

**IMPLEMENTING PEACE
AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (II):
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

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IMPLEMENTING PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (II): SOUTHERN AFRICA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The last part of Africa to be decolonised, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, remains one of the most peaceful. Yet, despite comprehensive protocols and agreements, SADC faces acute challenges characterised by tensions between member states, resource deficits, citizens' exclusion, social discontent and limited internal and external coordination. Regional security cooperation requires adept infrastructures underwritten by political commitment; but the organisation's Secretariat appears powerless to ensure policy implementation. It must develop an effective common security policy framework, improve coordination with international partners, harmonise and clarify its role with other SADC structures, broaden engagement with civil society, ensure member-state commitment to African Union (AU) efforts on human and people's rights and build capacity for evaluation and monitoring. As long as national sovereignty prevails over regional interests, however, the success of SADC mechanisms, notably in conflict resolution, will remain limited.

The region faces a range of evolving peace and security threats, including maritime security and piracy, cyber and technology-driven security threats, and socio-economic unrest. Beyond efforts to respond to these challenges, policy implementation capacity and information and response mechanisms are urgently required. SADC's intervention in Madagascar and Zimbabwe has exposed the region's limited capacity to enforce agreements it has brokered. Ad hoc and under-resourced mediation imposes additional burdens and responsibilities on the mediators. Civil society engagement in SADC processes in the two countries has been at best tangential, confirming the gulf between the regional body and its citizens. The Madagascar and Zimbabwe cases also highlight that structural governance deficits and politicised security sectors exacerbate conflict. SADC's mediation efforts reveal the complexities and challenges of dealing with unconstitutional changes in government, contested elections and violations of the region's electoral code.

A fragmented approach to crisis and the absence of a common policy hinder security cooperation. Member states pursue detached objectives without a consistent set of principles and policies in this area coordinated at the regional level. This reinforces their reluctance to cede authority to a SADC centralised structure. Regional commitment to the rule of law suffered from the decision of the SADC heads of state and government to confine the jurisdiction of its tribunal to interpretations of treaties and protocols relating to disputes between member states. The decision removes the right to individual petition, and without an alternate explanation from SADC's leadership, can be considered a reversal of previous gains in human security and people's rights.

SADC is keen to establish a mediation unit led by "elders" appointed by consensus between member states and supported by a credible and efficient resource team. Though the framework and operational methodology were approved in 2010, the organisation is yet to implement it. Regional conflict resolution efforts must incorporate military diplomacy options to address growing security sector influence in conflicts and their potential resolution. The establishment of national committees in each member state will buttress civil society participation in SADC policy formulation and implementation, as mandated by the treaty.

A culture of political solidarity among member states remains, fostered by a common liberation struggle history and a stated commitment to non-interference in the internal politics of others. This has inhibited effective preventive diplomacy and provided justification for non-engagement in cases of potential conflict and security threats. Despite the establishment of an early warning system in 2010, it is not clear if and how SADC utilises the conflict signals arising in the region and how best this infrastructure could be enhanced. Decision-making is consensual and rests solely with the heads of state and government and ministerial committees. The secretariat is expected to function as SADC's implementing arm, but lacks capacity and the authority to enforce decisions and is not empowered to engage in independent diplomatic action to address conflict situations.

The SADC Standby Force has demonstrated its readiness for deployment, successfully conducting joint exercises, though it needs further strengthening to expand its humanitarian and disaster management roles. It has not fully incorporated a civilian component, which is necessary to provide for human security as specified by the AU. SADC has no post-conflict reconstruction program or security sector reform policy framework to underpin sustainable peace. This reflects the prominence of bilateral over multilateral security cooperation, as well as varying geopolitical interests, the exclusive alliance of countries with liberation struggle history, and sensitivities regarding possible hegemonic domination. South Africa's role and potential in this regard are particularly pertinent, as are its relations with Angola, the second most influential SADC member.

Foreign partnerships around peace and security are disjointed and are not tied to a coherent strategy to build infrastructure and capacity. This manifests in the misapplication of resources and competing interests among SADC's international cooperating partners (ICPs). The organisation should support the implementation of the regional coordination platform for international partners, and consider how best to broaden engagement beyond traditional donors and partners.

The inter-governmental status of SADC limits the enforcement and monitoring of member states' compliance to its peace and security framework. Although political solidarity exists, relations between some of the regional leaders are fragile, even fraught, which has negatively affected sustainable regional security cooperation. However, compared to other challenges on the continent, Southern Africa is regarded as relatively peaceful. This affords it an important opportunity to build and consolidate its peace and security capacity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To strengthen SADC conflict resolution structures

To Member States:

1. Establish the election support unit at the Secretariat to coordinate and support the work of the SADC Election Advisory Council and other election-related activities.
2. Address effectively the problem created by the withdrawal of the human and people's rights mandate from the tribunal so as to provide citizens with appropriate remedial options when states fail to uphold their rights.
3. Broaden the regional early warning system (REWS) by establishing national centres and involving civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academia.

4. Set up and operationalise the mediation unit with a properly resourced panel of elders, reference group and support unit.
5. Build cohesion and competency of the Standby Force by conducting more regular joint exercises, securing adequate resources and expanding its role in humanitarian and disaster management programs.

To expand and strengthen SADC's policy framework

To Member States:

6. Develop and implement a common security policy to align national security institutions towards a common system.
7. Ensure the Standby Force has standard operating procedures and contingents for deployment in complex peacekeeping missions and situations of genocide, in accordance with objectives defined by the African Union (AU) and other regional organisations.
8. Make public the revised strategic indicative plan for the organ (SIPO II) for use as a broad guideline for the peace and security approach.

To Civil Society:

9. Develop and strengthen regional advocacy programs on the human and people's rights mandate that has been withdrawn from the tribunal and without which citizens have no remedial option when states fail to uphold their rights.

To improve internal coordination and efficiency

To Member States:

10. Integrate and clarify the role of the committee of defence chiefs in supporting political and diplomatic efforts in conflict resolution, especially in situations where security sector engagement is required to promote sustainable solutions.
11. Establish a common foreign policy guideline for the regional bloc to promote collective continental and global engagement.

To broaden regional participation in peace and security

To Member States:

12. Establish national committees as the platform for civil society groups, including trade unions, private sector and faith-based communities to participate in SADC processes.

13. Integrate the Parliamentary Forum into the head of state summit and Council of Ministers in order to broaden citizen participation through their parliamentary representatives.
14. Operationalise the memorandum of understanding signed by the Secretariat with the SADC-Council of NGOs by extending it to peace and security joint consultations and programs.
15. Establish the civilian component of the Standby Force by extending civilian involvement beyond civil servants from member states.

To Civil Society:

16. Develop regional advocacy programs for the establishment of the national committees in each member state.

To increase effectiveness of international cooperation

To Member States:

17. Align the Mutual Defence Pact's provisions on military intervention with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
18. Commit to strengthening the international cooperating partners' (ICPs) thematic group on peace and security by finalising fund management systems and enhancing capacity for implementation, monitoring and evaluation, prioritisation and documentation of projects.
19. Develop a "China policy" to guide regional engagement in anticipation of Chinese growing presence and interests in the region.

To the Secretariat:

20. Strengthen the capacity of the liaison office at the AU to promote constant engagement and harmonisation of roles.

To International Partners:

21. Coordinate partnership efforts through the international cooperating partners thematic group and commit to building the AU-SADC peace and security collaboration, taking advantage of the election of the SADC-supported candidate as AU chair in July 2012.

Johannesburg/Brussels, 15 October 2012

IMPLEMENTING PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (II): SOUTHERN AFRICA

I. INTRODUCTION

In April 1980, the Lusaka Declaration gave birth to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), with nine founding members and a core objective to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa.¹

On 17 August 1992 the Windhoek Treaty established the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to replace SADCC and formerly entered into force in 1993. Over time, membership has increased to fifteen states.² Until 2001, each state held sector specific responsibilities,³ but that system was abandoned in favour of a more centralised approach coordinated by a secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana.

The SADC Treaty established the heads of state and government summit⁴ (or “the summit” thereafter) as the supreme policymaking body, supported by the Council of

Ministers,⁵ and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC, or “the organ” thereafter). These structures operate on a “troika” basis.⁶ Day-to-day activities are run by the Secretariat, headed by the executive secretary, who is supported by directorates.⁷ The Secretariat is not a decision-making body; it is the principal executive institution and, as such, is expected to implement decisions taken by the policymaking structures.

The primary objective of the treaty is to enhance the legal framework for cooperation in the region and deepen political and economic integration. The organ is a key institution, mandated with the promotion of peace and security.⁸

¹ Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe formed the SADCC with the main aim of pursuing economic liberation and integrated economic development. It was preceded by the Frontline States (FLS), an alliance of five independent Southern African states (Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania) formed in the 1970s to support anti-colonial and anti-apartheid forces within the region.

² Namibia joined in 1990, South Africa in 1994, Mauritius in 1995, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Seychelles in 1997, and Madagascar in 2005.

³ For example, Angola was in charge of energy; Mozambique of culture, information, sport, transport and communications; South Africa of finance, investment and health; and Zimbabwe had responsibility for crop production, food, agriculture and natural resources. The DRC and Seychelles were the only two members that had no sector responsibility.

⁴ The summit, which meets at least twice a year, is responsible for overall policy direction and operations of SADC, as well as adoption of all legal instruments. The summit also appoints the executive secretary and its deputy and is responsible for the admission of new members into the bloc. It makes decisions by consensus, which is binding.

⁵ The Council of Ministers comprises foreign ministers from member states; they manage the functioning and development of the regional bloc. They also oversee the Integrated Committee of Ministers – a body of ministers appointed from member states who are responsible for monitoring and controlling trade, industry, finance, investments, infrastructure, food, agriculture, natural resources, and social and human development activities. The Council of Ministers also oversees the Standing Committee of Officials, which provides technical advisory services and comprises permanent secretaries from member states. Southern African Development Community Treaty, Article 11, August 1992. See Appendix B for SADC’s organisational structure.

⁶ The “troika” system is an association of three countries (comprising a rotational grouping of outgoing, incumbent and succeeding chairpersons) that constitute a decision-making unit on behalf of the broader SADC structures. Countries that assumed membership of the troika of the summit in August 2012 are: Mozambique (chairperson), Malawi (vice chairperson) and Angola (outgoing chairperson). See “Final Communiqué of the 32nd Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government”, Maputo, Mozambique, 18 August 2012.

⁷ See Appendix C for an organogram of the Secretariat. The executive secretary, currently Tomáz Augusto Salomão, is appointed by the summit on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. The key directorates of SADC are: Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR); Trade, Industry, Finance and Investments; Infrastructure and Services; Social and Human Development and Special Programs; and Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

⁸ The current members of the troika of the organ as from August 2012 are: Tanzania (chairperson), Namibia (vice chairperson) and South Africa (outgoing chairperson). “Final Communiqué of

Although the 1992 treaty emphasised regional peace and security, the relevant protocol was only signed in August 2001 and entered into force in March 2004, after its ratification by the requisite quota of member states.⁹ This twelve-year period between conceptualisation and creation reflects the slow construction pace of SADC's peace and security architecture.

Implementing the protocol required the organ (mandated by the heads of state and government) to produce a strategic plan, which would be implemented within five years (2004 to 2009). In 2004, the heads of state and government summit adopted the strategic indicative plan of the organ (SIPO I) to provide policy directions for the organ and guidelines for its day-to-day activities, as well as to align SADC's peace and security operations with the African Union (AU) peace and security architecture.

The Mutual Defence Pact (MDP), ratified in 2003, establishes a framework for security cooperation among member states in the face of external aggression, and reflects a broader intention to build a regional security community.¹⁰ The pact provides for joint research and intelligence, train-

ing, collective military action and the confidentiality of sensitive information among the signatories.

The region faces various conflict and security challenges and its capacity to foster and sustain peace and security has been tested in recent years by prolonged political and economic crises in Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Some countries are experiencing varying levels of protests, driven mainly by socio-economic factors (such as poverty, unemployment and inequalities) and political exclusion.¹¹ Economic growth across the region has not resulted in equal opportunities.¹² Protests have been met with a heavy-handed reaction by security forces, heightening fears between state and citizens and fuelling instability. This report is the second in a series that analyses regional insecurity and collective responses.¹³

the 32nd Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government", op. cit.

⁹ Ratification requires national procedures to make legislative and constitutional amendments and a two-thirds majority vote in parliament.

¹⁰ All SADC members have ratified the pact except Angola, the DRC, Madagascar and Seychelles. See "SADC protocols tracker: Signing and ratification score card for Southern African Development Community (SADC) – member states", SADC-Coalition of Non-Governmental Organisations, December 2010. Geopolitical interests have been identified as the possible cause of non-ratification. Though Article 6 provides for optional involvement in collective military action, the four countries have been reluctant to take responsibility for military action that may arise outside their areas of interest. Madagascar and Seychelles (being islands) may be unwilling to be involved in "mainland" military engagement. The military intervention in the DRC by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in 1998 left SADC divided on the necessity of such action. Kinshasa is therefore wary that the organisation may not have capacity and willingness to come to its rescue should such need arise again. The SADC summit seems to have confirmed this in August 2012 when it refused to make any clear commitment following a request by the DRC to deploy a neutral force along the Rwanda/DRC border to fight against the M23 (23 March movement) rebels (see Section II.A.2). SADC's limited military capacity may therefore explain the DRC's reluctance to ratify the pact. There is speculation that the Angolan government retains reservations based on the limited support offered by the SADC region during the civil war; and Luanda has accused some members – Zambia and South Africa under President Nelson Mandela – of supporting or being sympathetic to the rebels. Crisis Group email correspondence, SADC member state army commander, Pretoria, 16 July 2012.

¹¹ In 2010, Mozambique experienced mass riots and demonstrations reportedly because of socio-economic challenges faced by citizens. In 2011, social protests occurred in Malawi, Angola, Swaziland; most recently, in August 2012, labour unrest in South Africa's mining sector resulted in 34 protestors shot dead by police.

¹² See Appendix F for Gini coefficient of wealth distribution among SADC members.

¹³ See Crisis Group Africa Report N°181, *Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (I): Central Africa*, 7 November 2011.

II. AN INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION

The organ, guided by its strategic plan, is in charge of regional peace and security matters. Interactions with other SADC institutions – the summit, the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat – and instruments such as the Mutual Defence Pact also influence decisions in this area.

A. THE ORGAN FOR POLITICS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION

The organ is guided by the following objectives: protecting the people; promoting political, security and defence cooperation; developing common foreign policy approaches and a collective security capacity to respond to external threats; peacekeeping and resolving intra- and inter-state conflicts; promoting the development of democratic institutions in member states; implementing UN, AU and other international conventions; upholding international law; developing cooperation between police and security services in combating domestic and cross-border crime; and disaster management.¹⁴

These objectives can be further placed into five broad categories: military and defence cooperation, crime prevention, intelligence, foreign policy and human rights.¹⁵ They emphasise SADC's recognition of the correlation between development and security¹⁶ and the need to balance state and human security.

The organ is made up of two main components: the directorate (at times referred to as the organ secretariat) and the troika. The directorate is located within the SADC Secretariat and is headed by a director who reports directly to the executive secretary.¹⁷ The organ operates at six levels: the chairperson of the organ troika (usually referred to as organ chairperson); the Ministerial Committee of the organ;¹⁸ the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee

(ISDSC); the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC); ad hoc sub-committees established by the Ministerial Committee; and the organ directorate.¹⁹

The ISDSC is comprised of defence, public security and state security ministers mandated with achieving military, public security and intelligence cooperation.²⁰ The ISPDC focuses on good governance, human rights and diplomacy and comprises foreign ministers. Both committees are chaired by defence and foreign ministers respectively from the country chairing the organ troika. Under the ISDSC are three sub-committees with responsibility for state security, defence and public security and comprised of defence, police²¹ and intelligence chiefs of the member states. Reporting to the ISDSC chairperson, their role is to operationalise military, public security and intelligence cooperation.

The organ is led by a rotational chairperson – who must be a head of state or government – reporting to the summit. The chairperson is expected to commit and raise financial and human resources to complete the organ's tasks.

1. The strategic indicative plan of the organ (SIPO)

The SIPO is a five-year strategic plan for the implementation of the Protocol for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, focusing on politics, defence and state security, as well as governance and human security.²² SADC's Ministerial Committee undertook evaluation exercises of SIPO I in 2007, 2009 and 2010, which informed the de-

¹⁴ SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, Southern African Development Community, August 2001.

¹⁵ Mark Malan and Jackie Cilliers, "SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future Development", Institute of Security Studies, March 1997.

¹⁶ Crisis Group interview, researcher, University of Botswana, Gaborone, 8 February 2012.

¹⁷ Although the directorate may interact with the troika of the organ, it reports directly to the executive secretary, who in turn reports to the troika of the organ, the Council of Ministers and the summit.

¹⁸ The Ministerial Committee of the organ reports to the chairperson and consists of foreign, defence, public security and state security ministers from member states. It has responsibility for coordinating the work of the organ and its structures.

¹⁹ See Appendix D for an organogram of the organ.

²⁰ The Frontline States set up the ISDSC in 1975. The committee was responsible for support to various liberation movements, including training, logistics and the infiltration of freedom fighters. It was also linked to the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). See Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani and Abillah Omari (eds.), *Security and Democracy in Southern Africa* (Johannesburg, 2007), p. 52.

²¹ The police component is represented by the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs' Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO), established in Zimbabwe in 1995 to provide a cooperation platform for regional police forces. Its members comprise Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Mauritius, the DRC and Angola. Its objectives are to foster strategies to fight cross-border and regional crimes; disseminate information on crime; carry out regular joint reviews; make recommendations to improve policing; and develop regional training policies to enhance performance. Its forces are compelled to abide by a code of conduct. Operating as a stand-alone body, SARPCCO was incorporated into SADC in 2009.

²² "Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation", Southern African Development Community, August 2004, p. 47.

velopment of SIPO II.²³ The first plan lacked clear benchmarks for monitoring and evaluation,²⁴ and contained too many priority areas, reducing it to a “wish list” without details on sequencing, implementation and responsibilities for relevant SADC structures.²⁵

SIPO II was approved by the heads of state and government summit in Windhoek, Namibia, in August 2010. Two years after its adoption, the document is still not public. Concerns have been raised regarding the absence of civil society engagement in the development of SIPO II.²⁶ The document also fails to address the fragile relationship between the organ and its international cooperating partners (ICPs).²⁷ Despite evident deficits caused by the lack of internal resources and capacity, SADC retains a rigid approach to what it considers as “strategic” areas that must be exclusively funded and controlled by its membership, leaving only “non-strategic” designations open for international cooperation.²⁸ SIPO II adopted an ineffective sectoral approach²⁹ and concerns have been raised about a

lack of commitment by member states to democratic principles.³⁰

SIPO II brought policing responsibilities into the organ’s functional structure, focusing on rising domestic and cross-border crime threats. The plan has also introduced greater emphasis on monitoring and evaluation but without clear implementation procedures.³¹ Nonetheless, the SIPO framework remains the primary strategic guide for the organ to promote peace and security.

2. The Mutual Defence Pact

The 2003 Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) is rooted in the 1998 joint military intervention by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – Operation Restore Sovereign Legitimacy – in support of the then-president, Laurent Kabila.³² The three countries invoked provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter on collective self-defence, as well as principles of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).³³

As the DRC had joined SADC the previous year, the coalition also argued that it was acting in compliance with Article 2 (a) of SADC’s Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, mandating the protection of people of the region from external aggression. As chair of the organ, Zimbabwe claimed it was carrying out a peace-keeping role. But authorisation from either the UN or OAU was not obtained prior to intervention. The Zimbabwe-led coalition (together with the DRC) pushed for a protocol to create a SADC pact compelling all parties to carry out a collective response in the event of external aggression against a member state.³⁴ South Africa, wary of an interventionist approach, preferred a flexible set of options that would allow for broader conflict resolution and diplomatic engagement – seen by some as a more

²³ The first formal evaluation exercise was held in Dar es Salaam in February 2007 and recommended a review before 2009, as well as five yearly reviews and assessments. A second review workshop was held in Swaziland in March 2009, followed in May 2010 by a meeting of the Ministerial Committee in Gaborone to consolidate the outcome of the Swaziland meeting.

²⁴ Crisis Group interview, GIZ (German cooperation agency) technical adviser, SADC peace, security and governance program, Gaborone, 10 February 2012.

²⁵ Crisis Group interview, South African academic, Johannesburg, 8 March 2012.

²⁶ The development of both SIPO I and SIPO II was conducted by SADC officials mainly from the security sector, with oversight by the Ministerial Committee, ISDPC and ISDSC. The final drafts were adopted by the summit. The exclusion of civil society and other civilian components limited the scope of both process and content to a state-centric focus. See Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, “Towards Peace and Security in Southern Africa”, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, January 2012, p. 11.

²⁷ Some of SADC’s main partners are the UN Department for Political Affairs; UN Development Programme (UNDP); EU; German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ); Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), as well as the Austrian, French and Swedish governments.

²⁸ Strategic areas include the regional early warning centre; mediation; core functions of the Standby Force; strategic analysis and planning and core election logistics. Non-strategic areas are identified as: operationalisation of the Standby Force logistics depot and interoperability of equipment; demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR); election observation training; and any other activities deemed as requiring international support. See “Framework for Managing the SADC-ICP Relationship”, SADC, July 2010; and “Windhoek Declaration on a New Partnership between SADC and International Cooperating Partners”, 27 April 2006, p. 2.

²⁹ This included failure to group various peace and security challenges together and identify the specific stakeholders nec-

essary for addressing them, eg, socio-economic, politics, cultural and natural resources clusters.

³⁰ Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, “Towards Peace and Security in Southern Africa”, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, January 2012, p. 15.

³¹ Ibid, p. 16.

³² They justified their intervention as protection of a member state after Kabila asked for SADC’s assistance in repelling invasion by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. See A. Essuman-Johnson, “Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: A Comparative Analysis of two African Security Complexes”, *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, vol. 3 (2009), pp. 409-422.

³³ K. D. Hwang, *The Remaking of SADC Politico-Security Regionalism in the Post-Cold War Era* (Pretoria, 2006), p. 171.

³⁴ Cecilia Hull and Markus Derblom, “Abandoning Frontline Trenches? Capabilities for Peace and Security in the SADC region”, Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2009, p. 34.

“balanced approach”.³⁵ Along with several SADC members, South Africa, then chair of the summit, criticised Zimbabwe’s, Namibia’s and Angola’s unilateralism.³⁶

Angola’s relationship with South Africa has transformed into mutual cooperation since the military intervention in the DRC.³⁷ Under Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, the relationship was strained.³⁸ It improved under President Zuma because of his personal relationship with the Angolan president, Eduardo dos Santos.³⁹ Warm rela-

tions between both countries enabled Zuma’s facilitation role in the Zimbabwe political crisis.⁴⁰

Lesotho is another example of the unclear decision-making for mandating SADC intervention. In September 1998, the government of Lesotho requested assistance from SADC, following a “virtual coup d’état” in the wake of an army mutiny and the rejection of the May election results by opposition groupings.⁴¹ South Africa and Botswana deployed troops under “Operation Boleas”, prompting a debate on the procedures for decision-making in SADC.⁴²

According to Article 6 (1) of the MDP, an armed attack on any member state “shall be met with immediate collective action”. During the deliberations for the signature of the pact, this bold provision prompted concerns that such obligation would render member states hostage to those who behaved belligerently and would eventually draw the region into incessant military activities.⁴³ In response, Article 6 (3) was included, allowing for optional involvement in military intervention and providing that “each State party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate”. This opt-out clause is viewed as one of the main obstacles to a “security community” in SADC, as it enables and justifies hesitancy by member states in committing to collective security actions.⁴⁴ Even after it was signed, a slow ratification process meant the pact only entered into force on 17 August 2008 and that five members are yet to assent.⁴⁵

³⁵ Crisis Group interview, former Botswana Defence Forces commander, Gaborone, 8 February 2012. Such polarised positioning between South Africa and Zimbabwe can be traced back to the onset of the creation of the organ. See Section III.B.

³⁶ Fako Johnson Lokoti, “African Military Intervention in African Conflicts: An Analysis of Military Intervention in Rwanda, the DRC and Lesotho”, PHD thesis, University of the Western Cape, January 2006, p. 146. National interests of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the DRC were seen as reasons for the intervention. Angola’s security was threatened by potential alliance between the rebels, which had used DRC as a rear base for many years, and ex-Mobuto elements. Namibia was also concerned about the Angolan rebels’ destabilising role in the Caprivi Strip, and it had economic and geopolitical interests, especially with respect to securing vital water supplies and mining options from the DRC. Zimbabwe’s intervention was based on a complex set of economic, military and strategic interests that benefited the country’s political and military elite, but also sought to bolster its fragile power supply. Ibid, pp. 148-155. See also Crisis Group Africa Report N°2, *Congo at War: A Briefing on Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict*, 17 November 1998 and N. R. Ngangoue, “Politics-Africa: DRC conflict spreads northwards”, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), October 1998.

³⁷ “South Africa – Angola: A New Era of Hegemonic Cooperation or a Dangerous Precedence for Africa?”, ISS, August 2009.

³⁸ The Angolans were suspicious of elements in Mandela’s administration from the previous apartheid government, which had supported União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). A South African company, De Beers, was reported to be purchasing diamonds from rebel-controlled areas, which exacerbated tensions. See Adekeye Adebajo, “Regional rival Angola could yet become SA’s best friend”, *Business Day*, 19 August 2009. A document leaked to the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) in 2005 alleged that Angolan intelligence planned to support then-Deputy President Jacob Zuma to unseat President Thabo Mbeki. See “Inside the Browse ‘Mole’ row”, *The Mail & Guardian*, 3 August 2007.

³⁹ During apartheid, President Zuma spent part of his exile operating from Angola. When he was elected president of the ANC in December 2007, his first foreign visit was to Angola. When he became president in May 2009, his first foreign visit was again to Angola in August 2009. The Angolan president, Eduardo dos Santos, visited South Africa for his first state visit in December 2010.

⁴⁰ “Zuma recognised the importance of dos Santos’ leadership within SADC, while the Angolan gave more leeway and support to Zuma in his facilitator’s role vis-à-vis Zimbabwe”. See Leon Hartwell, “Contextualising South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe”, Institute for Global Dialogue, 31 October 2011.

⁴¹ “Virtual coup d’état caused by army, opposition parties, Lesotho’s foreign minister tells General Assembly”, press release, UN General Assembly, GA/9861, 1 October 1998.

⁴² Questions were raised about Botswana and South Africa’s unsanctioned intervention in Lesotho at a time when Zimbabwe had been mediating the country’s political crisis for ten years and was also chairing the organ. Crisis Group interview, retired Zimbabwe National Army brigadier general, Harare, 24 February 2012. There was no clarity of how the decision on intervention was made without authorisation from the organ, OAU or UN Security Council. R. J. Southall, “SADC’s intervention into Lesotho: An illegal defence of democracy?”, in O. Furley and R. May (eds.), *African Interventionist States* (Abingdon, 2001), p. 29.

⁴³ Crisis Group interview, former army commander of SADC state, Gaborone, 8 February 2012.

⁴⁴ Deane-Peter Baker and Sadiki Maeresera, “SADCBRIG Interventions in SADC Member States: Reasons to Doubt”, ISS, *African Security Review*, vol. 18, no. 1 (2009), p. 109.

⁴⁵ The ISPDC expressed concern on the slow ratification process as it was interpreted as an indicator of the region’s reluctance to build a collective security mechanism. SADC ISPDC minutes

The SADC region has not experienced new military interventions since the DRC and Lesotho conflicts of 1998; the MDP has therefore – for that period at least – become moribund. Member states have put greater focus on bilateral military cooperation with less attention on regional cooperation.⁴⁶ In August 2012, the DRC requested SADC to deploy a neutral military force to curb the incursions by rebels of the 23 March movement (M23) along its border with Rwanda, but received a non-committal response.⁴⁷ Considerations for a combined deployment with the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) were tempered by SADC's complex decision-making process and lack of political will and resources.⁴⁸ Discussions on the possible format of coordinated action by SADC/ICGLR have been ongoing, however, and this would be the first cross-regional military cooperation for SADC outside of AU and UN missions.⁴⁹ The SADC Treaty also makes provision for other measures outside of military intervention, such as sanctions (Article 33 (1)), which have never been used.⁵⁰

B. A SUPRANATIONAL DIMENSION?

SADC is an inter-governmental rather than a supranational organisation.⁵¹ Decision-making is centralised with the heads of state and government summit, whose decisions the secretariat is expected to implement, though it has no enforcement or monitoring capacity.⁵² There are, however, some emerging contradictions between the inter-governmental status and the expressed intention by some of its

institutions – the Parliamentary Forum (SADCPF)⁵³ and the tribunal – to operate as supranational bodies.

The SADC Tribunal was set up in 1992 to provide for the legal interpretation of the treaty and settle jurisdictional disputes over intra-state litigation.⁵⁴ This appears to confer supranational powers to the tribunal, which has prompted arguments that this was not what was intended. In 2010, the Zimbabwean government objected to a ruling that found it to be in “violation of rights for expropriation of private property” in contravention of the SADC Treaty, arguing that it was not bound by its rulings as the tribunal's constituting treaty had not been ratified by two thirds of member states as required.⁵⁵

In August 2010, the heads of state summit in Windhoek suspended the tribunal and commissioned a review of its mandate and jurisdiction. But instead of engaging the core recommendations contained in the report of the independent consultant, in May 2011 the summit “held that appropriate legal instruments to change the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the legal framework within which the Tribunal operates were to be prepared for presentation to the summit in August 2012”.⁵⁶

The Zimbabwean government submitted proposals that would exclude the tribunal's jurisdiction over disputes between natural or legal persons and member states.⁵⁷ In their recommendations to the Council of Ministers in June 2012, the SADC justice ministers and attorney generals

of meeting, Lusaka, 9-11 June 2004. Malawi, DRC, Angola, Madagascar, and Seychelles are yet to assent to the treaty. “SADC protocols tracker”, op. cit.

⁴⁶ Crisis Group email correspondence, SADC member state army commander, Pretoria, 2 July 2012

⁴⁷ Crisis Group email correspondence, SADC member state army commander, Gaborone, 29 August 2012.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Crisis Group email correspondence, SADC Secretariat official, Gaborone, 29 August 2012.

⁵⁰ Although SADC suspended Madagascar in 2009, it did not adopt any specific measures to isolate the country. The suspension only excluded Madagascar from participating in SADC meetings and voting.

⁵¹ A supranational body has mandate to make laws, regulations and rules that bind member states, effectively ceding sovereignty to the collective body. An intergovernmental body functions through member states' willingness to accede to common laws, regulations and rules. This allows states to cooperate in a range of areas while retaining sovereignty.

⁵² “Desk Assessment of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2005 – 2010”, Southern African Development Community, November 2011, p. 95.

⁵³ The SADCPF is a regional inter-parliamentary body composed of thirteen parliaments representing over 3,500 lawmakers in the region. It has no legislative powers and is currently advocating for its transformation into a parliament.

⁵⁴ The tribunal was set up under Article 16 of the SADC Treaty. It has jurisdiction over disputes between states or between states and natural or legal persons, after all judicial means have been exhausted at the national level and without requiring the consent of all parties to the dispute. SADC Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure, Article 15.

⁵⁵ The tribunal has made several rulings against the Zimbabwean government, primarily in relation to rights violated during its controversial land reform program, but also in 2008 for non-compliance with judgment debts ordered by the country's own courts in cases involving abuses by state security agents. See www.sadc-tribunal.org/pages/decisions and Derek Matyszak, “The Dissolution of the SADC Tribunal”, Research and Advocacy Unit, 19 August 2011.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 2.

⁵⁷ This proposition seems to seek compliance of SADC institutions to its inter-governmental framework at the expense of the citizens' collective rights. The body's justice ministers met in Luanda on 14-15 June 2012 to review the role, responsibilities and terms of reference of the tribunal and recommended a separate human rights treaty. Crisis Group interview, SADC Lawyers Association member, Johannesburg, 9 July 2012.

upheld this mandate.⁵⁸ The Council of Ministers, however, rejected the recommendation,⁵⁹ prompting the 17-18 August 2012 SADC Maputo summit to call for a new tribunal protocol that would exclude the rights of individuals to access the court.⁶⁰ This has raised profound concerns about the development of the rule of law and commitment to human rights in Southern Africa.⁶¹

SADC's Parliamentary Forum was established under Article 9 of the SADC Treaty to promote, among other objectives, peace, security and stability through sharing of regional parliamentary experiences. It has no legislative oversight of member states and does not legislate. It seeks to establish a "fully equipped and functional SADC regional parliament" by 2015.⁶² If achieved, it would operate with supranational influence within an inter-governmental regional bloc. There is no evidence, however, that this plan is in tandem with any intended broad objectives for SADC's shift towards supranational status.⁶³ There is also limited evidence that the summit supports the forum's transformation into a regional parliament.⁶⁴

III. THE PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Regional integration processes in Africa have tended to develop a broader mandate focused on security, economic, political and social issues. The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action set in motion the vision to establish an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2000.⁶⁵ The OAU struggled to facilitate this objective, facing enormous challenges, including its lack of focus on development finance, the deficiency of regional and continental integration approaches and weak economic and political governance.⁶⁶ The 1999 Sirte Declaration, which replaced the OAU with the AU, highlighted the need to link security and stability to development.⁶⁷ SADC began building and strengthening its architecture as mandated by its 1992 treaty before the establishment of the AU peace and security architecture.⁶⁸

A. POLITICAL INTEGRATION: THE SUBTLE DOCTRINE

One of SADC's core objectives is to "evolve common political values, systems and institutions".⁶⁹ Although it has underpinned political integration and regional solidarity, the emphasis on a shared history of colonialism has overlooked diversity among SADC countries. This has allowed governments to join efforts in dismissing calls for greater accountability, better governance and more effective institutional capacity.⁷⁰

The predominance of the heads of state and government summit within SADC has consolidated the inter-govern-

⁵⁸ "Draft protocol of the Tribunal", Southern African Development Community, June 2012, p. 14.

⁵⁹ Crisis Group email correspondence, Southern African Litigation Centre senior official, Johannesburg, 21 August 2012.

⁶⁰ "Final Communiqué of the 32nd Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government", op. cit.

⁶¹ "Statement released by Commonwealth Lawyers Association", Commonwealth Legal Education Association and Commonwealth Magistrates' and Judges' Association, 23 August 2012.

⁶² Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum, Strategic Plan 2011-2015.

⁶³ Crisis Group email correspondence, professor, Graduate School of Security and Defence Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 10 May 2012.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ The objective of the plan was "to achieve ... rapid self-reliance and self-sustaining development and economic growth"; in other words, to ensure economic, cultural and social integration on the continent. The Abuja Treaty, signed by 49 African states three years before, entered into force in 1994 to establish an implementation framework for the Lagos Action Plan.

⁶⁶ Rene N'guettia Kouassi, "The Itinerary of African Integration Process: An Overview of the Historical Landmarks", *African Integration Review*, vol. 1, no. 2 (2007).

⁶⁷ The declaration contained a clause that highlighted the need to "convene, as soon as possible, an African Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and cooperation on the continent". The conference eventually took place in Abuja from 8 to 9 May 2000. The OAU did not connect its development focus to security and stability, and consequently cooperation on these issues was not pursued within an integrated framework.

⁶⁸ The AU Constitutive Act of July 2000 paved the way for the creation of the peace and security architecture.

⁶⁹ SADC Treaty, Article 5, June 2003.

⁷⁰ See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Reconstructing the Implications of Liberation Struggle History on SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe", South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), September 2011.

mental status of the organisation and strengthened the executive power in often centralised states.⁷¹ National sovereignty invariably supersedes the collective assembly, weakening potential for accountability. An absence of legislative oversight and the suspension of the tribunal have promoted tolerance towards impunity by member states that consistently violate political values and principles of the SADC Treaty.⁷²

Member states have used the pretence of national sovereignty to limit “interference” in their domestic affairs. This approach appears to contrast sharply with the AU Constitutive Act, which “places important limitations on state sovereignty. It is based on the premise that sovereignty is conditional and is defined in terms of a state’s willingness and capacity to provide protection to its citizens”.⁷³

Liberation history is an important political identity in the region, with several countries having engaged in violent liberation struggles.⁷⁴ In 2002, Retired Brigadier General Hashim Mbita was tasked by the organ ministerial committee to document the liberation history of SADC member states.⁷⁵ The project’s objective (which has now been completed) was to build an understanding of political history to create a common future as “cement for regional political integration”.⁷⁶ In August 2011, the liberation movements of Southern Africa met in Namibia to consolidate solidarity and ensure that “SADC does not become infiltrated by imperialist powers seeking to control the region”.⁷⁷ Re-

percussions of the emergence of this grouping for peace and security are unclear, although these issues tend to be articulated through the lens of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist concern.⁷⁸ The common history must be viewed as an opportunity for engagement, since aspirations for economic and political emancipation, coupled with the promotion of human rights, democracy and rule of law, dovetail with the objectives of the SADC Treaty.⁷⁹

A silo mind-set to regional integration persists, hindering communication and coordination between member states. Political decisions are not weighed in terms of their impact on economic integration. The suspension of the tribunal, for example, has been widely critiqued from a political angle, but not in terms of its effect on the economic integration and investment prospects for SADC. The tribunal existed to strengthen rule of law, including the protection of property rights in the region. It provided assurances for non-state actors, including the business sector, that agreements will be honoured and that disputes will be settled fairly. Had the SADC summit upheld the November 2008 ruling against the Zimbabwe government, this would have been considered hostile to the “regime solidarity” belief, which is common among regional leaders.⁸⁰ The suspension in August 2010 and subsequent restriction of the tribunal’s human rights mandate in August 2012 reinforce this solidarity while creating safeguards against “interference” in the domestic affairs of any of the member states.⁸¹

B. SECURITY COMMUNITY AND CONFLICT TRAJECTORIES

The history of conflict in Southern Africa is characterised by colonialism and apartheid, liberation struggles, the effects of the Cold War and internal rivalry and tension. The region also experienced civil war in Angola and Mozam-

⁷¹ Crisis Group interviews, British diplomat, Gaborone, 7 February 2012; GIZ technical adviser, SADC peace, security and governance program, Gaborone, 10 February 2012; South African government official, Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO, foreign ministry), Pretoria, 7 March 2012.

⁷² Crisis Group interview, UN official, Gaborone, 16 February 2012.

⁷³ Kristiana Powell, “The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on The Responsibility to Protect”, The North-South Institute, May 2005, p. 11.

⁷⁴ Tanzania, Malawi, DRC, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa fought for liberation (through diplomatic and military means); and the latter five were involved in protracted armed struggles. Seychelles, Madagascar, Botswana, Mauritius, Lesotho and Swaziland do not have history associated with a liberation struggle.

⁷⁵ Minutes of the ISPDC meeting held in Lusaka, 9-11 June 2004. A Tanzanian national, Mbita was executive secretary of the Liberation Committee of the OAU between 1974 and 1994.

⁷⁶ Crisis Group interview, senior officer, organ, Gaborone, 15 February 2012.

⁷⁷ Crisis Group telephone interview, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) Politburo member, Harare, 29 February 2012. The liberation movements include ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe); African National Congress (ANC, South Africa), Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania); Movimento Popular de

Libertação de Angola (MPLA, Angola); Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO, Mozambique); and South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO, Namibia). These are ruling parties (except for ZANU-PF, which is part of an inclusive government with the Movement for Democratic Change) that led their countries to independence. They have met on three occasions – May 2010 (Tanzania), August 2011 (Angola), and June 2012 (Zimbabwe) – as a loose coalition of political parties and have no formal and binding legal status. Very little information is available about this grouping, its objectives or leadership structure.

⁷⁸ For example, some members of the liberation movements were critical of NATO’s 2011 bombing of Libya, France’s role in the 2011 Côte d’Ivoire election crisis and the 2008 International Criminal Court indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.

⁷⁹ Crisis Group interview, GIZ technical adviser, SADC peace, security and governance program, Gaborone, 10 February 2012.

⁸⁰ Crisis Group interview, SADC Lawyers Association, Johannesburg, 7 September 2012.

⁸¹ Ibid.

bique, sponsored by regional and international players.⁸² SADC was involved in resolving the Angolan conflict (1975-2002).⁸³ At an ISDSC meeting held in Luanda in 1996, regional defence chiefs offered military support to Angola in order to defeat União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). SADC did not provide such support, but the readiness by the defence chiefs reflected a commitment to high-level defence cooperation against UNITA. At the political level, however, member states rejected military cooperation.⁸⁴ This exposed sensitive political-military relations in the region.

The establishment of a security community requires centralised structures at the regional level that are integrated within member states. A common security policy provides guidelines for national security institutions with a view to guaranteeing common values and offering a framework for implementation. However, SADC's interpretation of security has focused on state rather than on human security,⁸⁵ and the body's institutions have acknowledged this anomaly.⁸⁶ While the organ provides for state, defence and public security subcommittees, it does not have any structure dedicated to human and people's rights.⁸⁷

⁸² Ana Leão, *Different Opportunities, Different Outcomes – Civil War and Rebel Groups in Angola and Mozambique* (Bonn, 2007), p. 1.

⁸³ At its August 1996 summit in Maseru, Lesotho, the organ (though still in its infancy) was instructed to ensure the Lusaka Peace Protocol, which recommended the integration of the rebels into the Angolan military, be put into effect. At an October 1996 organ summit in Luanda, SADC resolved to "achieve peace and security, including among other areas to settle disputes in a peaceful manner and bring about equity, balance and mutual benefit" to Angola. There were other follow-up meetings in 2000, 2001 and 2002.

⁸⁴ Crisis Group interview, researcher, University of Botswana, Gaborone, 8 February 2012.

⁸⁵ Crisis Group interviews, professor, University of Botswana, Gaborone, 8 February 2012; SADC outgoing senior officer, Gaborone, 12 February 2012; South African academic, Johannesburg, 8 March 2012; professor, Graduate School of Security and Defence Studies, Johannesburg, 8 March 2012; researcher, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 8 March 2012.

⁸⁶ The involvement of civilians in security structures is one way of enhancing a balance between state and human security. The chairperson of the ISDSC meeting in 2005 noted that the civilian component was lagging behind in policing in the region and urged its integration as mandated. Minutes of the ISDSC meeting, Cape Town, 7-9 April 2005.

⁸⁷ Human security is a key component of any security community as the citizenry needs to be incorporated and socialised to attain peaceful coexistence. SADC defines security as a matter for the mutual benefit of people and their well-being, civilisation, individual liberties and rule of law (preamble of the Mutual Defence Pact). The public security subcommittee's mandate includes the work of the police, while the state security and defence sub-

Interaction between the ISDSC subcommittees responsible for defence and police and the ISPDC dealing with political and diplomacy matters remains unclear.⁸⁸ Military frameworks are in place, but there is ambiguity about how they are integrated into decision-making and conflict resolution.⁸⁹ Although a core objective of the defence chiefs subcommittee is the management and resolution of conflict,⁹⁰ its precise role in SADC's conflict prevention processes remains obscure.

Discord between member states can be traced back to the formation of the organ in 1996. Differences in the interpretation of the objectives, structure and central aspects of the region's security framework led to two polarised camps, one led by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and the other by South African President Nelson Mandela.⁹¹ The former argued for an autonomous organ with its own chairperson separated from the SADC summit. This was premised on suspicion of South Africa's regional dominance agenda; fear of white South African continued control of the country's security establishment; and the need to separate sensitive security matters from an array of other donor-supported SADC programs.⁹²

South Africa argued that the organ needed to fall under the direction of the summit, which it chaired at that time. Pretoria also highlighted that there was no provision in the SADC Treaty to create a distinct body, under a separate and autonomous chairpersonship, and maintained that the treaty recognised the summit as the supreme policy-making body.⁹³

committees focus on the military and intelligence. No provision is specifically made for the protection of human rights.

⁸⁸ Crisis Group interview, former army commander of SADC state, Gaborone, 8 February 2012.

⁸⁹ Gavin Cawthra, "The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict", Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010, p. 20.

⁹⁰ Naison Ngoma, "The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: The Rise and Fall of a Security Community Model?", in *Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa – An Analysis of Regional Security in the Southern African Development Community*, ISS (Pretoria, 2005), p. 148.

⁹¹ The differences in interpretation stem from the lack of clarity on the structure and functions of the organ contained in the communiqué that established it in 1996. It merely stated that ministerial and technical levels were independent of SADC structures, the chair would be appointed on a rotational and annual basis and the ISDSC would be a component of the organ. Interpreting the issue of "independence" of the organ from SADC structures was the main contention between Zimbabwe and South Africa over the DRC intervention. Ngoma, "The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security", op. cit., p. 151.

⁹² Crisis Group interview, defence attaché to SADC, Harare, 23 February 2012; retired Zimbabwe National Army brigadier general, Harare, 24 February 2012.

⁹³ Ngoma, "The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security", op. cit., p. 154.

The differences between South Africa and Zimbabwe stemmed from the strained relationship between Mandela and Mugabe.⁹⁴ The latter had assumed the mantle of regional icon of liberation history since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990 and his election to the presidency in 1994 overshadowed Mugabe's dominant political image.⁹⁵ Tension between the two presidents became a matter of concern in efforts to build regional security cooperation.⁹⁶ But the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation established the organ as a body under the heads of state summit, putting an end to the differences between the two countries. Since then Mugabe has had differing relationships with other South African presidents.⁹⁷

In 1992, Namibia and Botswana had a dispute over the Island of Kasikili (as it is referred to by Namibia) or Sedudu (according to Botswana) on the Chobe River.⁹⁸ SADC's mediation failed and led to both countries sending troops to the disputed territory. President Robert Mugabe, who then chaired the organ, mediated in the conflict and eventually recommended that the case be handled by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which in 1999 ruled in favour of Botswana. The first open dispute between two members, the case exposed SADC's limitations in handling an interstate conflict, but it also demonstrated a willingness for engagement and for cooperation with international conflict resolution institutions like the ICJ. Constant dialogue was maintained, which averted a possible war.⁹⁹

Security challenges also include cyber and technology-driven conflicts.¹⁰⁰ In April 2012 SADC convened a meeting in Botswana to encourage member states to harmonise anti-cyber-crime legislation. Four member states were identified to have legislation in place while the rest are expected to expedite its development. Maritime security also presents a challenge for the coastal and island regions of the regional bloc, especially because of increased piracy.¹⁰¹ In February 2012, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for security cooperation in the Mozambique Channel.¹⁰²

Due to the liberation struggle history¹⁰³ and regime security tendencies, most members have evolved military establishments whose loyalty is more to the politicians than the state. SADC political leaders have therefore been reluctant to allow the evolution of regional military platforms and structures operating with some levels of autonomy. This has constrained involvement and open interaction of the broader SADC structures with state security and defence committees, resulting in complex and sensitive political-military relations.¹⁰⁴ A deeper form of security community – also referred to as security regionalism – can only be developed with a stronger complimentary nexus between security and political cooperation.¹⁰⁵

C. SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: ENGAGING CITIZENS

The SADC region has a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of about \$429.2 billion (41.6 per cent of Africa's GDP) and a total population of about 160.5 million peo-

⁹⁴ L.M. Fisher and N. Ngoma, "The SADC Organ: Challenges in the New Millennium", ISS, Pretoria (August 2005).

⁹⁵ Even after retirement from active politics, Mandela continued to criticise Mugabe's leadership at one point referring to him as a "tragic failure in leadership". Nelson Mandela speaking at a dinner marking his 90th birthday celebration in London. Cited by the BBC, 25 June 2008. Comments were in reference to the political violence during the 2008 presidential election re-run in Zimbabwe.

⁹⁶ L.M. Fisher and N. Ngoma, "The SADC Organ", op. cit.

⁹⁷ President Thabo Mbeki, who took over from Mandela in June 1999, had a good relationship with Mugabe. He stayed in Zimbabwe during his days in exile from apartheid South Africa. This is perceived to have influenced Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy" policy on Zimbabwe during the 2008 disputed presidential election, of which Mugabe was declared winner and after which Mbeki was appointed mediator. Crisis Group interview, senior researcher, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 9 March 2012. Mugabe's relationship with Mbeki's successor, Jacob Zuma (who became president in May 2009), has been characterised by underlying tension (see Section III.A).

⁹⁸ The Chobe River separates the northern Botswana border from Namibia's Caprivi Strip.

⁹⁹ Crisis Group interview, former Botswana Defence Force commander, Gaborone, 8 February 2012.

¹⁰⁰ This involves copyright infringement, fraud, hacking, account thefts, identify thefts, computer viruses and spam. Crisis Group interview, Interpol official, Harare, 15 March 2012.

¹⁰¹ At least six vessels belonging to, or registered in, SADC countries have been hijacked by Somali pirates since 2007. South Africa, Tanzania, Seychelles and Mozambique have been affected. See www.trademarksa.org/news/sadc-responds-maritime-piracy-threat. Crisis Group interview, SADC-Coalition of Non-Governmental Organisations (CNGO) expert on peace, security and governance, Gaborone, 16 February 2012.

¹⁰² "Tanzania: country signs joint anti-piracy pact", *Tanzania Daily News*, 8 February, 2012.

¹⁰³ During the liberation struggle, political and military operations and roles were integrated, but political leaders had overall control of the military, which was loyal to political ideology. Terence Ranger, "The Changing of the Old Guard: Robert Mugabe and the Revival of ZANU", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1980), p. 83.

¹⁰⁴ Crisis Group interview, former national security adviser of SADC state, Pretoria, 10 March 2012.

¹⁰⁵ André du Pisani, "The Security Dimension of Regional Integration in SADC", Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011.

ple (16.7 per cent of the continent's population).¹⁰⁶ The regional indicative strategic development plan (RISDP) outlines benchmarks for regional economic integration.¹⁰⁷ The SADC Protocol on Trade, which was signed in 1996 and entered into force in January 2000, is a tool to achieve this goal.¹⁰⁸ Despite considerable progress, several generic concerns continue to constrain inter-regional trade: low production levels; heavy reliance on primary industry; poor infrastructure; arduous regulatory processes; and reluctance to drop import tariff barriers.¹⁰⁹

SADC states, with the exception of Mozambique, have membership with other regional economic communities (RECs), including the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the East Africa Community (EAC); the Indian Ocean Community (IOC); and the recently revived Economic Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL).¹¹⁰ Multiple overlapping memberships are not

unique to SADC countries, and rather than being viewed solely as responsible for trade and economic disharmony, they can also be seen as an opportunity to promote broader economic integration.¹¹¹

SADC presents favourable projected economic prospects, but without immediate sweeping benefits, something many member states badly need.¹¹² South Africa is the regional economic power and relies on the region as its biggest export market.¹¹³ This hegemony is viewed as both a "stepping stone" and a "stumbling block".¹¹⁴ Some countries expect South Africa to take the lead on behalf of the region; while other, generally smaller states, see its imposing economic clout as a threat to their own interests.¹¹⁵ Pretoria, aware of this dualism, tries to strike a balance between safeguarding its national interests and not being seen as pushing its agenda.¹¹⁶ This "balancing act" is pivotal for ensuring progressive regional integration.¹¹⁷

¹⁰⁶ African Development Bank, "Southern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper: 2011-2015", Tunis, 2011. See Appendix E for SADC members' GDP and population sizes.

¹⁰⁷ The RISDP was developed in 2003 by the Secretariat as a fifteen-year development plan to provide strategic direction for regional integration through long-term socio-economic policies. A response to SADC's restructuring that took place in 2001, it outlines the need for good political, economic and corporate governance in a peaceful and stable environment. Its benchmarks include the establishment of a common market by 2015, a monetary union by 2016 and a regional currency by 2018. A free trade area (FTA) was launched in 2008 but the customs union that was earmarked for 2010 has not been established.

¹⁰⁸ The main objective of the protocol is to liberalise and increase intra-regional trade, which is a key indicator of regional integration and has increased from \$6.67 billion in 2000 to \$18 billion in 2009, primarily through the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The latter have proved more difficult to overcome, but SADC has developed a monitoring system, which has managed to resolve about 70 per cent of complaints in 2011. The protocol also aims at boosting production, improving the investment climate, enhancing economic development and establishing a free trade area.

¹⁰⁹ African Development Bank, "Southern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper", op. cit.

¹¹⁰ SACU, which is the world's oldest customs union, started in 1910 and was enlarged in 1969 and 2002. COMESA was launched in 2000 and includes Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Angola and the DRC are members of ECCAS, and Tanzania is a member of the EAC. The IOC was established in 1984 and includes Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, Reunion (which through its association with France is a member of the EU) and the Comoros. CEPGL, which comprises Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC, is reportedly "set to revive business cooperation" after almost twenty years of inactivity. "Central Africa: CEPGL to re-establish relations in private sector", *The New Times*, 21 December 2011. See also Appendix G.

¹¹¹ Southern Africa Trade Hub, Technical Report, August 2011, p. 45.

¹¹² Crisis Group interview, UK diplomat, Gaborone, 8 February 2012.

¹¹³ South Africa accounts for 71.5 per cent of the region's GDP (as of 2009) and Angola, which has the second highest contribution to the region's GDP, accounts for 10 per cent. See C. Alden and G. Pere as quoted by Amos Saurombe, "The Role of South Africa in SADC Regional Integration: The Making or Braking of the Organization", *Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology*, vol. 5, issue 3 (2010).

¹¹⁴ Crisis Group interviews, EU diplomat, Gaborone, 7 February 2012; and SADC embassy official, Harare, 16 March 2012.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Crisis Group interview, professor, Graduate School of Security and Defence Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 8 March 2012.

¹¹⁷ South Africa has also played this "balancing act" in its mediation in Zimbabwe and Madagascar. During the country's tenure as chair of the troika of the organ, President Zuma has maintained a consultative relationship with members of the troika, ie, Tanzania, Zambia, as well as Angola, which chaired SADC from August 2010 to August 2012 and is also considered a regional military and economic power. From July 2012, consultations and a joint mission with Seychelles, one of the smallest states in terms of GDP and population (see Appendix E), have been undertaken in Madagascar. Although South Africa's mediation in Zimbabwe has created potential for parallel bilateral engagements (see Section IV.B.2), Pretoria has remained mindful of the need to maintain its mandate within SADC guidelines and structures. It has worked hard to consolidate SADC's stance on Zimbabwe, and has strengthened the organisation's point position in the Malagasy process. Crisis Group interview, South Africa DIRCO official, Pretoria, 17 September 2012.

The region is faced with growing poverty, high unemployment levels and widening income disparity.¹¹⁸ These indicators are likely to fuel socio-economic discontent, leading to more internal upheaval and potential conflicts. In 2011, Malawi and Swaziland experienced riots and unrest exacerbated by growing socio-economic pressure on their citizenry. The economic disparity between South Africa and others in the region has exposed it to migration influx, which could amplify into a xenophobic reaction by its nationals, as it did in 2008. Political and economic crises in Madagascar and especially Zimbabwe also hinder integration and regional development. Other longer-term challenges include climate change, which is likely to negatively affect water supplies for agricultural production.¹¹⁹

SADC must demonstrate an economic rationale and the broader benefits of regional integration to facilitate citizen buy-in.¹²⁰ To date, the regional bloc has not invested enough effort into attaining such acceptance, which has further discredited its integration agenda as merely “elitist” and politically-motivated.¹²¹ Political will for regional integration in Africa (including in the SADC region) has been limited. Coupled with the lack of citizen involvement, this may endanger the realisation of projected economic growth levels and the achievement of regional social cohesion. These threaten regional peace and security, given the potential for socio-economic discontent and xenophobia.

IV. SADC MECHANISMS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

SADC’s peace and security architecture is structurally aligned to the AU peace and security architecture¹²² through the provision of mechanisms that are responsible for early warning of emerging conflicts, peacemaking, peacebuilding and building and consolidation of democracy. However, implementation has proved limited in solving the crises in Zimbabwe and Madagascar. The regional bloc’s military intervention capacity can be assessed by the readiness and profile of its Standby Force.

A. AN ARRAY OF MECHANISMS AND GOALS

1. Regional early warning system (REWS)

SADC’s early warning system (EWS) provides for the collection and analysis of information on any real or potential crisis to inform response strategies.¹²³ On 12 July 2010, SADC launched its formal peace and security EWS by inaugurating the “situation room” at the Secretariat in Gaborone.¹²⁴ Mozambican President Armando Guebuza (then chairperson of the troika of the organ) indicated it would operate through a network of in-country centres that feed a central system in Gaborone.¹²⁵

Slow establishment of the national centres has hindered effective implementation of the regional EWS.¹²⁶ Those that have been established are merely extensions of government intelligence systems, and have not secured the collaboration of civil society groups such as independent research institutions, think tanks, academics and NGOs. This limits broad-based information gathering, objective analysis and interpretation, as well as challenges SADC’s

¹¹⁸ “Promoting high-level sustainable growth to reduce unemployment in Africa – Economic Report on Africa”, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and African Union Commission (AUC), February 2010. See Appendix F for GINI coefficients of SADC states.

¹¹⁹ Crisis Group interview, GIZ-SADC peace, security and governance program specialist, Gaborone, 10 February 2012.

¹²⁰ Shanta Devarajan (World Bank chief economist for Africa), “Are lessons from European integration relevant for Africa?”, World Bank blog (blogs.worldbank.org/african), September 2010.

¹²¹ Crisis Group interview, UN official, Gaborone, 16 February 2012.

¹²² The peace and security architecture is made up of the following components: the Peace and Security Council – which promotes a broad approach including preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding, democracy promotion and humanitarian intervention; the Panel of the Wise; the African Peace Fund; the continental early warning system; and the Standby Force. It provides the instruments required to meet the peace and security objectives of the AU Constitutive Act. See “African Peace And Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study”, African Union, November 2010.

¹²³ Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), *Conflict and Peace Analysis Response Manual* (2nd edition, July 1999).

¹²⁴ The “situation room” refers to the monitoring and analysis room of the EWS.

¹²⁵ “SADC early warning centre inaugurated”, AIM News, 14 July 2010.

¹²⁶ Crisis Group interview, SADC-CNGO expert for peace, security and governance, Gaborone, 16 February 2012.

commitment to cooperate with non-state actors on issues related to politics, defence and security.¹²⁷

The AU guidelines for the protection of civilians in peace support operations recommend integrating civil society and civilian bodies into the regional economic communities, including into early warning systems, which are expected to provide direct representation of civilian interests.¹²⁸ The current exclusion of civil society groups in SADC suggests that the EWS has adopted a state-centric approach to conflict resolution.

Criticism has been directed at the EWS's failure to detect and raise alarm about new conflicts in the region.¹²⁹ SADC's lack of proactive engagement in the wake of emerging social protest and heavy-handedness by security forces in Malawi and Swaziland in 2011, for example, is partly the result of weak preventive diplomacy.¹³⁰ This shortcomings due to the executive secretary's limited leeway to engage in independent diplomatic action,¹³¹ the "non-interference" doctrine that guards national sovereignty; and the lack of coordination from early warning to early action.

2. Mediation

SADC has yet to establish a mediation unit to strengthen its peacemaking capacity. The framework for its structure, finalised in 2010, is not yet operational. It makes provision for a panel of elders (POE), supported by a mediation reference group (MRG) and administered by a mediation

support unit (MSU).¹³² This will also be an opportunity for civil society participation as technical teams will ideally comprise experts and not exclusively politicians and their appointees. SADC has, however, earmarked mediation as one of its "strategic" priority areas, thereby disqualifying options for external support and cooperation with international partners.

3. Security sector reform

Security sector reform (SSR) is one of the key post-conflict concerns in the region, as it identifies and builds the role of security institutions in relation to the state and its citizens. Reform can play a vital role in orienting the security sector to its constitutional responsibilities; enhance its legitimacy and "shift the perception of security officials from predators and human rights violators to service providers",¹³³ thus improving human security. Neither SADC nor the AU has developed an SSR policy framework, however, which has stymied options for debate on its relevance for peacebuilding or other areas of SADC conflict management.¹³⁴

Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Angola have all undertaken post-war SSR programs.¹³⁵ War veterans' rehabilitation and reintegration has also been handled at member-state level due to the absence of a SADC centralised policy framework.¹³⁶ This may buttress reluctance to comply with regional involvement in key domestic security issues, as highlighted in Section III.B. One prominent post-conflict program at the regional level has been the demining exercises targeting Angola, the DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.¹³⁷

¹²⁷ Crisis Group interview, Gaborone, 11 February 2012. Southern African Development Community, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, Article 10, Section 1.

¹²⁸ Press statement of the 279th meeting of African Union Peace and Security Council held on the 18th of May 2011 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; "Proposed guidelines for the protection of civilians in African Union peace support operations for consideration by the African Union summit", African Union, 26 October 2009.

¹²⁹ Crisis Group interview, SADC-CNGO expert for peace, security and governance, Gaborone, 16 February 2012.

¹³⁰ "Is SADC's Biased Early Warning System Preventing Early Action over Swaziland?", ISS, 11 November 2011.

¹³¹ The executive secretary is not mandated to undertake any independent preventive diplomacy action; this responsibility is vested with the chairpersons of the troika of the organ or the summit and their respective ministerial committees. The effectiveness of preventive diplomacy is therefore limited as the politicians assigned the role have to balance this with their domestic duties. The yearly rotation of these positions also hampers momentum and continuity to facilitate such diplomacy. See Jon Packer and Erik Friberg, "Regional IGOs and Operational Conflict Prevention", Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, May 2011.

¹³² The POE will consist of former leaders from the region who are no longer active in politics, and will be appointed by consensus at the heads of state summit. They will receive support from the MRG, which will be made up of a technical team of mediation experts. The MSU will be located in the organ directorate at the Secretariat in Gaborone. It will report to the director of the organ, who in turn reports to the executive secretary.

¹³³ "The Security Sector in Southern Africa", ISS, October 2010, p. 184.

¹³⁴ The AU has nonetheless launched the African solidarity initiative (ASI) in 2012. It aims at mobilising regional support from post-conflict reconstruction in a number of pilot countries and building a knowledge base of continental experiences in SSR. Crisis Group interview, Zimbabwe Peace and Security Project staff member, Harare, 5 March 2012.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ In 1999, in response to the legacy of regional conflict, SADC established the Mine Action Committee and initiated a pilot project focusing on technology awareness, information sharing and victim assistance in the early 2000s. Most demining activity,

4. Building and consolidation of democracy

The SADC Treaty states that human rights, democracy and the rule of law must be foundational in the governance processes of member states. In 2004, SADC adopted the “Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections”, intended to encourage adherence to democratic norms in terms of election processes and the contexts in which they are carried out. They also promote compliance and resonate with the AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, as well as the AU Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observation and Monitoring Missions. However, the guidelines have been applied selectively, and appear to have played little role in informing SADC’s position on the credibility of contested elections, such as in Zimbabwe in 2005 and the DRC in 2011.¹³⁸

In 2011, SADC established the Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC),¹³⁹ which had first been mooted in 2006. After a five-year lag, the regional bloc has come to realise that elections are central to some conflicts in the region, prompting it to establish the council, as well as an election support unit within the organ to provide administrative support.

Despite the establishment of structures and mechanisms for building and consolidating electoral democracy and good governance, the greatest challenge remains member states’ willingness to allow SADC to influence or enforce implementation.¹⁴⁰

B. A DIFFICULT IMPLEMENTATION

Two case studies, the Madagascar and Zimbabwe conflicts, show the practical implications and weaknesses of SADC mediation mechanisms.

however, has been undertaken at state level. See *Landmine Monitor* (2003).

¹³⁸ A South African civil society assessment of Zimbabwe’s 2005 elections highlighted a number of areas where adherence to the SADC guidelines was questionable. “Report on the 2005 Zimbabwe Parliamentary Election”, Zimbabwe Observer Mission. Serious concerns were also raised about the November 2011 election process in the DRC. Thierry Vircoulon, “RDC: les leçons du scrutin présidentiel”, *Afrikarabia*, 29 December 2011. SADC, however, endorsed the results, through South African president Jacob Zuma, as chairperson of the organ troika. “Statement on the DRC presidential and parliamentary elections held on 28 November 2011”, South African Presidency, 5 December 2011.

¹³⁹ Its role is to encourage, urge and advise member states to implement the “Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections”. Members of the council are drawn from each SADC state. Crisis Group interview, organ secretariat staff member, Gaborone, 15 February 2012.

¹⁴⁰ Crisis Group email correspondence, SADC member state army commander, Pretoria, 2 July 2012.

1. Madagascar

Madagascar has a history of fragile democratic transition.¹⁴¹ The country became a member of SADC in August 2005, in what was seen by some as then-president Ravalomanana’s intention to broaden bilateral and multilateral relations beyond the post-colonial influence of the French.¹⁴² In 2009, a coup replaced Ravalomanana with former Antananarivo mayor, Andry Rajoelina, plunging Madagascar into a new constitutional crisis.¹⁴³

As the situation deteriorated prior to the coup, SADC responded by sending two assessment missions, one led by the executive secretary and the other by Swaziland’s foreign minister, who chaired the Ministerial Committee of the organ.¹⁴⁴ After leading the first assessment mission, which constituted part of SADC’s early warning mechanism, the Secretariat did not engage in any follow-up preventive diplomacy.¹⁴⁵

After the ousting of Ravalomanana on 17 March 2009, SADC announced that it would not endorse the overthrow of a legitimate government.¹⁴⁶ On 19 March, an organ meeting chaired by King Mswati III of Swaziland considered sanctions and military intervention in the event of “non-cooperation and noncompliance by the de facto regime in Madagascar”.¹⁴⁷ The country was subsequently suspended from both the AU and SADC later that month.

¹⁴¹ Crisis Group will soon publish a report on the recent developments in Madagascar. After independence from France in 1960, a military coup in 1975 brought Didier Ratsiraka to power. Albert Zafy became president in 1993 after pressure on Ratsiraka to hold elections. In 1996 Zafy was impeached and Ratsiraka was voted back into office. Marc Ravalomanana to claimed victory following a disputed election in December 2001, despite no official result. This led to a standoff between Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka that culminated in the former consolidating his power with the support of the military. His government was eventually recognised internationally and Ratsiraka went into exile in France. See Crisis Group Africa Report N°156, *Madagascar: Ending the Crisis*, 18 March 2010.

¹⁴² Cawthra, “The Role of SADC”, *op. cit.*, p. 13

¹⁴³ Crisis Group Africa Report N°166, *Madagascar: Crisis Heating Up?*, 18 November 2010, p. 1.

¹⁴⁴ SADC’s executive secretary, Tomáz Augusto Salomão, was in Madagascar from 6 to 8 February 2009 and met with then-president Ravalomanana and the prime minister. The Swazi foreign minister, Lufto Dlamini, was in the country from 14 to 21 February 2009 and met with the government, diplomatic missions, civil society, representatives of churches and Rajoelina. See Media Briefing, SADC, Cape Town, 27 February 2009.

¹⁴⁵ Crisis Group interview, UN official, Gaborone, 16 February 2012.

¹⁴⁶ Media Briefing, SADC, *op. cit.*

¹⁴⁷ “Communiqué of the Extra-Ordinary SADC Summit of Troika of the Organ”, Ezulwini, Swaziland, 19 March 2009.

Inadequate coordination frustrated initial SADC engagement in the following months. Its special envoy, Absalom Themba Dlamini,¹⁴⁸ visited Madagascar on 11 May 2009 and found that AU and UN mediation efforts for a solution acceptable to both sides had already taken off, whereas regional efforts were still focused on Rajoelina's removal and Ravalomanana's reinstatement. "Regime solidarity", which is customary in the region,¹⁴⁹ as well as Mswati's strong support for Ravalomanana (whom he hosted in April 2009), is likely to have strengthened SADC's position.¹⁵⁰

At the SADC heads of state and government extraordinary meeting in Johannesburg on 20 June 2009, Joaquim Alberto Chissano (the former Mozambican president) was appointed mediator.¹⁵¹ SADC's intervention therefore shifted to mediation through the creation of an International Contact Group (ICG), an all-inclusive dialogue platform in line with other organisations to move beyond a primary focus on Ravalomanana's reinstatement.¹⁵² Chissano's mediation was, however, poorly resourced and at times overly reliant on support from the UN office in Gaborone.¹⁵³ The Maputo and Addis Ababa transitional power-sharing agreements were nonetheless signed in 2009, but implementation was blocked by Rajoelina, who instead pursued an internal parallel initiative to consolidate his power through the promotion of unilateral constitution-making and electoral processes.¹⁵⁴

Although South Africa had earlier participated in the mediation process as part of the broader SADC initiative, Presi-

dent Zuma only became directly involved in 2010.¹⁵⁵ The country's role in Madagascar became more active when it took over the organ chair in August 2011. South Africa is believed to have influenced the establishment of the SADC liaison office in Madagascar in November 2011.¹⁵⁶ In December, one of its most seasoned diplomats, Gert Grobler, was appointed ambassador to Madagascar. Due to SADC's limited resources and ad hoc mediation, the Madagascar processes have relied significantly on South Africa's capacity and willingness to reach an agreement.¹⁵⁷

In response to the failure of the Maputo and Addis Ababa agreements,¹⁵⁸ SADC's mediation focused on establishing a transitional roadmap towards credible and conclusive elections, which was signed by ten political stakeholders in September 2011. Although it provides for the return of political exiles, Ravalomanana's return remains contested, with the vocal opposition of Rajoelina and his support base. The amnesty law adopted in early 2012 – a key issue in the roadmap – does not seem to cover Ravalomanana's murder conviction in absentia, which was handed down in August 2010.¹⁵⁹ As of October 2012, this remains one of the stumbling blocks, prolonging the battle between the two primary protagonists and jeopardising the implementation of the roadmap.¹⁶⁰

¹⁴⁸ Former Swazi prime minister from 2003 to 2008.

¹⁴⁹ Crisis Group interview, former army commander of SADC state, Gaborone, 8 February 2012.

¹⁵⁰ "Swazi permanent secretary on USG in UNHRC; Kosovo; Madagascar; Zimbabwe; and Qadhafi", U.S. Mbabane embassy cable, 28 April 2009, as made public by WikiLeaks.

¹⁵¹ Joaquim Chissano is a former member of Crisis Group's Board of Trustees.

¹⁵² The contact group included the AU, SADC, UN, COMESA, the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), as well as the EU.

¹⁵³ Crisis Group interview, UN official, Gaborone, 16 February 2012.

¹⁵⁴ The Maputo agreement, signed by Mouvance Andry Rajoelina, Mouvance Marc Ravalomanana, Mouvance Didier Ratsiraka and Mouvance Albert Zafy on 8 August 2009, was an attempt to establish transitional institutions. But it was impeded by Rajoelina's unilateralism, failure to reach consensus on implementation modalities and political resistance from all sides. The Addis Ababa agreement, signed on 7 November 2009, was a follow-up to the Maputo deal, mainly setting out parameters on sharing executive powers to address Rajoelina's unilateralism. See "Madagascar: A Triumvirate to Head the Transition Government", ISS, 11 November 2009; and Crisis Group Report, *Madagascar: Crisis Heating Up*, op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁵⁵ Zuma's direct and active involvement in the mediation in Madagascar was motivated by the need to portray his country as championing democracy and conflict resolution in the region (since he was also mediating in Zimbabwe at that time). This would help South Africa obtain a seat in the UN Security Council, which it received in October 2010. The country had also backed the appointment of Joaquim Chissano as mediator in Madagascar and wanted to play a more active role in supporting him. See *ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁵⁶ Crisis Group interview, professor, Graduate School of Security and Defence Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 8 March 2012.

¹⁵⁷ Crisis Group interview, EU diplomat, Gaborone, 7 February 2012.

¹⁵⁸ Among a host of other challenges, the collapse of the two agreements was also attributed to Ravalomanana's refusal to accept Rajoelina as head of the transitional institutions. See "Madagascar's Rajoelina pledges roadmap to end crisis", Xinhua, 30 April 2010.

¹⁵⁹ The conviction was for the 100 people killed by the military during demonstrations against Ravalomanana on 7 February 2009.

¹⁶⁰ Ravalomanana tried to return to Madagascar in January 2012 and was denied entry. His wife also failed to enter the country in July 2012, although she had indicated that she needed to see her ill 82-year-old mother. SADC has not, however, sanctioned Ravalomanana's attempts to return. Ravalomanana and Rajoelina met in Seychelles on 25 July and 8 August 2012 under the mediation of Jacob Zuma in efforts to try and break the impasse. But they did not reach an agreement before the SADC heads of state and government summit in Maputo on 17-18 August, leav-

Signs of “competitive peacemaking” or a “crowded” field have appeared during the mediation in Madagascar.¹⁶¹ Although SADC appointed a mediator, the AU remained formally in charge of the negotiations. Unclear roles and working relations between the two organisations have generated tensions.¹⁶²

The security sector is a key stakeholder in the Madagascar crisis. It is not monolithic and senior leadership is tied to and divided along factional political lines, segueing from one set of loyalties to another. The military guard loyal to Ravalomanana was involved in the killing of about 100 protesters who marched to the presidential palace in February 2009; other disaffected military leaders were behind the CAPSAT (Corps des personnels et des services administratifs et techniques) camp mutiny leading to Ravalomanana’s exile and the eventual transfer of power to Rajoelina in March 2009.¹⁶³ On 22 July 2012, shortly before the Seychelles mediation started, another mutiny by soldiers at a camp near the airport in Antananarivo was violently repressed, reflecting tensions within the lower ranks.¹⁶⁴ The military has resisted Article 22 of the Maputo agreement, which provides for a politically inclusive committee for reflection on national defence and security.¹⁶⁵

2. Zimbabwe

After the disputed March 2008 presidential election runoff in Zimbabwe, SADC’s mediation led to the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008 and the formation of the inclusive government in February 2009.¹⁶⁶ SADC and the AU were “guarantors” of the agreement.

ing SADC mediators flatfooted and the summit to unconvincingly repeat its calls for an intensification of the dialogue to implement the September agreement. Mediators have been exploring any potential way forward that would keep both Rajoelina and Ravalomanana from standing in the next elections, but Ravalomanana in particular is opposed to this course of action, which, moreover, has yet to secure support from a critical mass among SADC member states.

¹⁶¹ Sarah Ancas, “The Effectiveness of Regional Peace Making in Southern Africa – Problematising the United Nations-African Union-Southern African Development Community Relationship”, *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, vol. 11, no. 1 (2011).

¹⁶² Cawthra, “The Role of SADC”, op. cit., p. 15.

¹⁶³ For further details, see Crisis Group Report, *Madagascar: Ending the Crisis*, op. cit., pp. 2-11.

¹⁶⁴ “Madagascar troops mutiny ahead of Rajoelina – Ravolomanana meeting”, Radio France international (English edition), 22 July 2012.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 18

¹⁶⁶ Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movement for Demo-

cratic Change (MDC) formations repeatedly complained about the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)’s deliberate flouting of the agreement and its reluctance to implement some of the key clauses.¹⁶⁷ Security sector and media reforms, law and order considerations and risks of political violence were central to these concerns.¹⁶⁸ In turn, ZANU-PF painted the MDCs as agents of regime change and until mid-2012 accused Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC-T in particular of undermining GPA demands for the removal of sanctions on Zimbabwe.¹⁶⁹

The GPA provided for the formation of the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) tasked with overseeing compliance with and implementation of the agreement.¹⁷⁰ Due to political polarisation and limited interaction with SADC, JOMIC was ineffective in ensuring comprehensive monitoring, let alone full implementation of the GPA.¹⁷¹ In an effort to remedy this situation, SADC gave ultimatums to the parties in November 2009 and August 2010,¹⁷² without notable compliance. This exposed the regional bloc’s limitation in enforcing the implementation of a deal it had brokered. Others attributed that to the vagueness of the role of “guarantors” to the agreement, while ZANU-PF insisted that the sovereign authority and mandate of implementation lay with the GPA parties only and not any external stakeholders.¹⁷³

cratic Change (MDC) formations, on resolving the challenges facing Zimbabwe, 15 September 2008. SADC had been officially mediating between the country’s political formations since March 2007, following the arrest and assault on MDC-T and civil society leaders.

¹⁶⁷ In November 2011 the MDC-T presented a dossier to SADC titled “A Time to Act: Zimbabwe Descends into Chaos”. It alleged ZANU-PF’s breach of the GPA due to its reluctance to halt state-sponsored violence and arbitrary arrests; breakdown of rule of law; disruptions of parliamentary hearings; closure of democratic space; selective application of the law; monopoly of state media; politicisation of security sector; and operation of parallel government structures.

¹⁶⁸ Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°82, *Resistance and Denial: Zimbabwe’s Stalled Reform Agenda*, 16 November 2011.

¹⁶⁹ Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°86, *Zimbabwe’s Sanctions Standoff*, 6 February 2012.

¹⁷⁰ Article 22 of the GPA.

¹⁷¹ Crisis Group Briefing, *Resistance and Denial*, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁷² In November 2009, the troika of the organ gave the Zimbabwean signatories until 6 December to fully implement the agreement and in August 2010, the heads of state and government set out a 30-day ultimatum for the same purpose.

¹⁷³ Jonathan Moyo, “Unpacking Zimbabwe’s GPA, draft constitution, sanctions policy and forthcoming elections”, speech at the Institute for Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDA-SA), Pretoria, 31 July 2012.

Lessons from Zimbabwe and Madagascar

- ❑ The AU and SADC are both tasked with resolving the crises in Madagascar and Zimbabwe; this underscores the importance of ensuring clarity on respective mandates and interrelated responsibilities.
- ❑ Despite the establishment of liaison offices, AU-SADC coordination in peace and security remains nascent and fragmented, raising questions about the effectiveness of these offices and their capacity to harmonise relations between the AU and SADC.
- ❑ Political disputes around roadmaps in both countries diminish prospects for credible elections to end the crises. Electoral institutions and processes are weak and contingent to politics.
- ❑ Conflict resolution processes rely on heads of state and government and ministerial committees, both of which are invariably committed elsewhere in their political and domestic roles. In the absence of a permanent mediation unit, the Secretariat has not played a distinct supportive role in preventive and effective diplomacy.
- ❑ There are diverse and conflicting interpretations of SADC's role in resolving conflicts in the region: whereas some understand the regional bloc to be an inter-governmental organisation without a mandate to intervene in internal issues, SADC has in some cases been involved in such processes.
- ❑ SADC's mediation processes lack resources and tend to rely on the means and actions of the mediators, rather than on a regional autonomous capacity.
- ❑ SADC has limited capacity to monitor, evaluate and ensure implementation of agreements that it helps to broker, and has no sanction mechanism for violation of the deals.
- ❑ SADC has not significantly engaged in addressing concerns or risks posed by and/or within the security sector, despite the significant and evolving role the military and defence forces play in the crises.
- ❑ Civil society is absent from SADC mediation processes.
- ❑ SADC's response to conflict situations is slow and the coordination from early warning to approval for early action unclear.

At the SADC meeting in Livingstone, Zambia, in March 2011, the troika of the organ was requested to dispatch three members to work with JOMIC to strengthen its oversight of the GPA.¹⁷⁴ Despite endorsement by the heads of state summit in Sandton in June, it was a further year before two officers were sent.¹⁷⁵ This followed protracted resistance by ZANU-PF, which interpreted this measure as interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign member state.¹⁷⁶ At the same Livingstone meeting, SADC's mediator, President Jacob Zuma, presented a report that accused President Robert Mugabe and his ruling party of holding back reforms. The report triggered considerable anger within ZANU-PF and Mugabe insisted that his party had the right to formally reject Zuma's mediation should the "interference" continue.¹⁷⁷ Though ZANU-PF did not formally make such a request, the attack exposed the fragility

and multiple interpretations of SADC peace and security processes, especially in cases where regional leaders have been censured.¹⁷⁸

Zuma's position as mediator at the Livingstone summit had been informed by the incessant delays in implementing agreements that had been made by the GPA signatories. The communiqué called for the establishment of an election roadmap, and in early July, the GPA negotiating teams signed off on a draft document that highlighted some key areas of disagreement.¹⁷⁹ Progress with negotiations and mediation slowed visibly over the following ten months, and it was only at the extraordinary heads of state summit in Luanda in early June 2012 that SADC reiterated the imperative of reform implementation before elections. Reform efforts, however, are now limited to the eight issues

¹⁷⁴ "Communiqué of the SADC troika of the organ meeting", Livingstone, Zambia, 31 March 2011.

¹⁷⁵ South Africa was supposed to nominate the third officer but decided not to, considering its role as mediator was adequate. "Zimbabwe's implementation panel 'snubs' SADC-appointed officials", Voice of America (VOA), 12 June 2012.

¹⁷⁶ Crisis Group interview, Zimbabwe political analyst, Pretoria, 31 July 2012.

¹⁷⁷ "Cornered Mugabe targets Zuma", The African Aristocrat, 24 May 2011.

¹⁷⁸ In the lead-up to the August 2011 SADC summit in Luanda, ZANU-PF tried to push for Zuma's removal as mediator, arguing he could not be both organ chair and mediator. The matter was not, however, formally raised at the summit.

¹⁷⁹ These regard the composition of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission secretariat; the role of the security sector in political processes; repealing of legislation considered to infringe on freedom of association and of assembly; the participation of foreign observers and monitors in the election; and the urgent need to deploy SADC officers to work with JOMIC.

outlined in the roadmap,¹⁸⁰ thus ostensibly excluding other key aspects in the GPA.¹⁸¹

Despite some progress around the drafting of the much-delayed constitution,¹⁸² security concerns are exacerbated by destabilising political statements from senior defence force members and widespread impunity for past and current violations. The National Security Council (NSC) – a key GPA creation – has not been operationalised, and the security sector has not adequately demonstrated a professional, non-partisan commitment, raising profound concerns about election-related security.¹⁸³

After November 2010, President Zuma's next visit to Zimbabwe was on 15 August 2012, and as of October 2012, he is still faced with resolving the impasse over the draft constitution that must precede a much-anticipated referendum. His protracted period of absence, which has been blamed on domestic and international commitments, is seen by some as having sustained the election roadmap gridlock.¹⁸⁴

C. THE STANDBY FORCE

The SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) – later renamed the SADC Standby Force (SADCSF) – was launched in August 2007 in compliance to Article 13 of the July 2002 protocol establishing the AU Peace and Security Commission.¹⁸⁵ It is supported by the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) located in Harare, Zimbabwe, which offers training and research for peace support operations.¹⁸⁶ Its broader objective is to ensure that SADC

and AU have capacity for peacekeeping and enforcement.¹⁸⁷ It is made up of military, police (SADCPOL) and civilian components and can only be deployed by the SADC summit on regional and international missions.¹⁸⁸ The personnel of the force are based in their countries and only available on call.

The Standby Force is regarded as one of the most functional and up-to-date among African organisations and therefore readily available for AU deployment.¹⁸⁹ It has proven capacity in military intervention decision-making and interoperability during Operation Golfinho, a joint exercise undertaken in 2009 with 7,000 troops from twelve countries.¹⁹⁰ The joint exercises have not, however, proved the readiness and capacity to engage in complex interventions, referred to as scenario 5 and 6, for which standard operating procedures still need to be developed.¹⁹¹

and finance; research; information and technology; and library. It supports the work of the Planning Element (PLANELM) through provision of capacity-building to the Standby Force members and other support staff.

¹⁸⁷ According to the MOU signed by SADC members in Lusaka in August 2007, its functions include monitoring and observation missions; preventive deployment; peacebuilding; restoration of peace and security in accordance with Article 4 (h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act, post-conflict reconstruction; humanitarian assistance; and restoration of peace and security by invitation of a member state.

¹⁸⁸ See Appendix D for SADCSF's location in the SADC structure.

¹⁸⁹ Crisis Group interview, senior associate at the Africa Conflict and Defence Monitor (who has observed the SADCSF joint operations), Johannesburg, 9 March 2012. SADC has fulfilled seven of the nine areas of the force's development. It has established the following: brigade headquarters (in Botswana); Planning Element (in Botswana); training centre (RPTC in Zimbabwe); framework documents including an MOU; troop pledges from member states; standby arrangements; and the police component. The outstanding areas are the civilian component and the main logistics depot. Since its formation in 2007, the force has never been deployed and its capacity has not been tested in live combat.

¹⁹⁰ The aim of the exercise was to prepare for multidimensional peace support operations in line with the AU Standby Force roadmap. The SADC force has undertaken several other joint exercises, including in Zimbabwe (1997), South Africa (1999), Tanzania (2002) and Botswana (2005). Henri Boshoff, "Exercise Golfinho: An Example for Other Continental Brigades", ISS, 13 October 2009.

¹⁹¹ The AU RECs are equipped to be ready for deployment in six types of missions – referred to as scenarios. Scenario 1 represents AU/regional military advice to political missions; scenario 2 represents AU/regional observers co-deployed with a UN mission; scenario 3 represents stand-alone AU/regional observer mission; scenario 4 represents AU/regional peacekeeping force and preventive deployment missions (and peacebuilding); scenario 5 represents AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional missions; and scenario 6 represents AU intervention,

¹⁸⁰ These are (i) sanctions, (ii) constitution, (iii) media reform, (iv) electoral reform, (v) rule of law, (vi) freedom of association and freedom of assembly, (vii) legislative agenda and commitments, and (viii) the election.

¹⁸¹ Key GPA exclusions in the current reform efforts concern: promotion of equality, national healing, cohesion and unity (Article 7); reforms in state organs and institutions (Article 12); non-partisan provision of humanitarian and food assistance (Article 16); security of persons and prevention of violence (Article 18); and institution of effective implementation mechanisms of the GPA (Article 22).

¹⁸² In the wake of the SADC summit in Luanda, the parties reached an agreement on draft legislation amending the Electoral Act and providing for the establishment of the Human Rights Commission.

¹⁸³ Crisis Group interviews, election experts, 30 July 2012.

¹⁸⁴ Crisis Group interview, Zimbabwe political analyst, Pretoria, 31 July 2012.

¹⁸⁵ Article 13 provides for the establishment an African Standby Force (ASF) consisting of five standby brigades in the five regions of the continent.

¹⁸⁶ The RPTC falls under the directorate of the organ. Established in 2005, its structure comprises command, operations and planning; training (civilian, military and police); administration

The capacity to deploy within fourteen days (as demanded by scenario 6) is therefore uncertain, but the force has demonstrated its capability for deployment within 30 days (scenarios 1 to 4).

In the event of use of force, troop contributing countries must approve the engagement of their contingency within a mission.¹⁹² This opt-out clause underscores the prominence of national considerations (ie, sovereignty) over SADC's intended collective approach and building of a security community.

SADC has also turned its attention to maritime security. The February 2011 and February 2012 meetings of the Maritime Standing Committee (SMSC), which operates under the ISDSC, focused on the implementation of the maritime security strategy¹⁹³ and regional cooperation in combating piracy. Mozambique, Tanzania and Seychelles have also participated in the AU Border Program, which seeks to define maritime borders and promote maritime cross-border cooperation and joint capacity building.¹⁹⁴

The civilian component of the Standby Force has not been fully integrated, reflecting poor civilian-military relations at the national level.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, the force has not set up a main logistics depot to cater for central maintenance, storage and management of equipment.

eg, in situations of genocide where the international community does not act promptly. Crisis Group interview, senior associate at the Africa Conflict and Defence Monitor (who has observed SADC's joint operations), Johannesburg, 9 March 2012.

¹⁹² Cecilia Hull and Markus Derblom, "Abandoning Frontline Trenches? Capabilities for Peace and Security in the SADC Region", Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2009.

¹⁹³ The strategy includes establishing and holding joint exercises for the Standby Force maritime component; cooperation plans between member states; implementing the presence of armed guards on ships; establishing floating armouries, so that merchant vessels offload their weapons before entering a port; as well as information sharing.

¹⁹⁴ In January 2007, the 8th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU took a decision to provide for structural prevention of conflicts through the implementation of the AU Border Program (AUBP). See www.aborne.org/african-union-border-programme.html.

¹⁹⁵ An expanded notion of security (incorporating human security and addressing the "responsibility to protect") means peacekeeping is no longer viewed as an exclusive military engagement, and now incorporates policing/public security and civilian needs (eg, human rights, legal aid, HIV/AIDS awareness, gender mainstreaming, and information dissemination). The civilian component of peacekeeping is well suited to address such needs and should be an integral component of peacekeeping. See "Towards the Operationalisation of the Civilian Component of the ECO-WAS Standby Force", Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Policy Brief 2/2009.

The mandate for intervention has diverse interpretations within SADC. Whereas Article 53 of the UN Charter stipulates that enforcement action by regional agencies should be undertaken with the authorisation of the Security Council, Article 6 (4) of the SADC defence pact states that the UN and AU may be notified of the intervention, but it is silent on whether prior approval should be sought.¹⁹⁶ The AU guidelines for the African Standby Force, however, state that both the AU and the regional communities will "seek UN Security Council authorisation of [their] enforcement actions".¹⁹⁷ There is need to harmonise this understanding between the UN, the AU and SADC.

The Planning Element (PLANELM), which was set up in 2005, provides logistical, planning, assessment and operational support to the Standby Force. It is a permanent structure located within the organ secretariat and staffed by personnel from member states' governments. The sub-committee of defence chiefs (within the organ) oversees the PLANELM, but the lack of coordination with other components of the organ contributes to strained political-military relations within SADC.¹⁹⁸

The infrequency of joint exercises has prompted concerns about the ability to maintain the momentum and readiness of the force; the impact on building collaboration and cohesion and enhancing interoperability; and the challenges of keeping abreast with military technological developments and the integration of new equipment.¹⁹⁹ Much like the South African military, SADC's Standby Force needs to take a prominent role in humanitarian and disaster management programs, as this enhances civil-military relations, cohesion of the force and human security.²⁰⁰

South Africa has the greatest capacity for peacekeeping and enforcement deployment in the region.²⁰¹ As early as

¹⁹⁶ Deane-Peter Baker and Sadiki Maeresera, "SADC Intervention in SADC Member States: Reasons to Doubt", *Africa Security Review*, vol. 18, issue 1 (2010).

¹⁹⁷ African Union (AU), "Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force - EXP/AU-RECs/ASF/4(I)", Addis Ababa, March 2005, p. 5.

¹⁹⁸ Crisis Group interview, Western defence attaché to SADC, Harare, 23 February 2012.

¹⁹⁹ Crisis Group interview, former policy adviser in the Botswana Defence Forces, Gaborone, 8 February 2012.

²⁰⁰ Crisis Group interview, former army commander of SADC state, Gaborone, 8 February 2012.

²⁰¹ South Africa's former defence minister, Lindiwe Sisulu, reported to parliament that by May 2012, the country had 2,100 soldiers deployed on peacekeeping as well as peacebuilding missions in the DRC, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). Since 1994, South Africa has deployed troops in the DRC, Burundi, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nepal, CAR, the Comoros and Mozambique. There is no other SADC member with such vast experience and involvement with missions in-

2003, the country envisaged that it would have to bear greater responsibility in that area,²⁰² but it has been sensitive to “regional power imbalances”²⁰³ with other SADC members and has therefore avoided being over-assertive in performing its role in the Standby Force.²⁰⁴

Lessons from the Standby Force

- ❑ The Standby Force has not yet been adequately prepared for engaging in complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions and in situations of genocide.
- ❑ The flexibility of each member state to opt out of a military intervention puts limitations on the framework for collective action.
- ❑ The Standby Force has not yet fully integrated the civilian component.
- ❑ There is a lack of clarity on the authorisation for intervention and engagement between the SADC Mutual Defence Pact and the UN Charter.
- ❑ Coordination between the Planning Element and the organ (both directorate and troika) structures is missing.
- ❑ The infrequency of joint exercises hinders the progressive adaptation to new technologies and methodologies.
- ❑ The Standby Force has not been fully engaged in humanitarian and disaster management programs in the region, although this would improve civil-security sector relations while providing for human security needs.

side and outside of the region. See “SANDF has 2 100 soldiers deployed on peacekeeping operations”, DefenceWeb (defenceweb.co.za), 3 May 2012.

²⁰² According to the then-South African defence minister, Mosisoa Lekota, as quoted by Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, “South Africa’s Regional Engagement for Peace and Security”, SAIIA (2007), p. 6.

²⁰³ Cedric de Coning, *A Peacekeeping Stand-by System for SADC: Implementing the African Stand-by Force Framework in Southern Africa*, in A. Hammerstad (ed.), op. cit., pp. 102-103.

²⁰⁴ Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, op. cit., p. 6.

V. CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR SADC

To improve its credibility, acceptability and efficiency, SADC has to work in two directions: improving relations with both African and international actors and fostering civil society participation in its decisions and mechanisms.

A. IMPROVING EXTERNAL RELATIONS

1. Beyond the region

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter encourages the settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements, to which the Security Council can contribute. The partnership between the UN and regional organisations, such as the AU, presents challenges of coordination and opportunities for collective action. The AU’s relations with sub-regional structures, such as SADC, must also conform to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This multi-layered association could be a stimulant to regional peace and security if roles were clear and cooperation harnessed. But with overlapping tasks and poor coordination, it is more of an impediment.²⁰⁵ SADC has a liaison office at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa to improve relations between the two bodies and the AU is in the process of establishing a liaison office at SADC.²⁰⁶

AU-SADC cooperation

The AU considers RECs as “building blocks” of the peace and security architecture.²⁰⁷ The AU Peace and Security Council protocol provides for cooperation between the AU and RECs in this area. The AU Commission chair-

²⁰⁵ In the 2009 Madagascar crisis, the UN, AU and SADC were among some of the regional and international organisations (collectively known as the International Contact Group) that were involved in mediation efforts. The inter-organisation tension that resulted exposed the need for the three bodies to clarify working relationships and roles. See Cawthra, “The Role of SADC”, op. cit., p. 15.

²⁰⁶ SADC established its liaison office at the AU in 2009. Headed by a former chairperson of the organ, João Ndlovu, it is part of the EU-funded program for all African RECs to establish a presence at the AU headquarters. Although it may be too early to determine the impact of these liaison offices, it is anticipated that they will enhance constant dialogue and coordination between RECs and the AU over time. The AU liaison office at SADC is being set up pursuant to the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which requires that the office and the chairperson of the commission harmonise and coordinate the activities of RECs and ensure consistency with the objectives and principles of the AU. By late September 2012, the AU was still in the process of setting up the liaison office.

²⁰⁷ African Union, Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 2002.

person and the council are mandated to ensure that regional organisations complement the broader African peace and security agenda.

In February 2004, African heads of state and government adopted the common African defence and security policy (CADSP). This policy emphasises collective defence by AU member states and engages broader human security issues such as human rights, refugees, participation of women and civil society, foreign policy and trade.²⁰⁸ It provides directives for national defence arrangements at state level, advocating transparency, cost-effectiveness and harmonisation with national legislation and executive actions.²⁰⁹ Through this policy, the AU attempts to influence national defence policies and operations to align towards a common continental purpose.

SADC has not integrated the central tenets of CADSP; its primary defence and security instrument, the Mutual Defence Pact, has neither a common security policy nor an emphasis on human security, foreign policy or trade. The adherence to member state sovereignty limits the body's influence on national defence policies and weakens the implementation of CADSP. This again reflects the sensitive and complex nature of political-military relations in Southern Africa.

International cooperating partners (ICPs)

In April 2006, the Windhoek Declaration established the new SADC/ICP framework to assist with the implementation of the organisation's strategic plans (SIPO and RISDP). In 2009, the Ministerial Committee of the organ noted that SADC's budget was inadequate to cover planned peace and security activities. This deficit is attributed to the low resourcing capacity of member states, rather than to a lack of political will.²¹⁰ SADC's budget is therefore made of member states contributions and inflows from interna-

tional partners.²¹¹ This led to the formation of the peace and security thematic group, a coordinating mechanism for international involvement with SADC.²¹² However, the regional body refuses external support in areas that are designated as "strategic", as it believes members states should "solely own and fund" such areas. ICPs are therefore only engaged in "non-strategic" areas and activities.

International support to SADC has been largely channelled through implementation agencies (NGOs, think-tanks, academic institutions, etc.) rather than directly to the Secretariat.²¹³ SADC has raised objections to this model of indirect support, and member states have noted that the impact and effect is "unclear, or at least not yet properly assessed".²¹⁴ The ICPs have justified this indirect funding on the basis of SADC's weak program monitoring and evaluation, lack of coordination between regional and national programs, inadequate expertise and lack of accountability.²¹⁵ Other ICPs have mentioned challenges in "establishing frameworks and conditions for effective engagement and policy dialogue" in the peace, security and governance sectors.²¹⁶ This has forced them to channel resources through civil society.

²⁰⁸ The adoption of the policy is premised on a common understanding of what African states must do collectively to meet the continent's defence and security interests and goals, as set out in Articles 3 and 4 of the AU Constitutive Act. The policy seeks to create a conducive environment for the implementation of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and provide a framework for the effective participation of women and civil society in conflict resolution. "Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy", February 2004.

²⁰⁹ The policy aims at strengthening the defence and security sectors at the national and continental levels. It also calls for transparency and clarity on national defence and security policies. Ibid.

²¹⁰ The March 2012 Luanda Council of Ministers noted that all members of SADC with the exception of Madagascar had paid their subscriptions for the year ending March 2012.

²¹¹ For the March 2012-2013 financial year, \$35.3 million (45 per cent of the total budget of \$78.4 million) is projected to be funded by SADC member states, while the ICPs will provide \$43 million (55 per cent). See SADC Council of Ministers meeting briefing, Luanda, 2 March 2012.

²¹² The group was established in January 2010 and the following ICPs were present at the launch: EU; Germany; France; UK; Netherlands; U.S.; Cuba; Brazil; Argentina; Russia; India; Japan; UN; and UNODC. Its purpose is to enhance confidence building, information sharing, coordination and resource mobilisation. The group is coordinated by the SADC/ICP Joint Task Force, which oversees all the thematic groups in different areas. Thematic groups are supposed to hold regular meetings (at least twice a year) with members and make recommendations to SADC. Consultative meetings can also be held with the SADC secretariat and engagement can also be at ministerial level. See "Framework for Managing the SADC-ICP Relationship in the Peace and Security Sector", op. cit.

²¹³ Institutions that have received ICP support for SADC-related programs include the SADC-Coalition of NGOs, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM). Crisis Group email correspondence, SADC member state army commander, Pretoria, 16 July 2012. "Framework for Managing the SADC-ICP Relationship", op. cit.

²¹⁴ Ibid, p. 4.

²¹⁵ Crisis Group interview, embassy official, ICP peace and security thematic group member, 7 March 2012.

²¹⁶ "Follow the Money! Policies and Practices in Donor Support to Civil Society Formations in Southern Africa", Southern Africa Trust, July 2011, pp. 19-20.

The channelling of funding through implementation agencies has weakened the Secretariat's monitoring, evaluation and participation as well as ownership of the programs.²¹⁷ SADC has proposed the establishment of either a "common pool" funding mechanism or a joint steering committee as part of the thematic group. This, it argues, will improve coordination of external support and eliminate the exclusion of the Secretariat in multilateral programs within the regional bloc.²¹⁸ The disharmony in the SADC/ICP working relationship can therefore be blamed on the failure to implement a functional thematic group.

Some suspect that the ICPs' dissipated approach enables SADC to select particular countries for specific partnerships, thereby safeguarding political sensitivities within the regional bloc.²¹⁹ This constrains the ICPs' accountability in their engagement with SADC, which in some instances augments suspicions about donor agendas.²²⁰

SADC has opportunities to explore additional or alternative partnerships with countries such as India and Brazil, which have relatively significant stakes in maritime security.²²¹ The BRICS grouping – composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and focused primarily on economic issues – has shown interest in peace and security matters.²²² Collaboration with the BRICS countries, which are considered under the ICPs, is evolving with growing economic interests and the importance of securing investments.²²³ Although China's peace and security cooperation with SADC remains embryonic, bilateral relations with several member states (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) and a growing economic presence are likely to change

this.²²⁴ The Seychelles has offered the use of its ports to China for anti-piracy purposes in the Gulf of Aden.²²⁵ Beijing may also pursue similar arrangements with other states like Mauritius, Madagascar and Mozambique to safeguard its commercial shipping ventures.²²⁶

The European Union (EU) has no formal engagement with SADC's peace and security mandate, but it is indirectly involved through the Africa-EU joint strategy mechanism.²²⁷ European countries engage bilaterally; Germany's Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), for example, has an active cooperation program with SADC on peace, security and democracy, economic integration, water management, conservation, climate change, private sector partnerships, institution building and sustainable development.²²⁸ In addition to its support of the Madagascar mediation process, France runs bilateral French-language training programs for the military in Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, South Africa and Mozambique.²²⁹ France is also engaging SADC on issues of maritime security.²³⁰ However, its Africa policy is viewed with suspicion among some African countries, especially in the wake of developments in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya in 2011.²³¹

²¹⁷ "SADC and Donors – Ideals and Practices from Gaborone to Paris and Back", Formative Process Research on Integration in Southern Africa (FOPRISA), April 2006, pp. 7-8.

²¹⁸ According to the first proposal, SADC would allocate projects by drawing from the common funding pool. According to the second one, the thematic group would manage the assistance provided in non-strategic areas, including mediation, through the joint steering committee. "Framework for Managing the SADC-ICP Relationship", op. cit.

²¹⁹ Crisis Group interview, EU diplomat, Pretoria, 7 March 2012.

²²⁰ Crisis Group interview, South Africa DIRCO official, Pretoria, 7 March 2012.

²²¹ Crisis Group interview, defence attaché, EU member state, Pretoria, 7 March 2012.

²²² The BRICS focus on international terrorism, climate change, food and energy security, millennium development goals and international economic and financial situations. The overarching themes at the fourth summit in India in March 2012 were global stability, security and prosperity. The group also calls for reform of the UN Security Council.

²²³ Crisis Group interview, defence attaché from EU member state, Pretoria, 7 March 2012.

²²⁴ China's provision of a \$98 million loan for the construction of a new Zimbabwe Defence College could indicate bilateral arrangements that could transform into multilateral cooperation at the SADC level. Crisis Group interview, retired Zimbabwe National Army brigadier general, Harare, 24 February 2012.

²²⁵ Crisis Group interview, African Conflict and Defence Monitor publisher, Johannesburg, 9 March 2012.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ The joint Africa-EU strategy, which was adopted at the 2007 EU-Africa Lisbon summit, seeks to promote a common political vision and practical approaches to partnerships between the EU and Africa (through the AU). SADC receives funds from the Africa Peace Facility (APF), which provides financial support to the peace and security architecture.

²²⁸ German support has been accepted in the region as "genuinely recognising Africa as an equal partner rather than a subsidiary". Crisis Group interviews, SADC outgoing senior officer, Gaborone, 12 February 2012, and German diplomat, Gaborone, 15 February 2012. See also "Guidelines for Germany's Africa Policy", German Federal Foreign Office, June 2009.

²²⁹ The French justify the language training as enhancing the interoperability of the SADC Standby Force as there are Francophone countries within the regional bloc (Madagascar and Seychelles). However, a WikiLeaks cable notes that language training is a part of France's changing Africa policy of increasing its military presence even into sub-Saharan Africa. "France's changing Africa policy: Part III (Military presence and other structural changes)", U.S. Paris embassy, 9 September 2008, as made public by WikiLeaks.

²³⁰ Crisis Group interview, Western defence attaché to SADC, Harare, 23 February 2012.

²³¹ Crisis Group interview, research associate, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 8 March 2012.

International partnerships remain critical given current resource deficits in SADC. Although there are concerted efforts to increase members' contributions,²³² SADC appears unable for the time being to fully support the development of its "strategic" activities. While others have recommended extending international cooperation to the "strategic" areas to mitigate funding challenges,²³³ that possibility remains intolerable given fears of external interference.

2. Civil society participation

The SADC Treaty makes specific provision for a participatory process that "encourages the peoples of the Region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the Region, and to participate fully in the implementation of the programmes and projects of SADC" (Article 5.2 (b)). Introduced in 2001 through an amendment to the treaty, Article 16 (a) provides for the formation of national committees (SADCNC) composed of civil society organisations at member-state level. Created to provide guidance on policies, strategies and programs, these structures are intended as platforms to initiate, coordinate and implement SADC programs at member-state level.²³⁴

For over a decade, the development and institutionalisation of the national committees has been sluggish, with Mozambique being the only member with a fully functional structure.²³⁵ In 2005, SADC's double troika task force (of both the summit and the organ) instructed member states to expedite establishment of the committees, urging them to facilitate financing, coordination and chairing of their respective structures.²³⁶ This was an implicit recognition that poor relations with civil society must be addressed.²³⁷ It also highlighted the challenge of the traditionally strong state-centric approach, which creates an "expansive divide

between the governors and the governed".²³⁸ Efforts to "enhance public participation"²³⁹ in the organisation also include integration of the Parliamentary Forum into the summit and the Council of Ministers, as well as implementing the 2003 cooperation agreement signed with the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO).²⁴⁰

There are further options for building and consolidating this relationship. SADC's public relations unit (SADCPRU), located at the Secretariat, has responsibility for publicising the organisation's philosophy and programs, as well as developing stakeholder relationships.²⁴¹ The unit works through national contact points that are also mandated to communicate SADC programs and plans in member states.²⁴² These contact points have not been effective as the contact persons have not maintained constant and regular interaction with citizens and the media in their countries and have not been consistently available to the public relations unit.²⁴³

B. STRENGTHENING THE ARCHITECTURE

SADC has developed the foundations for a functional peace and security architecture that now requires enriched coordination, broader scope of engagement and remodeling of the political interaction. A number of key priorities have been identified.

1. Remodelling political interaction

The strong orientation towards state sovereignty has hindered accountability within the regional body. This has led to the creation and development of robust state security in-

²³² In his chairperson's report for the period covering August 2010 to July 2011, Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba called for reducing external funding and increasing member states' contributions, as well as accountability and operational efficiency.

²³³ Crisis Group interview, German diplomat, Gaborone, 15 February 2012.

²³⁴ The SADC Treaty identifies key stakeholders to include government, private sector, civil society, NGOs, workers and employers organisations (Articles 4, 13 and 16 (a)).

²³⁵ Crisis Group interviews, senior officer, organ, Gaborone, 15 February 2012 and governance and security expert, SADC-CNGO, Gaborone, 16 February 2012.

²³⁶ Minutes of the SADC Double Troika Task Force meeting held in Gaborone, 22 June 2005.

²³⁷ Crisis Group interview, professor, Graduate School of Security and Defence Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 8 March 2012.

²³⁸ Crisis Group interview, South African academic, Johannesburg, 8 March 2012.

²³⁹ "Report of the SADC Chairperson for the Period August 2010 to July 2011", presented by President Hifikepunye Pohamba, President of Namibia to the 31st Ordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government, Luanda, August 2011.

²⁴⁰ The SADC Council of NGOs, based in Gaborone, is an umbrella body of national NGOs. It signed an MOU on general cooperation with SADC in 2003. See also *ibid*.

²⁴¹ Crisis Group interview, SADC public relations official, Gaborone, 9 February 2012.

²⁴² National contact points are located in foreign ministries of member states and are headed by a contact person. Their responsibilities include regular consultation and briefings with relevant government institutions, the private sector and media on SADC-related matters. Member states, however, have different support structures for the national contact points. South Africa is the only member with a fully-fledged department focusing on SADC within its foreign ministry.

²⁴³ Crisis Group interview, South African DIRCO official, Pretoria, 7 March 2012.

stitutions that have sometimes become obstacles to human security. In order for SADC to meet the evolving security challenges, state-centric approaches must be balanced and complement the provision for human security needs. The following measures would help:

- ❑ establishing the national committees immediately in each member state, including all civil society actors: the business sector, NGOs, trade unions and employers organisations;
- ❑ integrating the Parliamentary Forum into the summit and Council of Ministers to allow for engagement between SADC and national bodies and improve citizen representation in the regional bloc;
- ❑ implementing the MOU signed with the SADC-CNGO with the development of joint peace and security programs and initiatives;
- ❑ expediting the establishment of the election support unit to assist the electoral council in strengthening prospects for democracy in the region;
- ❑ increasing the scope of the public relations department beyond bilateral and multilateral engagement to include citizen participation and ownership; and
- ❑ resolving issues surrounding the suspension of the SADC Tribunal and ensuring its reconstitution does not overlook human and people's rights.

2. Broadening the scope of engagement

Conflict prevention

SADC needs to establish effective mechanisms to address emerging conflict in the region by:

- ❑ making the organ's strategic plan (SIPO II) public and ensuring that it outlines clear action plans and responsible persons, institutions or departments, so as to encourage a collective regional approach to conflict resolution with defined roles and timeframes;
- ❑ broadening the region's early warning system by establishing national systems including civil society, academics, private sector, trade unions and NGOs, so as to increase the scope of information gathering and analysis;
- ❑ developing a strategy for translating "early warning" into "early action"; and
- ❑ expediting the adoption of legislation for combating cyber and technology-driven crimes by all member states.

Conflict management

SADC needs to strengthen conflict response mechanisms by:

- ❑ operationalising the mediation unit by appointing the substantive panel of elders and mediation reference group as well as establishing the mediation support unit (which is currently stacked in the directorate of the organ);
- ❑ establishing the civilian component of the Standby Force by including civil society and the private sector (in addition to public servants from member states who are already in place);
- ❑ increasing joint exercises of the Standby Force to keep track of technology and methodology developments in security operations;
- ❑ increasing the involvement of the Standby Force in humanitarian work and disaster management to improve civil-security sector relations in the region and coordination of the force;
- ❑ developing standard operating procedures for scenario 5 (intervention involving low-level spoilers) and 6 (situations of genocide) for the Standby Force, to prepare for deployment within or outside the region;
- ❑ establishing main logistics depot for storage, maintenance and centralisation of the Standby Force equipment and machinery;
- ❑ developing a post-conflict reconstruction policy framework, which should also address demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) at a broader regional level with due influence in member states; and
- ❑ ensuring human and people's rights are effectively addressed, through the reinstatement of the tribunal and mandating individual access to remedial options when states fail to uphold citizens' rights.

3. Harmonising engagement

Given the multiple structures within SADC and its interaction with external stakeholders, there is need to build better intra- and inter-coordination.

Structural coordination

SADC can improve coordination and harmonise the peace and security architecture by:

- ❑ clarifying the relationship and roles of the organ secretariat and the subcommittee of defence chiefs in coordinating the Planning Element;

- ❑ developing a regional common security policy to assist in building a security community with shared values and principles between member-state institutions;
- ❑ establishing a common foreign policy framework to enhance effectiveness in dealing with cases of cross-regional peace and security challenges; as well as in anticipation of greater cooperation with the AU, especially in light of the election of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, SADC's candidate, as the new AU commission chairperson;
- ❑ establishing a clear role that the subcommittee of defence chiefs can play in the wake of increasing security sector involvement in conflict, including defining interaction with the politics and diplomacy committee;
- ❑ defining clearly SADC's intentions as an inter-governmental body and aspirations for supra-nationality, if any, to reduce internal contradictions; and
- ❑ clarifying the relationship and coordination of the roles of the executive secretary, director of the organ and the staff from member states chairing the troika of the organ (the office of the chairperson is always staffed by two assistants who are nationals of the state chairing the organ).

External coordination

SADC interacts with the broader continental and global institutions and affairs. Mutual relationships and benefits are essential to strengthen the peace and security architecture and can be achieved through:

- ❑ harmonising and developing a common understanding between the UN, AU and SADC of the "chain of command" in circumstances where military enforcement is required;
- ❑ operationalising the international cooperating partners' thematic group on peace and security to improve coordination with international partners, increase resource inflows directly to SADC and reduce risks associated with perceptions on donor conditions;
- ❑ expanding SADC peace and security cooperation beyond the traditional partnership members, including exploring possibilities of engaging the BRICS;
- ❑ developing a specific regional China policy given its growing presence and likely expanding interests in peace and security; and
- ❑ strengthening the capacity of the SADC liaison office at the AU headquarters to facilitate better coordination between the two organisations in peace and security.

VI. CONCLUSION

The gridlock in SADC's peace and security architecture is related more to political will than merely structural and resource capacity. Member states have exhibited a desire to preserve their right to manage internal political processes and only open up to SADC at their convenience. Accountability within the regional bloc has therefore been limited.

SADC member states have shown more willingness for economic than political cooperation. However, the bottlenecks in peace and security development are now restraining economic integration. A collective approach requires genuine commitment to harmonise national policies at the regional level.

Johannesburg/Brussels, 15 October 2012


APPENDIX A

MAP OF SADC COUNTRIES




APPENDIX B

ORGANOGRAM OF SADC




APPENDIX C

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APPENDIX E

GDP OF THE SADC COUNTRIES

Country	Population (million)	GDP, current prices (US\$ billion)	GDP per Capita, current prices (US\$ Units)	Total Investment Percentage of GDP
South Africa	51.198	419.925	8.202	19.588
Angola	20.213	121.466	6.009	10.417
Botswana	1.875	16.668	8.890	20.639
Lesotho	1.955	2.648	1.354	46.145
Swaziland	1.171	3.893	3.325	10.815
Zambia	13.921	20.288	1.457	24.87
Zimbabwe	12.575	10.142	0.807	
DRC	74.749	17.305	0.232	31.59
Mozambique	22.457	14.27	0.635	22.733
Malawi	16.632	5.727	0.344	12.963
Namibia	2.156	12.72	5.900	30.362
Madagascar	22.408	10.545	0.471	24.986
Seychelles	0.092	0.947	10.293	36.113
Mauritius	1.297	11.224	8.654	25.057
Tanzania	43.019	24.858	0.578	31.33

Source: The International Monetary Fund – World Economic Outlook Database – April 2012

APPENDIX F

GINI COEFFICIENT OF THE SADC COUNTRIES

Country	Most Recent Year of Measurement	GINI Coefficient	Ranking in the World/130
Angola	–	–	–
Botswana	1993	60.51	5
Namibia	1993	74.33	1
South Africa	2000	57.78	10
Tanzania	2000	34.62	88
Malawi	–	–	–
Mozambique	2002	47.29	31
DRC			
Lesotho	1995	63.2	2
Swaziland	2001	50.4	24
Mauritius	2000	39.01	67
Madagascar	–	–	–
Seychelles	–	–	–
Zambia	2004	50.8	22
Zimbabwe	1996	50.1	26

http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gin_ind-economy-gini-index

Source: World Development Indicators database

APPENDIX G

AFRICAN REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES MEMBERS

Country	Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)	Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU)	Common Market for Eastern & Southern Africa (COMESA)	Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)	East African Community (EAC)	Indian Ocean Community (IOC)	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC)
South Africa	●	●		●			
Angola	●			●			
Botswana	●	●					
Lesotho	●	●					
Swaziland	●	●	●				
Zambia	●		●				
Zimbabwe	●		●				
DRC	●			●			●
Mozambique	●						
Malawi	●		●				
Namibia	●	●					
Madagascar	●		●			●	
Seychelles	●					●	
Mauritius	●		●			●	
Tanzania	●				●		

APPENDIX H

GLOSSARY

AEC

African Economic Community – established by the African Union in 2000 to foster mutual economic development among African states.

CADSP

Common African Defence and Security Policy – conceptual framework for collective defence adopted by the AU in February 2004.

CEPGL

Communauté économique des pays des Grand Lacs – Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries.

COMESA

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.

EAC

East African Community.

ECCAS

Economic Community of Central African States.

GIZ

Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – German Society for International Cooperation.

GPA

Global Political Agreement – settlement signed by Zimbabwe's three main political parties in September 2008, leading to the formation of the inclusive government in 2009.

ICG

International Contact Group – grouping of international organisations and countries involved in addressing the Madagascar political crisis.

ICGLR

Conférence internationale sur la région des Grands Lacs – International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

ICP

International Cooperating Partners.

IOC

Indian Ocean Community.

ISDSC

Inter-state Defence and Security Committee – committee of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation responsible for defence, public and state security.

ISPDC

Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee – committee of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation responsible for politics and diplomacy.

JOMIC

Joint Operations, Monitoring and Implementation Committee – inter-party committee set up to evaluate progress in the implementation of the Global Political Agreement in Zimbabwe.

MDC

Movement for Democratic Change – Zimbabwean political party led by Arthur Mutambara at the signing of the GPA and now led by Welshman Ncube.

MDC-T

Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai – Zimbabwean political party led by Morgan Tsvangirai and signatory to the GPA.

MDP

Mutual Defence Pact – agreement operationalising mechanisms for mutual defence cooperation in the region.

MRG

Mediation Reference Group – proposed structure in the organ meant to provide technical support for mediation processes.

MSU

Mediation Support Unit – proposed structure in the organ meant to provide administrative support for mediation processes.

OPDSC

The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, or “the organ” – SADC structure devoted to the promotion of peace and security in the region.

PLANELM

Planning Element – unit within the organ with responsibilities for logistical support to the Standby Force.

POE

The Panel of Elders – proposed structure in the organ for mediating in regional conflicts.

REC

Regional Economic Community.

REWS

Regional Early Warning System – mechanism within the organ for detection and analysis of potential and evolving conflicts in the region.

RISDP

Regional indicative strategic development plan – regional integration development framework, setting priorities, policies and strategies for achieving SADC's long-term goals.

RPTC

Regional Peace Training Centre – SADC facility located in Harare, Zimbabwe.

SACU

Southern African Customs Union – customs union among five countries: Southern Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland established in 1910.

SADCBRIG

SADC Brigade – regional standby force; now referred to as SADC Standby Force.

SADC-CNGO

SADC Coalition of Non-Governmental Organisations – grouping of national civil society organisations, based in Gaborone, Botswana.

SADCNC

SADC national committees – platforms for participatory policy-making within member states, convening key stakeholders: government, civil society and the private sector.

SADCPF

SADC Parliamentary Forum – regional inter-parliamentary oversight body with no legislative powers.

SADCPOL

SADC Police – police component of the Standby Force.

SADCPRU

SADC Public Relations Unit.

SADCSF

SADC Standby Force – intervention unit comprising military, police and civilian components; formerly referred to as the SADC Brigade.

SEAC

SADC Elections Advisory Committee – unit in the organ responsible for advising SADC and member states on election issues, the enhancement of democracy and good governance.

SIPO

Strategic indicative plan of the organ – institutional framework for the day-to-day implementation of the activities of the organ.

SMSC

SADC Maritime Security Committee – subcommittee of the ISDSC responsible for regional maritime security policy and implementation.

UNITA

União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola – Angola's largest opposition party and former rebels during the 1975-2002 civil war.

ZANU-PF

Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front – Zimbabwean political party led by President Robert Mugabe and signatory to the GPA.

APPENDIX I

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

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The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. Undersecretary of State and Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

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October 2012

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