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# brief 25

## The Military in Transition

*Restructuring and  
Downsizing  
the Armed Forces  
of Eastern Europe*

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Polish soldiers pledging their oath on 22 August 1998 in Gubin, near the Polish-German border, dpa.



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## The Military in Transition

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*Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (ed.)*

august 2002

# Zusammenfassung

## *German Summary*

Der vorliegende *brief* beschäftigt sich mit der Reform der osteuropäischen Streitkräfte nach dem Ende des Sozialismus und legt besonders Gewicht auf die Darstellung der Erfahrungen beim Personalumbau und -abbau. Die Autoren identifizieren die Probleme, arbeiten Ursachen für Reformblockaden heraus und ziehen Lehren aus dem letzten Jahrzehnt. Die Beiträge basieren auf den stark überarbeiteten Vorträgen eines internationalen BICC Seminars zu Fragen der Demobilisierung von Streitkräften und der Reintegration in Osteuropa, das Anfang Juni 2001 in Bonn mit Vertretern aus Bulgarien, Deutschland, Lettland, Finnland, Großbritannien, Rumänien, Ungarn und der Ukraine abgehalten wurde. Der BICC *brief* ist Teil des Projektes „Demobilisierung von Streitkräften in Mittel- und Osteuropa“, das vom Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung gefördert wird und in 2002 zum Abschluss kommt.

Die mittel- und osteuropäischen Staaten sind mit der Erbschaft riesiger Massenarmeen konfrontiert – ein Hort sozialistischer Kommando-, Lager- und Misswirtschaft, der den Systemwechsel überlebte. Die osteuropäischen Armeen machten, wenn überhaupt, Schlagzeilen mit ihrem desolaten Zustand. Da sich die anfänglichen Befürchtungen vor Militärputschen bald gelegt hatten, verloren die Militärreformen an Dringlichkeit. Neben nationaler Traditionspflege avancierte die Rhetorik der Europa- und Westorientierung für die osteuropäischen Militärs zu einer neuen Legitimationsgrundlage. Die militärischen Trägerschichten des alten Systems sicherten sich als Akteure der Westorientierung so ihr institutionelles Überleben.

Folgt man den politischen Ankündigungen der postsozialistischen Regierungen, dann sollten mit dem Systemwechsel die Militärapparate demokratisiert, modernisiert, verkleinert, umstrukturiert und durch Kooperation mit der NATO und Teilnahme an friedenschaftern Missionen zunehmend internationalisiert werden. Weit reichende Militärreformen sind, alter sozialistischer Tradition entsprechend, meist in 10- oder 15-Jahresplänen angekündigt worden. Die Umsetzung litt jedoch im vergangenen Jahrzehnt unter der Beharrungskraft der Militärapparate, dem Fortwirken sozialistischer Verhaltensmuster, der geringen Bedeutung der Sicherheitspolitik unter den Transformationsaufgaben, mangelhaften Vorgaben durch zivile Politiker, der geringen Popularität des Militärs in der Gesellschaft und unter finanziellen Restriktionen.

Die Bemühungen um Militärreformen und die entsprechenden Hindernisse werden in drei empirischen Überblicksstudien vorgestellt. Unbeschadet alle länderspezifischen Besonderheiten identifizieren die Autoren ähnliche Gründe für Reformdefizite: unrealistische Zielsetzungen in der Anfangszeit, finanzielle Restriktionen und ein Reformdruck, der erst durch die Orientierung an NATO-Erfordernissen entstanden ist. Gundars Zalkalns fragt darüber hinaus, warum zehn Jahre nach der Unabhängigkeit der baltischen Staaten Militärreformen Stückwerk geblieben sind und macht dafür das Fortwirken sozialistischer Mentalitäten im Militär und in der sicherheitspolitischen Bürokratie verantwortlich. Frank Möller untersucht exemplarisch die Bedeutung

der Militär- und Sicherheitspolitik für die nationale Identität der baltischen Staaten und stellt eine Militarisierung kollektiver Identitäten unter dem Einfluss des „Sicherheitsestablishments“ fest. Die Erfindung von äußeren Bedrohungsszenarien und die tatsächlichen innergesellschaftlichen Sicherheitsgefährdungen klaffen auseinander. Die Autoren der Länderstudien widmen dem Streitkräfteabbau und der Reintegration von Berufsmilitärs besondere Aufmerksamkeit. Truppenabbau war in den 1990er Jahren vornehmlich das Resultat von finanziellen Kürzungen, massiven Abgängen unter Berufsmilitärs und einer Verkürzung der Wehrdienstzeit. Die Truppenreduzierungen beeinflussen die Funktionsfähigkeit der osteuropäischen Armeen erheblich, besonders deren Kampfpotential. Eine Antwort auf entsprechende Funktionsdefizite besteht in der Modernisierung von militärischem Inventar und der Infrastruktur, insbesondere durch Erwerb von westlichen Waffen.

Worin besteht der staatliche Handlungsbedarf? Reintegration ist nicht allein eine Aufgabe der Militärs, sondern „ziviler“ Politiker und Verwaltungen, v.a. der Wirtschafts- und Bildungsministerien. Die mangelnde Koordination unter den Ministerien und die Verzögerung von Reformen trägt zur Vertiefung der Reintegrationsprobleme bei. Gefordert sind darüber hinaus regionale, statt allein zentralstaatliche Ansätze. Zu fördern ist die wirtschaftliche Selbständigkeit von ehemaligen Berufsmilitärs. Schließlich empfiehlt sich, die Infrastruktur militärischer Liegenschaften für die Schaffung neuer zivilen Arbeitsplätze zu nutzen.

# Introduction

by *Andreas Heinemann-Grüder*

Recent debates on security politics in Eastern Europe have centered around four issues: security conceptions, civil-military relations, security economics, and NATO enlargement. However, in these debates, three aspects have been largely underrated—factors determining the actual reform or build-up of armed forces after the demise of socialism, actual experience gathered in downsizing the armed forces, and, as a particular facet of the latter, the demobilization and reintegration of professional soldiers. For this reason, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) conducted an international seminar on 31 May/1 June 2001 with participants from Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. The contributions to this BICC *brief* are partially based on revised papers originally presented at this seminar. The aim of the seminar was to discuss determinants of the restructuring of armed forces in Eastern European and to compare reintegration strategies.

## *System change and the military*

Among those socialist governmental institutions subject to replacement or radical reshaping, the army usually survived system change. At the moment of gaining independence, most of the successor states to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia simply nationalized the military infrastructure present on their territory. In some cases, such as Armenia, the Baltic states, Croatia, and Slovenia, informal militias

formed prior to independence became the building blocks of national armies. Compared to certain Latin American countries which abolished their armies altogether (Haiti, Panama, Costa Rica), no single Eastern European country opted either for state-building without armed forces or for a purely professional army without compulsory conscription.

Whereas the political and socioeconomic environment changed radically, the Eastern European military was marked by both a comparatively high degree of institutional continuity and the absence of radical and swift replacement of its leadership. With the end of socialism, the armies became part of the transition process—both subjects and objects at the same time. In this new context, the military was affected by shifts in economic and financing priorities, a change in its role within the political system, and the lowering in importance of most military functions which had emanated from its standing during the Cold War. In all, the build-up of armed forces after socialism seems to have been primarily influenced by changes in the following factors: security conceptions; power configurations among domestic interest groups; resource allocation; and the impact of the external environment, especially cooperation with, or integration into, NATO.

Given the anticipated danger of military interventions into government politics, the lack of outright military interference is striking. Instances of such interference in the former Soviet Union and in former Yugoslavia mainly relate to resistance against the effects that dissolving the country had on the military and were not aimed at the erection of an authoritarian military rule *per se*. These instances of military interference refer to situations with weak and deeply divided civilian authorities at an early stage of transformation. In general, resistance against the imperatives of system liberalization and system change has not been a dominant feature among Eastern European militaries. Yet, nowhere in Eastern Europe has the military been an initiator or upholder of societal reform either. Its members have obviously lacked a corporate political identity which was sufficiently autonomous and independent of civilian actors to wage a putsch or to insist on a dominant role in government. The very fact that, until the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Eastern European armies were subordinated to collective defense strategies commanded from Moscow contributed to the legacy of low autonomy in political decision-making.

### *Military reform: nationalization, democratization and downsizing*

Changes in the composition of armed forces were part and parcel of an overarching restructuring process and exhibited certain cross-regional features which can only be sketched in this introduction. After national armies were formed, they were reoriented away from collective defense of the 'socialist camp' and towards national security doctrines. The role and mission of the national armed forces were redefined in favor of 'all-around' defense, abandoning the former orientation on an attack by NATO countries and a World War II-image of war. Additionally, legislative measures were adopted to limit the role of former socialist armies in the defense of the political *status quo* or against political unrest. For example, the former communist party and state security control of the military was replaced by elements of civilian, especially parliamentary, control over military affairs, coupled with the banning of party activities within the armed forces. Rejuvenation and compulsory retirement replaced, at least partially, the most dogmatic standpatters of the old regime. Even so, in the course of nationalizing armies, the military establishment acted as a key player in defining national symbols, interests, and loyalties.

The economic and human resources available to the military in general and professional soldiers in particular diminished significantly. This frustrated the officer corps in terms of its declining socioeconomic standing and professional performance. Due to poor living conditions in the army, it was above all the younger, more qualified military professionals who left the forces, leading to a shortage of qualified officers, particularly in the lower ranks.

As mentioned above, changes in the composition of armed forces were part of an all-encompassing restructuring process. Socialist armies were mass armies, oversized, top-heavy and oriented around an image of war according to World War II; they were heavily ideologized, dominated by Soviet assignments and, in times of crisis, formed part of the domestic apparatus of repression. Over the past decade, these mass armies have gradually been substituted by smaller units (brigades, battalions) in order to reduce the total active-duty personnel, including a reshuffling of army personnel. The relative proportion of professionals has increased while conscription terms have decreased. Throughout Eastern Europe we face a reduction in the length of conscription to an average of 12–15 months. Moreover, the possibility of conscientious objection has added to a drop in the number of conscripts which had already been reduced by widespread draft evasion, especially in the successor states to the Soviet Union.

In the first instance, these force reductions were not initiated by decisions of political elites or a public keen to demilitarize but were due to economic constraints and the

existence of more urgent transformation priorities. By comparing the reduction of the armed forces to the level of military expenditure in the period 1985–1995, it becomes apparent that expenditures declined even more radically than troop strength. This downsizing of armies after socialism indicates changes in the functions exercised by the military in defense politics; shifts in military-society relations, particularly civil reintegration capacities; and changes in security identities. Demobilization and restructuring have critically affected the ability of the armed forces to function, particularly their combat capabilities.

In most Eastern European countries attempts were made to professionalize and reeducate enlisted commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Governments opted for leaner, technicized armies based on life-career professionals and contract soldiers. Yet, scattered evidence suggests that patriarchal, drill-oriented, 'macho-type' and ethnocentric behavioral patterns are still widespread among military professionals.

National armies 'internationalized' through the formation of units for 'peacekeeping' or 'peace enforcement' missions. Western training, command, communication and control experiences began to diffuse as role models to Central and Eastern European armies by means of extensive bilateral relations, the "Partnership for Peace", joint exercises, and NATO extension. In the course of cooperation with, or integration into, NATO, Soviet-style military equipment was at least partially replaced, mainly through

the acquisition of arms from Western providers. The often nontransparent procurement processes are shaped by the aggressive sales strategies of Western, particularly US, armaments companies.

Given the generally poor public image of the military, few are attracted by a professional military career. Nonetheless, compared to other governmental institutions, the military establishment has regularly outperformed parliaments, political parties, and political leaders in terms of public confidence.

The way demobilization is being handled is indicative of a decline in the military's influence on politics and in society at large. Professional and social reintegration have proved to be crucial in maintaining stable military-society relations and in preserving civilian prerogatives over the military. Yet the downsizing of the armed forces, induced by military restructuring and financial constraints, has often caused a decline in professional morale in the military, social insecurity and, at times, an increase in the incidence of criminality among servicemen. Illegal activities such as illicit arms sales, intra-military corruption, and criminality have become more widespread, especially in the first half of the 1990s.

### *A change of role for former military professionals*

Moving from a military profession to civilian life represents a major change of identity and social role. Officers laid off in the middle of their professional life most often do not exit this role voluntarily. Not only do they lose their lifetime job,

but also social securities or benefits and protection from unemployment. With social networks, prestige, a clearly assigned role, and the niceties of an early retirement gone, even their family status may be affected. But are laid-off officers necessarily losers? Between the summer of 2000 and the spring of 2001, we conducted anonymous standardized interviews with 30 redundant officers in each of the following countries: Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Ukraine. The questions asked related to four major issues: professional adjustment after being laid off; the role of assistance from the government and NGOs; the role of social networks; and, changes in political outlook. Based on these interviews, some general cross-regional insights on stages and patterns of role change became discernable.

Most officers who had been discharged went through periods of unemployment, ranging from months to a couple of years, depending on age and prior qualifications. The higher the skills, for example external diplomas, the better the job opportunities. The more qualified and younger tended to leave earlier and more often voluntarily, whereas the older, less qualified were usually dismissed. Those who had prepared for a post military career early on experienced much less difficulty in adjusting. Obviously the search for alternatives often began too late, and this affected the time it took for soldiers to adjust later on.

In general, it appeared that the military was still respected as an institution and few regretted their military career in retrospect. Nonetheless, the prestige and standing of the army were perceived to be in decline. Most of those interviewed felt that their military skills and qualifications were not valued as highly as before; very few managed to transfer skills directly from the military to the civilian sector. Often, laid off officers remarked that it was necessary to acquire dual-use skills. While the skills which were apparently useful in reintegration were above all social skills such as discipline, persistence, punctuality, a sense of duty, the management of personnel, and leadership qualities, an emphasis on command style-behavior seems to have constituted a disadvantage. It is perhaps not surprising that a very large segment of laid-off officers end up in security firms. Asked if they would encourage their sons to embark on a military career, the picture was very mixed, however.

The interviews revealed further that the major difficulties in adjusting to civilian life consisted in the necessity of learning again, in job insecurity, psychological stress, doubts expressed by employers with respect to qualifications acquired in the military, and housing problems. Lack of awareness of role requirements outside the military was cited as a significant obstacle. Among the problems experienced, it is surprising that almost nobody mentioned repercussions within the family situation.

Most interviewees felt disappointed at the amount of assistance received from the military and governmental authorities. Although officers made redundant kept in contact with each other, very few joined officer organizations or expected improvement from joining such an organization. Clearly, discontent is not organized: the dynamics of disengagement from the military role are shaped not by the whole cohort of former co-officers but by friendships and family ties. However, when experienced not as a group but individually, role exit leads to individualization.

The questionnaire showed that, with expectations of assistance low, personal commitment to the military as an institution was rapidly waning regardless of any positive assessment of individual military biographies on the part of those interviewed. Where role exit was seen as irreversible—that is, when an individual let go any hope of returning to the past—it was in this sense widely accepted and retrospective regrets were few. When asked about changes in their worldviews, most interviewees claimed to be actually a-political. While most said they adhered to democratic principles and freedoms, they disliked anarchy, corruption, social insecurity, and the perceived incompetence of politicians since the demise of socialism. Only a very few stated that they would prefer rule by the army instead of democratically elected politicians. However, a strong sense of disappointment with democracy did exist, especially with those features that contradicted military virtues: party pluralism, incompetence, and the absence of a strong hand. There was nonetheless no proof of a dominant socialist worldview, even

if social security and a strong government were highly valued. The overwhelming majority related positively to NATO, though some expressed the fear of a disempowerment in national security decision-making. Partial role exit manifested itself in a certain tendency to favor an authoritarian government, even if democracy was welcomed in the abstract. Yet, this tendency towards authoritarian regression was limited and not actively promoted. Due to the overall perception of a military in decline, the army was not regarded as a potential savior.

Is the shift from a military to a civilian role viewed as rewarding? Surprisingly, most of those interviewed felt personally better off in their new situation and had positive expectations as regards the future or at least did not anticipate that their situation could get worse. These personal assessments seemed to contrast with the widespread feeling that role exit was not socially rewarded enough. Exit from the military role was mostly induced either from the outside or by a fairly long period of conscious preparation. Where such preparation took place, for instance through the active upgrading of qualifications, the chances of developing a sense of having control over one's own post-military life were greater. In other cases, insecurity and doubts usually did not set in until dismissed officers had reentered civilian life.

Unfortunately, the negative effect of social entitlements has often been the creation of a passive frame of mind. Officers relying on entitlements often adopted a 'wait-and-see' approach, indulging in complacency instead of taking control of their own lives.

In essence, the question is what conditions were conducive to efficient reintegration? Evidently officers with technical knowledge or administrative and legal skills were better off on the civilian job market than 'polit-officers'. The continuous acquisition of civilian qualifications within the military proved to be the key. Hence, as one of the major contributory factors, a conscious reintegration policy should create an awareness of civilian market conditions and accentuate the importance of dual-use qualifications such as administrative, personnel management and social skills. Having seldom provided sufficient attention and assistance over preceding years, local and regional administrations could now play a much more active role in supporting those looking for jobs and in facilitating application procedures.



## *Recommendations: lessons for reintegration policies*

In administrating reintegration, a number of key questions have to be answered. Is reintegration better handled by an NGO, the Ministries of Defense, or a combination of both? What is the most efficient relationship between central planning and regional implementation?

### *1. Administrative measures*

From a cross-regional perspective, some tentative lessons can be drawn. In institutional terms it is obvious that the **Ministries of Defense** must play a key role in preparing, implementing and adjusting reintegration measures. **Special administrative units** with appropriate funding for the duration of the reintegration program as well as qualified manpower must be set up to implement reintegration policies, particularly the retraining of, and job creation for, redundant officers. It is imperative that the Ministries of Defense cooperate closely with other ministries involved in the reintegration measures (Finance, Labor, Education). To facilitate flexible adjustment, special **inter-ministerial coordinating bodies** for reintegration should pool experiences gathered at regional and local levels, along with expertise in the assessment of qualifications, vocational training, and job-market requirements. It should be their task not only to establish information networks and to encourage a constant flow of information, but also to prevent hierarchies in the access to information from developing. Finally, these coordinating bodies would be responsible for guaranteeing regular evaluation of program implementation and the generalization of insights into successes and failures.

### *2. Financial support/Evaluations*

Financial means should be **geared at direct beneficiaries** to prevent NGOs or other agencies from consuming most of the money allocated to reintegration. Retraining agencies should be chosen on a competitive basis, evaluated regularly, and rewarded for job-placement successes and for their flexibility in meeting real needs. A fixed, transparent, and accountable ratio between management costs and the cost of retraining beneficiaries is a prerequisite.

### *3. A regional focus*

Furthermore, retraining is best conducted at a **regional level** where the specific characteristics of the downsizing pattern, the local job market, and the opportunities for job creation can be best taken into account. Close cooperation with regional employment bureaus, job placement agencies, and vocational training centers is therefore the key. **Regional coordinating units** that include regional military commanders, regional administrations and the agencies involved in retraining or job creation—including small business incubators—should be set up. Regional administrations can encourage job creation by providing assistance in the establishment of small and medium-sized enterprises, for example by encouraging the setting up of business parks or by providing tax benefits, public services or premises at reduced prices. Job placement necessitates close links with potential employers. Job fairs, vocational training on-the-job, and support in the establishment of small and medium-sized enterprises are instruments that should already be taken into consideration at the planning stage.

### *4. Individual responsibility*

Equally important, **ex-servicemen should be encouraged to take on responsibility for themselves**. It is advisable that servicemen are prepared as early as possible for the eventuality of a post-military career. The reintegration process should start within the military, with civil-use vocational training offered at military schools and special assistance programs before leaving. Servicemen who have been prepared for reintegration psychologically and vocationally as early as possible fare better on the job market while a protracted break with the military inhibits later reintegration.

### *5. Support for the family*

In certain cases, reintegration must be accompanied by special psychological assistance, **supportive measures for families** and, very often, a specific housing policy.

### *6. External assistance*

Finally, at times **external assistance has been of crucial importance**. The following organizations have been active in supporting reintegration: the European Union's TACIS (Technical Assistance to CIS countries) program, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the World Bank, NATO, individual NATO countries, and NGOs (non-governmental organizations), such as the Soros Foundation. However, up to the present time, exchange of information and coordination between the various programs have been limited.

# The Post-socialist Demobilization of Poland's Armed Forces

by Lech Giermakowski and Tadeusz Keson

Having acceded to NATO, Poland is in the process of downsizing and restructuring its forces, but extra efforts need to be made to guide this process and strengthen local capacities in the interest of job creation and sustainable development.

The restructuring of Poland's national defense system—and of the armed forces, which form its integral part—is only one single facet within the complex transformation of the entire political system. Transformation began in 1989 when the collapse of the Warsaw Pact allowed Poland to redefine its own defense policy, the so-called 'Security Strategy'. This defense policy subsequently became the basis for decisions on troop reductions and army restructuring which still apply today. The legal foundations for all activities in that period were laid by the 'Professional Servicemen Military Service Bill' (amended in 1992 and 1996), the decrees of the National Defense Minister, and further regulations addressing new requirements engendered by the organizational and structural reshaping of the Polish National Forces.

Three basic stages may be differentiated in the 1990s. During the first stage, national defense needs were treated as a priority. The fundamental question of this period was: "How do we adjust the armed forces to the defense needs and the socioeconomic potential of the country?" In the second stage, Poland actively prepared to join the

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), asking the question: "How do we reorient the armed forces to meet the requirements of NATO membership". In the third stage, after "first-day-of-membership" readiness had been achieved and Poland had acceded to the Alliance, it began implementing the principles of integration with NATO and of Host Nation Support (HNS). The current question is therefore: "How do we modernize and equip the armed forces to make the state an efficient member of the Alliance?"

## *A new model for the Polish armed forces*

With the implementation of these sweeping changes, a new model for the Polish armed forces emerged, based on the following nine principles:

- Civilian control over the army
- Transparency of the defense budget
- Separation of administration and command
- The opening up of structures towards NATO

- Readiness to implement disarmament agreements
- The development of a new air-defense system
- An even distribution of the army installations across the country
- Full utilization of the existing logistical potential
- Creation of a territorial defense.

Since 1997, this model has been manifested in the 15-year Modernization and NATO Integration Program (1998–2012), and its 5-year version, the Development of the Armed Forces Program for the Years 2001–2006. Besides adapting the armed forces to Poland's current and forecast defense needs as well as to NATO requirements, the program provides stable financial conditions. As matters of national defense and security are usually handled above party divisions, the corresponding law—on the 'Restructuring and Technical Modernization and Financing of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in the Years 2001 through 2006'—was passed on 26 June 2001 with widespread support in Parliament and the Senate.

### *Budgetary changes*

According to the law of June 2001, the annual Defense Ministry budget will not drop below 1.95 percent of GDP (gross domestic product). As a consequence, coming defense budgets will not be smaller than the 2001 defense budget, which amounted to 4 billion US dollars. It is assumed that Polish defense costs will equal 105 billion PLN (Polish zlotys) over the 5-year period. However, the amount of state treasury outlays should not be lower than 16.1 billion PLN in 2002, 17 billion PLN in 2003, 17.9 billion PLN in 2004, 19 billion PLN in 2005, and 20.2 billion PLN in 2006. These amounts will be taken into account by the Council of Ministers in subsequent budget law drafts. (The above mentioned budget outlays do not however include expenditures for the procurement of a multi-task aircraft which comes under different legislation.)

The Ministry of Defense estimates that the sum allotted to defense expenses over the next 5 years will consist, among others things, of 1.5 billion PLN from the sale of army surplus through the Agency for Military Assets (Agencja Mienia Wojskowego (AMW)). According to the said law, this military property agency will annually transfer at least 93 percent of its income in the years 2001–2006 as a contribution to the financing of the Program, that is, a total of 1.3 billion PLN. In 2000, the Agency transferred 150.5 million PLN (90 percent of gross profit) to the Ministry of Defense following a decision taken by the Council of Ministers. A further 1.1 billion PLN should come from releasing radio frequencies that have been allocated to UMTS network operators. Moreover, 30 million PLN are

expected to result from the privatization of the Polish defense industry. At least 35 percent of the total income from the privatization of the defense industry will be earmarked for the Program, as stipulated in Article 8.1 of the corresponding law of 7 October 1999 on support for the restructuring of defense industry resources and technical modernization of the armed forces. In any case, this amount will be returned in the form of orders placed by the armed forces. Of the total amount, over 20 billion PLN is to be allocated to the technical modernization of the armed forces.

Furthermore, the law of June 2001 guarantees that all funds saved as a result of restructuring (for instance through cutbacks in personnel or the withdrawal of equipment) will remain within the Ministry's budget and will be spent on the modernization programs. Given the shrinkage of the military establishment during peacetime with the ensuing changes in the proportions of career officer ranks as well as reductions in military assets and real estate, it is estimated that savings of 1.5 billion US dollars can be achieved. 70 percent of the savings may stem from the downsizing of military personnel to 150,000 and the remaining 30 percent from the decommissioning of obsolete infrastructure and assets. This means that the armed forces will have to liquidate certain units and close so-called 'rickety' garrisons. The more extensive the restructuring and modernization measures, the greater the cost. However the implementation of this program will allow for the introduction of modern military equipment, such as the multi-task/transportation airplane, communication systems, guided anti-tank missiles, and anti-aircraft systems.

### *The social costs of closing garrisons*


Nevertheless, it would be wrong to focus exclusively on the financial costs of modernization and new equipment while overlooking the social costs. The closure of military units or garrisons generally creates huge problems in finding replacement jobs, especially in regions with high unemployment. Alternatively, however, the restructuring of the armed forces may prove to be a window of opportunity, not only for the armed forces themselves but also for a dozen or so small towns often troubled by structural unemployment, such as Bartoszyce, Braniewo, Morag, Gołdap, Giżycko, Orzysz and Tczew in northern Poland. The garrisons at these towns, which were chosen not only due to operational considerations but also because they were situated close to armed forces training grounds, will be increased by a total of 2,650 servicemen.

During the period 1987–2000, an overall number of 61 garrisons were closed. The reduction and transfer of military units between 1987 and 1996 resulted in a regional redistribution of Poland's defense potential (see Figure 1).

A further 71 garrisons (around 200 military units) will have been closed by the end of 2003, including 35 in 2001, 23 in 2002 and 13 in 2003 bringing the total to 132. However this second round of closures will not have much effect on the distribution of the armed forces throughout the country.

In deciding which garrisons to close, the Ministry of Defense adopted three main criteria: firstly, operational considerations and training conditions; secondly, the operational costs of individual military units including barracks infrastructure; and, finally, social aspects. In most cases, garrisons will be closed in towns where the number of servicemen have already been significantly reduced a long time ago. Such units include military recruitment offices and command posts for training grounds and emergency airfields, all of which employed only a handful of personnel. 71 towns are to be removed from the military map of Poland, and armed forces have already begun to move out. These cuts will mainly affect large cities and regions with a significant concentration of military units. Due to the closure of garrisons, between 35 and 40 percent of barrack complexes will be shut down. According to the Agency for Military Assets (AMW), these empty barracks encompass approximately 10,000 hectares and 4,000–6,000 buildings and will cost tens of millions of zlotys (PLN) each year to maintain, repair and guard. This real estate will be transferred to the Agency for Military Assets so that it can be put back into use or handed over to local authorities free-of-charge. A survey carried out in most of the garrisons in the Silesian Military District (which were handed over between 1989 and 1999) showed that reuse was more successful in large cities with a population of over 100,000, while the rate of reuse in smaller towns amounted to 10–30 percent.

**Figure 1: Decreases in the regional deployment of military units throughout Poland**



**Fluctuations in manpower, 1989–1999**

In the years 1989–1999, the number of posts were reduced from 398,660 to 226,460, that is, by 43 percent. The number of posts for commissioned officers was reduced by 27.3 percent, warrant officers posts by 9.8 percent and NCO posts by 36.4 percent. These figures include reductions in the actual total of compulsory-service recruits by 56.2 percent (from 279,110 to 122,260) and of professional servicemen by 30.5 percent (from 112,656 to 80,634). The years 1996–1999 saw a sharp increase in the number of professional servicemen or contract-service positions. A total of 8,181 professional soldiers were conscripted at the time, including 320 commissioned officers, 699 warrant officers, and 7,162 non-commissioned officers. Between

1990 and 1999, more than 62,500 professional servicemen retired from the army—approximately 67 percent of the manpower in service at the end of 1990. This includes approximately 31,500 commissioned officers (circa 67 percent of the 1990 figure), some 18,100 warrant officers (circa 70 percent), and some 12,750 NCOs (circa 62 percent) (see Figures 2 and 3).

The total number of dismissals of professional military servicemen in the period of 1990–1999 is presented in Figure 4 and illustrated in Figure 5.

*Figure 2: Changes in proportions between ranks in the armed forces, 1990–1999*

<i>Cadre</i>	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<i>Officers</i>	46,976	43,062	43,176	43,632	43,216	42,636	41,054	39,937	36,709	36,023
<i>Warrant officers</i>	25,914	24,761	24,888	26,316	27,466	28,556	28,432	26,675	24,701	24,912
<i>NCOs</i>	20,503	20,229	20,662	19,580	18,011	16,404	16,155	16,483	16,930	19,699
<i>Total</i>	93,393	88,052	88,726	89,528	88,693	87,596	85,641	83,095	78,340	80,634





Figure 3: Changes in proportions between professional servicemen ranks, 1990–1999



Rank	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Generals	114	87	101	115	119	122	125	134	125	120
Senior officers	22,466	19,727	20,657	21,780	22,028	21,066	20,421	19,537	17,461	17,090
Junior officers	24,396	23,248	22,418	21,737	21,069	20,368	20,508	20,266	19,123	18,813
Warrant officers	25,914	24,761	24,888	26,316	27,466	28,254	28,432	26,675	24,701	24,912
NCOs	20,503	20,229	20,662	19,580	18,011	16,369	16,155	16,483	16,930	19,699
<b>Total</b>	<b>93,393</b>	<b>88,052</b>	<b>88,726</b>	<b>89,528</b>	<b>88,693</b>	<b>86,179</b>	<b>85,641</b>	<b>83,095</b>	<b>78,340</b>	<b>80,634</b>

**Figure 4: Total number of dismissals from professional military service, 1990–1999**

<i>Reason for dismissal</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>1999</i>
<i>Incapable of professional military service according to Military Medical Commission (WKL)</i>	2,362	1,840	723	499	541	685	786	712	596	320
<i>Legal retirement age reached</i>	1,115	285	277	162	155	194	270	151	104	101
<i>Term as professional soldier expired</i>	5,122	4,199	759	1,044	2,637	3,347	4,823	5,174	7,036	1,632
<i>Term of military body expired</i>	-	-	58	269	179	208	406	205	140	174
<i>Age limit for rank reached</i>	3,095	1,671	334	111	86	145	88	25	18	18
<i>Full pension entitlement acquired</i>	-	-	-	10	33	92	32	-	-	-
<i>Court ruling (imprisonment)</i>	23	50	46	42	35	44	21	45	33	37
<i>On request of soldier</i>	1,063	537	365	38	46	20	35	24	35	2
<i>Death</i>	226	151	140	125	111	142	102	113	86	74
<i>Other</i>	1,007	908	1,058	216	100	98	64	51	115	78
<b>Total</b>	<b>14,013</b>	<b>9,641</b>	<b>3,760</b>	<b>2,516</b>	<b>3,923</b>	<b>4,975</b>	<b>6,627</b>	<b>6,500</b>	<b>8,163</b>	<b>2,436</b>

**Reductions in manpower, 2001–2003**

If the 15-year Modernization of the Armed Forces Program (1998–2012) set the manpower of the Polish armed forces at 180,000, including 50 percent professional servicemen, the 5-year Program (2001–2006) approved by the Council of Ministers foresaw even greater reductions—to 150,000 soldiers:


■ It was planned that armed forces personnel be reduced by 26,000 posts (13 percent) to a total level of 180,000 servicemen by the end of 2001 including 36,000 officers, 52,000 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and 91,800 conscripts.

■ By the end of 2002, armed forces personnel are to be reduced by another 15,000 posts (8 percent) to a total level of 165,000 servicemen including 30,000 officers, 51,500 NCOs and 83,400 conscripts.

■ By the end of 2003, armed forces personnel will be reduced by a further 15,000 posts (9 percent) to a total level of 150,000 servicemen including 75,000 professional servicemen and 75,000 non-professional servicemen (including 65,800 conscripts, 4,000 officer cadets (reserve) and 5,200 candidates for professional military service).

The 5-year Program will lead to the dismissal of 22,000 professional soldiers by the close of 2003.

Figure 5: Dismissals from professional military service, 1990–1999



It will be the task of the Minister of Defense to define the new structure of the armed forces, ensuring that no less than half of the jobs are allotted to professional military staff. According to the above mentioned law of June 2001, one-third of the posts will go to officers. Many of the garrisons closed had provided jobs for the local community and were sites for civilian businesses, such as bakeries, butchers' shops, and so on. Here, the social costs will be particularly painful. In an attempt to alleviate the negative effects, the government has created an interdepartmental team of experts to evaluate the consequences of closing down garrisons and plans to introduce special protection programs in the areas affected.

**Qualitative changes in the forces**

Along with quantitative changes in the structure of the armed forces, significant qualitative changes have also taken place. These include improvements in the structure of professional military service, the introduction of new categories of professional military service (for example, extended and contract military service or military service for women), a lowering of the average age of professional servicemen (see Figure 6), and improved levels of education.

If ongoing restructuring has resulted in a generation change among professional servicemen, a further change has taken place through the attempt to attract candidates from the system of higher education. In general, the professional qualifications of military personnel have improved. Nearly half the


officers (47.4 percent) have graduated from military academies or hold higher education degrees. There has also been a significant growth in the percentage of officers who have attended civilian institutions of higher education (nearly 20 percent). This trend is related to the introduction of contract military service and is often used by warrant officers and NCOs as a way of joining the officers' corps.

**Financial benefits on discharge**

For professional servicemen, troop restructuring may not only mean a change of location—50 percent of servicemen from military units designated for disbandment would be prepared to move—but possibly also dismissal. It is advisable to keep the number of young officers dismissed low, however, as they are not entitled to pension benefits.




Figure 6: Changes in the average age of professional servicemen, 1990–1999



<i>Cadre</i>	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<i>Senior officers</i>	44.80	44.17	44.26	43.71	43.86	43.97	43.81	43.86	43.55	43.97
<i>Junior officers</i>	31.96	32.05	32.07	31.37	31.49	31.44	31.22	30.96	30.76	31.22
<i>Total officers</i>	38.13	37.65	37.93	37.56	37.83	37.90	37.52	37.31	36.89	37.31
<i>Warrant officers</i>	35.18	34.70	34.74	33.89	34.59	33.04	32.34	32.34	32.20	32.67
<i>NCOs</i>	34.56	34.07	34.04	33.68	33.74	34.19	33.35	32.74	31.95	31.39
<i>Total</i>	36.53	36.00	36.13	35.63	35.99	35.62	35.02	34.81	34.34	34.43

Figure 7: Changes in the pyramid of posts



According to Polish regulations, professional soldiers have a right to pension benefits—40 percent of their basic salary (“partial pension”)—after 15 years of service. For each additional year, a rate of 2.6 percent applies, up to a maximum level of 75 percent of the basic salary (“full pension”). This is acquired after 29 years of service and is conditional upon rank and position. When discharged, a soldier who has acquired full pension rights amounting to 75 percent of his base salary can then take up new employment without the amount of his new salary having an impact on the level of pension received. However, when a soldier has acquired partial pension rights, regulations are such that taking up a new job does not necessarily mean an increase in income. Especially among NCOs, warrant

officers, and junior officers with short seniority, the economic situation of the soldier’s family may deteriorate upon his release from duty. For former servicemen, taking on an additional job is therefore practically unavoidable. Career officers with seniority shorter than 15 years are in the worst situation, as they have no pension rights at all. During the restructuring process, the attempt is made to protect such people from redundancy, even if this cannot be guaranteed in every case.

To facilitate their integration into the civilian community, the following additional benefits are available to discharged military personnel:

- The amount of remuneration of the last position is paid out every month for a period of one year after discharge. A discharged soldier may take up an additional job within this time and still receive remuneration from the military. As this additional income from the military does not count for tax purposes, tax benefits are incurred for one year.
- A monetary equivalent will be paid for holidays which are outstanding, including the holiday not taken in the year of discharge.

■ A one-off severance payment, equivalent to three months' salary of the last position held, is provided. The level of this severance pay rises by 20 percent of the monthly salary for every full year of seniority above 10 years of continual military service, up to the amount of 6 monthly salaries.

■ Additionally, until 31 December 2003, the period of notice for termination of military employment may—even on request of the soldier—be reduced from 9 to 1 month. Soldiers discharged from military service are entitled to receive a one-off payment equal to their accumulated monthly salary for the reduced period of notice. Thus the reduced period of notice is treated as equivalent to military service and is recorded as a period of active military duty.

All these financial benefits, listed above, are expected to help former military personnel in their future non-military careers.

#### *Changing proportions in ranks*

Within the ongoing restructuring process it will be necessary to adjust proportions between the numbers of officers, warrant officers and NCOs (see Figure 7). By December 2003, as a result of such changes, the officers' and warrant officers' corps will be reduced so that they together constitute 60 percent (30 percent each) of the total number of professional servicemen (against 75 percent in 1999). The proportions of warrant officers and NCOs will be increased to 30 percent (20 percent in 1999) and 40 percent (25 percent in 1999) respectively. Within the officers'

corps itself, the proportions will be as follows: 30 percent of senior and 70 percent of junior officers. At the same time, the proportion of professional servicemen in the total manpower of the armed forces will increase by the year 2003 from 42 percent to 50 percent.

#### *Shifts in the level of professional military education*

The restructuring of professional military education will play an important role in the overall transformation of the armed services. The main idea is to reduce the number of educational structures by closing some of them and integrating other individual educational units into larger institutions. The number of military academies and schools for higher officers has been reduced accordingly from 16 to 8 and schools for warrant officers from 17 to 11. This process involved the establishment, firstly, of centers of higher education equipped with much greater scientific and training potential and, secondly, of training centers for multi-level military education. Thus an attempt is being made to replace the traditional model of military schools by open institutions based on modern social communications and offering a variety of training options and educational programs at differing levels of qualification.

#### *A decade of reintegration*

'Conversion' of armed forces personnel—active support for their reintegration into civilian life—actually began in 1993 as a reaction to the first wave of dismissals, but it was not until 1996 that this was given a legal framework through its inclusion in the law on the military service of professional soldiers mentioned above. Various agencies in charge of human resources facilitate the process: they organize job fairs and seminars on conversion, act as employment agencies for both individuals and groups, prepare draft recommendations for the Director of the Social Affairs Department of the Ministry of Defense on the financing of individual requalification efforts for demobilized professionals, and organize group requalification.

Since September 1997, a special decree has been in force specifying which posts in central and local administrations dealing with national defense are to be staffed by former professional servicemen. An agreement aimed at easing the adverse effects of unemployment on such soldiers was signed by the Ministry of National Defense and the National Office of Labor in March 1999. In practice, however, these provisions are ineffective, as the said positions are already occupied by civilian personnel: to employ former soldiers would require dismissing the current staff.

In total, 25,762 professional servicemen left the armed forces in the period 1996–2000, 13,642 of whom came under the Personnel Conversion Program. Of these 13,642, 3,491 soldiers were requalified, 7,925 were given job

counseling and 5,620 were assisted in looking for a job, while jobs were found for 2,077 others. Even though the number of soldiers who actually found new positions may seem low, one should bear in mind that this only includes those soldiers who found employment opportunities through the direct involvement of the conversion authorities. This is in fact quite a promising figure, as it does not include former soldiers who established their own businesses or found jobs either on their own or through other employment services. It should be remembered, moreover, that conversion is an ongoing process and that new experiences and challenges modify the activities of the authorities involved.

#### *Shortage of funding*

Efforts to reintegrate personnel into civilian life are constrained by a shortage of funding. In 2000, the Ministry of Defense earmarked 1.6 million PLN for demobilization and reintegration measures. Yet, only 1.14 million PLN—one-third less—were set aside for the 5-year restructuring program and the ensuing downsizing which began in 2001. Reintegration measures are further inhibited by the limited number of administrative staff. Up to February 2000, there were only four persons dealing with reintegration at the corps and military district command headquarters. In fact, throughout the entire armed forces, only 33 people deal full-time with the conversion of personnel. Members of the Provincial Military Staffs (WSzW) and of the Military Reserve Commands (WKU) are expected to support the program although they are not officially involved in it. Troublesome and time-consuming

as these responsibilities are, it is unavoidable that new and permanent demobilization and reintegration structures be established. If not, the benefits will be very limited and the centrally organized effort inefficient. Existing structures are not able to effectively provide all measures foreseen for military staff under the law. Along with extremely limited capacities at headquarters and an almost complete absence of representation in the field, there is a permanent lack of funding. The means for demobilization and reintegration should therefore be distributed not only to the command posts of the military districts but also to the lower-level military administration authorities (WSzW and WKU) and to garrisons slated for downsizing. This is where knowledge of the actual needs lies and to whom the assistance should go and applies especially to regions affected by structural unemployment. In short, unless administrative resources are increased, conversion efforts—organized for the most part centrally—will not be able to provide all the supportive measures foreseen by law, in particular the expansion of capacities at the local level.

#### *Innovative measures*

Despite being a step in the right direction, the financial benefits available to ex-soldiers in addition to pensions (remuneration for one extra year, severance pay, compensation for a shortened period of notice) and the support in finding jobs (seminars, collective and individual career advice, recruitment assistance, collective retraining, and so on) are far from being sufficient. In view of this fact, viable innovative measures are called for. Informal contacts

between active and former servicemen often yield positive results. Even though there are no formal structures supporting demobilization and reintegration within the organizations of former career officers, many ideas are born at their sessions. For example, the Dean Convention (which consists of representatives of various different ranks such as NCOs, warrant officers and officers) proposed that a special governmental authority be appointed to deal with matters relating to the employment of former career officers in the defense industry and the public sector. A suggestion has been made that career officers might be offered shares in the property of garrisons to be disbanded and bases to be closed as well as in their infrastructure and land—similar to the package provided to the staff of privatized state companies. Discharged soldiers could participate actively in the process of creating jobs and conditions conducive to business. The real estate and assets of former military property, transferred by the Ministry of Defense to the Agency for Military Assets (AMW) with the express purpose of finding an economic use for them, might provide premises and infrastructure. The crux of the matter is how to merge the business initiatives of discharged personnel with the asset management process of the AMW.

#### *Business start-ups*

A significant step forward has been the establishment of a system to help soldiers start up businesses using some of the assets currently at disposal of the AMW. According to Article 9.1 of the law of June 2001 on restructuring of the armed forces, “the Minister of Defense may, until 31 December 2006, transfer a

subordinated or supervised unit to the Agency for Military Assets for a limited or unlimited period to secure the continuation of its business activity". Moreover, Article 10 stipulates that property from disbanded military organizations subordinated to, or supervised by, the Minister of Defense may be made available until 31 December 2006 under the terms of a limited tender for enterprises whose sole proprietors are discharged career officers. This innovative solution may prove highly effective for whole groups of discharged soldiers.

Another useful decision would be one enabling the AMW to take over individual facilities at garrisons slated for closure while they were still operational (such as workshops, fuel depots, canteens, laundries, nurseries, warehouses, or hotels) and transfer them to new companies established by ex-military personnel whom it employs, pending tender. The businesses set up by such ex-military staff could offer perimeter guard duty along with additional services such as construction, geodesic or military catering services; they could run recreational and sports facilities, or clear the military complexes of explosives. A next step would be the legislative backing to establish appropriate procedures and a preference system within the agency (payment deferrals, preference prices and tenancy fees) in support of the legal handover of property to former military personnel.

### *Special authorities*

As mentioned above, conversion is an on-going process. In view of the substantial reductions planned for overstuffed garrisons and military districts between 2001 and 2003,

special authorities responsible for conversion issues will be nominated. The Department of Social Affairs within the Ministry of Defense has also proposed some further-reaching solutions. Four career support centers could be established in Bydgoszcz, Wrocław, Kraków, and Olsztyn to expand the structure of the entire demobilization and reintegration apparatus to 105 persons (currently 33). The Cabinet and the Minister of Defense are especially aware of the fact that discharged staff must not be allowed to merely increase the ranks of the unemployed. Without help, the armed forces will not be able to successfully cope with the conversion challenge.

Help must come through a coordinated effort by the government, particularly the Ministries of Defense and of Labor, Parliament and local governments. The employment of discharged soldiers must be regarded as a vital part of the national economy. This again calls for interministerial dialogue and cooperation among many communities. Such cooperation is in the interest of all parties involved—not only the army. At stake is the loss of vast human resources, as not only senior officers and soldiers with full pension rights will be discharged but also highly qualified young people, aged between 30 and 40, who possess strengths and unique skills that have been developed during military service.

### *New solutions*

Based on recent experience, it seems that advisors should no longer encourage switching to a career in management and marketing as the boom in such positions is receding. With this market segment saturated, technical specialists, especially in the area of information technology, seem to be the ones most sought after. Further, proposals by the Ministries of Justice and of Regional Development and Construction are worthy of note: according to the Ministry of Justice, it would be possible to employ discharged soldiers either in prison management or as probation officers. This idea coincides with another project of the Ministry of Justice concerning the transformation of former garrisons into penitentiary facilities. Action taken by the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction is even more promising in that it has designed an innovative "Pilot Project of Re-conversion of the Nysa Garrison into the Center of Innovation, Technology and Education (CITE)". In collaboration with the local government, the Ministry has prepared a program to test new solutions and instruments for regional growth. The program will be financed through governmental resources (in 2001, 8.5 million PLN will be allocated from the general budget reserve). As a pilot project, it aims to test model solutions before they are implemented in other cities.

The model is designed to address common local problems, including the loss of sources of income and the necessity of creating new job opportunities for former officers as well as civilian employees of the military. The conversion programs for individual garrison towns will be customized to meet specific needs. The idea of establishing the Nysa Innovation, Technology, and Education Center (CITE) was the result of a joint decision of the central administration and the local administration of the town. If all turns out well, the Nysa CITE program may vastly improve the social climate and economic situation, not only within the town itself but also in the entire subregion. The implementation of such a model could lay the ground for long-term sustainable growth.

What are the lessons of the CITE-Nysa pilot project?

- First, governmental assistance is required, particularly a legislative foundation for the local and central administrations.
- Second, launching the project at an early stage in the downsizing of the garrison paves the way for counteracting unemployment, in the town and in the region alike.
- Third, the ‘conversion’ of personnel cannot be left in the hands of the military alone. Collaborative efforts by local government and the Ministries of Regional Development and of Defense are crucial.

### *Conclusions and recommendations*

Experience gained from the build-up of new army structures in Poland and the review of similar processes in other European countries shows that mechanisms such as limiting service age and financial incentives can be but two of many components essential to the reintegration process. A combined military-civilian authority is a prerequisite. Nor should conversion programs be drafted to meet the temporary career needs of certain politicians.

Independent institutes must evaluate the viability of individual demobilization and reintegration programs against their aspirations and minimum/maximum objectives. Similarly, the way conversion authorities are organized should be derived from their tasks and objectives as well as from a balance of assets and needs, rather than being decided from the top down.

Demobilization itself, along with the accompanying training seminars, provides no real assistance to discharged personnel unless backed up by an orchestrated job-creation effort. The scope of the conversion measures adopted should stem from local needs and opportunities, the situation on the labor market, and from its capability to absorb the highly qualified workforce.

Coaching into a new career should take into consideration the existing niches in the labor market and be in line with medium- and long-term regional development strategies. Not only should newcomers to the labor market be recognized as highly

qualified former soldiers, but their employers should also assess the value of their qualifications before they are discharged from service.

Foreign language training graduates should undergo a realistic test of their newly acquired skills, backed up by exams. Following language training, it would seem reasonable that former military personnel be accepted into the peacekeeping and observer missions of the UN, EU, and OSCE.

Very often, closing down military bases and dismissing military personnel affect not only individual people but also entire towns and regions. Hence, it is crucial that such pilot projects are designed to take account of local needs and to help establish an infrastructure which will support the economic existence of the region once the military facilities have closed. Urban or regional growth mechanisms capable of showing creativity must be provided as early as possible, thereby laying a foundation for the newly emerging civilian community.

# Hungary's Reform of the Armed Forces

by *Gustav Urbani*

**Once the initial exhilaration of NATO membership had subsided, many began to wonder whether the resources now being pumped into the armed forces could not be better spent on pressing transition tasks.**

For almost 15 years now, the Hungarian defense system has been undergoing a process of 'reform'. However, with Hungary's accession to NATO and its inclusion in NATO's structures of command and development, the initially positive assessment of reform gave way to a far less optimistic view. Reacting to mounting criticism in the summer of 1999, the government ordered a "Strategic Evaluation of the Whole Realm of Territorial Defense". On the basis of this evaluation, it then submitted a document to Parliament outlining the future goals and stages of the reform process along with measures to be taken and financial guidelines. Parliament approved the proposed reform plan with an overwhelming majority at the end of July 2000. This included a 10-year plan for the restructuring of the armed forces between 2001 and 2010.

## *Goals of reform against the backdrop of NATO membership*

As Hungary's military reform had been geared to preparation for NATO membership, actual membership was interpreted as a sign that reform had been a success. Yet, confronted with both the concrete

requirements expected of members and direct comparison to the levels of military preparedness in other NATO countries, this positive assessment soon gave way to a more sober evaluation—in particular in the wake of Hungary's contribution to the war in Kosovo. The Hungarian weekly *Magyar Narancs* summed the situation up this way: "In the last 12 years a lot happened under the heading 'reform of the armed forces', [but] with one exception: an actual reform of the armed forces" (*Magyar Narancs*, No. 26, 29 June 2000, p. 11). In its decisions of June 2000, the Hungarian parliament confirmed the necessity of a radical change in its defense forces: "The current Honved Army consists of an unnecessarily large number of military units which are insufficiently staffed, fragmented in terms of personnel and, in peacetime, close to dysfunction. Compared to the size of these military units, command structures are too complex. The proportion of ranks is unbalanced. The level of education is low, and military equipment is deteriorating more and more. Infrastructure is worn out and out-dated. The whole performance of the army cannot—or only with enormous difficulties—be financed" (*Magyar Honved*, No. 25, 23 June 2000, p. 21).]

This harsh and self-critical assessment is all the more significant when one relates this state of affairs to the average level of military preparedness of other NATO partners. Speaking at NATO's Parliamentary Assembly in Budapest in May 1999, the Hungarian Minister of Defense, Dr Janos Szabo (Smallholders Party), stated that the restructuring of the Honved Army must above all meet the requirements of the Alliance and that this could only be achieved through modernization; the Alliance would have to be patient, however, because restructuring would involve tremendous expenses and substantial burdens (*Magyar Honved*, No. 22, 2 June 2000, p. 10).

## *Qualitative changes*

In essence, restructuring would consist of a shift from quantitative to qualitative changes. While previous adjustments had concentrated primarily on a radical downsizing of personnel with the accompanying adverse consequences for the working and living conditions of professional soldiers, future reform was to be geared to overcoming the current crisis and achieving long-term goals within a 10-year period (2000–2010),

split into three separate stages. The aim of restructuring was “an army significantly downsized compared to the current level, capable of taking action even in peace time, striving for capacities rather than sheer size, and whose costs must be covered. Its military equipment should be up-to-date and as far as possible include modern means.” (*Magyar Honved*, “Reform 2000–2010,” No. 49, 8 December 2000, p. 5).

In order to realize these goals, the plan foresees among other things:

- A concentration of forces to compensate for reductions in personnel
- The outsourcing of functions carried out by superfluous or uneconomic institutions or equipment
- A reduction of personnel in the support services and within command structures
- A change in the type of training given to officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs)
- An improvement in working and living conditions

(*Magyar Honved*, No. 49, 8 December 2000).

The first stage of the 10-year Plan (2000–2003) concentrates on changes in the location of troops, as well as on the way troops are composed, and an improvement in service conditions, particularly the modernization of garrisons, housing and infrastructure. With an end to the radical downsizing of the previous period, it is hoped that insecurity of status will be reduced and that military service will become

more attractive for the young. Additional measures include the sale of obsolete or out-dated equipment and of military sites which are no longer used. Through the privatization of non-military services, the Ministry of Defense is expecting to save costs and acquire financial resources for investment, modernization, training and procurement. Finally, the acquisition of new weapons is envisaged, particularly for units which have been designated for direct cooperation with NATO.

The aim of the second stage (2004–2006) is to increase not only the combat capacities of the armed forces but also their ability to operate in conjunction with NATO. It is planned that Hungary’s armed forces participate in domestic and international troop and command maneuvers that will strengthen interoperability. This second stage will revolve around investments in infrastructure and training, particularly the introduction of simulation and information systems as well as the design of modern training grounds. A further measure will be the equipping of the air force with three-dimensional radar systems. Lastly, the proportion of NCOs and contract soldiers is to be raised while the share of recruits is to be decreased, but without a contraction in the overall size of the armed forces.

The main goal of the third stage (2007–2010) consists in the technological modernization of the armed forces, hand-in-hand with further improvements in the qualification of personnel.

### *Structural aspects of reform*

The overall aim of the 10-year Plan consists in actually filling the planned positions, in achieving healthier proportions between the various command structures and subordinate ranks, and in a reduction of personnel in the support services. Thus the future structure of the armed forces will affect the composition and size of the various branches, the actual meeting of planned troop strengths, the structure of command and troop locations, and the proportions allotted to certain ranks.

The 10-year Plan differentiates between:

- Rapid reaction forces, compatible with NATO and consisting of professional or contract soldiers
- The main defense forces which, although they exist in peace time, would only acquire full combat capacity after mobilization
- Reinforcement units whose main task it is to defend objects in the rear, as well as to replace losses. When required, these reinforcement troops can be rediverted from either the territorial defense or the reserve forces.

The armed forces are split up into three main sections: the Land Forces, the Air Force, and a Directorate for Logistics and Maintenance (*Magyar Honved*, No. 49, 8 December 2000, p. 14), while the Danube River Marine Force—with its 150 years of tradition—is slated for disbanding.



**Figure 1: Planned peacetime composition of Hungary's Honved Army (as of 31 December 2001)**

<i>Title</i>	<i>Troops of the Honved Army</i>	<i>Institutions of the Ministry of Defense*</i>	<i>Educational institutions</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Officers</i>	5,700	2,650	250	<b>8,600</b>
<i>Non-commissioned officers (NCOs)</i>	8,930	1,250	50	<b>10,230</b>
<i>Contract soldiers</i>	6,700	-	-	<b>6,700</b>
<i>Recruits</i>	12,160	-	-	<b>12,160</b>
<i>Higher education trainees</i>	-	-	1,200	<b>1,200</b>
<i>Civilians</i>	-	-	-	<b>4,010</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>37,500</b>	<b>3,900</b>	<b>1,500</b>	<b>42,900</b>

\* Personnel of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) applies to professionals working at the MOD, in the military defense services, at the University of National Defense and at NATO agencies, as well as MOD personnel without a concrete staff affiliation. This does not include military and civil servants at the MOD, an additional 2,100 persons.

According to the parliamentary decisions of June 2000, the future peacetime strength of the armed forces under the command of the Ministry of Defense is to be limited to 45,000 persons with a concentration on contract soldiers and NCOs and with a reduced number of recruits. The major bulk of troop reductions was to be accomplished by the end of 2001 (see Figure 1).

**Force levels**

In 2001, the Land Forces encompassed some 24,300 servicemen, divided into two divisions and four brigades, seven regiments and several independent battalions. Disregarding persons attending military schools, land forces also include a rapid reaction force of 490 men and—until its final dissolution—the Danube River flotilla of 300 soldiers. The 3rd Mechanized Division (with 3 motorized brigades)

in Cegled represents the main contingent of Hungarian fighting troops. Their chief equipment consists of T-72 and T-55 tanks, BMP and BTR-80 armored personnel carriers (APCs), 122mm howitzers, 125mm and 120mm artillery guns and the Mistral anti-aircraft weapon.


In 2001, the Air Force had a strength of 12,500. This was split up into two squadrons at Papa and Kecskemet, a helicopter gunship squadron in Szentkiralyzabadja, five support regiments, a mixed air-transport detachment and a radar detachment. In addition to the older MiG-21 and modern MiG-29 jet fighters, the Air Force owns An-26 transport planes, L-39 training planes and Mi-2, Mi-9, Mi-17, Mi-18 and Mi-24 helicopter gunships or transport helicopters.

The third pillar of the armed forces, the central Directorate for Logistics and Maintenance, has about 4,700 soldiers under its command.

It undertakes the repair of weapons and means of transport, providing depots for material, uniforms, clothing, gasoline, and so forth (see Figure 2).

The 10-year Plan foresees an increase in the actual peacetime strength of the fighting units from 30 to 77 percent of the planned wartime force; of the Land Forces from 22 to 63 percent and of the Air Force from 47 to 91 percent. There are also to be alterations in the current command structure. The General Staff, responsible for planning, organization and preparation of key decisions, is to be integrated into the Ministry of Defense and will be led by the Minister of Defense. With a view to making command structures more operational, division commands are to be dissolved. Following the outsourcing of non-military services (medicare, culture, media, recreation and others), the command for

Figure 2: The peacetime structure of the Honved Army (as of 30 June 2001)



Logistics and Maintenance will be centralized at a single directorate in Budapest. As a new element in the command structure, a unit for supplementary recruitment and training will be introduced with the aim of improving both training levels and enrolment numbers. As a result of restructuring, the personnel

strength of the leading command organs will be reduced as follows: General Staff by 20 percent; corps commands of the military branches by 18 percent; command of the Budapest garrison by 64 percent. Overall, the number of structural units of the armed forces is to be reduced by one-half.

#### Changes in garrison sizes

Since the year 1995, the number of military sites and military facilities has been substantially decreased. Many of the small and splintered formations had been unable to provide efficient training and most of their resources had been absorbed

by upkeep. Even garrisons with a larger personnel strength were often incapable of performing combat tasks. However, closure of garrisons did not coincide with qualitative improvements. For this reason, reform now aims at a concentration of troops around 'basic garrisons' which are able to provide the necessary civilian infrastructure, sufficient housing for professionals and their families, and educational and cultural facilities. Attractive garrisons should plan for enrolment of more highly qualified personnel, a longer stay by soldiers and, ultimately, the build-up of a professional army, relying increasingly on contract soldiers. To reach this goal, the Honved Army will close 108 facilities and dissolve or fuse 52 military units (*Magyar Honved*, No. 39, 2000, p. 1) in the coming years—an undertaking which is causing significant unrest among soldiers and their dependents. In particular, the number of garrisons housing recruits is to be reduced. One aspect of the future restructuring plan is the idea of transforming the territorial defense system into an organization resembling a National Guard (*Magyar Honved*, No. 25, 23 June 2000, p. 21f.).

Plans for changes in the personnel structure of the armed forces predict an overall reduction of 29 percent in the number of planned posts: the number of officers is to drop by 32 percent, of NCOs by 6 percent, of recruits by 40 percent and of civilian employees by 56 percent. As a consequence, the overall proportion of officers will be reduced from 16 to 15 percent, of recruits from 39 to 33 percent and of civilian employees from 17 to 11 percent; the proportion of NCOs on the other hand should increase from 18 to 24

percent and of contract soldiers from 10 to 17 percent. The division of labor between officers and NCOs will be largely determined by NATO requirements. Officers will be mainly responsible for strategic tasks while NCOs will deal with training and everyday command duties; peacekeeping and crisis prevention duties will be performed by contract soldiers.

#### *The move towards a purely professional army*

The transformation of the Hungarian army from one with compulsory military service to a voluntary or professional army is still under dispute among the political parties. With its new policy, the government hopes to create the factual preconditions for a professional army over the period of the 10-year Plan. The reduction of the service time for recruits from 9 to 6 months is in line with this. Due to the constitutional character of compulsory service, a two-thirds majority in Parliament would be required to enable the army to be transformed into a professional one. NATO countries such as France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium already have professional armies, while Italy, Spain and Portugal have opted for an end to compulsory service. Similar decisions have not yet been taken by any of the new NATO countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary).

These three new NATO members, which emerged from the first round of enlargement, are now faced with common problems in overcoming inherited 'mass' armies and in meeting NATO requirements, particularly in structural and technical terms. Yet, their ratios of

soldiers to the population vary, as do their visions of future defense policy. In 2000, Poland had 631 soldiers per 100,000 citizens, the Czech Republic 591, and Hungary 405.

#### *Insufficient financial allocations*

In Hungary, the most crucial problem impeding military reform is a deficiency in financial allocations. During the period 1989–2000, the share of military expenditures in GDP (gross domestic product) decreased substantially (see Figure 3).

In absolute figures (the figures in brackets are those after deduction for inflation) military expenditures amounted to 97.9 (21.6) billion forint in 1994, 96.8 (17.3) in 1997, 122.5 (18.7) in 1998, 164.0 (25.9) in 1999 and 184.0 (26.9) in 2000 (*Magyar Narancs*, No. 26, 29 June 2000, p. 12). The decision to join NATO clearly reversed the decade-long decline in military expenditures, and further increases are envisaged. Additional financial means will be allocated to the modernization of military vehicles, an upgrading of the MiG-29 jetfighters, radar systems and other segments of the Hungarian air-defense system including tank and artillery technology.

According to the 10-year Plan, financial means will be extended by increasing the military budget and by saving money through troop reductions, the concentration of infrastructure and personnel, outsourcing of non-military tasks, and the privatization of real estate and services. How financial support for military reform is to be distributed is shown in Figure 4.

**Figure 3: Share of military expenditures in GDP**

1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
2.79	2.52	2.33	2.08	2.24	1.83	1.65	1.26	1.26	1.24	1.65	1.51

**Figure 4: Distribution of financial support according to the 10-year Plan  
In percent**

	2000–2003	2004–2007	2008–2010
<i>Structural reform</i>	70	20	10
<i>Improvements in training and fighting capabilities</i>	20	60	20–30
<i>Technological modernization</i>	10	20	60–70

While there is general support for the military reform plan among the parliamentary parties, against the backdrop of increasing poverty in the populace and the substantial costs of preparing for EU membership, critics are nonetheless beginning to voice concerns over the extent of military expenditures compared to the means set aside for other pressing transition tasks.

***Social problems caused by the reform of the armed forces***

Among those affected, the previous downsizing of the Hungarian armed forces has caused considerable social tensions. Complaints from the Association of Hungarian Servicemen, HOSZ, for example maintain that officers who have been laid-off did not receive any material assistance apart from the money paid as an indemnity, and that even such compensations were

at times only transferred after the respective court rulings. It is feared, moreover, that officers and NCOs who remain in the armed forces will not receive any salary increases in the foreseeable future and that many will feel the effects of relocation and the concentration of military units directly: loss of apartments, loss of one’s wife’s job and the disruption of children’s schooling. Transfer to civilian life and a new profession is often abrupt and without appropriate warning. It has proved quite difficult for former officers to find new jobs which correspond to their level of qualification. Given that the overwhelming majority of military professionals with 25 or more years of service tend to leave the armed forces voluntarily and that younger officers and NCOs often switch to the private sector immediately after having received a college diploma, the future pool of personnel is being critically depleted. According to representatives of HOSZ, their

criticism and proposals are not taken into consideration seriously by the Ministry of Defense and regional military commanders.

***Improvement in conditions***

The 10-year Plan attempts to address some of the social problems stemming from past military reform. Officers to be discharged are now to receive compensation, pensions and other forms of material assistance. So-called “Innovation Bureaus for Employment in the Honved Army”—which have already existed on paper for some time—are to be given more personnel, while sub-offices are to be opened at many garrisons. It is planned that joint commissions comprising representatives of these bureaus and regional commanders be set up and that regular contact with local labor exchanges, major enterprises, local administrations and education facilities take place. Be that as it may, these improvements in

**Figure 5: Hierarchy of ranks in the Honved Army**  
*In percent*

<i>Rank</i>	<i>As of 30 May 2000</i>	<i>As of 10 January 2001</i>	<i>Optimal model</i>
<i>Colonel</i>	5	4	6
<i>Lieutenant-Colonel</i>	27	19	15
<i>Major</i>	29	21	23
<i>Captain</i>	30	31	40
<i>Lieutenant</i>	9	25	16

handling the reintegration process will have no effect on the living and service conditions of those remaining in the armed forces: planned increases in salaries, the provision of apartments or extra allowances for housing and vacations, medicare, and the quality of clothing and rations as well as sanitary services will still depend on appropriate budgetary allocations—yet these are stereotypically linked to the “economic performance of the country”.

Fixing criteria for salaries, the 10-year Plan stresses the interdependence of rank, position in the military hierarchy, duration of service, and the assessment of individual performance and qualification development. Service careers should follow the principle ‘upwards or outwards’ in the sense that those who do not move upwards on the carrier ladder should exit the military. The reform should meet a variety of requirements: the specific need for more officers in the lower ranks; the overcoming of congestion in upward promotion; provision of transparent and predictable career models; implementation of competitive principles for promotion and reimbursement; the need to bring the composition of ranks closer to the envisaged

“optimal model” (see Figure 5). At the end of 2000, with a two-thirds majority, the Hungarian parliament approved a program for the fundamental improvement of soldiers’ living conditions. Accordingly, soldiers will be allowed to choose between private and service accommodation, preferential credits for building or buying houses will be provided, extra allowances for accommodation will be increased, and special payments will be offered for moving from one military location to another.

The 10-year Plan particularly highlights the importance of modern training and qualifications for professional and contract soldiers and that this—including the training of field officers—should be concentrated at special military academies. It is expected that the first stage of the 10-year reform program will already bring positive results, among them, the adjustment of curricula to NATO norms and regulations; improvements in mathematical, information-technology and English language skills; plus an adaptation of military curricula to the level of those at advanced civilian institutions of education. In future, promotion is to be dependent upon a regular increase in qualifications.

Furthermore, plans have been made to ensure that education and training skills acquired in the military are transferable to civilian professions. It will be the task of those in charge of modernization of education and training to train personnel for missions abroad, particularly personnel participating in NATO’s crisis reaction forces.

With the introduction of these measures and, in particular, with the creation of a special authority—the “Main Division for the Formation of an Institutional System of using Human Resources”—the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Honved Army have taken a bold step forward in making the military service more attractive for teenagers as well as for professional and contract soldiers.

# Bulgaria's Military Reform During Transition

by *Dimitar Dimitrov*

**A valuable side effect of aspirations for NATO membership has been the development of democratic capacities, in particular the strengthening of democratic control over the armed forces.**

Over the last decade, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, including Bulgaria, have been faced with the task of restructuring not only their economies but also their entire political systems. Against this backdrop, reform and restructuring of the armed forces constitute part of a general process of transition reform, the ultimate pattern of which was unknown at the outset.

With the end of the Cold War, most CEE countries were forced to devote immense efforts and resources to reforming their security and defense systems within a very short period of time. This transformation was not merely tantamount to an adjustment, but involved a dramatic change in the overall structure of defense and the armed forces, not least in the philosophy of how to guarantee national security. There is nothing automatic about such reforms: they require vision, time, purpose, and systematic efforts. The following report examines Bulgaria's specific experiences in reorganizing its armed forces.

After 50 years in Soviet orbit, the CEE countries have had to democratize—and at the same time domesticate—their processes of national security decision-making. Economic hardships, especially at

the onset of transition, constrained these efforts: even under more favorable conditions, several years would have been necessary before appreciable improvements could have been seen. In this, some CEE countries were more successful than others. A wide range of decisive factors determined the outcomes: legacies from the past; differing capacities; economic constraints; the respective political and legislative framework; the external environment; integration into international security structures; and, participation in defense coalitions.

## *The legacy of the past*

Previously, Bulgaria's armed forces had been structured in accordance with the doctrinal views of the Warsaw Pact (WP). The country's defense policy was coordinated and subordinated to WP defense needs, dominated by the Soviet Union. As Bulgaria had received considerable military and technical-military help from the Soviet Union, its decisions in the field of defense policy were dictated from outside. Moreover, the armed forces and their commanders had been trained to act within the framework of a large coalition. This related not simply to strategic planning, common standards and equipment, but to doctrine as well. Hence Bulgaria's

defense industry and military repair factories were exclusively oriented to and specialized in the production and repair of Soviet-style weaponry. Wartime preparedness, reserves, and mobilization capacities were based on an anticipated 'mass' war similar to World War II. No relevant mechanism or applicable know-how existed for the assessment of national needs for weaponry, force structures or defense efforts in general. Additionally, the armed forces were characterized by an extraordinary secrecy and a lack of any democratic civilian control. In the absence of civilian expertise, defense was organized in a fully militarized way. This lack of transparency in the defense system—inherited from the past and preserved to a significant degree during transition—meant that society at large was unaware of the problems inherent in the armed forces.

An assessment of Bulgarian defense efforts during the late 1980s shows that Bulgaria had spent between 8 and 12 percent of its GDP (gross domestic product) on defense (Ivanov, 1997, p. 186). By the end of 1980s, the strength of the Bulgarian armed forces amounted to roughly 100,000 persons, just slightly below the limits set in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of November 1990.

## *Capacities*

With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, outside influences determining force structures and doctrines suddenly disappeared. Even so, there remained some reluctance to embark on a military reform program immediately after the demise of socialism: both the domestic and international situation seemed amorphous, especially for a relatively small country like Bulgaria, and it was not clear whether the democratic changes that had taken place were irreversible. In short, military reform did not rank high on the transition agenda because other economic and political problems were deemed more pressing—defense policy had lost its urgency. Furthermore, security threats and national defense priorities would first have to be defined anew before the objectives of reform could be determined.

During the initial years of transition—despite a drop in the military budget—the armed forces gave the impression of being stable and reliable, hidden behind military secrecy, traditions and national feelings. But, perhaps most significantly, security policy decision-making lacked committed institutions which could identify the new problems, analyze the strategic environment, and determine possible courses of action.

The early years of the 1990s were thus characterized by a lack of sufficient intellectual, political and economic capacities to cope with these challenges. The main players in the decision-making process—the political elite and the top military planners—were not prepared for radical reform. There was a lack of

experience in how to define a national security policy. The General Staff had been exclusively educated in strategic planning in the former Soviet Union, while Bulgaria itself had only created comparable educational capacities between 1994 and 1995 (the Rakovski Military College in Sofia). Likewise, the political elite was totally new and was busy with other tasks. The first years of transition saw several political and economic crises, including the adoption of a new constitution and frequent changes of government and the political parties in power. Politicians were simply not willing to open up new areas of reform, particularly in the armed forces. If the reform of the defense sector lacked managerial capabilities, the budget similarly did not allow for costly military reforms due to economic depression and problems with foreign debt payments.

### *The seeds of democratization*

Nevertheless, the early 1990s saw the establishment of some basic elements of democratization and domestication of the defense sector, among them the post of a civilian Minister of Defense, a new constitution, and regulations providing for democratic civil-military relations. Yet, the lack of civilian experts, academics, and research institutes specialized in defense policies as well as defense-related NGOs and media coverage imposed a limit on democratic control of the military during the first years of transition.

An informed public debate on security and defense issues could not emerge; defense publications were rare and Western publications on Bulgarian security problems were similarly absent. Only at the end of the 1990s, after some practical

experience had been accumulated and new education facilities established, did the democratization and domestication of national security gain momentum. Among the most important achievements in this respect was a basic understanding within society of the role and function of the armed forces within a democratic state. Gradually this led to the consensus—expressed clearly by the political parties and reiterated in their programs—that the build-up of the armed forces should be subordinated to national interests and available resources.

Bulgaria's aspirations to join NATO and the corresponding military reforms are now aimed at an improvement in Bulgaria's national security situation within the limitations of available resources. As a result of the democratization of Bulgaria's political system, education abroad, the exchange of information, and political and military cooperation with NATO countries, a basic model of democratic civil-military relations has emerged. Aside from this process of 'self-education', Western experts and collaboration with NATO have played a substantial role, a consequence being the acceptance by the defense establishment of the new democratic 'rules of the game'.

What has changed as well is the attitude of society towards the armed forces in general and military reforms in particular. Both society and the political elite have recognized that reform of the military cannot only be carried out by the military themselves, but must be politically guided, controlled by civilians, and subordinated to the overall requirements of national political and economic development.

### *The political and legislative framework*

Political instability during the early years of transition contributed to a delay in capacity-building and reform of Bulgaria's troops. Successful reforms also required changes in the existing legislation which had been inherited from socialist days. The law on military service in existence at the time merely regulated technical details. Bulgaria lacked a system of defense-related legislation, of strategic concepts as well as planning and programming documents for national security. A new law on defense and the armed forces would have the task of regulating the relationship between the civilian and military leaderships as well as of defining the decision-making process itself. Unfortunately, the elaboration and adoption of such a law was postponed until the years 1995–1997.

Consequently, during these first years of transition, politicians did not address key questions concerning the new mission of the military, possible friends and partners, and potential adversaries. Thus the military, accustomed to executing orders, did not receive a clear new orientation. Old functions, tasks and structures and the size of the armed forces were preserved (Dimitrov, 1999, p. 17). In the absence of a dialogue, neither the military nor civilians tackled army restructuring.

Although it has a long and rich history, Bulgaria has only experienced a few periods of real democracy. However, democracy is not only based on written laws but on traditions, informal procedures, education, political culture, and

historical experience. Most of these factors require time, everyday work and an honest desire for improvements. After the fundamental changes of the period between 1989 and 1992—the transition in the political system, the new constitution, the democratization and depoliticization of the armed forces, to name but a few—Bulgaria's new democracy was faced with the task of implementing many further steps.

While it had been accepted in principle that national security and defense matters should be based on a consensus-type policy, reaching such a consensus in practice was a problem. Not only did the definition of national interests require public debate and political will, but most of the political parties were new on the scene and lacked a clear perception of their mission. During the first years of transition, partial steps were taken in two directions: an attempt was made to elaborate not only a draft Military Doctrine (1992/93) but also a National Security Concept (1995/96). As early as 1995, the government accepted the so-called Plan 2010 defining the reform of the armed forces, but actual restructuring did not begin until after 2000.

Despite the fact that, historically, Bulgaria had never possessed a military doctrine or a security concept of its own (Simeonov, 2001, p. 31), both documents were nonetheless perceived to be necessary as legitimizing acts, confirming the primacy of the democratically elected authorities over the military. Western experts often ask why reforms did not start earlier, even in the absence of an accepted military doctrine. Possibly the military leadership used the lack of legislation as an excuse to delay

reform. The other explanation is, however, that the Soviet usage of the term “military doctrine” had no exact equivalent in the West.

According to Soviet usage, a “military doctrine” consisted of two elements: an overarching military-political component, which functioned as a surrogate for national security policy as known in the West, and a subordinate military-technical component which encompassed strategy, ‘operational art’ and ‘tactics’ (Anthony, 1994, p. 18). Some authors have even discerned similarities between the new military doctrines of the CEE countries in preserving Soviet-style doctrines. According to them, the new doctrines “do not provide systematic guidelines for defining defense requirements or methodologies upon which decisions about force structuring, weapon development and force deployment can be founded. Rather, they essentially offer political blueprints for military reform that reflect the general redirection of these states” (Kile in Anthony, 1994, p. 18). This observation that post-Soviet military doctrines are too general in nature holds particularly true for the first draft of Bulgaria's Military Doctrine of 1993 (not adopted until 1999).

#### *1997 brings real changes*

The true road to reform was not opened up until the political changes of 1997 and the ensuing acceptance of the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine by Parliament in the following years (<http://www.md.government.bg>). Although these documents were not debated widely in society, they nevertheless provided answers to the most urgent questions. From 1997 onwards, the Bulgarian leadership



began to realize that military reform and the restructuring of the armed forces must be seen as part of the overall political and economic development of the country. The first step in this direction was the acceptance of the National Security Concept (1998), followed by the Military Doctrine (April 1999), the Plan 2004 (November 1999), the Law on State Administration, the Law on the Civil Service, the National Program for NATO membership (1997), the Bulgarian Membership Action Plan (2000), and the Annual Report of the Council of Ministers on Security and Defense, debated and approved by Parliament in 1999 and 2000 respectively. These documents and laws confirmed the primacy of the civilian sector in defense matters and, at the same time, delineated the degree of autonomy accorded to the military. In this context, the new role of the military consisted in maintaining national and regional security as well as in international integration. The integration of Bulgaria into the EU and NATO were perceived as strategic goals and political priorities which were not to be pushed into the background by regional events.

Consequently, 'national security' was now understood as a guarantee of territorial integrity and independence and as prevention against an armed attack or violent changes to the constitutional order, political coercion or economic intimidation of the state and threats to the democratic functioning of the state and civilian institutions. The new approach was aimed at security in Southeastern Europe, but against any regional military alliance or political axis in that region.

### *The National Security Concept*

By adopting the National Security Concept on 16 April 1998, the National Assembly endorsed the concept that one of the paramount aims of national security is to guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Bulgarian citizens together with the democratic functioning of the state and civic institutions. Since then, national security has been perceived as being based on the rule of law; on the balance of interests in and responsibilities for national security between the individual, society and the state; and on the interdependence between national and international security.

The National Security Concept determined the principles and landmarks which formed the basis of the new Military Doctrine adopted by Parliament on 8 April 1999. The 'philosophy' behind this new Military Doctrine is that a military conflict should be avoided by strengthening international security and stability. The Military Doctrine has enlarged the spectrum of functions to be carried out by the Bulgarian armed forces: deterrence and defense functions are to be complemented by rescue, humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks; the armed forces are to provide assistance where necessary and to instill the citizens with a sense of security. Not only are the young to be educated in a spirit of patriotism, but ethnic cohesion of the nation is to be strengthened.

While the traditional mission of guaranteeing the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country has remained as an integral part of the new Military Doctrine, it is integration into

NATO which is now regarded as the most pressing mission of the armed forces, who are to bear a substantial share of the burden of meeting accession criteria. If the prerequisites are not met—progress in all aspects of interoperability, effective democratic control of the military, an appropriate military educational system and well-trained corps of officers and sergeants—membership in NATO will remain merely a dream.

### *Plan 2010 gives way to Plan 2004*

In the years preceding 1998, several attempts to reform the armed forces were undertaken. Yet, all efforts proved slow, primarily symbolic in nature, and limited in effect. Due to insufficient funding, combat training was considerably curtailed; the same held true for the availability of military equipment. Training of commanders, staffs and troops declined greatly. With these problems in mind, the General Staff drew up a concept in 1995 for the organizational restructuring of the armed forces in the coming decade (Plan 2010) with implementation to begin in 1997. However, when it became clear two years later that Plan 2010 would not succeed in preparing the armed forces to meet the criteria for NATO membership, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) initiated a reassessment. A group of Bulgarian and British experts were tasked with analyzing the defense system and formulating recommendations: the team of experts came to the conclusion that, despite certain strengths, Plan 2010 did not adequately address the changed strategic environment and the new political and military-political goals of the country. Once the Military Doctrine had been revised in the light of their conclusions, the so-called Plan 2004 emerged.

With the ambitious aims of Plan 2004, real reforms—restructuring, relocation of units and downsizing—started in 1998. Western advice and assistance, particularly from the United States, the United Kingdom and France, played a critical role in managing defense resources as well as in other joint projects. According to Plan 2004, the armed forces are to acquire a defensive structure and to be capable of protecting the territorial integrity and independence of the country with reduced personnel of up to 45,000 servicemen in peacetime, supported by some 5,000 persons under the Ministry of Defense, the Military Police, Counterintelligence, and Civil Defense. In wartime, capacities should reach 250,000 (<http://www.md.government.bg/>). The main combat potential of the armed forces is to be based on Rapid Reaction Forces and Immediate Reaction Forces, a three-level chain of command and a greatly reduced number of armaments. The recommendations urged radical improvements in the structure of the MOD and the General Staff as well as in the system of military education, logistics and personnel policy. Essentially, Plan 2004 has two components—one is the Plan for the Development of the Armed Forces 2004, drawn up by the General Staff, the other is the Plan for Reorganization and Development of the Ministry of Defense 2004, drawn up under the leadership of the Deputy Minister for Defense Policy and Planning. Both subplans were integrated and approved by the Council of Ministers on 18 October 1999 (<http://www.md.government.bg/>) with the following aims:

- To create a military capability which reflects the strategic environment and is able to face new types of conflicts and crises
- To achieve a high level of interoperability with NATO not later than 2001/02
- To contribute effectively to peace support operations
- To tailor the size of the armed forces to available human and financial resources.

To meet these goals, the capabilities of the armed forces are to be increased gradually but constantly, with units and military formations aiming at becoming interoperable with NATO forces. Additionally, the command and management systems are to be developed further at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Priority in recruiting career soldiers and acquiring armaments and equipment will be given to the Rapid Reaction Forces. Likewise, combat training of the Rapid Reaction and Immediate Reaction Forces is to be prioritized while certain elements of the air defense system and communications/information system are to be upgraded. As an additional measure, special efforts are to be made to improve the living conditions of servicemen and their families. In essence, the structure of the armed forces should have a defensive character, not directed against any specific adversary.

### *Force structures*

The armed forces will comprise the Army, Air Force and Navy plus supporting elements, organized into Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) (including an Immediate Reaction element), Defense Forces and 10 Territorial Defense Forces.

The Land Forces will be comprised of a Rapid Reaction Corps (RRC), two corps with a relatively low level of readiness, and a land forces package. The RRC will include mechanized brigades, ready to act without additional recruitment, and the Bulgarian contingent of the Multinational Peace Force–South-Eastern Europe (SEEBRIG), supplemented by other integrated units for participation in multinational missions. All military units should be manned at a rate of no less than 90 percent and equipped at 100 percent. A gradual professionalization of the RRF will be a priority in comparison to other divisions. The Immediate Reaction Force will maintain battalion-size units on a rotation principle. The rotation period could be from 6 to 12 months; personnel should consist of professionals equipped with all necessary equipment.

The remainder of the armed forces will be organized on a territorial principle with responsibility for the combat readiness and mobilization of troops in their respective zones. These units, which will comprise up to ten reserve brigades, are to be composed of reserve and retired personnel who would participate in the formation of the Defense Forces and Territorial Defense Forces in wartime.

Whereas, from a functional point of view, the RRF is to be seen as an instrument for managing military-political crises, for preventing military conflict and for participating in NATO Combined Joint Task Forces (plus other *ad hoc* peace support formations, disaster-relief operations and further operations other than war), the Defense Forces and Territorial Defense Forces will be deployed only in wartime.

All in all, the domestication and democratization of national defense and security decision has witnessed significant progress. The level of public debate has improved, and information released to the public has opened up the way for a real assessment of the reform.

### *Economic factors*

Improved economic stability after 1997, a low rate of inflation and increased budgetary discipline have exercised a positive effect on the military reform effort. As of 1998, inflation was brought under control and in 1999, after many years of decline, Bulgaria experienced stable economic growth for the first time, though it has not yet reattained its 1989 GDP level. Compared to the Cold War era, the military budget has shrunk between four and seven times (Ivanov, 1997, p. 186).

While delay, or the lack of reform, is often attributed to limited resources, this is only part of the story. The setting of clear defense objectives and effective management of defense resources are equally important. A high rate of inflation up to 1998 and the radical decrease in military expenditures led to defense budgets whose expenditures for food and salaries alone

amounted to 95 percent (Ivanov, 1997, p. 95; Dimitrov, 1999). Such a budget structure precluded any opportunity for reform. During the first years of transition, the armed forces only continued to survive by using accumulated reserves: on the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria had inherited the military materials and spare parts stockpiled within its borders; in addition, reserves accumulated for mobilization were tapped several times. Prior to 1998, the size of the armed forces had also been reduced, although fairly insignificantly. Of greater significance was the substantial drop in activities and training. Expenditures for procurement and investment were drastically cut. The respective share in the defense budget lingered at between 5 and 8 percent, disbursed mainly for spare parts. In effect, no resources were available for research and development (Ivanov, Tzvetkov and Dimitrov, 1995, pp. 130 and 202).

Until 1997/98, the old methods of resource allocation and budgeting and the lack of political will for reform had permitted reforms neither in the budget structure nor in the armed forces themselves. Due to the high level of unemployment—between 15 and 20 percent on average—and inadequate budgetary means for the social integration of ex-servicemen, very little downsizing of military personnel occurred.

The experience of the years since 1998 nonetheless demonstrates that reforms *are* possible, even within a limited defense budget which basically remained the same as in the preceding years. For the very first time—on account of the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine, Plan 2004 and

the draft White Book on Defense—defense expenditures are now clearly defined ([www.md.government.bg/white\\_book/wb.html](http://www.md.government.bg/white_book/wb.html)). The government has declared that, in the years ahead, Bulgaria will spend between 2.5 and 3 percent of its GDP on defense, dependent upon a projected annual economic growth of 3–4 percent. Since 2001, a budgeting program is being implemented at the Ministry of Defense which provides more predictability in defense planning.

### *The international environment*

With the end of the Cold War, Bulgaria faced a ‘security vacuum’. The crises in former Yugoslavia, together with its subsequent dissolution and uncertain relations with neighboring countries, contributed to a considerable degree to the delay in military reform. Although new threats such as terrorism, organized crime, illegal trafficking, and humanitarian crises were identified, there was no answer on how to respond to them. In the first years of transition, neutrality, Euro-Atlantic integration, or a revival of partnership with Russia were discussed as possible options, though in most cases discussion was based on emotions rather than on solid arguments ([www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/f96-98.htm](http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/f96-98.htm)). In the second half of the 1990s, a consensus was gradually reached concerning European and Euro-Atlantic integration—though achieving a consensus on NATO integration initially met with some emotional, cultural and political opposition. Bulgaria had to make its choice on how to guarantee its national security and to contribute to regional and international security. Its decision to apply for

NATO membership (February 1997) was based on a realistic assessment of expected costs and benefits *vis-à-vis* possible alternatives. The desire to join NATO is fuelled by the prospect of improved security, economic stability, future EU membership, and an optimized use of defense resources. Based on the experience of the new NATO members, it is thought that all this can be achieved at a reasonable cost whereas the theoretical options of neutrality or an alternative coalition are not considered promising.

***Integration into international security structures and/or participation in defense coalitions***

The new political and legislative framework after 1997 and Bulgaria's application for NATO membership in February 1997 were obviously strongly linked: although Bulgaria had actively participated in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and had cooperated bilaterally with NATO countries, the formula for these relations had previously been limited to "enhanced dialogue"; now the hope of integration into international security structures and Bulgaria's aspirations towards full NATO membership provided the most crucial impulses for reform of the armed forces. Considerable efforts were made to clarify the model of reform. Along with those of other prospective applicants, Bulgaria now had the chance to 'import' experiences made by the new NATO members and could additionally build on NATO's own reform know-how. Of particular importance were both the review process carried out by NATO

institutions and cooperation between NATO and the Bulgarian society in general. While efforts towards integration with NATO have enhanced the capacity-building aspects of Bulgarian institutions and personnel policy, the National NATO Membership Program, the Bulgarian Membership Action Plan (MAP) and the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) have also significantly increased democratic control of the armed forces.

# Security Concepts and the Build-up of Armed Forces in Latvia

*by Gundars Zalkalns*

**In the last ten years since they were established, the National Armed Forces of Latvia have made little progress in developing the foundations necessary for a comprehensive defense system: not only have they failed to establish an overall defense strategy, an operational doctrine and approved tactics, but they still lack basic concepts for personnel management, training and logistics.**

The fall of communism in Eastern and Central Europe did not automatically result in the emergence of democracy. Instead it created two different—but equally problematical—types of interim situation in the post-socialist countries. Although the majority of the former satellite states of the Soviet Union elected a new leadership, the government and the national laws initially remained the same. So too did the national armed forces, often finding themselves the unwilling inheritors of large portions of the Soviet Union’s tactical and strategic military hardware. The Baltic states, however, present a different picture. Upon their departure from the Soviet Union, these states were left without either military forces or laws regulating security affairs. There was thus no way after independence that they could continue to operate under the laws and structures of the union they had so eagerly left. And so a curious situation developed whereby anything Soviet was automatically rejected—even those elements that were accepted in the West. Ironically, however, since the new leadership was uncertain about what exactly the democratic alternative should be, the replacement solutions

often differed little from the original Soviet laws and structures.

Even now, roughly ten years after the establishment of new military forces, the National Armed Forces of Latvia have not managed to develop any of the following instruments: approved tactics; an approved defense strategy; a personnel management concept; a comprehensive training system; an operational doctrine; or a logistics doctrine or system. The confusion in the development of Latvia’s National Armed Forces during this period stems mainly from the fact that Latvia failed to establish the necessary foundations for its defense system.

As a retired US army colonel, I served in Latvia’s defense establishment for seven years, first in the Strategic Planning Department of the Latvian Ministry of Defense and, following the 1993 election of the President Guntis Ulmanis, as adviser to the President on defense issues. Soon afterwards, I became the executive secretary of the National Security Council of Latvia. The following insights reflect my experience with Baltic—particularly Latvian—decision-making in the 1990s.

## *The post-Soviet mindset*

After the fall of communism, most Central European states were confronted with a maze of laws and structures which had to be democratized and with military forces which were far too large and which they neither needed nor could afford. At the same time, however, they could not risk discharging troops for fear of destabilizing the political and economic situations. The Baltic states first had to reach a consensus on what laws were required, then on how to produce them, and finally on how to address national security issues, in particular the development of adequate armed forces. As if this were not problem enough, it all had to be done within the mindset created by fifty years of communism—the Post-communist mindset (PCMS)—whose influence can never be overestimated: it subtly pervades and affects all decisions, especially the lack of decisions.

Key elements of this PCMS include the persistent avoidance of difficult decisions; deliberate short-sightedness in planning; the frantic avoidance of administrative systems,

structures and documents that compel accountability and delimit maneuverability; decision-making without regard to the feasibility of implementation; a preference for unnecessary crisis management; the creation of an illusion of being “in control of the situation”; a chronic avoidance of coordination and the exchange of information; limited understanding of the value of public relations; administrative rigidity at the cost of results; process-oriented rather than result-oriented management; in short, collective irresponsibility.

The pervasiveness of this mindset has been repeatedly substantiated by Western diplomats and by high-ranking members of the US European Command (EUCOM) who have privately commented that they need only visit one of the nineteen countries they support through military liaison teams in order to find out what problems and attempts at solutions exist in all the others. These behavioral patterns can be readily identified in the behavior that was necessary for survival under communism.

*The need for Latvian politicians to become informed*

For some seven years, I moved between Western diplomats who could only see an issue as an integral element of the whole and Latvian politicians who were utterly incapable of seeing, or unwilling to see, any problem within the larger context. It was a sobering experience for me to realize that a Western ambassador, barely a month in the country, obviously knew a hundred times more about Latvian history, economy, culture and politics than the leading Latvian politicians. I encountered embarrassing

situations, discovering, for example, that top officials working in the field of foreign relations for over six years still did not know what ‘CFE’ (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1990) meant nor what it signified for Latvia. It also never ceased to amaze me that, while Western visiting dignitaries had obviously received elaborate briefings on their counterparts and the issues most likely to be discussed, Latvian politicians not only went blissfully into these meetings without any background information whatsoever, but also considered any follow-up superfluous. In fact, there existed, and continues to exist, two separate worlds, suspicious of each other, not understanding each other, but publicly pretending that the situation is as it should be.

There is an enormous conservative tendency in post-communist states not to question the structural and legislative *status quo*. Because it is there, it is automatically assumed that there is a good reason for it being there. Further, there is an utterly disproportionate fear that by questioning the *status quo* you may offend someone who may in turn presume to question *your status quo*. When the Defense Forces or the intelligence services of Latvia initially submitted their budgets, the question always centered on how much more money should be allocated for their future ‘development’. No one ever asked these structures to justify their current personnel strengths and budgets, or, God forbid, allowed for the possibility that reduction, not development, was in order. I think PCMS precludes rational, objective and comprehensive approaches to solving problems.

*Soviet inheritance in security planning*

Looking back, I see the enormous difficulties that post-communistic governments, left to their own devices, had to overcome in developing any national security strategies. The first obstacle is the unwillingness of politicians to become sufficiently involved in order to gain some understanding of these arcane issues. Without this involvement it is impossible to recognize—not to mention solve—a problem. In the Baltic states, once a minister is appointed, he needs no orientation or background information since, by dint of becoming a minister, he is automatically presumed to know everything there is to know about his new functional area of responsibility. Needless to say, none of his subordinates will dare to disabuse him of this prerogative. Moreover, in all the ministries and defense forces, business is conducted on the basis of written orders, without which nothing is done—even if already required by national law or service regulations.

Next is the problem of how to establish a mutually non-threatening forum of decision-makers to address the problems identified. In the years following independence, politicians and government departments (even within the same structure) tended to act in complete isolation of each other. If someone, on his own initiative, called a coordination meeting, he would be snubbed on principle and lose face, even if the meeting would have been to the advantage of all. Although it may not be true, it was explained to me that the ‘glue’ that in pre-independence days had held diverse state organizations together for

some fifty years and had effected a coordination of sorts was the Communist Party. These structures continued to act as if the Party were still there, no one daring to coordinate since that would be construed as unthinkable and unforgivable meddling.

For years, therefore, the secrecy paranoia and the absence of any internal coordination mechanism meant that different staff sections within the same organization duplicated the same projects, often unknowingly, and uncaringly worked against each other. No one worried if, or how, his part of a project would fit into the desired end product since a consensus had not been reached on what that end product should in fact be.

In my seven years on the job, I attended close to a hundred international seminars and conferences and, I believe, saw the same characteristic manifested by representatives of all post-communist countries—the absence of an orderly approach to evaluating national threats and developing a logical and affordable security architecture.

### *The place of defense and security in society*

How does a country which has virtually no laws, no defense forces and no positive tradition or precedents, except the PCMS, go about developing a security and defense infrastructure? As in Lithuania and Estonia, the fledgling government in Latvia—without deliberate planning—established volunteer defense forces in response to the aggressive behavior of special forces under the Soviet Ministry of the Interior (OMON) towards

peaceful demonstrations and to attempts to disrupt the functioning of the nascent government. Not surprisingly, patriotic former Soviet officers of Latvian origin formed the nucleus of this initial organization, acting as advisors to the new government and taking over command of the regular armed forces once the initial crisis had passed.

The first Latvian defense force commander, Dainis Turlais, had many years of experience in the Soviet army, including a combat tour in Afghanistan, and therefore fashioned his forces along the lines of the Soviet army he had known. The priority border guards were armed with heavy weapons and the infantry battalion staffs overloaded with about three times the number of officers found in comparable Western units—with a shoemaker, tailor and tin-maker thrown in for good measure. The old Soviet practice of beating up recruits reappeared—even worse, it appeared to be regarded as an integral part of military service by the recruits themselves who quite openly admitted that they intended to do the same once they had acquired non-commissioned officer (NCO) status.

### *The military's negative image*

Even after their declaration of independence and formal recognition by Russia, the Baltic states represented a potential flash point and efforts were made by Western governments not to further aggravate the already tense situation. Most Western officers of ethnic Latvian origin (including retired officers), who might have been able to contribute positively to the situation in Latvia, were precluded by their own national laws from serving in the defense forces of

other nations. Even serving in an advisory capacity required lengthy approval procedures and the risk of pension revocation. Further restrictions impacted adversely on the ability of the Baltic states to acquire even a minimal requirement of Western self-defense weapons.

In the Baltic States, there is a tradition for politicians, even leading ones, to stay out of the taboo area of security and defense, which was the sole domain of Moscow in the Soviet days. The general public still views defense forces and the police suspiciously, as, in the old days, these were repressive state organs. While for some unknown reason the defense forces in Lithuania managed to obtain the support of the people and even of the transitional government, still retaining it now, defense forces in Estonia, and especially in Latvia, generally have a negative image. The path to wealth, fame and fortune was, and is not, through military or civil service but through 'sport or culture'.

### *The build-up of armed forces*

At an early stage, the commander of the Latvian Defense Forces, Dainis Turlais, arbitrarily decided that Latvia's armed forces should have a final strength of 9,000. Yet, in fact, the regular forces never exceeded 6,000, two-thirds of whom were in the Border Guards. Simultaneously another, purely voluntary, unpaid and mostly unarmed self-defense organization fashioned on the pre-war national guard organization (*Aizsargi*) emerged in the countryside, now calling itself the Home Guard. This fiercely nationalistic structure had evolved spontaneously, primarily in

response to the prevalent breakdown of law-and-order in the countryside. Initially it not only supplemented but actually replaced the generally corrupt and unsympathetic police and Border Guards in many parts of the country, its initial strength soaring to over 16,000. The head of the transitional government and later the elected President was designated Commander, although a Chief-of-Staff carried out the day-to-day business. The Home Guard in Latvia currently (2001/02) constitutes 28.9 percent of the National Armed Forces. In contrast to Latvia, the Home Guard in both Estonia and Lithuania was denied police and border guard duties and tasked primarily with drafting and establishing reserve forces.

Early on, the most capable military force in Latvia was the mini-army of the Interior Ministry, left behind intact with armored personnel carriers, heavy machine-guns, grenade launchers and other equipment, but with no role in national defense. Equally important was the 1,500 strong State Security Service, created by an enterprising politician to protect the government, parliament and foreign embassies—but beholden to him personally and never sanctioned by law.

### *The first Latvian Defense Forces*

The first Latvian Defense Forces were based on the Soviet model using Soviet tactics but no doctrinal document was prepared concerning force employment in a crisis situation. As the Border Guards were given priority of weapons, the Defense Forces, with the exception of the officers, were no more than a useless crowd of recruits who were neither trained nor equipped to perform the duties for which they were paid. The Defense Forces, with the exception of the officers, initially consisted of untrained and unarmed volunteers and subsequently, under the new obligatory service law, equally untrained and unarmed draftees.

The exception to this ‘unarmed mob’ was the ‘airborne reconnaissance battalion’ of some 200 men whose stated mission was to be air-dropped like special forces in 12-man teams from (nonexistent!) planes to presumably find out from the local Home Guards what military action was transpiring at particular locations—although there was no communications equipment available to relay this information to headquarters, nor were there any deployable forces. A parliamentary inspection commission established that, while the members of this battalion could indeed parachute out of a plane, they had had no infantry training and were not qualified to use their weapons.

### *The defense concept and force development plan*

Unfortunately, the Soviet affection for special mission units is still impacting negatively on the development of National Armed Forces. For example, the Home Guard accepted an offer from the United Kingdom of training for an infantry unit that the Defense Forces had rejected and developed a rather vague territorial defense system which was unfortunately only logistically sustainable for a few days. No consensus was reached on the definition of strategic state objects, although logically these would progress from cultural and communications objects to hard defense objects as the military situation escalated. Consequently, there was also no agreement on the subdivision of responsibilities between the forces of the Ministry of Interior, the police, the Home Guard and National Armed Forces in a crisis situation.

The territorial defense concept approved in 1995 specified the preparation of a Force Development Plan geared to the execution of four essential missions:

- Meeting the requirements of all international conventions, among them control of air, sea and land borders
- Search and rescue operations
- Participation in peacekeeping and Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities as a means to promote NATO membership; maintenance of a national infrastructure to support these activities; and participation in relief efforts in the case of major national disasters.



Also, last but not least:

- Development of a national self-defense capability, relying almost entirely on Home Guard mobilization and reserves “to be established”. The problem here, however, was that uniforms—not to mention rifles—were not available while basic training, in the Soviet manner, consisted of putting the recruits in the staff battalion to be terrified and beaten up for some thirty days. Although the United States donated 10,000 M-14 rifles and the United Kingdom offered assistance in setting up a basic training program for the reserves, in the usual inexplicable manner, nothing was done to implement this for some five years until the end of the 1990s.

*The blind leading the blind*

Unfortunately, the whole territorial defense concept ran into the same old problem of ‘the blind leading the blind’ in every imaginable configuration. Since territorial defense had been mandated, the military planners obviously needed to know what state assets (transportation, fuel, rations) would be available to the mobilized national armed forces in the event of war. A preamble was agreed upon defining what this National Defense Plan should accomplish and the young and energetic civilian Chief-of-Plans and his assistant at the Ministry of Defense spent a year working on it, with the occasional assistance of a Swedish expert. As the plan was understandably classified ‘Top Secret’, the involvement of the Swedish consultant presented a problem. When it very soon became evident that the National Defense Plan

would not provide them with the planning guidance specified in the preamble and necessary for producing a military operational plan, the staff of the National Armed Forces lost interest and did not participate in the drafting. For one reason or another, those involved at the Ministry of Interior and others also dropped out, leaving the two well-intentioned but inexperienced civilians to produce, a year later, a totally useless document with no classified material in it whatsoever. The only significant contribution of this National Defense Plan was the recommendation to establish territorial defense regions, coinciding with the administrative regions, where joint civil-military committees would coordinate local defense.

*The initial plan fails to address real requirements*

As customarily happens in post-communist countries, no intermediate review and evaluation process took place during the developmental stage of the “plan”. It was therefore only after submission to the Cabinet that it became obvious that the plan was not what was wanted or needed. After much lobbying in the Cabinet, a compromise was reached and the Cabinet graciously accepted the document “for information” to be used in the future development of a national defense plan.

What is very obviously needed is a matrix not only with the four traditional stages of escalation from a planned or an unplanned incident to the mutual employment of military forces but also with a listing of the different state institutions involved in these escalation stages of national

defense. In stage one, the primary action and resources would rest with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; in stage two, with the Ministry of Interior. Stage three would entail a handover of responsibility to the Defense Ministry, and the fourth stage would be the responsibility of the National Armed Forces. Of course, other state institutions would play supportive roles at each stage.

Unfortunately, even if the plan had complied with its own preamble, it would still have been of no immediate use since a law permitting the mobilization of state resources for national defense was conspicuously missing.

Although some of the former Soviet officers had held combat unit staff positions, they had no experience in force structuring. Even worse, cost had never been a consideration in the development of the Soviet armed forces and therefore the collective leadership of the Defense Forces envisioned an army with tank battalions, if not divisions, squadrons of jet fighters and modern destroyers. Since national law stated that it was the prerogative of Parliament to determine the strength of the national armed forces (obviously intended through the approval of the budget), the staff of the armed forces looked to Parliament to tell them what they could have, while Parliament waited for the military experts to tell them what was required for national defense. The Cabinet, on the other hand, would not approve a budget or even make a projection of what money would be available in the future without a fully justified force development plan—stalemate.

*A new approach likewise fails*

The first Defense Forces development plan, which had required months of secret elaboration, was so utterly and completely unrealistic that, when the Home Guard (henceforth called the National Guard) was incorporated in the new National Armed Forces (NAF) and one of its members became the overall commander, the plan was scrapped and not even submitted to the Cabinet. When the new NAF were finally persuaded that they had to take the initiative and propose a financially viable development plan, an agreement was reached with the International Defense Advisory Board (IDAB), which was helping the Baltic states in an advisory capacity, that the new NAF Commander would prepare a one-page force development concept, clear it with the IDAB, resubmit an expanded concept based on their recommendations, and proceed in this consultative manner until a comprehensive plan had been developed.

The merit of this approach was that, at that time, the Baltic governments placed great weight on the recommendations of the International Defense Advisory Board to the Baltic States, headed by General Sir Garry Johnson, and that, if the plan were submitted with Johnson's endorsement, it would be passed by the Cabinet immediately. Nevertheless, in spite of the written agreement, National Armed Forces staff proceeded, over several months and without any consultations, to produce another useless force development plan. The IDAB fared equally poorly in the two other Baltic states as well. I think the reason for this was very simple: this

highly qualified team of experts was designed to provide sophisticated advice in fine-tuning existing defense concepts, plans and forces; instead it found structures that were crawling, not even on their feet, and which could therefore not be taught to run. The NAF leadership nevertheless assumed that the current budget would be adjusted upwards about four times to meet their requirements, which of course would have been impossible even if the government had subscribed to the plan. After the Cabinet accepted it once again merely "for information" and made no adjustment to upgrade the first year's budget, the rest of the plan obviously became irrelevant. However, the NAF against all criticism insisted that they had done what they had been asked to do and had submitted their development plan; as a result they took no further action for more than three years. I think the fact that the defense forces in Estonia and Lithuania received more funding than in Latvia was entirely due to the fact that they did a much better job of substantiating their requirements to the government.

Unfortunately but predictably, the introduction of National Guard officers onto the NAF staff in no way improved its competence. The new commander, a physical education graduate, had been a Soviet reserve lieutenant, while the Chief-of-Operations was a veterinarian. Although the defense concept mandated territorial defense based on the 16,000-strong National Guard, it became clear that, due to cost considerations, the regular forces could consist of no more than a battalion or two. In reality, the NAF staff preoccupied themselves with other things. Priority was given

to infighting about who was to occupy which staff positions and to the non-stop reorganization of the roughly 200 staff members involved.

When the State Security Service was reorganized, its "Special Mission Unit" was transferred to the NAF and the National Guard established its own Special Mission Unit. In short, the NAF had three full-time Special Mission Units, an elaborate staff organization at all levels—but not a single plain infantry company. The problem not only lay in the lack of experience in force-structuring on the part of the staff, but also in the still prevalent old belief that costs were irrelevant for national defense. Additionally no one had any notion, or really cared, how much it would cost per year to maintain, for example, one infantry battalion. The "Resource Management Computer System" provided by the United States sat idle because it required certain base-line information which nobody took the time to assemble. If we take into account the change of Defense Minister almost every eight months and the change of Defense Forces Commander roughly every year-and-a-half, the causes of continuous inactivity become even more obvious. The changes in leadership were mostly occasioned by incidents where recruits were seriously beaten up, a situation over which the leadership really had only limited control.

*Excess military facilities*

Another factor adversely affecting the development of the NAF has been the acquisition of excessive military facilities. The Ministry of Defense was the first to be offered facilities vacated by the Russian forces, including several military airfields, training areas, military bases, and entire military towns. The problem was simple: as a consensus had not been reached on exactly what the future NAF would consist of, almost every facility was accepted for potential use or for sale by the Ministry of Defense. As any facility left unguarded was completely looted within the next twenty-four hours, the already thinly spread recruits had to be scattered even further all over the country to guard these objects. This diverted funds from essential military projects, and for several years all resources were spent on these questionable acquisitions and the feeding and housing of the recruits, leaving no money at all for the purchase of weapons and equipment.

*Plans of coordinated weapon purchases fail*

Close coordination existed among the military leadership of the Baltic states in the early stages of their armed force development. It was recognized that weapons systems should be compatible and that, whenever possible, purchases of weapons, ammunition and other materiel should be combined to obtain the best prices. Unfortunately, the military leadership in all three states underwent such rapid changes that there was obviously no follow-up, and discussions started again each time from square one.

*The absence of military leadership*

Types of military leadership also differed among the Baltic states. While a former US Special Forces colonel became the first commander in Western-oriented Estonia, in Latvia and Lithuania the commanders were former Soviet officers. The influence of a Western commander was not that decisive, however, since by himself and without the necessary support, he was frustrated and opposed every step along the way. Also, it must be conceded that newly arrived Western commanders tended to judge by the *dicta* of the Cold War and see things either as black or white while the prevalent reality was mostly gray.

Most of the former Soviet officers in Latvia have left the service. In Lithuania they have been generally retained, while in Estonia they are now again returning to the defense forces on an individual basis. The ideal situation, of course, would have been for the Soviet-trained officers to work closely with the new cadre who had received their military education in the West. But it is understandable that in the early days feelings ran high and that was impossible.

*Planned security infrastructure development*

My first project as a consultant to the Ministry of Defense (1993–1995) was to develop an Organization and Functions Manual to specify who was responsible for what in the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Forces, to come up with an annual prioritized work plan and to institute a short standardized decision paper. Unfortunately, as all this required that various individuals make daring decisions (for example, whether to present the plans to the Minister), these documents disappeared somewhere in the desk of the Director of Strategic Plans and were never seen again. Although I repeatedly tried to introduce the documents once more from a much higher position, they are still not in force at the Ministry even now in 2001, eight years later. This leads me to believe that such management documents, considered indispensable in the West, are perceived as threats to the accustomed way of doing things, and are more or less deliberately avoided.

I led close to 50 inter-ministerial workgroups to develop concepts or national laws for submission to the Cabinet or Parliament and I continuously had to struggle with deliberate avoidance of specificity via such phrases as “the lawyers will understand what we mean”. The first edition of the security concept therefore merely stated that the ministries had to develop long-term plans for the improvement of the eleven security areas in need of enhancement. The chairman of the group charged with updating the concept the following year was an old party functionary and every specific tasking thereafter became

“plans are being developed; this and that is being done”, thus absolving specific officials and institutions of any direct responsibility. Because of this, the Latvian National Security Concept, like the previous Russian National Security Concept, has never been implemented.

*The unsolved problem of ultimate authority*

Going back to pre-communist constitutions, the presidents of the Baltic states are the “leaders” of the armed forces, but paradoxically they do not bear the political responsibility for their actions or lack of actions. The constitution states that the President shall appoint a Commander-in-Chief “for a time of national emergency”. As consensus has not been reached on exactly what is meant by this, presumably we will have to wait for a national emergency to find out how this will play out. The constitution is also silent on what the role of the President is once he has appointed the Commander-in-Chief. Does he continue to be the “leader” of the Defense Forces or is he no longer involved? The relationship between the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief during a conflict has also not been addressed and, even now, I fear the two would have serious differences of opinion as to what decisions fall into whose purview.

After being elected executive secretary of the National Security Council in January 1995, it was my responsibility to coordinate security issues between the President, Parliament and the government. Since the Council floated somewhere among the three, it was with great difficulty that I finally managed to secure a small staff to

carry out my duties. But the restrictive mold had been broken: security documents could now be worked out within the purview of the National Security Council, approved by the Council and submitted directly to the Cabinet or Parliament for implementation. The Lithuanians and Estonians lagged considerably behind the Latvians in establishing a Security Council in Estonia and a Defense Council in Lithuania. My dual function as advisor to the President and secretary of the Council gave me an advantage over the much more fragmented and decentralized security systems in the other two Baltic states.

*Tasks of the National Security Council*

Looking towards NATO requirements of democratic control over national armed forces, one of the first projects was to bring all the armed structures under the Ministry of Defense, especially the National (former Home) Guard. With some justification, the leadership of the National Guard referred to the “red colonels” as dinosaurs who were incapable of change, and the “red colonels”, also with some justification, referred to the National Guard as little boys playing at soldiers. Since by law the National Guard was “a voluntary self-defense organization”, extensive negotiations were required before its leadership acceded to come under the Ministry “in military matters” in order to form unified National Armed Forces. While the forces of the Interior Ministry were now to be subordinated to the Ministry of Defense during a national emergency, the State Security Service was split between the Interior and Defense Ministries; in

this, the National Security Council was attempting to ensure a “balance of power” between these ministries to reduce the danger of a coup by one or the other.

*A Defense Concept and a National Security Concept for the first time*

A national risk and a military threat analysis was conducted with the help of US experts and work commenced on a Defense Concept and a National Security Concept, both of which were eventually approved by the National Security Council and then by the Cabinet in June 1995, providing for the first time a framework for defense and security structure development.

The Latvian Security Concept differs not only from those of the other two Baltic states, but also from the security concepts of Western democracies since it perceives the threats to be primarily internal in nature: ethnic strife, uncontrolled immigration, organized crime, corruption, and so on. Moreover the Estonian and Lithuanian concepts are mostly declarative in nature and do not incorporate implementation instructions to include an annual review, preparation of an annual security enhancement work plan and a requirement for a crisis-management system. Not considering external military aggression to be the primary threat, the Latvian Security Concept assigns priority to the political resolution of potential conflict situations, but nevertheless prescribes certain actions to register aggression at the border, to delay and erode possible invading forces, to preserve the government, and to continue military resistance even after the total occupation of national territory.

### **Figure 1: The Latvian Defense Forces, 2001**

*Source: Report of the Minister of Defense to the Parliament on State Defense Policy and Armed Forces Development for the Year 2001 (www.mod.lv/english/09inform/wb\_2001/cont.php)*

<i>Category</i>	<i>Active duty (total)</i>	<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>	<i>National Guard (Zemessardze)</i>
<i>Officers</i>	1,050	418	102	101	429
<i>Enlisted personnel (professional)</i>	2,495	992	397	130	976
<i>Conscripts</i>	1,282	1,025	180	–	77
<i>Civil servants</i>	583	305	129	67	82
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,410</b>	<b>2,740</b>	<b>808</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>1,564</b>

#### ***Orientation to the West and Western assistance***

The appearance of US European Command (EUCOM) Military Liaison Teams in the Baltic states in 1993 introduced a fresh, alternative way of looking at force development and other issues which met with the support of some former Soviet officers and the opposition of others. The psychological impact of this orientation program cannot be overstated as it exposed the Defense Forces leadership to actual Western military organizations in Germany, the United States and other countries. The teams were initially more successful in Latvia and Estonia because of their Western Defense Minister and Defense Forces commander respectively. Some initial resistance against Western advisers was encountered in Lithuania.

#### ***The question of weapon sales from the West***

The negative impact of Western assistance concerns offers of outdated weapons and equipment at discount prices or even for free. In the light of the foregoing discussion, it must be obvious that the most important problem facing the Baltic

states in the development of armed forces is the absence of any infrastructure or foundations on which to base valid weapons and equipment requirements, coupled with the lack of experience in force development at all levels of the armed forces, government and parliament. Even when the acquisition of such weapons is clearly contrary to the precepts of the Defense Concept and the projected force development plan, any offer of cut price weapons or equipment is eagerly embraced. Once the weapons have been acquired, however, a use has to be found for them and entire units are formed merely to employ these weapons, totally in contradiction of all accepted doctrinal precepts. Some excuse for this could be offered if defense funding were adequate, or if these weapons systems provided key capabilities, but that unfortunately is not the case.

While Lithuania had inherited sufficient Kalashnikov rifles from the Russian forces, Estonia unilaterally expended tens of millions of US dollars on the purchase of Israeli weapons including the Galil rifle. Although immense internal and external

lobbying pressurized the Latvian military leadership to do the same, at this stage of force development it was impossible to justify paying US \$1,500 for a Galil—a modified Kalashnikow—when you could purchase the original Kalashnikow for US \$70 or less. At times, offers of excess weapons from Germany, Holland or other Western countries fizzled out when their Ministry of Foreign Affairs put an end to the proposed deals. The Swedish government, for example, withdrew its initial offer of 10,000 excess World War II vintage bolt-action Mauser 98 rifles.

As mentioned above, the Latvian Defense Forces cannot afford to maintain more than one or two regular infantry battalions without impinging on other essential defense functions. Any weapons or equipment incompatible with these units must therefore be redirected to the reserve component. Sophisticated but obsolete weapons such as the Bofor air-defense guns provided by Sweden require constant maintenance and training to be of even limited use; however, there is no money for civilian maintenance contracts or maintenance at active army facilities.

*Western assistance —  
not always helpful*

It must be said that, although well intentioned, Western assistance has sometimes actually been detrimental. Areas of responsibility for such assistance have not been agreed upon by the provider nations and have often overlapped, creating both confusion and indecision among the recipients. When the designated commander of the Marshall Center visited the evolving armed forces of Central and Eastern Europe to solicit their recommendations on what could be done to assist them in developing effective and democratically controlled national defense forces, the Latvians and, as it turned out, every one of the other countries, indicated the need to establish a multinational workgroup at the center which, with the assistance of Western experts, would produce simplified, generic, NATO-compatible doctrinal documents in these areas. Although this project was on top of the list and the Marshall Center agreed to act on it, the Center soon became so preoccupied with its own internal affairs, intrigues and interests that it lost touch with the needs of these developing countries and no one heard any more about this project. The Latvians made extensive tours of US, German, French, Swedish and other military personnel management facilities—but could not make up their minds which system to adopt. Currently, the Swedish system is being explored for selective service purposes and a US group of military experts is assisting in the development of a US-style military personnel management system for those already on active service.

The same applies to every other functional area mentioned, with Western experts offering their mostly incompatible systems while NAF staff vacillate among the offers. Here Lithuania's success in establishing an effective personnel management system must be mentioned. Through regular rotation, it produces officers with a wide range of expertise, capable of assuming every type of managerial job within the forces in the US tradition.

At first sight, it would make eminent sense to employ the National Defense Academy as the proponent for doctrinal literature, as in other nations; however, unfortunately, the academy was established by former Soviet military academy experts. For nine long years, although they had toured probably every Western military academy in the world and most had evaluated the Latvian academy leaving behind mountains of written recommendations, no changes were made to the old system in order to produce new, NATO-compatible officers. As has been pointed out in international evaluations of this problem, no national doctrine exists to specify the key areas that make an army an army. One could ask what the academy has been teaching its new lieutenants for the last ten years? Fortunately, the reorganization of the Academy's two-year teaching program is finally being considered.

*Expatriate officers from the West*

We must also address the efforts by Western officers of Latvian ethnic origin to assist in the development of the NAF. An official workgroup was established at an early stage in the Washington, DC area and US officers with diverse expertise, especially in logistics, spent several months each year working on related projects at the Latvian Ministry of Defense. Unfortunately, with no consensus on how the finished defense system should look, the results were piecemeal. Projects were usually sidelined or trashed after the departure of the experts. Even though the workgroup was provided with every available draft document affecting national defense and security, it seldom gave any input, and, even then, only after the document had already been established in law and could not be changed in any case. What was obviously missing was a comprehensive framework within which the individual efforts—both local and foreign—could proceed.

*The pitfalls of long-distance assistance*

A further problem with this 'long-distance' assistance was that things in Latvia moved so fast that the workgroup was always behind the power curve. When the first National Security Concept was approved in 1995, I solicited every known Latvian exile organization for assistance in its implementation, but received resounding silence in response—understandably family and financial considerations came first. A few members of the workgroup established the Baltic Foundation, and did indeed develop a comprehensive draft document for Baltic state security and defense infrastructure. However, unfortunately, by then most of the laws and structures had already been cast in concrete in Latvia. Inexplicably, the document developed by the Baltic Foundation and based on the US model, completely ignored the Latvian constitution and all its laws and concepts. Since it additionally envisioned a force structure beyond the dreams of even the former Soviet officers, it could not be seriously considered and all the time and effort had been wasted. This disconnection between idealistic Latvian exile organizations and the realities in place in Latvia exists in every functional area, not just security and defense.

*Recent positive developments*

Fortunately, following the last parliamentary election in Latvia in October 1998, the first Chief-of-Staff of the National Guard Girts Valdis Kristovskis, now a veteran politician, was appointed Defense Minister. Readily recognizing the priority of establishing the necessary foundations for the defense system, he obtained the services of two members of the Baltic Institute and contracted a commercial US military expert group. A new military threat analysis was conducted, the strength of the NAF set at 50,000, a revised defense concept developed and a realistic and adjustable long-term force development plan approved by the Cabinet. All ground forces were to come under the command of the National Guard headquarters, which was to be responsible for establishing the territorial defense system. A comprehensive future vision of the NAF has now also been institutionalized in writing, with emphasis on activities which will enhance future NATO membership. We can only hope that the process will have become irreversible by the next election and that a new Minister of Defense will not revert to old ways.

# The Baltic States: Security, Identity, and the Identity of the State

by Frank Möller

**Irrespective of the attitudes of the Baltic people, it would seem that the security sector elite of the Baltic states envisage security purely in military terms, with NATO as the only conceivable way of reaching this.**

This article explores security policies in the Baltic states as politics of national and state identity, discussing policy manifestations in the light of the identity-producing and state-consolidating functions assigned to the armed forces. To this end, it deals neither with external security nor with the technical, organizational or strategic aspects of military policies in the Baltic states (see Möller and Wellmann, 2001).

With the restoration of independence, security concepts in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have been developed around a military understanding of security as the build-up of national armed forces, international military cooperation, and integration into a military alliance. However, this focus on the military aspect of security cannot be explained exclusively in terms of external security since no external threat to security exists in the foreseeable future, as the Baltic governments acknowledge in recent security documents. Rather, aspirations to return to the West—a feature of identity politics over almost all of Central and Eastern Europe—and the construction of nation-states in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are goals which the

military is also deliberately pursuing: security conceptions are as much about identity and state-building as they are about security. Their aim is the construction of a collective self, meaning the identification of the individual with the nation, organized politically and socially as the modern, sovereign nation-state.

What is materializing in the Baltic states is a type of ‘tunnel vision’: decision-makers can only see limited ways of achieving security and refuse to even discuss alternatives. This is as much a result of their security concepts as it is a product of how they conceive the state should be. Both concepts reinforce each other. Together these result in what could be called a ‘militarization of the mind’. Furthermore, cooperative approaches to security, initiated as a rule from abroad, are being primarily used as vehicles with which to further national—rather than regional—security and identity.

## *Restoring sovereignty, restoring the armed forces*

In 1991, through non-violent popular movements, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia restored the independence they had lost in 1940. Yet neither these experiences nor the fact that the Russian military retreated peacefully from the territories of the Baltic states has been used to call into question the identification of security mainly with military security. It has even been said that the very success of the non-violent approach to restoring independence—which has neither now nor then been fully appreciated either politically nor militarily (Jundzis, 1995, p. 554)—was proof of the need to reestablish military control. Moreover the violent action of Soviet troops against civilians and border guards in 1991 was used to give legitimacy to the establishment of national military forces (Viksne, 1995, p. 64). However, had armed Baltic formations existed at that time, the Soviet reaction would in all likelihood have been more violent, the number of casualties higher and the chance of Baltic independence more unlikely, given the apparent reserve on the part of major Western states *vis-à-vis* the Baltic issue (see Gvosdev, 1995).



**Figure 1: Military expenditures, 1994–2000**

*In constant US dollars*

*Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2001, p. 281*

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
<i>Estonia</i>	44.0	43.6	42.4	56.6	59.9	74.5	88.0
<i>Latvia</i>	53.7	52.0	40.4	39.2	42.0	54.8	67.1
<i>Lithuania</i>	39.5	41.1	48.3	79.3	134.0	106.0	154.0

**Figure 2: Level of trust bestowed on the army, subdivided by nationality, November 1996**

*In percent*

*Source: Rose 1997, p. 30*

	<i>Lithuanians in Lithuania</i>	<i>Russians in Lithuania</i>	<i>Latvians in Latvia</i>	<i>Russians in Latvia</i>	<i>Estonians in Estonia</i>	<i>Russians in Estonia</i>
<i>Complete trust</i>	5	5	5	8	6	2
<i>General trust</i>	41	39	36	44	66	30
<i>General distrust</i>	32	28	35	23	24	39
<i>Complete distrust</i>	22	28	24	25	4	28

**Figure 3: Attitudes towards NATO integration**

*In percent*

*Source: Rose 2000, pp. 38–39*

*Note: The table is based on interviews conducted between February and May 2000. The question asked was: “NATO is an alliance of Britain, France, Germany, the United States and other countries. It offers military protection against attack. What do you think of the idea that this country should join NATO?” Answers are subdivided by nationality.*

	<i>Lithuanians in Lithuania</i>	<i>Russians in Lithuania</i>	<i>Latvians in Latvia</i>	<i>Russians in Latvia</i>	<i>Estonians in Estonia</i>	<i>Russians in Estonia</i>
<i>Very beneficial</i>	14	5	26	5	22	2
<i>Somewhat beneficial</i>	33	11	32	13	48	15
<i>Not so beneficial</i>	15	23	13	23	11	27
<i>Not at all beneficial</i>	17	36	6	33	7	39
<i>Difficult to say</i>	22	26	22	26	13	17

What followed independence may be termed militarization in its most basic definition as the steady growth in the military potential of a country. For example, military expenditures increased considerably in Latvia between 1996 and 2000 in real terms, more than doubled in Estonia, and more than tripled in Lithuania (Sköns et al., 2001, p. 251). As part of their policy aimed at accession to NATO, the Baltic governments have committed themselves to increasing military spending further to 2 percent of GDP (see Figure 1).

#### *Tunnel vision*

This constituted a militarization of the mind as well. Anxieties associated with conflict, memories of past experiences—loss of independence, occupations, deportations and so on—and a specific understanding of how a nation-state should be seem to have resulted in what can be called a security tunnel vision (Deutsch, 1987, p. 40). Both the potential to deal with security conflicts in a constructive way and the perceived range of possibilities for resolving conflicts appear to have been considerably limited in that they focused exclusively on military means.

Such emphasis on military-based security concepts demonstrates, among other things, the persistence in the Baltic states of habitually equating the security of the nation-state with the ability to defend it militarily. Simplified even further, the establishment of national armed forces is depicted as being “natural” and “simply necessary”, allegedly resulting from “geopolitical” or other ostensible “necessities”. Neutrality as a security policy

option, often envisioned in combination with demilitarization and discussed favorably among dissidents in the pre-independence period, has disappeared from the agenda because it was habitually conceived in terms of armed neutrality after independence and was consequently rejected on financial and operational grounds.

#### *The build-up of national armed forces*

Be that as it may, building-up the armed forces has not been an easy task. In 1991, national armed forces were simply non-existent, and had, in the eyes of the people, profoundly lost their legitimacy. Forms of harassment typical of the Soviet army such as *dedovshchina* (violence exerted by second-year service conscripts on those in first year) and *gruppovshchina* (harassment based on nationality) had made the situation unbearable for conscripts from the Baltic republics and had fundamentally undermined the legitimacy of the armed forces in general (Meyer 1991/92, p. 22). Unfortunately, to a certain extent, the incipient armed forces of the Baltic states displayed a continuation of, rather than a substantial deviation from, the Soviet military practice and abuse of authority (Vitas, 1996; Clemmesen, 1998). Would-be conscripts were not enthusiastic about joining the armed forces, not least because the social and economic fabric of society was simultaneously collapsing and everyone was preoccupied with laying the foundation for his or her own livelihood. Given the scarcity of resources, it might have been more advisable to focus on social and economic problems rather than on the build-up of forces whose ability to respond to armed aggression would in any event be

limited for the time being. Furthermore, in the years immediately following independence, competition among the different armed formations as well as the absence of both legislation and civilian regulation generated insecurity rather than security (Kerner, 1998, pp. 127–131). However, even though national armed forces competed with voluntary territorial forces for resources and professional standing, they were united with them in their hostility against the Russian army stationed in Lithuania until summer 1993 and Estonia and Latvia until summer 1994. In particular, the concept which the territorial force had of themselves as guardians of independence collided with the self-esteem of the regular armed forces who reciprocated by displaying contempt for forces they considered “hobby soldiers”.

Among the population, there is in general not much interest in security issues nor trust in the army (see Figure 2); attitudes towards increases in taxes for the development of the defense forces are reserved. In Estonia in 1997, for example, 26.6 and 59.8 percent respectively of all respondents would “rather not” and “certainly not” support an increase in taxes to fund the development of the defense forces while only 2.1 and 6.7 percent said they “would probably” or “would certainly” support this (Vares, 1997, p. 81). Indeed, for ordinary people “high-flown strategic considerations come a long way after the struggle for everyday survival” (*Economist*, 12 October 1996, p. 33).

The rates of approval of NATO integration are recently increasing but, as Figure 3 indicates, still do not correspond to the unanimous

support for military integration on the part of the governments and security sector elites. For instance, after several years of preparation for NATO membership, the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000, Section: Directions of Estonian Security Policy Development) has had to concede that public awareness is still in need of being improved.

*The apparent lack of alternatives*

A major result of the lack of alternatives is the absence of controversial public debate and the lack of interest or curiosity in the issue. All major political parties support the recent military policies, namely, the increase in military expenditure and integration into NATO. The so-called “compliant citizen” (Amato and Batt, 1999, p. 26), neither enthusiastic about, nor critical of, but rather indifferent to security policy issues, is a widespread phenomenon. As Giuliano Amato and Judy Batt explain, this is not merely a reaction to the over-politicization of the Soviet era but is also the expression of the citizens’ basic democratic right not to become engaged in politics. It may also reflect the individual’s perception of his/her own helplessness since one of the basic features of democracy, the choice between alternatives, does not seem to apply to security policies.

From the perspective of Baltic decision-makers, the European Union, increasingly referred to in scholarly writings in terms of security (Vares, 1999), is considered unable to provide the Baltic states with the kind of security they urgently desire, namely military security (Berzins, 1999, p. 56). Nor

does the Western European Union (WEU) appear to be open to the Baltic states. The suggestion has been made either to uncouple EU-membership by the Baltic states from full WEU-membership (Asmus and Nurick, 1996, p. 134) or to shift the emphasis away from the meaning of the WEU’s Article V. Were this not done, the United States could find itself in the unacceptable position of having to guarantee “through the backdoor” the security of those new EU member states which are not members of NATO (Dembinski, 2000, pp. 23–27). Finally, a security guarantee from Russia, as offered in 1997, is seen as inapt and inconsistent with the idea of a “return to the West.” Unilateral guarantees are said to be incompatible with the development of pan-European security structures which, in turn, is equated with NATO enlargement. Since Russia serves as the negative reference point against which Baltic identity is being constructed (Jæger, 1997), the rejection of Russian security guarantees—from the point of view of politics of identity—is equally unavoidable.

*NATO, culture, and identity*

NATO is depicted as a panacea against threats to security, sovereignty and identity. Since late 1993/early 1994, the build-up of armed forces—seen as an indispensable, quasi-natural ingredient of the nation-state and as an equally indispensable precondition for external security—has unfolded in the light of NATO integration. Interoperability with NATO forces has become a magic word. Likewise, military expenditure has been adjusted to the NATO average and pre-accession rhetoric to

NATO language. But this concentration on integration with the Alliance has not been without its inconsistencies: while the Baltic states are emphasizing military security, NATO is increasingly representing itself as a political organization; while they are keen to advertise themselves as a bulwark against the Russian Federation, NATO sees Russia as a partner; and while they are looking for protection against Russia, NATO, within certain limits, is aiming at a security set-up which incorporates Russia.

*Ignoring Russia*

Reacting to the apparent differences between their own way of seeing NATO and the way NATO represents itself, Baltic decision-makers are no longer emphasizing so vehemently what separates the Baltic states from Russia. Instead, stress has been shifted to what they have in common with the Western states. Rhetorically, they are bypassing Russia by simply not referring to it. For example, in its 2000 yearbook, the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not even dedicate a separate chapter to relations with Russia but subsumes Russia in the section “Relations with East European and Central Asian Countries”. Moreover, and in accordance with NATO language, they represent NATO as something—perhaps even historically—“new”. In doing so, they are reiterating NATO’s own position that enlargement is not directed against anyone and that it will, in fact, increase everyone’s security, even Russia’s, by providing for a zone of stability at Russia’s western borders which will enable it to focus on its own internal reform process. As a corollary, they represent NATO enlargement as “the end of a

centuries-old era of power politics and spheres of influence” (Vike-Freiberga, 2000) rather than as its continuation—as which it is no doubt understood by most Russian decision-makers (Herd, 1997, p. 252).

### *Western versus Eastern cultural norms*

The struggle for military spheres of influence is said to be over. What is deemed to have emerged in its stead is a struggle for cultural spheres of influence, with Russia as the most prominent source of danger to the Baltic states in particular and “Europe” in general. Thus the Baltic states are no longer being advertised as a bulwark against military aggression but as a cultural barrier, separating and protecting “us” from “them.” “Western” norms and values are contrasted and declared incompatible with “Eastern” culture predicting a clash of, rather than a dialogue between, civilizations (Huntington, 1997). This perspective, “avidly welcomed by cultural nationalists the world over” (Halliday, 2000, p. 49), has many adherents in the Baltic states, especially in Estonia (Lauristin and Vihalemm, 1997). More and more, therefore, NATO is being portrayed as a ‘community of values’ which defends Western identity rather than as a military alliance. But, quite regardless of whether the threat to the Baltic states and “Europe” is represented in military or cultural terms, it is seen to emanate from the East and military integration is understood as the most important—or even the only—remedy.

### *Wars and substitute wars*

The continuous confirmation and reconfirmation of the individual and collective self unfolds, among other things, through the equally continuous confirmation and reconfirmation of the other as the “other”. Thus, collective self and national identity are to a large extent expressions of *negative* identification, that is, the delimitation from others. This is based on who or what we are not. Delimitation from others is never as easy an endeavor as it is in times of war. This is because, under such circumstances, it is relatively straightforward to establish a distinction between “us” and “them”. In war situations, groups do not accept, and cannot afford, deviations from the basic principles on which they orientate themselves (Simmel, 1955). Thus, in wars, the pressure exerted on an individual to conform is extremely strong; deviations are correspondingly difficult and possible only at the price of being stigmatized as belonging to “them” rather than “us”. In other words, exclusion from the collective self is likely to follow.

### *Did World War II last until 1991 in the Baltics?*

War, however, is fortunately the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, “the risk of war in an arbitrary pair of neighbors was never more than a few percent per year in modern times and [was] below one percent in the 1990s” (Wiberg, 2000, pp. 289–290). If actual wars are so infrequent, this source through which to construct identity is normally non-existent. One way of dealing with this problem is to imagine wars: to represent and depict non-wars as wars. Security

policy, particularly in its military form, always involves the anticipation of imagined wars. In the present context, however, the issue is not one of anticipating wars. Rather, it is one of pretending to be actually in a state of war. According to a widely-held reading of Baltic history, for example, World War II came to an end in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania only with independence in 1991 (Meri, 1991, pp. 109). It can be argued that the reading of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states up to 1991 as a continuation of World War II served as a kind of substitute war. This definition attempted to maintain a collective Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian self in the absence of both a “real” war and an “own” state.

After 1991, this “own” state did indeed materialize and the imagined war, whose purpose had been the preservation of an image of the collective self, came to an end. In the absence of a war, real or imagined, the representation of others—and in particular of Russia—as a military or cultural threat may serve as another kind of substitute war. A collective self is created and sustained through the rhetorical cultivation of a permanent state of danger, emergency or siege in which security, independence and national survival are said to be at risk (Christophe, 1997, pp. 301–311). “Fighting” imagined wars and cultivating states of emergency may therefore be seen as practices through which individual and collective subjects produce and reproduce themselves (Shapiro, 1997, p. 56). Constructing (the impression of) a collective self, however, is a never-ending story; “insofar as there is a ‘national identity’, it is an ongoing project

rather than a fact” (Shapiro, 1997, p. 141). This in turn leads to the continuous confirmation and reconfirmation of the collective self by means of, among other things, confirming and reconfirming the other as “other”, for example, in narratives of past and current violence.

*Kosovo—the Baltics move closer to NATO*

Baltic participation in the NATO-led military intervention in Kosovo—that is, the replacement of an imagined war by a real war—may also be said to have had a profound function in establishing identity. This is because “war retains a significant dimension of both individual and collective identity affirmation” (Shapiro, 1997, p. 77). By participating in a war which was rejected by the Russian leadership, the role of Russia as a negative point of reference was confirmed. Both the collective self and the self-understanding of being part of the “Western world” or simply, “Europe,” was furthered by the reading that “our” military strengthens, while “theirs” threatens European security. The representation of Russia as the other, as the “non-West”, was fostered by the uncritical and out-and-out support of NATO which ostensibly defended and manifested “Western” values in Kosovo. A sense of community was furthered by participating in a war rejected by the Russian leadership. This seemingly “confirmed” its otherness and rightful exclusion from Europe.

The erasure in June 1998 of the word “peacekeeping” from the Baltic Battalion’s (BaltBat) title in order to make its participation in so-called NATO-led peace enforcement

operations possible considerably expanded the range of functions that the Battalion, which had originally been limited to peacekeeping under UN or OSCE mandate, could fulfill. In parallel with the expansion of NATO’s missions, as exemplified in the Kosovo war, a clash between BaltBat’s activities and Russia’s perceived interests could not be excluded. Some observers had already expected such a clash in connection with Baltic participation in KFOR and SFOR (Johnson, 1999). Furthermore, it was possible that the initially fairly positive reactions by representatives of the Russian Federation to the establishment of the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (Knudsen and Neumann, 1995, p. 25) could give way to a more critical stance which might then be interpreted by Baltic decision-makers as “confirmation” of Russia’s ostensible malevolence and hostility towards the Baltic states. This might, in turn, facilitate the depiction of Russia as the “other” and might indeed be welcomed by some Baltic decision-makers as a means through which to strengthen collective identity.

*Armed formations as a source of identity*

Critical, or at least indifferent, populations have to be convinced that the armed forces are indeed an appropriate provider of identity, the place where they “will learn to love [their] independent country and its values” (Meri, 2000a) and an institution to “unify the country” (Zaccor, 1994, pp. 203). The ways of achieving this are many: universal conscription; total defense concepts; pre-military service training; cultivation or invention of non-

Soviet military traditions; celebration of violent (albeit unsuccessful) resistance movements; and official contempt for all deviating views. Declaring current military policies as simply “natural”, “obvious” and “without alternatives” gives deviating views inferior status, serving to demonstrate the alleged superiority of one’s own position. In addition many representatives of the armed forces all too readily accept the forces being used for identity purposes which also serves as a way out of the their legitimacy problem.

In what way do the security sector elite see the armed forces as a provider of identity? How have they managed to de-legitimize divergent opinions? Many aspects which were criticized in the late 1980s with respect to the Soviet army are now being incorporated into the national armed forces of the Baltic states. Whereas the population at large is critical of armed forces in general, the elite disapproves only of the Soviet and, subsequently, Russian armed forces. In 1989, for example, the introduction of alternative service duties for conscientious objectors was included in a list of proposals submitted to the central Soviet authorities by representatives of the Estonian popular movement (Holloway, 1989/90, p. 18). Ten years later, the Estonian President is exhibiting considerable contempt for conscientious objectors by calling them “shirkers and cowards [with] loose morals, and a loose body to go with it”, thus banishing them rhetorically from the collective self. At the same time, he is celebrating the national armed forces as the place where, as noted above, the Estonians “will learn to love [their] independent country and its values” (Meri, 2000a).

Certain scholars agree, and present conscripted armies as “a positive element in establishing social harmony and lessening social and ethnic tensions. When defense of the state is at issue, the ethnicity of the defender is not important” (Ozolina, 1996, p. 51).

Proposals submitted by popular front representatives to the authorities in Moscow in 1989 had included the reduction, or abolishment of military training in schools (Holloway, 1989/90, p. 18). Yet today pre-military service training has been reintroduced, including courses in secondary schools on state defense. The Estonian Ministry of Defense states: “In the future, national defense instruction should be mandatory in all institutions of learning” (Estonian Ministry of Defense, 1999, p. 35). While the popular movements had celebrated the end of pre-induction military training for girls in 1989 as a step towards the “final elimination of militarism from the education process” (Holloway, 1989/90, p. 19), the Estonian Defense League (*Kaitseliit*) today oversees both the Home Daughters (*Kodutüred*), a voluntary organization for girls between eight and eighteen years with 1,000 members, and the Young Eagles (*Noored kotkad*), a similarly voluntary organization for boys between eight and eighteen years with 2,000 members (Haab, 1995, pp. 41–42; Vares, 1997, p.16; Estonian Ministry of Defense, 1999, p. 53). Likewise, in Latvia, the Young Guards (*Jaunsargi*) is a voluntary youth organization of the National Guard (*Zemessardze*) for boys and girls between twelve and eighteen years. Participation in the organization is officially said to contribute to useful leisure

activities, preparation for conscript service and a potential military career as well as studies at the National Defense Academy (Latvian Ministry of Defense, no year).

Basically, the emphasis is on total defense concepts which declare a national objective and a duty of every citizen rather than merely a task for which only the professional military organizations are responsible. Those who are not citizens of Estonia and Latvia (mostly ethnic Russians) are banned from serving in the national armed forces or in volunteer home guards. This has been said to undermine the very concept of total defense (Clemmesen, 1998, p. 231) and to contradict the idea of integration through the military. Military training, especially for university students, is aimed at countering students’ marked reluctance to serve in the armed forces. The objective of this training is the “ [facilitation of] patriotic education and training of youths for state defense purposes” (Latvian Ministry of Defense, no year).

### *Decision-makers in search of military traditions*

The official reading of Baltic independence as restoration of independence—rather than secession from the Soviet Union—facilitated the resumption of traditions broken off in 1940. It found expression in, for example, the reintroduction in 1992 of the 1922 Latvian Constitution (Dreifelds, 1996, p. 31), the “re-establishment of most of the major historical parties after 1988” in Lithuania (Krupavicius, 1998, p. 165) and in “politicians casting themselves in the role of their childhood heroes” (Lieven, 1994, p. 55). Relying almost exclusively upon voluntary defense forces immediately before and after the establishment of independence did not only result from the lack of armed formations but also from the aim of cultivating military traditions. This was achieved by revitalizing the pre-1940 volunteer defense organizations which had existed in all three Baltic countries during the inter-war period.

#### *Volunteer defense organizations revitalized*

Besides their operational function as territorial defense organizations, the National Defense League (*Kaitseliit*) in Estonia, the National Defense Volunteer Forces (KASP) in Lithuania, and the National Guard (*Zemessardze*) in Latvia are seen as an embodiment of (imagined) historical continuity—the KASP and *Zemessardze* in a more spiritual manner (Zaccor, 1994, p. 211) and *Kaitseliit* explicitly by having reenacted its 1931 statute and by revitalizing the inter-war youth and women’s organizations. These organizations are said to represent “the principle of historical

continuity” and to “strengthen . . . patriotic feelings among the population” (Vares, 1997, p. 16). Lithuania’s national voluntary defense forces symbolically uphold the continuity of the Lithuanian state by using replicas of the uniforms of the inter-war National Guard (Jæger, 1997, p. 26, Note 16). However, the units of the inter-war period can hardly be seen as a model for democratic armed formations: they were mainly recruited from conservative, rural circles, hardly accessible to the leftwing, and served as the armed branches of the authoritarian presidential government (Kerner, 1994, p. 31).

Similarly, statements such as: “Estonia is going to recreate her armed forces, similar to the Estonian army of General Laidoner” (Hain Rebas, as cited in Haab, 1995, p. 39) are indicative of the invention and cultivation of problematic traditions similar to the reestablishment of voluntary paramilitary organizations like the *Sauliai* Union in Lithuania. Johannes Laidoner was the first Commander-in-Chief and principal organizer of the Estonian armed forces, appointed on 23 December 1918, but he also occupied a central position in the authoritarian regime established after 1934 (Vares, 1997, pp. 8–11; Hiden and Salmon, 1994, pp. 32–33). In the inter-war period, the *Sauliai* Union was a voluntary military organization consisting in 1940 of 62,000 members. After the 1926 *coup d’état*, the Union was used to strengthen the nationalistic regime (Paulauskas, 1996, p. 31).

Today, the *Sauliai* Union is officially seen as a connecting link between the armed forces and civil society and—equally important in the light of inventing tradition—between the current Lithuanian state and the inter-war state. After its reestablishment in 1989, the *Sauliai* Union was largely free from state control and attracted radically-minded persons, equipped with arms and uniforms. At the very least, their inclination towards democracy seemed questionable (Vares and Haab, 1993, p. 304; Lieven, 1994, p. 74). The Ministry of National Defense assigns an important role to the Union in linking armed forces and society by, among other things, informing society about the missions and activities of the armed forces, raising national consciousness, developing state defense activities, as well as preparing for civil self-defense and universal and armed resistance in the event of, or threat of, war or occupation (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense 1999, Part III, p. ii). Yet, the currently low number of members—7,000 (Paulauskas, 1996, p. 31) as compared with 62,000 in 1940—indicates the limited pulling-power of *Sauliai* Union.

Finally, traditions of violence are cultivated through drawing connections with the so-called Forest Brothers, the anti-Soviet and anti-collaborator movement of the second half of the 1940s which diminished in the first five years of the 1950s. Indeed, extolling the fight of the Forest Brothers is depicted as being the most important way of approaching the communist past in Lithuania (Tauber, 1997, p. 15). By explicitly stating that defense should be prepared for on the basis of “the Nation’s experience of a decade-long, post-war partisan struggle against the troops and the occupational regime of the Soviet Union”, techniques of future warfare are being explicitly built upon those of past warfare: past enemies are implicitly represented as being also the current and future enemies (The Basics of National Security of Lithuania, Part One, Chapter 7, Second Section). This is not just a theoretical argument: in an essay contest among school and college students, organized by the Latvian publishing house, Vieda, in spring and summer 2001, the tradition of the Forest Brothers was emphasized as being a possible way of dealing with Russians residing in Latvia. On the other hand, past experiences may also act as templates for activities which could challenge national security. For example, the 1993 mutiny of some members of the Lithuanian territorial defense forces found its expression in the abandonment of their posts and their withdrawal into the woods (Tamulaitis, 1994, p. 23).

## Concluding remarks

### *National identity exists without the military*

Surprisingly, the Baltic nations emerged from decades of Soviet pressure to assimilate as “established and consolidated as nations” (Brubaker, 1996, p. 38 note 44). In their authoritative treatment of Baltic history, Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera come to the conclusion that “cultural assimilation in the Soviet Union may have been overestimated by many earlier observers” (1993, p. 273). Likewise, Graham Smith (1996, pp. 154–155) finds only a few signs of it among Latvians during and following the Brezhnev era. Among the administrative-managerial personnel, the titular nations in 1989 were represented with 91.5, 63.1 and 82.2 percent of this section of the workforce in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, respectively (Zaslavsky, 1993, p. 38). In the course of the 1990s, the security establishment nevertheless maintained that the survival of the state and nation were endangered and emphasis was shifted from military to cultural threats. However opinion polls show that among ethnic Balts identification with the nation is strong (see Figure 4). The construction of national identity through the military seems neither popular nor necessary.

### *Tradition linked to the inter-war years*

As outlined above, the armed formations have also been vested with an important function as providers of traditions. In particular they are said to link the current states with the inter-war states and thus help create an impression of historical continuity based on the

reading that “a state can be founded only once, once and for all” (Meri, 2000b). The narrative of the continuity of the state may have legitimized the strivings for independence in the late 1980s but, among the general population, the role assigned to the military as a provider of traditions was fairly modest. Rather, it was more the inter-war period which was perceived as a model due to the very fact of Baltic independence, the Baltic states’ economic achievements at that time (Lieven, 1994, p. 64), their integration into the world economy (Cicinskas, 1997, p. 348), and Estonia’s exemplary legislation on minority rights and cultural autonomy (Smith, 2001). Thus, using the inter-war period as an “invaluable resource in state-building” (Dreifelds, 1996, p. 5) does not require a reference to the military.

### *Identity of the state*

In the final analysis, the issue does not seem to be one of national identity but rather one of the identity of the state. Like security, the state is how it is thought and spoken of; like security, the state is a mental construction. In the Baltic states, it has been conceived according to a modern and realist design with the ideas of sovereignty and territoriality—that is, non-interference and spatial exclusion—as the fundamental pillars, and with military means as the primary way of defending both. This may be a consequence of thinking of Baltic statehood in terms of state continuity. In 1994, Anatol Lieven rightly observed that “the Europe many Baltic politicians seek to return to is not the Europe of today, but that of the 1920s and 1930s” (Lieven, 1994, p. 374). Although this statement must certainly be qualified

in the light of EU integration, in important respects it is still to the point. The same can be said of Mare Haab’s assessment that “security is identified with sovereignty, and the chances of defending sovereignty are seen primarily in terms of military means” (1994, p. 148).

Whatever threats may exist, therefore, it is often the military who are expected to solve them. Democracy may be the art of discourse—but debate over security issues is unwelcome. Security and defense policy are simply declared non-negotiable (Meri, 2000b). Even if security documents employ comprehensive security concepts including divergent means of security and issue areas, factual security policies are still statist and militarist. Regional cooperation may be welcomed but national security is still at the center of attention; cooperative approaches to security may be applauded up front on stage but are laughed at behind the curtain as being unrealistic, naïve and utopian. In accordance with realist thought patterns, the Baltic security establishment sees military alliances as “the only institutions . . . worthy of serious consideration” (Ruggie, 1998, p. 7). Everything else—increasing military capabilities and expenditure, regional cooperation, soft security cooperation and so on—is taken seriously only as a vehicle with which to gain membership in NATO. However, although decision-makers are attempting to construct the identity of the state by means of the armed forces, the population at large appear to have other resources at their disposal, on the basis of which they confirm and reconfirm both their individual self and the collective self of which they are a part.



**Figure 4: Which of these terms best describes how you usually think of yourself?  
In percent**

Source: Rose, 1997, pp. 46–47

	<i>Lithuanians</i>	<i>Latvians</i>	<i>Estonians</i>
<i>City/locality</i>	28	32	30
<i>Region</i>	13	9	4
<i>The respective Baltic nationality</i>	57	57	64
<i>European</i>	1	1	1
<i>Other</i>	0	1	1

### *List of Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations*

AMW	Agency for Military Assets (Agencja Mienia Wojskowego) (Poland)
BALTBAT	Baltic Battalion
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CITE	Center of Innovation, Technology and Education (Poland)
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU	European Union
EUCOM	US European Command
GDP	Gross domestic product
GDR	(Former) German Democratic Republic
HOSZ	Association of Hungarian Servicemen
IDAB	International Defense Advisory Board
KASP	National Defense Volunteer Forces (Lithuania)
KFOR	Nato-led Kosovo Protection Force
MAP	Membership Action Plan (aimed at NATO membership)
MOD	Ministry of Defense
NAF	National Armed Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMON	Special forces under the (former) Soviet Ministry of the Interior
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PARP	Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process
PCMS	Post-communist mindset
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PLN	Polish zloty
RRC	Rapid Reaction Corps
RRF	Rapid Reaction Forces
SEEBRIG	Multinational Peace Force–South-Eastern Europe
SFOR	Stabilization Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
TACIS	Technical Assistance to CIS countries (EU program)
UN	United Nations
WEU	Western European Union
WKU	Military Reserve Command (Poland)
WP	Warsaw Pact
WSzW	Provincial Military Staffs (Poland)

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# The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)

an independent non-profit organization  
dedicated to promoting the transfer  
of former military resources and assets  
to alternative civilian purposes

The transfer of resources from the military to the civilian sector represents both a social and an economic challenge, as well as offering an opportunity for the states concerned. The sustained process of disarmament during the decade following the end of the Cold War has made defense conversion an important issue in many countries today. This process has now slowed down considerably, but the problems faced by those affected are far from solved. BICC's main objective is to make use of the chances offered by disarmament, whilst at the same time helping to avoid—or lessen—the negative effects.

This issue concerns a number of areas: What can scientists and engineers who were formerly employed in weapons labs do today? What is the fate of the roughly eight million employees who lost their jobs in the defense factories? Why are so many defense companies faring better today than they did ten years ago? Will all demobilized soldiers or former combatants find a future in civilian society? What action must communities take when suddenly faced with the closure of a huge military base? How does one solve the problem of the ready availability of small arms and light weapons?

It is BICC's task to tackle these questions, to analyze them on the basis of scientific research, to convey the necessary information, and to give advice to those involved – in short, to **manage disarmament**.

**International think tank.** BICC conducts research and makes policy recommendations. In-house and external experts contribute comparative analyses and background studies.

**Project management and consulting services.** BICC provides practical support to public and private organizations. For instance, BICC staff advise local governments confronted with the difficult task of redeveloping former military installations. BICC also combines development assistance with practical conversion work by helping in the fields of demobilization, reintegration and peace-building.

**Clearinghouse.** In its capacity as an independent organization, BICC supports and assists international organizations, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, companies and the media, as well as private individuals. It hereby mediates and facilitates the conversion process at all levels – local, national and global. BICC collects and disseminates data and information on conversion to practitioners in a wide range of fields and institutions. BICC strives to reach researchers and practitioners as well as parliamentarians, the media, and the general public by means of a variety of tools including its library, its extensive on-line documentation services and its internet service ([www.bicc.de](http://www.bicc.de)). Furthermore, the Center documents the course of disarmament and conversion in its annual *conversion surveys* and produces a variety of publications.

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