	30.2%	28.3%	33.8%
Total	429	681	551	1661
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5.1 shows the distribution of respondents by department on the question of the existence of social unrest. Miragoâne, in Nippes, comes first, with 46.4 per cent of respondents indicating the existence of unrest, followed by Les Cayes and Chantal in Sud, with 30.2 per cent, and Jérémie and Abricôts in Grand'Anse, with 28.3 per cent.

Table 5.2
Percentage of respondents having acknowledged the existence of unrest in their neighbourhood in the towns and villages

Existence of unrest in the neighbourhood	Town or village						Total
	Miragoâne	Chalon	Cayes	Chantal	Jérémie	Abricôts	
Yes	129	70	179	27	117	39	561
	41.0%	61.4%	31.3%	24.8%	28.2%	28.7%	33.8%
Total	315	114	572	109	415	136	1661
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The case of the rural area of Chalon, which shares the communal section of the same name with Miragoâne, merits a closer look, as Table 5.2 shows. The existence of unrest was mentioned by 61.4 per cent of respondents in the area. This stands in stark contrast to the data obtained in Chantal, in Sud (24.8 per cent), and in Abricôts, in Grand'Anse (28.7 per cent), which, according to the Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique, are urban centres with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. Population flows have tended to concentrate the population of Chalon at the entrance to Miragoâne, which, thanks to its port activities, is a commercial hub with a rapidly growing population. Chalon is gradually becoming less rural and is probably experiencing the types of interpersonal conflicts that are characteristic of commercial areas.

Table 5.3
Unrest that turns violent, by department

Unrest that turns violent	Department			Total
	Nippes	Sud	Grand'Anse	
Yes	80	77	74	231
	41.0%	39.1%	42.8%	40.9%
Total	195	197	173	565
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5.3 shows the probability of the unrest turning violent in the survey sites, by department. It highlights the importance of Grand'Anse as a region. The data breakdown in Table 5.4 underscores the urban nature of the violence. In all the departments, the probability that the unrest will shift to violence is higher in the urban centres than in the rural zones (Chalon) or in villages with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants (Chantal, Abricôts).

Table 5.4
Unrest that turns violent, by survey site

Unrest that turns violent	Town or village						Total
	Miragoâne	Chalon	Cayes	Chantal	Jérémie	Abricôts	
Yes	67	13	69	8	57	17	231
	52.8%	19.1%	40.1%	32.0%	44.2%	38.6%	40.9%
Total	127	68	172	25	129	44	565
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

However, Miragoâne (in Nippes) is different from the other towns (Les Cayes and Jérémie), which inverts the observation made in Table 5.3 that the probability that the unrest would turn violent was even slightly higher in Grand'Anse than in Nippes.

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 underscore the relative importance of peripheral neighbourhoods or slums in outbreaks of unrest and the probability that the latter will turn violent. In the peripheral neighbourhoods, 44.6 per cent of respondents said there was unrest. The “rural village” category is likely affected by the fact that Chalon, a rural area, is situated near Miragoâne.

Table 5.5
Existence of social unrest depending on the environment

Existence of unrest in the neighbourhood	Type of environment			Total
	Rural village	Residential neighbourhood	Periphery or slum	
Yes	136	134	287	557
	37.3%	20.8%	44.6%	33.7%
Total	365	643	643	1651
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5.6 shows that, even though there is more social unrest in the peripheral neighbourhoods, the probability that the unrest will turn violent, which is stronger in such neighbourhoods (47.7 per cent), is also relatively strong in residential neighbourhoods (40.6 per cent).

Table 5.6
Unrest that turns violent, by environment

Unrest that turns violent	Type of environment			Total
	Rural village	Residential neighbourhood	Periphery or slum	
Yes	38	58	134	230
	27.7%	40.6%	47.7%	41.0%
Total	137	143	281	561
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The conclusion is that social unrest remains a phenomenon that is as much urban as it is rural, but that it can become hugely important in a commercial area in which there are sizeable population flows. Thus, in Sud, Les Cayes does not differ greatly from Chantal, and in Grand'Anse, Jérémie is even more similar to Abricôts in terms of the occurrence of social unrest in neighbourhoods. Miragoâne and Chalon are special cases. They share a population that comprises an urban centre, Miragoâne. The other part, Chalon, is still classified as a rural zone. The two are nevertheless drawn together by commercial momentum. Social unrest was mentioned by a large number of respondents from that area.

The second observation is that social unrest is more likely to turn violent in an urban zone than in a village, in Les Cayes than in Chantal, and in Jérémie than in Abricôts. The same holds true for Nippes with Miragoâne and Chalon.

The third conclusion is that peripheral neighbourhoods or slums, as opposed to residential neighbourhoods or villages, are different both because social unrest is more common there and because the unrest is more likely to turn violent.

We end this section with some thoughts on the nature of the violence that is a part of the daily lives of our respondents and on the specific characteristics of the Nippes region.

1. A violence that is personal, cultural and structural

As we said at the outset, Haiti is relatively well-known for its political violence, which is derived from struggles for political power involving the players, the leaders of political groups, regional notables, the members of the international community, and the armed and instrumentalized urban masses. Haiti is nevertheless also home to social vio-

lence, which, like political violence, can be direct or personal, structural or cultural, in the words of Johan Galtung (1969, 1990).

The violence described by our respondents is direct or personal, in that it affects the victims physically: they have had stones thrown at them, been attacked with broken bottles, mistreated as women and children, raped. But the violence is also self-destructive, in that it destroys the social relations binding the players themselves. Domestic violence affects not only the direct victims but also the perpetrator, who is thus deprived of the very structure he needs for fulfillment. Neighbourhood violence leads to the destruction of the social relationships needed to build trust and social capital. In this sense, the relationship between direct violence and structural violence is symmetrical. Neighbourhood violence is also local; it is limited to a vicinity and has little impact beyond the town or neighbourhood.

The violence referred to by the respondents is also cultural, in that it is underpinned by values that cast women and children in relationships of submission. The use of force, while not necessarily seen as necessary in all cases, can nevertheless create situations deemed acceptable on the ground, even if its disastrous repercussions on lives, well-being and individual property rights are to be rejected. The material gains, the rise in prestige, the pleasure to be obtained from the use of force are not frowned on. Conflicts in Haiti usually present a zero-sum structure. You either win or you lose. The culture of violence has found fertile breeding ground: for people in underprivileged neighbourhoods, acts of violence may be the only means they have of expressing certain demands. The responsibility the state has vis-à-vis individuals to ensure the well-being of its citizens does not feature prominently in the relationship between state and society.

The violence described by the respondents is also structural. As we have seen, violence is more strongly perceived in the peripheral neighbourhoods, generally known as slums. In those neighbourhoods, living conditions are marked by inequality and social injustice. The relation between the perceived level of violence and the type of neighbourhood is stronger for respondents who stated they had no job, but holds steady for those who stated they had a job.

2. The Nippes region: the probable impact of port activities

The case of the Nippes region, in particular Miragoâne, where the survey was conducted, underscores the importance of port activities in fostering social unrest and transforming it into violence. Ports are places that facilitate contraband and where mixed populations congregate. In a relatively unregulated context, where even administrative practices do not follow existing laws, the risks of conflict or violence are relatively high. Miragoâne

has a fairly large port infrastructure inherited from the firm Reynolds, which once operated bauxite mines there. Manufactured goods, vehicles, used domestic or electronic appliances draw merchants from all over. As can be seen in Table 5.7, 32.6 per cent of respondents surveyed in Miragoâne said they were from the region, a figure that rises to 40.8 per cent and to 46.9 per cent respectively for Les Cayes and Jérémie.

Table 5.7
Percentage of respondents having stated that they were originally from the neighbourhood in which they lived

Department	% stating they were from the neighbourhood
Grand'Anse (Jérémie, Abricôts)	46.9 (559)
Nippes (Miragoâne, Chalon)	32.6 (430)
Sud (Les Cayes, Chantal)	40.8 (688)

Table 5.8
Unrest that turns violent, by type of neighbourhood and department

Department			Type of environment			Total	
			Rural village	Residential neighbourhood	Periphery or slum		
Nippes	Unrest that turns violent	Yes	Count	13	24	42	79
			% in Type of environment	19.1%	54.5%	52.5%	41.1%
		Non	Count	55	20	38	113
			% in Type of environment	80.9%	45.5%	47.5%	58.9%
	Total		Count	68	44	80	192
			% in Type of environment	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Sud	Unrest that turns violent	Yes	Count	8	17	52	77
			% in Type of environment	32.0%	35.4%	42.3%	39.3%
		Non	Count	17	31	71	119
			% in Type of environment	68.0%	64.6%	57.7%	60.7%
	Total		Count	25	48	123	196
			% in Type of environment	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Grand'Anse	Unrest that turns violent	Yes	Count	17	17	40	74
			% in Type of environment	38.6%	33.3%	51.3%	42.8%
		Non	Count	27	34	38	99
			% in Type of environment	61.4%	66.7%	48.7%	57.2%
	Total		Count	44	51	78	173
			% in Type of environment	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5.8 shows that the relation between the possibility that unrest will turn violent and the type of neighbourhood is significant only in Nippes region. Let us note, first, that in both peripheral and residential neighbourhoods, the probability that unrest will turn violent exceeds 50.0 per cent in Nippes region. This must be due to the combined effect of population movement and social bond variables. In Sud and Grand'Anse, peripheral and residential neighbourhoods differ in that the probability that unrest will give rise to violence is stronger in the former (the peripheral neighbourhoods).

Nippes also stands out because of the nature of the causes of social unrest. For the respondents who acknowledged the existence of unrest in their neighbourhood, as Table 5.9 indicates, the causes are first collective in nature, but local in scope (46.2 per cent) and secondly personal and familial in nature (37.2 per cent). With 63.8 per cent of respondents believing that unrest in the Nippes region (Miragoâne) is the result of collective issues, the

region is the only one to exceed the survey average (46.2 per cent) with regard to unrest caused by issues that are impersonal in nature.

Table 5.9
Causes of social unrest, by department

Cause of social unrest		Department			Total
		Nippes	Sud	Grand'Anse	
Personal	Count	37	47	64	148
	% in Department	26.8%	49.0%	39.0%	37.2%
Collective, local in scope	Count	88	24	72	184
	% in Department	63.8%	25.0%	43.9%	46.2%
Collective, the town in scope	Count	3	2	3	8
	% in Department	2.2%	2.1%	1.8%	2.0%
Collective, regional in scope	Count	0	0	3	3
	% in Department	.0%	.0%	1.8%	.8%
Collective, national in scope	Count	10	23	22	55
	% in Department	7.2%	24.0%	13.4%	13.8%
Total	Count	138	96	164	398
	% in Department	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Conclusion

In terms of the social bond and trust variables, the data show that social bonds are fragile and levels of trust low throughout the communities surveyed. The differences between departments and between neighbourhoods are usually differences in levels of weakness. For example, relatively more respondents in Grand'Anse (Jérémie and Abricôts) than in Nippes or Sud indicated that they had a job, but the fact remains that only 28.6% of respondents in Grand'Anse said they were employed.

This observation holds true for vertical social bond indicators, i.e. indicators that could enable individuals to leave their immediate social environment: employment status, associative life and access to information. Such is not the case, however, for horizontal or primary social bond indicators, the natural bonds between individuals. Religious practice is high, but it gives an indication of the individual's relationship with the next world, and, in some social contexts, may even be a sign of social weakness. Religious practice can be seen as a "cry for help" from an individual who feels abandoned. In that case, the stronger the feeling of abandon, the higher is the religious practice. Participation in elections is also high. This is certainly not participation as a result of affiliation with a political institution, such as a party, a trade union or a socio-political club. This form of participation must be viewed through the prism of the types of relationships that exist between the elites and the masses in Haiti, of the paramount role as relays played by "born leaders" in communities in the peripheral neighbourhoods.

The fact that the relations are low does not, however, stop them from being, in certain cases, significant in the statistical meaning of the term. We found, for example, that respondents in the slums were more likely to indicate that social unrest existed in their neighbourhoods than respondents in other neighbourhoods. The difference in probable unrest and in the likelihood that it would turn violent was due to the difference in vertical social bonds. Vertical social bonds are weaker in the peripheral neighbourhoods than in others.

Trust in social relationships and in institutions was generally low. In the slums, however, trust in social relationships was lower than in other neighbourhoods, but trust in institutions was stronger. The stronger trust in institutions nevertheless did not prevent the peripheral neighbourhoods from being confronted with more social unrest and violence. In other words, trust in social relationships is a stronger determinant of social cohesion than trust in institutions.

We have also seen that the commercial activities linked to a port open to the outside give rise to major population movements that cannot be considered to result from rural migration. That situation generates unrest which, in an urban context, is very likely to turn violent. The greater presence of conflicts in the Nippes region, and the higher probability that unrest will turn violent, are in part due to the presence of port activities that have spurred a considerable trade in imported goods, attracting people

from all parts of the country. The Miragoâne neighbourhood known as Cité Gonâve is said to be inhabited for the most part by migrants from the island of La Gonâve.

In terms of recommendations, initiatives are required that strengthen the social fabric and raise people's level of trust in their social environment and in institutions. It is on that condition that the state can legitimately act as the agent with sole control of violence. We have seen that private education and trade in imported goods are the activities most often mentioned by the fewer than 30.0 per cent of respondents who said, in our survey, that they had a job. These are service activities that presuppose that the country depends on revenue transfers. Production activities require greater cooperation in planning and management. Such activities should be encouraged through initiatives that require funds to be pooled. Production cooperatives, in a country where capital is scarce, should be encouraged.

The political leadership must give fresh impetus to its relations with the masses in the slums in particular. Such changes may be difficult to make in a country in which political power is a dominant factor, given the weakness of the economy. The state in Haiti plays a central role in the allocation of international aid, which is becoming a source of revenue for the country. The struggle for power is merciless, involving the mobilization of the masses in acts of violence. Changing the relations between those masses and the political elites requires guiding political groups in order to produce a leadership that will break with the past. Such initiatives have been taken in the past. We do not know whether this dimension has been taken into account. To be more objective and legitimate, such initiatives should be based on research results. The results of research such as this should be made available in accessible forms to the groups and individuals involved in Haitian politics.

MINUSTAH poses a dilemma. The potential for violence remains strong in the country. The national police force, by various estimations, is not yet able to deal with the many problems of internal and external security. The number of kidnappings is on the rise. The borders are porous. The current government has mooted the idea of a new army. The reactions of the international community, which would have to help the government put in place such a force, have tended to be negative, judging by what has been said in public. MINUSTAH apparently continues to be a necessity. For many reasons, however, it does not have the trust of the population, as this study has shown and as is attested in the press. The mission's agents have been accused of human rights violations. There can be no trust, in any case, from a population characterized by poor social cohesion. Once again, the results of this research should be made available to the country's decision-makers. This is a field of research that would be worth taking further.

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The Social Bond, Conflict and Violence in Haiti

This study is the second part of a larger research project that focuses on violence and local models of conflict management in Haiti. The project began in 2007, and is undertaken in cooperation between the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and Centre d'Études et de Recherche sur le Développement des Cultures et des Sociétés (CERDECS), Haiti.

While the first part of the project considered political violence, this study looks at day-to-day social relations in a group of selected communities in order to enhance understanding of the recurring nature of political violence. Our point of departure is the intense urbanization of the

country, which has led to the appearance of slum-like *cités*, or neighbourhoods, around urban centres. These neighbourhoods are home to social processes that predispose the inhabitants to violent political participation. Our findings show that weak social bonds and low trust in both social relationships and formal institutions, such as the state, NGOs and the UN force, MINUSTAH, are traits shared by most neighbourhoods, slums, urban areas and rural villages. However, slums are weaker when it comes to vertical indicators, those that show links between individuals from different

social backgrounds or from different neighbourhoods.

In terms of policy recommendations, initiatives should be considered that reinforce social cohesion and the level of trust among people in the communities. The political leadership should be capable of renewing its relationships with the urban masses. This requires that political groups be made aware of what is at stake and be willing to take the risk. In the past, initiatives have been launched to work with political parties. However, such initiatives would be more objective and legitimate if they were based on research.