

Peace and Security Council Report

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Current members of the Peace and Security Council: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda

Peace and Security Council Protocol

'The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council' – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union

Early warning issues for October 2013

During October, in the aftermath of the terrorist atrocities in Nairobi that began on International Peace Day, there can be no guarantees that similar events will not again take place in Africa. Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb remain active in West Africa and the Sahel. Increased vigilance, resolve and collaboration are essential among those who oppose terrorism in all its forms. No individual African, no individual African country, should pretend to immunity from such murderous acts without first acting decisively to defeat the terrorist scourge by whatever means possible.

In the meantime, continuing atrocities against civilians in the Central African Republic and an uphill battle by aid agencies in the country to address the health needs of the general population require urgent African and international responses.

Events in North Africa have not yet run their course; elsewhere in Africa, sparks of discontent, often fuelled by fear or avarice, could ignite into peace and security conflagrations, as has happened before.

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► Current PSC Chair

Bio data: H.E. Mohamed Idriss Farah
Current posts: Djibouti's Ambassador to Ethiopia
Permanent Representative to the AU and UNECA
and Chair of the PSC

Livingstone formula

'Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC' – PSC/PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.



Country analysis

EGYPT

Introduction

The last country analysis on Egypt was published in the August 2013 edition of the Peace and Security Council Report, no. 49. Readers interested in previous analyses on Egypt are also invited to consult the March, May, July and September 2011 issues, as well as the January, March, June, July and September 2012 editions and the April 2013 edition.

Previous PSC and AU communiqués and statements

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), at its 384th meeting held on 5 July 2013, recalled its previous pronouncements on the situation in Egypt, in particular communiqué PSC/PR/COMM. (CCLX), adopted at its 260th meeting on 16 February 2011. In this communiqué, the Council expressed the AU's solidarity with the Egyptian people, whose desire for democracy was consistent with the relevant AU instruments, and recognised the exceptional nature of the situation then prevailing in Egypt.

The Council further expressed deep concern at the risks posed by the prevailing situation for the long-term stability of Egypt and the cohesion of its people, with potentially far-reaching national and regional consequences.

Accordingly, and as mandated by the relevant AU instruments, the Council decided to suspend the participation of Egypt in the AU's activities until the restoration of constitutional order.

The Council also requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to establish an

International Consultative Forum that would bring together Egypt and relevant international stakeholders to facilitate coordinated action in support of a transition leading to the restoration of constitutional order, the deepening of the democratic process, and the mobilisation of economic and financial support commensurate with the needs of Egypt and the challenges facing the country.

Crisis escalation potential

Following the ousting of former president Mohamed Morsi, the political situation in Egypt remains volatile. Scores of Egyptians, mainly civilians, have died during protests while violent confrontations continue to occur among the population, including between the army and Morsi supporters. On 14 August the army fired live ammunition at the ex-president's demonstrating supporters, killing an estimated 600 people.

Since the military coup d'état, Morsi and several other Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leaders, including Mohammed Badie and his deputy, Khairat al-Shatir, the MB's main English-language spokesperson Gehad al-Haddad, as well as hundreds of MB sympathisers and supporters, have been detained and are waiting for their trials to take place. Moreover, the MB's assets have been temporarily frozen. As a result, MB supporters fear they are facing the return of the Sadat and Mubarak eras.

The attempted assassination of the Egyptian Minister of the Interior and the government's preoccupation with the security situation in the Sinai, where an increasing number of clashes between Egyptian armed forces and militant groups are taking place, forewarn that Egypt has

embarked on a very delicate and uncertain political path towards instability.

The situation of the Copts, who account for ten per cent of the Egyptian population, remains an ongoing concern. Numerous churches have been looted and torched, thereby placing the Copt minority in a state of fear and insecurity. In addition, Egypt's dire economic situation, which is urgently in need of rebuilding and reform, is worsening the country's socio-political burdens by the day. Clearly, the socio-political and economic crisis indicates that Egypt is not only deeply divided but also apparently heading for many years of instability and increasing uncertainty. The instalment of a genuine democratic political system, the tackling of unemployment and the return of foreign investments are urgent problems the Egyptian authorities will rapidly need to solve.

Key issues and internal dynamics

Since the ousting of Morsi in July, the political situation in Egypt has worsened. Scores of Egyptians, mainly civilians, have died during violent confrontations with the police and soldiers. The situation in the Sinai Peninsula is also deteriorating, with many attacks involving alleged Islamist militants. At least 25 policemen and six soldiers have been killed in the Sinai since July. In September, two fake bombs were found in the Cairo metro while the army also engaged in a gun battle with alleged Islamist militants in the village of Kerdassa, near Cairo. By mid-September, at least 28 suspects had been arrested in connection with some of these attacks.

Furthermore, an atmosphere of hatred is perceptible in the streets



of Cairo and other cities. In a McCarthy-era style of betrayal and intrigue, people are starting and reporting rumours about each other with the encouragement of the interim authorities. Islamists and MB supporters have become the primary targets of these rumourmongers and as a result many men have shaved their beards to avoid harassment and arrest.

Egypt's Interior Minister, Mohammed Ibrahim, survived a car bomb explosion in Cairo in September targeting his convoy. This was the first attack on a high-ranking government official in Egypt since July this year. According to Egyptian officials, this assassination attempt was an act of terrorism, which brings to mind the dark years of the 1980s.

In the wake of the increasingly dire political situation, the interim government declared a state of emergency, initially for the duration of one month, but which has since been extended for a further two months across the country, with a curfew between 19:00 and 06:00. The interim government has also ordered the army to 'assist' the police in maintaining law and order. This situation clearly indicates a return to the authoritarian Mubarak era.

The state of emergency, which was also in place during the 30 years of Mubarak's rule, gives the army the right to arrest and judge any civilian. This development might indicate that Egypt has entered a new cycle of violence comparable to the 1990s, when Mubarak's regime fought the Gamaat al-Islamiya insurrection from 1992 to 1998. Massive human rights violations took place at that time and around 90 000 people were arrested and jailed.

Furthermore, in a bid to garner the maximum amount of support,

the interim government and the army are looking at the possibility of banning the MB and listing it as a terrorist organisation. Jordan and Saudi Arabia, who strongly support the Egyptian army and the coup against the MB, have both expressed solidarity with the current interim regime in Cairo.

The interim government has reported numerous arrests of MB sympathisers as well as of Jihadists, in addition to the discovery of a large amount of arms. However, this information, as relayed by the state media, has not been verified by independent sources.

Moreover, Mohamed El-Baradei, who was initially nominated as vice-president and who then resigned after the bloody repression of civilians by the army and the police, is now being stigmatised by the media. A Cairo court has also charged him with 'having betrayed the public trust'. Clearly, this development shows the lack of independence in the media and the power of the judges. Meanwhile, Mubarak has been freed from prison and is now under house arrest. MB sympathisers resent this decision, which ultimately may fuel the anger of the Egyptian population. Although Mubarak is not entirely free in terms of movement, the court's decision is strongly symbolic and may be an indication of a return to the old era of political order where the *feloul* (Mubarak sympathisers who served under his rule) could play a major political and economic role in the future development of a new Egypt.

The appointment of 25 new governors, mostly drawn from the police and military, further indicates the nature of the new regime to be installed in Egypt.

General Abdul Fattah al-Sissi, the *de facto* man in charge of Egypt's

political affairs, has declared that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 'will not stand by silently watching the destruction of the country and the people or the torching of the nation and [the] terrorising [of] citizens'. As a result, many Egyptians, mainly but not only Islamist sympathisers, fear that al-Sissi wants to return Egypt to a Mubarak-like ruling style of secular authoritarianism.

Since the 1952 free officers' revolution, Egypt's army and leadership has been courted and commanded by people whose religious fervour should be underlined. Gamal Abdel Nasser was himself a former MB partisan who then crushed his former allies in 1954.

A parallel may also be drawn with al-Sissi. Morsi's appointment of al-Sissi as Egypt's Minister of Defence last year came about because he viewed the General as not only a loyal supporter but also as a pious Muslim whom he could trust. However, it soon became clear that al-Sissi had merely been waiting for an opportune moment to overthrow Morsi and the Islamist government that he genuinely hated. Al-Sissi was assisted and encouraged to plot against Morsi by Saudi Arabia (see PSC Report issue no. 49), where he had served as Egypt's defence attaché for a number of years.

Moreover, although the likelihood of SCAF and the army nominating someone from their ranks as a candidate in the next presidential elections is very low, al-Sissi and his comrades could well be preparing the best path possible for him to become a future president of Egypt. It is important to recall that al-Sissi's spokesperson has appeared on television to say that although the General was not running for the presidency, there was nothing to



prevent him from doing so provided that he retired from the military.

Despite calls for and promises of a genuine democratic political transition, al-Sissi may not be the democratic leader he portrays himself to be. In fact, he could well be gearing up for a hybrid government consisting of military and Islamist representatives. Al-Sissi could be preparing for a military-led resurrection and reformation of the MB's social, political and economic programme that it so clumsily attempted to implement. In so doing, al-Sissi may be preparing to follow the example of Mohammad Zia al-Haq, who sought to impose a similar programme on Pakistan after his seizure of power in 1977. Despite his hatred of the MB, al-Sissi is believed to be a very pious Muslim whose female family members all wear the hijab. He also called for virginity tests on women during the uprising against Mubarak. According to al-Sissi, if democracy is to be successful in the Middle East it must show respect to the region's religious nature. He has condemned governments that have leaned towards imposing secular rule – according to al-Sissi, they thereby disenfranchise large segments of the population who believe religion should not be separated from government. Al-Sissi believes that democracy cannot be understood in the context of the Middle East without an understanding of the concept of *Al Khalifat* or the Caliphate, an Islamic constitutional theocracy founded on Islamic Shari'a law.

Al-Sissi's thinking may explain why he leaned on the Salafist al-Noor party to overthrow Morsi in July (see PSC Report no. 49). The al-Noor party believes Shari'a

law should become the main authoritative legal source of the new Egyptian constitution.

The Coptic Christians, or Copts, and their churches are increasingly being targeted by a fringe of radicalised Egyptians. The main reason for the growing hatred towards the Copts is that the latter have been largely supportive of al-Sissi and the interim government. As a result, many Islamists and Morsi supporters believe that the Copts are behind a plot against them. Consequently, the historical coexistence of Muslims and Copts in Egypt may be jeopardised, with mounting anger and frustration being displayed on both sides.

Nonetheless, not long ago Copts were chanting alongside Muslims for Mubarak to step down, which might indicate that the current divide could be merely temporary and that a century of peaceful coexistence is not in any permanent danger. Many Muslim entrepreneurs have offered to provide all the necessary materials and support to enable the Copts to reconstruct their damaged churches.

At least 830 Egyptians, including hundreds of civilians and some 70 police officers and soldiers, have died during the protests in the streets of Cairo, Alexandria and other major Egyptian cities. Moreover, many MB sympathisers have claimed that in order for them to bury their relatives, the Egyptian authorities have forced them to accept death certificates indicating that the victims had died of natural causes or asphyxia due to crowd pressure and tear gas.

In addition, at least 36 Islamist prisoners have died during an apparent attempt to escape during their transfer to a prison outside Cairo. These prisoners

died from the effects of inhaling tear gas, which was fired when the escaping detainees took a police officer hostage. The officer was subsequently freed, albeit after suffering severe injuries. At least 25 Egyptian policemen were also killed by extremists in an ambush in the Sinai Peninsula, close to the town of Rafah on the Gaza border.

Egypt's national economy is in a dangerous limbo. Foreign investors have lost confidence, some observers have suggested that growth 'is in a free fall', and unemployment could rise to 15 per cent from its current level of 13 per cent by the end of this year. The International Monetary Fund and the European Union have yet to assist Cairo with a pledged US\$4,8 billion loan (see PSC Report no. 49). Egypt urgently needs alternative sources of funding before its economy collapses. Foreign direct investments (FDI) and tourism, both of which are important components of the national economy, are already plummeting, leading to a steep rise in unemployment.

With a promised US\$12 billion in aid from neighbouring Gulf States, Egypt is becoming increasingly dependent on its neighbours, who are eager to support the military-backed interim government. According to some economists, the US\$12 billion could be enough to get Egypt through the next 12 to 18 months, which would compensate for the dearth of foreign currency and inward investment.

However, it is unlikely that the military-backed government will implement economic reforms to make Egypt more competitive and attract foreign investment, as these measures would undermine the status quo's economic interests. It should be kept in



mind that the Egyptian army reportedly controls around 30 per cent of the national economy.

Furthermore, Egypt depends heavily on foreign tourism (11 per cent of its economy), which has declined significantly since the fall of Mubarak in early 2011. In response to the ongoing violence, many European travel agents have suspended tours to Egypt, while the United States has warned its citizens against travelling to the country. The ongoing political, social and economic instability, in conjunction with terrorist attacks on tourists, is likely to decimate the country's already crippled travel industry.

If the conflict continues and the instability persists, the economy could slow down even further from the current anaemic 2,2 per cent, which is too low to remedy unemployment, officially estimated at around 13 per cent. The Gulf States have already delivered US\$5 billion out of the US\$12 billion pledged to Cairo (see PSC Report no. 49), which may be an indication of their interest in Egypt's stability. Nonetheless, the country's growing financial dependence on its Arab neighbours remains worrying, since much of the aid is in the form of loans, which must ultimately be repaid.

Despite some mild criticism emanating from the European Union (EU) and especially Washington, Egyptians and particularly the ruling interim government, as well as the army, do not seem seriously worried about any future sanctions. The general feeling in Egypt is that the country is far too geo-strategically important for Western interests to be jeopardised by sanctions being imposed. Due to its demographic weight, its peace treaty with Israel, and its symbolic position of

leadership in the Arab world, albeit a much-weakened position in recent years, Cairo simply cannot be diplomatically isolated.

The explosive situation in the Sinai, the years-long military relations between Washington and Cairo and the ongoing peace talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis, in which Egypt could play the role of mediator, are all parameters preventing Americans and Europeans from genuinely and actively sanctioning the current regime in Cairo.

Moreover, from a financial point of view, Cairo has been promised US\$12 billion from neighbouring Gulf States, as previously stated, which gives the current interim regime even further political leeway.

Geo-political dynamics

Africa and RECs

The PSC, at its 390th meeting held on 16 August 2013, recalled the content of its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCLXXXIV) and press statements PSC/MIN/BR. 2(CCCLXXXVII) and PSC/PR/BR. (CCCLXXXIX) adopted at its 384th, 387th and 389th meetings held on 5 July, 27 July and 14 August 2013 respectively.

The Council reiterated its firm condemnation of all acts of violence, as contained in its press statement of 14 August 2013, expressed deep concern at the escalation of violence in Egypt and strongly deplored the considerable losses of human life, the injuries sustained and the property damaged in Cairo and throughout the country. Consequently, the Council extended the AU's heartfelt condolences to the families of the deceased and wished a speedy recovery to all the wounded.

The Council further called on all Egyptian stakeholders, including

the interim authorities and the MB, to exercise the utmost restraint in order to avoid further losses of human life and destruction of property. The Council also recalled that since the onset of the current crisis, the AU had repeatedly stressed the need for all Egyptian stakeholders to embrace the spirit of mutual accommodation, dialogue and national reconciliation and to refrain from any act of violence and retribution.

The Council stressed that the tragic events that took place in Egypt were a stark reminder to Egyptian stakeholders of the imperative and urgent need for dialogue, with a view to overcoming the current challenges and facilitating an inclusive and peaceful transition that would lead to the early restoration of constitutional order.

Also, and in line with its duties and responsibilities towards all AU member states, the Council stressed the AU's determination not to relent in its efforts to promote and foster an African solution within the African framework, based on the relevant AU instruments. In this respect, the Council noted that the AU Commission had already formally informed the Egyptian authorities of the envisaged second visit of the High-Level Panel for Egypt to Cairo, to further consult with the Egyptian stakeholders and assist them in overcoming their differences.

The Council called on AU bilateral and multilateral partners to lend their full support to the High-Level Panel, as it engages with the interim authorities and Egyptians of all affiliations, in order to facilitate a consensual way out of the current difficulties, bearing in mind that Egypt's challenges are also Africa's challenges. The Council further requested the



High-Level Panel to continue to work with the League of Arab States as part of the strategic partnership between this organisation and the AU and in furtherance of their shared interest for a peaceful, stable and democratic Egypt.

United Nations

The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has condemned in the strongest terms the violence in Egypt that occurred when Egyptian security services used force to clear Cairo of sit-ins and demonstrations.

The Secretary-General also renewed his call for all sides in Egypt to reconsider their actions in the light of new political realities and the imperative to prevent further loss of life. He said he regretted that Egyptian authorities had chosen instead to use force to respond to the demonstrations.

The statement declared that the Secretary-General was well aware that the vast majority of the Egyptian people, weary of disruptions to normal life caused by demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, wanted their country to go forward peacefully in an Egyptian-led process towards prosperity and democracy. In the aftermath of the violence, Ban urged all Egyptians to concentrate their efforts on promoting genuinely inclusive reconciliation. While recognising that political clocks did not run backwards, he said he also believed firmly that violence and incitement from any side were not the answers to Egypt's challenges.

He noted that, with Egypt's rich history and diversity of views and experiences, it was not unusual for Egyptians to disagree on the best approach forward. What was important, in the Secretary-General's view, was that differing

views should be expressed respectfully and peacefully.

Following the wave of violence, Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, appealed to all parties in Egypt to act with restraint and initiate talks. Pillay 'deplored the loss of life and called on all in Egypt to seek a way out of the violence'. She also urged the Egyptian authorities and security forces to 'act with the utmost restraint'.

She called for a genuinely inclusive reconciliation and therefore appealed 'to all sides to engage in urgent dialogue to avoid further violence and hate speech, with the aim of restoring constitutional order through free and democratic elections'.

Pillay demanded that 'an independent, impartial, effective and credible investigation of the conduct of the security forces be carried out and that anyone found guilty of wrongdoing should be held to account'.

She further reminded Egyptian authorities that their security forces were bound by the rule of law and needed to act with full respect for human rights, including the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly. She also stressed that government opponents who had reportedly attacked public buildings and religious sites should be brought to justice, and underlined that demonstrators needed to ensure their gatherings remained peaceful.

Pillay added that under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Egypt is a party, no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life or be subject to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, even in times of emergency.

'Everyone deprived of their liberty must be treated humanely and afforded all the judicial guarantees under international law,' she stressed.

International community

Despite the fact that the violence has sparked harsh international condemnation, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan have expressed support for Egypt's 'fight against terrorism'.

On the economic front, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal has declared that the world's top crude oil exporter was ready to provide the appropriate financial assistance to Cairo if necessary. 'The Arab and Muslim nations are wealthy [in terms of] their people and resources and will not shy away from offering a helping hand to Egypt,' he stated in Jeddah.

The Arab League has expressed concern about the high death toll resulting from the clashes in Cairo and other Egyptian cities and has sent its 'deepest condolences' to the families of the victims.

In a press statement, the Arab League praised the Egyptian authorities' decision to launch a fact-finding committee to investigate the recent clashes between police and pro-Morsi protesters. The pan-Arab organisation also called on the committee to work quickly so that those responsible for the 'heart breaking events' could be held accountable.

In the light of the events in Egypt, the Arab League has urged all parties to guarantee the 'utmost restraint and commitment to peacefulness' in order 'to adhere to the democratic path the Egyptian people have supported'.

Furthermore, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Egypt's Dr Nabil Al-Arabi, has



condemned in the strongest terms the criminal attack that targeted the convoy of the Egyptian Interior Minister.

In a statement issued by the Secretariat-General of the Arab League, Al-Arabi warned that such criminal acts aimed to undermine Egypt's security and stability so as to impede the implementation of the road map through which the Egyptian people could achieve their aspirations. He also called upon the Egyptian government to take the necessary measures in order to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice as soon as possible.

Despite the fact that many members of the US Congress have recognised it as such, Washington has refrained from referring to Morsi's military overthrow as a coup. Moreover, American calls for restraint, dialogue and a return to the ballot box seem more rhetorical than practical or effective.

This may be explained by the US' realist politics and its need to maintain a close relationship with the Egyptian military establishment, which remains highly strategic in terms of the perceived regional interests of Washington and Tel Aviv.

Egypt is a major ally of the US and, consequently, since the Camp David Peace Treaty with Israel in 1979, is also the second largest recipient of US bilateral assistance after Israel. Since 1987, the Egyptian army has received financial aid from Washington amounting to US\$1,3 billion per year. Indicatively, in 2011, Cairo was granted nearly a quarter of all US foreign military financing funds. Additionally, a large number of Egyptian officers receive military training and military-related education in the US annually. Bearing in mind the

region's turmoil, Washington is therefore very unlikely to put an end to the military and financial aid to its strategic partner in the Middle East.

On 16 August, Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, issued the following statement:

With dismay and great concern I have followed the events in Egypt in the last few days. The toll of death and injury is shocking, and my heartfelt condolences go out to the numerous families who have been affected. Responsibility for this tragedy weighs heavily on the interim government, as well as on the wider political leadership in the country.

I have been in constant touch with European Union Foreign Ministers, and I have asked Member State representatives to debate and coordinate appropriate measures to be taken by the European Union in response to the situation in Egypt.

I again call on all sides to end violence, the security forces to exercise restraint, political forces to express their views peacefully, and keep the possibility open for a political process that will lead Egypt back on the path to democracy and heal the wounds inflicted on the Egyptian society.

Ashton's spokesperson also issued a statement on 6 September, stating, 'The High Representative is greatly concerned about the bomb attack on the Egyptian Minister of Interior. She deplores the casualties and her thoughts are with the families who have been affected. She condemns in the strongest terms all acts of violence, including extremist activities. Violence is never acceptable.'

Civil society

Ahead of the Ministerial Council of the League held on 3 September, 35 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and networks from 13 countries urged the Secretary General of the League of Arab States to put forward the current alarming situation in Egypt as a priority for discussion on the agenda of the Council.

These NGOs called on the League of Arab States to take an active role in addressing the situation in Egypt as a matter of the utmost urgency. They also underlined that while other international and regional institutions such as the UN and the AU took active steps about the situation in Egypt, the political bodies of the League of Arab States had remained silent.

These NGOs reiterated the call made by 22 Arab NGOs on 29 August 2013 for a thorough, independent and impartial fact-finding mission under the auspices of the League of Arab States, as a neutral body. They emphasised the need for an investigation into the events, especially in the light of conflicting claims by the various parties and the growing use of rhetoric to incite people to violence deployed by all sides, to guarantee that the truth is found; that necessary measures are taken to ensure accountability for human rights violations; and to stop any further escalation of the situation which may put the lives, property, livelihood and security of Egyptians at further risk.

Scenarios

From the above analysis, the following are the most likely scenarios:

Scenario 1

Egypt remains unstable for many months, if not years. Egyptian



society is divided and continues to seek compromises that will enable Egyptians to achieve their preferred model of the new Egyptian state.

Scenario 2

Strong pressures from the Muslim Brotherhood are exerted on the interim government, which could lead to further clashes, acts of terrorism and divisions across Egypt.

Scenario 3

A fringe of the Muslim Brotherhood could become more radicalised and take up arms to fight the Egyptian government.

Options

Given the above scenarios, the following options could be considered by the PSC to consolidate democracy in Egypt:

Option 1

In order to lessen tension and give some satisfaction to the

entire Egyptian population as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, and based on its previous findings, the AU could further work to bring together Egypt and relevant international stakeholders to facilitate coordinated action in support of a transition leading to the restoration of constitutional order, the deepening of the democratic process, and the mobilisation of economic and financial support, urgently required in Egypt.

Option 2

The army and the interim president, Adly Mansour, must demonstrate to the Muslim Brotherhood their commitment and willingness to find a suitable political solution to the unfolding crisis. Also, by releasing Morsi under certain agreed conditions, the army and the interim president would effectively show that they are genuinely seeking a final and firm solution to end the crisis. The PSC could consider

formulating this action as the first step towards and condition for Egypt's reintegration into the AU.

Option 3

Regardless of the illegitimacy of his ousting, Morsi might put the fate of his country and his people before his own aborted mandate. Also, with the assistance of the army, he could publicly call for an end to the riots and violence and instead call for national reconciliation. Dependent on promises from the Egyptian authorities, the PSC could give some guarantee to Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood that in calling for peace and reconciliation, their party would neither be outlawed nor be the subject of oppression by the Egyptian authorities.

Open page

BRUSSELS' NEW DEAL CONFERENCE ON SOMALIA

A week before the Westgate attack by the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab in Nairobi, Kenya, an international conference took place in the Belgian capital Brussels to find a lasting solution to the security and political crisis in Somalia. The outcome of the donors' conference, which included more

than 70 countries and organisations, was largely overshadowed by the horrific images of carnage, death and destruction emanating from Nairobi. The attackers killed almost 70 people, predominantly civilians, and left hundreds injured. With many possible victims still unaccounted for the number of casualties is expected to rise.

The conference on 16 September was one of a series of international conferences and meetings on Somalia that have taken place in recent years, including the high-profile conferences in Istanbul, London

and Yokohama. The Brussels conference sought to take advantage of the relative legitimacy of the Mogadishu government and recent progress in terms of domestic security. The agenda of the New Deal encompasses peace building and state building as well as inclusive political processes, judicial and security systems, and an economy that creates opportunities for revenues, development, job creation and investment for all.

The conference, entitled 'A New Deal for Somalia', was co-hosted by the Somali Federal Government and the European Union (EU), with participation



from Somalia's various regions, Members of Parliament and civil society, as well as international friends and partners. Members of the government in Mogadishu hailed the event as a landmark event, stating that the conference had taken place at a crucial time for 'reconciliation and reconstruction' and the consolidation of security and political gains by the federal government and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Notably absent from the conference was the self-declared independent state of Somaliland, whose foreign minister, Mohamed Yonis, explained that this non-attendance was due to the fact that Somaliland had not been invited to participate 'on an equal footing'.

The conference endorsed a New Deal compact emphasising a new partnership based on 'mutual accountability and risk management that is being initiated between the Federal Government, Parliament, regions and people of Somalia, and the international community'. The New Deal framework is an initiative by the Group of Eight (G8) countries, aimed at supporting fragile states in their transition towards stability, which was endorsed in Busan, Republic of Korea, in 2011. The new package aims to address Somalia's political, social and economic priorities by 'building inclusive politics, security, justice, the country's economic foundations, revenue collection and the provision of services'. It also aims at enhancing efforts and giving impetus to inclusive political processes that are intended to enable the

finalisation and adoption of Somalia's Federal Constitution by the end of 2015 and the holding of elections by 2016, and thereby to take Somalia from conditions of 'emergency to recovery' over the next three years.

The conference, which was described by some diplomats as 'a major milestone', succeeded in raising US\$2,4 billion. The Somali authorities declared that the money would target four key priorities, namely security, legal reform, public finances and economic recovery. The EU pledged €650 million, with remaining funding coming from individual countries such as Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the UK. The EU Commission's president, José Manuel Barroso, said the extra money would support a 'new phase in the life of Somalia'. From 2008-2013 the EU has contributed more than \$1,6 billion, mostly to finance the AMISOM force of some 18 000 troops.

At the conference, EU Commissioner Andris Piebalgs reported that the EU had provided some €521 million between 2008 and 2013 and achieved considerable results, getting 40 000 children into school, providing safe water for half a million people and helping 70 000 people to produce livestock. He went on to say:

The EU wants to launch a new approach to the way we work in Somalia. One thing is certain: we cannot continue carrying out cooperation in a 'business as usual' manner. As we seek to empower Somalia politically, we must do so by empowering its institutions and its people across the country. To this end, we will have to link together political processes, actions to establish workable

security and justice systems, economic growth, and service delivery. This is the strength of the New Deal and I urge everyone here today to embrace the process we have all embarked on alongside Somalia. It's a process with an aim we can all support: namely seeing a Somali government in place that can carry out its sovereign functions.

However, many challenges remain. Al-Shabaab is still a threat to peace and security. The constitution is not complete. Piracy and terrorism remain threats. Millions still live in camps reserved for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. The country lacks developed state infrastructure in the form of schools, hospitals, rail links, paved roads, power stations, dams and telecommunications services, as well as sanitation and other basic services. Al-Shabaab's tactic of resorting to suicide bombings still poses significant threats, not only to Somalia but also to the country's neighbouring states and the wider region, as demonstrated by the recent attack in Nairobi and the 2010 attack in Kampala.

Al-Shabaab compared the conference to 'Belgian waffles, sweet on the outside, [but without] much substance' and said it expected donor pledges would remain mostly unfulfilled or that the money would ultimately be lost to corruption. In July 2013, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia stated that Somalia's Central Bank had become a 'slush fund' for political leaders and that the incumbent governor had played a central role in irregularities surrounding large, unaccountable disbursements of cash. Consequently, under the New



Deal a 'Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility' is to be instituted to facilitate the management of donor funds. The UN, the World Bank and the African Development Bank are all expected to be involved in the development of the envisaged financing facility.

Despite the optimistic tenor of the conference some scepticism remains, as previous pledges at similar conferences have not yet translated into substantial irreversible improvements in

Somalia in terms of political, security, economic or social concerns. Some members of the government in Mogadishu have also publicly expressed their frustration and disappointment at the relatively low levels of representation at the conference by some of the major donor countries.

The government should show more commitment and determination to tackle corruption, improve public services, and institute more

effective public financial management systems. Public reportage of budgets, expenditure and audits has also been recommended by previous meetings to improve accountability and fight corruption.

Mission analysis

AFRICAN-LED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (AFISM-CAR)

Introduction

The latest analysis on the Central African Republic (CAR), published in the September 2013 edition of the PSC Report, is a retrospective on the protection of civilians being severely undermined by the rapid deterioration of security in the CAR due to the inability of the disbanded Seleka to establish order in the country. The analysis below deals more specifically with the transformation of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) peacekeeping mission, known as the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX), into the

African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (AFISM-CAR). In French the latter mission is known as the *Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite Africaine* (MISCA).

Previous PSC and AU communiqués and press releases

In their joint statement of 3 September 2013, the AU Commission and the ECCAS Secretariat 'reiterated their concern about the situation in the CAR and the need for international support to facilitate the completion of the transition in that country'. The AU and ECCAS appealed to the UN Security Council to authorise financial and logistical support for AFISM-CAR and exhorted other international partners to fully support their joint efforts.

In its press release of 30 August 2013, the AU Commission stated that 'a team of military and civilian experts from the AU Commission, which was joined by representatives of [the] AU's partners, visited Libreville

(Gabon) from 21 to 22 August 2013, for consultations with the General Secretariat of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) on the modalities and calendar of the transition from the ECCAS mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (MICOPAX) to AFISM-CAR'.

It also noted that, since 19 August 2013, 'another AU team, which also [included] experts from the United Nations, the European Union (EU), the United States, France and the International Organization of *La Francophonie* (OIF), [was] in Bangui, to assess the logistical and other resources needed by AFISM-CAR, in light of the situation on the ground and the capabilities already available at the level of MICOPAX'.

In its press release the AU Commission also noted with satisfaction 'the adoption by the United Nations Security Council, on 14 August 2013, of a press statement on the deployment of AFISM-CAR, following the letter addressed by the AU to the United Nations, on 26 July 2013'.



The Commission expressed the hope for 'the early adoption of a resolution that would endorse the deployment of AFISM-CAR and provide for UN support to the Mission, within the framework of the AU-UN partnership'.

The AU PSC, at its 391st meeting, held in public session on 19 August 2013, 'urged the UN Security Council to expedite (the) provision of financial and logistical support to the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (AFISM-CAR) to ensure, among (other aims), the safety of humanitarian personnel and protection of the civilian population'.

In its press release of 1 August 2013, the AU Commission announced the handover of MICOPAX by the International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (AFISM-CAR). The Chairperson of the Commission took the opportunity to appeal to all AU member states and partners to 'urgently ... provide the financial, logistical and technical support for the operationalisation of AFISM-CAR and the effective conduct of its operations'.

The AU PSC, at its 385th meeting on 19 July 2013, noted the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in the CAR and on the basis of the concept of operations annexed to that report, decided 'to authorise the deployment, for an initial period of six months, of AFISM-CAR'. It also urged 'the United Nations Security Council, the European Union (EU) through the Africa Peace Facility, and bilateral partners to lend their full support to the AU and ECCAS to facilitate the transformation of MICOPAX into AFISM-CAR and the effective functioning of AFISM-CAR through the provision of the

necessary financial, logistical and technical support'.

At its 380th meeting in Addis Ababa on 17 June 2013, the PSC took note of the conclusions of the military mission that had visited Bangui from 2 to 7 May 2013 to conduct a needs assessment on MICOPAX. The PSC welcomed 'the recommendations of the Mission, particularly with regard to the need for [an] enhanced international security presence to ensure the protection of civilians'. It also called on the Commission to 'develop, in consultation with ECCAS and other potential police and troop-contributing countries, as well as with relevant international partners, notably the EU, the UN and *La Francophonie*, a concept of operations and a concept of logistical support'.

Crisis escalation potential

Marked by decades of instability and fighting, the CAR saw a resurgence of violence in December, when the rebel coalition Seleka launched a series of attacks. Although a peace agreement was signed in January 2013, the rebels took over the capital, Bangui, in March and subsequently overthrew President François Bozizé. Despite the establishment of a transitional authority in April, the country has begun to experience a resurgence of violence amid a humanitarian crisis that could have serious regional implications. Michel Djotodia, the CAR's interim president and a member of Seleka, faces two major challenges to the country's security and humanitarian concerns.

With regard to the security dimension of the crisis, the transitional authorities are seeing the continuing fragmentation of the Seleka coalition and the emergence of self-defence and

pro-Bozizé groups. Seleka, which means the 'alliance' or 'coalition' in the CAR's Sango language, is a heterogeneous group of several Central African rebel militias and foreign elements that include mainly Chadians and Sudanese. The proliferation of rapes, looting, summary executions and other violations of human rights, often attributed to rogue elements within Seleka, highlights the difficulties the transitional president and the coalition's military leadership face in seeking to impose and enforce a single chain of command. The transitional president's decision of 13 September 2013 to dissolve Seleka also involves many risks. Nonetheless, it will take time for Seleka to heal its image, tarnished by the many abuses against civilians. The frustration of some factions with this decision by the president makes it likely that an open dialogue between the different components of the former rebel group could result in confrontation. Should such a confrontation arise, it would continue to undermine the already fragile security situation in the CAR.

The growing insecurity in Bangui and other cities has led not only to the emergence of various self-defence groups, but also groups that support Bozizé. The military victory of Seleka resulted in the disruption of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), the police and the security forces. Now, many former officers are reluctant to join the new authorities for fear of reprisal, despite the appeal by the transitional president. The disruption posed by Seleka and the absence of a strategy to reform the security services have created a security vacuum throughout the entire territory, which has alarmed the AU and the UN. As a result, people have organised themselves into self-defence groups. It is in this



context that, on 7 September 2013, armed men claiming to be supporters of the ousted president took control of villages in the Bossangoa region in the north-west of the country. Despite the fact that a pro-Bozizé rebellion appears unlikely, given that he seems to have been abandoned by his peers in Central Africa, even the rumour of such a rebellion could be an aggravating factor for future peace and stability. The risk of an alliance between self-defence anti-Seleka groups and pro-Bozizé groups should also not be completely ruled out.

Ethno-religious rivalry and conflict add further risks to the precarious security situation in the CAR and neighbouring countries. In Bossangoa, Bozizé's place of origin, his supporters have attacked Seleka and civilian Muslims. In response to these attacks, Seleka exacted reprisals against the Christian population. Consequently, longstanding religious antagonisms have resurfaced to sow divisions between the north and south, fuelled by the apparent inability of Seleka to impose minimum order and security on the areas under its control.

Escalating violence during September contributed to a very fragile humanitarian situation, particularly in the north-west of the CAR, mainly above the Bossangoa region, where violent clashes are commonplace and civilians have been the main victims. Dozens of villages were burned, either by Seleka soldiers or by self-defence groups. With the resurgence of fighting and conflict in this part of the CAR, thousands of people have fled their homes. By 6 September 2013, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees had registered 3 020 displaced people in the region, in addition to the total estimated number of at least

206 000 displaced throughout the country since December 2012. In addition, thousands of people have fled to neighbouring countries, including Chad and Cameroon. Similarly, according to Doctors Without Borders, 'the health system, already weakened by years of crisis, is now unable to meet the increasingly important and pressing medical needs of the population.'

Key issues and dynamics of the mission

Faced with the deteriorating security situation in the CAR, the AU PSC decided at its 380th meeting on 17 June 2013 to transform the ECCAS peacekeeping mission, known as MICOPAX, into AFISM-CAR. However, these are not the first African initiatives to attempt to bring peace to Central Africa.

On 2 October 2002, the Monetary and Economic Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) deployed troops as part of the Central African Multinational Force (FOMUC), replacing the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), whose mandate ended in 2000.

On 12 July 2008, management of FOMUC was transferred to ECCAS with a mandate to secure the CAR and support actors in the conduct of negotiations. With positive results in the early months, ECCAS aimed to transform MICOPAX in its peace building operations, which again involved CEMAC. The latter transferred all of FOMUC's responsibilities in order to avoid a duplication of mission responsibilities, which would have been detrimental to MICOPAX's objectives.

MICOPAX, which succeeded FOMUC, is actually the first peace mission serving under the authority of the Council for Peace

and Security in Central Africa (COPAX). With an initial staff of about 500 people and inadequate financial and logistical resources, it faces difficulties in effectively carrying out its mandate to improve the security situation. However, it receives financial support from the EU within the framework of the EU's Peace Facility for Africa, as well as logistical support from France.

Implemented on 1 August 2013 in accordance with the concept of peacebuilding operations, AFISM-CAR will deploy a total of 3 652 personnel, consisting of 2 475 for the military component, 1 025 for the police component and 152 civilians. The quotas currently serving in MICOPAX are the central components of the AFISM-CAR and must be strengthened to meet the required staff of 2 000 personnel. Scheduled for an initial period of six months, the mission's main tasks will be the protection of civilians and the restoration of security and public order, as well as the stabilisation of the country and the restoration of the central government's authority, the reform and restructuring of defence and security, and the creation of conditions conducive to the provision of humanitarian assistance for populations in need. According to AU planning, it is a peace enforcement and peacekeeping mission.

Employees scheduled for AFISM-CAR: 3 652

- Military contingent 2 475
- Police contingent 1 025
- Civilian component 152
- MICOPAX troops ready to integrate into AFISM-CAR 1 300
- Additional troops on hold

Great challenges await AFISM-CAR; primarily issues of leadership



and command of the new mission. The entire workforce of FOMUC, currently deployed in the CAR, amounts to 2 000 men, which will in fact be part of AFISM-CAR. ECCAS is a relative novice in the field of peacekeeping, but its strength resides in its success with FOMUC and MICOPAX. ECCAS also planned to deploy FOMAC under a new mission called MICOPAX 2 with a new, more aggressive mandate. This ECCAS project, which took shape as a result of the findings made by the military assessment mission, led by the AU in collaboration with other international partners, has been superseded by the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council. ECCAS was initially reluctant to provide troops for peace missions, but has finally given way to a desire to conclude an agreement with the AU. Nevertheless, the command of this mission could be problematic and might even significantly delay the deployment of AFISM-CAR, despite the security emergency in the CAR. The AU, which now seems willing to take things in hand, may discover that ECCAS, as the major contributor of troops and supporting human resources, will insist on commanding AFISM-CAR. Gabon, which provided leaders to oversee the FOMUC and MICOPAX missions in the past, as well as the operation in Chad, and which also chairs ECCAS and recently deployed a squadron of 400 men to support the process of disbanding Seleka, is among the potential candidates.

The AU is also being challenged to develop a mandate to meet recently introduced safety changes. Differences of opinion or not, AFISM-CAR must still collaborate with ECCAS. The goal is to avoid allowing MICOPAX 2 to remain

within AFISM-CAR with a different mandate for the new mission. As has been shown, the MICOPAX troops that are supposed to join AFISM-CAR are largely drawn from FOMUC. However, the latter has a somewhat tarnished reputation in the CAR. Although they were mainly deployed to ensure the security of President Ange-Félix Patassé, the coup by Bozizé on 15 March 2003 in fact occurred in the presence of 340 FOMUC soldiers supported by French forces. This event particularly discredited Chad, a troop contributor that had already been involved in three successive mutinies under Patassé.

In addition, AFISM-CAR must cope with financial and logistical issues crucial to its implementation. Although the AU has urged the international community to become more involved in the CAR, the unenthusiastic international response forewarns of the difficulty of operationalising AFISM-CAR. Although the main provider of personnel, ECCAS, has shown its limitations in this area, MICOPAX has thus far not deployed the civilian component. ECCAS would finance up to 20 per cent of the total budget.

Geopolitical dynamics

Africa and RECs

Violence has escalated in recent weeks in northern countries and the risk of war is more present than ever. ECCAS has convened many meetings to resolve the crisis. Thus, on 24 September 2013, ECCAS signed an agreement with CEMAC to finance the absorption of the MICOPAX workforce by AFISM-CAR and the installation of material security to the tune of 20 billion CFA francs (\$41.4 million).

On 16 September 2013, the Fifth Special Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Council for Peace

and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) was held in Libreville, Gabon. COPAX welcomed the conclusions reached by the AU and ECCAS on 3 September 2013 and asked that the AU-ECCAS-AFISM-CAR Agreement, shortly to be signed by both parties, be taken into account. However, COPAX also took the opportunity to express its disagreement with the concept of the AFISM-CAR operation as proposed by the AU. The Council agreed that AFISM-CAR should be implemented quickly. Ministers also demanded an offensive capability and wanted the command of the operation to be assigned to a General from an ECCAS member country. Credit was given that 'Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Chad had kept their promises to increase the number of MICOPAX 2 to achieve the immediate goal of 2 000 men'. They also took note of Burundi's decision to provide a battalion and, if necessary, a police unit, subject to logistical availability. In addition, they welcomed the proposal of Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to deploy additional troops and welcomed the proposal of Equatorial Guinea to support the mission staff component.

These disagreements and differences of opinion represent the kind of dynamic friction and tension that can arise between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) during peace support operations. Such differences are as much about the choice of strategic priorities as about operational practices during peacekeeping missions. They indicate the absence of a well-oiled mechanism of variation of the principle of subsidiarity, which articulates the roles of players according to their individual skills and comparative advantages.



United Nations

On 27 September 2013, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on the CAR, appointing an independent expert for a period of one year 'to monitor the situation of human rights in the Central African Republic'. This resolution was adopted at a time when there were expectations of another resolution authorising a multinational intervention force to secure the country.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of displaced persons, Dr Chaloka Beyani, urged the CAR government to meet its obligations and ensure the protection and support of internally displaced persons 'until durable solutions are found'. In addition to the massive population displacement, he noted the existence of another disturbing element, namely 'the massive and systematic destruction of public records, including birth certificates and other legal and administrative documents, which could be expected to have a negative impact on IDPs'.

At the opening of the 68th UN General Assembly on 23 September 2013, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon deplored events in the CAR, noted the collapse of public order in the country, remembered the millions of people cut off from assistance who could be victims of abuse and expressed his dissatisfaction with and disappointment at the inadequate contributions in terms of humanitarian aid to the CAR.

At the breakfast meeting for informal ministerial consultations of *La Francophonie*, Ban called on 'the International Organization of the *Francophonie* (OIF) to assist the CAR, as it has already in the past'.

International community

Partly because of developments related to the use of chemical weapons, the Syrian crisis has somewhat drawn attention away from the situation in the CAR. However, France has continued to express concern about the current situation in the country amid fears about its possible 'Somalisation'.

In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2013, the French president, François Hollande, called on the international community 'to be alarmed' by the situation in Central Africa, where chaos reigned and civilians were the first victims. He also announced the organisation of a summit for peace and security in Africa to be held in Europe at the end of 2013. The summit would discuss support for the training of African armies and the means to control and eliminate piracy and drug trafficking.

Also present in New York for the UN General Assembly, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius clarified France's position. Recalling the 'core importance of strengthening AFISM-CAR', he explained that Paris did not want to 'let an already very serious situation degenerate and create a state that only bears the name of state and that would, by contagion, lead to an extremely difficult situation throughout the region'.

Although France, in particular, has been involved in the CAR, it seems that the UN is now assuming greater overall responsibility. Thus French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said on 22 September 2013: 'France is ready for operational support, but does not [intend to] take the initiative.'

Also, as part of the 68th UN General Assembly and after the

UN Secretary-General expressed concern that only 37 per cent of the €150 million required for the CAR had been funded, the EU in turn decided to increase its humanitarian aid to €20 million to financially support AFISM-CAR. It should be noted that the EU, as one of the AU's leading partners, was among the first to have expressed willingness to contribute to the financing of AFISM-CAR, through the EU's Peace Facility for Africa, which had previously funded MICOPAX.

Civil society

Central African civil society believes that to achieve an improvement in the human security situation, the international community must take on greater responsibilities. Thus Morouba Mathias, president of the Central African Human Rights Observatory, has said that, 'the Central African people are dying. We cannot understand that we are going through difficult times in our history and that the international community cannot take responsibility'. It is in this context that Central African civil society sent a delegation to the UN General Assembly and expressed the need to see the UN more involved in managing the crisis in the CAR.

Human Rights Watch (HRW), in its report of September 2013 on the CAR crisis, called it a 'forgotten human rights crisis' and recommended to the AU PSC and AFISM-CAR that consideration be given to 'troop deployment from other member states and [the expansion of the] nucleus of the contingent to [include] countries that were not originally a part of MICOPAX' and to 'exclude any troops from AFISM-CAR whose presence might compromise the perceived neutrality of the AU force'.



Scenarios

Scenario 1

The AU and ECCAS are unable to agree on the mandate and command of AFISM-CAR. Because of such disagreements, the UN, the EU and the international community are slow to provide financial and logistical support for the rapid deployment of the mission. The president's decision to dissolve the Seleka-led transitional government and disarm the rebel leaders causes general dissent among Seleka militia commanders, who exploit the absence of AFISM-CAR by rebelling with a view to overthrowing the regime.

Scenario 2

With the support of the international community, the AU and ECCAS carry out the deployment of AFISM-CAR without having resolved the differences concerning the mandate and mission command. This action leads to the deployment of a mission founded on an unclear and inadequate mandate. The mission fails to attract the necessary staff and is unsuccessful in winning the support of the international community. AFISM-CAR also finds it very difficult to restore security and ensure state authority throughout the country, which further complicates the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Scenario 3

With the support of the UN and the international community, the AU and ECCAS are able to mobilise financial resources and the necessary logistics for the rapid deployment of AFISM-CAR forces, backed up by a robust mandate. With the support of the transitional authorities, AFISM-CAR manages to restructure the defence forces, restore security

and facilitate state authority throughout the country, which creates favourable conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance.

Options

Option 1

Faced with the deteriorating security situation, the AU Commission and the General Secretariat of ECCAS could intensify consultations to rapidly reach agreement on the key issues of the mandate, including command, control and financing, in order to avoid further delays in the deployment of AFISM-CAR.

Option 2

Pending the approval of the UN and the expected support of the international community, the AU and ECCAS and its member states could, on an interim basis, support the financial and logistical component of AFISM-CAR in an equitable manner.

Option 3

Unlike MICOPAX, which never established its civilian component, the AU could ensure the effectiveness of the latter under AFISM-CAR, particularly by taking into account the human rights and communication dimensions essential to the success of the mission. It should also address issues related to the civilian component with the same prominence as has been given to the military and police components.

Documents

AU documents

- Press Release, the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, 30 August 2013
- News of the Peace and Security Council of the AU,

391st meeting, Addis Ababa, 19 August 2013

- Joint Communiqué of the AU and ECCAS, Addis Ababa, 3 August 2013
- Press release of the commission, Addis Ababa, 1 August 2013
- Communiqué of the AU PSC, 385th meeting, Addis Ababa, 19 July 2013
- Press Release, the AU PSC, 380th meeting, Addis Ababa, 17 June 2013

ECCAS documents

- Press Release, 5th Special Meeting of Council of Ministers of the Council of Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX), Libreville, Gabon, 16 September 2013

UN documents

UNHCR, 'Anarchy in Central African Republic: UNHCR fears for the safety of civilians', 6 September 2013, available at <http://www.unhcr.fr/5229ed31c.html>



Important dates to diarise

| | | |
|----|----------|--|
| 2 | October | International Day of Non-Violence |
| 11 | October | International Day of the Girl Child |
| 15 | October | International Day of Rural Women |
| 17 | October | International Day for the Eradication of Poverty |
| 24 | October | United Nations Day |
| 6 | November | International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conflict |
| 16 | November | International Day for Tolerance |
| 20 | November | Africa Industrialisation Day |
| 20 | November | Universal Children's Day |
| 25 | November | International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women |

| Country | Election | Date * |
|---------------|---|------------------------------------|
| Ethiopia | Presidential (indirect) | October 2013 |
| Madagascar | Local Presidential 2 nd round | 23 October 2013 25 October 2013 |
| Mozambique | Local | 20 November 2013 |
| Mauritania | Senate, National Assembly, local | 23 November 2013 |
| Guinea-Bissau | Presidential | 24 November 2013 |
| Madagascar | National Assembly | 20 December 2013 |

**could change, dependent on circumstances*

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