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## Editor's Note

The past few months have witnessed some major developments in the international scene. The escalating conflict in Syria and tensions in the Korean peninsula have dominated the airwaves and attention of the global policymakers. The South Asian region has also witnessed some rather disheartening developments. Relations between India and China took a dip, while the fragile relations between India and Pakistan suffered yet another blow over the issue of deaths of prisoners. The deepening political impasse in Bangladesh has also been an increasing reason for concern.

Amidst this rather dismal backdrop, policymakers and scholars have been pondering of the future of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2014. Ensuring the stability of the country and preventing a spillover of the threat from the Afghan Taliban into other countries in the region is of pivotal importance. The security situation in Afghanistan will also have an imprint on the security and stability of the Central Asian region, Russia and China.

This issue of *Peace and Security Review* offers our readers a range of different articles covering a plethora of issues. Nboawaji Daniel Nte offers a viewpoint on the role of intelligence support to security operations in the Nigerian context. Using the examples of various operations in the past, Dr. Nte shows us the importance of effective intelligence support in ensuring operational success and the need to formulate an intelligence doctrine. In the second article, Major General Muniruzzaman (Retd.) touches upon the important issue of Identity Politics and its impact on radicalisation and extremism. As the United States and the world tries to answer questions that emerged after the recent bombings in Boston, General Muniruzzaman shows us how threats to identity security could lead to growths of extremism among different communities. The author also proffers some policy recommendations to mitigate this important challenge.

In the third article, Shahnawaz Ahmed Mantoo from the University of Kashmir discusses the issue of Bangladesh's strategic importance for India.

While focusing on the geo-political and geo-strategic significance of Indo-Bangladesh relations, Mr. Mantoo also offers the readers an insight into the significance of economic cooperation and integration and finding peaceful ways of ameliorating bilateral disputes. Finally, Mizanur Rahman discusses the spectre of environmental conflict using a case study from the Philippines. Mr. Rahman also shows us the social, legal and political dimensions of the conflict between two tribes in the Sagada region in the Philippines.

In sum, this issue provides our readers with an appetising palate of articles focusing on both traditional and non-traditional security issues. The articles have also been drawn from various parts of the world and cover issues in South Asia, South East Asia and Africa. Taken together, this issue provides the readers from students to opinion shapers an opportunity to understand some important issues and challenges and the policy option required to mitigate them. In essence, it ties in with the aim of this journal as well as its publisher the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), to undertake timely and policy oriented research on security issues of regional and global import and to strive towards a secure world.

We wish our readers the very best.

**Major General ANM Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (Retd.)**  
Editor

# An Analysis of Intelligence Support to Security Operations in Nigeria: A Review of Some Joint Task Force Operations

*Ngboawaji Daniel Nte, PhD\**

## **Abstract**

Nigeria's bid to grapple with the problem of threats to her internal security as a result of the pervasive state of insecurity in some parts of the country has thrown up interesting challenges for the intelligence community in the country. The effectiveness of intelligence therefore had been under scrutiny because of the recurring intelligence failures state of insecurity. This study was necessitated by the contending issues of lack of real time intelligence and lack of analytical skill associated with intelligence gathering and management. The study adopted the quantitative and analytical methods of analyzing data from primary and secondary sources to arrive at the conclusion and recommendations.

The study revealed that intelligence gathering and management has not been able to effectively support the conduct of security operation in Nigeria. This is because the impact of intelligence has not been significant for many reasons. From the study, it is clear that the intelligence community lacked the requisite technological platform to effectively support the conduct of security operations. The research identified some challenges which include; lack of funding, lack of real time intelligence, lack of analytical skill, lack of ICT facilities and absence of technical collection means.

To mitigate these challenges, strategies proffered include the need to ensure that the intelligence gathering and management enterprise in Nigeria should be able to provide real time intelligence; provide the needed analytical skills; get the necessary ICT facilities and adequate funding to acquire other technical collection systems to effectively support operations in the country.

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated, understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, refined and narrowed to meet those needs.

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Nations require intelligence about their immediate environment and that of other nations. This is necessary because, in order to preserve their security, they need to keep track of internal and external threats (Lowenthal, 2000). Consequently, nations require certain instruments to contain these threats. These are a strong military supported by an intelligence apparatus. Also, nations adopt strategies and policies such as defence and security policies to enable them to respond appropriately and safeguard them from both external and internal threats (Enahoro, 2010).

Intelligence, as a critical tool of statecraft, provides the necessary warning about imminent threats policy makers in order to protect a nation from being subjected to surprise military attacks. Intelligence as an organization is able to avert imminent threats to a country by providing timely, processed information to national security decision makers. This is achieved through the acquisition of covert information by covert means on the actions, policies and capabilities of other nations. The information, which is of utmost importance to national security, is collected, analyzed and disseminated for use to support action. Thus, the role of intelligence is to support action that may be deemed necessary in the furtherance of national interests (Lowenthal, 2007).

Intelligence is a critical element in the success of all human endeavour, be it in business, governance or military operations. In the context of military operations, intelligence is vital for guiding operations. If the intelligence is right; chances are that the operation will be successful. The significance of this assertion was illustrated in the operations Desert shield and Desert storm in the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

Adequate intelligence was provided to the US military during these operations. The operations were successful due to the accuracy of the in-depth intelligence on enemy vulnerabilities, capabilities and intentions. This enabled the US military to have a full and complete view of the adversary, while military power was directed where it was needed most (<http://www.Cia.gov/library/report/generl-reports-1/guiwar/061997/support>, 2010).

Security operations are the procedures and actions taken by security agencies to protect lives and properties in order to ensure there is no state of insecurity within a society. The conduct of security operations in Nigeria is shaped by the peculiarity of the security environment; thus, security operation could be proactive or reactive. When it is proactive, it involves essentially the use of intelligence to avert any threat to national security. These threats could be in the form of sabotage, subversion, terrorism and all other destructive actions that could undermine national security. Reactive security operations involve the use of security apparatuses to contain conflicts that are already on ground. When that happens, states involve security operations that are

reactive in nature and the use of military force is employed in conjunction with national intelligence assets to contain threats (Jackson et al, 2004).

There has always been a rather healthy tension between the producers of intelligence and the users of intelligence. This is against the backdrop that intelligence operations are not conducted for their own sake, but rather to inform the decisions of those who must act in defence of national security/community safety. The value of intelligence is in the eyes of its users, not its producers; intelligence is at its best when it is fully integrated with its users. These simple truths led to the development of intelligence methodologies and techniques as a function of support to specific instruments of national power such as diplomacy, law enforcement, and war fighting. The nature of today's threats has blurred the lines between traditional diplomatic, military, and law enforcement concerns, requiring all instruments of national power to work as a seamless network to defeat our adversaries. The rise of joint task forces, intelligence operations centres, and fusion centres has brought together professionals from across the law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities, offering them a unique opportunity to share tools and techniques in defence of the nation (Baginski, 2007).

However, in the face of these realities, and the need to collaborate effectively, intelligence and security agencies the world over have fallen into the trap of non-collaboration and indeed competition thereby attenuating security management and national security. In Nigeria, this challenge lives with us. Independent intelligence reports have shown lack of cooperation between military intelligence authorities and the state security service on one hand and between the intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies on the other. This apparent anomaly is responsible for the massive intelligence failures in Nigeria and the triumph of domestic terrorists attacks by Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. Added to this are proven cases of lack of patriotism, ethnic, religious and political sentiments by security agents. Above all, a major missing link in security management is the alienation of the community in information/intelligence gathering in ways that hurts the nation greatly. Be it the counter insurgency operations in the Niger Delta or Boko Haram in the North, community integration provide the most dependable approach in security management in Nigeria. It is therefore logical by public safety and national security standards for Nigerian intelligence community to witness the current level of massive intelligence failures against Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria where series of successful attacks have cast serious doubts on Nigeria's public safety capabilities.

In Nigeria, these internal threats manifest mostly in the form of communal conflicts, both inter and intra, ethnic, religious as well as finding expression in

militant activities. Typical examples of a security operation in Nigeria include the Joint Tasks Force (JTF) Operation RESTORE HOPE in Niger Delta, Op FLUSHOUT III in Rivers State and Op HARMONY IV in the Bakassi Peninsular. The mandate of these security operations was to reverse the state of insecurity in the affected areas.

Nigeria has had to grapple over the years with the challenge of inadequate intelligence sharing amongst its security and law enforcement agencies. The non effectiveness of the intelligence in support of security operations in Nigeria are attributed to inadequate human and technical intelligence capabilities. These are assumption based on public opinion of intelligence failure. The study seeks to confirm these hypotheses.

The intelligence component of the JTF Op RESTORE HOPE for instance is composed of a detachment of the Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps (NAIC), State Security Service (SSS) Task Force Group and intelligence element of the Nigerian Navy (NN) and Nigerian Air Force Task Force Groups. The JTF intelligence component would require collaborative efforts between the military intelligence and SSS Task Force Group.

Recent events in the Nigeria, which include; the Boko Haram saga and the recurrent Jos-Plateau sectarian crises among others have thrown up arguments on the level and quality of the intelligence support provided for national security. Within the military that plays a leading role in operations, there are three schools of thought amongst commanders. In the first school of thought are some commanders whose opinion is that intelligence as practised in Nigeria is not real time and therefore does not add value to operations. A second school of thought believes that intelligence management in Nigeria lacks analytical skills and is therefore unable to predict events correctly. The third school of thought like Clausewitz and Tolstoy believes that intelligence in operation are unreliable and therefore not needed. The arguments on the need for intelligence or lack of it when critically dissected are premised on the use of technology such as communication facilities, satellites, sensor equipment and computers that are essential input to the production of intelligence. In other words, it amplifies the fact that technology is not an end itself, but the means to process and pass intelligence in support of the commander and the mission (Ilogho, 2006).

Ralph Bennett (1996), in his study of intelligence and strategy, argues that at the operational level, intelligence may be easier to appreciate than at strategic level, but more difficult to use since it depends on many variables such as command and control, availability of military might and the commander's attitude. The significance is that there ought to be synergy in the conclusions

drawn from the most reasonable intelligence obtained between the intelligence staff and military commanders.

The lack of real time intelligence and lack of analytical skills to predict incident accurately before, during and after they occur as well as intelligence as a product being unreliable during operations, are some of the issue that have created doubt in the quality of intelligence available to military commanders. This has further created a dilemma between military commanders and the intelligence staff on the necessity to rely on intelligence as one of the determinants of success in operations (ibid). It is the need for the resolution of these arguments that has aroused this researcher's interest in the matter. Thus this study sets out to find out the issues associated with how intelligence has supported security operations in Nigeria with a view to ascertaining the prospects and challenges of intelligence support of security operations in an emerging country like Nigeria (Ilogho 2006).

## **1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

To conduct intelligence activities, the Federal Government has a variety of agencies such as the Department of State Service (DSS) also known as SSS. Others are; Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Intelligence Community (IC). These agencies have over time developed capacities to produce timely and accurate intelligence to confront issues that threaten national security. However, the proper employment and accurate designation of tasks for these intelligence agencies to support national security objectives has been a major challenge. In the same vein, the views of operatives that intelligence management in Nigeria is fraught with lack of analytical skills, and questionable real time intelligence which denigrates the value of intelligence product in security operations. These contending issues have therefore thrown up renewed interest in the analysis of intelligence support to security operations in Nigeria in recent years. This study therefore seeks to provide answers to such questions as; What is the level of intelligence support to security operations in Nigeria? How effective is this support? What are the intelligence lapses in security operations in Nigeria? What can be done to cover these lapses? Answers to these questions will provide useful insights into the management of intelligence support to security operations in Nigeria.

## **2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The main objective of the study is to evaluate how intelligence has supported operations in Nigeria. The specific objectives are to:

- a. Establish the relationship between intelligence support and the conduct of security operations in Nigeria.

- b. Evaluate how the intelligence has supported the conduct of security operations in Nigeria.
- c. Identify the issues and prospects of the intelligence in support of security operations in Nigeria.
- d. Proffer strategies to enhance intelligence support for security operations in Nigeria.

## **2.1 SCOPE OF THE STUDY**

The study covered only selected joint operations conducted in Niger Delta and Bakassi Peninsular over a period of 10years, that is, from 1999 to 2009. This period covered 10 years of uninterrupted democratic governance in the country.

## **2.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

- a. Is there a relationship between intelligence support and security operations in Nigeria?
- b. How has the intelligence supported the conduct of security operations in Nigeria?
- c. What are the issues and prospects of the intelligence in support of security operations in Nigeria?
- d. What strategies can be adopted to enhance intelligence support for operations in Nigeria?

## **3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The theoretical framework selected for this study is the structural functional theory. The theory focus on the assumption that the society is a single, interconnected system, each element of which performs a specific function, The analysis further explain activities in relation to the role they play in keeping a given system in a proper working order and thus maintain its equilibrium, in other words, every system is made up of subsystems or part which work for the maintenance of the system (Ujo, 2008).

According to Gabriel Almond "a system is comprehensive in the sense that it includes all the interactions-inputs as well as output" (Almond, 2001). According to Almond, functional approach to structures within the political system is therefore through their functions. These functions were classified into input and output. Although the theory provides a comprehensive analytical tool for an understanding of the role of institutions in a political system, it has been criticized over the years by various theorists. The theory has been

criticized for being unable to account for social change. The theory has been said to be teleological. In other words, it attempts to describe social institution solely through their effects and does not explain causes of these effects.

Despite these criticisms, the theory still has significant relevance to the understanding of the role, structure and functions of political institutions in political systems. The theory is relevant to this study by virtue of its theoretical construct that emphasis on the analysis of the functions of institutions. By identifying and understanding the functions of these institutions in a political system, it enables one to be able to understand the positive roles they play in the maintenance of social order and control. The theory will therefore often a better understanding of the role and function of the intelligence arm of the state, in providing relevant intelligence support to assist the state in taking informed decisions at both the strategic and operational levels with regards with regards to the need to undertake security operations in Nigeria (Almond, 2001).

#### **4. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

In this section of the work, the major variables in the study are conceptually explicated. These concepts are intelligence support and security operations. This section also examines the relationship between intelligence support and security operations and ends with a review of existing and relevant literature on the subject of intelligence support and security operations in Nigeria.

##### **4.1 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT**

Intelligence is a relative rather than absolute term used to describe the process of gathering, analyzing and making use of information (Jackson et al, 2004). Intelligence has many meanings and it is in the context in which the term is used that it can be understood. However, intelligence in this study is focused on issues related to national security such as defence and internal security. It is the information most often provided to decision makers to help guide future decision or actions (Gilbride et al, 2005). Examples of such actions are outright war and Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW) of which security operation is one?

In order to provide the necessary intelligence, nations establish and maintain their intelligence organizations. The structure of the intelligence organizations differ from one country to another, but generally consist of the domestic and foreign intelligence. In the case of Nigeria, the DSS and NIA are the domestic and foreign intelligence organization respectively. There is also the military component which has the DIA and the three Service intelligence organizations.

These are NIAC, the Directorate of Air intelligence (DIA) and the Directorate of Navy intelligence (DNI).

### *Source*

The role of intelligence in national security has increased in significance as a tool of state policy. Thus, Micheal Herman thinks that intelligence is a form of state power in its own right (Jackson, 2004). This concept of intelligence as a form of power is based on the definition of power by Lawrence Freedman. Freedman defined power as “the capacity to produce effects that are more advantageous than would have been otherwise been (Herman, 1996).” This concept has not captured the basic processes involved in intelligence production.

Conversely, John Ferris has a different view and posited that intelligence is “not a form of power but a means to guide its use, whether as combat multiple or by helping one to understand one’s environment and options. Thus, it relates to how to apply force or leverage and against whom. Furthermore, he believes that intelligence involved the collection and analysis of information which allows the use of resource in the most effective way possible against rivals who are doing the same. He therefore concluded that the knowledge (commonly referred to as intelligence) derived from the information collected is for the purpose of supporting an action, the concept dwelled more on the application and usage of intelligence. Though it captures some aspects of intelligence process, it cannot satisfy the requirement for this study (Ferris and Handel, 1995).”

Lowenthal (1999) on his own part defines intelligence as, “The process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed and provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safe guarding of these processes and this information by counter intelligence activities; and the carrying out operations as requested by lawful authorities.

The essential elements involved in the intelligence process are captured in the concept, which are collection and analysis involved in the processing of information. It is the analysis of raw information that leads to the finished product, which is intelligence. Therefore without analysis there cannot be intelligence. The term intelligence here also refers to the organization that is primarily involved in the chain of activities in the processing of Information. Beyond the organization level, intelligence is described in the concept as a profession that carries out certain activities such as intelligence activities. The tri-dimensional feature of this concept of intelligence provided a broad perspective in dealing with every aspect of intelligence as it relates to military

operations. The concise Oxford Dictionary defines support as “to give assistance” (Oxford University Press 1999). Assistance in this context implies input which would enhance expertise or capabilities. A synergy of these definitions would meet the requirement of this study. In this study, the research defines intelligence support as input resulting from information concerning domestic environment or areas of operations that has been collected, processed, analyzed and the safeguarding of the product and process which is provided to security policy makers to guide decision or actions in support of operations.

#### **4.2 SECURITY OPERATIONS**

According to John E Mroz (1991), security, “is the relative freedom from harmful threats, security itself implies an absolute condition. Accordingly, something is either secure or insecure” The nature of security defies pursuit of an agreed general definition. However; security is underscored by the need to protect a nation against threats such as espionage, sabotage and terrorism. It is not surprising that the ultimate pursuit of many nations is the search for stability, peace and which are achieved through security operations.

According to Akinda, security operations are all the activities, procedures, actions taken or involved in the protection of lives and properties and provision of a peaceful and stable environment for the daily conduct of lawful activities by individuals and groups within the community (Adebayo, 2008). This concept gave a general format of security operations. Furthermore, it captures the elements of proactive actions and procedures in pre-empting threats (proactive security operations) to internal security. However, it is silent on the specific type and activities to be taken in security operations particularly when a state of insecurity has been established. Hence, the concept would not satisfy the requirements of the study. In this study, the researcher defines security as those deliberate operations such as intelligence operations and cordon and search operation designed to detect, and counter all forms of threats capable of creating insecurity within a section or parts of a country in order that there is peaceful environment conducive for stable governance.

#### **4.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AND SECURITY OPERATIONS**

Intelligence support is critical to operations success. Intelligence support entails that extensive collection processing, and analytical capabilities are fused together in the entire intelligence process which would to ensure accurate and timely dissemination of intelligence. Intelligence support thus ensures that intelligence requirement is met through the visualization of the operational area as well

as providing knowledge of the current disposition and activities of an adversary security operation on the other hand help in identifying and defeating imminent threats within the area of operations through counter measures.

Intelligence support and security operations feed each other. This is because all operation have intelligence component in that it also reports information. Effective security operations produce information, which generates more intelligence. Similarly, ineffective or inaccurate intelligence produce ineffective security operations which produce opposite results. For instance, if intelligence is not provided on the location, strength and capabilities of an adversary, such as experienced in the Niger Delta, the success of the operation may be at higher cost to both human and equipment. Therefore, intelligence support and security operations have a mutual but cause and effect relationship.

#### **4.4 MANAGEMENT EVALUATION AND CONSTRAINTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF SECURITY OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA**

This would find out how the intelligence supported security operation in Nigeria. Furthermore, it identifies the issues and prospects of the intelligence in effectively supporting security operations in Nigeria. This is achieved by examining the management and operations of the Nigeria IC and also evaluating the intelligence input in Ops RESTORE HOPE and HARMONY IV as models.

The national security Act (CAP 278)No 19 of 1986 created three separate intelligence outfits, namely the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and the Department of State Security Service (DSS) to take charge of defence related intelligence, external intelligence and internal security respectively, (National security Agency Act No of 19 of 5 1986). The three bodies now make up the Nigeria intelligence community. The statutory responsibilities of these agencies are follows:

- a. **Defence Intelligence Agency.** The Defence Intelligence Agency has responsibility for defence related intelligence within and outside Nigeria. The Agency's main pre-occupation is the protection and preservation of all military matters concerning the security of Nigeria. The Agency also coordinates the intelligence activities of the Intelligence Directorates of the Armed Services. Military intelligence (DMI), Naval Intelligence (DNI) and Air Force Intelligence (DAI), (National security Agency Act No of 19 of 5 1986).
- b. **Department of State Security Services.** The Department of State Security Service is wholly responsible for internal security matters. The outfit

functions include the protection and preservation of all non-military classified matters concerning internal security (Okeke, 2005).

- c. **National Intelligence Agency.** The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) is responsible for the general maintenance of the security of Nigeria outside Nigeria concerning matters that are not related to military issues. However, military related intelligence stumbled upon are passed to DIA. The Agency also plays a very important role in the determination of external threats as well as opportunities.
- d. **National Security Adviser.** The National Security Adviser (NSA) is charge with the coordination and management functions of the intelligence community. The NSA has the status and enjoys the privileges of a Federal Minister. He advises the president on national security and directs the IC on policies approved by the president. He is a member of the National Security Council (Okeke, 2005) on intelligence issues. On, under his direct, several interagency meeting take place to ensure collaboration on serious threats to national security. Three of such meetings are the weekly Intelligence Community Committee (ICC) monthly Joint Intelligence Board and General Security Appraisal Meetings.

More importantly, the NSA chairs and directs the work of interagency groups which offers the advantage of applying procedures through which inputs on security threats requiring response are analysed and converted into useful outputs. Thus, the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) is responsible for the coordination of actions and also performs management responsibilities on issues of intelligence and security affecting the country. A major constraint in the management of intelligence is in structure. The various agencies in the IC and the intelligence components of the law enforcement agencies are part of structures of other separate executive departments. This arrangement though allows the NSA to manage the IC, it however, does not make the office have authority over all the law enforcement agencies and even the entities of the IC for which he has responsibility for coordinating and integrating.

The inability of the ONSA to have day to day direct control of both IC allows each to operate according to their individual doctrine or policy. This observed lapses was replicated by the agencies in *ad hoc* arrangement such as in the JTF Op RESTORE HOPE. There are obvious a deficiency in the present structure does not make provision for central intelligence facilities and training institution. Central intelligence facilities and training institutions would foster better understanding amongst the ICA and thus maker they operate optimally in joint operations.

#### **4.5 OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS RESTORE HOPE AND HARMONY IV**

The JTF Op RESTORE HOPE was set up in August 2003 and the Area of Responsibility as defined by the operational directives from the Defence Headquarters (DHQ), comprised the entire Niger Delta region (Ilogho, 2006). However, this is less River State which is now under the command of Op FLUSHOUT 111 the JTF was tasked primarily to arrest the criminal activities of the militants groups in the Niger Delta, restore law and order as well as ensure a secure and enabling environment for social and economic activities of the citizens and that of the oil industries. The overall objective was to achieve long-term peace settlement and reinstate political and socio-economic stability in the Niger Delta (Ilogho, 2006). Similarly, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) deployed troops to the Bakassi Peninsula under the command of Op HARMONY IV.

Nigeria's ill defined international border particularly that with Cameroun was the most agitated. The area affected is the oil rich creeks in the southernmost part of the border. Nigerians living along the creek were frequently subjected to humiliating treatment. They were forced to pay tax to Cameroun and discard trading in naira and at times detained. The climax was the killing of an officer and five soldiers of the Nigerian Army in may 1983 (Imobhige, 2003).

Following the persistent humiliating treatment of Nigerians, the Federal Government deployed troops to the Bakassi Peninsula. The operation code named Op HARMONY IV was mandated to re-establish authority in the area while ensuring that the security of lives and properties of Nigerians were guaranteed (Mohammed, 2010). The Op HARMONY IV was joint operation involving the NA, NN, and NAF. Consequently, security operations were conducted by 2 JTFs to reverse the state of insecurity.

The intelligence support to the operations was provided by the intelligence component of the JTF. This comprised of the NAIC intelligence Detachment, SSS Task Force Group and the intelligence elements of the Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Air Force Groups.

#### **4.6 INTELLIGENCE INPUT TO OPERATIONS RESTORE HOPE AND HARMONY**

The application of intelligence in support of these security operations is undoubtedly critical to their successes. In complex situations such as in difficult terrains, it is a daunting task to obtain intelligence needed to drive the operations. The Niger Delta creeks and canals make accessing information difficult (Ebulue, 2007). Given the nature of the terrain, the intelligence would rely on human

intelligence (HUMINT) sources. Despite the nature of the difficult terrain in the Niger Delta, the intelligence provided accurate intelligence to the JTF Op RESTORE HOPE. The intelligence component of the JTF on 29 July 2006 indicated possible threats to the Nigeria Agip Oil Company (NAOC) facility Brass, in Bayelsa state on account its foreign workers (Department of State Security Services Report, 2007). Intelligence was given to the JTF with certainty.

In spite of the accurate intelligence provided, no adequate fortification was made until the facility was attacked resulting in the abduction of three Italians and a Lebanese (Department of State Security Services Report, 2007). Similarly, the intelligence revealed that Gbaramatu kingdom in Delta State harbour the armoury of most militant groups in the Niger Delta (Ilogho, 2008). It was further confirmed by the intelligence that hostage taking in Delta and destruction of oil facilities were perpetrated from militant bases in Gbaramatu. The provision of this accurate intelligence facilitated the deployment of troops to Okorenkoko in Gbaramatu kingdom and environment in order to checkmate activities of militant groups and also sustain peace in the Niger Delta (Ilogho, 2008).

The intelligence support of the JTF Op RESTORE HOPE recorded some successes in spite of the difficult terrain of Niger Delta. The intelligence input enabled the commander to concentrate his troops where they were needed most in the Gbaramatu kingdom. This led to relative peace being attained. However, the non use of the intelligence provided to JTF which led to the attack on the NAOC oil facility and subsequent abduction of the expatriates, underscored the importance of the application of intelligence in guiding decision or actions in security operations.

The terrain in the Bakassi Peninsula is largely swampy with which troops of Op HARMONY IV were deployed along the creeks (Imobigbe, 2003). The challenge posed by the terrain is similar to that experienced by JTF Op RESTORE HOPE. However, according to Mohammed, the intelligence was unable to provide the JTF Op HARMONY with the required intelligence on the disposition and strength of the Cameroon force (Mohammed, 2005).

#### **4.7 CONSTRAINTS OF INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATIONS**

The intelligence recorded some successes as stated earlier stated on the conduct of Op RESTORE HOPE. However, it was constraint to effectively support the operations. A major constraint identified was the difficult swamps and creeks in the area of operations. The difficulty in the terrain corresponded to difficulty in accessing information most times (Ebulue, 2007). To mitigate the effect of

this limitation on the intelligence gathering efforts, it presupposes intelligence operators and agents were too well dispersed to collect information within the AOR. This has been difficult because of considerable demand in manpower. In the JTF Op RESTORE HOPE the NAIC Detachment was grossly inadequate for it to cope with the main task of intelligence gathering (Ebulue, 2007). Closely related, is the employment of technical intelligence collection capabilities in Op RESTORE HOPE and Op HARMONY IV.

The difficult terrain of the creeks and swamps made reliance on HUMINT source as the main method of gathering intelligence this was due to absence of technical intelligence collection systems. Technical intelligence collection system is the most attractive option that could have supplemented HUMINT source in the circumstance. However, technical intelligence collection systems such as Unarmed Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and remote sensor are very expensive, (Lowenthal, 2000). Hence it would require deliberate planning and appropriation of funds to procure them.

According to Ilogho, most of the areas of deployment are not linked by communication particularly in the creeks; except at shell petroleum Development Company (SPDC) locations where troops have access to SPDC telephone facilities (Ilogho, 2008). There are also no alternative secured means of passing sensitive information. This was corroborated by Ebulue. He affirmed that timely intelligence dissemination was hampered by several factors such as the absence of cryptographic and ICT facilities at the HQ Op RESTORE HOPE (Ebulue, 2007). This hampered the dissemination of classified messages through radio communication and ICT facilities respectively.

#### **4.8 EVALUATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT OPERATIONS**

The intelligence component recorded some successes in Op RESTORE HOPE. It provided accurate intelligence which led to the locating and successful destruction of militant arms caches in the Niger Delta with minimal collateral damage. Despite some of the successes recorded by the JTF Op RESTORE HOPE, Vigo was of the view that it had a country view. According to him, the intelligence effort did not impact much on the overall operations as their actions were mainly reactive (Vigo, 2006).

He further stated that the few successes achieved were largely due to luck and could not be attributed to the intelligence as they could not since they could not provide real time intelligence to support the operations. He was of the view that the provision of real time intelligence would have placed the JTF some steps ahead of the militants. This was corroborated by Mohammed

affirmed that the intelligence component of the joint operations Task Force could not provide real time intelligence during the operations (Mohammed, 2010).

This work is an important contribution to the role of intelligence in supporting military and civil operations, counter insurgency and peace support operations in Nigeria none of these works directly link intelligence support to security operations in Nigeria. This study therefore, seeks to fill that void consequently the study will focus on intelligence support and security operations in Nigeria.

## **5. RESEACH METHODOLOGY**

### ***5.1 Sample Population***

The sample size for this study was fifty (50) senior officers and who were also within the age group 25 years and above. The sample population was drawn from three securities organisations using the cluster sampling technique, twenty three (23) respondents were chosen from each cluster. These clusters include:

1. The Nigeria Police Force Head Quarters,
2. The Nigeria Defence Head Quarters,
3. The Nigeria State Security Services.

### ***5.2 Sample Size Technique***

The three securities organisations were chosen using the cluster sampling technique. The participants were divides into three groups called clusters. It is the selection of the group of study units instead of the selection of study unit individually; clusters are often intelligence support and security operations in Nigerian Issues and prospect.

Also, the quota sampling method was also used. By this conditionality quota sampling ensures that a certain number of sample unit from different categories with specific characteristic appears in the sample so that all these characteristics are represented (e.g., age, sex, status and rank and so on) of the respondents must be typical or representative of the area or the group being studied.

Our next of action was the use of sample random sampling technique to select our sample population. This procedure which ensures that every unit in the study area has an equal chance (that is equi-probability) of being included in the sample and given that the choosing of one unit for the sample does not produce the chance or any other unit being chosen was employed for the study.

### ***5.3 Method of Data Collection***

In this study, the researcher chose to use both secondary and primary data collection method. The secondary and primary data collection consisted of

information obtained from textbooks, journals, seminar paper, research reports, newspapers, publications and internet browsing.

**Primary Sources of Data:** Primary data were sourced unstructured interviews, questionnaire and discussions with senior military officers and civilian intelligence practitioners. Those interviewed were Brig Gen KA Vigo, former Commander Op HAKURI and Army Task Force Group of the JTF Op RESTORE HOPE and Mr Toyin Akanle, former Director of State Security Service, Rivers State. Others interviewed include Col UA Mohammed, former Commanding Officer of 130 Battalion of OP HARMONY IV in Bakassi Peninsular and Lt Cols N Ebulue and Ashinze, both of whom at different times were officers commanding the NAIC Detachment of JTF Op RESTORE HOPE in Warri.

**Secondary Sources of Data:** The secondary data were mainly sourced from books, magazines, seminar papers, published and unpublished works as well as the internet. Other publications included those of the National Defence College, the libraries of the Institute of Security Studies, Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution and Defence Intelligence Agency all in Abuja.

**Statistical tool of Data Analysis:** The analyses of data collected through the questionnaires were tabulated and their percentage (S) (%) generated using the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS, version 18). In reaching conclusion, the use of table and percentage (%) are primarily to show the trend of respondents in the questionnaire and also to be able to ascertain why it should be so.

Secondly, ANOVA and one-way t-test statistic was used to test relationship or association between categorical variables. It is a statistical method used generally when one wishes to test or evaluate frequencies obtained from samples, to see if they vary significantly from those which would be expected by chance alone.

**Method of Data Presentation:** The data were presented in a descriptive form, leading to conclusion and recommendations.

## 6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The major limitation of this study is the difficulty in accessing classified information and documents. Another limitation emanated from the unique nature of intelligence in that it is conducted under secrecy and people interviewed were not prepared to open up on their roles or on what really happened. All observed limitations were therefore mitigated sufficiently to guarantee the credibility of the research.


## 7. RESULTS

Questionnaires were administered to 70 respondents of which 50 of them were retrieved. Table 1 shows the socio-demographic characteristic of the respondents.

A higher proportion of the respondents 32 (64.0%) were within the 31-35 year age group and the mean age of respondents was 2.350 (SD=.90824). A higher proportion of the respondents 23 (46.0%) claimed to be civilians.

**Table 1 Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents**

Variables	Frequency (n=200)	Percentage (%)
Age		
20-25	3	6.0
26-30	2	4.0
31-35	32	64.0
36-40	8	16.0
41 and above	5	10.0
Total	50	100
Occupation		
Police	11	22.0
Military	16	32.0
Civilian	23	46.0
Total	50	100



*Fig. 1: Column chart distribution for gender*

Data from Figure 2 shows that 42 (84.0%) of the respondents were male, while 8 (16.0%) were female.

**Reliability Statistics**

The reliability estimate for this study is:

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.253	15

**Table 2 One sample t-test analysis of variables on the intelligence support to security operations on the national security**

Variables	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
item1	15	2.0650	.90824	53.675	85	.000
item2	15	1.3350	.47317	82.218	85	.000
item3	15	2.4293	1.39708	49.377	85	.000
item4	15	2.0450	1.09497	45.857	85	.000
item5	15	2.7350	.97443	48.582	85	.000
item6	15	2.2350	1.81833	8.233	85	.000
item7	15	2.7953	.96229	31.260	45	.000
item8	15	2.7419	1.01827	22.170	45	.000
Item9	15	2.7432	.99742	31.390	45	.000
item10	15	2.7572	.98773	33.507	45	.000
item11	15	2.7947	.96828	29.314	45	.000
item12	15	2.7867	.97338	46.716	45	.000
item13	15	2.6429	1.13504	37.149	45	.000
item14	15	2.7867	.97338	36.238	45	.000
item15	15	2.6429	1.13504	40.219	45	.000

**Key:**

- Item 1: The results in table 1 above revealed that respondents who participated in this study have undergone JTF, Anti-bomb Squad operations.
- Item 2: Shows that the operations to the best of their knowledge is consider as being normal.
- Item 3: Poor working condition/lack of equipments in the intelligence agencies can weaken Nigeria's security operation.
- Item 4: Showed a significant difference in the respondents' view that conflicting reports in the intelligence operations is what brings about an intelligence failure in the country.
- Item 5: Shows that poor working equipment encourages intelligence failure.
- Item 6: Nigerians should cooperate with the police for an effective performance by the police.
- Item 7: It was claimed that although their operations was a success but that it can be improved upon if the components of intelligence support can have a better coordination.
- Item 8: Partnership with the intelligence agencies will enhance security operations in the country.
- Item 9: It is agreed that secrecy in the intelligence operation undermine the insurgent's adversaries in the system of intelligence support and security operations in Nigeria.

The data in Table 3 highlighted mixed result. Three of the independent variables (age, gender, Occupation) showed a significant difference in the respondents' view that conflicting reports in the intelligence operations is what brings about an intelligence failure in the country.

To answer the research questions the results in Table 3 revealed that respondents who participated in this study have undergone JTF, Anti-bomb Squad operations. It was claimed that although their operations was a success but that it can be improve upon if the components of intelligence support can have a better

coordination. The table also revealed that there is a positive association between intelligence support and good security conducts in Nigeria, and as such should cooperate for an effective performance of security operations in the country. It is agreed that secrecy in the intelligence operation undermine the insurgent’s adversaries in the system of intelligence support and security operations in Nigeria.

**Table 3 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of respondents’ demographic information**

Demographic Information of Respondents		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Age	Between Groups	2.542	2	.574	.905	.043
	Within Groups	52.011	42	.634		
	Total	53.733	45			
Gender	Between Groups	.270	3	.090	1.200	.031
	Within Groups	6.160	42	.075		
	Total	6.430	45			
Occupation	Between Groups	6.363	2	2.121	.607	.031
	Total	125.023	45			

To answer the research questions 1, 2, and 3, the results in Table 1 revealed that the intelligence agencies supporting operations have the capacity to conduct successful intelligence operation if the precipitating factors such as poor/lack of equipment in the intelligence system can be improved on. As a result of this, it has lead to high failure rate in the country intelligence which has lead to threat to the Nation security. It is strongly agree that the intelligence operation needs a reform to help stop intelligence failure in the country.

**8. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS**

**8.1 Summary**

This work is centered on an in-depth examination and analysis of the issues and prospect of intelligence support and security operations in Nigeria.

It also describes intelligence and operational support and advancement, not only as operations of positive change, but also as major forces contributing to the occurrence of intelligence support as the result of their ability to diminish the operations. The operations in the company are much stronger than has ever been known in the past due to the effect of technological and ICT advancement. The research work also identifies the different ills associated with intelligence support and security operations and their impact on the individual operational level. The study goes further to stress the need and ways to provide the

country with adequate support and security control or management so as to fend off all manner of crime which, in the end, will have catastrophic consequences for our national security.

## **8.2 Conclusion**

The broad objective of the study was to evaluate how intelligence could support security operations in Nigeria. The study established that intelligence support was necessary for all operations. These include military, counter insurgency, PSO and security operations. The study examined the various ways intelligence was employed in JTF Ops RESTORE HOPE and HARMONY IV.

The study also revealed that there was appreciable utilization of intelligence in support of security operations in Nigeria. However, the effectiveness of the intelligence was constrained by a number of factors. These include the lack of technological platform and the low level of ICT, amongst others.

Similarly, the absence of an integrated ICT and the over-dependence on the HUMINT source has been a source of concern. As an all source intelligence producing organization, the ICT in Nigeria ought to have an up-to-date technology platform. The lack of such a facility has made real time intelligence unattainable while the analytical skills of personnel were also affected.

The intelligence gathering efforts were identified to be largely based on HUMINT sources. This was apparently due to the absence of a technical intelligence collections system. The ICT in Nigeria, as all source intelligence producing agency, has yet to attain the desired level of intelligence. The current status of intelligence has attracted diverse comments that are germane to their roles. The ability of intelligence to effectively support security operations, according to some commanders, was adversely affected by its inability to provide real intelligence as well as its lack of analytical skills.

The prospect of intelligence effectively supporting security operations would be dependent on its successfully enhancing intelligence collection and manpower capabilities. It would be desirable that the ICT come up with a policy or doctrine that would encourage common intelligence practice that would engender synergy of effort amongst the different section of the ICT in joint operations.

The challenges affecting the efficacy of the intelligence were the lack of real time intelligence, lack of analytical skills and absence of ICT. Other challenges are the lack of adequate funding, non-synergy in intelligence efforts and inadequate manpower. Strategies were proffered accordingly.

Consequently, in order for intelligence to effectively support security operations, the study found that the government needed to adopt strategies

that would ensure the provision of real time intelligence and adequate analytical skills while the necessary ICT facilities, integrated communication system and technical intelligence collection systems are to be put in place. This would require a systematic approach of gradual procurement of the necessary intelligence infrastructure through deliberate and dedicated budgetary allocation over a period of time.

### **8.3 Recommendations**

It is recommended that:

- a. The FG should procure technical intelligence collection equipment system through a phased programme for the IC before 2015.
- b. The training of poor and untrained manpower should be organized by ONSA through a phased training programme in all IC.
- c. The ONSA should formulate and propose a policy to the FG that would put in place a common intelligence doctrine for the IC.
- d. The FG should upwardly review the funds allocated for intelligence activities undertaken by the IC.

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## Identity Politics: The Pathway to Growing Extremism

*Major General A.N.M. Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (retd.)\**

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Identity matters a lot in every aspect of what we do and why we do. What differs substantially is the level of perception and the magnitude of awareness of the influence of identity in our life. Though this position is debated at least to the people who have arbitrarily devised ways to prove that they operate beyond a narrow attribution of cultural or normative construct and consider identity as a feeble construct, it is much clear, hence, that their diagnosis of identity induced socio-political junctures must make

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An experienced peace keeper, he has taught the subject as a faculty member and has experience in the field. He was a member and head of the country contingent to UNTAC in Cambodia. He also has the distinction of heading the post election UN Mission in Cambodia.

General Munir now the President and CEO of the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), a leading think tank in South Asia.

He is a founding member of the consortium Non-traditional Security-Asia (NTS-Asia) based at NTU, Singapore. He sits on the board of Governors of Council for Asian Transnational Threats Research (CATR). He is a member of the International Military Advisers Council (IMAC) on Climate Change and the Global Futures Forum (GFF). He is also an advisor on climate change and energy security at the G-20 consultative Process.

He is a frequent speaker on international security and policy issues in the international conference and lecture circuit. He has spoken at conferences/events at UN, EU, ARF, NATO, Shangri-La Dialogue, ASPEN World Security Conference, Consultations on the future of Afghanistan, Climate Summit-COP15, IISS, RUSI etc. He is consulted by different governments, international organisations on security issues.

He was commissioned from the Pakistan Military Academy and has received advanced training from USA, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Austria, former Yugoslavia, Turkey, China etc. He is a graduate of the National University of Bangladesh, National Defence College, Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College and Legal Studies School of the US Naval War College.

false reputation of pragmatic importance, though can be academically striking, degenerating a deep rooted identity crisis. Someone struggling to show that he himself is accorded the thing he claims from the society because of what he is as an entity of identity, and solution coming from the opposite direction objecting that since he is claiming on the basis of identity, he should be denied of his social rights further, creates another form of crisis known as legitimacy of ownership crisis for the identity groups.

The influence of globalization, rapid technological growth, reorientation of politics in the line of ideological principles, paralyzed and failing democracies in the developing world and the threat perception and projection based on so called clash of civilization along with the poor economic condition, unemployment and scarcities and vulnerabilities induced from climatic change are posing significant threats to identity and even further proving grounds for newer identity group formation and the externalization of others. The consequent diminution in the level of tolerance and increase in the identity awareness within and outside of cultural characteristics marked by the spread of discriminatory practices induced from globalization and economic growth and so called modernization affecting traditional cultures have made the acceptance and popularity of violent ideas and activities among the growing young people in the developing world possible. Political parties and terrorist organizations clearly identified with religions are opting for greater share making them legitimate stakeholder within the society.

In reaction to all those developments, states are also becoming far more assertive and extreme in terms of maintaining law and order and there is a growth of confrontational politics among the mainstream political parties and the government itself. Far right movements and religious parties are taking the benefits exploiting the condition, where marginalized and deprived community remains silent no longer taking the path of extremism to demand and attain their rights and shares within the community. In short, the identity politics has changed over time and the change is quicker in the post 9/11 world. This paper is intended to show some of the outcomes of my researches on the changing dynamics of extremism in South Asia in the context of changing socio political structures affecting identity security.

## **2. IDENTITY POLITICS IN A CHANGING WORLD**

The identity politics by and large involves a particular form of awareness of oneself as a member of a distinct group often oppressed or deprived of what he claims as his legitimate rights and more importantly the anger associated with that awareness that conform him within that distinct identity group fighting for their rights and demands. Identity politics are political arguments that focus

upon the self interest and perspectives of self-identified social groups and ways in which people's politics may be shaped by aspects of their identity through race, class, religion, sexual orientation or traditional dominance. Not all members of any given group are necessarily involved in identity politics. What is crucial about the "identity" of identity politics appears to be the experience of the subject, especially his or her experience of oppression and the possibility of a shared and more authentic or self-determined alternative. Thus identity politics rests on unifying claims about the meaning of politically laden experiences to diverse individuals.<sup>1</sup>

On usual terms identity politics are driven by the objectives of obtaining socio-political status or rights while to prevent oppression and discrimination or on the very other hand to justify social belongings and benefits. In the changing face of identity politics, there are two dimensions that are prevalent within the society. Firstly, it involves what I call an egalitarian identity politics that serves as a means to certain socio-political interests and cultural self-rule. The other one is more of preservationist identity politics being a form attributive practice for politico-economic objectives.

The egalitarian identity is the formation of social entities based on identity primacy in order to legitimize their claims and position in the society. Their normative position rather than their role is being used to form the scope of their demands and to justify their stronghold to fight for their demands. It helps associated people to be united and to stay motivated and at the same time to maintain a clear distinction between the "us" and "them" discourse". On the other hand, preservationist identity politics is to do much more to define "them" rather than "us". They attribute certain cultural and ideological distinctions, mostly to indicate the potential contravention in the society. The objective of such politics is to marginalize and separate the very identity group from the people so as to reduce their popularity within their own populace and weaken their acceptability and legitimacy to the exterior actors and populations.

In the context of identity's growing role in our politico-economic participation and interaction, it is much relevant to bring the discussion of Manuel Castells on identity formation and identity politics. Castells understands "identity, as it refers to social actors," as "the process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or related set of cultural attributes, that is/are given priority over other sources of meaning."<sup>2</sup> Unlike "roles" (e.g., worker, mother), which are defined by "norms structured by the institutions and organizations of

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<sup>1</sup> H. Noonan, 2009, "Identity," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/identity/>

<sup>2</sup> M. Castells, 1997. *The Power of Identity*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, p.6.

society," identities (e.g., gay, Latino, feminist) "are sources of meaning for the actors themselves, and by themselves, constructed through a process of individuation."<sup>3</sup> Identities and roles can coincide, he points out, but "in simple terms, identities organize the meaning while roles organize the functions" of individuals in society. What is important here is that identity primarily gives meaning to the social actors at the same time this meaning intensify their roles and extremism therefore is a very probable outcome of identity construction.

Castells conceptually distinguishes three forms and origins of identity building. Legitimizing identity is "introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their domination vis-à-vis social actors." An example is the identity of citizen confined to political actions within the limits of established state power. Resistance identity is "generated by those actors that are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society." Examples include religious fundamentalism and queer culture enclaves that involve the "exclusion of the excluders by the excluded." Castells believes this "may be the most important type of identity-building in our society." Finally, although rare, project identity formation occurs "when social actors, on the basis of whichever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seek the transformation of overall social structure."<sup>4</sup> Castells gives the example of feminists who move beyond the defensive stance of women's identity and women's rights to "challenge patriarchalism, thus the patriarchal family, thus the entire structure of production, reproduction, sexuality, and personality on which societies have been historically based."<sup>5</sup>

The political analysis should focus more on "problematic of identity" rather than about "identity" itself as discussed by Robert Bailey. Problematic of identity is "the ongoing dialogue between the social constructions of identity" always takes place in a context marked by power relationships."<sup>6</sup> Since the forms of identity, both as outlined by me and by Manuel Castells and the objectives championed by those groups have both ideological meaning and functional

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p.7.

<sup>4</sup> R.E. DeLeon, "Urban Regimes and Identity Politics: Some Theoretical Bridges," retrieved from <http://bss.sfsu.edu/naff/Diversity/DeLeon%20Draft%20Chapter%20Identity%20and%20Regime.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> M. Castells, 1997. Op cit, p.9.

<sup>6</sup> R.W. Bailey, 1999. *Gay Politics, Urban Politics: Identity and Economics in the Urban Setting*. New York: Columbia University Press.

gravity, identity politics is likely to create a two way extremist manifestation: from identity groups themselves and from the stakeholders who are frightened by the identity groups growth and power. State sponsor terrorism is an appropriate example of such politics.

What is new here is the diminution in the level of tolerance and increase in the identity awareness within and outside of cultural characteristics marked by the spread of discriminatory practices induced from globalization and economic growth such as unemployment, inequality, and so called modernization affecting traditional cultures and civilizational or cultural clash orientation in the psychological preoccupation and politico-economic practices in the society. The point of divergence of modern society with identity politics is that Identity politics is illiberal, that is, it is particularist<sup>7</sup> in the gradually grooming pluralistic societies even in the developing world. Though it can create confusion with the interest groups but identity groups focus more on resistance unlike interest groups which deal with persuasion. Therefore, unlike any other group formation, identity politics is the most likely to fuel extremism to a violent scale.

Now, who are getting the benefit out of identity politics is a fundamental problem. The intent of the identity politics in this changed world, what I call the interest regime of the identity politics, is manifold with multiple dividing lines and with incompatible objectives. On the egalitarian identity politics, the preservationist religion has become an egalitarian religionism. In the post 9/11 identity politics, religion has become a major factor in defining the course of identity based group formation and mobilization. Political parties and terrorist organizations clearly identified with religions are opting for greater share making them legitimate stakeholder within the society. On the other hand, secular stakeholders are in resistance to exclude right wingers or Islamists from the mainstream politics and alienate them from the society. Religious leaders, secular authorities and even the national government are taking the benefit of identity politics; unlike the past where only identity groups have the major benefits.

Ethnic groups' struggle for autonomy remain still strong and in addition conflict over scarce resource, climate induced vulnerabilities, socio-economic problems are changing the nature of ethnic conflicts from politics to religion, resource, climate change or marginalization and deprivation. The stake of the modern capitalists in the identity politics is not less notable including marker

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<sup>7</sup> Stanley Fish, 2008, February 17. "When 'Identity Politics' Is Rational," *the New York Times the opinion pages*. Retrieved from <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/when-identity-politics-is-rational/>

benefit from culture or tradition induced demand and consumption, exploitation of class struggle and using a similar stage to obtain their objectives as interest groups. Identity politics on the preservationist part brings the benefit of societal or power stability in favor of the existing status quo. The state extremism, indiscriminate actions against particular identity groups such as war on terror and anti-Islamic radicalization into the mainstream politics and the growth of far rights are the inadvertent outcomes of the preservationist identity politics. For international community, it is about systemic stability and the division of nations into the lines of civilizational clash identities is helping to operate the world *modus operandi*.

In the discussion over new trends in the political extremism, I will give details of the newly drawing lines of extremism within the discourse of identity politics and will give some examples particularly from South Asian context.

### **3. CHANGES IN THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL STRUCTURES AND THREAT TO IDENTITY SECURITY**

With the changes in the socio-economic and political structures, identity politics gets newer dimensions that are threatening identity security substantially. Firstly, globalization along with growing cultural awareness and differentiation, information and communication technology, and social network is the most striking factor in affecting identity security leading to formation and socialization of identity politics in South Asia. The major forces of globalization that are affecting identity politics include cultural awareness of distinctiveness, indiscriminate modernization of traditional culture, secularization vs. indigenization of political culture, transnationalism and regionalism, economic marginalization, immigration and flow of arms and drugs, cyber crimes and external interference with the regional and national politics such as of war on terror on Pakistan and so on.

From a socio-cultural perspective, globalization exercises a permeating effect on building the relationships between and among various locales. Places become 'closer' to each other as time and space tend to compress due to the advances of technology and mass media: the most distanced places are easy to access, and the world seems smaller. In this sense, it is the leading factor contributing to the de-centering and dislocation of identities. Due to the spread of mass communication and exacerbating pace of development of relationships in the various spheres of life, as an individual becomes more and more involved in the process of increasing 'mutuality' of the world and finds himself submerged in a great number of various dialogues and debates, he is exposed to the widest variety of opinions and viewpoints, often contradictory and hardly reconcilable. This has a direct impact on his identity in the form

of multiple sources of pervasive influence; it becomes more complicated to stick to one or several distinctive identities since in order to do so it is necessary for an individual to have a reference group, which confirms and buttresses his identity. With the increase in the number of such groups originating from various cultural backgrounds, carrying various values and articulating various norms, possessing different abilities concerning de-coding the messages one is trying to convey as constitutive part of his/her identity, identity becomes more vulnerable to the influence of the external forces and more difficult to affirm. In other words, not only the relationship between people and happenings transform, but the identities of people also undergo dramatic changes.

What globalization had definitely contributed to was the erosion of the 'master identities' such as, for example, citizenship in the abstract meaning of membership in the territorially defined and state-governed society, and its replacement by an identity based on ethnicity, race, local community, language, and other 'local' and culturally concrete forms. In other words, the trends towards unification that were exacerbating during the past decades in turn provoked the appreciation of the role and importance of the opposing trend — towards the specific and the local.<sup>8</sup> "Deterritorializing" character of globalization is accused of diminishing the significance of locality in cultural experience. That is in turn helping to emerge reactive identity politics socializing rigidity of cultures and identities at the institutional level, which is in contradiction with their inherent fluidity & instability attuned to the flow of globalization.

Secondly, governmental policies in South Asian countries particularly in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, have accentuated the extremist trend in all these states. Governments, in these countries, whether civil or military, have used the religion and ethnic card, in order to prolong and strengthen their rule, further strengthening the fundamentalists and extremists in the society.<sup>9</sup> Many of the ruling parties are known to have links with the extremist elements and have covertly supported them, as well as used them to create violence for conducting manipulative politics. Each South Asian state manifests the impact of mal-governance in one way or another.

Thirdly, Islamization of politics particularly in Pakistan and Bangladesh has crucial effect in the growth of extremism in South Asia. Pakistan, during the Zia regime, in the period 1977 to 1988 was under his Islamization policies. These tendencies were further developed in the decade of 1990s, when a historically

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<sup>8</sup> M. Castells, 2006. "Globalisation and identity A comparative perspective, transfer". Retrieved from [http://www.osi.hu/nsp/program\\_uk/yorkconf/papers2001/GlobalizationandIdentity.htm](http://www.osi.hu/nsp/program_uk/yorkconf/papers2001/GlobalizationandIdentity.htm)

<sup>9</sup> S. Nasir, 2004, October. "Rise of Extremism in South Asia," IPRI PAPER 7, Islamabad: Asia Printers. Retrieved from <http://ipripak.org/papers/riseofextremism.shtml>

unprecedented growth in poverty combined with an undermining of democratic institutions. Bangladesh is also witnessing the consequences of the Gen. Ziaur Rahman's politicization of religion, which eventually led to the surfacing of the Jamat-i-Islami. Religion as a political weapon is becoming more and more influential in politics as well as in society. Similar trends are visible in Sri Lanka and Nepal, where government policies instead of dealing with the lack of human security have used the deprived class, using religion and ethnic identities to consolidate their hold and same card is used by the opponent political forces.<sup>10</sup>

Fourthly, and most importantly insecurities from the deteriorating economic condition cause a major threat to identity security and increase the potential of extremism in both ethnic and politico-economic dimension. Poor economic growth in the region, led to the problems of mass unemployment, hunger and malnutrition, health problems and income inequality all of which are growing and alongside the increase in population growth. The key human development indicators show a dismal picture of the region. South Asia's share in world's adult population in year 2001 was 22 per cent, while its share in world's adult illiteracy by year 2000 was 50 per cent. The region is among the most illiterate regions with over 614 million illiterate adults, and also most malnourished with around 50 per cent of the region's children under the age of 5 years are malnourished. During the period of 1990-2001, 32.2 per cent of the total population of the region lives under poverty line with less than \$1 a day.<sup>11</sup> The multi-dimensional profile of poverty and human development index had a far-reaching impact on the society and its behavior. South Asia has become a breeding ground of crime and violence and with increasing insecurity and vulnerability; the competing interests have pitted caste and communal groups against each other. The economic inequalities and deprivation has created frustration and insecurity among the masses, leading to an increasing criminalization of society in which there are available targets for exploitation by the extremist elements in and outside governments.<sup>12</sup>

Fifthly, the external interference and the war on terror are also major contributing factor in the changing socio-cultural belief and value structure within South Asia leading to identity insecurities and resultant extremism in both ethnic and religious dimensions. The extremist trends have been boosted in the South Asian countries due to the interference by the extra-regional and

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>M. Shar, 2009, August 22. "Causes of extremism in South Asia-Pakistan," *CSS Forum*. Retrieved from <http://www.cssforum.com.pk/general/news-articles/26177-causes-extremism-south-asia-pakistan.html>

neighboring countries in the internal affairs of the states. The outside powers have either supported the governments or a particular communal or ethnic group or extremist elements, in pursuit of their interests. And this has been a major factor affecting South Asian politics since the early years of these states. Most of the ethnic movements in South Asia are cross-border and inter-related, exacerbating the intensity of these movements. Like the Tamil rebels group in Sri Lanka, is known to have links and has received support and been sponsored by the Indian government and the ethnic Tamil population in India. Similarly the Maoist in Nepal is known to have collaboration and sponsorship from India. The Kashmiri separatist movement in India has received support from the Pakistan.

Extra-regional actors have also played an important role in accelerating extremism in the region. To counter Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the United States supported and sponsored the Pakistani government and also the Jihadi groups during the period 1979-1989, which in post-1990 period became a threat for the security and stability of Pakistan.<sup>13</sup> The so called "War on Terror" today is also responsible for growing extremism particularly in Pakistan, due to misperceived international policies of the national government of Pakistan supporting US mission in Afghanistan.

Sixthly, the demographics of South Asia suggests that it is the huge and mounting proportion of youth who will be the sufferer of such instability and insecurity at the same time they will be playing the key role in deciding their future course in terms of promoting and sustaining peace in South Asia. Youth ages 10-24 represent the largest number of young people ever to transition in South Asia, being the home to over 400 million young people ages 10-24, making up 31 percent of the region's population. In India alone, the second most populous country in the world, there are 330 million young people in this age group. The advent of 21st century era of youth along with the new media revolution, it is high demanding that youth is in the foremost role in social engagement and nation building, creating a strong base for regional and international cooperation. Middle East has just experienced the rise of young people in defending their rights and freedoms in support of peace and stability.

Seventhly, changes in the cognitive structures such as the growing fight between nationalism and religion is another factor that working towards radicalized societies in South Asia. Radicalization stems from the changing solidarity among the people of particular ethnicity or religion. The influence of religion in the daily lives of general is decreasing day by day. Their loyalty to the religious dogmatism has rather turned to an anti-dogmatic stance what

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<sup>13</sup>S. Nasir, 2004, Op cit.

can be termed as anti-fundamentalists radicalization in South Asian Muslim society. In the case of Bangladesh, the identity retreat and identity confusion over whether primarily as Muslim as Bengali has divided people into divergent strata few fundamentally oriented with Islam and most others is having an antipathy towards extremist's interpretation of religion favoring religion over nationalism. In the post-independence decades no South Asian state has been able to resolve the dilemma in the relationship between religion and politics. Rather the crisis is getting severe because of the inability of states to establish stable governance, and create sustainable economic conditions, giving the extremist elements chance of taking advantage of the situation. Pakistan till today is facing the crisis of determining a relationship between the state and the religion, often leading to crisis of governance. This confusion has helped political parties to take advantage of the situation according to their respective interests.

Finally, Migration and human capital export have increased far greater than any another times of history making anti-immigrants movement emerge as a newer source of social and political stability. This marks another dimension of the internal security problems of the regional states. Along with immigration, the proliferation of small arms alongside the menace of drug trafficking and narco-terrorism are also affecting identity politics. Each of these issues has significant transnational dimensions. This feature not only complicates the situation for the respective countries but also negatively affects the inter-state relations.

#### **4. EMERGING STRATEGIC TRENDS IN IDENTITY POLITICS AND NEW FACES OF POLITICAL EXTREMISM**

##### *Confrontational Politics and Political Violence*

Confrontational nature of politics is a looming source of extremism among the mainstream political activists particularly among BNP, Awami League and Jamaat Islami activists. As a result of the lack of consensus, politico-historical legacy of confrontation and divergent policy choices of both government and opposition, Bangladesh's parliament has gone through lengthy periods of complete dysfunction, including through opposition boycotts. Identity debate over Bengali vs. Bangladeshi nationalism among the major two parties in Bangladesh added much salience to the dysfunction and political consensus among the political elites of the country.

Personal enmity between political leaders, corruption, criminality and organized violence, taking place in a context of consistent human rights violations, have corroded Bangladesh's political culture. The police have a poor reputation

and there are concerns about the accountability and impartiality of the Rapid Action Battalion paramilitary force. This fragmentation within the political spectrum of Bangladesh has resulted into violent demonstration, hartal, police attack, torture and, unwarranted political imprisonment, disappearance or assassination of the member of political opposition. Most importantly, Bangladesh's dysfunctional politics have created space for radical Islamist groups<sup>14</sup>:

- Islamist parties are seen as being cleaner and more dedicated, driven and effective than mainstream parties. They are active in building support bases through work in local communities.
- Bangladesh's Islamist groups do not have identical programs. However, elements of their social and political programs include pushing for Sharia law, pressuring or attacking minorities and expanding Islamic education.
- Islamist groups in Bangladesh, ranging from governing parties to banned jihadi organizations, share certain common approaches, but also differ in several key respects. The nature of the relationships between groups is often obscure.
- Circumstantial evidence, as well as cold political logic, suggests that those in power have cultivated and sheltered underground Islamist terrorist groups. There are also concerns about the external links and financing of Islamist groups.

### ***Right Wing Extremism***

Like Europe, South Asia is infested with the growth of right wing extremism and their violent path of demonstration. Many recent developments like the tragedy in Norway where Anders Behring Breivik, dressed in police uniform shot dead at least 84 people at a youth summer camp of Norway's ruling political party, hours after a bomb killed seven in the government district in the capital Oslo<sup>15</sup> is symptomatic of a growing culture of politically motivated violence induced from far-right ideology across different regions of the world that has potential of wider security implications for international peace and stability. This has made the relationship between far-right extremism and political violence suddenly as a top political and security concern.

The growth of extreme right may push countries into right-wing radicalization in line of anti-immigrant violence, racial discrimination, cross-ethnic

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<sup>14</sup>International Crisis Group, 2008, "Bangladesh Today," *Asia Report 121*, International Crisis Group.

<sup>15</sup>W. Gibbs and A. Ringstrom, 2011, July 23, "At least 91 dead in Norway shooting, bomb attack," *Reuters*. Retrieved from <http://mobile.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE76L2VI20110723>

conflict and demise of multiculturalism. More violence may soon follow just like as Europe around the world including South and South East Asia due to both mounting intolerance and hatred against Muslim population and Muslim immigrants. The consequent portrait will not be pleasing in any sense. There will be civil unrest and political instability having a potential of state collapse and even interstate-conflict. All well established norms and institutions of governance will be under intense stress. Since terrorism of any kind has multiplier effects, the society will face the rise of other extreme occurrence such as segregation, mass slaughter and the rise of violent groups from the Muslim as well.

Another major signal from the rise of right wing extremism is that the next wave of will come not from al-Qaeda-inspired groups, but rather rightwing groups that want to respond to this threat and reassert their position against Muslim immigration. Therefore, terrorism will now show new dimension being connected to people that are not only “kidnapping” Islam but Hinduism, Christianity or any other religion. Like al Qaeda, far-right terrorists often see themselves as vanguards that will awaken the masses.

One of the examples of rising rightwing terrorism in India is with Saffron, or Hindutva right wingers. Saffron right wingers in India claim that Hindus are the most tolerant and peaceful people – and then smoothly go on to proclaim that all other religions are evil, especially the Abrahamic Religions. They also vent their fury on Atheists and Intellectuals. Muslims become evil slime balls with green goo for blood and “Urban Elites” are weak-kneed party goers who’ve lost touch with reality and only get knowledge by thinking in armchairs.

Besides, mainstream politics in many countries are being increasingly adopting chauvinism, anti-Islamism and other forms of racism in their political programs, and reconciling themselves with far-right parties. What they all have in common is that they use the issue of immigration and Islam to motivate and mobilize frustrated people.<sup>16</sup> The media contribute to this right-wing development by boosting right-wing preachers of hate. From Scandinavia to the Mediterranean, the last few months have seen an increase in anti-immigrant, specifically anti-Muslim, policies and a backlash against ethnic minorities reflected in electoral breakthroughs for the far-right in the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, France, and Italy. The growth of this new brand of extremism has been the result of indifference and inadequate effort to curb the growth of extreme right within the mainstream society. Until now, many countries and their

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<sup>16</sup>L. Fekete, 2006, “Enlightened fundamentalism? Immigration, feminism and the Right,” *Race & Class*, Vol. 48 (2): 1-22.

security services had focused almost exclusively on the threat from al-Qaida-inspired terrorism. Rightwing extremist groups and their more violent affiliates were dismissed as a disorganized, fragmented and irrelevant movement.

### *Political Misuse of Youth*

In Bangladesh, political misuse of youth particularly criminalized nature of student politics provides one of the major sources of violent extremism among youths who are being habituated with the culture of using violence into political spectrum in Bangladesh. Students are being used as party wings to demonstrate muscle power. The political parties, devoid of sound theories and pragmatism of politics, deliberately nourish and patronize unhealthy student politics only for their vested interest, setting aside the greater interest of the nation.<sup>17</sup> Violent intra-group and inter groups clashes among student political wings and their practices of intolerance has introduced extremism and violence in the main stream political activities in Bangladesh.

Since misuse of youth becomes a synonym for hooliganism, hijacking, extortion, robbery, they are prone to violence and to accept radical ideologies. They are also both the cause and result of dysfunctional politics and intolerant political behavior with and from the opposition parties. After independence, dozens of students and non-students have been murdered in educational institutions due to campus violence triggered by venomous political parties' student wings. After the 9th parliamentary election, anarchy in the educational institutions seems to be an everyday affair. Higher educational institutions are closed sine die for violence and vandalism created by different sections of student wings. The universities are turning into a battle field with mediaeval barbarism to kill or cause grievous hurt to fellow students.

### *Extreme State Machinery in Law and Order*

The maintenance of law and order is the key responsibility of the government. While it is supposed to eliminate radical elements from the society, it has turned into a window of human rights violation and so called state sponsored terrorism. In South Asia it is now widely seen that there is a rising extremism within the political governance structure which is becoming intolerant and violent in terms of preserving law and order. The identity perception that allowed them to policing the civilians in violent way is determined in terms of over exaggerated hold of political responsibility and law and order maintenance.

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<sup>17</sup>K.M. Mukta, 2009, April 8, "Unhealthy student politics: Impediment to development," *Financial Express*. Retrieved from <http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2009/04/08/63347.html>

Major law enforcing agencies including Bangladesh Police, RAB and other detective branches are being used as a tool of oppression on protesting voices. Recent event stream suggest that, ruling political government is not only using law enforcing agencies against its opposition, but also using mercilessly against general people. British daily Guardian has reported a policeman is beating under-aged children in a protest of garments workers against low pay. The RAB, composed of elite members of the army and navy, was formed in March 2004 to target the armed criminal gangs and extortion rackets operating in many parts of Bangladesh. Its officers, clad in pitch-black uniforms with bandannas and mirror shades, soon became a common—and imposing—fixture on the streets of Dhaka, earning a reputation for ruthless efficiency. RAB committed its first extrajudicial killing on the fifth day of its operations in 2004. Since then they are operating with impunity. According to a recent report by Amnesty International, the force has been responsible for the unlawful killing of 'at least' 700 people since its inception. Despite promises by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to halt extrajudicial killings when she came to power in early 2009, Amnesty claims at least 200 deaths have occurred on her watch. RAB officers accused of human rights violations have remained outside the purview of law.<sup>18</sup>

### *Instrumental Use of Religion and Religious Extremism*

The instrumental use of religion is the most striking aspect of identity politics particularly in the post 9/11 world. Religion is increasingly seen as an important aspect of identity by Muslims, it is deployed in many different and diverse ways. For example, in some cases it is shaped by, and has developed in response to, experiences of racism and discrimination; in others it can be a resource to negotiate parental and community pressures. The politics of identity can be a trigger for wider civil and political participation, and thus support integration. At the same time, an Islamic discourse can be used to support isolation and resist integration. Having placed identity politics in this broader role, the paper then examines the relationship between identity and radicalization. It finds that the search for identity plays an important role in radicalization. It notes that the discourse of 'European/British-Islam' is emerging as a powerful response to 'radical Islam.' Thus, whilst Muslim identity politics may contribute to violent radicalization, it can also be a significant tool for challenging such processes.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Bangladesh's Troubling Death Squad, 2011, September 16. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <http://the-diplomat.com/2011/09/16/bangladesh%E2%80%99s-troubling-death-squad/>

<sup>19</sup>T. Choudhury, 2007, April, "The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation," *Communities and Local Government of the University of Durham*, London: Eland House, Bressenden Place. Retrieved from <http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/452628.pdf>

There are *five* key points that emerge from the review of the current research literature. *First*, the path to radicalization often involves a search for identity at a moment of crisis. Whilst defining oneself is part of the normal process of identity formation among young people, for those who are at risk of violent radicalization, this process creates a 'cognitive opening,' a moment when previous explanations and belief systems are found to be inadequate in explaining an individual's experience. *Second*, underlying the identity crisis is a sense of not being accepted or belonging to society. The intensity of such feelings is reinforced by experiences of discrimination and racism, a sense of blocked social mobility; and a lack of confidence in the British political system. *Third*, as part of this process individuals seek to construct a sense of what it means to be Muslim in Britain today. The appeal of extremist groups reflects, in part, the failure of traditional religious institutions and organizations to connect with young people and address their questions and concerns. *Fourth*, a lack of religious literacy and education appears to be a common feature among those that are drawn to such groups. The most vulnerable are those who are religious novices exploring their faith for the first time. *Fifth*, the discourse of 'European/British-Islam' is emerging as a powerful response to 'radical Islam.' Thus, whilst the politics of identity plays a role in the radicalization process, it remains an important tool for de-radicalization.<sup>20</sup>

The inspiration for the spread of Islamization in India's neighborhood has come from state policies that sought refuge and utility in religion, and drew inspiration from Wahabbi influences outside its own borders. At the same time, in tackling the menace of growing Islamist extremism and terror, we must recognise the following facts.

- Islam has to be respected and understood for its mobilizing force, latent power, perseverance and theological indestructibility.
- There is a section in the Muslim world which does not consider Osama bin Laden as a cleric but as a folk hero. To many of his followers, Osama bin Laden is a man of faith, intellectual honesty, courage and integrity.
- This folk hero has had the motivation and the determination to calmly, clearly and articulately express his hatred for America and its friends/allies and, with equal calm, affirm his determination to either destroy these countries one by one, or die trying.<sup>21</sup>


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<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>V. Sood, "Radical Islam in South Asia and Implications for the Region," p-45. Retrieved from <http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/html/paper/pdf/vikram.pdf>

### *Elite vs. Non Elite: Dormant Radicalization*

It has become a norm in the identity politics that differentiation particularly along the line of economic and social status serves to be one of the fundamental sources of identity formation. What is new in this regard is the dormant nature of radicalization within the poor non-elite majority of the people who are getting pissed off because of the growing inequality in the society and the discriminatory economic and social benefits accorded to the elite class snatching from the lower class share of the property. The economy is becoming more like an enclave economy where people identified based on class-struggle and economic exploitation are becoming radical and showing sometimes violently their concerns and grievances.



Source: Trading Economics.com


One example of such kind of radicalization is violent expression of the victims of the repeated stock market failure in Dhaka Stock Exchange. Hundreds of angry investors took to the street after biggest one-day fall in its 55-year history of Dhaka Stock Exchange. The protests disrupted traffic in front of the Dhaka Stock Exchange while the angry people piled up papers and set those on fire in front of the regulatory Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) chanting anti-government slogans and prompting interventions of baton wielding policemen. Over three million people – many of them small-scale individual investors – have lost money because of the plunging share prices. Vehicles were vandalised and bonfires were lit at traffic intersections.<sup>22</sup> And such examples are a regular phenomenon in Dhaka city today and what driving investors to create violence is their perception that some government supported big investors are responsible for that and they are taking the right share of the small scale investors illegally.

<sup>22</sup>“Bangladesh stock market fall: Clashes hit Dhaka,” 10 January, 2011, *BBC Business News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12149340>

### *Climate Radicalization and Climate Change Bringing Ethnic Conflict at the Fore Front*

The decreasing availability of physical, environmental and land resources such as clean water, good agricultural land for arable and animal husbandry could create a condition of “simple scarcity,” “group identity” and “deprivation” in the area,<sup>23</sup> that could provoke violent conflicts of high magnitude due to population movements and scramble for the available resources.

Radicalization and terrorism may increase in many developing societies particularly in South Asia due to the climate induced social and economic deprivation. When a government can no longer deliver services to its people, conditions are ripe for the extremists and terrorists to fill the vacuum. The Rohingyas of Myanmar is a very relevant example of how marginalized people get involved in radicalization and subsequently to terrorism. Climate change could potentially trigger large-scale displacement and migration from one region to other in search of new avenues for employment and settlement. The 2001 World Disasters Report estimated of 25 million current “environmental refugees.”



Source: Homer-Dixon, 1994<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup>T. Homer-Dixon, 1994, *Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases*. Toronto: University of Toronto.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

Reduced agricultural productivity and the resultant situation of food insecurity is potentially the most worrying consequence of climate change. Such impacts are particularly severe in developing regions such as South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa. This situation can undermine the economic performance of weak and unstable states, thereby encouraging or aggravating destabilization, the collapse of social systems and violent conflicts. Resource scarcity has the potential to be a contributing factor to conflict and instability. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was in many ways a consequence of squabbles over agricultural resources. The 1974 Nigerian coup resulted largely from an insufficient response to famine. Situation in Darfur, which had land resources at its root, is increasingly spilling over into neighboring Chad. The United Nations estimates 300 potential conflicts over water exist around the world today.

Ethnic conflict seems to be common in all countries of the world where people are divided into separate ethnic groups, that may have a racial, national, linguistic, tribal, religious or caste basis. The members of an ethnic group tend to favor their group members over non-members because they are more related to their group members than to outsiders. This disposition to favor kin over non-kin becomes important in social life and politics when people and groups of people have to compete for scarce resources. What is different and even new in terms of changing identity politics is the influence of climate change as an instigator of ethnic divisions bringing the ethnic conflict at the fore front. Two patterns climate change induced ethnic conflict would have potential to penetrate the present lines of ethnic conflicts: (1) significant climatic hazards will lead to growing conscience of ethnic divisions and ethnic competition for the hold of resources threatened by the climatic consequences; and (2) the more a society is facing scarcity of resources and climate induced vulnerabilities, the more political and other interest conflict tend to become channeled into ethnic lines.

### ***Misperceived International Policy***

The formation particular identity groups are being influenced by the misperceived international policy as well. When the policies of the national government particularly with regard to its decision to cooperate with the outside pressure, such as the case of Musharraf in Pakistan to help the United States in its invasion in Afghanistan in 2001, lead to a perception by the definite identity groups such as religious groups in Pakistan that the Government is having an anti-religious stance helping the enemies, it is a very provable source of political extremism in today's Muslim World. In the Middle East, specifically Iraq, and Central Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan) such misperception could be

responsible for the rise in international terrorism considering, for example these two regions had an increase of approximately 1,500 terrorist incidents in 2010 in comparison to 2009. Who is indirectly to blame for this misperception is the United States who is responsible for some of today's terrorist activities in the Middle East and Central Asia bringing the Muslim countries within its alliance for so called Global War on Terror.

### ***The Esoteric Appeal of Violent Ideologies and Intellectual Radicalization***

Along with the exoteric appeal (popular support) for the radical ideas, now there is a significant development in the esoteric appeal of extremism among the intellectuals fascinated with religious fundamentalism. With a higher level of modern western education and acquaintance with the secular philosophies, many intellectual and upper class people are resorting to the religion in terms of taking position in favor of radical ideas and writing in their favor and even being involved into the radical groups. Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh (HT-B) which is a part of the global Sunni political party that aspires to establish Khilafat by uniting all Islamic countries is an example of such radicalization. Most of the frontline leaders of HT-B are university teachers with North American PhDs and the supporter base is from talented university students. Hizb ut-Tahrir has three clear goals: to establish a community of like-minded Hizb ut-Tahrir members in host states, to sway public opinion in one or more host states to facilitate change of government, and, finally, to establishment a new government that will implement Islamic laws.<sup>25</sup> HT's Bangladesh unit has been under scanner for quite some time, branded as banned outfit and presently Bangladesh authority is probing HT-B's suspected involvement with proscribed Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and any other forms of terrorism in the country and elsewhere. Following September 18 arrests, HT threatened to oust the government by launching a countrywide movement. The threat was issued at a HT-B meeting in Dhaka in clear contravention of the state of emergency in the country. Tahrir is also against participating in elections as it views elections are contrary to Shariah law.<sup>26</sup>

### ***Identicide and Radicalization***

The strategy of identicide seeks to destroy libraries, cemeteries, families, sacred places, monuments, and landmarks despite the international laws and standards

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<sup>25</sup>J. Bhattacharjee, "Understanding 12 extremist groups of Bangladesh." Retrieved from [www.observerindia.com/.../Bangladesh-Militant-Groups\\_1246945884723.pdf](http://www.observerindia.com/.../Bangladesh-Militant-Groups_1246945884723.pdf)

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

which aim to eliminate, or in the least, mitigate, such war practices.<sup>27</sup> In the identity politics, the growing tendency to weaken and to make certain identity groups peter out is affecting political extremism considerably. Such was the case in the former Yugoslavia where civilians and their lived-in places became targets of enemy fire. Enemies understood the importance of places of identity and how their intentional targeting could weaken individuals and groups. In South Asia, the state sponsored activities such as those in Pakistan and India against particular identity groups, though in low scale, have particular relevance to identicides. The separatist movements and ethnic extremism all have a reactive element either the experienced or perceived threat of identicides by the majoritarian politics in South Asia. The demand for autonomy and other forms of radical ethnic and sometimes religious demands are induced from the reaction to identicides.

### ***Radicalization from Extreme Deprivation and Marginalization***

We all know that a hungry man is an angry man. But if a hungry man continues being hungry having his family in hunger too for a long time, his anger can't be confined to just mere anger rather it becomes violent or even ferocious. It does happen and in real, extremism can take its root not much better than it can by exploiting this situation.

Accordingly, a notable form of extremism comes from the extreme deprivation and marginalization where people have the view that they are denied of their rights and facilities by the state while particular segment of the society is enjoying the most of the opportunities in the country. The ability of the state to deliver welfare, services, and justice through its administrative and judicial organs is critical to maintaining the loyalty of the population and thus the legitimacy of the government. If this mechanism breaks down, there is danger of marginalized groups resorting to violence, including terrorism.<sup>28</sup> Much of the left-wing violence in India and Nepal originated in this sort of neglect.

In the northern districts of Bangladesh, for example, there is a growing tendency towards extremism and violence and the rise of terrorist's organizations capitalizing extreme poverty and marginalization. Extreme ideologies have always bigger appeal to poor masses. Hence, Maoist insurgencies did not allow us to

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<sup>27</sup>S.J. Meharg, 2006, November, "Identicide Precursor to Genocide" Working Paper 05, *Centre for Security and Defence Studies*. Ottawa: Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University. Retrieved from [http://www.carleton.ca/csds/docs/working\\_papers/MehargWP05.pdf](http://www.carleton.ca/csds/docs/working_papers/MehargWP05.pdf)

<sup>28</sup>V. Balachandran, *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Transnational Crime in South Asia*, p.115. Retrieved from [www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Stimson\\_ch6\\_1.pdf](http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Stimson_ch6_1.pdf)

conclude that it is not true in the northern districts of Bangladesh as much as in the North-East India.

The northern regions of Bangladesh are extremely poor. Food insecurity in Bangladesh mostly affects the segments of the population that are heavily dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. The poverty in this region is often attributed to a phenomenon called *Monga*, a seasonal food insecurity primarily caused by an income and unemployment deficit. *Monga* has forced poor people either to borrow money from usurers at an excessively high interest or to sell their labor in advance at an unusually low rate to keep their families from starvation. Many people have sold their meager produce of aman crops well before harvesting to tide over the acute shortage of employment and food.

Poverty and hunger is manifested in a number of forms in Bangladesh; foremost are the malnutrition, violence; however, joblessness and prolonged working hours are the reasons of hunger. What drives them to extremists' frontier is their perceptual identity as deprived and marginalized community. They think that it is a result of historical injustice and denial of rights resulted in the human degradation and barrier to access the fruits of justice. It considers the entire issue as a result of politics and power tilted against the poor. The privileged class of Bangladesh has always benefited at the cost of the disadvantaged. As a result, over the years the rich have become increasingly richer and the marginalized increasingly deprived. According to government statistics, the share of the national income of the richest 5 percent of the families of Bangladesh increased from 18.85 percent in 1991-92 to 23.62 percent in 1995-96 and then to 30.66 percent in 2000.

However, radicalization based on marginalization induced identity perception results into different extreme implications in the Northern districts of Bangladesh:

1. Most likely to join extremists or terrorists organizations such as Maoists, JMJB, JMB, Hrakhtal Jihad and so on.
2. Involved into crimes, drug trafficking, human trafficking and forced labor.
3. Popularity and wider acceptance of radical ideologies.
4. Violent forms of reactions and expression of their demands.

### ***Long-term Status as Identity less Group and Radicalization***

A different pattern of identity induced ambience creating the atmosphere for violent extremism is seen in the case of stateless Rohingyas in Bangladesh. More than 26,000 Rohingya refugees are living in Bangladesh as both stateless and identity less community in a miserable condition. The camps, where they live,

are in a shocking condition and host to some of the most appalling, unhygienic and poor situations. Many women have lost their husbands, mothers their sons; and children are often without proper education. Depression is palpable everywhere; but so too is anger, resentment and a readiness to face even death if this means to escape such a miserable and unjust life.

Yet Rohingya have very few choices and possibilities. This is also true in the case of education, which is mainly religious and in Bangladeshi madrasas. The religious teaching in these madrasas is at the best very traditional and at worst dangerous for the education and formation of frustrated and poor new generations of displaced Rohingya Muslims. Radical groups are targeting and exploiting the desperate reality of these people. Rohingya refugee camps become a prolific breeding ground for future extremists and possibly even cheap terrorists.<sup>29</sup> Al-Qaeda had reportedly recruited Rohingyas from refugee camps in southeastern Bangladesh to fight in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Chechnya.

The Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) represents over 120,000 Rohingyas in Bangladesh. The Rohingya also speak the same language as Bangladeshis from the Chittagong area. These “destitute and stateless people” have been open to recruitment to various militant Islamist groups. The RSO has reportedly received support from the Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh. Afghan instructors are reported to have been seen in RSO camps.<sup>30</sup> Others worry that armed extremist gangs are radicalizing the youth of this marginalized, leaderless community, and suspicions of drug smuggling and an increase in petty crime in the camps have been recorded in the local press.<sup>31</sup>

### *The State of Confused Identity*

Identity confusion can be another newly developing source of violent extremism in South Asia in particular as it happens with Wahabi vs. Sunni dilemma among the returning migrants from the Gulf. In South Asia, particularly among the Muslim migrant workers from Bangladesh, Pakistan and India working in the gulf countries are facing a state of confused identity and a dilemma

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<sup>29</sup>M. Islam, 2009, February 3, “Rohingya Muslims and injustice: a security issue?” *Muslims, and an Anthropologist*. Retrieved from <http://marranci.wordpress.com/2009/02/03/rohingya-muslims-and-injustice-a-security-issue/>

<sup>30</sup>B. Vaughn, 2007, January 31, “Islamist Extremism in Bangladesh,” *CRS Report for Congress*. Retrieved from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22591.pdf>

<sup>31</sup>M. Hussain/K. Palong, 2010, Feb. 19. “For Rohingya in Bangladesh, No Place is Home” *Time World, Postcard from Bangladesh*. Retrieved from <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1966621,00.html>

over the differences in the interpretation of Islam in Wahabi societies like Saudi Arabia. Since most of the migrant workers are illiterate or have little formal or religious education they are likely to be influenced by the Wahabi strict interpretation of Islam and feel guilty for not implementing fundamentalist practices in their own society. Therefore, on their return, they start implementing radical practices and a new form of intolerance to soft religious practices in the society emerges.

### ***Low Left Identity Bulge and Self Radicalization***

Another source of radical tendency within certain individual is nothing but a self assessment of the society motivated by low left identical bulge. Internet and other kinds of information and communication networks serve to be the breeding ground for this kind of self-radicalization. The ideology of violence and obsession to particular things or repulsion to some ideological, cultural or even political approach led people to cultivate radical mentality and to join into similar bulge of radical forces.

## **5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

With the changing socio-economic structures and both vulnerabilities and opportunities of globalization, identity politics is becoming more dynamic and complex. In the post 9/11, though religion based identity elements has always been in the key attention, economic, political and other socio-cultural components, ignored mostly, also became highly influential in determining the direction and the patters of identity politics. Political parties and terrorist organizations clearly identified with religions, insurgents groups, identity groups based on economic and environmental dislocation are opting for greater share making them legitimate stakeholder within the society. Consequently, states are also becoming far more assertive and extreme in terms of maintaining law and order and there is a growth of confrontational politics among the mainstream political parties and the government itself. Far right movements and religious parties are taking the benefits exploiting the condition, where marginalized and deprived community remains silent no longer taking the path of extremism to demand and attain their rights and shares within the community. An integrated and comprehensive effort is necessary to address the repercussions of the extremist developments in terms of identity politics. Some of the recommendations that my researches on the issue offer include:

- Increasing dialogue among the stakeholders and different identity groups.
- Managing social recognition of identity groups and their legitimate imperatives and demands.

- Fostering inclusive economic growth and increase in the equality of the society.
- More social engagement and contribution of the advance and richer community for the poor.
- Cultural exchange and exploration of commonalties and cooperation among the identity groups.
- Ensuring minority rights and effective nation building.
- Functional democratization and strong, efficient and accountable institutions for state administration.
- Increasing efficiency in the political governance and upholding rule of law and ending human rights violation by the state authorities.
- Wide scale awareness building and program directed to increase tolerance in the society.
- Ethical education and more creative participation of the youth in the society.
- Protection of the cyber spaces against unwarranted use and so on.

## India and the Strategic importance of Bangladesh

*Shahnawaz Ahmad Mantoo\**

### **Abstract**

The geographical location of Bangladesh is a preponderant fact that influences the decision makers in making foreign policy because of the various elements in the formulation of foreign policy of a country in which geographic location occupies a significant position. Geopolitics examines the political and strategic significance of geography and in this context geography is defined in terms of the location, size and resources of the places. Geopolitical location of Bangladesh gives it both strength and weakness from different perspectives. As it is by location land locked by India it keeps Bangladesh in a disadvantage but a little land boundary with Myanmar and its entrance in sea gives an advantage to its external orientation. Indians need of corridor through Bangladesh and enhancing global importance of the south Asian region comes as a hope to Bangladesh to keep its foreign policy in an advantageous position.

Since the concept of large scale troops movement became part of warfare, "strategy" became inseparable from the conduct of warfare. Strategy since then has been a constant subject of study by the commanders who would direct armies in battle. As the battle grounds became bigger and bigger involving continents, more and more geography came into play in conceptualizing the future wars. It was in the Napoleonic era that geo-strategy became the province of the commanders as well of the sovereign. Two great wars gave the concept a boost, with additional emphasis laid on it by the geographers turned geo-strategists. Geo-strategy is not absolute but some of the ingredients or factors could be absolute and the value could change with changing characters of variables. Geo-strategy is transparent yet perceptive. Therefore, one needs to understand the prevalent geo-strategic reality in the global context in general

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and regional context in particular. One has to be clear in understanding as to how the global reality affects the region, such as Bangladesh, which is increasingly becoming an arena of middle power rivalry involving the lone superpower by one actor or another to counter balance the adversary.



In South Asian context, the region that we are directly concerned with, rapid geo-strategic changes have to be viewed in right perspective to understand the regional geo-strategic ambience, particularly by the policy makers of peripheral countries like Bangladesh. This is essential to make a comprehensive assessment of the regional dynamics. Bangladesh is part of South Asia that continues to be one of the most volatile geo-strategic regions, with three neighbouring nuclear powers. South Asia's balance of power since the Sino-Indian war of 1962 tilted completely towards India after the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. India became the dominant power in the region with the nuclear explosion in 1974. However, this situation was not without a challenge. Pakistan, which was still recuperating from the ignominious military defeat by India, decided to counter the regional giant with equal ferocity. India's nuclear explosion pushed Pakistan into a collision course, having triggered an unholy nuclear race that continues unabated. The nuclear race culminated in 1998 in series of nuclear explosions, first by India and then by arch-rival Pakistan. The two regional antagonists became the sixth and the seventh nuclear powers. It is notable that three out of seven proven nuclear powers are Asian countries, sharing common and disputed boundaries.

Bangladesh could not remain out of the ambience of changes obtaining globally and regionally. With the changed South Asian geo-strategic scenario, Bangladesh's geopolitical importance increased due to three factors. First, Bangladesh began to be referred to as the third largest Muslim country in the world and as the second in the region. The second factor is Bangladesh's location within the 'geo-strategic frontier' of India, South Asia's most powerful country.

And the third is Bangladesh being in close proximity with China, Asia's largest power, considered a strategic rival of both the US and India.

Despite her small size, Bangladesh does have certain geographical advantages that make her important to regional and extra regional powers which may drag her into a complex strategic scenario created due to rivalries between big powers. Bangladesh may be seen as a key player in strategic game plans of India, Pakistan, the U.S.A. and China because of the following reasons.

The unique geographic location of Bangladesh which cuts the troubled North East region of India off from mainland constitutes a significant security weak point for India for the fact that the region shares border with China and that various insurgent groups are active within the region that are fighting against the Indian government for self determination. In light of their experience in Indo-China war in 1962, the Indian defense planners consider the strategic chicken neck to be inadequate and see Bangladesh to be the safest and the shortest route to transport military logistics to North East region in case of a military conflict between India and China in the future. A strategic corridor through Bangladesh is also seen as important to conduct sustained military campaign against the insurgent groups in North East. The corridor through Bangladesh has economic significance as well because it is the most cost effective route to connect North East with the rest of India for the transshipment of industrial goods to and from North Eastern states, which is vital to improve the economic condition of this land locked region.

Bangladesh, which is being regarded as a bridge between SAARC and ASEAN, also has enormous geographic advantages for its proximity to Myanmar and other South East Asian nations to promote interregional economic, political and security cooperation. Once connected via Asian Highway and Trans-Asian Railway, the South and South East Asian nations will be using Bangladesh as the main transit point to increase economic interactions amongst themselves. Bangladesh with appropriate policies and infrastructures in place will be playing pivotal role in defining the direction of economic relations between the two emerging regional groups.

Bangladesh is considered the gateway to Bay of Bengal with its 45000 sq. miles of sea territory in which lies valuable marine resources such as hydrocarbon, fisheries etc. Its well developed sea ports offer both economic and military opportunities because India can use the port facilities to increase trade with its land locked North East region while other South and South East Asian countries and China can use the same facilities to increase interregional economic interactions. With the ambition to protect the oil transshipment and trade routes in the Indian Ocean, the Chinese navy is making rapid progress in developing relations with the coastal nations such as Myanmar and Bangladesh to gain

access to their port facilities so as to conduct sustained naval operations in the sea. In light of Indo-U.S. Strategic agreement, and recently concluded *Joint Declaration of Bangladesh-United States Dialogue on Partnership* it can be assumed that the USA is seek similar facilities from Bangladesh as a response to Chinese naval presence in the Bay of Bengal. Because of her burgeoning population, high economic growth, and rapid industrialization, India has become the sixth largest energy consumer in the world, but she has to import oil to meet 70% of her domestic demand which cost 40% of her total export earnings. She has to diversify import sources for uninterrupted supply of energy, but due to international politics importing hydrocarbon from Iran and Venezuela has become uncertain leaving Bangladesh and Myanmar as only cheap and secure sources of energy supply. While Bangladesh has a speculative gas reserve of 33 TCF, its proven reserve is only 12-15 TCF which is inadequate to meet its own domestic demand so the government has already decided against exporting gas to other countries unless new reserves are found. Even though Bangladesh has expressed her inability to export gas at the moment, India considers Bangladesh a major source of energy in the long run because of its potentials to discover huge hydrocarbon reserves in the Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh also is the most cost effective route for India to import gas from Myanmar; therefore, Bangladesh may emerge as a significant player in regional strategic energy game.

Bangladesh is significant because of the complex strategic scenario that has emerged due to India's strategic alliance with the USA and USA's recently concluded Strategic Partnership with Bangladesh, to contain China and its rivalry with Pakistan for regional supremacy. India has to take cognizance of the fact that Bangladesh has established deep military relations with China and repaired her relations with Pakistan to correct the problem in balance of power in her relation with India. So, the possible military role of Bangladesh in case of a war either between India and China or between India and Pakistan could be a strategic concern for India. In light of Bangladesh's endeavor to take control of her own affairs and her attempt to seek greater independence in foreign policy matters, India formulated a set of strategies to isolate, intimidate, and coerce Bangladesh to submit to Indian domination to reap the strategic benefits of breakup of Pakistan. The following strategies have been put into action by Indian foreign and defense services to create pressure on Bangladesh:

1. **Delaying tactics to solve bilateral problems:** Having shared land and maritime borders, both Bangladesh and India should have demarcated their borders based on mutual cooperation, trust, and interest for peaceful co-existence, but regrettably, despite a series of diplomatic efforts by Bangladesh, India refused to respond adequately so as to resolve border

disputes in an amicable fashion and employed a delaying tactics to create pressure on Bangladesh. Bangladesh, on the other hand, showing political maturity and the spirit of amicable co-existence has already ratified the border agreement signed between the two governments in 1974 and also made several diplomatic moves to demarcate maritime border only to be frustrated by lukewarm Indian response. Non ratification of the border agreement by India and its reluctance to find solution to maritime border dispute has caused a gradual deterioration in bilateral relations giving birth to mutual suspicion and mistrust. But now the hope has emerged in Bangladesh because of the Indian Prime Ministers visit to Dhaka in August, 2011 and its aftermath.

2. The aggressive posture of its border security forces along 4096 km. Indo-Bangla border and the deployment of its navy near a disputed Island in the Bay of Bengal named South Talpatty in the 1980s are signals that in case Bangladesh fails to accommodate Indian interests causing further deterioration in bilateral relations, India will not hesitate to use military power against Bangladesh.
3. **Policy of supporting secessionist movements in Bangladesh:** Chittagong Hill Tracts, which is one tenth of the total size of the country, with its enormous natural resources and strategic geographic location is vital for the existence of Bangladesh. Taking advantage of geographic proximity to its Tripura state and the desire of the local Chakma tribes for greater autonomy with an ultimate goal of creating Jumma land — an independent state for Chakmas — India used its military and intelligence resources to provide help and support to Shanti Bahini. The surreptitious Indian involvement in providing money and weapons to tribal insurgents in the Chittagong Hill Tracks since 1976 was acknowledged by Bimal Chakma — a Shanti Bahini official — in an interview with *The New York Times* in June 11, 1989. India used the insurgents against Bangladesh as a tool to gain political and economic concessions which she would not otherwise be able to extract from the government of Bangladesh. Finally, Bangladesh entered into a peace agreement with Shanti Bahini in 1997 to end insurgency and restore law and order in Chittagong Hill Tracks, but the security and intelligence agencies of the Bangladesh are still convinced that a lot of ex-Shanti Bahini members and other terrorists are still getting help from Indian security agencies and are hiding in the North East states of India.
4. Because of India's step motherly attitude towards its landlocked North Eastern states, a growing sense of deprivation, exploitation and insecurity

is prevalent among the people of this region, which has contributed to give birth to a number of insurgent groups who have taken up arms against their own government for self-determination. India's myopic decision to crush insurgency through military means without finding the root causes to better understand the problem and the absence of a mature policy of providing economic and social incentives to remove inequalities have created myriad of problems causing further alienation of indigenous people. India in an attempt to portray itself as a victim of terrorism is now trying to find a scapegoat in Bangladesh to blame for the insurgency to conceal its failure to contain insurgencies in the North East and disprove its own involvement in secessionist movement in Chittagong Hill Tracks.

Notwithstanding its small landmass, Bangladesh, in terms of population, is the eighth largest country in the world and a home for 130 million Muslims. She has been playing a major role in international peace efforts and war against terrorism through contributing the second highest troops to UN missions and introducing tough anti-terrorism ordinance with a provision of death sentence for those convicted of terrorism. The then US Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns termed Bangladesh as a unique example of democracy in South Asia region, and as a model for democracy and tolerance by Harry K Thomas — ex-US Ambassador to Bangladesh. Disregarding the support and appreciation of International community for Bangladesh's role in the war against terrorism, Indian media keeps inventing fictitious stories about Bangladesh's alleged inability to respond to the security needs of India, in particular, and the world, in general to create pressure on the government of Bangladesh. But the fact of the matter is, Bangladesh takes regional and global security matters seriously and working closely with the international community to stop its soil from being used by elements inimical to regional and global security. It can be mentioned that the international community including the United States has welcomed Bangladesh's dismantling of the terror network of Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB) and the execution of its top leaders after following due process of law and termed Bangladesh as a valuable partner in war against terror.

In bilateral trade relations with its neighbors, India follows a policy of deriving maximum benefits by securing duty free access for its commodities and cornering other smaller regional countries by not allowing them similar privileges and imposing non tariff barriers on their exports. Bangladesh is a victim of the same exploitative Indian trade strategy and suffers from a trade deficit to the amount of \$2 billion with India which can be attributed to non removal of tariff and

non tariff barriers on its exports. To offset the negative impact of this yawning trade gap, so far no significant amount of investments and loans were made available to Bangladesh by India.

The Indian strategy of bilateralism and non-implementation of water sharing treaties has caused enormous difficulties to its lower riparian neighbors because India uses prevailing asymmetry of power to its own advantage to deprive its neighbors of their due share of water. This has caused enormous ecological damage to riverine Bangladesh as supply of water during dry season has dwindled at an alarming rate.

With 20 times larger landmass, 10 times larger population, and 10 times larger military, India is placed in an advantageous position to negotiate with Bangladesh from a position of strength to define the bilateral relation that suits its own political, strategic, and economic interests.

Being the weaker party, Bangladesh has to be creative in devising strategies to utilize India's geographic and security vulnerabilities to its advantage by using geographical advantages, forming alliances with strong friendly nations and being part of powerful international security forums to reduce its own strategic vulnerabilities that arise from asymmetry in power vis-à-vis India and protect its strategic, political and economic interests.

The government of Bangladesh should define the responsibilities of different agencies to design, implement, and enforce strategies to deal with existing power inequalities with India, and they should also establish policies to review the current strategies to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses to ensure effectiveness to respond to current risks and to adjust to future risks.

No single strategy is enough to deal with a country as big and powerful as India, so Bangladesh has to employ several different strategies to diminish India's strategic advantages over Bangladesh through identifying India's security weak points and using them as Bangladesh's own strategic assets, and through internationalizing bilateral issues to seek help from powerful friends and international forums so as to force India to resolve any disputes on the basis of justice, equality and mutual respect.

In light of the above discussion, Bangladesh may employ following strategies to protect its national interest vis-à-vis India:

- To use bilateral diplomatic channels to resolve disputes in an amicable manner, and if that fails then use regional forums to raise the issues and involve other regional actors in the dispute resolution processes, and if still that doesn't work then use the United Nations to take diplomatic actions to prevent disputes from escalating into conflicts.

- **International security forums:** To make exhaustive efforts to raise bilateral security issues with India in ASEAN Regional Forum in an attempt to engage all the members of the forum in constructive security dialogues to resolve disputes through confidence building or preventive diplomacy.
- **Strategic alliance:** To form strategic alliance with China and also with USA to obtain security guarantee in the event of a military conflict with India, and to obtain political guarantee that China will use her veto power to thwart Indian attempt to use the United Nations Security Council to legalize its actions with respect to disputes with Bangladesh. Bangladesh should also work with China on matters that affect Chinese security interests based on mutual cooperation, interest, and utmost respect for each others sovereignty.
- **Strategic chicken neck:** To consider the 'chicken neck' as strategic asset and take political decision based on national consensus to not allow India to get transit rights on a bilateral basis through Bangladesh to transport goods, military or industrial, to its North East region. This will give Bangladesh a clear strategic advantage over India because the latter will be forced to rely on Bangladesh for the stability and economic development of its North East region.

Despite a few irritants in their bilateral relations and unequal balance of power between Bangladesh and India, both being so close neighbors and part of so many regional and international forums, should try to take solid actions to minimize differences to foster understanding and cooperation in various socio-economic and security issues for amicable co-existence and regional stability. The following sets of actions are recommended to achieve a peaceful bilateral relation:

- To promote regional cooperation to harness water resources for the benefit of agriculture and electricity production,
- To provide duty free access for each others commodities to promote greater economic cooperation,
- To take prompt diplomatic actions to demarcate land and maritime borders in the spirit of justice, equity and good neighborliness,
- To work closely to combat sea piracy, illegal arms trade, and drug trafficking and human trafficking for the sake of regional security and stability,
- To create culture of non-interference in each others internal affairs to promote trust, confidence, and cooperation.

## CONCLUSION

What must be re-emphasized is that Bangladesh's geo-strategic location is a prime concern for India as a growing world power, as Dr. Shubash Kapila puts it in one of his strategic concept papers. He contends the following:

- Bangladesh lies contiguous to India's sensitive northeast, which has been the focus of de-stabilization through anti-Indian insurgencies by China, Pakistan and now Bangladesh, singly and jointly with Pakistan.
- India's national security interests dictate that Bangladesh is not allowed to operate as a "springboard" for anti-Indian activities in any form or variety.
- India's national security interests dictate that Bangladesh is not permitted to be "Talibanised." A "Talibanised" Bangladesh is not only a security threat to India but also to Southeast Asia and the United States global security interests.

Dr. Kapila's strategic concerns for India are not unique; he rather represents the mainstream geo-strategic thinkers of Delhi. It was in thus-defined geo-strategic ambit that New Delhi's reaction to the bomb blasts on 17 August 2005 is to be viewed. For long, Delhi has been accusing Bangladesh of connivance with religious extremists for expanding towards Northeast India's Muslim majority districts of Assam. India's increasing demand on Bangladesh for strategic concessions needs to be viewed in the context that most Indian strategists agree that Bangladesh is a crucially important country for India to secure its strategic frontier which goes beyond India's geographical boundary, from Hormuz to Malacca and from Pars, Iran, to Hanoi, Vietnam. To India's strategic decision makers, Bangladesh is well within its internal security parameter. That perception makes India more tremulous while dealing with Bangladesh.

What Bangladesh must not lose sight of is that the increasing geo-strategic stature of it, may become its burden if they do not pay attention to the internal security as much as they should.

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## Environmental Conflicts, Artisanal Gold Mining, and Communal Forests in Filipino Indigenous Communities: A Case from Sagada

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### **Abstract**

Gold mining and deforestation play a fundamental role in generating environmental conflicts in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the role of artisanal gold mining and communal forests in the creation of environmental conflict is almost invisible in national policy agendas. Therefore, to highlight this issue as a matter of public concern, this paper analyzes the intra-environmental conflicts that have been taken place over the past 25 years between the Fidelisan, who have resource abundance, and the Tanulong, who have experienced resource scarcity. Both are indigenous communities at Sagada in the Philippines, and their story relates to the interaction of artisanal gold mining and communal forest management.

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

The Filipino indigenous communities are divided now mostly by intra or inter-conflicts. There is little or no conclusive empirical evidences on the modes of integrating and giving the communities a voice vis-à-vis the intra-conflicts among the community. This phenomenon of lack of participation continues till now, marginalizing and isolating groups. Socio-economic growth and human development of those communities is now facing a critical situation mainly related with intra-conflicts among communities that meet sustenance levels on various types of natural resources that are dwindling, degraded and depleted as result of lack of environmental governance. To resolve conflicts utilizing different response mechanisms, such as an analysis of environment conflicts

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and status of natural resources, do not suffice. Instead the aforementioned should be combined with strong public policy, bringing the voice of the community to the forefront, is a requisite (Humphreys, 2005; Sinding, 2005). That requires analyzing empirically various contextual, cultural, economic, political, institutional, social and environmental characteristics of intra-conflicts in Filipino indigenous communities. This paper emphasizes mainly the intra-environmental conflicts that exist between Fidelisan and Tanulong indigenous communities — the two most prominent “*barangays*” — “smallest administrative unit in the Philippines and is the native Filipino term for a village” (Alicar-Cadorna, 2009), of Sagada in Mountain Province of the Philippines. The major two intra-environmental conflicts, discussed further on in the paper, are related to artisanal gold mining, which has been operating by the community’s youth of Fidelisan since 1986, and management of communal forest. Field experiences and direct interaction with the community make up a vast part of the previously designed data collection methodology. The following section draws upon the methodology and analytical methods used to perform the study.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

The case study is based on qualitative data analysis which has been complied by a series of interviews with all members of elders’ council of Fidelisan and Tanulong *barangays* including an interview with all captains of Sagada Municipality. Before being in the field, the primary data collection methodology was designed with following research tools and objectives presented in Table 1.

Even though the methodology was well designed but the following practical circumstances and specificities relating to social infrastructure of the Filipino indigenous communities, Fidelisan and Tanulong, have forced to change the data collection methodology:

- a. The size of the population of each *barangays* or indigenous community is very small.
- b. All important decision of the community is taken by the elders’ council of respective community. Therefore, generally, the youth people were not allowed participate in the decision making process of the community. Youths are also not permitted to share information of, particular, conflicts to the out-comers or any person outside the community.
- c. The elders’ council does not welcome outsiders as interventionists to solve their own intra-conflicts.
- d. The elders’ council of each community is male-oriented and consisted of very small number of male from their own community which varied from one community to another.

**Table 1 Research tools, objectives and data collecting methodology**

No	Research Tools	Objectives of using research tools	Data collecting Methodology
1	Time lines of Conflicts	to show different views of the history of a conflict	FGD 1 (Focal Group Discussion)
2	Stages of conflicts	to see the stages of and cycles of escalation and de-escalation of conflicts	KII (Key Informant Interview) KII 1: People in power KII 2: People in not power
3	Conflict Mapping	to identify openings for intervention or action and to check the balance of one's own activity or contracts	FGD 2
4	ABC Triangle Mapping (Attitude, Behavior and Context)	to identify a starting point for intervention in the situation by knowing the three level of relationship among the conflicting and other parties	Micro workshop 1
5	Conflict Tree	to relate causes and effects to each other and to the focus of the organization	FGD 3
6	Pyramid or Three level of relationship among Conflicting and other parties	to assess what types of approaches or actions are appropriate for work at each level and to identify potentials allies at each level	Micro workshop 2

During my field experience, in one interview with one of elders' council member of the Tanulong, he had mentioned that, "Youth of the community are only allowed to speak with outsiders or unknown person if he/she gets the consent from any of the elders' council." Consequently, the designed data collection methodology has faced an unavoidable challenge accompanied with the gravity of the reality. Hence, the new data collection methodology has been incorporated which comprised of two FGDs (Focal Group Discussions) with each elders' council of each *barangay* without changing research tools.

### 3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The Environmental Security Assessment Framework (ESAF), designed by Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability (FESS), has been used as a skeleton tool of analyzing the case. The revised ESAF has been introduced in April 2009 by FESS which is for generating an analysis that provides a comprehensive set of variables to examine environmental security and its interactions and then to filter critical concerns through a series of analytic phase that guide to frame scenarios and specific policy recommendations (FESS, 2009). Commensurate with this, the ESAF has been ubiquitously used in different public and private institutions around the world. The paper has also used the

FESS's definition of environmental security, "Environmental security is a condition in which a nation or region, through sound governance, capable management, and sustainable utilization of its natural resources and environment, takes effective steps toward creating social, economic, and political stability and ensuring the welfare of its population" (Stark & Terasawa, 2006).

Within the scope of ESAF, the paper has used David Baldwin's seven questions of security analysis (1997) to observe how Filipino indigenous communities tend to construct their own security; Paul Collier's four traps analysis (2007) to evaluate the surrounding circumstance of Fidelisan and Tanulong indigenous communities; and Community Peace Recovery and Reconciliation (CPRR) model (2011), which was designed by Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (ACCORD), to analyze different dimensions of intra-environmental conflicts of those respective communities. The research tools in this case study have been designed in the light of CPRR model.

Baldwin (1997), in his paper "The concept of security," emphasized analyzing the rationality of the security policy with the following seven constructive questions: (a) security for whom? (b) security for which values? (c) how much security? (d) from what threats? (e) by what means? (f) at what cost? (g) in what time period? (Baldwin, 1997). The paper has added another question to analyze the dynamics of security which is "who gets ask the question and the answer of it?" Furthermore, Paul Collier (2007), in his famous book "*The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What can be Done about it*", explained four types of inescapable traps: (1) conflict traps, (2) the natural resource traps, (3) the trap of being landlocked with bad neighbors, and (4) the trap of bad governance (Collier, 2007). He also mentioned that conflict is inherent to politics and without precise comprehension of the traps; security solution may not meet sustainable solution (Collier, 2007).

On the other hand, ACCORD developed the CPRR model, in Burundi in 2001, which is also known as community social peace model. This model is developed to primarily analyze the dynamics of intra-conflicts that exist between the communities and then, at later stage, empowers local community to solve their own conflicts themselves to recover peacefully within mutually respected and developed social codes of conduct. CPRR model has been finally developed and published as a handbook for its ubiquitous utilization by UNDP, ACCORD, The National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC), Ministry of Provisional Administration and Internal Security and Office of the President of Kenya in 2011. It has been widely used in Kenya; Central Kalimantan, Indonesia; Rwanda; Palestine<sup>1</sup> and Somalia

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<sup>1</sup> H. Bekdash (n.d). *Reconciliation: Lessons for peace and justice in Palestine*. Retrieved from <http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/6666>

(ACORD, 2011; Alkire, 2003, Relief Web, 2011; Smith, 2005; Worldvision, 2008; CRD, 2004).

#### 4. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FIDELISAN AND TANULONG INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES

The Filipino indigenous people, constituting 18% of the total population of the country<sup>2</sup> are greatly affected by dominant money economy and oppressive practices against them.<sup>3</sup> There are two types of indigenous communities, Tribal and Muslim. Tribal indigenous people (IPs) comprise of 55 different ethno-linguistic groups located in six different geographical locations, whilst Muslim IPs are comprised of mainly Maranaos, Maguindanao and Tausugs communities with 10% of total indigenous population.<sup>4</sup> Both Fidelisan and Tanulong indigenous communities are tribal IPs who have distinct *barangays* at Sagada municipality in the Mountain Province.

*Barangay* Fidelisan is one of 19 *barangays* of Sagada municipality. Together with five *barangays*-Aguid, Pide, Bangaan, Tanulong and Madongo, *barangay* Fidelisan is to the north by *barangays* Aguid and Pide; to the south by *barangay* Tanulong, to the west by *barangay* Bangaan; and to the east by *barangay* Dalican of the municipality of Bontoc. Fidelisan can be accessed via a 30 minute walk either from Bangaan or Aguid, neighboring *barangays* accessible by the Sagada-Aguid provincial road.

The Fidelisan has a total population of 444 composed of 229 males and 215 females. Persons with an age range 17-65 years have the highest population (219). The population is relatively young wherein it constitutes 182 persons within the age group (1-16 yrs.) and few numbers of infant and elders (see Table 2).

Tanulong is another *barangay* of 19 municipalities of Sagada. It is located in the northern part of Sagada and bounded to the north by Fidelisan and Guesang, Banga-an; to the south by Baang, Kilong; to the east by Demang, Mountain West, Madongo; to the northwest by Pandayan, Banga-an; to the southwest by Dogo, Patay; and to the southeast by Tetep-an Sur. *Barangay* Tanulong is composed of four clusters namely Pega, Pana, Bato and Patigey. It is accessible by road

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<sup>2</sup> Country profile: Philippines (1998). Retrieved from [http://www.state.gov/www/global/human\\_rights/1998\\_hrp\\_report/phillippi.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/phillippi.html). This 18 percent figure for the numbers of IPs in the Philippines lies within the range given by different sources. From an average 10 percent to a high 20 percent.

<sup>3</sup> Indigenous People in the Philippines (2011). Retrieved from <http://www.iwgia.org/sw16704.asp>

<sup>4</sup> Development Legal Assistance Center, (1990). *Laws and Jurisprudence Affecting the Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines* (1<sup>st</sup> Ed.), Quezon City: Author.

**Table 2 Population by age, group and sex**

Age	Male	Female	Total
Under 1 yr old	7	7	14
1-5	22	29	51
6-12	46	39	85
13-14	11	12	23
15-16	11	12	23
17-65	117	102	219
66 and above	15	14	29
Total	229	215	444

Source: Sagada Municipality, 2010.

and an ascending 800 meter semi-paved pathway from Bangaan *barangay*. The road is used only during the dry season. Some portions were not paved, very muddy and slippery during rainy days. People often use the pathway leading to Madongo *barangay* where transportation is available. Parts of this pathway were eroded during the heavy rains in the month of June 2010.

The total population of *barangay* Tanulong is 430 composed of 218 males and 212 females (*see table 3*). Persons with ages 17 to 65 years are only 37 which is almost 6.5 times lower than the Fidelisan. Geographically, Fidelisan is the upper-mountain community and Tanulong is the lower-mountain community of a mountain.

**Table 3 Sex-disaggregated data by age and population of Fidelisan**

Age	Male	Female	Total
Under 1 yr old	3	4	7
1-5	18	13	31
6-12	7	10	17
13-14	33	44	77
15-16	121	105	226
17-65	19	18	37
66 and above	17	18	35
Total	218	212	430

Source: Sagada Municipality, 2010.

## 5. INTRA-ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN FIDELISAN AND TANULONG INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY

A brief description is given below on the elements of the CPRR model presented above and that will be used to analyze intra-environmental conflicts between these two communities.

### *Timeline of conflicts*

- Conflict started in 1986 due to artisanal gold mining.
  - Gold mining in the Fidelisan was explored by some members of the community in the 1970's but was prohibited by the majority of elders' council of Fidelisan themselves. Out of persistence for sustainable livelihoods, it was eventually allowed by community elders upon the insistence of young local miners to operate small scale mining with agreement that the method used will be simple and not damaging to agricultural lands. Another condition stipulated that access will be limited to members of the community.
  - An informal organization of miners was formed and informal by-laws were created to regulate the operation without having consultation with neighboring communities.
  - In 1989, the use of chemical processing began and this started polluting the river, complaints were raised by the Tanulong and the mining was stopped.
  - In the 90's, mining resumed without use of chemicals such as cyanide but operations expanded with the use of machines and blasting equipment. This increased the waste of silt and gravel that affected farmlands along the river downstream to the Tanulong community. The miner's organization weakened and most of the provisions of the by-laws were violated. Mining, however, became the secondary source of income for the Fidelisan.
  - During the early millennium, the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) conducted investigations on the use of chemical processing and river pollution based on complaints of Tanulong and other downstream communities. Commensurate with this, the use of chemical cyanide decreased and the chemical processing structures were dismantled. Subsequent water testing for acid contamination, however, yielded negative results which gave rise to suspicion that the sample was not reliable compared to the experience and observation of actual miners and affected people.
  - In 2011, acid contamination of the river was observed. Also, more farmlands were affected in Tanulong and the farmers took their complaints to the community officials or elders' council. In a community general assembly, the miners were advised to clear out the mining affecting farmlands. The farmers of the other tribe now await action.

- Some individuals who violated the provisions in the agreement simply ignored community sanctions and tried to evade regulations with secrecy. The organization of small-scale miners which should be the body to monitor regulations has weakened.
  - Fidelisan recognized that members of the Tanulong were aggrieved as well as other communities around the polluted river. As the members were convinced that the miner's association should be held accountable to regulate the mining and they also felt aggrieved with the breaching of initial agreements on the regulation of the mines. They also recognized that the mining site is within their jurisdiction but the mine operators are not exclusively within their community by the end of 2011. So they cannot sanction all the miners. Tanulong felt aggrieved because their farmlands were affected. Though few members of their community constitute the labor force of the mines, they are not in control of the operations and would like the Fidelisan to take more responsibility in the regulation and control of the pollution.
  - The dialogues and discussions of the problem among affected parties led to some forms of awareness and settlement of disputes that served as a benchmark to assess precautionary measures for each party in handling subsequent conflicts.
- Communal forest conflict has started in 2000.
- In 2000, forest conflict started when members of neighbor Tanulong cut trees from the part of the forest designated for the Fidelisan. The individuals who cut trees paid penalties for the violation, but were not satisfied.
  - During the year 2000 to 2010, both communities felt that trees from the communal forest have been decreasing slowly but nobody blamed the other suspecting that outsiders were complicit with this illegal deforestation.
  - In 2010, the members of Tanulong cut trees again haphazardly and encroaching on the designated area for the Fidelisan. This prompted the Fidelisan to initiate dialogues with the Tanulong and impose fines claiming that tree cutting and logging was excessive and used for purposes of commercial transactions with Korean businessmen who bought the timber and built a church in Tanulong.
  - This is a violation of the rules in accessing resources from the communal forest. Members of Tanulong refuse to pay the fines insisting that the area is communal and the woods were used in a church building for use of community members anyway.

- Both communities felt aggrieved. Tanulong members thought they were being prevented from accessing the communal forest that they freely used in the past days, on one hand, while Fidelisan members thought they were being disrespected for the violations in the use of the communal resources, on the other. Fidelisan IPs were aware that both tribes have been using the forests with regulations and permissions from one another in cases needed. Notwithstanding this, Fidelisan members thought they were disrespected with Tanulong people. As a consequence, they imposed sanctions and asserted control and regulatory measures in the use and access to the forest.
- No external intervention happened. The issue was discussed by both affected parties with the imposition of fines as penalty for the individual violators. However, with the 2010 violations, the Tanulong refused to pay the fines insisting that they cut trees from the communal forest and the wood was used for a community purpose. Both communities let the issue rest for now with the view that it could again arise when forest use becomes necessary again.

### *Stages of conflicts*

- Conflict related to environmental degradation and depletion is due to artisanal gold mining and conflict related to deforestation is due to violation of traditional and un-codified communal laws on regulation and protection of communal forest.
- The physical locations of conflict are in very sensitive places of the community. First, communal forest is used for preserving natural water used for domestic needs and livelihood related activities; and artisanal gold mining was, at the beginning of time, at the center of the Fidelisan community. Now the community has moved approximately few hundred meters from the mining area to avoid pollution. Most importantly, affected river and land areas are considered part of ancestral domains of the involved communities of the Fidelisan and Tanulong.
- The artisanal gold mining related conflict is also related to other lower-mountain communities. Because chemicals used in mine pollutes river system flows through communities and other tribes downstream.
- Series of progressive incidents have taken into place during last decades without any substantial settlement.
- Artisanal gold mining related conflict has been ongoing for last 25 years when mining operation was accommodated by the elders of the community in 1986 and violation of usage of communal forest has started in 10 years ago.

- Level of tension between the people of communities has reached to its saturation point with both major conflicts. But the positive measure is that on-going dialogues for settlement have been used as a strong community dispute resolution tool among the elders of both communities.
- Community dialogues is also used to address the issues of self-regulation of the communities, and imposition of fines for violations.

### *Conflict mapping*

- The people who are directly affected by pollution and forest destruction are economically poor and politically less empowered than the Tanulong's. But vast member of both indigenous communities are not directly involved with the conflicts are aggrieved for the damages that have taken place during last decades.
- Among actors of both conflicting communities, all are users of natural resources but of different occupations, which adequately conveys different needs levels for those resources discussed.
- Kinship relationships exist among the actors.
- The general status of the people in both communities is undifferentiated as they are all considered residents and members of the community in general without any level of discrimination. But it is disclosed and common information that influential individuals run the show from the backdoor.
- In the case of excessive tree cutting in the communal forest, the presence of the Korean group who bought the wood for the church introduced a commercial transaction in the use of resources which was traditionally dedicated for use of the residents for housing or community ritual purposes.
- Farmers, small scale miners and other members of the communities, in general, are involved with the conflicts and eventually their own food source and forest water systems are affected. Hence, conflicts emanate due to the nature of livelihoods and natural resources management in both communities.

### *Attitude, Behavior and Context (ABC) triangle mapping*

- The elders' council of each community takes care of, concerns, any complaints or information that concerns its members, especially conflicting and contentious issues. In general, the council first identifies the concerned individuals or groups and clarifies the issue and advises dialogue.

- Other concerns that need community consensus are discussed in general community meetings.
- Community dialogues through mobilizing community representatives also impose penalties for the wrong doers.
- Both parties value the shared cultural beliefs of 'lawa and inayan' or 'do no harm' which motivates them to avoid conflict or escalation of such. There is also collective attitude. However that they will not allow others to abuse them and hence agree to impose sanctions when violated.
- There is a general trust but there is also suspicion when facts are hidden by the involved individuals and the community or leaders do not take action.
- Fidelisan believes it is an older established settlement and laid earlier claim to the territory and resources available but shared and accommodated later settlements in the spirit of sharing of the vast natural resources for everybody's welfare, that the Tanulong members are abusing in violating the forest regulations.
- Conflicts arising from pollution effects and unregulated use of forest resources combined with fear from both communities of being able to compromise with each other and cooperate for resource sustainability, food security and environmental safety.

### *Conflict tree*

- The core problem relating with artisanal gold mining conflict is the pollution of the river and farmlands leading to loss of fishes and decreased food production.
- The core problem relating with communal forest conflict is the violation of regulated use of forest resources leading to deforestation and decreasing the level of natural water reserve.
- The conflicts also create gaps in closer relations of the neighboring communities with the aggrieved parties perceiving that they are not respected by the other party.
- Due to the artisanal gold mining conflicts, a high level of economic pressure is identified into the realization of community people the need for other sources of livelihood to meet the increasing demands for cash and development of the community.
- Due to the communal forest conflict, the need for new developments in the community has been identified such as a structure for a church that serves younger people who seek faith and traditions from both

communities. But the continued violation of agreed rules and ignoring penalty fees may increase the level of tension among the community people and might cause more destruction.

- Due to mining, the pollution of the river system will affect food security as the river presents key food products to affected communities and hence lead livelihoods deterioration.
- Forest destruction due to unregulated use and cutting of trees affecting also the ecological balance between the communities.
- The regulatory use of resources and prevention of damage to property and resources of the community and neighboring communities might hinder the growth of conflict escalation.

***Pyramid analysis or three level relationship analyses among conflicting parties***

- There is a traditional council of elders which works closely with the local government unit. Members of the elders' council select *barangay* officials who represent the community in the municipality and other governmental activities. This structure has equal counterpart with the other communities.
- In each community, there is a woman's organization in charge of monitoring the implementation of community's agreed regulations such as non-working holidays which everyone must follow without having any decision-making power at large scale.
- The elders' council of community calls general assembly or meetings to ensure that no one person or group of persons control decisions but are open to public discussions until consensus is reached. But the reality is that elders' council runs the show backed by influential individuals.
- The specific groups, those are highly affected by the artisanal gold mining, are the miners and the farmers. Both leaders of the communities encourage the specific groups to talk among themselves and arrive at resolution before the leadership or the whole community as they believe that every single entity of the community is involved as a whole. Nevertheless, they did not sit together at any time.
- On artisanal gold mining conflict, the miners are financially more powerful as they explore other sources of income aside from the subsistence farming in the community.
- On the communal forest issue, the Fidelisan is recognized by other tribes as one who has jurisdiction over the entire communal forest after the

settlement of boundary conflict with other tribes through a tribal war which was held in 2000. This, however, is not similarly recognized by the nearby Tanulong who insist the concerned forest is traditionally communal.

- However, in both communities, the general consensus is that no one has power over the other as conflicts and other issues are considered community's issues as well as an opportunity for community consensus building. In addition, dialogue correspondence is actively practiced in which negotiating parameters lead to conflicting issues that are to be carefully handled and prevented from escalating.
- The two tribes have close kinship origins and intermarriages between them regardless of positions of leadership. Community people believe that these relationships are strong motivations to settle conflicts and maintain peace among the members of the community and with neighboring community.
- In order to resolve conflicts, the municipal level of the local government can intervene if needed which is not generally accepted by the elders' council of the community. On the other hand, elders are who those who are respected by both parties and can facilitate the dialogues acting as reconciliatory figures for both conflicting parties. Other non-government organizations, which are run by local people, also may facilitate discussions among the conflicting parties but the general practice is always the affected parties are encouraged to settle agreements among themselves. In the case of NGO involvement or outsider's intervention, the resource persons are only expected to involve in clarifying technical knowledge and possibilities in order to fulfill the gaps of the capacity of the communities.
- Generally, both communities do not allow outsider as an intervener or mediator to solve their own conflicts. As a result, either members of the elders' council from their communities or the officials from the local government always take initiative to resolve any conflicts that take place in the community.

### ***Synthesis of existing intra-environmental conflicts between Fidelisan and Tanulong***

The Table 4 shows the synthesis of existing major intra-environmental conflicts between the Fidelisan and Tanulong which indirectly also indicates the critical situation of the human security of the members of each community (see Table 4).

**Table 4 Synthesis of intra-environmental conflicts between Fidelisan and Tanulong indigenous communities**

No	Intra-environmental conflict analysis tools	Status of Fidelisan	Status of Tanulong
1	Time line of the Conflicts	Both communities agreed that the major conflicts are relating with (1) artisanal gold mining and, (2) illegal usage of communal forest, which have started in 1986 and 2000 respectively.	
2	Stages of Conflicts (tension, verbal confrontation and outbreak of violence)	Tension and verbal confrontation among themselves and between youth group and elders' council	Tension, but elders' council of Tanulong started dialogues for settlement with elders' council of Fidelisan. If the dialogues do not work, then there is a possibility to have verbal confrontation between the communities.
3	Conflict Mapping (Escalating and de-escalating factors)	Usage of chemicals like cyanide, waste of silt and gravel contaminates water and farmland escalating the level of tension into the lower-mountain community people of Tanulong.	Violation of traditional practice of usage of communal forest trees is the escalating factor for the Fidelisan.
4	ABC Triangle Mapping (Attitude, Behavior and Context)	<p>Attitude: they can solve the problem mutually without any kind of intervention from outsiders. As one of the member of Fidelisan elders' council said that "If any affected community, was harmed by us, they come to us, we will of course cooperate to solve those disputes without any forms of harm."</p> <p>Behavior: supportive and liberal.</p> <p>Context: the elders' council of Fidelisan community acknowledges the practical consequences of the mining activities towards the lower-mountain community, Tanulong. But due to external forces into the community, they sometimes are unable to control the surrounding circumstances. These external forces have been increasing day by day due to artisanal gold mining.</p>	<p>Attitude: they follow traditionally "No Harm" policy and dialogues for dispute settlement. Between both communities, Tanulong is the first who started dialogues with elders' council of Fidelisan.</p> <p>Behavior: understanding and overbearing.</p> <p>Context: Poor economic status and politically less empowered with very few youth community which is 6.5 times smaller than Fidelisan's. The youth community has less domination over the conflicting situation.</p>

(Contd.)

(Table 4 continued)

No	Intra-environmental conflict analysis tools	Status of Fidelisan	Status of Tanulong
5	Conflict Tree (iterative factors that trigger the conflict)	Economic pressures which lies with the need for other sources of livelihood to meet the increasing demands for cash and development of the community.	The need for new spiritual infrastructural developments in the community such as a structure for a church that serves younger people who seek faith and traditions.
6	Pyramid or Three level relationship among conflicting and other parties (relationship between: (a) between conflicting and affected parties, (b) the authorities to the conflicting parties, (c) social arrangement and conflicting parties)	Both communities have common nature of pyramid or three level relationship among the conflicting and other parties: (a) Between conflicting and affected parties: The specific groups highly affected by the mining issue are the miners and the farmers. Both leaders of the communities encourage the specific groups to talk among themselves and arrive at a resolution before the leadership or the whole community which did not take place for even a single time. (b) The authorities to the conflicting parties: Other authorities like <i>barangays</i> , for instance, the municipality is independent from the conflicting parties. So the municipality does not interfere with the way the local community tends to solve their disputes traditionally until or unless community people ask them for their intervention. (c) Social arrangement and conflicting parties: The two tribes have close kinship origins and intermarriages between them regardless of positions of leadership. These relationships are strong motivations to settle conflicts and maintain peace among the members of the community and with neighboring community.	

## 6. INTRA-ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY ANALYSIS

### *Security for whom?*

The referent objects of the Fidelisan's security are both individuals, from the external forces that presently exist due to artisanal gold mining operation, and territory of communal forest, from deforestation practice of neighboring Tanulong. On the other hand, the referent object of the Tanulong's security is specifically related with its environment due to its environmental degradation and territorial depletion in effect to Fidelisan's artisanal gold mining operation, which harms their livelihoods and causes harmful water-borne diseases and food contamination. The Tanulong's are also concerned with securitization of their spiritual growth of their youth community by building a Church in its territory from communal forest trees.

***Security for which values?***

Fidelisan wants to securitize: (a) its economic welfare by expanding the artisanal gold mining, (b) public safety from the external forces available inside their community due to mining as well as by preserving natural waters in the communal forest. But Tanulong wants to securitize: (a) its physical safety by ensuring the quality and quantity of its physical environment, (b) psychological and spiritual well-being by having its own Church within its territory.

***How much security?***

Fidelisan wants to have absolute form of security. Even though the elders' council considers that external and internal threat is logical and inherited from artisanal gold mining operation. On the other hand, Tanulong also emphasizes on its absolute form of environmental and spiritual security.

***From what threats?***

Fidelisan concerns basically two kinds of threat: (a) potential threats from external forces that exist inside their community due to mining, and (b) threats related with future water reserves in the communal forest. Similarly, Tanulong apprehends also two kinds of threats but with difference in nature: (a) threats to its environment caused by Fidelisan artisanal gold mining operation, and (b) threats from the negative and non-spiritual cultural diffusions into its youth community due to the negative consequences of development.

***By what means?***

On hand, the goal of the Fidelisan's security is mainly based on economic empowerment and self-autonomy. On the other hand, the goal of the Tanulong's security is to have its environmental security and spiritual empowerment through having access to its own Church regularly.

***At what cost?***

Fidelisan concerns that the cost of the pursuit of its security is only maintainable if they continue economic expansion through the artisanal gold mining. Even if they stop mining now, they would NOT be able to maintain the cost of removing pollutants from the river's water and farmland which was placed by the mining. But they believe that, at this present situation, the cost of the securitization of its public safety is lower than the opportunity cost of stopping mining. Nevertheless, they do not know the estimated monetary measure of pursuing their security.

Tanulong strongly believes that their environmental security relies on the Fidelisan's artisanal gold mining operation. Even though, few of its members work there, but the highest income of them is very nominal. They are also concerned about the present and future recovery cost of on-going environmental damage due to mining as it is much larger than the total economic benefits that Fidelisan would gain from the mining. On the other hand, Tanulong also believes that spiritual damage due to negative consequences of development is financially not measured. However, they do not seem to have any estimation about the approximate costing of their security.

*In what time period?*

Fidelisan wants to have long-term security measure which is only achievable, they believe, by enlarging their economic empowerment. Tanulong wants to have also long-term environmental security. As a result, they demand Fidelisan to stop its mining operation.

*Who gets ask the question and who gets the answer of it?*

The authority of Sagada municipality is not fully interested to take necessary measures about the securitization of both — Fidelisan and Tanulong. The reason beyond it is that as an indigenous community, Fidelisan and Tanulong have absolute autonomy to regulate their intra-conflicts based on their traditional practices and customs. Therefore, they are responsible to solve their own problems themselves. Nevertheless, they do not have any mutual codified agreement on how to solve conflicts that arise between them. As a result, security related questions are also asked and discussed within the intellectual radius of each community.

**7. HOW DID THE SITUATION GET TO BE THIS WAY  
(CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS)?**

*Historical and Political context*

The Philippines's civil society's peace and security action can be organized into five broad categories based on its working scope and approach.<sup>5</sup> Among them "Peace Constituency Building" is the most valued carrying approach which acknowledges sustainable peace and governance reforms of the communities. A good example of this approach is "Peace Zone" which is a community based

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<sup>5</sup> C.M. Ferrer, (2006), "The Philippine Peace Process." In *Tadem*, T.S.E, & N.M. Morada (Eds), *Philippine Politics and Governance* (123-160). Manila, Quezon City: Department of Political Science, University of Philippine.

initiatives to stop and prevent violence for gradually restoring and enhancing peace in the community.<sup>6</sup> In the Philippines, in accordance with the time factor, there are two waves of community peace zones:

- During period of first wave of community peace zones (1988-1994), there were more than ten communities including Sagada.
- During period of second wave (2000-2005), more than fifty six communities have declared peace zones in which no arm groups, state or non-state, may enter.

Theoretically, the big difference between the existing “Peace Zones” model and community-based peace recovery and reconciliation model lie with centralization of the community’s voice. On one hand, in Peace Zone model constituency and mechanism were declared by local government officials, instead of community, for which the model was not effective and sustainable (Ferrer, 2006). On the other hand, the community peace recovery and reconciliation model is absolutely community centered (ACORD, 2011) which has not been used in the Philippines before. Even though, peace zone in Sagada is not based on absolute community’s voice, it provided an autonomous political legitimacy that belonged to all tribes which can be exercised independently without any external exculpation or disturbance.

However, politically, the Fidelisan and Tanulong indigenous communities became part of the peace zone in 1988 which allowed them to prevent themselves from any kinds of armed group intervention. That peace zone initiative had provided a favorable political environment with an opportunity to expand Fidelisan’s artisanal gold mining by its youth group that already started earlier on in 1986. Meanwhile, Fidelisan’s victory in the tribe war which was held in 2000 also had added extra political advantages to expand its economic growth through its artisanal gold mining.

## 8. LEGAL CONTEXT

There is an adequate legal framework to protect the rights of tribes in the Philippines. The Philippines’ Constitution and the Indigenous People Rights Act (IPRA) serve as the primary legal framework of the safeguard system for the tribes. Furthermore, there are several other Philippines’ laws that provide protection of the tribes’ rights, such as National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act, the Philippines Mining Act, the Organic Act of Muslim Mindanao, the Philippines Environmental Impact Statement System, and the

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<sup>6</sup> Method Finder, (n.d.), *Practitioner’s Guide: Peace Zones*. Retrieved from [http://methodfinder.net/pdfmethods/gtz-prct/gtz-prct\\_method88.pdf](http://methodfinder.net/pdfmethods/gtz-prct/gtz-prct_method88.pdf)

administrative orders of the NCIP and Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR). Nevertheless, the World Bank has conducted a comprehensive study on the rule and regulations of the indigenous people in 2007 wherein the report has concluded that “there are many conflicting provisions of these various legal instruments and their implementing rules and regulations, including substantive, jurisdictional and procedural issues that are affecting the implementation of the IPRA” (WB, 2007).

The government of the Philippines has been pursuing an aggressive policy to revitalize the mining industry to regulate. Because in the Philippines, there is 30 percent of country’s land relating to mining (Doyle, Wicks & Nally, 2007). More particularly there are two sets of laws on small scale mining in the Philippines. PD 1899 was the first legislation to legalize small-scale mining which provided licensing system and mentioned mining claims are subject to the consent of the claim holders. In contrast, Republic Act 7076, which was enacted in 1991, grants mining rights in the form of joint venture or mineral production sharing agreement between the government and the small scale miner. Then small scale safety rules and regulations was passed in 1997 which was the first legislation in the world with separate and distinct safety rules on small scale mining (Bugnosen, 2001; Caballero, 2004). But there is ambiguity and disconnected provisions between the Philippines mining investment policy and indigenous peoples’ rights (Holder & Ingelson, 2007). However, the people of Fidelisan and Tanulong are not aware about those rules and regulations. Few members of elders’ council have heard about those Acts and did not examine them due to non-availability and lack of literacy.

## 9. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT

The negative consequences for the development<sup>7</sup> causes the loss of ancestral land, disarticulation of communities, and obliteration of the traditional way of life, economic insolvency and political marginalization such as Cordillera People’s Alliance, Minority Rights Group. But although indigenous people want their immediate benefit though new market oriented modes of livelihoods, they face many difficulties for the following major crises:

- a. The changes are imposed from above
- b. Their consent and participation is not concerned

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<sup>7</sup> Philippines indigenous people’s link: Development Issues, (n.d.). Retrieved from [http://www.piplinks.org/development\\_issues](http://www.piplinks.org/development_issues), where it is said that the indigenous people of the Philippines always struggle to defend their land due to the land, inside the forest or mountain territory of their domain, is rich with natural resources and hence conflicts often visible with companies who want to exploit those resources without having their consent.

- c. Eroding their traditional way of life
- d. Discrimination and consummate force
- e. Deprivation with sometimes token concession.

Furthermore, the Philippines has an extensive history of ideologically enthused conflicts<sup>8</sup> which set also indigenous communities at different corners. This situation eventually is increasing intra-conflicts among them which endow them to be united rather it imposes to be isolated. The gap between the indigenous community people and policy makers is also very alarming. For instance, section 14 of The Indigenous People Rights Act directly excluded people of Cordillera and Mindanao to form their own indigenous domain and then have access to their own practices.<sup>9</sup>

The elders' council of both — Fidelisan and Tanulong is aware about the negative consequences of the development aggression. Most importantly Tanulong has a considerable faction of youth community; a group whose ages lies between 16 to 17, with 226 male and females, comprising almost 6 times more than the Fidelisan youth community. Therefore, this explains the Tanulong concerns to enhance their social and cultural values through their own kinds of spiritual empowerment. On the other hand, the youth community of Fidelisan; a group with ages ranging from 17 to 65, consisting of 219 male and females and 6.5 times larger than the Tanulong's same group. That youth group is motivated by economic modernization and imperialism which leads them to expand their growth through artisanal gold mining regarding of environmental consequences.

## 10. TRAPS BETWEEN THE FIDELISAN AND TANULONG COMMUNITIES

**Conflict traps:** Fidelisan and Tanulong both communities were involved with a tribe war in 2000 which was headed by Fidelisan and by its nature a mini-civil war. That gives an idea that both communities have been experiencing fatal outcomes of intra-conflicts. After that victory, however, Fidelisan has been using its jurisdiction to dominate the territory of communal forest, even though traditionally it was supposed to be regulated by mutual un-codified agreement between tribes. Furthermore, while Tanulong has been complaining about its environmental insecurity from the Fidelisan for the last 25 years,

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<sup>8</sup> R. Edillon, (2005), *Ideologically Motivated the Conflicts in Philippines: In search of Underlying causes*. Manila, Human Development Network Foundation, Inc.

<sup>9</sup> Republic of the Philippines. Third Regular session, Tenth Congress, (1997), *The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act*. Metro Manila, Government Printing Office.

Fidelisan has been continuing its artisanal gold mining operation for its own economic empowerment. That generated a strong rationality in Tanulong's youth group to cut off trees from the communal forest with the reason that they will use those trees for building a church. In contrast, Fidelisan has been claiming that those cut-trees have been used for commercial purpose to a Korean company. Therefore, the overall situation is that both communities are in conflict traps which transmitted through their communal politics.

**The natural resource traps:** As it is mentioned earlier that Fidelisan is an upper-mountain and Tanulong is a lower-mountain community of a same mountain. On the other hand, Fidelisan's artisanal gold mine is at the top of the mountain and very close to the river that flows to downstream through the Tanulong territory. Therefore, whatever chemical Fidelisan uses in the artisanal gold mining, it easily gets mixed with river's stream and then flows down to the lower-mountain communities via the territory of Tanulong. As a result, it contaminates not only water of the river, rather entire farmland. Because Tanulong's entire farmland is situated nearby the river due to irrigation facilities constructed over hundreds of years ago. On the other hand, the communal forest reserves the natural water which has been used for domestic and aqua-agricultural activities for long times by both communities. As a result, the destruction of the communal forest would likely to hamper all aspects of lives for both communities.

Hence, the natural resource traps are very critical and interlinked with conflict traps. Because Fidelisan has resource abundance and Tanulong has resource scarcity.

**The trap of being landlocked with bad neighbors:** Even though there is no existence of being direct landlocked by the bad neighbors, the water-locked situation is acted out as a trap between these two communities. Because, if the Fidelisan blocks the water-path of the upper-stream river, the lower-mountain community Tanulong and others could potentially have adverse impacts ensuring violent conflict. Because without the water from the river, lower-mountain communities like Tanulong would not be able to survive.

**The trap of bad governance:** Even though, both communities claim that they do resolve their own crisis by using the set of traditional or indigenous rules and regulations that they have been exercising generation after generation, those rules and regulations are mostly un-codified. Therefore, no one knows how the indigenous rules and regulations transform from one generation to another. Most importantly the influential individuals, in both communities, play with the elements of vulnerabilities and conflicts backed by elders' council. On the other hand, both communities do not, generally, welcome external parties

for intervention until or unless the external parties are with some form of communal authority.

## 11. SCENARIOS ANALYSIS

**The best case scenario:** Fidelisan would stop its artisanal gold mining operation and start working on environmental damage recovery in cooperation with Tanulong and Sagada municipality. On the other hand, Tanulong would build up the Church on the common territory of both — Tanulong and Fidelisan with the assistance of all other relevant parties such as Sagada municipality, Korean company and other neighbors, so that all can meet together to share their perspectives and understanding, especially on conflicting issues to stop growing intra-conflict trees or closing latent window of intra-conflicts.

**The worst case scenario:** Fidelisan would continue its artisanal gold mining operation more widely in order to achieve its repaid economic growth. That might allow other external parties to come in which might be the potential threats for both lower-mountain communities like Tanulong as well as Fidelisan' sown public safety. On the other hand, the degree of environmental insecurity will lead to either violent conflict between Fidelisan vs. lower-mountain communities led by Tanulong (which might be the reoccurrence of tribe civil war held in 2000) or lower-mountain communities, most likely Tanulong, will evacuate the place. On the other hand, Tanulong would cut off more trees from the communal forest without any prior consultation with Fidelisan might also lead a violent conflict between these two communities.

**The intermediate (and most likely) scenario:** Fidelisan would continue its artisan gold mining operation which might trigger the existing tension of Tanulong to the verbal confrontation and then to eventually violent conflict. As a third party, Sagada municipality and other lower-mountain communities might involve in the negotiation process which might open new windows of political, social and economic instability among the parties.

## 12. CONCLUSION

The no-conflicting situation triggers the higher human security from the fear of not being beleaguered by any means. But it is also universally true that there is no existence of society, indigenous or non-indigenous, without the conflicting situation. Though the conflicting situation in the community is unavoidable to be survived or lived, the proper way of dealing with conflicts is a must, whichever way that fits with the long lasting settlement of disputes by either transformation or prevention or reconciliation. In the case of Filipino indige-nous communities, though the people of those communities, generally, do not

welcome the out-comers as the reconciliatory party to create equally-benefited environment for corresponding their bargains between them and then to re-establish the peace and social infrastructure for mutual codes of conduct, therefore, it seems very unfortunate and difficult to resolve the existing conflicts between them. But Filipino indigenous communities, stimulatingly, do welcome the reconciliatory party either from within the communities or the municipal authority. In the case of Fidelisan and Tanulong intra-environmental conflicts, the policy recommendations are: (a) Sagada municipality should play a role immediately to solve this crisis through community peace recovery and reconciliation processes wherein the role of the municipality would be to catalyze the process and bring to the forefront the community people as key actors in finding a solution, and (b) Sagada municipality should take the capacity enhancing program on various legal frameworks of artisanal mining and communal forest in collaboration with Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR) and indigenous communities.

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