



**Time for a Caucus
“The Future of US Alliances in Asia”**



Issues & Insights
Vol. 11 – No. 16

Manila, Philippines
May 2011

Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Henry Luce Foundation, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at brad@pacforum.org.

Table of Contents

	Page
Acknowledgements	iv
Executive Summary	v
By Cristina B. Gregorio	
Australia	1
By Danielle Chubb, Fergus Hanson, and Andrew Pickford	
Japan	7
By Linnea Duvall, Masamichi Minehata, and Lynn Miyahira	
Philippines	15
By Julio Amador III, Maria Kristela Castronuevo Charmaine Misalucha, TJ Orosa, and Brian Ventura	
Thailand	21
By Fuadi Pitsuwan	
United States	27
By Linnea Duvall, Justin Goldman, Lynn Miyahira, and Eric Sayers	
<u>Appendices</u>	
Appendix A: Pre-conference Essays	A-1
Appendix B: YL Participants	B-1
Appendix C: YL Agenda	C-1

Acknowledgements

The Pacific Forum CSIS is very grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation for its support of the Young Leaders program. A special thanks to the Yuchengco Center, De La Salle University, and the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research for organizing the *The Future of US Alliances in Asia* Conference. We are especially thankful to the MacArthur Foundation for their sponsorship and support of the Young Leaders program. A very special thanks to Julio Amador III for his work in helping to organize the Young Leaders activities.

Executive Summary

By Cristina B. Gregorio

Contemporary regional issues in Asia and the Pacific have diversified to include non-traditional security concerns. This has triggered a call to revisit the US “hub-and-spoke” approach for solutions. The increased importance of Asian states in global affairs adds more urgency to the need to complement existing post-World War II diplomatic structures with an “Alliance Caucus” between the US and its Alliance partners. This project explores the need for a parallel structure (informal or formal) alongside state-to-state meetings to address common concerns that are beyond the scope of official agendas.

Using six case studies from Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and the US, the project proposes a networked alliance structure aligned with US objectives, that allows Alliance partners to abide by their commitments, address domestic security reforms locally, and heighten cooperation to address common issues.

The cases show that alliance partners favor an informal grouping for knowledge-sharing and a forum for states to discuss matters that may be too politically sensitive for existing mechanisms or beyond the scope of official structures. These informal dialogues may serve as an avenue for practical cooperation to address various issues. The cases also revealed that the proposed Caucus may be useful for countries to discover more common concerns. Informal cooperation may be on politics, defense, economics, and civil society, parallel to formal mechanisms that assign these functions to existing regional architecture. Due to its informal nature, a flexible arrangement allows Asian countries to collectively claim center-stage alongside US active engagement in regional affairs.

The Alliance Caucus could be useful in dissipating naval tensions or in addressing geopolitical and human rights issues. The Caucus will also allow informal regional cooperation in terms of security affairs under one umbrella – their common engagement with the US – to harmonize and strengthen military arrangements. Issues such as climate change, disaster management, human trafficking, and democratic governance are some of the areas that will benefit from the Caucus. Regional interdependence has increased civil society calls for cooperation; especially when solutions to such problems are often beyond the capacity of the state and existing official mechanisms. The Caucus can then be used to advance mutual interests among countries excluded from existing mechanisms and elevate it to a multilateral level.

Reshaping their relationship with the US and among themselves vis-à-vis the evolving regional power structure is possible through the Alliance Caucus. Certainly, leadership on regional cooperation among the Asia-Pacific countries will strengthen their collective capacity, reducing burdens on the US at a time when sub-regional issues are better addressed at the regional level. In this way, the networked alliance structure allows a partner-initiated pursuit of US objectives that is aligned with distinct national, sub-regional, and regional interests, demonstrating they can be proactive partners of the Asian Century, too.

Australia

Team Members: Danielle Chubb, Fergus Hanson, and Andrew Pickford

Australian Priorities: The Australian case study is critical while it is not the most important ally strategically, as Australia is a longstanding partner of the United States, and has worked extremely closely with the US on issues in East Asia over the past half century. However, in this discussion it raises the question: what are Australia's international interests and how are they best served? The foreign policy and military establishment would answer this question in terms of continuing and expanding links with the US. However, an increasing number of analysts are publicly raising other alternatives.¹

In this process of the US shifting from a hub-and-spoke to network alliance; Australia may deepen ties with the US, but it will also directly engage other US allies in Asia much more closely and consistently than before. Sometimes this will include issues on which the US has a neutral view or does not have a set position, although it may occasionally differ from US priorities.

In practice, Australia is reaching another transition point in terms of how it interacts with the rest of the world. For much of the first part of the last century, it largely followed its imperial master, the United Kingdom, and international engagement was an extension of Whitehall's global policy. This meant that for most of this period, Australia did not have its own foreign affairs bureaucracy. With the transition to the US as its primary security partner, Australia created a more independent defense and foreign affairs capability, while still generally following US priorities. Australia's international engagement must remain mindful of these priorities, alongside considerations of a fluctuating regional context, which is adjusting to a more assertive and economically robust China.

For Australia, as one of many nations in the Western Pacific revising security arrangements to more closely harmonize with US forces, it is easiest and generally preferable to work with other US allies. This is because there has been a common thread in bringing those nations into the US camp. The common thread is due to various historical reasons, but this nevertheless means that Australia will generally have more in common with these nations than other hypothetical groupings.

The terminology we are using purports forming an informal "Alliance Caucus." To strengthen relations between US allies in Asia, our common view is that Caucus meetings are necessary. To understand specific issues in more depth, we have examined four sectors of international engagement: military, political, economic, and civil society (from an Australian perspective). Throughout the drafting of the Australian section, we have been guided by the following questions:

¹ The most visible sign of Australia's future options is the debate unleashed by Hugh White's *Quarterly Essay*. See Hugh White, 'Power Shift: Australia's Future between Washington and Beijing', *Quarterly Essay*, September, No. 39, 2010. Available at <http://www.quarterlyessay.com/issue/power-shift-australia%E2%80%99s-future-between-washington-and-beijing>.

- What are some of the broader issues that are important to Australia in East Asia?
- What issues, important to Australia, are not addressed adequately in existing forums?
- How would Australia benefit from working within a Caucus to promote common aims and interests?

Political

Broader issues: The shifting global balance of power toward Asia creates one overriding and determinative issue for Australia, in light of which all regional foreign policy decision making is framed: the management of rivalry among Australia's Asian neighbors. Accordingly, for Australian policy makers interested in the creation and maintenance of a stable regional environment, the diplomatic and the strategic are closely intertwined.

Australia's efforts to contribute to regional stability take place in the context of the country's formal alliance with the US, a relationship shared by a number of its regional neighbors, such as the Philippines, Thailand, the ROK, and Japan. At present, the US alliance system in Asia is based on a hub-and-spoke style system in which Asian allies each work individually with the United States in the context of other domestic and regional pressures.

Rivalry among Australia's regional neighbors leads to an increased possibility for instability and conflict, brought about by a rapidly changing strategic environment. From an Australian perspective, the coming 'Asia Pacific century' provides a unique set of political challenges. Political leadership inside Australia has recognized the need to advance new institutional mechanisms through which to pursue more comprehensive engagement in its immediate Asia-Pacific region. This has most recently manifested in proposals such as the 'Asia Pacific community' advanced by Foreign Minister (then Prime Minister) Kevin Rudd.²

Issues not adequately addressed in existing fora: As a dynamic and rapidly growing region, with a number of increasingly powerful nations influencing its political environment, rivalries among nations are likely. Managing these rivalries and preventing them from spiraling into conflict is the major political issue facing Australia and its neighbors. The hub-and-spoke model does not increase a sense of security community among US allies, which is a necessary prerequisite to the formation of greater transnational cooperation. A more flexible Caucus mechanism, which brings together Asian allies of the US, would be beneficial to Australia, providing an opportunity to develop diplomatic initiatives that keep pace with a dynamic strategic environment and which are more responsive to the shifting needs of its participants. Rather than relying on traditional conceptions of the bilateral-multilateral nexus, emphasis here is placed on the development of more versatile diplomatic initiatives within the Caucus model.

How Australia would benefit: In light of the continued central importance of the US alliance system, Asian allies have important decisions to make with regard to how they manage shifting power relationships in their region. Australia faces a number of unique challenges, given its close historical and cultural identification with what some analysts have

² 'Full text of Kevin Rudd's speech to the Asia Society Australasia', *The Australian*, 5 June, 2008. Available at <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/politics/full-text-of-kevin-rudds-speech/story-e6frgczf-111116541962>.

termed the Anglosphere, currently dominated by the US. From an Australian perspective, innovative relationship-building efforts that encourage creative diplomacy and build upon the interests and concerns Australia shares with Asian neighbors provide the most attractive way forward for its diplomatic relations and security future. In particular, Australia has much to learn from how its Asian neighbors have managed competing political priorities in a regional strategic context characterized by shifting power relations.

Rather than seeking to provide another layer of multilateral institutionalism to a region replete with competing architectural models, creative diplomatic fora such as this Caucus would grant policy flexibility to participants and allow for a more dynamic alignment of interests among states. The types of policy issues that could be discussed under this political umbrella must remain open, given the Caucus' emphasis on flexibility and its potential to adapt fluidly to the changing strategic environment. These issues would range from traditional geopolitical challenges to problems such as terrorism, natural disaster response, and crime.

Defense

Broader issues: Since the creation of ANZUS,³ a core national interest for Australia has been the maintenance of a dominant US military presence in the Western Pacific to underpin regional peace and security and ensure open shipping lanes vital to Australian trading interests. Australian policymakers have long worked to try and 'tie Gulliver down' in Asia through the gradual strengthening of defense links. In practical terms, this has resulted in many joint operations and training exercises between Australia and the US, and coordinated development of what is, in military terms, doctrine and interoperability. Australia maintains a heavy bias toward purchasing US-military equipment.

The rise of China, shifting power balances in Asia, and US budgetary constraints post-Global Financial Crisis have raised concern in some circles about the longevity of the US commitment, but Australian politicians and defense planners have responded by trying to deepen defense links. This was seen most recently through the formation of a Force Posture Working Group announced at the 25th AUSMIN held in November 2010 'to begin developing options for enhanced joint defense cooperation on Australian soil.'⁴

The Force Posture Working Group's investigation into closer US-Australia defense collaboration illustrated the rising strategic importance of expanding basing options from which the US could project naval power into the Indo-Pacific maritime theatre. As great power competition extends southward of Northeast Asia and the efficiency of the US post-World War II naval basing system appears increasingly inadequate, some analysts have

³ The ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States) treaty was signed Sept. 1, 1951. See Gary Brown and Laura Rayner. *Upside, Downside: ANZUS: After Fifty Years*. Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 28 August, 2001. Available at <http://aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/2001-02/02cib03.htm>.

⁴ Australia-US Ministerial (AUSMIN) joint press conference, 8 November, 2010. Available at http://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2010/kr_tr_101108_press_conf.html.

pointed to the potential of enhancing the US naval presence in Australia.⁵ These analysts argue Australia's Western and Northern naval facilities could support increased US engagement in the shifting maritime security needs of nearby theatres such as the Indian Ocean and South China Sea.

The issue of US basing and the idea that it should increase its options in the East Asian littoral raises a litany of important and timely political and strategic questions.⁶ An informal Caucus would be an ideal mechanism to allow US allies across the region to come together and discuss the pros and cons of such an idea.

Issues not addressed in existing fora: No other forum in Asia brings together all US alliance partners. There are strong trilateral ties between the US, Japan, and Australia and deepening links between Australia, the ROK and the US. While meeting of this group should not be expanded at the expense of existing military ties, it would make sense to develop a new broader Caucus mechanism. This could explore ways to strengthen the alliance, create a sense of community, boost the status of alliance countries (particularly the Philippines and Thailand) and explore opportunities for joint training, capacity building, and interoperability.

While several states (the US, Japan, and Australia for example) already engage and cooperate in the military sphere with the Philippines and Thailand, bringing this cooperation under a single umbrella with other alliance members would allow for a more integrated approach and could be used to pressure both of these weak partners into doing more to bolster the alliance.

How Australia would benefit: The Caucus would benefit Australia in several ways. It would:

- help strengthen confidence in the alliance among Asian alliance countries;
- serve to further deepen and strengthen US military links in Asia, and;
- offer a mechanism for strengthening the weak Thai and Philippine alliances.

The Caucus would also allow Australia to demonstrate to all Asian states its relevance to Asia. However, the Caucus also comes with risks that would need to be managed. Australia would want to avoid the impression it was part of a policy to contain China – this would be extremely hard to convince the Chinese of. There would also be a risk that more important US security partners in Asia which lack formal alliances (Singapore and Indonesia, for example) might feel slighted by the elevation of alliance status.

⁵ Australia's shared interest with the US in maintaining the current regional maritime system, distance from Chinese strike missile systems, as well as amenable political and physical infrastructure requirements also bolster the potential benefits of US basing options in Australia. See Dr. Toshi Yoshihara, 'Resident power: the case for enhanced US military presence in Australia', *Strategic Snapshots: Lowy Institute*, Jul, No. 9, 2011. Available at <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1630>.

⁶ For further details on this ongoing conversation, see Peter Drysdale, 'US bases in Australia: A step too far', *East Asia Forum*, 18 July, 2011. Available at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/18/us-bases-in-australia-a-step-too-soon/>; and Ron Huisken, 'US military bases in Australia: Don't circle the wagons yet', *East Asia Forum*, 17 July, 2011. Available at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/17/us-military-bases-in-australia-don-t-circle-the-wagons-yet/>.

Economics

Broader issues: At a macro level, the majority of Australia's economic interests lie in East Asia, which in 2009, accounted for over 50 percent of Australia's total trade in goods and services.⁷ The weight of world economic activity is also continuing to drift toward the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, every member of the proposed Caucus, except the Philippines, is among Australia's top 10 two-way trading partners.⁸

In this light, it would seem advantageous for Australia to further strengthen ties through a Caucus with these key trading partners. However, the Caucus of alliance partners would likely offer few additional benefits to Australia from an economic perspective, given its already very close trading ties with all proposed members. Australia has already concluded free trade agreements with the US and Thailand and has an FTA with the Philippines via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area. FTA discussions are also currently underway with Japan and the ROK.⁹

Issues not addressed in existing fora and how Australia would benefit: One possible role for the Caucus, from an Australian perspective, could be to function as a focal point for discussions on trade liberalization and FTA compliance issues. Australia could also use the forum to push for improved agricultural access and reductions in agricultural tariff and non-tariff barriers. However, Caucus states would likely have very different issues to raise.

Civil Society

Broader issues: The issues dealt with by the myriad civil society organizations active in Australia and the region are manifold and include (but are not limited to):

- economic integration;
- transnational crime (including human trafficking and labor exploitation, drug production, and use), and;
- pandemics and HIV/Aids.¹⁰

AusAID, which works closely with local and Australian NGOs, operates in the context of extant regional architectural arrangements (such as ASEAN) as well as UN bodies such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). More flexible fora such as the Caucus would provide more openings and opportunities for addressing regional challenges. Including the views of civil society groups in these discussions would be important, especially given the emphasis on creativity and innovation. These insights would also prove important in light of

⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Australia's trade with East Asia 2009*, Commonwealth of Australia, 2010, p.1. Available at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/stats-pubs/Australia-trade-with-East-Asia-2009.pdf>.

⁸ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Australia's top 10 two-way trading partners and Australia's top 10 exports, goods and services', Commonwealth of Australia, 2011. Available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/focus/081201_top10_twoway_exports.html.

⁹ Austrade, 'International agreements on trade and investment', Commonwealth of Australia, 2011. Available at <http://www.austrade.gov.au/Free-Trade-Agreements/default.aspx>.

¹⁰ AusAID, 'Regional East Asia', Commonwealth of Australia, 2011. Available at <http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/country.cfm?CountryID=82431878&Region=EastAsia>.

the need to provide long-term energy, resource, and food security in the region – problems whose solutions are simultaneously local, national, and transnational in nature.¹¹

Conclusion

Based on a very limited analysis of Australia’s military, political, economic, and civil society considerations for promoting an Alliance Caucus, the following observations and recommendations can be made:

- As a plethora of institutions and structures already exist, in strict cost/benefit terms adding or proposing another formal institution would appear counterproductive. We thus see great value in an informal approach with (preferably) non-US nations taking the lead in creating side meetings to advance agreed policy frameworks. In developing the parameters of an Alliance Caucus, consideration of Australia’s broader strategic context and neighbors would also be important to avoid undermining emerging security architecture in the region.
- On political and military fronts, there is much that can be done to broaden activities. The Australia-US collaboration could act as a suitable template for other nations to follow and Australia could be used to promote regional approaches which – for historical or political purposes – the US cannot. Likewise, allies that don’t have the capacity for meaningful military engagement should be offered tailored aid for suitable equipment, which matches their particular needs. The Australian experience of providing Pacific Class Patrol Boats to small South Pacific nations should be studied.
- Deep and longstanding economic and civil society relationships exist. While the expansion of these matters through an Alliance Caucus would most likely generate minimal side benefits, it would still be worthwhile considering its potential to support broader interregional dialogue on trade and humanitarian issues. Shifting from the hub-and-spoke model will initially be uncomfortable for the US, so focusing on contingencies and other areas where the US has longstanding positions would address some concerns.
- Trialing projects and concepts in as-yet relatively uncontested zones will build robustness before there are unnecessary distractions. The Indian Ocean is one such example.

¹¹ For further details, see the list of publications dealing with AusAID initiatives in regional East Asia. See *Ibid.*

Japan

Team Members: Linnea Duvall, Masamichi Minehata, and Lynn Miyahira

This section aims to illustrate how an Alliance Caucus provides a valuable opportunity for Japan to achieve its newly set out strategic agendas. In December 2010, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) highlighted Japan's shift from a "basic defense concept" to a "dynamic defense force,"¹ and its more active engagement in the effort to promote peace and stability in the region. On June 21, 2011, Japan and the United States further emphasized regional peace as part of the US-Japan alliance objectives with the joint statement by defense and foreign ministers/secretaries at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC). The first sentence in the statement's preamble underscored the importance of the Asia-Pacific region for the alliance, stating that "our Alliance remains indispensable to the security of Japan and the US, and to the peace, stability, and economic prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century."² Furthermore, the first common strategic objective of the statement was to "ensure the security of Japan and strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region."³ Mainly focusing on military, economic, and legal spheres, this section aims to support the objectives set out in the SCC joint statement through the establishment of a new framework that helps facilitate the policy coordination of Japan's evolving strategic posture towards the Asia-Pacific region.

Political

There are critical security issues that incorporate the common interests of the six alliance countries in the Asia-Pacific region such as public health, energy development, and nonproliferation. Nuclear energy is increasingly considered as a key energy option in Asian states and the Asia-Pacific region is also the home to rapidly developing life science industries. At the same time, there is a risk posed by dual-use technologies – peacefully developed technologies that can be exploited for malicious purposes such as terrorism or crime. Therefore, the regional effort to enhance public health preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) disasters and nonproliferation architecture is also a common interest. Specific legal frameworks on these issues include the International Health Regulations (IHR) by the World Health Organization (WHO), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

One of the key agreements in the public health⁴ sphere is IHR of the WHO in 2005.⁵ Epidemic, accidental and deliberate outbreaks, toxic chemical accidents and radio nuclear

¹ Yamaguchi, N. (2011) 'Deciphering the New National Defense Program Guidelines of Japan', The Tokyo Foundation: Research Brief. Available from <http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2010/deciphering-the-new-national-defense-program-guidelines-of-japan>

² SCC. (2011) *Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: Toward a Deeper and Broader US-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership*. June 11. Available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/joint1106_01.pdf

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Regarding public health, a study shows that "75% of all emerging viruses over the past two decades have been zoonotic," and particularly in East Asia, the experience of SARS and Avian Influenza have given critical momentum for regional

accidents are broadly covered by the scope of the IHR. This is why further cooperation between the NPT/BWC/CWC and the WHO is needed.⁶

Intervention points: Public Health

- **Japan:** Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is a *Key Partner* for implementing the IHR. Following the March earthquake in Japan, political, financial (particularly ODA), and psychological constraints make it difficult to expect any expansion of Japan's international role. A challenge for Japan will be how to manage these constraints, which are likely to accelerate the reduction in Japan's international engagement, a process that has been underway for some time.
- **Alliance Caucus:** In addition to the JAICA, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Asian Development Bank (ADB), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and ASEAN are also *Key Partners* to support IHR implementation.⁷ It is important for an Alliance Caucus to identify and take leading roles within these regional frameworks to better implement the basic principles of the IHR. The Alliance Caucus would also help share best practices among countries as there is "no one size fits all" in national implementation.

Regarding legal prohibitions within the larger concept of biosecurity, recent international efforts have been conceptualized as "nuclear security architecture" or a "web of prevention."⁸

⁹ The development of this architecture will depend significantly on building capacity and

governments to prioritize public health as a security issue. Therefore, regional communities, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), have recurrently addressed the importance of coordinated policy making in public health. See Mackenzie, J. (2007) 'Emerging Viral Diseases in South-East Asia and the Western Pacific: the Importance of Biosecurity and the Dilemma of Dual-Use', presentation provided at the *Regional Biosecurity Workshop*, May, Singapore. Available from <http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/index.php?docTitle=&author=&docNotes=&docType=&project=The%20Controlling%20Dangerous%20Pathogens%20Project> at p. 5.; Enemark, C. (2007) *Disease and Security: Natural Plagues and Biological Weapons in Asia*, London: Routledge.; APEC. (2005) 'Proposed Report and Recommendations', presented at the *APEC Symposium on Response to Outbreaks of Avian Influenza and Preparedness for a Human Health Emergency*, 28-29 July, California, USA. at p. 2; ASEAN (2010) *Strategic Plan of Action on ASEAN Cooperation in Food, Agriculture and Forestry*, Available from <http://www.aseansec.org/6218.htm>

⁵ IHR is a legally binding instrument that entered into force in 2007 with a view to prevent, protect against, control and provide public health response to diseases, but "not limited to specific diseases, but are applicable to health risks, irrespective of their origin or source, they will follow the evolution of diseases and the factors affecting their emergence and transmission." WHO. (2005) *International Health Regulations* Geneva: WHO. Available from <http://www.who.int/ihr/9789241596664/en/index.html>

⁶ Bakanide, L., Imnadze, P., and Perkins, D. (2010) 'Biosafety and biosecurity as essential pillars of international health security and cross-cutting elements of biological nonproliferation', *BMC Public Health*, 10 (Suppl 1) 1-12. Available from <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/S1/S12>

⁷ WHO. (2007) *International Health Regulations (2005): Areas of Work for Implementation*, WHO/CDS/EPR/IHR/2007.1, Geneva: WHO

⁸ Security architecture may include, among other things: International legal frameworks (e.g. NPT, BWC, CWC) and these national measures under the UNSCR 1540; facility/laboratory management (nuclear safety and security, laboratory biosafety and security); public health capacity; peaceful exchange of science and technology; export control (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group); intelligence; oversight of sensitive research; review of science and technology; responsible conduct in research.

⁹ British Medical Association, *Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity* (London: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999). British Medical Association, *Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity* (London: BMA Professional Division Publications,

fostering collaboration between scientists/engineers who are cognizant of the concerns of the security community and vice versa.

The Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit 2010 acknowledged the need for capacity building for nuclear security and the promotion of nuclear security culture through, among other things, education.^{10 11} Also in the life sciences, a wide range of international communities in science, economics, public health, and security, have underscored the increasing need to develop a responsible culture and education in life science research concerning biosecurity issues.¹²

Intervention points: Prohibition Regimes

- **Japan:** on nuclear security, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) established the Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security in April 2011 to provide capacity building courses on nuclear security in Asia in cooperation with the US Department of Energy, IAEA and the European Union.¹³ The situation of Fukushima after March 11 earthquake revealed that potential nuclear disasters can be caused deliberately with malicious intention-

2004). International Committee of the Red Cross, *Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity*, August 2003, Available from <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/bwh?OpenDocument>. Graham S. Pearson, "Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Web of Deterrence," *Washington Quarterly* 16 (1993). Graham S. Pearson, "Why Biological Weapons Present the Greatest Danger," paper delivered to the Seventh International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Stockholm, Norway, 15-19 June, 2001. There have been efforts to conceptualise a multifaceted approach comprising several practical measures through what is termed the Web of Prevention (WoP). For the conceptual evolution of the WoP in literature, see Feaks, D., Rappert, B. and McLeish, C. (2007), 'Introduction: A web of prevention', in Rappert, B. and McLeish, C. (eds), *A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Science and the Governance of Research*, London: Earthscan.

¹⁰ White House (2010) *Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit* April 13, Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/communiqu-washington-nuclear-security-summit>

¹¹ In the context of physical protection of nuclear material, the promotion of nuclear security culture and capacity building was underlined in the IAEA recommendation in January 2011. IAEA (2011) 'Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,' *IAEA Nuclear Security Series* No. 13 (INFCIRCRev 5.), Vienna: IAEA.

¹² For example, G8 Counter-Terrorism Cooperation has consistently addressed the issue of bio-threats since 2001, Available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2002/coop_terror.html; Regarding biosecurity education, in 2008 the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) recognized the value of education for scientists on dual-use issues "including possible mandatory components" at the higher education, and the BTWC's national implementation has been authorised under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 since 2004. See United Nations, *Report of the Meeting of States Parties, BWC/MSP/2008/5*, December 2008; Voluntary awareness-raising for scientists, national legislation on biosecurity and biosafety measures, and oversight of scientific research were underlined by the *Statement on the Consideration of Biodefence and Biosecurity* signed by editors of some 30 major scientific journals, including Science, Nature and PNAS in 2003. Editorial. (2003) "Statement on the Consideration of Biodefence and Biosecurity," *Nature* 421, February, p.771; also InterAcademy Panel (IAP) issuing a statement calling for, amongst other things, the oversight of scientific research and the awareness raising of scientists through education. See IAP. (2005) *Statement on Biosecurity*, Available from <http://www.interacademies.net/?id=4909>; WHO experts group provided a report by making education the first priority to prevent the misuse of the life sciences. WHO. (2007) Scientific Working Group on Life Science Research and Global Health Security: *Report of the First Meeting*, Geneva: WHO.

¹³ Kimura, N., and Naoi, Y. (2010) *Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security* (IAEA-CN-184/52) Available from <http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/Symposium/2010/Documents/PapersRepository/052.pdf>

terrorism.¹⁴ Therefore, the JAEA's efforts to enhance capacity building on nuclear security will be of regional interest in creating momentum to promote a nuclear security culture.

- **Alliance Caucus:** There is certain opportunity to work on nuclear security issues under the Caucus. ROK hosts the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012. In cooperation with the ROK, Japan has much to prepare to live up to the joint statement with the US at the prime minister/president level.¹⁵ JAEA's efforts on nuclear education are specifically designed to promote capacity building of engineers and security experts in Asian countries (currently Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia). Yet, as Thailand announced to a halt to all plans to nuclear power plants, nuclear energy development in the region needs to be discussed among key regional allies after Fukushima.¹⁶

On biosecurity, the role of the JACKSNNZ is noteworthy. At the 6th Review Conference of the BWC in 2006, a new like-minded diplomatic group emerged as the 7 States Parties within the Western Group - JACKSNNZ - Japan, Australia, Canada, South Korea, Switzerland, Norway, and New Zealand. Within JACKSNNZ, Japan has emphasized the importance of education with national papers to the BWC since 2008. In the run-up to the 7th Review Conference of the BWC in December 2011, Australia, Japan, and Switzerland jointly provided an official paper to the BWC to promote discussion of education in April 2011. This paper is hoped to be further extended into a working paper at the December meeting based on additional policy coordination with other Asian countries.

There is hope for such policy coordination. The Philippines and Thailand have laid important foundations for regional capacity building in biosecurity. There is a series of important efforts in the region, made with US-Philippines joint action, to help mitigate the threats posed by proliferation of biological weapons.¹⁷ Thailand in February 2011 held the first annual conference for the biosafety and biosecurity capacity building by the International Federation of Biosafety Association (IFBA).¹⁸

Defense

Japan faces a wide spectrum of risks and threats in the region, ranging from natural disasters, CBRN accidents, proliferation of dual-use technology, vulnerability in cyber, maritime, and

¹⁴ Luongo, K. (2011) 'Preventing a Nuclear Terrorist Version of Fukushima', *Bulleting of Atomic Scientists*, April 8, Available from <http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/PDFFrameset.asp?URL=http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/preventing-nuclear-terrorist-version-of-fukushima>

¹⁵ MOFA. (2010) *Japan-US Summit Meeting*, November 13, Available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/meet_pm_1011.html

¹⁶ Lee, U.W. (2011) 'Thailand Freezes Nuclear Power Plants', *Business Times*, March 17, Available from <http://www.eco-business.com/news/thailand-freezes-nuclear-power-plant-plans/>

¹⁷ The Philippines has been a hub of US engagement of the region in terms of capacity building for regional scientists about biosecurity measures (especially laboratory security measures) by establishing a National Association for Biosafety and Biosecurity in cooperation with the Bio-engagement Program (BEP) as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program of the USA. In relation to this, the Philippines will host a regional workshop "the Super Week" at the end of June 2011 to the beginning of July to prepare for the 7th Review Conference of the BTWC.

¹⁸ IFBA (2011) *The Year of Building International Biosafety Communities*, Available from <http://www.internationalbiosafety.org/english/2011-year-growing-intl-communities.asp>

air space; international crime; and terrorism. As an island nation that depends on maritime trade for food and energy, Japan is particularly concerned about the sea lines of communication in Southeast Asia. It is engaged in territorial disputes with the ROK, China, and Russia, and is concerned about the implications of an increasingly powerful China.

In this strategic environment, Japan maintains a Self-Defense Force (SDF) capable of performing its roles in deterrence and response, ensuring the security of sea and air space surrounding Japan, and responding to attacks in CBRN, cyber, ballistic missile, and nontraditional domains.¹⁹ The NDPG illustrated the efforts needed to achieve such defense capability by enhancing organization, equipment, and disposition of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces.²⁰ However, Japan's SDF is constitutionally limited in its regional role, so Japan leans heavily on the US alliance to provide regional stability and security. An Alliance Caucus would allow Japan to diversify its security partnerships and find areas where the SDF can apply its extensive resources to support regional security in a way that does not violate the constitution. Areas for regional cooperation might include maritime domain awareness, information sharing, humanitarian and disaster relief and exercises. For example, Japan can enhance its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities with Caucus members to promote higher policy coordination that is in line with US efforts. To this end, international joint development and production projects will be necessary.²¹ Alongside the joint development of facilities and equipment, joint training and human resource capacity building should be enhanced.

Japan is an active participant in Asian regional architecture, so the Alliance Caucus should focus on topics that avoid redundancy with the ASEAN +3, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM). Specifically, this would involve finding issues in which the Republic of Korea, Australia, and Japan can better align their engagement with Thailand and the Philippines. For example, Japan, ROK, and Australia could use the Caucus to encourage Thailand and the Philippines to make effective use of bilateral alliances with the US by focusing military capability development on areas of mutual interest such as maritime domain awareness and illegal trafficking, rather than spending scarce resources on expensive but less useful fighter aircraft.

Economic

Economic integration between all five of the US security allies in Asia – Japan, ROK, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand – is robust and significantly contributes to Japan's economy. Although China is Japan's largest trade partner in terms of exports and imports, the US, Australia, ROK, and Thailand consistently rank among Japan's top 10 trade partners. Japan is the third largest economy in the world, and while it has struggled with economic stagnation and deflation since 1991 and faces significant reconstruction costs in the aftermath

¹⁹ Ministry of Defense, Japan. (2010) *National Defense Program Guidelines*. Tokyo: MoD. Available from http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

of the '3-11' tsunami and Fukushima nuclear disaster, it will be looking to Asian neighbors to help stimulate growth.

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs realizes that a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in Northeast Asia would produce the greatest benefit in terms of lowering tariffs and other trade barriers. For example, the ROK has an average tariff rate of 16.1 percent with Japan as compared to 3.6 percent for the US.²² Both countries realize that a FTA could spur exponential growth between the two countries, and this seems to be the most important FTA negotiation for Japan. An Alliance Caucus meeting could provide motivation to expedite negotiations between the countries by allowing Japan to discuss how other countries in East Asia have implemented their FTAs. Of most interest to Japan are the ROK-Australia FTA negotiations and the US-ROK (KORUS) pending FTA. Japan has been in negotiations with Australia for an FTA since April 2007, and has yet to start negotiations with the ROK but has done considerable research on the matter.

Japan has done well in promoting economic cooperation in Southeast Asia and has a Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEP) with ASEAN put into force in 2008.²³ This CEP has elements of a FTA but also goes beyond trade and specifies areas that need improvement such as barriers to services, investments, tourism and standardization of regulation and intellectual property rights. Underneath the umbrella of the CEP, Japan has Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei – all entering into force between 2002 and 2007. An Alliance Caucus would help Japan promote its work in ASEAN countries and help it further its economic goals with the US, ROK, and Australia.

Japan has been guarded in its promotion of EPAs or FTAs, and domestic politics in its agricultural industry have played a large part in creating trade regulations. Priorities for EPAs are given to countries and regions that already have strong relationships with Japan in other aspects, and the Alliance Caucus would help accentuate and articulate those countries that have mutual interests with Japan.

Civil Society

Discussions and illustrations of civil society in Japan are diverse.²⁴ For the Alliance Caucus, nuclear security is policy relevant and a timely issue in which joint cooperation has been developed at the level of civil society. The Nautilus Institute reported the joint efforts of civil society (over 20 organizations) from Japan and Australia in considering the following issues: the nature of the Post-Cold War strategic nuclear environment; Northeast Asian and Southeast Asia regional security dynamics and implications for proliferation and disarmament pathways; the role of the UNSC 1540 Committee, including expert contributions and civil society engagement; and evaluation of the prospects of the NPT

²² MOFA. (2002) *Japan's FTA Strategy*, Available from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/strategy0210.html>

²³ ASEAN. (2010) *Japan-ASEAN Dialogue Relations*, Available from <http://www.asean.org/5740.htm>

²⁴ For example *The State of Civil Society in Japan* gives great historic and policy relevant discussions on the topic. Schwartz, F. J. and Pharr, S. J. (2003), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

regime.²⁵ While the efforts are mainly on disarmament issues, implications of these efforts are worth considering as the Nuclear Security Summit is taking place in 2012 in terms of non-proliferation and nuclear security. Coordination of civil society from ROK and Southeast Asia will be a possible discussion for the Caucus, which can review the above efforts and help coordinate the dialogue between Tracks 1 and 2. The engagement of civil society should not be limited to nuclear issues but should be expanded into a discussion of cyber, bio, and other relevant topics. As the region has been a source of cutting-edge science in this century, raising concerns about the diffusion of dual-use technologies, there is a certain opportunity and rationale to pursue such efforts in the caucus.

Civil society has often inhibited the development of a stronger US-Japan alliance. Public opposition to US basing in Okinawa over a host of issues from noise pollution, crime by US military, and the presence of nuclear military technology in Japanese territory has greatly increased friction in the alliance. Japan's efforts to play a greater regional and global military role – for example by refueling US ships in the Indian Ocean – have repeatedly been hamstrung by domestic opposition. An Alliance Caucus would allow the Japanese government to strengthen its case for greater use of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and demonstrate to domestic audiences the regional need for an outward-looking foreign policy.

Key Findings and Recommendations

Key findings: Possible discussion topics under an Alliance Caucus are highly relevant to issues that have been highlighted by the NDPG and the SCC statement. Therefore, this case study of Japan demonstrates that the Caucus represents the strategic interests of Japan and vice versa.

In order to take this analytical exercise forward, key policy recommendations that emerge from this study include the following:

- **Military:** Defining priorities of strategic interest to caucus members; asking how Japan, ROK, and Australia could use the Caucus to encourage Thailand and the Philippines to make effective use of their bilateral alliances with the US by focusing military capability development in areas of mutual interest such as maritime domain awareness and illegal trafficking
- **Economic:** Japan has traditionally been guarded in its promotion of EPAs or FTAs, and in its agricultural industry has played a large part in creating trade regulations. It is critical to identify how the Alliance Caucus would help accentuate and articulate those countries that have mutual interests with Japan.
- **Political/Legal:** Striking the right balance between like-minded interests of the Caucus and that of multilateral legal frameworks will be key. By taking an “all hazard approach,” Japan needs to identify how its national resources can best support a wide range of security issues that are shared with caucus members.

²⁵ Nautilus Institute (2009) *Australia-Japan Civil Society Cooperation for Nuclear Disarmament*, Available from <http://www.nautilus.org/projects/A-J-disarm/aust-japan-coop>

- **Civil Society:** Sharing best practices of public diplomacy for achieving active international engagement among caucus members would give the Japanese government insight into how to strengthen its case for greater use of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and demonstrate to domestic audiences the regional need for an outward-looking foreign policy, to make both military and non-military international contributions.

Philippines

Team members: Julio Amador III, Maria Kristela Castronuevo
Charmaine Misalucha, TJ Orosa, and Brian Ventura

Introduction

During the Cold War, the US ensured that East Asia, in general, and Southeast Asia in particular, was in its sphere of influence. To achieve this, it firmly established bilateral alliances with Japan and Australia in 1951 and with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Thailand, and the Philippines in 1954. The hub-and-spoke model became an effective tool in organizing the US relations with states in East and Southeast Asia, especially in light of the need for the US strategy of containment during that time. However, while these alliances worked primarily in favor of the superpower, they proved to be a stumbling block in regional community-building processes. In particular, despite the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, the deepening and the widening of regionalism efforts took longer than expected as evidenced by the lack of strong ties between the “spokes.” This is not to speak of the absence of diplomatic relations between, for instance, Thailand and the ROK; rather, the failure of the hub-and-spoke model rests on the inability of US allies to create and maintain formal alliances with each other. In short, the hub-and-spoke paradigm has not, so far, been transformed into a wheel. As a consequence, contemporary issues whose common denominator is that they remain unbound by territoriality, are not adequately addressed by states.

If there is any way in which today’s issues can be effectively addressed, it is through a revision of the structure of international relations: by de-centering the hub and linking the spokes to each other. Clearly, the structure remains very much reducible to states, but the fact that the various ways in which these actors interact highlights a more nuanced view of international relations. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, moving away from the hub-and-spoke model allows for sharing the burden of managing the international system. This will be advantageous for the US, which traditionally bore the brunt of the responsibilities attached to being the hegemon. At the same time, relegating the archaic structure to Cold War history can likewise provide the push that East and Southeast Asian states need to further their efforts to community building.

Against this backdrop, an Alliance Caucus is proposed involving the Australia, Japan, ROK, the Philippines, Thailand, and the US. The spirit behind this proposal is that the holding of informal backchannel meetings alongside those that at the state level can provide the venue for discussing and addressing issues that are oftentimes buried in the official agenda of state-to-state meetings. To justify the necessity of such an arrangement, Team Philippines presents possible areas of cooperation among all the members of the Caucus in the spheres of politics, security, economics, and people-to-people exchanges.

Political

The multilateral and informal arrangement of an Alliance Caucus falls within the constitutional limitations of the Philippines. As a purely foreign affairs matter it falls into the realm of the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to negotiate for the president of the Philippines. However, if the issue involves matters of great public concern

and is not entirely about international security, then it would fall under the general rule that every treaty or agreement must pass through Senate ratification. This is costly and time consuming but will best serve deliberative democracy. In 2009, a case concerning the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) was filed before the Supreme Court on the issue of the lack of public participation and the right of the public to be informed of negotiations done for the country – at the very least through notice and information to the Senate. This was reflective of the growing concern then of the usage of “executive agreements” such as the highly controversial Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) concluded with the US.

Security arrangements involving the Philippines must pass through a two-level diplomatic game. At the international or interstate level is the negotiation between the US and the Philippines (bilateral), the US and its other strategic partners in Northeast Asia (Japan and the ROK), and the US and its partners in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia, as well as Australia). At the regional level, it is worth mentioning that China and the US are both members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This becomes pivotal given the recent circumstances in the Spratlys, which makes the Philippines more conscious of its security arrangements. The Alliance Caucus could dissipate the tension brought about by the South China Sea crisis as the members of this arrangement will act as the nodes and will make connections with each other via a network that revolves around informal discussions on low-politics issues like disaster management cooperation and customs and coasts cooperation through open door policies. A multilateral cooperative framework on nontraditional security issues will also open the door to more communication.

Defense

The field of security is often represented by the military. But while militaries are paramount to a state’s exercise of sovereignty, contemporary problems require easing up on our tight hold on notions of self-help and moving toward cooperative security with other members of the international system. East and Southeast Asia are faced with security threats that are not necessarily traced to a single state. Instead, current security threats are non-state in nature. This situation implies that our existing structures (state-based) do not correspond with the threats we face today (non-state).

Rather than advocating the dissolution of traditional structures, it might be more prudent to enhance them to meet contemporary problems. In this sense, joint exercises between and among the members of the proposed Alliance Caucus will ensure that formal links between states are improved. At the same time, informal links will likewise be established and will flourish, given the kinds of negotiations and discussions that will take place prior to holding these joint exercises. In short, while the joint exercises are at the bottom official activities of states that are geared toward addressing non-state threats, the initial logistics of these operations will depend on meetings that take place at the Alliance Caucus. In this sense, the Alliance Caucus is necessary to ensure that traditional security structures can be enhanced to address nontraditional security threats.

Further justification for an Alliance Caucus is based on the experiences of the Philippines. The Philippines’ relationship, specifically in the realm of defense, security, and military ties

with the US, is perceived to be a focal point of the country's international engagement. Defense and security policies of Manila have been influenced greatly by Washington, with the Armed Forces of the Philippines seen as being "dependent" on the US when it comes to the development of its capabilities. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries binds this relationship. In the same manner, while the Philippines remains a strategic and long-time ally of the US, Washington also has strategic partnerships and/or alliances with other countries such as Thailand, Australia, Japan, and the ROK under their respective bilateral frameworks.

While the bilateral relationships of the US with these countries achieves good outcomes, the emergences of regional and global defense and security concerns that cannot be resolved bilaterally call for multilateral cooperation. To this end, it is worthwhile to explore the possibility of holding an Alliance Caucus between the US and its allies in East and Southeast Asia. The Caucus will provide an avenue for participating countries to discuss, among others, defense, and security issues that are of mutual concern without incurring too much time, cost, and ministerial procedures as compared to formal ones. This, of course, is under the premise that all observe the constitutional limitations of each country. The agreements borne out of the Caucus will also provide insights and will help policy making of the countries involved.

The Caucus may pave the way for discussion and agreements on key defense and security concerns such as:

1. Capability development and upgrade of defense forces of ASEAN countries to enable them to respond to traditional security threats. This includes the availability of military hardware as well as technical and technology transfer. With the modernization of it, Armed Forces and the shift to external defense capability building, the Philippines will benefit.
2. Collective and cooperative frameworks for integrating the different allies' disaster response forces into a regional disaster response force so that it will become readily deployable in any part of the region when. As ASEAN countries are more often than not, vulnerable to disasters and calamities, this will be beneficial not only to the US allies, but to the entire region.
3. Conduct of joint military exercises, including land and maritime exercises between the allied countries.
4. Conduct of peacekeeping exercises in consonance with the plans and intentions to have a regional peacekeeping force.

Economics

Forming closer economic ties among Australia, Japan, Thailand, the ROK, the Philippines, and the US will bring security cooperation to a new level by recognizing that economic prosperity is a major part of security and by taking advantage of the complementary characteristics of the economies. The six countries have either started implementing bilateral free trade agreements or are under negotiations to form one. Free trade agreements between Australia and Thailand, Australia and the United States, Japan and the Philippines, and Japan and Thailand, and United States and the ROK are either signed or are in effect. Meanwhile, consultations, studies, and negotiations for free trade agreements between Australia and

Japan, Australia, and the ROK, the ROK and Japan, the ROK and Thailand, Philippines and the US, and Thailand and the US have commenced. Aside from the bilateral trade pacts that have been signed or are being explored, multilateral arrangements between ASEAN and Australia, Japan, the ROK, and the US as partners are being studied.

Outside this arrangement, however, there is no venue for the five countries in the region that are security allies of the US to meet and explore how security alliance and economic relations may interface and can complement each other. It is therefore of great importance that this gap is bridged by forming an Alliance Caucus.

Two short-term and a couple of long-term issues can kick-start the Caucus in the sphere of economics. One of the immediate tasks is to explore how a multilateral trade pact among the six parties can complement existing bilateral arrangements or can harmonize the agenda for those still under study or negotiation. Trade envoys can discuss how planned trade agreements can learn from those that already in effect. For example, trade ministers from Australia and Thailand can discuss with counterparts in the ROK ways in which new agreements would not conflict with those under negotiation, and how this could open the door to multilateral arrangements.

The second immediate task is to examine how the economic capacities of the six members can be fully utilized to complement security responsibilities in existing treaties. The industrial capacities of Japan, the ROK, Australia, and the US, particularly those that have mixed civilian and military purposes, can be strengthened by further cooperation by, for example, increasing interchangeability of products or parts that they produce so that in the event of crisis, economic capacity of one can supplement allies under attack.

In terms of long-term issues, the Caucus can focus on how the overall economic characteristics of the members can complement each other to address problems like slow economic growth aging societies. The Caucus can explore the harmonization of professional and technological standards to facilitate the movement of human resources and technological exports.

The lack of a forum where the six close security allies can explore how their economic capacities can strengthen their security ties is a gap that must be addressed. Forming an Alliance Caucus with clear economic objectives simply harnesses the potential of the fact that economic cooperation is an indispensable part of security relations.

Civil Society

All of the states allied with the US have vibrant civil societies and hold human rights as a basic value. For the Philippines, the US and the rest of its East and Southeast Asian allies are important destinations for its overseas workers. Many Filipinos are hired as workers and end up as immigrants and are highly valued members of their new societies. The Philippines, Thailand, and Japan are important tourist destinations for many of the US-allied states. This interaction is fostered by shared history and to some extent, the use of English and other factors that knit these peoples together. Japan, the ROK, Australia, and New Zealand are

also destination countries for students in many disciplines. All US allies have found ways to send promising students to study in the US, creating a bond with its culture and way of life. Generous assistance from these states allows them to provide scholarships to Philippine students to study abroad. This creates feelings of attachment that come to play when these scholars become persons of authority and hold responsibilities in business, government, and civil society.

There is a need therefore to improve understanding between and among the peoples of the US and its allied states. While the debate on the Asian Values is not over, there are clear differences in how states deal with certain issues. In the process of building regional institutions, a “Western” mindset favors outcomes over processes, while it is clear from an ASEAN perspective that processes are considered as outcomes themselves. This process-vs.-outcome orientation was shown in the desire by Australia to create a new Asia-Pacific community that would deal with different issues that the region was facing. ASEAN opposed the initiative because it believed that the process of confidence building has not reached a level where preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution could be used. To a great extent, cultural diplomacy is needed to foster greater understanding among US allies not only to build confidence, but also to ensure that cooperation can work. Only through greater understanding in areas beyond the traditional confines of military and security cooperation can states that share common values work together.

Greater practical cooperation in nontraditional security cooperation can build greater ties and technology transfer from more advanced US allies to the Philippines and Thailand would be beneficial as well. Areas that are ripe for joint exercises and cooperation include maritime security, piracy, disaster and risk reduction, climate change, and human trafficking. There have already been examples of cooperation and joint exercises, such as the Coast Watch South, which aimed to improve the capacity of the Philippine navy and other security agencies to secure the Philippines’ southern frontiers. This project was successfully implemented with support from the US. There is no reason why greater cooperation from Japan and Australia, cannot happen in the same framework. Another area that might be considered is disaster management. With the recent tragedies in Japan and the Philippines, the US and allied states may consider putting up a facility that will provide immediate response and relief to disaster-stricken states in the region. This facility can be an avenue for sharing responsibility and resources in managing the impact of disasters.

Conclusion

There is nothing that should prevent the US and allied states from engaging in informal dialogue during ASEAN events and process. Even in the UN, such informal dialogues should be fostered as a means for like-minded states to cooperate on pressing issues. An Alliance Caucus can then try to evolve into mechanisms that promote practical cooperation. The political sphere recommends the holding of the Caucus because it can potentially dissipate tensions surrounding the Spratlys issue. In the security sphere, joint activities can run more smoothly if informal talks via the Caucus are held. In economics, what is recommended is that through the Caucus, a multilateral trade pact can be negotiated to increase the economic capacities of members. Finally, the realm of people-to-people

exchanges emphasizes how a Caucus is in line with the values embraced by ASEAN and other Asian states.

The Caucus is a good means to ensure that states such as the Philippines and Thailand can become more responsible for their external security, thus lessening the burden of the US in projecting power in East and Southeast Asia. In the long term, this might be a means to ensure that states from outside ASEAN have a greater role to play, not only as a provider of resources and means, but as partners in shaping the Asian century.

Thailand

By Fuadi Pitsuwan

Introduction

In 1833 during the reign of King Rama III and the presidency of Andrew Jackson, Thailand and United States signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce – it was the first US treaty with an Asian country. During the early stages of the Cold War, the relationship between Thailand and the US was reinforced in 1954 when the two countries become part of the Manila Pact and in 1962 by the signing of the Thanat-Rusk Communiqué. Such arrangements became an anchor that defined Thai-US diplomatic and security relations throughout the Cold War.

The lack of common threat in the post-Cold War period has resulted in a weakening of the Thai-US alliance. While the US has concentrated its international policy on the war against terrorism, Thais have become pre-occupied with instability around their borders – refugees on the western border with Burma, insurgency in the deep South, and the border disputes with Cambodia. More recently, with the US being dragged further into economic and fiscal troubles and Thailand becoming embroiled in internal political unrest, the alliance between the two “treaty allies” has struggled to find useful and relevant meaning.

While both Track 1 officials and Track 2 groups have acknowledged and realized the need to revitalize the Thai-US alliance, neither has come up with a concrete plan nor successfully implemented the resuscitation of the alliance.

During the conference on the “Future of US alliances in Asia” in Manila in May 2011, a proposal to form a Six-Party Alliance Caucus – comprised of the US and its allies in Asia, namely, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, the Republic of Korea, and Japan – was mooted. The purpose of the Caucus is not only to strengthen the hub-and-spoke system in Asia, but to connect and improve multidimensional bilateral relations among key Pacific allies of the US.

Caucus Structure

From Thailand’s perspective, a Six-Party Alliance Caucus should be done in a less-than-formal setting. The Caucus should have neither a secretariat nor a budget and responsibility for Caucus affairs should rest within an office in charge of foreign affairs of each Caucus member. The reason being that Thais would perceive an attempt by the US to institutionalize the Caucus as a liability for its international engagement with its neighbors, particularly with China.

For years, Thailand – despite being a US treaty ally since 1954 and a major non-NATO ally since 2003 – has maintained a hedging strategy in its engagement with the US and China. Thailand considers its economic relationship with China to be very important to its economic progress. While the proximity to China presents an opportunity for closer economic ties between Thailand and China, Thailand’s diplomatic relationship with the Chinese, which only began in 1975, is not as robust as on the economic front. Thailand still relies on and benefits from the US presence in the region to provide a security guarantee as it deals with

the Chinese and perceived uncertainty. Institutionalizing the Caucus would make Thais wary of antagonizing China, but Thais should be open to forming a Caucus that convenes informally prior to, or on the sidelines, of meetings of existing regional groupings – namely Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit (EAS) – where all six countries are present. The Caucus should not only be convened at the top level, i.e., heads of state, but also at ministerial and senior official meetings. The annual Cobra Gold Exercise, which the Thailand and the US serve as the dual-core, should also be reconfigured to reflect renewed “treaty ties.” Such a series of meetings at various official levels should produce the most effective outcomes of the Caucus’ agenda.

Political

On the political front, Thailand would see the Caucus as an opportunity to voice its views on ASEAN security issues and other regional affairs. As a core member of ASEAN and with its geo-strategic position, Thailand sees itself as a leader in the region. Through Thailand (and the Philippines), the Caucus provides another venue for ASEAN to engage the US, Japan, the ROK, and Australia on political and security fronts.

One example is issues pertaining to the South China Sea. Although Thailand is not a claimant state in the South China Sea, the country has an interest in freedom of navigation through the area. Thai exports to Northeast Asia rely on passage through the Gulf of Thailand before entering the South China Sea. Imports from the Eastern Pacific would find the Gulf of Thailand a closed body of water if troubles and instability reign in the South China Sea. Thailand’s position on the South China Sea has never been clear, but it advocates a regional approach, i.e., a common ASEAN position on the issue. Thailand exhibits “the view that cordial, cooperative ties with China are best reached with a continued US military presence in the region.”¹ At the Caucus, Thailand would seek support from other parties to support its and ASEAN’s position on this issue.

Another political issue on top of the Thai agenda for the Caucus would be the democratization process of Burma. It is in Thailand’s interest to see the Burmese embark the true path of national reconciliation and democratization. Thailand would use the Caucus to coordinate its approach for engaging Burma in the political sphere. The US should expect the issue of sanctions to be a major topic. While the US continues to maintain tough sanctions on the country, none of its allies in Asia adopts a sanction strategy as comprehensive as the US. It was not until the crackdown on protesters in September 2007 that Australia implemented limited financial sanctions “targeted against members of the Burmese regime and their associates and supporters.”² On the other hand, Thailand, Japan, the ROK, and the Philippines conduct business as usual with the regime, but while pushing for democracy and

¹ Odgaard, Liselotte. “The South China Sea: ASEAN’s Security Concern about China.” Sage Publication. March 2003. pp 17.
<http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Odgaard.%20ASEAN's%20South%20China%20Sea%20Concerns%20about%20China.pdf> Date Accessed: Aug. 13, 2011.

² “Burma Country Brief.” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. July 2011.
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/burma/burma_brief.html Date Accessed: Aug. 13, 2011.

maintaining support for Burmese civil society. For the Caucus – which is the only venue where all six parties are present without Burma – Thailand is expected to work with other parties with a hope to help shape US policy toward Burma.

Defense

In the security realm, Thailand's immediate concern is its border dispute with Cambodia over the area surrounding the Preah Vihear temple. Several skirmishes between Cambodia and Thailand took place during the past few years resulting in loss of lives and displacement of people living along the border. At the Caucus, Thailand could be expected to downplay the tension and assure the five other parties that it is confident in using a bilateral approach to solve the dispute diplomatically and politically. Because the Caucus would be the only group where Cambodia is not present with the US, Japan, the ROK, Australia, and the Philippines, Thailand may use this opportunity to clarify its position on military undertakings close to the border.

Thailand conducts joint exercises with the US military on average 40 times per year. While frequent military exercise has provided Thailand with confidence and a renewed commitment by the US to the mutual defense cooperation, Thailand would be open to the idea of having all members of the Caucus participate in joint exercises. Only three Caucus members, (Thailand, Japan and the ROK), are participants in Cobra Gold, the largest exercise involving US troops in Asia. The US should explore the possibility of creating an exercise module that exclusively comprises all six members of the Caucus. In doing so, the allies would be able to coordinate better militarily, not only with the US but among themselves. The effort will create a sense of exclusivity for US allies in Asia. However, Thailand would be wary of the joint exercise being perceived as an attempt to balance against Chinese military activities in the region. To alleviate this concern, the exercise should be designed to enhance cooperation on non-contentious issues such as natural disaster relief, piracy, environmental protection, and maritime terrorism.

The Caucus provides an opportunity for the alliance members to deal with security issues as a bloc. Rogue states, such as Burma and North Korea, and their military activities could be dealt with by coordinated actions of Caucus members. For example, while the US has refrained from engaging the Burmese junta directly due to constraints put in place by Congress, it can work with Thailand and other allies to engage the junta. There have been various calls by academics and think tanks for the US to resume the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for the Burmese military with hope that young military officials will be exposed to democratic, good governance, and universal human rights. The IMET program for Burma has been suspended since 1988. Thailand and the Philippines are among the top recipient countries of IMET scholarships. The US can work with Thai and Philippine personnel trained under the IMET program and use them to help train young Burmese military officials. This could circumvent restrictions by Washington. The ROK, Japan, and Australia could help support this initiative by providing technical support and their own training modules and exercises.

Economics

The 1997 Asian financial crisis dampened the US-Thai relationship when “the US was blamed for the harsh IMF conditions attached to the country’s aid package.”³ The US failure to provide back-up loans as part of the IMF offer and the US refusal to support Thailand’s candidacy to head the WTO in 1999 also disappointed the Thai government. The stalled negotiations of the Thai-US FTA following the military coup in Thailand in 2006 further hampered the relationship on the economic front.

On top of Thailand’s economic agenda at the Caucus would be an effort to resume Thai-US FTA negotiations. Thailand has bilateral free trade agreements with the ROK, Australia, and Japan and a multilateral one with its ASEAN members. Thailand would like to conclude a similar free trade agreement with the US. However, recent political difficulties on both sides – Thailand struggling to maintain political stability and the US change in administration leading to less favorable views of free trade agreements – have blocked any progress in reviving the negotiations.

The Obama Administration has put forward the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a trade instrument of choice for the US. According to USTR, the TPP is a “high-standard, regional agreement” that is more carefully negotiated and takes extreme consideration about the impact of the trade deal to businesses and jobs within the US. Under the current plan, the TPP consists of the United States, Australia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Chile, Brunei, and Peru. The ROK is pursuing its own course to reach a free trade agreement with the US, while the US and Japan in November 2010 launched the Economic Harmonization Initiative. Two other allies of the US in Asia – Thailand and the Philippines – are being left in limbo over trade issues with the US. Although the US plans to expand the TPP membership to cover the region, it should expedite the participation of Thailand and the Philippines as a way to show US commitment to less influential treaty allies in the region.

Moreover, the US could explore the possibility of entering into an economic partnership multilaterally with its allies in Asia. A study of such initiatives should be launched to look into how existing bilateral agreements among Caucus members could complement a multilateral one. This exclusivity will not only benefit members of the Caucus economically, but will also have a spillover effect into other areas of the alliance system.

Civil Society

The Caucus could provide a venue for diplomacy of all tracks to engage each other. The US and its allies should look to adopting a structure similar to the “ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN People’s Forum” (ACSC/APF), which is a workshop for regional NGOs from 10 ASEAN countries to share ideas, collaborate, and discuss issues of mutual concerns.⁴ More importantly, the ACSC/APF is held each year immediate prior to and at the

³ “Bilateral Conference on United States-Thailand Relations in the 21st Century.” The Asia Foundation. March 2002. <http://asiafoundation.org/pdf/US-THAIBilateral.pdf> Date Accessed: Aug. 13, 2011.

⁴ “The Journey of Reclaiming Space(s) in ASEAN.” ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN People’s Forum. January 2011. <http://www.aseancivilsociety.net/en/asean-and-civil-society-engagement/background-on-acsc>. Date Accessed: Aug. 13, 2011.

same location as the ASEAN Summit. Toward the end of the workshop, civil society participants have an opportunity to interface with leaders of ASEAN to raise their concerns and push their agendas directly.

The Caucus should consider implementing a similar workshop for civil society from the six countries. Prior to the Caucus meetings, there should be an opportunity for civil society to convene to provide a platform for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to consult, cooperate, and coordinate. There should also be a venue for these NGOs to interface with leaders, ministers, and senior official meetings. Social issues of mutual interest such as human trafficking, public health, the environment, poverty, illiteracy, and human rights as well as other development agenda may be raised during the discussion.

Furthermore, as part of the Caucus' series of meetings, development officials from the six countries should be convened. This would provide a platform for ODA officials from the US, Australia, the ROK, and Japan to coordinate their approach to regional development to increase efficiency and effectiveness. Thailand is both a donor and recipient of ODA. Thailand still relies on ODA from developed economies in a few sectors, while it provides ODA to its immediate neighbors. Thailand and the Philippines would both benefit from coordinated aid systems by more developed economies of the Caucus. Thailand would also like to see ODA directed at its less developed Southeast Asian neighbors, namely Burma, Laos, and Cambodia, and be coordinated as development activities in these countries have political, economic, and social impacts on Thailand.

Conclusion

As illustrated above, Thailand has a myriad of issues to be raised at the Alliance Caucus. Thailand would see the Caucus as an opportunity not only to engage the US, but also to work with other US allies in Asia to pursue its agenda. While Thailand may be wary of the institutionalization of the Caucus and would advocate a less formal structure, as more engagements among the allies take place, it is inevitable that the structure of the Caucus would become more formalized. For Thailand, institutionalizing the Caucus at the outset – i.e. establishing a secretariat, instituting a charter, signing of agreements, among other efforts – would make it less willing to cooperate for fear that the new architecture could antagonize China. Thailand would be open to a more flexible approach, which would see the Caucus evolve based on level of cooperation, international circumstances, and other factors, which necessitate a tighter.

United States

By Linnea Duvall, Justin Goldman,
Lynn Miyahira, and Eric Sayers

Introduction

The stability provided by the US network of bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region has been fundamental to the prosperity the region has experienced since World War II. The diverse alliance relationships with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand have all contributed to an active US presence in the region. However, the strategic situation is changing: whereas the US was once the leading economic partner and the guarantor of security, Asian nations, including US allies, are seeking to concurrently benefit from the Chinese economic miracle. America's Asian allies have a difficult balance to strike as the region grapples with evolving power dynamics.

While the US contends with a fiscal situation that could restrict its regional engagement in the years ahead, a robust debate is taking place on both sides of the Pacific as to how this new balance of power will affect a region marked by historical tensions and strong nationalism. Rod Lyon describes how those in the region “are increasingly inclined to question the shape and texture – rather than simply the existence or durability – of US primacy in the region.”⁴¹ As the US scrutinizes expenditure with a sharper focus, the return on investment from these alliance relationships is under scrutiny. Jim Thomas contends that “at the moment when the United States needs allies more than ever, many of America's present alliances are at their weakest point in decades.”⁴²

As the US seeks to compete more effectively in the Asian strategic space, revitalizing its relationships with regional allies provides an opening. Creating a caucus of the US and its five Asian allies presents a setting for enhanced coordination and cooperation; with several regional forums across Asia and ongoing debates about regional architecture, the Alliance Caucus could advance key shared interests in multilateral settings. Cooperation in the four areas identified in this paper – defense, economics, politics and legal, as well as civil society – could all benefit through closer coordination between US allies in this mini-lateral grouping. This Alliance Caucus would also be a venue to tackle issues that may not be the highest priority during ministerial meetings, but are of interest to these like-minded US allies.

Political

The US diplomatic posture in the Asia-Pacific has remained more or less unchanged since the World War II. In what has often been described as a hub-and-spoke approach, the US engaged its alliance partners – Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia – on a bilateral

⁴¹ Lyon, Rod. “Forks in the River: Australia's Strategic Options in a Transformational Asia.” ASPI. June 2011. pp 4. http://www.aspi.org.au/htmlver/ASPI_ForksInTheRiver/index.html. Date Accessed: July, 29, 2011.

⁴² Thomas, Jim. “From Protectorates to Partnerships.” The American Interest. May-June 2011. <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=957>. Date Accessed: July 29, 2011.

basis. Concerns such as the rise of the Soviet Union's Pacific Fleet in the 1970s were managed between Washington and Tokyo while the inter-Korean challenges were handled directly with Seoul. This approach was sufficient for challenges facing the region at the time.

The rapid shift in the regional economic and military balance over the last several decades has created a new security environment in the Asia-Pacific. This system is marked by multiple actors whose growing economies are fueling an expansion of their diplomatic ambitions and military capabilities. The five allies find themselves intertwined in this system in a number of ways that affect their interests. Japan looks warily toward a rising China that has been increasingly prepared to operate in waters close to its territory. The ROK continues to deal with instabilities generated by the Kim regime on the Korean Peninsula. The Philippines faces an internal terrorism challenge while dealing with pressures from China in its maritime territories. Thailand continues to deal with sharp domestic political divisions and an unresolved civil conflict in the three predominantly ethnic Malay southern provinces. And Australia finds itself as the southern anchor in the Asia-Pacific facing the rise of China and a host of lesser diplomatic tests.

The host of overlapping regional institutions has attempted to address many of the challenges the region is facing, often with varying degrees of success. While there is a need and a benefit for the US to move beyond the hub-and-spoke model, fashioning that level of engagement remains a struggle. A caucus mechanism that brings together the US and its five regional allies is one approach that could begin to advance a new period of integration and cooperation. The advantage of a caucus would lie in its simplicity. An informal grouping could safeguard the sovereignty concerns of ASEAN countries and even some US administrations sensitive to the role of hyperactive multilateral institutions. Meetings of the caucus members could take place during almost every major multilateral meeting. The regional diversity of members, informal nature, and size of the caucus would also provide cover to encourage participation by members who may fear China's angst. Finally, the shared liberal-democratic systems of all six countries would lend itself well to identifying common interests and concerns.

Operationally, a caucus could provide a number of advantages. Instead of working bilaterally with the Philippines to build its atrophied maritime capabilities, the US could seek to include Japan, Australia, and the ROK in the process. A caucus could also be used to coordinate diplomatic approaches at multilateral meetings on issues like the South China Sea and to coordinate interpretations of international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Defense

The US defense relationships with its five allies in the Asia-Pacific region are each distinct. The relationship with the ROK is incredibly close and operational, but almost entirely directed against a single, obvious threat. With Japan the relationship is deep and productive, but lacks such obvious direction as the US-ROK alliance. The relationship with Australia is flexible and closer now than at any point in its history. The operational relationship with Thailand remains strong, but a lack of high-level strategic direction – and declared intentions for the alliance – means these strong ties exist in a vacuum. With the Philippines, all aspire to a mature, productive relationship, but the relationship chronically disappoints.

Despite the varying degrees of strategic alignment, interoperability, and purpose, the five allies do have two important things in common: 1) each wants the US to remain the primary guarantor of regional security and 2) each wants the US to remain its most important security partner. Until recently, it went unchallenged that the US fills these roles for the foreseeable future. With an emergent China, that future is now in doubt.

China's emergence also makes four of the five allies (Australia the exception) hesitant about participating in a mini-lateral grouping that could appear to be an effort to contain China, even if this is their overall policy goal. Indeed, the greatest barrier to mini-lateralism in the region is countries' willingness to participate in meetings that might appear to be about containing China, even if the arrangement had entirely different policy goals. While nearly all regional actors are comfortable with trilateral arrangements, many are wary of quadrilateral arrangements. And, while countries are often uncomfortable with quadrilateralism, they strongly support large, multilateral arrangements. One reason countries like large multilateral settings (that include China) is because smaller regional actors feel comfortable speaking their minds on difficult security issues.

Assuming that each ally would like to be part of mini-lateral groupings that include the US and other like-minded countries, but are reluctant to do so because of the impression it gives, the US alliance system in Asia provides advantageous cover for the six countries to meet. If the US is serious about an Asia policy that leads with its alliances, it should prioritize sitting down with all the allies at one time. In this format, commonalities would likely rise to the fore.

A meeting of the six allies would most practically take place on the sidelines of a major multilateral meeting. At first, it should take place at the sub-ministerial level and be between defense officials, since ties run deepest among this cohort. The ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus framework provides the perfect opportunity annually at the ADMM plus Senior Officials Meeting. In stark contrast to the hectic schedules surrounding ministerial meetings, this meeting is a more relaxed affair, with sufficient time for side meetings. Putting together a breakfast or side meeting among the allies would be a simple task and the participants might be surprised with what all they have in common.

Economics

Economic integration between all five US allies in Asia is arguably the most advanced aspect in this web of relationships. For years, the private sector has recognized the mutual benefits of economic integration, not only with the US, but also amongst themselves, and has encouraged the various government ministries and trade authorities to enact regulations that are conducive to economic growth.

The US has many bilateral trade agreements in Asia, and its Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Australia in 2005 and its pending FTA with South Korea (KORUS) are two examples of how the US deeply engages its allies on an economic front. The US also has a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the Philippines and Thailand (separate from the TIFA between the US and ASEAN). The TIFAs aim to set up a framework for dialogue on trade issues, which usually consists of annual meetings of senior government trade officials to discuss

tariffs, regulatory practices, etc. Japan has had a complex trade relationship with the US since WWII; both countries recognize how deeply they are economically entwined. The US-Japan Economic Harmonization Initiative (EHI) was launched in November 2010 with the goal of harmonizing approaches that facilitate trade, address business climate issues and advance coordination on regional issues.

Multilaterally, amongst the US allies in Asia there is much activity on the economic front—all US allies in Asia have economic relations with each other at a very significant level. Australia, Japan, and the ROK are all in negotiations with each other to create FTAs between each country. The ROK and Australia already have FTAs with ASEAN that entered into force in 2009 and 2010 respectively, while Japan has had a customized Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEP) with ASEAN since 2008. Separate from its FTA with ASEAN, Australia also has an FTA with Thailand that came into force in 2005. Thailand and the Philippines are linked together through the ASEAN Free Trade Area and are two of the most economically dynamic countries in the region.

The US would like even more integration between its allies in Asia, and the Alliance Caucus on the sidelines of meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ADMM Plus, ASEAN +3, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leader's Meeting would provide an opportunity to leverage resources to ensure peace in the region. The US benefits when its allies are financially sound and can commit resources to their own national security – only an ally that has the economic resources to spare can truly contribute to an alliance.

The Alliance Caucus will help US allies touch bases on a variety of topics and influence them to see how much more potential these relationships have if they are more integrated. On the economic front, the US wishes to gain the following from an Alliance Caucus meeting:

- Restart FTA negotiations with Thailand that ended with the coup in 2006;
- Encourage Japan, Thailand and the Philippines to join TPP negotiations
- Demonstrate to countries that you can have strong diplomatic, military and economic ties with the US and still have strong ties with China – there is no need to choose.

The Alliance Caucus will be an important step in bridging a gap that exists amongst the US allies in Asia and will morph the hub-and-spokes model into more of a web-model that better depicts the multilateralism that is already happening in Asia.

Civil Society

Support for civil society remains a critical aspect of US cooperation with its Asian allies. The shared commitment to democratic values strengthens these relationships and US support helps organizations whose programs drive efforts to bring about good governance. Effective engagement in this sector must reflect the characteristics of each country on its unique path of national development. Australia, Japan, and the ROK have all experienced tremendous economic growth and today they are generous donors of official development assistance. While the US relationship with Thailand has been strained since the coup of 2006 and the political

divisions that culminated in 2010's massive anti-government protests in the, the Thai political transition presents a new opening in this sector.⁴³

For the purpose of this section, the focus will be on engagement with the Philippines, in particular support to the Mindanao region where the government of Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and Muslim separatists struggle to resolve their decades-long conflict. Support for the peace process has been a key focus for the United States with former Ambassador Kristie Kenney receiving high praise from stakeholders ranging from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to the leadership of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).⁴⁴ Ambassador Harry Thomas continues that effort and does so in concert with the GRP's Bayanihan Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) which came into effect in January 2011.⁴⁵ Basilan remains critical to resolution of the conflict due to parties present there which seek to undermine the peace process that the IPSP places at its forefront. Ambassador Thomas has visited Basilan following the launch of the IPSP and he remains actively engaged with the Growth with Equity in Mindanao program.⁴⁶

The current fiscal challenges facing the US have placed the Obama administration's plans to double foreign aid spending in jeopardy.⁴⁷ At a time when key stakeholders see progress in implementing the IPSP as well as a real opening for a peace agreement between the GRP and the MILF, closer coordination with its Asian allies that are actively engaged in can add considerable value to the shared objective of conflict termination during this time of resource constraint.⁴⁸ Improving road networks has long been an important tactic in counterinsurgency campaigns; interactions with civil society often provide insights on local conditions that will impact the implementation and utilizing of such infrastructure projects. USAID supports the Basilan Circumferential Road project that community leaders have sought to link commercial and agricultural areas to the provincial capital.⁴⁹ In addition to supporting crucial economic

⁴³ Chongkittavorn, Kavi. "Abhisit's exits and his political legacies." *The Nation*. July 18, 2011. <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/07/18/opinion/Abhisits-exits-and-his-political-legacies-30160451.html>. Date Accessed: July 20, 2011.

⁴⁴ Ubalde, Mark Joseph. "US Ambassador Kristie Kenney bids farewell to Filipinos." *GMA News*. Jan. 6, 2010. <http://www.gmanews.tv/story/180892/nation/us-ambassador-kristie-kenney-bids-farewell-to-filipinos>. Date Accessed: July 21, 2011.

⁴⁵ Garcia, Bong. "Basilan to Receive more Development Projects." *Sun Star*. 22 March 2011. <http://www.sunstar.com.ph/zamboanga/local-news/2011/03/22/basilan-receive-more-development-projects-146286>. Date Accessed: July 20, 2011.

⁴⁶ US Agency for International Development. US Ambassador visits USAID Infrastructure Project in Basilan. 14 April 2011. http://www.mindanao.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=587:us-ambassador-visits-usaid-infrastructure-project-in-basilan&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=61. Date Accessed: July 21, 2011.

⁴⁷ "NSC Official Reaffirms Obama Pledge to Double Foreign Aid." *USAID Frontlines*. August 2009. http://www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_aug09/p5_nsc080909.html. Date Accessed: July 21, 2011.

⁴⁸ Aben, Elena L., "Aquino Satisfied with Military's Performance." *Manila Bulletin*. July 16, 2011. <http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/327116/aquino-satisfied-with-militarys-performance> Date Accessed: July 21, 2011

⁴⁹ "New USAID Bridges on Basilan Ring Road Ensure Better Transport for Farm Products." *Mindanao Magazine*. Nov. 7, 2010. <http://news.mindanao.com/2010/11/new-usaid-bridges-on-basilan-ring-road-ensure-better-transport-for-farm-products/>. July 21, 2011.

development in this conflict-affected area, the enhanced road network also expands the reach of the GRP as well as local government, ultimately enhancing security.

The Australian aid (AusAID) program in the Philippines supports human security by enhancing the road network to increase access to services and infrastructure. The AusAID effort targets several provinces in Mindanao which are part an effort to rehabilitate and maintain over 1000km of roads through the Provincial Road Management Facility (PRMF).⁵⁰ The PRMF builds local institutional capacity to effectively plan and manage the road network in order to ensure appropriate maintenance sustains this investment over time.⁵¹ In this sector, AusAID has supported *Bantay Lansangan* (Road Watch) which has played an integral role in monitoring the Department of Public Works and Highways; this effort includes local government, the private sector, citizen groups, NGOs, and development partners.⁵² The group produces a Road Sector Status Report Card to communicate the current state of such projects to fellow citizens who utilize these transportation links.⁵³ In addition to Australian efforts, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is the largest bilateral donor to the Philippines and through the Community Empowerment Program it supports Community and Family Services International in building local capacity to serve the humanitarian needs of Filipinos displaced by calamities ranging from armed conflict to natural disasters.⁵⁴ The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) funds an early warning system to bolster Mindanao's resilience to confront the threat of natural disasters; they train local volunteers to operate and monitor the flood early warning systems.⁵⁵ As with the US and Australia, Japan and South Korea are engaged in key projects in complimentary areas. Holding the Alliance Caucus on the sidelines of regional meetings like the ARF would provide an important opportunity for focused consultations on such efforts.

Conclusion

While the US alliance system has been the guarantor of security in the Asia-Pacific since the end of World War II and the US remains the strongest military power, that strategic space is much

⁵⁰ AusAID. Aid Activities in the Philippines. Feb. 15, 2011. http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/cbrief.cfm?DCon=1148_8702_9418_7487_8517&CountryID=31&Region=EastAsia. Date Accessed: July 21, 2011.

⁵¹ Coffey International Development. Provincial Road Management Facility in the Philippines. Sept. 11, 2009. <http://www.coffey.com/our-businesses/coffey-international-development/where-we-work/provincial-road-management-facility-in-the-philippines>. Date Accessed: July 20, 2011.

⁵² "The Bantay Lansangan (Road Watch) Experience: Improving the Philippine Road Sector through Vigilant Monitoring and Volunteerism." pp. 3. January 2010. http://www.ansa-eap.net/assets/200/59-1-4_Bantay_Lansangan_Road_Watch_Experience.pdf.

⁵³ Reye, Rebecca Lyngdoh. "Mapping AusAID's Engagement with Civil Society in the Philippines Country Program." pp. July 19, 2010. http://www.ode.ausaid.gov.au/current_work/Documents/mapping-philippines.pdf

⁵⁴ Community and Family Services International. Philippines. June 20, 2011. http://www.cfsi.ph/p_phil.htm. Date Accessed: July 21, 2011.

⁵⁵ Baluyos, Tess Superioridad. DOST-KOICA early warning system to enhance Mindanao preparedness against natural hazards. Department of Science and Technology. 11 September 2009. http://www.dost.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=781:dost-koica-early-warning-system-to-enhance-mindanao-preparedness-against-natural-hazards. Date Accessed: July 21, 2011.

more competitive. While the five regional allies of the US represent tremendously diverse relationships, they share important positions. It is clear they want the US to remain the guarantor of security in Asia, but they want to capitalize on the economic opportunities presented by a growing China. It is in the economic sector that many of America's allies already have robust relationships. Meeting in this manner will allow caucus members to discover that with all likelihood there are additional commonalities not previously identified.

Gathering as an Alliance Caucus, particularly in a setting such as the ADMM plus Senior Officials Meeting, is an opportunity to coordinate in a way that does not place a great additional burden on each ally. By using the US alliance system to gather the grouping, our Asian allies are provided important diplomatic cover to contend with heightened sensitivity to charges such of being part as an "encirclement" effort to contain a growing China whom they depend on economically. Meeting as an Alliance Caucus would help the US compete more effectively in Asia's strategic space and contribute to order-building as the region contends with an evolving power dynamic. And, who knows, maybe US allies in the region will discover they have more in common than they assume?

Appendix A



PACIFIC FORUM CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

Pre-Conference Assignment

Assess US engagement in the region

Australia

Dr. Danielle CHUBB

US engagement in the Asia Pacific has been accused of a distinct lack of attention in the wake of a turbulent international economic and political scene, as well as its ongoing commitments in Afghanistan. At the same time, the growing influence of China and India is causing disquiet about the shifting global balance of power taking place in the very heart of Asia. Hard questions are also being asked about the future of American strategic presence, the quantitative strength of its commitment and the qualitative endurance of its interactions.

A closer inspection of recent US actions and rhetoric surrounding its engagement with Asia shows that its influence there is neither in decline, nor is it edging its way towards disengagement. Maritime security, especially the issue of Chinese claims in the South China Sea, has given the US an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment towards acting as a mediator, rather than as an enforcer. Commitments by the Obama administration to participate in political and security fora within the context of ASEAN, including the upcoming East Asia Summit, further indicate the sincerity of these diplomatic commitments.

Formal alliance systems aside, US engagement in Asia has been widening and deepening in a substantive manner and has seen it reaching out to former adversaries – India, Vietnam, Singapore, as well as its friends – Australia, South Korea and Japan. All of this in an attempt to adjust its strategic planning as it becomes increasingly obvious that the power dynamic within the region is changing and its military supremacy is being contested by a determined and rising China. American allegiances are shifting fundamentally, and this must be seen as an ongoing pattern that is taking place in light of new (and emerging) geopolitical realities.

While the United States has indicated it is willing to reassess the role it plays in multilateral fora in Asia, and especially in Southeast Asia, this should not be mistaken as an indication that it is willing to step aside and let others (China) take the strategic and political lead. Over the past year, its military presence – particularly in Southeast Asia – has increased rather than decreased, and US interest in monitoring activity in the South China Sea is an indication of the awareness that the US has of the growing importance of China's maritime capacities.

An examination of recent US engagement with Asia shows a renewed interest in Washington to start planning how it will engage with the emerging security landscape in ways that allow stability and some sense of continuity. Affirming the importance of its extant bilateral alliances, making renewed commitments to engagement multilaterally, and improving its informal bilateral relationships, there is every indication that the US is in the process of re-imagining its future in Asia in ways that could fundamentally change regional dynamics, at least in the medium and perhaps long term.

Mr. Fergus HANSON

“We’ve been on a little bit of a Middle East detour over the course of the last ten years,” Kurt Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said. “And our future will be dominated utterly and fundamentally by developments in Asia and the Pacific region.”

This detour has led some to question the commitment of the US to Asia. In fact, the US has maintained strong ties across the region over the course of both the Bush and Obama presidencies. Nevertheless, an increasingly assertive China has offered it the opportunity to further strengthen its key alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia and grow relations with other regional allies and partners.

In Japan, the US successfully navigated controversy over the Futenma air base, effectively turning the issue from a bilateral dispute into a domestic political controversy. Chinese incursions into Japanese territorial waters and its response to recent North Korean aggression helped reinforce the importance of the alliance. The US has also been at pains to assure Japan of continued protection under its nuclear umbrella.

In South Korea, a stalled FTA with the US and a dispute over beef, were dramatically overshadowed by North Korea’s sinking of the South’s warship *Cheonan* and shelling of Yeonpyeong island. China’s failure to condemn the attacks helped drive the South still closer to Washington.

In Australia, mounting elite and domestic concern over China’s rise, helped lay the groundwork for the most substantive Australia US Ministerial (AUSMIN) in years, with agreement in late 2010 to explore options for ‘more US force training on Australian soil, more port visits, disaster relief co-operation and a greater US regional naval presence.’

Beyond this core group of alliances, the US has looked to grow its relations with other regional allies and partners. The Obama White House sought to exploit the President’s links to Indonesia to expand cooperation there. A string of announced, then cancelled visits, lost much of this momentum, but the eventual visit still managed to lay the ground work for closer ties.

Indian border disputes with China and an alignment of interests with the US, make it a natural partner for Washington. The Bush Administration’s civil nuclear agreement with India was an effective piece of US diplomacy, laying the foundation for a broadening of ties with this demographic and potential economic giant.

Other countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, wary of the implications of a rising and assertive China have also sought to cultivate closer ties with the US: entreaties Washington has been quick to embrace.

Multilaterally, the US has joined the East Asia Summit, an important victory for regional states keen to tie the US into Asia and blunt China's weight in regional institutions. It has also sought to multilateralise issues like territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Mr. Andrew PICKFORD

Southeast Asia and the Western-Pacific more broadly, is becoming *the* focal point for global geo-political competition. Despite idealistic rhetoric, US engagement in the region – which encompasses South-East Asia – has been based on Lord Palmerston's maxim of permanent interests rather than permanent friends or enemies. Hence Japan, a former enemy of the US, is now a key ally in the latest iteration of competition for control of the approaches to the eastern end of the Eurasian landmass.

As the dominant, post-World War II institutions, security arrangements, alliances, and even trade patterns begin to fray, other possibilities emerge and the sense of pending change becomes palpable. The US built its power projection deep into the Western Pacific over a number of decades as it became increasingly able and willing to pursue its interests abroad. For most of the 19th, and continuing into the 20th Century, the US began to focus westward. Success in the Spanish-US war and World War II resulted in territorial and basing options, however there were much deeper trends causing the shift. Trade, a shifting centre of gravity, as well as declining European powers, made the Western Pacific a natural site of US interests. In part, inheriting many allies and footprints from the declining British Empire allowed the US to continue its "Manifest Destiny" course right to the edge of Eurasia.

The Philippines experience illustrates where European-style competition and conflict resulted in the US having de facto control of a strategically important state. Similarly, the more recent annexation of Hawaii physically entrenched the US as a Pacific power. This trend of territorial expansion, forward basing and power projection reached its apex in the aftermath of World War II with US military assets stationed in Japan, the Philippines and Guam. The conclusion of World War II and the onset of the Cold War saw a ready-made, singular purpose for the US to project power onto Eurasia, aimed at containing the Soviet Union. This required US engagement to be more based on common interests, such as counter-terrorism and poverty alleviation, rather than the more direct "containment of the PRC" as justification for cooperation.

Now, with the prospect of greater geo-political competition on their doorstep, nations across the region are attempting to hedge their bets while being cautious of vacillations of US foreign policy and short attention spans of its political leaders. Vietnam is a case study of a frontline state balancing expanding PRC power and economic development, and the reality of US strength. The mooted US-led "1,000-ship navy" and encouragement for key allies such as Australia and Japan to undertake a greater local, security "burden sharing" commitment reflect the desire for the US to remain a key power in the Western Pacific, but one that does not fit all the bills or necessarily always take the lead.

The PRC, for various reasons and not necessarily aimed at the US, will work to hamper these efforts and is starting to exert considerable soft-, and increasingly hard-power of its own.

US engagement in the region will become more challenged, but is still fundamentally based on control of the approaches to Eurasia and its associated permanent interests.

Japan

Dr. Masamichi MINEHATA

This composition assesses one particular area of regional security – biosecurity – which has been less focused in the bilateral efforts of the US and Philippines despite a nascent but growing sense of joint effort in helping support regional biosecurity efforts in recent years.

Threats and Risks:

- Increasing strategic challenges posed by state and terrorist use of biological weapons. Safety risks from accidental/unintentional exposure of pathogens to humans, animals, and plants
- A growing number of advanced research laboratories in the region deal with higher level pathogens.
- Finally, but most significantly in terms of the number of human casualties and economic impact, there is a threat posed by the natural outbreak of infectious diseases such as SARS and Avian Influenza, which caused extensive damage to the Asia-Pacific region in recent years.

There are a series of important efforts in the region, made by US-Philippines joint action, to help mitigate the threats of the proliferation of biological weapons.

- The Philippines has been a hub of US engagement of the region in terms of capacity building of regional scientists about biosecurity measures (especially laboratory security measures) by establishing National Association for Biosafety and Biosecurity in cooperation with the Bio-engagement Program (BEP) as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program of the USA,
- In relation to this Philippines will host a regional workshop “the Super Week” in the end of June 2011 to the beginning of July in order to invite 40 member states and consider the followings:
 - (1) Regional Brainstorming on the Outcomes for the 7th Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 7th Review Conference in December 2011, (2) Building Capacity for Prevention, Preparedness and Response / **Science and Technology**, (3) BWC Confidence Building Measures, (4) **BWC National Implementing Legislation and Mechanisms**.
 - This effort is also supported by the EU Joint Action,
- The US, Australia, and the Republic of the Philippines propose to sponsor and host a ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) workshop on “Disease Detection and Surveillance: Enhancing Public and Veterinary Health Networks to Combat Infectious Disease and Bioterrorism,” during late summer/early fall 2011.

What should be underlined in those efforts is the inclusion of scientific/technological discussions which is fundamental to assess what kinds of security policies are relevant for the regional

biosecurity. However, what is not clear is whether these efforts include the education and awareness of regional scientists about biosecurity issues. Effectively enhancing technical aspects of biosecurity measures depends on building capacity and fostering collaboration among scientists who are cognizant of the concerns of the security community and vice versa. Currently it has been evidenced by several studies that the education of life scientists in the region is not well developed.

Nevertheless, there is an opportunity to promote education as an initiative of the Philippine Government in cooperation with the US by utilizing the discussions emphasized above topic (4) (bold texts). As BWC national implementation of the BWC includes education and the US has been leading player of the issue. The US engagement of the biosecurity issue in the region will be critical in order to make sure biosecurity education is an element of the above meeting processes and also to ensure the bilateral-tie for helping support the regional biosecurity capacity building.

Philippines

Mr. Julio AMADOR

The US recognizes that Southeast Asia is vital to its national interest; thus, the current rise in US attention to the region should be recognized both for the opportunities that can arise and the challenges that are surely expected to appear. The US should further appreciate that Southeast Asia is not only a security theater; it is also an economic and a soft-power arena for its foreign policy. Southeast Asia should be given greater policy awareness among US policymakers, diplomats, bureaucrats and analysts. Evidence shows that this might be occurring.

At the political front, the US has been quite active. It signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, named an Ambassador to ASEAN and the held two ASEAN-US summits. Secretary Clinton and many high-ranking officials from the State and Defense Departments actively participated in ASEAN and ASEAN-related processes. Of course, active participation also resulted in some controversies such as the flare-up with China on the issue of the South China Sea. At the Hanoi 2010 ARF meeting, Secretary Hillary Clinton stated that the US is committed to working with its partners in Southeast Asia. She further stated that the US has a “national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.” China’s aggressive response and the apparent restiveness that this remark caused to many ASEAN member-states indicate that great power relations in the region are still crucial to Southeast Asian states’ strategic considerations.

Economic relations with Southeast Asia have been “robust” according to Falan Yinug of the US International Trade Commission. Southeast Asia is the fourth-largest export market and fifth-largest import supplier of the US. Yinug conjectures that the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 could further boost US exports to the region. The US also has an active interest in the development of Southeast Asia. In 2009, the US launched the US Mekong River initiative that will help the region manage one of its most vital resource regions. The US also sees climate change and widespread poverty in the region as areas where it can

exercise leadership according to Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

The US has shown itself ready to take part in the community-building and development processes in Southeast Asia. The question will be: is Southeast Asia ready for active US involvement in the region? While the US has two treaty allies, Thailand and the Philippines, it is also a vital economic partner to Singapore and has improved its ties with Vietnam and Indonesia. It is imperative for ASEAN member-states to have a clear policy as individual nation-states and as a region towards the US. The onus is on these states to provide clear guidelines on how they will engage the US' renewed interests towards them. ASEAN's ability to bring different states together makes it an important platform for improving US engagement not only with Southeast Asia but the wider Asia Pacific as a whole.

The two sides must come to a clear, coherent and comprehensive *modus vivendi* if deeper engagement is truly desired. It is clear that it is Southeast Asia that needs to be more proactive in determining where its shared interests can converge with the US to maximize the latter's involvement in the region. Until then, no amount of interest on the part of the US can shore up ASEAN's difficult dream of building one sharing and caring community.

Ms. Charmaine MISALUCHA

US formal engagement in the region can be gauged via multilateral means, i.e., engagement with ASEAN and its adjunct groupings, and via the bilateral level, i.e., the establishment of government-to-government relationships with each member of ASEAN. Since the 1960s, the US has encouraged Southeast Asian regionalism; in fact, it has often been argued how the US was a crucial factor in the creation of the Association of Asian Nations in 1961, and eventually in ASEAN in 1967. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, support for regional efforts in Southeast Asia was a function of the American policy of containment. In the post-Cold War era, the US widened and deepened its links with Southeast Asia by pushing for the extension of the scope not only of membership, but also of the issues covered by each arrangement. APEC and the ARF come to mind here. In the wake of the War on Terror, the US again proved how strongly linked it is to the regional architecture by involving the Southeast Asian states in its fight against terrorism. Ultimately, America's formal engagement with ASEAN can be gauged by its accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009. From simply being a dialogue partner, the United States is now, more than ever, deeply entrenched in Southeast Asian affairs.

In the same way, bilateral relations between the US and individual Southeast Asian states demonstrate America's engagement. The Philippines has always considered itself a "special" partner of the Americans by virtue of its shared history. Moreover, the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 remains the basis of the alliance. Despite the lag in US-Philippine relations in the 1990s, scholars have argued for the reinvigoration of the alliance. Likewise, Indonesia has also experienced such a reinvigoration, if not normalization, of its relations with the United States, a case in point being the lifting of the ban on the US military's contact with *Kopassus* in 2010. Hence, at both the multilateral and bilateral levels, the United States has indeed demonstrated how strong its formal links to Southeast Asia are.

Granted that the structure of formal engagements is in place, and the operation of such appears largely positive, this begs the question, however, of the purpose and the future of this deep entrenchment. Are these links propped up by exogenous factors? By implication, absent such external forces, will the relationship stand? Now that circumstances in various levels of analysis seem biased towards optimism, how Southeast Asian states and the US shape their future interactions depend largely on their own stances and actions. Relations, after all, are shaped by both structures *and* agents.

Mr. Theoben OROSA

Tables talking about economics and international security rarely talk about similar issues but if the US is to find some constructive engagement policy then it may find it by being more holistic. The reason why China has become so powerful is because of its continued high numbers of economic growth, huge surpluses in trade and a continued regulated currency – and if this growth continues, then security wise, we may have a tight challenger for the US.

In this light, the recent move by the US offering the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to Asia-Pacific countries, from the perspective of one who would protect US interests in Asia, would have been timely and strategic. At that time, Australia (through PM Rudd) and Japan (through PM Hatoyama) were both raising the points for a stronger East Asian community. With TPP, Japan has to rethink its position. Other countries also had to consider this, especially the ASEAN countries. The US has been a global hegemon politically and security wise since the fall of the Berlin Wall and has been geopolitically present in Asia through its tight defense alliances with South Korea and Japan. But in terms of economic hegemony, the US has had some severe drawbacks especially in the wake of 2008's financial crisis which precipitated a perception that East Asia should consider building a stronger market within its domain as the US market has a certain level of unreliability – thus a certain need for regional integration. To some, this integrative move protects financial stability and strengthens regional markets. US would be increasingly edged out in economic theaters. TPP made some Asian countries rethink their position. How to reconcile this TPP with the East Asian Summit (EAS) is something that remains to be seen.

Ever since the wake of the *Plaza Accord* that forced Japan to appreciate its yen with the twin effect of the shifting of production to the south – Southeast Asia thereby seeing growth in economic terms. ASEAN became a sub-regional arrangement crucial as the nucleus for Asia-Pacific integration. ASEAN as the core carried consensuality as a premise – and with such principle a constructive policy towards continuous dialogue, mutual settlement and non-interference. In this regard, the increasing integration in the ASEAN could benefit the US. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the regional security arrangement takes a mellow centrality, which negates the heat away from a two-player game – and from a more hopeful perspective, begins a more indirect conference. It may be to the interest of the US to invest in building stronger ties in areas of disaster management, human security and other low politics area.

Regional trade agreements have seemingly replaced the multilateralism that was once pushed for by European states and the US. Instead of a race to create bilateral ties – where the US remain to be the dominant negotiator, the other party, seemingly weak, full of concessions but without

equal footing – US may find it to its interest to bargain with some Asian regional arrangements. By bargaining with Asian sub regional (South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Middle East) arrangements instead of countries, US may find greater legitimacy and at the same time find itself dealing with less malleable partners – who in their weakness could be shifted by an increasingly powerful neighbor. Within East Asia this increasing trend to respect subregional arrangements have made tractions in trade agreements, with Australia (with New Zealand), China and Japan all racing to create stronger ties with ASEAN, with Japan sending in an ambassador solely to the ASEAN.

US engagement in Asia depends not only in maintaining its global military hegemonic role. It must see itself as a partner in economic development and an influence in how economic regions are formed. By cultivating regional arrangements, US may find itself with a lasting power as the global hegemon.

Mr. Brian VENTURA

Asia is rapidly changing and US engagement in the region reflects this dynamism. While Asia's economic development has been capturing the attention of global leaders and analysts for a decade or so now, the region still lacks an impressive record in terms of addressing issues related to its regional security architecture. In fact, it is this very economic development that may potentially increase the pressure for the region to resolve security problems much more seriously. Increase in economic capacity creates more resources for the military to spend.

State Secretary Hilary Clinton's comment about US interests in the South China Sea, and the appointment of David Carden as America's first representative to the ASEAN are clear indications of how Obama is trying increase its engagement in the region. The way this increase in engagement progresses appears to be focused on two fronts, one is in terms of help in strengthening multilateral institutions, as the appointment of the ASEAN representative suggests. Another is by engaging other allies, like Japan, South Korea, and Australia, to play a bigger role in shaping the security architecture of the region.

The major factor affecting the reexamination of US role in the region is obviously the rise of China as a much more militarily capable, economically large and politically influential regional and global player compared to its status since the end of the Cold War. It is clear that, as of now, the United States is still the only existing power in the region with the capability to assist countries in the neighborhood in terms of dealing with the rise of the China phenomenon. Thus, the US is confronting this reality, that while the region is openly embracing the economic benefit that comes from the rise of China, they are also cautious of the increase in Beijing's military capability. And in many cases it is not easy to see where one ends and the other starts.

In sum, we can say that US engagement in the region confronts a level of uncertainty that can normally be expected from a rapidly changing environment. The need, however, to help improve the capacity of regional bodies to deal with problems in the region and to aid allies to improve their individual capacity to conduct their own affairs is and will continue to endure.

Thailand

Mr. Fuadi PITSUWAN

When one assesses US engagement in Asia, it is extremely important not to view Asia as a monolith. At the very least, one must distinguish between US policy and actions in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The US has distinct engagement records for the two regions.

The US engagement in Northeast Asia, namely with Japan, South Korea, and China, is robust and continues to receive significant attention from policy makers in Washington. Japan and South Korea are long-time allies whose cooperation with the US has been crucial to maintain peace and economic prosperity in the Asia Pacific region. And as China rises to contend with American influence in the region and North Korea adheres to its erratic behaviors, the tri-lateral relationship – among US, Japan and South Korea – has been strengthened by default. China, for all the perceived threat it poses to the US, has continued to be attractive for American companies looking to benefit from cheap labor as well as from a large consumer base. Military-to-military engagement between the two world major powers is recognized to be an area of priority by both sides. At the time of this writing, a high level Chinese military delegation is visiting Washington to forge closer ties between the US military and the PLA.

Such a sustained level of interest seen in Northeast Asia is not evident in Southeast Asia. Two US allies in the region, namely Thailand and the Philippines, struggle to find contemporary meaning to the alliances forged several decades ago with the original purpose to contain communism. One may argue that Thailand and the Philippines have been pre-occupied with their domestic political problems, which, as a result, reduced the opportunity for the US to engage. Japan, in Northeast Asia, too is facing a similar internal issue, but it continues to receive attention from Washington.

Is it because there is a relative lack of threat in Southeast Asia that results in declining American interest in strengthening the two alliances? This should not be the case. Northeast Asia may have North Korea and China for the US to worry about. But Southeast Asia too has Burma, a rogue country which is increasingly becoming a client state of the Chinese, to create concern. Issues surrounding the safety of passage and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea have not, until recently, received proper attention from the US despite the fact that significant material supplies to US operation in Afghanistan and energy supplies to Korea and Japan, two US allies in Northeast Asia, pass through this strategic sea lane.

In terms of trade and investment, the relationship between the US and Southeast Asia is surprisingly robust. Foreign Direct Investment by US companies in the region is three times higher than US FDI in China. Trade volume between the ten ASEAN countries and the US is roughly equal to US-Korea and US-India combined. ASEAN as a whole is ranked as the US' fourth largest export market and fifth largest supplier of imports. When ASEAN becomes a single economic community in 2015, its importance to the US in terms of trade will increase significantly. Economies of Southeast Asian nations are also growing at a rapid rate – Indonesia and Vietnam even grew when the rest of the world faced recession a couple of years ago.

To its credit, the Obama Administration has worked to correct such a perception of American absenteeism in Southeast Asia. Right after the Democrats took office, the US signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. More recently, the US became part of the East Asian Summit (EAS). High-level visits by US officials have been more frequent and consistent. The US-ASEAN Leaders' Meeting has been held twice under President Obama's leadership. The next meeting is scheduled in October this year in Bali, Indonesia on the side line of the EAS.

This is almost a complete reversal of the Bush era's engagement with South East Asia. President Bush and Secretary Rice opted out of various meetings in ASEAN when the US was supposedly too pre-occupied with early stages of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars following 9/11 incidents and had to figure out its approach to dealing with then-newly nuclear-armed North Korea.

The question now is whether the US can sustain the same level of commitment to Southeast Asia. After Indonesia, the rotating chairmanships of ASEAN for the next three years will be Cambodia, Brunei and Laos (or Burma – contingent upon its improvement in governance) in that order. Future EAS will be held in these developing countries. Other meetings, which have ASEAN at their core, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (eight dialogue partners) will be conducted in the aforementioned states for the next three years. These countries will lead Southeast Asia in the region's engagement with the US. Do we see the US President, Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense coming to Cambodia, Brunei, Laos or Burma for a meeting? The dilemma here for the US is that the Chinese and the Russians will not mind sending their heads of state or other high-ranking officials to ASEAN-related meetings regardless of the host country.

Will the US let the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the Russians dictate the affairs of Southeast Asia? Will President Obama undo what has been viewed as "American re-engagement" so far? Will the US eventually develop its grand and comprehensive strategy to engage Southeast Asia and sustain the commitment to the region? These are questions, Southeast Asians, including myself, are asking.

United States

Ms. Linnea DUVALL

At a CSIS Young Leaders conference, it seems pertinent to talk about youth. It is well known that Japan and South Korea are aging, with median ages of 42 and 38 respectively according to the CIA World Factbook, and that the US and China are slightly better off, with median ages of 36 and 35. But the countries of Southeast Asia, with the exception of Singapore (39) are still very young: Thailand (33), Brunei (28), Indonesia (27), Vietnam (27), Burma (26), Malaysia (25), Philippines (22), Cambodia (22), and Laos (19).

Young, growing populations create new opportunities for economic growth and innovation. ASEAN statistics show that cell phone usage is growing rapidly in every country but Burma, which is exciting given recent innovations in mobile banking. Today's young are able to use crowd-sourcing and social networking technology to fight corruption and strengthen civil

society. And the world's best universities are noticing the region's potential – Yale chose Singapore for the location of its first international campus.

But the challenges of population growth are also well understood. Environmental degradation and global warming is exacerbating natural disasters. Food scarcity will also be a huge issue. The vast majority of the region's protein comes from fish, whether from the politically contested South China Sea, or from the hydro-power hungry Mekong River region. ASEAN has done well addressing humanitarian disaster relief and some environmental issues like smog, but it will struggle to tackle competitions between members for food and energy resources.

Given this situation, there are three issues that in my opinion should be of most concern to regional youths. The first of these is NOT the competition between China and the US for influence in the region. Rather, it is a local concern: governance. Corruption impacts the economic growth and opportunities in all of the ASEAN states to a greater or lesser degree. The PAP's poor outcome in Singapore's election is one hint that some may be heading the right direction, but the violence preceding Thailand's next election shows that there is still a long way to go. With their technological savvy and connectivity, ASEAN's youths are well positioned to make their local governments more accountable and transparent.

The second issue is a catchword of the last twenty years: sustainability. As mentioned, environmental and resource sustainability is essential for survival. In addition, economic sustainability, especially long term and stable growth, is required for ASEAN to fully utilize its young population, and not lose segments of it to drugs, crime and poverty.

The third issue is about the US and China – but only a little bit. The youth of Southeast Asia must do some deep thinking about cultural identity. The question of whether the US' allies and partners in the region will draw closer to China and India has much to do with cultural affinity, as does the future of Islam's relations with the West. Yet cultural identity is primarily local: many of the countries in the region formed only a few generations ago, and they are struggling to incorporate different ethnicities, religions and traditions while sorting through the consequences of colonization. ASEAN is working hard to build a Southeast Asian regional identity, but it will be an uphill battle.

US interest in Southeast Asia is focused on hard security and economics, but no discussion of security in the region would be complete without an examination of governance, sustainability and cultural identity, and a consideration of how the young generation of Southeast Asia will shape these issues in the future.

Ms. Christina FAILMA

During the Bush administration many criticized the US for becoming increasingly disengaged in Southeast Asia, directing more of its focus on problems in the Middle East. These sentiments were reinforced by President Bush's inability to attend the 12th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in the Philippines and former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's absence from two of four ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meetings. Despite several contributions contradicting perceptions of disengagement – ASEAN Cooperation Plan,

Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership, and the US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement – these feelings persisted amongst ASEAN members.

The Obama Administration reassessed US foreign policy in the region and sought out opportunities to strengthen strategic mutual interests with ASEAN countries. Hilary Clinton's presence at the 2009 ASEAN Regional Forum was later followed by the appointment of an ASEAN Ambassador. During President Obama's first visit to Asia in November 2009, he met with leaders from ten ASEAN countries, garnering much attention for being the first American President to do so. These events foreshadowed many more to come and signified the US' commitment to the region culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

China's rise in Asia continues to present more opportunities for the US to strengthen its alliances not only with ASEAN countries, but also with countries in Northeast Asia. With several political, economic, maritime and territorial disputes developing, many countries are seeking US support to provide stabilization in the region through multilateral and bilateral frameworks tasked with identifying the proper approach.

Strengthening economic ties with a growing and vibrant Southeast Asia is important for US interests as we navigate through global and domestic financial crisis. In comparison to other regions, ASEAN countries have done well. In 2010, a list of 54 Asian and Pacific countries according to GDP ranked five of the ten ASEAN countries in the top 20. President Obama's ties to Indonesia (among the five and where the president spent some of his childhood) presented a straightforward and significant opportunity for the US as Indonesia's economy continues to predict upward growth due to increasing domestic consumption. These relationships will be important to take advantage of and foster as the US slips lower and lower as one of ASEANS largest trading partners. In 2009, the US fell to fourth place as China assumed third. The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) between US and Asia-Pacific countries is an example of a strategic approach the US has taken to address this situation.

There are many new promising opportunities presenting themselves promoting a stronger alliance between the US and Southeast Asian countries: a US with a renewed interest in the region, the growing threat of a rising China, economic opportunities, and territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea. The US' biggest challenge is approaching the alliance in a diplomatic way that is politically, culturally, and economically sensitive to the diverse region. In doing so, they will re-establish themselves as a reliable power. Otherwise, it is fair to say that China's role in Southeast Asia will become increasingly influential.

Mr. Justin GOLDMAN

US engagement in Southeast Asia is on a positive trajectory, but it takes place in a region marked by an assertive China, a critical economic partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Decisions taken by the current administration as well as its predecessor have bolstered this level of engagement through traditional alliances and new partnerships. While security cooperation remains a core aspect of these interactions, current efforts seek to broaden these relationships. The normalization of military-to military relations with Indonesia in 2005 overcame a remaining constraint in the relationship, but this was preceded by crucial efforts.

When President Bush and President Megawati met in Bali in October 2003, they announced a multi-year \$157 million program focused on expanding access to quality basic education. These efforts built mutual confidence leading to the formal launch of the US-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership during President Obama's November 2010 visit to Jakarta.

Although relations confront a complicated history, the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 provides a strong foundation. Interactions between both militaries declined following the rejection of the Military Bases Agreement in September 1991, but have been reinvigorated following the attacks of 9/11. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) launched the Internal Peace and Security Plan in January 2011 which emphasizes the centrality of the peace process. US-AFP cooperation in the southern Philippines has been bolstered and it is more closely integrated with peace negotiations. The US Agency for International Development funded Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) Program is implemented in partnership with the Mindanao Development Authority; GEM seeks to accelerate broad-based economic growth in Mindanao. From October 2002-December 2007, GEM II was responsible for the design and construction of 830 *barangay* infrastructure projects ranging from small water systems to roadway improvements, with local government providing key direction and 25-50 percent of project costs, vital to long-term sustainment.

In 2008 US relations with Vietnam overcame past hostilities through the initiation of the first Political, Security, and Defense Dialogue between both countries. This ongoing effort is reflected in the 2011 US National Military Strategy which acknowledges the need to invest new attention and resources in Southeast Asia. The improved mutual relationship led to the March 2010 "Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation in the Civil Nuclear Field" as Vietnam moves towards building its first nuclear power plant, scheduled to begin in 2014. ASEAN invited the US to join the East Asia Summit following their meeting in October 2010; at this time Vietnam announced that Cam Ranh Bay would be reopened to foreign navies, a facility that US planners have long sought to regain access to.

While the trend of US engagement in Southeast Asia is one of progress, to succeed it must respect the unique sensitivities of diverse countries in Southeast Asian. This importance was highlighted by the response to Senators Daniel Inouye and Thad Cochran visiting Subic which ignited the strong sentiment in opposition to US basing in the Philippines, two decades after US bases were closed.

Ms. Lynn MIYAHIRA

The US has a strong interest in maintaining its current alliances in Asia as well as forging new partnerships in the region. Although there is a perception that the US was preoccupied with its global war on terror and was "absent" in Asia during the Bush Administration, the US has always continued to engage its Asian allies through diplomatic and military channels. The Obama Administration has made an effort to have a more visible political presence in the region by making sure that the US not only have proper attendance at important summits and meetings, but also has a clear message to support its interests and allies. Over the years the media has often overlooked US engagement in Asia, as headlines tend to concentrate only on crisis areas;

however US engagement in the region on a political, military and economic level has always been continuous.

For countries like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, having a strong US presence is key to their own interests and security strategy. Although the stigma of dependency and occupation that once came along with a strong US military presence may not be totally gone, most Asian nations are finding it in their best interests to cultivate strong ties with the US. For example, when Thailand needed assistance in counter-terrorism training and intelligence gathering it looked to the US Rather than looking to other ASEAN neighbors for help, most counties in Southeast Asia reached out to the US when in need of more resources and training in order to tackle terrorists and other security threats on their own territory. Another consideration for most Asian nations is how the rise of China will affect their own positions, and most countries are trying to find a balance between relations with both the US and China. It is not in anyone's interest to have smaller Asian nations pick sides as if this were still the Cold War.

Most countries in Asia would probably agree that having more political and economic engagement with the US is a great advantage, but having an even larger military presence would be a domestic nightmare. The US also needs to understand the domestic political issues of their host nations and create plans to help mitigate and prevent any future problems. Although most Asian governments agree that having a US presence is vital, many politicians have yet found ways to garner public acceptance from their constituencies. The US can also help with this by being as transparent as possible and providing education on security issues for public officials and journalists. By continuing to provide the necessary resources and intelligence to its Asian allies, the US will remain a sought after security partner in the region for the foreseeable future.

Mr. Eric SAYERS (US/CA)

Thought often lost in the muddle of the United States' global foreign policy posture, US engagement in Southeast Asia is on a strong trajectory. First, the US has worked steadily to deepen its alliances and relationships with Southeast Asian countries. Second, its efforts have also been boosted by the rise of the People's Republic of China. In a region where threats to the global commons, including the maritime domain, are scheduled to become increasingly contested, making and keeping friends has never been more important for the US. With its growing economies, vibrant civil societies, expanding conventional capabilities, and proximity to a rising China and India, the nature of America's relationships in Southeast Asia will be a shaping force in global politics.

Typical analysis holds that the US was distracted during the past decade by its engagements in the Middle East. This assertion is false. The US has actively worked to develop its relationship with Singapore, often referred to as a "quasi ally." In 2004 the two countries signed a Free Trade Agreement followed in 2005 by a Strategic Framework Agreement. In 2005 the US normalized military relations with Indonesia. Since 2002, the US has worked to train Philippine forces conducting counter-terrorism operations in the southern Philippines. And in January 2011 the two countries conducted their first Strategic Dialogue. In 2010 President Obama visited Indonesia and announced the US-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesian President Yudhoyono. The US relationship with Vietnam has also never shown more potential.

Over the past decade, for instance, trade has increased over seven-hundred percent. The US conducts major multilateral maritime exercises with Southeast Asian states, including Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). Finally, the US has also worked to strengthen its relationship with ASEAN, signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009 and being invited by ASEAN to join the East Asia Summit in 2010.

China's rise has also contributed to America's standing in Southeast Asia. Singapore and Australia have proactively worked to facilitate US presence in the region. Singapore hosts US Pacific Command's Command Logistics Western Pacific on the island and constructed the Changi Naval Base to accommodate US carrier strike groups after the US Navy's withdrawal from Subic Bay, Philippines in 1991. The US and Australia are also discussing avenues to generate great US presence in Australian. In 2010, Vietnam announced it would allow foreign navies to again visiting its Cam Ranh Bay port facility, and the US destroyer USS John S. McCain subsequently conducted a port visit to mark the 15th anniversary of normalized relations between the countries. The US is also working closely with the Philippines to develop its nascent maritime capabilities so that it can adequately secure its coastal waters and contested territorial claims.

In the future, the US must continue to develop its regional security presence in a manner that is sensitive to the region's politics. This will mean not only managing outstanding questions concerning US basing in Okinawa and Guam, but also developing a range of strike capabilities that will allow it to continue to project power into the region without relying on a heavy local military footprint.

Appendix B
PACIFIC FORUM CSIS

YOUNG LEADERS
Pacific Forum CSIS
Biographies

Mr. Julio Santiago AMADOR III (PH) is a Foreign Affairs Research Specialist at the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies (CIRSS) of the Foreign Service Institute. He provides policy analysis and strategic advice to the Office of ASEAN Affairs, Office for Strategic Policy and Planning Coordination and Office of Asia-Pacific under the Department of Foreign Affairs. He is a Yuchengco Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS, Fellow of the Ronald Coase Institute and the Salzburg Global Seminar, and was a visiting scholar at the University of California San Diego in 2007. He has a BA in Public Administration and is pursuing an MA in Political Science at the University of the Philippines.

Ms. Maria Kristela Sylvia B. CASTRONUEVO (PH) is a researcher/analyst of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Resource Management Office. She worked as a researcher of the AFP Modernization Program Management Office. She received her BA in public administration at the University of the Philippines and intends to pursue further education in international studies. Her areas of interests involve the defense resource management system, in particular efficient and effective allocation utilization of resources of the Armed Forces of the Philippine. She is a Yuchengco Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS.

Dr. Danielle CHUBB is Departmental Visitor and Sessional Lecturer at the School of International, Political and Strategic Studies at The Australian National University (ANU). She holds a PhD in International Relations from ANU and her research examined South Korean responses to inter-Korean relations, with a special focus North Korean human rights and the role of civil society. As part of her dissertation fieldwork, Danielle travelled to Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington DC. She will be a Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS in July 2011.

Ms. Linnea DUVALL (US) is a civilian employee at US Pacific Command J52 Southeast Asia Planning division ASEAN desk. She was a Presidential Management Fellow, taking part in a two-year leadership development program directed at recent graduates entering the public sector. She received an MA in Law and Diplomacy at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, with a certificate in Diplomacy Studies. She lived for three years in Tokyo, where she studied Japanese foreign policy and worked at a public relations firm helping Western clients enter the Japanese market. She has a BA in History and East Asian Studies from Yale University and speaks intermediate Japanese.

Ms. Christina Cali FAILMA (US) is a Yuchengco Fellow and WSD-Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS where she researches East Asian security policies and tensions on the Korean

peninsula. She also works under the program officer developing and enhancing Pacific Forum programs. Formerly, she worked as a reporter, video-journalist, and photographer at *Pacific Business News* and *The Honolulu Advertiser*. She graduated with a dual-degree BA in advertising and public relations from Hawaii Pacific University and intends to pursue an MA in international relations.

Mr. Justin GOLDMAN (US) is an Associate Research Fellow in Military Studies at RSIS. As a US Marine, he participated in two Western Pacific naval deployments ranging from Singapore to the United Arab Emirates. He provided humanitarian assistance in East Timor, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He graduated from Regis University in 2006 with a BA in International Policy. He later worked on a joint heavyweight torpedo program with the US-Royal Australian Navy, was a West Africa analyst for the Marine Corps, and deployed with the Africa Partnership Station – a regional maritime security cooperation engagement – onboard USS Fort McHenry. He earned an MSc in Strategic Studies in 2010 at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore.

Mr. Fergus HANSON (AU) is the Director of Polling and a Research Fellow at the Lowy Institute. He has a Masters in International Law from the University of Sydney and his published thesis focused on regional stability in the Pacific. Fergus worked for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) from 2004 to 2007. From 2005 to 2007 he served at the Australian Embassy in The Hague where he was responsible for Australia's relations with five international legal organisations and domestic political issues. He is a former 2010 Vasey Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS.

Mr. Brian HARDING (US) is Country Director for Australia and New Zealand in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) where he manages the United States' overall defense relationship these countries. Brian was a research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he focused on Southeast Asia, helping to build the first dedicated Southeast Asia program in the Washington, DC think tank community. Brian was also a Fulbright fellow in Indonesia and research assistant at the Institute for National Strategic Studies. He holds an MA in Asian Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs and a BA in History and Japanese Studies from Middlebury College.

Dr. Masamichi MINEHATA (JP) is a SPF fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. He was awarded a PhD at the University of Bradford's Department of Peace Studies in July 2010 of Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). His primary research focus has been promoting global biosecurity education for life scientists under the auspices of the UK Prime Minister's Initiative on International Education (awarded by the British Council, UK).

Ms. Charmaine MISALUCHA (PH) received her PhD from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies of the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. She currently serves as an Assistant Professor and Vice Chair at the International Studies Department of De La Salle University in Manila. She is a Yuchengco Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS.

Ms. Lynn MIYAHIRA (US) received a Japan-focused MBA from the University of Hawaii's Shilder College of Business and BA in Politics with a minor in Japanese from Willamette University in Salem, Oregon. She received a research grant to study opinions of US military bases in Okinawa. After completing her undergraduate studies, she worked in Okinawa for five years as a Coordinator for International Relations for the local government. She held an internship at the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan and is a non-resident SPF fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS.

Mr. Theoben OROSA (PH) is a Filipino scholar in the "Future Leader's Program for Regional Integration and Cooperation in Asia" program of Waseda University and Japan's MEXT pursuing a PhD in International Studies. He received his JD from the Ateneo de Manila University's School of Law; MPP from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies of Japan; and BA in Political Science from the University of the Philippines Diliman. He was a "Next Leaders Program" scholar and policy intern with the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia based in Jakarta, Indonesia and was law clerk to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

Mr. Andrew PICKFORD (AU) was appointed the ISSA Indo-Pacific Managing Director to create and lead a strategic think-tank focused on the Indian Ocean region. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Mankal Economic Foundation, Senior Fellow at the International Strategic Studies Association, and project consultant for Committee for the Economic Development of Australia. He has an MA in accounting from Curtin University of Technology, and is completing an MA from Australian National University. He contributed the agricultural research and analysis to the Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook on Pakistan (2008).

Mr. Fuadi PITSUWAN (TH) is an associate at The Cohen Group, a strategic advisory firm headed by former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, which assists US companies in domestic and international markets. Mr. Pitsuwan focuses on Asia, particularly the ASEAN region. He is an adjunct research scholar at the Georgetown University's Asian Studies Department. Mr. Pitsuwan was involved with disaster relief efforts after Cyclone Nargis hit Burma in 2008 and after a tsunami devastated large parts of Southeast Asia in 2004. Mr. Pitsuwan received a BSc in Foreign Service from Georgetown University (Phi Beta Kappa).

Mr. Eric SAYERS (US/CA) is a WSD-Handa Fellow and former SPF Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. He holds an M.Sc. in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), BA in Political Science, and an MA in Political Science from The University of Western Ontario. He worked as a Research Assistant for national security policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation in Washington D.C. and as a Research Assistant with the US Research Program at RSIS.

Mr. Brian VENTURA (PH) is an assistant professor in political science in the University of the Philippines, Visayas. He finished his MA in International Relations at the International University of Japan. His research interests include environmental policy, energy security and foreign policy analysis and he has presented on these topics at several international conferences. Currently, he is developing a framework to examine the relationship between weak state structure and foreign policy decision making.

Appendix C

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS **YOUNG LEADERS**

The Future of US Alliances in Asia
New World Hotel, Manila, Philippines ♦ May 25 - 27, 2011
Co-organized by
Pacific Forum CSIS
Yuchengco Center, De La Salle University
Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research

Young Leaders Agenda

Tuesday, May 24

6:00 PM YL dinner hosted by Rep. Julieta Cortuna

Wednesday, May 25

6:30AM- 8:30 Breakfast Buffet Open

9:00 – 12:30 Young Leader Introductions and SPF Roundtable: US Engagement in Asia

12:30 – 13:30 Lunch

15:00 – 17:00 Young Leader Recognition by Philippine Congress

18:30 – 21:00 Welcome Dinner

Thursday, May 26

8:30 – 9:00 Registration

9:00 – 9:15 Welcome and Introductory Remarks

9:15 – 10:45

Session 1: Security Perspectives

This session focuses on security priorities in Southeast Asia. What are the primary security concerns in the region? Have those concerns changed over the past 10 years? What are the major factors shaping security perspectives? What role do domestic politics and conflicts play in shaping perspectives?

Presenters: Philippines: Renato DeCastro
Thailand: Thitinin Pongsudhirak
Australia: Carlyle Thayer
US: Robert Fitts

10:45 – 11:00 Coffee Break

11:00 – 12:30 **Session 2: China and Southeast Asia**

This session explores China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia. How is China’s role in the region perceived? Has the balance of power in the region shifted? How and to what extent? What are the security implications? How does China’s growing influence affect Southeast Asia’s relationships with the US and Australia? How does China influence Australia’s role in Southeast Asia? Does China have “soft power” in the region? If so, how is it manifested?

Presenters: Philippines: Aileen Baviera
Thailand: Surasit Thanadtang

12:30 – 13:30 Lunch

14:00 – 15:30 **Session 3: US Engagement in Southeast Asia**

The US has increased its engagement in Southeast Asia in the past several years. How has its engagement strategy changed over the past decade? Does the US have soft power in the region? If so, how is it manifested? What could the US do to make its engagement in Southeast Asia more effective? What does the US expect from its alliance partners? How is US engagement in Southeast Asia perceived? What do the US alliance partners expect from the US?

Presenters: US: Catharin Dalpino
Sheldon Simon

Discussants: Thailand: Kitti Prasirtsuk
Philippines: Amado Mendoza

15:30 – 15:45 Coffee Break

15:45 – 17:15 **Session 4: Australia and Southeast Asia**

Should Australia be more or less engaged in security issues in Southeast Asia? Does Australia have soft power in Southeast Asia? What does Australia expect from the US and its Southeast Asian allies? What do the US alliance partners expect from Australia? How does the US-Australia alliance relationship influence perceptions of Australia? How is Australia perceived in Southeast Asia?

Presenter: Australia: Ben Schreer

Discussants: Thailand: Kavi Chongkittavorn
Philippines: Rommel Banlaoi

18:30 – 21:00 Dinner

Friday, May 27

09:00 – 10:45

Session 5: US Alliances and Multilateral Security

This session focuses on the US alliance system and multilateral security institutions in Southeast Asia. To what extent has the US alliance system shaped multilateral organizations? What is the relationship between the alliances and the multilateral organizations? Are they compatible? How do the US alliances influence multilateral security relations in the region? What are the alternatives to maintaining the US alliances? How would those alternatives impact regional security?

Presenters: Philippines: Raymund Quilop
Thailand: Prapat Thepchatree

10:45 – 11:00 Coffee Break

11:00 – 12:30

Session 6: Shaping the US Alliances

This session focuses on shaping the US alliance system in Southeast Asia. Does the US alliance system contribute to regional security? What are advantages and disadvantages of retaining the current bilateral alliances? What impact does the US-Australia alliance have on Southeast Asian security? Can the bilateral alliances be networked? How? Should other security partners in Southeast Asia be brought into a closer relationship with alliance partners? How? Does the alliance system promote a web of enhanced security relationships? What should the relationship be with US allies in Northeast Asia? What steps can be taken by the alliance partners to promote security cooperation in the region?

Presenters: US: Sheldon Simon
Australia: Ron Huisken

12:15 – 13:30 Lunch

13:30 – 15:00

Session 7: Wrap-up and Next Steps

This session will focus on the prospects for further examination of the US alliances in East Asia. What are the key findings from the discussions thus far? Is the alliance system more than the sum of its bilateral parts? Should the US alliance partners in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia be linked? How? Should the feasibility and modalities of networking among some or all US alliance partners in East Asia be

examined? Should the role of the alliance system in the evolving multilateral security architecture and community-building efforts in East Asia be further examined? Should the role of the US alliances in shaping Chinese security policies be further examined?

18:30

Dinner

Saturday, May 28

8:30 – 10:00

SPF Breakfast with Brad