# The EU and the UN:
A shared future

Hanna Ojanen

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Abstract

Relations between the European Union and the United Nations have entered a new phase. Along with increasing practical cooperation their activities also carry a new kind of strategic weight. They are redefining their own positions in the international relations of the 21st century and in many ways share the same world view. Both of them also try to mask rough political reality through ostentatiously pompous rhetoric. However, the gap between aims and achievements will by no means be bridged by placing the goals even higher. Reaching the goals may only be possible through the persistent ambition and mutual cooperation of both organisations. Therefore, it is increasingly important to discern how each organisation's internal state, performance, development and objectives also directly reflect on the other.

UN reform tops the agenda of the international community in the autumn of 2005. From the EU's point of view key reform issues are those that are linked to crisis management. Nevertheless, it is also interested in institutional issues, specifically Security Council reform and the new role of regional institutions – in other words, in everything that has a bearing on the EU's position as an international actor. As for reforming the UN, the EU also has its own agenda. It is committed to supporting international norms and the UN system but it also wants to guarantee its own, independent, capability of action and opportunity for increasing its international role. As an actor the EU is in a class of its own. It faces the danger of becoming virtually too large, of using its influence excessively and of seeking self-interest, thereby jeopardising the legitimacy of the organisation. On the other hand, the influence of the Union is needed as a counterweight to the old-fashioned great powers and nation-states in developing the international system, and as a part of that development, in supporting the UN.

The EU is, therefore, a partner of prime importance to the UN. Thanks to the EU the UN may be able to escape its problems – unless the EU decisively speeds up the final erosion of its status. Yet, the EU recognizes that it also needs the UN. The development of the EU as an international actor requires international acceptance, the only actual institutional source of which is the UN, the world organisation. For its part, the strengthening of the UN's authority requires improved performance as well as clear guidelines that actors such as the EU can support.

Crisis management cooperation and increasing their own decision-making capabilities are beneficial for both organisations. However, it is their shared view on security that might have the most far-reaching implications. This report, therefore, regards the most important tasks of the organisations in the present international relations to be those of influencing security thinking, developing a common understanding of what is meant by security as well as defining what is permissible under the auspices of security. These are, at the same time, the cornerstone of the organisations' mutual cooperation. As for international relations, both organisations are in the same boat: should it capsize, both would equally be in danger of drowning.

Finally, the report studies the organisations' mutual relationship from the point of view of Finland, a member state with a very positive attitude towards them both. Can a country like Finland support both organisations by its actions? The report on updating the Act on Peace Support Operations, presented in the spring of 2005, is an interesting example of how Finland, concerned for its own position, might come to support the EU in a way that weakens the UN, something that could backfire on the original objective and weaken the EU as well. The interdependence of the organisations places new challenges on their member states. The member states should also consider the organisations in concert, for it is no longer sufficient for a nation to formulate a separate policy vis-à-vis each organisation.

Introduction[1]

The EU and the UN in the autumn of 2005: the blind leading the lame?

The 60th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly in September 2005 are especially important when it comes to the future of the UN. The intention of these meetings is to strengthen the world organisation and their extensive agendas include development, peace and collective security, human rights and the rule of law as well as the reform of UN organs.[2]

Surely no one is challenging the raison d'être of the world organisation, yet it has not been easy for all to embrace the reform goals. Changing the composition of the Security Council has particularly spawned discord. It is feared that this single question will cause other – less controversial as such – reform projects to founder. Of the permanent members in the Security Council, China has expressed its desire to block the entire reform package because it opposes Japan's permanent membership in the Security Council.[3] The question of Germany's membership in the Security Council divides the EU. It has been opposed by at least Italy, Spain, Poland and the Netherlands. Instead, they have supported the EU having a common seat in the Security Council. Great Britain and France are ready to support Germany, since Germany's membership would guarantee their own Security Council seats in the future. The United States also opposed Germany's membership, since Germany did not participate in the war in Iraq (de Jonge Oudraat 2005: 255). The United States has not been favourable towards the UN and it will certainly not press for the overhaul, if it seems to be moving in an unfavourable direction.[4] However, after the U.S.-EU Summit in June it has thought that Germany could become a permanent member,

albeit without veto power. On the other hand, extension of the veto power has been an important means of gaining the support of, for instance, African countries for the reforms (Laurenti 2005: 75-76). Therefore, it is not inconceivable that the reforms will eventually be toppled by the attitudes of the great powers.

Who, then, could help the UN to proceed in this situation? Reforming the Security Council or increasing its performance are hardly on the great powers' own agendas, since a strong Security Council could limit their freedom of action. Instead, the overhaul would serve the interests of the EU. If the reasoning goes that the EU's international legitimacy is based on its relying on international norms and on the UN system, the EU cannot increase its own role by any other means than by also beefing up the role and authority of the UN.

The EU now has the opportunity to be in a decisive position as a new partner having emerged among big nations. If UN funding and share of its regular budget are considered to be significant indicators of clout, then the EU is clearly the most important internal opinion-leader of the UN – without, however, being a member.

A large financial share *per se* is not of significance, unless one knows how to or wants to transform it into influence. It is often suspected that the EU is not sufficiently cohesive politically to accrue practical gain from its "mass" and its wealth. One must also ask why it would be worthwhile for the EU to expend its economic and political capital to promote the goals and support the activities of the UN in particular.

On the one hand the outlook for autumn 2005 is bleak, but on the other hand it has promise. The situation looks gloomy if the organisations' present states are examined. The year 2005 has not been particularly bright for the Union as its Constitutional Treaty as well as its budget harmony have been hanging in the balance. Sufficient resources for cohesive and successful external action may no longer be available, as it is burdened by internal worries. The UN, too, has been battered[5] and from the very beginning has been burdened by the fact that its own armed force, as defined in the Charter, has not proceeded beyond words on paper. One could, therefore, believe that the EU is presently blind and the UN lame and that the Union, adrift, and the world organisation, entangled, hardly have the energy to support each other.

The development of the UN regular budget

UN regular budget
1980–1982

UN regular budget
1992–1994

UN regular budget
2004–2006

Source: United Nations, "Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations" (A/RES/34/6, A/RES/46/221, A/RES/58/1), available at http://documents.un.org/.

Promising, however, in EU-UN relations is the fact that as a wholly new kind of player, the EU can influence the game in a way that is advantageous to both organisations. Its success probability is improved by the often noted fact that the EU's common external activity frequently increases as a counterbalance to its internal tribulations. Playing an active international role and achieving international success can increase faith in the EU. For its part, the EU's cohesiveness is necessary for succeeding in inter-institutional relations (cf. Bailes 2005: 25, note 65) and, therefore, in this kind of situation it does not behove even the member states to halt the EU's progress.

This report assesses both the EU's significance in developing the UN and how, on the flip side, the UN affects the Union. Security policy cooperation has been chosen as the focus of this analysis. With the EU's security policy development the organisations have ended up dealing with very similar tasks very much resembling each other. However, at this point in time they do not necessarily consider each other as their key partners. Of the practical, pressing affairs the report particularly examines the intensification of crisis management and the related reform of the Security Council, the improvement of the status of regional organisations and, on the other hand, the organisations' opportunities for jointly affecting the change in security thinking. Finally, the new interdependence between the respective organisations is also studied from the viewpoint of an individual member state. It is no longer adequate for nations to formulate separate policies for each organisation. They should also be able to comprehend how the organisations affect each other and how they jointly shape nations' operating environments.

Towards closer relations

The EU and the UN actually cooperate in all fields imaginable as well as in all parts of the world;[6] development policy, peace-keeping, humanitarian aid, the environment, human rights and culture can be taken as examples of the cooperation areas. The various organs of the European Communities, later on the European Union, have been represented in the UN since the 1970s. The European Commission is represented by several delegations

to the UN (Geneva, Paris, Nairobi, New York, Rome and Vienna), while the Council of the European Union is represented by two, Geneva and New York (the Liaison Office of the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU was established in July 1994). The Commission's information office changed into an official delegation to the UN in 1974; at the same time it also became the first entity other than a state to enjoy permanent observer status in the General Assembly's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Jørgensen and Laatikainen 2004: 2). The EU is an observer within the General Assembly as well as in most UN specialised agencies. The EU is also a party to more than 50 UN multilateral agreements and conventions as the only non-state participant. The EU has been a full voting member of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) since 1991.[7] The UN Regional United Nations Information Centre for Western Europe was established in Brussels in 2004.[8]

During the past few years the relationship between the organisations has gained new political and strategic – programmatic – content. The change in the way the organisations perceive each other is considered to be a paradigm shift. The crucial push to intensify the relations came from the EU in 2000-2001, as it was redefining its own crisis management role (Tardy 2005: 54).[9] The general principles aimed at guiding EU cooperation with other actors can be dated to the same timeframe. These are: usefulness, interoperability, visibility and independence in decision-making (Jakobsen 2004: 10).

The joint agenda has expanded from development questions to developing mutual cooperation on, especially, international peace and security. Practical cooperation includes *inter alia* exchange of lessons learned from the field, training projects, operations and disarmament. Clear cooperation areas for the organisations are also peacekeeping, peacemaking, the fight against terrorism, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and enforcement of UN sanctions, human rights, international organised crime and drug trafficking, refugee and asylum policy as well as dialogue between civilisations and cultures. In addition to regularly scheduled meetings, the organisations arrange specific biennial summits and they also meet in a larger forum in the meeting of the UN and regional organisations, arranged every other year.[10]

Perhaps the most important reason for seeking a new form in the relations has been the EU's development, above all that of its common foreign and security policy and the clarification and expansion of the Union's international role. The increasingly independent role of the EU in international crisis management and in security policy at large as well as its growing importance in the UN place the EU beyond the category of regional organisations into a league of its own.

The EU is motivated by the desire to raise its real influence in the UN to the level its economic and political importance or, quite simply, its share in UN funding already requires. The EU considers itself to be an indispensable partner to the UN. According to it, "global governance" will remain weak unless multilateral institutions are able to ensure effective compliance to their decisions and norms. The EU thinks that it carries a particular responsibility in the implementation of commitments. It simultaneously serves as a model and provides support to other actors in the development of their capability to implement commitments.[11] The EU's agenda also includes playing an active role in the reform process of the UN as well as in coordinating the interaction between various global governance institutions, such as the Bretton Woods Institution, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Labour Organization (ILO).[12]

The UN holds that cooperation with regional organisations is an increasingly important method in promoting its goals and in acquiring new resources for its disposal. Regional organisations, however, cannot bypass the United Nations. Even the question of whether or not the EU can be regarded as a regional organisation, is difficult. Organisations abound, but it is not necessarily easy to find exactly the right kind of organisations to operate in connection with the UN. Many organisations' capabilities are too modest compared to the tasks and expectations. The EU, for its part, sets its own goals in a manner resembling the world organisation itself rather than according to the basic pattern of any regional organisation.

The EU's "effective multilateralism"

Action in international organisations as part of the common foreign policy

The EU's role and influence in international affairs is often regarded as directly proportional to the success of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to the extent that the member states' mutual foreign policy disagreements draw attention away from the growth of its own international importance. For instance, the Commission's communication mentions the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court as well as furthering development funding as the EU's achievements but it hastens to point out that reaching an agreement on a common line in CSFP is still not always successful.[13]

Traditionally, the UN has been seen as one of the spheres where the EU countries' common foreign policy is implemented in practice. Voting cohesion among the countries has been studied as an indication of the existence of a common foreign policy, or of the lack of one. Seeking common lines while operating in international organisations belongs, after all, to the EU's – or more precisely to the EU member states' – common foreign policy.

When the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of the United Nations in 1973, the policy coordination in the UN between the member states of the European Communities (EC) became part of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the 1970-established forerunner of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It was only after Germany became its member that all EC countries were represented in the United Nations and the General Assembly began to have place and meaning in the

development of the EPC. (Keatinge 1997: 276.) The December 1973 declaration of foreign ministers mentioned the objective of common stands in international organisations, especially in the UN and its specialised agencies. The objective of achieving common stands in international institutions and conferences was stated for the first time in a legally binding manner in the Single European Act, which entered into force in 1987.

Achieving common stands, however, was not easy and the permanent members of the Security Council rejected all obligations for notifying other EC countries of issues handled at the Security Council. It took until the Kuwait crisis in 1990-91 for this kind of exchange of information to begin. Formally the EU's own voice gradually strengthened in relation to the voices of the Union's member states. In September 1973 the Italian foreign minister spoke in the General Assembly for the first time on behalf of the "nine foreign ministers of the Community's Member States", from 1981 until 1994 the form "on behalf of the Community and its Member States" was used, after which the form "on behalf of the European Union" has been in use. (Luif 2003: 9-10.)

The Cold War "game between the blocks" had congealed the UN. The end of the Cold War not only increased the importance of the UN, but it also kindled peacekeeping activities, which grew in an unprecedented way in the 1990s. The countries of western Europe played a central role in this. In 1993 the combined share of twelve EU countries and four EFTA-member EU candidate countries (Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway) comprised 40% of all UN peacekeeping personnel (Keatinge 1997: 280). [14]

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) formally originated in the Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty 1993). Pursuant to its article 19, member states shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold common positions in such fora. Member states which are also members of the UN Security Council will concert and keep the other member states "fully informed". Member states which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union. Along with the Treaty, the coordination obligation was further strengthened. However, only since January 2001 have weekly

"Article 19" briefings been arranged, in which Security Council related issues are detailed to the EU countries. (Luif 2003: 18.)

The latest addition to the founding treaties, i.e. the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, emphasises the Union's own positions more clearly than ever before and also gives the Union an opportunity for common representation. As the Constitution was drafted, improvement of the cohesion of external action was of particular concern. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (16.12.2004)[15] states that "The Minister for Foreign Affairs shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. He or she shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and shall express the Union's position in international organisations and at international conferences."

It is further stated in the Treaty:

> *Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the Union's positions in such fora. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall organise this coordination. In international organisations and at international conferences where not all Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the Union's positions. In accordance with Article I-16(2), Member States represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter, as well as the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council shall concert and keep the other Member States and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs fully informed. Member States which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the United Nations Charter. When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs be asked to present the Union's position. (art III-296)*

What is new is that as per the Constitution the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs coordinates the Member States' stands instead of the country holding the presidency of the Council, as has been the custom until now. The intention is that the Union's Foreign Minister shall present positions in high-level international fora such as the UN Security Council. The Constitution also establishes the EU as a legal person with the possibility of observer status in the UN (in lieu of the EC). The status of the Commission also strengthens the common voice. The Com-

mission's diplomatic and consular missions are developed as part of the Union's new common External Action Service and they are considered to be of particular importance in those cities where the UN has its missions. The Commission is also responsible for an extensive development and humanitarian agenda and, therefore, its role in conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation is important. In addition, the Commission is actively developing the civilian side of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Considering the many segments of the policy over which the powers belong to the EU instead of the Member States, and which are of importance in UN policy, one can think that discord among Member States will not necessarily lead to the paralysis of the EU. The Union possesses real capability for independent action as well as an increasingly strong justification for external representation. Interestingly, many reforms designed to increase the visibility and impact of the common foreign and security policy have already been put into practice by other measures; therefore, they are not contingent on the destiny of the Constitution (cf. Tiilikainen *et al.* 2005: 210).

Crisis management operations as manifestation of security policy

The EU's own military crisis management capability and the desire to deploy it globally has been the most significant change in the EU's international role in recent years. It has been an essential part of the security and defence policy that has developed since 1999 (see more extensively Gnesotto 2004). During the past five years security and defence policy has become a new area in which the EU has its own external role and its own, evolving policy. The policy does not seem to be affected by the fact that when it comes to traditional foreign policy, there is often much to hope for in the Union's internal cohesion. Even though in this field the EU does not legally represent its members, as it does in, for instance, trade policy, in practice individual members do not wield the same importance in security policy that they used to. The rise of security policy questions to a central position in the present international roles of both the UN and the EU continues to strengthen the EU as an actor above its member states.

EU crises management operations

Operation	Location	Number of troops	Type	Duration
EUPM	Bosnia-Herzegovina	930	police operation	01/2003 – 12/2005
Concordia	Macedonia	350	military operation	04/2003 – 12/2003
Artemis	The Democratic Republic of Congo	1800	military operation	06/2003 – 09/2003
Proxima	Macedonia	200	police operation	01/2004 –
EU JUST Themis	Georgia	10	support for rule of law	06/2004 – 07/2005
Althea	Bosnia-Herzegovina	7000	military operation	12/2004 –
EUPOL Kinshasa	The Democratic Republic of Congo	30	police operation	12/2004 – 12/2005
EUSEC DR Congo	The Democratic Republic of Congo	8	security sector reform	06/2005 – 06/2006
EU JUST LEX	Iraq	24	support for rule of law	07/2005 – 06/2006

Source: Homepage of the EU Council http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g.

The EU executed the police mission EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the military mission Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in cooperation with the UN.[20] The commencement of the military operation Artemis was influenced by the request from the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the EU. The operation also resulted in a joint UN-EU declaration (24.9.2003), in which more similar cooperation was hoped for in the Balkans and in Africa. (Ortega 2004: 18-19.) The fact that Annan turned specifically to the EU was symbolically very significant. The EU could consider this as recognition of the Union's capability for military action outside its own area and even of the status of the Union as an international actor. Timing was important because by summer 2003 the Union had hardly any practical crisis management experience. Furthermore, it was internally divided due to the war in Iraq. The EU was tasked to execute a short and precise military operation, from which the conditions for the UN's own follow-on operation in the region would be created. From the

viewpoint of the UN, however, operation Artemis could be criticised: the transfer of authority from the EU to the UN was by no means smooth. (de Jonge Oudraat 2005: 266.)[21] The fact that no EU country participated in the post-Artemis UN contingent showed that they were only ready to support the UN with their own operation instead of participating in a UN operation (Tardy 2005: 57).

Even if the Union, in the first phase of its crisis management, has mainly attempted to prove its capability of conducting the military actions it has promised to undertake, expectations on its activities continue to grow along with successful operations and on the basis of the Union's own promises. The member states are, therefore, also eager to increase the efficiency and rapidity of its action. The permanent structured cooperation, included in the Union's draft Constitution, includes the Union's battle groups. Battle groups are rapidly deployable and capable of stand-alone operations, also in more dangerous and more demanding conditions compared to traditional peacekeeping troops. The lessons learned from operation Artemis were valuable in the development of the concept itself. The battle groups are intended to be used in EU crisis management especially, albeit not exclusively, following a request from the UN. The purpose of the battle groups is to demonstrate to the countries outside of the Union that the EU can employ viable military capability outside its own area and that it is a military partner to be reckoned with. Simultaneously, their purpose is to prove to the EU member states that the Common Security and Defence Policy proceeds as planned. (Also see Kerttunen *et al.* 2005.)

The EU has also kept in touch with other organisations in its operations. The link to the UN is reflected by article I-41 of the Constitutional Treaty, according to which the Union uses military force outside the EU's area in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. A direct subordinate relationship to UN resolutions, however, is not desired. The rapid increase in the number of operations is also telling of the EU's desire to be able to prove that it is an independent and global international actor.

The EU's crisis management operations thus far – apart from Althea – have been very limited. Toje (2005: 118) thinks that they have been so small that unless they would have been the EU's first operations, and as such of particular interest, they would not even have been noticed. Thus, caution characterises the EU as an

actor. Judging on the basis of the operations thus far executed it is difficult to discern any particular policy line. In addition to their prudent scope, another common denominator for the operations has been that they have been conducted in states that are in one way or another weak. It would seem that supporting weak states by various means is now a key objective of comprehensive crisis management.

The European Security Strategy

The European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003[22] is probably the clearest indicator of what kind of international actor the EU is, or intends to become, and how it positions itself vis-à-vis other actors. It is the EU's first ever security strategy. Fostering both internal cohesion on these issues as well as cohesion between the EU and the United States can be seen as its objectives. However, it is by no means a concrete, detailed action strategy (Toje 2005: 120).

The document is important because it defines the EU's commonly adopted view on the global security situation as well as the measures required. It lists the key factors threatening security, the Union's objectives regarding them as well as the Union's instruments to counter them. According to the EU the biggest threats are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime (pp. 3-5). The Union's strategic objectives do not only include countering threats, but they also aim to increase security in its neighbourhood. The Strategy notes that none of the threats are solely military in nature and that threats cannot be countered by military means alone (p. 13).

The Strategy, however, does not draw particularly original lines. Dissonance on its threat scenarios hardly exists; consensus-based threat definition may for its part increase the legitimacy of the Union but, simultaneously, it easily leads into vagueness and exaggerated comprehensiveness. Toje even believes that when it comes to defining its list on security topics, the EU is dependent on the United States, which seems to wield ultimate power on defining the actual agenda. (Toje 2005: 127.)

The EU's relationship to the UN is one of the central themes in the strategy. The strategy emphasises an international order based

on effective multilateralism.[23] A stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order are the Union's objectives:

> *We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority. [...]We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must, therefore, be ready to act when their rules are broken. (P. 9.)*

Isolation is not tolerated. The EU is ready to provide assistance to such countries that have sought isolation so that they would rejoin the international community. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that "there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union" (p. 10).

The EU must be more active, more coherent and more capable and it must work with its partners. The strategy notes that "there are few if any problems the European Union can deal with on its own" and that no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems alone. (P. 1) The EU "needs to pursue its objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors" (p. 13). Especially the EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats in international peace and security. "The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations." (P. 11.)

The Commission defines effective multilateralism in practice as follows: Firstly, an active commitment to an effective multilateralism means that (all) global rules are taken seriously. Secondly, other countries are helped to implement and abide by these rules, and, thirdly, it means engaging actively in multilateral forums, and promoting a forward-looking agenda that is not limited to a narrow defence of national interests. In practice the EU should be a kind of front-runner or leader: it itself should be capable of rapid action and also of providing a good example. By influencing the views of others, it could collect "critical mass" for facilitating agreements' entry into force. It should also be a more efficient actor in international funding institutions. [24]

On the other hand, it is also important to develop its own, independent capability for action. "A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight." "The EU needs to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention." However, when it comes to use of force, the Strategy is extremely vague. It gives no example whatsoever of the kind of situation in which force could be used. The reason for the Strategy's silence on this is discord among member states regarding why or where it could be necessary to resort to force. Instead, preventive action is emphasised: "The EU needs to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avert more serious problems in the future." (P. 11.)

Alyson Bailes regards the European Security Strategy as being post-modern. It combines the political, societal, economic and strategic dimensions of security, discovers causes for conflicts and insecurity from economic and social sources and discusses different non-state actors. It also deals with institutions as absolute values rather than as tools of policy. (Bailes 2005: 15, 17.) Emphasis is placed on contemporary concepts of inter-national security, such as the problem of failed or weak states as well as pre-emptive engagement and multilateralism (cf. Toje 2005: 121) – much like in the new security characterisations of the UN.

As it adopted the document in December 2003, the European Council decided to concentrate the monitoring of the Strategy first on four topics. The first of them was effective multilateralism with the UN as its core; the remaining were terrorism, the Middle-East and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In September 2003 both the Communication from the Commission and the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management[25] were published. Later, in June 2004 the European Council adopted the EU's contribution[26] to the High-Level Panel, established by the Secretary-General of the UN. It noted the progress made on the clarification of modalities for EU military contributions to UN crisis management, and the need for further work on civilian capabilities. It welcomed joint commitments on support for effective multilateralism made with key regional partners. (Bailes 2005: 20–21.)

A renewing UN?

The role and principles of the UN on trial

The war in Iraq in 2003 tested the UN's credibility as much as it strained the EU's unity. The tribulations, however, seem to have resulted in an increasingly clear formulation of strategy and in security thinking. New tones have coloured the UN's long-standing reform process;[27] parallel to increasing the efficiency of activities, novel argumentation and thinking as well as new justifications and fresh motivation are needed. In a way, the EU and the UN respond to the same challenges and, fortunately for the both of them, in very similar ways.

The founding principles of the League of Nations were non-aggression, settling disputes between countries through negotiation and diplomacy, collective security, the reduction of national armaments to a minimum and nations' right of self-determination. It, however, had three problems: the nations' right to resort to war if all other means had failed, the universal veto power and the voluntariness of military contributions. As its successor, the UN removed the right to resort to war and, at least in principle, endeavoured to establish an effective implementation system: the right to veto was only given to five great powers and military contributions were made obligatory (albeit only on paper). Many of the principles in international relations have since been tested. Graham and Felício list *inter alia* the following challenges: the prohibition of the use of force has been confronted by pre-emptive action in a "just war", humanitarian intervention and its new and more easily accepted version called the "responsibility to protect" challenges the sovereignty principle, and the regime change in Iraq challenges the state recognition doctrine (Graham and Felício 2005: 7-9).

Security policy is not static. In addition to rethinking principles, threat scenarios also change. Threats and how to regard them play a central role in the new security policy thinking which is clearly presented in the High-Level Panel's report[28] of 2004. Prins (2005: 373) calls it the most important strategic document of the UN's entire history. Along with the reports of two other panels[29] it formed the foundation for the Secretary-General's report *In Larger Freedom* (2005). It crystallises the key features in the organisation's security thinking that will be looked at more closely later in this section.

In addition to new thinking and argumentation, the UN has attempted to accelerate the internal reform process aimed at improving the organisation's capability for action. These include making the work of the present organs more efficient as well as creating new ones. According to the Secretary-General, the central objective of the UN's internal reform is to make states stronger so that they could better serve their citizens by cooperating in accordance with common principles and common priorities. Sovereign states are the necessary cornerstone of the international order. States, however, cannot do the job alone. An active civil society and a dynamic private sector as well as agile and effective regional and global intergovernmental institutions are needed.[30] The characterisation seems very state-oriented, but in order for the reforms to pass, it is the states that have to accept them. The implications of the reforms, however, extend beyond states alone. Many of the reforms quite clearly affect the EU, especially those aimed at transforming the Security Council, increasing the efficiency and the comprehensiveness of crisis management as well as the ones dealing with the status of regional organisations.

Reform of the Security Council

At present there are five permanent members in the Security Council with veto power: Great Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States. In addition, there are 10 members that are regionally selected for a period of two years. Proposals to enlarge the Council to encompass up to 24 members have been made.[31] In fact, the discussion on reforming the Security Council often ends up on the question of the Council's enlargement. Enlargement *per se* is generally accepted but the question of which

new countries are to be let in unavoidably creates conflict between the great powers and also divides the EU. The question of selection criteria has indeed spawned spirited debate.

Since the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it must not only be more representative but also more able and willing to take action when action is needed. Therefore, there has been thought to increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most financially. (*In larger freedom* 2005: 43.) Thus, the selection criteria would comprise contributions, representativeness, effectiveness and accountability. (Graham and Felício 2005: 10.) Achieving equal geographic share or representation is, even according to the Charter, a secondary criterion; the Security Council's effectiveness should be the key objective (de Jonge Oudraat 2005: 225). Emphasising effectiveness or willingness for action instead of formal equal representation also calls the present five permanent members' achievements into question. Graham and Felício (2005: 25) note that although the five permanent members place high on the military contribution and budget share, their status will inevitably decrease if measured by such new legitimacy indicators as population or activity in UN peacekeeping. (Cf. von Hippel 2004: 15-16.) As Laurenti (2005: 78) notes, permanence leads to passivity, eliminates a member's incentive to perform as there is no special need to "earn" the seat. It is difficult to set demands for the five permanent members. However, there is a prospect for evaluating even them, as it is emphasised that the Security Council's composition will be revisited in 2020.

Whereas states are in mutual competition for the new seats on the Security Council, the situation can be uncomplicated from the standpoint of the EU. In time the Minister for Foreign Affairs will have a clear role representing the Union in the Security Council. At the same time it may be possible for the EU to take advantage of the fact that several of its member states can simultaneously be Security Council members.[32] From the EU's standpoint, the issue of main importance in the reform of the Security Council is to develop the Council's performance and decision-making. The EU demands more efficiency from the Security Council. The Security Council is the body that can authorise the use of force in situations other than the lawful exercise of the right to self-defence. The Council, however, must

be prepared to make a rapid assessment of any threat brought to its attention and, if necessary, to act quickly and decisively in order to neutralise it.[33] If it does not take action itself, it should rapidly assign the task to some other body, for instance to the EU. Otherwise there is a danger that some actors decide to take initiative and proceed as they themselves best see fit.

Reforming the Security Council is not simply a question of enlargement, but also one of its capability for action. The Council's efficiency is affected by the culture of using veto power as well as the Council's ability to receive information early enough and in sufficient manner in order to be able to react correctly and efficiently.[34] The veto power has been the attraction with which the great powers have been persuaded to join the organisation. As such, however, it can no longer be used. The UN could be bypassed as a decision-making forum, should it extend the veto power to more countries than at present (Laurenti 2005: 75-76). The ones already possessing the veto power will certainly not give it up either. However, the growing number of members in the Security Council may decrease the importance of a single veto.

The question of who happens to have a seat in the Security Council should not be let to dominate the discussion. It is, naturally, good to acknowledge nations' own ambitions. On the whole, what is most important is that the Security Council does consist specifically of states. This fact, often taken for granted, may gain new meaning along with the strengthening of non-state actors. States can maintain their significance if they take advantage of their status and, simultaneously, regard the Security Council – and the UN – as important, bring matters for its deliberation, and provide it with necessary means for action. The mandate and instruments of the Security Council may affect its operating culture as well as the member states' behaviour in the Council. As part of the new security thinking, it is now emphasised that the Security Council is not there to impotently sit by and observe crises deepening but that its mandate also includes the effective use of force when required.

Crisis management and peacekeeping

At the moment the UN peacekeeping activity is focused on Africa and the resources available are facing overstretch. A central

problem is that affluent countries have deployed five times as many troops to NATO, the EU and *ad hoc* coalition-led operations in places that are of strategic, political or economic importance to them, compared to what they deploy to UN operations. (Novosseloff 2004: 8; von Hippel 2004: 12.)[35]

Even though the EU countries' combined share in the funding of peacekeeping is very high, approximately 40%, they hardly deploy their own troops to UN operations any more. As of March 2005, the EU member states' share of all UN troops comprised less than 7%, and only about two per cent of the troops for operations in Africa. Therefore, it seems that the EU countries participate in *UN-mandated* operations but not in *UN-led* operations. Tardy considers one reason for this to be doubt of the UN's capability to lead as well as of its structures in general. (Tardy 2005: 52; see also Graham 2004: 21.) The same has happened with civilian resources. The more the EU countries use resources in their own operations, the less these can be earmarked to the UN, because the EU uses for its own operations the same resources that would previously have been allocated to the UN (or to the OSCE) (see also Jakobsen 2004: 11-12).

The Secretary-General proposes a twofold solution for the resource problem. Firstly, a more comprehensive approach on crises is required, especially peacebuilding, or a capability to help countries with the transition from war to a lasting peace, and to help them avoid renewed violent crises following peace agreements. It is proposed that an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, as well as required support functions (Peacebuilding Support Commission) within the United Nations Secretariat, be created to achieve this end. These Commissions would plan for rebuilding and sustained recovery focusing on predictable financing, on establishing the necessary institutions and on improving coordination between various actors. All in all the purpose of the Commissions would be to extend the period of political attention in the crisis areas. (*In larger freedom,* pp. 31-32.) The EU warmly welcomes this conflict prevention project and considers the EU, and especially the European Commission, to be well placed to contribute actively to the Peacebuilding Commission.[36]

Secondly, a system for combining the different peacekeeping resources is needed enabling the partnership of relevant, predictable and accountable regional organisations to the UN

(*In Larger Freedom*, p. 31). The efficiency of the UN would be increased by their added resources. The UN turns to such regional organisations that possess these kinds of resources. The Draft Outcome Document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly notes that the UN supports the efforts of the European Union and other regional entities to develop standby capacities.[37]

The new role of regional organisations

The main idea in improving the status of regional organisations is that they should complement the activities of the UN. The Secretary-General's report draws particular attention to the African Union's 10-year development plan but the goal is to sign separate *Memoranda of Understanding* with several different regional organisations. These documents would deal with the information exchange between the organisations and the UN, as well as organisation-specific expertise and resources. It is intended that those organisations possessing conflict prevention or peacekeeping capabilities would place such capacities in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System.[38]

Regional organisations, or arrangements, are already mentioned in the UN Charter. According to Chapter VIII article 52:

> *1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.*
> *2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.*
> *3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.*

Article 53 adds:

> *1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional*

> *arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.*[39]

The status of regional organisations is defined in such a way that they play an autonomous role in the peaceful settlement of conflicts but they have to report to the Security Council of their activities. However, without Security Council authorisation they are not allowed to use force independently. A regional organisation may be – with its own consent – the implementing body of a Security Council Resolution and in that case, it may also use force. The UN's monitoring over regional organisations is, therefore, dependent on their activities. In traditional peacekeeping activities, in which both sides accept the peacekeeping operation, a regional actor may operate independently without Security Council authorisation. Peacemaking, which may include features other than securing a cease-fire, such as, for example, use of force, is regulated by Chapter VII of the Charter and a regional actor is not allowed to embark on it without Security Council authorisation. (Graham and Felício 2005: 18-19; Petman 2000: 47.)[40]

It was long regarded that Chapter VIII had very little significance but now it is seen as potentially important both for achieving the UN's purposes as well as for bypassing them (Petman 2000: 41). As the UN was established, special attention was paid to its relations with already existing international organisations. During the Dumbarton Oaks conference the victorious powers of the Second World War considered that regional actors should not play any significant role. In the first drafts of the UN an Executive Committee was planned, consisting of nine members which were four large nations (Great Britain, China, the United States and the Soviet Union) as well as five representatives of different regions. The United States opposed this arrangement. Regionalism became a central problem in San Francisco in 1945. The representatives of Latin America and the Arab states tried to ensure that regional actors would take precedence in conflict prevention and that they would be independent in relation to the UN. They garnered the support of Great Britain with its Commonwealth as well as that of the Soviet Union. The United

States, against, settled for a compromise whereby the exercise of the right of self-defence was added to the Charter (see also below). (Petman 2000: 41; Graham and Felício 2005: 11-12.)

At first, regional organisations were regarded as problematic. Especially in the 1940s it was considered that regionalism could weaken global solidarity (Graham and Felício 2005: 22). The principle of precedence of regional organisations has also been problematic in those instances when regionally dominant states have taken advantage of the organisations. They could always claim their desire to "peacefully" settle conflicts as grounds for not bringing crises for the UN's deliberation at all. In the 1950s and 1960s this was what the United States did in connection with the crises of Cuba, Panama and the Dominican Republic. The Soviet Union did the same with the crises of Hungary and the Czech Republic. Nigeria has been regarded as a similar hegemonic leader in the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS.[41] (Petman 2000: 45.)

The status of regional arrangements has gradually improved and they are viewed more positively than before; regionalism is considered to support the global order and to add marked value to the UN. In 1994 the UN General Assembly issued a declaration on improving the cooperation between the UN and regional organisations and the declaration mentions *inter alia* the significance of regional peacekeeping troops. The General Assembly has encouraged many kinds of actors to participate and in 1993 it invited the OSCE as an observer to the Assembly. In 1994 a high-level meeting for regional organisations was organised, with the participation of the British Commonwealth, the Islamic Conference, the OSCE, the CIS, the EC, WEU and NATO. (Petman 2000: 43-44, 47.) This spawned a series of meetings intended to improve the strategic partnership between the UN and regional actors. Interest in partnership has been mutual. In April 2003 the Security Council also met with the regional actors for the very first time. Another similar meeting was organised in July 2004. (Graham and Felício 2005: 13.)

There were already 21 participants in the high-level meeting for regional organisations of 2003 (Graham 2004: 13). The number of regional actors has, indeed, significantly grown.[42] The question of who actually are regional organisations has also become complicated. At first, the Organization of American

States and the Arab League were mainly considered to be such. Later on, even other organisations whose tasks include peace and security, have been adopted as such. According to one authoritative definition these include organisations or unions that are established on an agreement or on constitutions following the goals and principles of the UN and whose primary purpose is the maintenance of peace and security under the control of the UN.[43]

However, Graham and Felício (2005: 14-15) deem that one cannot talk any more about "primary purpose" nor about UN control. Many organisations, such as the EU and the ECOWAS, have expanded their activities from, for instance, economy to security. They have also been able to geographically expand their activities or extend their own decision-making powers beyond the UN Charter.[44] No formal rules on how to gain the status of a regional organisation exist. Sometimes organisations have been invited into this role, other times the organisations have claimed the role for themselves. (Petman 2000: 42, 54, note 8; Graham and Felício 2005: 21.)

The more important and formal status regional organisations receive in the reform of the UN, the more convoluted becomes the conundrum on which organisations suffice for this task and what criteria are used in their selection. As a solution, Graham and Felício propose that the world be divided into eight security regions. One organisation would be selected on the basis of membership, purpose and geography to represent each respective region in the Chapter VIII role. These organisations would be obligated to represent their region and to report on its activities; they would also replace the already anachronistic regional voting blocks.[45] Furthermore, they would carry out an implementing role on behalf of the Security Council.

When listing candidate organisations, the authors ran into the difficulty of whom to select to correctly represent Europe. They feel that the Council of Europe is more comprehensive than the EU and thus ultimately better suited to represent Europe, although neither one, in their opinion, is suited for this purpose because of their lack of formal conflict-solving mechanisms. Nor does the EU seem to consider itself such an organisation as denoted by Chapter VIII.[46] Instead, the EU could possess a different, even unique, future as a security partner of the UN,

entailing, perhaps, a dedicated seat in the Security Council. (Graham and Felício 2005: 34-35.)

The EU does, in fact, differ too much from all other organisations to fit into the category of regional organisations. This is because at times it almost acts more like a state than an organisation and because it is also a significant financer (also see Novosseloff 2004: 6, note 20; de Jonge Oudraat 2005: 251). When the EU speaks of regional organisations, it means someone other than itself. For example, in the Security Strategy, the EU considers that regional organisations strengthen global governance. As examples, it mentions the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern (American) Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the African Union.

New security thinking

In addition to identifying new resources and reforming its decision-making, the UN also needs to prove that its policies and principles are still relevant and that its security thinking remains up to date. Much like the EU, the UN has also realised the need to pen its security views into a strategy presented in the form of "new security thinking". The organisations also share a close relationship with the United States as a background feature in the formulation of security thinking. One of the tasks of the High-Level Panel was to find a way to get the United States to commit to cooperation or be sympathetic to the UN. The means for achieving this – paralleling the EU – was to assure that the United States' security concerns are understood and that they are considered to be justified and serious elsewhere as well. (Prins 2005: 380.)

The result of the Panel's work emphasises the responsibility to protect, *i.e.*, the individual's status in relation to the state, the primacy of the UN in peacebuilding and peacekeeping as well as a comprehensive approach to crises. The basic idea is that it is in the interest of everyone to promote security by cooperating, even when the underlying goals are purely selfish. (Prins 2005: 387.)

Central in the new security thinking is the emphasis on the fact that no common, shared, security can exist without a reciprocal

recognition of threats. In his report *In Larger Freedom* the Secretary-General compares security thinking to development thinking. In his opinion, an unprecedented consensus exists on how to advance global economic and social progress. Security is another matter: the problem is that threats are not uniformly agreed on and, therefore, common ground on the obligations of how to counter them cannot be found. According to the Secretary-General, however, faith in effective multilateralism is growing. There is also consensus on the recognition that threats are interlinked and that development, security and human rights are mutually interdependent. Furthermore, it is understood that no state can protect itself acting entirely alone and that all states need an equitable, efficient and effective collective security system. The UN is basically the world's only universal body with a mandate to address security, development and human rights issues. (*In Larger Freedom* 2005: 7, 57.)

Today's security threats do not only include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, war and organised crime but, also, poverty, deadly infectious diseases and the destruction of the environment. These are emphasised in different ways but one cannot pick and choose between them. Collective security today depends on accepting that the threats which each region of the world perceives as most urgent are, in fact, equally so for all. Threats are also interlinked. All of them need to be taken seriously and all of them need to be as efficiently countered. (*In Larger Freedom* 2005: 24-25.)

But who is capable of efficient action? Up until now the Security Council as an actor has been more or less lame. The Charter's edicts on all members committing to provide armed forces to its disposal and, for instance, holding immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action, have not become reality any more than has the decision on a Military Staff Committee (Articles 43-47) to plan the employment of forces placed at its disposal. The member states, by invoking the right to self-defence, have taken care of countering threats themselves as best they see fit.

Article 51 of the Charter guaranteeing the right to self-defence reads as follows:

> *Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has*

taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Self-defence has become the most often used and the most flexibly interpreted justification for the use of military force over the past five decades. According to Graham and Felício, this was not the intention of the Charter; nor does it strengthen the collective security system. Self-defence is not very transparent and it does not always end when the Security Council has decided to take action. Some view that self-defence can now be global in nature and that it also includes pre-emptive strikes. (Graham and Felício 2005: 26-28.) Preventive, pre-emptive and protective use of force are new concepts by which one justifies resorting to the use of force. They have, however, caused much discord.

If one thinks that the UN has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in international affairs as, according to Weber, the state does in society, one could think that the UN also has an obligation to use force whenever it is needed. For this purpose it can obtain the necessary resources from elsewhere, for instance from regional organisations.

The Secretary-General now emphasises that the Security Council indeed has the necessary capability and the full authority to use military force, also preventively: "The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better." Therefore, there is no need to apply a new, expanded self-defence doctrine to the new hidden threats and the basic principles of legitimate use of force do not need to be altered.

Article 39, Chapter VII of the Charter states that

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 42 continues that should the Security Council consider the non-military measures inadequate,

it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The principles of use of force, however, should be developed.[47] The Security Council should adopt a Resolution on the principles it follows when it decides on authorising the use of force. Force should be sufficient yet reasonable. Specifically, one should weigh the seriousness of the threat; one should evaluate whether means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat; whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand; and whether there is a reasonable chance of success. (*In Larger Freedom* 2005: 33, 58.) Even in this the Security Council should be efficient, lest the others take action prior to Security Council's decision. Inertia, in principle, should no longer be a reason for not listening to the UN. Graham and Felício hold that in modern times, when the Security Council is continuously in session and telecommunications are advanced, nothing short of a pre-authorised mandate for the use of force is acceptable. Any suggestions that *ex-post-facto* or implicit mandates, when needed, would suffice, could therefore be forgotten.

The EU and the UN
– a shared future

Is the EU too small or too large to support the UN?

Organisations easily point fingers at each others' weaknesses instead of considering what they could do for each other – or how, in the end, it would be beneficial for them to support the other. From the EU's standpoint the UN can be inefficient and so it reserves the right for action independent of the UN, if required. Its member states, for their part, assign their resources to the EU's international activity as a part of the Union's internal construction and to safeguard its credibility. Since the total amount of resources is not increased, they are absent from UN activities. The Union, however, has adopted multilateralism as its international profile, which in turn binds its success to the UN's success. It should, therefore, use its authority to advance the status of the UN and respect the Security Council.

The UN, for its part, is suspicious of the EU for being too independent and headstrong of an actor. The fact that the national resources have been seized for the Union's own crisis management, just for the sake of proving its crisis management capability, also appears to be harmful. The UN tries to steer the EU into the same league as the other regional organisations and, in general, attempts to find ways to develop cooperation with regional actors. However, it makes a mistake if it fails to appreciate the EU's special nature and that the EU-UN relationship has already bypassed the UN's relations to other organisations. The EU differs from other regional organisations because in its extent and in its international goals it has come to resemble the UN and also because it has partly distinguished itself above its member states as a supranational actor, more influential than many nations.

At best, the EU and the UN really do support each other. As Jørgensen and Laatikainen (2004: 19) say, the EU recognises the UN as its "global normative beacon" and in *quid pro quo* expects that the UN recognises it as an actor of prime importance. The blind EU, therefore, is no longer blind; there is a clear need for its playing an active role in influencing the security thinking. Neither is the lame UN lame any more when it receives the backing of the EU.

The EU does seem to be in practice acting in the interest of the UN: it seems to be ready to accept clear limits to its international activities. In the light of the Security Strategy it would seem to be essential to the EU to seek authorisation for its activities from somewhere else than itself or from the transatlantic relationship (Toje 2005: 132) – that is, from the UN. In practice the EU can support the UN in, at least, three ways. Firstly, it helps in committing its member states as well as other states, in the goals of the UN. The significance of abiding by the treaties and engaging states are also emphasised in the report *In larger freedom* (pp. 7, 25). The EU can help in implementing norms and carrying out decisions. Its own members are bound to it, it puts pressure on countries interested in becoming its members and, even more extensively, affects its surrounding countries as well as its distant trading partners. Secondly, the EU can advance the development of the principles of the use of force in the "lobbyist" role it seems to be adopting. New security thinking can become concrete, for example, through human security.[48] Thirdly, it can assign its crisis management resources to the UN. Specifically, what the UN would need from the EU are rapid deployment capability, intelligence information, medical units and logistics (Tardy 2005: 51), but the EU also has facilities to assist in civilian crisis management (Jakobsen 2004).

All are not convinced by the EU's verbal helpfulness, however. Rather, the Union's promises seem unfoundedly pompous. The Security Strategy, for instance, is quite lofty in stating that the European Union is inevitably a global player and that it should be ready to share in the responsibility of global security and in building a better world (p. 1). Jørgensen and Laatikainen (2004: 4) find examples of a "LHBWA" (Look-How-Big-We-Are) doctrine from the EU's stands on the UN. The EU considers itself important and regards that its budget share and other support

should entitle it to greater influence in the UN. They consider this wishful thinking: even though nobody can deny that the EU's existence is important, its real clout is still undefined.

The EU's stand on the Secretary-General's reform plan is a harsh example of the difficulty in finding consensus. It is significant, however, that this is the first time the EU has decided to take a common stand on UN reform. At the same time, the European Council is "firmly resolved" to assume a significant role in the UN in general and, specifically, in the preparation of the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly. The process of dialogue with country groupings and countries in order to help drive forward convergence of positions is specifically mentioned.[49] At closer look, however, the common stand is already splintered. The Council admits that the reform of the Security Council and the rules of engagement are the two issues on which common ground may not be achieved.[50] Again, the most important agenda items seem to be overrun by discord among member states or lack of vision.

Jørgensen and Laatikainen consider the EU to be too small or, at least, unprepared for anything other than the role of a medium-sized power just for the reason that it does not have clear enough views. The EU will hardly reach its goal of becoming a "pioneer" or a leader. In order for the EU to wield full influence in the UN it is not sufficient enough for it to merely be its fervent supporter. It must post a clear and strong stand on the reform of the UN. The EU, however, does not seem to possess clear ideas or visions for anyone other than, at most, itself – or maybe it simply lacks the potential to implement the visions. Instead of affecting international relationships *per se* the aim of its policy may rather be to build its internal cohesion and identity. (Jørgensen and Laatikainen 2004: 2, 11.)[51]

Still, it seems that the problem is not the EU's small size or its inability to fulfil its promises but, instead, its large size and rapidly increasing authority. The EU may well be able to play its role but it may desire an even more independent role as part of its becoming an international actor. The more important an actor it becomes, the more its activities will also be criticised.

Therefore, Jørgensen and Laatikainen deem that the EU may also be too large for the traditional role of the medium-sized power, a role that includes an emphasis on multilateralism, bridge

building, diplomatic talent, concentration on certain goals, creativity, coalition building and credibility based on selflessness. The EU does not only concentrate on certain issues: its agenda in the UN keeps on widening. The EU is becoming a global multi-policy actor inasmuch as the UN is.

It is also difficult for it to create coalitions of the like-minded, because the most obvious coalition candidate, the United States, is, as a superpower, a very different kind of player. Above all the EU is not regarded as selfless. It is simply too large and influential.[52] Besides, the EU keeps on growing: along with its enlargement, coordinated EU-policy also spreads to the country group of Eastern Europe. Country groupings matter administratively, because representatives to different organs are selected from them and this also applies to the fixed-term members of the Security Council. During the past decade the EU has consolidated its presence and influence in the UN to the extent that it has a hegemonic role in the General Assembly, which is also influenced by the fact that the United States has simultaneously gradually withdrawn from the UN. (Jørgensen and Laatikainen 2004: 12-18.)

This being the case, it would be problematic if the EU would really demand more influence for itself. It would be highly probable that the other UN Members would criticise the fact that Europe is clearly over-represented in the UN. In the voting group of Western Europe and Others, Australia has already complained about the EU's dominant position. (Jørgensen and Laatikainen 2004: 4.)[53]

The challenging interdependence of the EU and the UN

The EU's desire to be an independent actor causes particular problems. Its own autonomy distances it from the UN. This can hinder the efficiency of the UN's activities, especially in peacekeeping activities if the EU's own military crisis management operations erode the UN's activity. The EU does not intend to weaken the UN but when it seeks maximum visibility and decision-making autonomy with its independent operations, it cannot simultaneously participate in UN-led operations and, thus, its support to the UN decreases. The EU's own operations increase

the Union's legitimacy among the member states but they can decrease it in the eyes of others (cf. Jakobsen 2004: 11). The EU is easily perceived to be only advancing its own interests. While the UN is seen to pursue an open agenda, the EU's policy is interpreted to reflect the pursuit of its own interest or the need to respond to conscience-shocking situations for the sake of its own reputation (Tardy 2005: 49). Strategic and commercial interests can be seen to influence the selection of operations (Youngs 2004).

Therefore, the EU must operate according to two sets of logic: the one internal, the other external. It must strengthen itself and, simultaneously, strive to strengthen the UN. The central dilemma in the EU-UN relationship is that the EU can help the UN to reform but in order to do so, it may have to exceed the boundaries of wielding reasonable influence. In a way it has to put pressure to the UN by proving that it can also act alone if the UN cannot follow its progress and support it. The EU can also be interpreted to be acting counter to the UN's interests. The organisations do not necessarily understand each other or sufficiently know each other's practices (de Jonge Oudraat 2005: 271). The EU hopes that mutual knowledge and confidence would continue to improve, to scale up the effectiveness of activities.[54]

To express the dilemma in other terms one can say that the EU must simultaneously further the UN's principles and renew the UN (Chinkin 2004: 1). As Novosseloff (2004: 7-8) puts it, there is a certain dualism in the EU's relationship to the UN: it recognises the primacy of the UN but it also wants to set its own terms or conditions for cooperation. Above all the EU requires better efficiency from the UN.

On the one hand the EU promises to follow international norms and to monitor compliance to them but, on the other hand, it sets requirements for the norms it follows. It does not necessarily follow any norm whatsoever but it wants to influence their development. The Security Strategy hints that all standards are not necessarily good enough: "It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments" (p. 10). Development of the crisis management capability illuminates the same desire to maintain independence: maintaining autonomous capability for action may also be an absolute value which one does not want to jeopardise by too close relations with the UN as, *e.g.*, that the EU's international operations would always require a UN mandate.

Therefore, a complex interdependence exists between the EU and the UN. The EU needs the UN because the UN is the only body that can authorise the Union's activity outside its own area and, especially, the use of force. The UN is also the EU's principal partner and the main area on which global governance is advanced. Correspondingly, the UN needs the EU's resources, especially for crisis management in difficult conditions. The EU is becoming "the UN's most important western partner" from whom the UN receives the bulk of its resources. The UN may also need the EU to counterbalance the influence of the United States. (Novosseloff 2004: 7, 15; Eide 2004: 3.)

The organisations, thus, need each other. When it comes to international affairs, in the end they are in the same boat. Both benefit if crisis management improves and if their respective decision-making capabilities improve. Above all, both benefit from the gain that they can accrue from advancing the new security thinking. The most important task of both organisations as well as the cornerstone of their cooperation in today's international relations is to influence security-related thinking, to create communality of interpretation in what is meant by security and what is allowable in the name of security.

A central tenet of the new security thinking is that international security cannot be advanced on any single actor's terms alone but the multi-dimensional nature of threats and actors must be taken into account. The absolute value of international institutions and the security of the individual are emphasised. However, a balance is needed: states should be supported but not merely for their own sake. Instead, they should be supported so that they could guarantee the security of the individual. As a supranational organisation the EU indeed challenges the UN's state-based foundation (Eide 2004: 3). At the same time, the defence of the status of non-state actors is on the organisations' shared agenda. The UN and the EU act together in the same manner as sovereign states act in concert against non-state actors. A shared security requires that states are both bypassed and engaged. The need for cooperation in the world of non-state and state actors is accentuated. Normatively thinking, the UN should become as strong in relation to non-state actors as it is to states.[55] The UN's strength in this is aided by the EU's strength.

For the EU and the UN, shared future means, above all, shared credibility. The special nature and influence of the Union is needed

as a counterweight to the old-fashioned great powers and nation-states in implementing new security thinking and, thus, in developing the international system. On the other hand, the new security thinking may also increase the EU's authority within the UN. In the UN, the EU's action is critically evaluated particularly by the developing countries, and credibility in their eyes is becoming all the more important. The EU needs legitimacy as an actor if it intends to monitor compliance to international norms. According to Biscop and Arnould (2004: 22-23), the fact that the EU advances global governance with the goal of guaranteeing such "public commodities" as security, stability, justice and well-being, is apt to increase the EU's legitimacy. The new security thinking, practical implementation of multilateralism and such instruments of crisis management that are generally regarded as legitimate may, therefore, help the EU: they increase its legitimacy and, hence, authority in international affairs.

Conclusions for a member state: the case of Finland

It is no longer adequate to consider the organisations solely as the results of their member states' policies. True, the states have created the organisations but organisations also shape the state; they can even radically mould their members by, for instance, making them more uniform (Onuf 2002: 221). At the same time they also create other actors, delegate responsibility and power and identify appropriate tasks for them (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 700). The organisations certainly continue to serve the states but they are not always dependent on them. They also practice their own policy, which includes relations to other organisations. One can neither understand an organisation like the EU or the UN merely by studying it as such nor by trying to grasp it through its member states. It is essential to study the organisation's relations to other organisations: their significance in what kind of space and role they grant each other in international affairs and how they shape each other.

This also sets new challenges for member states. It is no longer sufficient for a nation to formulate a separate policy vis-à-vis each organisation. Individual member states now also need to consider the organisations together.

This naturally also applies to Finland. Traditionally, Finland has been a strong supporter of the UN. Along with EU membership, however, policy emphases shifted. The EU rapidly became the cornerstone of security policy and of Finland's international identity. The clarity of this change was probably affected by the political culture, notably the tendency that when winds shift and the boat is tacked, in Finnish politics everyone scrambles to the upwind side of the deck. A practical example of this is that the previously described general resource problem is also visible in Finland. The international crisis management resources, which were previously completely at the UN's disposal, are now primarily identified for the EU. This is done at least partially because Finland wants to secure a good position for itself within the EU. As a close-knit Union, the EU seems to require generous commitment from its member states. In addition to money and other practical resources, this also applies to political attention and expenditure of political capital. Investing these in the EU seems to give a better return than investing them in the UN.

The EU emphasis is interestingly evident in the 2005 updating of the Act on Peace Support Operations (see: *Report of the working group on updating the Act on Peace Support Operations*, 2005). The EU's need for independent operations is emphasised in it. Finland's need to be able to participate unhindered in all activities decided by the EU can be seen as the setting for the update because this is considered to strengthen Finland's position in the Union. This time, the EU's new battle groups are also in the background of the update of the legislation. The battle groups rotate in readiness and in order to avoid too much variation in the EU's capability for action, they have to be sufficiently uniform in function and capability. Moreover, rotation requires particular compliance to commonly agreed principles and, hence, necessitates standardisation, for example, in rules of engagement as well as the realisation that the use of force is also allowed in order to achieve the objectives of the operation, instead of only for self-defence. In public, the update of the Act has been justified by referring to a risk where at a critical juncture the UN Security Council would block the EU's benign action: veto power over the EU's action cannot be granted to "Russia and China".

The novelty in the Government bill is that Finland can now also participate in an operation in which force is used without a

UN mandate. Use of force without UN mandate, however, would be possible only in exceptional circumstances. The working group's report (pp. 41-42) lists these possible exceptions. Firstly, they comprise traditional peacekeeping operations being executed on the basis of the host nation's consent or request and which do not include military enforcement. Participation in these is already presently allowed based on the decision of the OSCE or on request by a special organisation or agency of the UN. Furthermore, tasks that could be construed as minor could make an exception because it is considered unnecessary to seek a Security Council mandate due to their insignificance. Finally, cases when participation is "deemed justifiable", even if they did not have a UN mandate, could make an exception. In these cases, when considering whether to participate, the goals and principles of the UN Charter should be taken into account as well as other provisions in international law binding Finland. One should also consider whether the EU has decided to participate in managing the crisis by military means. The decision on participation would also be taken in the light of Finland's general objectives in international cooperation: peace, human rights, societal development, democracy and the principles of rule of law.

It would seem that in every case Finland would follow the EU's decisions. Finland does go quite far in stressing the EU's independence and opens up an option which should not actually exist, namely that the EU can also use force without a UN Security Council mandate. Whether this is an exception proving the rule or an exception becoming the rule in time, may depend on the development of the EU. Finland, however, does not take a stand on when and how the EU should act but, instead, leaves this to the EU. As a member state, Finland, however, manages to strengthen the EU in a way that may carry unexpected consequences: the EU becomes stronger at the expense of the UN but, in the long run, the weakening of the UN also enfeebles the EU because the EU's international legitimacy is based on its commitment to the UN system.

While one can ask whether the EU can influence the future of the UN, and why it should, one can also ask whether Finland can affect this constellation and if so, why should it even try to do so. The individual member state does not carry much weight but the value of its initiative and ideas is all the greater. Finland is firmly

anchored in the EU. A strong EU, then, seems to require a strong UN. Hence, it is for Finland's best to act in the interest of both of them, by more boldly striking up debate on the limitations of the EU's activities and also by more courageously identifying national resources for both of them, especially by advancing joint operations and, finally, by expending more political capital on helping the UN to reform. Administratively and politically thinking it is no longer adequate to concentrate on one organisation at a time: the organisations' mutual relations are now giving their member states new food for thought.

The web pages of the Finnish UN Association are a great help to information seekers. The UN Charter, for example, can be found on the following page: http://www.ykliitto.fi/yktieto/peruskir.htm. The background of central UN questions is illuminated in the special edition of the *Ulkopolitiikka* magazine 3/2000.

In addition to Paul Luif, for instance Katie Verlin Laatikainen writes in *Cooperation and Conflict* 4/2003 (vol. 38, pp. 409-441) about voting cohesion in the General Assembly of the United Nations in the article: 'Norden's Eclipse. The Impact of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy on the Nordic Group in the United Nations'. Luif studies in a very interesting manner how the other countries in the General Assembly position themselves on the EU's stands. Laatikainen regards that the traditional Nordic group has diminished in significance but, on the other hand, it has now migrated closer to the larger EU group in the UN. According to her, the EU seems to adopt an approach which resembles the one that the Nordic countries practiced in the past. The EU's role in the UN is also the topic of the special edition 1/2004 of *CFSP Forum* publication (see http://www.fornet.info). Its articles deal with, e.g., the voting behaviour of the new EU countries.

Burkard Schmitt's and Gustav Lindstrom's articles 'European capabilities: how many divisions?' and 'On the ground: ESDP operations' describe the EU's development as a military actor. Both can be found in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.) *EU Security and Defence Policy. The first five years (1999-2004),* Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies 2004. The book *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen and Brian White (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE Publishers 2004) offers a more extensive review to the topic.

In addition to the articles of Bailes and Toje, mentioned in this report, the European Security Strategy is also compared to the strategies of NATO and the United States in, for example, Simon Duke's article 'The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does it Make for Secure Alliances in a Better World?' *European Foreign Affairs Review,* 4/2004 (vol. 9, pp. 459-481). Sven Biskop's (ed.) (2004) volume *Audit of European Security Strategy* also contains useful evaluations. (Egmont Paper 3. Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB)).

In addition to the article mentioned in this report, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore have also recently published the book *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics* (Cornell University Press 2004), in which the status and importance of international organisations and "the global bureaucracy" is more extensively assessed.

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[2] High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, 14-16 September 2005, Draft Outcome Document of 3 June 2005. http://www.un.org.

[3] *Helsingin Sanomat* on 5.4.2005, tells of a petition on the Internet against the membership of Japan, signed by 27 million Chinese. On the other hand China claims to support the reforms, especially when it comes to the status of small and medium-sized countries in the system (Also see: China's position to UN reform, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005_06/08/content/3056817.htm).

[4] The Senate of the United States and the House of Representatives have somewhat disagreed. The question of reducing the United States' financing share has also surfaced.

[5] Prins (2005: 376-377) speaks about three bad blows, the first of which was bypassing the UN in the context of the war in Iraq, the second one occurred when its headquarters in Baghdad were bombed and the third blow was the corruption scandal around the "food for oil" relief programme.

[6] Also see the January 2002-established home page: "European Union @ United Nations", http://www.europa-eu-un.org/home/index_fi.htm.

[7] The Commission has recommended to the EU to seek ICAO and IMO membership as well. *The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism.* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels 10.9.2003. COM (2003) 526 final, p. 17.

[8] Regional United Nations Information Centre for Western Europe (RUNIC Brussels), http://www.runic-europe.org/.

[9] Also see e.g. the Commission's communication in May 2001 (*Building an Effective Partnership with the UN in the field of Development and Humanitarian Affairs.* COM (2001) 231 final, 2 May 2001) and the EU Gothenburg Summit in June.

[10] *The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism.* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels 10.9.2003. COM (2003) 526 final. (Pp. 11-16.)

[11] *The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism.* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels 10.9.2003. COM (2003) 526 final. (Pp. 3, 5, 7-8.)

[12] *Idem,* p. 6.

[13] *The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism.* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels 10.9.2003. COM (2003) 526 final. (P. 4.)

[14] As later mentioned in this report, the situation is now different. The EU countries are even more important in financing the missions but less prominent in deploying personnel to them.

[15] The text can be read, for example, on the following web page:http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:FI:HTML.

[16] Security Council Resolution 1371.

[17] Security Council Resolution 1396.

[18] Security Council Resolution 1484.

[19] More information on the operations can be found on the home page of the Council http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g.

[20] Practical cooperation has also occurred in Kosovo, where the EU still leads one of the pillars of the UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo), economic reconstruction and development.

[21] For instance, it would have been beneficial if a part of the military personnel had been directly transferred from operation Artemis to the UN operation that followed it. De Jonge Oudraat refers to the report *Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force* (New York, Department of Peace-keeping Operations, peace-keeping best practices unit, military division, October 2004).

[22] A secure Europe in a better world. The European Security Strategy. December 2003. http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

[23] Toje (2005: 130, ref 61) points out that "multilateralism" in this document is a key word possessing almost similar value as the word "freedom" does in the security strategy of the United States.

[24] *The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism.* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels 10.9.2003. COM (2003) 526 final. (Pp. 3, 9 and 20.)

[25] *Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management.* Brussels, 19 September 2003. 12730/03. http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st12/st12730en03.pdf

[26] *Paper for submission to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,* http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU%20written%20contribution2.pdf.

[27] On previous reform projects also see Lahdensuo 2000.

[28] *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility.* Report of Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. United Nations 2004.

[29] *We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and global governance* (June 2004) and *Investing in development: a practical plan to achieve the Millennium development goals* (January 2005).

[30] *In Larger Freedom* 2005: 6.

[31] *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility.* Report of Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. United Nations 2004: 81.

[32] Even at this moment one third of the Security Council's 15 members belong, in one way or another, to the EU. Four of them are member states and one is a future member.

[33] *Paper for submission to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,*

http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU%20written%20contribution2.pdf, p.12.

[34] Many times the crux of the problem is that the Security Council does not receive the relevant information facilitating rapid decisions (Professor Martti Koskenniemi at a *Ius Gentium* seminar at the University of Helsinki 21.4.2005).

[35] These problems were deliberated in the Brahimi report of August 2000 (*Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations*) as well as by the High-Level Panel, established in 2003. The Panel produced the document *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility.* Report of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. United Nations, 2004. http://www.un.org/secureworld/report3.pdf.

[36] 'Commission adopts strategy for successful 2005 UN Summit', http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_4800_en.htm, and Commissar Benita Ferrero-Waldner's speech 'The UN at the Crossroads', 3.6.2005, http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/fi/article_4767_fi.htm.

[37] High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, 14-16 September 2005, Draft Outcome Document, http://www.un.org/ga/president/59/draft_outcome.htm.

[38] UNSAS, United Nations Standby Arrangements System, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/fgs2/unsas_files/sba.htm.

[39] It is now intended that any references to enemy states be removed.

[40] Article 51 is applied to the defence alliances (NATO and WEU). In other words they have no reporting obligation and the Security Council does not control them (Petman 2000: 43).

[41] The Economic Community of West African States.

[42] Latin America and the Arab world led the regionalisation process in the 1940s; in the 1950s an unprecedented regional institutionalising in Europe began. Along with the independence of the colonies, Africa and Asia entered the picture in the 1960s, the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean regions in the 1970s and the newly independent states in Central Asia in the 1990s (Graham and Felício 20005: 12).

[43] Bruno Simma, *The United Nations Charter: A Commentary.* Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995: 699.

[44] Graham and Felício use the terms *"mandate creep", "mandate crab"* and *"mandate stray"* on the forms of enlargement.

[45] Now there are five of these groups: Africa, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Western Europe and Others.

[46] This refers to Thierry Tardy's study: 'Limits and Opportunities of UN-EU Relations in Peace Operations: Implications for DPKO', External Study for UN DPKO Best Practices Unit, September 2003: 9. Also NATO has implied that it does not consider itself to be this kind of an organisation (Petman 2000: 50-52; Graham 2004: 13).

[47] The Draft Outcome Document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, 14–16 September 2005, states that discussion on the principles of the use of force must continue. Draft Outcome Document of 3 June 2005, http://www.un.org (p. 12).

[48] See, e.g., Mary Kaldor's research team's report *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (2004).

[49] Presidency conclusions. European Council Brussels 22–23 March 2005. The Council of the European Union 7619/05 (p. 17).

[50] *EUObserver*, 23.3.2005, http://www.euobserver.com/?aid=18735&print=1. In January 2004, the European Parliament has supported a single shared seat for the EU in the Security Council.

[51] Jørgensen and Laatikainen (2004: 11) extensively discuss the EU's value base and European values and regard that the EU should advance universal values as such, instead of calling them European and to note, for example, that the EU has adopted these precious values as well as the principles of the UN Charter and agreements. One reason for stressing Europeanism in, for example, the Constitution, may be the desire for internal cohesion.

[52] Also see the tables in the beginning of this report regarding the development of the UN budget. It is interesting that, on the United States' initiative in 2000, the ceiling of the budget share of individual nations was set at 22% and to 27% of the peacekeeping budget, respectively. This limitation does not apply to the EU as it is not a state. Therefore, it can reap benefit from its special nature even here (*55th session of the General Assembly, Round Up of the work of the fifth committee during part of the session,* http://www.un.org/ga/55/fifth/round5.htm).

In addition to the EU-15 and Malta, also Andorra, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey as well as Australia, Canada and New Zealand belong to the group of Western Europe and Others. In election issues Turkey belongs to this group whereas in other issues it belongs to the Asia-Pacific group. The United States has observer status in the group. (Luif 2003: 7.) The Eastern Europe group comprises the countries of the former East Block and the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. Cyprus belongs to the Asia-Pacific group and, this being the case, there are EU Members in three country groupings out of five.

[53] *The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism.* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels 10.9.2003. COM (2003) 526 final, p. 15.

[54] *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility.* Report of Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. United Nations 2004. (Pp. 47-52.)

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