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brief 12

The UNTAES Experience:

*Weapons Buy-back in Eastern
Slavonia, Baranja and Western
Sirmium (Croatia)*

october 98

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of either the United Nations or the Bonn International Center for Conversion.

Cover Photo:

UNTAES buy-back program: weapons turned in at the Russian Battalion's Weapons Buy-back location at Klisa, Eastern Slavonia.



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*by
Derek Boothby*

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Zusammenfassung

German Summary

Ende 1995 wurde parallel zum Abkommen von Dayton, mit dem die Waffen in Bosnien und Herzegowina endlich zum Schweigen gebracht wurden, zwischen Serben und Kroaten über die Zukunft des letzten von Serbien besetzten Teils Kroatiens verhandelt. Dieses Gebiet, westlich der Donau, der natürlichen Grenze zwischen den beiden Ländern, war seit dem Fall des Zentralortes Vukovar im November 1991 unter der Kontrolle der Serben. Das Ergebnis dieser Verhandlungen wurde in Erdut, einem Dorf am Ufer der Donau, am 12. November 1995 unterzeichnet. Es sah vor, daß der UN Sicherheitsrat eine Übergangsverwaltung einsetzte, die das Gebiet für einen bestimmten Zeitraum 'regieren' sollte, und daß er eine internationale bewaffnete Truppe zur Sicherung des Friedens und der allgemeinen Sicherheit autorisierte.

Am 15. Januar 1996 gab der UN Sicherheitsrat grünes Licht für eine zweijährige UN Friedensmission in diesem Gebiet. Die Aufgabe der UNTAES (United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium) war die friedliche Reintegration des Gebietes in die Republik Kroatien.

UNTAES war mehr als eine reine Friedensmission. Als 'Regierung' hatte die Übergangsverwaltung weitreichende Verantwortung auch in zivilen Bereichen, wie z. B. die Einhaltung von Recht und Ordnung. Obwohl die ansässige serbische Armee im Juni 1996 entwaffnet worden war, gab es immer noch eine große Zahl von Waffen in den Händen der serbischen Bevölkerung. Dazu gehörten Gewehre ebenso wie Panzerabwehrraketen, Mörser, Minen und viele Typen von Munition.

Obwohl das Mandat der UNTAES nicht ausdrücklich vorsah, die Zivilbevölkerung zu entwaffnen, war es klar, daß solch eine Aktion nötig war, um überhaupt Recht und Ordnung einzuziehen zu lassen, um Frieden und Sicherheit zu gewährleisten und um die Rahmenbedingungen für die zukünftige Übergabe eines entmilitarisierten und sicheren Gebietes an die alleinige Kontrolle der kroatischen Regierung zu schaffen.

Die Option, in Razzien Waffen zu suchen und zu beschlagnahmen, wurde von den UNTAES verworfen, da man befürchten mußte, daß die Bevölkerung die UNTAES schnell als Besatzungsmacht ansehen würde. Man mußte andere Wege finden, ausreichende Anreize für die freiwillige Rückgabe von Waffen zu schaffen. Aus diesen Überlegungen entstand das Konzept eines Waffen-Rückkauf-Programms, das von der kroatischen Regierung finanziert wurde. Verhandlungen mit der kroatischen Regierung begannen im Juni 1996; im Oktober wurde man sich einig und das Programm begann.

Zwischen dem 2. Oktober 1996 und dem 19. August 1997, dem Ende des Waffen-Rückkauf-Programms, wurden ca. 10.000 Gewehre, 7.000 Panzerabwehrraketen-Werfer, 15.000 Granaten und fast zwei Millionen Schuß Munition abgeliefert. Während des Programms konnte die Bevölkerung die Waffen an vier Sammelplätzen der UNTAES in der Region gegen Barzahlung und ohne Feststellung von Personalien abgeben. Kroatische Experten ermittelten die zu zahlenden Beträge und zahlten sie direkt bar an die Ablieferer aus. Dies geschah auf Wunsch der UNTAES, die kein Geld verwalten wollten, um auszuschließen, daß später irgendwelche Anschuldigungen über eine falsche Verwaltung des Geldes erhoben würden.

Funktionstüchtige Waffen wurden nach Zagreb gebracht und dort auf UN-Gelände bis zum Ende des UNTAES-Mandats im Januar 1998 verwahrt. Sie wurden dann den kroatischen Behörden übergeben. Alte, unbrauchbare oder gefährliche Waffen sowie sämtliche Munition wurden von den UNTAES zerstört.

Alles in allem war das Waffen-Rückkauf-Programm höchst erfolgreich. Natürlich wurden nicht alle Waffen von der Zivilbevölkerung abgegeben, aber jede einzelne Waffe und jeder Schuß Munition, die eingesammelt wurden, verminderte deren Gesamtanzahl und trug zusammen mit vielen anderen Aspekten der Tätigkeit der UNTAES langsam aber sicher mit dazu bei, daß die Region von einem unsicheren Kriegsgebiet zu einem Gebiet wurde, in dem man sich wieder sicher aufhalten kann.

Beruhend auf den UNTAES Erfahrungen gibt es wenig Zweifel daran, daß ein Waffen-Rückkauf-Programm unter den richtigen Voraussetzungen - mit Bedacht geplant und sorgfältig durchgeführt - ein besonders sinnvoller Beitrag zu umfassenden Bemühungen um die Wiederherstellung von Frieden und Stabilität nach Bürgerkriegen ist.

Executive Summary

In late 1995, at the same time as the Dayton Accord was at last bringing silence to the guns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a separate agreement was being negotiated between Serbs and Croats over the future of the remaining Serb-occupied part of Croatia. This region, lying on the western bank of the River Danube that was the border between the two countries, had been under Serb control since the fall of its main town, Vukovar, in November 1991. Singed at Erdut, a village on the bank of the River Danube, on 12 November 1995, the agreement called upon the UN Security Council to establish a transitional administration to “govern” the region for a transitional period and to authorize an international force to maintain peace and security.

Authorized by the United Nations Security Council on 15 January 1996, for the next two years a UN peace-keeping operation took place in the region. With the title of United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), its mission was to achieve the peaceful reintegration of the region into the Republic of Croatia.

UNTAES was more than a straightforward peace-keeping operation. With authority to “govern” the region, the Transitional Administration had extensive civil responsibilities including the maintenance of law and order. Following the demilitarization of the local Serb army in June 1996, there were significant numbers of weapons in the hands of the Serb population. The weapons ranged from handguns to anti-tank rockets and mortars, mines, cassette bombs and a wide range of ammunition.

Although the mandate of UNTAES contained no specific reference to removing weapons from civilian hands, it was clear that a determined effort of this nature was consistent with the need to ensure civil law and order, the maintenance of peace and security and the preparation of conditions for the eventual handing over of the region, demilitarized and secure, to the sovereign control of the government of Croatia.

A ‘search-and-seize’ operation by UNTAES was discounted, as it would have resulted in UNTAES being quickly regarded as an occupation force. Other methods had to be found, with appropriate inducements that would attract the voluntary surrender of weapons. From these considerations the concept arose of a weapons buy-back scheme financed by the Croatian government. Discussions with Croatian authorities began in June 1996 and by early October, arrangements had been agreed and the program began.

Between 2 October 1996 and 19 August 1997, when the program ended, the program recovered approximately 10,000 rifles, 7,000 anti-tank rocket launchers, 15,000 grenades and almost two million rounds of ammunition. The program provided for payments in cash and anonymously, at four collection points in the UNTAES military compounds in the region. The amounts to be paid were determined by Croatian weapons experts who then paid cash direct to the person concerned. This was at UNTAES request so that no UNTAES personnel handled any money, thereby eliminating the risk of subsequent allegations over the mishandling of cash.

Weapons in good condition were transferred to Zagreb and placed in storage in UN custody until the end of the UNTAES mandate in January 1998 when they were handed over to the Croatian authorities. Weapons that were old, unserviceable or dangerous, and all ammunition recovered, were destroyed by UNTAES.

Overall, the weapons buy-back program was a highly successful operation. It certainly did not remove all the weapons from civilian hands, but every weapon and every round of ammunition recovered reduced the numbers at large and steadily contributed, together with the other aspects of UNTAES work, to moving the region from the tension of war towards a return of stability.

In the light of the UNTAES experience, there would appear to be little doubt that in appropriate circumstances a weapons buy-back program—sensitively designed and carefully implemented—can be a highly useful contribution to wider efforts to restore peace and stability in civil societies in the wake of war.

Preface

The termination of several long-standing armed conflicts in recent years has raised the prospects for the redirection of resources towards more peaceful pursuits. However, in many respects, the immediate post-conflict period is characterized as a time of uneasy transition. Ex-combatants must be demobilized and reintegrated into civil society, the long process of physical and psychological healing must begin, dysfunctional public institutions rebuilt, and disrupted development restarted in a sustainable way—all significant challenges in and of themselves. The presence of a large volume of weapons—especially small arms and light weapons—in this environment directly endangers the fulfillment of these objectives.

Despite the extreme difficulties in implementing disarmament in the immediate post-conflict period,¹ countries emerging from a period of conflict, as well as the international community, have begun to recognize the importance of removing the weapons threat from the post-conflict equation. With increasing frequency, weapons collection is becoming an explicit and essential element of peace settlements. The agreements marking the termination of conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, Liberia, Mozambique, Angola, Mali, and the Central African Republic, among others, have all borne this out to varying degrees of success. The international community also has recently introduced important initiatives calling for the proper integration of weapons collection into conflict-termination agreements:

- In August 1997, the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms delivered its final report to the Secretary-General.² Aside from highlighting the extent to which the proliferation of small arms is threatening international development efforts and the peace-keeping operations of the UN itself, the report urges the UN and its Member States to step up their efforts in combating the illicit use and transfer of these weapons. Among other things, the report specifically recommends: *UN support for post-conflict disarmament measures such as weapons turn-in programs and disposal of weapons; the integration of weapons collection and disposal plans into peace settlements; and the prompt collection and destruction of all weapons not under legal civilian possession and not required for national defense or internal security.*
- On 26 June 1997, the European Union Council of Ministers adopted the “EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms,” in which both Member States and the European Commission express their political commitment to take action to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in arms—particularly small arms. The Programme itself lays out a framework of activities which fall into three categories: 1) measures to prevent illicit arms flows from or through Member States; 2) measures to help other countries prevent illicit arms flows from or through their territories; 3) measures to assist countries, especially in post-conflict situations or situations where a minimal degree of security and stability exists, in suppressing the illicit flow of arms. The latter includes *incorporating appropriate*

measures into peacekeeping operations and cease-fire and peace agreements; establishing weapons collection, buy-back and destruction programs; setting up educational programs to promote awareness of the negative consequences of illicit trafficking, and; promoting re-integration of former combatants into civilian life.

Though these initiatives are encouraging, significant gaps remain in both knowledge of past experience and plans on how to proceed with implementation of practical measures in the areas circumscribed. However, with further elaboration of what has been done and what is possible, states can be compelled to take concrete action.

Weapons collection at BICC

The case study presented in *BICC Brief 12*—covering the weapons buy-back program conducted by UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia—has been commissioned in conjunction with BICC’s project on *Weapons Collection and Disposal as an Element of Post-Settlement Peace-Building*. The project, spanning a two-year period, is partially funded by the Ford Foundation and the United States Institute of Peace, in addition to BICC’s own institutional core funding. In essence, the project has been designed to enable a better understanding of the interaction and relative importance of weapons collection and disposal among other post-conflict processes—such as the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.

¹ In such a situation, combatants are often uncertain a peace will hold and unwilling to give up their arms, and the unstable security environment warrants even ‘civilian’ possession of weapons for self-defense.

² *Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms*. United Nations General Assembly document A/52/298, 27 August 1997.

As part of this project, we have chosen to undertake a focused comparison of several countries where weapons collection was considered an essential element of the process. The cases selected to date include: Guatemala, El Salvador, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Mali, the Central African Republic, and Liberia. These cases share both significant similarities and offer significant differences from which to evaluate aspects of weapons collection and derive lessons learned.

There are, potentially, two phases to weapons collection in a post-conflict society. In what I will term *Phase I* collection, the immediate threat of reversion to open conflict is removed or lessened by the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants. However, this does not remove the threat of weapons or the potential for reversion to violence. Frequently, in societies which have undergone drawn-out and divisive conflict, a culture of violence is instilled and weapons have been dispersed throughout communities—among combatants and non-combatants alike. Therefore, *Phase II* collection and related activities are a group of longer-term efforts aimed at disarming an armed civilian population, reducing the availability and visibility of weapons, and diminishing the perception that weapons are a means to settle disputes. Essentially, the experience in Eastern Slavonia reflects both these aspects of weapons collection and thus offers fertile ground for analysis.

The project is specifically geared to generate a strategy for the integration of effective weapons collection programs into post-conflict peace-building activities, and to develop a practical handbook to guide practitioners in the effective collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons. Weapons collection and

destruction, especially in the immediate post-conflict and/or force demobilization phase, is a key choke-point and provides a window of opportunity to begin to make inroads into stemming the flood of weapons in circulation in conflict-prone regions. Equally as important, the timely and effective collection of weapons can be a measure of conflict prevention; preventing the subsequent spread of these weapons to other conflicts within or outside the immediate area.

Approach and methodology

As noted above, the core of the project is a focused comparison of case studies to determine the elements of successful weapons collection program design and implementation, as well as the relevancy of weapons collection in the broader context of peace-building and development. In order to achieve maximum comparability among the studies commissioned, each author has been provided with a set of factors from which to base their data collection and analysis. These factors were designed to be relevant to the environment, conduct and outcome of weapons collection in the selected countries. This set of baseline factors is as follows:

Contextual factors—*The general environment triggering and influencing the performance of the collection effort.* This includes a broad review of the political economy of each country as well as a more detailed analysis of the conflictual context that prompted the weapons collection effort and the nature of the weapons-related threat. Analysis of these factors will require consideration of the:

- general economic situation in the country
- impetus for the collection effort
- legal context
- cultural acceptability of weapons
- availability and visibility of weapons
- types and volume of weapons in circulation
- sources of weapons flows (internal circulation, leaks, imports)

Program factors—*The goals, design, and conduct of the collection program itself.* This includes a detailed review of program documentation (including elements of peace agreements referencing disarmament provisions and peace-keeping force mandates) as well as interviews with key informants of the process. Analysis would include:

- definition and feasibility of program goals
- incentive structure, adequacy and side-effects
- whether the program was part of a broader strategy (education, awareness, enhanced security)
- timing and duration
- storage and destruction
- form(s) of the collection effort (voluntary hand-in, buy-back, amnesty, enforcement action)
- scope of collection (ex-combatants, civilian population, etc.)

- role of external assistance (incl. peacekeeping forces, advisors, financial and technical assistance)

Outcome factors—*Actual program results as well as the perceived impact by the relevant actors and civilian population.* This group of factors aims to evaluate the impact of the weapons collection effort and whether original goals and objectives were achieved. These factors, especially, will require both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the program's impact:

- number and condition of weapons collected
- overall program cost
- perception of the general population as to the collection program and its outcome
- whether the program addressed the supply and demand of weapons
- whether the original goals of the program were reached
- whether the potential for violence has been decreased
- final disposition of the weapons
- whether collected weapons have been replaced through further supply
- whether the visibility of weapons decreased or increased

- intangibles—secondary and tertiary effects of the collection experience

We, at BICC, trust you will find the following study not only engaging, but also ripe with practical observations from which to inform further planning, implementation and evaluation of weapons collection efforts.

Joseph Di Chiaro III
Project Leader

Prologue to a Collection Effort

From October 1996 to August 1997 a weapons buy-back program was carried out by the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). During those ten months, approximately 10,000 rifles, 7,000 anti-tank rocket launchers, 15,000 grenades and almost two million rounds of ammunition were removed from civilian hands (United Nations Security Council, 1997). Before describing how this program was organized and carried out, it is of interest to consider how such a large quantity of arms and ammunition came to be in the hands of a civilian population of some 135,000.

Politico-military background

By its constitution of 1974, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Tito was organized for administrative purposes into six republics, with two autonomous provinces within the republic of Serbia. The boundary line between the republic of Croatia and the autonomous Serb province of Vojvodina was drawn for the most part down the river Danube, from the Hungarian border in the north to Ilok in the south. Principally intended as an administrative demarcation, when Croatia's independence was recognized internationally in 1992 this boundary became Croatia's eastern border with Serbia.

By the time of Tito's death in May 1980, the strains of keeping the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia together were already mounting. In the years that followed, the federal institutions deteriorated and the country disintegrated into factional struggles. Fanned by the flames of nationalism and widening disagreements with the federal authorities in Belgrade, first Slovenia in September 1989, then Croatia in April 1990, declared sovereignty while remaining members of the federal republic. Within Croatia, some 12 percent of the population of 4.7 million were Serbs, mostly in the three regions of the Krajina, Western Slavonia and Eastern Slavonia. Increasingly, during 1989 and 1990 hostile acts between militant members of the respective communities polarized opinion and spread deep apprehension and fear on both sides. More incidents and provocations occurred and, in May 1990, confrontation between Croats and Serbs escalated sharply when a number of Croatian policemen were killed in a Serb ambush in Borovo Selo, on the northern outskirts of Vukovar. In the weeks that followed, further violent incidents took place that led to the atmosphere becoming yet more highly charged.

On 25 June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared themselves independent. Open warfare broke out in the summer of 1991 between the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the poorly equipped defense units of the two new states. The war in Slovenia lasted only ten

days, as the JNA saw no reason to fight when virtually no Serbs lived in the country. However, in Croatia—which contained almost half a million Serbs—the fighting was vicious and bitter. For the Serbs, it was a matter of protecting Serb lives and property by asserting territorial control. To the Croats it was blatant Serb aggression.

By September, the JNA controlled over a quarter of Croatian territory. It was in three separate blocks: in the Krajina around the Serb stronghold of Knin, in the part of Croatia known as Western Slavonia, and in Eastern Slavonia and the Baranja although the town of Vukovar itself remained in Croatian hands.

Box 1: The geographical setting

As the River Danube emerges southwards from Hungary, on its long way to the Black Sea, it winds its way majestically across a highly fertile alluvial plain before turning south-east, then east towards Belgrade and beyond. Over the years, the wide river has altered its course from time to time, meandering through marshlands and thickly wooded areas. Inland from the river the land is very rich, with vineyards, orchards and extensive open fields producing abundant harvests of wheat, barley, corn, sunflowers, rapeseed and other crops.

Along both its banks, the Danube passes villages and towns that have been inhabited for centuries: Batina, Apatin, Aljmas, Erdut, Dalj, Borovo Selo, Vukovar, Ilok and Backa Palanka. To the west of the Danube, the northern part lying between the tributary river of the Drava and the Danube is known as the Baranja, while the central section is part of the larger area of Eastern Slavonia and the southern part, extending from below Vukovar past Ilok and into Serbia is Western Sirmium. In the Baranja, the only town of size is Beli Manastir, but further south the largest urban concentration is the town and river port of Vukovar which, until war destroyed it in 1991, was a handsome and ethnically mixed town of some 58,000 residents with architecture and houses that reflected the history and wealth of the region.

The Vukovar area itself has been settled for some 5,000 years, as evidenced by archeological finds at the Vucedol site by the river five kilometers south of the town. The Romans established their presence in the vicinity of Vukovar, reclaimed marshland and planted the first vineyards. Demographically, the region as a whole has witnessed the ebb and flow of many peoples and, until 1991, the population on both sides of the river was a mix of Serbs, Croats, Hungarians, Slovaks, Vlachs, Ruthenes and others.

The width and speed of the Danube have permitted few bridges, but the richness of the land and the value of the river as a route of transport and communication have attracted the interests of powerful states and migrating peoples. On both banks of the river and the surrounding lands, Roman, Frankish, Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and German armies have marched, deployed and constructed defensive positions. State authority has changed hands on many occasions as military power and political authority have risen and fallen. In the 20th century, with the rearrangement of state borders that followed the end of World War I, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created, which was subsequently, in 1928, given the name of Yugoslavia.

After sporadic mortar attacks in August, between September and November 1991 the Serbs launched sustained land and air bombardment against Vukovar. Situated on the right bank of the Danube, it was an easy target for Serb artillery across the river and Serb aircraft from nearby bases. JNA troops and Serb paramilitaries attacked the town by land, putting most of its residents to flight, and the few who remained took shelter in their cellars. In the street fighting that took place over three months, the town was virtually destroyed. Vukovar fell on 18 November and those residents who emerged from almost three months in their cellars found a town that was almost unrecognizable. Over 200 patients and wounded at the hospital were taken out by the JNA and Serb paramilitaries to a farm south of Vukovar, interrogated, beaten, shot and dumped in a mass grave. This atrocity further enraged Croatian public opinion, setting the scene for eventual revenge.

By the end of 1991, except for a few mostly elderly Croats living in isolated Croatian villages, the only other Croats living in the region were those intermarried with Serbs. Through the countryside to the west ran a sinuous, heavily mined no-man's land. The two nearest Croatian towns, Osijek and Vinkovci, were under Serb siege and well within Serb artillery range. As in most of Croatia, the population polarized and Serbs who had lived in those towns, in fear of their lives, fled to the security of the Serb-held areas. From a pre-war population of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium estimated to be about 180,000, the number of Serbs and others remaining had declined to less than half that figure. Vukovar, its port, railways, public services, schools, churches, shops, houses and industry were destroyed. The villages that had had Croatian residents were a tragic picture of houses smashed, looted and burned, churches defaced—a rural life savagely torn by the brutality of war. But for

those people who remained, the region was ethnically Serb, most of the land could still be farmed and the produce sold or bartered in Serbia.

Punctuated by sporadic bombardments and probing attacks against each other's lines, this uneasy situation continued until the summer of 1995. By then, Croatia had armed and trained its military forces with assistance from abroad despite the general arms embargo declared by the UN Security Council. In two swift and brutal military operations, first Western Slavonia and then the Krajina were recovered. The tide of ethnic cleansing was turned with a vengeance as now it was Serbs who were ejected; almost 200,000 Serbs fled from their homes and streamed eastwards. While many continued on into Serbia, some arrived in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium to make homes in former Croatian houses that had been looted and burned some four years earlier. This brought the number of Serbs in the region to some 125,000, of whom about 60,000 were displaced from elsewhere in Croatia.

In August 1995, the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia became greatly alarmed at the prospect of a Croatian attack to recover the last Serb-held enclave on Croatian territory. These fears were heightened in early September when NATO took strong military action against the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and forced the parties to the conflict to the negotiating table at Dayton. This concern was well justified as, emboldened by their two earlier successes, there were loud public calls in Zagreb for a third operation in Eastern Slavonia that would eradicate the Serb problem once and for all.

The Basic Agreement and the establishment of UNTAES

Through August and September 1995, Peter Galbraith, US Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia, and Thorvald Stoltenberg, UN Representative to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, worked with the two sides to negotiate a text on arrangements for bringing the territory peacefully under Croatian authority.

In addition to seeking to avoid a repetition of the dramatic events and the exodus of Serbs that had taken place in Western Slavonia and the Krajina, the international community did not wish to see a resumption of conflict in Eastern Slavonia just at the time when the Dayton Accord was able to bring war to an end in Bosnia. Croatian military action to recover control of their territory *pre*-Dayton was one thing, but further open war, killings and ethnic cleansing *post*-Dayton was quite another. It therefore became essential to find a way of avoiding such an outcome.

Eleven basic principles of a settlement were tentatively agreed by early October, but it was only in the margins of Dayton that Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman hammered out the deal that led to what became known as the Basic Agreement. It was eventually signed at Erdut, on the banks of the River Danube, on 12 November 1995. Unlike the hundreds of pages and maps that constituted the Dayton Accord, the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium consisted of only fourteen paragraphs (see text, Appendix I).

As its first provision, the Basic Agreement stipulated that there would be “a transitional period of 12 months” which could be “extended at most to another period of the same duration if so requested by one of the parties.”

The signatories called on the UN Security Council to establish a Transitional Administration to “govern the Region during the transitional period in the interest of all persons resident in or returning to the Region.” They also requested the Council to authorize an international force to maintain peace and security.

The Basic Agreement declared that the Region would be demilitarized according to the schedules and procedures determined by the international force and not later than 30 days after deployment of that force. The demilitarization must include all military forces, weapons and police, except for the international force and for police operating under the supervision, or with the consent, of the Transitional Administration. There was no mention of the control or disposal of weapons that might remain in civilian hands.

The UN Security Council, in adopting its resolution 1025(1995) on 30 November, requested the Secretary-General to draw up a report and make recommendations on how the Basic Agreement might be implemented. He presented that report on 13 December (United Nations Security Council, 1995) and his concerns regarding the fragility of the situation in the region were quite apparent:

“4. After four years of hostilities and prolonged tension, deep-rooted mistrust prevails and each party perceives the other to have broken agreements and committed acts of aggression. There is, in this Serb-controlled area, both an element of lawlessness and a fear of Croatian military and police action. The Croatian government has, in the recent past, repeatedly stated its preparedness to embark on military action to achieve the reintegration of the territory. Against this background, and given the failure of earlier attempts to demilitarize the sector under a United Nations peace-keeping operation, deployment of an insufficient force would be likely to undermine implementation of the basic agreement and to precipitate the very chain of events the operation is intended to prevent. Only a substantial military force

deployed at the outset could generate the mutual confidence necessary for the parties to take the difficult steps required of them under the basic agreement.”

The Secretary-General’s preference for a multinational force, rather than a UN force, authorized by the Security Council and with a Chapter VII mandate was clear. He proposed a force of 9,300 troops, plus logistic support, attached for command and logistical purposes to the implementation force being deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Originally it was also envisaged in some capitals that the international force would not be a UN force,¹ but for a number of reasons it became apparent that his report should include a UN option. Somewhat reluctantly, therefore, the Secretary-General offered as a second option that the operation should be entrusted to a UN force of the same size.

Finding 9,300 troops, and their necessary logistic support, at the same time as a major military operation was being mounted in Bosnia and Herzegovina was no easy task for the international community. Moreover, as a UN operation it would increase the costs on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, even though only one of them (Russia) would actually have troops on the ground. In the absence of any US troops, there was an even stronger need for American commitment to be in evidence. In December Mr. Jacques Paul Klein, a career United States Foreign Service diplomat (and also a Major-General in the US Air Force Reserve), was identified as the prospective candidate for the leadership of the UN operation and visited Belgrade, Zagreb and the region. With personal assurances of cooperation from Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman, he returned to the United States with the view that the operation was practicable and could be done with 5,000 troops provided that the member States fully supported it.

On 15 January 1996, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1037(1996) establishing a UN peace-keeping mission under the name of United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). Its military component was described as “an initial deployment of up to 5,000 troops” with the following mandate:

- “(a) To supervise and facilitate the demilitarization as undertaken by the parties to the Basic Agreement, according to the schedule and procedures to be established by UNTAES;*
- (b) To monitor the voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their home of origin in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as provided for in the Basic Agreement;*
- (c) To contribute, by its presence, to the maintenance of peace and security in the region; and*
- (d) Otherwise to assist in the implementation of the Basic Agreement.”*

(United Nations Security Council, 1996)

On 17 January the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his decision to appoint Mr. Jacques Paul Klein as the Transitional Administrator.

¹ Croatia had come to regard the presence of UN troops as an obstacle to the recovery of its territory. At the same time, Washington did not believe that the UN had the capacity and muscle to perform the function successfully—a judgment with which the Secretary-General did not disagree as he had no confidence that the necessary troops and resources would be forthcoming from member States. The original US idea was to have a combination of US and Russian troops, but when it became clear that the deployment of yet more US troops, in addition to those in Bosnia, would be rejected by the US Congress, and that no other variation of a NATO option was available, Washington had no alternative but to fall back to a force of UN ‘blue-helmets.’

It should be noted at this point that the legal authority of UNTAES was, for a UN operation, unusually straightforward. In most UN peace-keeping operations, the UN leadership does not have independence of control, but has to deal with one or more existing governments and work with those authorities in implementing the mandate given to the operation by the UN Security Council. For UNTAES, there was no doubt that the region was part of the sovereign territory of Croatia, but in accordance with the Basic Agreement and resolution 1037(1996), it was the Transitional Administrator who had the legal responsibility to *govern* the UNTAES region. In practice, the local Serbs continued to run much of the day-to-day business of local authority. Only the Transitional Administrator was in a position to make binding arrangements with the Croatian government in Zagreb, the Serbian government in Belgrade and the local Serb authorities.

Over the following four months, the 1,600 Belgian and Russian troops already in the region as part of the existing UN peace-keeping operation were supplemented by a further 3,300 troops. These consisted of battalions from Jordan and Pakistan, with their M60 and T95 tanks, M113 armored personnel carriers and howitzers; a helicopter squadron from Ukraine with Mi-24 assault helicopters and Mi-8 transport helicopters; an Argentinean reconnaissance company; a Slovak engineering battalion; a Czech field hospital and surgical team; and an Indonesian medical company. A small Polish special police group was added later. There were also 100 military observers from 22 countries. The Force Commander was Major-General Jozef Schoups from Belgium, succeeded in February 1997 by Major-General Willy Hanset also of Belgium.

By mid-April, UNTAES had established its civil, police and military headquarters in Vukovar, and at the end of April the Jordanian and Pakistani battalions arrived by ship at the Croatian port of Rijeka and moved overland to the region. As Spring progressed, the local population witnessed more and more evidence of a vigorous UN presence. As the troops and their military assets arrived and were deployed, with heavy equipment taking up its positions and helicopter gunships exercising over the region, an unspoken but clear message was being deliberately sent to the Serb and Croatian authorities, and to the people of the region, that UNTAES was more robustly equipped than other UN missions and would be prepared to impose security if challenged. This attitude, together with other aspects of the style with which UNTAES implemented its mandate, undoubtedly helped to create an atmosphere that was conducive to the civilian population subsequently taking part in the weapons buy-back program.

Demilitarization and the economy

At the beginning of the year, before the arrival of UNTAES troops, the region was the home of between 8,000 and 12,000 armed Serb soldiers of the 'Army of the Republika Srpska Krajina,' 11 Slavonia Baranja Corps and a number of Serb para-militaries. Almost every able-bodied male was serving, or liable to serve, in some form of military capacity, reserve or paramilitary group. Some of the officers were from the JNA and the military equipment included 120 tanks, 120 artillery pieces, 140 mortars and other heavy weapons. The Serb police (*milicija*) were also supplemented by personnel from Yugoslavia.

This military atmosphere pervaded a setting in which the economy was virtually at a standstill. Vukovar had been extensively destroyed and in the

four years since the end of the fighting almost nothing had been done to restore the economy. It must be recognized that the conditions in and around Vukovar in the first months after the fighting must have been almost indescribable, with bodies in the ruins, rubble in the streets, no electricity or water supplies, and winter weather. As time passed, basic clearing up was done and the hospital was put back into working order, but with the destruction of the port, industry, the railways, shops and businesses, there were almost no jobs. Apart from individual efforts, there was no reconstruction as there was no money available. Unemployment was approximately 70 percent. The economy, except the agriculture sector, was devastated and there was little financial or other support from any source to help it to recover.

When, in late May 1996, UNTAES declared itself ready to supervise demilitarization of the Serb army, it was recognized that one of the products of this process would be further unemployment. To a small extent, this was alleviated by taking some of the demilitarized soldiers into the local police force. This did not improve the expertise and professionalism of the police, but at least it reduced the numbers of those released on to the streets with no job and no prospects. The only part of the legal economy that functioned, albeit with difficulties, was agriculture. Between ploughing and planting in the spring and harvest in the autumn, there was seasonal work for those living in the region who had farming equipment and land to cultivate. There was, of course, no means of exporting the produce westwards to markets in Croatia, but traditional ties with Serbian markets to the south and east continued. But this was work generally open only to indigenous residents of the region. The 60,000 Serbs displaced from the Krajina and Western Slavonia were, for the most part, jobless.

Totally cut off from any financial support from the Croatian side, the local Serb authorities depended heavily on subventions from the Yugoslav government in Belgrade. These were granted in return for oil being produced from the Djeletovci oilfields in the southern part of the region and taken to help the Yugoslav economy. In mid-April 1996, however, a behind-the-scenes deal between Belgrade and Zagreb resulted in the pumping of oil being stopped. From then on the financial subventions from Belgrade also began to dry up. Progressively, salaries of police, teachers and others were paid later and later as the year went on.

As is often the case in war zones, there was a thriving black market. Coffee, cigarettes and other goods entered the region from across the Danube and by country roads and trails from Serbia in the south, often dodging efforts to collect customs duties. This, too, meant that the sources of income open to the local Serb authorities diminished, with the result that there was no money to employ people in demolishing rubble or any works of reconstruction. The presence of UNTAES itself, with international personnel paying rent for their accommodation and with opportunities for offering some jobs to local employment, eased some of the economic strain. For the majority of the population, however, finding sources of income was a constant challenge.

Impetus for the weapon collection effort

Identifying the problem

By late June 1996, the UNTAES Force Commander was able to carry out a series of inspections and then certify that demilitarization had been successfully completed. But as soldiers took off their uniforms and merged into civilian life, they often took their hand-carried weapons with them. The

combination of a jobless, demoralized, apprehensive population with ready access to large quantities of weapons was seen by UNTAES as a major threat to the maintenance of civil law and order. Furthermore, the prevalence of weapons and their use by armed groups might tempt some of the more militant Serbs to carry out attacks across the no-man's land against Croatian targets (although, in the end, this never occurred). In turn, such developments would invite Croatian punitive action and bring UNTAES into a political, or worse military, confrontation with Croatian authorities. Finally the continued possession of weapons by local Serbs would be highly unacceptable to the Croatian government, could be an obstacle to the eventual transfer of authority to Zagreb, and would certainly result in retribution by the Croatian authorities after the departure of UNTAES at the end of its mandate. In these circumstances, as soon as demilitarization of the Serb army was completed, the next logical step was an organized effort to control the weapons that remained and, as far as possible, get them out of civilian hands.

The first part of this effort was the designation of weapons that could be held legally and a system for their registration. The procedure designed by UNTAES was modeled closely on the Weapons Act of Croatia of 1992, as amended in 1995, as this would eventually be the law in force in the region at the end of the UNTAES mandate. The weapons permitted were defined by exclusion: automatic, semi-automatic weapons with more than ten rounds of storage capacity, silenced weapons, exploding projectiles and other devices, and any other types of weapons or devices UNTAES designated as prohibited, were not allowed. Weapons not prohibited could be registered for self-defense purposes and could be kept in the owner's home or regular place of abode. Following usual practice in Croatia, no numeric

limit was set on the number of weapons that could be registered. Permits to carry weapons, in addition to registration, were issued for hunting and sporting purposes subject to a distance limit of 10 kilometers from place of residence.

The issuance of registration licenses and carrying permits was implemented through local police stations and the arrangements were introduced in late June 1996, shortly after the end of demilitarization. With these two major aspects in place, it became time to institute arrangements to take as many of the remaining weapons out of civilian hands as possible.

The nature and scope of the weapons threat

In considering what might be the best approach to the matter of weapons collection, UNTAES had to take fully into account local attitudes towards firearms. Throughout the Balkans there is a traditional acceptance of civilian possession of weapons. Not only are they needed for hunting and sporting, but on occasions of weddings, celebrations or other significant days, it is not uncommon for weapons to be fired into the air. The unwary foreigner, newly arrived into a Serb area, might easily mistake the customary *feu de joie* on Serb Orthodox New Year's Eve as the noise of a spirited gun battle.

This possession of guns was further strengthened by the effects of war and the perceptions by most families that weapons, including automatic rifles, were needed for self-protection against indiscriminate ethnic violence, murder, rape and robbery.

In addition to hunting rifles and handguns, there was a wide variety of hand-held weapons, grenades, mines and mortars in the region. Moreover, except in the Baranja which was protected by the river Drava, the Serbs had long expected that a Croatian

attack would be spearheaded by tanks coming eastwards across the open fields. To rebuff such attacks, the JNA had brought into the region and distributed large numbers of mines and single-shot anti-tank rocket launchers. Many of these were left behind when the JNA departed, together with large quantities of ammunition of all kinds.

Thus, weapons left behind by the Serb military during the conflict and upon demilitarization were the primary source of available weapons. But it was clear that, since the end of the hand-to-hand fighting in late 1991, weapons had been circulating freely and in large quantities among the local population.

Secondary sources were across the traditionally open border with Serbia, to the east and south. Although UNTAES border monitors were stationed at the border bridges and crossings, and greater efforts were made after demilitarization to stop the import of weapons, the fact remained that it was not practicable to search extensively every vehicle and all its contents as they entered the region. In particular to the south the border with Serbia lay across open countryside and wooded areas through which local people knowing the trails and secondary roads were always able to bring in further weapons if they so wished. However, as there were already large numbers of weapons in the region, it seems doubtful that there was any organized illicit trafficking.

In early 1996, when UNTAES was first established, it was not unusual to see handguns and similar small weapons being carried in the streets. This was primarily due to the fact that many local Serbs were also serving in the Serb army, or liable to do so, and the local Serb *milicija* did not regard the practice as one that they should do anything about. As UNTAES troops and police grew in numbers, the situation improved but handguns were often still carried discreetly, particularly by local thugs and ‘mafiosi.’

Box 2: An illustrative list of weapons in civilian hands

Handguns:

- pistol CZ M 70 cal 7.65 BR
- pistol CZ M 99 cal 9 mm Luger and 40 S&W
- trophy pistol cal 9 mm Luger (“Parabellum” Luger 08, Walther P 38, etc.)

Long military weapons:

- repeater rifle CZ “company 44” MS
- semiautomatic rifle PAP M 59/66 cal 7.62x39
- semiautomatic sniper rifle with optical device CZ M 76 cal 7.9

Long hunting weapons:

- shot gun “boker” SSSR IZ
- hunting carbines Zastava-70 (various calibers)

Automatic weapons:

- automatic pistol “Skorpion” cal 7.65
- automatic rifle M 70 CZ cal 7.62x39
- sub-machine gun M 53 CZ cal 7.9
- machine gun Heckler & Koch PM cal 5.9 Para

Other weapons:

- portable launcher M 57
- RPG 7
- grenade launcher MGL 40
- guided anti-tank rockets
- hand grenades

The types of weapons in circulation varied widely, as did their age and condition. Some were modern, still in the manufacturer’s wrapping, while others were relics of World War II and even, on occasions, of earlier vintage. Box 2 provides an illustrative list.

In addition, there were anti-personnel and mortar mines, cassette bombs, grenade fuses, artillery projectiles and a wide range of ammunition. At the beginning of the buy-back program, UNTAES categorically refused to accept mines. In public

announcements, UNTAES declared that mines were highly dangerous and should not be moved or carried. Subsequently, however, despite these instructions there were occasions when mines were brought to the collection points and were accepted by UNTAES for destruction.²

² Although mines were dangerous to transport to the collection points, it would have been irresponsible for UNTAES to have sent them away. In the final weeks of the program over 500 mines, including TMA4 anti-tank mines, were brought to the collection points in the Baranja. Their source was never identified but UNTAES military believed that they might have come from minefields around Kopacevo.

Program Design and Implementation

Neither the Basic Agreement nor resolution 1037(1996) approved by the Security Council in January 1996 contained any specific reference to a weapons buy-back program, nor would such a reference be expected. But the philosophy of the UNTAES leadership was to regard the mandate as a floor on which the fabric of implementation was to be constructed, rather than a ceiling that placed restraints and limits on the operation. Accordingly, a determined effort to significantly reduce the quantities of weapons in civilian hands was consistent with the need to ensure civil law and order, the maintenance of peace and security and the preparation of conditions for the eventual handing over of the region, demilitarized and secure, to the sovereign control of the government of Croatia.

One possible method that was promptly discarded was a house-to-house search. Such a ‘search and seize’ policy would have been unacceptably intrusive and would have resulted in UNTAES being quickly regarded as an occupation force. On the contrary, it was necessary that UNTAES should win the confidence and respect of the local population if the aims of the civil aspects of the UNTAES mandate were to be achieved. Moreover, it would have been an incorrect use of UNTAES troops and an inappropriate function for UN civil police. It was decided that such invasions of private property would only take place if there were incidents that necessitated such actions, and that on such occasions the local police force would be used.

In this context, it should be recalled that one of the tasks of UNTAES was to establish and train a Transitional Police Force (TPF). This force was constructed in stages from the original

Serb *milija*, with Croatian police being added gradually as the months passed. The quality of the TPF improved over time, but due to their natural sympathies with local Serbs and the historical fact that the early stages of the Serb/Croat confrontation had seen violence and shooting within the police, the Serb members of the TPF could never be totally relied upon to take action against local Serbs.

Thus, it was necessary to keep the goal straightforward—to get as many unauthorized weapons, ammunition and explosives off the streets and out of the hands of the civilian population. Keeping this goal simple helped considerably in the design of a practicable and achievable program.

Discussions with Croatian authorities

Within UNTAES it was clear that, as no one in the local population was going to surrender weapons voluntarily and without reward, success could only be achieved by purchasing weapons for cash. But UNTAES had no money to purchase weapons, even if it had been possible to overcome the position generally adopted by the UN that the organization should never be in the business of purchasing weapons. Who would have interests strong enough to find money for such a program? The answer was: the Croatian government.

Exploratory discussions with the Croatian authorities began in June 1996, between the Deputy Minister of the Interior and the Deputy Transitional Administrator of UNTAES. Initially, and perhaps understandably, the Croatian reaction was that rather more direct methods should be used to relieve Serbs of their

weapons as the idea of paying Serbs money from the Croatian public purse did not seem likely to attract much support in Zagreb. However, the practical value of such a program was quickly recognized, particularly as there was already a similar program in operation in Croatia now that conflict was over.

Once the principle of a Croatian-financed buy-back was accepted, details of the arrangement were discussed. The Croatian position was that persons offering weapons should hand in the weapon, leave their names and addresses and then return for cash at a later date, by which time it would have been possible to carry out checks on the weapons. UNTAES declared that in those circumstances, Serbs would not come forward. UNTAES insisted that returns should be anonymous and cash payments should be made on the spot. The Croats also wanted to pay in the Croatian currency, kunas, to which UNTAES responded that the Serbs used Yugoslav dinars and would not accept kunas on principle. Recognizing that it would be equally unacceptable for the Croats to pay in dinars, the solution was found in using German marks (DM).

UNTAES wanted weapons collection procedures that would be controlled and monitored by UNTAES, but with the assessments of weapon condition and value being made by Croatian experts at the site of collection. Moreover, in order to preclude the risk of any subsequent allegation over the mishandling of cash, UNTAES asked that the payments should be made directly by the Croatian representatives to Serbs without any money ever touching the hands of UNTAES personnel.

Regarding the disposal of weapons collected, UNTAES wanted them all to be destroyed. However, the Croats objected on the grounds that as the weapons would be purchased with Croatian money they would then be Croatian property and should be handed over for Croatian disposal as they saw fit. UNTAES argued that

Serbs would not participate if they thought that weapons in good condition might soon be re-issued by the Croatian authorities and even perhaps used against Serbs. Eventually, a satisfactory compromise arrangement was found (see section on “Weapon storage and disposition” below).

These discussions, the establishment of price lists, and the setting up of workable arrangements within UNTAES for receipt and storage of weapons took about three months. The weapons buy-back program began in earnest on 2 October 1996.

Program elements and inception

Operational structure

As discussions with the Croatian authorities proceeded, extensive consideration was given within UNTAES to the procedures to be adopted to ensure that the program would be successful. It was clear that there must be well-controlled arrangements for the acceptance and custody of weapons, and that these could only be provided by the UNTAES military. The Force Commander instructed his staff to draw up an Operation Order based on the concept that there would be four Weapons Buy-back Locations (WBL), one at each battalion headquarters (Belgian and Pakistani battalions in the north, and Russian and Jordanian battalions in the south). Each battalion was required to provide security for the WBL and to be prepared to store weapons under secure conditions. In addition, each battalion was required to make arrangements to store ammunition and explosives for a few days until they were removed for destruction.

It was decided that each WBL would be open Monday to Friday, from 09.00 to 16.00. Each battalion was responsible for escorting a Croatian weapons expert into and out of the region, and for his security. The process of handing in weapons was anonymous, with no identification of persons bringing them to the WBL. Anyone seen taking photographs or video was stopped and the film destroyed unless the person concerned was in possession of written authorization by UNTAES. Weapons were separated from ammunition and explosives, so that the type and condition of the weapon could be assessed by the Croatian representative and a military expert, and the price to be paid determined by the Croatian expert. The money was then paid in cash directly to the person who had handed over the weapon or weapons.

Comprehensive records were maintained and submitted daily to UNTAES headquarters, together with an updated daily report. Weapons identified for retention were separated from those identified for destruction. The latter were subsequently destroyed at each WBL, whereas ammunition and explosives were kept separately and in safe custody for (approximately) weekly collection and transfer to special explosive ordnance disposal sites for disposal by UNTAES experts. It was made clear that the Croatian experts could witness those destructions if they so wished.

In order to guard against any risk of dangerous incidents, whether accidental or malevolent, private vehicles bringing weapons and explosives to the WBL were not allowed to enter the battalion compounds. The items were transferred to battalion transport and conveyed to the WBL under UNTAES custody. This gave rise to consideration of what action should be taken if the person with the weapon

did not accept the price offered (or in the event that the Croatian expert should have insufficient cash). In such cases, if the weapon was one that could be legitimately held and registered under the arrangements described earlier, it was taken into custody and a receipt was provided to the person concerned. Once he had registered the weapon properly with the police and had a registration certificate, he could return and recover the weapon in exchange for the receipt. All other weapons were taken into custody by UNTAES and a nameless receipt was issued, which the person concerned could exchange for cash at a later date if he so chose. In no circumstances were weapons allowed to leave the military compound, unless they were weapons that could be legitimately held and had been properly registered.

Public awareness

In order to inform the local population of the arrangements for weapons buy-back, an extensive publicity campaign was mounted. Posters were printed, in Serbian and Croatian,³ announcing the program and giving examples of the buy-back prices (see Appendices II and III). Special articles were also published in the UNTAES Bulletin, a newssheet prepared and published in both languages by UNTAES Public Affairs approximately every ten days (see Appendices IV and V). In addition, the leadership of UNTAES made special broadcasts on the local radio to announce the program and respond to call-in questions.

³ UNTAES carefully used both the Serbian (Cyrillic) script and the Croatian (Latin) script in its printed matter. The UNTAES Bulletin, printed in broadsheet form, was reversible with one language on one side and the second language on the other. So that UNTAES staff would be able to read the Bulletin, it was also printed in smaller numbers in English, which is the version shown in Appendices IV and V.

It was made clear that there would be no enforcement by UNTAES of the buy-back program, but that it was in everyone's interests that the weapons in the region should be significantly reduced—and here was a way of doing it that raised money, with no questions asked, at the same time. Notice was also given that anyone found with a weapon, but not in possession of a valid registration or authorization, would have the weapon confiscated on the spot.

In announcing the program, UNTAES made clear that it was open to all people living in the region, with no distinction being made between men, women, ex-combatants, Serbs, Hungarians, Ruthenes, and so on. UNTAES promised that the procedure was deliberately simple and anonymous, and ensured that that promise was kept. The public was told that any weapons would be accepted, except mines which were highly dangerous and should be reported so that UNTAES demolition experts could deal with them *in situ*. Once the program was in operation, UNTAES kept the population well informed of its progress, including of an occasion when two men had brought in 70 anti-tank rocket launchers and had received, at the declared price of DM 155 each, the sum of DM 10,850 in cash. The public was also told where the destruction of ammunition and explosives would take place, so that the noise of explosions would not create misunderstandings.

Adequacy of the incentive structure

At first, it was announced that the program would last only from early October 1996 to early January 1997, but subsequently the program was extended and eventually did not end until 19 August 1997. Payment in German marks continued for longer

than originally expected, before shifting to payment in kuna in Spring 1997. Throughout the period there were some criticisms in the Croatian parliament and the media that Serbs should not be paid money for their weapons. Another factor regarding payment in kuna was the marked psychological rejection by local Serbs of the kuna as a currency. This was due to the historical and symbolic associations of the kuna which, not surprisingly, carried the Croatian national flag. One of the challenges facing UNTAES was how and when to shift the currency of the region from Yugoslav dinars to the Croatian kuna. Following preparatory steps, such as payments in kuna to public employees of the region, this was eventually achieved over a two month period in May/June 1997, following which dinars were no longer legal tender.

The buy-back prices were set entirely by the Croatian authorities and prices and types of weapons listed were adjusted by the Croats as experience was gained. Care was taken to avoid, as far as possible, the creation of a market that would attract weapons from outside the region. From time to time during the program, there were some concerns that weapons were being brought in or smuggled across the border with Serbia, but it was never possible to prove this conclusively.

Early experiences were often surprising, as may be seen from Figures 1 and 2. For example, in the first two weeks of the program, the Jordanian WBL received 1,188 grenades (including rifle-grenades and anti-tank grenades), almost twice as many of this type as the other three WBLs together. In the same period, the Russian WBL and the Jordanian WBL together received 2,163 light anti-tank weapons. This number compared with the 171 light anti-tank weapons received by the two Belgian and Pakistani WBLs. In addition, the Russian and Jordanian WBLs, both situated in the southern part of the UNTAES region, received over 400,000 rounds of ammunition and explosive charges.

These results gave rise to a number of theories. First, it was possible that people thought it 'easier' to do business with the battalions in the south than in the north. On the other hand, it indicated that there were more weapons available in the south than in the north. This was highly likely, as a Croatian tank attack from the west had been long expected by the Serbs and the number of anti-tank weapons indicated the reception that such an attack might have received. Another factor could have been the comparative openness of the border with Serbia in the south, providing opportunities for smuggling from Serbia or even Bosnia and Herzegovina.

One of the effects of the high numbers of returns was that on several occasions the Croatian experts exhausted their supplies of cash early and the WBLs had to be closed ahead of the daily schedule.

Evaluation and adjustment

After the first two weeks, sufficient experience had been gained to review the implementation of the program and make adjustments. In addition, the Croatian authorities expressed their unhappiness with several aspects. On 16 October a meeting was therefore held, at ministerial level, between the Croatian authorities and UNTAES representatives. Items raised by the Croats included:

- the success at some of the WBLs was due to the fact the program was anonymous, and so individuals could sell weapons that did not belong to them;

- a number of vehicles bringing weapons had foreign (i.e., especially Yugoslav) license plates, indicating that weapons were being brought into the region for sale to the buy-back program;

- some members of the Transitional Police Force (TPF) were confiscating weapons from people en route to the WBLs and this attitude discouraged individuals from participating in the buy-back program;

- UNTAES supervision of weapons was not sufficiently secure and so it might be possible for weapons to reappear in the hands of civilians;

- ammunition and explosives were not being destroyed daily;

- weapons were not being stored satisfactorily and would deteriorate;

- Croatian experts were not being given sufficient protection;

- payments would continue to be made in German marks, but the time would come when payments would be made in kuna.

In response, UNTAES representatives made the following points:


- the success of the program showed how valuable it was to have the principle of anonymity, and this would be maintained;

- many of the vehicles in the region still had Yugoslav license plates and there had been no evidence to prove that weapons were being brought into the region, but UNTAES would tighten up its checks for weapons at the border crossings;

Figure 1: Buy-back program results by battalion, 2–18 October 1996

Ammunition figures in thousands.

Note: Figure recreated from charts supplied by the author.




BB: Belgian Battalion
 PB: Pakistani Battalion
 RB: Russian Battalion
 JB: Jordanian Battalion

Figure 2: Buy-back program results by type, 2–18 October 1996

Ammunition figures in thousands.

Note: Figure recreated from charts supplied by the author.



- the allegations against the TPF would be investigated,⁴ but the TPF had been given general instructions to confiscate unregistered weapons as part of their responsibilities to maintain law and order. Moreover, it was known that there were organized criminal elements at work, probably seeking to take advantage of the buy-back program;
- UNTAES was confident that weapons handed in were kept securely and there was no risk of them being ‘recycled’, but the arrangements would be checked;
- regarding daily destruction of ammunition, it had been found that the amounts handed in and the other destruction tasks (e.g., dealing with mines and other explosive items that were in great abundance in the region) was proving to be more than the UNTAES ordnance destruction teams could safely handle on a daily basis. Destruction would therefore be carried out every few days rather than daily;
- the problem of proper storage for weapons and arrangements for maintenance needed further consideration;
- the issue of protection would be considered as part of general security issues, including handling of public gatherings at the WBLs, and discussed with the TPF;
- a special UNTAES-Croatian working group would be established to address the issues of implementation.

Although it was apparent that there were indeed some initial difficulties in the implementation of the program that had to be resolved, it was also clear that in general the arrangements for the buy-back program had been well thought through and were successful. This was important as it constituted yet another step in building confidence and trust.

Weapon storage and disposition

As described above, the arrangements negotiated with the Croatian authorities provided for the assessment of weapon type and condition to be made by a Croatian expert at each collection site. Weapons that were old or in bad condition were kept by UNTAES for destruction. Small arms were crushed and heavier weapons were disabled by pouring concrete into the barrel. Ammunition and explosives were destroyed under controlled conditions by UNTAES demolition teams organized by the Force Engineer at special sites well away from public areas. Arrangements were made to enable Croatian representatives to be present, if they so wished, to satisfy themselves that UNTAES was carrying out the destruction satisfactorily.

The issue of how and where to store weapons in good condition was not resolved until some weeks after the buy-back program had started. Initially the Croatian authorities wanted them to be in Croatian custody, but UNTAES insisted that they should remain in UNTAES custody on the grounds that the Serb population might quickly develop mistrust in the program if they thought that the weapons were being handed directly to the Croats.

This impasse was resolved by an agreement that UNTAES should transport the weapons to secure and appropriate storage at Pleso Airport, Zagreb, where they would be kept under guard by UNTAES military until the end of the UNTAES mandate. This solution neatly achieved the aims of removing serviceable weapons from the region, and therefore out of reach of any recovery, and yet keeping them in UNTAES custody. It also gave Croatian military personnel convenient access to the weapons for maintenance purposes until the end of the UNTAES mandate in January 1998.

In early November 1996 it was estimated that by the end of the buy-back program there might be some 3,500 weapons to be stored in UNTAES custody at Pleso.⁵ An UNTAES team was given the task of finding suitable, secure storage that would be cost-effective and provide opportunities for Croatian weapon experts to carry out any necessary maintenance. The team was instructed not simply to pay lip service to the provision of security as, if any of the weapons were stolen or went missing while under UNTAES guard, the embarrassment to the UN would be significant. Even the possibility that some informal group of Croats might deliberately seek to embarrass the UN in this way was not overlooked.

⁴ As there were no Croatian members of the TPF at this juncture, these allegations were interesting in themselves: they indicated that the Croats either had sources of information inside the region, or were operating covertly to gather intelligence.

⁵ At that time, the end of the buy-back program was announced as January 1997. It was always assumed that this date would be extended but the ultimate duration was unknown. By the time the program ended on 19 August 1997, over 10,000 weapons were stored at Pleso.

Two strengthened military aircraft shelters in the UN compound at Pleso airport were identified as suitable, each with a floor space of about 50 square meters. A watchtower and special fencing were installed, and the site put under guard by Jordanian soldiers of UNTAES. The first four containers of weapons for safe custody were transported by UNTAES to Pleso in late November. On 5 December 1996, following careful inspection, counting and preparation by UNTAES and Croatian experts, the weapons were moved to the storage under UNTAES guard and with a double-key system for access. A UN container was placed to block the gates, with instructions that it could be moved only with authorization of the UN Military Liaison Officer Zagreb.

On 27 May 1997, by which time more than 7,000 weapons were in storage, the Croatian Minister of Interior wrote to the Transitional Administrator of UNTAES, informing him of a request by authorized trade agencies of Austria and Germany to purchase the long firearms in custody, for 'decorative purposes.' Such a sale was attractive to Croatia as it would result in recovering some of the costs of the buy-back program. The Minister confirmed that the firearms in question would be deactivated to the German standard for deactivating firearms so that they would be no longer usable and, if the proposal was accepted by UNTAES, the deactivation should be monitored and supervised by UNTAES experts.

Following approval from UN Headquarters in New York, and subject to the weapons being rendered *permanently* unusable, on 20 June UNTAES replied positively to the Croatian proposal and requested a copy of the German deactivation standard (German Federal Ministry of Science, 1979). It was ascertained that the intention was to deactivate some 2,000 weapons over a period of several weeks, starting by mid-July. By early August, 362 weapons had been

deactivated and removed from UNTAES custody for sale by the Croatian authorities but thereafter the program stopped and was not subsequently resumed during the period of the UNTAES mandate.

Following the end of the buy-back program, on 19 August 1997, the final consignment of weapons for storage was transferred to Pleso and by 12 September there was a total of 10,136 weapons in UNTAES custody. With the end of the UNTAES mandate in sight, during the summer of 1997 UNTAES began its military drawdown and contingents began to return to their respective countries. It was decided that the Jordanian platoon would be repatriated on 15 October and on 24 September the Force Commander wrote to the Croatian authorities requesting that they take over the full time guard of the weapons storage from 14 October.

Custody of the weapons, however, remained an UNTAES responsibility and, with the full cooperation of the Croatian authorities, the double-key system of access was continued. Croatian officials wanting access to the weapons had first to inform the UN Civil Liaison Officer who, in turn, was required to obtain clearance from UNTAES headquarters in Vukovar and then maintain a full time presence throughout every Croatian visit.

On 16 January 1998, with the end of the UNTAES mandate, the UN containers were removed from their positions in front of the storage doors and the UN keys were formally handed over to the Croatian authorities, thereby transferring the entire control of the remaining weapons to the Croatian government.

Program Outcome and Impact

An element of a broader strategy

One of the primary objectives of UNTAES was to hand over the region to the Croatian authorities at the end of the UNTAES mandate demilitarized, safe and secure. This entailed, in the first place, taking a deeply apprehensive Serb population with access to large numbers of weapons to a situation where law and order could be effectively maintained by the TPF, under monitoring and supervision by UNTAES Civil Police. Once that had been achieved, it set the stage for the gradual introduction of Croatian members of the TPF and prepared the local population for the arrival of Croatian authority on the departure of UNTAES. The weapons buy-back program was therefore an important part of this broader strategy of keeping the region peaceful and secure while progressive steps were taken by UNTAES to shift it from Serb control to Croatian control over a period of two years.

This had to be achieved in the face of the unreliability of local Serb TPF members, their reluctance to tackle armed mafiosi gangs and their unwillingness to deal robustly with occasions of Serb crowd violence. On several occasions UNTAES was pressed by the Croatian authorities to carry out raids on private homes and other inhabited places that were suspected of harboring weapons. Unless there was direct evidence of illegal activity UNTAES resisted such pressure, on the grounds that UNTAES was not in the business of establishing a police state. On the contrary, UNTAES wanted to generate a level of confidence and trust as part of moving towards a society in which people could live together once more. The buy-back program contributed significantly to this by reducing the numbers of weapons available to civilians but without doing that in such a way as to antagonize the local population.

Numerical results and costs

Table 1 presents a comparison of reported and published numbers of weapons collected at the program's mid-way point and at its conclusion.

These numbers do not fully reflect the range of weapons and explosives handed in. In addition there were a small number of handguns, various mines, over 100 mortars, detonators, explosive charges and even, towards the end, some hand-held ground-to-air missiles. The condition of the weapons and ammunition varied from very good, and sometimes still in the original packing, to antique, rusty and downright dangerous.

The Croatian government provided all the money for the payments made in exchange for weapons and ammunition. As stated earlier, in the early months payments were made in German marks, and subsequently in Croatian kuna. The provision of this money was not without political difficulties for the Croatian government. There were voices in the Croatian parliament and in the media that objected strongly to the idea of paying Serbs money for their weapons. There were many in Croatia who had deep and bitter memories of incidents

Table 1: Mid-term and final collection results

Sources: ^a Appendix VI, ^b Vercernji List (Croatian newspaper), 20 August 1997

<i>Items</i>	<i>7 March 1997^a</i>	<i>19 August 1997^b</i>
Rifles (including automatic and semi-automatic)	3,590	9,146
Rocket launchers and anti-tank weapons	4,777	6,375
Grenades (hand, rifle, anti-tank)	10,274	14,521
Ammunition (rounds)	723,200	over 1,900,000

of violence and brutality committed by Serbs in 1991 and 1992, and to them the concept of using scarce Croatian financial resources to benefit Serbs while the scars of war had not yet been repaired was anathema. It may have been for these and similar reasons that the Croatian government never made public the overall cost of the program.

Shifting perceptions

In October 1996, the general attitude of the local Serb population to the program was very skeptical. This was not surprising when one bears in mind how much had happened in the previous eighteen months. Since May 1995, the Krajina and Western Slavonia had been lost to Croatian military action, some 200,000 Serbs had fled from their homes, the Serb cause in Bosnia and Herzegovina had suffered major reverses from NATO bombing and the deployment of the combat troops of IFOR. Eastern Slavonia had seen the arrival of many thousands of displaced Serbs who had little more than whatever they had been able to bring with them in their panicked flight. Politically, by the Basic Agreement signed at Erdut in November 1995, the region had been negotiated away to be transferred to Croatian authority, without most of the people being either consulted or even properly informed by their Serb leadership.

In early 1996, following the arrival of a new, stronger UN presence, the Serb army had melted away and had been demilitarized. The people were confused, deeply fearful and looking in vain for leadership in which they could have confidence. Then, in October 1996, Serbs were being invited to rid themselves of their remaining defensive weapons. They were being told by Croatian television that UNTAES would be present only for a few more months.⁶ Who would protect them when UNTAES had gone?

Recognizing these fears, UNTAES, in its civil affairs programs, was actively trying to maintain public calm and plant the seeds of confidence for the future, for example:

- for the first time in five years mail links had been restored with other parts of Croatia;
- the border in the Baranja with Hungary had been opened for limited use;
- joint Serb/Croat discussions were taking place to find ways of moving forwards in health, education, agriculture;
- a weekly market was being held on the road in the no-man's land between the Serb and Croatian areas that allowed families and friends to be reunited;
- UN agencies and non-governmental organizations were giving constructive assistance to the displaced and the needy.

In these circumstances, it took considerable time for the public at large to take a positive attitude to the buy-back program. Despite the efforts of UNTAES to promulgate the details of the arrangements widely, many people in the villages seemed not to know about the program. Some were hostile as they viewed the program simply as a means to remove the Serb ability to defend themselves when the Croats returned.

There were others, however, who saw the opportunities for profit immediately. For some it was a quick way of making money in exchange for weapons, several of which were unusable or virtually so—even if they were still in their manufacturer's packaging. The persons staffing the WBLs began to see several faces on a regular basis. It became clear that some people, either criminals or opportunists, were going to villages and obtaining weapons, either by

offering low prices or by bullying, and then taking them to the WBLs for sale. In retrospect, it may be surmised that much of the large quantities brought in during the first few weeks probably came from hidden caches of arms known to a limited number of people. Exchanging them for cash was too good an opportunity to be missed.

Overall, as the program was extended and the Serb population saw the general situation move steadily towards the end of the UNTAES mandate, the public attitude to the handing in of weapons became more positive. In the final weeks of the program, in August 1997, there was an upsurge in business as people felt that they might as well get money for weapons as long as the program lasted, as once it ended they would receive nothing and the continued possession of firearms might well lead to difficulties. Indeed, on the last day the Croatian officials quickly ran out of cash and several hundreds of weapons were handed in without payment. Additionally, as the Transitional Administrator reported on 22 September 1997, despite the end of the buy-back program, residents of the region continued voluntarily to turn in military weapons. In the month following the end of the program, a total of 204 rifles, 11 anti-tank rockets, 238 grenades, and 55,000 rounds of ammunition were handed in (United Nations Department of Public Information, 1997).

⁶ By October 1996, the Croatian government and media were already agitating strongly for UNTAES to leave in January 1997, but in November the UN Security Council helped to calm the situation considerably by extending the mandate until January 1998.

Addressing the availability and visibility of weapons

Supply and demand

In a broad sense, the issue of supply and demand for weapons in the region was not relevant. The buy-back program removed the excess supply, but UNTAES suspected that many Serbs secreted at least one weapon in attics or outhouses for possible use if physically threatened by returning Croats.

With the demilitarization of the Serb army in May/June 1996, UNTAES had declared the import of weapons to the region as forbidden. Vehicles crossing the three bridges over the Danube from Serbia were liable to search and any weapons discovered were confiscated. But the border with Serbia was, deliberately, never made totally watertight by UNTAES controls as such actions would have been perceived by the local Serbs as steps towards closing the border altogether which, in turn, could have led to panic and mass evacuation. Moreover, it was impossible to patrol by boat or on land the length of the Danube flowing through the region, and to the south of the region the border with Serbia ran through wooded land and open fields. Determined smuggling of weapons could therefore not be prevented but, as recounted earlier, there was never any hard evidence that organized smuggling was taking place.

While there can be no certainty, it is highly unlikely that there has been any subsequent supply of weapons. The circumstances that brought about the presence of such high quantities of weapons and ammunition in the region no longer exist and have been replaced by a totally different situation. With the end of the UNTAES mandate on 15 January 1998, the region passed to the full sovereign authority of the Croatian government and therefore the laws of the rest of Croatia became fully applicable in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium.

A changed environment

The difference in atmosphere between the situations at the start and the end of the UNTAES mandate was marked. At the beginning, the region was very much in a military mode, with elements of the local Serb army and the Serb *milicija* very much in evidence. The atmosphere was tense as the dramatic events of 1995 (the evacuation of Serbs from the Krajina and Western Slavonia, followed in September by the robust NATO action in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Accords and the Basic Agreement signed at Erdut in November 1995) were only a few months old.

The establishment and deployment of UNTAES in the early months of 1996 steadied the situation considerably. With the demilitarization of the local Serb army, the firm assertion of UNTAES control, and the introduction of civil measures to move the population towards peace and stability—of which the weapons buy-back program was one—there was a progressive decrease in the visibility of weapons in the region. UNTAES made it clear that the carrying of weapons in public would not be permitted, except for properly authorized sporting or hunting rifles. For the most part these instructions were respected. There continued to be incidents of criminality in which handguns, and occasionally automatic weapons, were used. There were also occasions when grenades were used in family disputes or to settle old scores. In general, however, the readiness to resort to the use of weapons steadily diminished as time passed. The existence of the buy-back program certainly contributed positively to this change in attitude.

At the same time, it must be recognized that in the long run the traditional cultural acceptability of weapons will probably be little affected. As noted earlier, firearms are an accepted feature of life and often fired into the air at times of celebration and commemoration. Croatian law does not prohibit the possession of firearms, except certain classes of

weapons, provided that they are declared and properly licensed. Moreover, firearms in the hands of Serbs will inevitably be regarded by returning Croats as potential threats to life and limb, and by Serbs as their ultimate method of self-defense for use in the last resort. Probably in a clear effort to show that undeclared weapons would not be tolerated once Croatian authority was in place, when the buy-back program ended in August 1997 the Croatian government made a public announcement to the effect that persons who did not turn in their weapons would be liable to prison penalties of up to ten years (*Glas Slavonije*, 19 August 1997).

Easing the potential for violence

The transfer of large quantities of weapons and ammunition from civilian hands or access into the custody or destruction of UNTAES certainly decreased the *potential* for violence. However, for the most part, while UNTAES was present there was little actual civil violence. UNTAES was not seen by the Serbs as an ‘enemy’ and the Croats were still outside the region. The potential for real violence applied only to the risk of Croatian military intervention or Serb para-military forays across the separation zone, neither of which occurred nor were threatened.

The other risk of violence could have occurred after the departure of UNTAES in January 1998, when full authority passed to the hands of the Croatian government. No organized violence has taken place, and with isolated exceptions firearms and explosives have not been used in clashes between Serbs and Croats. The Croatian police have conducted weapon searches in houses, but usually for other reasons—such as suspicion of drugs or other criminality—rather than indiscriminate intrusions into homes.

Nevertheless, the early months have not been easy and many dispirited Serbs have left the region and moved into Serbia or abroad. The elected Serb leadership and the Croatian authorities have worked together, not easily and not with much mutual trust, to rebuild a future for the region. Some leaders, on both sides, have worked hard and conscientiously to establish a process of reconciliation, but all too often their efforts have been undermined by others who have had narrower agendas. The Transitional Police Force (TPF) has been absorbed into the national Croatian police structure under firm but fair control and the bridges across the Danube are now international border crossings, with workable transit arrangements for local persons resident in Croatia but with relatives and friends in Serbia.

Overall assessment of the program

As a part of the overall UNTAES effort, the weapons buy-back program was an undoubted success. It could not have been carried out without the full cooperation of the Croatian government which provided the money, in the face of some opposition in certain quarters in Zagreb, and the experts to assess the types and condition of the weapons handed in. The terms of the program were negotiated amicably between UNTAES and the Croatian authorities and the principles of anonymity and cash payment on the spot proved to be of significant importance. Once the initial problems with implementation had been ironed out, for the most part the program worked well. The insistence by UNTAES that no UNTAES personnel would handle the money at any time was also a valuable aspect as it effectively precluded any misunderstanding or risk of subsequent allegation of misappropriation.

Among the observations and impressions formed by members of the UNTAES military who took part in the program were the following:⁷

- in the early months, many people suspected that somehow their names would be noted and records kept of who handed in weapons, therefore there was a 'wait and see' attitude;
- others were afraid to hand in their weapons and ammunition, partly because they wanted to retain some form of self-defense;
- some tried to bring their weapons discreetly, (e.g., in large paper bags, or by asking a UN Military Observer to act as an intermediary) in order to avoid being seen by their neighbors;
- despite wide announcements of the anonymity of the program, some men sent their wives or children to hand in weapons;
- as time passed, it became clear from their repeated visits that some people were 'middlemen', selling weapons on behalf of others, or even 'brokers' who bought weapons in the villages then sold them to the program for a profit;
- the number of handguns surrendered was small, due probably to the greater ease with which pistols could be retained and hidden and also due to the tradition of possessing a weapon;
- many waited until the final days of the program before handing in weapons and ammunition;
- despite UNTAES efforts to give wide publicity to the program by radio, television and print media, there were still many who professed not to know about the program. This might have been a combination of genuine ignorance, illiteracy, general mistrust or simple pretense;

- notwithstanding the positive results—in the form of numbers of weapons and ammunition surrendered—at the end of the program the general feeling in UNTAES was that there were still considerable quantities that had not been handed in.

All these comments are of a practical nature and not critical of the program itself. Informal exchanges with individual members of UNTAES, military and civilian, and with some of those involved on the Croatian side have all confirmed that there was a general satisfaction with the objectives and implementation of the program.

The primary goal of the program was to reduce the numbers of offensive weapons and ammunition in the region and thereby reduce the risks of violence. In UNTAES' view every weapon, explosive or round of ammunition handed in at the WBLs was one less available on the streets or in the hands of the civilian population. In this, the buy-back program was successful far beyond expectations in the quantities of weapons that were recovered. The program did not remove *all* weapons from the region, nor was that result ever expected. But the program contributed significantly to the overall aims of UNTAES and the Croatian government of bringing the region—demilitarized, safe and secure—under the authority of Croatia.

In the light of the UNTAES experience, there would appear to be little doubt that in appropriate circumstances a weapons buy-back program—sensitively designed and carefully implemented—can be a highly useful contribution to wider efforts to restore peace and stability in civil societies in the wake of war.

⁷ Extracted from the final reports to UNTAES headquarters by the Belgian and Russian battalions, dated 25 August and 16 September 1997 respectively.

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Appendix I: Basic Agreement

BASIC AGREEMENT ON THE REGION

OF EASTERN SLAVONIA, BARANJA, AND WESTERN SIRMIMUM

The Parties agree as follows:

1. There shall be a transitional period of 12 months which may be extended at most to another period of the same duration if so requested by one of the parties.
2. The U.N. Security Council is requested to establish a Transitional Administration, which shall govern the Region during the transitional period in the interest of all persons resident in or returning to the Region.
3. The U.N. Security Council is requested to authorize an international force to deploy during the transitional period to maintain peace and security in the Region and otherwise to assist in implementation of this Agreement. The Region shall be demilitarized according to the schedule and procedures determined by the international force. This demilitarization shall be completed not later than 30 days after deployment of the international force and shall include all military forces, weapons, and police, except for the international force and for police operating under the supervision of, or with the consent of, the Transitional Administration.
4. The Transitional Administration shall ensure the possibility for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes of origin. All persons who have left the Region or who have come to the Region with previous permanent residence in Croatia shall enjoy the same rights as all other residents of the Region. The Transitional Administration shall also take the steps necessary to reestablish the normal functioning of all public services in the Region without delay.
5. The Transitional Administration shall help to establish and train temporary police forces, to build professionalism among the police and confidence among all ethnic communities.
6. The highest levels of internationally-recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be respected in the Region.

7. All persons have the right to return freely to their place of residence in the Region and to live there in conditions of security. All persons who have left the Region or who have come to the Region with previous permanent residence in Croatia have the right to live in the Region.

8. All persons shall have the right to have restored to them any property that was taken from them by unlawful acts or that they were forced to abandon and to just compensation for property that cannot be restored to them.

9. The right to recover property, to receive compensation for property that cannot be returned, and to receive assistance in reconstruction of damaged property shall be equally available to all persons without regard to ethnicity.

10. Interested countries and organizations are requested to take appropriate steps to promote the accomplishment of the commitments in this Agreement. After the expiration of the transition period and consistent with established practice, the international community shall monitor and report on respect for human rights in the Region on a long-term basis.

11. In addition, interested countries and organizations are requested to establish a commission, which will be authorized to monitor the implementation of this Agreement, particularly its human rights and civil rights provisions, to investigate all allegations of violations of this Agreement, and to make appropriate recommendations.


12. Not later than 30 days before the end of the transitional period, elections for all local government bodies, including for municipalities, districts, and counties, as well as the right of the Serbian community to appoint a joint Council of municipalities, shall be organized by the Transitional Administration. International organizations and institutions (e.g. the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations) and interested states are requested to oversee the elections.

13. The Government of the Republic of Croatia shall cooperate fully with the Transitional Administration and the international force. During the transitional period the Croatian Government authorizes the presence of international monitors along the international border of the Region in order to facilitate free movement of persons across existing border crossings.

14. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the adoption by the U.N. Security Council of a resolution responding affirmatively to the requests made in this Agreement.

DONE this Twelfth day of November, 1995.

SIGNED:



Milan Milanovic
Head, Serb Negotiating Delegation



Hrvoje Sarinic
Head, Croatian Government Delegation


WITNESSED:



Peter W. Galbraith
United States Ambassador



Thorvald Stoltenberg
United Nations Mediator



Thorvald Stoltenberg
United Nations Mediator



Peter W. Galbraith
United States Ambassador

Appendix II: Promotional Poster—Serbian (Cyrillic) script



УНТАЕС

ПРЕЛАЗНА УПРАВА УЈЕДИЊЕНИХ НАЦИЈА ЗА ИСТОЧНУ СЛАВОНИЈУ, БАРАЊУ И ЗАПАДНИ СРЕМ

ПРОГРАМ ОТКУПА ОРУЖЈА

ОД 2. ОКТОБРА ДО 5. ЈАНУАРА УНТАЕС СПРОВОДИ
ПРОГРАМ ОТКУПА ОРУЖЈА
ПОДСТИЧУЋИ ЉУДЕ ДА ЗА
СВОЈЕ ОРУЖЈЕ, МУНИЦИЈУ И ЕКСПЛОЗИВНА СРЕДСТВА
ДОБИЈУ ГОТОВИНУ

Свако може донети своје оружје, муницију и експлозивна средства
УНТАЕС НЕЋЕ ТРАЖИТИ НИ ЛИЧНУ КАРТУ НИ ИМЕ
Целокупна процедура преузимања оружја, његове процене и каталожног испитивања биће анонимна

Програм се ради у сарадњи са хрватском Владом
До 15. октобра она ће оружје плаћати у немачким маркама, а после у кунама

ЛОКАЦИЈЕ И РАДНА ВРЕМЕНА

БЕЛГИСКИ БАТАЉОН	<i>Бели Манасџир</i>	од 9 до 16 САТИ
ПАКИСТАНСКИ БАТАЉОН	<i>Товолик</i>	од 9 до 16 САТИ
РУСКИ БАТАЉОН	<i>Клиса</i>	од 9 до 16 САТИ
ЈОРДАНСКИ БАТАЉОН	<i>Грабово</i>	од 9 до 16 САТИ

ОСНОВНЕ ВРСТЕ ОРУЖЈА И ЊИХОВЕ ЦЕНЕ

1. аутоматска пушка М 70, Ц. Застава, кал. 7,62 x 39 мм	550,00 куна /	155 ДЕМ
2. аутоматска пушка АКМ (рубоуска и слична), кал. 7,62 x 39 мм	325,00 куна /	91 ДЕМ
3. митраљез М 53, Ц. Застава, кал. 7,9 мм	625,00 куна /	176 ДЕМ
4. митраљез М 72, Ц. Застава	625,00 куна /	176 ДЕМ
5. све врсте ручних бомби	5,00 куна /	1 ДЕМ
6. све протантенковске ручне гранате	50,00 куна /	14 ДЕМ
7. протанковски ручни бацачи	550,00 куна /	155 ДЕМ

ПРОГРАМ НЕ ОБУХВАТА НАГАЗНЕ МИНЕ
НЕМОЈТЕ ИХ НИ УКЛАЂАТИ НИ ДОНОСИТИ НА САБИРАЛИШТА
ОНЕ СУ ИЗУЗЕТНО ОПАСНЕ

ОРУЖЈЕ ЋЕ ПРОЦЕЊИВАТИ СТРУЧЊАЦИ
ПОНУЂЕНЕ ЦЕНЕ ЋЕ СЕ СМАЊИВАТИ У СКЛАДУ СА ОШТЕЂЕЊИМА
ЦЕВИ, ПРЕКРИВНОГ СЛОЈА ОДНОСНО ДРВЕНИХ И ПЛАСТИЧНИХ ДЕЛОВА

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Appendix III: Promotional Poster—Croatian (Latin) script



UNTAES

PRILAZNA UPRAVA UJEDINJENIH NARODA ZA ISTOČNU SLAVONIJU, BARANJU I ZAPADNI SRIJEM

PROGRAM OTKUPA ORUŽJA

OD 2. LISTOPADA DO 5. SIJEČNJA UNTAES PROVODI
PROGRAM OTKUPA ORUŽJA
POTIČUĆI LJUDE DA ZA
SVOJE ORUŽJE, STRELJIVO I RASPRSKAVAJUĆE NAPRAVE
DOBIJU GOTOVINU

Svatko može donijeti svoje oružje, streljivo i rasprskavajuće naprave
UNTAES NEĆE TRAŽITI NITI OSOBNU ISKAZNICU NITI IME

Cijeli postupak preuzimanja oružja, njegove provjere i gotovinske isplate bit će anonimnan

Program se radi u suradnji s hrvatskom Vladom

Do 15. listopada ona će oružje plaćati u njemačkim markama, a poslije u kunama

LOKACIJE I DJELATNA VREMENA

BELGIJSKI BATALJUN	<i>Belj Manastir</i>	OD 9 DO 16 SATI
PAKISTANSKI BATALJUN	<i>Topoljk</i>	OD 9 DO 16 SATI
RUSKI BATALJUN	<i>Klisa</i>	OD 9 DO 16 SATI
JORDANSKI BATALJUN	<i>Grabovo</i>	OD 9 DO 16 SATI

TEMELJNE VRSTE ORUŽJA I NJIHOVE CIJENE

1. strojica M 70, C. Zastava, kal. 7,62 x 39 mm:	550,00 kuna / 155 DEM
2. strojica AKM (rumunjska i slične), kal. 7,62 x 39 mm:	325,00 kuna / 91 DEM
3. mitraljez M 53, C. Zastava, kal. 7,9 mm:	625,00 kuna / 176 DEM
4. mitraljez M 72, C. Zastava:	625,00 kuna / 176 DEM
5. sve vrste ručnih bombi:	5,00 kuna / 1 DEM
6. sve protutenkovske ručne granate:	50,00 kuna / 14 DEM
7. protuočkolni ručni bacači:	550,00 kuna / 155 DEM

PROGRAM NE OBUHVAĆA NAGAZNE MINE
NEMOJTE IH NITI UKLANJATI NITI DONOSITI NA SAKUPLJALIŠTA
ONE SU IZUZETNO OPASNE

ORUŽJE ĆE PROCJENJIVATI STRUČNJACI
PONUĐENE CIJENE SMANJIVAT ĆE SE SUKLADNO OŠTEĆENJIMA
CIJEVI, POKRIVNOG SLOJA TE DRVENIH I PLASTIČNIH DIJELOVA

Appendix IV: UNTAES Bulletin, Issue No. 16 (October 1996)



UNTAES BULLETIN

October 1996

Issue No. 16

UN TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION FOR EASTERN SLAVONIA, BARANJA AND WESTERN SRMIUM

Weapons Buy-Back Programme Begins

Demilitarisation of the Region was one of the first and most important tasks of the UNTAES mandate defined under UN Security Council resolution 1037. This element of the mandate, which involved the removal of heavy weapons such as tanks, mortars and artillery pieces from the Region, was successfully completed by 21 June. UNTAES followed this with a "weapons registration programme" where people are encouraged to come forward and register their personal and hunting weapons with UNTAES.

In the third phase of the normalization of civilian life, UNTAES, in cooperation with the Croatian Government, has now launched a unique "Weapons Buy-Back Scheme" aimed at removing offensive weapons and ammunition from the Region so that people can carry on with their lives free from any fear or threat. The two significant factors in this "buy-back" scheme are: the assurance of total anonymity; attractive on-the-spot cash payment for goods received. More information is provided in this simple question and answer format.

Q. What is this weapons Buy-Back scheme?

A. UNTAES, in cooperation with the Croatian Government has devised a list of certain weapons, ammunition and explosives which you can bring to the collection points and exchange for on-the-spot cash payment.

Q. I did not register some of my weapons under the registration programme. Can I bring such weapons under the Buy-Back scheme?

A. Yes. Anyone can bring his weapons, ammunition and explosives under this scheme without fear. If you have some weapons which are not on the list, you can still engage with the military experts at the receiving point (they will buy these weapons). However, kind owners of any kind will not be accepted under this scheme — they are too dangerous.

Q. Do I have to bring my ID for the exchange?

A. No ID is required and no names will be asked. The whole procedure

BUY-BACK — CATEGORIES AND PRICES

- | | |
|--|-----------------------|
| 1. Automatic rifle M 70, C. Zastava, cal. 7.62 X 39mm. () | 550,00 Kuna — 155 DEM |
| 2. Automatic rifle AKM (Romanian and alike), cal. 7.62 X 39mm. () | 325,00 Kuna — 91 DEM |
| 3. Machine-gun M 53, C. Zastava, cal. 7.62mm. () | 625,00 Kuna — 176 DEM |
| 4. Machine-gun M 72 C. Zastava, cal. 7.62mm. () | 625,00 Kuna — 176 DEM |
| 5. All types of hand-grenades. | 5,00 Kuna — 1 DEM |
| 6. All anti-tank hand-grenades. | 80,00 Kuna — 22 DEM |
| 7. Anti-armour infantry launchers | 550,00 Kuna — 155 DEM |

This is a representative list of the items under the Buy-Back scheme

of taking your weapons, evaluating its price and making payment in cash will be anonymous.

Q. Where can I take my weapons to sell?

A. There are four UNTAES points, in the Baranja, you can go to Beljevac

Batalion in Beli Manastir or Pakoštan; Batalion in Topuzil, in the southern part of the Region, it is the Russian Batalion in Klina and Serbian Batalion in Grabovo. They are operating between 0900 and 1900 hours.

Q. How will weapons be evaluated?

A. Croatian and UNTAES military experts have listed certain weapons present in the Region and their general value. The price will be estimated on the basis of the condition of the weapons. For example, a good condition automatic rifle like the M 70 Crovna Zastava could be worth about 550 Kuna or 155 DEM. The prices for all weapons and other items will evolve in proportion to their level of defect or condition.

Q. Who is paying for these weapons and in what currency will I be paid in?

A. This scheme is being worked in co-operation with the Croatian Government and they will be paying for the weapons in DEM and Kuna notes and in Kuna thereafter.

Q. How long will this scheme remain open?

A. The "Buy-Back" began on 2 October and will continue until 5 January 1997.

Another step towards opening up the Region to the outside world, and assisting in its peaceful reintegration with the rest of Croatia, was taken on 4 October when UNTAES Transitional Administrator Jacques Klein and the ceremonial ribbon to declare open the Knezevo-Udvar border crossing. Present at the occasion were delegations from the Croatian and Hungarian Governments.

The opening was made possible following the signing of the Protocol between UNTAES, the Government of Croatia and the Government of Hungary on 26 September 1996.

At present the crossing will be opened between 0800 and 1800 hours for the following persons:

— Residents of the UNTAES administered Region who have Croatian or Hungarian passports;

— Vehicles from the UNTAES administered Region who have registered travel documents issued by the Croatian Government; and

Knezevo-Udvar Border Opened



Mr. Klein with Croatian and Hungarian representatives at the opening. Photo: Eric Sandberg

— Vehicles registered by the Hungarian Government with travel documents.

Vehicles with RSK license plates are not allowed to enter or return from Hungary through this border crossing point.

Another significant step is that Croatian buses and their passengers, bearing other Hungarian travel documents or Croatian passports or travel documents, can cross the Knezevo-Udvar border crossing point and travel through the Region to elsewhere in Croatia and outside.

Residents of the UNTAES Region having Croatian passports can use these buses to enter and return from Hungary.

Residents of the Region with Croatian ID cards or Demotocva will be able to ride on these buses to go to Gajk and back.

The border crossing point on the Hungarian side is under UNTAES control and all police functions associated with the crossing will be performed by the Transitional Police Force (TPF).

The functioning of the border crossing point will be reviewed after 30 days, by the delegations of experts from the Croatian and Hungarian Governments, and UNTAES, and they may make changes if necessary and mutually agreeable.

Appendix V: UNTAES Bulletin, Issue No. 17 (October 1996)



UNTAES BULLETIN

October 1996

Issue No. 17

UN TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION FOR EASTERN SLAVONIA, BARANJA AND WESTERN SRMIUM

More than 6,000 Weapons already "Bought-Back"

When the UNTAES weapons "Buy-Back" scheme was introduced, nobody was sure of how it would turn out because this was something new and untried. There were many questions about the scheme in general. The reason



A soldier steps at RUMAF (B)

it was related to the situation in the Region. Did people believe that the conflict in the Region was well and truly over? And if yes, would people come forward and turn in their weapons at the prices being offered?

After an initial hesitation, people began turning up at the four designated weapons "Buy-Back" places in the Region where they first opened on 2 October. Word had spread that there really was nothing to fear as the whole procedure was so simple and unambiguous as UNTAES had promised.

Each day, at the four collection points is different. Some days only a few rifles turn up. On a few other occasions, several equipment come in

that the Croatian representatives turn out of cash by early afternoon. In fact, on one day, two men brought in about 70 anti-tank rocket launchers. At the declared price of 155 Dollars per Marko per piece, they were paid 10,825.00 DM.

This actually encouraged the Croatian Government to widen the scope of items under the Buy-Back scheme from a limited initial list, to include many other categories of weapons and explosives with the exception of mines.

So far, approximately 6,000 weapons, including over 2,500 portable anti-tank rocket launchers have been received for payment of about 500,000

DEM. As announced earlier, the "Buy-Back" is now operated in Karan.

The collected items are taken away to UNTAES storage sites of safe after sorting, registration and those items which are not in the best of condition are destroyed by UNTAES explosives experts under controlled conditions. Other weapons are put in UNTAES storage depots.

The destruction of ammunition under the Buy-Back scheme is being carried out in a controlled burning area called Ajkuzi BR, between Ajkuzi and Marincet farms. Except for slight shock waves in the immediate vicinity, there is no danger to people or property.



Photo: Eric Kaufman

Photo: Eric Kaufman

Loans for small enterprises

Following a grant of US\$ 7 million from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Montenegro-United Agency (MUSA) opened its office in Zagreb on 23 October 1996. UNTAES TA Jacques Klein, the US representative in Croatia, Peter Lofthouse and Mr. Barbara Turner of USAID, Washington, were present on the occasion.

Aimed at economic revitalization through micro-credit, small businesses, the MUSA will disburse loans for projects costing between \$1,000 and \$20,000 at low interest rates, and other favourable conditions. The focus is primarily on supporting agriculture related activities, small production lines (B&B, bakeries and service oriented enterprises).

The operating area is from Puzica, Skradinski Bend, Gajski, Vukovci, Zagonja, Vukovci to Bob Marušić, covering Eastern and Western Slavonia and Dalmatia. MUSA also offers 10000 credit lines will be eligible for the loans.

As soon as certain legal procedures are established, there are plans to open two credit offices in Vukovci and Dalmatia to receive applications from within the UNTAES Region.

The information on how to apply is still applying for the loan along with the terms and conditions, contact:

MUSA
Zagonja 58227 T. Croatia
Tel: (051) 24 258

Agreement on Agriculture

The 13 October Transitional Administration Jacques Klein presided over the signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning the current economic issues in the Region agriculture. The MOU was signed by Dr. Vujaković Stanimirović on behalf of the local Serb leadership and by Mr. Marko Tadić for the Croatian Government.

The memorandum, while integrating the parts of agriculture companies from the UNTAES Region into the economic system of the Republic of Croatia, also provides for interest-free credits for the fall planting in the Region. The value of the interest-free credits for the farmers' land amounts to 1000.30 Kuna per hectare. Repayment of the principal of the value will be made by wheat deliveries in 1997.

The memorandum identifies the participants of these arrangements on both sides. Management of the joint works companies: Đelje, ĐPK and Vapik and of the organizing units of the same companies in the UNTAES Region will jointly follow and monitor the progress of the fall planting.

The Regional organizing units of ĐPK, Đelje and VAPIK companies will be credited with 350 kg of mineral fertiliser and 30 litres of diesel per hectare (total value of 311.30 Kuna), and the repayment will be made in wheat or cash.

Aimed at boosting the agricultural activity which forms the backbone of the Regional economy, the arrangement, following a similar agreement earlier for spring planting, will be of mutual benefit.

Deminers from the Region undergo leadership training

A three-week leadership training programme on demining for 15 students from the UNTAES Region was carried out between 4 and 23 October in the mountains of Ibra, between Srijerovo and Palić in Borovci. Funded by the American Government, the three-phase training programme covered leadership skills, equipment and demining training and mine field reconnaissance and clearing.

UNTAES Transitional Administrator Jacques Klein, accompanied by Dr. Vujaković Stanimirović travelled to the location to get a first-hand impression of the training process. "I think every-one understands the demining problem in Eastern Slavonia is significant," Mr. Klein said. "The pay-off of this training is long term because these men will be busy for years doing something

very very careful. And that is making the region safe for civilians and other people who live there."


Dr. Stanimirović said it is very important that people get the education in demining which is something different from ordinary demining. "Continuous people need to do it. There is no place for heroes in the mine fields, only for professionals and hard ones," he said. Dr. Stanimirović also thanked the United States for making the money and the experts from the US special forces team available. Special kits valued at \$25-4,000 were given to each student on completion of the course.

Due to technical reasons, a similar number of students from other parts of Croatia could not attend this training session but it is expected that they will be in the future.

Appendix VI: Weapon Buy-back Program Results to 7 March 1997

WEAPON BUY BACK PROGRAMME - RESULTS TO 7 MARCH 1997

MARCH	TO BE KEPT										TO BE DESTROYED										AMMO (X 1981)			DAY TOTAL			
	RIFLE					ATTR					GRENADE					LAW					BB	PB	JB		TOTAL		
	BB	PB	JB	TOTAL	BB	PB	JB	TOTAL	BB	PB	JB	TOTAL	BB	PB	JB	TOTAL											
1	9	12	20	23	52	1	0	0	1	2	4	07	22	3	134	13	3	13	0	29	20.3	55.1	74.3	201	420.6	827.94	
4	14	19	26	5	64	0	0	0	3	6	11	55	44	14	6	129	1	3	20	0	24	15.6	43.5	35.0	4.8	99.67	327.67
5	11	10	12	20	52	0	0	0	0	0	6	15	6	0	31	0	0	27	0	27	4.1	5.6	10.7	1.1	159.4	316.42	
6	5	13	10	10	38	0	0	0	0	5	25	27	24	0	78	2	4	30	0	36	4.5	41.9	3.8	16.0	66	221.19	
7	16	3	15	13	47	0	1	2	5	6	24	66	26	0	116	3	2	10	0	15	10.3	10.7	105	21.6	147	333.38	
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	
TOT OCT	130	186	281	279	787	3	14	87	60	100	266	648	1162	1837	4872	85	98	4671	1096	2804	108	332	68	280	768	8887	
TOT NOV	22	66	41	217	8	5	13	8	29	27	172	222	0	421	8	48	126	19	200	29	227	68	81	371	1256		
TOT DEC	68	65	30	189	288	8	5	18	15	47	138	192	753	1	1097	26	14	187	6	207	113	408	143	80	741	2351	
TOT JAN	143	378	206	87	772	1	4	44	7	86	276	488	767	9	1449	33	67	287	0	287	286	482	429	124	1091	3749.24	
TOT FEB	218	418	295	206	1291	19	6	69	62	185	534	786	938	8	2748	102	246	43	822	898	1287	925	298	3228	8796		
TOTAL	728	1081	948	944	3393	32	36	246	142	476	2118	2648	3883	5715	10274	295	429	2486	1024	4301	1208	2870	2029	1128	7723	28673	



LEGEND
Rifle = Rifles and machine guns
Attr = Anti-tank rocket launchers, mortars, mortars, carbons and SA launchers
Gren = Grenades (hand, rifle, Anti-tank)
Law = Light anti-aircraft weapons
Ammo = Ammunition and explosives
(small arms, guns, mortars, ...)

BB = BEL BAT
PB = PAKSAT
JB = RUSBAT
JB = JORBAT

Weapons for Peace in 1997
Rifle: 771
Attr: 517

Total weapons: 81
Earm Recorders: 8
Fuser: 3
20mm RA Cannon: 5
16 rifles from WBBP
Belbat given to IPF
on 13 Nov 96

Total ammo destroyed
October: 13.5 tons
November: 37 tons
December: 8.3 tons
January: 2.8 tons

TABLE 1117 - WEAPON BUY-BACK PROGRAM - Summary and results to 07 Mar 97 - page 2 of 2 - WBBATTX.WMT



Publications

BICC series such as *brief*, *report* and *paper* are published either in English (with a German summary) or in German (with an English summary).

report 1:

Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, with the assistance of Joseph Di Chiaro III, *Conversion and the Integration of Economic and Security Dimensions*, January 1995

report 2:

Nicola Mögel, Thomas Sachse und Hans-Henning Schröder, *Chancen und Probleme der Rüstungskonversion in der Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten: Konversionsprofile ausgewählter Regionen - Nizhnij Novgorod, Republik Udmurtien, Ekaterinenburg, Republik Belarus [Problems and Prospects of Defense Conversion in the Commonwealth of Independent States: Conversion Profiles of Selected Regions—Nizhnii Novgorod, Udmurtiya, Yekaterinburg, and Belarus]*, March 1995

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Keith Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, *Restructuring the US Military Bases in Germany: Scope, Impacts and Opportunities*, June 1995

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brief 2:

Anke Habich, Werner Voß und Peter Wilke, *Abhängigkeit der Werften im Ostseeraum von der Rüstungsproduktion [Dependence of Shipyards in the Baltic Sea Region on Defense Production]*, March 1995

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brief 4:

Kees Kingma and Vanessa Sayers, *Demobilization in the Horn of Africa, Proceedings of the IRG Workshop, Addis Ababa, 4-7 December 1994*, June 1995

brief 5:

Werner Voß and Michael Brzoska, *Eurofighter 2000: Consequences and Alternatives*, February 1996

brief 6:

Michael Renner, *Cost of Disarmament: An Overview of the Economic Costs of the Dismantlement of Weapons and the Disposal of Military Surplus*, March 1996.

brief 7:

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brief 8:

Pawel Wieczorek and Katarzyna Zukrowska, *Conversion in Poland: The Defense Industry and Base Redevelopment*, November 1996

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brief 13:

Yudit Kiss, *The Transformation of the Defense Industry in Hungary*, Winter 1998

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- Civilian applications for military R&D
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- Demobilization and reintegration
- Base closure and redevelopment
- Dismantling and disposal of surplus weapons

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