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**DanChurchAid's SALW Awareness
Raising and Risk Education**

MINE ACTION AND ARMED VIOLENCE REDUCTION



Burundi

Une grenade chez soi, peut exploser à n'importe quel moment. CASE STUDY | SEPTEMBER 2012

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INTRODUCTION¹

DanChurchAid began its humanitarian mine action operations in Burundi in October 2004, following the recommendations made by two earlier assessment missions carried out by the organisation in March and June 2004. DanChurchAid trained two mobile demining teams to carry out clearance in the provinces of Makamba, Rutana, Bururi and, eventually, Bujumbura Rural. In addition to its clearance operations, DanChurchAid worked alongside Burundi's National Council Churches (*Conseil National des Eglises du Burundi*; CNEB) to deliver Mine Risk Education (MRE) to affected communities in order to both educate them on how to minimise the risks posed by mines/ERW and to collect information on contaminated areas. The project's purpose was to enable safe access and minimise the risk of accidents for the returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

In August 2007, DanChurchAid, together with CNEB, launched a Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) awareness project. The aim was to use their already existing network of MRE trainers to both deliver messages about the risks of SALW possession and help convince the population to hand in their weapons as part of a national civilian disarmament campaign. In 2012, more than two years after the end of their SALW project in Burundi, DanChurchAid initiated a similar SALW risk education project in Libya, which is briefly profiled in this case study.

The purposes of this case study are to examine DanChurchAid's SALW work in Burundi and the rationale for the shift away from a strict focus on mine action and into the wider field of Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), and to identify lessons learnt from its experience.

CONTEXT

When DanChurchAid began its mine clearance and MRE operations in Burundi in 2004, the country was still in conflict. In 2000, the Government of Burundi (GoB) and several of the many active armed groups signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, marking the beginning of the end of the conflict. However, the two largest Hutu-dominated rebel groups—the *Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie* (CNDD-FDD) and the *Parti de libération du peuple hutu-Forces nationales de libération* (Palipehutu-FNL)—remained outside the peace process. The CNDD-FDD eventually joined the peace process in late 2003 by signing a power-sharing agreement. With the biggest rebel group in the fold, the GoB was able to launch a comprehensive political reform process, even with the Palipehutu-FNL's ongoing rebellion. A new constitution was approved in a national referendum in February 2005; communal elections were conducted in June 2005; and parliamentary elections were held in July 2005. The new parliament elected a new President. It was only in 2008 that the Palipehutu-FNL also put down its weapons and signed its own ceasefire agreement with the government, finally bringing full-fledged peace to the central African nation.

As early as January 2003, despite the ongoing conflict with the CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL, the Government of Burundi had already begun working with the World Bank to develop a national Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration Programme (DRRP).² And, in August 2003, the government formally established the National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR) to provide policy guidance to the DRRP. An Executive Secretariat (ES/NCDRR) was put in place to lead the implementation of the national programme and coordinate contributions of international partners, including the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), deployed in May 2004, and the World Bank.³

Although the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process was fairly comprehensive, targeting all former combatants, including the *Gardiens de la Paix* (militias) and community-defense groups, its success in effectively disarming all ex-combatants was limited. By the end of 2007, only about 6,000 weapons had been collected from a total of 35,000 combatants and militia members demobilised through the DRRP. According to the Small Arms Survey, this figure is not in line with estimates of the number of weapons rebel groups actually held during the conflict, suggesting that many of the SALW that had been in the hands of combatants during the conflict were still freely circulating in the country.

The DDR process also failed to tackle the weapons purchased by civilians for self-protection over the conflict's 14-year period. In fact, according to the results of a 2007 household survey by the Small Arms Survey and the Burundi-based Ligue Iteka, an estimated 100,000 households in Burundi possess SALW, including grenades.⁴ However, this is a minimum estimate. The UN panel of experts on the DRC, in its January 2005 report, estimated that about 300,000 weapons were in the hands of Burundi's various rebel groups, militias and community defence forces taking part in the peace process.⁵

Whether this figure is reliable or not, there is no question that armed violence has become one of the greatest sources of insecurity in post-conflict Burundi. According to 2004-2005 public health data obtained by the Small Arms Survey⁶, firearms and grenades are the two greatest causes of injury in post-conflict Burundi. Firearms and grenades are often used in isolated political attacks as well as in economically-motivated criminal activities; accidents involving SALW are also very common. In 2008 alone, more than 1,500 incidents involving SALW and grenades occurred around the country, resulting in 1,000 deaths and more than 1,200 injuries.

Acknowledging the burden of armed violence on Burundi's security and development, the Government of Burundi began to advocate for disarmament early in the post-conflict period. In 2006, the President launched a campaign to disarm the civilian population and, through a Presidential Decree, established the Technical Commission on Civilian Disarmament and the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CTDC) as an agency under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and Public Security. The CTDC was mandated to design a national disarmament policy in line with Burundi's international commitments⁷ as well as to ensure close technical cooperation between all those involved, including the *Police Nationale de Burundi* (PNB), local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), ONUB and others. Unfortunately, the CTDC failed to develop a clear framework for the campaign, especially in terms of communicating with the population. For example, in 2006, the UN Secretary-General stated that "concerns among the population over weapons registration, and the absence of instructions to the security forces to support the process, resulted in considerable confusion about the initiative and the modalities for its implementation."⁸ In addition, many Burundians were still concerned by the threat posed by the yet-to-be demobilised Palipehutu-FNL, leading many to hold on to their weapons as a means of self- and community-protection. As a result, the disarmament campaign failed to achieve its objectives. Between May and December 2006, the government only managed to collect 4,766 of the Burundi's estimated 100,000 to 300,000 SALW, a figure that is not insignificant, but largely inconsequential in light of the wider SALW situation in the country.⁹

In 2007, the CTDC decided to change its approach following the findings and recommendations of that year's Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka study on SALW in Burundi.¹⁰ The CTDC implemented a national drive towards civilian disarmament, but with much greater focus on improving communication with the general population. Originally conceived in two phases—awareness raising and SALW collection/destruction—the CTDC's activities in 2007 and 2008 focused on disseminating key messages and spreading awareness of the risks of SALW to persuade Burundians to hand their SALW over to the local authorities.^{11,12} The CTDC, under its new name—*Commission de Désarmement Civil et de Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre* (CDCPA)¹⁵— with UNDP support, set up a Small Arms Programme in 2007 under the Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (BINUB; former ONUB).¹⁴ Its objective between July 2007 and October 2009 was to reduce, in a significant way, the risks related to the proliferation of SALW, and it would do so in two steps. It would first carry out a sensitisation campaign aimed at “moral disarmament” of the Burundian population and then implement a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-led pilot “Arms for Development” campaign to collect SALW from the population.¹⁵ The CDCPA collaborated closely with international NGOs on the ground, including Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and DanChurchAid, to actually implement both campaigns. This report focuses on DanChurchAid's role in supporting the sensitisation campaign. The following section will examine DanChurchAid's project in support of the national SALW awareness campaign led by the CDCPA from 2007 to 2009.

PROJECT

DanChurchAid had been delivering MRE to mine/ERW-affected communities across Burundi since it first began its clearance operations in late 2004. To ensure their MRE messages reached the maximum number of people possible, DanChurchAid tapped into an already existing, country-wide social network, the *Conseil National des Eglises du Burundi* (CNEB). As a primarily Christian country, the Church is not only widely present, but also plays a large role in the daily lives of Burundians. The CNEB's wide network of Churches was a key feature of DanChurchAid's MRE work. Through its collaboration with CNEB, and using a ‘train the trainer’ (ToT) approach, DanChurchAid provided MRE training to key religious leaders within the CNEB who then delivered MRE sessions in their respective provinces and communities.

In June 2007, as mine/ERW clearance operations began to slow down, DanChurchAid's Burundi-based staff took note of the debilitating humanitarian and security challenges posed by the wide availability of SALW and grenades around the country. Supported by the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Recovery and Abatement (WRA), DanChurchAid's main donor for MRE activities since 2004, DanChurchAid decided to use the methodology developed through DanChurchAid's MRE work to support Burundi's disarmament campaign. DanChurchAid wanted to use its experience in providing mine/ERW risk education to implement awareness-raising and risk education specifically tailored to Burundi's growing SALW problem.

Rapid Assessment of the Impact and Perceptions of Small Arms in the Burundi Interior

Before developing the methodology and the materials for the SALW awareness and risk reduction campaign (referred to hereafter as “the campaign”), DanChurchAid carried out a rapid assessment of the impact and perceptions of SALW in Burundi to inform the development of accurate, pertinent and persuasive messages for the campaign. In addition to seeking to design the campaign in accordance with the local context, DanChurchAid decided to carry out the assessment in line with its institutional commitment to ensure community participation in the development of its humanitarian activities. The 10-day assessment was carried out in April 2007 and featured semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with civil society organisations such as Ligue Iteka (member of the International Action Network on Small Arms – IANSA), police officers, hospital staff, former combatants and civilians, including men, women and youth.¹⁶ The interviews and group discussions sought to understand:



- > which groups should be targeted by a small arms awareness campaign
- > the communication channels that should be used
- > the perceptions and attitudes that need to be addressed by the campaign
- > the behaviour around small arms that needs to be addressed by risk education
- > the expectations of the community regarding disarmament
- > the challenges that a small arms awareness campaign could face

The assessment’s major finding was that a civilian disarmament campaign in Burundi was highly feasible as rural and semi-urban populations were highly concerned about the acute detrimental effects that SALW availability and misuse was having in their communities. Based on the outcomes of the interviews and focus group discussions, the assessment made the following recommendations for designing and implementing a SALW awareness raising campaign in Burundi:

- > the campaign should focus on community-based interpersonal communication whereby local people are trained to advocate for disarmament

- > the support of the authorities is essential to give the campaign credibility in the eyes of the local population; zone and sector chiefs (*chefs de zone et de secteur*) should call community meetings to discuss disarmament and introduce the person who will pass advocacy messages
- > religious leaders are able to influence behaviour change; for specific target groups, women and youth leaders and demobilised soldiers will be effective awareness raisers
- > radio is an effective support to a community-based activity but is not sufficient on its own to promote behaviour change
- > theatre and film projections are effective and popular channels for communication in rural areas
- > posters, leaflets and other written information have little impact on behaviour change
- > the destruction of handed-in weapons should be done transparently and publicly to address community fears that the security forces will misappropriate collected small arms

Implementation

Objectives

Based on the findings of the Small Arms Survey 2007 report and of DanChurchAid's own rapid assessment, DanChurchAid decided to implement a project that would increase security by removing the risks posed by the SALW still largely in circulation in the country. The objectives of the project were:

- > to increase public awareness of the risks posed by SALW
- > to support Burundi's national civilian disarmament campaign by encouraging the population to hand in their SALW
- > to inform the population about the campaign, the legal framework behind it and the logistics for safely handing over SALW to the authorities

Put succinctly, the objective was to promote behavioural change. By educating the population about the uselessness and dangers of SALW, the project aimed to attach a stigma to SALW ownership, thereby paving the way for a culture of non-violence.

Approach and Activities

Using the information gathered during the assessment, DanChurchAid developed a two-pronged approach to achieve its objectives:

1. train trainers to deliver direct SALW risk education (RE) sessions
2. raise the general public's awareness of both the risks associated with SALW and the benefits of participating in the national disarmament campaign

The First Stream

The first stream of activities focused on using DanChurchAid and CNEB's existing network of community trainers to educate local communities about the risks of SALW possession, essentially following the same methodology of DanChurchAid's MRE work. The first step in this process was to develop the necessary messages and materials. Given that there was no standard national or international curriculum for SALW risk education (as there is with MRE), DanChurchAid's international programme manager developed these materials from scratch, based on a comprehensive review of existing international best practice and guidelines, including from the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) and UNDP. Working with CNEB, DanChurchAid also took into consideration the use of pertinent sayings and proverbs in the local Kirundi language when developing the messages and materials for the project.

Once a core set of messages was developed, they were tested with UNDP and CNEB staff as well as a sample target group of CNEB parishes. DanChurchAid adjusted the messages according to the feedback received. Once the CDCPA approved the messages, DanChurchAid employed local artists to draw and photograph accompanying images, which were also tested and adapted through consultations with UNDP, CNEB and representatives of the target group. Although the messages were aimed at people who own and keep all types of SALW (AK47s, pistols, ammunition), the main focus was on grenades, not only because their possession was widespread in Burundi, but also because they were seen as more politically 'neutral' in terms of peoples' willingness to give them up. With this in mind, DanChurchAid's messages were divided into four distinct message groups, each aimed at a specific desired behavioural change and a target group:

- > Message group 1 | aimed mainly at men and teenage boys keeping all kinds of SALW at home
- > Message group 2 | aimed at men, women and teenagers keeping grenades at home
- > Message group 3 | aimed mainly at teenage boys keeping grenades at home without their family's knowledge
- > Message group 4 | aimed at all audiences and focused on dissuading people from throwing grenades into pubs, parties and private homes¹⁸

Once the key messages were developed, DanChurchAid proceeded to identify and select eight CNEB staff members to attend a 'train the trainer' workshop. Once trained, these eight CNEB coordinators became the liaisons between DanChurchAid and the CNEB, and took on the role of training other trainers in specific CNEB communities and parishes. Although not technically DanChurchAid staff, DanChurchAid paid the eight trainers a modest amount for their work. With DanChurchAid support and guidance, the eight trainers were mainly responsible for holding ToT sessions for the people who would then deliver the SALW risk education sessions in their respective communities—pastors, women leaders and former combatants from their own churches and parishes. Each trainer went through a four-day ToT before being deployed to their respective parishes and communities to deliver the RE. On average, each RE session was attended by approximately 40 people and lasted about an hour; the frequency at which sessions were delivered depended on the community/parish and the trainer.

Because of their previous MRE work, DanChurchAid and CNEB were well known and welcome in communities across Burundi. This not only allowed for easy access to target communities, but also added legitimacy to the project and the SALW messages being communicated. The logistical organisation of SALW RE sessions was facilitated by the CNEB's previous experience organising and delivering MRE sessions across the country.

The Second Stream

The second stream of activities focused on supporting the national disarmament campaign through more general SALW awareness raising. In order to supplement the more grassroots MRE-style education sessions organised through the CNEB, DanChurchAid supported the disarmament campaign by disseminating audio and visual materials, aimed at mass consumption, around the country; these included radio spots, and billposting media such as flyers and A3 posters.¹⁹ There were three separate radio spots, each featuring a specific message and script:

- > Radio Spot 1 | aimed at children, urging them not to play with suspicious objects, and to report these to their parents
- > Radio Spot 2 | aimed at adults (especially men), informing them of the probability of the presence of UXO if they live in areas that were former combat zones
- > Radio Spot 3 | aimed at adults, urging them to contact the local authorities if SALW or UXO are found²⁰

DanChurchAid hired famous local actors to act out the script of each radio spot. The spots were strategically aired in the early morning and at night — peak listening hours, especially for women and farmers. The station chosen to air the radio spots was Radio Isanganiro, a radio station highly respected by Burundians and outside journalists for its objective, fair reporting, according to an assessment by Search for Common Ground.²¹

The radio spots were supported by the wide dissemination of visuals in the Burundian capital of Bujumbura. DanChurchAid designed six different posters, which contained either short storyboards or a combination of slogans and photos, and featured famous Burundian soap opera actors acting out scenarios or posing for photos in support of the campaign. The first six thousand copies of the posters (one thousand of each) was funded by UNDP in Burundi, the Government of Burundi's key partner in the design and implementation of the national disarmament campaign.²²

Human Resources

For its mine action operations in Burundi, since 2004, DanChurchAid employed 34 people, four of whom were expatriates (two deminers, one finance/logistics officer and one programme manager). The national staff consisted of a few administrative support officers and two full demining teams, including medics and drivers. Although DanChurchAid's programme manager had no direct experience in SALW, he had previously worked on MRE and child rights awareness raising in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MRE Burundi. Using this experience and his review of previous SALW awareness raising and risk education methodologies and materials from SEESAC, the programme manager became the focal point for DanChurchAid's SALW work in the country as of 2007. Furthermore, that same year, DanChurchAid hired a Burundian national as SALW project officer, dedicated specifically to assisting the programme manager in designing and implementing the organisation's SALW work. In addition to its own staff, DanChurchAid also provided training and a small remuneration package (about 80 USD) to the eight CNEB coordinators who became DanChurchAid's focal points within the CNEB. The coordinators were chosen for their previous experience in development in Burundi; they had all been previously employed by their churches to run development projects in their respective parishes and, therefore, had experience in handling funds as well as designing and managing projects. In total, DanChurchAid carried out the SALW project with two staff and eight associates; the CNEB members who became field trainers were not remunerated.

Supporting police capacity development

In 2008, DanChurchAid worked closely with MAG's technical advisor in Burundi to develop the Manuel de Formation sur les Risques des Armes Légères et de Petits Calibres (Annex 4), a small training manual aimed at training police officers who were going to be stationed at police stations expected to receive SALW around the country. Using their SALW expertise, DanChurchAid and MAG technical advisers developed a training package that focused on safe SALW handling, collection and storage (emphasising the differences between all the possible SALW they were expected to receive). However, rather than just focusing on the weapons themselves, the training also included guidance on how to engage with those submitting the SALW, and speak more generally how to communicate more clearly in general about the dangers of SALW.

DanChurchAid and MAG also developed visual materials that the police could consult before receiving SALW. These included posters and flyers with photos and instructions on how to handle and store weapons.

RESULTS

By March 2008, 40,000 people had participated in the DanChurchAid and CNEB SALW awareness sessions. Although preliminary, this figure demonstrates how widely DanChurchAid was able to disseminate its message by using the CNEB network of churches.²⁵ In fact, by 2010, DanChurchAid's SALW messages had become fully incorporated into the daily activities of the CNEB churches, ensuring the continued dedication of the CNEB to the disarmament cause.

However, there is no doubt that measuring outputs—what was produced—is much easier than measuring outcomes—what was the impact—especially in a post-conflict context such as Burundi. DanChurchAid's project, as part of a wider UNDP and CDCPA campaign, was certainly ambitious, especially considering the limited time period and resources, and the prevailing lack of trust in the state's ability to provide security for its people. The project sought to increase the security of Burundi's population by helping remove the threat posed by the widespread presence of SALW through interventions focused on education and behavioural change. Unfortunately, the political situation remained tense throughout 2007 and 2008—due to the continued rebellion by the Palipehutu-FNL—and in 2009—due to fears of upcoming violence during the 2010 elections. And although DanChurchAid's rapid assessment in 2007 indicated that the population seemed ready to hand in their weapons, the results of the national civilian disarmament campaign were modest. By late 2008, the PNB had only collected 2,090 weapons from the general population, and of this figure, a significant portion was not voluntarily handed over, but rather forcibly taken through PNB raids.²⁴ These modest results attest to the challenges present in a fragile post-conflict context such as Burundi (see Lessons Learnt and Challenges).

DONORS

The primary donor contributing funds to DanChurchAid's SALW project in Burundi was the US Department of State's Office for Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA). In 2007, the WRA launched a tender process in the value of 2.2 million USD dedicated to clearing landmines and ERW from former battle areas around the world. Through this tender, DanChurchAid received 99,652 USD for its SALW-related activities in Burundi.²⁵

GENDER

DanChurchAid did not operate under a central, formalised gender mainstreaming policy. However, in an effort to ensure men's and women's perspectives were accounted for in the project, the Programme Manager tried to specifically include women as much as possible. Of the eight CNEB trainers working with DanChurchAid, for example, three were women. And although most CNEB pastors were male, many female leaders were also trained as focal points to deliver the SALW risk education sessions in their respective communities and/or groups. Women were also included in the media billposting materials and in the radio spots aired by Radio Isanganiro.

LESSONS LEARNT AND CHALLENGES

- > DanChurchAid identified the wider political context as being key to the success or failure of any programme related to security, more generally, or disarmament, more specifically. In Burundi, the political context proved to be the main challenge to DanChurchAid's work. Through its experience in Burundi, DanChurchAid learnt that preparing the ground for an eventual disarmament campaign by working with civil society and the population at-large to advocate for civilian disarmament, as was done in Burundi, can only yield concrete results if there is true buy-in from the national government. Without clear dedication from the government to ongoing peace processes and security sector reform, people are unlikely to want to disarm. Similarly, if the government is not serious about collecting and destroying weapons collected from civilians, by, for example, doing so in a transparent and professional manner, the population will lose its trust in the government and likely opt to keep their weapons. Understanding the national and local political context is essential for determining the feasibility of implementing, as well as for planning a successful civilian disarmament campaign.
- > Religious organisations can provide an effective medium for reaching a large number of people, if they are perceived to be a credible source of information. For a very small financial reimbursement (or none at all), CNEB pastors were willing and motivated to pass on messages across their parishes. However, they will only do this if they are convinced that it is valuable work, so communication with the CNEB and the humanitarian value of DanChurchAid's SALW project were vital for ensuring their cooperation.
- > Interpersonal communication is the best way of trying to change behaviour, but it takes time. Relying solely on posters and billboards will prove insufficient in changing people's perceptions and behaviour, but combined with interpersonal risk and education sessions, these tools can be amplified and serve as a reminder. Radio can also be a powerful medium if the station selected has a good reputation and is generally viewed as a reliable and high-quality source of information.
- > MRE messages are qualitatively different from SALW ones. Great care must be taken to ensure there is no confusion. In Burundi, this was less of an issue since the actual threat from UXO and mines is very small, but in other countries, this difference can prove crucial in the design and implementation of SALW messages.

DanChurchAid's SALW Risk Reduction Project in Libya

Drawing on its experience and lessons learnt in Burundi, in 2011, DanChurchAid sent its Burundi programme manager to Libya in order to assess the feasibility of implementing a similar project there. Through a concept note design on the basis of this assessment, DanChurchAid began implementing a SALW risk reduction project in the Libyan city of Misrata in mid-2012.

As a result of experiencing the longest and heaviest period of fighting during Libya's 2011 civil conflict, Misrata has become one of the cities in Libya with the highest concentration of SALW. The majority of weapons were taken from Government combatants and stores, found abandoned on the street or brought back into private households from fighting in other areas of the country. These weapons pose a serious risk to the stability and the physical security of men, women and children. In order to respond to the situation and as part of its SALW and armed violence reduction project in Misrata, DanChurchAid is implementing behavior change activities and risk education (RE), in coordination with national and local authorities, to reduce the presence and the risks of weapons on the street and in homes, in order to mitigate the development of a culture of violence.

Activities and achievement so far

Since the beginning of the project in June 2012, DanChurchAid's SALW team has focused on raising the general population's awareness of the risks associated with SALW. To do this, billboards (3x5m to 3x8m) have been placed in strategic locations across Misrata, and thousands of SALW RE leaflets, designed by DanChurchAid, have been distributed across the city by DanChurchAid's RE team. When distributing the leaflets, DanChurchAid staff also engage directly with recipients to sensitise them on the risks associated with SALW. This interpersonal dimension is a direct link to the lessons learnt by DanChurchAid in Burundi (See Annex 3 for samples of posters designed and distributed by DanChurchAid in Libya).

In addition to these activities, DanChurchAid is also working with the military council to analyse the possibility of DanChurchAid providing safe storage devices to secure the SALW of local militias and other irregular forces (Katibas) formed during the 2011 armed conflict; most of their SALW and ammunition are today stored in houses and populated areas, often in an unsafe manner. The objective is to provide Katibas and civilians with weapons storage cabinets and gunlocks to establish safe environments and to prevent accidents in their homes. The difficulty lies in trying to ensure that the message delivered through this activity will reduce risks rather than promote SALW retention.

In addition, DanChurchAid plans to advocate the local authorities and civilian population for safe management of SALW to prevent armed violence. It also plans to establish an armed violence observatory to monitor the evolution of armed violence statistics in Misrata and to highlight the prevalence of violence involving weapons or ammunition, the reasons for the violence and the perpetrators (when known).

CONCLUSION

In 2006 and 2007, DanChurchAid identified that SALW posed a more serious threat to peace and security in post-conflict Burundi than mines and ERW. In an effort to support the government's national drive to disarm the civilian population and help remove the threat posed by the estimated 300,000 SALW in Burundi, DanChurchAid designed and implemented a SALW education project from 2007 to 2009. The project's main aim was to increase security among the civilian population in Burundi by (a) educating the population about the risks of SALW ownership and (b) encouraging the population to hand over their SALW to the authorities. DanChurchAid did this by using its already-extant relationship with the CNEB to deliver SALW messages to communities across the country as well as by using visual and audio tools to disseminate these messages more widely in urban centres. The project sought to change behaviour by attaching a stigma to SALW, but the fragile political context in Burundi at the time greatly limited the project's effectiveness, as the population opted to keep their SALW in the face of widely perceived insecurity and the potential renewal of violence.



ENDNOTES

- ¹ This case study was written by Albert Souza Mülli based on information obtained through desk-based research, a review of relevant documents provided by DanChurchAid and an interview with Adam Forbes, DanChurchAid's programme manager in Burundi from 2006 to 2009.
- ² Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) is the general term given to post-conflict activities that seek to disarm and ultimately reintegrate combatants into a peaceful, post-conflict society. However, different country-specific programmes will often adapt the name to reflect the particularities of the programme. In Burundi, the term adopted by the World Bank was DRR, rather than the traditional DDR.
- ³ The World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) fully financed the DDR process between 2004 and 2009. "Desk Review: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Human Security in Burundi," Centre for International Cooperation and Security, University of Bradford, July 2008.
- ⁴ Stéphanie Pézard and Nicolas Florquin, *Small Arms in Burundi: Disarming the Civilian Population in Peacetime*, Small Arms Survey and Ligue Iteka, August 2007.
- ⁵ United Nations Security Council, Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Operations in Burundi, 8 March 2005. S/2005/149.
- ⁶ Small Arms Survey obtained this data from the Doctors Without Borders-Belgium's Centre des Blessés Légers in Bujumbura.
- ⁷ For example, under the UN Programme of Action on SALW, the International Instrument on the tracing of light weapons, the Bamako Declaration, the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol.
- ⁸ United Nations Security Council, Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Operations in Burundi, 21 June 2006. S/2006/429.
- ⁹ Willy Nindorera, "Security Sector Reform in Burundi: Issues and Challenges for Improving Civilian Protection," CENAP/NSI Working Paper, Centre d'Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits, July 2007.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Sylvestre Kibeceri, *Annual Report on the Implementation of the Tracing Instrument and of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Burundi*, Technical Commission on Civilian Disarmament and the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CTDC), 21 March 2008.
- ¹² Despite the CTDC's move towards public awareness raising and voluntary SALW handovers, the PNB was implementing a parallel policy of forcibly raiding and collecting civilian-held SALW.
- ¹³ The CDCPA changed its name again in 2011 to its current name, Commission nationale permanente de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre (CNAP).
- ¹⁴ Funding was provided by the governments of France and the United States, and the UN Peacebuilding Fund.
- ¹⁵ Susanna P. Campbell with Leonard Kayobera and Justine Nkurunziza, *Independent External Evaluation – Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi*, March 2010; available at <http://www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/Independent-Evaluation-Burundi.pdf>.
- ¹⁶ The majority of civilian participants were identified and chosen by CNEB pastors previously trained by DanChurchAid to deliver MRE. Therefore, the majority of participants were members of CNEB church congregations.
- ¹⁷ See Annex 1 for the Focus Group Discussion Questionnaire.
- ¹⁸ Please see Annex 2 for a list of the messages developed under each message group.
- ¹⁹ Paper size: 29.7cm × 42cm.
- ²⁰ Please see Annex 3 for the full scripts of each radio spot.
- ²¹ Search for Common Ground is an international peacebuilding NGO based in Washington, DC. The organisation focuses on long-term processes of conflict transformation, and operates in 26 different countries. For more information, see http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_intro.html.
- ²² Please see Annex 4 for samples of DanChurchAid's posters.
- ²³ African Council of Religious Leaders, "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Africa – A Resource Guide for Religions for Peace," Religions for Peace, March 2010.
- ²⁴ Stéphanie Pézard and Savannah de Tessières, 'Arms in Circulation in Burundi – Possession Figures', *Insecurity is Also a War: An Assessment of Armed Violence in Burundi*, p. 99. Geneva: Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development Secretariat / Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 1 January 2009.
- ²⁵ Burundi Realités, "Burundi: The DanChurchAid to Foster Public Support for Community Disarmament," allafrica.com, 31 May 2007.

ANNEX 1 | FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONNAIRE

Impact and Perceptions towards Small Arms

How do weapons affect your community?

In your opinion, why do people in the community continue to own weapons?

What sections of the community own weapons?

Do you think that some demobilised ex-combatants own weapons? Why?
(Demobilised group only)

Do people need their weapons for self defence? Why, why not?

How does the presence of weapons in your community make you feel?

How do you view people who own weapons?

Do people know how to keep their weapons securely?

What level of awareness do community members have of the risks of small arms?
(Demobilised group only)

Attitudes towards Disarmament

What have you heard about the Government's civilian disarmament programme?

Do you think that it's feasible to disarm people in your community at the present time?

Why, why not?

What will motivate people to hand in their weapon?

Awareness Raising

What is the best way to talk to weapons owners about disarmament?

Who is best placed to discuss disarmament with weapons owners?

What media can be used to convince people to disarm (eg radio, theatre)? How?

ANNEX 2 | SALW AWARENESS MESSAGES BURUNDI

Note These SALW messages differ from those used in MRE because they target people who are knowingly keeping weapons (mainly AK47s, pistols, grenades and ammunition) at home.

The main focus should initially be on grenades, of which possession is widespread throughout Burundi but that are more 'neutral' than AK47s or pistols. Previous disarmament efforts have shown that Burundians are currently more likely to hand in a grenade than a gun.

These messages are in *pre-testing* stage.

Message Group 1

Behaviour | Keeping all kinds of SALW at home for self-protection

Target Group | Mainly men and teenage boys

Messages

- > You want a gun or grenade to protect your family but to have such an object in the house puts your family in a permanent state of danger.
- > If your children find the weapon that you keep in the home they could easily set it off or make it explode. Do you want to run that risk?
- > If your friend, brother or husband is carrying a gun, then we never know what may happen: if people are drunk or there is an argument then someone can get shot and you'll regret it for the rest of your life.
- > Teenagers may use a gun or grenade found in the house to kill themselves when they have a big argument with their parents. There have been several such cases in Bujumbura.
- > Fire creates Fire (*le feu attire le feu*). If the worst happens and your house is attacked are you really going to use your gun to fight the attackers? Remember that if you possess a gun then the criminals will believe they need one also.

Message Group 2

Behaviour | Keeping grenades in the house

Target Group | Men, women and teenagers

Messages

- > Grenades are explosive devices and so it is never safe to keep them at home. They are always ready to explode and kill.
- > The older a grenade gets, the more dangerous and likely it becomes to explode.
- > Grenades are offensive not defensive weapons. You cannot tell yourself that you are keeping it for self defence and so why put your family in such danger?
- > Grenades are not precise weapons and can kill and wound people who were not targeted including the person who threw it.
- > If a grenade explodes it can kill or handicap you for the rest of your life. How are you going to support and protect your family then?
- > There is no good reason for keeping grenades in the house so inform the police (or demining organisation?) and ask them to take them away.

ANNEX 2 | SALW AWARENESS MESSAGES BURUNDI

Message Group 3

Behaviour | Teenagers keeping grenades in the house without the rest of the family knowing

Target Group | Teenage Boys

Messages

- > You are putting your whole family in danger. Imagine how you will feel if your mother or your sister is killed when the grenade explodes. You should inform your parents of the danger and ask the police to come and take them away.

Message Group 4

Behaviour | Throwing grenades into pubs, parties and private houses

Target Group | People throwing grenades

Messages

- > Grenades are not exact weapons and you will hurt and kill people who you did not target, maybe including yourself.
- > Grenades are blind and do not distinguish between men and women, the innocent or the guilty. You may easily kill a member of your family or a friend without knowing it.
- > It is not brave to attack innocent people – you will be courageous if you refuse violence.

ANNEX 3 | DANCHURCH/AID/CNEB RADIO SPOTS

Diffused on Radio Isanganiro | Scriptwriter: Abedi François

Radio Spot 1

Target Audience | Children

Core Message | don't play with suspect found objects; avoid them and tell your parents

Script | We are in a classroom and hear the clicking of children's fingers as they participate in the lesson.

Teacher: (asks the children a question) How can you recognise a mine?(The children clamour to answer)

Child: Me, miss, me miss!

Teacher: yes, Bernard, have a go

Bernard: Mines can look like pineapples or pens and be different colours and sizes so it's not easy to recognise them.

Teacher: Thanks Bernard! Everyone else clap. To be safe you need to be wary of all unknown and military looking objects that you come across in a former fighting area.

Voiceover: Children, be careful and don't play with any unknown objects where there has been fighting. If you see them, don't touch! Tell your Parents

Radio Spot 2

Target audience | Adults, especially men

Core Message | Awareness of existence of mines/UXO and their presence in former combat areas. Don't touch.

Script | On the street corner

The first man is very happy. He is laughing and saying how he's finally struck lucky as he's found something very valuable.

The second man arrives and tells him to be careful of picking up this unrecognisable object. He says that, as they live in a former warzone they need to be careful of all unknown objects and not touch them.

Voiceover: If you live in a area where there was fighting, be careful of unknown objects. Most of all, don't touch them.

ANNEX 3 | DANCHURCH/AID/CNEB RADIO SPOTS

Diffused on Radio Isanganiro | Scriptwriter: Abedi François

Radio Spot 3

Target Audience | all adults

Core Message | Inform the authorities if you come across a suspect object

Script | We are in the market. Two people are talking; one is a woman who is well informed of the dangers of mines. The second is a man who is not at all interested in the threat.

The woman she's out of breath and talks rapidly. She says that she's looking for her neighbour to tell him of the strange object that she saw behind his house.

The man (her neighbour) calls the woman over and asks her why she's in such a rush.

The woman replies that she's afraid of an object that she discovered behind his house.

The man laughs loudly saying that women have always got to make noise about something.

The woman asks the man if he forgot about his nephew who lost his leg to a landmine.

The man sobers up and asks the woman what he should do.

The woman tells him that he should do like her – don't touch the object, warn his neighbours and tell the authorities

Voiceover: If you find a mine or suspect object inform your neighbours and the authorities.

IKIRWANSHO MU MURYANGO KIRASHOBORA GUKWEGA URUPFU MU GIHE C'IMPARI.



es disputes domestiques peuvent être meurtrières si on fait recours à une arme!

CNEB
Conseil National
des Eglises du Burundi



Commission Technique
de Désarmement Civil



GERENADE IRI MU NZU YAWE ISHOBORA GUTURIKA UMWANYA UWARIWE WOSE



CNEB
Conseil National
des Eglises du Burundi



Commission Technique
de Désarmement Civil



Une grenade chez soi, peut exploser à n'importe quel moment.

NOTES

MU NZU YA



Commission Technique
de Désarmement Civil

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