Peace and Security Council Report

Current members of the Peace and Security Council: Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe

Peace and Security Council Protocol

'The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council' – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union

Early warning issues for March 2013

During March there will be national assembly and local elections in Kenya and Togo as well as a constitutional referendum in Zimbabwe. A political assassination in Tunisia (see country analysis) and an attempted assassination in Libya are also stark reminders of simmering tensions and unresolved issues that remain in the wake of the North African uprisings. Elections due to start in mid-April in Egypt may also bring more tension to an already volatile situation across the country.

▶ Current PSC Chair

Bio data: H.E. Mr. Bulus Paul Zom Lolo
Current posts: Nigeria's Ambassador to Ethiopia, Permanent Representative to the AU and UNECA and Chair of the PSC

Tunisia

For many months, the Ennahda leaders tried not to condemn or alienate their Salafist base, arguing that this would only lead to a replication of the era of the old regime, when political opponents were oppressed, tortured and imprisoned. However, the ongoing situation across the country and especially in Tunis may in the near future lead to a rupture between the leaders of Ennahda and the Salafist fringe.

The current political impasse that Tunisia is experiencing is hindering the completion of Tunisia's draft constitution. This situation has consequences for the agenda of the future elections as the election process can only take place if the constitution is fully completed. Furthermore, the lack of time available works against the current government as the many existing socio-economic urgencies are a fertile ground for all kinds of political manipulations and intrigue.

Livingstone formula

'Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC' – PSC/PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

IN THIS ISSUE

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

Given the fragile security complex that exists in Central Africa, the Lord's Resistance Army(LRA) continues to present a grave threat to the wellbeing of civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR), as well as to the ongoing peace and political processes in these countries. The possibility of the LRA forming opportunistic alliances with regional governments or other rebel groups in Darfur and the Great Lakes region could also pave the way for the survival and revival of the terrorist group.

Country Analysis

TUNISIA

Previous PSC communiqués and statements

At the 257th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on 15 January 2011 (PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CCLVII) the PSC had condemned the excessive use of force by the Ben Ali regime and loss of life in Tunisia. At its 268th meeting on 23 March 2011 (PSC/PR/BR.3 (CCLXVIII), the PSC welcomed the new 'climate of freedom and the steps taken to promote democracy, good governance and the rule of law' in Tunisia. However, during the past two years no significant statements on Tunisia have been issued by the PSC.

Crisis escalation potential

Following the assassination of the human rights lawyer and political activist Chokri Belaïd, tension across the country and especially in the capital, Tunis, is high. The Salafists were rapidly suspected of being behind this murder while the Prime Minister, Hamadi Jebali, was quick to say that this killing was a political assassination that went beyond the personality of Belaïd.

The formation of a new government composed of technocrats, which should have been announced on 17 February, failed, which may not facilitate any political settlement. Consequently, Jebali resigned from his position. As a result, the Troika government, composed of a majority of Ennahda, faces considerable challenges with an immediate task of resolving the current political crisis. In the absence of an appropriate and rapid answer by the authorities, violence could worsen further and cross a perilous threshold.

The socio-economic situation complicates an already volatile political condition. These explosive ingredients are now a danger for the Tunisian unemployed youth, who may find a perceived solution to their daily problems in the Salafists' discourse. The instability of the region, where terrorists are increasingly present, is of further concern for Tunisians.

The current political impasse that Tunisia is experiencing is hindering the completion of Tunisia's draft constitution. This situation has consequences for the agenda of the next elections as the election process can only take place if the constitution is fully completed. Furthermore, the lack of time available works against the current government as the many existing socio-economic urgencies are a fertile ground for all kinds of political manipulations and intrigue.

Two years after the fall of then-President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, his numerous partisans threaten tremendous difficulties and appear to be more than a nuisance in preventing a trouble-free political transition from taking place. However, the danger for Tunisia and Tunisians is that if a strong political unity is not put in place, those nostalgic for the ancient regime, given their means, resources and logistics, could derail the transitional process or at least make it more complicated.

Key issues and internal dynamics

The assassination of human rights lawyer Belaïd on 6 February led to mass protests across the country and especially in the capital city of Tunis, where thousands of Tunisians marched in homage to the lawyer. This march resembled the one that followed the dramatic suicide of Mohamed Bouzizi in Sidi Bouzid, which in turn led to the end of Ben Ali's regime. Likewise, this assassination precipitated the end of Jebali's government.

Following the killing of Belaïd and the mass protests that followed, Jebali decided to create a Panel of the Wise (*conseil des sages*) in order to find a solution to the socio-political crisis. Jebali gathered this Panel of the Wise on 12 February at the Carthage palace of Dar Dhiafa. Sixteen personalities, among them an army general, an economist, a constitutionalist and a trade unionist, responded positively to the invitation. They met in order to evaluate the general situation and insisted on the urgent setting of an agenda for the next elections, the legitimacy of the national assembly and the need to create awareness among civil society and news media actors. This Panel of the Wise also intended to meet with various political parties.

Other opposition political parties proposed different alternatives. The Popular Front (PP), a leftist coalition in which Belaïd was the main figure, proposed a National Saving Congress (*Congrès national de sauvetage*) while the Tunisian Workers General Union (UGTT) trade union attempted to convince its partners of the advantages of a national dialogue.

Jebali also announced his decision to form a new government composed of technocrats, but failed to do so even before the refusal of Ennahda's president, Rachid Ghannouchi, to adhere to the idea of a government of technocrats. According to Jebali, future ministers must never have held a portfolio during the old regime, must have no political affiliation and cannot contest the next elections. The UGTT announced that it was in favour of the formation of a government composed of technocrats. Jebali resigned from his post, as he failed to obtain a consensus to form such a government of technocrats. By attempting to reshuffle his government, Jebali had risked a backlash due to the more orthodox views and position of his party, Ennahda. A new Prime Minister needed to be appointed, and his new cabinet formed, a situation threatening further social instability in Tunisia. As a result, President Moncef Marzouki appointed Interior Minister Ali Larayedh as the new Prime Minister. Larayedh, who is also the chosen candidate of Ennahda, will now have the difficult task of not only forming a new government, but also of finding rapid solutions to the ongoing crisis in Tunisia.

Following the resignation of Jebali, and the growing pressure on Ennahda, Ghannouchi has accepted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense would not be held by Ennahda's members (ministères régaliens in French). The Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rafik Abdessalem, who is also the son-in-law of the founder and president of the Ennahda party, Ghannouchi, is furthermore embroiled in a 'Sheratongate' extra-marital sex scandal. This affair, which has yet to be proven, may accelerate his resignation.

However, the party of the current Tunisian president, Marzouki, the

Republic Congress (CPR), has rejected the idea of a new government composed of technocrats. Yet the leader of the CPR, Mohamed Abbou, who called for the resignation of the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice, also stated that if no improvements or changes occurred by 19 February, his ministers would definitely resign. The Islamist Ennahda is also against such an idea and argues that this would allow the return of those who governed under the Ben Ali regime. On 16 February an estimated 12000 Ennahda sympathisers gathered in the streets of Tunis to listen to Ghannouchi. As a result, more than two weeks after the death of Belaïd, no new government had been formed.

In these difficult times, the UGTT trade union, which boasts nearly 520 000 members, appears today to be the sole opposition to the Tunisian government. Demonstrations against the Ennahda party or the government, led by the UGTT, occur regularly in Tunisia. Consequently, the Ennahda executive bureau accuses the UGTT of being manipulated by the forces of the old Ben Ali regime with the intention of preventing the current government from undertaking any constructive action. In response, the UGTT leaders argue that it is precisely because it is the only credible political opposition to the government that such accusations are proffered.

By the same token, Jebali declared during a debate aired on a Tunisian television channel that it was important for the UGTT to understand that the Tunisian government was making every effort to work towards the improvement of the daily life of the population. It was therefore important for the UGTT to remain focused on its initial mission of trade unionism and not to get involved in politics.

In fact, it appears as though the UGTT, since its foundation in 1946, has always been the convenient scapegoat of political forces, be it under Habib Bourguiba, Ben Ali or the leadership of Ennahda. The UGTT was also behind the fall of the two transitional governments in the immediate post-Ben Ali era in January and February 2011.

The UGTT leaders have declared and affirmed that in times of crises they will not hesitate to get involved in political matters. Therefore, in June 2012, they called for the creation of a national council for dialogue, which would gather all Tunisia's key political actors in order to find solutions to the socio-economic and security problems affecting the country.

As a result, there may be signs that Ennahda is attempting to control the UGTT from within. Indeed, in recent months, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of new members of the UGTT who appear to be also Ennahda's sympathisers, if not members.

The weak and divided political opposition in Tunis is today unable to advance an economic alternative to the Ennahda programme and has serious difficulties in existing outside the UGTT framework. Despite its proactive stance, the UGTT remains more of an opposition force than a credible alternative government with concrete solutions to the ongoing problems facing the Tunisian population. It has no sound alternative to the neo-liberal economic programme of Ennahda that could put an end to the crisis in Tunisia.

The Ennahda party is growingly caught between the Salafists, the hard-core fringe of its adherents, and the nostalgic supporters of the Ben Ali era who have attempted to sabotage the democratic process in Tunisia since the fall of the dictator in January 2011. Following the killing of Belaïd, a fringe of the Tunisian population now accuses Ennahda of being indirectly responsible for his assassination.

However, while Ennahda has a pure political position, the Salafists are solely guided by religious fervour and intend to deeply 'Islamise' Tunisian society. Since the fall of Ben Ali, they have conducted a large number of actions attacking TV studios, premises where alcohol is sold and police stations, as well as intimidating the Tunisian population.

For many months, the Ennahda leaders tried not to condemn or alienate their Salafist base, arguing that this would only lead to a replication of the era of the old regime, whereby political opponents were oppressed, tortured and imprisoned. However, the ongoing situation across the country and especially in Tunis may in the near future lead to a rupture between the leaders of Ennahda and the Salafist fringe.

After Ghannouchi had left Tunisia for London, where he remained during most of the Ben Ali period only to return after his fall, a new generation of young Islamists who are relatively unfamiliar with the ideals of Ennahda emerged. With the new communication tools available, these young Islamists are now more familiar with external ideas and resistance ideologies emanating from Afghanistan or Iraq than with the views of Ghannouchi. Also, now that the iron-fisted regime of Ben Ali is no longer in place in Tunisia, Salafists have slowly started to promote their ideology, not only among the population but also within the Ennahda party. For instance, the latter is increasingly coming under pressure to inscribe a major role for Shari'a or Islamic law in the new constitution.

As a result, non-Islamists have grown increasingly anxious, and worry that the Salafists' views are not only slowly taking root across the country, taking advantage of the general disorder and the emergence of lawless areas in order to advance Islamic law, but that Ennahda is also acting in connivance with the Salafists and shares their ultimate Islamic goals.

Consequently, Ennahda is in an increasingly uncomfortable position as it is effectively caught between the Salafists, who see the political bureau as being too soft on Islamic issues, and the non-Islamists who, in turn, perceive Ennahda as being too lax in dealing with Tunisia's security threats. The Ennahda party has become divided between religious preachers and the core beliefs of its militant base on one side and pragmatic politicians with their more flexible positions on the other.

In these times of heightened fear and incomprehension, it is very likely that there will be some exaggeration and premature alarm vis-à-vis the 'Salafist threat'. This situation can be explained by the fact that the non-Islamists and

non-Salafists have serious difficulties in accepting the fact that Islamists are actually governing Tunisia. This fear finds expression in concrete ways.

It is a fact that the Salafists are increasingly becoming visible in Tunisian society, especially in poor neighbourhoods. Like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria in the early 1990s, Salafists have managed to fill the vacuum created by deteriorating public services in marginalised areas, thereby becoming key economic actors, subsidising and compensating for the lack of a governmental presence and governmental action. It is estimated that more than 400 000 Tunisians (4 per cent of the total population) live on less than one dollar per day.

In order to respond to increasing concern among some Tunisians, the Ennahda political bureau has argued that the radicalisation of religious discourse is a temporary phenomenon, largely due to years of frustration and repression. It also argues that by integrating the Salafists into the political system, they will in time become more moderate. However, many observers contend that this is a double-edged strategy that risks gradually Islamising Tunisian society from below.

Following the killing of Belaïd, demonstrations against Ennahda were met by pro-Ennahda rallies. During their protest march, the slogan 'France dégage', known worldwide since the fall of Ben Ali, was shouted by protestors. Indeed, France's Ministry of Interior strongly criticised Ennahda, insinuating that the Islamist party was behind the assassination of Belaïd, even referring to 'fascist Islamists'. France's position provoked the summoning of the French Ambassador in Tunisia by the Prime Minister to remind the Ambassador that Tunisia was a sovereign state. The Prime Minister also stressed that France was a close ally and friend and therefore Tunis expected some support from Paris during these difficult times, at least in terms of its silence. In addition, placards were carried by the demonstrators declaring 'France dégage' (France, get

out), 'France, ça suffit!' (France, it is enough!) and 'La Tunisie ne sera plus jamais une terre de colonisation' (Tunisia will no more be a land of colonisation). Many demonstrators also showed anger at French journalists, reminding them that during the Ben Ali era they were absent and omitted to inform the world of what was happening in Tunisia.

The Fitch global ratings agency recently published an alarming report pointing at serious delays in the Tunisian transition and warns that the current rating, already downgraded to 'BB' in December 2012, could be negatively revised if the social violence in Tunisia persists, leading to political instability, which in turn could endanger the political transition. The Fitch analysts pointed out the difficulties Tunisians face in forming a new government. An American hedgefund that had intended to acquire 25 per cent of the mobile phone company Tunisiana, but then withdrew its offer, is a serious indication of the uncertainty and perplexity of potential foreign investors. Moreover, the adoption of a new investment law in Tunisia is being keenly awaited by foreign investors. Financial markets and stock exchanges are also scrutinising the decision by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to grant a loan of $2,32 billion in March 2013. However, for the same financial markets, the settlement of the political situation in Tunisia is a prerequisite for optimism.

Geopolitical dynamics

Africa and RECs

The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and the AU condemned the assassination of Belaïd, as well as the subsequent death of a police officer in protests following the killing. The AU condemned these acts as undermining the efforts towards the peaceful completion of the ongoing transitional process in Tunisia. The Chairperson expressed confidence that the Tunisian authorities would spare no effort in bringing the perpetrators of the heinous crime to justice, while also deploying the necessary efforts to

enhance the security environment in the country.

The AU reminded the Tunisian people and its leaders of the urgent need to overcome their differences and rise above partisan and ideological considerations to ensure the fulfilment of the high expectations of the 2011 Revolution.

During NATO's military intervention in Libya, hundreds of migrants who were living in Libya left the country and many of them ended up in a refugee camp in Tunisia. The Choucha camp located on the Libyan-Tunisian border is, however, set to close this June, leaving hundreds of refugees with no official status. The refugees in this camp left their respective countries, including Sudan, Nigeria and Chad, for economic reasons. As a result, they do not qualify as refugees in terms of UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) criteria and are not entitled to any assistance from the UNHCR. Also, once the camp is closed down, it is very likely that many of these refugees will remain in Tunisia, living a clandestine life and relying on low-paid temporary jobs as well as aid from the Tunisian population. However, in a country facing tremendous socio-economic challenges, these refugees could soon become the target and scapegoat of a fringe of desperate unemployed Tunisians.

United Nations

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon strongly condemned the assassination of Belaïd. For the Secretary-General, there has been important progress in Tunisia's transition. Yet, much remains to be done in terms of the constitutional process and with regard to meeting the social and economic demands of the Tunisian people. The Secretary-General has encouraged the Tunisian authorities to move the reform process forward as Tunisia's democratic transition should not be derailed by further acts of political violence.

International community

Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice-President of the Commission, and Štefan Füle,

Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, both condemned in the strongest possible terms the assassination of Belaïd. They expressed their sincere condolences both to the victim's family and to the other leaders and members of the Unified Democratic Patriots Party. They also expressed the hope that the Tunisian authorities would conduct a full investigation into the assassination so that those responsible for Belaïd's murder could be brought to justice.

For Ashton and Füle, the growing number of acts of violence committed by extremist groups, including the Committees to Protect the Revolution, is a threat to the transition process now underway. 'Everything must therefore be done to put an end to the activities of these violent groups as it is in the interests of all the citizens of Tunisia that the political transition process should be allowed to go forward, in accordance with the law and in a spirit of constructive and peaceful dialogue.'

Civil society

Following a call from the UGTT, a strike was conducted in Tunis on 8 February. Fearing an escalation of the violence, the Tunisian League for Human Rights, known in French as the *Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme* (LTDH), asked the authorities to protect threatened political personalities.

The Euro Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) condemned the assassination of Belaïd. For the EMHRN, this tragedy came about as a result of a government-sanctioned climate of intimidation and violence against the democratic movement in Tunisia.

According to the EMHRN, the repeated attacks, coming from government officials as well as from some Ennahda leaders, singling out Belaïd as the leading light of the protests, incited his murderers. The EMHRN goes further, arguing that the apprehension and conviction of the killers is being compounded by a biased use of the justice system and law enforcement capacity, due to a single party having seized the main levers of state power.

'This is not what the Tunisian people overthrew the Ben Ali regime for,' the EMHRN has stressed. The first duty of the public authorities is clearly to bring those who ordered and carried out this abominable act swiftly to book. But no less is it the responsibility of the Tunisian authorities to put an end to the climate of intimidation and violence they have allowed to evolve. For the EMHRN, failure by the government to ensure justice for Belaïd will throw any hopes of fair and democratic elections into doubt.

Scenarios

Tunisia remains unstable and serious discrepancies prevail among the population, especially between the Salafists and the non-Salafists. Insecurity across the country may soon appear to be a major challenge for the Tunisian authorities. The final drafting of the Tunisian Constitution may also prove a difficult task, which would in turn postpone the presidential elections planned for July this year.

The Salafist component of Tunisian society is a subject that needs to be dealt with rapidly, with subtlety and wisdom. Force and coercion ought not to be used, as there would undoubtedly be a negative reaction, which could encourage the hard-line fringe of the Salafists to take up arms against both the government and the population.

Scenario 1

Tunisia will remain unstable for many months. Tunisian society is divided and two years after the fall of Ben Ali still seeks compromises and the creation of a model society broadly acceptable to the majority of Tunisians.

Scenario 2

The Salafists exert strong pressure against the government, but also against ordinary Tunisians across the country. This could lead to further clashes and divisions throughout Tunisia.

Scenario 3

The volatile situation in neighbouring Libya, and also across the region, could spark more political unrest in Tunisia. Arms are circulating freely and illegally in Tunisia and could end up in the hands of hard-core Islamist Tunisian militants who could use them against both the civilian population and governmental bodies and state infrastructure.

Options

Given the above scenarios, the following options could be considered by the PSC to consolidate democracy in Tunisia:

Option 1

In order to lessen tension and give some satisfaction to the Tunisian people, the government ought to establish an independent committee to investigate Belaïd's assassination.

Option 2

As the UGTT has suggested, establish a national council for dialogue comprising the main political and civil society organisations as well as trade unions to agree on a clear and feasible roadmap for political transition.

Option 3

Encourage cooperation between Islamist and secularist organisations. Ghannouchi, as president and founder of Ennahda, could further explain his conception of Islam adapted to contemporary challenges and its intended role in Tunisian society. This process could be facilitated by civil society associations with close ties to the party to spread the message.

Option 4

The Salafist control of, and influence in, poor neighbourhoods could be terminated or substantially reduced by public service institutions engaging in pro-active strategies towards this end.

PSC Spotlight

The 2013 election of the members of the PSC

In terms of article 5 of the Protocol establishing the AU Peace and Security Council, the PSC shall be composed of 15 members selected in the following manner: ten Members elected for a term of two years; and five Members elected for a term of three years in order to ensure continuity.

The tenure of five members of the PSC (Table 1 below) serving for a three-year term will terminate at the end of March 2013. Article 5 of the PSC Protocol stipulates that the Council's membership is to be decided according to the principle of 'equitable regional representation and rotation'. For their three-year tenure, each of the five regions is represented by one member.

Table 1

Region	States whose term ends in 2013
Central Africa	Equatorial Guinea
East Africa	Kenya
North Africa	Libya
Southern Africa	Zimbabwe
West Africa	Nigeria

Following the communication from the AU Commission inviting the five regions to submit their candidates for the five seats expected to be vacant at the end of March 2013, the list of candidates was received. Table 2 shows the list of candidates that competed for the five seats. Some of the candidatures were received directly from member states rather than through the regions.

Table 2

Region	Candidates for 2013 PSC election
Central Africa	Equatorial Guinea
East Africa	Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda
North Africa	Algeria
Southern Africa	Mozambique
West Africa	Nigeria

Apart from Eritrea, all the other candidates have served in the PSC at least once. Equatorial Guinea served once during the 2010–2013 term. Similarly, Mozambique and Uganda served in the PSC once, but for a two-year term, during 2004–2006 and 2006–2008 respectively. Ethiopia and Algeria each served two consecutive terms of three years each during 2004–2010. While Ethiopia was replaced by Kenya, Libya took over from Algeria. Nigeria has been a member of the PSC since 2004 and is emerging as a de facto permanent member of the PSC.

As the list of candidates shows, the region lacking agreement on a unified candidacy was East Africa. Four countries, including the incumbent holder of the three-year seat for East Africa, Kenya, competed for the new three-year term seat. Ethiopia withdrew from the election. Eritrea did not succeed in garnering the required support. Accordingly, the real fight for the seat was between Kenya and Uganda. As Kenya was campaigning for immediate re-election, Uganda ultimately received the required support to become the new member of the PSC from East Africa.

Table 3 Members of the PSC elected at the 22nd ordinary session of the Executive Council for 2013–2016

Region	Re-elected or newly elected members
Central Africa	Equatorial Guinea
East Africa	Uganda
North Africa	Algeria
Southern Africa	Mozambique
West Africa	Nigeria

Mozambique is the only country from Southern Africa that has not served on the PSC since 2006. Its emergence as the only candidate for the region accordingly represents the continuation of the region's strict adherence to the principle of rotation. It also manifests the level of cohesion in the region and higher tendency of countries of the region to play a representative regional role in the PSC.

The result of the election shows that while Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea were re-elected, the other three states were newly elected to the PSC. The continued re-election of Nigeria to the PSC suggests the emergence of a practice in the West Africa region of reserving its three-year term seat for Nigeria. Nigeria has accordingly become the only AU member state to evolve into a de facto permanent member of the PSC.

Algeria had only a three-year break when it resumed its membership of the PSC in April 2013. This reflects limited rotation of the three-year term seat among countries of the North African region. The successful return of Uganda to the PSC to occupy the seat formerly held by Kenya makes it the third country in the East African region to hold the three-year seat.

Clearly, there are variations between the different regions in their adherence to the principle of rotation.

Although the principle of regional representation is in the technical sense fully observed, the practice shows that the extent to which members of the PSC represent the views of their respective regions varies from region to region. Actual regional representation is more evident on the part of members of the PSC coming from Southern Africa and is also reflected to a lesser extent by PSC members from West Africa. Actual representation of their respective regions by other PSC members seems to be generally weak, although there have been instances, particularly in East Africa, where individual states were willing to play a representational role.

Apart from regional representation and rotation, the PSC Protocol and the Modalities for the Election of Members of the PSC provide additional criteria that apply to the election of members of the PSC. These include the commitment to uphold the principles of the AU; contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa; provision of capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibilities entailed in membership; respect for constitutional governance, the rule of law and human rights; and possession of sufficiently staffed and equipped Permanent Missions at the AU and the UN.

An analysis of the PSC membership process in practice shows that these requirements are secondary to regional representation and rotation. The current membership of the PSC, as represented in Table 4, shows that this second category of criteria for PSC membership is not strictly complied with. Not all of the current members of the PSC respect constitutional governance, the rule of law and human rights. Indeed, in March 2012 Mali, a current member of the PSC, experienced a military coup while the PSC was holding a ministerial level meeting in the capital, Bamako. Similarly, not all current members of the PSC contribute to the promotion of peace and security or possess the capacity to assume responsibilities for regional and continental peace-making, conflict management and resolution efforts.

The members of the PSC elected for the term of 2013–2016 will assume their seats on 1 April 2013.

The membership of the PSC as of 1 April 2013 is shown in Table 4.

Table 4

Region	PSC members as of April 2013
Central Africa	Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Congo
Eastern Africa	Uganda, Djibouti and Tanzania
Northern Africa	Algeria and Egypt
Southern Africa	Mozambique, Angola and Lesotho
Western Africa	Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia and Guinea

Of the 54 AU member states only 47 are parties to the PSC Protocol. As of January 2013, Cape Verde and South Sudan havenot signed the PSC Protocol, while five member states (the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Seychelles and Somalia) have not ratified the Protocol, although they are signatories.

Out of the 47 states party to the PSC Protocol, the number of states that have so far served in the PSC is 37.

Regional security analysis

THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

Previous PSC and AU communiqués

In a press release dated 13 February 2013 the African Union (AU) announced that the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which is a member of the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), had contributed a battalion of 500 troops to the military component of the initiative, the African Union-led Regional Task Force (RTF), for the elimination of the LRA. The RTF, which aims to have a maximum troop strength of 5000, is commanded by a Ugandan Brigadier General, Dick Olum. The handover of the battalion by the DRC, which was the last member of the initiative to contribute troops to the regional force, was commended by the AU at a ceremony that took place at Dungu in the DRC, the headquarters of the RTF troops. Major General Amuli Bahigwa, Chief of Staff in charge of operations of the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC), handed over his country's contingent to the Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), Ambassador Francisco Madeira. The ceremony was attended by the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative and Head of the UN Regional Office for Central Africa, Abou Moussa. South Sudan has pledged to make an additional contribution of 500 troops in the coming months.

The DRC's troop contribution was in line with the decision of the first Ministerial meeting of the Joint Coordination Mechanism for the elimination of the LRA in Addis Ababa on 8 May 2012. The meeting requested the LRA-affected countries to designate Sector Commanders, and to contribute and deploy their contingents under the RTF in their respective sectors within an agreed timeline.

Subsequently, in September 2012, the operation received 2860 troops from Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR) and the South Sudan Army (SPLA). Uganda contributed 2000 soldiers, South Sudan sent 500 and the CAR deployed 360 soldiers of the *Forces Armées Central Africaines* (FACA) to the regional force. According to the AU statement, together with the 500 FARDC troops the current total strength of the RTF has increased to 3350 soldiers, and paves the way for the full operationalisation of coordinated operations against the LRA in the Dungu sector, in addition to the sectors of Nzara in South Sudan and Obo in the CAR.

The PSC, in its meeting of 22 May 2012, discussed developments regarding its initiative to eliminate the LRA. In a communiqué that followed the meeting, the Council extended the operations and mandate of the RCI-LRA by an additional twelve months. The PSC also discussed the logistics and financial elements of the operation and requested the UNSC 'to consider modalities of enhanced support through the UN peacekeeping missions present in the area of operation of the RCI-LRA, including by adjusting as may be necessary their mandates'. In its meeting on 22 November 2011 the PSC authorised the implementation of the RCI-LRA. The force was mandated by the Council to protect civilians from LRA atrocities, strengthen the operational capabilities of countries affected by the LRA, stabilise the region and facilitate humanitarian activities in the area, among other responsibilities. After that meeting, the AU appointed Francisco Madeira as the AU Special Envoy for the LRA issue.

Crisis escalation potential

A recent report by the Washington-based advocacy group, Resolve, claims that the LRA 'killed fewer people, launched fewer attacks and had a higher number of defections in 2012 than in recent years'. Resolve's LRA Crisis Tracker project, which monitors the rebels' activities in Central Africa, also stated that the sudden decline appears to have happened as a result of the strategic decision by Joseph Kony in mid-2011 to reduce killings of civilians. The report, however, warned against any complacency in the fight against the group in the light of the reduced deaths and reported defections, and said that the LRA was still capable of carrying out mass killings.

The LRA has no central command structure or any established logistical capability or training camps. However, reports show that its infamous leader, Kony, still controls the widely scattered group through radio communication and satellite phones. The group also continues to loot and kill for survival. Despite the good news about defections, the number of abductions remains high. According to Resolve's Crisis Tracker, in 2012 the LRA committed more than 260 attacks on civilians and abducted over 500 people, including more than 100 children. In one high-profile incident, in September 2012 the brutal terrorist group attacked the town of Bangassou in the CAR and abducted 49 people. In comparison, the LRA carried out some 270 attacks against civilians in 2011.

Given the fragile security complex that exists in Central Africa, the LRA continues to present a grave threat to the wellbeing of civilians in the DRC, the Republic of South Sudan and the CAR, as well as to the ongoing peace and political processes in these countries. The LRA also continues to take advantage of the escalating security problem in the eastern DRC, which resulted in a change of priority by the Kinshasa government and the redeployment of DRC troops from the LRA-affected region to the M-23 rebel-controlled areas. This move reduced the presence of security forces where they were desperately needed and increased the vulnerability of civilians in areas exposed to LRA attacks. The security and political crisis in the CAR has also forced the CAR government to divert attention to dealing with the local rebel groups, thereby making the LRA campaign less important. The possibility of the LRA forming opportunistic alliances with regional governments or other rebel groups in Darfur and the Great Lakes region is also another possibility that can pave the way for the survival and revival of the terrorist group.

Key issues and internal dynamics

The additional troops provided by the DRC makes it possible to fully implement coordinated operations against the LRA in the Dungu and Nzara sectors in South Sudan, and the Obo sector in the CAR. However, there is an ongoing debate between the four members of the regional task force about operational matters. The countries concerned are yet to reach consensus about how best to organise their troops. There is the view that each troop-contributing country should protect its territory from LRA attacks, while there are also experts and officials who support a unified, coordinated force against the LRA that will allow, enable and promote actions by the RTF in every country regardless of the origins of its troops.

According to the latest report by the international NGOs Invisible Children and Resolve, the LRA's strength has declined and its capacity to carry out major operations has been reduced significantly. In 2012, LRA terrorists killed a total of 51 civilians, down from 154 deaths in 2011 and 706 deaths in 2010, according to the report. In the first half of 2012, about 190 LRA attacks were reported in the region. That number fell to 84 in the second half of the year. The LRA killed civilians in 10 per cent of its total attacks in 2012, compared to 30 per cent in 2011 and 50 per cent in 2010. Similarly, the average number of people killed per attack has decreased steadily in the past three years: 1,5 (2010), or three people in every two attacks; 0,52 (2011), or one person in every two attacks; and 0,18 (2012), or one person in every five or six attacks.

The report estimates that at present there are about 150 to 250 LRA fighters distributed in smaller groups in the DRC, South Sudan and the CAR. It is also thought that there are up to 400 abductees, mostly women and children, traveling with them. In 2012, two senior LRA commanders were captured or killed and about 20 fighters left the group. The report indicated that there was an increase in the number of Ugandan members of the LRA who were defecting or escaping from the rebel group. It noted that the trend was particularly

important because Ugandans made up the core of the LRA. 'And because the LRA no longer operates in Uganda, every time a Ugandan combatant leaves the LRA they're essentially irreplaceable.'

Kony is thought to be hiding out close to the meeting point of the CAR, South Sudan and Sudan. Besides killings, abductions, rapes and looting, the LRA is now also linked to the illegal ivory trade in Gambara National Park in the north-eastern DRC. In February 2013 the Ugandan army recovered a cache of elephant tusks in the jungles of the CAR. The LRA is using the illegal ivory trade as a method to acquire new supplies or forms of financial support.

In January 2013 Ugandan soldiers announced that they had killed Brigadier Binany, one of Kony's top bodyguards who had also earned a grim reputation for the abduction of children. The incident took place in the dense jungles of the eastern CAR close to its border with South Sudan. Sources in the Ugandan army said that in addition to being a top Kony bodyguard, Binany had been in charge of food collection as well as abducting children for the rebel group.

According to Resolve, the senior LRA commanders are operating primarily in the CAR and the Sudanese-controlled Kafia Kingi enclave. Among them are International Criminal Court-indictees Kony, Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo. Maj. John Bosco Kibwola and Col. Otto Agweng, two increasingly influential LRA commanders, are also reported to be in the CAR or Kafia Kingi. Lt. Col. Vincent Binansio 'Binany' Okumu, formerly a personal bodyguard to Kony, was allegedly the ranking LRA commander in the Congo for much of 2012. He was killed by the Ugandan military in the CAR in January 2013.

Despite its size and military capacity, the group has taken advantage of the geography and the weakness of the armies and governments of the states in the region in order to evade elimination. The AU-led mission should learn from past attempts and prioritise civilian protection, as reprisal attacks might expose people in the area to further LRA brutality. The military operation to hunt down LRA rebels still

faces many logistical and intelligence-gathering challenges. In the meantime, the rebels continue to attack civilians. In 2012 the AU Special Envoy for the LRA, Francisco Madeira, said that despite making some progress the regional task force still faced logistical, material and financial resource challenges, which limited its operations. The lack of proper financing and coordinated leadership could also hamper the mission. The uneasy relationships and conflict history of the national armies of the countries involved in the operation are further causes for concern about the likely success of the plan.

Geopolitical dynamics

Africa and RECs

The second Ministerial Meeting of the Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM) of the RCI-LRA took place on 15 January 2013 in Addis Ababa at the AU Headquarters under the chairmanship of the Peace and Security Commissioner, Ramtane Lamamra. The meeting was attended by the Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Defence Staff of the member countries of the RCI-LRA, namely the CAR, the DRC, the Republic of South Sudan and the Republic of Uganda. Also in attendance, as observers, were representatives from Chad, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the United Nations.

The meeting, which referred to the outcome of the meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff of the member countries of the RCI-LRA that took place in Bangui on 20 December 2012, adopted the mission documents of the RCI-LRA, including the Strategic Directives, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), the Rules of Engagement (RoE) and the Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). The Chiefs of Defence Staff and experts also met a day before the JCM in Addis Ababa, discussing the operational elements of the initiative. The AU is planning to convene a meeting of the RCI-LRA Support Forum in early April 2013 in Addis Ababa to mobilise further resources for the successful implementation of the Initiative, both from member states and partners. In the meantime, the Ministers of Defence will meet again in mid-March

2013 in Juba, South Sudan, to evaluate the progress made and chart the way forward for the elimination of the LRA. The military campaign has mostly been focused on hunting the rebel fighters while also protecting civilians.

On 24 February 2013, eleven African countries signed a United Nations-drafted peace deal to stabilise the DRC, where rebels allegedly backed by neighbouring countries last year threatened to oust the government. The DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, CAR, Angola, Uganda, South Sudan, South Africa, Tanzania and the Republic of Congo signed the accord. It is hoped that the new agreement will improve relations and cooperation between countries of the region and help to enhance the fight against the LRA.

United Nations

The UN is monitoring and supporting the activities of the RCI-LRA through the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa. In December 2012 the UN Security Council called for an investigation into how the LRA was being supplied and financed.

The UN-drafted peace deal to stabilise the troubled Congo, where rebels allegedly backed by neighbouring countries last year threatened to oust the government, is believed to help improve relations and cooperation against the LRA.

International community

On 16 January 2013 US President Barack Obama signed a bill that authorised rewards of up to $5 million for information leading to the arrest of wanted war criminals, including Kony. The move was hailed as an 'exciting new tool for efforts to end LRA atrocities in central Africa' by members of civil society. As a result of the US legislation, anyone indicted by 'international, hybrid, or mixed tribunals for genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity' became newly eligible targets of the US 'Rewards for Justice' programme. The US State Department is expected to announce a financial reward soon for information leading to the arrest of Kony and his top deputies. An official statement issued by Obama specifically named Kony as the first target of the new programme and

reaffirmed the US commitment to help stop the kind of mass violence perpetrated by individual terrorists and terrorist groups like the LRA wherever it occurs.

On January 2013 the US also backed a plan to use surveillance drones to support UN peacekeepers working in the DRC. The US said that Washington supported the UN's proposal to use unarmed, unmanned aerial vehicles, for example, in the DRC to increase the surveillance capacity of the UN peacekeeping operation. US officials also said that the drones could be used to track down Kony.

Scenarios

Given the situation of the LRA and state of security in the region, the following are potential scenarios:

Scenario 1

Improving regional relations and cooperation, and resolution of the crisis in the eastern DRC could shift the focus of Kinshasa to fighting the LRA. The new Infantry Battalion of 500 soldiers contributed to the RTF could also enhance the hunt for LRA fighters and the protection of civilians.

Scenario 2

The possibility of a rift in the LRA leadership could result in more high-level defections by captives. Such a scenario would help the regional force in gathering vital information on the locations and patterns of the group, thereby leading to further operational successes. The possible capture or killing of Kony with necessary external support could restrict the LRA's sphere of activity and help capture or kill other LRA leaders and fighters, thereby putting an end to two decades of LRA atrocities.

Scenario 3

The additional troops could add more energy to the RTF. However, the logistical and financial challenges faced by the task force might create fatigue and rifts between the different national armies that make up the mission.

Scenario 4

The possibility of Kony's presence in Sudan could escalate regional tension

and continue the legacy of proxy conflict in the region. The possible merger of the LRA with other regional armed militias in South Sudan, Darfur, Rwanda or the DRC could effectively multiply the magnitude of the existing security threat.

Options

Given the above scenarios, the following options could be considered by the PSC to improve security and stability in the region:

Option 1

The PSC could continue to request the involvement of partners and the UN to resolve the logistical and financial challenges faced by the regional task force by improving aerial and human intelligence in Central Africa. The PSC could design a specific hybrid plan with the UNSC to develop a joint response strategy, which would be based on a close partnership with UN missions in the war-affected countries and which would address defensive gaps in the eastern CAR as well as much of the northern DRC. Such mechanisms could help improve the safety of civilians in the region.

Option 2

The PSC, through the AU special envoy to the LRA, could try to include Khartoum in efforts to eliminate the LRA. The envoy could also initiate discussions between the DRC and Ugandan governments to improve intelligence sharing and cooperation.

Option 3

The PSC, in collaboration with members of civil society active in the area, could encourage countries affected by the LRA to take measures for healing trauma through traditional and state conflict resolution and legal institutions. The PSC could also support more defection initiatives.

Documentation

Relevant AU documents

Press Release – Democratic Republic of Congo hands over 500-strong contingent to the African Union-led Regional Task Force for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (13 February 2013) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Press Release – Important action-oriented decisions adopted by the 2nd Ministerial Meeting of the Joint Coordination Mechanism of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (16 January,2013) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

(PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCCXLI)(13 November 2012) Communiqué on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa

Press Release on the 2nd Regional Ministerial Meeting on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (6–8 June 2011) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Assembly/AU/6(XIII) (1–3 July 2009) Report of the Peace and Security Council to the African Union on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, Sirte, Libya

(PSC/PR/2(CCXV) (8 January 2009) Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR)

PSC/MIN/Comm.2 (CLXIII) (22 December 2008) Communiqué on the situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

PSC/PR/Comm.(CCI) (25 August 2009) Communiqué on the implementation process of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

UN Documents

S/RES/1861 (14 January 2009) Resolution adopted by the Security Council on the Central African Republic (CAR)

Open Page

EAST AFRICA'S REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES

Introduction

Depending on how one chooses to define the region, East Africa has a number of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the form of the East African Community (EAC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which admittedly overlaps a number of more geographically-specific regions. In addition, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) also qualifies as an REC, comprising Indian Ocean island states and territories.

EAC

The historical origins of the concept of an East African REC or Sub-Regional Economic Community (SEC) can be traced back to the Customs Collection Centre (Kenya and Uganda) of 1897 and, thereafter, the Customs Union established by Kenya and Uganda in 1917, subsequently joined by Tanganyika (now part of Tanzania). In 1967, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda signed a treaty to form the East African Community (EAC) but, by 1977, the EAC concept had effectively collapsed.

The EAC was eventually successfully founded in November 1999 by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and officially came into existence on 7 July 2000. Burundi and Rwanda joined the EAC in 2007. South Sudan and Somalia have applied to join. The headquarters of the EAC are located in Arusha, Tanzania.

The EAC's vision is a 'prosperous, competitive, secure, stable and politically united East Africa' and itsmission is to 'widen and deepen Economic, Political, Social and Culture integration in order to improve the quality of life of the people of East Africa through increased competitiveness, value added production, trade and investments'.

EAC member states created a Customs Union in 2005 and a Common Market in 2010. In future years the member states of the EAC intend to form a Monetary Union and, thereafter, a Political Federation of East African States.

The total population of EAC member states exceeds 130 million people occupying a total geographical area of some 1,82 million square kilometres, in extent slightly larger than Libya.

The main organs of the EAC are the Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Member States; the Council of Ministers; the Co-ordinating Committee; Sectoral Committees; the East African Court of Justice; the East African Legislative Assembly; and the Secretariat.

Summits take place annually. However, any member state may initiate an Extraordinary Summit meeting. Decisions are taken by consensus. The Chair rotates annually among member states.

The current Chair is Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni, who assumed the position in November 2012 at the 14th Summit Meeting of the EAC, which took place in Nairobi, Kenya. Among other decisions, the November Summit approved the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security that deals with cross-border crimes.

The Council of Ministers, among other responsibilities, establishes sectoral councils drawn from its members to address matters arising under the EAC Treaty. The Council of Ministers meets twice annually and decisions are by consensus. EAC Sectoral Councils include those dealing with Defence, Finance and Economic Affairs, Foreign Policy Co-ordination and Agriculture

and Food Security. Currently, there are sixteen Sectoral Councils.

The Co-ordinating Committee consists of permanent secretaries responsible for regional co-operation, and also meets at least twice annually. Among other responsibilities, it implements the decisions of the Council of Ministers and co-ordinates the activities of the Sectoral Committees.

Sectoral Committees report to the Co-ordinating Committee. They prepare the programmes in order to implement the objectives of the Treaty.

The East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) is the EAC Parliament. It has 52 members – nine members from each partner state – plus seven ex-officio members, namely the five Ministers responsible for regional co-operation, the Secretary-General and the Counsel to the Community.

The Counsel to the Community is appointed by the Council of Ministers and acts as the principal legal adviser to the EAC. The Counsel is also entitled to appear in the courts of the partner states in matters regarding the EAC and its Treaty.

The major responsibility of the East African Court of Justice is to ensure legal adherence to the interpretation and application of, and compliance with, the Treaty. In this regard the Court would be expected to preside over treaty disputes between partner states, as well as disputes between the EAC and its employees or questions concerning the compliance of national laws with the Treaty.

The Secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General, is the executive organ of the EAC and runs the REC's day-to-day business. The Secretary-General is supported by four Deputy Secretaries-General, whose responsibilities are:

- Planning and infrastructure
- Productive and social sectors
- Finance and administration
- Political federation

There are also a number of autonomous institutions that form part of the EAC. These include the Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC), the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation (LVFO), the Inter-University Council of East Africa (IUCEA), the East African Development Bank (EADB) and the Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency (CASSOA).

The EAC has been designated a key pillar in terms of the African Economic Community (AEC) Treaty.

IGAD

The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has eight member states, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and, most recently, South Sudan, which joined in 2011. IGAD member states occupy a total surface area of almost six million square kilometres and have a total population of almost 200 million.

IGAD has its origins in what was originally the Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), constituted in 1986 with a view to combating drought and desertification in the region. However, in the 1990s IGADD's focus also began to include regional security and political dialogue. By the mid-1990s its member states had begun to envisage a regional, economic, political, developmental, trade and security organisation similar to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

IGAD was officially established at the IGADD Second Extraordinary Summit in Nairobi, Kenya, on 21 March 1996. A few weeks later, the IGAD Council of Ministers identified three primary areas of cooperation:

- Conflict prevention, management and resolution and humanitarian affairs
- Infrastructural development (transport and communications)
- Food security and environmental protection

IGAD has been designated a key pillar in terms of the AEC Treaty.

IGAD's main organs are the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (this supreme organ meets once a year); the Council of Ministers (Foreign Ministers plus one additional focal minister meet twice annually); the Committee of Ambassadors (located in Djibouti, advises the Executive Secretary); and the Secretariat (located in Djibouti, headed by an Executive Secretary, comprising the Office of the Executive Secretary and the three divisions of Economic Cooperation, Agriculture and Environment, and Political and Humanitarian Affairs).

The 12th IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2012.

Peace and security issues, as well as early warning of potentially disruptive events precipitating such issues, have been, and remain, a major focus of IGAD's attention. In past times and currently, Sudan, Somalia, terrorism and piracy have featured prominently on the IGAD agenda. Food security and terrorism also feature on the national agendas of IGAD member states.

IGAD's vision is to become the premier regional organisation for achieving peace, prosperity and regional integration in the IGAD region. Its mission is to assist and complement the efforts of its member states to achieve, through collaboration and increased cooperation, food security and environmental protection; promotion and maintenance of peace and security; promotion of humanitarian affairs; and economic cooperation and integration.

IGAD coordinates the activities of two Addis Ababa-based institutions– the Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism (CEWARN) secretariat and the IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT).

IGAD's CEWARN Unit came into existence in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in

June 2003. This event followed the signing in January 2002 by the IGAD Council of Ministers of a Protocol Agreement to officially establish CEWARN.

CEWARN's coordinating structures include the Secretariat; Committee on Early Warning; Committee of Ambassadors; and the Council of Ministers and the Assembly. In addition, there is the Council of Permanent Secretaries, comprising the Permanent Secretaries, Directors General or equivalent ranks of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs.

In terms of the CEWARN Protocol, member states may also involve national and regional parliaments, academic and research institutions, religious organisations, local non-governmental organisations and the news media in early warning and response operations and analyses, particularly in terms of research, raising awareness of early warning and response issues, alerting society appropriately and conflict management and resolution at the grassroots level.

The Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs) in each member state are linked to IGAD through the CEWARN Unit and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Each CEWERU comprises an optional steering committee, a focal point and local committees. The Steering Committee, which reports to CEWARN's Committee of Permanent Secretaries, would include representatives of the central government; parliamentary legislators; representatives of the provincial administration; police; military; civil society representatives, including religious organisations; academic institutions; research institutions; and whatever other representatives individual governments may designate.

The main functions of CEWERUs include collecting information relevant to early warning and response; liaising with civil society groups involved in collecting information at the grassroots and other levels; undertaking preliminary analysis of collected information; reviewing analyses received; formulating response strategies; preparing periodic conflict early warning reports; and communicating information and analysis to the CEWARN Unit.

ICPAT was initiated in 2006. Its primary objective is to enable IGAD member states to effectively combat terrorism and promote regional security cooperation. ICPAT addresses these needs by enhancing judicial cooperation; optimising inter-departmental cooperation; enhancing border control; providing training, sharing information and best practices; and promoting strategic cooperation. A Steering Committee, chaired by the IGAD Secretariat, guides ICPAT's work. The Steering Committee comprises representatives from IGAD states as well as non-voting representatives from countries providing core support to the programme.

The IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre (ICPAC), located in Nairobi, Kenya, evolved from the Drought Monitoring Centre (DMC) that was established in 1989 by some two dozen countries from Eastern and Southern Africa. First conceived in October 2003, ICPAC became a specialised IGAD institution with the signing of the Protocol on 12 April 2007, which fully integrated ICPAC into IGAD. In addition to the eight IGAD member states, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania are also overseen by ICPAC.

ICPAC's Mission is to provide timely climate early warning information and support specific sector applications to enable the region to cope with various risks associated with extreme climate variability and change for poverty alleviation, environmental management and sustainable development of member countries.

The 2011 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) reflects a relatively low 'quality of life' assessment for all IGAD member states that ranges from the best to the worst from among a total of 187 countries surveyed. The UNDP rankings are as follows: Kenya (143), Uganda (161), Djibouti (165), Sudan (169), Ethiopia (174), Eritrea (177), South Sudan (not surveyed) and Somalia (not surveyed). Consequently, in terms of quality of life, the total population of IGAD member states falls into the bottom 25 per centof the world's total, a factor that tends to encourage peace and human security threats and makes facilities such as CEWARN, ICPAT and ICPAC virtually indispensable.

COMESA

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) stretches from Egypt to Botswana, making it as much a Southern as an Eastern REC; and it includes Central and North African states as well as Indian Ocean island states. Its official name, therefore, does not adequately describe the vast extent of this particular REC.

COMESA comprises 20 member states, namely Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, the Seychelles, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. COMESA's total population exceeds 400 million and its member states collectively occupy a surface area of approximately 13 million square kilometres (considerably larger than China or Canada). Former COMESA member states include Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Tanzania.

COMESA's vision is to 'be a fully integrated, internationally competitive regional economic community with high standards of living for all its people ready to merge into an African Economic Community'.

Its mission is to '[e]ndeavour to achieve sustainable economic and social progress in all Member States through increased co-operation and

integration in all fields of development particularly in trade, customs and monetary affairs, transport, communication and information, technology, industry and energy, gender, agriculture, environment and natural resources'.

COMESA's primary organs are the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the COMESA Court of Justice and the Committee of Governors of Central Banks.

In addition there are the Intergovernmental Committee, the 12 Technical Committees (Administrative and Budgetary Matters; Agriculture; Comprehensive Information Systems; Energy; Finance and Monetary Affairs; Industry; Labour, Human Resources and Social Affairs; Legal Affairs; Natural Resources and Environment; Tourism and Wildlife; Trade and Customs; and Transport and Communications), the Consultative Committee of the Business Community and other Interest Groups, and the COMESA Secretariat located in Lusaka, Zambia.

The Treaty establishing COMESA was signed on 5 November 1993 in Kampala, Uganda, and was ratified in Lilongwe, Malawi on 8 December 1994.

COMESA replaced the former Preferential Trade Area (PTA), which had existed since 1981. COMESA was established 'as an Organization of free independent sovereign states which … agreed to co-operate in developing their natural and human resources for the good of all their people'.

Its main focus is on the formation of a large economic and trading unit capable of overcoming some of the difficulties and obstacles faced by individual states. By the year 2000, all internal trade tariffs and barriers were to have been removed. Within four years after that COMESA was to have introduced a common external tariff structure to deal with all third party trade that would have considerably simplified all relevant procedures. COMESA's other wide-ranging

objectives include in its priorities the promotion of peace and security in the region.

COMESA has been designated a key pillar in terms of the AEC Treaty.

The 16th COMESA Summit of the Authority took place in November 2012 in Kampala, Uganda. On the subject of peace and security, the Summit's Final Communiqué reiterated 'the (paramount status) of peace and security for creating an enabling environment for investment and sustainable economic development'. The communiqué also devoted appropriate attention to peace and security issues such as the constitutional crisis in Madagascar; events in the eastern DRC and Great Lakes Region; developments in Somalia; terrorist attacks in Kenya and Uganda; the elimination of the LRA; the scourge of piracy; the reconstruction of Comoros; progress in negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan; and attacks by Israel on an industrial complex in Sudan.

IOC

The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) [*Commission de l'Océan Indien* in French]is an inter-governmental organisation created on 20 December 1982 with the Declaration of Port-Louis. This was followed on 10 January 1984 by the Victoria agreement, signed in the Seychelles by Comoros, France (Réunion), Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles. The Maldives enjoys observer status.

The IOC is financed mainly by the European Development Fund (EDF). The organisation executes and implements projects financed by the EDF and other donors such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the French Cooperation, UNESCO, and UN-AIDS. Its objective is to promote the sustainable development of the western Indian Ocean islands.

The IOC represents the island states in international forums and defends their interests with regard to specific environmental and economic issues. IOC member states have established

mechanisms of cooperation for political, diplomatic and security issues, insular socio-economic development and management, and protection of natural resources and the environment. The institutions of the IOC are the Summit of Head of States, the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Permanent Officials and the Secretariat-General based in Quatre Bornes, Mauritius.

The UNDP's most recent HDI data reflect wide differences between individual IOC member states in terms of development and the quality of life enjoyed by their individual populations. The relevant HDI rankings are: Seychelles (52), Mauritius (77), Madagascar (151), Comoros (163) and Réunion (not surveyed, although France was ranked 20).

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it is clear that COMESA's focus of interest and responsibility, as its name confirms, extends far beyond East Africa. Libya, for example, as a COMESA member state, is geographically neither part of Eastern Africa nor part of Southern Africa. COMESA's primary motivation is economic and it tends to leave the region's security concerns to IGAD and SADC.

IGAD, despite the relative poverty, under-development and political instability of many of its individual member states, is an ambitious and relatively sophisticated REC with an indispensable Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism as well as unique and forward-looking approaches to dealing with terrorist and environmental threats, in the form of ICPAT and ICPAC.

The EAC, on the other hand, exhibits an historical and contemporary focus on political and economic integration.

Finally, the IOC, being wholly Francophone and geographically exclusive as a community of islands, has a largely maritime focus in terms of physical and economic security. Piracy and environmental issues are especially prominent. Because its

abbreviated form (IOC) in English is unfortunately shared with the better-known International Olympic Committee and the UN's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, it might be useful for IOC member states to consider changing the official English designation to Commission of the Indian Ocean (CIO).

While overlapping memberships of organisations with non-conflicting visions and objectives need not always result in duplication of activities, wastage of time and resources, and cost-ineffectiveness, there is nonetheless no logical reason why a single REC, focusing on East Africa exclusively, could not effectively address issues of political and economic integration, economic and social development, and peace and human security.

In this regard, a merger of the goals and capabilities of IGAD and the EAC, as well as some aspects of COMESA, all key pillars under the AEC Treaty, might simplify what is sometimes complex, fast-track that which is timeconsuming, and ultimately even achieve far more with fewer human and financial resources. It should also make it easier for current multiple-membership states to pay their membership fees. In addition, access to aid, donor funding and loans should become less competitive.

Only the willingness of key decision makers to explore all options and the political will to take difficult decisions on behalf of the entire region can ultimately determine success or failure in the long-term best interests of the people of East Africa.

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Important dates to diarise

8	March	International Women's Day	
21	March	International Day for the elimination of racial discrimination	
22	March	World Water Day	
19-27	May	21st African Union Summit, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (theme: Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance)	

Country	Election	Date *
Kenya	Presidential, National Assembly and Local	4 March 2013
Zimbabwe	Constitutional referendum	16 March 2013
Togo	National Assembly and Local	24 March 2013
Egypt	House of Representatives	22 April 2013
Guinea	NationalAssembly	12 May 2013
Equatorial Guinea	House of People's Representatives and Local	26 May 2013
Somaliland	House of Representatives	May 2013

could change, dependent on circumstances

Contact

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