



# Handicap International's SALW Risk Awareness Project in Libya

MINE ACTION AND ARMED VIOLENCE REDUCTION

Libya

CASE STUDY | SEPTEMBER 2012

GICHD | CIDHG



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## INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

Handicap International (HI) began its operations in Libya with a focus on mine action. In early April 2011, HI began providing emergency mine/Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Risk Education (ERE) to civilians in Benghazi and the surrounding Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. Eventually expanding to Ras Lanouf and Misrata in September 2011, the project featured a large-scale awareness-raising campaign as well as the provision of direct ERE sessions. The objective was to minimise the risk posed by the widespread contamination of ERW in and around civilian homes and public spaces. For this reason, HI initially concentrated its risk reduction efforts on delivering mine/ERW safety messages in IDP camps. This target group was selected because HI wanted to deliver their safety messages to the most at-risk groups before they returned to their homes in and around Benghazi, Ras Lanouf and Misrata.

Despite continuing its mine/ERW risk reduction activities, in September 2011, HI expanded its project to also cover Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). This was a separate, distinct stream of risk awareness activities addressing the widespread incidence of SALW-related incidents and accidents in eastern Libya's urban centres. With the end of the conflict in late 2011, and the transition to a post-conflict phase in early 2012, HI expanded its activities to Tripoli. There, it focused specifically on SALW Risk Awareness (RA) comprising Risk Education (RE), Public Information and Advocacy; SALW Community Safety Plans; SALW Impact Assessment and Community Safety Perceptions; and Gun Violence survivors' data collection.<sup>2</sup> Since April 2012, HI has been working on the integration of SALW into the mine/ERW Risk Education and data collection process in Misrata and Sirte.

The purpose of this case study is to examine HI's SALW project in Libya, the rationale for and reasons behind the shift away from a strict focus on mine action into the wider field of Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), and to identify lessons learnt from its experience to date.

## CONTEXT

Inspired by the wave of protests and demonstrations that swept across the Middle East starting in December 2010, Libyan dissidents of the Muammar Gaddafi regime organised a "day of rage" on 17 February 2011 to protest and demand the end of Gaddafi's 42-year rule. After several weeks of escalating confrontations with Gaddafi's security forces, the opposition movement transformed into an outright armed rebellion, launching Libya into a ten-month civil conflict.<sup>3</sup> With military support from a UN-approved North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operation and the mass defection of soldiers and high-level officials from Gaddafi's ranks, the armed rebellion moved to become loosely organised under a National Transitional Council (NTC), which came to play a coordinating role as the rebels moved from their eastern-held cities towards Misrata, Tripoli and, eventually, Sirte – Gaddafi's last stronghold. The conflict only came to an end with the fall of Sirte and the eventual capture and death of Gaddafi himself in October 2011.<sup>4</sup>

The protracted conflict inflicted a great humanitarian toll on the Libyan people. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), since the beginning of the conflict in mid-February 2011, more than 900,000 people left the country while an estimated 200,000 people were internally displaced by the conflict.<sup>5</sup> The conflict also resulted in serious levels of mine/ERW contamination across the country. Apart from ERW, including unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) left behind in battle areas spread across the country, many communities and key roads were contaminated by landmines and cluster munitions used by Gaddafi's forces.<sup>6</sup> Handicap International estimated that about half a million Libyans would be exposed to the dangers of ERW either due to the



proximity of their homes or their return routes to contaminated areas.<sup>7</sup> It is within this context of ongoing civil conflict that HI began its emergency mine/ERW RE and SALW RA activities in Libya in April and September 2011, respectively.

## **THE RATIONALE FOR THE SHIFT**

In addition to the serious mine/ERW contamination problem, Libya's conflict has also contributed to the proliferation of SALW, which have become household items in many cities. The reasons behind the proliferation of SALW include Gaddafi's deliberate opening of his military stocks to sympathetic civilians; the raiding of Gaddafi's weapons and munitions depots as they were abandoned by his forces; and Western governments supplying rebels with weapons. In short, an unknown number of SALW found their way into the hands of civilians who are not trained in their proper usage or storage.

The wide availability of SALW has resulted in accidents, especially in heavily populated urban areas. According to Frédéric Maio, HI's manager of operations in Libya, 400 people were killed between October and November 2011 in Tripoli alone, as a result of accidents involving SALW. In fact, doctors at the Tripoli Central Hospital claimed that stray bullets were the "number one reason" for admittance to emergency rooms in the capital.<sup>8</sup> Based on the humanitarian impact that SALW in civilian hands was having on the Libyan population, HI's ERE teams working on the ground suggested the organisation expand its work to include a SALW-specific focus. According to HI's SALW Project Manager in Tripoli, over 1,100 people have been treated for SALW-related injuries in Tripoli since the beginning of 2012, while there were only 213 mine/ERW victims in the entire country between January 2011 and June 2012.<sup>9</sup>

The broadening of HI's work in Libya reflected a strategic shift that had already begun years earlier. HI's Mine Action Department began its involvement in AVR in 2007, with an initial focus on collecting data on victims of AVR alongside data collected on mine/ERW casualties and injuries. HI's Risk Education Technical Advisor eventually became a part-time AVR Technical Advisor, focused on identifying all potential disciplines that HI could offer to provide a holistic AVR capacity, and on informing further the organisation's senior management and Board on the potential need for AVR specific programming. HI realised that many projects implemented by the Development Department were already part of an AVR response in HI programmes. To make HI's operations more integrated and holistic, SALW Control officially entered the agenda. The Risk Education Technical Advisor became a full-time AVR Technical Advisor dedicated to the organisation's SALW work. Focusing on the notion of preventing disability by engaging with AVR, HI has participated in international fora on AVR, indicating the organisation's clear positioning in AVR and more specifically in SALW Control. HI is working on developing its policy and has a wide angle paper that outlines its approach, strategy and methodology for its AVR programming, and HI's past and current operations in regard to AVR and SALW Control are also feeding into the development of the policy.

HI's programme in Libya currently comprises SALW Risk Awareness, including RE, Public Info and advocacy; Weapons Disposal; PSSM; data collection and research. The current programme illustrates the major shift of HI's Mine Action Department towards a more integrated, holistic approach in its field interventions.

## THE PROJECT

### Rapid Assessment

In early March 2011, only a few weeks after the start of the conflict, HI's France-based Mine Action Department deployed a three-person international team (one AVR Technical Advisor, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal [EOD] Level Four senior Technical Advisor, and a Desk Officer) to eastern Libya to carry out a rapid needs assessment of the mine/ERW and SALW situation in the region in terms of the threats posed to civilians. During the needs assessment mission, HI's team met with members of the burgeoning NTC, local communities, and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs)<sup>10</sup> present in the region to gather key information on the emerging mine/ERW threat as well as the relevant security and logistical situation. Among others, the assessment mission found that:

- > large numbers of poorly trained combatants were contributing to civilian deaths due to misfires and UXO contamination in and around conflict zones, including in densely populated civilian areas
- > civilians had gained unrestricted and unregulated access to a wide range of weaponry and explosive ordnance from weapons depots and Ammunition Storage Areas (ASAs) abandoned by Gaddafi's retreating forces
- > the ongoing conflict was contributing to a large amount of UXO contamination including air-to-ground weaponry such as bombs and rockets as well as ground artillery, grenades, mortars, napalm, tank-fired shells, and Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)
- > there was a growing availability and misuse of SALW by civilians and poorly trained combatants
- > no other organisation or actors were addressing the problem

In addition to the serious ERW and SALW situation, HI's team also witnessed risky behaviour undertaken by civilians, ranging from children tampering with ERW and other military equipment in and around destroyed military bases to civilians collecting ammunition and ERW to sell as scrap metal and souvenirs. Such widespread mishandling of weapons and hazardous items by untrained civilians, including children and adolescents, is what led HI to focus its efforts on mitigating high risk behaviour through appropriate ERE tailored to the needs of these pre-identified target groups.

### Implementation

#### Phase 1 | Eastern Libya

Despite an early withdrawal by the needs assessment team on 22 March 2011 due to the deteriorating security situation in the country, HI managed to gather enough information from the needs assessment to deploy its rapid response team to Benghazi on 06 April 2011.

Although the needs assessment mission concluded that the wide proliferation, availability and misuse of SALW posed a serious humanitarian risk to the Libyan population, the ongoing conflict made addressing the SALW situation difficult as weapons were not only seen as necessary for self-defence, but had also gained symbolic association with freedom from Gaddafi's rule. For this reason, HI launched its SALW risk awareness project in October 2011, once the political situation had stabilised, making it possible to talk more openly about the risks posed by SALW misuse.

## Objectives

Based on the findings of HI's rapid needs assessment mission, the overall goal of the organisation's intervention in Libya was to reduce the impact and risks posed by mines/ERW/SALW on civilian populations within conflict-affected areas in eastern Libya. More specifically, the project objectives were to:

- > rapidly provide public information and safety messages to at-risk populations in order to assist civilians in avoiding death and injury from mines, other ERW and SALW
- > contribute to the safe return of IDPs to residential, educational and health facilities with a minimised threat of death and injury from mines and ERW
- > advocate for local and national authorities not to use landmines; to destroy any landmine in their possession; to cooperate in the provision of mine clearance, RE and Victim Assistance (VA); and to join the Mine Ban Treaty<sup>11</sup>
- > assist local authorities to identify and, if appropriate, dispose of ERW in the most affected zones
- > set up an Information Management & Exchange system aiming at enhancing data collection/analysis and sharing on suspected dangerous areas and victims



## Implementing Partner

In April 2011, HI signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Scouts and Guides<sup>12</sup> association (hereafter referred to as "the Scouts") of Benghazi (and, eventually, Misrata and Zliten) outlining their partnership in carrying out the activities planned under HI's project. The Scouts were chosen as HI's implementing partner not only because of their traditional role as a socially-minded, non-political and non-profit actor within Libya society, but also because of their wide community-based networks of volunteers. With a wide and welcome presence in communities all across the country and a clear operational structure already in place, partnering with the Scouts would ensure breadth in the delivery of HI's safety messages. For this reason, the Scouts were solely responsible for the implementation of all of HI's field activities, including undertaking pre- and post-impact assessments and, most importantly, delivering HI's direct RE sessions in the communities. The Scouts were also trained as trainers so that they themselves could then train local actors (teachers, community leaders, etc) to deliver the RE sessions.

## Materials

With a solid local implementing partnership in place, the first step in the project was to design the necessary Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials, including leaflets, posters, children's notebooks, TV spots and billboards, as well as to develop the training material for training the people that would deliver the RE sessions. To develop the key messages and the formats of distribution, HI drew from a range of different sources such as the main findings of the pre-impact assessment and the HI Emergency Risk Education Kit. On the specific topic of SALW, HI's AVR Technical Advisor developed most of the training materials based on existing methodologies and guidelines of the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) and the Bonn International Centre for Conversion's (BICC) training and education on small arms modules (TRESA) (especially the modules on basic definitions, global and regional agreements on small arms and the relationship between SALW and development).

The IEC materials were developed by HI's staff in close collaboration with the Scouts, to ensure they were adapted to and reflected the local context in Libya. The materials developed included leaflets as well as designs for four different posters and six different billboards.

## Activities

In order to meet their SALW Risk Awareness (RA)-related objective, HI implemented activities using two complementary approaches:

1. **Public Information** - large-scale sensitisation and awareness-raising through a mass media campaign using different media, from the strategic placement of billboards to the airing of TV and radio spots, and through massive distribution of leaflets and posters.
2. **RE** - direct RE sessions.

Furthermore, the HI team and its partners conducted Community Liaison activities initiating a data collection process aimed at informing further HI Conventional Weapons Destruction programming and national database related to suspected Dangerous Areas (DAs); victims; and incidents.

### Public Information | Large Scale SALW Sensitisation

HI's large-scale SALW sensitisation effort focused on four elements: billboards, radio spots, TV spots and the massive distribution of leaflets and posters (including 12 different posters of survivors' testimonies). HI's assessment of the SALW problem identified urban centres as suffering the greatest toll by SALW accidents. For this reason, at the beginning of the intervention, all of HI's 22 billboards were set up in Benghazi. Coming in two different sizes (3m x 4m and 3m x 10m) and six different designs, the billboards were placed in strategic public locations such as gas stations, cafés, and schools, as well as in both poor and wealthy neighbourhoods where the proliferation of and accidents linked to SALW were believed to be most serious. The photo on the following page provides a good example of one of HI's 3m x 10m billboards in Benghazi.





In addition to the billboards, which brought great visibility to the SALW issue, HI also aired two SALW TV spots on the topics of unsafe storage of weapons within the home and the risks of tampering with ammunition. HI hired a local film maker to produce the spot, which aired a few times on local channels, including Libya Hurra. And although the TV spot was only aired a few times, HI's radio spots on mine/ERW/SALW safety were broadcasted daily for a period of three months on six local radios stations in Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Brega and Misrata.

#### Direct SALW Risk Education

From the outset, HI decided that its SALW RA methodology would be different from the one used for mines/ERW RE, which was being delivered in IDP camps and more rural areas, including small, peri-urban communities. Since the SALW problem was specific to urban areas, HI decided to focus its SALW RE on Benghazi and Ajdabiya, both cities which, at the time of the SALW component's launch in October 2011, were under rebel control. In Ajdabiya, HI and the Scouts trained teachers in all schools as soon as they reopened to deliver SALW RE sessions and distributed leaflets and posters. In Benghazi, HI and the Scouts placed an emphasis on training the staff of local NGOs to become trainers, in order to ensure the project was truly locally owned and sustainable. By training members of local civil society on both SALW risks and facilitation skills, HI sought to ensure that these actors would continue to both train other civil society actors and deliver awareness-raising and RE sessions themselves. To support this process, HI provided each local NGO that participated in HI training sessions with the following materials:

- > an action plan with objectives for them to achieve (specific to each NGO according to their mandate and areas of intervention) and to ensure they would continue the awareness
- > a map with their defined area of intervention, coloured on the map, to avoid gaps or overlap with the work of other NGOs, and ensure that all neighborhoods would be targeted
- > a power point presentation on a CD, in Arabic, ready to be used for further sessions
- > training materials to distribute in the future

- > a weekly reporting format (two pages of a word document) to use and send to HI (as long as active in Benghazi, and then for their personal use), to familiarize them with reporting and evaluating processes. The report included information on:
  - > the type of activities undertaken
  - > the number of beneficiaries targeted (disaggregated by sex and age)
  - > the location of the activity
  - > the type of material distributed and in which quantities
  - > positive outcomes and improvement / support needs

HI has monitored and followed up most of the NGOs and the results have been positive. Trained NGOs have delivered RE sessions for teenagers in schools (Al Berr and Ayadeena), training sessions to Imams (Takamol Al Marifa), training to other staff members, and RE sessions within their communities (Scouts, LibAid, Fareeq Aldaa'm Alnafsi). Despite a greater focus on local NGOs, HI also targeted local high schools in Benghazi, either by training teachers to be trainers, or by delivering sessions directly.

To ensure local buy-in by the community and the students, HI launched a drawing contest under a "Libya against weapons" theme, in which the winning design would figure in one of the official campaign posters. Apart from submitting paper-based drawings, students could also enter a graffiti contest, which was held on a wall in an emblematic area of Benghazi. The NTC fully supported the contest and HI's SALW campaign as whole, agreeing on an official slogan "I'm Libyan, I'm against weapons," which now figures on the leaflets and posters. Apart from fostering a positive and inclusive environment ahead of the wider SALW effort, the drawing contest allowed HI to establish partnerships with local NGOs and media, which were invited to participate in the organisation of the contest and sit on the jury.

## Phase 2 | Tripoli, Misrata and Sirte

From April 2011 to February 2012, HI implemented its SALW activities under what was considered an emergency context, seeing as the conflict was ongoing for most of that period. During this emergency phase of intervention, HI focused its activities in eastern Libya, both due to easy access and the proliferation of SALW in a region now no longer under government control. However, once Tripoli fell and the conflict was officially declared over, the context began to shift from emergency to transition. As a result, HI decided to not only shift its activities geographically—expanding into Tripoli, which was also witnessing a surge in civilian-held SALW and increasing SALW-related accidents—but also methodologically, using its operational experience in the east to design a project that was more suited to the evolving context.

## Objectives and Methodology

The overall objective of HI's SALW in Libya remains the same in Tripoli as it was in the east, to minimise the impact and incidence of preventable SALW-related deaths and injuries. More specifically, in phase two, HI seeks to implement SALW Risk Awareness activities to curb the misuse of SALW by increasing citizens' knowledge of the risks and dangers associated with SALW and promoting safer behaviour.

In addition to the SALW RA component, HI also seeks to reduce the risks by:

- > identifying and securing Ammunition Storage Areas (ASAs) through Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) activities
- > conducting Battle Area Clearance
- > deploying Rapid Response EOD Teams to deal with EOD Spot Tasks reported by the local population through a hotline set up by HI at the national level and identified by the HI Community Liaison Officers
- > implementing Weapons Management and Destruction activities

To reach the objectives related to SALW control and, more specifically, SALW RA, HI decided to follow the same general methodology used during phase one, namely through a two-pronged approach. One side focused on disseminating SALW messages on a mass-scale, through posters, TV and radio transmissions, and the other focused on the training of trainers (ToTs) of different target groups to deliver direct RE sessions to the different sectors of the population in Tripoli. The greatest innovation in phase two is the 'Safer Community Plan' component, which aims to assist in the development of community-based plans and activities in communities in and around Tripoli so as to promote a community- and people-centred approach to safety. During phase two, HI is also formalising the set up of a data collection process and system at national level to integrate SALW-related data (ie victims and survivors data) into the classic IMSMA forms and national database.

HI believes that, to ensure interventions remain effective and in line with the real needs of the Libyan population, it needs to better understand what characterises those who are both taking risks and at-risk. To do this, HI' decided to collect casualty data from Tripoli, Misrata and Sirte's hospitals. HI signed an MoU with the main hospitals in Tripoli and provided nurses and health staff with training on data collection and basic safety messages. By understanding the types of accidents (eg related to unsafe storage, misuse, criminality, mishandling, etc) suffered by the population, HI believes it can better tailor its activities to needs on the ground, and it can provide evidence for further programming of Risk Reduction/Management and Gun Violence Survivors Assistance.<sup>13</sup>

### **Pre-Implementation | Preparing the ground**

HI began preparing the ground for its activities in April 2012 by meeting with local partners, including government ministries (Education, High Education, Civil Society, Health, Defence, Interior, Islamic Affairs and Social Affairs), local councils (Tripoli, Soug al Gumaa, Abo Salim) and local NGOs (United charity organisations of Sooq Agumaa, H2O, Alleqa NGO, The 17<sup>th</sup> of February Coalition of Janzor, The Libyan organization for the Development of Handicapped people). Through these meetings HI not only informed authorities and civil society representatives of its project and activities, but also actively sought to develop partnerships, especially with the local NGOs, as these would be the main 'agents of change' to be trained by HI to disseminate SALW materials and relay messages.

In mid-April, HI organised a workshop titled "Together to Build a Safer Community, Free of Weapons," which sought to gather participants' views on the SALW situation in Tripoli after the end of the conflict. In order to ensure a wide spectrum of opinions, HI invited government representatives, local NGOs, civil society organisations, and members of local councils. In addition to tapping into local knowledge to gain a better understanding of the SALW situation in the city, HI also used the workshop as an opportunity to fine tune its pre-impact assessment (PIA) questionnaire, a tool developed to obtain a baseline for monitoring the project's activities and results. The PIA questionnaire, designed to gauge the knowledge, perception and practices of Tripoli's population in regards to SALW, was



eventually field tested with different target groups in different areas of the city and, finally, given to 250 respondents in eight different areas of the city (identified by workshop participants). HI has used the data gathered through the PIA to inform its programming. The PIA results have given HI's SALW team more specific information on the nature and scale of the problem in Tripoli, and have enabled HI to improve their targeting and the development of safety messages. The same data will be collected again at the end of the project as part of a post impact assessment aimed at determining the impact of HI's SALW intervention.

Before commencing implementation, HI designed and developed relevant materials (radio/TV programmes, billboards, posters, leaflets and other educational materials), and procured the necessary local service providers for distributing and/or disseminating these materials. Radio/TV broadcasts (spots and talk shows) were identified as a key element of ensuring HI's messages reached a wide audience as soon as possible. The two spots developed included one against celebratory shooting and one advising listeners to keep their SALW away from children and store them safely. Once the messages and the scripts were developed, the next step was to identify viable and reliable radio and TV stations. After meeting with a handful of English and Arabic language radio stations, HI signed an MoU with Tripoli FM 102.5 in May 2012 and with Tribute FM 98.1 in June 2012 to formally recognise their partnership and the terms of the relationship. According to the MoUs, the stations would not only broadcast HI's pre-recorded SALW radio spots, but also run weekly talk shows on SALW issues including guest speakers, SALW victim testimonies and Questions & Answers from the audience. HI's SALW team has also approached TV channel Libya Hurra to develop a TV spot to be aired in Tripoli.

During the months of May and June, HI's SALW team focused on developing the curriculum for the training of trainers (ToT) and the visual materials for both the ToT (leaflets, visual aids, posters) and billposting (billboards and posters). HI initially designed five billboards and eventually engaged local youth, through the Libyan Youth Centre, as well as local artists/designers to develop new SALW messages and design new billboards and posters. In parallel with the development of the visual materials, HI approached several billboard companies to identify which company it would hire to display its billboards.



## Activities

### Capacity Building | Training of Trainers

HI's ToT methodology focuses on training two separate groups, teachers and local NGOs. Working in close coordination with the Ministry of Education, the training of teachers aims to specify the key role that teachers should play in raising awareness of SALW in their respective classrooms and communities. It also aims to provide them with the materials and knowledge to play this role. In June 2012, HI held the first training session in the Jefra area of Tripoli for 30 teachers from the southern part of the city.

Rather than strictly focusing on how to deliver SALW messages in a classroom setting, the aim of training members of local NGOs is to enable them to design awareness tools in order to deliver the messages according to different target groups using a wide variety of means, from distributing leaflets to organising lectures and workshops. In addition, unlike the training of teachers, who are themselves the direct communicators of the SALW messages, local NGOs are trained to deliver training on SALW messages and tools. In June 2012, HI delivered training to about 20 members of two different local NGOs, the Souk Al-Jouma Union of NGOs and the Free Media Center. Each training session featured two different workshops, one on designing SALW IEC tools and the other on delivering RE sessions.

While other ToT sessions for teachers and local NGOs are planned to take place intermittently throughout 2012 and beyond, HI has also developed a new training package specifically geared towards briefing journalists to improve the frequency and the quality of their reporting on SALW issues in Libya to ensure the issue is properly addressed in the media. Through this training, journalists will be briefed in key aspects of the issue of SALW (eg the impact of SALW misuse, SALW control, SALW collection) as well as on their role as journalists in relation to each of these aspects. In addition, the training material will also provide questions that journalists can ask on different SALW-related topics.

### Public Information

Through both Tripoli FM and Tribute FM, HI is broadcasting its SALW radio spots more than six times a day. In addition to the radio spots, HI also participates in a weekly live talk show on Tripoli FM to discuss SALW-related issues. The talk show usually includes discussions of the dangers of SALW, current consequences for the Tripoli citizens, updates on HI's work, and the dissemination of general SALW safety messages. The talk show also features different guests each week, including members of local civil society organisations, doctors, international organisations and regular citizens.

HI chose ten prominent locations in and around Tripoli to display its billboards. Through sporadic visits to the selected sites, HI's SALW team ensured that the billboards were erected in accordance with the contract.

HI has also hosted public events in an effort to give further traction to its ongoing public information activities. On 8 August 2012, for example, HI hosted an iftar event in Tripoli's Martyrs Square where they gave away T-shirts and stickers with the "I'm a Libyan and I'm against weapons" slogan printed on them as well as leaflets discussing the dangers of weapons proliferation.

### Safer Community Plan

HI drew on the existing “Community Safety Plan” approach to develop their ‘Safer Community Plan’ as a participatory tool for understanding and addressing the means and motivations behind civilian weapons acquisition, possession and misuse.<sup>14</sup>

Although important, HI understands that the distribution of materials and the delivery of RE lectures are not sufficient to change behaviour; it is also crucial to involve communities in a wider, more inclusive process. HI believes that when an environment is supportive, individuals feel confident about maintaining their ‘new behaviour’ and about accessing information and services.

The Safer Community Plan aims to involve communities in the identification of problems and the solutions to SALW threats. As a participatory tool, the Safer Community Plan is designed to:

- a) assist project staff in the difficult task of gathering information about SALW at community level
- b) source local expertise that can be used to improve the analysis of gathered information
- c) involve communities themselves in decisions about SALW Control measures

Typically, community safety plans include, but are not limited to:

- > a map showing which parts of the community are affected by SALW proliferation
- > key groups involved
- > causes and patterns of deaths and injuries
- > people’s knowledge, attitudes and behaviours
- > the social function of weapons and the rules within the communities for weapon use
- > the profile of the victims
- > the profile of the users

However, before engaging with communities to develop Safer Community Plans, HI is first focusing on creating community profiles, which will serve as the basis for the eventual Safer Community Plans as well as other advocacy purposes. To develop these profiles, HI plans to bring community members together in a workshop setting to discuss the nature of the SALW problem in their neighbourhoods, and to discuss potential solutions. Through this discussion, HI aims to gain a clearer picture of how the SALW problem manifests itself in different parts of Tripoli, and will be able to identify potential solutions put forward by the community members themselves.

On the basis of the profile, discussions can then be held to develop a Safer Community Plan. Although the workshops for developing the Plans are facilitated by HI, the communities themselves are in charge of using the information gathered in previous discussions to develop a plan that aptly focuses on the needs and resources of that community.

Each community will be asked to identify a volunteer who will be trained in initiating and/or facilitating SALW RA activities. This person will be the SALW RA representative for the community (Community Focal Point) and will continue developing and monitoring the Safer Community Plan as well as subsequent SALW RA activities, according to the specific needs within the community. The volunteer should be experienced, recognised by the community and perceived as credible and trustworthy. More than one volunteer can be appointed if community dynamics require it.

HI will organise a follow-up of the community initiatives through regular meetings with volunteers/ village representatives.

## **Human Resources**

During phase one, HI had a total of 27 staff members (excluding MRE and clearance teams), four of which were dedicated to its SALW work (one expatriate technical advisor and three national SALW team leaders). For phase two, however, HI created a SALW team composed of seven members (five men and two women), which was trained in March to begin implementing the project in April. The SALW team received administrative and managerial support from HI's office in Tripoli and, in July 2012, they received additional support through two new staff members, a Project Officer and a Media and Communications Officer, dedicated to HI's SALW work in the capital city. None of HI's international or national staff had prior experience directly working with SALW-related projects. The international project managers dedicated to SALW had RE and mine/ERW experience, which allowed HI's AVR Technical Advisor (TA) to easily build their SALW technical capacity. The national staff also lacked concrete SALW experience, as their backgrounds varied. However, HI's TA also trained them on SALW issues and methodologies. Although HI faced difficulties in recruiting SALW experts, the focus on building the capacity of its staff has allowed for a coherent approach to its SALW work.

## **Quality and Information Management**

HI's Technical Advisor and Libya-based Project Manager designed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to guide and ensure the quality of their SALW projects in Libya. To ensure the quality of HI's activities in Libya, HI's AVR TA conducts regular monitoring visits to Libya to ensure the project is being implemented in accordance with the SOPs. The TA also leads refresher training courses for HI's in-country staff to ensure their capacity remains up-to-date.

Also included in the SOPs are procedures for collection of data from hospitals and for advocating with both national authorities and the Libya Mine Action Centre (LMAC). The national mine/ERW data collection questionnaire also includes questions on SALW injuries and casualties. This illustrates HI's desire to integrate its mine/ERW and SALW work through more inclusive data collection and analysis and to advocate for States to record gun violence related incidents and victims in order to further develop programming and be able to provide appropriate national reporting in concerned international fora. In addition, HI has also developed a reference tool kit for mine/ERW data collection, which has become the standard data collection tool for HI's staff worldwide. Although initially focused on mine/ERW, SALW will also be included in the tool kit.

## **Monitoring and Evaluation**

HI uses its Direction of Technical Resources to analyse and assess the progress of HI programmes and projects, and to provide advice, support and assistance in the implementation of their recommendations. This team consists of the organisation's most experienced technical advisors. Regular visits of the Technical Advisors are an obligatory occurrence in the life cycle of every HI project; visits are carried out under the authority of the director of the Mine Action department and subsequent reports and recommendations are submitted to the director, who, in turn, ensures that recommendations are followed through and implemented. Terms of reference for the Technical Advisors include assessing and advising on the following issues: human resources, capacity building/training needs, technical competency, review of SOPs, use or suitability of new technology and methodology, productivity, finance and administration, fundraising and profile, value for money, partnerships and coordination and management.

## RESULTS

At the end of phase one (April 2011-February 2012), HI reported that it had:

- > set up 22 SALW-specific billboards (in addition to 20 other mine/ERW RE-specific ones)
- > trained a total of 628 teachers (508 women and 120 men) on how to deliver SALW RA sessions
- > trained 70 teachers, school inspectors and Boy Scouts as SALW RA trainers
- > delivered direct SALW RE sessions in 17 high schools in Benghazi, to a total of 4,692 teenagers (2854 boys and 1588 girls)
- > delivered 15 SALW RA training sessions (two days each, three hours per day); 13 in Benghazi, one in Brega and one in Ajdabiyah, to a total of 225 members from 14 local NGOs (118 men and 107 women)
- > broadcasted daily mine/ERW/SALW safety messages on six local radio stations in Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Brega and Misrata
- > distributed 4690 (size 50cm x 70cm) and 1178 (size A3) SALW posters as well as 45,225 SALW leaflets during trainings
- > aired two SALW TV spots

These outputs present HI's results during phase one in terms of the indicators HI itself developed to monitor and measure its activities. However, there is no doubt that measuring outputs—what was produced—is much more straightforward than measuring outcomes—what was the impact—especially when it comes to projects that seek to change behaviour, as is the case with HI's project. However, to date, there has been no evaluation of the impact of HI's work in actually reducing the number of SALW-related incidents and accidents.

As phase two was still being implemented at the time of writing, the results were not included. However, in phase two, HI intends to use a post-impact assessment questionnaire to collect the same data as collected through the PIA in order to measure the impact of their intervention. The data, which focuses on perceptions of security, will be compared to the SALW victim data collected in hospitals to help determine the level of impact.

## GENDER

HI considers gender in all of its interventions and programmes. In 2007, the organisation developed a Gender Policy, which serves as guidance for ensuring considerations of gender are always included in HI's work. Other resources include a Gender and Disability Toolbox (CD-ROM), a Gender checklist for gender sensitive assessments prior to programming, the Gender and Development (GAD) Facilitation Guide and a Gender Handbook. These resources ensure that HI remains gender sensitive in both its hiring practices, and also in its relationship with the communities in which it works.

In Libya, more specifically, HI makes an effort to work with women's groups whenever possible. Examples include Al Berr and Ayadeena in Benghazi. HI also ensures that at least 35 per cent of those participating in their direct RE and ToT sessions are women. In areas where it is more difficult to reach women, such as Sirte, HI has been doing RE door-to-door (this applies more to MRE than SALW), and carrying out sessions with, for example, women's prayer groups.

HI has also ensured gender parity in its own human resource management. The SALW team in Tripoli is currently composed of three men and three women.



## DONORS

With open civil conflict still ongoing in April 2011, HI's intervention began as an armed violence reduction/prevention emergency response project funded primarily by UNICEF's Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS). However, HI sought other institutional partners, eventually receiving support from the German Federal Foreign Office's humanitarian aid stream as well as from the Swiss foundation "Swiss Solidarity" and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.



## CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNT

HI identified the following as the main challenges encountered during the implementation of its projects in Libya:

- > difficult access to some highly affected areas due to the volatile security context
- > difficulties in getting data from the hospitals, due to the lack of records and initial unwillingness to share data with an outside organisation
- > difficulties retaining staff as the situation in Libya became stable. As universities, companies, governmental offices started to reopen, most of the initial staff returned to previous occupations
- > difficult to find qualified national staff for the design of SALW materials
- > school calendar made it difficult to implement teachers training planned for the month of November 2011; the training had to be postponed to January 2012
- > working with volunteers: even if very fruitful throughout the project, volunteer work has some limitations, since it is difficult to manage young teenagers, who often do not go to work on time or on a regular basis
- > logistical constraints delaying activities (especially with material coming from abroad and being blocked in customs)

As HI moved from phase one to phase two of the SALW project, the organisation looked back on its experience from April 2011 to February 2012 to design the Tripoli project. The following are the main recommendations HI identified to guide its work in phase two; they reflect the lessons learnt through its operational experience in eastern Libya. Among others, HI stipulated that, in phase two, there should be:

- > less emphasis on mass distribution of print material and more focus on radio and TV spots
- > less direct implementation and more focus on building local capacity through ToT
- > more emphasis on identifying and working with community leaders and other 'agents of change' (such as women's groups, religious leaders, teachers, youth groups) as a means of influencing behaviour change over the longer-term to achieve sustainability
- > stronger participatory approaches to engaging with and empowering local actors and HI Libyan staff members
- > more emphasis on a qualitative approach through the implementation of a community safety plan whereby Community Focal Points are established in affected communities
- > stronger emphasis on identification, training and working with local organisations
- > establishing formal monitoring and evaluation system/tools and national Information Management and Exchange System and Database

HI also believed the new transition context demanded that it:

- > forge links with Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) processes and associated actors to ensure projects support broader disarmament, education and public health initiatives
- > establish a stronger project link with national-level bodies (government and civil-society) from the outset of the project to ensure the agreement and involvement of relevant stakeholders and thereby facilitate project planning and implementation. These actors include (but are not limited to): Libyan Ministries (education, health, social affairs, welfare, communication, defence), UN agencies working on DDR and SSR, Heads of Schools, teachers groups, community leaders
- > improve community involvement in the design of material and messages to ensure accuracy and relevancy to maximise behaviour change

## **CONCLUSION**

In March 2011, only weeks after the conflict broke out in Libya, Handicap International began an emergency response aimed at ensuring that IDPs, refugees and communities in Libya were informed of the risks associated with mines/ERW. Through its work on the ground, interacting directly with affected people, HI realised that the proliferation of SALW and ammunition posed a serious threat to the security of the Libyan people. As a result, HI launched a SALW risk awareness project to help reduce the threat posed by SALW. Initially focused on eastern Libya, HI eventually expanded its project to the capital, Tripoli. With a dedicated SALW team, HI has been expanding its SALW project. In addition to using public media and direct risk education sessions to inform the public about the issues surrounding SALW, HI has also engaged with local and national authorities, collected gun victim data from hospitals, and developed a Safer Community Plan methodology to assist communities in and around Tripoli to play a more active role in their own safety.

HI's project in Tripoli has been informed by its experience in the east of the country, and will certainly continue to develop as the organisation continues to work closely with affected communities, civil society and local authorities. By focusing on building the capacity of local actors, HI hopes that awareness of the risks posed by SALW will circulate in a sustainable manner, reaching wider and wider audiences. And although the project is ongoing, HI plans to use the data collected in the pre-impact assessment to carry out a post-impact assessment, which will demonstrate the project's effects to date, and allow HI to tailor its future activities accordingly.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> This case study was written by Albert S. Mülli based on information obtained through a desk-based review of relevant documents provided by HI as well as an interview with James Turton, former HI AVR technical advisor, and Sylvie Bouko, HI's current AVR technical advisor.
- <sup>2</sup> HI's project in Tripoli was only three months into implementation when the case study was written. For more up-to-date information on HI's work, please contact Sylvie Bouko.
- <sup>3</sup> Aislinn Laing, "Libya: timeline of the conflict," *The Telegraph*, 22 August 2011, available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8714379/Libya-timeline-of-the-conflict.html>.
- <sup>4</sup> Rania El Gamal and Tim Gaynor, "Gaddafi killed as Libya's revolt claims hometown," *Reuters Africa*, 20 October 2011.
- <sup>5</sup> UNHCR, "2012 UNHCR country operations profile – Libya," UNHCR 2011, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485f36.html>.
- <sup>6</sup> C.J. Chivers, Land Mines Descend on Misurata's Port, Endangering Libyan City's Supply Route," *The New York Times*, 06 May 2011, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/07/world/africa/07libya.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/07/world/africa/07libya.html?_r=1).
- <sup>7</sup> Handicap International, "Risk Education and Risk Reduction in Libya," Handicap International Project Proposal, April 2011.
- <sup>8</sup> Scott Peterson, "Tripoli rebels rein in gun use in city awash in weapons," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9 September 2011.
- <sup>9</sup> Data from the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LMAC).
- <sup>10</sup> These include the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Human Rights Watch (HRW).
- <sup>11</sup> In March 2011, Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC) pledged not to use anti-personnel (AP mines). Following HI advocacy work, on 28 April 2011, the NTC issued a communiqué formally pledging that "no forces under the command and control of the NTC will use antipersonnel or anti-vehicle landmines." The NTC committed to "destroy all landmines in their possession" and to "cooperate in the provision of mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance." The communiqué also stated that "any future Libyan government should relinquish landmines and join the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty."
- <sup>12</sup> Formed in 1954, while the country was still under strong British influence, the Libyan branch of the Boy Scouts is a youth organisation with the stated aim of supporting young people in their physical, mental and spiritual development, so that they may play constructive roles in society. The movement employs the Scout method, a programme of informal education with an emphasis on practical outdoor activities and social service. According to Scouting International, there 13,500 scouts in Libya today.
- <sup>13</sup> As the data collection is an ongoing process and is in the process of being used to inform HI's activities at the time of writing, the case study will focus on HI's direct SALW activities rather than on the data collection activities. Please note that a Casualty Report is currently being produced.
- <sup>14</sup> The "Community Safety Plan" is an approach that is recommended by technical advisors as the key form of community-based activity, designed to place the needs and priorities of affected communities at the centre of the planning, implementation and monitoring of SALW Awareness initiatives. SASP 3 – SALW Awareness Support Pack, SEESAC, Belgrade 2007. For details, please see RMDS/G 05.90 on 'Safer Community Plans', [www.seesac.org](http://www.seesac.org).

## ANNEX 1 | DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

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### Handicap International

- > “Emergency response to the threat of and consequences of armed violence - mines, unexploded ordnance - to civilians in eastern Libya” | Project Proposal | February 2012
- > “Risk Education and Risk Reduction in Libya” | Project Proposal | April 2011
- > “Risk Education and Risk Reduction in Libya – Final Report” | HI Final Report | February 2012
- > “Risk Reduction Education Libya Phase 2 – Addressing the humanitarian impact of Small Arms/Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War (SALW and ERW)” | Project Proposal | February 2012
- > “Libya Emergency – Situation Report” | HI | 9 May 2011
- > “Libya: Military weapons still threaten the civilian population” | HI Press Release | 14 February 2012
- > Monthly and Weekly Reports (Libya, Tripoli, Eastern Libya) from 12 February to 8 August 2012

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) | “SASP 3 – SALW Awareness Support Pack” | SEESAC | Belgrade 2007





**SALW PROJECT TRIPOLI  
PRE-IMPACT ASSESSMENT PROTOCOL**

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### **Title of the pre-impact assessment:**

*Small Arms Light Weapons (SALW)  
Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices pre-impact assessment in Tripoli, Libya*

## **1. Statement of the pre-impact assessment**

In response to the harmful humanitarian and development effects of the proliferation and misuse of SALW in Libya, and following a phase one project in the East of the country, HI decided to extend the scope of its work in Tripoli. The objectives of this SALW Risk Awareness project are to employ a range of measures to address the demand for weapons and misuse, and in doing so, support government and civil-society initiatives to minimize the impact and incident of preventable gun-related deaths and injuries, and, to the extent possible, support the regulation of their supply.

After setting-up the base in Tripoli and understanding better the context in the capital city, it has been identified that the threats linked to misuse of weapons are very high. By misuse, we mean mishandling, unsafe storage, intentional harm to others & playing with weapons. Every actor met (representatives of ministries, local NGO members, Civil-Society actors...) all say the same thing: there are weapons everyone, in every household, and accidents are common. Moreover, it is clear that the proliferation and availability of weapons is a strong threat to the safety and security of civilians and there is significant gaps in addressing the SALW misuse. Finally, as no other international organization is tackling this issue, HI has decided the need of taking action was urgent, especially to support local initiatives done by locals (i.e Janzur voluntary registration and disarmament process...).

Reducing the demand for arms in affected communities requires an understanding of why communities or individuals resort to arms in the first place. A complex web of social, cultural, political, and economic conditions determines the demand, and thus it is necessary to take a holistic view of the situation. Conducting this pre-impact assessment is one way of gathering (lacking) information on the topic and trying to understand better the issues linked to SALW possession and the reasons for their ownership.

Eventually, findings of the survey will enable HI to adapt its activities on the field to the actual needs identified by the communities interviewed, maintaining our main focus on reducing the incident and impact of weapons misuse through the identification of at-risk and risk-taking groups/behaviours, and employing community-based strategies (in partnership with affected communities) to tackle SALW misuse

## **2. General/ specific objectives & expected results**

### **o General objective**

To assess the Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices related to SALW in Tripoli, to inform programming.

### **o Specific objectives**

- § To understand where to implement a Safer Community Plan
- § To identify the groups to be targeted in the frame of the SALW project in Tripoli
- § To identify the locations (most gun-affected and/or most relevant according to possibilities of implementation) where to focus the project's community based-activities
- § To tailor tools and messages according to people's needs and gun-related problems

### o Expected results

- Risk awareness (comprising Risk Education, Public Information and Advocacy) strategies, messages, and tools are adapted to the needs and problems identified through the analysis of the findings of the pre-impact assessment.
- Pre-identified specific areas of Tripoli where it is most relevant to implement our Safer Community Plan well is evidence-based.
- A baseline informing current and future programming is established and allows future measurement of impact and trends related to SALW in an expected volatile environment.

## 3. Sampling & target groups

### o Target groups

We have identified our sample (= people who will answer our questions) as typical representatives of our overall SALW awareness project target population:

- Teachers
- Armed forces (policemen, militias, military councils...)
- Teenagers /young adults (15 – 29 year old)
- Imams
- Members of local NGOs and civil-society organizations
- Random civilians (men and women older than 30 years)

### o Sampling size & type

#### ***The type of sampling:***

Based on the fact that no official census has been done recently in Libya, the assessment will obviously be limited in terms of epidemiologic techniques.

Therefore, the team has made the assumption that the Tripoli population is composed of approximately 60% of women and 40% of men.

Our target sample will be focused 6 specific groups that will be particularly important for our up-coming SALW Risk Awareness project.

Therefore our sampling method will be the "purposive/non-probability" one. Even if it will obviously be less robust quantitatively than a random survey, it will hopefully still be meaningful in terms of seeking the views of key audiences

This seemed to be the most appropriate method as we are trying to conduct a 'rapid assessment', relying on 250 interviews with our future project's target population.

#### ***Methodology:***

The population will firstly be split into geographical clusters (neighborhoods, see below part called "geographical coverage"), then samples of each target groups will be assessed by the data collectors, according to a predefined plan.

As it is commonly assumed by Tripoli citizens, staff members and partners, that the most important risk-taking groups are male teenagers/young adults, we have decided to define our sample quotes as below:

- 60 % men (including 80 % of teenagers/young adults from 15 to 30 years old)
  - à 150 questionnaires will need to be male respondents, out of which a minimum of 120 questionnaires will have targeted teenagers/young adults (15 to 29 years old).
- 40 % women

à 100 questionnaires will need to be female respondents

Finally, based on our time and human resources constraints, we have decided to conduct the assessment on 250 individuals.

### 4. Geographical Coverage

Generally speaking, the pre-impact assessment will be done in Tripoli city, from Janzur in the East to Tajoura in the West.

More specifically, thanks to the SALW workshop organized on April 15<sup>th</sup> on the topic “*Together to Build a Safer Community Free of Weapons*”, decisions have been taken on where best it will be to conduct the assessment. Indeed, one of the objectives of the workshop was for the participants involved to identify which areas in Tripoli are the most gun-affected according to them, rank them (from most affected to less affected) and where it would be the most relevant for HI to conduct the pre-impact assessment.

Thanks to the outcomes of the meeting, added to internal discussions, it has been decided that it would be relevant to assess people’s perceptions, knowledge and practices regarding weapons in 4 highly-affected areas but also in 4 less obviously affected areas, to try to identify if there are major differences, common points and/or trends that could be identified.

The areas defined to be covered during the pre-impact assessment are the following:

Highly gun-affected areas (and quite poor areas):

- 1. Abu Salim
- 2. Tajoura
- 3. Janzur
- 4. Fashlum

Less gun-affected areas (richer areas)

- 5. Ben Ashur
- 6. Souk Al Juma
- 7. Gargaresh
- 8. Downtown:



To respect the reality and population density in each neighbourhood, it has been decided that the following numbers of questionnaires would be done in each of the areas:

1. Abu Salim : 74
2. Tajoura: 17
3. Janzur: 25
4. Fashlum: 14
5. Ben Ashur: 14
6. Souk Al Juma: 73
7. Gargaresh: 16
8. Downtown: : 17

With the following breakdown per target group:

Target Group/per location	Abu Selim	Tajoura	Janzour	Fashlum	Benashour	Soug el jumaa	Gergaresh	Downtown	Total	♂	♀
<b>Total</b>	74	17	25	14	14	73	16	17	250	66%	34%
Teachers	5	2	2	2	2	5	2	2	22	55%	45%
Armed Forces	5	2	5	2	2	5	2	2	25	100%	0%
Youth and young adults	41	7	11	5	5	40	7	7	123	81%	19%
Women	15	3	5	3	3	14	3	3	49	0%	100%
Imams	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	12	100%	0%
Local NGO's	4	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	8	50%	50%
Civilian over 30	1	1	1	1	1	4	1	1	11	100%	0%

## 5. Data collection

### o Data collection Tools

#### **Questionnaires**

The only tool that will be used for this pre-impact assessment will be the questionnaire (see in annex).

It has been decided internally that Key Informant interviews and focus group discussions will be done, in depth, during the implementation of the activities on the field in a few weeks/month and especially during the Safer Community Plan, where teams will have more time to do qualitative interviews which will help informing the project, especially in the designing of tools and messages.

### o Data collection methodology



For logistical and confidentiality rules reasons, the following data collection method has been chosen:

Data will be collected by HI SALW team members (4 project Officers and 3 drivers) + 3 members of a local NGO from Janzur and/or daily workers, with a maximum total of 12 data collectors.

Data collectors will be trained for a day by the SALW Project Manager and will be under its direct supervision on the field.

Due to the length of the questionnaire, it is estimated that each data collector will:

- a. Do approximately 10 questionnaires per staff per day → so in average 70 questionnaires per day
- b. Survey during a maximum of 5 days: 250 questionnaires done
- c. Positive: reduced risk in poor fillings of questionnaires, easier management with a smaller team, better grip and control over the team (all HI staff)
- d. Negative: small sample so the less sample, the less the results are accurate

The data will be collected by HI staff members and possibly by members of the civil-society, under HI PM supervision.

These 6 targets were specifically chosen for the PIA to as they represent our future beneficiaries, in the frame of the HI SALW Risk awareness project.

Each target group presents a layer of the community that has or will have direct and/or indirect influence on the project.

By targeting armed forces, HI will have a better understanding of what they know about small arms light weapons, whether themselves are following safety behaviour & what they know about the community's behaviours and attitudes towards the weapons. It will enable us to better respond to their needs/problems and communicate around this to relevant actors (including governmental representatives).

Interviewing teachers, imams, representatives of local councils & local NGOs will be crucial for the implementation of our project. Indeed, those groups will have an influential position and as they deal with the community in all its forms, they will surely help HI gain a better understanding of the situation and be better respected within the community.

Finally, gathering information from teenagers & young adults will help HI have a better understanding of who are the risk taking and at risk groups. After the conflict, many of the weapons fell in the hands of the young, so to determine exactly where the problems are. It is very likely youth and young adults will be our main beneficiaries throughout the project.

Sampling groups interviewed:

### 1. Teachers

- Can be done in schools, at the recess and/or after hours.
- Easy because teachers can be gathered in one room for the introduction of HI, explanation of the KAP survey's objectives and confidentiality rules..etc
- In this type of environment, we could use the support of local NGO members: easy to supervise, HI does the introduction and explanation, no big security issues because inside a school...etc

### 2. Armed forces (policemen, militias, military councils...)

- Easier with the support of the Janzur local organization who has very good relationships with the militias
- To be done in Tajoura with one HI staff member who is from the area

### 3. Teenagers /young adults (15 – 25 year old)

- For teenagers: same process as in schools, to be done in a high school, maybe with the older grade students.

- For young adults: we will at least target them at the university but not only because not all young adults using weapons are studying. Also, in the university, it might be longer to find the students who are coming from the areas we are targeting. Others will be targeted randomly in the streets and/or coffee shops.

#### 4. Women

- In hair dresser
- At household level if possible, but quite difficult culturally.
- After Coran classes in Mosques
- In charity organizations

#### 5. Imams

- The head of Al Qaaf has already proposed to gather for us some imams for a training. Maybe we could ask him a first gathering for the pre-impact assessment
- Or at mosque-level

#### 6. Members of local NGOs and civil-society organizations

- Can also be gathered in one location for a day or ½ day so HI staff members only do the explanation once.
- Only problem, if they are only 4 staff collecting data, some respondents will wait a long time before they are interviewed.

### o Follow-up and Quality Assurance (QA) monitoring

The SALW PM will be on the field every day to supervise the teams and the DW/local NGO members trained for the purpose (if relevant). She will support them as much as possible and try to tackle filing issues (if any) directly on the field.

Every questionnaires will be checked every evening by the SALW PM (and Project Officers if relevant, to check the local NGOs questionnaires) and new trainings provided according to the needs.

## 6. Data analysis schedule

A professional Libyan market research company, Erad, has been identified to conduct our data analysis.

A first meeting was held with them on April 5<sup>th</sup> 2012 to discuss possibilities of collaboration, time frame and budget.

The company can take the responsibility of all the data analyse stage:

- including data entry of the questionnaires
- creation of a database
- writing reports (both in Arabic and in English)

According to the company, for 250 assessments, they will need approximately one week to do the data entry and analyse the data.

Then they will need another 3 weeks to one month to write the reports.

## 7. Budget

### o Staff costs

Hi staff costs are already covered as part of the project HR.

Questionnaires have been drawn up in Arabic and in English by the HI staff members so there will be no costs for translation needs.

No specific support will be needed from logistics and/or admin team

- **Hiring DW:**

A budget of 667 euros is available for hiring DW for the data collection à which gives the possibility to hire 3 DW for 10 days at a daily rate of 32 LYD (=  $32 \times 3 \times 10 = 960$  LYD / 1,7 = 564 euros)

o **Logistics**

- **Transportation:**

- § 3 cars and 3 drivers are available for the purpose of the project.
- § Fuel is already included in the project costs

- **Food and drinks:**

- § Should HI require the support of local NGO members, sandwiches and drinks could be provided

- **Communication:**

- § Should it be required, phone cards for both operators are available for the staff members

- **Printing of questionnaires**

- § Budget is available for the printing of 250.

o **Contracting a professional Market Research company**

A budget of is available to contract the company.

We have just received their quote. Total amount for:

- Data entry of 250 questionnaires
- Data analysis
- Edition of 2 reports (one in Arabic and one in English)

Is of 3, 510 LYD.

## 8. Project schedule

## 9. Description of use and dissemination of the Pre-Impact Assessment results

The choice of asking a professional market research company to do the analysis and the report of the PIA has been made in order to, hopefully, have a clear and useful report that can be shared with any relevant partners.

HI would like to be able to share the report with, at least:

- o Participants to the context analysis workshop "*Together to build a safer community free of weapons*" because:
  - § those people have been involved in the decision of where it is best to conduct the survey
  - § they have fed the context/problems/needs analysis required for our project
  - § the findings might be interesting for some of them
- o Representatives of ministries such as Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Education... as:

- § the results of the PIA could have a strong influence on the positioning of certain politicians/decision makers
- § It could influence or convince to implement stronger laws and security systems to tackle the issue of weapons
- § HI wants to keep being transparent in its activities and the findings of such a survey
- o Local NGOs and civil-society members as
  - § They could become partners in the implementation of solutions to the problems identified through the PIA
- o Journalists:
  - § So that they could write relevant articles and/or press reviews, with accurate figures and data to educate on the problems linked to SALW and the perception of a sample of the Tripoli citizens.

### 10. Constraints

Currently, HI hasn't got the capacity and the time to conduct a full KAP survey as such. The time-frame of the project is too short and moreover, it isn't the objective of this assessment. Indeed, today, what is most needed for the SALW Risk awareness project is a baseline to inform our project and adapt activities, messages and tools to the reality of the field.

HI has also made the choice to conduct Key Informant interviews later on during the project (while implementing its Community based activities such as the Safer Community Plan) as it seemed more relevant. Also, doing it now would require too much time and human resources which are not available to us now.

The sooner we have the findings of the assessment, the sooner relevant community-based activities will be conducted and the most likely they are to be adapted to the needs of the affected people and therefore the more likely they are to work.

Finally, in this assessment, HI has decided to exclude questions concerning types of accidents and types of casualties occurring as, again, this would turn the assessment into a comprehensive, long, time-consuming survey. Moreover, HI is in the process of collecting this data through collaboration with main hospitals of Tripoli, other international organizations such as Hilfswerk and IMC and will continue to do so in the frame of its activities on the field.

### 11. Appendices

- A.1. Questionnaire design protocol
- A.2. Questionnaire
- A.3. Training of data collectors planning

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**Date:**  
**Name of data collector:**  
**Assessment n°:**  
**Place of interview:**

1	Where do you live ?  G	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Abu Salim</li> <li>2. Tajoura</li> <li>3. Janzur</li> <li>4. Fashlum</li> <li>5. Ben Ashur</li> <li>6. Souk Al Juma</li> <li>7. Gargaresh</li> <li>8. Downtown</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Sex of respondent:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Male</li> <li>2. Female</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Marital status	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Single</li> <li>2. Married</li> <li>3. Divorced</li> <li>4. Widowed</li> <li>5. Refused to answer</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	How many children do you have?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 0</li> <li>2. 1 to 3</li> <li>3. 4 to 5</li> <li>4. More than 5</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	How old are you?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 15 to 17 years old</li> <li>2. 18 to 20 years old</li> <li>3. 21 to 24 years old</li> <li>4. 25 to 29 years old</li> <li>5. 30 to 34 years old</li> <li>6. 35 to 39 years old</li> <li>7. 40 to 44 years old</li> <li>8. 45 to 49 years old</li> <li>9. 50 to 59 years old</li> <li>10. Over 60 years old</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	What is your occupation?  Give only one answer	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. University student</li> <li>2. Teacher</li> <li>3. Farmer</li> <li>4. Fisherman</li> <li>5. Businessman/woman</li> <li>6. Government employee</li> <li>7. Employee with LNGO, INGO, UN</li> <li>8. Housewife</li> <li>9. Police or military officer</li> <li>10. Imam</li> <li>11. Retired</li> <li>12. Unemployed</li> <li>13. Other _____</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>



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		14. Refused to answer	
7	<p>Compared to 6 months ago (since October), how would you describe the levels of security in your community?</p> <p><i>G@v@nly@nvn@nswvr</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Levels of security have improved</li> <li>2. Levels of security have stayed the same</li> <li>3. Levels of security have deteriorated</li> <li>4. Do not know</li> <li>5. Refused to answer</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	<p>In your opinion, how much civilians own a weapon in your neighborhood?</p> <p><i>G@v@nly@nvn@nswvr</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Everyone owns a weapon</li> <li>2. 75% of the population own a weapon</li> <li>3. 50% of the population own a weapon</li> <li>4. 25% of the population own a weapon</li> <li>5. There are no weapons</li> <li>6. Do not know</li> <li>7. Refused to answer</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	<p>Who typically owns weapons where you live?</p> <p><i>G@v@nly@nvn@nswvr</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Men and women alike, young and old</li> <li>2. All men, all ages</li> <li>3. Only older men</li> <li>4. Only younger men</li> <li>5. All women</li> <li>6. Only older women</li> <li>7. Only younger women</li> <li>8. Women may own guns when men are absent</li> <li>9. No one has guns</li> <li>10. Others_____</li> </ol> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>11. Do not know</li> <li>12. Refused to answer</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	<p>Who is more likely to own a weapon in your neighborhood?</p> <p><i>G@v@nly@nvn@nswvr</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Criminal groups</li> <li>2. Teenagers</li> <li>3. Militias</li> <li>4. Military men</li> <li>5. Police forces</li> <li>6. Businessmen</li> <li>7. Government officials</li> <li>8. Political activists</li> <li>9. Ex-combatants</li> <li>10. Civilians</li> <li>11. All of the above</li> <li>12. Other</li> </ol> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>13. Do not know</li> <li>14. Refused to answer</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	<p>In average, how many weapons do think people have in their household?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. One</li> <li>2. Two</li> <li>3. Three</li> <li>4. Four</li> <li>5. Five or more</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>

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	<i>Give only one answer</i>	6. Don't know 7. Refused to answer	
12	Do you think there are too many weapons in your neighborhood?  <i>Give only one answer</i>	1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't know 4. Refused to answer	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	How do you feel in your daily life?  <i>Give only one answer</i>	1. Safe 2. Unsafe 3. Other _____  4. Do not know 5. Refused to answer	<input type="checkbox"/>
14	Which are the most gun-affected areas in Tripoli?  <i>Please give a maximum of 3 answers</i>	1. Bu Salim 2. Al Hadba 3. Soog Aljuma 4. Janzour 5. Ben Ashur 6. Gergarsh 7. Hay Alandalus 8. Gharghor 9. Fashloom 10. Others _____  11. Do not know 12. Refused to answer	<input type="checkbox"/>  <input type="checkbox"/>  <input type="checkbox"/>
15	In your opinion, what is the main reason for the people in your neighborhood to own a weapon?  <i>Please give a maximum of 3 answers</i>	1. Personal protection 2. Protect property 3. Protect community 4. Illegal trading 5. To perpetuate crimes 6. Fear of a new conflict 7. Lack of trust in the government 8. Lack of trust in the arm forces 9. Souvenir/surplus from war 10. Others  11. Do not know 12. Refused to answer	<input type="checkbox"/>  <input type="checkbox"/>  <input type="checkbox"/>
16	Do you think it is normal for civilians to own weapons?  <i>Give only one answer</i>	1. Yes 2. No 3. Makes no difference 4. Don't know 5. Refused to answer	<input type="checkbox"/>
17	How easy or difficult do you think it is to acquire SALW in Tripoli?  <i>Give only one answer</i>	1. Very easy 2. Easy 3. Possible 4. Difficult	<input type="checkbox"/>











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32	<p>Who do you think should be in charge of collecting weapons?</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>GḠvḠnlyḠnvḠnswvr</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ministry of defence</li> <li>2. Ministry of interior</li> <li>3. Military councils</li> <li>4. National/Local NGOs</li> <li>5. Imams</li> <li>6. Others _____</li> <li>7. Do not know</li> <li>8. Refused to answer</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33	<p>What do you think would help the reduction of proliferation of weapons?</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>GḠvḠnlyḠnvḠnswvr</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Train police forces</li> <li>2. Build a strong army</li> <li>3. Enforce strict laws and regulations on the owners of weapons</li> <li>4. Elections with a strong government</li> <li>5. Collect weapons from civilians</li> <li>6. Disband militias</li> <li>7. Secure state stockpiles</li> <li>8. Other _____</li> <li>9. Do not know</li> <li>10. Refused to answer</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
34	<p>Given the opportunity to acquire a weapon legally, would you choose to do so?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Yes</li> <li>2. No</li> <li>3. Do not know</li> <li>4. Refused to answer</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
34a	<p>If yes, why?</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>GḠvḠnlyḠnvḠnswvr</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To protect myself/my family</li> <li>2. To protect my property</li> <li>3. To contribute to the overall safety of my area</li> <li>4. For political reasons</li> <li>5. I have a high-risk job</li> <li>6. Because a lot of people have weapons</li> <li>7. Family tradition</li> <li>8. Hunting</li> <li>9. Other _____</li> <li>10. Don't know</li> <li>11. Refused to answer</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>
34b	<p>If no, why?</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>GḠvḠnlyḠnvḠnswvr</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Don't like guns</li> <li>2. Dangerous for the family in the house (i.e children)</li> <li>3. Don't need one</li> <li>4. Dangerous for the community</li> <li>5. Don't know how to use one</li> <li>6. Afraid</li> <li>7. Don't have means to properly store a weapon</li> <li>8. Other _____</li> <li>9. Don't know</li> <li>10. Refused to answer</li> </ol>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Thank you very much for your participation and your time!



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