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## Policy congruence and distributive politics: matching voter preferences and party positions on distributive issues

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# **Policy congruence and distributive politics: matching voter preferences and party positions on distributive issues**

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## **Abstract**

Do parties still represent their voters' preferences with regard to distributive policies? Three negative answers can be found in the literature: first, parts of welfare state research see distributive policies increasingly determined by exogenous constraints (globalization), rather than voter preferences. Second, recent research on party system realignment argues that party competition today is structured by cultural, rather than economic issues. Third, an even more far-reaching party organization literature questions democratic representation altogether, seeing current party politics as purely elite-based and detached from voter preferences.

All three arguments have been underlined empirically by studies showing that parties have changed their positions on economic policies as compared to the post-war past. We argue that such an approach may underestimate party-voter congruence since it does not take shifting electoral configurations and shifting policy agendas into account, as parties may advocate different policies, because they represent different voters with different interests. Hence, voters and parties may still be congruent in their positions, even though policy positions have changed. We test our arguments with regard to labor market policy in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK between the mid-1990s and the late 2000s. We rely on a newly compiled data set on party positions in electoral campaigns and compare them to voter preferences on the basis of micro-level survey data. Our results show that there still is a reasonable amount of congruence with regard to labor market policies, especially in countries with proportional representation. We also find evidence that left parties represent their voters' labor market policy preferences more congruently than right parties. Finally and in contrast to widespread assumptions in the recent cleavage literature, we find no evidence for a trade-off between congruence on cultural and economic issues: countries with a salient cultural conflict perform no different in terms of overall economic congruence than countries without. At the same time, however, our results show that right-wing populist parties are particularly incongruent with their voters' preferences regarding labor market policies.

## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Congruence between citizens' policy preferences and the positions of their elected representatives is crucial to democratic quality. In a very fundamental sense, democracy and democratic representation are about making citizens' opinions present in the policy process (Pitkin 1967), and the election of political parties is supposed to ensure this link between voter preferences, party positions and policy outputs. For a long time, this condition seemed largely unproblematic, since "mass parties" precisely mobilized specific socio-structural electorates to represent their interests in the democratic process. As Peter Mair (1997, 99-100) put it "[Mass parties] were the first parties that explicitly claimed to represent the interests of only one segment of society (...) The political party was the forum in which the political interest of the social group it represented was articulated." In the specific area of distributive policies, it has long been unquestioned that the "democratic class struggle" (Korpi 1983) must be seen as the direct translation of class-based distributive interests into the parliamentary arena via elections. The core claim of the power resources theory holds that left parties are representatives of the working class, and thus advocate generous welfare policies, while right-wing parties try to limit these policies to avoid heavy taxation for their middle- and upper-class voters. This view corresponds exactly to the idea and concept of the mass party representation. And even though the comparative welfare state literature and the party/representation literature have developed (and still develop) almost completely separate from each other, both converge today regarding their skepticism as to whether this particular link between party positions and voters' distributive preferences is still intact.

In this paper, we address three different strands of literature, which all contend that the congruence of voter- and party positions with regard to distributive policies has become weak: 1) the "*comparative welfare state*"-literature: key contributions to recent welfare state research dealing with the impact of political parties argue that globalization

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increasingly ties the hands of national parties, detaching their policies from the preferences of voters (e.g. Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Huber and Stephens 2001). 2) The “*realignment*”-literature: much of the recent research on party system change claims that party competition in today’s Western democracies is structured by cultural issues such as immigration, rather than by economic issues, and that the representation of these cultural issues blurs the congruence of voter-party positions with regard to social and economic policies (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008). 3) Finally, the most radical critique of voter-party congruence stems from the *literature on “cartel parties”*, which sees parties as purely elite-based and state-oriented, and democracy as increasingly detached from voter preferences altogether (Katz and Mair 1995; Mair 2004).

We adopt an agnostic position as to whether we expect these critical claims to be empirically valid. However, we argue that there is a number of problems with the theoretical and empirical foundations on which they are made. These problems stem to a large extent from the fact that party system research tends to be blind regarding recent changes in what distributive policies are about (which is analyzed extensively in the welfare state literature), and that welfare state research tends to be blind regarding ongoing dynamics of electoral change (analyzed extensively in the party system literature). Therefore, certain studies measure congruence with regard to distributive issues that do not reflect the current distributive policy agenda, while other studies measure congruence by only looking at parties, but not at the constituencies these parties actually mobilize. Hence, our question in this paper is to what extent and under what conditions party positions on current labor market policies - articulated during election campaigns - are congruent with the policy preferences of their current electoral constituencies.

For our analysis, we draw on new data from an ongoing comparative research project that compares voter and party positions with regard to different distributive policies in seven European countries. In this paper, we analyze voter-party congruence with regard to labor market policy in Austria, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK between the mid-1990s and the late 2000s. We thereby proceed as follows: In the next part, we review the three strands of literature, which claim that policy congruence on the economic-

distributive dimension is declining. In a third part we present our own argument why these assumptions might underestimate congruence and we develop a number of country-, party- and policy-specific hypotheses regarding the determinants of congruence. A fourth section presents our case selection, data and methods. In section five we present our findings of our mostly explorative analysis and section six serves as a conclusion.

## **2. Theory: has voter-party congruence on distributive policies declined?**

The literature on congruence and party responsiveness is broad and rich, so that a few terminological clarifications may be helpful to situate our endeavor in these debates. In line with Bartels (2008), we distinguish between congruence and responsiveness. Responsiveness refers to a *dynamic* process of interest representation, i.e. parties are responsive if they follow shifts in the preferences of their voters and vice versa (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien 1995; Wlezien and Soroka 2007). However, as Bartels (2008, 4) argues, policy-makers may be responsive at the margin, even though their policies differ strongly from what the public wants. Consequently, the literature on policy congruence is interested in the correspondence between the preferences and policy-positions of the public and policy-makers (governmental elites and parties), rather than dynamic shifts. This is what Powell (2000) does, focusing on the overall ideological left-right scale. As Bartels (2008), however, we prefer to focus on specific policies and policy reform directions, since they are more clearly interpretable than the left-right scale. Our approach is therefore also related to the concept of “party representation” (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2007; Thomassen and Schmitt. 1997), which implies that parties offer policy alternatives and that these alternatives are congruent with the preferences of their voters. Finally, and most clearly, our paper is in line with a recent contribution by Kitschelt and Rehm (2011), who compare the preferences of party constituencies to the positions of parties on three different policy-dimensions, and who find ample evidence for congruence. We share much of their approach and assumptions, but we measure party positions on the basis of statements in the media (during election campaigns) rather than on the basis of expert-surveys or manifesto-data, since we want to break the analysis down to a specific

policy field in order to grasp positions on the actually salient reform directions.

Most of the current literature argues that the congruence between voters and parties on distributive issues is bad, respectively deteriorating. These assertions are mostly made on the basis of the empirical observation that parties today advocate and implement “unexpected” policies (see e.g. Kitschelt 2001; Kriesi et al. 2008; Pierson 1994, 2001; Ross 2000). Social Democrats implementing cutbacks of welfare benefits or – on the contrary – right-wing parties defending the current welfare status quo are taken as indicators of a declining policy congruence<sup>2</sup>. Three arguments and possible explanations can be distinguished.

The first argument belongs to *comparative welfare state research*. The very influential power resources literature (Esping-Andersen 1985; Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979) has always relied on the “mass party”-view of voter-party representation. Power resources theory has demonstrated that social democratic parties in the post-war era mobilized the quickly growing industrial working class and represented their interests in the policy-making process very effectively. For the power resource theory, welfare politics is a class struggle with democratic means. The electoral basis of parties – i.e. workers voting for the left and the more privileged strata voting for the right – were and are usually neither questioned nor investigated empirically. Hence, when a range of studies in this area found declining differences between the positions of parties (such as Huber and Stephens 2001), this was interpreted as a decline in representational congruence and a decline of the importance of political parties. Globalization, increasing fiscal austerity and institutional path-dependency are supposed to be the drivers of this decline in congruence (Huber and Stephens 2001; Pierson 2001). The underlying idea is that parties would still represent the same social groups with the same interests if only they could. However, looking at party positions and party policies only to judge interest representation is obviously problematic, because it implies that the electoral basis of the political parties

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<sup>2</sup> One may obviously distinguish between what parties advocate (i.e. the policy positions they take in the elections) and what they actually implement (i.e. actual government policies). There may be convergence in either one of them or both. In this paper, we only compare voter preferences to policy preferences parties articulate in election campaigns. In the wider context of the project from which this paper is drawn, we do trace the entire representational chain from voter preferences to policy outputs.

participating in distributive struggles are more assumed than actually observed (Häusermann 2010). In other words, it completely neglects the voter side. Even if parties defend policies that differ from what they advocated in the 1960 and 1970s, they can still be perfectly congruent with their electorate, since the electorate may have changed, too.

The second strand of literature which argues a radical decline in voter-party congruence can be traced back to the “*cartel party thesis*” developed by Katz and Mair (1995) and further elaborated by Mair (2004, 2008) and Blyth and Katz (2005). The key idea in this thesis – very much in contrast to the welfare literature – is that the age of “mass parties” is over. On the basis of rising abstentionism and electoral volatility, as well as declining trust in political institutions among citizens, these authors argue that political parties have become almost entirely detached from voters and voter preferences. Instead, parties are oriented towards the state for their support, legitimacy and resources. Elections in this view do not actually affect or change policies, because parties divide resources and power among themselves anyway. The idea that globalization and exogenous constraints narrow down the leeway of political parties in distributive politics is very much present in the cartel party literature, too, but in contrast to the power-resources view, cartel parties are not expected to defend their voters interests *even if they could*, because their power does not depend on voters anymore. This view is certainly the most radical questioning of voter-party congruence (the “hollowing of democracy” in Mairs’ words, 2004). It, however, shares a major weakness with the welfare state literature, namely the neglect of the demand side. The fact that parties advocate positions that differ from their positions in the past does not per se mean that they have abandoned their electorate.

The final strand of literature, which argues a decline in voter-party congruence on distributive policies deals with a *realignment* of party competition and party systems over the past 30 years. In contrast to the welfare state literature, both the demand- and the supply-side are taken into account in this strand of research, which has mostly been developed in works by Kriesi (1998, 1999; Kriesi et al. 2008), Kitschelt (1994; Kitschelt and Rehm 2011) and more recent contributions ((Bornschiefer 2010; Lachat and Dolezal 2008; Oesch 2008). The argument in this literature bears not on a decline of congruence

in general, but on a *specific* decline of traditional “class voting”, i.e. a decline of congruence in *distributive* politics. These authors argue that since the 1970s, a new cultural dimension of party mobilization and conflict (comprising issues such as cultural liberalism, immigration or EU integration) has been structuring voter-party links in Western Europe. Today, they argue, voters choose parties on the basis of these cultural issues, rather than with regard to economic preferences, because economic issues are seen as increasingly technical questions that tend to be out of the hands of national governments. Given that voters choose parties because of their stances on cultural themes, it is assumed that voter-party congruence has shifted to these “salient” issues, whereas it declines with regard to economic and welfare policies (Lachat and Dolezal 2008). Hence, there is an underlying idea of a *zero-sum game* or a *trade-off* between congruence on cultural vs. economic themes. This is why this literature suggests that a rise of cultural politics leads to a decline of congruence on distributive issues. The weak point of this literature is mainly twofold: first, there is no logical reason for an overall trade-off between congruence on cultural and economic issues, since different dimensions of party competition may be salient for different parties. And second, as criticized by Bartels (2008), the “economic dimension” tends to be conceptualized and measured quite simply - but probably inadequately - as “more spending” or “more welfare”. The welfare literature, however, has shown that the agenda of salient distributive policies today has shifted to more diverse and specific preferences on retrenchment, social investment or redistribution (e.g. Bonoli 2005; Häusermann 2010; Häusermann and Kriesi 2011; Levy 1999). Hence, congruence must be assessed with regard to these actually salient issues.

### **3. The argument: new voters, new demands**

All of the critics of current voter-party congruence make plausible arguments as to why it might have become more difficult or less of a goal for parties to represent their voters’ social and economic policy interests. However, we contend that we might underestimate voter-party congruence because electorates and policy issues have changed. The three criticisms discussed above tend to neglect these changes, which is why they cannot test congruence conclusively.



Our basic hypothesis is that we still find a reasonable amount of congruence between parties and their electorates if we compare voter-party positions on the basis of their current electorates and relevant policy-issues. We contend that distributive policy still matters to democratic representation, because fiscal austerity has put social and economic policies even more strongly on the forefront of the policy agenda. Of course, the aforementioned authors do not deny the relevance of distributive policy as such, but they argue that it has been subtracted to the national electoral arena, since it is out of the hands of governments (Duch and Stevenson 2008). And while this may be true for fiscal and monetary policy (Boix 2000) the same cannot be said for social policy. Welfare policies – pensions, labor market regulation, health care, family policy, education and training systems, and even tax policy – are still in the hands of national governments and huge variations in the regulation of these areas and their distributive consequences persist, as an ample welfare literature has shown (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001; Häusermann 2010; Palier 2010; Pierson 2001; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). Also, welfare policies still matter for the electoral success of parties (e.g. Armingeon and Giger 2008) and party polarization over redistributive issues has not declined since the 1970s (Finseraas and Vernby 2011). And while “new”, more culturally connotated issues such as immigration or environmental protection have certainly become key to voters’ electoral choice (Kriesi et al. 2008), there is in principle no reason for there to be a trade-off between cultural and economic policies. Lachat and Dolezal (2008), for instance, show that in Western Europe, attitudes on immigration have become equally important to economic attitudes in explaining vote choice, and Bartels (2008) similarly shows that while cultural issues have increased in electoral saliency, economic-distributive issues have remained equally important as in the past. A zero-sum view of issue-congruence depends on the assumption that parties necessarily need to present coherent packages of policies, and that an increase in the party polarization on one issue dimension necessarily leads to lower polarization on the other issue dimension.

Based on the contention that there still is ample room for polarization and congruence on distributive policies, we argue that a test of congruence needs to take two developments

seriously: the change in voter alignment and the change in policy agendas. With regard to electoral changes, we draw on the realignment literature. An ample strand of research has been showing over the past 20 years that the socio-structural transformation of Western societies goes together with changing patterns of voting behavior (Bornschieer 2010; Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi 1998; Kriesi et al. 2008; Oesch 2006). In the wake of post-industrialization, the middle class has become broader and more heterogeneous. Kriesi (1998) identifies a new class of “socio-cultural professionals”, i.e. (high-)skilled individuals who work in the public sector or in private services. This new middle class typically votes on the left, because they share universalistic values (Oesch 2006). At the same time, the working class has also become divided between a service and a manual working class – or a “new and old” working class. Members of the old manual blue-collar working class – the traditional electorate of the left, and the main reason these parties have defended generous and expansive welfare policies - increasingly desert the left and cast their vote for the radical and populist right (Bornschieer 2010; Oesch 2008). The “new” working class on the other hand has no party that traditionally mobilizes and represents them and their party choice is thus very much undetermined<sup>3</sup>.

Overall, we do know that both the middle- and the working classes have become split in different social classes with their distinct demands and needs, and thus their distinct policy and party preferences. Hence, parties may today rely on an electorate that is very much different from their traditional constituency. Left parties increasingly represent the educated middle classes, whereas the radical right represents workers. If these parties still want to be congruent with their voters’ economic interests, they need to change policy positions as opposed to the 1960s and 1970s. Hence, a shift to more moderate social policies by Social Democrats may not be a sign of declining congruence, but rather a sign of adaptation to their new middle-class constituency. This is why we think that we need to take both the demand and the supply side of policy preferences into account when

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<sup>3</sup> Little research exists on these workers political preferences. We may link it to Rueda’s (2007) distinction of insiders and outsiders with blue-collar workers being the insiders and the service proletariat being the outsiders. Rueda assumes that the left represents the insiders while the outsiders turn to the radical right, but empirically this is still untested.

assessing congruence.

The second change that we need to take into account when assessing congruence is change in policy agendas. With the differentiation of the class structure, the needs and demands of different social classes have become more specific and more diverse. The new working class needs job opportunities in the first place, while the old working class relies on social insurance (Häusermann and Schwander 2011; Rueda 2007). High-skilled female service sector workers may demand childcare policies to combine work and family, whereas they may refuse subsidies to save jobs in declining industries. Given that the context of fiscal austerity (Pierson 2001) has made the stakes higher and distributive struggles more acute, different social groups increasingly advocate the expansion of benefits for themselves only, not in general. This change and differentiation of social policy preferences might therefore translate into party positions that are not aligned on a single dimension anymore. Hence, in contrast to times of welfare expansion, the question today is not just how much welfare state or redistribution a party or a constituency advocates. Rather the policy reform space has become truly multidimensional (Bonoli and Natali 2012; Häusermann 2010; Häusermann and Kriesi 2011). Hence, if we only test whether voters and parties want “more or less” welfare, we may find a bad congruence fit, which however neglects these underlying differentiations. This is why we argue that we need to examine voter-party congruence on theoretically and politically meaningful dimensions of policy reform.

In the following, we develop a series of hypotheses regarding the determinants of voter-party congruence, which we derive from the theoretical discussion above, and which will structure our empirical analysis. We start (H1) with a general comparison of the voter-party match to address the claim that there is no linkage between voter- and party-positions in Western Democracies anymore, and that parties have converged on the same policies (Mair 2004). Our goal here is to assess whether we see some (positive) relation between voter and party positions and whether parties offer distinct alternatives to the electorate, as two necessary conditions for congruence and democratic quality.

The other theories discussed above can be traced back to specific explanatory factors, i.e. determinants of congruence, and can therefore be tested through comparisons across countries, parties and policy issues. At the level of country-specific determinants of voter-party congruence, we contrast two hypotheses. The “cultural” realignment theory (Kriesi et al. 2008) argues that cultural party competition distracts parties from the representation of economic preferences. If this is true, we should see voter-party congruence on distributive policies to be lower in those countries where the cultural dimension of voter mobilization has become particularly salient (H2). Hence, we can compare countries with strong cultural mobilization (articulated in the rise of a right-wing populist party) to those countries where the economic dimension of party competition has remained the predominant one.

The second country-specific hypothesis refers to the institutional argument that proportional democracies (PR), characterized by multiparty systems (Bernauer, Giger, and Rosset 2010; Lijphart 1999; Powell Jr. 2000) have a better representative performance than majoritarian democracies (H3), the mechanism being that parties in PR systems can “specialize” in the representation of a particular constituency. We may note that H2 and H3 are largely contrasting since the cultural conflict dimension has emerged more “easily” in PR systems than in majoritarian systems, where the rise of new parties is much more difficult.

A second set of hypotheses focuses on characteristics of political parties as determinants of voter-party congruence. In line with the realignment-literature, we argued above that changing patterns of party preferences have made party electorates and constituencies more heterogeneous, which may render the representation of economic interests more difficult. Hence, we argue that the more heterogeneous a party’s electorate in socio-structural terms, the worse its voter-party congruence on distributive policies (H4). This hypothesis is similar to Kitschelt and Rehm’s (2011) idea that some parties resemble “department stores”, offering different supplies to different groups of voters, whereas others are “boutique parties”, which represent a (socially and thematically) limited group of voters. Second, on the basis of issue ownership theory (van der Brug 2004) one would expect that left parties have a better voter-party congruence regarding distributive

policies than right-wing parties (H5). With the rise of new topics such as immigration, security and multiculturalism over the past years, the right has increasingly focused on a law-and-order approach, whereas the left has more strongly tried to uphold its traditional areas of competence, which clearly are in economic and social policy. Hence, given that the left is more clearly elected *precisely for* these topics, one would expect congruence to be higher.

Finally, one may also expect congruence to differ depending on the issue at stake. In line with Piersons' (1994, 2001) very influential work on austerity and retrenchment, it can be hypothesized that congruence is lower with regard to social policy retrenchment than with regard to expansive policies (H6). Indeed, Pierson has strongly argued that voters across classes and across the political spectrum are likely to reject retrenchment. Parties, on the other hand, are likely to have somewhat more polarized positions for or against retrenchment, based on their programmatic orientation and/or external constraints. Following this argument, we may expect a disconnection between voters and parties regarding retrenchment. Alternatively, parties might not advocate retrenchment in the electoral campaign either, out of the fear of electoral blame, in which case we would have weak congruence because we have weak variation among both parties and voters. Expansive policies, by contrast, are electorally more attractive, as credit-claiming policies for both voters and parties, which is why they are supposed to be more relevant for electoral party competition and thus more important for voter-party congruence. Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses.

**Table 1: Hypotheses**

<b>Hypothesis</b>	<b>Theoretical foundation</b>	<b>Unit of analysis</b>
H1: Parties today are detached from their voters and converge on distributive policies	Cartel party thesis (Katz and Mair 1995; Mair 2004)	Political parties
H2: The more relevant voter mobilization on the cultural dimension, the worse voter-party congruence w/r to distributive policies (trade-off)	“Cultural” realignment theory (Kriesi et al. 2008)	Country
H3: Proportional representation leads to better voter-party congruence	Institutionalism: PR vs. Majoritarian (Bernauer, Giger, and Rosset 2010; Lijphart 1999)	Country
H4: the more heterogeneous a party’s electorate, the worse its voter-party congruence	Realignment theory (Kitschelt and Rehm 2011)	Political parties
H5: Left parties have a better voter-party congruence w/r to distributive policies than right-wing parties.	Issue-competence (van der Brug 2004)	Party families (left vs. right)
H6: Voter-party congruence is lower with regard to retrenchment policies than with regard to expansive policies	New Politics of the Welfare State (Pierson 2001)	Policy reform direction

#### **4. Case selection, data and methods**

In order to analyze the voter-party congruence across different countries, party systems and parties, we study five Western European countries: Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. This case selection enables us to compare majoritarian systems (UK) to PR systems (A, Ger, NL, CH), as well as party systems with important parties on the radical left (Ger: Die Linke; NL: SP) and on the radical right (CH: SVP; A: FPÖ; NL: LPF, PVV). We also limit our analysis to labor market policy, i.e. all distributive policies that deal with employment performance, unemployment benefits and employability of individuals. We choose labor market policy because it is one of the key problems of Western democracies and because it has clear distributive implications.

## Data and coding

For our analysis of party positions, we code information from national legislative elections<sup>4</sup>, because elections are crucial in the voter-party-link (Mair 2008) and thus for voter-party-congruence. Following the work by Kriesi et al. (2006, 930), we consider “political debates during election campaigns, as reflected by the mass media” as an appropriate way to catch a party’s position. Rather than relying on party manifestos (as used in Kim and Fording 1998, 2002, 2003) or expert surveys (as used in Huber and Powell 1994; Kitschelt and Rehm 2011; Powell Jr. 2000). This focus enables us to simultaneously (1) include the most hotly debated issues during the election campaign, (2) grasp the positions of a party as it is seen in the public and (3) measure the saliency and the position of a party regarding specific issues. We believe that this gives us a more ‘realistic’ (read: as seen in the wider public) party position than alternative approaches. The disadvantage of our approach is that we have to rely on newly collected data. We applied newspaper content analysis to identify the positions of political parties in the media. For the selection of the time periods, newspapers and newspaper articles we followed the work by Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008), i.e. we chose for each country a quality newspaper and a tabloid<sup>5</sup> and analyzed their articles two month prior to the national elections. We coded all articles containing statements of political parties on labor market policy. Each article was coded in a two-step-procedure. In the first step, articles were analyzed sentence by sentence. If a sentence contained information on the relationship between a political party and some issue on labor market policy<sup>6</sup>, the sentence was copied into a data file together with additional information such as the date and the newspaper name<sup>7</sup>. In a second step these statements were coded regarding their policy direction. A statement could express a party’s position in favor of one or several of four possible

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<sup>4</sup> The national elections are: Austria 1999, and 2006; Germany 1998, 2002, and 2005; Netherlands 2002/2003, and 2006; Switzerland 1995, 1999, and 2007; UK 1997, 2001, and 2005. We had to exclude the mid-1990 elections in the Netherlands and Austria because there is no micro-level data on the voter preferences for this time point in the ISSP surveys.

<sup>5</sup> The newspapers are: Austria: Die Presse, Kronenzeitung; Germany: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Bild; Netherlands: Algemeen Dagblad, NRC Handelsblad; Switzerland: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Blick; UK: The Times, The Sun.

<sup>6</sup> Statements related to industrial relations have not been included.

<sup>7</sup> Following this procedure we gathered the following number of statements for each election: Austria 273 (for the 1999 election), 132 (2006); Germany: 267 (1998), 234 (2002), 422 (2005); Netherlands: 87 (2002/3), 201 (2006); Switzerland: 336 (1995), 205 (1999), 542 (2007); UK: 288 (1997), 120 (2001), 241 (2005).

reform directions: redistribution, retrenchment, social investment (i.e. public action to enhance employability and job opportunities) or status quo. For each direction, the party received a value of 1 if the statement supported this reform direction, and 0 otherwise. This allowed us to calculate the mean support of a party for a particular reform direction per election year. If all of a party's statements favored redistribution, it would receive a value of 1. Since statements can refer to several directions simultaneously, all four positions can range from 0 to 1.

Regarding the micro-level data, i.e. the position of voters, we rely on the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data from the Role of Government 1996 and 2006 surveys, since they contain the most detailed information on specific labor market policy reform preferences. We use the 1996 data to analyze congruence in the first election of the mid-1990s and 2006-data to analyze congruence in the last election of each country. Regarding the election in between these two, we use the average of constituency preferences. Austria is not included in the ISSP, which is why we use data from the Sozialer Survey Österreich (SSÖ) 2003 for the last and middle election. The Netherlands are lacking in the ISSP 1996, which is why we use the 2006-data for the last and the middle election. From the specific questions in these surveys, we calculated the preferences of each individual regarding redistribution, retrenchment, social investment and status quo on a scale from 0 to 1. This allows us to compute the mean position of all party electorates regarding all four reform directions. Hence, for each party electorate, we have four positions per election. The precise operationalization of voter preferences is explained in appendix 1.

## **Methods**

While these two datasets (survey-data and coded party positions) offer us rather detailed and sophisticated measures of parties' and voters' positions on labor market policies, the challenge is to combine them in a meaningful way since they are not and cannot be measured on the exact same scale. In the literature on voter-party congruence and party responsiveness, several approaches have been used depending on the chosen



measurement of party positions<sup>8</sup>. We opt for an approach similar to the one by Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2007) and Kitschelt and Rehm (2011), i.e. we use correlations to measure the congruence of voters and parties. By doing so, we follow Bornschieer (2010, 81) who argues that “[i]t is possible to measure the congruence of representation ... by calculating correlations. The differing scales are not a problem in correlations, because the latter tap only the covariance between positions”, this means that we only interpret relative positions, rather than absolute values, which makes sense given the fact that we cannot measure voter and party positions on the exact same scale.

## **5. Empirical analysis: matching voter and party positions on labor market policy**

We start our empirical overview with a general assessment of voter-party congruence across all countries and elections. Figure 1 correlates the mean position of party electorates (x-axis) with the mean position of parties (y-axis) on all observed issues on each of the four possible policy directions.<sup>9</sup> Values can range between 0 and 1, 0 meaning that a party has not advocated a policy reform direction in any of its statements and that none of a party’s voter advocates this policy reform, whereas 1 means that a party has claimed a certain policy reform in all of its statements and that all of a party’s voters support this policy reform direction. We have a total of 244 observations (3 (UK, CH, Ger) or 2 (NL, A) elections, 24 parties and four policy reform directions). We do not label the data points here, since figure 1 is only supposed to give an overview of the general trend. Two observations are important with regard to figure 1. First, there is a positive correlation between voter and party mean positions, meaning that the more a party electorate is favorable to retrenchment, redistribution, social investment or status quo, the more the corresponding party is favorable to that policy direction, too. Overall,


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<sup>8</sup> Bartels (2008), for example, uses frequency distribution to track down the degree of voter preferences and their perceived fulfillment. Soroka and Wlezien (2010) focus on shifts in voter preferences and shifts in actual policies (mostly spending levels) to test their thermostat-theory. Kitschelt and Rehm (2011) regress voter preferences measured by ISSP-data on party positions measured by expert surveys to analyze the congruence. Finally, Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2007) correlate average party constituency preferences with expert survey data on party positions.

<sup>9</sup> Party mean position denotes the percentage of party statements that advocated a particular policy reform direction. Voter mean position denotes the percentage of party voters who favor that particular policy reform direction (operationalized as described in appendix 1).

we see that the correlation of 0.34 - which is significant at the 0.01 level – indicates that voter-party congruence in labor market policy has not entirely disappeared, as the cartel party thesis might have suggested.

**Figure 1: Voter-Party Congruence (all countries)**



The second observation in Figure 1 that we would like to point out is that the spread of voter positions is only slightly smaller than the spread of party positions. Mean positions of voters vary between 0.2 and 0.9 and mean positions of parties vary between 0 and 1. This is important with regard to the presence of policy alternatives as a precondition for representation and democratic quality, since it shows that positions of parties are equally diverse as positions of the party constituencies. We have assessed the presence of policy alternatives in a second way, displayed in table 2 below. For this table, we have paired all parties of a country with all possible other parties for each election period. We have then calculated the differences in their positions regarding each of the four policy directions and we have (by means of a two-sample test of proportion) tested if these differences are significant. Table 2 displays the percentage of significantly different party positions. The higher the percentage, the more policy alternatives are present by political parties within

a country.

**Table 2: Comparison of alternative party-positions by country**

<b>Country</b>	<b>All parties:</b> % of pairwise comparisons that are significantly different	<b>Only across left-right:</b> % of pairwise comparisons across the left-right blocks that are significantly different
Austria	42	44
Switzerland	54	59
Netherlands	47	64
Germany	51	63
UK	64	58

The pairwise comparisons have been calculated for each election and then added up per country. Chosen level of significance: 0.1.


As can be seen, differences between countries are considerable. Only in the Netherlands and in Austria are less than 50% of all pairwise comparisons significantly different. However, a high percentage of similar positions is not very surprising for the first, left-hand column, since it includes *all* party comparisons, i.e. also between e.g. social democrats and greens, which obviously are not expected to differ that much. Consequently, in the second column on the right hand side, we only show the comparisons between countries of the left and the right. The across-the block comparison only leaves Austria with less than 50% of significantly different pairs. All other countries show considerably higher level: around 60% of all pairwise comparisons are significantly different, which gives evidence for the fact that these party systems indeed present voters with alternative policy positions to choose from.

### **Country-specific determinants of policy congruence**


We want to assess two theories on voter-party congruence at the country level. The “cultural realignment hypothesis” argues that congruence should be lower in those countries where cultural party mobilization has become very salient. They suggest a zero-sum game between economic and cultural voter congruence. When testing this hypothesis, we take the existence of a right-wing populist party as a proxy for the

saliency of the cultural conflict dimension. Indeed, these parties clearly and predominantly mobilize their voters with regard to cultural issues such as immigration and traditionalist values (Bornschieer 2010). Obviously, it may still be that cultural traditionalism is strong in a country without right-wing populist party, because such a party did not emerge for structural or institutional reasons (Bornschieer 2012). However, this is not a problem for our analysis, since the argument that we test holds that once such a party exists, it will distract parties and voters from economic and distributive politics. Consequently, we should see congruence being weaker in Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands (after 2002) which all have strong right-wing populist parties (the SVP in Switzerland, the FPÖ/BZÖ in Austria and the LPF and PVV in the Netherlands) than in the UK and Germany. Figure 2 shows the same information as we have seen in Figure 1, but split for countries with and without salient cultural mobilization. Contrary to the expectations of the cultural realignment literature, voter-party congruence on labor market policy is about the same in both sets of countries. This finding shows that cultural mobilization does not automatically and necessarily disrupt the overall voter-party congruence on distributive policies. We have discussed this literature skeptically above, since we argued that there is no logical reason for there to be a trade-off between cultural and distributive congruence, and indeed we do not find evidence for such a trade-off.

**Figure 2: Voter-Party Congruence and saliency of cultural voter mobilization**








The argument on an effect of electoral institutions on congruence is based on the idea of constituency-representation, namely that parties in SMD-systems need to gather large masses of voters and these heterogeneous voters can then only rarely be adequately represented with a single policy position. For parties in PR-systems, however, representation should be better since they mobilize a smaller (read: more homogenous) constituency (see e.g. Bernauer et al. (2010) for the discussion of this argument). We turn next to the question if homogeneous constituencies indeed enhance the voter-party-congruence.

### Party-specific determinants of policy congruence

H4 argues that the more heterogeneous a party's electorate, the worse its voter-party congruence on labor market policy. Its aim is to assess the realignment theory at the level of party electorates. Therefore, we have calculated the degree of socio-structural heterogeneity of party electorates on the basis of an 8-class scheme (Oesch 2006) that precisely differentiates the new and old working classes and the split within the middle class that we have discussed above. Table A3 in the appendix gives the values of constituency heterogeneity that we obtained by applying the Herfindahl-index in terms of

these 8 classes to each party. Heterogeneity can vary from a minimum of 1 (only members of 1 class vote for that party) to a maximum of 8 (all classes are represented proportionally to their share in the overall population). We can then correlate this index of constituency fractionalization to the value of voter-party congruence for each party, which corresponds to the correlation coefficient of voter-party positions on the four policy reform directions. The higher this value, the more closely this party matches its voters' positions on redistribution, status quo, social investment and retrenchment of labor market policy. Figure 4 shows immediately that the socio-structural fractionalization of party electorates as measured here is not closely related to party's congruence with their voters.

**Figure 4: Voter-party congruence and heterogeneity of party constituencies**



Even though the correlation coefficient is negative (as expected), the scatter is way too loose to show any significant correlation. While this disconfirms our hypotheses, we must keep in mind that it might be related to the way in which we measure heterogeneity here, namely with regard to 8 occupational classes. Other class-schemes or more reduced conceptualizations of groups may represent distributive interest heterogeneity more




accurately and we will probe deeper into this as we advance in this project.

Based on the issue-ownership theory, we derived hypothesis 5, which suggests that (radical) right parties have a lower degree of party-voter congruence than left-wing parties when it comes to distributive policies. Figure 5 thus shows the correlation between voter and party positions for left-parties and for right-wing parties separately. It also shows three correlation coefficients: the first refers to the overall correlation of all left- resp. right-wing parties, whereas the second and third coefficients refer to the congruence of moderate vs. radical right and left parties. Two results are particularly important: first, as expected, the congruence is stronger for left- than for right-wing parties. For all left-wing parties, the correlation between voter- and party-positions is highly significant at 0.43. Especially intriguing, but outside of the narrow focus of our hypothesis, is the result that the congruence of social democratic parties in Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands seems somewhat better than the congruence of the German and British Social Democrats (see figure A1 in the appendix). Both the German and the British Social Democrats have undergone a process of transformation from the 1990s onwards, sharing for at least a decade an explicitly more liberal, third way approach, which was supposed to move the distributive policies of the social democrats more towards the center and middle classes. It seems like this strategy did not reflect their voters' preferences, whereas the Austrian, Swiss and Dutch Social Democrats remained closer to their constituencies with their more traditional left-wing profile. The second important result is that the lower congruence found on the right is first and foremost due to the radical right-wing parties. They even display a negative correlation (though not significant). We interpret this as strong support for the issue ownership thesis: the left parties, whose core issues include labor market policies, have a much better congruence on these issues than the radical right-wing parties which mobilize their voters based on cultural issues such as immigration. Partly, this also provides evidence for the cultural realignment theory in the sense that the radical right indeed has low distributive congruence. But overall, this does not lower the congruence with regard to distributive policies, since the left and even the moderate right continue to represent their voters' interests in terms of labor market policy relatively well. This finding is consistent with

evidence showing that while the radical right mobilizes culturally, voters cast their ballot for the moderate left and right out of economic concerns (Häusermann and Kriesi 2011).

**Figure 5: Voter-Party Congruence : left vs. right-wing parties**




### **Policy-specific policy congruence**

So far, all empirical analyses have included the four policy reform directions (retrenchment, redistribution, social investment and status quo) as different but equally important aspects of labor market policy. Our 6<sup>th</sup> and final hypothesis relies on the argument that parties have particular difficulties or advantages in representing expansive vs. restrictive policy reform directions. Pierson's (2001) work suggests that we should expect stronger levels of congruence regarding expansive reforms than with regard to retrenchment: while expansion is a key part of electoral credit-claiming, retrenchment is supposed to be particularly unpopular among voters and particularly problematic (for the risk of electoral blame) for political parties. Hence, positions on retrenchment might either not vary much, or be purely opportunistic on the part of parties. Consequently, while we would expect congruence regarding redistribution and social investment (expansion), we expect to find little congruence regarding retrenchment.

Figure 6 shows voter-party convergence for each of the policy reform directions and it also differentiates congruence according to radical and moderate parties. In line with Pierson's argument, we find that expansion (redistribution and social investment) is much more popular with voters than retrenchment, and the variance of voter positions is lower with regard to retrenchment than with regard to expansion. However, contrary to what we would expect based on Pierson's new politics approach, parties are equally polarized with regard to both reform directions and they advocate both to similar extents. The pattern we find is that in absolute terms, voters are keener on redistribution and social investment than parties, whereas parties are on average more favorable to retrenchment than voters. However, congruence is equally positive and significant in all three cases. Contrary to what one would expect given the theory, it is even strongest with regard to retrenchment. Again, moderate parties perform better in terms of congruence than radical parties. What figure 6 also shows is that there is very little variance regarding voters' or parties' positions in favor of defending the policy status quo. We initially interpreted this policy direction in the sense of welfare protectionism, but due to the fact that the status quo can be both an anti-retrenchment or an anti-expansion position, it is difficult to interpret it substantially, which explains both the low variation of positions and low congruence.

**Figure 6: Voter-Party Congruence: different labor market policy reform directions**



## 6. Conclusion

Several different, unrelated strands of recent political science literature are arguing that the voter-party congruence on distributive policies has declined in Western Europe. Our goal in this paper was to start an empirical exploration of the arguments underlying this hypothesis. Different authors contend that parties deviate increasingly from what their voters want in terms of economic and social policies, because their hands are tied by exogenous forces (such as „globalization“), because their source of power and legitimacy has become detached from elections and voters (the „cartel party thesis“) or because parties and voters today care about cultural, rather than distributive policies (the „cultural realignment thesis“). In opposition to these three claims, we have argued that voter-party congruence might persist, because distributive policies are persistently salient to the public and the democratic process. We also claimed that parties might still be congruent with their voters, even though these voters – and hence their economic interests – have changed. Congruence today may actually require parties to advocate different policies than they claimed in the past.

We based our analysis on newly collected data regarding labor market policy in five West European countries, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Labor market policies are highly salient in the public debate. Also, they are really in the hands of national governments, so that congruence is a matter of the parties' choices, not institutional constraints (pension policies, e.g. are much more path-dependent and thus allow for less variable party positions). To assess congruence, we mostly correlated the mean positions of party electorates (based on survey data) and average party positions (based on coded newspaper data).

In conclusion of this paper, we would like to stress three findings. First, left-wing parties are more congruent with their voters regarding labor market policies than right-wing parties. This difference is rather clear when we compare all left-wing parties to all right-wing parties. When we differentiate between moderate and radical parties on both the left and the right, it appears that both radical and moderate left parties are clearly congruent with their voters, while on the right, the radical parties advocate policy reforms that are completely unrelated to their voters' position. The moderate right-wing parties, by

contrast, are also congruent with their voters. We interpret this finding as evidence for the issue ownership thesis, which holds that parties to a certain extent “own” particular political topics that are key to their mobilization and to what voters expect from them and trust them to do. For the electoral success of moderate and radical left parties, distributive policies have always been key and they seem to remain important. Hence, the argument that parties have moved away from their voters and converged on neo-liberal policies because of exogenous constraints such as globalization does not seem to hold.

The second main finding is actually a non-finding. Contrary to what the “cultural realignment thesis” would hold, we do not find a trade-off between cultural and economic voter mobilization. Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands have all seen the emergence of powerful populist right-wing parties (the SVP, FPÖ, LPF/PVV), which have massively shifted the political debates in these countries towards cultural issues such as immigration or cultural liberalism (Kriesi et al. 2008). All parties in these countries need to deal with these topics, even if only in a reactive way. One might expect that this focus on the key topics of the new right has distracted attention from distributive policies altogether, so that congruence between voters and parties on these economic issues would be particularly weak. This is, however, not what we find. Overall congruence in Austria Switzerland, and the Netherlands is equally strong as in Germany and UK, two countries where the populist right has not managed to enter the electoral debates on an important scale. Hence, there does not seem to be a general trade-off between economic or cultural congruence. Quite the opposite, further analyses of congruence regarding specific party families has shown that the Social Democrats in those countries with a strong populist right (Austria, Switzerland, and the Netherlands) are very much in line with their voters, and somewhat more so than the Social Democrats that have not been challenged by new right-wing competitors who try to steal their working class electorate (in Germany and the UK, see figures A1 in the appendix). To us, this seems a particularly intriguing finding, since it may mean that where the electoral competition for worker’s votes is more acute (i.e. where Social democrats face right-wing rivals), the left is pushed to represent their voters economic interests more clearly so than in contexts, where the left seems unchallenged and thus has the leeway to move to the center (as in the UK and

Germany under the “third way” experiment). In this sense, the emergence of a culturally based workerist right (the populist right) may not weaken voter-party congruence on distributive issues overall, but even strengthen it on the left side of the political spectrum.

Finally, a third finding seems important to us, since it calls for further investigation. We have hypothesized that voter-party congruence may be weak if a party’s electorate is very heterogeneous socio-structurally. However, we have not found evidence for a link between the heterogeneity and congruence.<sup>10</sup> There are relatively homogenous parties (such as the Austrian FPÖ) which represent their voters labor market policy positions very poorly, and there are parties with a very heterogeneous electorate (such as the Swiss Social Democrats) who still have a very good fit. While the first deviation from a linear correlation might be explained – see above – with the specific non-economic issue-profile of right-wing populists, the second is more difficult to understand. How does a party manage to be congruent with its electorate if the latter is composed by very different social groups, with very different economic needs and demands? In line with earlier work of the power resource literature (Esping-Andersen 1985; Korpi 1983) it might be that these parties are particularly successful in fostering a policy program that speaks to several groups of voters, so that they actually foster homogeneity themselves. But this requires further research, especially a test of a variety of conceptualizations and measurements of heterogeneity. Overall, we think that our paper has shown that congruence between parties and voters on distributive policies has not disappeared, but it varies across countries and parties according to patterns that can be explained by existing theories.

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<sup>10</sup> However, we do find evidence that parties in PR-system have a better voter-party-congruence than parties in MA-systems. But as shown by our non-finding on the heterogeneity of constituencies, the causal link cannot be from electoral system, to more homogenous parties to better representation. An alternative explanation – and in line with our finding on the impact of cultural cleavage-mobilization – might be that our PR-system-countries tend to be countries where the radical right has surged. This in effect might cause social democratic parties to foster voter-party-congruence on labor market issues and thereby improve the overall voter-party-congruence within a country.

## Appendix

Table A1 List of variables

VARIABLE	OPERATIONALIZATION
Redistribution (UK, GER, SWI)	<p>ISSP Role of Government 2006.            Redistribution is the mean of the following three dichotomous variables: the respondent thinks 1) that the government should spend more money on unemployment benefits (V23), 2) that it is the government responsibility to provide a decent living standard for the unemployed (V30) and 3) that it is the government's responsibility to reduce income differences (V31).</p>
Redistribution (A)	<p>Sozialer Survey Österreich 2003            Redistribution is the mean of the following two dichotomous variables: 1) that it is the government responsibility to provide a decent living standard for the unemployed (f91f03) and 2) that it is the government's responsibility to reduce income differences (f91g03).</p>
Social investment (UK, GER, SWI)	<p>ISSP Role of Government 2006.            Social investment is the mean of the following four dichotomous variables: the respondent thinks 1) that the government should finance projects to create new jobs (V12), 2) that the working week should be reduced to create more jobs (V16), 3) that it is the governments' responsibility to provide a job to everyone who wants one (V25) and 4) that it is the governments' responsibility to provide financial help to students from low-income families (V32).</p>
Social investment (A)	<p>Sozialer Survey Österreich 2003            Social investment is the mean of the following four dichotomous variables: the respondent thinks 1) that it is the governments' responsibility to provide a job to everyone who wants one (f91a03) and 2) that it is the governments' responsibility to provide financial help to students from low-income families (f91h03).</p>
Retrenchment (UK, GER, SWI)	<p>ISSP Role of Government 2006.            Retrenchment is the mean of the following four dichotomous variables: the respondent thinks 1) that there should be cuts in government spending (V11), 2) that the government should spend less money on unemployment benefits (V23), 3) that it is not the government's responsibility to provide a decent living standard for the unemployed (V30) and 4) that it is not the governments responsibility to reduce income differences (V31).</p>
Retrenchment (A)	<p>Sozialer Survey Österreich 2003            Retrenchment is the mean of the following three dichotomous variables: the respondent thinks 1) that there should be cuts in government spending (f95b03), 2) that it</p>



	is not the government's responsibility to provide a decent living standard for the unemployed (f91f03) and 3) that it is not the governments responsibility to reduce income differences (f91g03).
	ISSP Role of Government 2006. Status quo is the mean of the following five dichotomous variables: the respondent thinks 1) that the government should spend neither more nor less on unemployment benefits (V23), 2) that the government should support declining industries to protect jobs (V15), 3) that the government should make no cuts in government spending (V11), 4) that it rather is the government's responsibility to provide a decent living standard for the unemployed (V30), and 5) that it rather is the government's responsibility to reduce income differences (V31).
Status quo (UK, GER, SWI)	Sozialer Survey Österreich 2003 Status quo is the mean of the following three dichotomous variables: the respondent thinks 1) that the government should make no cuts in government spending (f95b03), 2) that it rather is the government's responsibility to provide a decent living standard for the unemployed (f91f03), and 3) that it rather is the government's responsibility to reduce income differences (f91g03).
Status quo (A)	ISSP Role of Government 2006 GB_PRTY ("Which party do you feel close to"; if respondent does not feel close to any party, then "Which party would you vote for next Sunday?")
UKparty	ISSP Role of Government 2006 DE_PRTY ("Which party would you vote for next Sunday?")
GERparty	ISSP Role of Government 2006 CH_PRTY ("Which party do you feel close to?")
CHparty	Sozialer Survey Österreich 2003 H13103 ("Which party do you feel close to?")
Aparty	Index of <i>electoral</i> fractionalization of the party-system according to the formula [F] proposed by Rae (1968). Values from Argmingeon et al. (2010).
Party system fractionalization	Effective number of parties on the <i>votes</i> level according to the formula [N2] proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Values from Armingeon et al. (2010)
Effective number of parties	Herfindahl-Index: Value Party A = $1 / (\sum s_i^2)$ where s = share of class i on party A's constituency calculated from ISSP 2006 and SSÖ 2003 data.
Heterogeneity in party constituency	

Table A2: List of Political Parties

<b>Party Label</b>	<b>Party Name</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Moderate/Radical</b>
cda	Christian Democratic Appeal	Netherlands	moderate
cdu	Christian Democratic Union	Germany	moderate
cons	Conservative Party	UK	moderate
cvp	Christian Democrats	Switzerland	moderate
d66	Democrats 66	Netherlands	moderate
evp	Protestant People's Party	Switzerland	moderate
fdpCH	Radical Democrats	Switzerland	moderate
fdpD	Free Democrats	Germany	moderate
fpo	Freedom Party	Austria	radical
gl	GreenLeft	Netherlands	moderate
greenA	Greens	Austria	moderate
greenCH	Greens	Switzerland	moderate
greenD	Greens	Germany	moderate
lab	Labor Party	UK	moderate
lib	Liberal Democrats	UK	moderate
linke	Radical Left	Germany	radical
ovp	People's Party	Austria	moderate
pvda	Labour Party	Netherlands	moderate
sp	Socialist Party	Netherlands	radical
spd	Social Democrats	Germany	moderate
spo	Social Democrats	Austria	moderate
sps	Social Democrats	Switzerland	moderate
svp	Swiss People's Party	Switzerland	radical
vvd	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	Netherlands	moderate

**Figure A1: Voter-Party Congruence: new and old social democracy**





Table A3: Heterogeneity in Party Constituency

Party	Heterogeneity (Herfindahl-Index)		
	1 <sup>st</sup> period	2 <sup>nd</sup> period	3 <sup>rd</sup> period
<b>cda (NL)</b>	.	5.71	5.71
<b>cdu (Ger)</b>	5.97	6.30	6.62
<b>cons (UK)</b>	.	6.29	6.29
<b>cvp (CH)</b>	6.50	6.69	6.88
<b>d66 (NL)</b>	.	4.76	4.76
<b>evp (CH)</b>	3.57	4.04	4.50
<b>fdpCH (CH)</b>	6.49	5.91	5.33
<b>fdpD (Ger)</b>	7.00	6.71	6.41
<b>fpo (A)</b>	.	4.2	4.2
<b>gl (NL)</b>	.	5.22	5.22
<b>greenA (A)</b>	.	4.5	4.5
<b>greenCH (CH)</b>	6.61	6.24	5.87
<b>greenD (Ger)</b>	6.34	6.35	6.35
<b>lab (UK)</b>	.	5.91	5.91
<b>lib (UK)</b>	.	6.87	6.87
<b>linke (Ger)</b>	6.06	5.19	4.31
<b>ovp (A)</b>	.	4.80	4.80
<b>pvda (NL)</b>	.	6.10	6.10
<b>sp (NL)</b>	.	6.01	6.01
<b>spd (Ger)</b>	5.09	5.25	5.41
<b>spo (A)</b>	.	4.2	4.2
<b>sps (CH)</b>	5.99	6.05	6.10
<b>svp (CH)</b>	6.65	6.41	6.16
<b>vvd (NL)</b>	.	5.27	5.27

Calculation are based on the ISSP-data from 1996 and 2006, using the 8-class-scheme by (Oesch 2006).

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