



**Mistrust in the US-Japan-ROK Triangle:  
Next Generation Solutions**



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## Introduction

By Sam Kim and Adrian Yi

The US-Japan and US-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliances have long been the pillars of regional stability in the Asia-Pacific, enabling a peaceful environment for East Asia's remarkable economic development and integration. These alliances represent not only the full commitment of the US to the defense of Japan and the ROK, but also the willingness of Japan and the ROK to play an active role in regional and global security. In particular, these alliances are necessary to deter aggression from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and elicit China's cooperation in contributing to regional stability and prosperity. However, bifurcated security arrangements alone are no longer enough to meet today's geopolitical security challenges. A strong trilateral relationship is required that needs to be based on not only strengthened bilateral ties between the US and its allies but also between Japan and ROK. This volume assesses challenges and opportunities within the three bilateral relationships by focusing on areas of mistrust and providing concrete solutions to strengthen cooperation.

On Feb. 6-10, 2012, 24 Young Leaders (YLS) joined senior experts in Maui for the US-Japan and US-ROK Strategic Dialogues in addition to a YL-only trilateral program hosted by Pacific Forum CSIS and sponsored by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The agendas for the two bilateral talks mirrored each other: security developments and dynamics, strategic assessment, domestic politics (transition and the alliance), assessments and implications of deterrence policy, extended deterrence, regional contingencies, and the future of the bilateral alliance. While YLS attended the track-two dialogues as observers, they were highly encouraged to engage senior participants during both the conference and on the sidelines to share their perspectives on current security and policy issues facing the alliances.

Prior to the conference, YLS were tasked with identifying the implications (if any) of a DPRK nuclear test and missile test on the credibility of extended deterrence, and extended nuclear deterrence. YLS identified three issues. First, there was a discrepancy among the way YL understood and defined the concept of deterrence. However, YLS were able to agree on deterrence involving the threat to use force in response as a way of preventing first use of force by someone else. Second, the US' ability/credibility to deter the DPRK was questioned by its allies because of recent US defense budget cuts. Third, YLS from allied countries had differing opinions on the effect of DPRK nuclear and missile tests on the US defense posture in East Asia. This was in contrast to a consistent view among US YL participants that DPRK saber rattling does not affect US extended deterrence or nuclear deterrence capabilities.

On Feb. 8, Japanese, US, and ROK YLS were grouped into teams based on nationality and tasked with assessing their country's likely response to a scenario that included a missile test by the DPRK. This exercise was built on a YL-created scenario conducted in Seoul at the end of 2011. One of the takeaways from the Seoul simulation — which was published in *Pyongyang in the Cockpit: Regional Responses to North*

*Korean Provocations* — was that strengthened trilateral cooperation between the US, ROK, and Japan was imperative and currently lacking.

During the Feb. 8 trilateral exercise, teams outlined the most ideal vs. feared reactions from the other two countries. Surprisingly, all three countries feared being marginalized by a stronger bilateral relationship among the other two countries in other words. Through this scenario, YLs discovered new angles and wrinkles in the US-Japan-ROK alliance. Each bilateral session raised the question of trust.

Distrust in the US-Japan alliance was reflected in misaligned priorities in a DPRK contingency, Japan's security role within the alliance, information assurance and intelligence cooperation, impact on Japan of US defense budget cuts on Japan and the alliance, US position on reallocation of marines to Guam, US response to Chinese A2/AD capabilities, the US posture vis-à-vis North Korea. In essence we debated whether the US will be ready to provide offensive or defensive capabilities in Japan's time of need, or will the US leave Japan to fend for itself?

Similar issues roil the US-ROK alliance. The list involves (1) fear that the US will hinder the ROK's regarding; (2) fear of abandonment, and (3) fear of entrapment and diminished support because of strategic flexibility. The first issue refers to the recent DPRK 2010 and 2011 provocations. The South fears that the US will not support their policy of proactive deterrence. As the number of US troops has been withdrawn from the peninsula since the Nixon administration, the fear of abandonment has always been present. Lastly, troops from the ROK have been deployed from the peninsula to support US wars in the Middle East; the ROK fears that its involvement makes it a target, reducing their deterrence posture.

Japan-ROK relations have been "close, but still far." The countries continue to clash on historical issues but they recognize the importance of economic cooperation. During the conference, focus was placed on increased defense cooperation. Koreans are uneasy with the prospect of having Japanese Self-Defense Forces on Korean soil in the case of a DPRK contingency. Seoul and Tokyo also have divergent views over the way a DPRK or China threat should be dealt with. Lastly, territorial disputes and conflicting views of their history perpetuate the chasm of mistrust between the two countries.

What follows is an assessment of the fundamental challenge for trilateral cooperation—mistrust in the US-Japan, US-ROK, and ROK-Japan relationships. The three pieces also propose solutions to strengthen trust within these three relationships.

**Looking Ahead:  
Building Confidence and Overcoming Mistrust in the  
US-Japan Alliance**

By Naoko Aoki, Justin Goldman, Kei Koga, Philippe de Koning,  
Oriana Skylar Mastro, Mihoko Matsubara, and Ayako Mie

The US-Japan alliance is one of the oldest bilateral partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region. While the security context in which the alliance was formalized in 1960 has radically changed over time, the US-Japan relationship has continued to be mutually beneficial. One of the critical ingredients that have held the alliance together over time is strong strategic trust.

The emergence of an aggressive North Korea (DPRK) endowed with nuclear weapons, and the amplified assertiveness of China in its foreign relations since 2009 has pushed Northeast Asia to one of its most critical junctures since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, the global financial crisis of 2008, compounded by the demographic problem of aging societies in nearly all advanced industrialized democracies, took a toll on Japan and the United States. In this context, a new set of challenges has created fault lines that threaten to fray the strategic trust between these two allies. For example, the Hatoyama administration's policies of 'a close and equal alliance' stalled the US military realignment process while failing to credibly demonstrate a commitment to take on more of the alliance burden. Deep coordination, which is based on deep mutual trust, is necessary to successfully manage, and counter regional contingencies.

While trust between the US and Japan remains strong overall, this status quo may not be sustainable unless these fault lines are clearly identified and their impact on the alliance mitigated. This paper seeks to identify critical areas in which mistrust between the two allies could intensify in the short- to mid-term time horizon and propose actionable recommendations.

**Areas of US Mistrust of Japan**

While this list of pressures that could damage the alliance in the short- to mid-term is by no means exhaustive, three factors stand out as important fault lines that could cause the US to increase its mistrust of Japan as a reliable alliance partner: the role of the alliance in a DPRK contingency, Japan's broader security role in the alliance, and information assurance and intelligence cooperation.

The US-Japan Alliance in a DPRK Contingency

The first area of potential distrust concerns the actions Japan would or would not take to support the United States in a limited DPRK contingency. The alliance stipulates a basic division of responsibility: the US will support Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) with offensive strike capability to repel enemy attacks, and Japan is expected to withstand enemy invasion through defensive operations. But over the years, as the alliance has

taken on a more regional and global role, a new type of uncertainty and potential distrust has emerged; specifically, will Japan allow Japan-based US forces to be used in non-homeland contingencies? Will its own armed forces directly support US military operations on the peninsula?

Given the past cycle of DPRK provocation, and its inferior conventional military capabilities, the DPRK is likely to employ coercive diplomacy against the United States and its allies in a crisis situation. By holding Japan at risk, most likely with its arsenal of missiles, the DPRK may hope to prevent the US from using its bases in Japan in the event of a future conflict on the peninsula. The DPRK could also attempt an anti-access and area-denial strategy (A2/AD), using missiles to disrupt and delay mobilization and deployment of assets. Given the limited accuracy of DPRK missiles, it is unlikely such a brute force attempt could halt US military mobilization against them. More likely, the missile attacks could be used to turn Japanese public opinion against national involvement in a DPRK contingency. While in the case of all-out war, US concerns about Japanese support are negligible, in crisis scenarios or limited war, there remains a degree of distrust concerning the resolve of the Japanese people to support the United States.

One way Japan has sought to mitigate this issue is through the development of theater missile defense (TMD). While progress in this area would reduce the incentive for the DPRK to pursue the aforementioned strategy, it does not address the fundamental issue of the costs Japan is willing to absorb to support regional objectives.

### Japan's Security Role within the Alliance

A second potential fault line is the significant US defense cuts planned over the next 10 years. While Japan appears willing to take on heightened security roles within the alliance framework, there are still doubts in the United States about Japan's ability and willingness to follow through on these commitments. While the Obama administration's rhetoric has helped reassure Japan about the US commitment to the defense of Japan, the US is likely to press Japan to take on increased responsibility in the alliance in the context of more stringent limits on US military capabilities. This desire is by no means new – US policymakers have repeatedly requested Japanese increases in defense spending in the past few decades – yet these calls could become louder in the context of fiscal austerity in the United States.

Though not necessarily due to US pressure, Japan has taken many steps in the past several years to illustrate its willingness to take on more important functions within the alliance framework: participation in UN peacekeeping operations, logistical support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, construction of the first overseas SDF base in Djibouti, and most importantly, the establishment of the framework for a “dynamic defense” posture in the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). The recent decision to acquire F-35 jets – 5th generation stealth fighter jets with significant offensive capabilities – to replace the obsolete fleet of F-4s, could be perceived as another signal that Japan would fill gaps in the alliance that might be created as a result of US budgetary issues.



However, it is still unclear whether the Japanese government will be able to live up to US expectations of an increased security role within the alliance. Skepticism focuses on two factors. First, the steady decline in Japanese defense spending since 2002 is very likely to continue in the context of spiraling public debt, which is largely a consequence of depressed tax revenues throughout cyclical financial crises and unfavorable demographic trends. Such a decline in defense spending could negatively impact Japan's ability to purchase sufficient numbers of F-35 aircraft and other forms of advanced military equipment the US deems necessary in the JSDF. Second, many of the steps described above can be perceived as largely symbolic in nature, and it is unclear whether the Japan is *operationally* ready for the amplified role the US envisions for its Pacific partner. For example, while the dynamic defense posture laid out in the most recent NDPG is a very important policy statement in that it emphasizes countering aerial and maritime threats through rapid response capabilities, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) remains far larger than the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces combined, and many of the JGSDF bases remain in Hokkaido, far removed from the most ominous contemporary regional threats.

While US distrust of Japan in this area has yet to be fully felt, the risk that a gap forms on defining Japan's security function within the alliance framework is significant, and steps must be taken to deepen understanding of each other's objectives under potentially severe budgetary restrictions.

#### Information Assurance and Intelligence Cooperation

Although key efforts have taken place since the 2007 leak of AEGIS data by Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) personnel to solidify information-sharing for security cooperation purposes, a comparable breach of trust would set back the alliance significantly at a time of great consequence. The alliance responded to the DPRK's missile test in 2006 over the Sea of Japan by focusing on enhancing Japan's missile defense capability. In the face of ongoing provocative behavior from the DPRK and an increasingly assertive China, the alliance can ill afford such a setback. The resulting impact on the transfer of technology, such as vital parts for the JMSDF destroyer *Kongo* that was delayed in 2007, could be extremely detrimental.

The protection of information also goes to an aspect of the alliance relationship that is often cited as an area needed for a more mature partnerships and intelligence cooperation. In addition to bilateral cooperation, discussions have taken place to enhance trilateral cooperation with Australia, whose Air Warfare destroyer will be fitted with the AEGIS combat system. As a result of operational requirements, post 9/11 intelligence-sharing with Australia has grown and its recent independent review of the intelligence community identified its partner relationships as a key "force multiplier." As the 2010 NDPG describes "efforts to stabilize the Asia-Pacific region," this will create critical intelligence requirements. The NDPG also calls for enhanced cooperation with Australia and the Republic of Korea (ROK), both part of an emerging network of cooperative partners on missile defense. Missions ranging from global peacekeeping to theater missile

defense require cooperation, one based on trust needed to fulfill key intelligence requirements.

### **Areas of Japanese Mistrust of the United States**

There are four areas in which Japan is concerned about US strategic intentions: 1) the potential negative impact of US defense cuts of \$487 billion over the next decade; 2) the outcome of negotiations over the US Marine Corps relocation to Guam; 3) US response to China's increasing A2/AD capabilities; and 4) uncertainty regarding US stance over North Korea's nuclear and missile development. Even though the Obama administration declared a US pivot to Asia and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton promised that the United States is "here to stay," some Japanese security experts expect the budget reductions will inevitably result in lesser US commitment to the alliance.

#### Impact on Japan of US Defense Budget

The defense budget cuts force Tokyo to reconsider its air strategy encapsulated by the FX program. The Department of Defense (DOD) has already announced that the United States will reduce its planned purchases of F-35s by 179 between 2013 and 2017 in order to save \$15.1 billion. According to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. Norton Schwartz, Washington has not decided when to start mass production. Because the conditions of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) do not consider changing the price or delivery date a breach of a contract, it is highly possible that the price of F-35s will increase by the time Japan introduces them in March 2017. Reportedly, Tokyo sent a letter to Washington asking the US to maintain the agreed upon price and warned that the Japanese government may reconsider the purchase if the price increases. Washington has refrained from making any official comment on this request to avoid revealing details of intergovernmental negotiations though a favorable response is unlikely.

#### US Position on Marine Relocation to Guam

Tokyo and Washington agreed to increase the Japanese financial burden from \$2.8 to \$3.5 billion and reduce the number of US Marines via relocation to Guam from 4,700 to 4,200. According to the 2006 US-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, the number to be relocated was projected to be about 8,000 and now this number will be almost half. Nevertheless, the US government requested that the Japanese government bear more of the financial burden for the relocation, which is estimated to cost approximately \$1 billion. The rationale was that this was necessary to fend off US Congressional budgetary pressure and to convince Congress to support the Guam project. Tokyo is frustrated with this request since the number of Marines to be moved to Guam is much less than the original plan.

#### US Response to Chinese A2/AD Capabilities

Japan and the United States have perception gaps regarding Chinese A2/AD. After a long silence following AirSea Battle's debut in the Quadrennial Defense Review in

2010, Washington announced that it would release further information on the operational concept in a timely manner. However, such clarification and guidance has yet to be released to Japan and even briefing at an inter-governmental level has been delayed. “Even the government-to-government level briefing lagged behind. Some Japanese government officials became anxious and started to question whether this concept had been abandoned or not,” the *China Daily* reported.

#### US Posture vis-à-vis North Korea

While the security threat from North Korea has so far served as a catalyst for the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, there could be problems ahead. One potential problem is the differences in priorities between Japan and the United States over what they hope to achieve with regard to North Korea. There is the growing concern in Japanese policy circles that the United States has shifted to a policy of managing a nuclear North Korea, rather than trying to eliminate nuclear weapons from the country. Japanese officials and analysts worry the priority for the United States is the prevention of proliferation by North Korea to areas such as the Middle East. They are wary that the United States will ultimately accept North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons as long as the DPRK does not threaten the United States. This, of course, would do nothing to mitigate Japan’s security problem. Japanese scholar Izumikawa Yasuhiro has pointed out that unlike Washington, Tokyo focuses on technology and material being transferred into North Korea rather than those being shipped out of the country.

#### **Steps for the United States (Japanese Perspective)**

To overcome mistrust, Tokyo and Washington need to recognize each side’s positions on the issues and attempt to reach the same strategic understanding. To this end, both should: 1) assure that the US reduction of the defense budget and US Marine Corps relocation will not drastically affect its overall strategy toward Asia; 2) craft a bilateral strategy toward China’s A2/AD; and 3) clarify the perception gaps existing between the United States and Japan over North Korea’s missile and nuclear development.

First, ongoing debates over the US defense budget cut and the Futenma relocation plans would potentially affect the overall US and Japanese strategies in the Asia-Pacific region. However, they were not the sole determinant, and increasing interoperability between the two and coordinating their operational doctrine could help alleviate these problems. To this end, the United States and Japan should take a two-pronged approach: while clarifying the strategic implications of the US defense budget cuts and the issues surrounding Futenma, both should create a bilateral consultation group to provide policy options in order to prepare for responding to outcomes these issues may produce.

Second, both the United States and Japan are concerned about China’s A2/AD capabilities. However, the US strategy has been still under consideration and its operational concept of AirSea Battle has yet to be concretely formulated. The 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) for example, did not specify what role US allies, including Japan, need to play. If this trend continues, a lack of coordination might induce

mistrust between the United States and Japan. Therefore to avoid this coordination problem, it is necessary for both states to begin closely discussing and coordinating a division of labor to respond to China's A2/AD capabilities.

Third, it has been increasingly unclear to the extent which the United States and Japan will allow North Korea to pursue North Korea's missile and nuclear development programs. If this trend continues, it would widen perception gaps between the United States and Japan, producing mistrust between both states and creating doubts about on the credibility of the US extended deterrent. Whether the red line for the United States to undertake a military option against North Korea fluctuates, it is imperative for the United States and Japan to reach the same understanding of such a red line. Thus, to buttress the US extended deterrence, both states need to clarify its role with respect to North Korea, a red line for North Korea's missile and nuclear development programs, and a division of labor for USJF and SDF in a Korean contingency.

### **Steps for Japan (US perspective)**

Japan should actively work to mitigate US concerns about the degree of Japanese support in a DPRK contingency. The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation is one of the most asymmetric treaties in the international system, requiring the United States to defend Japan without any reciprocal requirement of Japan. While Japan's "peace constitution" prohibits collective defense, a provision could be added to the Treaty requiring Japan to allow the United States to use its bases in a DPRK contingency. Under these circumstances, the US could be more confident that even if Japan opted to stay out of a broader conflict on the peninsula, attacks on Japan would not allow the DPRK leadership to gain leverage against the United States in the war. This would go far in undermining the DPRK ability to complicate offensive options of US preemptive strike on DPRK nuclear facilities by holding Japan at risk.

There is a discrepancy between the symbolic actions Japan has taken in the defense arena and its ability to amplify its security role in light of budgetary restraint. The United States may also be at fault for focusing far more on these symbolic options than the budgetary limitations that Japan has certainly not tried to hide, and its expectations for Japan to take on a heightened security role as the US limits its own security spending may be too high. A key ingredient for remedying this is for the United States and Japan to have higher levels of regular communication between defense planners to better understand each other's respective difficulties with respect to budgetary affairs. This kind of dialogue would be critical in prompting the US to temper any affairs it has for Japan to increase its defense budget any time in the short- to mid-term. Only through a realistic understanding of each other's own domestic struggles can strategic trust be maintained.

In light of the failed North Korean *Unha-3* Launch Vehicle on April 13, the need for confidence to share information and intelligence between the US, Japan, and the ROK should be clear. Although tripartite trilateral cooperation must overcome historical challenges, Japan and the ROK agreed with the US in January 2011 that a General Security of Military Information Agreement was needed to protect confidential

information. As Japan confronts a difficult regional security environment, cooperation becomes even more essential. Although it received strong opposition from the Mass media Information and Culture (MIC) Union, the fact that the DPJ brought a “secret protection bill” up for debate is an important step. The Japanese government began considering the measure in light of the leaked footage of a Chinese fishing boat ramming a Japanese patrol vessel in the Senkaku Islands. Classifications are designed to protect the methods and sources of US intelligence gathering more so than the information itself. Japan needs to adopt the appropriate statutes to protect said sources before the United States can consider greater intelligence sharing.

## **Conclusion**

Tokyo and Washington have several areas of mistrust such as uncertainty over a North Korean contingency, negotiation about US Marines Corps relocation to Guam, US response to China’s A2/AD capabilities. To mitigate concerns, the two governments need to clarify what each will do to solve these issues. It is necessary for the United States to assure Japan that the defense budget cut would have no negative impact on its power projection in the region. The two also have to confirm specifics about the US strategy for the Korean Peninsula and China and Japan’s support for Washington. A stronger information assurance system will be indispensable for Japan to better cooperate the US military and intelligence community. These will be the first step for the governments to appreciate a more robust alliance.



# **Honeymoon Over?**

## **Emerging Issues of Mistrust within the US-ROK Alliance**

By Paul Choi, Petra Dunne, Luke Herman, Hyunkyung Kim,  
Sam Kim, Kwangwoo Kim, Minsung Kim, and Kyu-toi Moon

### The current status of ROK-US security relations

Since the Korean War, the ROK-US alliance has remained strong. However, there is room for improving ties between the two countries by identifying future challenges and opportunities in Northeast Asia.

The ROK-US alliance was formed after the Korean War with the primary objective of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Since 1953, the scope of the alliance has expanded not only through contributing to peace and security in Northeast Asia but also in global conflicts such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia.

There are still numerous obstacles to ROK-US security cooperation. First, ROK's domestic politics may negatively impact the state of the alliance. Due to the nature of partisan politics in Seoul, its contribution to global security related issues remains limited. Second, the recently announced US defense budget cut could lead to limited US military capabilities. In addition, the recent request by the US for the ROK to increase its defense burden-sharing for the United States Forces Korea (USFK) has been received with skepticism in Seoul.

A challenge facing the alliance is lack of trust. Public opinion polls in both countries reveal weakening confidence in the alliance and this can lead to the deterioration of future ROK-US cooperation. This report, identifies problems affecting trust between the two sides and proposes solutions on how to strengthen and deepen the ROK-US alliance.

### **Current Problems Causing Bilateral Mistrust**

ROKs mistrust of the US fall into three categories: (1) fear that the US will hinder ROK actions; (2) fear of abandonment; and (3) fear of entrapment and diminished support because of strategic flexibility.

US commitment to the security of the ROK should a war break out due to DPRK's conventional or WMD (both biological and nuclear) attack capabilities has been clearly outlined in Joint Communiques between the ROK and the US, dating from the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 to the Joint Vision of 2009. Furthermore, the ROK and the US have reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining security and stability on the Korean Peninsula and declared a strong joint defense posture.

However, South Korea is concerned that the US will restrain ROK actions to deter or respond to DPRK provocations. Despite its fears of escalation, South Korea is less tolerant now after the 2010 and 2011 DPRK provocations. Consequently, Seoul has announced a policy of proactive deterrence, which calls for countering any provocations by directly attacking the source of an attack. The ROK's primary concern relates to the US cost-benefit analysis and to the fact that the US might prevent the ROK from retaliating to DPRK provocation.

Fortunately, to resolve potential US-ROK conflict, the two countries have agreed on a new joint counter provocation OPLAN that would deter and address such contingencies in the future. The details of the OPLAN are as follows:

South Korean troops would destroy the origin of the North Korean provocation and surrounding forces in the first stage. To thwart further provocations, additional assets of the US military would be mobilized in the second stage. In other words, if North Korea launches another local provocation, the US will assemble its forces, including those stationed in South Korea, Japan, and at the US Pacific Command, to carry out operations jointly with South Korea. The US is reportedly drawing up a list of forces that could swiftly respond to North Korean provocations. US Forces Korea artillery and fighters from US Forces Japan and the Marine Corps are among the potential forces to be included in the list. Still it is unclear whether, during a crisis, the US would support a ROK response that might cause an escalation to a higher level conflict.

Fear of abandonment is not new. When President Nixon withdrew US military forces from South Korea in the 1970s, the South Korean leadership realized that the US might not always stay on the Korean Peninsula. The fear of abandonment has remained ever since, and will be present as long as the DPRK continues to be a threat to the ROK.

After the recent US Nuclear Posture Review called for a reduced role of nuclear weapons around the globe (i.e., extended deterrence to allies), the response of the South Korean leadership was far from optimistic. For instance, should the US decide not to retaliate against the DPRK with nuclear weapons as a response to a DPRK act of belligerence, the leadership in Pyongyang might misinterpret the US extended deterrent as nothing but a concept and perceive the US to be a "paper tiger." Therefore, extended deterrence might fail to deter future provocations by the DPRK.

Finally, USFK strategic flexibility remains an area of mistrust as the ROK fears potential deployment of US troops from South Korea may draw the ROK into a conflict it does not desire to be involved in. Even if South Korea doesn't contribute troops to such a conflict, South Korea would like to be considered as supportive of US operations because USFK would be deployed from ROK bases. Subsequently, South Korea may be the target of an attack. Finally, there is also fear that the deployment of USFK for regional or global missions may weaken the deterrence posture on the Korean Peninsula.



## US' lack of trust toward the ROK

The US lack of trust toward the ROK relates to (1) deterrence policy, (2) domestic policy, and (3) nuclear reprocessing capability.

The ROK deterrence policy after the DPRK provocations in 2010 shifted to “proactive deterrence.” The concept of proactive deterrence has been hotly debated due to the call for preemptive strikes and retaliation. However, the current policy does not use the terms “preemptive strike” or “retaliation”, and therefore, some experts question the effectiveness of this document since it may not send the right message to the DPRK.

Furthermore, the ROK failed to send an accurate correct message to the US about what the proposed proactive deterrence policy means. Miscommunication along with misinterpretation negatively affected trust between the ROK and US. ROK's proactive deterrence policy has been a mystery for US policymakers due to the lack of detailed information or proper explanation. It is not in the US interest to escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Yet, the ROK's new deterrence policy includes elements that could destabilize the region, and the ROK ought to provide proper explanations of the policy to reassure the US of its intentions.

To resolve current challenges facing the ROK-US alliance, both sides have engaged in formal and informal dialogues and other platforms to help close the miscommunication gap. As a result, the US and ROK established the above mentioned OPLAN which provides guidelines on how to cooperate in a contingency.

The development of the ROK's weapon capability without consulting the United States also increases US mistrust of the ROK's deterrence policy. Failure to reach a consensus on ROK-US ballistic missile guidelines is a good example. The US is not willing to let the ROK possess medium-or long-range ballistic missiles. This is the result of fears such as ROK capability could lead to an escalation of conflict with the DPRK and possibly with the PRC.

The US has been concerned with ROK's domestic politics as alliance issues are often used for political leverage, whether it is a basing issue or the KORUS FTA. Politicians use these issues to get the public emotionally charged and often the alliance is strained as a result of anti-American sentiments.

Lastly, the limitation of ROK's peaceful use of nuclear energy remains an issue. As the ROK reliance on nuclear energy increases, radioactive waste management will be addressed as well. Seoul is hoping to exercise its right to reprocess radioactive waste to reuse the used radioactive waste and has been researching a method of pyroprocessing nuclear spent fuel.

But the ROK's 1974 agreement with the US, which is due to expire in 2014, bans spent fuel reprocessing (and uranium enrichment), predominantly because of associated proliferation risks.

There has been a debate as to whether pyroprocessing technology is reprocessing technology; in any case, pyroprocessing is generally considered less conducive to proliferation for many technical reasons, most notably because it leaves separated plutonium mixed with several other elements, which is why the Bush administration allowed the ROK to build facilities to conduct research on pyroprocessing. The Obama administration has appeared much less flexible, although there is a bilateral agreement to conduct a 10-year joint study.

Both the ROK and the US have engaged in discussions regarding the ROK's right of reprocessing nuclear waste; yet, the US remains skeptical about ROK intentions for two reasons: first, if the ROK has nuclear reprocessing capabilities, both states lose the possibility of denuclearizing the DPRK. Furthermore, it will set a negative precedent for the global nonproliferation regime. However, the US already has agreements with some European countries, Japan, and India to provide technical assistance on spent fuel reprocessing. Second, it would arguably increase nuclear security risks due to materials that may be produced from the reprocessing.

### **Potential Issue Areas Regarding Trust between the ROK and US**

#### Wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer in 2015

The two countries set the date for the wartime OPCON transfer to December 2015, according to the "Strategic Alliance 2015". The delay of the wartime operational control provides additional time for the alliance to synchronize multiple key initiatives and successfully transfer wartime OPCON responsibilities to the chairman of the Republic of Korea Joints Chiefs of Staff. The current US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) will no longer be needed and will be dissolved.

Opposition to the transfer of OPCON by 2015 reflects fear of weakening of the US security commitment to Korea and the ROK-US alliance. The US and ROK governments should make continuous effort to inform the public that the transfer of the wartime OPCON will bring about mutual benefits, such as strengthening the US-ROK strategic alliance, upgrading South Korean defense capabilities, improving and recalibrating US Forces Korea, and better aligning military exercises to meet the new security challenges.

The ROK and the US are already examining essential operational and tactical changes to allow increased responsibility for the defense of South Korea to the ROK military, under the Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan. However, we need to define more clearly the definitions of "enduring capabilities" and "bridging capabilities" and what the United States provides and delivers after the transition of wartime OPCON in 2015.

Since the transition has been ongoing, it is important for Korea and the US to ensure that the combined capability and readiness remain strong under the new command

structure. The commitment to the alliance must also be visible to send the strongest message of deterrence to North Korea.

### ROK burden sharing for the USFK

The US has been pressuring the ROK to contribute and take on a bigger share of the burden in maintaining the USFK on the Korean Peninsula. Under the 5-year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) reached in 2009, ROK's financial contribution for US troops in South Korea was 812.5 billion won (about \$743 million) in 2011. This is about 42 percent of the total cost of maintaining the US forces in South Korea. However, in recent US-ROK military negotiations, the US called on ROK to increase its share to at least 50 percent.

The two sides are likely to enter negotiations regarding costs and contributions as soon as in the mid-2012, and there is a very high potential for increasing anti-US sentiment among the Korean public. The Korean government agrees in principle to share a fair level of burden for USFK.

It is expected that the US will pressure Korea to increase its contribution for the maintenance of current US troop levels (28,500). However, this will not be easily accepted by the ROK and it is highly unlikely that Seoul will increase the burden sharing rate from the 42 percent to 50 percent, especially when the ROK aims to sign a long-term agreement similar to the 5 year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) of 2009.

Due to the recent defense budget cuts, the US may also demand that the ROK step up and take on more responsibilities; however, the US is also aware of ROK public sentiment surrounding the issue and its impact on the ROK-US alliance. Therefore, both sides will have to determine the cost that is mutually satisfactory.

### **Ways to Enhance Confidence-Building**

The US and ROK should reaffirm the strength of the alliance and confirm the necessity of bilateral close cooperation based on shared visions, common values, and forward-looking actions. Both sides should also identify common goals and each other's defensive/offensive capabilities. A joint ROK-US Cyber Command should be created to address and successfully manage threats related to cyber security.

Security cooperation between the US and ROK can be strengthened by increasing the number of joint exercises between the two militaries, and strengthening intelligence sharing. In nontraditional security issues, both sides can cooperate further in peacekeeping operations, personnel training, and in conducting exercises that would promptly allow the US and ROK to respond to emergencies, including natural disasters and pandemics.

Frequent dialogues, exchanges and communication channels through Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track 2 with institutions, organizations, and think-tanks in both countries can also provide a good platform for cooperation between the two sides.

After the sinking of the ROK Pohang-class corvette *Cheonan* and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korea in 2010, Korea and the US reaffirmed their commitment to further develop the alliance's deterrent capability for defense of the Korean Peninsula. One such measure was through the establishment of the "Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD)," a senior-level policy consultative channel co-chaired by the ROK deputy minister of national defense for policy and the US under secretary of defense for policy, as an umbrella framework that encompasses various defense dialogue mechanisms between the ROK and the United States to ensure high-level political oversight and synchronization of the objectives of the US-ROK alliance.

#### Improving Public Diplomacy, Strengthening public support for the ROK-US alliance

Strengthening public education to improve the state of the alliance is critical for the ROK and US. Both governments should emphasize the importance of educating the public on various ROK-US alliance related issues, to mitigate unnecessary or ill-grounded fears or concerns of the public, and to curtail possible anti-US sentiment that may arise in the process of resolving sensitive issues, such as cost-sharing negotiations for the stationing of the USFK, or strategic flexibility.

Strengthening Korean support through its global role and promoting use of the alliance as a platform for South Korea's rise as a middle power is one method for public diplomacy leading to increased leverage of the ROK-US alliance. Furthermore, public diplomacy in the United States emphasizes the benefits of cooperation/partnership with Korea, and its contributions to shared interests with the United States, and its support in missions that alleviate costs on Americans.

#### Expanding US-ROK Bilateral Relations to Trilateral Cooperation with Japan

Since the Korean War, the ROK-US alliance has evolved from its original purpose to primarily focus on sustaining security and stability in the Northeast Asian region. South Korea has joined in many US-led operations outside the region to honor and show its strong commitment to the alliance. However, the time is ripe for both sides to go beyond existing frameworks of cooperation and find new ways to strengthen the alliance.

The US has already tried to improve the state of alliances in Northeast Asia by proposing trilateral cooperation between Japan, the ROK, and the US. However, this initiative has not been fruitful, and one of the reasons is the ROK's longstanding historical relationship with Japan, including tensions over territorial disputes. Two suggestions for improving the trilateral mechanism are as follows;

First, the three sides should conduct joint military exercises the outside the Northeast Asian region. The ROK and Japan have been participating in military exercises with the US since the formation of their alliances, but the three countries don't hold in trilateral military cooperation due to ROK's domestic politics.

Second, the three sides should increase the number of official and unofficial dialogues that will provide a platform for constructive problem solving. The three countries hold official and unofficial dialogues, and the next step is to reach out to the public outreach to create a consensus for the need for trilateral cooperation.

Third, the three sides are major contributors of aid and assistance to developing countries. The US, ROK, and Japan can address global challenges such as famine, diseases, and other critical humanitarian matters together to assist nations in need; this will to strengthen the trilateral relationship.

Tensions from territorial disputes and historical issues between Japan and ROK will prevail for a long time. This does not mean that both countries should stop seeking new ways and solutions that would lead to strengthening their cooperative efforts while also maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.



## **Close but Still Far: ROK-Japan Relations for the Future**

By Ryo Yamaguchi, Akito Nishiuchi, Joseph Oh,  
Dong-Joon Park, and John Hemmings

“Close, but still far” is often used to explain the bilateral relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Since normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965, the two countries have built up an impressive, in-depth relationship on a wide and varied array of issues. The two countries have drawn closer, culminating in President Kim’s decision to allow the partial import of Japanese pop culture. The two countries went on to co-host the 2002 World Cup, and in 2003, agreed to hold regular ‘shuttle diplomacy’ summit visits to improve relations.

Such efforts to increase bilateral dialogue and exchange are part of a conscious effort to improve ties between Japan and the ROK. However, despite the relative frequency of the exchanges and dialogues, Japan and Korea struggle to overcome obstacles to bilateral relations. Despite the two countries agreeing to hold regular talks in 2003, this exchange was postponed in 2005 as Seoul protested against Tokyo for its approval of history textbooks that seemed to attach a positive light to Japanese imperialism. And even though it was resumed in 2008, those issues remain unsolved. South Korea’s President Lee’s visit to Japan last December ended with both parties vowing to build ‘forward-looking relations’, but still displayed wide differences in views toward the past, including the comfort women issue. The Dokdo/Takeshima issue was rekindled in 2011, highlighted by the rejection of Japanese lawmakers wanting to visit the disputed islets.

Political differences aside, the two countries have tried to focus on specific areas where cooperation is not only possible, but in the interests of the two countries. Both parties have recognized the importance of economic cooperation to better position themselves vis-à-vis the rapidly expanding Chinese economy. During the last decade, there have been talks of a possible Free Trade Agreement (FTA) while in 2008, in response to the global financial crisis, then Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro, emphasized the importance of economic interdependence between the two states by proposing a bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).

South Korea and Japan have also increased defense cooperation; Tokyo sent military observers to the “*Invincible Spirit*” exercise in July 2010 while Seoul sent military observers to Japan’s “*Keen Sword*” in December 2010. Seoul has been invited to observe “*Nimble Titan*” exercise, a multilateral missile defense war-game that includes both Japan and the US; and in 2010, Seoul hosted the “*Eastern Endeavor 10*” exercises, a part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) led by the US and Japan for the first time. Cooperation between the two states is often achieved if both countries acknowledge that the issue at hand is greater than historical animosities that the two countries have toward each other. In the wake of the March 2011 disaster, South Korea responded by dispatching a large rescue team to help with search and rescue efforts.

## **Issues in Japan-ROK Bilateral Relations**

While disagreements over the historical interpretation of the early 20th century and the closely related territorial dispute remains the most obvious obstacle to better bilateral relations, other issues must be addressed. First, both Japan and the ROK have firm interests in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. However, there is a level of misconception and mistrust in each other's definition of "stability." On one hand, Japan is concerned about any developments that lead to instability on the Korean Peninsula. While most Koreans, acknowledge the fact that Japan would be involved in a contingency in North Korea, people are uneasy with the prospect of Japanese SDF forces on Korean soil. As unreasonable as it may seem to outsiders, both countries remain suspicious of each other's intentions.

Second, there are conflicting views between Seoul and Tokyo over *how* to deal with the DPRK and the threat from China. This is closely related to the issue mentioned above, but is also due to the fact that different North Korean actions have different effects on each country's threat assessment. Japan considers missile launches and nuclear tests as bigger threats whereas South Korea is more concerned with North Korea's conventional military capabilities.

On a related note, there is a perception in both Japan and the ROK that the military modernization programs taking place in each country are targeted at one another. Japan's efforts to strengthen its maritime capabilities as well as the acquisition of the F-35s were not well received in the ROK. Since the Roh Moo-hyun administration, Seoul has also pursued its "self-reliant" military capabilities, acquiring F15Ks and blue-water naval capabilities including its own line of Aegis cruisers.

In the end, the crux of the problem lies in conflicting perceptions toward each other. Much of this mistrust between Japan and Korea is due to history as well as conflicting prisms with which each country interprets history and territorial disputes that have risen as a result. Before discussing specific confidence building measures, it is important to address this critical issue in Japan-Korea bilateral relations.

## **Steps for the Future: An Outsider's View on Improving Bilateral Relations**

Animosities arising from historical and sovereignty issues constrain both Japan and the ROK from furthering relations. The inter-government, top-down initiatives by the Japanese and ROK policy makers have often been undermined by bottom-up reaction. Due to the strength of public sentiment both in Japan and the ROK, governments have often exploited bilateral diplomatic problems and nationalism for domestic legitimacy.

Many Westerners relate the tensions to those between France and Germany or the UK and France while pointing to the current EU system. This is not an accurate analogy: none of the three countries colonized each other in the recent past as occurred between Korea and Japan. Furthermore, while Germany did occupy France from 1941 to 1945, it permitted the semblance of a state to exist in the South (Vichy) and never enforced ethnic



assimilation as took place on the Korean Peninsula. To move forward, a number of principles must be utilized: recognition (of the efforts of the other to resolve these issues), reciprocity (that both states take equal steps), and reorientation (moving away from old to new ways of thinking on certain issues). Japan and Korea might also seek the diplomatic help of Norway as a third party to host and oversee this process. Norway has used its position as an energy-rich middle power to play an active mediation role in the Middle East and Sri Lanka, and its place as an outsider could help the process.

With regard to the first principle, Korea must realize that despite the misgivings of certain elements within Japanese society, Japanese leaders have apologized repeatedly for historical issues. Recognizing this fact is more important and a more positive step than questioning the sincerity of the act. Korean leaders can see that their counterparts would like to improve relations. While there may be misgivings about Japanese sincerity, this type of thinking harms the process and robs the act of apology of meaning. Therefore, Korean leaders will have to encourage the idea that Japan has apologized, that this action is over, and further apologies are no longer necessary. With regard to recognition, Japanese leaders should try to recognize that South Korean leaders like Lee Myung-bak have been sincere in seeking better ties and not give up on South Korea simply because the issue is a political one for Korea. Certainly, there is some benefit for politicians to play the “Japan card.” Though it is all the more important to recognize the sincere efforts of Korean politicians to improve relations.

With regard to the second principle, both countries should take certain actions in close coordination with each other. They should announce, for example, a revival of the historical committee to write text book sections relevant to both countries. The Japan-Korea Joint History Research Committee (2005-2010) should be reconvened and tasked to write specific sections on the most contentious period (1910-1945). Both Korea and Japan should instruct their Ministries of Education to adopt and approve the findings as the main texts for middle school and high school. It is understandable that for Japan this will involve special legislation given the current system by which the MOE instructs guidelines for textbooks. This requires political will that comes with political strength, something that may be impossible in the short term for Japan. On the other hand, Prime Minister Noda has shown himself to be quietly more impressive and efficient than any of his two DPJ predecessors and willing to work on contentious issues (three principles, TPP, and consumption tax).

Re-orientation is the hardest and most important step. This involves moving away from certain policy positions and the emotive policy-making that sustains them to something new. It might be necessary for a Japanese government to move away from the idea that admitting South Korean sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima is a loss of face. Face is important in international relations, but it is a purely emotive term and should be replaced with rational decision-making. The fact that Chinese military spending is once again doubling, and it is not clear that China has decided on what kind of power it wants to be, should convince both countries to shore up relations with other regional powers and look at the bigger picture. Their bilateral relations should not be considered in isolation. Any Japanese move on Dokdo/Takeshima should be reciprocated by South

Korea in the best way possible. Using emotive policy-making with regard to the comfort woman issue must also be replaced with something more rational. Naturally, the crime is a horrific one, but some sort of statute of limitations should be brought to bear. South Koreans will have to realize that reparations and legal redress of the kind that is being sought is not merely bad international relations, it is also bad law. Very few criminal acts can be pursued this long after they expire.

### **Korean and Japanese Views on History for the Future**

From a Korean perspective, the dispute over history and jurisdiction over Dokdo/Takeshima are closely linked with the painful experience that the nation endured during the early part of the 21st century. It is unfortunate that the Chosun dynasty succumbed to the forces of colonialism at the hands of Japan, and that it faced ethnic assimilation as part of Japan's colonial rule over the country. Though it is important that these facts are not forgotten, it is important for Koreans to recognize that Japan's colonialism was the trend of the era. For bilateral relations with Japan to improve, it is imperative that some gestures are made to suggest that Korea accepts Japan's apologies that have been repeated over the last decade.

Often, the problem with such apologies is that Korea only acknowledges them half-heartedly since they are considered to be insincere, mostly due to the Dokdo/Takeshima issue or historical textbooks. Yet it is also hard to deny that Japan's leaders have apologized. While Korean leaders have turned a cold shoulder to apologies by Japanese leaders, they should signal acceptance officially in the future if any Japanese leader chooses to apologize again. This would require Japan to apologize once again, but this would also be the last time it becomes an issue in bilateral relations. For leaders serious on improving bilateral relations, this apology and acceptance could be negotiated as an agenda for a future Japan-ROK summit.

It is important to discuss the scope of the apology. As noted the, sincerity of the apology is always contended by Korea since the ROK and Japan do not agree on interpretations of the colonial period, with the issue of the existence of comfort women being one of the most contentious. For a future apology to have significance, it could be arranged that the apology is for the act of colonialism itself, an acknowledgement of the fact by both countries. Some might say this renders the apology to be hollow, but it will provide a foundation for discussions on the issues upon which the two countries disagree.

The revival of the Japan-ROK Joint History Research Committee should be the venue where issues in history are discussed. It might be wise to define the purview of joint history committees on specific issues such as the comfort women or the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute rather than have it produce a general overview of the joint history.

It is critical that both Tokyo and Seoul agree before the results are published that the conclusions will be adopted by the Ministries of Education in each country. Seoul should strongly request that the Japanese government change legislation to allow for

these findings to be reflected in textbooks used in public schools. In return, Seoul should be open to objectively analyzing some of the effects of the colonization, which did help the Chosun dynasty modernize. In addition, considering how volatility of public opinion on such issues, it is vital that any joint historical committee is fully backed by the government. Mutual understanding of the historical past is the only way that many of the problems between the two countries will be resolved.

Re-orientation is a difficult step to take, but it is increasingly more important to reframe our understanding of the past. Although the older generation that actually experienced the colonization period is passing away, anti-Japanese sentiments remain. While the feeling is understandable to some extent, Korea should also be careful that this animosity is based on facts rather than a vague sense of past misgivings by Japan.

Two questions can be made regarding this issue from the Japanese side. The first is whether issues on historical context have restrained Japanese diplomacy toward South Korea. Domestically, there has been a swing of movements between self-condemnation and reevaluation of Japanese history among nations. The establishment of the “peace constitution” and the abandonment of war as a means of conflict resolution were forwarded by the US. The new constitution further shaped the Japanese public’s view of history and security largely because the Japanese society felt powerless and was tired with militarism and war.

Some on the political right, who feel Japan lost too much confidence and dwelled too much upon guilt, started to promote “new” ways to appreciating Japan’s history and national identity. Some developed the idea to counter the claims made by China and Korea by arguing that Japan’s war commitment in East Asia was not an invasion. These neo-nationalistic sentiments have not manifested themselves in diplomatic dialogues between Japan and the ROK, and overall, the Japanese public retains more moderate views. However, while there is acknowledgement of the negative aspects of Japanese history in the general population, many also view that with historical viewpoints forwarded by China and the ROK. Furthermore, the majority of the Japanese population also considers further apologies unnecessary based on the view that historical issues were settled diplomatically when Seoul and Tokyo normalized ties.

The second question is whether Japan acknowledges the necessity for deeper cooperation with the ROK. In this sense, there exists a dichotomy, where Japan feels geographically a part of Asia, but diplomatically and strategically is focused more on the Japan-US alliance. Due to the heavy reliance on the US hub and spokes alliances network, Japan has not had a strong incentive to strengthen bilateral security ties with the ROK. Hence the relationship with the ROK has mainly focused on cultural and trade aspects.

Despite the security that an alliance with the US provides, the Japan-ROK security relationship needs to be strengthened. There are two factors that need to be considered. First, there are economic incentives that drive the desire for closer relations between Japan and the ROK. The second is the realization of regional security issues by the Japanese public especially after the North Korean missile crisis in 1998. Furthermore,

the experience of the 3.11 earthquake deepened positive views of the SDF in Japan. Forging closer security cooperation with the ROK will gain more public support as Japanese become more aware of security challenges in the region.

### **Confidence Building Measures to Strengthen Japan-Korea Ties**

Solving the historical issue between the two countries will require candid discussions and genuine intentions on both sides. There are measures that can be taken to dissolve some mistrust and improve bilateral relations. For one, politicians in both countries should refrain from leveraging historical and sovereignty disputes. Politicians shape public opinion and often in a way that diverts attention from other areas ripe for bilateral cooperation between Japan and Korea. While this issue is important, both countries should not misuse historical disputes to score cheap political points. Arranging regular exchanges between members of the Korean Parliament and the Japanese Diet to improve mutual understanding can be effective to this end.

Side-stepping sensitive issues and concentrating on other tasks that are in the common interest of both countries is important. Coordination and establishment of sustained senior dialogue on security affairs is an area that the two countries should contemplate. Not only will this platform allow leaders to articulate shared objectives for developing national defense policies and capabilities, but it will also mitigate mistrust and miscommunication between the ROK and Japan. Sustained senior dialogues will also provide the essential groundwork for action officers to develop a broad agenda.

Through sustained dialogue, both countries will hopefully be able to discuss, identify, and understand similarities in national interests that will be the foundations for improved bilateral cooperation. For instance, regional maritime safety and freedom of navigation of the seas are highly prioritized by both nations. Both Japan and Korea rely heavily on trade, and depend on the safe passage of sea-lanes. Maritime cooperation, including joint naval exercises, search and rescue operations, counter-proliferation, anti-piracy, and disaster relief are areas that Japan and Korea should cooperate more.

Exchanges between Japan and Korea do not have to be limited to bilateral relations. Increased cooperation is also important in multilateral platforms. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a good example. The PSI is task oriented and represents cooperation for a specific, clearly defined purpose. As one of the 11 founding countries, Japan hosted numerous PSI maritime interdiction exercises Korea has increased involvement since 2010. PSI opens the door for sustained relationship building on a scale that is deeper, wider, and multifaceted.

Another option with minimal constraints that can be adopted from the US Pacific Command in the maritime domain is the Maritime Domain Awareness project. Australia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that this project has been a key initiative of the organization via the US Coast Guard, in concert with the US Navy through close collaboration with interested nations to study the global maritime factors that affect collective security, safety, trade, and environmental interests. Since the US has already

built a model for the Maritime Domain Awareness project, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. It would be more logical to tailor the project to the ROK and Japan but use the US to bridge the gap.

## **Conclusion**

Japan and the ROK must realize that they share similar challenges and that these issues rarely get resolved unilaterally or by merely coexisting. Both Seoul and Tokyo must recognize that they share similar strategic ends. The two countries need to increase communication to candidly share their goals and interests so that joint efforts for mutual security and prosperity can take place. Lack of cooperation between Japan and the ROK provides opportunities for China and the DPRK to exploit and advance their own strategic leverage in the region.

Both Seoul and Tokyo need to recognize the capabilities that could be gained from cooperation. Security cooperation between Japan and the ROK could include: missile defense, cyber warfare, or air and maritime security in the East China Sea. However, to achieve the above, Japan and the ROK must first work on the basics, such as: intelligence sharing; improving inter-adaptability and coordination of security forces; and holding command post exercises.

Ultimately, there's a strong rationale for Japan and the ROK to build closer security ties. If this is achieved, the US-Japan-ROK alliance triangle will be "complete." US mentorship is required to implement effective and efficient regimes aimed at improving coherence and inter-operability between Japan, the ROK, and the US. If we achieve this, the US-Japan-ROK security relationship will be strengthened.

Currently, South Korea, and Japan share very few capabilities or commitments, despite having similar challenges they share challenges. The US can be a catalyst in bridging this gap. Successful ROK-Japan security cooperation, demands clear communication of goals and intentions so that there can be mutual security and prosperity. Both Seoul and Tokyo need to recognize the capabilities that can be gained from cooperation such as intelligence sharing, improving inter-adaptability and coordination of security forces, and holding command post exercises.



## **Appendix A**

### **US-ROK-Japan Strategic Dialogue**

**February 5-10, 2012**

**Maui, Hawaii**

#### **Preconference Write-up**

*What implications (if any) does a DPRK nuclear test and missile test have on the credibility of extended deterrence? Extended nuclear deterrence? (500 words max)*

#### **Japan**

##### **Naoko AOKI**

Two questions should be examined when discussing whether a North Korean missile and/or nuclear test would impact the credibility of US extended deterrence by conventional and nuclear forces covering Japan and South Korea. First, would the tests change the military balance in the region? Second, would tests trigger a perceived or real deterioration in US defense commitments to the two countries? While it is extremely unlikely that the former will be affected, the latter requires a more careful analysis.

A successful nuclear or missile test would not significantly change the military balance between the US and its allies. Even if North Korea successfully demonstrated that it has managed to produce a nuclear weapon small enough to mount on its missiles, its arsenal of such weapons remains small, and the military might of the United States and its allies will continue to be superior to that of North Korea in both quality and quantity.

A trickier aspect of this issue is the psychological impact such tests may bring about. If North Korea's missile and nuclear tests do not exceed their level of success, the impact is not likely to be significant. Both Japan and South Korea have been through them before. If, however, Pyongyang shows that it has succeeded in developing warheads that it can mount on its Rodong and Scud missiles or its longer-range Taepodong missiles, it would likely draw sharp reactions from Japan and South Korea that would place renewed attention on the US's extended deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence.

In the case of Japan, such a development may stoke the anxiety it has harbored toward the credibility of US extended deterrence. Tokyo has, for example, consistently urged the United States not to rule out the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea.

Major progress in North Korea's nuclear weapons capability will raise questions in Japanese policy circles about whether the US would be committed to protecting Japan in the face of a possible nuclear attack by Pyongyang.

So far, Japan has chosen the path of strengthening and institutionalizing its alliance with the United States when faced with developments that heightened its vulnerabilities. Whether Tokyo will continue to do so, however, will depend on its confidence in the United States' defense commitment.

### **Ryo HINATA-YAMAGUCHI**

Questions concerning the credibility of the US extended deterrence/extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia need to be considered on two levels: rationale and effectiveness. Mere tests by the DPRK would not directly undermine the rationale or Japan and the ROK's confidence in the US extended deterrence. However, given the changing situation concerning the DPRK, extended deterrence will need to be reconfigured to ensure its effectiveness.

The DPRK's missile/nuclear capabilities are a problem, but not the problem. To date, the DPRK does not have the capability to miniaturize their nuclear warheads onto ballistic missiles, and the missiles are said to have poor accuracy. Even if the DPRK successfully integrates and improves these two technologies, there are other aspects of the DPRK's military threat, including chemical/biological weapons and conventional capabilities equipped with asymmetric strategies that need to be better configured in the US's extended deterrence strategy. In recent years, after realizing that its returns from its missile/nuclear ambitions have been slower than desired, Pyongyang forged innovative ways to penetrate the US alliance's deterrence system. The results are diversified asymmetric capabilities based on existing conventional platforms and other technologies such as cyber-warfare.

Against this backdrop, a realignment of the deterrence strategy vis-à-vis the DPRK is in order. Both the sinking of the *Cheonan* and shelling of Yeonpyong Island in 2010 underscored the vulnerabilities in the deterrent's effectiveness. Unless the US, ROK, and Japan devise new countermeasures, the DPRK will continue searching for ways to compensate for its technological shortfalls to ensure that its asymmetric capabilities are one step ahead of the alliance's deterrence strategies. The alliance therefore needs to find new strategies that are more expansive and flexible to deal with the DPRK's military threat. In particular, improving intelligence, greater military preparedness, and cooperation between the three powers are essential.

The new Kim Jong-un leadership will "inherit" the policies and principles of the predecessors. While the DPRK will initially focus on shoring up the regime's domestic legitimacy, hardline attitudes will soon reemerge. But coupled with the increased possibility of the regime falling into instability, the nature of the problems posed by the DPRK differs from the past. The DPRK's hardline strategy under the new conditions, combined with China's and perhaps Russia's role and capabilities in the region, has implications for the US's extended deterrence strategies.

Even if the DPRK's military capabilities strengthen enough to alter the regional balance of power, Seoul and Tokyo's support for the US extended deterrent is likely to increase,



simply because it is the only realistic and reliable option. That said, if any of these problems creates direct damage on Japan or the ROK, this will chip away at the effectiveness and credibility of the US's extended deterrent and extended nuclear deterrent. This may not only accelerate Seoul and Tokyo's self-reliant defense capabilities, but if poorly managed, may undermine the alliance's efforts toward and interests in regional security.

## **Kei KOGA**

The DPRK's nuclear and missile tests could reduce the credibility of the US extended deterrent, but it is not a determinant. As there is no complete assurance of the credibility of extended deterrence, credibility depends on three other variables: US defense policy (including nuclear policy), the DPRK's fear of future US action, and the US allies' expectations of extended deterrence.

First, the US defense policy and reassurance matters most because it signals the degree of the US security commitment to both the DPRK and its allies. As long as the United States clarifies its defense and nuclear policy and reassures its allies (i.e., no "No First Use") policy and/or the "negative assurance," the DPRK tests do not erode the US extended deterrence credibility. For the foreseeable future, the strategic balance, both conventional and nuclear, favors the United States and its allies. Considering that extended deterrence has two main components, capability and credibility, the clarification of US defense policy and security commitment to US allies will enhance its credibility.

Second, the DPRK's tests illustrate its fear of US military action such as preventive or preemptive attacks, and thus, verify the credibility of US extended deterrence, including extended nuclear deterrence. The demand of nuclear weapons and its means of delivery illustrates the DPRK's desire to further relax the military constraints vis-à-vis the United States and its allies.

Third, the US allies' expectations of US extended deterrence also affect its credibility. Extended deterrence is not a silver bullet to prevent adversaries from making any provocation. The DPRK will continue to undertake limited military provocations, as shown in the 1983 Rangoon bombing, the 1988 Korean Airline bombing, the 2010 *Cheonan* incident, and the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island shelling; however, this does not necessarily undermine the credibility of the US extended deterrent. Why? The threatening situations did not escalate into wars. US allies keep relying on extended deterrence (i.e., shaping their security strategy), and they assume an immediate nuclear as well as conventional war with the DPRK would be highly unlikely.

Another DPRK nuclear and missile test, however, may alter these variables. Given that the US and its allies do not recognize North Korea as a nuclear power, this is the key question: to what extent can they tolerate North Korea's strategy to develop its nuclear capability? If the United States admits the DPRK as a de facto nuclear power without persuading its allies, this hurts the credibility of extended deterrence. US allies would consider that the US policy and commitment would change without notice, while the

DPRK assumes its *fait accompli* strategy works. Thus, regular meetings between US and its allies that clarify the US defense policy and security commitments would be key to maintaining US credibility in Northeast Asia.

### **Mihoko MATSUBARA**

North Korean nuclear and missile tests do not necessarily challenge the credibility of extended deterrence or extended nuclear deterrence, as long as Japan and South Korea have confidence in the US willingness and capability to deter their adversary by denial or punishment. Pyongyang does not seem to have miniaturized nuclear warheads to load on missiles. Still, doubts of extended deterrence can be triggered by the improvement of a hostile country's military strength but also the relative decline of US power compared to the rise of China. In fact, the two allies of Washington are now more worried about the implication of the recent decision to cut the US defense budget and the number of nuclear weapons than potential North Korean provocations.

Extended deterrence addresses the opponent and assures allies. The United States has to be capable of inflicting unacceptable damage by denying the achievement of North Korea's goals by charging them an excessive price for achievement. Extended deterrence primarily aims to avoid a war and nuclear attack rather than small-scale provocations. Thus, if nuclear and missile tests do not lead to a nuclear attack or eventually a war, extended deterrence remains in effect.

It would be unrealistic to eradicate all nuclear and missile tests by North Korea as long as the regime inherits Kim Jong-il's legacy of calculated adventurism. Pyongyang has conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, launching the *Nodong* and *Taepodong* missiles in the past. North Korea believes that such acts demonstrate its political risk-taking posture, enhance the credibility of its deterrence, and garner financial assistance from the international community. After the death of Kim Jong-il, the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security expects to see a third nuclear test or another missile launch to consolidate Kim Jong-un's credentials.

The North Korean nuclear and missile capability has not sparked heated debates in Tokyo or Seoul, and no questions have been raised about US deterrence or the demand to shift to more independent security relations with Washington by going nuclear. At this stage, neither government seeks a US-UK or US-France alliance model.

Nevertheless, it does not mean that Japan and South Korea are fully assured by US extended deterrence. The two agonize over the implications of a \$400 billion defense spending cut by Washington over the next decade and the reduction of US nuclear weapons by the thousands. Although senior US officials, including President Obama and State Secretary Clinton, promise "We [the US] are here to stay," but the proposed reduction of a US military presence has rattled its allies. Extended deterrence relies on perceptions of the allies and opponent, but it is extremely difficult to control psychological satisfaction and risk. Washington faces a tough call to allocate its limited

resources while sending the right signals under constrained budgets in order to keep extended deterrence.

### **Ayako MIE**

Nuclear and missile tests by North Korea have not undermined nor bolstered the credibility of extended deterrence. The death of Kim Jong-il and the recent budget cuts in the US military might have more significant implications for deterrence, which will influence the balance of power in East Asia.

Deterrence is intended to convince a potential aggressor not to undertake “a particular action” because the cost will be unacceptable or the probability of success is extremely low. Any form of deterrence is only possible when the response to a violent and hostile act is credible. Since the armistice that ended the Korean War, the US has succeeded in convincing the North it will retaliate if necessary. In response, Pyongyang has sent messages that it is willing to embark on reckless and ruthless provocations.

Yet, history has demonstrated extended deterrence could not prevent missile or nuclear tests by the North. It even gave an impression those small provocations are not targets of extended deterrence. Pyongyang has conducted nuclear tests and launched the Nodong and Taepodong missiles in the past. Yet, the alliance has never retaliated against such premeditated provocations with the use of force. South Korea has stopped short of embarking on military actions against violent attacks such as the sinking of its *Cheonan* corvette and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. They only called for more sanctions, pressure from the UN, and heightened the deterrence level.

This is because North Korea also deters and even outmaneuvered the alliance in the psychological, if not the physical, war. Pyongyang has positioned a large number of artillery and long-range rockets near the DMZ, threatening to bombard Seoul and turn it into a “sea of fire.” Pyongyang also capitalizes on its alleged nuclear capability to deter attempts to overthrow its regime. Pyongyang’s brinkmanship and aggressive bargaining taught the allied forces that restraint is a more sensible option. In fact, South Korea has avoided war and has flourished economically, and deterrence prevented another Korean invasion or an all-out war.

The year 2012 might test whether the alliance and North Korea can keep the credibility of deterrence. The North had a smooth transfer of the power to Kim Jong-Un, but the new leader will be tested if he can maintain support from the military. Without that support, he would face a harder time to maintain the impression that the North Korean regime has the political will to act even in ways that appear irrational. Recent US budget cuts made Japan and South Korea skeptical about the US capability to keep providing the nuclear umbrella. President Obama’s vision for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons may have raised doubts in Pyongyang about the nuclear umbrella. Analysts say the North does not have capability to invade successfully. But East Asia might face a little change, if stakeholders fail to maintain the same credibility.

## **Akito NISHIUCHI**

Since Kim Jong-il took power in the mid-90s, the DPRK has conducted ballistic missile tests (1998, 2006, 2009) and nuclear tests (2006, 2009). These events strengthened its image as a “rogue” state. However, the DPRK is an isolated country and chronically suffers from famine and energy shortages. This uniqueness of the DPRK made its belligerent impression even stronger, since deterrence is based on the assumption that every country is reasonable. That is, a country would not resort to arms when it calculates that it would lose more than what it would gain. However, the implication of the DPRK’s missile tests and nuclear tests cast a doubt on this scheme.

Regarding extended deterrence between the two US allies in East Asia, Japan’s security issues are deadlier than the ROK’s security concerns over North Korea., Although Japan is geographically separated from the DPRK by the Sea of Japan, the combination of the DPRK’s long-range missiles, and the introduction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) changed the Japanese perspective toward regional security. The DPRK’s weapon tests accelerated the Japanese government’s effort to establish a ballistic missile defense system (BMD). Although BMD has been regarded as a symbol of a new dimension between the US and Japan, it is a substantial change from the traditional extended deterrent that the Japan-US Security Treaty has provided. Originally, the credibility of extended deterrence was a controversial issue, since it is not clear whether the country providing a so-called nuclear umbrella will retaliate when its ally is attacked. The growing capability and widely believed unpredictability of the DPRK highlighted the potential dilemma. Therefore, both governments should back up the extended deterrent by building BMD. This is the implication of the DPRK’s missile and nuclear developments.

## **Karin NISHIYAMA**

The series of nuclear tests and missile tests by the DPRK does not directly threaten extended deterrence or extended nuclear deterrence. The credibility of deterrence in general is assessed by capability and intention. There is no argument about the capability of the US to retaliate in case of a DPRK attack. Although the US military budget and the number of its nuclear weapons are under severe cuts, this fact may have implications for the discussion of intention, not capability.

However, the rise of China should deserve attention in this context. Although China’s military capability is far behind the US, its rapid economic growth has a huge potential for changing the regional military balance. Though it is unlikely for China to give full support to the DPRK’s provocative actions, it may become less tolerant of US military influence in its backyard. The tension between China and the US can have a negative impact on extended deterrence.

When it comes to nuclear deterrence, credibility will not be threatened in theory as long as one has the power to counterattack. But for “extended” nuclear deterrence, more discussions should be made about intention.

In terms of intention, the points are, first, whether the US has the intention to exercise its military might and nuclear weapons in a crisis between the DPRK and Japan or the ROK, and second, whether this intention is perceived as credible by the DPRK. The first point is controversial, and one cannot be sure until an attack occurs. Also, there are various scenarios depending on the level of the attack and the potential damage. Therefore, it is risky for Japan and the ROK to blindly expect the US military commitment in every situation. Since the purpose of deterrence is to prevent attacks, and does not include provocative actions or nuclear and missile tests of the DPRK, the key issue is to demonstrating our strong will for retaliation if necessary.

The second point relates to how we assume the rationality of Pyongyang. Despite the DPRK's label as a rogue state, it is different from terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, which are willing to destroy themselves for the sake of their mission. Pyongyang has always sought to maintain its regime, which indicates that it would not take action that may invoke retaliation as long as the government is stable. However, the generational turnover can be a critical phase, since it may cause domestic political turmoil if the transition is not successful. If this is the case, it will become difficult to predict what is going to happen, and we will not be able to expect the same level of rationality, which may disrupt the assurance of deterrence.

### **Republic of Korea (ROK)**

#### **Paul Seuk-hoon CHOI**

“Deterrence involves the threat to use force in response as a way of preventing first use of force by someone else.”

Whether a DPRK nuclear test and missile test have implications on the credibility of extended deterrence or extended nuclear deterrence depends on what first use of North Korean force the United States, South Korea, and Japan are trying to prevent; how North Korea views the US threat to use force following the former's tests; and if there is a change in ally perceptions of US commitment to their defense.

If deterrence was and is aimed at curbing a large-scale North Korean attack, then DPRK nuclear and missile tests are not indicative of deterrence failure. The US security commitment and alliances with South Korea and Japan seem focused on deterring war – not such tests or even small provocations. This position is supported by the defense conditions (DEFCON) remaining at stage 4 following the 2009 nuclear test.

Whereas North Korea may feel that its defense against a first strike is enhanced by such testing, it is unlikely that North Korea views that the US threat of force in response to a North Korean attack is diminished. The US and European air assault against Libyan forces in 2011 may have strengthened the position in North Korea that it needs a nuclear arsenal and greater missile capability for defense, but there is no reason to believe that

such testing would reassure the North Koreans that US extended deterrence or commitment to respond to a North Korean attack has weakened.

Nevertheless, DPRK nuclear and missile tests, and even the revelation of its uranium program seem to have implications for extended deterrence credibility for South Korea. Following reports of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in 2010, former South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young announced that the country might request that the United States redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula. DPRK tests inspire the need for US reassurance that it is committed to South Korea's defense.

Credibility of extended deterrence as a function of trust in US commitment is challenged, even though deterrence or the goal of a specific defense posture has not yet failed. It is noteworthy that despite such North Korean tests, the US-ROK alliance would unquestionably win a war. The DPRK is aware of this. However, DPRK testing and nuclear capability will create insecurities for a non-nuclear South Korea. Thus, it is important that the United States inspire South Korean confidence in its defense commitments. Finally, both the United States and South Korea should agree on what behavior extended deterrence is attempting to prevent, and that North Korea understands that if it were to act in such a way, that the US threat of force is real.

### **Kwang-woo KIM**

The DPRK's nuclear and long range missile tests have prompted discussion of the US extended nuclear deterrence for the allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the first DPRK nuclear test in October 2006, the ROK-US alliance and the US-Japan alliance have been trying to increase the credibility of the extended nuclear deterrent and to specify the concept of the US extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella for the ROK and Japan. For example, the joint communique of the 2006 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) between the ROK and US used the phrase "extended deterrence including nuclear umbrella" for the first time. From 1978 to 2005, the ROK and US had used the term "nuclear umbrella" for their SCM joint communiqués. The joint vision for the alliance of ROK- US, which was adopted at the ROK-US summit meeting in June 2009, just after the DPRK's second nuclear test in May 2009, also proclaimed that "We will maintain a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security interests. The continuing commitment of extended deterrence including the US nuclear umbrella reinforces this assurance." This was the first summit-level declaration of the extended nuclear deterrent of the US for the ROK in their 60-year alliance. All these efforts made by the two countries have aimed to strengthening the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence.

In addition, the ROK and the US have established the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee in 2011 to solidify the shape of extended nuclear deterrence for the ROK. The ROK-US Table Top Exercise, a military exercise geared to manage a DPRK nuclear crisis, has been carried out since 2011. The US-Japan alliance started raising the bar on their deterrence policy group talks in 2009.

However, the DPRK's continuing development of ICBM and nuclear programs could weaken the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for its Asia-Pacific allies in the long term. In other words, will the US provide enough and effective extended nuclear deterrence to protect Seoul and Tokyo when the DPRK proclaims it will launch ICBMs targeting Los Angeles or San Francisco?

Given this uncertainty, I propose that the US and ROK regularize high-level trilateral meetings for extended nuclear deterrence. The trilateral 2+2 meeting could be a useful mechanism to discuss in details on the extended nuclear deterrence for the region.

### **Min-sung KIM**

The DPRK's nuclear and missile tests have influenced the credibility of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence, a core defense and foreign policy of the United States since the Cold War, has been an important strategy to provide security for its allies and security partners through comparable deterrent threats – threats of punishment and/or threats of denial. Extended deterrence is still effective in Western Europe, and Northeast Asia. North Korea has been successfully deterred in general. However, two nuclear tests and several missile tests by North Korea in the past have changed the security dynamics on the peninsula. In addition, the *Cheonan* sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling via the DPRK's conventional methods in 2010 raised concern among US allied countries, specifically in terms of the effectiveness of deterrence. It is obvious that any type of North Korean provocation will require the Republic of Korea, the US, and Japan, to review their deterrent measures to establish solid ways in dealing with security in and around the Korean Peninsula.

In the non-nuclear security environment, deterrence could be simplified in a certain level through measuring physical capabilities. However, with nuclear weapons the situation gets more complicated. North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons can work as a strong deterrent against outside threats. However, the North's nuclear arms strengthen its military, and it could be a gateway for new threats. Are there enough response measures from the ROK and the US to the North's provocations? What if there will be a nuclear war on the peninsula? The possibility of nuclear war is low, but we should be concerned because of its impact on psychological warfare. Although there is OPLAN 5027, the ROK-US military operation war plan in case of a North Korean invasion, it does not assume the conditions caused by nuclear issues. In brief, on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea dictates whether tension escalates.

Moreover, the concepts of US extended deterrence and their operational principles in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) create concerns over credibility. In accordance with the 2010 NPR, the changes in post-Cold War threats make it necessary for the US to change its policy of extended deterrence, reducing the role of nuclear deterrence by enlarging the functions of conventional strike capabilities and missile defense mechanisms. This signifies that deterrence by punishment based on nuclear capabilities is changing to deterrence by denial based on a missile defense system and conventional power projection. This change in configuration of extended deterrence gives rise to

concerns as to whether the US attempt to strengthen extended deterrence while reducing the role of nuclear weapons can be successful to deal with a “nuclear North Korea” on the Korean Peninsula. In this vein, the ROK and the US need to solidify the format of extended deterrence and specify the list of implementing actions based on cooperation and consultation for credible extended deterrence.

### **Hyeonsoo LEE**

When assessing the concept of extended nuclear deterrence, it is imperative to clearly identify the objectives of the deterrence strategy. North Korean nuclear tests confirm the troubling existence of nuclear weapon proliferation, but these reflect the difficulty of preventing or containing the threat of nuclear weapons, which is the objective of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other initiatives, but is not necessarily the primary objective of extended nuclear deterrence strategy. Thus, the DPRK nuclear tests alone should not undermine the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence, although they may challenge the efficacy of the NPT or call into question the likelihood of a diplomatic solution to denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. To assess the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence, we must answer the following question: “What are the specific goals of US extended nuclear deterrence?” If the goals are to deter large-scale attacks and nuclear attacks against US allies under its nuclear umbrella, one could say that the US nuclear security deterrent has been mostly successful... thus far. I say “mostly successful” because – if you accept “deterrence of large-scale attacks” as part of extended nuclear deterrence – then North Korea has not always been deterred from attempting large-scale attacks on South Korea. For example, numerous incursion tunnels have indicated North Korea’s willingness to attempt a large-scale invasion of South Korea after the armistice was signed, despite US extended deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence in South Korea. Most notably, the Third Tunnel of Aggression, discovered in 1978 thanks to a tip from a North Korean defector, would have facilitated 30,000 North Korean troops per hour, along with light weaponry, to pass under the DMZ and attack South Korean targets.

To fully understand the issue of extended nuclear deterrence, we must also analyze the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence from its allies’ perspectives. The US commitment to extending nuclear deterrence to its allies has been questioned on numerous occasions throughout the history of the nuclear weapons era, most notably by French President Charles de Gaulle, who famously asked US President Eisenhower in 1959: “Will future US presidents take the risk of devastating American cities so that Berlin, Brussels and Paris might remain free?” In the North Korean nuclear context, former US Defense Secretary William Perry concluded in his 1999 Perry Report that while military deterrence on the Korean Peninsula has remained strong, continued North Korean nuclear and missile activities could jeopardize the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and even of the United States. Thus, key US allies in the region like Japan and South Korea will continue to scrutinize the reliability of US extended nuclear deterrence – which may gradually lose credibility if North Korea’s technological advances eventually allow it to threaten America’s own security.



Scholars have posited that the escalating North Korean nuclear threat will eventually compel Japan (and perhaps South Korea) to develop an indigenous nuclear weapons program. This potential decision is extremely complex and warrants a more detailed discussion of the numerous factors involved, but one must ask, “What are the consequences (particularly for the US military) if Japan and/or South Korea decide to go nuclear?” Some may argue that the justification for a large US military presence in northeast Asia may be reduced if countries currently under the US nuclear umbrella decide to develop their own nuclear weapons programs. However, several historical examples, including the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Sino-Soviet border conflict, the Kargil War, and North Korean incursion tunnels indicate that a nuclear deterrent alone is not sufficient to guarantee the deterrence of aggression. Ultimately, America’s strategic, multifaceted alliances with allies like South Korea and Japan will guarantee the continuation of extended nuclear deterrence in northeast Asia for the short-term.

### **Kyu-toi MOON**

The scenario of another nuclear or missile test is the most feasible choice by the DPRK. However, US extended deterrence cannot be considered to have failed or undermined by the DPRK’s decision to pursue another nuclear or missile test.

Unlike past nuclear and missile tests, a third nuclear or missile test will be a tool for strengthening the legitimacy of the regime more than challenging the extended deterrence of the US. If the DPRK executes a third nuclear test, it may create two impacts within the DPRK. First, it will remind people that the DPRK still considers its “Military First” policy (Songun politics) as its priority. It will vindicate the DPRK’s existing harsh environment and buy some time for the new regime to satisfy the public. It is unknown what kind of measures and reforms Kim Jong-un and the power elites in Pyongyang might choose, but if the DPRK goes through economic reform similar to China, it will require time.

Second, the DPRK media’s propaganda states Kim Jung-un’s specialty is science and technology. Another nuclear or missile test may be the best way to mark his achievement and increase his domestic popularity. In the short term, it may unite North Koreans and reduce tensions within the DPRK.

Even though the main audience of the third nuclear test is not external parties, the DPRK has to prepare for responses from the US and ROK. The DPRK may lose humanitarian aid from the US and ROK. And the DPRK’s nuclear test will stop negotiations and strengthen hardliners in the ROK.

Discussing the competence of extended deterrence may not be the right debate, so the ROK and US must prepare for the aftermath of a third nuclear test by the DPRK.

## **Dong-Joon PARK**

A DPRK nuclear test and missile test would have multiple implications for the credibility of US extended deterrence. In addition to such events affecting different aspects of the US presence in the region, the impact would be interpreted according to each country's position and national interests: deterrence is not only about *who* is deterred, but also what *action* of the adversary is to be deterred. For example, the impact of a missile or nuclear test is minimal in deterring North Koreans from an all-out war.

An additional question arises: is preventing North Korea's development of nuclear and missile capabilities an objective of US extended deterrence? This question is critical because if it is, then Pyongyang's continued missile and nuclear testing undermines US extended deterrence; it has failed to "deter" the North Koreans. If the answer to this question is no, and the sole purpose of US extended deterrence is to prevent North Korean aggression in the region, then the effect of these tests on US credibility is certainly indirect.

The answer to this question may also differ for each nation. For the ROK, US extended deterrence is not focused on nuclear weapons or North Korean missiles. The threat posed by nukes is ironically irrelevant when thousands of missiles and artillery aimed toward the South can more than raise a "sea of fire." As for the missiles, North Korea is developing longer-range missiles: it already possesses ones that can strike the South. Missile and nuclear testing have an indirect impact on the credibility of US extended deterrence for the ROK: failure to prevent North Korean misbehavior is concerning.

On the other hand, missiles and nuclear weapons pose a more direct threat to both the US and Japan. If the Japanese public perceives the US extended deterrent as ineffective in preventing increased nuclear threats, credibility of the US extended deterrent may be lost. One way to counter this perception may be the joint development of a missile defense system, which the two countries are actively pursuing. In light of the tsunami last year, it will be interesting to see how the Japanese public reacts to a rekindled nuclear threat and how the "nuclear taboo" fits the equation.

With the failure of the Six-Party Talks, it will be interesting to see how the US, in this situation, defines the role and purposes of US extended (nuclear) deterrence. If the US views denuclearization or at least the "management" of the Korean peninsula as an objective of the US presence in the region, nuclear and missile tests might force the US into stronger responses to counter perceptions of declining credibility of its extended deterrence.

## United States (US)

### **Elbridge A. COLBY**

A DPRK missile test, in and of itself, has very little impact on US extended deterrence - conventional and nuclear - because improving missile capabilities on the part of North Korea absent a genuine WMD payload have little value in modifying the military balance, which points decisively in favor of the United States and its allies.

A DPRK nuclear test would have considerably more significant implications for extended deterrence, however. Such a test, if successful in creating a sizable yield and thus demonstrating North Korea's ability to develop and weaponize its nuclear capability, would make concrete the North Korean nuclear threat, which has until now remained ambiguous and partial. If this nuclear test were coupled with a successful missile test that indicated North Korea's ability to mount a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile of sufficient range to target South Korea and Japan, not to mention the United States, its effects would be compounded.

That said, even in this case the implications for US extended deterrence relationships, while significant, would be manageable. Under any plausible conditions, the United States and its Korean and Japanese allies will enjoy a stark superiority in military capability over North Korea, which substantially reduces the salience of resolve in the rivalry. Indeed, North Korea's plausible options would remain very narrow. Even with a deliverable nuclear capability, North Korea's arsenal would remain small, and its use would court a devastating and perhaps regime annihilative response from the United States. Moreover, US and allied military capabilities, including strike assets and missile defenses, stand a very good chance of intercepting any DPRK ballistic missiles, especially longer-range missiles, meaning that the damage North Korea could do with its nuclear forces would be at best uncertain and quite possibly nugatory.

The key for the United States and its Japanese and Korean allies in the face of North Korean development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities is to continue moving forward in developing superior military capabilities to ensure that the three allies enjoy continued military superiority *and* discriminate between plausible military options to respond to North Korean provocations or aggression short of total war. Missile defenses are one important method of defending against attacks on South Korea and Japan and raising the bar for entry into the club of those who can target the United States with nuclear weapons. A less noted but particularly important requirement is for the United States and the allies to develop usable discriminate strike options against hardened and deeply buried targets. This is important for deterrence as well as for discriminate responses to North Korean aggression.

## **Philippe DE KONING**

The uncertainty incurred by the opaque leadership transition in the DPRK reinforces that the US-Japan and US-ROK alliances must do their utmost to be prepared for a North Korean missile or nuclear test. Nevertheless, there is only a limited probability that such actions would damage the credibility of US extended deterrence in East Asia.

There are two major requirements for US extended deterrence to be effective and credible against a major DPRK aggression: first, a capability to retaliate against a North Korean aggression; second, a discernible will for the US to undertake such retaliatory measures in the event of a major North Korean aggression in East Asia.

Even if North Korean advancements are achieved in the deliverability of a nuclear missile and the miniaturization of a nuclear warhead, the vast superiority of US armed forces, both conventional and nuclear, will not come into question. In spite of the prospect of nuclear arms reductions in the United States, and of cutbacks to conventional forces in the US, Japan, and the ROK, resulting from domestic budgetary challenges, there is no foreseeable scenario which the United States would no longer be capable of responding to an attack on its allies.

While the “capability” component of extended deterrence would be largely unaffected by a missile or nuclear test in North Korea, the question of a discernible US will to retaliate is more complex. Japanese and ROK confidence in the credibility of extended deterrence may erode in the event of a nuclear test in particular, but, as was illustrated in 2006 and 2009, the consequences of North Korean nuclear tests remain manageable with active US diplomacy aimed at reassuring Japan and the ROK that US commitment to extended deterrence remains unaffected.

There is, however, one scenario under which the credibility of a US “nuclear umbrella” for Japan and the ROK would be weakened. If the DPRK were to successfully achieve warhead miniaturization through a third nuclear test, and demonstrate that the Taepodong II ICBM can reach US territory, a shift in the East Asian balance of power may occur. In such a case, it becomes uncertain whether the United States would be willing to take retaliatory measures against a North Korean attack on its East Asian allies. Even if the US did maintain the will to retaliate against a DPRK with such advanced nuclear capabilities, Japan and the ROK would have difficulty distinguishing this clearly due to a possible public aversion in the US to support actions that would put American lives at risk in a North Korean nuclear attack. That said, the chance that the DPRK achieves such advances in its military capabilities remains faint, and unless this capability is achieved, confidence in extended deterrence would mostly remain intact.

## **Petra DUNNE**

The two nuclear tests conducted by North Korea in 2006 and 2009 complicated the concepts of nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence for the US and its regional allies.

However, they did not undermine the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence or extended deterrence per se. Under the Kim Jong-II leadership, it was understood that provocations and belligerent acts signaled a need for attention or were perceived as a form of negotiations to the North Korean regime. That is, testing a nuclear weapon was not only to show North Korea's determination to proliferate nuclear weapons and/or material, but it also served as a bargaining chip and resulted in creating physical and psychological damage to members of the nuclear club and the international community.

Nuclear deterrence is closely tied to the fear of retaliation. Moreover, the aggressor must not only be confident in its second-strike capability, it must also assess the risk of gain or loss. The success of nuclear deterrence cannot be proven. Extended deterrence threatens with strategic response in the case of a nuclear attack on a particular nation or territory. Under Article 5 of NATO's Treaty, for instance, if any member state falls victim to an armed attack, the remaining member states will take collective action in any way and however they deem necessary to assist the attacked nation. Article 5 thus best describes the concept of collective defense but also serves as a type of extended deterrence.

In North Korea's case, Kim Jong-il is no longer in power and our regional allies, namely Japan and South Korea, can rest assured that the Obama administration remains committed to the principles of extended deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence. These principles continue to be one of the United States' core regional interests vis-à-vis North Korea, and North Korea has been effectively deterred. A test by Kim Jong-Un would confirm that North Korea's policies are consistent with those of the old leadership; yet, another test alone would not change the concept of extended deterrence or nuclear deterrence – by punishment or by denial. Moreover, the regional alliance strategy would remain unchanged.

Dealing with North Korea has always been closely connected to deterrence even during negotiations. Diplomatic engagement – both official and through Track II meetings -- along with China's commitment to support conditions and outcomes of the negotiation process, might be our best bet when trying to understand the new "Supreme Commander" of North Korea. Kim Jong-Un should also understand that the allies are not afraid to retaliate and use force if the next provocation results in chaos and instability on the Korean Peninsula.

## **Linnea DUVALL**

How do you assess the successful implementation of extended deterrence? If the US military is trying to evaluate whether its their policy of extended deterrence is successful, it might use the following criteria: "The DPRK does not attack another state with nuclear weapons." But by this metric, deterrence efforts would be measured as 100% successful in a year without a nuclear attack, and as a complete failure if an attack occurs the following year. This binary assessment does not show whether adversaries are dissuaded or just biding their time.

Another metric might be “DPRK does not test nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles.” This measure indicates the success of efforts to prevent the DPRK from developing weapons, but it reveals nothing about whether the DPRK was dissuaded from using them against US allies or partners.

An ideal measure of success might be that the DPRK leadership understands that the use (as opposed to just testing) of nuclear weapons will be met with a catastrophic nuclear or conventional response. Alas, this kind of data is very difficult to acquire, unless we can get our hands on Kim Jong-un’s diary.

Measuring the “credibility” of extended deterrence is only slightly less difficult. If the US cannot ask the Dear Leader if he is convinced, a proxy measure might be that the US allies and partners believe that the US would respond to an attack on them with a nuclear or overwhelming conventional response. If US allies and partners are convinced that the nuclear umbrella is credible, then there is good reason to believe that the DPRK would think so too.

Thus assurance is an important part of deterrence. The problem is that while a DPRK missile test might not indicate failed deterrence, a muted US response to such a test might leave allies and partners concerned that the US is not so committed to the region. In other words, a DPRK nuclear or missile test does not necessarily undermine US extended deterrence credibility, but it might if the US response is not managed carefully.

What can the US do to assure its allies and partners that it is committed to extended deterrence? I would argue that the stationing of troops in the ROK and Japan, and particularly the commitment to maintain 28,500 in ROK, is the clearest demonstration that if the DPRK attacks US allies, US forces will be there – taking the hit alongside the ROK and responding in kind. The ROK doesn’t need to worry about US commitment and credibility if the Americans stay in Seoul, but they should be worried if US forces in the ROK start to get cut out of dwindling defense budgets or realigned to fight a different Northeast Asian neighbor.

## **Justin GOLDMAN**

Extended deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence have long been a central aspect of US policy in East Asia and the commitment to treaty allies. With a mutual defense treaty entering into force between the US and the ROK soon after the cessation of hostilities from the Korean War, the DPRK has been successfully deterred from carrying out the full-scale attack that it often threatens. These threats regularly include Japan, for whom deterring large-scale DPRK aggression remains a key tenet of their alliance relationship with the US.

While a DPRK missile or nuclear test would have implications for extended deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence, the impact could be managed to ensure both Japan and the ROK remain confident in US security guarantees. A missile or nuclear test in 2012

would provide the type of third provocation that many analysts foresaw as 2011 was coming to a close. While the DPRK prepares to mark the 100th anniversary of the death of Kim Il Sung in April, the leadership transition to Kim Jong-un heightens the potential instability that may come in the aftermath of that celebration.

While the logic of extended deterrence has prevented high-end threats, including that of “all-out war” after the international investigation found a DPRK torpedo responsible for sinking the *Cheonan* in March 2010, it has been less successful in preventing smaller-scale provocations. The inability to effectively deter these DPRK actions can lead to diminishing confidence of US allies in the credibility of extended deterrence. When the long-awaited nuclear posture review was released in April 2010, just weeks after the sinking of the *Cheonan*, it presented a challenge to the expectation of allies who rely on US security guarantees to prevent attacks as the review reduces the role and size of the nuclear arsenal.

A successful nuclear test by the DPRK would have very significant implications, based on the size of the yield. While the May 2009 underground test to explode a plutonium device was estimated to have a low yield, it did reflect progress from the October 2006 test. Reporting following the November 2010 visit to the DPRK by Dr. Siegfried Heckler of Stanford University increased concerns on the progress of the nuclear program, including the over 1000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment. With that data point, a new DPRK test could make explicit the level of progress that has been made.

The evidence shown to Dr. Heckler combined with a successful nuclear test that display an increase in yield would move the DPRK further toward its desire to be deemed a de-facto nuclear weapons state. Despite the US signaling of a “pivot” to Asia, the Defense Department is contending with large spending reductions that will impact force structure. This feeds the narrative of a relative US decline and threatens to increase the concern of allies over the credibility of US deterrence.

## **John HEMMINGS**

The prospect of a third nuclear test or missile test by the DPRK is high. Kim Jung-un’s recent succession has seen him take power with almost no preparation and with few political allies outside his family. North Korean leaders have tended in the past to utilize tests to raise tensions between it, the US, and South Korea. Generally, the DPRK does this for three reasons: first, to get Washington’s attention and finds that this is a certain way of doing so. This is either to pressure the US over military exercises, stalled nuclear negotiations, or over halted aid. Second, North Korea resorts to missile and/or nuclear tests due to internal dynamics, and this usually indicates that the leadership is feeling weak vis-a-vis the military or wants to shore up its support among the ruling elite.

Third, also internally driven, but more insidious, might be that such tests keep North Korea on a war-footing and justify harsh conditions to their population. The nuclear tests seek to legitimize the Kim family leadership by showing a willingness to defend North

Korea, appeal to Korean pride in developing such weapons, and justify the harsh social and political conditions, a reminder to the North Korean population that they are at war. The fact that these tests often lead to further sanctions and economic penalties reinforces the narrative that the North is besieged on all sides.

While these three drivers are all speculative, they are amongst some of the most common drivers ascribed to the North Korean regime. If they are credible, then it is interesting to note that US actions and deterrence policy play a very small role in the causes of these tests. Instead, these actions take on their own logic and force, as they are used by the leadership to effect changes and situations that have little to do with the US system of deterrence or with US intentionality. If this is so, how did we get to this state? Clearly, the frozen nature of the Korean conflict plays a role in this.

The North knows that the US and the ROK will continue to react in a constrained manner. It also knows that these actions usually incur political dividends at home in the form of a reassured DPRK military caste, as well as tightened social control. Furthermore, US and ROK reactions to these tests have always stopped well-short of real action. Shielded ultimately by Beijing, Pyongyang knows that it can escape any real negative actions within the UN Security Council. Extended deterrence continues to function well because ultimately, it has prevented North Korea launching a full-scale attack on the South of the type that took place in 1950.

### **Luke A. HERMAN**

Since a mutual defense treaty was signed between the US and ROK in 1953, the DPRK has been deterred from launching, or even attempting to launch, a full-scale assault on the South. Given the degraded state of its forces, it is doubtful that the DPRK could even defeat the ROK in a conventional war. Nevertheless, in the intervening years, the extension of the US nuclear umbrella prevented Kim Il-Sung from another attempt at reunifying the peninsula by force. By this standard, the US policy of extended deterrence has been a success.

However, it has been far less successful in deterring the DPRK from small-scale, provocative acts that have raised tension on the peninsula. Among these provocative acts are missile tests and two nuclear tests, one in 2006 followed by another in 2009. One might say that the implications of a DPRK nuclear or missile test for the credibility of extended deterrence are relatively small. As Abe Denmark has pointed out, the massive disparities in both living standards and what effect public opinion has on leadership, the DPRK holds an advantage in any game of brinkmanship with the ROK. Extended deterrence, even with necessary and useful modifications such as those made in the wake of the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, will remain imperfect as long as an intensely hostile regime remains in the north.

This should not imply that a nuclear or missile test would have no implications for the credibility of extended deterrence. Though they must be wary of entering into a situation



where tensions escalate uncontrollably, the US and ROK must also make it clear that DPRK actions will not go unchallenged. It will be especially important for the US to assuage the ROK's fears about its commitment following defense cuts announced earlier this year. In the event of a nuclear or missile test, the US will have to not only reaffirm the security guarantees in the mutual defense treaty and subsequent joint communiqués, but take some additional actions. Chief among these should be increased investment in the proposed missile defense system which will reportedly come on-line in 2015 (concerns about effectiveness notwithstanding) and joint war games. In addition to conveying US commitment to the ROK, a side benefit of these moves is the signal it sends to the DPRK's only ally, China. Though Chinese influence on DPRK policymaking is often overstated, it is more than nothing. Chinese policymakers are aware that continued DPRK aggression invites expanded US intervention, and are more likely to pressure the DPRK if they believe this state of affairs will continue.

In conclusion, extended deterrence will be unsatisfying in many ways as long as the DPRK remains hostile toward the US and ROK. However, as long as the US is able to reassure the ROK of its commitment, extended deterrence should remain credible into the future, even in the face of provocative actions by the DPRK.

### **Sam KIM**

“In October 2006, North Korea became the world's eighth atomic power, conducting an underground nuclear weapons test,” said the *New York Times* in on Jan 11, 2012. On May 25, 2009, North Korea launched its second nuclear test. At that time, the five permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, “...unanimously passed a resolution to tighten sanctions targeting North Korea's nuclear and missile development programs, including encouraging UN members to inspect cargo vessels and airplanes suspected of carrying weapons and other military material.” Looking at past reactions to the DPRK nuclear weapons tests, it would be safe to say that the international community's response would remain resolute and unswerving while each Six-Party Talk members' roles in the region, apart from the DPRK, would remain static. That is, the nuclear umbrella of the members in the Security Council such as China, Russia, and the US would continually cover each of their allies.

Although the DPRK's nuclear tests have been somewhat successful, *Taepodong-1*, *Taepodong-2*, and the 2009 launch of a long-range rocket, thus far to military and private understanding, have failed. The 2009 launch, widely also understood to be an unsuccessful attempt to launch a satellite, caused the U.N. Security council to enter into an emergency session. Japan and South Korea were outraged by the DPRK's attempt to show that it had the potential to one day carry a nuclear payload.

During the Cold War, nuclear weapons possessed by the US and the USSR prevented a nuclear holocaust, although moments such as the Cuban Missile Crisis raise the question on whether extended nuclear deterrence or extended deterrence can prevent an all-out war. Since the Cold War, we know the US nuclear umbrella has covered its allied

countries in Northeast Asia and prevented another Korean War. Even if the DPRK has a sizable nuclear arsenal one day that may have the ability to strike the continental US or its allies, America's posture in the Northeast Asia will most likely remain unchanged, despite recent force reductions. Deterrence, if measured by the prevention of a conventional war or nuclear launch, will continue to be a successful strategy as long as the US-ROK-Japan alliance maintains the status quo.

### **Oriana Skylar MASTRO**

The success of a nuclear and missile test and the delivery platform tested determine the impact on the credibility of extended conventional and nuclear deterrence. As Richard Bush articulates, the issue is whether the defending state would risk its own security for that of a third party. If the tests succeed, or the platform tested could deliver a warhead to CONUS (none currently under development can), then the risks to the security of the United States to defend South Korea or Japan increase exponentially. In this case, the credibility of extended deterrence would be called into question in Tokyo and Seoul. In other words, while a failed or deficit DRPK effort to achieve operational capability is highly disconcerting because it signals malignant intentions, faith in the alliance will remain strong under these conditions.

Second, the purpose of the test is relevant. A test like those in the past that sought to demonstrate a symbolic nuclear capability will have minimal impact on strategic thinking in the region. This is because this type of DPRK military provocation is expected. The US first placed sanctions on the DPRK 20 years ago for missile proliferation, the same year the IAEA noted discrepancies in North Korea's initial report on its nuclear program. In particular, the amount of reprocessed plutonium in country was in question. This is to say we have been dealing with a North Korea with possible symbolic nuclear capabilities long enough that expectations have adapted.

However, if North Korean conventional or unconventional missile activity were to cause deaths or damage to South Korea or Japan, inadvertently or worse, on purpose, then a lack of concerted response would call into question the credibility of US commitments to defend its allies. On a different note, allies may be sensitive to the credibility of US commitments and consequently any DPRK provocation, regardless of purpose or outcome, could trigger concern. The new strategic guidance announces, "US forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations." Such stability operations are precisely the type of conventional operations necessary to stabilize the Korean peninsula during a crisis. Coupled with the proclaimed reduction in the US nuclear arsenal, the strategic pivot toward Asia may not be sufficient to signal commitment to extended deterrence given a simultaneous reduction in US capacity in the region.

## **Joseph OH**

Communication in extended deterrence means that the North Korean leaders must understand deterrent threats in order for the strategy to succeed. The DPRK leaders are fully aware that the ROK-US alliance possesses a credible deterrence threat of unacceptable counteraction. With that said, North Korean leaders would not carry out actions that compromise the desire to preserve the regime. Conversely, if an actor is not afraid to die, then the actor cannot be deterred. The leaders of the DPRK have too much to lose to cross the line and can be deterred given the unfolding significant events such as the pending leadership transition to Kim Jong-un and the promise to become a “great and prosperous nation” on Kim Il-Sung’s 100th birthday anniversary (April 15, 2012). Unfortunately, these two issues still pose the most risk of triggering a nuclear test or a missile test.

Communication in extended deterrence also means that allies must be reassured and verified by the US. Through the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, the US has been committed to providing the ROK with extended deterrence for over six decades. During this period, the US has had “skin in the game” by deploying troops on the ground, exercising combined operational plans, demonstrating capabilities required to deter, conducting show of force, and coordinating decisions while consulting the ROK.

Regarding extended nuclear deterrence, US tactical nuclear weapons were removed from the peninsula in 1991 and there is no need for forward-deployed nukes due to the enhanced mobility of weapon systems (jet aircraft and intercontinental missiles). The redeployment of nuclear weapons to the peninsula would most likely destabilize the region, draw sharp criticism from regional actors, and stir up negative public opinion in South Korea. Recently announced under President Obama’s new Strategic Defense Guidance, the US will continue to counter WMDs, maintain a secure and effective nuclear deterrent, and deter/defeat aggression as primary missions of the US military.

The past nuclear and missile tests imply that the actions of South Korea, Japan, and the US were reactive. Crisis management and responses to limited provocations are reactive in nature, but one option that should not be overlooked in order to supplement the credibility is continued dialogue with the DPRK.

As North Korean elites must achieve to be great and prosperous and solve the leadership succession issue, the allies must leverage the situation in North Korea. As experts from the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University pointed out that dialogue does not equal concession: “We must talk to our enemy so we can understand him.”



## **Appendix B**

### **US-ROK and US-Japan Strategic Dialogue**

**February 6-10, 2012**

Royal Lahaina Resort • Lahaina, Maui

### **YL Biographies**

#### **US**

**Mr. Elbridge COLBY** is a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses. He served as policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense's Representative to the New START talks, serving both on the delegation in Geneva and then as a point man for the Treaty ratification effort. He served as an expert advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and in a number of other government positions. He has been an adjunct staff member with the RAND Corporation and is a consultant to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, US Strategic Command, and other government bodies. A term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the IISS, he is a graduate of Harvard College and Yale Law School.

**Mr. Philippe DE KONING** is a Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Nuclear Threat Initiative in Washington, DC. His current research focuses on global efforts to secure nuclear materials and US-China nuclear relations. He graduated with a BA in International Relations with distinction from Stanford University, and spent a year researching Japanese defense policy at Hiroshima University as a Fulbright Fellow. He previously worked as a research assistant to Dr. Siegfried Hecker at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and to Dr. Condoleezza Rice at the Hoover Institution. He speaks French, Dutch, Japanese, and basic Spanish, and will serve as a Mitchell Scholar at Dublin City University, Ireland, beginning in September 2012.

**Ms. Petra DUNNE** is a resident James A. Kelly Fellow with Pacific Forum CSIS. Previously, she worked as a Project Associate for the National Committee on American Foreign Policy's Forum on Asia-Pacific Security (FAPS). Ms. Dunne's focus has been on international security policy with regional concentration on East and Northeast Asia, traditional and nontraditional security issues, and regional security architecture, reflecting in her interest in public policy throughout her international and educational career. Ms. Dunne received her BA from Hunter College and her MA from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs.

**Ms. Linnea DUVALL** is a civilian employee at US Pacific Command J52 Southeast Asia Planning division ASEAN desk. She was a Presidential Management Fellow, taking part in a two-year leadership development program directed at recent graduates entering the public sector. She received an MA in Law and Diplomacy at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, with a certificate in Diplomacy Studies. She lived for three years in Tokyo, where she studied Japanese foreign policy and worked at a public relations firm helping Western clients enter the Japanese market. She has a BA in History and East Asian Studies from Yale University and speaks intermediate Japanese.

**Mr. Justin GOLDMAN** is a resident SPF Fellow with CSIS Pacific Forum. He earned his MSc in Strategic Studies in July 2010 from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). As an Associate Research Fellow in Military Studies at RSIS he provided instruction at the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute including the Naval Advanced School and the Campaign and War Studies component of the Command and Staff College. He served as a West Africa analyst for the Marine Corps and deployed in the spring of 2008 with Africa Partnership Station. In the spring of 2005 he worked as a researcher in the office of the Right Honorable Colin Breed, a Member of Parliament from the southwest of England.

**Mr. John HEMMINGS** a resident Handa Fellow with CSIS Pacific Forum. While a MA candidate in International Peace & Security at King's College, London, he interned at RUSI in 2007. After graduation he was appointed to the department full-time, both as an administrator and as a research analyst for RUSI's Asia Program. At RUSI he has assisted in developing and coordinating Japan-related research and conference activities both in RUSI's Whitehall premises and in Tokyo with partners including the British Embassy, Asia Forum Japan (AFJ), and the National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS). He has published various commentaries on Japanese politics and security issues.

**Mr. Luke HERMAN** is a graduate student at the UCSD School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS) concentrating on International Politics with regional focus on China and Korea. During the summer of 2011, he interned for the Korea Economic Institute (KEI). At KEI he developed the North Korea Leadership Project, which included a lengthy report on the appearances made by Kim Jong Il and its implications. He wrote a well-received article on what may occur in North Korea after the passing of Kim Jong Il utilizing data from the Kim Jong Il funeral committee list.

**Mr. Sam KIM** pursues a Master's degree in East Asian Language Literature-Korean at the University of Hawaii (UH). Also, he is an East-West Center Affiliate and President of the Student Veteran Organization at UH. Prior to graduate school, he taught English at an international school for North Korean refugees in Seoul for two years. In addition, he was a communication airman, with an Applied Science degree in Information Systems Technology from the Community College of the Air Force, and Korean linguist in the US Air Force and spent over three-and-a-half years of his four-year enlistment in South Korea, participating in numerous war exercises.

**Ms. Oriana Skylar MASTRO** is a doctoral candidate in the Politics department at Princeton University. Her research focuses on military operations and strategy, war termination, and Northeast Asia. She is a coeditor as well as coauthor of two chapters in *Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan's Security*. She has worked on US China policy issues at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, RAND Corporation, US Pacific Command at Pearl Harbor, and Project 2049 Institute. Ms. Mastro is a member of the Air Force Officer Reserves and completed Officer Training School (OTS) and received her commission as a 2nd Lieutenant in May 2010.

**Mr. Joseph OH** serves as an operational net assessment analyst with Combined Forces Command (CFC) and US Forces Korea's (USFK) operations and plans division. He has a mandate to recommend diplomatic, information, military, and economic actions for future operations and planners. He also provides independent research regarding the US-ROK alliance, Korean unification, and North Korean human rights issues. Before this assignment, he served as a US Army intelligence and plans officer for USFK Air and Missile Division. He supported theater missile operations for the United Nations Command/CFC/USFK Commander's Theater Missile Defense Senior Advisor.

## **Japan**

**Ms. Naoko AOKI** is a freelance journalist based in Washington D.C. She was formerly with Kyodo News, Japan's largest news agency, covering Japanese domestic politics and economic policy in Tokyo before serving as Kyodo's Beijing correspondent from 2004 to 2009. She has written extensively about Japan, China, and North Korea, and has traveled to North Korea 18 times as a journalist. She has an MA from SAIS Johns Hopkins University, with concentrations in international economics and Korea studies.

**Mr. Kei KOGA** is a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. His research interests include international relations theory, international security, terrorism, East Asian regionalism, US-Japan relations and ASEAN. Before attending Fletcher, he was a resident Vasey Fellow at Pacific Forum, CSIS, as well as serving as a Research Fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and as assistant executive secretary at the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC), where he researched political and security cooperation in East Asia on traditional and non-traditional security issues.

**Ms. Mihoko MATSUBARA** is a resident SPF Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. She served for nine years as a foreign liaison officer at the Japanese Ministry of Defense, and worked in close contact with the US government and military. She received her BA in Literature (Western History) from Waseda University, Tokyo, in 2000 and MA in International Relations and Economics from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University as a Fulbright Scholar in 2011. While studying at SAIS, Mihoko also interned at the CSIS Japan Chair and the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, researching security, politics, and economic matters touching upon Japan-US alliance.

**Ms. Ayako MIE** is a multimedia journalist from Tokyo and has worked at The Washington Post since August 2011. A Rikkyo University graduate, she started her career as a reporter at Tokyo Broadcasting System in 2001 and served as a Washington, D.C. correspondent for TBS. In 2008, Mie went to the journalism school at University of California, Berkeley as a Fulbright scholar. After earning a master's degree in May 2010, she contributed stories to the Japanese edition of The Wall Street Journal and the Nichi Bei Weekly. Mie returned to Tokyo in December 2010, for an internship program at The Wall Street Journal. She wrote stories on the 3/11 disaster and the crisis at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant for their blog, *The Japan Real Time*.

**Mr. Akito NISHIUCHI** is a civilian official at the Ministry of Defense, Japan. Currently he is in the MA program at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C. At the MOD, he has engaged in establishing defense policies, such as realignment of the US military bases in the Pacific and the anti-piracy measures off the coast of Somalia. Also, he joined the team to react to the DPRK missile launch and nuclear test both in 2006 and 2009. He got a BA from University of Tokyo in 2004, where he majored in Political Science.

**Ms. Karin NISHIYAMA** is a defense official in Japan's Ministry of Defense. She worked for the intelligence division, the administrative coordination division, and Office of the Minister's secretariat. Currently, she is a degree student of master of international affairs in Columbia University as a part of the Japanese government long-term overseas fellowship program. Her major is international security policy and conflict resolution. She studied international relations at the University of Tsukuba.

**Mr. Ryo YAMAGUCHI** is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of New South Wales – Australian Defence Force Academy. Ryo's doctorate dissertation examines North Korea's military capability management. Ryo is also a Reserve Sergeant First Class (Specialist) at the Japan Ground Self Defence Force, and a Radio Personality Trainee. Ryo was a recipient of the Korea Foundation Language Training Fellowship from 2006 until 2007. His research interests include defence planning, and military/security balance in East Asia. Ryo is bilingual in Japanese and English, as well as fluent in Korean, with some knowledge of Chinese and Malay.

## **ROK**

**Mr. Seukhoon Paul CHOI** is a Research Associate in the program on US-Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is also a non-resident James A. Kelly fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. Previously, he was a consultant to the Center for US-Korea Policy at The Asia Foundation; visiting scholar at Fudan University in China; a lecturer at the Korea Military Academy in South Korea, and an officer in the ROK Army. He has conducted research on base politics and the US-ROK alliance at the East-West Center and for the Reischauer Center at SAIS. He has an MA in International Cooperation from Seoul National University GSIS, and a BA in Philosophy, Politics & Economics from the University of Pennsylvania.

**Ms. Hyunkyung KIM** received her BA in English Language and Literature, and MA in Korean-English Simultaneous Interpretation from Ewha Woman's University. She joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in March, 2006 and started her career as the third secretary at the Korea-US Security Cooperation Division, North American Affairs Bureau. She has participated in many Korea-US bilateral consultations, such as the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) consultations, and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) meetings as official interpreter. She currently works at the Republic of Korea consulate in Honolulu as Vice Consul, in charge of political, security, economic, academic and cultural affairs.



**Mr. Kwang-woo KIM** is a Second Secretary of MOFAT, ROK. He has entered the ministry in 2007 and worked at the Personnel Management Division and ROK-US Security Cooperation Division. He has a BA in Business and Administration at Korea University and an MA in East Asian Studies at Stanford University. He is studying at the School of International Studies of Peking University in Beijing, PRC. His research includes ROK-US-Japan security cooperation, Sino-DPRK military cooperation and PRC's pol-mil policy toward the South China Sea.

**Ms. Minsung KIM** is a Researcher for the American Studies Department at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) where she has conducted major researches on the ROK-US alliance, US foreign policy, and inter-Korean issues. She has a Master's degree in International Relations from Korea University Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS), and an MSc Research Degree in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). She was also a research assistant at the Sejong Institute and at the Seoul office of the Hanns Sidel Foundation. Currently, she is pursuing a Ph.D. at Korea University GSIS focusing on alliance transformation and East Asian security dynamics including inter-Korean relations.

**Ms. Hyeonseo LEE** is a BA candidate majoring in Chinese at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul. A native of North Korea, Ms. Lee moved to China and then to South Korea. Her interests include Korean reunification, North Korean politics and society, North Korean human rights issues, North Korean refugee issues, and trade relations between China and South Korea. Ms. Lee is a student journalist for the Ministry of Unification, a volunteer at the Songmo Orphanage for North Korean children, and a select member of the "English for the Future" program at the British Embassy in Seoul.

**Mr. Kyu-toi MOON** is a Resident Kelly Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and holds an MA in Area Studies from Yonsei University. Also he is expected to receive an MA in International Business from KyungHee University in 2012. He received a BA in Sociology from Butler University. He has also been managing his own private manufacturing firm specialized in pharmaceutical products. He has interned at the Asia Foundation, Center for US-Korea Policy Studies, while his research interests include Sino-DPRK relationship and security policies of the ROK.

**Mr. Dong-Joon PARK** is a resident Kelly Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. He is also an MA candidate at the Department of Politics and International Relations at Korea University, where he received his BA in Political Science and International Relations. From 2004 to 2006, he served in the Korean Army as a translating soldier. His research interests include inter-Korean relations, nuclear proliferation, and Northeast Asia regionalism. He has recently been focusing on deterrence on the Korean peninsula.



## **Appendix C**

### **US-ROK, US-Japan, US-ROK-Japan, and Dialogues** Royal Lahaina Hotel ♦ Maui, Hawaii

February 5-10, 2012

#### **YL AGENDA**

#### **Fifth US-Japan Strategic Dialogue**

##### **Sunday, February 5, 2012**

**5:00-6PM** YL opening session

##### **Monday, February 6, 2012**

**9:00** Welcome remarks

**9:15** **Session 1: Security developments and dynamics**

This session looks at security developments since we last met, focusing on specific issues and incidents. Speakers should explore what has transpired on the Korean Peninsula, in both North and South Korea. What are the prospects after Kim Jong Il's death? How does the North's program to become a "rich and prosperous nation" affect regional relations? Is Pyongyang acting more responsibly? What are the prospects for another North Korean nuclear crisis? What are the implications? Have N-S tensions abated? Why? What is next? What is the impact of elections in the region? How are cross-strait relations? What are their prospects? What is the situation in the South China Sea? Have the East Asia Summit and related multilateral security meetings calmed the waters? Has the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq changed security dynamics? What do participants assess the Iranian nuclear program and its impact on security? Discussion of China apart from its role in specific issues should be withheld until the next session.

US speaker: James Kelly

Japanese speaker: Nobumasa Akiyama

**11:00** **Session 2: Strategic assessment**

This session examines views of the balance of power in Asia. How do participants characterize that balance? What role do nuclear weapons play in that balance? What is Japan's net assessment of China? How do the US and Japan view each other's relations with China and what impact does that have on US-Japan relations? How are other countries responding to the rise of China and its status in the region? How does the "US return to Asia" or the "strategic pivot" play in that equation? What are their likely impact? How will the US deployment to Australia and the basing of US ships in Singapore be interpreted?

US speaker: Gordon Flake

Japanese speaker: Masashi Nishihara

**13:45 Session 3: Domestic politics: transition and the alliance**

Here we explore the impact of domestic politics on the alliance. Our focus is on how politics affect the credibility of the alliance itself. Do US defense and nuclear budget debates and developments affect views of the US, its credibility and commitment to the region? Will US policy toward Asia, Japan, the alliance, change if a Republican wins the White House? Will a second Obama administration differ from the first? How is the new government in Tokyo handling the alliance? Has stability returned to Tokyo? What is the impact of the March 11, 2011 events on Japanese domestic politics, notably the impact of the Fukushima nuclear accident? Will there be movement on key issues? What is the meaning of the F-35 decision? How does the decision regarding TPP affect the alliance?

US speaker: Weston Konishi

Japanese speaker: Yoichi Kato

**15:30 Session 4: Assessments and implications of deterrence policy**

This session explores military policy. Japanese participants should explain how Japan is implementing “dynamic deterrence,” and issues and concerns accompanying its adoption. What other doctrinal and policy developments are driving Japanese policy? What has been the result of the US review of the Nuclear Posture Review? Has the White House provided guidance? What is it? What are its implications for the alliance?

US speaker: Elaine Bunn

Japanese speaker: Yuki Tatsumi

**US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Exercise**

**February 7, 2012**

**17:30-18:30 YL Introductory Session / Objectives and Goals of YL trilateral meeting**

Brad Glosserman, executive director, will provide introductory remarks and explain Young Leaders Program. YLs will review the scenario and discuss specifics that need to be clarified. Ground rules such as the Chatham house rule will be reviewed.

The main purpose of this US-ROK-Japan trilateral Young Leaders conference is to better understand the prospects and limitations of the security architecture in Northeast Asia, with a focus on the role of extended deterrence. Young Leaders will assess the credibility of US extended deterrence and identify potential areas of enhanced trilateral cooperation. How does extended deterrence differ from extended nuclear deterrence? What should the US do to make its ED more credible? What can allies do to

increase the credibility of extended deterrence? What can they do to enhance escalation control?

The following scenario will provide the Young Leaders with a hypothetical crisis regarding North Korea. The objective of this exercise is not only to review the strengths and weaknesses of each nation's position in responding to North Korean provocations, but also to better understand the expectations and concerns of other countries during security crises.

### **Scenario**

On April 15<sup>th</sup>, North Korea celebrates the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Kim Il-Sung's birthday extravagantly despite its ongoing economic and social difficulties. On the 17<sup>th</sup>, the third and last day of the holidays, the North Korean state media Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announces in the midst of the festivities that Pyongyang will conduct its third nuclear test in the upcoming days. On the 19<sup>th</sup>, news outlets around the world report that North Korea had conducted a successful nuclear test in the Northeast region near *Kilju* at around 10:00 AM local time, where the second nuclear tests were conducted in 2006. In early May, the CIA obtains intelligence that North Korea has begun fueling missiles near *Gitdaeryung* and *Musudanri* and that the North Koreans are preparing to test fire various missiles including the Nodong and Taepodong-2 missiles; the Nodong missile is estimated to have a range between 1,000 and 1,300km, whereas the Taepodong-2 missile can reach as far as 4,000 and 4,500km. The Obama administration has decided to share this information with Seoul and Tokyo.

### **Now it is 09:00 on May 7, 2012.**

#### *Further Information*

- The power transition to 'the great successor' Kim Jong-un seems to have been relatively smooth and eventless: while there were rumors about a possible power struggle in Pyongyang, Kim led the state celebrations for both Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung's birthday.
- In Korea, the Grand National Party (conservative) has lost the majority in the South Korean Parliament to the Democratic United Party (progressive), but only by a slim margin in general elections held on April 15. Several South Korean news outlets noted that the North Korean issue was a non-factor and that the elections were dominated by economic issues.

### **February 8, 2012**

9- 9:15AM Scenario Kick-off: Adrian will clarify any last-minute questions regarding the scenario exercise.

9:15 AM **Session I : Group Breakout Session**

YLs will break into pre-assigned teams per nationality to identify each country's priorities and short-term (within two months) reactions to the scenario. Teams will also identify actions of other two parties that are 1. the most optimal and 2. the least welcome (again, short-term). In short, prioritize three- five actions that:

1. your country/team will take in reaction to the scenario

2. are the **most ideal expected** reactions from the other two countries (five for each country) briefly noting how probable these reactions are and why.
3. are the **least welcome/most feared expected** reactions from other two countries briefly noting how probable these reactions are and why.

Each team to post their lists on the shared Google doc by 12:30PM. Teams are to thoroughly review other teams posts by beginning of session II.

12:00 PM Working Lunch

13:15-15:30 **Session II: Roundtable**

How do each country's reactions (list #1) compare to the ideal reactions (list #2) and least welcome reactions (list #3) identified by the other two teams? Where do the lists diverge/converge? Teams will address the likelihood of reactions identified in list 2 and 3.

Each team is to consider actions outlined by the other teams and their implications for the credibility of extended deterrence. How does this compare to your assessment of extended deterrence in the preconference write-up?

15:30-17:00 **Session III: Wrap up**

Young Leaders will discuss lessons learned and steps that can be taken in both alliances and in a trilateral context to enhance the credibility of extended deterrence.

**Fourth US-ROK Strategic Dialogue**

**Thursday, February 9, 2012**

9:00 **Welcome remarks**

9:15 **Session 1: Security developments and dynamics**

This session looks at security developments since we last met, focusing on specific issues and incidents. Is the region more or less stable than the last time we met? What factors are driving regional security policy? What is the impact of elections in the region? What are the prospects after Kim Jong Il's death? How are cross-strait relations? What are the prospects? How have the events of March 11, 2011, notably the Fukushima nuclear accident, affected Japan and its role in the region? What is the situation in the South China Sea? Have the East Asia Summit and related meetings calmed the waters? Has the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq changed security dynamics? What is the assessment of the Iranian nuclear program and its impact on security? Discussion of China apart from its role in specific issues should be withheld until the next session; Korean Peninsula issues will be taken up in Session 4.

US speaker: James Kelly  
ROK speaker: Chung Min Lee

**11:00 Session 2: Strategic assessment**

This session examines views of the balance of power in Asia. How do participants characterize that balance? What role do nuclear weapons play in that balance? How do they interpret “the US return to Asia”? How is the “strategic pivot” being implemented? What are the constraints? Has US engagement with the region changed? If so how? How is the other country’s relations with China seen and what impact does that have on your relationship with your ally? How are other countries responding to the rise of China and its status in the region?

US speaker: Robert Gromoll  
ROK speaker: Byung-Se Yun

**13:45 Session 3: Domestic politics: transition and the deterrent**

Here we explore the impact of domestic politics on the alliance, focusing on how politics affect the credibility of the alliance. Do US defense and nuclear budget debates and developments affect views of the US, its credibility and commitment to the region? Will US policy toward Asia, the ROK, the DPRK, the alliance, change if a Republican wins the White House? Will a second Obama administration differ from the first? What does the political landscape in South Korea look like? How have National Assembly elections impacted the bilateral relationship? How have they affected the presidential campaign and that election?

US speaker: Gordon Flake  
ROK speaker: Kim Hyunwook

**15:30 Session 4: Korean Peninsula developments**

This session will dig into developments in North Korea and their impact on the ROK and the alliance with the US? How does the North’s program to become a “rich and prosperous nation” affect regional relations? Is Pyongyang acting more responsibly? Have N-S tensions abated? Why? What is next, notably after Kim Jong Il’s death? What is the status of the Six-Party Talks? Are Seoul and Washington in agreement on how they assess the North’s nuclear program and how to proceed? What is China’s proper role when dealing with North Korea?

US speaker: Evans Revere  
ROK speaker: Cheon Seongwhun

**Friday, February 10, 2012**

**7:30-8:30 YL Breakfast Meeting**

**9:00 Session 5: Assessments and implications of deterrence policy**

This session explores military policy. ROK participants should explain the concept of “proactive deterrence” and how it is supposed to work. How has ROK

military policy and thinking changed since the incidents of 2010? What is the status of the move to transfer wartime control of OPCON to the ROK in 2015? What was recommended by the Defense Reform Committee (chaired by Rhee Sang-woo) and what is the status of those recommendations? Will defense policy change after the presidential election? How? What is the status and purpose of the new naval bases being built in the south, in Jeju and Ulleungdo? What has been the result of the US post-Nuclear Posture Review? What are its implications for the alliance? Both sides should examine cybersecurity, how it fits into the deterrence discussion, and whether the two countries can and should step up cooperation in this field.

US speaker: Elaine Bunn

ROK speaker: Rhee Sang Woo

**11:00 Session 6: Extended deterrence and dealing with regional contingencies**

This session explores thinking in each country about what is required to make extended deterrence (ED) work. What are the components of ED? How does ED differ from extended nuclear deterrence (END)? When and how can ED/END be applied? Do requirements change depending on the circumstances – what is being defended, who is being deterred – in specific Northeast Asia contexts? What should the US do to make its ED more credible? What can allies do to increase the credibility of extended deterrence? What can they do to enhance escalation control? In particular, what role would US forces in Japan play in a Korean contingency? What are its implications for the extended deterrent and the alliance?

US speaker: Van Jackson

ROK speaker: Shin Beomchul

**13:45 Session 7: The future of the US-ROK alliance**

This session invites specific recommendations on what the two countries can do to promote regional security and stability, specifically within the context of ED/END, and how these policies can strengthen the alliance. How can the US and ROK strengthen their alliance and better cope with future strategic challenges? What role do nuclear weapons play in that equation? What issues deserve more attention? How can trilateral cooperation between the US, the ROK, and Japan be enhanced?

US speaker: Michael Urena

ROK speaker: Kim Kyou-hyun

**15:30 Session 8: Next steps and concluding remarks**

**16:30 Meeting adjourns**

**16:30-17:30 YL Wrap up meeting**



## Appendix D

# PACIFIC FORUM CSIS YOUNG LEADERS

## **US-ROK and US-Japan Strategic Dialogue**

Royal Lahaina Resort ♦ Maui, Hawaii

February 6-10, 2012

### Participants

#### US

**Mr. Elbridge COLBY\***  
Research Analyst  
Center for Naval Analysis

**Mr. Philippe de KONING\***  
Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow  
Nuclear Threat Initiative

**Ms. Petra DUNNE\***  
James A. Kelly Research Fellow  
Pacific Forum CSIS

**Ms. Linnea DUVALL<sup>1</sup>**  
International Relations Specialist  
US Pacific Command

**Mr. Justin GOLDMAN\***  
SPF Research Fellow  
Pacific Forum CSIS

**Mr. John HEMMINGS\***  
WSD-Handa Research Fellow  
Pacific Forum CSIS

**Mr. Luke HERMAN<sup>2</sup>**  
MA Candidate,  
Intl. Relations & Pacific Studies, UCSD

**Mr. Sam KIM<sup>2</sup>**  
MA Candidate  
University of Hawaii, Manoa

**Ms. Oriana MASTRO\***  
PhD Candidate  
Princeton University

**Mr. Joseph OH<sup>2</sup>**  
Operational Net Assessment Analyst  
USFK Future Operations Plans Division

#### Japan

**Ms. Naoko AOKI**  
Freelance Journalist

**Mr. Kei KOGA**  
PhD Candidate  
The Fletcher School, Tufts University

**Ms. Mihoko MATSUBARA**  
SPF Research Fellow  
Pacific Forum CSIS

**Ms. Ayako MIE**  
Journalist  
The Washington Post

**Mr. Akito NISHIUCHI**  
Chief of Operations Coordination  
Bureau of Operational Policy,  
Defense Operations Division, MoD

**Ms. Karin NISHIYAMA**  
Minister's Secretariat  
Ministry of Defense, Japan

**Mr. Ryo YAMAGUCHI**  
PhD Candidate  
University of New South Wales  
Australian Defense Force Academy

**ROK<sup>2</sup>:**

**Mr. Seukhoon Paul CHOI**  
Research Associate  
Council on Foreign Relations

**Ms. Hyunkyung KIM**  
Vice Consul  
Consulate General of the Republic of Korea  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Mr. Kwangwoo KIM**  
Second Secretary,  
ROK-US Security Cooperation Division,  
MOFAT

**Ms. Minsung KIM**  
Researcher, American Studies  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade

**Ms. Hyeonseo LEE**  
Journalist  
Ministry of Unification

**Mr. Kyu-toi MOON**  
Kelly Fellow  
Pacific Forum CSIS

**Mr. Dong-Joon PARK**  
James A. Kelly Research Fellow  
Pacific Forum CSIS

**Staff:**

**Mr. Brad GLOSSERMAN \***  
Executive Director  
Pacific Forum CSIS

**Ms. Adrian YI\***  
Program Officer  
Pacific Forum CSIS

**Dr. David SANTORO<sup>2</sup>**  
Sr. Fellow for Nonproliferation and  
Disarmament  
Pacific Forum CSIS

**Ms. Gintare JANULAITYTE\***  
WSD- Handa Research Fellow  
Pacific Forum CSIS

\*Attending both bilateral dialogues  
<sup>1</sup> Attending US-Japan Program Only  
<sup>2</sup> Attending US-ROK Program Only