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'Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC' – PSC/PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

Early warning issues for October 2012

During October, continuing turmoil and division in Mali, with militant Islamist forces accentuating their control in the north, remain a cause for concern. Recent attacks in Côte d'Ivoire emphasizing the enormous challenges of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, security sector reform and reconciliation, are among early warning and ongoing issues that require close attention at a time when the African Union is about to welcome the new Chair of the AU Commission. Events in the Sahel, developments in Sudan and South Sudan, events in Somalia and neighbouring Kenya, and the terrorist acts of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram also require the close attention of the African Union and relevant RECs.

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▶ Current PSC Chair

Bio data: H.E. Dr Ruben Maye Nsue Mangue
Current posts: Equatorial Guinea's Ambassador to Ethiopia, Permanent Representative to the AU and Chair of the PSC

Somalia

Somalia is currently experiencing a political and historical turning point. After almost 8 years of the transitional period and 21 years of state collapse, the end of the transition and the launching of a new government have engendered the hope that this could be the inception of a broader political process embracing all Somalis. It also opens the door for a possible and much needed transformation from a war-based economy to a post-war civilian economy. However, the stabilisation of the country is a long way off.

South Sudan

Although there is a promising start to the new peace road map between the two Sudans, Juba still faces numerous security challenges from within. The government is faced with a big challenge to disarm the various armed ethnic and rebel groups. The many rumours of failed coups also demonstrate the tensions among the various groups in the armed forces and relations with the government. The increasing cost of living and the inability of the government to fulfill the expectation of the citizens of the new state are other factors that could further affect the stability of South Sudan. Furthermore, the increase in armed groups has created insecurity in several parts of the country, and increased pressure on the SPLA to deal with them and protect the civilian population despite the government's failure to

Livingstone formula

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resolve the root causes of the conflict. The culture of extending an amnesty to rebel groups who have committed atrocities reflects a failure by the government to effectively address the problems of crime and justice.

Côte d'Ivoire

At the end of September 2012, Côte d'Ivoire was the scene of renewed attacks by unidentified armed elements against security sites in the district of Port Bouët in Abidjan and against a post in Noé, on the border with neighbouring Ghana. These incidents occurred after a few weeks of calm, following a series of similar attacks in August. The events highlighted many shortcomings of the Ivorian security architecture that emerged from the post-election crisis. The list of security weaknesses is long and includes a lack of basic training among newly integrated elements within the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire, FRCI), competition among the various intelligence services, failures in the chain of command, and a lack of coordination in responding to security threats.

Country Analysis

SOMALIA

Previous PSC and AU Communiqués

The African Union (AU) has expressed satisfaction with the political improvements made by all Somali stakeholders that have marked the end of the transition and are ushering in a new stage in the Somali political landscape.

In its communiqué of 29 August 2012, issued at its 331st meeting, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) underscored its approval of the launching of a new interim Constitution on 1 August 2012. It also welcomed the inauguration of a new Federal Parliament on 20 August 2012 and applauded the coordinated efforts of the Traditional Elders, the Technical Selection Committee (TSC) and International observers in undertaking the respective procedures for ending of the transition in Somalia. The Chairperson of the Commission of the AU, Jean Ping, in the AU Press Release of 11 September 2012, congratulated all involved for the swearing in of Mr Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia.

With regard to the persistent and worryingly precarious security situation, the communiqué of the PSC's 331st meeting pointed out that despite the progress made by the Somali National Forces (SNF) with the support of AMISOM and the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), Al Shabaab was still destabilising the country. The communiqué also expressed concern about the actions of some individual spoilers who inteneded to derail the ongoing efforts to finalise the transitional process. The Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (DSRCC) for Somalia, M Wafula Wamunyinyi, in the AU Press Release of 14 August 2012 shed light on such concerns and expressed discontent about the intimidation of, and threats made against, the TSC members.

Crisis escalation potential

Somalia is currently experiencing a political and historical turning point. After almost 8 years of the transitional period and 21 years of state collapse, the end of the transition and the launching of a new government have engendered the hope that this could be the inception of a broader political process embracing all Somalis. It also opens the door for a possible and much needed transformation from a war-based economy to a post-war civilian economy. However, despite the abovementioned achievements towards peace, the stabilisation of the country is a long way off.

The emerging challenges have their roots in the same post-transitional government, the consequences of the imperfection of the ongoing peace process and the threats posed by Al Shabaab, which in the foreseeable future will largely frame the Somali security agenda and define the domestic and regional political environment.

Firstly, the main concern with regard to the political context is whether the establishment of a new government and president will improve the quest for the stabilisation of the country. Ostensibly, the grievances that arose from the inherent imperfections in the whole transition process (for example, rampant corruption in Somalia's various administrations, difficulties in monitoring the use of financial resources and equipment, the lack of a governance capability among civil servants, and clan favouritism) and the many problems that emerged during the electoral process (an unequal playing field in the run-up to the Presidency, allegations about seat-buying, and intimidation of members of the TSC), were foreseen in the Roadmap for Ending the Transition in Somalia, yet continue to raise questions and doubts and provoke dissatisfaction among the population.

Secondly, the current peace process, according to some critics, is characterised by limited inclusiveness, which has led to inequalities in the representation of different sections of Somali society

in the emerging political and social sphere. The growing disaffection with regard to the new political system is one of the consequences of perceived exclusion. In addition, the community-level reconciliation process, foreseen within the Roadmap, has hardly been developed. These grievances could lead to a re-emergence of different expressions of fragmentation in Somali society, possibly in the form of the resurgence of clan militias or warlords, producing even deeper social fractures that result in a resumption of violence. Therefore the new Somali government and the international community need to take urgent action to remedy such flaws in the ongoing peace process.

Thirdly, Al Shabaab continues to lose influence in south Somalia. In September 2012, AMISOM forces together with TFG soldiers captured Middo town (16 km south of Afmadow, lower Juba, which was secured by AMISOM troops in July 2012); Harbole town (6 km from Miido) and the strategic town of Bibi. AMISOM has also deployed troops at the port of Elma'an, about 40 km north east of Mogadishu. This port had previously been used for acquiring illegal weapons and ferrying foreign fighters from the Gulf of Aden into Somalia.

The diminution of Al Shabaab footholds in the south is developing in parallel with the on-going build-up to the capture of Kismayo by the Kenyan contingent of AMISOM. Somalia's Radio Garowe recently announced that Al Shabaab officials had withdrawn from Kismayo and that all prisoners had been released.

Finally, on 28 September, reports indicated that AU forces had launched a beach assault against Al Shabaab forces and had taken control of parts of Kismayo. A Kenyan military spokesman, Col Cyrus Oguna, subsequently confirmed that parts of Kismayo had been captured and that the town

was expected to fall soon. A victory by AU forces would cost Al Shabaab its main base in southern Somalia.

Nonetheless, since the presidential elections on 10 September 2012, the security situation in Somalia has been worsening. Suicide attacks and assassinations are increasing in the capital, Mogadishu. For instance, two days after the inauguration of Somalia's new president, there was an attempt to assassinate him through a terrorist attack that was foiled by Somali security forces with the support of AMISOM. Al Shabaab has also threatened to target members of the new parliament. On 22 September, gunmen shot dead a member of Somalia's new parliament in Mogadishu, Mustafa Haji Maalim. The victim was the father-in-law of former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and was also the first parliamentarian to be targeted since the new 275-member assembly was installed in August 2012.

In addition, the terrorist group has begun to change its style of operations towards the increased use of 'hit and run' tactics, also undertaken, for instance, by Nigeria's Boko Haram militias. Reversion to guerrilla tactics, including strategic withdrawals from territory under its control and fixed defensive positions, is a logical option for Al Shabaab at this point, bearing in mind the odds it is facing. Currently it is seeking the space and time to reorganise and regroup.

Furthermore, the actual and potential spoilers, domestic and international, and local clan-based fighters are continuing to threaten certain geographical zones and borders. In this line, Somalia's government remains extremely weak and a large part of Somali territory remains beyond effective state control. This situation could foster the re-emergence of armed militia groupings in different parts of the country. Kenya and Ethiopia are being encouraged to establish and implement appropriate measures in order to defend their borders and

avoid the violence spilling over into their territories.

To sum up, in Somalia the situation is characterised by the persistence of a variety of threats namely clanism, warlordism, corruption, terrorism and, of course, piracy, which are all capable of fuelling violence and can potentially undermine the emerging political process in Somalia.

Key issues and internal dynamics

In the political sphere, three key benchmarks for finalisation of the transition, laid down by the Security Council in July, were fulfilled during August and September 2012: the launching of a new federal constitution on 1 August 2012, to be placed before the Somali public for approval in a national referendum and national election scheduled for 2016; the setting up of a new parliament; and the election of a new president of the country. The beginning of the post-transition period shows willingness from stakeholders to foster the rebirth of formal government institutions and iron out the political and social tensions provoked by the former Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Since numerous challenges derived from the institutional heritage of the former government prevail in the new administration, the high expectations created by the new government should be balanced.

With regard to the new constitution, it is important to emphasise that its creation was formulated upon clan-based criteria in order to ensure a fair representation of the different communities of the country. Thus, 135 delegates from all Somali clans (25 representatives from each of the four big clans and 35 from the smaller clans) participated in it. The provisional constitution envisages a federal and parliamentary system with a national assembly and an upper house. It is defined by a rule of law which has to be compatible with Islam and the representation of women amounting to 30% of the representatives. Despite the progress

represented by the drafting of the interim constitution, the events surrounding the launching have been shrouded in controversy.

The fact that this institutional process has been dominated by international actors, such as United Nations (UN), the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in alliance with local and national forces as well has marginalised the role of certain segments of Somali society. This has led to discontent and has raised questions of ownership. In this context, the constitution was finally endorsed in the face of continuing disagreements and confusion amongst the different stakeholders regarding crucial points, for instance the question of minority rights or the statement that 'Somali borders can be discussed at a later date'. Therefore, the possibility that, in the immediate future, the constitution may lead to divisions and polarisation among the Somali society, has to be envisaged. The new legal charter also has to contend with the challenge posed by traditional authorities and customary law that have experienced a revival amid the collapse of the central state.

With regard to the launching of the Parliament, the chief of public information at the UN Political Office for Somalia, Nick Birnback, has recently stated that parliament's convention with a majority of lawmakers is an important advance for Somalia. 'But it is just that… a lot of hard work remains in the days ahead'. Accusations of intimidation, bribery and seat-buying marred the nominations of legislators made by tribal elders from complex clan structures. As the UN Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, mentioned, 'some in the process have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo'.

One of the immediate tasks of the new parliament was the election of the president. However, the electoral process for this election was also criticised and defined as a 'flawed

process'. In this sense, the fact that the primary stakeholders in the transition have also been competitors on the political playing field provoked tensions in public opinion.

Mr Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has become Somalia's first president with a full mandate since the fall of the dictator Siad Barré in 1991. The new president was elected by the Somali Parliament from among 22 contenders drawn from academia, the political milieu and the Diaspora, including women, after three rounds of voting. He is largely unknown outside Somalia, but highly respected in Mogadishu. He enjoys the support of the educated class, civil society, business people and a variety of Somali clans. He is widely considered a committed, unifying and conciliatory figure and, above all, he is not viewed as belonging to the discredited political establishment. Taking into account the widespread dissatisfaction towards the more formal structures of government, Mr Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has to encourage Somali society to get involved in the ongoing peace process, showing that he is amenable to 'lessons learned' from the practices carried out by the former TFG.

In spite of undeniable political progress in Somalia, as evidenced by the above-mentioned developments, questions still persist regarding the capability and willingness of the new government to learn from the mistakes of ineffective interim administrations of recent years. The so-called 'Mediated State' model of governance, in which the central government outsources its core functions to local polities, private sector and non-profit organisations, was practiced by the former TFG government. As a result, the emerging government has inherited a weak and almost non-existent political institutional apparatus. In addition, there is increasing wariness of the effectiveness of formal state institutions of government, due to mismanagement and non-service

delivery by public services as practiced by the former TFG. For instance, the so-called 'taxing without service', consisted of the practice of collecting taxes without any provision of public goods or services in return. Moreover, despite the apparent goodwill exhibited by the new government and its international acceptance, it is likely that the government will have a limited territorial impact and will remain heavily dependent on external support, due to the weaknesses of its state institutions. Mr Hassan Sheik Mohamud also has the arduous task of struggling to defeat corruption, the cliental-based criminal networks and the fractious clan politics that became endemic during the tenure of the former TFG.

Considering these structural grievances, it is unlikely in the near future that the new president will be able to project his authority much beyond the environs of Mogadishu. Thus, it is probable that the control of most of the country, which is still largely informal and subject to the effectiveness of local self-governance structures, will remain under powerful, influential, autonomous individuals, self-proclaimed autonomous states such as Puntland, and Somaliland, clan militias and the terrorist group, Al Shabaab.

Geopolitical dynamics

Africa and RECs

IGAD is depicted as the REC that has worked most closely with Somalia. Its support and the orientation of its political positions reflect the positions of the AU and the UN and to some extent the larger international community, as the Roadmap also reflects.

In the statement 'Ending the transition in Somalia', issued in August 2012, IGAD, the AU and the UN expressed their concerns about the spoilers that, through the use of violence, bribery or intimidation, were thwarting the expected finalisation of the transition process. In addition, they urged the Technical

Selection Committee (charged with selecting the members of parliament) to single out and exclude politicians regarded as having a history of violence and criminal behaviour. The August statement was highly criticised by the supporters and promoters of a more inclusive transition. In their common statement, the three international organisations once again confirmed their convergence, alliance and common position with regard to the ending of the transition period in Somalia and identified what still needed to be done.

In the IGAD 'Statement on the political situation in Somalia', released on 23 August 2012, the institution congratulated the new members of parliament on their inauguration. Two weeks later, in its statement of 10 September 2012, IGAD also welcomed the new president of Somalia and reiterated its support in assisting Somalia to continue on the path to a prosperous future.

United Nations

The UN has expressed its satisfaction with regard to the emerging government of Somalia. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon convened a mini-summit on Somalia in New York on 26 September 2012 on the margins of the UN General Assembly. The Communiqué SG/2187AFR/2450 issued on that day pointed out that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia had participated by video teleconference from Mogadishu and was being represented in New York by Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali. Other participants included Dr Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, together with the Chairperson-elect, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and high-level representatives of Burundi, China, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Norway, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda,

United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Yemen, AU, European Union (EU), League of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, IGAD, African Development Bank, World Bank and Islamic Development Bank.

Participants congratulated President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the Somali authorities and the people of Somalia on the peaceful end of the transition process. It was also noted that the new Somali authorities and the international community 'would begin to work jointly to identify priority tasks in capacity and institutional building in the areas of security, justice, equitable provision of basic services, economic recovery, human rights, humanitarian access, and good governance', and underscore the necessity of coordination of all actors engaged in Somalia. Finally, the participants reaffirmed their strong commitment to supporting a more peaceful and stable Somalia.

International community

The international community has followed the events in Somalia closely. There is widespread acceptance of the adoption of the new Constitution and the election of the new president that reportedly, 'will serve as a basis for taking the country forward'. The International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia (a group of UN Ambassadors and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), initiated by the United States at the UN headquarters in June 2006) has been leading the Roadmap to End the Transition, which was created on 6 September 2011.

The EU, in its communiqué of 25 October 2012, announced its decision to provide additional support to AMISOM in order to allow the mission to continue to fulfil its mandate and to reach its total strength of 17 731, as authorised by the UN. According to the EU, the support covers costs such as troop allowances, costs of the police and civilian component of the mission, medical care, housing, fuel and

communication equipment. The EU's latest funding support amounts to €82 million. The new funding brings the overall EU contribution to €411.4 million since 2007.

Civil society

The contribution of civil society actors (CSOs) – traditional and religious leaders, the business community and NGOs as well as community-based organisations – has been erratic and intermittent. During the conflict, they were embattled and hampered by insecurity. Due to the collapse of the state, the Somali authorities indirectly took advantage of civil society skills and work, using CSOs to deliver public services in the field. Also, thanks to CSO services, the governance in Somalia's local communities could be strengthened to better sustain peace and security in the country.

In this line, due to the weaknesses of Somalia's formal governance structures, numerous local communities have experimented with hybrid forms of governance, which combine traditional structures (clan elders) with formal arrangements. In this regard, the case of Somaliland or Puntland is illustrative of the path travelled to establish and consolidate so-called 'hybrid governance' structures in their institutions. Actually, the TFG has done the same, employing clan elders as representatives in a national constituent assembly that was assigned to select a new parliament and approve the country's constitution. These dynamics have emerged as societal responses that seek to tackle the institutional and political vacuum in Somalia and decrease the likelihood of turmoil or disorder. However, such responses have been highly criticised since they can lead to an instrumentalisation by traditional authorities of the structures, leading to a decline in their legitimacy.

Another element of civil society to consider is the role of business leaders. In reality, most of them have

relocated their trading to neighbouring Kenya in order to avoid the tax payments imposed by either Al Shabaab or the former TFG. Therefore, the government should envisage the introduction of stimulating economic measures to entice back the commercial networks and foster the restoration of social ties.

With regard to the legitimacy of the new government, it seems that the president has the support of only part of the population. For instance, the Somali Civil Society Coalition (SCSC) issued a statement on 14 September, acknowledging the outcome of the Somali presidential election and expressing loyalty to Mr Hassan Shiekh Mohamoud as the new president of Somalia, urging him to strive to bring stability, reconciliation and integration to the country. At this incipient stage of Somalia's political progress, sympathies from the bulk of Somalia's clans, militias and communities are difficult to appraise and will largely depend on the political performance of the new government.

The reconciliation, reconstruction and development of Somalia are all critical factors required to ensure durable peace and prosperity for the country. The task of responding to this challenge rests on all Somalis, from all segments of society. All have a role to play. Hence, undoubtedly the effectiveness of this new promising government will be dependent on the initiatives of Somali society and its willingness to repair broken ties and damaged relations

Scenarios

Scenario 1

Ideally, there is a consolidation of the newly emerged government structures in Somalia which govern according to the rule of law. The parliament acts independently of any external influence. The capacity of formal structures to efficiently provide public services and goods to the society leads to an improvement of living standards.

Somalia's political institutions, with the support of the international community, bring about a Somali reconciliation process based on dialogue and inclusiveness of all clans, political stakeholders and local community-based groups. The balanced representation of marginalised segments of society in the political sphere reduces the disaffection and distrust that formal structures provoked and encourage the participation and involvement of those actors.

This induces civil society and traditional authorities to craft grassroots reconciliation strategies which enjoy legitimacy among the larger Somali society. The Somalis finally achieve unity irrespective of their political opinions and geographical loyalties. The involvement of a broader range of actors in the stabilisation of the country allows for a more effective peace process based on bottom-up and top-down dynamics.

The legitimacy of, and support for, Al Shabaab and other local, regional and international spoilers of the peace process are effectively reduced by the above-mentioned improvements. The Somali authorities develop channels for dialogue with Al Shabaab in order to achieve an inclusive peaceful settlement.

In terms of international interference, Somalia's formal structures manage to strike a balance between constructive support and counter-productive interference.

Scenario 2

The grievances that emerged from the ongoing peace process and the newly established government may provoke an increasing fragmentation of society that could lead to violence and political unrest. The government may fail to deliver lasting security and basic services. Consequently, predatory militia violence spreads across the country, causing massive casualties and humanitarian crises, and hence destabilises the fragile progress achieved. Neither the government nor traditional authorities can control the militias. As a result, lawlessness and disorder emerge in Somalia's various communities, preventing the implementation of the peace process.

International interference also may prevent a sustainable settlement in Somalia. The government is perceived as 'western-backed' and as a continuation of the former administration characterised by rampant corruption, allegations of mismanagement of resources and the centralisation of political power rather than seeking after federal solutions to guarantee minority group representation.

Scenario 3

Despite the imperfections of the peace process in Somalia, the end of the transition and the inauguration of a new government constitute a major step forward towards stability. Undoubtedly, this engenders hopes and expectations among stakeholders. Particularly the AU, the UN and other members of the international community expect the system to evolve into representative democracy as conditions improve. The new government tries to distance itself from the ineffective TFG by launching anti-corruption measures in order to avoid mismanagement of resources by civil servants and to build legitimacy amongst ordinary Somalis. According to the roadmap of the intended peace process, there are attempts to build consensus about the nature of the state with regard to the central government and federal units, the role of Islam and shared governance between traditional and formal authorities. Nevertheless, the institutions of government in Somalia are still extremely weak and unable to fully implement the policies of the Somali authorities. The Somali people are fatigued by the conditions they continue to suffer,

governance of territories is still hybrid and complex, and corruption is unavoidable.

Violence by clan militias, Al Shabaab insurgents and regional spoilers continues to threaten the fragile stability achieved by the SNF with the support of AMISOM. Al Shabaab controls certain areas and carries out regular targeted bombings and shootings in the capital, Mogadishu.

The Somali government remains heavily reliant on international forces, particularly AMISOM forces fighting in coordination with Ethiopian forces and their local proxies.

The on-going peace building process remains characterised by a top-down and security-driven approach, obstructing the achievement of a truly legitimate local solution to peace and good governance in Somalia.

Options

Option 1

The new Somali authorities with the support of the AU, the UN, and the international community, should continue to actively promote the Somali peace process in order to achieve higher degrees of reconciliation amongst Somalia's different clans and communities, a better level of inclusiveness of underrepresented sections of society and the development of a sustainable stability for the country.

These measures should also include the fostering of an inclusive bottom-up dialogue among Somalis over the country's future security architecture, in line with the Provisional Constitution, and noting specifically the need to engage women. The process of disenfranchisement of women during the last election should be addressed.

Option 2

The PSC should propose policy-driven measures to the Government in order to seek to reform and reinforce Somalia's formal structures. Capacity and institutional building in the areas of security, justice, provision of basic services, economic recovery, human rights, humanitarian access and good governance should be strongly recommended. Moreover, it would be positive to launch institutional mechanisms to control the corruption or other expressions of mismanagement of public resources. Bottom-up popular and inclusive initiatives to address the challenges emerging from hybrid governance (coexistence of traditional and formal authorities) should also be considered.

Option 3

The PSC should also recommend security-driven solutions. There is an urgent requirement involving a reform of the security sector to ensure national security and AMISOM has the intricate task of

training and reorganising Somalia's national forces. The new government also needs to develop a policy on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) to address the issue of combatants and former combatants. AMISOM should also develop strategies to address the above-mentioned new tactics undertaken by Al Shabaab, which are similar to Boko Haram's strategy.

Documentation

AU documents

Peace and Security Council, African Union, 331st MEETING, PSC/PR/COMM(CCCXXXI), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 August 2012.

Press Release: The African Union Welcomes the Successful Presidential Election in Somalia, 11 September 2012.

Press Release: AMISOM Foils Attack on Somali President, 12 September 2012.

IGAD documents

IGAD Statement on the political situation in Somalia, 23 August 2012.

Country Analysis

SOUTH SUDAN

Previous PSC and AU communiqués

The AU High-Level Implementation Panel, which was created in 2009, played a significant role in leading the talks between Sudan and South Sudan. The two governments, whose

relations subsequently deteriorated, finally signed a series of agreements under the auspices of the AU in Addis Ababa on 27 September 2012. The details of some of the agreements are yet to be released by the African Union.

During a meeting held on 3 August 2012 the PSC received the report of Thabo Mbeki, in his capacity as the Chairperson of the AU High Implementation Panel (AUHIP), and

considered a number of previous communiqués and documents by the Council on the situation between Sudan and South Sudan. In a communiqué PSC/PR/COMM (CCCXXIX) that followed the August meeting the Council called on the parties to address their security issues in order to promote confidence building between the two countries. The PSC also urged the two governments to comply fully, unconditionally and speedily

with the decisions on the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC) to finalise the establishment of the Abyei Police Service so that it can take over policing functions in the Abyei area.

The differences between Sudan and South Sudan also featured in the meeting of the PSC held on 14 July 2012. The Council, which considered the briefing by the AUHIP head, Thabo Mbeki, also discussed the terms of its communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM/3 (CCCXIX), which articulated a Roadmap to help resolve the situation between Sudan and South Sudan. In addition, the Council discussed the communiqué adopted at the 4th meeting of the Sudan-South Sudan Consultative Forum, held in Addis Ababa on 22 June 2012, that was convened jointly by the AU and the United Nations. In its communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM/3, on 2 May 2012 the PSC welcomed the United Nations Security Council's adoption of Resolution 2046(2012), which endorsed the Roadmap and acknowledged the support extended to the AU-led efforts by other bilateral and multilateral partners. The Council also commended South Sudan's acceptance of the administrative and security map for the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ) submitted to the Parties by the AUHIP in November 2011 and called on the Government of Sudan to do the same.

Crisis escalation potential

In one of their most successful attacks against the armed forces of South Sudan, on 17 August 2012, rebels in South Sudan's largest state, Jonglei, attacked a convoy of 200 soldiers, killing more than thirty government soldiers. The rebels, led by David Yau Yau, had split from South Sudan's army (SPLA) in April 2012. The August attack took place in the Pibor region of Jonglei after government soldiers were sent to investigate reports that Yau Yau had been sighted in the area. The group was one of several militias fighting the government near Pibor, a remote

corner of the eastern state of Jonglei. Some reports claimed that the rebels were joined by youths from the Murle tribe who were resisting government efforts to disarm their community. The region has seen devastating clashes between various ethnic and armed groups, claiming the lives of hundreds of victims last year. A heavy-handed government disarmament campaign to halt tribal rebellion has triggered strong resistance by the ethnic militias and rebel groups in the area. The deaths of so many soldiers raised questions about the capacity and professionalism of South Sudan's armed forces and the strength and impact of the various rebel groups and tribal militias who were intent on destabilising the new state. Yau Yau began his rebellion after the 2010 elections, when he failed to be appointed as Pibor's Commissioner.

South Sudan experienced an escalation of tension in the last weeks of July 2012, following the spread of a convincing rumour of a failed military coup attempt in Juba by a group known as 'Garang's Boys,' loyalists of the late SPLM leader, John Garang. Subsequent reports claimed that the attempt was carried out by high-ranking officers in the army. The believability of the rumour and resultant uncertainty forced President Salva Kiir to come out publicly on 30 July 2012 and denounce speculation about the coup d'état, also accusing his northern neighbour of being the instigator. The president termed the rumour a fabrication and called on people to remain calm. This is the third rumour of an attempted coup against Kiir since South Sudan's independence.

Although there is a promising start to the new peace road map between the two Sudans, Juba still faces numerous security challenges from within. The government is faced with a big challenge to disarm the various armed ethnic and rebel groups. The many rumours of failed coups also demonstrate the tensions among the various groups in the armed forces

and relations with the government. The increasing cost of living and the inability of the government to fulfil the expectation of citizens of the new state are other factors that could further affect the stability of South Sudan. Furthermore, the increase in armed groups has created insecurity in several parts of the country, and increased pressure on the SPLA to deal with them and protect the civilian population despite the government's failure to resolve the root causes of the conflict. The culture of extending an amnesty to rebel groups who have committed atrocities reflects a failure by the government to effectively address the problems of crime and justice.

Key issues and internal dynamics

On 29 September 2012, the Sudanese security forces raided the house of the South Sudanese rebel leader, James Gai, in Khartoum where they arrested some members of his militia and seized weapons. Gai, who leads the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A), escaped the raid, but the security forces were able to arrest five officers and 70 individuals and also seized arms and ammunition after an exchange of fire. The raid which, came two days after Khartoum and Juba signed a series of agreements ranging from security to oil and trade deals, was considered a promising start to the consolidation of peace and cooperation between the two states. The government of Sudan stated that the rebel SSLM/A was opposed to the new agreements and was determined to continue their fight against Juba. Days before the raid, the cabinets of Sudan and South Sudan had approved the agreements signed in Addis Ababa relating to unresolved issues resulting from South Sudan's independence.

The series of agreements signed on 27 September in Addis Ababa between Khartoum and Juba was considered a breakthrough after several months of near-war

experiences between the two states and a stalemate in negotiations about numerous outstanding issues. The agreement about security matters required the withdrawal of forces on both sides of the border and the operationalisation of a Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ) in accordance with the administrative and security map presented to the parties by the AUHIP in November 2011. The agreement also consolidated overall border management between the two states and committed them to the 'soft border' principle, to ensure that they maintain a peaceful, safe and secure border in which the movement of their respective nationals would remain unhindered. It further recommitted the two states to complete the demarcation of their international border and border demarcation modalities, including the establishment of broad institutional arrangements for managing the border. The only outstanding issue, namely the final status of the Abyei region, is to be referred to the AU Peace and Security Council for decision.

One of the most contentious issues between the two governments has been the issue of oil revenues. An agreement was reached on 27 September 2012 facilitating cooperation between the two states to ensure that the production, processing and marketing of oil produced in south Sudan reaches consumer markets. The parties agreed to the processing and transportation of oil through Sudan subject to a one dollar per barrel transit fee.

The Cooperation Agreement affirms the two states' commitment to the principle of mutual viability and working towards promoting and building a relationship of prosperity for the peoples of Sudan and South Sudan. The two states also agreed to establish a Joint High Level Committee (JHLC), to oversee joint management and decision-making about issues relating to their respective nationals to facilitate

residence, movement, economic activity, and the right to acquire and dispose of property of the citizens of the two nations. Trade and trade-related issues and cooperation on central banking issues were also part of the deal and an agreement was reached to set up joint ministerial and technical committees to foster trade relations and to develop a long-term trade policy beneficial to both countries. In an effort to resolve the numerous challenges arising from the secession, the two countries also reached an agreement on managing the division of their respective national assets and liabilities, arrears and claims. The parties also agreed to work together in approaching the international community to find ways of alleviating Sudan's debt burden and to seek an end to sanctions imposed on that country.

The conflict with its northern neighbour has been the most serious security issue affecting South Sudan. It is hoped that the agreements signed under strong international and regional pressure will facilitate further talks and cooperation in tackling the various security challenges facing South Sudan and Sudan. However, recent months have experienced increased attacks by rebel groups within the country, causing a serious security concern and leading to many casualties for the army. There is also an increase in the activities and impact of the renegade militia groups (RMGs).

Following the attack against the South Sudan army on 17 August 2012 that took the lives of more than thirty government soldiers, the Government of South Sudan pledged to eradicate the rebel group led by David Yau Yau. In past years, populations that have been disarmed in South Sudan have expressed fears that they were being made vulnerable to attack by other tribes, particularly neighbouring groups that may have been overlooked in the government's disarmament operation. Earlier this

year the South Sudanese Army conducted a state-wide disarmament campaign in Jonglei state, following clashes between the Murle and Luo Nuer tribes which affected over 100-000 people. SPLA officials have stated that the disarmament process will continue as planned despite stiff resistance from targeted communities. In the meantime, the government has neither the capacity to protect the disarmed groups from their rivals nor the trust of the general population or the affected groups.

On 4 September 2012, South Sudan's Deputy Minister of Defence, Majak D' Agot Atem, said the government was committed to making peace with Yau Yau, and allowing members of his group to participate in government. The remarks were made days after a lethal attack by the same group on SPLA soldiers. The Deputy Minster said that if Yau Yau wanted to come home he would be welcome to do so because he was a South Sudanese citizen. Yau Yau briefly responded to the presidential amnesty offered by Salva Kiir and signed an agreement with the Juba government in 2011 before taking up arms again in April 2012. He accused the government of failing to honour the agreement and allow his fighters to become integrated into the national army or allow the inclusion of some of his political supporters in the government. Yau Yau also wanted to remain a general by constitutional appointment.

South Sudan has experienced surging inflation since independence. The annual inflation rate was 43% in August and 60% in July. Food prices have contributed the biggest share. The South Sudanese pound fell sharply after oil revenues began to dry up. South Sudan imports most of its food as it has no sizeable agricultural industry.

The increasing cost of living and the inability of the government to fulfil the expectation of the citizens of the new state are additional factors that

could further complicate the stability of South Sudan.

Geopolitical dynamics

Africa and RECs

The series of agreements signed on 27 September was considered a great diplomatic success for the African Union and the AUHIP on Sudan. The 5th Sudan-South Sudan Constructive Forum (SSSCF), which took place on 29 September 2012, commended the presidents of Sudan and South Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir and Salva Kiir Myardit, for the breakthrough achieved during the negotiations held in Addis Ababa. A communiqué issued by the African Union stated that the Forum, co-chaired by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, and the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Dr Jean Ping, as well as the Chairperson-elect of the AU Commission, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, commended the two presidents for demonstrating constructive leadership and political will to reach agreements on the following issues: security, border issues (including demarcation), oil, the status of nationals of the other state and other economic arrangements. The Forum also praised the AUHIP, chaired by the former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki, for facilitating the resolution of outstanding issues between the parties.

United Nations

On 20 September 2012, the United Nations Security Council received a briefing by Special Envoy Haile Menkerios on the implementation of Resolution 2046 (2012) and the African Union road map. The Council welcomed the resumption of the negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan under the auspices of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and urged the negotiators to continue their intensive work to resolve all remaining issues outlined in resolution 2046 and the road map. The Council further emphasised the

urgency of immediately establishing the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mission on the basis of a safe demilitarised border zone and urged all parties to expedite all necessary steps to immediately commence humanitarian relief operations in accordance with the relevant Memoranda of Understanding the parties had signed with the tripartite partners.

The UN maintains a peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The mission was established through Security Council Resolution 1996 on 8 July 2011. On 24 August 2012 UNMISS accused the South Sudan army of 'serious human rights violations' allegedly committed by 'undisciplined' soldiers who were part of the contingent participating in the disarmament programme in Jonglei. Between 15 July and 20 August, the Mission declared that the SPLA soldiers had allegedly killed one person and that there were numerous allegations of torture and ill treatment, such as beatings, and simulated drownings in some cases, 12 rapes, six attempted rapes and eight abductions. The Mission underscored that the victims were generally women and in some cases children. The Mission called on the South Sudanese authorities to hold accountable those who had committed these abuses against civilians, stressing that such violations undermined the confidence in and collaboration of local communities with the disarmament process.

International community

The agreement of 27 September, 2012, which included concurrence on security matters and border management, was warmly welcomed by international role players in Sudan. On 28 September, US President Barack Obama and Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, welcomed the agreement reached by Sudan and South Sudan on a number of outstanding issues that had complicated ties between the two neighbours. President Obama

hailed the agreement as a break-through and described it as '(breaking) new ground in support of the international vision of two viable states at peace with each other, and (representing) substantial progress in resolving the outstanding security and economic issues between Sudan and South Sudan'.

The European Union foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, also commended the signing of the agreement, referring to the move as a 'historic step' for both Sudan and South Sudan. She also congratulated 'both governments on the leadership and spirit of compromise' they had demonstrated in reaching these agreements. 'It is now essential for both sides to implement the agreement without delay. It is particularly important that oil starts flowing and cross-border trade resumes as this will benefit both economies and improve the lives of ordinary people'.

Scenarios

These are the possible scenarios that could occur in South Sudan:

Scenario 1

The continuation of violence between the different communities could further complicate the disarmament process. The clashes between SPLA and rebel groups could also continue to cause casualties and humanitarian crises in Jonglei and other states.

Scenario 2

A genuine initiative by the South Sudan government, accompanied by transitional justice and meaningful negotiations, could address the causes of the rebellion, thereby creating a much safer environment for disarmament.

Scenario 3

The peace deal with Sudan and recent raids by Sudan could weaken the rebel groups, forcing them to concede and negotiate with the government in Juba. However, the fact that South Sudan is expected to do the same in respect of the rebel

groups fighting against Khartoum could create tensions between the SPLA and targeted groups.

Options

Given the above scenarios, the following options could be considered by the PSC to support conflict prevention efforts in South Sudan:

Option 1

The PSC could request the AU Commission to help the Government of South Sudan develop and implement a comprehensive political and development strategy, accompanied by a transitional justice element, to address inter-communal violence in the country with

particular attention to the situation in Jonglei.

Option 2

The PSC could call upon the Government of South Sudan to undertake the investigation it has launched into the recent violence, with the utmost impartiality and transparency and on the basis of an inclusive process, while ensuring that the outcome of the investigation is implemented with the full participation of the concerned communities.

Option 3

The PSC could encourage the Government of South Sudan to expand the presence of state

institutions and call upon the international community to support such efforts. As part of this process, the government should develop an early response and intervention capability, taking advantage of the support of UNMISS.

Documentation

AU documents

PSC/PR/COMM./(CCCI) (30 November 2011) PSC Communiqué on the Activities of the AUHIP

Country Analysis

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Introduction

The last country analysis on Côte d'Ivoire was published in the February 2012 edition of the Peace and Security Council Report. The present analysis covers developments that occurred between February and September 2012. Readers interested in previous events are invited to consult the February issue.

Previous PSC and AU communiqués

In a press release dated 17 August 2012, the Commission of the African Union condemned 'the series of attacks by armed elements … in Abidjan and other parts of the country, including Abengourou, Agboville Pékambly and Dabou', noting that 'all claims and any political objective must be pursued through democratic and peaceful means'. The AU has reaffirmed its full support for the efforts of the Ivorian authorities and reiterated its engagement to continue to support

them in the process of reconciliation, reconstruction, peace building and the consolidation of democracy. Before this release, the last mention of Côte d'Ivoire within the PSC took place more than a year ago, at the 288th meeting on 10 August 2011. After reviewing the report PSC/PR/2(cclxxxviii) of the Council's mission conducted in Côte d'Ivoire from 25 to 30 July 2011, the Council 'reaffirmed its commitment to do everything in its power to support ongoing efforts of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, and asked the Commission to send a mission to assess the situation of Ivorian refugees, (and lend) support to the reconstruction and development of post-conflict national reconciliation including the reform of the defense and security sectors'.

The assessment mission composed of technical experts was led by Anicet Georges Dologuele, former Prime Minister of the Central African Republic, with the aim of evaluating the overall situation in Côte d'Ivoire, identifying the challenges facing the country, informing national and bilateral

partners and making recommendations. Although the mission was dispatched from 5 to 12 November 2011, the report has not yet been officially released and further actions by the AU, including the organisation of an African initiative of solidarity within the context of the AU post-conflict reconstruction and development framework, are still awaited.

Crisis escalation potential

At the end of September 2012, Côte d'Ivoire was the scene of renewed attacks by unidentified armed elements against security sites in the district of Port Bouët in Abidjan and against a post in Noé, on the border with neighbouring Ghana. These incidents occurred after a few weeks of calm, following a series of similar attacks in August. Those events highlighted many shortcomings of the Ivorian security architecture that emerged from the post-elections crisis. The list of security weaknesses is long and includes a lack of basic training among newly integrated elements within the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire, FRCI), competition amongst the

various intelligence services, failures in the chain of command, and a lack of coordination in responding to security threats. To all this is added a certain passivity or complicity, especially noticeable in the attack against Akouédo military camp, at the end of August, which reflects the lack of integration and persistent mistrust between former Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (Defence and Security Forces, FDS), of the regime of Laurent Gbagbo, and former Forces Nouvelles (New Forces, FN), which supported Alassane Ouattara, both of which now cohabit within the FRCI. If some blind spots persist about the identity of the perpetrators of some of these attacks, their exact motives and their sponsors, and although security sources say that these events do not have the potential to plunge the country back into a crisis, they nevertheless highlighted the urgency of implementing efficient disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) processes as well as actions in favour of both political and military reconciliation that go beyond mere symbolic actions. Reactions to these attacks have also stressed that the civilian power in Côte d'Ivoire did not trust these first category forces (police and gendarmerie), mostly from ex-FDS, and still relied heavily on the former zone commanders from the ex-FN to manage emergency security situations.

In August 2012, Côte d'Ivoire also witnessed vandalism of a political nature that had the potential to undermine the efforts of post-conflict reconciliation. On the morning of 18 August, the headquarters of the party of former president Laurent Gbagbo, the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), was attacked by armed individuals. The following night the offices of the newspaper, *Le Temps*, politically close to Laurent Gbagbo, were also vandalised.

As mentioned above, several armed attacks against the FRCI (Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire) occurred during recent weeks. Violent attacks took place on 25 August at a FRCI checkpoint near Grand Lahou, south-west of Abidjan, and on 14 August, at a military post on the border with Liberia. It is in this climate of insecurity that Independence Day was celebrated on 7 August 2012, in the aftermath of the attack on the Akouedo military camp, which killed six members of the FRCI. This attack was preceded by one in Yopougon, on the night of 4-5 August, which resulted in four FRCI deaths, and a subsequent attack on a FRCI military base in the city of Abengourou, also on 5 August.

In addition to these attacks against FRCI personnel, deadly clashes took place on 20 July in Nahibily refugee camp in the western part of the country, where, according to humanitarian sources, up to 5-000 refugees were being accommodated. Young people from the town of Duékoué killed 13 people in the camp in response to the death of four other victims the previous night. On 8 June, seven peacekeepers from Niger were killed in an ambush in a forest area near Tai.

Key issues and internal dynamics

Several political, security, judicial and electoral dynamics must be taken into account at the national level. First, at the political level, nearly two years after the 2010 presidential elections, the divisions between the respective camps of the candidates for the election run-off are still very deep, and the consequences of the post-elections crisis continue to shape the Ivorian political landscape. In this polarised context, political dialogue is experiencing a stalemate, in spite of initiatives such as the Grand-Bassam Conference in April 2012, hosted by the Prime Minister, Jean-Marie Ahoussou, or meetings between political parties led by the Dialogue Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR), directed by Charles Konan Banny, a major PDCI figure and former prime minister from 2005 to 2007.

Since the post-elections crisis, a large proportion of FPI supporters are either in exile or in prison. In August 2012, two additional representatives of the party (Laurent Akoun and Alphonse Douati, respectively Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General of the FPI) were imprisoned. Radical positions taken by this historical party seem to reflect its current weakness and how difficult it might be for its interim leadership to engage in a dialogue without having its legitimacy questioned. Other pro-Gbagbo parties have mostly stopped asking for Gbagbo's a prerequisite for dialogue and now focus their claims on the following points: the release of all political prisoners, the unfreezing of assets, the return of exiles and the creation of conditions for fair and transparent local elections (including reforming the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), de-linking the holding of municipal and regional elections, as well as ensuring freedom of expression and association).

The Houphouetist Rally for Peace and Democracy (RHDP), the coalition that brought Alassane Ouattara to power during the 2010 presidential elections, was already showing signs of erosion during the December 2011 legislative elections. Many parties, both within and outside the coalition, currently denounce the 'catch-up' policy of Alassane Ouattara's Rally of Republicans (RDR), a policy aimed at making up for the years during which the RDR was marginalised. It is a policy that involves positioning its members in key positions in the administration while maintaining corrupt practices similar to those in place during the time of the previous regime.

Second, from a security or military perspective, the various possibilities regarding the perpetrators of the attacks of recent months illustrate the need to urgently review the Ivorian defence and security

architecture. The Interior Minister, Hamed Bakayoko, said at the beginning of August that the authors of such attacks were from 'the galaxy of pro-Gbagbo militiamen and ex-FDS'. In a press release dated 5 August 2012, the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) asserted that 'the actors and authors of these deadly attacks generally come not only from the ranks of pro-Gbagbo militia, but also dozos [traditional hunters who fought alongside the FRCI] and the uncompensated demobilized auxiliaries and some rogue elements of the FRCI', thus making it necessary to 'accelerate the reform of the army and disarm the dozos'. Several entities with converging objectives, but which are not necessarily coordinating or collaborating, are probably involved in those attacks. Among these entities, there are of course pro-Gbagbo militias and former members of the defence and security forces, but even within the camp of the victors, there are also 'disappointed' winners with weapons, including supporters of Ibrahim Coulibaly (who was killed by the FRCI), some elements of the FRCI waiting for promised rewards or demobilisation, and elements of the FRCI who wish to remind the authorities of the role they played in the effective installation of the elected President.

Government responses to these security challenges have been multifaceted. From a practical point of view, it was decided to equip the defence and security forces with a new type of uniform to differentiate between authorised forces and 'false' elements. Each attack was followed by repressive combing operations and arrests which did not always respect international standards. In recent weeks, check points have returned to the streets of Abidjan and the main access roads to the economic capital with the aim of intercepting weapons. At the institutional level, after the attacks of early August, a decree creating a National Security Council (NSC) was

adopted. The NSC, which comprises 19 members and is chaired by the President of the Republic, is mainly responsible for coordinating all matters relating to the internal and external security of Côte d'Ivoire, provides strategic direction, sets national priorities on SSR, as well as informs and continuously advises the Head of State about security issues. Other decrees issued on the same day have suppressed many structures that hitherto managed DDR and created a single Authority in charge of DDR (ADDR). This is a significant change in dynamics regarding DDR and SSR, as it brings those matters under the supervision of the presidency, matters which had, since the beginning of the crisis, been managed by the prime minister's office. If these institutional developments are potentially positive developments, it remains to be seen how effective they will be in terms of their implementation. Expectations are high and DDR and SSR processes will require political courage.

Third, in terms of justice, despite the commitment of President Ouattara to fight impunity, the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) has denounced victor's justice. It must be recognised that no one close to President Ouattara has yet been prosecuted. The August 2012 publication of the report of the National Commission of Inquiry on violations of human rights and humanitarian law which occurred after the presidential elections of 31 October and 28 November 2010, has generated strong reactions from both sides. According to this report, the forces supporting Laurent Gbagbo are responsible for the deaths of nearly 1-500 people, while the FRCI forces, who fought for President Ouattara, are responsible for the deaths of about 730 people. Following up on this report will be central to give weight to Ouattara's claim to fight impunity in all camps.

The fourth and final important dynamic relates to the upcoming local elections (municipal and regional), scheduled for February

2013. The approach of this election could create a window of opportunity for negotiations regarding the participation and status of the opposition, the reform of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (designed in the peace agreements only for presidential and legislative elections) and the revision of the voters list. The resolution of these issues could lead to important preliminary steps in terms of political reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire.

Geopolitical dynamics

Africa and RECs

Neither the AU PSC nor the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council has met recently to consider the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire. Despite maintaining its presence in Côte d'Ivoire through the office of the Representative of the President of the AU Commission and its condemnation of the attacks that occurred during August 2012, the AU has remained publicly very discreet. The ECOWAS representation in Abidjan has also maintained a presence in Côte d'Ivoire through its office. It donated food to the Ivorian government in May 2012 and provided financial support to the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR) in February 2012 for the implementation of its activities. The ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Salamatu Hussaini Suleiman, also noted, on 13 August 2012, a deterioration of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire. The timorous reactions from the political leadership of the AU and ECOWAS about Ivorian issues may be related to their preoccupation in dealing urgently with the crises in Mali and Guinea Bissau or the entrance of Côte d'Ivoire into a new peace-building phase led by the Ivorian government which has defined a new role for external partners. The accession of Alassane Ouattara to the Presidency of ECOWAS, in February 2012, has also limited the manoeuvrability of ECOWAS in

addressing issues relating to Côte d'Ivoire.

The attacks at the borders with Liberia and Ghana have stressed the importance of an increased bilateral and regional cooperation, particularly between these countries and Côte d'Ivoire. On 23 June 2012, the Liberian authorities arrested and extradited 41 Ivorians suspected of being involved in crimes committed during the post-elections crisis. After two emergency meetings that took place in Abidjan and Monrovia, Liberia also strengthened its collaboration on border security with Côte d'Ivoire as part of the Mano River Union.

However, relations with Ghana remain strained. Ghana is home to many pro-Gbagbo political and military exiles who have inserted themselves into the financial and pentecostal circuits of Ghanaian society. The acting president of Ghana, John Dramani Mahama, declared on 5 September that 'the territory of Ghana (would) never be used as a base to destabilize Cote d'Ivoire'. However, the attack in Noé on 20 September, Côte d'Ivoire's subsequent closure of the border, and the release on bail by Ghanaian judicial authorities, on September 25, of Gbagbo's Budget Minister during the post-elections crisis, Justin Koné Katinan, who is suspected of having sponsored some of the recent attacks, are contentious issues affecting relations between these two countries (he was re-arrested three days later). The Ivorian Minister of the Interior stated on 27 September: 'We have evidence that whatever happens is coordinated in Ghana. ... I have no evidence to prove the complicity of the Ghanaian state, but it happens on the territory of Ghana'. The enhancement of security relations between Côte d'Ivoire and its neighbours is an urgent necessity in what has become a sub-region in crisis. It should also be mentioned that many weapons distributed during the post-elections crisis have not yet been recovered. Consequently, there is a real

possibility that illegal arms trafficking will result in increased arms flows towards Mali, through northern Côte d'Ivoire.

United Nations

In its resolution 2062 of 26 July 2012, the Security Council of the UN strongly condemned 'the attack by armed elements on a patrol of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) in the south west of … Côte d'Ivoire on 8 June 2012, in which seven peacekeepers and a number of other persons were killed'. The UNSC urged the United Nations Mission in Liberia to cooperate with UNOCI to ensure border security and to work together on any matter within its mandate. The Security Council further reiterated 'its concern with the unresolved key challenges of disarmement demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform as well as the continued circulation of weapons which continue to be significant risks to the security of the country, particularly in western Côte d'Ivoire'. It also noted with interest, 'the creation of the inter-ministerial working group on DDR and SSR', which developed the strategy to be implemented by the Authority for DDR and the National Security Council. The resolution decided that UNOCI 'shall put added focus on supporting the Government on DDR and SSR'. Finally, Resolution 2062 extends the mandate of UNOCI 31 July 2013 as well as the authorisation given to the French forces to support UNOCI within their means and in their areas of deployment.

International community

The Head of Delegation of the European Union in Côte d'Ivoire said on 27 August that recent security incidents were ' matters of concern for the government, but also … for the international community and the European Union'. The deputy spokesman of the French Foreign Ministry, Vincent Floreani, had previously stressed that 'disarmament and reform of the security sector should be more than

ever a priority, as well as the continuation of the process of national reconciliation and the fight against impunity'.

On 3 October 2011 the ICC Prosecutor was allowed to open an investigation into the situation in Côte d'Ivoire for crimes allegedly committed since 28 November 2010. It was decided, on 22 February 2012, to extend its authority to investigate the situation in Côte d'Ivoire to include within the jurisdiction of the court, crimes allegedly committed between 19 September 2002 and 28 November 2010. In parallel, two bills related to the ICC were adopted by the Ivorian Council of Ministers at the end of September 2012 to facilitate the ratification of the Rome Statute by Côte d'Ivoire. Regarding the proceedings against former President Gbagbo, the hearing concerning the confirmation of charges, scheduled for 13 August, was postponed. A closed-door hearing was held on 24 and 25 September to determine whether Laurent Gbagbo's health status would enable him to take part in the proceedings against him. No information has yet been made public in this regard.

Civil society

On 8 september 2012, the Ivorian League of Human Rights (LIDHO) expressed concern about the security situation. Its president strongly condemned the latest violence perpetrated against FRCI and invited the political class to show restraint in political discourse. Also, he emphasised that reconciliation and reform of the security sector and armed forces were urgent matters that were taking too long to be implemented.

Scenarios

Given the above analysis, three scenarios can be identified:

Scenario 1

A reconciliation framework taking into account some of the claims of the opposition (including the reform

of the Independent Electoral Commission for local elections and the revision of the law on the financing of political parties) is in place to revive the political dialogue. The ensuing appeasement of the political climate creates a new situation in the relations between the government and the political and military pro-Gbagbo exiles in Ghana. In parallel, DDR and SSR processes are conducted in an effective manner, leading to an improved security situation conducive to post-conflict reconstruction and economic growth.

Scenario 2

The political reconciliation process remains stalled. Attempts at dialogue do not lead to any progress in terms of reconciliation and radical elements on both sides still hold on to their positions. In the absence of a significant dialogue and given the tensions between Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana on issues regarding the political and military exiles, the security situation remains unstable. In parallel, DDR and SSR processes take time to go beyond the recent institutional development. Even if the continuing attacks do not represent a serious threat to those in power, the climate hinders post-conflict reconstruction and economic recovery.

Scenario 3

The absence of political dialogue widens the gap between the two camps. Attacks against security sites continue. The repressive government reactions occur without the necessary discernment, which further consolidates the political and military opposition. Advocacy led by pro-Gbagbo exiles in Ghana and internal tensions ahead of elections in Ghana do not favour a rapprochement between Accra and Yamoussoukro. In parallel, corruption practices in DDR and SSR stall the reconciliation processes and create frustration among ex-combatants and militamen. The continuing climate of insecurity hinders post-conflict reconstruction and economic recovery as it does not encourage the return of investment in the economy.

Options

Option 1

The large number of military and civilian exiles in Ghana since the post-elections crisis, the unilateral Ivorian decision to close the border between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire following the attack at the border post of Noé at the end of September and the release on bail of Gbagbo's Minister of Budget and spokesman during the post-elections crisis, Justin Koné Katinan, also at the end of September, are serious contentious points between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. The African Union and ECOWAS could play a discreet mediation role to encourage better bilateral cooperation on security issues.

Option 2

The National Security Council and the Authority for DDR were created by the Ivorian authorities to implement recently developed SSR and DDR policies. These institutional changes must be accompanied by real progress on the ground. Thus, the African Union and ECOWAS should continue to monitor the implementation of these policies and be ready to offer technical assistance, financial or material if necessary and in coordination with UNOCI. Sharing of experience between Côte d'Ivoire and ECOWAS, which is developing a draft regional concept on sector security governance, could especially be considered.

Option 3

The African Union and ECOWAS should continue to support the government in the delicate reconciliation process by encouraging an open, frank and constructive political dialogue between the opposition and the government, especially in the context of the forthcoming local elections.

Documentation

AU Documents

Statement of the President of the Commission press release of 17 August 2012.

Report PSC/PR/2 (cclxxxviii) of the Council's mission to Côte d'Ivoire from 25-30 July 2011.

ECOWAS Documents

Press release No. 229/2012 of 13 August 2012.

UN documents

Resolution 2062 (2012) adopted by the Security Council at its 6817th meeting, on 26 July 2012.

Important dates to diarise

1	October	World Habitat Day
2	October	International Day of Non-violence
11	October	International Day of the Girl Child
15	October	International Day of Rural Women
16	October	World Food Day
17	October	International Day for the Eradication of Poverty
24	October	United Nations Day
16	November	International Day for Tolerance
20	November	Universal Children's Day
20	November	Africa Industrialization Day
25	November	International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women

Country	Election	Date *
Togo	National Assembly	October 2012
	Local	October 2012
Sierra Leone	Presidential	17 November 2012
	House of Representatives	17 November 2012
	Local	17 November 2012
Burkina Faso	National Assembly	December 2012
Ghana	Presidential 1st Round	7 December 2012
	Presidential 2nd Round	28 December 2012
	National Assembly	28 December 2012

could change, dependent on circumstances

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