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a journal of the brazilian political science association

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AIMS AND SCOPE

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This article is dedicated to recounting the main initiative of Nelson Mandela's government to manage the social resentment inherited from the segregationist regime. I conducted interviews with South African intellectuals committed to the theme of transitional justice and with key personalities who played a critical role in this process.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is presented as the primary institutional mechanism envisioned for the delicate exercise of redefining social relations inherited from the apartheid regime in South Africa. Its founders declared grandiose political intentions to the detriment of localized more palpable objectives. Thus, there was a marked disparity between the ambitious mandate and the political discourse about the commission, and its actual achievements.

Keywords: Human rights, transitional justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa

When is statistical significance not significant?

Dalson B. Figueiredo Filho, Ranulfo Paranhos, Enivaldo C. da Rocha, Mariana Batista, José Alexandre da Silva Jr., Manoel L. Wanderley D. Santos, Jacira Guiro Marino

This paper provides a non-technical introduction to the *p value* statistics. Its main purpose is to help researchers make sense of the appropriate role of the *p value* statistics in empirical political science research. On methodological grounds, we use replication, simulations and observational data to show when

statistical significance is not significant. We argue that: (1) scholars must always graphically analyze their data before interpreting the *p value*; (2) it is pointless to estimate the *p value* for non-random samples; (3) the *p value* is highly affected by the sample size, and (4) it is pointless to estimate the *p value* when dealing with data on population.

Keywords: p value statistics; statistical significance; significance tests.

Investigating Elite Behavior through Field Experiment in Brazil: do candidates answer more to core or swing voters?

Paolo Spada and Feliciano Sá Guimarães

This paper explores recent advances in experimental methodology to analyze elite behavior. Using an email experiment conducted in the context of the Brazilian 2008 municipal elections, we studied whether candidates target "swing" or "core" voters during campaigns. Candidates from all parties – 1,000 candidates in all – were contacted by randomly generated citizens who identified themselves as either core or swing voters. Additionally, we randomized senders' past voting behavior and their gender. To identify the baseline answer rate, we employed a placebo treatment with no reference to the elections. Our results show that Brazilian candidates target any sender as long as she identifies herself as a potential voter. Within this general finding, models with city-specific fixed effects indicate that Brazilian politicians tend to target core voters. The paper contributes to the general experimental literature by providing an easily replicable design that can test the behavior of elite interaction with the public. At the same time, the paper extends the literature on core versus swing voters by providing an empirical test that can shed light on the effects of a specific political environment (type of election, voting rule, and party structure), and how it affects the relationship between candidates and voters during elections.

Keywords: Experimental analysis, Electoral Studies, Urban Politics, Methodology

Human Security Paradigms and Economic Crisis in the First Year of the North Caucasus Federal District

Tiago Ferreira Lopes

The decrease in insecurity in the North Caucasus during the first eight years of the 21st century was achieved with the help of federal money used to amnesty soldiers and to pacify ethnic leaders' ambitions. But circumstances changed after Dmitry Kozak's announcement that the federal budget for the entire region would decrease significantly. As all the republics in the North Caucasus are dependent on federal aid of no less than 50% (in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan dependence is superior to 80%), such cut represented a politically potential danger.

The main goal of the article is to present a deeper understanding of the potential link between the international and regional economic dynamics and the current acceleration of social disruption in the North Caucasus region. The paper explains how ethno-political and transition studies can benefit from the inclusion of the economic dimension into the analysis, and so it clarifies the importance of a bi-level analysis using two concepts: economic society and economic security. The paper employs the concepts of economic security and economic society to perform

a richer and innovative analysis.

Keywords: Human Security, North Caucasus, Insecurity, Insurgence, Ethno-politics

Public policy and media frames: the debate over migration in Brazil
Augusto Veloso Leão

The main goal of this article is to provide a good basis to assess the way media frames are embedded in a wider social scenario, and how public and political preferences can be researched through media debate. The methodology adopted allows for an analysis of newspaper articles that can show broader trends of the debate and serve as a thermometer to measure public debate. It can further highlight details and enable in-depth analyses of media discourse.

The article explores the interconnectedness of media debate and policy-making process by means of the analysis of articles published in a Brazilian newspaper between 2009 and 2010. Quantitative and qualitative methodologies are employed to identify the frames used in media and to offer insights of their relationship with the political debate.

The ongoing political debate has raised attention to the issue of migration, with a great numbers of actors expressing very diverse points of view. A broader public debate has been initiated and some portions of it find voice in different means of communication. The paper argues that changes in the public and in the media debate are a response to changes in the political debate, while at the same time the first two also help to outline the latter.

Keywords: migration, public policy, media debate.

Human rights and political transition in South Africa: the case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission[1]

Cristina Buarque de Hollanda

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This article is dedicated to recounting the main initiative of Nelson Mandela's government to manage the social resentment inherited from the segregationist regime. I conducted interviews with South African intellectuals committed to the theme of transitional justice and with key personalities who played a critical role in this process.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is presented as the primary institutional mechanism envisioned for the delicate exercise of redefining social relations inherited from the apartheid regime in South Africa. Its founders declared grandiose political intentions to the detriment of localized more palpable objectives. Thus, there was a marked disparity between the ambitious mandate and the political discourse about the commission, and its actual achievements.

Keywords: Human rights, transitional justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa

Prologue: ethnographic note

On the same day that I arrived in Johannesburg to start my research about the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), in August 2008, I was invited by my hosts to a dinner with friends. The first night in the city gave me a clear idea of just how alive and controversial my theme of research was, even ten years after the Commission ceased its activities. In a restaurant in a wealthy neighborhood of the city, an unexpected gathering brought together friends of friends. On the long table that

formed, there were only whites, with the exception of a South African born and raised in Soweto, who was sitting opposite me. We started a casual conversation about the city and the weather, which then unfolded into brief narratives about work and profession. On the topic of my visit to the country, I explained the intentions of my research to him, to which he expressed a strong opinion: that the Commission is responsible for a large part of the problems facing the country, even today. This harsh assertion triggered instant reactions from other people in the group, who until that moment had not been part of the conversation. One middle-aged white woman inquired, in a calm manner, "what would be the alternative for the government? Vengeance? Revenge?" This inquiry provoked the fury of my interlocutor. According to him, the granting of amnesty to individuals knowingly involved in brutal crimes against humanity had corroborated a culture of civic irresponsibility in the country. As an example of this, he quoted the case of Winnie Mandela, a case which national television and radio networks accompanied for over eight consecutive years. Mandela's ex-wife was accused of being involved in the murder of a 14-year-old youth accused of being a police informant, but had persistently denied the crime, in spite of evidence and testimonies that unequivocally implicated her. Desmond Tutu, archbishop of the Anglican Church who presided over the work of the Commission, had encouraged an act of forgiveness in which the mother of the adolescent publically pardoned Winnie for the crime, despite the refusal of a confession. For the black youth of Soweto, that episode would become the symbol of the political mistake of the Commission: adjusted to the political conveniences of the situation, it had left a legacy of impunity for the new democracy. The new era of politics had not established a clear break with the oppressive past.

The end of his indignant speech revealed dramatic information about his origins: "I am tired of pretending that my life started 10 years ago [an imprecise reference to the years of democracy in the country]; my life started 33 years ago with my mother raped by a white policeman".

Introduction

The practices of racial segregation in the southernmost part of the African continent were legally formalized when the English, after dominating the old Boer republics, founded the Union of South Africa in 1910. Instituted in 1948, the apartheid regime (or 'separate lives', translated from Afrikaans) was a corollary of a model of social hierarchy which ranked whites, coloreds[2], Asians and blacks, in that order. The distinction between these groups was ensured, for example, through the criminalization of inter-racial marriages and through differentiated policies regarding land access, remuneration and transport. It was the blacks, lowest in the regime's racial scale, who bore the brunt of the most severe

measures of social control, such as forced removals, strict controls on urban mobility, labor market restrictions to manual work and the restriction of housing to specific regions in national territory, according to ethnic origins ascribed by the regime and in disregard of individual and family histories.

The first free elections in South Africa took place in April 1994, when the election of Nelson Mandela to the national government marked the end of differentiated citizenship as a political principle. Despite the clear sense of rupture involved in the change of regime, the extensive elections resulted from a process of negotiation with the political actors in decline. In the new balance of power, the conservative forces of apartheid did not completely leave the scene: they maintained representation in the government and in parliament. The powerful idea of South African national unity, in contrast to the radically divisive rhetoric of the previous model, precisely envisioned this kind of an inclusive perspective, committed to institutional guarantees for the new role of whites.

In this political paradigm, the harsh principle of retribution was avoided with regard to former rights violators. The adoption of a punitive policy would compromise the negotiated peace process and would add further tension to the uncertain course of democracy in the country. For Alex Boraine, Methodist minister who fought against apartheid and one of the main visionaries behind the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the generals of the old regime would not accept proceedings against them (Boraine, 2000: 67). Nahla Nvali, also linked to the defunct TRC, argues, along the same lines that "the threat of criminal proceedings against the old guarding apparatus of apartheid security implicated the very real possibility of an outbreak of bloody civil war" (Nvali, n.d.).

Among those following this cautious perspective, the new government could not disregard the tacit condition put forward by the military, namely, the refusal of criminal proceedings against them. And yet, it had to create a sense of legitimacy for the new democracy. Therefore, it had to find an institutional path distinct from that of international tribunals, which occupied an important place in the political imaginary of the time. Among other reasons, this was due to the experience of the International Tribunal of War Crimes in Rwanda, established in the same year as the free elections in South Africa. The tribunal's focus on clarifying past events, attributing blame and applying rigorous punishments, ran contrary to the conciliatory intentions of the new government. According to Babu Ayindo, this type of forum was caught up in procedures of excessive formalism, leaving no place for ambiguities in the discourse and for expressing sentiments (Ayindo, 1998). It was a counter-model to what was intended by those in charge of new democracy in South Africa.

If the paradigm of retributive justice, focused on punishing the aggressor, was not suited to the conciliatory character of the transition government, neither was an indiscriminate

amnesty, which suppresses punishment, suited to it. For citizens victimized by the regime, a "national amnesia about the past", in the words of Nvali (n.d.), "was also unacceptable". Retribution or unconditional forgiveness, on either extreme of the spectrum of possibilities, directly collided with the political interests and expectations of whites and blacks, respectively. The political ideal of redefining relations between them – and also between other segregated groups – could not neglect any of the parts in question. In this context, the TRC emerged as a "solution of compromise" (Nvali, n.d.).

This article is dedicated precisely to recounting this institutional experience, the principal initiative of Nelson Mandela's government to manage the social resentment inherited from the segregationist regime. Alongside an examination of key works in the diverse literature – which include texts both exalting and strongly criticizing the Commission – I conducted interviews with South African intellectuals committed to the theme of transitional justice and also with key personalities who played a part in this process, and were situated on different points of the political spectrum at the time. The short time of research in situ did not allow me to access and gather the testimonies of Commission deponents. In order to address them, I had to depend on fragments of interviews in works already completed and published, duly referred to throughout this article. Given the decision to take a comprehensive approach towards the Commission and bearing in mind the diverse points of view that exist about it, I was also not able to select my interviewees in a manner that presupposes them to be representative of the social groups they belong to. The interviews which I use in this article therefore form a collection of individual narratives of people who occupied and/or occupy a key place in their respective fields of study and/or activism. Although the narratives of individual personalities do not allow me to generalize about their class contexts, they form an important part of this descriptive and analytical exercise about the symbolic institution of political transition in the country.

With that said, the first section of the article is dedicated to the creation, the structure and the justification of the TRC, based, above all, on the narratives of Desmond Tutu (2000) and Alex Boraine (2000), two of its founding-fathers. The three consecutive sections map out the principal critiques of the Commission, referring to the three different political groups involved in the political transition. The first of these, the military critique, brings in a perspective that is absent in the literature about the Commission, which I sought, in part, to reconstruct based on interviews with Deon Fourier, colonel of the defunct voluntary army of South Africa, and Deon Mortimer, representative of the South African Armed Forces in the Commission. Mortimer (2008) demonstrates his aversion to a production of memory which would be biased in favor of former opponents of the regime. For him, forgiveness on its own would imply an unjust attribution of guilt. Although his personal narrative cannot be taken as the official military perspective it is important to

underline his role as their representative in the Commission hearings. Moreover, it is quite possible that his views reflect widely held views in the military which, generally speaking, were not publically pronounced in the post-apartheid period.

The second body of criticisms directed at the Commission, which this article considers, comes from human rights activists who were dissatisfied with the abandonment of retributive justice as a principle, and with the disregard of racism as a political crime. Subsequently, I will highlight the reactions of the third group, leaders of the African National Congress (ANC), a political party of the new democracy bringing together former anti-apartheid activists. In their view, the Commission had taken on the unjustified practice of assuming 'moral equivalence' between former supporters and opponents of the regime. With regard to this disagreement between the ANC and the Commission, I furthermore consider Tutu (2000) and Boraine's (2000) refusal to make a distinction between good and bad violence, designating violence in itself an object of repudiation. Finally, I will discuss what I consider to be the principal political limitations and achievements of the institutional experience on which a good part of the country's political efforts during transition was concentrated.

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Foundation and Structure

In the period of political transition in South Africa, the rigid and impersonal nature of the state bureaucratic apparatus appeared impotent to deal with the kinds of social demands directed at it. For Alex Boraine, it was necessary to go beyond the boundaries of formal politics and to institute a public dimension of dialogue and recognition (Boraine, 2000).

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa would serve this purpose. Inspired by models already tested in Latin America, as well as in Eastern Europe, the TRC was the primary institutional expression of South Africa's transitional paradigm. In the TRC, there was space for mourning and emotion. Through the voluntary testimonies of victims, witnesses and self-confessed aggressors, members of the Commission sought to make progress in the public revelation of the methods and the everyday life of oppression in the segregationist regime. In its testimonial process, the objective of rehabilitating victims overrode the principle of efficiently attributing guilt. According to its founders, attention was directed less at scrutinizing the past than it was on the possibilities of reinventing sociability in a context of profound social antagonism.

The TRC was created by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 and it began its work in April 1996. Presided over by Desmond Tutu, the

archbishop of the Anglican Church, the commission was given the responsibility of examining politically-motivated human rights abuses, committed between 21st March 1960, the day of the Shaperville massacre[3], and the 10th May 1994, the first day of Mandela's term as President of the Republic. The Commission was, above all, the political initiative of the African National Congress. Despite its specific political origins, it reached a diverse composition by having mobilized diverse actors across the political spectrum and across national religions, such as the military and left wing activists, Christians, Muslims and Hindus.

It was in operation for two and a half years, a period established in its founding document, with a six-month extension conceded by parliament. As Boraine observed, the premise of its founders was that the investigation of crimes should not go on for an excessive amount of time at the risk of allowing past experience to condemn the present and future of politics (Boraine, 2000).

Established with four regional offices – Cape Town, Gauteng, Durban and East London – the TRC contracted 438 employees and 17 commissioners in big and small cities across the entire country (Boraine, 2000). With regard to the structure, it included three committees that were dedicated, in principle, to distinct yet complementary functions: the testimonies of victims and witnesses, recommendations for reparation, and regulated concessions of amnesty to self-confessed rights violators. The next section will deal with each one of these in turn.

i. The **Human Rights Violations Committee**, hosted sessions of individual and institutional hearings. Institutional hearings included the testimonies of representatives of civil and state organizations such as police and military officials, religious leaders, lawyers and businesspeople. The premise was that the history of segregation, along with individual narratives of victimization, should also take into consideration the narratives of people who acted due to compulsion, guidance and/or voluntary identification with groups supporting or resisting the regime. The objective was to make clear the links between institutions which committed human rights violations during the apartheid years. In this way, the committee sought to ensure a formal space for the process of collectively holding the influential groups of the former regime responsible; whether they were linked to the state or not, and regardless of their degree of formalization and dedication to the political cause. The institutional hearings were not, however, the primary function of this committee. Its public face was tied, above all, to the testimonies of witnesses and victims of past violence and their specific tragedies. Around twenty-three thousand of them were heard, with more than two thousand held in public hearings, which included translations into the country's eleven official languages and live transmission on national radio and television networks. The committee's sessions reached a significant audience and were even transmitted on television channels abroad. For Hugh Corder[4], an expert in restorative justice at

the University of Cape Town, the mobilization of broad segments of the population around the Commission's work, was a radical novelty as it enabled traditionally marginalized actors in the national political scene, and those openly excluded from it, to be heard.

Although linked to a secular state, the Commission adopted a language and practices that were openly religious. The sessions of the victims' committee were punctuated with prayers, candle-lighting ceremonies, religious hymns and readings from the Bible, the "most subversive instrument in a context of injustice and oppression", in Desmond Tutu's view (Tutu, 2000: 31). For Villa-Vicencio and Du Toit, the objective was to create an atmosphere favorable to forgiveness that would benefit from the religiosity of South Africans (Villa-Vicencio and Du Toit, 2006: 120). As the 1991 census revealed, more than 70% of the population had active links with one of the Christian denominations, creating conditions for the "extraordinary capacity of the people to forgive", according to Tutu (Tutu, 2000: 31).

The expectation at the time was that the cathartic ritual of testifying would lead to the abandonment of punitive demands. One of the testimonies quoted by Tutu relates:

> I feel what…has brought my sight back, my eyesight back, is to come here and tell the story. I feel what has been making me sick all the time is the fact that I couldn't tell my story. But now… it feels like I have got my sight back by coming here and telling you the story. (Tutu, 2000: 167).

In the committee's sessions, victims were to feel part of a community of pain and to escape the solitude of trauma. In Tutu's politico-religious rhetoric, beyond an openness to forgiveness, South Africans would be particularly sensitive to the *ubuntu* spirit, a concept of *bantu* origin to denote the sentiment that a person only achieves self-realization through others. It is an identity constructed in opposition to the Western principle of the self, self sufficient and removed from collective needs. In this uniquely African consciousness with respect to the self, there would be a possibility for a peaceful transition, inseparable from the Christian motivation.

The religious perspective was therefore predominant in the rhetoric justifying the Commission. Without apparent tension, it accommodated, moreover, arguments inspired by psychoanalysis, well formulated in the essay by Chris van der Merwe and Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela entitled *Narrating our Healing*. In this essay, the authors address three possible reactions to trauma, an event which extinguishes the original meaning of life and which sets up an insurmountable hiatus between past and present experience (van der Merwe and Gobodo-Madikizela, 2008). For the authors, the first reaction of the self shattered and disoriented by trauma is the annihilation of the subject[5]. In this case, the authors argue that the sentiment of impotence could lead to suicide. In the second reaction

indicated, the subject, incapable of recovering any sense of purpose in life, relives the trauma by inverting the places of the agents in conflict – that is, turning the self into the aggressor and the original aggressor into the victim. The fiction of retribution tends to satisfy the vindictive impulse and creates a sense of relief for the original victim. For the individual and for society, the consequence of this path is a repetition of the cycle of violence.

Finally, the third possible reaction, which is based on an incomplete and imprecise narrative of trauma, is precisely what the founders of the Commission aimed to make possible in South Africa. This consists of testimony as a therapeutic resource, capable of enabling freedom from trauma and reconstituting the possibility of life. In this path, the interests of the traumatized subject and the society that he/she is a part of would coincide. Committed to the ideal of national reconciliation, the authors affirm that, despite the essential (and even insurmountable) tension between trauma and language, the very effort of communicating has a curative effect on the self. The narrative which results from it, very possibly disordered and beneath the emotional complexity of the event, is superior by definition to the scenario of silence, in which there does not exist the possibility of a cure or liberation, but rather the vicious reproduction of the cycle of violence.

In South Africa's transitional context, the psychoanalytic perspective therefore patterns itself after the religious one, around a method, a value, a counter-value and an objective, which are: testimony, forgiveness, revenge and reconciliation. In this system, the purpose of these testimonies is not simply to create a random collection of personal tragedies, but rather to elucidate a common sense of suffering. The objective was to reshape the pain of individuals as the pain of the nation, and thus to create a singular national narrative, in spite of the division of its parts.

ii. The **Reparation Committee** had two principal tasks. The first of them was to select deponents for the Human Rights Violations Committee among volunteers who put themselves forward as candidates[6]. Its second task was to recommend to the government reparations to be granted to victim deponents, with the objective of symbolically breaking with the organizational principles of previous governments. One of the modalities of reparation was monetary. The other assumed the form of public tributes to anti-apartheid figures with the construction of monuments, parks and museums and the renaming of roads, schools and other public spaces.

This committee was the focal point of a significant part of the victims' dissatisfaction, both from those who had their status recognized, and from those whose application to the victims' committee had been denied. Both experienced a sense of re-victimization: those who could not testify were hurt by the state once again and those who achieved recognition as victims suffered with this principle and with the terms involved with placing monetary value on their suffering. Firstly, they were disappointed with the value recommended

by the government committee: in reports published in 1998, this consisted of an approximate sum of three thousand dollars per year, to be paid for six consecutive years. Next, they were surprised by the decision made by President Thabo Mbeki, Mandela's successor, to give victim deponents a one-off payment of about four hundred dollars. The low level of commitment demonstrated by the Mbeki government with regard to the committee's recommendations was made even more evident when he refused to tax companies knowingly involved in sustaining the politics and the economy of apartheid[7]. This negligence would endanger two important objectives of the committee: holding responsible sectors of civil society which collaborated in the political reproduction of an oppressive regime, and the creation of a reparations fund for victims, especially bearing in mind the lack of available funds for this purpose. By arguing that a compulsory charge would threaten the principle of reconciliation, Mbeki made voluntary the contribution of companies and individuals that had benefited from the regime.

A strong and general sentiment of disappointment was therefore directed at the commission and the government. The contrast with how readily the amnesty committee (described next) conceded amnesties created the feeling that self-confessed aggressors were being privileged, to the detriment of victims.

iii. The **Amnesty Committee** was an important mark of distinction in the Commission in relation to similar experiences in the world. Dedicated to the reports of self-confessed ex-aggressors who pleaded for civil and criminal amnesty, it initiated its activities six months after the establishment of the Commission. To receive this benefit, which was conceded on an individual basis, the solicitant had to fulfill three requirements: provide proof of the political motivation behind their act, tell the "complete truth" about the crime reported (which could imply denouncing criminal networks associated with it) and prove that their actions had been proportional to their stated objective. If solicitants failed to comply with any of these demands, they would become subject to traditional judicial procedures as with aggressors who did not volunteer themselves to the committee and who could have their names implicated by other deponents.

The amnesty committee had statutes and procedures that were very different when compared to the other committees, which were rigidly inscribed within the limits of the Commission[8]. Firstly, it had a hybrid composition: among its five members, just two, with degrees in law, were a part of the body of commissioners. The other three were judges directly appointed by Mandela as a guarantee of political neutrality (Boraine, 2000: 116). Secondly, its mandate permitted that plaintiffs could appeal to lawyers to speak in their name. And finally, it was absolutely sovereign in relation to its decisions, without the need to be subjected to the other committees. It functioned, therefore, as an autonomous cell in relation to the wider body of the commission.

With quasi-judicial procedures, the committee distanced itself from the Commission's emotional style. In the committee, there was no need for a public demonstration of remorse and pleas for forgiveness. The necessary exchange was between truth and amnesty. According to Hugh Corder,

> During the transition years, security forces destroyed much of the incriminating evidence against the apartheid-era aggressors. Because of this, it was very difficult to locate witnesses and gather evidence to press criminal charges against those who did not volunteer to testify at the TRC. (Corder, 2008, verbal information).

With the recourse to amnesty, there was therefore a hope to generate revelations that would have been less likely to emerge in regular judicial procedures, especially in a context where material proof was scarce.

In practice, however, as Nahla Nvali (n.d.) reveals, this objective was in great measure a disappointment. The majority of requests for amnesty, around seven thousand in the whole country, saw ordinary prisoners representing their crimes as political ones, with the intention of being freed. They had nothing to lose. In the remaining cases, the accounts of political crimes were not as revealing as they were intended to be. The deponents tended to blame, in a diffuse manner, the state violence of the period, implicating people who had already died and exempting themselves from providing a comprehensive account of their participation. As it became clear that the government was incapable of investigating the cases of solicitants who did not follow procedures according to committee guidelines, there was less and less incentive to collaborate with the committee. Few amnesty requests complied with the conditions of the agreement and less than 17% of the total number of solicitants received the benefit (Nvali, n.d.). Finally, the information which resulted from this experience was insufficient to expose the reality of state violence during apartheid.

The controversy surrounding amnesty mobilized large segments of South African civil society. The families of Steve Biko and other icons of the anti-apartheid struggle, associated with a wide network of NGOs, attempted to create judicial obstacles to the committee's prerogative to arbitrate civil and criminal forgiveness to self-confessed aggressors (Boraine, 2000: 117). They alleged that the amnesty agreement hurt their constitutional rights, and thwarted civil and criminal justice. The Constitutional Tribunal nevertheless understood that the exception was justified by the need to guarantee the general objectives of the transition and also by the fact that the law which created the TRC envisioned the right to reparation in place of the right to justice. The judicial decision was therefore aligned with an understanding of amnesty as a condition for a new political era.

According to Boraine, the judicial threat to the committee, which called into question the key recourse to amnesty, ultimately benefited the Commission because it gave judicial

powers the opportunity to corroborate the political decision, which was at the heart of the transition process negotiated in the country (Boraine, 2000: 119). For Hugh Corder (2008), this convergence of powers was crucial for the maintenance of political peace in the country. As the Constitutional Court was the highest judicial court in the country, its decision meant that questioning the constitutionality of the amnesty committee was no longer possible, allowing it to continue its work without the threat of being shut down.

The Military Critique

The paradigm of forgiveness provoked the criticism of actors situated on antagonistic points of the political spectrum. For Deon Mortimer[9], spokesperson of the now defunct South African Defence Force (SADF), in the institutional sessions of the TCR victims' committee, the notion of forgiveness presupposed an illegitimate attribution of guilt to the military. In his view, the actors of the new political regime, under the guise of religious generosity, would take an arbitrary and unjust judgment of the police and the military to be true. The commission's search for the truth would be rhetorical and sensationalist. For Mortimer (2008), "members of the commission wanted evidence that would prove their point of view that the old regime was the devil". To this end, inquisitory methods had been used in a manner that would guarantee that the final version of the facts coincided with the Commission's *a priori* narratives about the national reality. This forum did not have a genuine interest in the facts. In the words of Mortimer:

> They demanded to hear from SADF only what they thought would guarantee the condemnation of the military. They wanted us to say, "we killed people". They did not believe in the truth. They wanted us to tell them all the bad things we had done. In our opinion, we hadn't done anything wrong. The members of the SADF had no reason to take part in the Commission. Nothing that we did was illegal. (Mortimer, 2008, verbal information).

Deon Fourier[10], retired general of the South African voluntary army[11], presented a different version, referring to the non-collaboration of members of the defunct SADF with the TRC. According to him, lawyers for the military had instructed their clients not to testify in the Commission, fearing accusations in international tribunals which were independent of official decisions in national territory. The public confession of guilt for crimes against humanity could be used in cases that would escape the jurisdiction of the South African government.

Contrary to this version of military self-protection, Mortimer (2008) claimed that the "actions of the SADF were legal. The excessive actions were residual. Few thought that

it was necessary to request amnesty. Very few". For him, what was at stake was the fundamental misunderstanding between the military and the commissioners. In addition to being against apartheid, members of the commission were, in general, incapable of understanding the military point of view: "how can Tutu and Boraine, who are pacifists, understand the soldier's point of view?" asked Mortimer. There was no possibility for dialogue. "I too could never understand them", the retired general concluded. In his perspective, the commission, without actually incorporating the perspective of apartheid supporters, could not sincerely aspire to the truth. For Mortimer (2008), in dispensing with one side of the story, the narrative that the commission developed produced a biased version of collective memory.

The general lamented, furthermore, the non-recognition of military virtue in "freeing the country from the clutches of the communists" and, moreover, in the process of a peaceful political transition to democracy. In his words:

> Indeed, we prevented an outbreak of chaos in this country, from a legal and security perspective. We guaranteed peace and the elections, which was not our function. Communism was defeated through our efforts. We guaranteed that South Africa would not become a one party state. We also helped Namibia and Zimbabwe. If the communists had seized power in Angola and Zimbabwe, this would have extended towards us. We did a good job for this country and for the region. When I am told that communism was not a threat, I say "of course communism was a threat! Ask the Hungarians. How long did they fight that bloody war? They were a subjugated country. The Soviet government fell because it spent too much on defense, especially in Africa. (Mortimer, 2008, verbal information).

In Mortimer's (2008) testimony, the theme of forgiveness appears to be essentially incompatible with the military self-understanding of their place in history. His narrative however does not reflect the entirety of the military perspective on the commission. Deon Fourier's (2008) version about the pragmatic motivation among members of the defense force to not participate illustrates this. Yet, it seems reasonable to suppose that Mortimer's testimony is representative of a key sector of his class, considering that the general was elected to speak in the name of the military in the Commission's institutional sessions. The limited availability of military officials to discuss the theme of repression made it difficult to ascertain the levels of agreement and disagreement with other versions from the military on the same topic.

The TRC and the Human Rights Activists' Critique

Forgiveness as a metaphor of political transition also provoked, for radically different reasons, the reactions of human rights activists, linked to a wide network of non-governmental organizations which emerged in South Africa's post-apartheid. Hugo van der Merwe [12], director of the Transitional Justice Programme of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Recognition in South Africa[13], agrees with Tutu (2000) and Boraine (2000) on the theory that religion had inspired people "to be more understanding with their aggressors and to have more tolerance and compassion", but highlights the high cost for people who were not "ready to forgive". For him, "openness to forgiveness was not unconditional". Many deponents would have been compelled to publically declare forgiveness, due to the perceived and unspoken moral obligation to do so. In the environment of testimony, van der Merwe (2008) suggests, all demands for retribution were dealt with as inopportune individualism, incompatible with the principle of reconciliation. This philosophy would have created unfulfilled expectations of punishment and would have driven away potential deponents: one notable group of people directly violated by the former regime had decided not to seek recognition as victims by the Commission. For them the participation in the processes of the Commission would not bring benefits in proportion to the level of sacrifice implicated by testifying.

Oupa Makhalemele[14], also from the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in South Africa, highlights this criticism: "the assumption that people who lived through years of conflict would be able to reconcile was extremely optimistic. The emphasis on reconciliation was excessive. This can not happen instantaneously". For him, the paradigm of reconciliation clashed with the principles of "taking responsibility" and "justice as accountability". The notion of *ubuntu* that "has to do with a certain myth about African culture, taken as an indistinctive whole", would be "used in a undifferentiated way"[15]. The refusal to apply of the punitive principle would be the result of a romantic and undifferentiated view of African culture, which valorizes expressions of social harmony instead of conflict.

Richard Wilson (2001), author of the *Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa* reiterates this critique of *ubuntu* as an unfortunate political category. For him, the idealization of an African soul inclined towards forgiveness and to common life would had been convenient for the rhetoric of amnesty, but inadequate for the redefinition of political life on new terms. Based on the pan-Africanist fiction of reconciliation, the Commission neglected the punitive principle of international treaties on human rights in favor of a heterodox understanding of this topic, which envisioned tolerance towards torturers and murderers as a precondition of democracy. According to Wilson, in Desmond Tutu's

unrealistic narrative, the vague allusion to an African jurisprudence was based on the assumption that the expectations of justice were of a restorative, rather than a retributive nature (Wilson, 2001: 152).

For Wilson (2001), *ubuntu* corresponds to a static and ahistorical image of African nations. The government discourse, which purported to be sensitive to popular values, established a fictitious and irreconcilable duality between, on the one hand, a conciliatory African soul and, on the other, a vengeful Western disposition. In this perspective, all punitive action would be antithetic to reconciliation. There was no possibility of combining the two principles.

In a study of South African townships, Wilson devotes his argument precisely to *ubuntu*'s lack of importance, in the face of the very real prevalence of demands for punishment in poor communities in the country. In popular South African tribunals, even death was given as a sentence for offenders. In these improvised spaces of justice, the expectation of conciliation between offenders and victims was secondary in the face of demands for retribution. In many cases, according to Wilson, the punishment of aggressors was taken as a prerequisite for restoring the dignity of victims. In this context, the political principle of amnesty seemed to run counter to the priorities of social expectations (Wilson, 2001: 170).

Among human rights activists, the criticism of the forgiveness-reconciliation-amnesty formula amounted to a widespread dissatisfaction with the Commission's negligence of the racial question, which was the foundation of social distinction in the former regime. The organization's mandate did not identify the political motivation behind racial crimes and excluded it from the scope of investigation. For Madeleine Fullard[16], ex-member of the reparation committee of the TCR and director of the Missing Persons Task Team[17]:

> The TRC ignored the issue of race and discrimination, which took an economic and social form. Race was an ugly word. Five million people were forcibly removed from their homes because they were black. These people had limited mobility and we failed to address that. (Fullard, 2008, verbal information).

In the same vein, van der Merwe (2008) reaffirms the misalignment of the Commission in relation to the specific South African social and political context: "the theme of reconciliation should not be between victims and torturers. The question is racial; it is beyond individual agents". Reconciliation on an individual basis would tend to obfuscate the force of the collective question which underlay the overwhelming majority of cases taken to the commission: racism. In a complementary perspective, Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson draw attention to the commission's negligence of violence against women. To

omit this in the face of marked patterns of rights' violations, the commission would have ignored "structural violence, based on race and gender" (Posel and Simpson, 2002: 63).

In spite of having different goals, the criticisms of the Commission were all directed against a common fundamental characteristic: the individualist paradigm. In this perspective, the moral emphasis on the idea of peace had led to a depoliticization of the Commission's procedures, the result of which was a strict consideration of individual cases removed from their social and political foundations.

The African National Congress and the Dispute over Moral Equivalence

In addition to the disagreement about the legitimate interpretation of human rights (disputed in large part by commissioners and human rights activists), another, more basic, level of disagreement divided those in charge of the political transition. This had to do with the adoption of human rights as a political category and as a paradigm of transition. In the post-cold war political scene, the notion of inviolable universal rights collided with the radical language of the anti-apartheid movement and led to open protests based on misunderstandings and frustrations in the first years of South African democracy. The abandonment of a socialist vocabulary in favor of the language of human rights, more palatable for the transition period's white elite and attuned with the expectations of the international community, constituted an important rupture with the kinds of political expectations developed over the long and heterogeneous transition towards democracy in the country.

In spite of originally agreeing with the commission's principles of action, party members of the African National Congress (ANC) demonstrated dissatisfaction with the universalist paradigm of the Commission and with the supposed "moral equivalence" of activists who resisted the regime and those who were part of it. For Kader Asmal, one of the most important representatives of the ANC in the process of managing the commission, the "decriminalization of resistance" was an imperative of the new democratic era. (Asmal, Asmal and Roberts, 1997).

In the activist perspective, the struggle outside of the legal framework of the former regime was absolutely necessary: revolutionary activities were justified in the context of the former regime's illegitimacy. In an interview for this research, Asmal (2008) affirms that there were no doubts with regard to the judgment of political actors of that era: the moral quality of men who dedicated their lives to surmounting the "immoral, unjust and intolerable" order was superior to those who were in charge of maintaining it. Asmal (2008) did not contest the reconciliation paradigm, but vigorously opposed the premise of

moral equivalence between past opponents. For him, it was possible to reconcile without neglecting evidence of moral asymmetry.

In Tutu (2000) and Boraine's (2000) political formula, the universalism of human rights and of religion combined to form a discourse of peace and aversion to conflict. For them, it was not reasonable to suppose moral distinctions among criminals: the violence of the resistance movements should be an object of investigation and accountability in the same manner as that of state agents. In this perspective, the just cause of freedom could not welcome unjust procedures; the attainment of revolutionary ends could not be different to its means (Tutu, 2000: 108).

In Alex Boraine's terms, the objective of the TRC was to "hold up a mirror to reflect the complete picture" of violence in South African society. From that, it would be possible to identify "all victims in the conflict and to confront all perpetrators of gross human rights violations" (Boraine, 2000: 326). It would therefore not be suitable for the Commission to decide about good and bad violence. The moral decision shifted from the ends to the very means of political action, that is, violence in itself. For Boraine, the moral choice for one side of the conflict would simply prolong the authoritarian paradigm which they wanted to refute. The novelty of democracy would consist precisely in the collective refusal of using violence as a political instrument.

In Tutu's narrative, this premise is associated with the skill demonstrated in relativizing the categories of victim and aggressor. For him, South Africa was a nation of victims and survivors, affected by the common misfortune of apartheid (Tutu, 2000: 102). Among the 25,000 violent homicides committed during the regime, it is estimated that 16,000 had been the result of conflicts between rival segments in the political struggle (Fullard, 2008). Many individuals therefore oscillated between the status of aggressor and victim. The identities constituted themselves in an ambiguous manner, incomprehensible through rigid moral categories. Not unusually, and moved by the desire for retribution, the original victims mimicked their aggressors and made themselves executioners, as seen in the van de Merwe and Godobo-Madizikela's (2008) description of the possible psychological processes that the traumatized subject experiences. Paul Verryn, implicated in the Winnie Mandela scandal, summarizes this scenario:

> The primary cancer was and will always be the oppression of apartheid, but the secondary infection touched many of apartheid's opponents and eroded their knowledge of good and evil. One of the tragedies of life is that it is possible to become like those who we hate most and I have a feeling that this drama is an example of that. (*apud* Boraine, 2000: 222).

In addressing the question of identities constructed in a context of violent sociability, Alex Boraine (2000) identifies P.W. Botha, the last president of the regime, and Winnie

Mandela, ex-wife of Mandela and anti-apartheid activist, as personalities that symbolized the "madness of apartheid". On opposite ends of the political spectrum – with differences in origin, ideology, gender, age and the experience of power – both had been victims of the "South African tragedy", even as they were also – knowingly – agents of violence. In this perspective, suffering has a singular and shared nature: treating others inhumanely results in the dehumanization of the self. The role of agency does not therefore extinguish the experience of pain. To illustrate this idea, Tutu brings up the testimony of a confessed torturer, who committed suicide after testifying in the amnesty committee:

> They can give me amnesty a thousand times. Even if God and everyone else forgives me a thousand times – I have to live with this hell. The problem is in my head, my conscience. There's only one way to be free of it. Blow my own brains out. Because that's where my hell is. (Tutu, 2000: 53-54).

For Tutu (2000), the human soul does not have *a priori* substance. Intrinsically good or bad people do not exist: we all have the potential to act in every way, depending on the environment that surrounds us. Goodness and evil therefore acquire an unexpected dimension of chance and opportunity. Tutu asserts that "none of us could predict that if we had been subjected to the same influences, the same conditioning, we should not have turned out like these perpetrators"[18]. In his view, "we cannot underestimate the power of circumstantial conditioning". Men who "trod on the right path" should rehabilitate the "sons of God who act as animals" and awaken them to the dormant potential of goodness (Tutu, 2000: 85). Moral condemnation, on its own, does not take into consideration the difficulties of the aggressor. In this perspective, evil is described as an absence of good; it does not exist in and of itself. And, once triggered, it is not an inexorable path.

For Boraine, the tacit expectation among members of the new democratic party was that, going against its neutral mandate, the Commission would condemn the National Party[19] and its allies for their dehumanizing policies and would make the ANC emerge as the "hero that had stopped the villain in its tracks and ushered in a new democracy with a human face" (Boraine, 2000: 326).

The disagreement between commissioners and members of the ANC reached its peak in October 1998, the date of the Commission's closure. At the beginning of that year, the ANC had asked for a hearing with the TRC. Boraine and Tutu thought that an exclusive hearing for the party would constitute an unjustified privilege and given the impossibility of extending this recourse to other organizations included in the report, they decided to refuse the request. As a reaction to this, the ANC, through a judicial appeal, tried to impede the publication of the Commission's final report.

The appeal was denied and the report was published on schedule. In spite of this, the episode left deep scars in the memory about the commission. Mandela declared public support for it but protested disapprovingly in seeing that its report was guilty of "an artificial even-handedness that seemed to place those fighting a just war alongside those whom they opposed and who defended an inhuman system" (Boraine, 2000: 319).

Concluding Notes

The context of democratic transition coexists with a great sense of uncertainty over the political future ahead. In addition to the lack of clarity over the new terms of public life, and the establishment of new everyday routines, there is controversy and little clarity with respect to the way in which cases of violence, which took place under repressive regimes, will be dealt with. Will criminals – self-confessed or not – be held accountable for their actions? In what manner? Will judgments on them take into consideration new or old laws?

The question of how to seek justice for past crimes is central to new democracies. Generally speaking, this goal can be pursued through three strategies, which are neither clear-cut, nor entirely mutually exclusive, and which can thus substantially overlap. The first of them is retributive in nature, tied to the objective of retaliating against past aggressors and in line with a perspective that sees retribution for suffering as necessary. International war tribunals are the key examples of this strategy. The second strategy, in stark contrast with the first, dispenses with a punitive logic and bases itself instead on a broad and unrestrained principle of amnesty. This model is based on the assumption that the institutional framework of democracy, in itself, establishes sufficient conditions for a new social pact. The underlying presumption is that it is possible to erase the past, creating a new blank slate on which a new society can be founded. This was the case, for example, in the first decades of political transition in Brazil.

Finally, in the third strategy, we return to South Africa, whose experience of transition is situated somewhere between the harsh principle of retribution and "blanket amnesty". For the architects of the South African transition, regulated amnesty should serve the objective of shedding light on the conditions and agents of past violence. The punishment of aggressors is de-emphasized in order to establish favorable conditions for the emergence of a new political scene. In the presumed moral context, victims would receive the truth imbued in a spirit of forgiveness.

In this article, I presented the TRC as the primary institutional mechanism envisioned for the delicate exercise of redefining social relations inherited from apartheid in South Africa. Its founders declared grandiose political intentions – further elevated by

religious inspiration – to the detriment of localized, more palpable objectives. Thus, there was a marked disparity between the ambitious mandate and the political discourse about the commission, and its actual achievements. One of the important criticisms of the Commission emerged precisely because of the disjuncture between the objectives of national truth and reconciliation, on the one hand, and the practices and actual results of the experience, on the other, namely the induced routines of forgiveness, the minimal reparations paid to deponent victims and the unsatisfactory levels of clarification about past crimes and of holding accountable individuals and groups knowingly involved in human rights violations.

In fact, the disparity between expectations about the Commission and the actual results it achieved is salient. In part, this contrast is the effect of the paradox of success. If it is reasonable to suppose that one's capacity to reveal and make public the atrocities of the former regime through the words of victims, is indicative of success, it was precisely this event that instigated and encouraged the rejection of amnesty as an appropriate recourse for dealing with those responsible for the violence. This means that the knowledge of the truth about the victims advanced in inverse proportion to the stimulus of reconciliation on the terms of the Commission, that is, the terms of forgiveness. The Commission shifted trauma and pain from private circles (of family, of friends and neighbors) to the public agenda. In doing so, it created expectations it could not fulfill about its capacity to produce closure with regard to this question that the Commission itself had brought up and instigated.

If it, in part, circumvented the boundaries of the tribunals' actions – and was praised for this – it also created its own set of frustrations. In South Africa, the Commission gave rise to a sense of discontent which is inherent in political transitions – for despite the ruptures which they institute, they do not restore the period prior to the violence and they coexist with sentiments of injustice and social rivalry. In the Commission, there was a convergence of expectations which did not strictly fit within its confines. Thus, to a large extent, the frustration that emerged in relation to it was relevant to the wider political context, both past and present.

Its capacity to shed light on crimes, for example, was limited by the scarcity of material proof, a result of the long-standing negligence of the former regime. It had to do with restrictions that were beyond the reach of the Commission, but whose effects were projected on it. With regard to the political obstacles of the new democracy, it is worth underlining the low level of commitment to the objective of reparation demonstrated by the Mbeki government and its dismissal of the Commission's recommendations. The government's actions generated a feeling of injustice and disproportion in the treatment given to rights violators, who benefitted from the amnesty, and victims who deserved minimum

compensation after exposing their stories during painful testimonial sessions. The actual competence of the Commission was therefore clearly below its capacity to complete the stated objectives - ambitious even for a government agenda.

If the Commission is seen, nevertheless, as a short-term institutional experience, without having the expectation of national redemption falling upon it, its achievements transcend its shortcomings. When adjusted to the scale of this experience, the critique loses much of its force. If, on the one hand, the case-by-case approach towards brutal episodes by and against the regime neglected the question of everyday racial violence against the black population, on the other hand, it established a concrete and palpable dimension for the Commission's actions. Through the means of testimony, it was capable of reconstituting the terms of the former regime's political reproduction. In the place of an agglomeration of random narratives, confined to the tragedies of their individual parts, the Commission delineated the contours of the national tragedy, inapprehensible in its extent and complexity.

Therefore, far from filling the gaps of information about events and agents of past violence, the Commission, even so, brought in sufficient elements to invalidate the denial or the allegations of ignorance about apartheid. The agency of groups of society, which had until then been forced into a situation of invisibility or political and social marginality, established foundations for the new social memory of the country.

Interviews Conducted

André Du Toit, Emeritus Professor at the University of Cape Town, specialist in transitional justice.

Deon Fourier, colonel of the former voluntary army of South Africa.

Deon Mortimer, colonel representative of the South African Defense Force in the human rights' violations committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Fanie Du Toit, executive director of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.

Hugh Corder, Professor at the University of Cape Town, specialist in restorative justice.

Hugo van der Merwe, director of the Transitional Justice Programme of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in South Africa.

Kader Asmal, deceased June 2011, was a key personality in the anti-Apartheid struggle. Professor of Human Rights at the University of Western Cape at the time of interview.

Madeleine Fullard, ex-member of the reparation committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Director of the Missing Persons Task Team, linked to The National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa, at the time of interview.

Oupa Makhalemele, researcher at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in South Africa.

Thapelo Mokushane, director of the Department of Information and Research, Post-Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC Unit), at the time of interview.

Two mothers, unidentified, in the group Mamelodi mothers, a group of activist mothers whose sons were killed by the Apartheid regime in 1986.

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Translated by Megha Amrith

Submitted in April 2012

Accepted in April 2013

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DU TOIT, Fanie: interview [in August 2008] to Cristina Buarque de Hollanda at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, in Cape Town.

FOURIER, Deon: interview [in August 2008] to Cristina Buarque de Hollanda at home, in Pretoria.

FULLARD, Madeleine: interview [in August 2008] to Cristina Buarque de Hollanda at the headquarter of the Missing Persons Task Team, in Pretória.

MAKHALEMELE, Oupa: interview [in August 2008] to Cristina Buarque de Hollanda at office in the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in South Africa, in Cape Town.

MOKUSHANE, Thapelo: interview [in August 2008] to Cristina Buarque de Hollanda at office in the Post-Truth and Reconciliation Commission, ein Pretória.

MORTIMER, Deon: interview [in August 2008] to Cristina Buarque de Hollanda at home, in Pretoria.

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Notes

1   This article is the result of research which began in March 2008, with a research grant from the Ford Foundation, and ended in July 2012, during a postdoctoral fellowship in the Department of Social Science of New York University, Abu Dhabi.

2   The term used in Southern African countries to refer to the mixed population, with varying European, *bantu* and *khoisan* influences.

3   On March 21st 1960, in the city of Shaperville on the outskirts of Johannesburg, there was a violent repression of a peaceful protest against the pass laws. The latter obliged black South Africans to carry with them a document authorizing them access to designated areas in the country. This confrontation resulted in 69 deaths and injured hundreds.

4   Interview of Hugh Corder with the author, in Cape Town, 2008.

5   Important: van der Merwe and Godobo-Madikizela do not imply a hierarchy of importance or incidence among the three reactions indicated.

6   Candidates were people who claimed to be victims or witnesses of serious rights violations during the period covered by the Commission. The distinction between one and the other is tenuous or even nonexistent, since witnessing violence is also a form of victimization.

7   With respect to the contribution of private companies to the apartheid regime, Nvali cites the case of Swiss banks who pulled the Botha government out of its financial crisis, deferring the repayment of loans and buying more than half of the gold produced by the country (Nvali, n.d.).

8 Deon Mortimer, representative of the defunct South African Defense Force in the institutional hearings of the victims' committee, referred to the Amnesty Committee as an organization distinct from the TRC. He directed his harsh critique specifically against the Commission, which he identified as synonymous with the Victims' Committee. With regard to the Amnesty Committee, he referred to it, if not in a flattering manner, neutrally. He said that they had done "their work".

9 Interview of Deon Mortimer to the author, in Pretoria, 2008.

10 Interview of Deon Fourier to the author, in Pretoria, 2008.

11 At the time of Apartheid, South Africa had a voluntary army, with the same ranks and promotions as the regular army. Its members had military education, and over the year, dedicated one month to military activities, within and outside the country. Public and private enterprises were under legal obligation to release their employees to this purpose, without compromising the regular leave period to which they were entitled. According to what I was told, participating in this military corps was very common among white men.

12 Interview of Hugo Van Der Merwe, Hugo to the author, in August 2008.

13 An important South African non-governmental organization formed in 1989, before the election of Nelson Mandela.

14 Interview of Oupa Makhalemele to the author in August 2008, in Cape Town.

15 For him, "there existed a disposition towards forgiveness among the victims who participated in the TCR's process. But this topic is a dangerous and controversial topic because it is necessary to eliminate impunity". (Makhalemele, 2008, verbal information).

16 Interview of Madeleine Fullard in August 2008 to the author, in Pretoria.

17 The Missing Persons Task Team is linked to The National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa. It was created after the closure of the commission to give proceedings to the search of politicians who disappeared during the Apartheid regime.

18 A tacit reference to soldiers and police of lower rank, who were put under pressure to comply with orders. The commission's procedure to attribute individual blame, to the detriment of institutional responsibility, gave rise to, among other things, formal opposition among members of the South African Police. According to Alex Boraine, representatives of the military corps argued that "there should have been collective responsibility for acts of violence". If the focus was to be on the individual, this would privilege "political leaders who gave orders to the police and who refused to acknowledge their responsibility" (Boraine, 2000: 126).

19 Founded in 1915, it was an apartheid party which governed the country from June 1948 to May 1994.

When is statistical significance not significant?

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The article provides a non-technical introduction to the *p value* statistics. Its main purpose is to help researchers make sense of the appropriate role of the *p value* statistics in empirical political science research. On methodological grounds, we use replication, simulations and observational data to show when statistical significance is not significant. We argue that: (1) scholars must always graphically analyze their data before interpreting the *p value*; (2) it is pointless to estimate the *p value* for non-random samples; (3) the *p value* is highly affected by the sample size, and (4) it is pointless to estimate the *p value* when dealing with data on population.

Keywords: p value statistics; statistical significance; significance tests.

*The basic problem with the null hypothesis significance test in political science is that it often does not tell political scientists what they think it is telling them. (*J. Gill)

*The statistical difficulties arise more generally with findings that are suggestive but not statistically significant. (*A. Gelman and D. Weakliem)

*The research methodology literature in recent years has included a full frontal assault on statistical significance testing. (*J. E. McLean and J. M. Ernest)

*Statistical significance testing has involved more fantasy than fact. (*R. Carver)

Introduction[1]

What is the fate of a research paper that does not find statistically significant results? According to Gerber, Green and Nickerson (2001: 01), "articles that do not reject the null hypothesis tend to go unpublished" Likewise, Sigelman (1999: 201) argues that "statistically significant results are achieved more frequently in published than unpublished studies. Such publication bias is generally seen as the consequence of a widespread prejudice against non significant results"[2]. Conversely, Henkel (1976: 07) argues that significance tests "are of little or no value in basic social science research, where basic research is identified as that which is directed toward the development and validation of theory". Similarly, McLean and Ernest (1998: 15) point out that significance tests provide no information about the practical significance of an event, or about whether or not the result is replicable. More directly, Carver (1978; 1993) argues that all forms of significance test should be abandoned[3]. Considering this controversy, what is the appropriate role of the p value statistic in empirical political science research? This is our research question.

This paper provides a non-technical introduction to the p value statistic. Our main purpose is to help students in making sense of the appropriate role of the p value statistic in empirical political science research. On methodological grounds, we use observational data from the Quality of Government Institute[4] simulations and replicate results from Anscombe (1973), Cohen (1988) and Hair et al., (2006) to show what can be learned from the p value statistic. There are situations where interpretation of the *p value* requires caution and we suggest four warnings: (1) scholars must always graphically analyze their data

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before interpreting the p value; (2) it is pointless to estimate the p value for non-random samples; (3) the p value is highly affected by the sample size, and (4) it is pointless to estimate the p value when dealing with data from population[5].

The remainder of the paper consists of three sections. Firstly, we outline the underlying logic of null hypothesis significance tests, and we define what p value is and how it should be properly interpreted. Next, we replicate Anscombe (1973), Cohen (1988) and Hair et al., (2006) data, using basic simulation and analyze observational data to explain our view regarding the proper role of the p value statistic. We close with a few concluding remarks on statistical inference in political science.

What the p value is, what it means and what it does not

Statistical inference is based on the idea that it is possible to generalize results from a sample to the population[6]. How can we assure that relations observed in a sample are not simply due to chance? Significance tests are designed to offer an objective measure to inform decisions about the validity of the generalization. For example, one can find a negative relationship in a sample between education and corruption, but additional information is necessary to show that the result is not simply due to chance, but that it is "statistically significant". According to Henkel (1976), hypothesis testing is:

> Employed to test some assumption (hypothesis) we have about the population against a sample from the population (…) the result of a significance test is a probability which we attach to a descriptive statistic calculated from a sample. This probability reflects how likely it is that the statistic could have come from a sample drawn from the population specified in the hypothesis (Henkel, 1976: 09)[7].

In the standard approach to significance testing, one has a null hypothesis (H_o) and an alternative hypothesis (H_a), which describe opposite and mutually exclusive patterns regarding some phenomena[8]. Usually while the null hypothesis (H_o) denies the existence of a relationship between X and Y, the alternative hypothesis (H_a) supports that X and Y are associated. For example, in a study about the determinants of corruption, while the null hypothesis (H_o) states that there is no correlation between education and corruption, the alternative hypothesis (H_a) states that these variables are correlated, or more specifically indicates the direction of the relationship; that education and corruption are negatively associated[9].

Usually, scholars are interested in rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis, since the alternative hypothesis represents the corroboration of the theoretical expectations of the researcher. Also, as identified by Gerber, Green and Nickerson

(2001), there is a publication bias that favors papers that successfully reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, scholars have both substantial and practical incentives to prefer statistically significant results.

McLean and Ernest (1998: 16) argue that "a null hypothesis (H_o) and an alternative hypothesis (H_a) are stated, and if the value of the test statistic falls in the rejection region the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Otherwise the null hypothesis is retained on the basis that there is insufficient evidence to reject it". In essence, the main purpose of hypothesis test is to help the researcher to make a decision about two competing views of the reality. According to Henkel (1976),

> Significance testing is assumed to offer an advantage over subjective evaluations of closeness in contexts such as that illustrated above where there are no specific criteria for what constitutes enough agreement (between our expectations and our observations) to allow us to continue to believe our hypothesis, or constitutes great enough divergence to lead us to suspect that our hypothesis is false. In a general sense, tests of significance, as one approach to assessing our beliefs or assumptions about reality, differ from the common sense approach only in the degree to which the criterion for closeness of, or correspondence between, observed and expected results are formalized, that is, specific and standardized across tests. Significance testing allows us to evaluate differences between what we expect on the basis of our hypothesis, and what we observe, but only in terms of one criterion, the probability that these differences could have occurred by 'chance' (Henkel, 1976: 10).

In theory, the p value is a continuous measure of evidence, but in practice it is typically trichotomized approximately into highly significant, marginally significant, and not statistically significant at conventional levels, with cutoffs at $p \leq 0.01$, $p \leq 0.05$ and $p > 0.10$ (Gelman, 2012: 2). According to Cramer and Howitt (2004),

> The level at which the null hypothesis is rejected is usually set as 5 or fewer times out of 100. This means that such a difference or relationship is likely to occur by chance 5 or fewer times out of 100. This level is generally described as the proportion 0.05 and sometimes as the percentage 5%. The 0.05 probability level was historically an arbitrary choice but has been acceptable as a reasonable choice in most circumstances. If there is a reason to vary this level, it is acceptable to do so. So in circumstances where there might be very serious adverse consequences if the wrong decision were made about the hypothesis, then the significance level could be made more stringent at, say, 1% (Cramer and Howitt, 2004: 151).

Figure 1 illustrates the logic of null hypothesis significance testing.

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Figure 1. Null Hypothesis Significance Testing illustrated

We know that the area under the curve equates to 1 and can be represented by a probability density function. As we standardize the variable to a standard normal, we have a mean of zero and the spread is described by the standard deviation. Importantly, given that this curve's standard deviation equals 1, we know that 68.26% of all observations are between -1 and +1 standard deviation, 95.44% of all observations will fall between -2 and +2 standard deviation and 99.14% of all cases are between -3 and +3 standard deviation. The shaded area represents the probability of observing a result from a sample as extreme as we observed, assuming the null hypothesis in population is true. For example, in a regression of Y on X the first step is to state the competing hypotheses:

$$H_o: b_x = 0$$
$$H_a: b_x \neq 0$$

While the null hypothesis states that the effect of X on Y is zero ($b_x = 0$), the alternative hypothesis states that the effect is different from zero ($b_x \neq 0$). The second step is to compare our estimate with the parameters specified under the null hypothesis. The more our estimate approximates to the parameters specified by the null hypothesis, the less confidence we have in rejecting it. The more distant our estimate is from the parameters specified by the null hypothesis, the more confidence we have in rejecting H_o in favor of H_a. The p value statistic is a conditional probability, the probability of obtaining the observed or more extreme result given that the null hypothesis is true. To estimate the p value or the probability value, we should proceed as follows; (1) write down both the null (H_o) and the alternative hypothesis (H_a); (2) calculate the difference between the expected value under the null hypothesis and the observed value based on sample data; (3) standardize the difference into Z scores, and (4) estimate the probability of the alternative hypothesis assuming that the null hypothesis is true. Algebraically,

$$Z = \frac{\bar{x} - \mu_0}{\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{n}}}$$

Where $\bar{x}$ represents the observed value, μ_0 represents the value under the null, represents the variance of the distribution and n represents the sample size (number of observations). When the difference between the observed value and the value under the null increases, all other things constant, higher is the Z. Similarly, when the sample size gets bigger, all other things constant, the variance is lower and the Z is higher. The Z score is higher, and the p value statistic is lower. Therefore, the p value depends not only upon the effect magnitude but is, by definition, determined by the sample size.

To make the estimation of the p value statistic more practical to political science scholars, we use observational data from the Quality of Government Institute[11]. The first step is to state both the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis.

H_o: $r \geq 0$

H_a: $r < 0$

Theoretically, we expect a negative correlation between schooling years and corruption ($r < 0$). Alternatively, the H_o (null hypothesis) states that the correlation between schooling years and corruption will be higher or equal to zero ($r \geq 0$). The *p value* statistic will inform the probability that the observed value is due to chance, assuming that the null hypothesis is true. We know from basic statistics classes the rule that "when the p value is low, the null hypothesis must go". In other words, the lower the p value, the higher our confidence in rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Figure 2 summarizes our empirical results.

Figure 2. Average schooling years and Corruption

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
The results suggest a strong negative (-0.799) correlation between average schooling years and corruption. The relationship is statistically significant (p value<0,000) with a sample of 113 country-cases. Following the 0.05 criteria, we should reject the null hypothesis of no or positive association between the variables. Then, we should conclude that there is a negative relationship between average schooling years and the level of corruption.

Most statistics handbooks present a rule of thumb of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels. It is important to stress that these are highly arbitrary cutoffs, and that the scholar should choose between them, preferably before analyzing the data. Fisher (1923) argues that:

> If one in twenty does not seem high enough, we may, if we prefer it, draw the line at one in fifty (2 per cent point), or one in one hundred (the 1 per cent point). Personally, the writer prefers to set a low standard of significance at the 5 per cent point, and ignore entirely all results which fail to reach this level. A scientific fact should be regarded as experimentally established only if a properly designed experiment rarely fails to give this level of significance (Fisher, 1923: 85).

Through analyzing the relationship between schooling years and corruption, we established a 0.05 cutoff. Our p value is less than 0.000. To be sure, the p value is never exactly zero, but it is usual to report only three digits, therefore we interpret it as less than 0.01. So, given the null hypothesis that the correlation between schooling years and corruption is higher or equal to zero, the p value of less than 0.000 means that the probability of finding a correlation as extreme as -0.799 is less than 0.000. Therefore we should reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis.

After defining what the p value means, it is important to stress what is does not. It does not mean that the likelihood that the observed results are due to chance is less than 1%. Similarly, a p value of .01 does not mean that there is a 99% chance that your results are true, and a p value of .01 does not mean that there is a 1% chance that the null hypothesis is true. Additionally, you cannot interpret it as 99% evidence that the alternative hypothesis is true[12]. Lets follow Fisher's classic definition: the p value is the probability, under the assumption of no effect (the null hypothesis H_0), of obtaining a result equal to or more extreme than what was actually observed (Fisher, 1925).

The next section considers situations where the p value interpretation requires caution, and presents four warnings to properly interpret the p value statistic.

Four Warnings on Significance Testing

Anscombe (1973) demonstrated the importance of exploring data graphically before drawing inferences from it. He showed that different relationships between X and Y can be summarized by the same statistics (F, standard error, b, beta etc). Figure 3 replicates his data, presenting four different relationships between variables with the same significant p value.

Figure 3. Replication of Anscombe's (1973) data

All graphs in Figure 3 gave the same p value statistic of 0.002. However, the graphical analysis shows that the nature of the relationship between the variables is markedly different. For example, the upper-right graph shows a non-linear relationship. As long the scholar only examines the p value he would never get this information. Therefore, if you rely only on statistical significance you would reject the null hypothesis for all cases,

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arguing that the relationship found using sample data could be generalized to the population. In addition, the researcher may fail to reject the null hypothesis after finding significant coefficient estimates, but this could be due an outlier effect (for example the bottom right graph in Figure 3). Basic statistics handbooks teach us that outliers can influence the probability of making Type I and Type II errors[13]. Thus, our first warning is that before interpreting the p value statistic, scholars must graphically analyze their data. To make our case more explicitly, we examine the correlation between the Human Development Index (HDI) and corruption.

Figure 4. Correlation between Human Development Index and Corruption

In both cases the correlation is statistically significant (p value<0.000). However, when the researcher examines only the p value he would fail to acknowledge that the relationship between the variables is best described by a quadratic function (r^2 =0.673) rather than by a linear function (r^2 =0.457). The practical consequence of functional form misspecification [14] in this case is the underestimation of the magnitude of relationship between the variables. Functional form misspecification can also lead to Type I and Type II errors.

To summarize, the careful graphical depiction of data is an essential step in empirical research. Scholars must avoid interpreting the p value statistic without graphically analyzing their data first. Breaking this important rule can lead to incorrect conclusions about political phenomena.

Our second warning is that it is pointless to estimate a p value for non-random samples[15]. According to Moore and McCabe (2006: 250), "a simple random sample (SRS) of

size n consists of n individuals from the population chosen in such a way that every set of n individuals has an equal chance to be the sample actually selected". There are different sampling methods, considering the complexity of the population and the representativeness of different characteristics. However, regardless of the method, if the sample is not random, the underlying assumptions of both the normal distribution and central limit theorem[16]do not hold. Thus, sample statistics are no longer unbiased and efficient estimates of population parameters[17]. According to Smith (1983: 394), "the arguments for randomization are twofold. The first, and most important for science, is that randomization eliminates personal choice and hence eliminates the possibility of subjective selection bias. The second is that the randomization distribution provides a basis for statistical inference".

Henkel (1976: 23) argues that "the manner in which we select samples from our populations is critical to significance testing, since the sampling procedure determines the manner in which chance factors affect the statistic(s) we are concerned with, and consequently affect the sampling distribution of the statistic"[18]. If the sample is random, the data is subject to the laws of probability and the behavior of estimated statistics as described by the sampling distribution. According to Moore and McCabe (2006), when you use systematic random samples to collect your data, the values of the estimated statistic neither consistently overestimate nor consistently underestimate the value of the population parameters.

Figure 5. Bias and variability

While randomization minimizes bias, the larger sample size reduces variability; the researcher is interested in producing estimates that are both unbiased and efficient (low variability) (see bottom right example).

To make this claim more practical, we intentionally selected a biased sample and then we estimated the relationship between Human Development Index (HDI) and corruption[19]. Figure 6 summarizes this information.

Figure 6. Correlation between Human Development Index and Corruption

When dealing with the biased sample[20] (n = 14), the scholar would conclude that Human Development Index (HDI) and corruption are independent variables (r = 0.018 with a p value of 0.950). However, when we consider the full sample (N = 172), we observe a negative (-0.676) and statistically significant correlation (p value<0.000). This is to say that if we use the biased sample to infer about the population, we would not reject the null hypothesis when we should reject it (type II error). It is natural to blame the sample size when explaining a lack of statistical significance. However, this is not always the case; as long the pattern of correlation between the variables is stable, as we use a random sample, it is more likely to detect the presence of the association. Figure 7 illustrates this argument.

Figure 7. Correlation between Human Development Index and corruption
(random sample)

When dealing with a random sample of the same size (n=14), we observe a negative (-0.760) and statistically significant (p value = 0.002) correlation between the variables. In this case, when working with the random sample the scholar would reach the same conclusion based on population data.

Another potential problem is the use of a biased sample to reject the null hypothesis when it should not be rejected (type I error). Figure 8 illustrates this problem.

Figure 8. Correlation between Area and Average schooling years

We analyzed the correlation between the geographic area and average schooling years. While the left graph shows the raw data, the right one displays the transformed data

(logarithmic). In both cases, the correlation is not statistically significant. In other words, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is equal to zero. So, we should conclude that geographical area and education are statistically independent. The following figure replicates this correlation with an income biased sample.

Figure 8a. Correlation between Area and Average schooling years

The result is markedly different. When dealing with the income biased sample (n=14), we observe a positive (0.671) and statistically significant (p value = 0.009) correlation between the variables. In this case, we would wrongly reject the null hypothesis (type I error). Therefore, we would conclude that geographical area and schooling years are positively associated.

Regardless of the sampling method design, we should meet the assumption of equiprobability, i.e. that each element in the population has the same chance of being selected. Non probabilistic samples cannot be used to make reliable statistical inferences. Therefore, we argue that it is pointless to interpret the p value of non-random samples.

Our third claim is that even marginal effects tend to be statistically significant when the sample size is large enough. We use basic simulation to show that, as the size of the sample increases, the power (*b*) of detecting a significant relationship also enhances. Hair et al. (2006: 10) argue that "power is the probability of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis when it should be rejected. Thus, power is the probability that statistical significance will be indicated if it is present". They suggest five rules of thumb regarding statistical power analysis:

(1) Researchers should always design the study to achieve a power level of .80 at the desired significance level;

(2) More severe significance levels require larger samples to achieve the desired power level;

(3) Conversely, power can be increased by choosing a less severe alpha. 4. Smaller effects sizes always require large sample sizes to achieve the desired power, and 5. Any increase in power is most likely achieved by increasing sample size.

To make our case, we partially replicate the experiment developed by The Institute for Digital Research and Education from the University of California[21]. We want to compare the means of two groups on a standardized mathematic test. Computationally, we used the Stata program function fpower to do the power analysis[22]. To do so, we had to define (1) the number of groups, (2) the effect size (delta)[23] and (3) the alpha level. We compared two groups with two different effect sizes (0.35 and 1.2), and we varied the alpha level in the three traditional cutoffs (0.1; 0.05 and 0.01). Figure 9 summarizes this information.

Figure 9. Test power and sample size

Our simulation results show that the larger the sample size, the higher the probability of detecting statistical significance. Similarly, the smaller the effect's size, the greater the sample's size should be to achieve statistical significance. In particular, when sample size approaches 250 any difference/effect is statistically significant, regardless of the alpha level. To make our argument more robust, we generated three random variables. X has a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1. X and Z correlates at .75, and X and W correlates at .10. Figure 10 illustrates their relationship.

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Figure 10. Different relationships, the same *p value*

According to Hair et al., (2006: 11), "by increasing sample size, smaller and smaller effects will be found to be statistically significant, until at very large samples sizes almost any effect is significant". What is the meaning of a minute difference that is statistically significant? The relationship between X and W is statistically significant (p-value<0,000) but there is no substantive meaning on it. As stated by Gill (1999: 658), "political scientists are more interested in the relative magnitude of effects (…) and making only binary decisions about the existence of an effect is not particularly important". Similarly, Luskin, (1991: 1044) points out that "to know that a parameter is almost certainly nonzero is to know very little. We care much more about its magnitude. But on this score the numbers do not speak for themselves". Rather than focusing only on the *p value*, scholars should be looking at the magnitude of their estimates, the difference between group means, etc. The main conclusion is that when the sample is large enough (n>300), even marginal effects/ differences tend to be statistically significant. Scholars should be aware of this fact before claiming too much about their empirical findings.

In summary, whether we maintain the effect size constant and vary the sample size (figure 9), and whether we hold the number of cases constant and vary the magnitude of the observed relationship between the variables (figure 10), these procedures have a great effect on the size of the p value statistic. In either case, scholars should be cautions before extracting too much information from it, at the risk to reach wrong substantive conclusions.

Our fourth claim is that it is pointless to estimate the *p value* when you are dealing with population. Analytical data from the population has increased in political science in general. Examples of this in Brazilian political science include the analysis of elections, roll-call votes and budget allocations. According to Hair et al., (2006), "a census of the

entire population makes statistical inference unnecessary, because any differences or relationship, however small, is true and does exist" (Hair et al. (2006: 09). Introductory statistics handbooks teach us that we should use samples because they are faster and cheaper. If they are properly collected, they are also reliable. Keeping in mind that the role of inferential statistics is to draw inferences about the population from sample data, if the population is contained in all observations, estimation[24]is not needed. There is no reason to test the hypothesis since you already know your parameters.

Figure 11. Population, sample and statistical inference

In our view, if the sample size is equal to the size of the population, we cannot expect any error in estimating the true population parameter. Imagine a census of the population where men are shown to have an average income of X and women an average income of X+1. The mean difference between the groups is just one unit. As long we have information about all cases (the population), there is no room for estimating the expected value of the population parameter, since we already know it. The important issue is the magnitude of the difference, which is in this case very small. Our general position is that scholars should focus on the size of the expected effects, instead of worrying about the significance of the difference, especially in the situations we have defined here.

Usually, statistical handbooks present introductory statistics based on this sample-population inference approach. However, it is important to stress that this position is not unanimous in the literature. There are differing answers to the "what does statistical p value mean when the sample equals the population" question. There is an ongoing debate between frequentist-bayesian approaches. In general, Bayesian scholars tend to reject point estimation (p value) and prefer to use confidence intervals. Some of them have even argued that confidence intervals should be abolished altogether. For example, Gelman (2012b, n.p.) states "I'm thinking more and more that we have to get rid of statistical

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significance, 95% intervals, and all the rest, and just come to a more fundamental acceptance of uncertainty" (Gelman, 2012a, n.p.). Regarding the sample-population debate, Bayesian scholars also tend to believe that we should always consider the population as a sample produced by an underlying generative process. The rationale is the following; the population you examined can be seen as a result of a more complex and dynamic process that can always generate a different population in some other moment in time. However, if you ask the same question to a frequentist researcher, he will likely answer that there is no meaning in the interpretation of the p value when the sample equals the population, since we already know the true parameter value.

As long as our main purpose is to introduce the logic of the p value statistic and is based on the frequentist position, we do not examine this debate more deeply. We encourage readers to follow the references to obtain more information about this issue. Additionally, we advise students to adopt the following guidelines; (1) define your own position on the role of the p value statistic when the sample size equals the population; (2) once you pick one, you should be consistent with it, and (3) regardless of your technical position, you should always report not only the p value but also all the estimates in order to facilitate other people's assessment of your work. As a rule, you should always report all the information since your reader may not share the same opinions as you.

Conclusion

And if my estimated coefficient is not statistically significant? God help you! Unfortunately, many scholars still share this opinion. The evidence of this claim can be found in publication bias phenomena in various fields of knowledge. Gill (1999: 669) argues that "from the current presentation of null hypothesis significance testing in published work it is very easy to confuse statistical significance with theoretical or substantive importance". In other words, political science students should be aware of the difference between statistical significance and practical significance. The p value cannot inform us about the magnitude of the effect of X on Y. Similarly, the p value cannot help us to choose which variable explains the most. The p value cannot be compared across samples of different sizes. The p value cannot, by itself, answer the questions scholars are interested in. As noted by Moore and McCabe (2006), critical thinking about the use of significance tests is a sign of statistical maturity, however, scholars cannot make this decision when they do not fully understand the role of significance tests. Through this essay, we hope to help political science students make sense of the appropriate role of the *p value* statistic in empirical research.

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APPENDIX 1

According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 27), "scholars should always record the exact methods, rules, and procedures used to gather information and draw inferences so that another researcher can do the same thing and draw the same conclusion". The main purpose of this section is to describe how the variables were measured.

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Table 01. Variable Description

Name	Description	Source	QOG Code
Corruption	CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). The index was inverted so that greater values equal more corruption.	www.transparency.org	ti_cpi
Average Schooling Years	Average schooling years in the total population aged 25 and over.	www.cid.harvard.edu/ ciddata.ciddata.html (Barro and Lee, 2000)	bl_asyt25
HDI	Composite index that measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools, and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars.	www.hdr.undp.org (UNDP, 2004)	undp_hdi
Area	A country's total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland water bodies includes major rivers and lakes.	Food and Agriculture Organization.	wdi_area

Source: Quality of Government Institute (2011).

Table 02. Descriptive Statistics

Label	N	min	max	mean	standard deviation
Corruption	181	1.20	9.70	4	2.07
Average schooling years	103	0.76	12.25	6.02	2.90
Human Development Index	175	0.27	0.96	0.70	0.18
Area	190	2	17.098.240	702,337.27	1,937,230.60

Figure 12. Variable Histogram

Figure 13. Variable Histogram (log)

Notes

1   As the paper provides a non-technical introduction to the p value statistic, we minimized mathematical application of all concepts presented. Readers interested in more sophisticated approaches should follow the references. In addition, we are mute on the frequentist-bayesian

debate, since it falls outside of the context of this paper. For an online introduction to the frequentist-bayesian debate, see Jordan (2009). Readers interested in the Bayesian statistics should check Gelman, Carlin, Stern and Rubin (2003), Gill (2007) and Gelman (2007).

2   Publication bias represents the trend of both referees and scholars to overestimate the importance of statistical significant findings. According to Scargle (2000: 91), "publication bias arises whenever the probability that a study is published depends on the statistical significance of its results. This bias, often called the file-drawer effect because the unpublished results are imagined to be tucked away in researchers' file cabinets, is a potentially severe impediment to combining the statistical results of studies collected from the literature". Similarly, Everitt and Skrondal (2010: 346) define it as "the possible bias in published accounts of, for example, clinical trials, produced by editors of journals being more likely to accept a paper if a statistically significant effect has been demonstrated". To get more information on publication bias see Greenwald (1975), Mahoney (1977), Coursoul and Wagner (1986), Simes (1986) and Begg and Berlin (1988), De Long and Lang (1992). In political science see Sigelman (1999) and Gerber, Green and Nickerson (2001). To see a simple definition see The cocharane Collaboration (n.d).

3   For a rebuttal of Carver arguments see Sawilowsky (2003).

4   Most data in political science comes from observational research designs rather than from experimental ones. For this reason, we use observational data to show the interpretation of the *p value* statistic when dealing with real political science research problems. As we know, observational data suffers from all sorts of shortcomings compared to experimental data. Scholars working with observational data face more challenges in making causal claims compared to those working with experiments. In addition, it is easier for a novice to understand examples based on observational data than from basic simulation.

5   A more systematic way of examining the role of the p value statistic in Brazilian political science literature is to survey all empirical papers and analyze how scholars have been interpreting the statistical significance of their empirical findings. The downside of this approach is the potential personal damage of exposing eventual mistakes. To minimize conflict, we prefer to focus on a more pedagogical approach.

6   Everitt (2006: 306) defines population as "any finite or infinite collection of 'units', which are often people but may be, for example, institutions, events, etc. Similarly, he defines sample as "a selected subset of a population chosen by some process usually with the objective of investigating particular properties of the parent population".

7   According to Gill (1999: 648), "the current, nearly omnipresent, approach to hypothesis testing in all of the social sciences is a synthesis of the Fisher test of significance and the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test". For a historical overview of statistical significance see Huberty (1993). For an introduction to the statistical significance debate see Carver (1978; 1993), Henkel (1976), Shaver (1992), Daniel (1998), Sawilowsky (2003), Gill (1999), Gelman and Stern (2006) and Gelman and Weakliem (2009).

8   Van Evera (1997: 09) defines a hypothesis as "A conjectured relationship between two phenomena. Like Laws, hypothesis can be of two types: causal (I surmise that A causes B) and noncausal (I surmise that A and B are caused by C; hence A and B are correlated but neither causes the other)."

9   The hypothesis formulation is fundamental in any empirical research. For this reason, it should be clearly stated at the beginning of the study.

10 Regarding figure 1, Gill (1999) argues that the test procedure assigns one of two decisions (D_0, D_1) to all possible values in the sample space of T, which correspond to supporting either H_0 or H_1 respectively. The *p value* (associated probability) is equal to the area in the tail (or tails) of the assumed distribution under H_0, which starts at the point designated by the placement of T on the horizontal axis and continues to infinity. If a predetermined α level has been specified, then H_0 is rejected for *p value*s less than α, otherwise the *p value* itself is reported. Thus decision D_1 is made if the test statistic is sufficiently atypical given the distribution under the H_0 (Gill, 1999).

11 The description of the variables, basic descriptive statistics and distributions are presented in the appendix.

12 Too see this example in a cartoon see Youtube (2010).

13 A Type I error is the rejection of a true null hypothesis. Simply put, it is the chance of the test showing statistical significance when it is not present (false positive). The Type II error is the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis when you should reject it (false positive) (Hair et al., 2006: 10). A more intuitive way of thinking about type I and type II errors is the following: imagine a man in a courtroom. He is not guilty (H_0). If he is convicted, the jury mistakenly rejected a true null hypothesis (type I error). Contrary, if the man is guilty (H_0) and the jury let him free, it means that they failed to reject a false null hypothesis (type II error). More details about this example can be found at Rogers (n.d).

14 Everitt and Skrondal (2010: 280) define misspecification as "a term applied to describe assumed statistical models which are incorrect for one of a variety of reasons, for example using the wrong probability distribution, omitting important covariates, or using the wrong link function. Such errors can produce inconsistent or inefficient estimates of parameters".

15 "a probability sample is a sample chosen by chance. We must know what samples are possible and what chance, or probability, each possible sample has (…) the use of chance to select the sample is the essential principle of statistical sampling" (Moore and McCabe, 2006: 250-251).

16 Draw a random sample of size n from any population with mean μ and standard deviation. When n is large, the sampling distribution of the sample mean is approximately normal. Then, all properties of normal distribution apply to drawing inferences about population using sample data. According to Moore and McCabe (2006: 398), "the central limit theorem allows us to use normal probability calculations to answer questions about sample means from many observations even when the population distribution is not normal".

17 By unbiased we mean that the sampling distribution of the statistic is equal to the true value of the parameter we are interested in. By efficient we mean that the estimated statistic has the lowest variability of all unbiased estimates.

18 The probability distribution of a statistic calculated from a random sample of a particular size. For example, the sampling distribution of the arithmetic mean of samples of size n, taken from a normal distribution with mean μ and standard deviation , is a normal distribution also with mean but with standard deviation $\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{n}}$ (Everitt, 2006: 350).

19 The biased sample is an intentional selection of the 20 countries with the highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

20 There are two main types of sample: the probabilistic sample and the non-probabilistic sample. Non-probability sampling is a sampling technique where the samples are gathered in a process

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that does not give all the individuals in the population an equal chance of being selected. According to Davidson (2006: 15), "forms of sampling that do not adhere to probability methods. Probability methods choose samples using random selection and every member of the population has an equal chance of selection. Some types of nonrandom sampling still aim to achieve a degree of representativeness without using random methods. Several different techniques are associated with this approach, for example accidental or convenience sampling; snowball sampling; volunteer sampling; quota sampling, and theoretical sampling. Convenience samples are also known as accidental or opportunity samples. The problem with all of these types of samples is that there is no evidence that they are representative of the populations to which the researchers wish to generalize". Simple Random Sampling: A simple random sample (SRS) of size n is produced by a scheme which ensures that each subgroup of the population of size n has an equal probability of being chosen as the sample. Stratified Random Sampling: Divide the population into "strata". There can be any number of these. Then choose a simple random sample from each stratum. Combine those into the overall sample; this is a stratified random sample. (Example: Church A has 600 women and 400 men as members. One way to get a stratified random sample size of 30 is to take an SRS of 18 women from the 600 women and another SRS of 12 men from the 400 men.) Multi-Stage Sampling: Sometimes the population is too large and scattered for it to be practical to make a list of the entire population from which to draw an SRS. For instance, when a polling organization samples US voters, they do not do an SRS. Since voter lists are compiled by counties, they might first do a sample of the counties and then sample within the selected counties. This illustrates two stages. In some instances, they might use even more stages. At each stage, they might do a stratified random sample on sex, race, income level, or any other useful variable on which they could get information before sampling. See: http://www.ma.utexas.edu/users/parker/sampling/srs. htm. Since sampling procedures design is not the focus of this paper, we restrict ourselves to discussing the role of the p value statistic for probabilistic samples. To get more information about sampling see http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/40803_5.pdf

21 The full description of the original simulation is available at http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/ stata/dae/fpower.htm

22 Power analysis is the name given to the process of determining the sample size for a research study. The technical definition of power is that it is the probability of detecting a "true" effect when it exists.

23 According to Everitt and Skrondal (2010: 148), "most commonly the difference between the control group and experimental group population means of a response variable divided by the assumed common population standard deviation. Estimated by the difference of the sample means in the two groups divided by a pooled estimate of the assumed common standard deviation".

24 According to Everitt and Skrondal (2010: 154) "The process of providing a numerical value for a population parameter on the basis of information collected from a sample. If a single figure is calculated for the unknown parameter the process is called point estimation. If an interval is calculated which is likely to contain the parameter, then the procedure is called interval estimation".

ARTICLE

Investigating Elite Behavior through Field Experiment in Brazil: do candidates answer more to core or swing voters?[1]

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This paper explores recent advances in experimental methodology to analyze elite behavior. Using an email experiment conducted in the context of the Brazilian 2008 municipal elections, we studied whether candidates target "swing" or "core" voters during campaigns. Candidates from all parties – 1,000 candidates in all – were contacted by randomly generated citizens who identified themselves as either core or swing voters. Additionally, we randomized senders' past voting behavior and their gender. To identify the baseline answer rate, we employed a placebo treatment with no reference to the elections. Our results show that Brazilian candidates target any sender as long as she identifies herself as a potential voter. Within this general finding, models with city-specific fixed effects indicate that Brazilian politicians tend to target core voters. The paper contributes to the general experimental literature by providing an easily replicable design that can test the behavior of elite interaction with the public. At the same time, the paper extends the literature on core versus swing voters by providing an empirical test that can shed light on the effects of a specific political environment (type of election, voting rule, and party structure), and how it affects the relationship between candidates and voters during elections.

Keywords: Experimental analysis, Electoral Studies, Urban Politics, Methodology

Introduction

The literature on how politicians allocate resources in order to optimize electoral performance has generated intense debate in the social sciences. Some lean towards Cox and McCubbins' 1986 model in which politicians allocate resources to core voters (Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006; Nichter, 2008; Magaloni et al., 2008; Cox, 2009). Others prefer Lindbeck and Weibull's 1987 model (Schady, 2000; Case, 2001; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; Stokes, 2005) where politicians focus on undecided or swing voters.

Empirical tests of the two models using non-experimental methods present mixed results (Schady, 2000; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Stokes, 2005; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006; Magaloni et al., 2008). Our study is the first to apply a field experiment in order to further test some of the claims in this ongoing debate. Through a modified "email experiment" we implemented a test in order to shed some light on candidate behavior. This article is based on a field experiment conducted in the context of the 2008 Brazilian municipal election. We aim to elucidate if candidates are more responsive to swing or core voters' demands, or if they answer indiscriminately.

It is important to mention that these empirical studies focus on traditional clientelistic practices and distributive politics; they look to understand how resources are allocated to certain group of voters through clientelistic practices. Our paper has a different approach, which is to understand how candidates answer to voters' demands. We want to verify whether politicians target voters trough signaling mechanisms rather than resource distribution. Answering to voters' demands is different from resorting to clientelistic practices. Generally, we are interested in the discussion of distributive politics. However, we tackle it via communication rather than spending or patronage because our research design allows us to better gauge politicians' strategies from that perspective. Therefore the results may shed light on the clientelism agenda because the allocation of candidates' scarce time may mimic the process of allocation of other resources, although this argument cannot be made based on our experiment candidates' use of clientelistic practices towards certain voters. We can argue, however, that candidates have a preference to communicating with voters that present specific ideological characteristics.

Using an experiment design we directly measure the candidates strategies towards voters, while avoiding problems with endogeneity, collinearity, and self-selection of the traditional distributive politics literature. Experiments are complementary to more traditional empirical methods because they have a higher degree of internal validity and ability to derive causal inference, as well as a more precise measurement of the variables of interest (Gerber et al., 2004; Gerber and Green, 2012).

The logic of the "email experiment" design we propose is quite simple. We measure the probability of a candidate or a candidate's staff to respond to emails sent by different types of voters. During the weeks previous to the election, time is a scarce resource for candidates and staff. If we consider the allocation of time as an "investment", then a candidate seeking to win the election would invest time where he or she expects to obtain the highest return, i.e. the highest probability of gaining a vote. Therefore if the candidates consistently targeted one type of sender it would mean this type of sender was considered on average a better "investment".

Our experimental test is specifically designed to identify systematic patterns in the candidate answering rate. The treatment is the voter type. Some voters identify themselves as loyal supporters that will certainly vote for the candidate (core), while others state that they are undecided (swing). We also employ a "no identification" email, or placebo, in which the sender simply asks a question with no reference to the coming election. This treatment aims to capture the baseline-answering rate to a generic email during the electoral period. Additional treatments investigate the effects of other characteristics of the senders, such as past voting behavior, gender, and profession.

We ran the experiment during the Brazilian municipal elections of October 2008. The unique Brazilian institutional setting was the inspiration for the choice of the Brazilian local election. In Brazilian elections parties often change coalitions, and electors regularly vote on a personal basis. We sent an email to each mayoral candidate in all the cities above 50,000 inhabitants. The email asked if the candidate had the intention to lower the IPTU tax, a local tax on property. A total of 1181 emails were sent, and 1051 responses were obtained. Focusing on the difference between a treatment effect and the placebo effect allows us to safely drop the missing values from the sample. The answer rate of candidates demanded by core voters (123/358 = 34.3%) is only slightly higher than the rate for candidates questioned by swing voters (103/340 = 30.2%). The senders that did not offer any identification received a significantly lower proportion of answers statistically (74/353 = 20.9%). The Brazilian results shows that emails referring to the elections in the subject had a higher probability of being answered, but also that Brazilian politicians, at first glance, seem not to differentiate between swing and core voters when allocating time to answering emails.

With some simple modifications our design can be used to investigate any type of elite interaction with the public. As long as the researcher can alter the signals received by the elite and treatments can be easily hidden among many other similar signals from the public, it is possible to implement an experimental design for studying elite behaviors.

The article will proceed as follows. Firstly, we will review the political economy literature on politicians' behavior. Secondly, we will describe the design in detail. In conclusion we will propose an experimental research agenda on elite behavior.

The debate on core voters and swing voters

As mentioned in the introduction, the literature on candidate behavior presents two main models: the Cox and McCubbins (1986) model and the Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) model. For the former, vote-maximizing politicians focus their resources on core constituencies. In this framework, politicians perceive swing voters as a risky investment, while core voters that have declared their preferences are perceived as a safe investment. In addition, politicians seek to prevent voters from abandoning their party. Contrastingly, in Lindbeck and Weibull's framework, money spent on ideologically proximate voters is wasted, since they will vote for the candidate's party regardless. The intuitive logic behind this model is clearly summarized by Stokes (2005: 317):

> Voters who are predisposed in favor of a party on partisan or programmatic grounds cannot credibly threaten to punish their favored party if it withholds distributive rewards. Therefore the party should not waste rewards on them.

These initial papers generated equilibrium results in which parties focused all their resources either on swing or core voters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986 and Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). Subsequent papers expanded this analysis to allow parties and candidates to adopt additional strategies. The current literature focuses on four strategies; rewarding loyalists (core voters who will turnout); vote buying (swing or opposition voters that will turnout); turnout buying (a core voter that may not turnout) and double persuasion (swing or opposition voters that may not turnout) (Nichter, 2008). Interestingly, while the earlier literature had a clear equilibrium prediction, the more recent literature does not present definite results. According to the modern literature, in equilibrium we should observe different strategy portfolios depending on the characteristics of the polity (e.g. voter loyalty, collective action costs, propensity to turnout and existence of a party machine) that influence the relative payoff of each strategy. Most current papers still propend towards one main strategy, but contend that the party would also follow others.

Nichter (2008) and Cox (2009) have strengthened the "core vote model" by relaxing some of its assumptions. Nichter questions the assumption that all voters turnout to vote as some may abstain. Consequently, the party machine has to spend resources among proximate voters in order to buy turnout, instead of simple vote buying. In this model, politicians have to invest resources to convince a latent core constituency to go to the polls.

Similarly, Cox notes that models on distributive politics focus solely on persuasion. Once coordination (lowering similar competitors in the ballot) and mobilization (taking voters to the polls) are included, it is possible to confirm that parties allocate benefits to individuals who can provide coordination and mobilization services, rather than brokers who are experts at identifying swing voters (Cox, 2009). What Nichter (2008) and Cox (2009) show is that the "core vote model" can be reinforced by questioning its unidimensionality. These authors demonstrate that it is possible to strengthen the model by refining voter types and politicians' behaviors.

In a more recent paper, Dunning and Stokes (2008) seek to bridge the gap between the swing and core voter models. They demonstrate that Nichter (2008) and Cox (2009) are correct in questioning the fact that not all voters actually vote, but they argue that these critics have not gone as far as they could in challenging the unidimensionality of the "core vote model". They present a full two-dimensional model. In their view, a party chooses how to distribute resources based on two dimensions of voter difference: propensity to vote or abstain and ideological position. The results are three-fold. Firstly, under general conditions parties tend to buy both votes and turnout. Secondly, among supporters who go to the polls anyway (non-abstainers) the party is better off targeting swing and weakly opposed voters. When it comes to non-abstainers, the machine can gain additional votes by spending resources on swing voters only. Thirdly, among potential voters (those who may turn out if offered a benefit) the party will target supporters. In other words, the party will try to take to the polls only those who are likely to vote for it.

As was mentioned in the introduction, empirical studies on the two models based on non-experimental methods have had so far mixed results. There are empirical records supporting the "swing voter model" (Schady, 2000; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002) and others more consistent with the "core voter model" (Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006, and Magaloni et al., 2008). In order to identify the voter groups (swing or core), these studies employ either surveys estimating the distribution of political preferences among voters (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; Stokes, 2005), or aggregate voter returns biased by clientelistic actions of party patrons (Schady, 2000; Calvo and Murillo, 2004, 2009; Magaloni et al., 2008).

As previously stated, these empirical studies are focused on distributive politics (clientelistic practices). They attempt to understand how different clientelistic practices work in different political environments, especially resource allocation towards a group of voters. This paper has a different goal, which is to understand how candidates answer to voters demands. Answering to voter demands is clearly different than resorting to clientelistic practices, although the results might shed light on the topic of clientelism due to the fact

that the allocation of candidates' scarce time might mimic the allocation process of other resources.

Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that our paper employs an ideological definition of core and swing voters. This is different from some of the definitions encountered in the relevant literature. As Calvo and Murillo (2004) note, among the different definitions some authors highlight an adherence dimension, for example a special identity between the party and a defined group of voters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986). Others stress the loyalty of voters, such as the ideological proximity to a party's political platforms (Stokes, 2005). Some works emphasize the physical proximity to party networks (Calvo and Murillo, 2004), and others the relative riskiness of voters (Diaz-Cayeros, 2008). This can be simplified into three main definitions; (a) Core voters have an ideological preference toward a party; (b) Core voters are those that parties may target more easily or cheaply (i.e. the leaky bucket is less leaky for them) and (c) Core voters are less risky (due to their steady and certain behavior through time) (Calvo and Murillo, 2009). However, mathematically the three concepts lead to similar mechanics of altering the expected net-cost of buying out voters. Thus, the current generation of models cannot distinguish among them. It is also unclear if our experiment can clear these differences out.

In this article, following Stokes 2005, we define core voters as loyal voters whose ideological proximity to a party's political position prevents defection based on tactical redistribution of benefits by other parties. Our test explores the effect of the ideological position of voters (core and swing) on candidates allocation of time and resources. Apparently, this core voter definition should only be tested in countries where core voters have partisan or programmatic (not clientelistic) links to parties. While weak partisan identities would render Brazil an inappropriate setting to conduct the experiment, the fact that we are manipulating voters ideological positions and that the communication is individual should enhance the message credibility in the minds of candidates (Samuels and Zucco, 2012).

The next section explores the experiment in detail. The same design may be employed to test the reaction of candidates to voters that are more or less proximate, or their riskiness, but in the current implementation we focus purely on ideology and propensity to vote.

The experimental design

The "email experiment" design is a modification of the "cv experiment". In a "cv experiment" different applications (e.g. CVs and housing applications) are sent to multiple recipients to see if they respond in differently depending on the characteristics of the

sender, such as gender, race, and ethnicity (e.g. Firth 1981; Weichselbaumer 2003; Oreopoulos, 2009).

In the "contacting the candidate" design the recipient is not an employer but a candidate running in political elections. The treatments randomly alter the characteristics of the sender to investigate the behavior of aspiring politicians during electoral campaigns. The variables that can be easily recorded by the researcher are the answer rate, the content of the answer, and the time taken to receive an answer. In the examples reviewed we will focus only on the answer rate. When using emails as media, as in our implementations, failure to contact is easily identified, and usually comes with an identification code (e.g. a spam filter blocked the email, the mailbox was full or the email did not exist).

The experimental design: the Brazilian municipal elections of 2008

The Brazilian electoral system for city Assemblies is rather unique: while an open list allows voters to cast a vote for an individual candidate, it also gives them the option of voting exclusively for the party (*voto de legenda*). Mayors are chosen in single member districts, through a plurality system in cities with a population of less than 200,000 and a majoritarian run-off system in cities over that threshold. The Brazilian literature shows that politicians' personal reputation is key to shaping voters' preferences (Nicolau, 2002; Carreirão and Kinzo, 2004; Carreirão, 2007). Parties constantly struggle to establish themselves and retain a set of loyal supporters. More importantly, the highly fragmented party system induces the creation of large government coalitions (Nicolau, 1996; Amorim Neto, 1998). It is very common to observe traditional leftist parties, such as the Workers' Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*) and the Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Brasileiro*) establishing coalitions with right wing parties, especially at a local level. In such a scenario, it is more difficult for Brazilian voters to differentiate left from right and vice versa (Ames and Smith, 2010). As we will hypothesize in the conclusion, another possible consequence is that this very unique institutional setting makes it more difficult for Brazilian candidates to retain voter support between elections.

The experiment was conducted on September 22nd 2008, two weeks before the Municipal elections in Brazil. All emails were sent in one day using newsletter software eliminating the possibility that an external shock would change the answer rate of different days. We used 18 aliases, 9 males and 9 females. The structure of the email was identical for all name.surname@gmail.com. We randomized the most common names and surnames found on a Brazilian website. In the event that the email would not be available we added a number after the surname.

The experiment focused on the mayoral candidates in every city with more than 50,000 inhabitants (~550 cities). Candidates' emails were obtained from the Brazilian Electoral Tribunal, with access to a list containing the majority of the candidates. The number of candidates varies between two and more than 10 per city, but not all candidates have an email account. Thus in our sample the number of candidates varies between 1 and 7.

A total of 1181 emails were sent. We excluded 173 emails from the sample: 103 due to miscoding of the email and 70 because of sending duplicate emails to the same recipient. Finally, 7 emails arrived after the Election Day. The total available sample is 1008.

An interesting characteristic of this experiment is that it allows recording contact failures and analyzing their reasons (e.g. the email account does not exist, the email account is full). Probably due to the nature of the experiment we had very few treatment failures. Candidates monitor their email accounts frequently and thus no email bounced back due to a full email account. Given that we are studying the difference between the treatment effect and the placebo effect, and we do not have a traditional control group, we can simply drop these missing values or contact failures from the sample. Thus the results we present only apply to politicians who have an active email account.

Given that the Brazilian experiment was conducted during a municipal election, it was necessary to find a baseline question concerning local politics. One important and constant issue of electoral campaigns in Brazilian cities is the reduction of taxes, in particular the reduction of real estate tax (IPTU). Therefore each alias asked the same question regarding the reduction of IPTU. The reduction of taxes is usually a non-neutral question, because it is more strongly advocated by right-wing coalitions. The presence of a placebo treatment, in which the senders did not provide any identification, addresses this problem. A comparison between the answer rates in the treatment groups and the placebo illuminates the potential bias induced by the question itself. The placebo group identifies the baseline effect of the message, which is an average of all the potential effects of the elements of the email that were not considered as a treatment (the question itself, the specific name of the sender, the email provider and the time of the day the email was received).

Typically candidates for the mayor office in Brazil are supported by large electoral coalitions. These coalitions vary in composition dramatically. Parties that are allied in one city are often running in opposite coalitions in other cities. In addition, parties switch coalitions over the years in the same city. For these reasons the concepts of left and right are difficult to apply in Brazil at the municipal level. Therefore, we have phrased the treatment to investigate past support. Some senders declared they have "always voted for the party of the candidate". Others declared they have "never voted for the party of the candidate". Finally, a group of senders did not provide any information regarding past support.

We also investigated the effect of gender. The treatment scheme was therefore 3x3x2x2. The following three examples exemplify some of the treatments. The original text was in Portuguese.

Example 1: *Swing; Right; Entrepreneur; Male*

SUBJECT: A question from an undecided voter

How do you do? My name is B and in the past I have always voted for your party. In this election I am still undecided and I am not sure if I will vote for you or for another candidate. I have a question regarding the IPTU. In the past few years I have paid a lot of IPTU and I would like to know if you will lower the tax rate. I believe that this could increase the tax revenue of the city. Do you have any proposals concerning this matter?

Best Regards

Mr. B

Small Entrepreneur

Example 2: *Core; placebo; placebo; Female*

SUBJECT: A question from one of your supporters

How do you do? My name is C. In the next election I will vote for you. I have a question regarding the IPTU. In the past few years I have paid a lot of IPTU and I would like to know if you will lower the tax rate. I believe that this could increase the tax revenue of the city. Do you have any proposals concerning this matter?

Best Regards

Ms. C

Example 3: *placebo; placebo; placebo; Female*

SUBJECT: A question

How do you do? My name is B. I have a question regarding the IPTU. In the last few years I have paid a lot of IPTU and I would like to know if you will lower the tax rate. I believe that this could increase the tax revenue of the city. Do you have any proposals concerning this matter?

Best Regards

Ms. B

Additionally, in order to capture the possibility that the political dynamic in cities with more than 200,000 registered voters may differ from the smaller cities (between 50,000 and 200,000 registered voters) we have stratified the treatments by electoral system. Electoral rules in Brazil depend on the size of the municipality. In cities with more

than 200,000 registered voters there is a second round (run off). That is, if in the first round a candidate does not receive more than 50% of the valid votes, a second round is held a couple of weeks later. In cities with less than 200,000 registered voters, the candidate with the most votes wins, regardless of the 50% margin. In Brazil voting is compulsory, but the law is not stringently enforced and there are still a considerable number of people that do not vote. In our sample 269 candidates were running in cities with a two-round system, while the remaining 789 were running in smaller cities with a single round.

The results

289 candidates responded to the email. This corresponds to 28.7% of the 1,008 contacts. Candidates from cities with more than 200,000 registered voters and, consequently, with a run-off election answered slightly more than candidates from smaller cities (33.4% vs. 27%). Table 1 summarizes the design and displays the answer rate for each treatment.

Core voters received more answers (123/359=34.3%) than swing voters (92/294=31.3%), but this difference is not statistically significant. Voters in the "no identification" group receive significantly fewer replies than both groups (74/355=20.8%). A t-test of difference in means between the no identification group and the swing voters group (-10.4%) always rejected the null. The 95% confidence interval on the difference is contained between -3% and -17%. Additionally, the difference between the no identification group and the core treatment group (-13.4%) is significantly different from zero, while the 95% confidence interval on the difference is contained between -6.9% and -19.9%.

Table 1. Answer rate

	Sender's type			
Sender's Voting history	No identification	Core	Swing	Total
Undeclared	20/119 (16.8%)	43/117 (36.7%)	32/122 (28.5%)	95/348 (27.3%)
Supporter in the previous elections	23/117 (19.7%)	40/120 (33.3%)	19/56 (33.9%)	82/293 (27.9%)
Non Supporter in the previous election	31/119 (26%)	40/122 (32.8%)	41/126 (32.5%)	112/367 (30.5%)
Total	74/355 (20.8%)	123/359 (34.3%)	92/294 (31.3%)	289/1008 (28.7%)

The lower answer rate to senders in the no identification group could be due to the fact that the subject of the email ("a question") contains no reference to the election, while

the two other groups contain explicit references ("a question from one of your supporters" and "a question from an undecided voter").

On inspection of Table 1 two things stand out. Firstly, among the voters with no declared voting history, those that sent a core voter message received a higher answer rate (36.7%) than those that sent a swing message (28.5%). The usual battery of tests reveals that we cannot rule out the possibility that the difference in the answer rate is zero. The one tail t-test rejects the null at the 10% level (Pr=0.094), but the one tail Fisher exact test does not reject the null (Pr=0.119). Thus there is only a weak indication that the core group mean is larger than the swing group mean. The 95% confidence interval on the difference is contained between -4% and 20%.

If we now turn our attention to the first column we can see that among the voters that sent a message with no identification, those that sent a "non supporter in the past" message received a higher answer rate (26% vs. 19.7%). This difference is not statistically significant in our sample. When considering the treatment gender and the treatment "small entrepreneur" and all the possible interactions we find no effect.

The Brazilian case: main considerations

The results of our analysis point out that Brazilian candidates did not target either swing or core voters specifically. They instead targeted any sender that could have been a potential voter. As illustrated in Table 2, those senders that did not clearly identify themselves as potential voters received on average 10% less answers:

Table 2. Answer rate in the Brazilian Experiment

Sender's type		
No identification	Potential voter (Core or Swing)	Total
74/355 (20.8%)	215/653 (32.9%)	289/1008 (28.7%)

These results could reflect either the personalistic nature of Brazilian local elections (Nicolau, 2002; Carreirão and Kinzo, 2004; Carreirão, 2007), the smaller amount of votes required for election in small cities, or concerns regarding voters' turnout. Therefore, to shed additional light on the Brazilian case we present a multivariate analysis in Table 3 that controls pre-treatment covariates that might correlate with the answer rate. We also show a Linear Probability model corrected for heteroskedasticity. To control unobserved municipality characteristics we use city-specific dummies. The dependent variable is the

rate of answers to the senders. The placebos for the first and second treatment group are the baseline reference, thus the first four coefficients must be interpreted as the difference between the treatment effect and the placebo/no identification email.

The first column is our basic model using only the experimental treatments. As expected the model recovers the treatment effects we discussed in the previous section. In the second column we observe that when introducing city-specific fixed effects, the swing coefficient becomes insignificant; the model does not detect any statistical difference between the answer rate to senders that identified themselves as swing voters or that did not provide any identification. The core coefficient decreases instead, but remains positive and statistically significant (+10%, with a p-value of 0.017). The 95% confidence interval for this estimate is contained between 1.8% and 18.3%. The other treatments (past voting behavior, the sender identifying themselves as a small entrepreneur) are not statistically significant, apart from "Male". If the sender identified themselves as a male, the probability of receiving an answer was slightly lower. This result is borderline significant at the 10% level, and the 95% confidence interval for this estimate is contained between -12% and 0.9%.

The third column introduces three additional controls. The first ("Education") is a measure of the education of the candidate; it assumes value 1 if the candidate has completed high school. The second is the age of the candidate, while the third identifies incumbents that were running for re-election. While education has no significant impact on the answer rate, the age of the candidate has a small negative impact and the incumbency has the largest negative effect on the probability of receiving an answer. The core coefficient remains positive and statistically significant (+10.7% with a p-value of 0.011). The 95% confidence interval suggests a slightly higher value contained between 2.5% and 18.9%.

Finally, in the fourth column we introduce a measurement of the political stance of the coalition supporting the candidate. Due to the extreme regional differences and the nature of municipal politics, coalitions are rather fluid in Brazil. Our simple classifications of Left, Mixed and Right are rather crude. Therefore we present these results separately, and we caution the reader to take them *cum granu salis*. From column 4 we can see that the core treatment effect remains strongly significant and around 10%, with a 95% confidence interval contained between 2.5% and 18.5%. The effect of incumbency remains most prominent, -22%, with a 95% confidence interval contained between -32% and 11.8%. Finally, the age of the candidate and the leaning toward the extreme right of the candidate's coalition have a minor negative effect on the answer rate. These effects have a weak significance. The 95% confidence interval for Age is contained between -0.07% and +0.001%, while the one for the leaning of the coalition toward the extreme right is contained between -7.5% and +0.01%.

Table 3. Multivariate Analysis, Brazil 2008, Municipal Elections

Dep. Variable: receiving an answer

	LPr baseline	LPr	LPr	LPr
Swing	0.101*** (2.89)	0.060 (1.33)	0.058 (1.28)	0.051 (1.14)
Core	0.131*** (3.97)	0.101** (2.40)	0.11*** (2.68)	0.105*** (2.58)
Past Supporter	0.021 (0.58)	0.044 (0.97)	0.048 (1.09)	0.047 (1.05)
Past Opposer	0.04 (1.16)	0.06 (1.37)	0.061 (1.27)	0.061 (1.27)
Male	-0.035 (-1.25)	-0.058* (-1.69)	-0.053 (-1.55)	-0.055 (-1.61)
Small Entrepreneur	0.027 (0.85)	0.066 (1.57)	0.067 (1.63)	0.068* (1.65)
Education			0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (-0.001)
Candidate Age			-0.004*** (-2.42)	-0.003* (-1.91)
Incumbent			-0.23*** (-4.39)	-0.22*** (-4.19)
Coalition				-0.037* (-1.96)
District Dummies		Included	included	Included
Constant	0.194*** (4.85)	0.194*** (3.83)	0.43*** (3.91)	0.119 (1.42)
Joint Test	F(6;1001)=3.72 0.001	F(6;426)=2.03 0.06	F(9;426)=4.49 0.00	F(9;426)=5.69 0.00
Groups N	1008	427 1008	427 1008	427 1008

The first four coefficients consider as a baseline the respective placebo, and thus they must be interpreted as differences from the no identification email.
"Education" is a dummy that assumes value 1 in case the candidate has completed high-school.
"Coalition" is a measure of the coalition ideology; it assumes 3 values, -1, for left, 0 for unclear, +1 for right.
T-statistics are shown in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient.
The significance level is identified by asterisks: ***1%; **5%; *10%.
The variance is calculated with the Huber-White sandwich estimator to correct for heteroskedasticity.

The multivariate analysis reveals that our experimental results concerning the answer rate to a swing voter are due to city-specific effects. When we control for city-specific effects the answer rate to senders that identified themselves as swing voters is not statistically different from the answer rate to those that did not provide any identification. The difference between the answer rate to the core voters and the placebo voters, instead, remains large and statistically significant. Thus, we conclude that in the 2008 Brazilian municipal elections candidates were systematically targeting core voters rather than voters

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that did not provide any identification. Regarding swing voters our model is silent, not identifying any statistical difference either between core and swing voters, or between swing and placebo voters.

If we focus on the core voter effect, combining the swing and the placebo treatment, we are able to identify a significantly positive difference between voters that identified themselves as core and the others. This difference is positive at around 8%, and robust across specifications as can be observed in the first row of Table 4. Thus we can display some evidence that during the Brazilian municipal election of 2008 candidates were targeting more core voters, although it is difficult to argue that such a pattern is widespread and systematic.

Table 4. Multivariate Analysis, Brazil 2008, Municipal Elections

Dep. Variable: receiving an answer

	LPr baseline	LPr	LPr	LPr
Core	0.086*** (2.83)	0.075* (1.95)	0.085** (2.25)	0.083** (2.21)
Past Supporter	0.014 (0.39)	0.039 (0.87)	0.044 (1.0)	0.043 (0.97)
Past Opposer	0.053 (1.40)	0.07 (1.48)	0.065 (1.37)	0.065 (1.35)
Male	-0.028 (-1.0)	-0.054 (-1.56)	-0.05 (-1.43)	-0.052 (-1.51)
Small Entrepreneur	0.04 (1.31)	0.075* (1.81)	0.075* (1.85)	0.075* (1.86)
Education			0.008 (0.02)	-0.002 (-0.06)
Candidate Age			-0.004*** (-2.44)	-0.003* (-1.91)
Incumbent			-0.23*** (-4.36)	-0.22*** (-4.18)
Coalition				-0.038** (-2.05)
District Dummies		Included	Included	Included
Constant	0.227*** (5.86)	0.215*** (4.38)	0.45*** (4.19)	0.41*** (3.78)
Joint Test	F(5;1002)=2.45 0.03	F(5;426)=1.98 0.08	F(8;426)=4.77 0.00	F(9;426)=4.98 0.00
Groups N	1008	427 1008	427 1008	427 1008

The first four coefficients consider as a baseline the respective placebo, and thus they must be interpreted as differences from the no identification email.
"Education" is a dummy that assumes value 1 in case the candidate has completed high-school.
"Coalition" is a measure of the coalition ideology; it assumes 3 values, -1, for left, 0 for unclear, +1 for right.
T-statistics are shown in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient.
The significance level is identified by asterisks: ***1%; **5%; *10%.
The variance is calculated with the Huber-White sandwich estimator to correct for heteroskedasticity.

Discussion

The experiment indicates that politicians at the municipal level in the Brazilian 2008 election cared equally about swing and core voters, but when we introduced pre-treatment controls and city fixed effects, the results changed (Tables 3 and 4). We obtained some evidence that Brazilian politicians were focusing more resources on core voters. However, it is difficult to argue that Brazilian politicians definitely target core voters based on these findings. Despite the fact that there might be a tendency for candidates to target core voters, only additional data can confirm such a hypothesis. It is in fact more likely that our results reinforce models that either consider two-dimensional strategies (Dunning and Stokes, 2008) in which the politicians have a more refined utility function that targets both core and swing voters at the same time, or an indiscriminate strategy resulting from an institutional setting that makes it more difficult for candidates to concentrate their resources in one type of voters.

As mentioned before, we hypothesize that the unique Brazilian institutional environment makes it more difficult for politicians to rely on voter loyalty. Carey and Shugart (1995) show that certain electoral rules create different incentives for personal vs. partisan votes. They argue that in open list systems there is an incentive for voters to seek personalistic strategies, while in closed list systems there are incentives to vote for partisan behavior. Therefore, it is possible that such patterns are affecting Brazilian majoritarian elections, but we cannot precisely argue in which direction the institutional characteristics of Brazilian elections are leading the results. However, we can argue that Brazilian candidates seem to have invested resources on core voters, while also targeting swing voters. Additionally, the indiscriminate way of answering to voters could portray difficulties in formulating efficient electoral strategies in a very complicated institutional setting.

Only further replications of the same experiment and in-depth interviews could clarify if Brazilian candidates truly target voters indiscriminately, and more importantly how the institutional settings affect the results. Additional replications of our design could elucidate potential behavioral patterns that correlate with specific types of election and different political environments. Although the impossibility of randomly assigning electoral rules will make it unfeasible to experimentally identify such effects, these replications could further the understanding of candidates' behavior and the possible effects of specific political environments[1].

It is important to remember that although the overall response rate of candidates is considered low (around 30%); this number shows some impressive and unexpected mobilization from candidates in targeting potential voters. A question that arises from this is, given that "talk is cheap" (and email even cheaper), why are politicians not responding

to everyone? If they answer indiscriminately, why is the answer rate low since all emails received are potential voters? Do candidates care about communicating with constituents who have specific questions? Are there embedded costs in responding electronically to voters in Brazilian politics that prevent candidates from presenting higher response rates? These questions require further studies to be properly answered.

Submitted in May 2012

Accepted in March 2013

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Notes

1   We performed a similar experiment in the 2010 national election. Although the national election has a rather different institutional setting compared to the municipal election, we found no differences in answering rates between core and swing voters. It is important to remember, however, that the 2010 experiment was also testing other factors such as race and gender that might have biased the results (Spada, Guimarães, Cepaluni and Kern, 2010).

Human Security Paradigms and Economic Crisis in first year of the North Caucasus Federal District

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The decrease in insecurity in the North Caucasus during the first eight years of the 21st century was achieved with the help of federal money used to amnesty soldiers and to pacify ethnic leaders' ambitions. But circumstances changed after Dmitry Kozak's announcement that the federal budget for the entire region would decrease significantly. As all the republics in the North Caucasus are dependent on federal aid of no less than 50% (in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan dependence is superior to 80%), such cut represented a politically potential danger.

The main goal of the article is to present a deeper understanding of the potential link between the international and regional economic dynamics and the current acceleration of social disruption in the North Caucasus region. The paper explains how ethno-political and transition studies can benefit from the inclusion of the economic dimension into the analysis, and so it clarifies the importance of a bi-level analysis using two concepts: economic society and economic security. The paper employs the concepts of economic security and economic society to perform a richer and innovative analysis.

Keywords: Human Security, North Caucasus, Insecurity, Insurgence, Ethno-politics

Theoretical framework

In the literature, transition and ethno-political phenomena are more often linked to political and social features, even with historical legacies or anthropological data, than to economic data. According to Paul Blokker, "until the end of the 1990s, the debate on 'transition' was dominated by approaches that shared a number of elementary

assumptions on the general nature of social change" (Blokker, 2005: 504), which is generally downgrading the real importance of economic features. The majority of authors studying transition processes and ethnic politics tend to look at economy only as a secondary element of analysis. However, if we take in stock that "the most fundamental human interest, it is argued, is the maximization of life chances, from which flow the instrumental pursuits of wealth, security and power" (Hale, 2008: 3), we can begin to understand the real importance and impact of economy in the political transitions all over the world. If economy, that is the path to achieve wealth, is one of the fundamental human interests, its absence as a central element of analysis in ethno-political or transition studies undermines the conclusions about the multiple paths contemporary societies are threading.

With this paper, we set out to connect economy with ethno-political and transition studies focusing on the impact of the global crisis upon Russia and its consequences for the North Caucasus insurgency. In order to approach these topics, we will make use of the concept of human security in a double manner: (1) as a mediator between ethno-political and transition studies, on the one hand, and economic dynamics, on the other; and (2) as a trigger for more sophisticated analyses. Crucially, the paper aims at probing whether there is a connection between the global crisis beginning in 2007 and the upsurge in the North Caucasus violence.

As Henry Hale (2008) states, economy is important to ensure the maximisation of human life. In line with that argument, we can assert that the degree of economic wealth of a country or a region influences the development of every transition process. In this matter, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan assert that "the final supportive condition for a consolidated democracy concerns the economy, or rather the arena we believe should be called "economic society" (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 11). The authors state that truly free and democratic societies are those that show open and free markets promoting the values of equality, democracy and competitiveness. While the merits of open markets and command economies can be argued and debated, we can assume as a starting point for this paper that "economic interests may play a role in ethnic conflict" (Horowitz, 2000: 106), urging the necessity to include a more sophisticated analysis of this dimension into ethno-political and transition studies research.

The sphere of economic society — abstractly conceived of, under a veil of ignorance as it were — is certainly made up of institutions, regulations and norms, but there is no direct state control and no protecting mechanisms. The bottom line is the ability of the actors to create value that will define the winning and losing sides of the economic game with no regard to the ethnic origin or the social status. That's why for liberals the market is a force for inclusion and integration, depoliticised as it were, and for some the actors

should even enter the contract under the veil of ignorance in order to prevent unfair inequalities arising from the social background and personal handicaps.

In line with this, it is possible to assert that the workings of this depoliticised arena in transitional societies might be able, at least partially, to promote more motivation towards integration (or at least to non-violent coexistence and non-violent secessionism) because all actors have a basis to be equally considered in the economic game. In Henry Hale's (2008: 161) perspective, the economic workings also play a political and motivational role, considering that "those ethnic regions that stand to gain the most from union, therefore, will tend to be willing to take the greatest perceived chance of exploitation, whereas those that stand to gain the least will be among the first to 'jump ship' as the perceived exploitation rises".

We can then assume that the degree of functionality and openness of economic societies is directly linked to the ability to promote integration, or at least guarantee non-violent coexistence or even non-violent secessionist or separatist projects. Besides the integrative function, an open and non-state-guided market is also more capable of accommodating the divergent interests of ethnic elites transforming a potential enemy (the central state) into an acceptable and desirable broker. At this point, we can argue that "transitions clearly were most likely to occur in countries at the middle and upper-middle levels of economic development" (Huntington, 1993: 62). Since that, those countries could easily ensure political as well as economic pluralism.

In this dialectic relation between economic societies' stage of development and successful transitions, ethnicity tends to be rationalised or instrumentalized as a "strategic choice by individuals who, in other circumstances, would choose other group memberships" (Bell, 1975: 171). Integration or separatism will be decided through a calculus of gains and losses that tend to make richer regions more prone to separatist drives, since they have most to lose by prolonging an attachment to a certain non-homogeneous state apparatus.

This argument could explain why the poor Karakalpakstan region wasn't able to secede from Uzbekistan and has gradually refrained its demands short of independence. And it also elucidates the motivation of Catalonia to achieve greater autonomy, since it is the most economically developed and sustainable of all Spanish autonomies. But it doesn't explain why the Trans-Dniester insists in its separatist stalemate with Moldova. Even being Europe's poorest country, the Moldovan republic is in a better economical condition than the separatist region.

Although a more rationalist-economicist perspective is suitable to some separatist cases, we should not ignore that "the emergence of democracy [and subsequent open and inclusive societies] is not a by-product of economic development" (Przeworski and

Limongi, 1997: 177) and, therefore, "many separatist groups all over the world have proceeded to fight for ethnic autonomy despite the costs" (Horowitz, 2000: 132). In our understanding, human motivation is not linear and rationality could be accounted for in several ways, for example, instrumentally and non-instrumentally.

It is crucial to underline, however, that the path towards integration, secessionism or separatism is not only influenced by the ability to establish an open market, and to build an economic society, but by a larger set of different factors. Despite the difficulty to measure the impact of economic behaviour and its influence upon integration, secessionism or separatism, it is generally consensual that the more difficult it is to build an economic society, the more the levels of ethno-political uncertainty tend to increase and feelings like loyalty, solidarity and cooperation tend to deteriorate.

Although it is inaccurate to assert about a strict casual relation between the establishment and development of economic societies and the tendency towards integration, secessionism or separatism, it is also incorrect to ignore that states where economic societies are virtually non-existent tend to live without economic security, which is one of the seven dimensions of the UN's Human Security concept. Originally put forward by the PNUD in 1994, "the concept of human security represents a powerful, but controversial, attempt by sections of the academic and policy community to redefine and broaden the meaning of security" (Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2008: 492). With this kind of approach, experts, analysts and policymakers have started to broaden their focus and concerns and move them away from the threats states pose to states.

This multidimensional conception of "security" proposed by the UN gives a "response to the complexity and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats (…) Such threats tend to acquire transnational dimensions and move beyond traditional notions of security that focus on external military aggressions alone" (United Nations, 2009: 16), leaving aside such important challenges to contemporary societies as economic crisis, persistent and endemic poverty, and social unrest.

Presently, the concept of "human security" continues to be under an enormous debate that does not fall under this paper, but it almost unanimously accepted that "when people are uncertain where the next meal will come from, when their life savings suddenly plummet in value, when their crops fail and they have no savings – human security contracts" (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 73), since this type of disruption causes instability that tends to raise the prospects of violence and to the emergence of exclusivist notions of psychosocial identity such as ethnic separatism.

Through a "human security" perspective, we look more attentively to threats and vulnerabilities of human beings and sub-state communities, knowing that "human insecurity can arise from want of a job, lack of access to food, threats to health, poor infrastructure,

oppression by the state, social discrimination and prejudice, crime, and so on" (Human Development Network, 2005: 2); in this regard, it is already plausible to argue that in advanced and functional economic societies, economic security (micro level) and human security (macro level) tend to be strengthened.

The relevance of a correlated analysis using the concepts of economic society and economic security is practically unquestionable if we recall that "poverty is one of the most serious and persistent threats to human security (...) [since] it affects all aspects of human security understood in terms of "freedom from want"" (Unesco, 2008: 66). Developed economic societies are more able to downsize the prospects of poverty and, consequently, to raise the variables that ensure a human-secure environment. Summing up, this is why we consider that a new focus on the economic performance is of much help, towards a new understanding of the path chosen by political elites in transitional societies, whether this implies a transition towards democracy or autocracy, towards integration or separatism.

Before concluding the theoretical part of this paper, we should notice that economic society and human security cannot be mixed together, even if they both share in the pre-requisites of the economy realm. Economic society is the institutional domain affecting the transitional path of states and other political entities towards a variety of different social and political futures. In this line, economic society represents a macro level of analysis. Alternatively but complementarily, human security represents a more micro level of analysis to human vulnerabilities that are conceived as a challenge to the more institutional setup. They are conceived of as unnecessary limitations to the freedom from want, wherein every human needs to fulfill his or her inherent dignity.

Throughout the paper, we make use of these two levels of economic analysis in order to ensure a better understanding of the phenomena affecting the newly created North Caucasus Federal District. The main aim of this paper is not to put forward political solution though, even if it hints at what could be perceived as draft suggestions to specific problems. The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section offers a short historical synopsis of the paths that both the Russian Federation and the North Caucasus economies have taken in the last twenty years of their recent history. After that, we will probe how the disruption caused by the economic global crisis in the enfeebled economies of the North Caucasus Federal District could help in explaining the upsurge in regional violence.

Historical synopsis of the Russian Federation and North Caucasus economies

In order to comprehend the evolution of the economic state of affairs in the newly created North Caucasus Federal District and its probable connections with the growth of

separatist demands and regional violence, we should start to look to the Russian Federation's recent economic history. Broadly speaking, in the last twenty years (1991-2010), the economy of the Russian Federation has undergone profound transformations. The first ten years immediately after the implosion of the Soviet Union were dramatic. Under Boris Yeltsin's rule, the (important) ability of the Russian state to collect taxes was reduced so much that "between 1989 and 1997, state revenues fell by nearly 45 per cent" (Freeze, 2009: 470). As a direct consequence, there was a disruption in major social services such as education and culture, but there were also cuts in security, law enforcement and public health budgets.

The Russian Federation's feeble economy didn't guarantee stability or even daily certainty, and suffered from the exponential growth of bribes and illegal parallel markets. Yeltsin implemented several measures, the most famous being the disastrous Gaidar's "shock therapy", which proved to be ineffective given that "between 1991 and 1998, Russian national income shrank by about half, one of the steepest peacetime falls ever recorded anywhere" (Wasserstein, 2007: 714), not even comparable with the economic falls of the United Kingdom, Germany or the United States during the 1930s Great Depression. On one side the Federation struggled to acquire control over tax collection and to regain international trust in order to seek foreign loans; on the other side, "there were persistent constraints upon entrepreneurial innovation. The government did precious little to impose the rule of law" (Service, 1997: 526), with there being a significant growth in internal corruption and a decrease in foreign investments as a result.

Yeltsin's final, desperate measure, the "loans-for-shares", collapsed in the financial crisis of August 1998, a period also known as *Catastroika*. In sum, in the first decade after the implosion of the Soviet Union, the economy showed a continuous weakness and sheer incapacity to recover both on domestic and international levels. To have a more accurate idea of the weaknesses of the Russian Federation's economy, it is important to know that in only six years (1991–1997), "the GDP dropped a staggering 43 per cent (…) [as a result of that], Russia's per capita GDP in 1999 was only 4,200 dollars — slightly more than Botswana (3,900 dollars), but less than Namibia (4,300 dollars) and Peru (4,400 dollars)" (Freeze, 2009: 475), states that are usually approached as poor and part of the Third World.

With a frail and, in some moments, uncontrolled economy, it was more than expected that "poverty rates rose significantly over the transition years (…) The Russian Bureau of Statistics reports that poverty increased from 10–12% in 1990 to 25%–33% in 2000" (Brookdale Institute, 2003: 11), threatening the economic security of the Russian population and strengthening the claims to greater sovereignty of several ethno-political leaders — not just in North Caucasus, but also in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha republic.

Without the capacity to fulfill basic daily needs, populations tended to become more willing to adhere to nationalist and separatist groups and to promote or even practise violent acts.

Overall, "Yeltsin's choice to privilege economic restructuring over democratic state restructuring weakened the state, weakened democracy and weakened the economy" (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 392), threatening the transition towards democracy in itself and jeopardising the production of human security. The disruption in the economy produced a destructive wave in all other areas from public health to culture and to public security. At the end of the millennium, the situation in the Russian Federation neared total chaos. Yeltsin's unfruitful reign in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union was followed by the arrival of a new strong and charismatic leader: Vladimir Putin.

Practically unknown to the majority of the social and even political circles in Moscow, the former director of the secret police FSB (*Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii*) and former director of the Security Council started a progressive economic transformation. There were several economic reforms started under Putin's rule, but none of them used policy measures as extreme as the ones chosen by his predecessor. The reforms that were implemented proved to work: from 2000 to 2008, the GDP of Russia in Purchasing Power Parity (the PPP corrects distortions of nominal currency values) rose 202% from 1,120 billion dollars to 2,266 billion dollars (Index Mundi, 2011), upgrading the Federation's economic situation from a feeble condition to the eighth largest economy worldwide.

Nevertheless, we must never lose from sight the rise of revenues for the trade in commodities in order not to overstate the reach of Putin's policies. The majority of economic data prior to the recent economic global crises was favourable to Putin's administration though. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the *per capita* GDP rose from 4,200 dollars (2000) to 14,600 dollars (2008), allowing a general improvement in life conditions, across the Russian Federation. Rising income made possible the allocation of money to health, education, social security, and to fight poverty. According to the World Bank, poverty rates in Russia decreased from 19.2% in 2002 to 11.1% in 2006 (World Bank, 2012)

What some call the 'miracle' orchestrated by a certain strategic vision of Putin's was also facilitated by "the red-hot global economy of those years (1999-2008), which generated a sharp surge in demand for commodities, especially hydrocarbons, metal, and timber — Russia's principal exports" (Freeze, 2009: 498) to the global market. Another essential factor to Russia's rapid economic recovery was the depreciation of the ruble after *Catastroika*, which made Russian products less expensive and thus more competitive, an occurrence similar to China's economic success that was partially achieved because of the

depreciated Yuan and Chinese products compared to those sold in Pounds, Euros, Dollars or Yen.

Despite this major economic growth, some areas continued to be underdeveloped. Justice reforms proved to be shortly effective and were sometimes even simple rhetorical exercises of the Kremlin's newest tsar. Federal and regional bureaucracy also hadn't achieved a high level of proficiency. Putin's first priority was to stabilise the domestic markets and to improve the international image of the Russian Federation in political and economical spheres. However providential and effective, Putin's economical choices had produced an extraordinary dependence on commodities: "In 2009, Russia was the world's largest exporter of natural gas, the second largest exporter of oil, and the third largest exporter of steel and primary aluminum." (Commodities Street Journal, n.d.)

Russia's incapacity to diversify its exporting portfolio transformed it into a fragile state in a scenario of global economic crisis, like the one spreading throughout the world in the second semester of 2008. At the beginning the crisis produced a sharp reduction in the oil prices. In order to prevent a new *Catastroika*, "the government had to raid the foreign exchange reserves (…) [that had] shrunk from 598 billion dollars to 426,5 billion dollars by early January [2009], and dropped to 388 billion a month later (a decrease of 35 per cent)" (Freeze, 2009: 524). These most needed initial measures weren't enough to prevent the depreciation of the ruble, and had slowed down growth in the Russian Federation.

The cycle of economic transformations and the rhythm of its multiple effects weren't identical in all regions of the Russian Federation. In the specific case of the North Caucasus, the economic history of the last 20 years was as plain as it was dark. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, "political killings and inter-ethnic discord afflicted virtually every Russian republic" (King, 2008: 232) in this region in addition to the revival of ethno-national separatism and the explosion of Islamic extremism. In a paper published in 2009, Sergey Markedonov signalled that "in the Russian North Caucasus, the main challenge to regional security is posed by illegal armed formations, acts of sabotage, and terrorist *jamaats*" (Markedonov, 2009: 14) that have been revived in the last three years across the entire North Caucasus.

The never-ending socio-political unrest had such atrocious consequences on the economy that "the extent of this economic collapse is difficult to grasp, as it had few precedents in recent history (…) by the mid-1990s, up to half of the population of the South Caucasus lived below the poverty line, and though less reliable, figures in the North Caucasus were even worse" (Cornell and Starr, 2006: 36). Adding to this dramatic picture, they reached the highest unemployment rate in the entire Russian Federation. The combination of these factors undermines the economic security of local populations, making it easier to adhere to extremist Islamic movements or to ethno-national separatist projects.

In comparative terms, the North Caucasus republic with the lowest rate of unemployment in 2008 was Adygea, reaching 8.5%[1] among a total population of more than 440,000 citizens. Ingushetia's republic recorded the highest regional rate of unemployment, with 47.4% of the population (comprising fewer than 500,000 citizens) being without a job (Körbel, 2009: 2). According to Thomas Körbel (2009), young people unemployment in Ingushetia was even higher, above 70%. These rates are partially responsible for the upsurge in regional violence. Without hope for a better future, being deprived of a regular job and proper living conditions, youngsters tend to adhere to extremism or separatism as a way to improve their possibilities, to achieve the maximisation of life options.

Despite the levels of violence and political defiance, the unstable North Caucasus is economically important to the Russian Federation because it ensures direct access to both the Caspian and the Black seas. The shocking fact is that, even with this potential relevance, the North Caucasus "is regarded as the least attractive region in the entire country for foreign investors" (Matveeva, 1999: 44) because of this continuous socio-political instability. In the years of the Yeltsin presidency, the North Caucasus underwent a gradual deterioration of living conditions as a consequence of the Russo-Chechen wars as well as other ethnic conflicts (those of North Ossetia and Ingushetia and in Dagestan). The parade of conflicts partially explains why since 1991, it has "constituted the poorest regions of the entire Russian Federation" (Coene, 2009: 190), with the overall lowest indicators on socioeconomic development, excluding birth rate (the highest in the entire Federation).

The prospects of a change in the beginning of the new millennia were soon dropped. In fact, "under Putin the region has not beneficiated significantly from the oil and gas" (Melvin, 2007: 44) productions in the region. The need for heavy investment to modernise regional refineries and factories and the unattractiveness of this area to foreign investment was responsible for the actual decadence. It is a strange historical irony that the first region of the Soviet Empire where oil was exploited, the region that in the 1920s accounted for more than 10% of the Soviet production in oil, "has lost its prominence as a fuel base. In the early 1990s, it accounted for 1,8 per cent of the crude oil and 0,8 per cent of gas production" (Matveeva, 1999: 44), with the current figures supposedly being even lower.

The primary sector in the North Caucasus is also heavily affected by this endemic underdevelopment. For example, "agriculture seems to work somehow, but only to the extent of providing some basic food products to the region" (Liono, 2000), giving no prospects to business opportunities in this sector. The socioeconomic relevance of agricultural activities in the region can be heightened if we remember that "by the end of the 1990s, only one region [Northern Caucasus] had more than four private farms per 1,000 persons" (Wegren, 2003: 44) in the entire Russian Federation territory.

Differently, the Ossetian alcohol production is a significant business representing almost 20% of the raw materials placed in the Federation market for the production of alcoholic drinks. Although we can argue that this is a small and geographically limited success, we have to agree that this is "a satisfactory figure for a region where money does not fall from the skies" (Liono, 2000). The tourism sector also has great economic potential, especially in the republic of Kabardino-Balkaria because of the ski resorts in the Elbrus. The reality is that "tourist facilities have only 25% occupancy rate" (Liono, 2000), which is mostly ensured by domestic tourists and by foreigner tourists from Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Several researchers criticise the lack of a multilevel strategy in Putin's policies for the regions that are as focused on security issues as unable to solve them. The critical fact is that "the absence of truthful programs of nation building and economic development in this region is denying an improvement of the current situation" (Körbel, 2009: 3) and is even creating new problems, such as the previously mentioned phenomenon of juvenile delinquency that has flourished as a consequence of the lack of jobs. Some measures of the central administration have deepened some economic structural problems.

Although the Federal Administration has tried to circumvent those hindrances through the Regional Support Fund, given that "the largest net recipients tend to be the relatively rural, less developed regions of the North Caucasus" (Smith, 1999: 195), the fact is that the region continues to be unable to overcome its chronicle underdevelopment. One of the main reasons for this scenario can be attributed to the absence of urban settlements. "According to the data of the population census of 2002 in the North Caucasus, we see no big cities" (Lordkipanidze and Totadze, 2010: 162) except for Makhachkala (capital of Dagestan) that overcomes half a million inhabitants.

In this regard, there is little surprise when we perceive that we have in the North Caucasus the 2nd (Ingushetia), 4th (Dagestan), 6th (Chechnya), 7th (Kabardino-Balkaria), 11th (Karachaevo-Cherkessia), 14th (Dagestan), and 15th (Adygea) most subsidised regions (Perovic, 2006: 7) in a total of 83 federal subjects (there were 88 subjects until the administrative reform of 2008) composing the Russian Federation. The effort to keep those regions artificially stabilised through federal monetary subsidies, which account from more than 58% (Adygeia) to almost 90% (Ingushetia) of the subjects' budget, might be in peril due to the world crisis scenario like the one faced by the Russian Federation since the second semester of 2008. From here on, we would like to stress how the disruption caused by the economic global crisis in enfeebled economies like the ones in the North Caucasus Federal District could help to explain the upsurge in ethnic violence. We will use the concepts of economic society and economic security to guarantee a proper bi-level analysis on ethno-political and transition phenomena.

Economic society, economic security and ethno-politics in the North Caucasus

The North Caucasus is one of Russia's most distinctive regions. It encompasses one of the thirteen military districts[2], one of the twelve economic regions[3], and it has also been the eighth federal district since 19 January 2010. Until that date, the North Caucasus territories were inside the Southern federal district that after the split has only maintained the Ciscaucasian constituencies of Adygea republic, Krasnodar krai and Kalmykia republic. In a speech to the Federal Council on 12 November 2009, Dmitri Medvedev "argued that the region's problems derive in the first instance from economic backwardness, unemployment, and high-level corruption" (Caucasus Report, 2010), a factor that undermines the confidence of the local population in federal and regional institutions.

The economic factor is so decisively important to begin to solve the numerous problems of the region that even the choice of the governor to the new federal district took the fact into account. The appointee, Aleksandr Khloponin, is a former businessman with a short but very successful political career in the Siberian Federal District. The nomination of Khloponin can be understood as the Kremlin's statement that economic issues should be the primary focus of power. Aleksandr Khloponin knows that he urgently "needs to create a normal living environment in the North Caucasus, in particular improving socio-economic environment" (Jackson, 2010) in order to ensure economic security and to promote the development of a truly economic society. The North Caucasus Federal District summons all four major threats to human security: besides the high rate of unemployment, it has "insufficient economic resources, unstable economic flows and asset losses" (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 73), creating a bulk of circumstances that undermine the narrow confidence of the locals in Moscow's capability to solve real problems.

Despite the pressing necessity to solve these economic security vulnerabilities, only in the beginning of July 2010 did the first governor of the North Caucasus Federal District present his plan to solve the region's socioeconomic problems, with an expected prominence on economic and financial measures. In the document presented to Medvedev (at that moment, President of the Russian Federation), Khloponin "proposes launching priority projects, along with improving the overall investment climate in the North Caucasus in 2010–2012 and starting an 'active growth phase' in 2013–2025" (Dzutsev, 2010).

The two major proposals put forward by Khloponin were a huge investment in transport infrastructures[4] and a downgrade or even an elimination of taxes on economic initiatives developed in the region. Despite their merit, these two initiatives are in jeopardy mainly because of the effects of the global crisis on the Russian Federation's central budget. The development of the North Caucasus transport infrastructures requires big sums

of money that only Moscow could ensure to the local government. Prior to the global crisis, this wouldn't have been a problem: the amounts of money given to subsidise the republics' inefficient socioeconomic programmes[5] could easily have been diverted to this kind of specific project.

The global crisis has introduced a new degree of complexity and has even produced some incongruence and contradiction in the political speech. In September 2009, Dmitry Kozak, the Deputy Prime Minister and former governor of the Southern Federal District, stated that the "Russian government plans to cut subsidies to the republics of the North Caucasus" (Goble, 2009) in order to invest that money in other regions. However, by mid-July 2010, Khloponin was demanding more funds from the Kremlin to develop the economy of the North Caucasus. To be accurate, no substantial numbers were given either about the amount of money to be cut or on the timeline to apply those cuts. But it was crucially made sure that the cuts were inevitable.

This double-faced discourse from political leaders produces at least confusion in the local population. How can someone ask Moscow for money if Moscow has said beforehand that money was ending? Surely Khloponin knows that in the near future, "Medvedev and Putin might be hard pressed to rationalize such a huge budgetary outlay on this rebellion region, whose inhabitants are racially maligned by a significant portion of [the] Russian society" (Leahy, 2009). This is the same society that, at the same time, does not believe in any kind of mid-term success in the region and that has been called onto the polls to elect a new president. Even if the Kremlin could ensure the amounts of money needed to fulfill Khloponin's ambitious programme, there is another barrier ahead: republic heads/presidents[6] and ethnic leaders. To ensure the proper execution of the investment programme proposed by the North Caucasus Federal District governor, the decisional power would have to be concentrated in Khloponin. But the condition for that to happen is that "Moscow will have to break up the local government circles and redistribute power, something that is hard to do without jeopardizing an already unstable situation" (Dzutsev, 2010) in a region where local leaders have an almost absolute power in economic and social policies already menaced by the mere presence of the Kremlin-appointed governor.

The promises of Khloponin on heavy investments in transport infrastructures and factories across the North Caucasus as a tool to fight the insurgency had a pernicious effect. On 22 July 2011, the chief engineer for the Dagestan's company Sulaksky Hydro-Energy Cascade was abducted following the attack on the Baksan hydroelectric plant, which was located at the Kabardino-Balkaria republic and perpetrated by a group of six militants. At the same time, the numbers of terrorist attacks in Dagestan's railways have grown during the last few months. These attacks have a symbolic message stating that economy is not the major problem to solve in the North Caucasus. Insurgency fighters

are battling for political representation, and simple economic measures will not stop their demands. Khloponin's socio-economic programme is perceived as a challenge to which they've given a strong and bloody answer.

Going back to the subject of the predictable downsizing of federal budgetary aids, it is important to stress one more issue that can contribute to the upsurge of violence in the North Caucasus. The reduction of the money received from Moscow would make it much harder to achieve regular processes of loyalty production. Until recently, "federal subsidies have facilitated the process of amnestying former guerrillas" (Leahy, 2009) integrating these men into the republic's security forces, one of the most secure and well-paid jobs in the region. With scarce money and the ambition to invest in other structural areas, these programmes would become difficult to maintain and their attractiveness would consequently decay.

We shouldn't judge lightly the reasons why this kind of scheme to combat insurgency ranks is being contemplated by the Kremlin. From an anthropological perspective, we have to take into account that "the Caucasian traditions demand that every man should take an active part in providing his relatives with the necessary resources for living" (Liono, 2000), no matter what kind of activities he has to do to achieve those precious resources. Accomplishing this paternalistic obligation is a question of manhood and honour, two structural values in the North Caucasus societies.

This societal demand on males aligned with "systemic corruption along with stat despotism and a culture of impunity" (Halbach, 2010: 15) are fomenting the growth of a "shadow economy" in the North Caucasus. Because this is a phenomenon as difficult to follow as poorly studied, we have to focus on its effects instead of looking at its dynamics. According to Arbakhan Magomedov, "illicit economic activity contributes to a "shadow state", encourages corruption and undermines the sustainability of economic development" (Jackson, 2010), which is in so much need in this Russian region.

The apparent merge on less legal economic and political activities is a heritage of the Russian influence in the region, namely Patrimonialism. Due to the Patrimonialism influence in the North Caucasus, we have several local regimes "where the rights of sovereignty and those of ownership blend to the point of becoming indistinguishable" (Pipes, 1995: 22–23), making it difficult, if not almost impossible, to reach any kind of endurable economic society, which could provide economic security and stimulus to a stabilisation of the situation and an acceleration of the integration.

According to Douglas Blum, "Putin's policies at home and abroad reflect a particular conception of the state, one that is historically rooted with imperial Patrimonialism" (Blum, 2008: 353), in which the value of entrepreneurship and innovation is substituted by the need to satisfy clienteles and loyalists. To sum up, "we have few doubts that the

national economic system in Russia fashions a type of patrimonial capitalism, resulting from the political Patrimonialism existent in the institutions and power relations in Russia" (Freitas, 2012: 2), with there being a special occurrence in the North Caucasus. We have to have in mind that all political elites in public positions need to be confirmed by the Kremlin, and at the same time, Moscow needs to please local political elites in order to diminish regional discontentment and resentment.

So far, we can state that all North Caucasus republics have a feeble "economic society" as their very best scenario, disrupted by a shadow economy, by continuous ethnic disputes and by insurgency attacks. Even more concerning is the sheer incapacity of the federal and regional institutions to improve the already bad situation plundering the economic security of local populations. It is impossible to assert that there is human security, or even economic security, when even the traditional threats to the state security are out of control.

Moving forward, it is also important to centre our attention on the numbers concerning violent insurgency incidents and the death toll resulting from those incidents. According to a recent report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the number of violent incidents registered in the first four months of 2010 was 5% lower than the number of violent incidents recorded last year in the same period: decreasing from 291 violent incidents registered in 2009 to 283 violent incidents recorded this year (Mendelson, Malarkey and Moore, 2010: 7).

At a first glance, it appears that the insurgency movement had not grown but stabilised. However, we should complement this first indicator with a second one: death toll. In 2010, the decrease in 5% on violent incidents recorded during the first four months of the year had resulted in a growth of 16% in the number of deaths, compared with the same time period in 2009. The result of the violent incidents has moved from 183 deaths reported in 2009 to 219 in 2010 (Mendelson, Malarkey and Moore, 2010: 11). From this data, we can conclude that the number of violent incidents has slightly decreased its frequency but has grown up in intensity and mortality.

How could such an outcome be related to the economical plight of the republics in North Caucasus? It is expected that violence grows when the living conditions are perceivably eroding, especially in societies without job opportunities, with insufficient and mostly ineffective social services, and where the central state is seen by a large majority of the ethnic populations as the enemy. Additionally, we should not forget that men are obliged to fulfill the basic family needs, even if young men are the most affected group by unemployment and by the economic continuous underdevelopment. There are no coincidences when we see that the most subsidised region with the higher rate of unemployment (Ingushetia) is also the second most deadly (with 290 registered occurrences) of all the

subjects composing the North Caucasus Federal District. Dagestan, the most dangerous and deadliest of the North Caucasus republics (surpassing 320 confirmed occurrences), is the second most subsidised republic with the second highest unemployment rate.

Reinforcing our argument and understanding the perilous situation is the "Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin's plan to create 400,000 jobs for North Caucasus residents over the next ten years" (Vatchagaev, 2010). To the majority of the political analysts and experts, these statements were made under the pressure of the growing destabilisation of North Caucasus, at a time in which the hosting of the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014 and of the World Football Championship in 2018 is getting closer. Putin's declarations were vague about when the job creation would start and vaguer about which resources from the federal budget would be allocated to accomplish that[7]. The importance here is that Putin knows that North Caucasus' economic plight must be improved in order to guarantee economic security to local populations and, consequently, to increase the levels of loyalty to the Kremlin.

Once again, it is true that "unemployment and poverty may be factors in the rise of instability, but they do not explain the complex nature of violence in the region" (Melvin, 2007: 45), where almost fifty different ethnic groups cohabit with different and mostly divergent interests. We can even argue that, to some extent, the prolongation of insurgency could be linked to the "lack of openness, incompetence and unwillingness to hold a dialogue with opponents" (Markedonov, 2009: 52), phenomena that have characterised Russian politics since the first military campaigns launched in Astrakhan in the sixteenth century[8]. From this macro perspective, the unsuccessful economies of the North Caucasus are just a contributive factor to the resurgence of insurgency. The capacity to establish an economic society is vital to the transitional path towards democracy and social stability, but "it is often difficult or impossible to make systematic statements about the effect of economics in democratization processes" (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 77). In simpler words, economic dynamics could produce socio-political phenomena if and when they are related with several other factors.

In the specific case of the North Caucasus, economy surely plays an important part but is not the sole factor; this is if we take into account that even during the most peaceful years (2000–2007), the regional economies fared pretty badly. As we have argued elsewhere,[9] the growth of social and political instability and the rebirth of ethno-religious nationalisms are the result of a sum of different structure and conjuncture factors. Economy (and the building of an economic society) is part of the problem but does not in itself account for the phenomenon under analysis.

Conclusion

The situation in the North Caucasus will surely be worse after the announced cuts to the budgetary aid to all North Caucasus republics. At a different level of analysis, we can conclude that the legacies of the global crises will decrease the already feeble guarantee of human security in the region. The expected decline in human security will most probably degenerate in a dangerous uncertainty, making it more accrued in an already critical situation. This is pretty much a real picture of what could happen in the near future in the North Caucasus. As Bronislaw Geremek stated:

> It has rightly been said that poverty does not necessarily generate terrorism, since terrorists also come from among the privileged. It is nevertheless true that terrorism takes advantage of misery, knowing that despair creates favourable conditions for terrorist projects and actions. (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 74)

Loyalty can't be ensured (or even demanded) when the basic needs of the local populations are not guaranteed. Knowing that "the average all-Russia rate was 7.3 unemployed in 2006 and 6.1 percent in 2007, [and that] in the Caucasus the unemployment rate was 13.7 and 11.7[10]" (Markedonov, 2010: 4), we better understand the difficulty in ensuring economic security because of a non-existent economic society. The attractiveness of insurgency groups to local populations resides on the certainty that some basic needs could be fulfilled through them. In a region where the shadow economy employs more people than a regular and legal economy, people will see "shadow economy" as the exit door to a troubled life. In the case of Ciscaucasian ethnic populations, we also have to understand that these individuals regard themselves firstly as part of a community and only after that as singular subjects.

The applicability of human security paradigms is partially conditioned by this structural precondition (what we could call the communitarian clause). That is the main reason why this paper has tried to weave a macro level (economic society) together with a micro level (economic security). Indeed a human security focus on individuals is important to provide an alternative level of analysis to questions that historically have proven to be difficult to account for on a more macro level. Human security offers the possibility of enlarging the type of analyses and allows taking new and more accurate conclusions that should be taken into consideration by the Kremlin when looking at the North Caucasus as an object of political connection.

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Notes

1　In 2008 the medium unemployment rate registered across the Russian Federation was lower than 5.5%. For more accurate information on macroeconomic indicators in the Russian Federation in 2008, see World Bank (2008).

2　Military District is based in Rostov-on-Don (capital of the Rostov Oblast) and ensures the security for all administrative constituencies of the North Caucasus Federal District and of the Southern Federal District. To better understand the origin and nature of the North Caucasus Military District, we suggest: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/vo-north-caucasian.htm

3　Similar to the North Caucasus Military District, the North Caucasus Economic Region includes all the administrative constituencies of the North Caucasus Federal District and of the Southern Federal District. This economic region is part of the European-Russia Economic Zone. Information about this subject is scarce, but a good start to understand it is: http://www.museumstuff.com/learn/topics/North_Caucasus_economic_region

4　The main measures appointed to accomplish this goal in Khloponin's proposal are the "construction of highways across the North Caucasus, invigorating the development of railroads to the South Caucasus, construction of ports on the Dagestani coast of the Caspian Sea and creating a transport corridor to Iran" (Dzutsev, 2010).

5　At the end of the 1990s, a series of socio-economic programmes were approved, such as "Measures for State Support for the Social and Economic Development in Kabardino-Balkaria or State Support for the Social and Economic Development in North Ossetia-Alania". Despite the political intentions, the majority of the programmes have proven their inefficiency in the production of concrete results. To read more about this topic, see: Matveeva (1999).

6　On 12 August 2010, Ramzan Kadyrov proposed that only the President of the Russian Federation could use that title, changing his own title as President of the Chechen republic to Head of the Chechen republic. Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, President of the Ingushetia republic, had supported this idea as well as the current President of the Karachaevo-Cherkessia Republic, Boris Ebzeev. Prior to that, in 2005, Alexander Dzasokhov had already changed the title of President of the North Ossetia-Alania republic to Head of the republic. To read more about this subject, see: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/regional-bosses-seek-new-title/412431.html

7　In a political document presented in Moscow, Vladimir Putin's grandiose plan to create 400,000 jobs in ten years in the region has been reviewed to a smaller number of 160,000 jobs. This programme wasn't considered a priority to the Kremlin endangering its nearby fulfillment. To read more about this turnover in Vladimir Putin's promises, see: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/ncw/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36636&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=423&no_cache=1

8　For a developed reading about the campaigns in the Caucasus and the résistance of the ethnic groups, see Gammer (2005).

9　Lopes (2010).

10　Unemployment rates in Kalmykia, Krasnodar, Rostov and Stavropol are much lower than the ones registered in the other predominantly non-Russian republics. The numbers that Markedonov presents in its research results from an average calculation that includes those four predominantly Russian regions.

Public Policy and Media Frames: The Debate over Migration in Brazil

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The main goal of this article is to provide a good basis to assess the way media frames are embedded in a wider social scenario, and how public and political preferences can be researched through media debate. The methodology adopted allows for an analysis of newspaper articles that can show broader trends of the debate and serve as a thermometer to measure public debate. It can further highlight details and enable in-depth analyses of media discourse.

The article explores the interconnectedness of media debate and policy-making process by means of the analysis of articles published in a Brazilian newspaper between 2009 and 2010. Quantitative and qualitative methodologies are employed to identify the frames used in media and to offer insights of their relationship with the political debate. The ongoing political debate has raised attention to the issue of migration, with a great numbers of actors expressing very diverse points of view. A broader public debate has been initiated and some portions of it find voice in different means of communication. The paper argues that changes in the public and in the media debate are a response to changes in the political debate, while at the same time the first two also help to outline the latter.

Keywords: migration; public policy; media debate

Migration public policies have received increasing attention in public debate in the last few years, especially in countries with a large migrant worker population. We can observe that the debate over migration in the last decade showed a greater focus on national security issues, constituting the main reasoning behind the proposition of more rigid entry and permanence laws for migrants (Weiner, 1993; Rudolph, 2003). Weiner (1993) and Rudolph (2003) argue that migrants can be perceived as threats to the geopolitical security, to the production and accumulation of wealth, and to social stability and cohesion, especially by bringing or creating political conflicts or through the social

and economic burden they can represent. The beginning of the twenty-first century also saw terrorist attacks with the participation of migrants, further increasing the perceived threats that migration poses to national security.

Examples of public policies that aim at enhancing national responses to the mass entrance of migrants and, particularly, at countering irregular migration, include the Normative Resolution 97/2012 act from the Brazilian National Immigration Council (CNIg), which restricts the number of humanitarian visas conceded to Haiti nationals to 1200 per year, the European Union Directive 2008/115/CE, initiated by the European Commission and establishing the "common standards and procedures for returning illegally staying third-country nationals" (also known as Return Directive), or the Senate Bill 1070, of the Arizona state in the United States of America, intending "to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present" in the country (its most polemical provisions are currently blocked by a preliminary injunction issued by a federal judge). All of these policies have been highly criticised internally, by other countries, and by international institutions because of their discriminatory provisions and because they create the possibility of migrant human rights abuse. The fact that these policies were approved is a response to parts of the domestic population who feel themselves threatened by the growing migrant population, either economically or because of cultural differences.

In Brazil, the current law defining migrant policy was issued in 1980 (Law 6815/1980) and reflects an exaggerated preoccupation with national security – Ventura and Illes (2010) credit this preoccupation to how the military government at the time perceived the Cold War. The national security concerns are already evident in its first articles, which restrict the entry and permanence of migrants for safeguarding national interests, namely, national security and the protection of the national work force. At the moment, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, the lower federal chamber, is discussing a proposed law from 2009 (PL 5655/2009), by the Ministry of Justice which is designed as a substitute to the 1980 law. The proposal presents several improvements towards a better protection of migrants' human rights, and a public audience to discuss the project that was approved in late 2012 should occur in the beginning of 2013. The proposed law reinforces the idea that all migrants are warranted their rights and constitutional guarantees, as well as access to education, health, and to the labour benefits system, irrespective of their migrant status. Yet the proposed law also gives an even greater focus to the duties of migrant workers, creating several mechanisms to stop their entry and restraining certain rights (some aspects of political participation, for example) and grants the Executive branch enlarged powers to act in the control of migrant workers. According to Ventura and Illes (2010: 2), the proposed law "introduces a large number of rights on general and abstract terms"

and "an even larger number of specific regulatory apparatus which restrict the meaning or extent of those rights". The authors further state that the programmatic mention of migrant workers' rights without some level of definition can be used to render those rights ineffective in daily life, particularly because the proposed law does not specify the roles of federal, state, and municipal governments in guaranteeing those rights.

During the discussions on the proposed law, the Brazilian National Immigration Council (CNIg), a department of the Ministry of Labour in charge of policymaking and immigration coordination[1], has presented the government's "National Policy of Immigration and the Protection to the Migrant Workers" in May 2010. The policy is marked by a strong preoccupation with the migrants' human rights and their integration into the Brazilian market and society, responding directly to some concerns of the migrant population in Brazil and establishing a row of concrete actions to enforce the protection of this section of the population's rights. One such action is the recommendation to sign and ratify the "United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families" in order to reaffirm Brazil's commitment to the protection of migrant workers internationally. The National Policy also introduces a technical qualification program for public officials working in the registration of migrants to promote a better orientation of migrant workers' rights and a more humane relationship, one of the most common complaints from migrants who ought to be registered in the Federal Police Office from the Ministry of Justice. Furthermore, the document recommends the development of research and enquiries on the situation of migrants and of the migrants' networks, stated as a necessary condition for improving and proposing adequate public policies addressing the issue.

This research uses newspaper articles on migration public policies and on migrants in order to help identify some of the major frames – ideas that help us give meanings to a theme – on the issue of migration in the media debate. We chose to analyse *Folha de S. Paulo* because it is Brazil's most widely read national newspaper and because it represents an important source of opinion diffusion and leadership, informing much of the political, public, and media debate in Brazil. The analysis of one newspaper enables the creation of a large panorama of the most important frames in the different debates examined, even though, corresponding to the rationale we present below, the inclusion of more newspapers could increase the diversity of points of views captured. The objective of this analysis is to verify if the references to migrants in the media debate can be linked to the development of a public policy that either proposes better control and policing towards migrants or the protection of migrants' human rights, advocating for a better social and economic integration of this group. A total of 126 newspaper articles from 2009 and 2010 were examined in this study.

Two Different Perceptions

Migration is a complex phenomenon that has its roots in different economic, political, social, and environmental issues (Castles, 1986; 2006; Freeman, 1995; Hugo, 1996; Mattar, 2012). Its complexity in forms and motivations causes migration to be perceived differently by each country and to be seen, at the same time and by both the sending and the host countries, as an opportunity for growth and a problem.

Remittances sent by migrants to developing countries have transferred more than 300 billion dollars in 2010 (World Bank, 2012) and, consequently, are an important part of the family income in the sending countries. Furthermore, migrant workers have an important economic role in supplementing the workforce and causing better economic allocative efficiency and an increase in productivity, especially in countries or regions with scarce labour or an ageing population (Freeman, 1995). The significant cultural gains from the promotion of an exchange between host and migrant cultures are also positive.

However, migration also has negative consequences to both sides. To the sending country, the "brain drain" effect (in which a significant part of the specialised workforce moves to a developed country), combined with a lack of motivation for seeking specialisation caused by low wages, obstructs economic development, and increases dependence on external capital (including capital sent by emigrants to their families)[2], thus encouraging further emigration (Rosenzweig, 2005). Host countries have to deal with irregular immigration, threat of unemployment (especially between poorer working classes), lowering of wages, competition over social benefits and resources, and concerns regarding the inclusion of culturally different groups. Moreover, changes in values and national identity are frequently cited as negative consequences arising from the presence of culturally different populations.

The perceived difficulties therefore affect both the local and the migrant populations – the latter being, in many cases, excluded socially, economically, and politically from the community they live in. Koopmans and Statham (1999) describe two main challenges to the contemporary nation state: the post-national challenge, in which universal values prevail over the internally accepted and determined ones; and the multicultural challenge, in which the internal plurality of a community weakens the state's capacity to maintain social order. The importance given to universal values and a community's internal plurality affect how the legitimacy of a government's actions is perceived. In most cases, these actions are perceived as failing or illegitimate once the main cultural values change and problems with the cultural integration of migrants occur.

The loss of legitimacy in the contemporary nation state is also discussed by Hurrell (2007). Legitimacy, for that author, is expressed in five different dimensions: shared

understanding of justice, specialised and specialist knowledge, reason-giving in light of shared principles inside the political community, the process and procedure of its operations ("input legitimacy"), and the effectiveness of those actions ("output legitimacy") (Hurrell, 2007: 80-91). The importance of legitimate actions from a government increases in so far as the distance between citizen and political actors becomes greater. Legitimating its actions is a strategic attitude in the national political game, and also internationally because it implies the acceptance of the governors' authority and the citizens' disposition in following the established rules (Hurrell, 2007: 78). It is a grave issue when both local and migrant populations perceive the government's actions as illegitimate. To the native population, this happens when state actions cannot solve the problems brought by immigration (its effectiveness) or the principles of social order are challenged by the migrant culture. To the migrant population, state actions can be perceived as illegitimate when they are not based on the same principles of justice or when their political community is based in different reason-giving conducts, added by the fact that the migrants are rarely allowed participation in the processes and procedures for decision-making (input legitimacy). In Brazil, illegitimacy is often perceived because government actions lack effectiveness in registering or controlling migrants and in giving them access to their rights. A common argument is that because Brazilian boundaries are extremely large and porous, the government is unable to account for irregular entrances. For migrants, lack of effectiveness is perceived when official information is contradictory, registration processes are demanding and slow (a migrant identity card takes approximately one year to be manufactured), and the government fails to guarantee access to justice, health or education. Because migrants are denied access to most political rights in Brazil, they also experience a lack of input legitimacy.

The controversy about legitimacy loss leads to various reactions from governments and societies regarding the integration of the growing migrant community, two of which we shall analyse here. We focus our discussion on two frames for the meanings attributed to migration and migrants: one that encompasses the preoccupations with national security and one extending over the preoccupations regarding migrants' human rights.

The increase of migrant populations initiates discussions inside a political community that can be seen in national security terms, which relates to the first frame we analyse. The national security frame focuses on the burden migrant populations impose on internal social and cultural cohesion. The presence of immigrants is seen as the focal point of social and economic problems in the country, with the cultural differences between groups leading to a perception of the decay of national identity values. Usually, this frame highlights problems such as irregular migration and competition for social benefits and stresses the idea of a loss of governmental control over the migrant population.

To the second frame, the source of social and economic hardship is not ascribed to the presence of migrant populations, but instead is blamed on society's and the government's failure in properly integrating those migrants in the social, economic, and political domains, mostly by disrespecting the principles of universal human rights. This lack of integration and the disrespect for migrants' human rights is the main force driving the social conflicts between native and migrant populations. This frame emphasises that the migrant population does not share the same political principles and reason-giving conducts as the native population, consequentially causing a perceived lack of legitimacy in the government's actions. It could also suggest the integration of the migrant population as a solution for the social and political conflicts brought to light by the increase in the migrant population.

It is important to recognise that the focus given to each frame is related to a given community's concept of citizenship and its organising principles. Citizenship is a central concept to the study of migration because it defines who is entitled to have their rights guaranteed in a nation state. In most cases, migrants are entitled to economic, social, and cultural rights but are barred from the majority of political rights, and because citizenship cannot be understood in the absence of political rights, migrants cannot be considered citizens until they naturalise in their host country (Reis, 2007). We can relate two broad concepts of citizenship within the frames presented. If citizenship is related to belonging to a specific social group and affiliating oneself with a muster of national identity, it gives space for a stark differentiation between "us" and "them" and places incentives to adopt the national security frame. On the other hand, if citizenship is related to the possession of the legal rights of individuals in the nation state, there is more space for the adoption of the migrants' human rights frame.

The first concept of citizenship – communitarian citizenship – states that a mutual responsibility agreement and a shared common goods concept are possible through a social process of constructing a political community around common history, culture, language, and territory (Bellamy and Warleigh-Lack, 1998: 459-460). Through this process, individuals and political communities are able to establish who is entitled to rights, how the rights are to be provided, and also consolidates individual commitment to a political organisation – the nation-state – that guarantees the production and distribution of public goods. The second concept – cosmopolitan citizenship – reinforces the moral obligation of individuals towards all other human beings and is based on the existence of bonds that create a human community, taking precedence over one's nationality. This Kantian ideal of universal citizenship is based on solidarity ties between all humans rather than on the existence of a world government. Linklater (1998: 26) reminds us that the concept of citizenship can have its moral dimension expanded, thereby facilitating the defence of

universal human rights, even in the absence of transformations in the political boundaries of the nation-states or the constitution of a global government.

The principles of how a community should organise itself are also important in order to give prominence to one or the other frame in the migration debate. Demant (2009) presents a study that can be useful in thinking about the preferences of different societies when integrating migrants. The debate about how many different groups can live together inside a political community may admit to a classification along its two main characteristics: the possibility of the existence of different cultures inside the same space and the tendency of those groups to be in contact each other (Demant, 2009: 2). A certain community might give preference to fewer and culturally similar groups to live together, making up a more cohesive society ("cultural monism") or to the coexistence of various groups, thereby forging a diverse society ("cultural pluralism"). On the other hand, communities might understand that cultural identity is relatively immutable ("cultural essentialism") or that different cultures can combine different elements between them ("cultural evolutionism"). From the crossing of those two dimensions, four main routes appear to deal with migrant population: societies which are "monist-essentialist" prefer little or no diversity and do not believe in changes in cultural values, rejecting migrants and giving preference to barring their entry, while "monist-evolutionists", although also favouring the coexistence of culturally similar groups, understand that migrants can be assimilated into the national culture. "Pluralist-essentialists" can live with a diversity of cultural groups, but do not believe in big cultural changes, preferring multicultural policies and creating structures to guarantee autonomy and differentiation between groups[3], while "pluralist-evolutionists" also admit the existence of different cultural groups but believe that cultural values can admit changes, leading to an integrationist perspective with the creation of a new culture with elements from both the native and the migrant cultures. Arguably, it is not the mere presence of migrants that guide the composition of preferences, as migrants from culturally similar groups might experience unhindered acceptance even in monist-essentialist societies. In all kinds of societies there may exist a preferred type of migrant for whom integration can present no great difficulties – such as highly skilled workers, investors, or people from a determined cultural group.

In general, "monist-essentialist" communities would be more prone to adopt the national security frames, while "pluralist-evolutionists" would be more prone to adopt the migrants' human rights frames. The other two groups have a relatively more ambiguous relationship towards the two frames, but could be more prone to adopt the national security frames as the migrant community grows significantly once the hegemonic position of the native culture (or the egalitarian relationship between them in the case of pure multiculturalism) is challenged by the migrant culture.

Brazil is a nation formed by many different migration flows (Portuguese and West Africans in the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Europeans, Middle-Easterners, and Japanese in the nineteenth and twentieth century, and more recently, Chinese and South Americans since the last decades of the twentieth century), and contributions from each migrant culture have been weaved together to form a rather mixed and integrated national culture where the boundaries of all these different contributions are now blurred (Prado Júnior, 1994; Holanda, 1995; Ribeiro, 1995; Freyre, 2006). Accordingly, we can recognise tendencies for a cosmopolitan citizenship concept, for example, in the adoption of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* as a citizenship right at birth, or in the low requirements for naturalisation, as well as a "pluralist-evolutionist" approach to cultural differences. Disputably, we can also identify some negative reactions to the integration of some cultural groups in Brazilian history, for example in the resistance to integrating the African or the Asian migrants and, more recently, the South Americans, while there have been expressions of preference for specific kinds of migrants, especially high-skilled workers.

Public Debate and Media

This work means to clarify how the media debate could be linked to the process of decision-making around public migration policies. In this section, we first explain how the media debate can help us understand the relationship between political actors and citizens in modern democracies, and also how the use of particular frames in the media debate is related to the public responses to different policies. We later present the main findings from the analysis of the media debate over migration in Brazil.

In his "two-track model", Habermas (1997) explains how public debate can be linked with the proposition of public policies: discussions arising from the public debate are introduced by the mass media, themselves a source of information about social demands for governors. Nowadays, mass media have become the main space for political actors to communicate with citizens in modern democracies, with both groups receiving and giving information through the main means of communication. Citizens define their political preferences through information publicised in the media and by means of periodic elections, convert those preferences into political power, choosing governors and the policies they want them to adopt. Correspondingly, political actors present their points of view to citizens, obtain publicity for their actions, and also receive information about citizen preferences through the media. Responding adequately to those preferences help governors be elected to political positions or keep them in their current positions (Habermas, 1997).

In our understanding, the media is a privileged *locus* for visibility, with great reach and resonance in the public debate and the place where symbolical disputes are discussed

by different social and political actors around certain understandings over the facts and information (Gamson, 1992; Van Gorp, 2005; Porto, 2007). According to Gamson,

> we should think of them [the mass media] as the site of a complex symbolic contest over which interpretations will prevail. This cultural system encounters thinking individuals, and political consciousness arises from the interweaving of these levels (Gamson, 1992: xi-xii).

The most significant political actors contend for a place to present their understandings and frames inside the mass media system. Maia (2009) clarifies that public visibility in the mass media is important for the performance of four processes influencing the proposition of public policies:

- defining public issues and proposing solutions for those issues;
- collecting citizen's preferences and organising mobilisation around them;
- introducing public demands to elected representatives;
- organising legislative pressure and monitoring the political representatives' actions (Maia, 2009: 87)

Visibility in the mass media and, therefore, the chance to present one's preferential frame involves much more than the simple understanding of an issue. In other words, this understanding is directly linked to the ways the issue is addressed. This means that a certain understanding about one issue will have a role in shaping citizens' demands and priorities, in their comprehension of how those demands affect their daily lives, and in thinking of possible ways those demands could be addressed by the political representatives who possess political decision-making power. If the most prominent frames in the mass media place immigration as an issue related to the economic situation, the debate will probably concentrate on labour legislation, social security, or the role of migrants in maintaining the productivity level in an economic system. If the discourse in the media debate is concentrated on social-cultural issues, the debate will probably also have a focus on the integration of the migrant and host cultures, and the impact of the migrant culture in the national identity. Additionally, the media debate plays an important part because it feeds discussion in other places too, for example in the political institutions or the public debate that happens in other forums.

The method of content analysis used in this research aims to identify the frames used in the media debate in order to observe which opinions coming from the public or political debates reach the media. We especially focus on the way migrants are represented in this discourse and the suggestions on how the migrant movements should be dealt with.

Here, we identify and contextualise themes and frames presented in the news coverage from 2009 and 2010 and then observe how they are inserted in the broader social-political scheme. This aids in clarifying the perceptions about the issues and their resonance in the proposition of public policies.

Frames and the process of framing by the mass media have gained importance for studies in politics and communication since the work of Erving Goffman (1986) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981; 1984). In an earlier work, Bateson (1972) highlighted the use of frames to focus on the inclusion of some piece of information in the presentation of a message while excluding others and to stress the existence of premises that guide us in the interpretation of the message (Bateson, 1972: 144). Goffman (1986) picked up on this concept to discuss the way frames help us organise our daily lives, offering "keys" and "keyings" on the type of interaction for each case, for example helping us determine whether something is a fight or a play of a fight. On their side, Tversky and Kahneman used an experimental psychology study to show how the presentation of some issues determines one's preferences by confronting people with the same options who are "framed" as positive or negative and evaluating the outcomes of their decision. The results suggest that the "framing of an action sometimes affects the actual experience of its outcomes" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981: 458). As a consequence, presenting an issue in a different manner "could influence the decision made […] without distorting or suppressing information, and merely by the framing of outcomes and contingencies" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981: 346). The relative importance of the frame in shaping decisions is central to the study we propose here, as we are looking at the interplay between media debate and policymaking processes.

While those authors concentrated more on conceptual reflections on frames and framing, Gamson and Modigliani (1994; 1989) and Iyengar (1990) focused on how media frames help define the descriptions and evaluations of a determined issue. Gamson and Modigliani used focus groups to analyse how media frames related to individual understandings of themes such as affirmative action policies (1994) and the controversy around benefits and costs from nuclear power (1989), while Iyengar (1990) studied how conceptions of the causes of poverty shifted from societal to individual responsibility depending on the way it was framed. Iyengar experimented with media frames that could either have an episodic frame – an article with a concrete and personal focus, for example, a family's personal experience of poverty – or a thematic one – an abstract and impersonal article with background information, for example, on the poverty rate and the outcomes of different policies (Iyengar, 1990: 22) –, finding that episodic frames tended to place the focus of responsibility for poverty on individuals, while the thematic frames favoured societal responsibility in surveys after media exposure.

Describing the growing interest in the theme, Entman (1993) notices an astonishing diversity in the uses of the concept of framing. The author discusses many disputed conceptualisations of framing, while noting its relevance in defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgements, and suggesting remedies (Entman, 1993: 52). Entering a central debate to the framing processes, Entman stresses that frames in the mass media are not simply manipulated by individuals and that culture can be perceived as a stock of commonly invoked frames (1993: 53) that are then used by journalists in the media (Gitlin, 1980; Maia et al., 2008). Entman ascribes the inclusion/exclusion tension of frames a central role in the concept and, according to him, "exclusion of interpretations by frames is as significant to its outcomes as inclusion" (1993: 54). In the study proposed here, we assume that different frames to an issue exist in our society, but the work of the media in only highlighting some of them is central in increasing their publicity in the public and political debate, while the ones excluded remain partially invisible in all three forums.

Scheufele (1999) proposed an organisation of the field according to the manner in which a frame is analysed and observes that frames can be investigated from two main perspectives. In one perspective, frame studies can focus on how the individual or the media use different frames. Alternatively, they can focus on the frame either as the outcome of a series of events (dependent variable) or as the effect leading to some other process (independent variable) (Scheufele, 1999: 109-110). Scheufele then develops a model of framing that attempts at highlighting the inputs, processes, and outcomes involved in the framing of an issue for both the media and the audience and makes an effort to place different studies along this process model, helping recognise each study's contribution in a systematic and coherent manner. The research proposed here focuses mainly on the outcomes of the media processes of framing, while also looking briefly at the inputs for this process when we reflect about how public policy can inform media debate.

In sum, the concept of frame used in this research is close to that of Gamson and Modigliani, who define it as "a central organising idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue" (Gamson and Modigliani, 1994: 376). For our study, we place the creation and existence of frames in their wider social cultural background, but we stress the selection process from mass media actors when publicising an issue.

In order to identify frames in newspapers articles, we start by following the steps of Vimieiro and Dantas (2009), who suggested that frames can be observed in news coverage from two of the frames' main characteristics in the social reality: their semantic organisation function and their structure for the social world function. The two authors tried to put into operation the frame characteristics pointed out by Reese (2001), and Gamson and

Modigliani (1989)[4]. The first function, organisation, develops the understandings associated to a certain theme, for instance, if the theme is presented in a positive or a negative manner or in terms of gains and losses (a cognitive organisation of frames). According to Reese (2001), there is also a cultural dimension to organisation, referring to the shared cultural values activated when the issue is presented, thereby allowing the reader to make connections to a broader setting instead of just the specific case. The author uses the examples of "Cold War" or "War on Drugs" to explain the cultural dimension of the organisation function. The second function, structure, is related to the symbols activated in relation to the issue, as such symbols have a great emphasis in the process of attachment to larger cultural ideas. Reese argues that some structures can be very explicit, but sometimes they also are intricate and implicit. In journalism, structures of meaning can be identified by the inclusion/exclusion of information (Reese, 2001:17). In the case of migration, we could mention the inclusion or exclusion of information about the importance of the migrant workforce to the recent economic situation.

In practical terms, Vimieiro and Dantas (2009) suggest that we can recognise frames in news articles by identifying actors referred to, illustrating images, terms defining the issue, proposals for solutions, metaphors, and moral judgements. A similar model for the analysis of political debates in the means of communication is proposed by Porto (2007) in order to clarify the "interpretive frames" and the symbolic disputes in which they are embedded. The author identifies five dimensions that help identify the connections between interpretive frames and the issue at hand:

- definition of the issue (a);
- assignments of responsibilities and causes (b);
- evaluations of the importance of the issue or event (c);
- arguments over consequences (d);
- proposals for solutions (e). (Porto, 2007: 31)

We can see that three of those dimensions are also in the research by Vimieiro and Dantas (2009), but the evaluation of the importance of the issue and the arguments over the consequences will be included in this research as migration issues receive a lot of attention described along those dimensions.

To describe the debate in newspaper articles, we are also looking for additional information to assess the importance journalists give the theme, which, in turn, reflects how relevant the issue is in the public debate. The section in which the article is printed indicates the context in which the issue is presented (for instance, an article about migration could be in the economy or in the crime sections), opinion editorials organise and

summarise some of the information, and the greater relevance of an issue brings it to the front pages of the newspaper. In this sense, we are looking for information in the news articles that qualifies the frames but also helps us place the public debate about migration:

Table 1. Analysis categories in the media debate about migration

Frames	Actors	Textual categories
	Images	
	Definitions of the issue	
	Causes of the issue	
	Evaluation of the importance of the issue	
	Metaphors and examples	
	Moral judgments	
	Arguments over consequences	
	Proposals for solutions	
Media information	Section	
	Format	
	Theme	
	Is it a cover page story?	

Source: Porto (2007); Vimieiro and Dantas (2009); Veloso Leão (2011).

Discussion

The research was performed with all articles published in the Brazilian newspaper *Folha de S. Paulo* in 2009 and 2010 which mentioned migration, the situation of migrant workers in Brazil, the situation of Brazilian migrant workers in other countries, and which debated migration public policies. The period reflects the initial discussions of the Proposed Law 5655/2009 in the lower legislative chamber and the publication of the "National Policy of Immigration and the Protection to Migrant Workers". *Folha de S. Paulo* was chosen because it was the best-selling daily newspaper with nationwide issue in Brazil at the time[5], and the articles were selected using a keyword search[6] in the newspaper online archive. In total, 270 articles mentioned the selected keywords, 36 of which mentioned themes excluded from this research (migration movements inside Brazilian borders or foreign investment). In addition to the categories mentioned above, three theme-specific categories were created to help qualify the articles: a category to help qualify the article as related to the frame "national security" or "migrants' human rights", a category to indicate a very famous case in Brazil during the period regarding the Italian activist Cesare

Battisti[7], and a category to identify whether the article made reference to the Proposed Law 5655/2009 or to the National Policy on Immigration and Protection of Migrant Worker.

The great controversy caused by the Battisti case attracted much media interest and was the theme of 106 news articles in the two years studied. After being analysed and codified, those articles were excluded from the research results. Articles about the case accounted for nearly half of the news articles produced, and the judicial dispute was prominent among them. Because they dealt with a single and specific case and debates focused more on the processes of extradition and the status of this political refugee, this coverage created a bias in the media debate about migration in Brazil. Therefore the research *corpus* is composed of 126 news articles.

The analysis level adopted here was the category actors. Information given by each actor was codified using the different categories presented above[8]. For example, the article "Law that grants amnesty to illegal foreigners in Brazil is approved", on 03/07/2009, was codified using three different actors. The journalist presented one "argument over consequences" is that the immigrants would now have access to health, education and work, while president Lula presented a "moral judgment" that states that migration policy in rich countries is unfair; and the Minister of Justice, Tarso Genro, presented a "definition of the issue" when he stated that migration policies in certain countries criminalise migrants. All three statements were identified with the frame "migrants' human rights". The choice of using actors on the analysis level allows for a more detailed description of the debate, making it possible to see the actors behind each point of view expressed and evaluate the contributions of each group of actors to the debate.

In all 126 news articles, 138 different actors presented 291 statements classified under one of the textual categories: definitions of the issue, causes of the issue, evaluation over the importance of the issue, metaphors and examples, moral judgments, arguments over consequences, and proposals for solutions. The most frequent themes of the statements were Politics, with 42% of the articles referring to it (124 statements), followed by Economy with 24% (71), Crime with 12% (35) and Demography with 10% (28). Themed under "Demography", for example, there is the article "Brazil did in decades what Europe took centuries to do" (06/09/2009), which discusses the fast process of ageing and the reduction of birth rates in the Brazilian population and the need to count on international migration which, the journalist points out, has been associated with cultural changes, social conflicts, and xenophobic reactions (definition of the issue).

Journalists were by far the most frequent group to present statements. As many as 67% (197) of the 291 statements were made by journalists, followed by Specialists representing 16% (49) of the statements, members of the Executive, 9% (27), and Civil Society organisations, 2% (7). It is remarkable that migrants were almost absent from the discussion,

only presenting 4 statements (1%), as well as Brazilian citizens, who presented only one statement on the issue of migration between 2009 and 2010. From the total statements, 46% (133) referred to the national security frame, 29% (85) referred to the human rights frame, while 25% (73) of the statements refer to neither of the two frames. One example of the statements referring to the national security frame appears in the article "Terrorism in the Brazilian agenda" (16/06/2009), in an opinion editorial where a specialist in terrorism, André Luís Woloszyn, states that the increase and ease of international migration is one of the causes of the current expansion of terrorist networks (causes of the issue).

Looking at the frames data, we can clearly see the prominence of statements that can be qualified under the frame of national security rather than the ones under migrants' human rights. However, different political and public events have a large influence on the frames presented (see graph 1). We speculate that the global economic crisis may account for the larger concentration of the national security frame in the first months of 2009. In the same sense, in October 2009 there is a prominence for the migrants' human rights frame, mostly due to the publication of a study advocating for migration as a fundamental human right by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2009). Graph 1 shows the distribution of statements divided by each frame:

Graph 1. Total number of frames by month

Source: Folha de S. Paulo (2009-2010)

The quantitative data is presented clustered in months to show the broader patterns involving the frames. Furthermore, it also helps to aggregate them when looking for information over the two frames, because not all articles featured statements that could be related to one or the other frame. This situation reveals the value of expanding the research

to include a larger timeframe or articles from other national newspapers in order to have more robust and reliable data.

The quantitative data showed an interesting relationship between news sections and frames. The section that concentrates the majority of national security frames is "Money" (Economy section), with 57% (24) of statements in this section with the security frame against 10% (4) of human rights frames. Articles in this section are highly marked by discussions referring to the global economic crisis as well as national security concerns raised by economic hardship. The foreign issues section, "World", has 54% (36) of statements with the security frame against 36% (24) of human rights frames. Conversely, the "Power" section, comprising Brazilian Politics issues and the opinion page, is much more balanced. In this section, 42% (41) of statements presented the national security frame and 38% (37) the human rights frame. This scenario is also supported by the qualitative analysis which shows that the sections "Money" and "World" referred mainly to discussions over the economic crisis abroad, discussed other countries' propositions to expand regulations over migrants, and published news about the fiercer tensions with irregular immigrants in foreign countries, including Brazilian emigrants. The section "Power" mostly had news about the Brazilian political debate and migrant regulation and integration in Brazil. As the country has fewer conflicts with its migrants and was not so seriously affected by the global economic crisis, news in this section more often referred to the increasing need for migrant labour and discussions about changing the regulations to provide more security for migrant workers and investors.

In the next paragraphs, the discussion concentrates on two categories: the actors and the textual categories. The analysis of the statements presented by each actor reveals some interesting features of the public debate and, at the same time, shows the way journalists organise their messages in the news.

Specialists (professors, analysts, researchers, etc.) had a fair participation in the debate: they are the second group most frequently invited into the media debate, followed by members of the executive branch. News articles usually use the statements from specialists to introduce the debate to the readers, especially in the categories definition of the issue, causes of the issue, and arguments over consequences. This is the case of the political scientist Demetrius Papademetriou, who speaks about how the 2008 economic crisis is different from its precedents at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century (definition of the issue) because it is more severe and happens in a time with bigger migration flows (causes). Presenting solutions for the issue is a task given to political actors, especially members of the executive and legislative branches like a senator from the U.S. Congress, Chuck Grassley, quoted in his proposition to dismiss migrant workers first (solution) in order to guarantee the protection of national labour (definition).

The civil society, although given limited participation, was called to debate causes and consequences of the issue, as did the secretary of the organisation "Continental Cry from the Excluded", Luiz Bassegio, stating that unemployed migrants prefer to stay in Brazil because of health and education services and in the hope of finding work (causes).

As stated, journalists themselves were the most recurrent group in the news articles. Their participation was more evenly distributed in all categories, but they were mostly in charge of discussing the causes of the issue, presenting definitions, presenting metaphors and examples, and presenting arguments over consequences. Immigrants and emigrants rarely had the opportunity to present their problems personally, or even to contribute to the discussion over possible solutions. Their quotes are mostly limited to anecdotal statements, retelling situations from their lives or illustrating the situations presented by journalists. Because of that they rarely present any textual category. For instance, the Japanese immigrant to Brazil Yukio Yamashita uses the metaphor of confinement to talk about his early life in rural migrant working colonies in the beginning of the twentieth century. We can note that migrants are almost absent from this discussion, and even though they are the focus point of the debate they have strikingly little participation in the textual categories.

These journalistic choices reflect how the media debate is organised (solutions are presented by political actors, migrants present examples and metaphors from their daily life) and give us insights on how the public debate, inside and outside the media, organises itself. However, the presence of journalists as the most recurrent group in the news articles and in the presentation of textual categories reminds us of their job in mediating and selecting the information in the newspapers. Traquina (2001) alerts us to the fact that journalists are subject to cultural and institutional influences, and he also calls attention to the circumstances around the production of the piece (resources, availability of sources and time, for example) in the construction of printed discourse (Tuchman, 1978; Scheufele, 1999). Acknowledging the role of journalists in newspapers, we can still use the articles as thermometers to measure the broader trends of the public discussion around an issue, especially in indicating the prevailing trends and points of view in the debate.

With the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the newspaper articles, we can also discuss some findings about the two frames of national security and migrants' human rights and how they appear to the public in the newspaper. The first observation is the lack of articles mentioning the debate, the legislative process, possible outcomes or the results of the Proposed Law 5655/2009 and the National Policy on Immigration and Protection of Migrant Worker – resulting also in the lack of discussion about the inconsistencies between the premises of both. Only one article mentioned the Proposed Law, in defence of a new regulation pertaining to human trafficking. According to the National Secretary of

Justice, Romeu Tuma Júnior, one of the consequences of giving incentives to regular migration is diminishing human trafficking (arguments over consequences), as the latter is closely connected with irregular migration flows (causes of the issue).

We have already said that the national security frame has preponderance over the migrants' human rights frame, but very interestingly there are differences in the textual categories associated with each frame, meaning that the structure of the debate changes between both frames. The national security group makes major use of the categories "causes of the issue", "definition of the issue" and "metaphors and examples", and furthermore mentions several times that the recent economic crisis is the main reason behind migration policies that suggest more control over migration flows. In statements related to this frame, there is also a preponderance of negative references and metaphors to describe immigrants, for instance "illegal", "irregular", "black sheep", or "invaders". On the other hand, in the articles related to the migrants' human rights frame, most statements come under the "arguments over consequences", "definition of the issue" or "proposals for solutions" category. The most quoted statements tend to explain the advantages of inclusive public policies for migrants (arguments over consequences) to advocate for the respect of human rights as a possible solution for the issue of integration or to discuss the proposition of voting rights to migrants (proposals for solutions).

The analysis of the media debate about migration points to a restricted discussion involving a small number of actors which can in turn mean that there are limited points of view in the debate about migration in Brazil. The debate is mostly focused on specific events such as the publication of reports, analysis of political or economic scenarios, or police operations that trigger a small amount of publicity to the theme of migration. Much of the news coverage in the period actually discussed policy changes in other countries or significant cases involving migrants outside Brazil. Another sign that the media debate is still underdeveloped in Brazil is that the concerned population – migrants – are almost always absent from the discussions. Despite these limitations, it is an important feature of the media debate that the actors who take part in it perform the same roles that they already occupy in the political or the public debate. For example, specialists are called to introduce and analyse the situation, political actors to present solutions, and the civil society to debate causes of the issue and its consequences. In the same sense, although the specific events regarding the political debate on the Proposed Law and the National Policy have not been discussed in the media, other political and public events have fed the discussions in the newspaper, which further connects the media debate to the other two debates.

Concluding Remarks

We claim that the present method for quantitative and qualitative analysis of the media debate about migration in the newspaper *Folha de S. Paulo* in 2009 and 2010 is useful to show some broad tendencies of the recent public debate over the issue and show some opinions coming from it. The combination of those two types of analysis is a good contribution to recognise variations on the debate and identify how migration is shown in the newspapers. The importance of the political and economic context in the choice of themes and frames in the news indicates that the media debate is closely related with the debates going on in public and the political debate – the asserted influence of the 2008 economic crisis on the prevalence of the national security frames is one example. Ideally, the expansion of the period studied and the number of newspapers analysed can provide more information about diversity in the media debate.

It is also a very important finding that the roles played by specific groups of actors in the media debate are in line with their presumed roles in the political and public debates. We believe that this fact reinforces our supposition that the media debate works in connection with the public debate and can be a good site for the analysis of current and past opinions and points of view about an issue.

Regarding the debate on human rights, the great majority of references are about human rights already guaranteed to migrants, such as access to the labour market, education or justice, and the debate lacks discussions about the expansion of rights, for instance, the right to vote. Even though the news articles in this study do not directly mention the legislation or the public policies for migration, we can observe a link between them to the extent that elements from both the Proposed Law and the National Policy are also constant in the media debate. The importance of international human rights regimes and the necessity for a clear integration policy for migrants – elements from the National Policy – are mentioned many times in the news coverage. The same is true for statements that make the case for broader governmental control over migrant workers or the precedence of the national citizens' rights over migrants' rights. Both are components of the Proposed Law and of some news articles, especially at the beginning of the year 2009 when the legislative discussion started in the Congress and the effects of the 2008 economic crisis could be felt more intensively.

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Notes

1 In the Proposed Law 5655/2009, the CNIg would be renamed the National Council of Migration and its responsibilities would be expanded to also act in the protection of emigrated Brazilians and the policymaking regarding both the immigration and emigration of peoples.

2 The World Bank published, in April 2010, a series of data showing that developing countries are significantly more dependent on international remittances than developed countries. In 2008, developing countries have, on average, received an amount of remittances corresponding to 2% of their Gross National Product (GNP), while in developed countries it corresponded to 0.2% of their GNP on average. The data also shows some developing countries that are extremely dependent on international remittances such as Lebanon (where the remittances corresponded to 20.4% of the country's GNP in 2008), Honduras (20.4%), and Haiti (20.3%). Data were obtained from estimates by the World Bank based in the *International Monetary Fund's Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook* 2008, (World Bank, 2010).

3 The concept of consociational politics, from Lijphart (1968) is one example of how a society could organise itself as "pluralist-essentialist". Variations in the multicultural policies could give way for the hegemony of one cultural group, in which case this "pluralist-essentialist" society could be called "communalist".

4 Originally, Reese described six characteristics of frames: organising, principles, shared, persistent, symbolically, structure ("Frames are *organising principles* that are *socially shared* and *persistent over time,* that *work symbolically* to *meaningfully structure the social world*") (Reese, 2001:11-12). [Emphasis added].

5 The Instituto Verificador de Circulação (IVC), which inspects the print publications in Brazil places *Folha de S. Paulo* as the best-selling daily newspaper between 1986 and 2009. In 2010, the newspaper Super Notícias, a popular tabloid, became the best-selling daily newspaper in Brazil, but it only prints local issues in the city of Belo Horizonte. At the time of this research, *Folha de S. Paulo* was the only large national newspaper with an online archive search tool that enables keyword query in specific time periods.

6 Searched keywords (in Portuguese): migrant; migrants; immigrant; immigrants; emigrant; emigrants; migration; migrations; immigration; immigrations; emigration; emigrations; foreigner; foreigners (migrante; migrantes; imigrante; imigrantes; emigrante; emigrantes; migração; migrações; imigração; imigrações; emigração; emigrações; estrangeiro; estrangeiros; estrangeira; estrangeiras).

7 Cesare Battisti is an Italian citizen arrested in Brazil at the end 2007, charged with four murders in Italy since 1987. The crimes were committed at the end of the 1970s, a time when Battisti was supposedly a member of an armed extreme left group, which Battisti denies. The activist was accepted as a refugee in France until 2004, when the French government issued his extradition to Italy. The activist then escaped to Brazil. At the end of 2008, the Minister of Justice in Brazil gave him the status of political refugee, claiming a "proven fear of persecution because of his political ideas" and in opposition to a decision in favor of his extradition by the National Committee for Refugees. The case received a lot of attention in Brazil and in Italy and has been analysed in different aspects by the Brazilian Supreme Court, which, in the end, gave the president the final word about the extradition. President Lula rejected the extradition in his last day in office in 2010, and this decision was once again analysed and ratified by the

Supreme Court in 2011. Battisti now has a refugee status in Brazil and was released after staying in prison for more than 4 years in Brazil.

8   We performed an agreement test with a sample of the news articles. In total, the analysis of 12 news articles and 120 textual categories were compared between the two independent raters. The raw agreement coefficient scored 0.6, while the Cohen's kappa coefficient rated 0.58, suggesting moderate agreement between raters.

Two to Tango: An Analysis of Brazilian-Argentine Relations

by Karina Lilia Pasquariello Mariano

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(SARAIVA, Miriam Gomes. *Encontros e Desencontros. O lugar da Argentina na política externa brasileira.* Belo Horizonte: Fino Traço Editora, 2012)

"The Federal Republic of Brazil seeks to form a Latin American community of nations through the economic, political, social, and cultural integration of the peoples of Latin America." So declares the opening paragraph of Article IV of the Fundamental Principles of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. At first glance, one has the impression that this provision represents a focus of Brazilian foreign policy along with issues such as autonomy, human rights, self-determination, and others in the same Article. The reality, however, is quite different, with the cited text reflecting a time of change when the Brazilian political class was reaffirming its readiness to establish relations on a new footing with its neighbors, especially Argentina.

This repositioning of the Brazilian state in relation to Latin America indicated a willingness to finally overcome Brazil's historic rivalry with Argentina and strengthen the integration process between the two countries. However, due to the lasting image in the public consciousness of binational competition – an image constantly cited as the explanation for the tensions and crises of Mercosur – there was not sufficient political will to overcome the burden of the history between the two nations.

The core of this problem lies in the way the Brazilian state was formed, a process characterized for more than a century by latent confrontation with Argentina over Brazil's regional dominance and international ambitions. The history of this relationship is the topic of Miriam Gomes Saraiva's book *Encontros e Desencontros: O lugar da Argentina na Política Externa Brasileira (Friends and Rivals: Argentina's Role in Brazilian Foreign Policy)*, which analyzes the development of Brazilian foreign policy vis-à-vis policymakers'

perspectives on Argentina starting with Brazilian independence and ending with the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Such a long timeframe requires delimitations either that are formal and periodic or that are defined by singular moments relative to the whole. In this book, the story is divided into three phases: distrust and estrangement (1822-1978), distrust and rapprochement (1979-1990), and cooperation and tension (1991-2003).

The first part of the narrative underscores how a sense of rivalry was present even at moments when certain Brazilian governments expressed an intent to establish some kind of rapprochement with Argentina. These efforts led to periods of relative cordiality between the two countries but did not produce concrete results capable of establishing new parameters for relations in the Southern Cone.

This first phase was marked by disputes over the delineation of national boundaries during the first half of the nineteenth century, due especially to Brazil's support for Uruguayan and Paraguayan independence from Argentina. During this period arose the Argentine belief in Brazilian imperialist intentions in the region and a consequent simmering dispute for regional dominance. In Brazil, meanwhile, there emerged a fear of the establishment of an alliance between Argentina and other countries in the region.

During the Paraguayan War this rivalry was put aside in the name of common interest, thereby ushering in a period of cordiality between the two countries, although their international alignments remained very different. While Brazil drew closer to the United States to establish a strategic alliance with this emerging power, Argentina remained closely tied to England and as a result grew politically and economically stronger.

Suspicions remained during the period from the Proclamation of the Republic in Brazil to 1950. Saraiva describes this time as a period of pronounced tension and rivalry against a backdrop of official détente based on a mutual understanding of the need to maintain regional peace. The author highlights the influence of the role of the Foreign Ministry in maintaining a sense of competition between the two nations.

The very structure of the Foreign Ministry as established by the Baron of Rio Branco reflected this tension relative to two aspects of Brazil's international projection: defining boundaries and identifying allies and enemies. For Brazilian diplomacy the U.S. became a strategic ally necessary to ensure Brazil's regional leadership, and so Brazil's relations with its neighbors were driven by the Monroe Doctrine rather than by Bolivarian principles embraced by many other countries, especially Argentina. This divergence further isolated Brazil from other South American nations and increased suspicions of Brazilian imperialist intentions.

Over time, a rivalry arose that went beyond the political sphere and entered the minds of the Brazilian and Argentine people. This rivalry touched a wide range of facets

of everyday life, but perhaps none more so than soccer. In any case, the book effectively demonstrates how this perception was manipulated or provoked at various points by groups and sectors of society that had no interest in rapprochement with Argentina or that saw such overtures as harmful to their interests.

A good example of this phenomenon was the Perón and Vargas governments' 1950 rapprochement initiative that received strong opposition from the Foreign Ministry and the Brazilian press, which mobilized public opinion and the political class against this project. Overcoming these suspicions and views has not been simple and has required long-term dedication, and Saraiva shows how this process has been carried out for more than half a century in Brazil and Argentina.

The first clear move in this direction was the result of external pressure. In the late 1950s, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) presented economic studies indicating that overcoming underdevelopment in South America would necessarily depend on surmounting rivalries and promoting a process of economic integration.

ECLAC's position stimulated the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) in 1960 but did not generate the expected outcomes because in practice there was no significant change in countries' attitudes towards their neighbors, especially in the case of bilateral relations between Brazil and Argentina. The integration that was supposed to promote trust and pave the way for cooperation instead led to increased nationalistic thinking permeated by the idea of autonomous development and the profound distrust of partners.

Saraiva reveals how this attitude changed only in the late 1980s as a result of two key factors: the move of the military governments of the 1970s (especially that of Figueiredo) to review the place of Latin America in Brazil's strategic foreign policy, and Brazil's change in diplomatic outlook in the 1980s that identified Argentina as a strategic partner for Brazil's insertion into the new international context.

This new attitude of the Foreign Ministry drove a change in relations between the two neighbors that was also facilitated, as the author points out, by the convergence of economic and foreign policy and by Brazil's focus on political democratization and the institutional reconstruction of the state. It was at this moment that the Brazilian Foreign Ministry began to defend the idea of regional integration as a viable tactic to promote these countries' industrial development and international engagement.

The repositioning of diplomacy and foreign-policy strategy was reflected in the Brazilian political system as a whole, including the Constituent Assembly, which incorporated into the text of the new constitution the issue of South American integration and cooperative partnerships with neighbors to overcome distrust. In the area of diplomacy, this new

position materialized in the signing of the Treaty of Integration, Cooperation, and Development between Argentina and Brazil, also in 1988, in an attempt to advance the process initiated by the Program for Integration and Economic Cooperation (PICE) in 1986.

This period of rapprochement and relaxation of tensions between the two nations gave rise to a new stage in relations between Brazil and Argentina beginning in March 1991 with the signing of the Treaty of Asunción that established Mercosur. Relative to PICE, this was a proposal for cooperation that was both broader, in that it incorporated Uruguay and Paraguay, and deeper, in that it created the possibility of a common market in the region.

In practice, this proposed common market was never implemented, since Brazil's Foreign Ministry thought of Mercosur as a means to an end -- the international insertion of Brazil -- and not as an end in itself. This weakened both the integration process and efforts to overcome rivalries and tensions. Argentina remained steadfast in its distrust of Brazilian motives for cooperation between the two countries. This distrust was confirmed in 1999, when Brazil devalued its currency without giving Argentina advance notice, thereby throwing into crisis both its Argentina's economy and the entire integration process, which never recovered from this shock despite partnerships adopted later.

This unilateral Brazilian action instantly revived the flames of suspicion. The Brazilian government sought to soften the impact of its decision by attempting to enhance the weight of South America in Brazilian foreign policy, but this further damaged relations with Argentina because such a repositioning was detrimental to Mercosur.

Even with the advent of the Lula and Kirchner administrations in 2003 and their strong talk of bilateral cooperation, relations between the countries remained strained and revealed contradictions within the Brazilian state. Saraiva points out that while Lula granted more influence to a group linked to academia and to the institutional structure of the Workers Party (PT), which advocated broader and deeper cooperation, he at the same time opted to strengthen the hand of the faction within the Foreign Ministry that pressed for greater autonomy and regional leadership as part of a strategy to make Brazil a world power.

Notwithstanding these difficulties and contradictions, the author points to significant progress in cooperation between the two countries, despite ongoing rivalry, and especially to the Brazilian government's changed view towards Argentina as an important strategic partner for Brazilian foreign policy.

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