

# Peace and Security Council Report

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Current members of the Peace and Security Council: Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe

## Peace and Security Council Protocol

'The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council' – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union

## Early warning issues for June 2012

During June, developments in the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan, continuing events in Mali following the recent attack on the interim president, developments in Libya, Guinea-Bissau and the

Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the Egyptian elections and their aftermath are among early warning issues that require close attention.

### Current PSC Chair

**Bio data:** H.E. Mr Pierre Juste Mounzika Ntsika  
**Current posts:** Congo's Ambassador to Ethiopia, Permanent Representative to the AU and Chair of the PSC

## Egypt

It has been more than a year since the revolution in Egypt started. Despite its success in toppling Hosni Mubarak, the revolution has remained both unfinished and turbulent for most of the past year. While it has opened a new era of political activism and reawakening, the uprising also unleashed deep divisions and fierce rivalry among the different established and newly formed political forces. Amidst the fierce contests between various forces, violent protests have continued to erupt in the country.

While the presidential election promises to meet the growing demand for the military to hand over power to civilian rule, whether or not it will end the political instability is far from certain. On the internal front, the election of the president will bring to the fore major political and socio-economic issues hitherto neglected, including the economy, the role of Islam, political freedoms, rights of minorities and the role of the military.

## Livingstone formula

'Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC' – **PSC/PR/(CLX)**, 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

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## Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau is a country in a state of perpetual transition, frequently interrupted by tragic events that hold back the nation-building project that has been a major goal since the country won its independence in 1974. In recent years, military interventions in the national political process have been particularly violent and detrimental to the post-conflict reconstruction. Equally, post-coup elections have revealed serious flaws in attempting to restore democratic order through constitutional provisions in Guinea-Bissau.

In fact, both military and political forces in Guinea-Bissau are much more concerned about gaining control of the state and its resources for personal gain. Indeed, the latest developments in Guinea-Bissau serve as a reminder that, in transitional societies or countries emerging from war, elections alone are insufficient to guarantee a well-functioning democracy. At best and in the specific case of Guinea-Bissau, elections provided for the recycling of the political or military elite without necessarily creating conditions for the emergence of independent, credible and effective state institutions.

## Terrorism in Africa

The realization of an effective collaboration network between radical militant groups would create a dangerous alliance of terrorist bands from the western to the eastern edges of the continent. This extension of the Al-Qaeda 'franchise' in Africa and localization of terrorism could pose a significant security threat for countries in the region as

well as the entire African continent. In the absence of coordinated regional and continental initiatives and efforts to effectively combat terrorism, the network could grow to become a major security threat for the continent in the near future.

The Sahel encompasses eight million square-kilometres (3.1 million square miles) on the edge of the Sahara desert. Countries in the region have

raised concerns over controlling their large borders as they struggle against the influence and threats of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). Effective cooperation between countries affected by AQIM requires high-level political cooperation in addition to timely information sharing and coordination of operations.

## Country Analysis

### EGYPT

#### Previous PSC and AU Communiqués

On 22 November 2011, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union received a briefing from the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Ramatne Lamamra, and the Permanent Representative of Egypt on the situation in Egypt. The subsequent press statement PSC/PR/BR.(CCXCIX) by the Council expressed serious concerns over the violent incidents and loss of lives, and requested maximum restraint from the various parties involved, especially the transitional authorities and the security forces.

The Council also requested the Chairpersons of the AU Commission and the Panel of the Wise to continuously monitor the developments in Egypt and to provide every possible support to facilitate the completion of the transition to democracy.

#### Crisis escalation potential

It has been more than a year since the revolution in Egypt started. Despite its success in toppling Hosni Mubarak, the revolution has remained both unfinished and turbulent for most of the past year. While it has opened a new era of political activism and reawakening, the uprising also unleashed deep divisions and fierce rivalry among

the different established and newly formed political forces. Amidst the fierce contests between various forces, violent protests have continued to erupt in the country.

The presidential election scheduled to take place on 23 and 24 May 2012 comes at a time of continuing political instability and economic decline. Given the interests at stake in the presidential election and the fierce contest between the various political forces, the first major issue is whether or not the election would be free and peaceful. While the presidential election promises to meet the growing demand for the military to hand over power to civilian rule, whether or not it will end the political instability is far from certain. On the internal front, the election of the president will bring to the fore major political and socio-economic issues hitherto neglected, including the economy, the role of Islam, political freedoms, rights of minorities and the role of the military. Additionally, in the sphere of foreign policy, the new president would need to face the deteriorating relationship with Egypt's major ally, the US, and the fate of the historic 1979 peace treaty with Israel.

Clearly, the uncertainties facing Egypt as voters go to the polls are multiple. The first and most immediate concern is the smooth conduct of the election. Another is the ability of Egypt's new democratic institutions, including the presidency, to address the issues confronting the country in a manner

that nurtures national consensus and brings some calm. At least, in the short term, the risks of instability, due to protests either from the urban youth and liberal forces or from Islamist groups, remain very high. If instability persists and the military feels threatened by the President, the risk of a military coup cannot be discounted.

#### Key issues and internal dynamics

Following the removal of Hosni Mubarak from power in February 2011, Egypt witnessed a very enthusiastic political awakening. This development involved the emergence of a diverse and dynamic civic and political activism consisting of a proliferation of diverse political parties, movements and civil society actors as well as the free expression of political views, including dissent.

As disagreements about the length of the transition and the role of the Military Council deepened by mid-2011, the situation evolved into one of tension and protest. With no consensus on the transitional processes, fierce rivalry ensued between and within both old political forces and new ones, which emerged in the wake of the revolution. Two major factors accounted for these developments.

At one level, concerns arose regarding the ascendance to political prominence of Islamic groups and the resulting potential denial of some anticipated democratic changes, such as those with respect to the rights of women and

minorities. Apart from the Muslim Brotherhood, ultraconservative Salafist groups took advantage of the new political space to emerge as new political actors.

Another factor fuelling the rise of the fierce contests among the various political forces was the reluctance of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the body that took power from Mubarak as an interim authority, to countenance a speedy and genuine democratic transformation.

On the one hand, many Egyptians were suspicious of the commitment of SCAF to democratization. This was in part due to the fact that the Egyptian military had been the most important component of Mubarak's regime. Most importantly, genuine democratization threatens the military's historical political influence as well as social and economic privileges. It is estimated that the Egyptian army controls 5 to 15 % of the country's economy. It has wide commercial networks and military-owned companies that have been active in the water, olive oil, cement, construction, hotel and gasoline industries. Its various commercial industrial divisions produce television sets, jeeps, washing machines, furniture, bottled water and even milk and bread. None of the enterprises participating in this vast web of business is subject to taxes. The budget of the military has been subject to neither civilian nor democratic oversight.

As an interim authority, SCAF also used its position to manipulate the transitional process. After a constitutional referendum that approved proposed constitutional amendments, SCAF issued a constitutional declaration made up of 63 articles that preserved some elements of the old constitution, including the eight voter-approved amendments, while scrapping others. Under the constitutional declaration, the distribution of authority among elected bodies and the SCAF is ambiguous at best. For

example, Article 33 declares that the parliament has the authority to 'legislate and determine public policy of the state', while Article 56 gives the SCAF sweeping powers, including those of 'legislation' and 'issuing public policy'.

Initially, SCAF was committed to a transition to a democratically elected civilian government by the end of 2011. It was only after the resurgence of popular protests in November 2011, that the Council was forced to accelerate the establishment of democratically elected civilian institutions by abandoning its significantly extended timeline in which both an elected parliament and an elected President were expected to come into existence around mid-2013. Toward the end of 2011, parliamentary elections were held.

Parliamentary elections were organised in three rounds from the end of November 2011 until mid-January 2012. Despite concerns on the part of the liberal and leftist political groups about the lack of even ground for competitive elections, voters were allowed to express their choices freely and there was no systematic manipulation or rigging of the elections. The elections saw the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party emerge as the dominant party with 47% of the seats. Even more surprisingly, the Salafist El Nour party won 24%, while the more secularist New Wafd party and the Egypt Block managed to get about 8 % each.

The overwhelming victory of the Islamist parties, including the ultraconservative Salafists, and the poor performance of the liberal and leftist groups in an election involving high voter turnout, was seen as a manifestation of a strong conservative tendency on the part of the electorate. While the Muslim Brotherhood were supportive of the role of the SCAF in the aftermath of Mubarak's departure, following their electoral success they displayed an increasingly vocal rejection of the

military leadership. Even after the parliamentary election and the inauguration of the new parliament, the SCAF, despite a lack of popular legitimacy, continued to be in charge of the transitional government. It defied the demand of the Islamist groups for a transfer of power to a transitional civilian government that reflected the role of the majority parties. Consequently, the SCAF remained in charge of forming an interim government.

This deepening contest between Islamists and the SCAF followed the latter's declaration of 'constitutional principles' that were meant to circumvent the role of Islamists in shaping the drafting of the final constitution. Although these principles were presented as a means for protecting the rights of minorities and the 'civil' character of the Egyptian state, the military also used the principles to entrench its own privileges. Such principles included the absence of any civilian and democratic oversight of the military budget. The issue is still open and is not likely to be resolved before the drafting of the final constitution.

Apart from its domination of the transitional process, SCAF also reactivated old practices that frustrated political freedoms during the Mubarak era. Although it partially lifted the state of emergency that was in place for some four decades, the Council also took measures that were contrary to established democratic and human rights standards. Activists and bloggers were arrested for defaming the military. Civilians continued to be tried in military courts and thus their due process rights were violated. There have been shocking incidents of police brutality against protestors, including women. The excessive use of force against demonstrators and restrictions on freedoms of assembly, association and expression, including press freedom, have continued.

In terms of the structural transformation of the security sector,

following the raid by angry protestors against the notorious State Security Investigation Services (SSIS) on 15 March 2011, the interior ministry announced the dissolution of the SSIS. In its place, the National Security Service (NSS) was established. The government announced that the NSS would be subject to judicial oversight and would only work as a civil intelligence-gathering agency. Nevertheless, there are reports that members of the SSIS who were involved in torture have been re-employed by the NSS.

It is clear from the above developments that there are two important issues that stand to determine the immediate fate of Egypt's quest for democratic transformation. The first one is the dominance of Islamist groups in the parliamentary process, putting them in the enviable position of shaping the constitution-making process. The other is the position of the SCAF and its disposition to manipulate the political process, practise repression reminiscent of the Mubarak era, and protect its own privileges.

SCAF has announced that it would hand over power on 1 July 2012, following Presidential elections in May and June. According to electoral rules, if no candidate wins at least 50 per cent of the vote in the 23-24 May ballot, a second-round run-off will be held between the two candidates receiving the most votes on 16 and 17 June. The focus is now on electing a President.

Another important situation of some significance for the presidential election is the drafting of the final constitution. The constitutional declarations issued by SCAF lack clarity about the intended timeline and the actual process for constitution making. Article 60 of the declaration simply stipulates that the parliament, at the invitation of the SCAF, will elect a 100-person constituent assembly to draft the constitution within six months,

followed by a public referendum. It does not say much about the composition of the assembly.

It was only at the end of March 2012 that Parliament named the members of the 100-person constituent assembly charged with the authority to draft the final constitution. Even if the assembly commenced its work right away, there would not be enough time to have the constitution ready when voters go to the polls to elect the president. However, the assembly has not yet begun this process. Following the election of 50 members of Parliament to the Assembly, with most of them coming from the FJP or the Salafist Nour Party, and others affiliated with, or sympathetic to, Islamist politics, many have started to challenge the representativeness of the assembly. Within days, most of the non-Islamist members of the constituent assembly resigned in protest. On 10 April 2012, the court suit that liberal and secular groups filed, challenging the constitutionality of the composition of the assembly, resulted in a ruling suspending the assembly.

All these developments made it inevitable that Egyptians would go to the polls to vote for a president whose constitutional powers had yet to be determined.

Article 60, which does not specify the details of the composition of the assembly, was invoked to challenge the representativeness of the assembly. However, in declaring that the Assembly proposed by parliament was not representative of the Egyptian public, the advisory council of the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces acknowledged the vagueness of Article 60. It suggested that a 'new constitutional declaration should be issued... specifying how the constituent assembly is formed. Article 60 of the current declaration was so vague that it has left the assembly in the hands of one force.'

On 2 May 2011, various political groupings and the SCAF held a

meeting to discuss the constitution-making process and the future powers of the President. No consensus seems to have been arrived at.

According to the rules for the election released on 30 January 2012, candidates have to be born in Egypt to Egyptian parents, they may not hold dual nationality and may not be married to a foreigner. They additionally require the support of 30 MPs or 30,000 voters.

After the commencement of the formal registration process, 23 individuals were registered as candidates for the presidential election. Taking many by surprise, Khairat El-Shater, the Brotherhood's main financier, top strategist and deputy supreme leader, announced his candidacy, breaking the earlier promise of the Muslim Brotherhood not to seek the presidency. The process of confirmation of the presidential candidates was also not free of further surprises. The Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC), which determines the eligibility of those seeking to contest the election, rejected the candidacy of 10 of the 23 candidates.

Among those rejected was the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate, El-Shater, who was disqualified on account of a previous criminal record. Given the widespread belief that during Mubarak's era criminal convictions were politically motivated, this disqualification was seen as an attempt to control the choice of presidential candidates. The potential influence of Islamists was further reduced with the disqualification of the ultra-conservative Salafi, Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, because his mother held US citizenship.

On 12 April 2012, the parliament passed a law prohibiting candidates who had been high-ranking government officials during the last decade of the Mubarak

administration (2001-2011) from running in elections. Consequently, Omar Suleiman, Mubarak's former intelligence chief, and Ahmed Shafiq, the former Prime Minister, were also disqualified. Although many of the unsuccessful candidates appealed against their exclusion, most appeals were rejected. On 25 April the Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC) accepted the appeal filed by Ahmed Shafiq, overturning its previous decision to exclude him from running for President.

There are 13 candidates campaigning for the presidency. Seven of the candidates are party representatives, including Mohamed Morsi, president of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). He registered for the presidential race at the last minute, when it seemed that Khairat al-Shater, the Brotherhood's first choice, was disqualified. Others include Hamdeen Sabahi of the Dignity Party, Hossam Khairallah of Democratic Peace, Abul-Ezz Al-Hariri of the Socialist Popular Alliance, Mohamed Fawzy of Democratic Generation, Hisham al-Bastawisi of Tagammu and Abdullah El-Ashaal of Authenticity.

Six of the candidates campaigned as independent candidates. These are Amr Moussa, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, Ahmed Shafiq, Mohamed Selim al-Awa, Khaled Ali and Mahmoud Hossam. Amr Moussa, former foreign minister of Egypt and chief of the Arab League, and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh were the frontrunners at least until a few days before voting. Amr Moussa has presented himself to the electorate as a candidate of experience and stability. This may appeal to the Copts and members of the Egyptian public who are tired of the continued instability and chaos. Although he supported the popular uprising that unseated Mubarak, he has also criticised protestors. Last month, he

reportedly accused members of the April 6 movement of trying to 'sow chaos' in Egypt.

Until the last few days before voting, for those who were seeking a complete break with the past, Aboul Fotouh appeared to be a popular choice. His credentials as a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood are believed to have strong appeal for Islamist groups, although most of the votes from supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood were sure to go to its candidate, Morsi. At the same time, his active participation from the very beginning of the uprisings in January 2011 and his moderate Islamic position could win him support from liberals and young Egyptians as well as Coptic Christians. On 18 May, he held a rally that drew some 44,000 supporters.

In a break from past electoral practices, in which the incumbent was the only candidate, the two frontrunners in the presidential election participated in a televised debate for the first time in the history of the Arab world. It emerged from the debate that Moussa is more of a candidate of continuity than change, while Aboul Fotouh represents change and the potential promise of the future democratic transformation of Egypt.

While the two candidates were favoured frontrunners, support for Hosni Mubarak's last Prime Minister, Ahmed Shafiq, surged in the final days leading up to the election. According to the official results, Shafiq received a surprising 23.3 per cent of the vote, qualifying him for the run-off election. Given the electoral base of the Muslim Brotherhood and its strong electoral outreach, another candidate who attracted strong support and became the leading candidate for the second round of votes was the Justice and Freedom Party leader, Mohamed Morsi. The official results show that 24.3 per cent of the voters chose him.

Although this was the first free and democratic election for the highest office in the country, the voter turn-out was much lower than expected. Of the more than 50 million registered voters, only about 23 million people cast their votes, some 46 per cent of the electorate. It is interesting to note that this figure is also lower than the voter turn-out for the parliamentary elections.

Many liberals and revolutionary forces are disenchanted with the outcome of the election. The prospect of a Shafiq presidency is particularly likely to attract fury and frustration. Indeed, this fury has already started to manifest itself. Hours after the official announcement of the results, unidentified assailants set fire to Shafiq's headquarters in Cairo. The reported plan by the Muslim Brotherhood that Morsi would put together a national unity government, if true, is likely to allay the fears of many. Otherwise, Egypt is sure to experience further protests and instability.

After more than a year of turmoil, bloody protests, a declining economy and rising crime, there is a strong desire for calm and stability in Egypt. This partly explains Shafiq's surprisingly strong performance. While this desire for stability emerged in the vote count, it may not necessarily produce national consensus. The situation has left Egyptians in a very polarized position. They must now choose between continuity of the old regime by electing Shafiq or break with the past and turn to Islamist leadership by electing Morsi. If Morsi succeeds in winning the run-off elections (which is the most likely scenario), the Muslim Brotherhood, which controls the plurality of votes in Parliament, will be in the enviable position of controlling the two most important elected institutions of government in Egypt. In that event, the realization of all or most of the

promises of the revolution will depend on the willingness of the FJP to accommodate the demands of the revolutionary forces, whose total voting strength potentially exceeds the number of votes garnered by Morsi and Shafiq individually.

### **Geo-political dynamics**

#### ***Africa and RECs***

At the recent 17th Assembly of the AU Heads of State and Government held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, the Assembly in its decision, Assembly/AU/Dec.369 (XVII), noted the developments in Egypt at the time of that meeting. In particular, it stressed the importance of steps being taken to enable the Egyptian people to democratically choose their leaders and establish institutions truly representative and respectful of fundamental freedoms and human rights. The Assembly also encouraged 'the Egyptian authorities and parties to persevere in their efforts to complete the transition and ensure that the aspirations and hopes of the Egyptian people are fulfilled'. Finally, the Assembly requested 'the Commission to spare no efforts in supporting and accompanying the transition, building notably on the outcome of the visits undertaken by the Chairperson and the Panel of the Wise to Egypt, on 26 and 27 March 2011 and from 4 to 6 June 2011, respectively'.

Although it has not been officially announced, if its recent practices on elections are anything to go by, it is expected that the AU would deploy election observers. In fulfilling the above decision of the AU assembly and subsequent PSC decisions, the AU may also consider sending a delegation to Egypt.

#### ***United Nations***

Even if the presidential election in Egypt is part of the reform process that resulted from the popular uprising that toppled Mubarak from power, the UNSC will continue to

treat it as a domestic affair with no bearing on international peace and security. However, there is no doubt that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon will continue to monitor the situation and respond as necessary.

#### ***International community***

Egypt's major long-time ally is the United States. While the US was initially ambivalent about the popular uprising, upon realizing the magnitude and persistence of the popular revolt in Egypt, the Obama administration expressed its support for the democratic transformation of the country. However, many developments in the politics of Egypt since the departure of Mubarak have placed much strain on the US-Egypt relationship. In the light of the uncertainties that the new political environment has created and the rise to political prominence of Islamist groups, there are concerns about Islamists in the US and the future of America's relations with Egypt.

The decision of SCAF to crack down on civil society organizations receiving support from outside the country resulted in major new tensions with the US. The International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) were among 17 US-based and local foreign-funded groups whose offices were raided by Egyptian prosecutors in December 2011.

The Egyptian authorities announced on 5 February 2012 that 43 people, one the son of the US Secretary of Transport, were being put on trial on charges of 'setting up branches of international organisations in Egypt without licenses from the Egyptian government' and of 'receiving illegal foreign funding'. The announcement was received with angry responses from the US, whose Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, warned Egyptian authorities that aid to Egypt-including \$1.3billion of military assistance granted each year-would be reviewed.

Both Western countries, most notably the US, and Israel have been

closely following developments in Egypt's presidential election due to its huge ramifications both for Egypt and for the politics of the entire Middle East.

As events in Egypt usually tend to affect the politics of the Middle East, this is an election that also attracts the interests of other countries of the region. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are among major countries that have showed strong interest in the political developments in Egypt. Early in May 2012, the Saudi government deposited US\$1 billion with Egypt's central bank, to help shore up foreign exchange reserves. Although Saudi Arabia promised \$ 4 billion in aid to Egypt in 2011, it was only after a delegation of Islamist politicians visited Riyadh that Saudi Arabia released the \$ 1 billion. Given its strong ties with Mubarak's regime and its anxiety about the consequences of the revolution, as well as the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, the release of further Saudi Arabian funds is likely to depend on which party wins the election in Egypt.

Qatar has been receptive and even supportive of the political changes in Egypt in general and the electoral successes of the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. Qatar channels its financial support for Egypt through private-sector investment in infrastructure. These investments include those directed to the building of two new ports, and setting up a new regional investment bank and oil refinery.

#### ***Scenarios***

Given the above analysis, any one or combination of the following scenarios may unfold:

##### ***Scenario 1***

If the election result is contested or if it does not result in a president that will facilitate an inclusive and consensual political process in Egypt, there is a high risk of continuing instability due to protests from liberals and the urban youth who led the uprising, or Islamists. A Shafiq

presidency in particular is certain to face fierce opposition, while it would receive the support of the military and supporters and beneficiaries of the old regime.

### Scenario 2

Depending on the threat that the new political developments pose to the interests of the military, the risk of a military takeover cannot be discounted. This risk is particularly high if Morsi becomes the next President and Egypt continues to witness protests and instability.

### Scenario 3

If the new president reaches out to all the major political forces and succeeds in striking a deal that will reflect their views in the final constitution, the election outcome will face no major opposition and the new president of Egypt will lead the country towards stability and

consensus on the various issues facing the country.

### Options

Given the above scenarios, the early response options that the PSC may consider include:

#### Option 1

The PSC could issue a press statement acknowledging the importance of the Presidential election and the need to use the occasion to achieve consensus and move the democratic transformation of Egypt forward.

#### Option 2

The PSC could more specifically request the various political forces in Egypt and more particularly the military to respect the decision of the electorate and support the establishment of a democratically elected government.

### Option 3

The PSC could request the AU Commission to deploy monitors for the run-off election scheduled for 16 and 17 June 2012 and to send a high-level delegation to Egypt.

### Documentation

PSC/PR/BR.3 (CCLXVIII), (23 March 2011) Peace and Security Council of the AU, Press Statement on the Situation in Egypt

Assembly/AU/Dec.369(XVII), (30 June to 1 July 2011) Decision of the 17th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the State of Peace and Security in Africa

PSC/PR/BR.(CCXCIX) (22 November 2012) Peace and Security Council, Press Statement on the Situation in Egypt

## Country analysis

### GUINEA-BISSAU

#### Previous PSC and AU Communiqués

In a press statement released following the military coup that took place in Guinea-Bissau on 12 April, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) expressed concerns about the coup. ECOWAS expressed its disappointment, particularly given the timing of the coup, coming just days after a joint ECOWAS-AU-UN mission meeting with the military hierarchy to warn against any temptation to disrupt the on-going electoral process.

For ECOWAS, the coup is unacceptable as it comes at a moment when ECOWAS is engaged with Guinea-Bissau in efforts to pursue wide-ranging reforms for economic development and national reconstruction. The regional body firmly denounced this latest

incursion by the military into politics and unreservedly condemned the irresponsible act, which once more demonstrated the army's tendency to maintain Guinea-Bissau as a failed state.

ECOWAS demanded the immediate restoration of constitutional order to allow for the completion of the on-going electoral process. It saw the coup as a flagrant defiance of the ECOWAS' principle of Zero Tolerance for power obtained by unconstitutional means, as enshrined in the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and vowed to punish the perpetrators who, by their action, had wilfully and knowingly outlawed Guinea-Bissau from ECOWAS.

#### Crisis escalation potential

On 12 April, Guinea-Bissau once again made the news with yet another military coup. The coup came at a time when the country was gearing up toward the run-off elections to complete the

transitional arrangements following the death of President Malam Bacai Sanha on 9 January 2012. The country held the first round of the elections on 18 March with Carlos Gomes Junior, the flag bearer of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde) (PAIGC), taking the lead with 48.97 % of the vote, followed by the leader of the Party for Social Renewal (Partido para a Renovação Social) (PRS), Kumba Yala, with 23.36%. Manuel Serifo Namhajo, a dissident from the PAIGC who stood as an independent candidate, garnered 15.74%.

However, as soon as the electoral commission announced the results, the main opposition party, the Party for Social Renovation, rejected them on the grounds that they were rigged. A group of parties called for a boycott of the run-off election while Kumba Yala even warned of violence should the electoral commission go ahead with those elections.

The contestation of the results and threats of violence created a polarised and tense environment ahead of the run-off election. Indeed, the coup has seriously derailed the transition process, jeopardising some efforts to steer the country out of its political, military and socio-economic quagmire. Not only has the coup consolidated the army's hegemony in Guinea-Bissau's national polity, it has also neutralised the ascendance of Prime Minister Gomes and the dominance of the PAIGC since its victory in the legislative elections of 2008. Moreover, the coup undermined the democratisation process while pushing Guinea-Bissau further into political uncertainty. Guinea-Bissau remains a complex emergency case in which a fragile consensus, combined with the threats of drug-trafficking and the prominence of the army in national political debate, continues to frustrate efforts by the international community and domestic actors to restore peace and promote socio-economic development.

### Key issues and internal dynamics

Guinea-Bissau is a country in a state of perpetual transition, frequently interrupted by tragic events that hold back the nation-building project that has been a major goal since the country won its independence in 1974. In recent years, military interventions in the national political process have been particularly violent and detrimental to the post-conflict reconstruction. Equally, post-coup elections have revealed serious flaws in attempting to restore democratic order through constitutional provisions in Guinea-Bissau.

In fact, both military and political forces in Guinea-Bissau are much more concerned about gaining control of the state and its resources for personal gain. Indeed, the latest developments in Guinea-Bissau serve as a reminder that, in transitional societies or countries emerging from war, elections alone

are insufficient to guarantee a well-functioning democracy. At best and in the specific case of Guinea-Bissau, elections provided for the recycling of the political or military elite without necessarily creating conditions for the emergence of independent, credible and effective state institutions.

One could argue that the coup d'état of 12 April was the second leg of the attempted coup of 1 April 2010, during which the Deputy Army Chief of Staff, Antonio Indjai, arrested Carlos Gomes Junior, the then Prime Minister. General Antonio Indjai's plan proceeds from the logic of eliminating key political and military actors whom he considers to be undermining the authority of the armed forces. The plan has functioned both naturally (as a result of the death of president Malam Bacai Sanha) and systematically (as a consequence of the recent coup against the interim government of Reimundo Pereira) and has cleared Indjai's path toward restoring the hegemony of the army in the national polity. For many observers, the 1 April 2010 attempted coup and the latest intervention by the army were aimed at redefining the balance of power among the main political and military actors in Guinea-Bissau. It was the direct consequence of the constant deterioration of the relations between the executive and the army on the one hand and the Balante ('those who resist') ethnic group and the coastal Papel ethnic group, on the other hand.

There are two key factors that led to the downfall of Carlos Gomes Junior. Firstly, the former prime minister incarnates the reformist trend within the PAIGC, a trend that is strongly resisted by some conservatives on the basis of their role in the war of liberation against Portugal. These ideological differences partly explain the fragmentation of the former liberation movement ahead of the first round of the post-Sanha elections. Secondly, Carlos Gomes Junior's reform agenda inspires concerns particularly within the

army's which fears losing control over the country. These concerns feature prominently among reasons advanced by the coup leaders in justifying their unconstitutional actions against the interim government. In a statement released after the coup, the members of the military junta cited Carlos Gomes Junior's plans for security sector reform as justification for their actions. They indicated that the coup had been executed in order to derail a pact between Gomes Junior and Angola seeking to 'annihilate Guinea-Bissau's armed forces'. Clearly, the contentious issue of a foreign military presence in Guinea-Bissau continues to be perceived as a direct threat to the country's armed forces. Like previous arrangements on the issue, the fragile truce negotiated by the late President, Bacai Sanha, to allow the presence of Angola's military team to protect state institutions and assist in security sector reform (SSR) ended with his death on 9 January 2012.

The paradox of the recent coup is that it does not have clear leadership and that the coup leaders prefer to operate through a spokesperson. The apparently leaderless 'Military Command' that was set up to engage with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was nothing but an instrument in the hands of the alleged instigator of the coup, the army chief of staff, Antonio Indjai, to make his point that the army is opposed to the prospects of having Carlos Gomes Junior as the new president of Guinea-Bissau. Although he was arrested together with the interim president and the prime minister, reports indicate that General Indjai has maintained regular contact with the so-called 'military command'.

The army in Guinea-Bissau has long held the view that it did not really need political power to ensure its authority and keep control over the lucrative drug trafficking network that has flourished in Guinea-Bissau for many decades. Often the army defines, manages and maintains its



sphere of influence through its ability to work closely with politicians and/or top military officers. Such influence has become a major security threat against any chances for normal political life in a state born of a hard-fought liberation struggle that has yet to lead to sustainable democratic governance.

Indeed, Guinea-Bissau is still a victim of a failed state-building process. For almost three decades, a fragmented army has hampered state building while a disorganised and selfish political elite has created a web of conflicting interests that are incompatible with a much-needed common vision to pull Guinea-Bissau away from the political abyss. In taking centre stage in the latest military coup, and controlling important portfolios within the contested interim government, the army has declared that it remains the most important centre of power in Guinea-Bissau. This is a dangerous development for the democratic process, let alone the reform of the security sector, considered crucially important for a lasting peace.

In reality, the argument against the former Prime Minister, Carlos Gomes Junior, and his reform agenda backed by Angola, hides a deeper ethnic division manifested in the ranks of political parties as well as the army. Firstly, the army is seen as predominantly comprising members of the Balante, one of the largest ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau and which claims to have made the largest contribution to the liberation of the country. Members of the Balante community often complain they have not benefited from the liberation dividends in terms of education and socio-economic status. Moreover, the rise to political power of Carlos Gomes Junior and Reimundo Pereira is seen as the growing dominance of mixed-race 'mulatos' within the national polity. Therefore, the SSR, which aims at increasing education levels of army officers and reducing the size of the institution, appears as the manifestation of both ethnic and

class rivalry, with an existing and potentially disastrous impact on the national peace building project.

### **Geo-political dynamics**

#### ***Africa and RECs***

The coup in Guinea-Bissau came at a very difficult time for ECOWAS and the African Union (AU), both struggling to find a solution to what is seen as a major security challenge for the regional body in Mali. The AU particularly is also affected by the ongoing rivalry between Gabon and South Africa over the future chairmanship of the AU Commission. As for the West African regional body, the coup in Guinea-Bissau occurred just six days after ECOWAS facilitated the signing of the Bamako Framework Agreement for the restoration of constitutional order in Mali. As a first step, that agreement led to the handover of power by the Malian military junta to a transitional government led by Acting President Dioncounda Traore, who was previously the Speaker of Mali's National Assembly.

ECOWAS' reaction to the coup in Guinea-Bissau came almost immediately and was in line with the provision of its 2001 Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Guinea-Bissau was suspended and ECOWAS threatened to impose sanctions on the leaders of the coup. However, the normative stance of ECOWAS suffers from a lack of consistency.

While the regional body was calling for the restoration of the democratic order, in other words, the restoration of the status quo ante, its approach to the crisis in Mali did not live up to its 'Zero Tolerance' norm. Even though the former Malian President, Amadou Toumani Touré, was completing his last days in office, ECOWAS' acceptance of his premature exit from power, and his departure from the country, sent a wrong signal to other potential coup plotters. Domestic realities and imperatives might have been influential in the process, but the

ECOWAS approach in Mali also has direct implications for the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

The Military Command proposed to the regional organisation a transition plan that excluded both Carlos Gomes Junior and the PAIGC from the transition process and established a new timeframe beyond the existing constitutional provisions. It appointed Manuel Serifo Namhajo, a dissident from the PAIGC, as interim president, while offering the position of Prime Minister to Rui Duarte de Barros of the Party of Social Renovation.

Such transitional arrangements were contested by the PAIGC on the grounds that they violated the constitution. Meanwhile, it is important to stress that there was a strategic and pragmatic reason why ECOWAS made that deal. The regional body had never approved the military presence of Angola in Guinea-Bissau, even if both countries were part of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). Therefore, the transitional arrangements provided ECOWAS with the opportunity to send its own troops to Guinea-Bissau as Angolan troops prepared to exit.

As ECOWAS troops began arriving, there were two main concerns that needed to be raised. The first was about relations between ECOWAS troops and Guinea Bissau's armed forces, given the resentment of some of its leaders towards any foreign military presence. The second was whether Antonio Indjai had not used that bargaining strategy to buy time and finally confirm the exclusion of Carlos Gomes Junior and his reform agenda from the national polity. It was also essential to draw attention to the fact that, once criminal elements succeeded in capturing the state apparatus, the challenge would become infinitely greater for both domestic and external actors to restore the legitimacy of the political dispensation in Guinea-Bissau. In addition, as long as Guinea-Bissau remained in crisis, peace and security

in West Africa would remain fragile and the risk of political conflagration would become more certain.

### **United Nations**

Even if the United Nations had earlier endorsed the ECOWAS decision concerning the coup in Guinea-Bissau and called for an immediate restoration of the constitutional order, or at least the completion of the electoral process, the world organization did not support the transitional arrangements approved by ECOWAS. In Resolution 2048 (2012), adopted by the Security Council at its 6774th meeting on 18 May 2012, the UN, with specific regard to paragraph 3, requested '... the Secretary-General to be actively engaged in the process, in order to harmonize the respective positions of international bilateral and multilateral partners'; particularly the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Portuguese Speaking Countries Community (CPLP) and the European Union (EU). It also called for 'ensuring maximum coordination and complementarity of international efforts, to develop a comprehensive integrated strategy with concrete measures aimed at implementing security sector reform, political and economic reforms, combating drug-trafficking and fighting impunity'.

What the UN resolution sought to address was the legitimacy deficit of the transitional process in Guinea-Bissau that excluded some important stakeholders, including the PAIGC. Already, some domestic actors have rejected the transition deal and accused ECOWAS of conniving with the armed forces to impose an illegitimate government on the citizens of Guinea-Bissau.

### **International community**

The absence of a unified approach by the international community to a particular regional crisis could be detrimental. While reactions against the coup have been almost unanimous, there are divergent

approaches being advanced for resolving the crisis. Key contentious issues that currently divide domestic actors on the one hand and ECOWAS and the UN, the CPLP and the EU, on the other, include the proposed transition timeframe, the appointment of the interim president, the completion of the electoral process and the participation of some former PAIGC leaders currently in exile in Portugal. In addition, there are suspicions in Angola that ECOWAS is determined to undermine CPLP traditional ties with Guinea-Bissau by using military intervention to support the installation of pro-ECOWAS individuals in senior positions of the government and security services of Guinea-Bissau.

In his address to the Security Council following the 12 April coup, Joseph Mutaboba, the head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), pointed out that it was critical for all international partners of the troubled West African country to agree on a joint international response to facilitate a peaceful restoration of constitutional order. He also indicated that the coup was unpopular in the country and that there was mounting anxiety over the social and economic consequences of the crisis, which included the delay of civil servants' salaries and the disruption of the cashew-trading season.

In addition, human rights violations have continued, including restrictions on freedom of expression, intimidation and arbitrary arrest. Reaffirming the United Nations' strong condemnation of the coup and support for the ECOWAS-led mediation, the UN Representative said that any sustainable solution needed to be inclusive. He pledged to work with national actors to foster dialogue among all segments of society. Guinea-Bissau has become a theatre for geopolitical rivalry, which

presents additional obstacles for the quick return of the country to constitutional normalcy.

### **Civil society**

The latest coup in Guinea-Bissau has exposed divisions not only among international actors, but also among members of civil society and political parties. A group of civil society activists and a number of political parties joined forces to form a united front against moves to take power illegally. They called for an immediate return to constitutional government. For this group, the current arrangements endorsed by ECOWAS are doomed to fail. Local as well as international civil society organisations have signed petitions against the coup and called for the return of the military to their barracks.

### **Scenarios**

In light of the above developments and considerations, one or a combination of the following scenarios may unfold in Guinea-Bissau:

#### **Scenario 1**

The military command could insist on maintaining the current transitional arrangements with ECOWAS support. While many believe that this is a pragmatic approach, it contains the seeds of exclusion and has a weak legitimacy. It might help the country in the short term, but does not provide any guarantee of lasting stability. In addition, it weakens the regional body's 'Zero Tolerance' policy, which could inspire other potential coup plotters.

#### **Scenario 2**

Given the pressure from the UN and other external stakeholders, as well as criticism from local actors, mainly the PAIGC, ECOWAS and the military command, the coup leaders cannot afford to ignore their demands. The on-going discussions between the ECOWAS and external partners could lead to a renegotiated transition plan, which could be more inclusive

and might take into consideration existing constitutional provisions.

### Scenario 3

In Guinea-Bissau, political violence is never far away and appears to be the main avenue leading to political power. The current army chief of staff has successfully neutralised his opponents and assumed control over the country through resorting to violence and force of arms. If nothing is done to curb the trend, Guinea-Bissau could find itself in a spiral of violence involving opposing factions of the army and political groups.

### Options

#### Option 1

It is essential that ECOWAS balances a normative approach with pragmatism. However, this cannot be achieved by ignoring the national

constitution and the regional body's own protocols. The challenge facing Guinea-Bissau is too big to be the exclusive affair of ECOWAS. ECOWAS should remain sensitive to the demands of other stakeholders. The PAIGC still remains the major political party in Guinea-Bissau.

#### Option 2

The electoral process that was interrupted by the coup was declared to be relatively free and fair. It would be useful to address some of the known irregularities and work towards holding the second run-off elections in a manner that effectively enables the voters to decide who runs the country. While the armed forces might fear the victory of a particular candidate, they should not be allowed to obstruct the free expression of the will of the people. The concerns of the military are more

about its involvement in the international drug trade than issues of national unity, justice and stability.

#### Option 3

Regardless of the preferred option, the presence of a foreign military force is necessary with a clear mandate and resources to complete its assigned tasks. Currently, a political process based on democratic norms cannot succeed in Guinea-Bissau without the presence of a stabilisation force to protect political authorities and institutions. The national armed forces of Guinea-Bissau have become a serious threat to peace and stability, both at the national and regional levels. It is therefore essential that they once more become servants of the state and not its masters.

## PSC Retrospective

### CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF THE AU PSC AND THE EU PEACE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

Article 17 of the PSC Protocol requires the PSC to cooperate and work closely with relevant international organizations on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa. Within this framework, one such organization with which the PSC established and has maintained relatively long-standing and close cooperation, is the EU. This has been one of the AU's most important relationships in terms of both supporting the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and providing funding for the AU's conflict management and resolution

efforts. The African Peace Facility, a major funding instrument that the EU established in response to an AU request in 2003 for supporting the peace and security work of the AU, has been a core source of financing for AU peace support operations in Darfur and Somalia.

The policy organs of the two organizations on peace and security, the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU Peace and Security Committee, held their annual consultative meeting on 29 and 30 May 2011 at the EU Commission in Brussels, Belgium. This was the fifth annual consultative meeting that the two bodies have convened on an annual rotational basis in Addis Ababa and Brussels.

The consultative meeting is an opportunity not only for discussing issues to help both institutions harmonise their policies, but also to reflect on existing and potential areas of collaboration. Based on agreements reached between the two organs in previous meetings,

they recently started implementing monthly consultations between the President of the EU PSC and the Chairperson of the PSC. Accordingly, in April 2012, Angola's Ambassador, who was the monthly Chairperson of the PSC, held a video-conference with the President of the EU PSC. While the EU Delegation to the AU is currently providing the conferencing facilities temporarily, the expectation is that the AU Commission will provide video-conferencing facilities and also make the necessary arrangements for conducting such consultations in future.

This is a practical development that can be replicated in the PSC's relations with the UN Security Council, as envisaged under Resolution 2033, although it would be necessary to address existing technical difficulties as well as recognize that the implementation of regular consultations between the monthly chairperson of the AU PSC and the President of the EU PSC

will depend on the dynamism of the relevant PSC chairperson at least until such communication methods become an established practice.

Previous meetings reflect that the agenda of the consultative meeting between the AU PSC and the EU-PSC usually includes deliberations about country-specific developments and thematic issues. Following a request by the AU for consolidating thematic issues into discussions on country-specific cases, this year the agenda of the consultative meeting will be largely confined to such cases.

In anticipation of the meeting, the AU PSC has dedicated one of its sessions during the month of May to a preparatory meeting. This is particularly important, both in familiarizing members of the PSC with the agenda of the meeting and in harmonizing the views of the members of the Council on the various agenda items. By drawing the attention of the members of the Council to the agenda of the consultative meeting, such a preparatory meeting will facilitate discussion on substantive issues.

Although the final agenda of the meeting was not available at the time of going to press, the provisional agenda anticipated a discussion on a range of country specific cases, including the recent spate of armed clashes between South Sudan and Sudan and on-going efforts to bring the two countries back to AUHIP-led talks. In this regard, apart from the outstanding issues between the two countries, the humanitarian situation in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states of Sudan is likely to receive particular attention.

The continuing constitutional crisis in Mali and Guinea-Bissau is another important agenda item. Major issues that the two bodies are likely to discuss include harmonization of their policy responses, coordination of communication and engagement

with the political forces in these two countries and, most notably, the proposed deployment of ECOWAS forces to Mali.

Together with the discussion on Mali, the situation in the Sahel generally may draw the attention of some members back to the debate on Libya. Should this debate arise, it is likely that some disagreement may arise between some members of the AU PSC and the EU PSC.

Somalia is another country specific situation for discussion between the AU PSC and EU PSC. While some strong gains have been achieved on the military front, the political process that is expected to end the transitional process in August 2012 has been fraught with serious problems. While international actors, including the AU and the UN, seem determined to follow the processes and timelines set by the Roadmap of last September, it is not clear if the end of the transition will mark the emergence of a new political dispensation for Somalia.

In addition, a major point of discussion on Somalia would be EU support for AMISOM. During the London Conference on Somalia in February 2012, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton announced an additional annual contribution of 100 million Euro to AMISOM, although this has not been formally agreed to among EU member countries. Nonetheless, the AU has already requested the release of this additional funding. In the light of the expansion of AMISOM forces, the AU is also keen on increasing current EU support.

At the moment much of the EU's financing of AU peace support operations is directed towards supporting AMISOM. While EU countries have yet to agree on the allocation of the 100 million Euros for AMISOM, announced by the EU foreign policy chief, ECOWAS has already made a substantial request for EU funding to support its

planned mission to Mali. This request is for an amount of 500 million Euros for six months. In light of this large request and the view of some countries that the Sahel is more important than the Horn of Africa, the AU PSC – EU PSC meeting will be faced with the difficult task of reconciling such competing demands. Although the EU is likely to express its support for the ECOWAS mission in Mali, it may not be willing or able to provide the requested amount.

Apart from country-specific cases, other issues that will feature on the agenda of the consultative meeting of the AU PSC and EU PSC include EU support for operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and more specifically the African Standby Force (ASF). In this regard, the focus of the meeting would in particular be on the implementation of Roadmap III of the ASF and the preparations towards Exercise AMANI Africa II, a continental field training exercise that will assess the operational readiness of the ASF in 2015.

While the organisations manifest a working-level relationship in Addis Ababa, the AU and EU do not have the same level of collaboration on peace and security issues in other multilateral forums. Cooperation on peace and security issues in multilateral forums such as in New York and Geneva would also feature on the agenda of the two bodies.

Apart from the half-day meeting between the AU PSC and EU PSC, the two days scheduled in Brussels envisages interactions of AU PSC members with the European External Action Service, the European Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, the African Peace Facility, the EU Counter terrorism coordinator, and the Chair of EU Military Committee. This will be particularly valuable to familiarising AU PSC members with the

structures and decision-making actors and processes of the broader EU.

One specific outcome of the consultative meeting would be a joint statement by the AU PSC and EU PSC. The statement would be issued after deliberations on, and

revisions to, a draft prepared by the EU. It is expected that the statement will convey joint positions of the two bodies on the political process in Somalia, the situation between South Sudan and Sudan and the crisis in West Africa, including Guinea-Bissau and Mali, as well as the situation in the Sahel generally.

It is unlikely that specific commitments concerning additional funding for AU operations would be agreed upon, while the EU is likely to express general support for both AMISOM and the planned ECOWAS mission in Mali.

## Regional security analysis

### GROWING THREAT OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA

#### Previous PSC and AU Communiqués

Amid unabated and spreading attacks and the growing threat of terrorism, as well as increased collaboration among different terror groups on the continent, the AU has been vocal in condemning acts of terror and calling for action at national, regional and continental levels. In a press statement dated 31 October 2011, the Chairperson of the AU Commission strongly condemned the kidnapping of three Humanitarian Aid workers by members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The kidnapping took place in the Sahrawi refugee camp of Tindouf, in Raboundi, south-west Algeria. The AUC Chairperson, Jean Ping, referred to the action as a 'cowardly act' and pledged that the AU would follow developments seriously. The Chairperson further urged countries of the region to increase their cooperation in the fight against terrorism in the Maghreb region. Kidnapping foreigners and asking for ransom or the release of imprisoned terrorists has been the most visible Modus Operandi of the AQIM in recent years.

The decision by the Assembly of the AU at its 13th Ordinary Session, held

in Sirte, Libya, from 1 to 3 July 2010, Assembly/AU/ Dec. 256(XIII), also rejected any ransom payments to terrorist groups in exchange for the release of hostages. The decision stressed that the payment of ransom constitutes one of the main methods of financing international terrorism and urged the international community not to agree to ransom demands and to consider any act of terrorism as a crime.

Following the spate of terror attacks by Boko Haram at the end of 2011, the AU Commission released a strong statement on 26 December of that year condemning the group and its activities. In the statement, the Chairperson stated that 'Boko Haram's continued acts of terror and cruelty and absolute disregard for human life cannot be justified by any religion or faith'. Ping further reaffirmed the AU's total rejection of all acts of intolerance, extremism and terrorism. The AU also released a further press statement following the deadly waves of attacks by the group on January 20-21 that killed some 200 people in Nigeria's second biggest city of Kano. The 22 January statement expressed the AU's condemnation of the attack 'in the strongest terms'. The AU pledged to support efforts by the government of Nigeria to bring an end to 'all terrorist attacks in the country' and combat terrorism in all its forms.

The AU has also been vocal in condemning and rejecting terrorist attacks by the Somali group, Al-Shabaab, in Somalia, Kenya and Uganda. The AU PSC PSC/PR/COMM (CCCII) has also requested the AU

Commission to submit recommendations to enhance the mandate of AMISOM and to authorize increasing its strength to a level and size that would be appropriate for the consolidation of peace and security and support the transitional government's efforts to defeat Al-Shabaab.

#### Crisis escalation potential

On 24 October 2011 the Nigerian militant Islamic group officially acknowledged its working relations and cooperation with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the North African chapter of the international terrorism network. The declaration confirmed the worst fears of security analysts and officials as collaboration between the different terrorist groups on the continent could intensify their attacks and lead to more sophisticated operations and attacks, as well as diversify their financial and recruitment sources. Additional reports also claimed that the Nigerian group had strong links with Al-Shabaab and stated that Al-Shabaab also trained Boko Haram's fighters in Somalia.

The realization of an effective collaboration network between the three radical militant groups would create a dangerous alliance of terrorist bands from the western to the eastern edges of the continent. This extension of the Al Qaeda 'franchise' in Africa and localization of terrorism could pose a significant security threat for countries in the region as well as the entire African continent. In the absence of

coordinated regional and continental initiatives and efforts to effectively combat terrorism, the network could grow to become a major security threat for the continent in the near future.

### Key issues and internal dynamics

In a press release dated 12 May 2012, the Nigerian police announced that they had arrested Suleiman Mohammed, a senior commander of Boko Haram, in the northern city of Kano. A report released by the Nigerian government days before his arrest reflects the magnitude of Boko Haram's growing attacks and the resultant security crisis in Nigeria. According to figures from the Nigerian military, in 2011 Boko Haram launched 118 terror attacks, killing 308 people in six states in north-central Nigeria and Abuja. From the time when Boko Haram began its attacks against the Nigerian government in 2009 until January 2012, the group has killed at least 1,200 people. These figures support the statement on 9 January 2012, by Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, comparing the terror threat posed by Boko Haram to the country's civil war in the 1960s that killed more than a million people.

Boko Haram has become more sophisticated in its approach to attaining its terrorist goals through the use of increased suicide bombings, advanced weaponry and explosives, and what appear to be imported tactics and resources, but the Nigerian government has also lacked the required intelligence and prior information to be able to effectively deal with the threat. It has become clear that the Boko Haram problem is no longer exclusively a Nigerian problem, particularly after Boko Haram's spokesperson, Abul Qaqa, confirmed that his group was receiving support from AQIM.

In further news that will certainly be of concern to those fighting terrorism in Africa, the Nigerian government allegedly received confirmation in May 2012 that Boko

Haram had received the equivalent of 250 000 USD from AQIM. The donation by the Algerian-based AQIM is supposedly a first batch of funds as part of planned long-term financial support for Boko Haram. The report also indicated the two groups had met a number of times in their bid to agree on plans for long-term cooperation.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb officially joined Al-Qaeda international in September 2006. The news was welcomed by the leadership of Al-Qaeda. On 11 September, 2006, the then second in command of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, approved the merger and described the group as 'a source of chagrin, frustration and sadness' for Algeria's authorities. He called the merger a 'blessed union'.

On 14 November 2011 the Algerian government announced the closure of around 900 mosques and prayer halls throughout the country, stating that they were being used for meetings by suspected Islamic terrorists. Algerian officials hold the view that AQIM, which originated in Algeria, was being particularly active in places of worship, where meetings among militants are able to take place in secrecy. The number of places of worship that have been closed by the Algerian government is demonstrative of the active grass root activities of AQIM in Algeria. The group has, however, been more active in countries like Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Morocco. The group has also kidnapped many foreigners and a number of AQIM terrorists have engaged in suicide bombings across the region. They have also lent support to other terrorist groups outside their normal operational region.

According to the Malian defence ministry, about 100 North Africans, essentially from Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, recently joined the ranks of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The ministry also said that AQIM was recruiting Moroccans and Egyptians en masse. On 22 March, following

the military coup in Bamako, Islamic militants and tribal Tuareg groups took advantage of the political and military disorder to push government forces out of northern Mali, an area the size of France and Belgium that includes the cities of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu.

In Somalia, terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab have posed a serious security threat for Somalia and the larger East African region. Al-Qaeda's influence on al-Shabaab has been profound as the Somali radical group has also forged ties with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere to obtain foreign fighters, expertise and cash. The group also shifted from engaging in an exclusive localized terror campaign when it launched attacks in Kenya and Uganda. It also focused on training Boko Haram militants. According to analysts the danger of al-Shabaab having a safe haven in Somalia is that it could train and host other like-minded radicals in its tactics on the continent, as witnessed in the case of Boko Haram. Al Shabaab is beginning to change its operational tactics, resorting more and more to suicide bombings as part of its overall guerilla-terrorist strategy. It is likely that Al Shabaab will continue to maintain its networks in Mogadishu, in order to undertake attacks against TFG and AMISOM forces. However, recent developments in Somalia indicate that Al Shabaab is effectively on the defensive. AU forces are now reportedly in control of most of Mogadishu, Somalia's capital.

According to intelligence documents recovered from the Pakistan house of the now dead Osama bin Laden the latter once enjoyed some form of regular communication with Boko Haram. According to a report in the UK's Guardian newspaper, bin Laden appeared to have been in direct or indirect communication with Boko Haram as well as many other militant outfits. Recovered documents have also confirmed that Boko Haram was working with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). A United States

government cable dated 29 June 2009, and subsequently publicized by Wikileaks, also documented the terrorist organisation's relationship with a veteran Chadian extremist, Abu-Mahjin, described as having 'limited ties to al-Qa'eda associates,' who was, on behalf of Boko Haram, seeking more funds to intensify its operations.

## Geo-political dynamics

### *Africa and RECs*

Recent years have witnessed a growing threat of terrorism in Africa. Numerous terrorist acts which have grabbed the attention of the international media and community have compelled the AU to further its existing efforts to fight terrorism and develop a coordinated and harmonised definition and response to one of the most visible threats to human security, democracy and development on the continent. In an effort to institutionalise and operationalise policies and decisions regarding terrorism in Africa, the Peace and Security Council of the AU considered a report of the Chairperson of the Commission, Jean Ping, entitled 'Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Measures to Strengthen Cooperation in the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism' PSC/PR/2(CCXLIX) at its 249th meeting on 22 November, 2010.

The issue of terrorism was also on the agenda of the 15th Ordinary Session of the African Union, held in Kampala, Uganda, in the wake of the 11 July bombings in that city which killed more than 80 civilians. The Assembly of the Union identified terrorism as a serious concern for peace, security and stability in Africa and consequently adopted decision Assembly/AU/ Dec. 311(XV) on the prevention and combating of terrorism. The Assembly of Heads of States and Government also emphasised the need for renewed efforts and increased mobilisation of resources to combat the threat. The Assembly further requested the Commission to submit to the PSC

concrete recommendations aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of Africa's actions in seeking to prevent and combat terrorism. The report of the Chairperson was presented to the Council in accordance with the above request in order to provide an overview of the perceived terrorism threat and vulnerabilities existing in Africa and to articulate the AU's efforts in establishing the required institutional capacity to successfully combat terrorism.

The Director of the African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) briefed the PSC on 28 August 2008 about the AU and UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The PSC issued a statement (SC/PR/1(LXCIX) following the meeting, in which it 'condemned unreservedly acts of terrorism, wherever they occur' and stressed that the fight against terrorism relies on the full implementation of all continental and international counter-terrorism instruments. The PSC further called on member states that had not ratified the Organization for African Unity's (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and its Protocol, to do so.

The 22 November 2010, the report of the Chairperson divided the terrorist threats on the continent into five major categories: terrorist attacks against African interests; terrorist attacks against Western interests; use of African territory as a safe haven; Africa as a terrorist breeding ground and source of recruits and financing; and Africa as a transit point for terrorists and fund-raising tied to other illicit activities.

The Chairperson's report stated that the vulnerability to terrorist attacks in the different regions of the continent varied and that North and West Africa and the Horn of Africa received the most attention. At present these regions are suffering from the brutal activities of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, with all having established official operational relations or indirect links

with the mainstream Al Qaeda network.

The OAU adopted the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism at its 35th Ordinary Session in Algiers, Algeria, in July 1999. The Protocol sought to define what constitutes an act of terror and it also highlighted the growing links between terrorism and organised crime, as well as the illicit trafficking of arms, drugs and money laundering. The Algiers conference also produced a Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism which focused on state-building, inter-governmental co-operation, and strategies to discourage and penalise terrorist activities. The OAU initiatives were further enforced and pursued by its successor, the AU, and a Plan of Action to implement the Algiers Protocol was adopted by the AU High-Level Inter-Governmental meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa in Algiers in September 2002. The Plan of Action intends to give concrete expression to the commitments and obligations of AU Member States and access to appropriate counter-terrorism resources.

In October 2004, the African Centre for Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in Algiers, in response to the proposals in paragraphs 19 to 21 of the AU Plan of Action. The ACSRT serves as the technical arm of the AU on matters relating to terrorism and the implementation of the Union's counter-terrorism programme. The Centre also strives to harmonise the African perspective on and definition of terrorism and aspires to become the continental hub for the study of terrorism. It also works towards the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The Centre is mandated to develop analyses on the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. The ACSRT has provided a forum for interaction and cooperation among Member States and the various Regional Mechanisms, through their

representatives. It has also taken steps to provide technical assistance to Member States by developing technical expertise in a number of counterterrorism areas, through the organisation of training courses and seminars.

Other significant progress in the implementation of the 2002 Plan of Action is the process of finalising the African Model Law on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, with the draft presented by Member States to the meeting of experts in Algiers from 15 to 16 December 2010. The Model Law further serves as a guide for Member States in developing, strengthening and/or updating their existing national laws, to better meet their international and regional obligations.

In 1 May 2012, Chad's president, Idris Deby, called for the urgent creation of a regional force to tackle Nigerian Boko Haram militants. Deby said Boko Haram posed a permanent security threat to Nigeria and the region. He urged the creation of a joint deterrence force at a meeting in Libreville of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, which includes Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and the Central African Republic.

The Sahel encompasses eight million square km (3.1-million- square-miles) on the edge of the Sahara desert. Countries in the region have raised concerns over controlling their large borders as they struggle against the influence and threats of AQIM. Effective cooperation between countries affected by AQIM requires high-level political cooperation in addition to timely information sharing and coordination of operations. Many analysts claim that weapons from war-torn Libya fell into the hands of al-Qaeda. Foreign ministers from the Sahel countries of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Chad held a meeting in Nouakchott in December 2011 to discuss regional security.

The December 2011 ministerial meeting also paved the way for the second Sahel security meeting,

scheduled for January 2012. The first meeting was held in Algiers in September 2011. The absence of a strong regional organisation is one of the glaring weaknesses in the fight against AQIM. A comprehensive regional response has been compromised because of the differences and disagreements between the states concerned.

On 4 October 2011 the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) of the Economic Community of West African States discussed the Boko Haram threat at its meeting in Abuja. The meeting emphasized the need to bring about a lasting solution to the terrorist attacks by addressing the deeply rooted social, political and economic factors causing the threat. ECOWAS stated that the security efforts should be accompanied by socio-economic and political development.

#### **United Nations**

The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2017 on 31 October 2011, unanimously urging Libya and its neighbours to safeguard their arsenal of weapons so that they would not fall into the hands of terrorists. Subsequently, AQIM claimed that it had benefited from the Libyan crisis as it had acquired weapons from Gaddafi's arsenal. According to military sources, the weapons included some 20,000 portable surface-to-air missiles.

The United Nations has been a major victim of Boko Haram, having lost eleven of its staff members in the attacks on the UN Office in Abuja that killed a total of 23 people and injured more than 100 others in August 2011. The UN has condemned attacks by the group and its Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has called such attacks 'unjustifiable' and urged an end to all acts of sectarian violence.

#### **International community**

There has not been any coordinated international effort to address the challenge of terrorism in a comprehensive way.

In a letter dated 30 April 2012, several US congress members, including former Republican presidential candidate Michele Bachmann, warned that Nigeria and the West African region could be destabilized if terrorist groups were not check-mated. A report by the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security noted that Boko Haram was being trained by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The report also referred to Al-Qaeda's ties to the Somalian militant group, Al Shabaab. Pressure is mounting on the Obama Administration to take decisive action against Boko Haram and to designate Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization (FTO).

The US has been supporting the fight against terrorism in Africa and in 2011 it announced that it was increasing its annual counterterrorism financial support to the North African and Sahel region to \$150 million. The US supports such activities through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a multi-faceted US government programme under the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), aiming at defeating terrorist organisations and strengthening regional counter-terrorism capabilities. The initiative also aims to enhance the indigenous capacities of governments in the Pan-Sahel region (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Niger, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) to confront the challenge posed by terrorist organisations in their region and to facilitate cooperation between the Pan-Sahel countries and Maghreb partners (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) in combating terrorist activity.

#### **Scenarios**

The threat posed by terrorist groups in Africa could take a number of courses depending on the actions taken by the various parties to the crisis in the coming months. The following are the possible scenarios:

##### **Scenario 1**

The terrorist network of Al-Qaeda could continue to grow, especially



with the fragility of the situation in Somalia, Mali, Nigeria and Libya. The continued attacks and abductions by various terrorist groups could lead to more insecurity on the continent. The weaknesses of security institutions and presence of ungoverned areas in the affected regions could also create a safe haven for the activities of terrorist groups.

### **Scenario 2**

Effective coordinated continental action, supported by international support, could limit the sphere of activity of terrorists and their effective collaboration. Focused regional integration and determined partnership amongst the countries of the region that practice collaboration and cooperation in intelligence and security measures would enhance the likelihood of success against the terrorist scourge.

### **Scenario 3**

The growing partnership between AQIM, Boko Haram and Al Shabaab could multiply the magnitude of the security threat.

### **Options**

Given the above scenarios the following options could be considered:

#### **Option 1**

The PSC could urge tougher actions against individuals and organizations supporting terrorism and support provisions allowing investigation into, and the seizure of, properties and cash belonging to terrorist groups and their financiers.

#### **Option 2**

The PSC could call for the implementation of the 2002 Plan of Action in the process of finalising the African Model Law on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The Council could also call for the updating and harmonisation of legal systems, both national and regional, to uniformly apply Investigations into terrorist activities, and the prosecution of terrorists, on the continent.

#### **Option 3**

The PSC could urge member states to ratify and enforce international and regional conventions and treaties on terrorism and effectively implement the AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the Convention and Suppression of Financing of Terrorism.

#### **Option 4**

The PSC could continue to urge strong regional cooperation between countries affected by the activities of terrorist groups and could assign a special envoy to coordinate and oversee continental efforts in the fight against terrorism with a special focus on Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Africa. The PSC could coordinate its efforts with the UNSC and other international players to develop a joint response anti-terrorism strategy which would be based on a close partnership with UN missions in the affected countries. Such cooperation could focus on enhancing the exchange of information and intelligence relating to terrorist groups, entities and individuals, their methods of operation and the means and sources of their funding.

#### **Option 5**

The PSC could hold an exclusive meeting focusing on terror in the Maghreb, Sahel, West Africa and the Horn to raise continental and international awareness about the issue and enhance regional cooperation that could lead to a comprehensive and collaborative approach to help combat terrorism. The PSC, in accordance with the AU border security declaration, could also facilitate support for countries of the region that would enable them to develop more effective border patrol and security measures.

#### **Option 6**

The PSC could request the AU Commission to investigate the impact of collaboration among various terrorist groups and submit a report on a coordinated regional

response that the AU, in consultation with ECOWAS and other relevant regional groupings, could adopt. The PSC could also request the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) to facilitate cooperation among states as well as the effective implementation of regional, continental and international legal instruments.

### **Documentation**

#### **Relevant AU Documents**

Press Release by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission Kampala, 27 July 2010

Press Release (August 2011) AU Commission Press Statement condemning suicide bomb attacks on the United Nations Office in Abuja, Nigeria

PSC/PR/COMM (CCXCIII) (13 September 2011) Communiqué on the situation in Somalia

Press Release (4 October, 2011) The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union Strongly condemns today's terrorist attack in Mogadishu

Press Release by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, 31st October 2011

PSC/PR/COMM (CCCII)(2 December 2011), Communiqué on the situation in Somalia

Press Release (26 December 2011) AU Commission Press Statement condemning the Terrorist Bombings in Nigeria

Press Release (22 January 2012) AU Commission Press Statement condemning the Terrorist Attacks in Kano, Nigeria

#### **UN Documents**

Resolution 2017 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6644th meeting, on 31 October 2011

#### **RECs Documents**

Communiqué of the 41st Extra Ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers

## PSC Retrospective

### CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN SOMALIA

After the term of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia was extended for a further period of one year, a Roadmap outlining benchmarks and timelines towards the completion of the transitional period was signed in Mogadishu on 6 September 2011. The Roadmap was initiated and accepted by the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), leaders of regional entities such as the Puntland and Galmudug states, the head of the Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaa'ah militant group, the UN envoy to Somalia, as well as representatives of the League of Arab states, the African Union and the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). Tasks listed in the Roadmap included security, political outreach, reconciliation and good governance. However, one of the major tasks envisaged in the Roadmap was the adoption of Somalia's constitution by June 2012. To this end a number of constitutional conferences have been held since the end of 2011.

The Committee of Experts for the Constitution was appointed on 23 September. The Committee organized the first Constitutional Conference in Garowe on 21-23 December 2011 with a view to creating an environment conducive to the required stabilization process. This first national constitutional conference was hosted in Somalia after 20 years of conflict and is considered as a landmark achievement in Somalia's stabilization and peace process. The conference succeeded in creating unity of purpose among Somalis and brought together the TFG, Puntland state, and members of civil society in

Somalia. The conference made a significant contribution to the implementation of the Roadmap.

The conference discussed the envisaged size, composition, basis of representation and selection criteria of the new federal parliament under the envisaged federal constitution. Adoption of the new federal constitution by a constituent assembly, including the assembly's mandate and the size and selection criteria of the constituent assembly, was also emphasized.

A second constitutional conference was held in Garowe from 15-17 February 2012 and issues such as federalism, systems of governance and electoral systems, were among the topics discussed as well as the practical operationalization of institutions of government. This culminated in the Garowe II constitutional principles.

The Somali Roadmap signatories held a third consultative meeting in Galka'yo on 26 March 2012 and agreed on the following issues:

First, to reduce the size of the Constituent Assembly, as agreed upon in the Garowe II conference, from 1000 to 825 delegates who share parliamentary seats proportionately on the basis of the 4.5 power sharing formula. This means essentially that a majority of parliamentary seats will be assigned to each of the four biggest clan families and the remaining seats will be allocated to minority clan families represented by point five. This formula among the Somali clans is seen as the correct procedure for power sharing.

Second, it was agreed that 135 Traditional Elders representing Somali clans, including 30 members for each of the four major clans and 15 members for each major sub clan, would select members of the Constituent Assembly to adopt the draft constitution and members of the new Parliament in consultation

with their respective clans. In addition, this task would be supported by a technical committee comprising 17 members, six of whom would come from the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), three from Puntland, three from Galmudug, three from Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a and two from the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS).

At more or less the same time as the third consultative meeting took place, Somali civil society organisations met on 23-27 March 2012 with the participation of over 120 leaders of Somali civil society. The meeting captured the country's political interest in the wake of the Roadmap announcement and consultative meetings and was intended to meet the following targets: unification of Somali civil society groups; development of a civil society strategy aimed at contributing to the ongoing stabilization process; reflection of, and engagement in, dialogue on the Roadmap with a view to creating a forum for identifying ways in which Somalia's civic actors and organizations could contribute to guiding principles on the nomination and selection of members to join and drive the three Roadmap institutions, namely the interim independent electoral commission (IIEC), the National constituency Assembly (NCA) and the New Federal Parliament.

A further consultation meeting was subsequently held in Mogadishu on 25 April 2012 to check and finalize the preparation process for the traditional elders' conference.

On 5 May 2012 a meeting of the 135 traditional elders and members of civil society was held to decide the selection of the Constituent assembly that would ultimately adopt the constitution and form a new parliament. However, in the course of the constitutional conference divergent views were

reflected. Those who supported the conference said the conference was being held according to the Roadmap, which they acknowledged as the first Somalia-led and Somalia-owned process. Furthermore, the conference made a significant contribution to the peace process in Somalia because the envisaged new constitution, unlike the interim charter, will grant more powers to civilians and allow the establishment of semi-autonomous regional states like the Puntland and Gamudug provinces. The new constitution also will provide the Somali people with a new parliamentary and presidential system.

Nonetheless, the elders' conference has not been free of opponents. Among some critics the word 'Roadmap' is being used to mislead and confuse the Somali public into believing that the objective of the conference is to reduce the legislative body size from 825 to 225. Critics argue that the Roadmap is the brainchild of the international community, with very little Somali input, and that only a small group of self-appointed leaders is advancing policies that effectively lack the approval of most Somalis. Furthermore, these opponents suggest that the Roadmap has created insecurity among parliamentarians because the new constitution will not only reduce the number of legislators, but will also define new criteria governing representation in parliament.

In addition, the Islamist militant group, Ahlul Sunnah wal Jamaa'ah (ASWJ), has challenged the process that aimed to end the transitional period according to the agreed timeline. During the elders' conference, the group was vocal in announcing that the clans supporting Al-Shabaab and those forming part of Al-Shabaab were controlling areas that would ultimately elect members of parliament who favor ASWJ.

Although Al-Shabaab did not disrupt the meeting, it prevented some traditional elders from travelling to Mogadishu from Buqda-Aqable, El-Ali and Mukeyle, in the Hiiraan region, and from the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions. This intimidation was part of Al-Shabaab's efforts to threaten traditional leaders intending to participate in the meeting.

The TFG has described the traditional elders' conference as one of the major achievements in the transition and stabilization process. Civil society groups were also present at the conference and stated their commitment to supporting the traditional elders, who represent not only the interests of civil society groups, but also the interests of most Somalis as well.

In response to initiatives that some Somali actors launched independently of the process envisaged under the Roadmap, and the risk of such initiatives undermining the ongoing processes within the framework of the Roadmap, the United Nations, the African Union and the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) issued a joint statement warning against what they called spoilers. Their joint statement said that non-compliance with, or active obstruction of, the Roadmap for ending the transition in Somalia would be unacceptable. Moreover, they warned of further sanctions against spoilers.

In addition to this development, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), in support of the conference on 4 May 2012, said that elders, representing the full spectrum of Somalian society, would nominate and select the National Constituent Assembly and a new Parliament, thereby paving the way for the end of the transitional period on 20 August 2012.

Two factors contributed to the effectiveness of the constitutional

conference. The first was that the African Union troops in Somalia had made some important progress, wresting nearly all of Mogadishu from the control of insurgents, in addition to other security gains. Second, the mandates of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government are to expire in August 2012. These developments provide an opportunity to launch a new and broader political process embracing all Somalis, with a greater emphasis on supporting regional governance as well as a stronger and more representative central government.

Nonetheless, emerging divisions between relevant political actors in Somalia, concerning the constitutional process as well as outstanding challenges, including security concerns, still need to be addressed more effectively.

## Important dates to diarise

5	June	World Environment Day
12	June	World Day Against Child Labour
16	June	Day of the African Child
20	June	World Refugee Day
26	June	International Day against Drug Abuse and Trafficking
12	August	International Youth Day
23	August	International Day for the remembrance of the Slave Trade and its Abolition
15	September	International Day of Democracy
21	September	International Day of Peace

Country	Election	Date *
Republic of Congo	National Assembly	June 2012
Democratic Republic of Congo	Senate (indirect)	13 June 2012
Senegal	National Assembly	17 June 2012
Cameroon	National Assembly and Communes	June / July 2012
Angola	Presidential National Assembly	31 August 2012 31 August 2012
Somalia	Presidential	August 2012
Togo	National Assembly	October 2012

*\*could change, dependent on circumstances*

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