



**Regional Security Trends:  
Next Generation Perspectives on Cooperation**



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## **Pacific Forum CSIS**

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The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and scholars to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, builds adaptive leadership capacity, promotes interaction among younger professionals from different cultures, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is possible with generous funding support by governments and philanthropic foundations, together with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more information, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, [www.pacforum.org](http://www.pacforum.org), or contact Nicole Forrester, Director – Young Leaders Program, at [nicole@pacforum.org](mailto:nicole@pacforum.org)

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The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of Young Leader program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of the relevant governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.

## Executive Summary

The security environment in the Asia-Pacific is fluid. New challenges are emerging, varying from military modernization to maritime environmental, energy, and human security issues. Yet the biggest problem is the lack of cooperation among states to address regional challenges and concerns.

Domestic political-economic agendas and policies based on competition are the main factors that undermine institutionalized security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. A sense of the need to advance a state's own power, fear of domestic backlash, and intergovernmental sensitivities also restrict opportunities for closer ties.

To compensate and supplement dysfunctional intergovernmental dialogues, Track 1.5 and working-level dialogues function as a channel to facilitate progress on regional issues. In particular, their non-attribution nature enforced by "Chatham House rules" have allowed frank discussions on crucial issues such as non-proliferation, maritime security, strategic realignments, extended deterrence and nontraditional security issues such as environmental and human security.

Not all the findings and recommendations produced in Track 1.5 and working-level dialogues manifest into actual policy. Yet, prominent programs such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and the ASEAN Regional Forum Experts and Eminent Persons Group are well recognized by government officials in the region. Since these dialogues are continually developing, one can hope that their impact will also grow.

There remain issues that nongovernmental dialogues should cover. New security trends in the Asia-Pacific, and new conceptual directions need to be incorporated to make Track 1.5 and Track II dialogues more relevant and effective.

On 2-3 June 2013, the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders met in Manila, Philippines in conjunction with CSCAP. The Young Leaders discussed issues that were overlooked or underemphasized in the region, ranging from Arctic security, traditional and nontraditional issues in maritime security, China's role in solving the North Korean nuclear issue, China-US arms control cooperation, and modernization of conventional military systems in the Asia-Pacific.

One group highlighted worrying trends in the modernization of conventional military platforms in the Asia-Pacific. The group argued that Track 1.5 and working-level dialogues that specifically look at operational aspects, such as military expenditures, exercises, exchanges, and weapons systems are desperately needed to supplement intergovernmental dialogues.

Two groups examined the maritime security issues in the South China Sea, both from the traditional and nontraditional security standpoint. Both groups found that much needs to be achieved, particularly in conceptualizing and institutionalizing the approach

to solving regional issues such as law enforcement, human security, and environmental security issues.

A group also examined fundamental differences in the way the US and Chinese government handles arms control. The paper highlights how China's arms control policies are not only about national strategy, but also reflect a myriad of domestic bureaucratic and political issues. Mutual understanding of contrasting decision-making procedures and governance will be key to fostering cooperation.

Ways to encourage China's greater role in urging North Korea's denuclearization were also analyzed. The group argued that Pyongyang's belligerent behavior is creating opportunities for Beijing to use its leverage to solve the issue. While numerous caveats surround China's role on the Korean Peninsula, the paper emphasized the need for innovation in halting North Korea's dangerous adventurism.

Another group looked at the recent, long-awaited inclusion of five Asian countries – China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore – as permanent observers to the Arctic Council. The paper argues that admission of these Asian states into the Arctic Council is geopolitically logical, and these states could make important contributions to the Council's work. Still much needs to be done in promoting and expanding the role of Asia-Pacific states in Arctic issues.

The Young Leader papers reveal the complex and multifaceted nature of security issues in the Asia-Pacific, but also reflected the new perspectives and approaches needed to solve them. Specifically, the realignment of domestic agendas to provide political momentum for governments to act on pressing regional issues warrants attention. Track 1.5 and working-group dialogues should be seizing the opportunity to expand their vision and promote their role.

The role of Track 1.5 and working-level dialogues is not change but to provide alternatives to move policymakers' thinking from competitiveness to cooperation. These papers are merely a start; many issues warrant discussion. But they also suggest a new framework to promote security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

# **Establishing a Track 1.5 Study Group on the Modernization of Conventional Military Platforms in the Asia-Pacific**

By Jiun Bang, Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, Harry Kazianis,  
Christian La Luna, and Martina Ucnikova

The modernization of conventional platforms in the Asia-Pacific has produced increasingly lethal results. The advance of precision-strike, cyber-attack, electronic warfare, network-centric command and control capabilities, and innovation in the application of capabilities is increasing not only the effectiveness and efficiency of military operations but is also instigating an arms competition in the Asia-Pacific. A new approach is needed to mitigate these problems. Interested parties in the Asia-Pacific should establish a Track 1.5 Study Group to promote mutual transparency while negating media sensationalism, clarifying operational aims and rationale for new weapons acquisitions, and minimizing the potential impact of maritime disputes.

## **Rationale**

Reports by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm-based International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) quickly degenerated into fodders for alarmist claims of an emerging arms race in Asia.<sup>1</sup> To prevent a classic security dilemma from taking hold, there must be a balance between the need to secure effective military capabilities and deterrence against threats through sustainable arms acquisitions, and the imperative to work to reduce mutual threat perceptions. To that effect, discussions on preventative measures against arms competition as well as the nature and causes behind the phenomenon would serve as a valuable step in suppressing temptations by states to engage in military one-upmanship that could be destabilizing.

Despite recent media attention, territorial tensions in the Asia-Pacific are not new. In particular, two of the most widely covered territorial clashes of the last decade – in the East China Sea and the South China Sea – both involve China. The multilateral disputes not only highlight the risks to sovereignty, natural resources, and sea lines of communication (SLOC) but, more alarmingly, raise risks of kinetic conflict. Compounding the territorial disputes are Cold War tensions, particularly on the Korean Peninsula, where the Kim Jong-un leadership inherits North Korea's strategy of bellicose interactions with the US and its alliance partners.

The regional tensions are driven and exacerbated by mutual distrust. In many cases, the antagonisms are bleak, such as between Japan and China and the two Koreas.

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<sup>1</sup> According to the IISS report, Asia's overall defense spending in 2012 overtook that of Europe for the first time. See, IISS, "The Military Balance 2013," available at <http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2013-2003> accessed June 12, 2013. Meanwhile, SIPRI noted that the five biggest recipients of arms were India, China, Pakistan, South Korea, and Singapore, collectively accounting for 32 percent of total international arms imports. See, SIPRI, "Trends in International Arms Transfers 2012" (March 2013), available online at [http://books.sipri.org/product\\_info?c\\_product\\_id=455](http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=455) accessed June 12, 2013.

Others, such as those in Southeast Asia are subtler, but tensions with China in the South China Sea have led to frictions. Yet the most complex relationship is between China and the US, where mutual suspicions have led to an underlying military standoff despite efforts to form a strategic relationship. The combination of strategic distrust and military modernization changes regional security perceptions among regional states, leading to miscalculation and misinterpretations. All this may not be considered to be a full-blown arms race *yet* – but mismanagement could spark an arms competition, or worse, increase the risks of kinetic conflict. To mitigate these risks, Track 1.5 and working level inter-governmental dialogues that specifically address military issues need to be conducted in parallel with strategic, diplomatic dialogues.

## **Items on Agenda**

### *Weapon Systems*

States in the Asia-Pacific have devoted considerable time, energy, and resources to developing modernized conventional military platforms. The pursuit of new weapons systems is worrisome, but the application of these systems to operations is more concerning, particularly in the area of amphibious and power projection capabilities. Maritime territorial disputes have led many regional states to focus on naval modernization. Beijing is developing a robust, modern navy with “blue-water” capabilities, highlighted by its first aircraft carrier, and fleets of destroyers and submarines, in addition to growing its shore-based anti-ship missiles. Japan and South Korea are also strengthening their blue-water capabilities whilst investing in platforms that facilitate amphibious operations. Malaysia, Singapore, and others are developing robust naval capabilities by purchasing highly sophisticated vessels. The Philippines, while comparatively lacking economic resources, is purchasing US Coast Guard vessels to protect its claims in the South China Sea.

Air forces throughout the Asia-Pacific are also being modernized through the pursuit of next-generation fighters. China has led the way through its indigenous program to develop stealth and potent tactical airpower. Both Japan and South Korea are looking at acquiring the next-generation fighter with stealth capabilities. Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and others are modernizing their own air forces with US, European, and Russian assistance.

All nations of the Asia-Pacific have taken steps to develop strong cyberwarfare capabilities. States in the region are exploring defensive capabilities to fend off would-be cyber strikes. This new domain, however, is proving to be extremely difficult to conceptualize, given its ever-evolving nature.

The wide-range of military modernization programs present concerns for the Asia-Pacific region. The absence of an arms control regime of conventional weapons not only determines actions of states to advance their military capabilities, but also the lack and ineffectiveness of dialogues to remedy the regional arms competition. If direct



intergovernmental negotiations are not successful, then alternative channels such as Track 1.5 and working-level dialogues on specific defense-related issues are required.

### *Military Exercises*

Military exercises are double-edged in nature: they strengthen confidence for participating states, but create suspicion among third parties at whom scenarios may target. The US has voiced its concerns about the direct link between military exercises and force modernization – especially in the case of China – stating that such exercises “contribute to PLA [People’s Liberation Army] modernization by providing opportunities to improve capabilities in areas such as counterterrorism, mobility operations, and logistics. The PLA gains operational insight by observing tactics, command decision making, and equipment used by more advanced militaries.”<sup>2</sup> The same report notes that the PLA held 21 joint exercises and training events with foreign militaries in 2011 and 2012, in stark contrast to the 32 during the entire 11<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010). Given the increasing frequency in military exercises, there needs to be heightened awareness and consciousness of the rationale and nature behind military exercises through candid discussions in the region. This should promote overall transparency and inhibit unnecessary arms competition.

### *Military Expenditures*

The definition of defense budgets varies from state to state, often leading to mutual misperceptions regarding political-economic commitments and industrial capacity for military capability. Even for states that officially publish their defense outlays, grey areas exist in areas such as research and development in dual-use technologies and internal security forces. Another problem lies in the lack of adequate methodologies to quantify defense expenditures, where fiscal records are “buried” in states with poor, corrupt, or overly sophisticated bureaucratic systems and practices. The two problems indicate the urgent need to fill the gaps in states’ defense expenditures.

There are limits to the complete disclosure of defense accounts or the technical distribution of resources, let alone setting a regional “cap” on defense spending. In such case, two alternatives exist. First, discussions on how various states perceive and define defense expenditures will render a clearer picture of the “black” and “white” components of the “grey” areas. Second, discussions on states’ rationales for defense budget increases are opportunities to reduce misunderstandings and miscalculations. Indeed, the two approaches fall short of reaching conclusive answers. Yet, the aim is to lessen concerns that exacerbate frictions, which would be a step toward greater transparency.

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<sup>2</sup> US Department of Defense (DoD), Annual Report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013,” Office of the Secretary of Defense (2013), online at [www.defense.gov/pubs/2013\\_China\\_Report\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf) accessed June 12, 2013.

## *Military Exchanges*

High-level military exchanges strengthen the ties between countries as mutual engagement decreases the risk of accidental armed conflict and cultivates strategic trust and stability. Military-to-military engagements include both event-based activities, such as joint drills and port visits, and longer-term efforts such as dialogues and exchanges between officers.

Such activities help build deeper diplomatic ties between nations by building capacity and confidence between military staff. Military exchanges also improve strategic trust between the participants by offering a platform for discussion of each other's intentions, therefore, mitigating the risk of misreading or misinterpretation.

While China often expresses its political differences by limiting or cancelling military exchanges,<sup>3</sup> there have been recent efforts by China to strengthen cooperation efforts in the region, especially when it comes to maritime security. The Chinese have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate as evidenced by Defense Minister Fan Changlong's planned visit to Washington DC later this year.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, further development of cooperative 'military-to-military' measures between countries in the region should be promoted to foster common interests.

## **The Road Ahead**

Addressing the issue of military modernization in the Asia-Pacific and promoting greater transparency requires patience and well-planned steps that meet the interests and concerns of all states involved. The first step would be to begin at the Track II level, then form a sub-study group or a session in Track 1.5 dialogues that can feed outcomes and recommendations to respective governments and intergovernmental dialogues, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, and the Shangri-la Dialogue. While mutual distrust and interstate tensions are apt to constrain progress, debates on military modernization framed by multifaceted aspects with a regional approach are a credible step toward achieving greater stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific.

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<sup>3</sup> Andrew S. Erickson ("Pentagon Reports Reveal Chinese Military Development," in *The Diplomat*, May 08, 2013), available at <http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/08/back-on-track-pentagon-report-reveals-chinese-military-developments/comment-page-2/?all=true> accessed June 22, 2013.

<sup>4</sup> Minnie Chan, "Barack Obama and Xi Jinping see eye to eye on improving military dialogue – and both are desperate to avoid a costly arms race," (June 9, 2013), available at <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1256755/us-chinese-presidents-agree-step-dialogue-between-their-militaries>, accessed June 22, 2013.

# **Maritime Security in the South China Sea: The Indispensable Role of Institutionally Driven Conflict Management**

By Richard Javad Heydarian, Benjie Lelis, and Peter Yemc

The South China Sea increasingly resembles a maritime battlefield, hosting a growing number of military garrisons, fortifications, and naval exercises by contesting parties. The militarization of South China Sea disputes is arguably the biggest challenge to regional security, threatening freedom of navigation in one of the world's most important maritime trade arteries, thus representing a core international security issue in need of urgent resolution.<sup>1</sup>

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has the potential to play a decisive role in advancing legal measures to contain tensions and regulate the behavior of conflicting parties. However, a number of continuing problematic factors exist, namely: China's preference for the bilateral resolution of territorial disputes, the use of conflicting claims by hawkish elements for internal political gain, and the buildup of military fortifications in disputed areas. Such problems suggest that ASEAN has yet to fulfill its institutional responsibility to provide a stable and effective conflict-resolution mechanism, and that the members, as well as the organization itself, should be more proactive in bridging institutional gaps and dealing with new regional challenges.

Nonetheless, through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and related track 1.5 and Track 2 activities, the regional body has also proven to be an indispensable mechanism for ensuring *a modicum of institutionalized exchange and cooperation among key regional actors* lest a collapse in communication channels increases the probability for fatal misunderstanding among disputing states. This is precisely why the ARF, and other platforms such as the ASEAN's Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), are more than just "talk shops" and "photo ops," as many critics assert. These dialogues provide the foundation of a more inclusive and robust regional security architecture. However, much will depend on the political will of individual members and their collective adaptation to new challenges.

To better grasp the depth of challenges faced by the region's cooperative mechanisms, one must note historical factors. Indeed, some of the territorial tensions date back to the early decades of the 20th century. But a number of factors in the post-Cold War era have undermined maritime security in the region: the withdrawal of US military from its major bases in the Philippines in 1992 created a power vacuum that coincided with China's rapid rise as a global power. The considerable hype and increasingly accurate studies on the presence of sizable amounts of hydrocarbon reserves in the South China Sea basin have raised the stakes for energy-hungry claimant states. Scholars have also looked at the emergence of popular nationalism as a bedrock of the Chinese national psyche, especially as communism seems to have lost its ideological resonance in a

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<sup>1</sup> The piece is partially based on Heydarian, R.J. (2012) "ASEAN's Fast Fade into Irrelevance," *Asia Times Online*: [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast\\_Asia/NK29Ae01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NK29Ae01.html)

rapidly market-oriented environment. The US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region has also played into the rhetoric of Chinese hawks accusing American foreign policy as being a containment measure. At the same time, hawks among US allies, in turn, have used rising maritime tensions as a justification for a more assertive military posture.

Meanwhile, there has been a perceptible fracture within ASEAN itself, with China and the US' regional allies taking divergent positions over the organization's role in resolving disputes. As the US rebalances its global focus to the Asia-Pacific region, a new geopolitical layer of heightened Sino-American competition for hegemony has entered the picture, further complicating efforts at disentangling legal maritime issues from broader geopolitical dynamics.

Against such a gloomy backdrop, ASEAN this year has sought to avoid internal conflagration and outright regional confrontation by resuming efforts to establish momentum for concluding a legally binding Code of Conduct (CoC). From Indonesia's "Six-Point Principles" initiative, underlining the importance of developing a CoC in line with the spirit of the 2002 DOC, to the incessant efforts of other founding members such as Singapore and Thailand to rein in intra-regional and ASEAN-China tensions over territorial disputes, it is increasingly clear that the change in ASEAN's chairmanship, from Cambodia to Brunei<sup>2</sup> (with a veteran Vietnamese diplomat now assuming the helm of the organization), bodes a qualitative shift in how the region intends to deal with maritime security. China's recent decision during the 2013 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Brunei<sup>3</sup> to re-negotiate a CoC underscores how the *process* of ASEAN-driven regional conflict management is, at least, back in the fold – highlighting the importance of reinvestigating conflict management mechanisms within existing institutions.

Restarting negotiations over the CoC carries the long-term promise of peacefully settling territorial disputes. In the interim, however, there should be focus on establishing mechanisms to maintain stability in maritime security in the region and proper communication of states' positions. ASEAN and its institutions, facing the myriad challenges noted, need time and space to conduct the lengthy process of formulating resolutions. To this end, states, between themselves, should consider several provisions:

1. States should acknowledge the role of ASEAN as the *venue* for negotiation processes. At the same time, states should acknowledge that, in the interim, bilateral or other combinations of agreement on measures designed to maintain stability should be pursued while more binding resolutions (which will suffer from the rigidity of consensus agreement within ASEAN) to the disputes are negotiated. Indonesia's "Six-Point Principles" initiative is an example of states

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<sup>2</sup> See Heydarian R.J. (2013) "To Heal Divisions, Brunei Must Take A Proactive Role in ASEAN Disputes," *World Politics Review*: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12613/to-heal-divisions-brunei-must-take-proactive-role-in-asean-disputes>; also see Heydarian, R.J. (2012), "Brunei in the South China Sea Hot Seat," *Asia Times Online*: [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast\\_Asia/NL22Ae07.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NL22Ae07.html)

<sup>3</sup> See Heydarian, R.J. (2013) "Conflicting Currents in the South China Sea," *Asia Times Online*: [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast\\_Asia/SEA-01-100713.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-100713.html)

finding a mechanism to promote stability when the multilateral structure fails.

2. States should increase formal or informal mechanisms to prevent escalation, particularly when it comes to interactions between competing forces. Efforts can include multilateral military exercises (such as the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief exercise in June 2013<sup>4</sup>), military exchanges, and joint naval patrols and hotlines (such as the one being established between China and Vietnam,<sup>5</sup> that Vietnam called for between all ASEAN nations at the 2013 Shangri-La Dialogues).<sup>6</sup> In addition, nations should endeavor to increase other multilateral military activities, such as United Nations efforts, to expand opportunities for interaction. As military engagement develops, states should establish a multilateral mechanism that ensures real-time, credible, and neutral monitoring of activities in the disputed areas to properly assess any unwanted clashes or incidents. Such an endeavor can build off (and likely involve) the understanding forged through engagement activities.

3. More links should be developed among states to temper tensions in the region, particularly where cooperation can easily be accomplished. As the ASEAN states prioritize the creation of an institutional framework, the issue can also be addressed through a more human-centered approach. After all, locals bear the brunt of disputes. One example is the reinforcement of the ASEAN identity among citizens of the bloc. This can be achieved through cultural events and student exchanges. Moreover, ramping up intraregional investment can also mitigate the escalation of conflict among ASEAN states since it will create jobs and businesses in their countries. Additional opportunities may present themselves in other regional issues, including environmental and fishing issues.

Within the tumult of military buildups, regional balancing, and lengthy multilateral negotiations, states should not lose sight of nontraditional measures to contain conflict and maintain stability. In the long run, these efforts may prove to be more cost-effective and would fit within the framework of the ASEAN way of conflict management.

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<sup>4</sup> Danial Norjidi, "ASEAN Military and Disaster Drill Officially Begins," *BruDirect*, June 18, 2013, <http://www.brudirect.com/national/national/national-headlines/1566-asean-military-and-disaster-drill-officially-begins>. Accessed June 20, 2013.

<sup>5</sup> Pu Zhendong and Zhang Yunbo, "China, Vietnam to set up naval hotline," *China Daily*, June 7, 2013, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-06/07/content\\_16580678.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-06/07/content_16580678.htm), accessed June 18, 2013.

<sup>6</sup> Col. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh, "Fifth Plenary Session: Advancing Defense Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific," June 2, 2013, Singapore, [www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-s-la-s-dialogue](http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-s-la-s-dialogue), accessed June 18, 2013.



## **Human Security in the South China Sea**

By Maria Castronuevo, Nelson Cainghog,  
Chin-Hao Huang, and Joyce Teodoro

While high politics continue to dominate headlines in the South China Sea, the controversy should also be approached through the lens of an alternative perspective – human security. The concept is broadly defined as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and protection from the sudden and hurtful impact in the patterns of everyday life.”<sup>1</sup> Recent confrontations in the South China Sea are in part due to development issues, with states competing against each other to stake a claim in the high seas for future gains.

The South China Sea’s vast resources of fishery and untapped potential for environmental benefits bear human security underpinnings that are often overlooked. These concerns need to be better prioritized as the foundation upon which state and regional security should be built. After all, the most secure states are those that are able to provide the maximum human security to their citizens; weak states are those that cannot.

Thus, there are real gains to be had by the claimant states in the region to jointly develop the economic opportunities in the South China Sea in a sustainable and equitable way. In doing so, the greater security of each claimant state can become mutually reinforcing with that of another, offering an alternative and promising approach to conflict prevention in the region.

What then might be the next steps for conflict prevention from the human security perspective?

The South China Sea is a rich fishing ground where fishermen from countries around the region race to catch their share of the bounty.<sup>2</sup> In China alone, it is estimated that nearly 13 million people are employed in the fisheries and aquaculture sector.<sup>3</sup> Given the dwindling fishery stocks in waters adjacent to each claimant states’ coasts, fishermen have been driven to venture further afield into the South China Sea where fish stocks are

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<sup>1</sup> Human Development Report, United Nations Development Program (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 23. Among the key subsets of human security include “economic and social security,” which is defined as the freedom from poverty and want, and “environmental security,” defined as the freedom from environmental destruction and resource scarcity.

<sup>2</sup> Heileman, S. n.d. South China Sea. Large Maritime Ecosystems Brief No. 36. In Large Maritime Ecosystems of the World. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from [http://www.lme.noaa.gov/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=82:lme36&catid=41:briefs&Itemid=72](http://www.lme.noaa.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82:lme36&catid=41:briefs&Itemid=72)

<sup>3</sup> Mallory, Tabitha Grace. 2013. China’s distant water fishing industry: Evolving policies and implication. *Marine Policy* 38: 99-108. p. 100 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.05.024>

more abundant.<sup>4</sup> However, as seen in recent years, their ventures onto the high seas provoke tensions, given existing maritime and territorial disputes.<sup>5</sup>

Fishermen are left with little choice as their risky adventures are necessary to earn and provide food for their families. Preventing them from fishing, as the Chinese government has attempted with its zero growth policy, proved to be ineffective given difficulties in shifting occupations.<sup>6</sup> Their policy threatens fishermen's human security, particularly their economic security. Worse yet, it incentivizes fishermen to engage in illegal fishing on the high seas.

Beijing's fishing bans affect the economic security not only of Chinese fishermen, but also Vietnamese and Filipinos. Vietnamese fishermen who traditionally fish near the Paracel Islands are cut from their source of livelihood. The same fate befell Filipino fishermen in Zambales who were prevented from fishing in the Scarborough Shoal after China gained *de facto* control of the disputed area.

Given the increasing importance of the South China Sea to the economic security of workers in the fishing industry, there is a need to come up with a mechanism to ensure that fishermen across the region are able to access these resources in a sustainable and secure manner. Increasingly, the sustainability aspect is being threatened by overfishing.<sup>7</sup> The security of fishermen is also in peril given possible arrests and harassments from law enforcers of claimant countries.

Presently, the biggest challenge is with the claimant states' traditional state-centric approach to the South China Sea, where sovereignty remains indivisible. Rather than designate carving out artificial lines of boundary on the high seas, it is more constructive and mutually beneficial for all claimant states to think outside the box and enter into a fisheries agreement that would not delimit each country's sovereign spheres. A common-sense approach calls for a region-wide agreement that would protect areas where fish could spawn during specific periods and seasons throughout the year to ensure ecological sustainability and preservation. A large part of the contested areas should also be declared as fish sanctuaries. These region-wide "no-fishing zones" would be a key step toward thinking about the South China Sea through the prism of collective and common security.

If an agreement at the ministerial level is not possible, harmonization of local legislation where claimant countries would simultaneously designate parts of contested areas as sanctuaries is a viable alternative. The implementation should be coordinated through dialogues in the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM).

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<sup>4</sup> Zhang, Hongzhou. 2012. China's evolving fishing industry: Implications for regional and global maritime security. RSIS Working Paper No. 246. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP246.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> For instance, Zhang (2012, p. 1): the Scarborough standoff, the Taiwanese fisherman that got killed, and the fishermen that were arrested by Japanese authorities in the Pinnacle Islands.

<sup>6</sup> Zhang 2012, p. 9-10

<sup>7</sup> Nguyen Dang, Thang. 2012. Fisheries co-operation in the South China Sea and the (Ir)relevance of the sovereignty question. *Asian Journal of International Law* 2(1): 59-88. p. 66  
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S2044251311000099>



This is important because if no governance mechanism is enforced in the area, it is only a matter of time before fish stocks are depleted. This race to the bottom will significantly affect the long-term economic security of millions of fishermen. Follow-on dialogues through HACGAM could also include such important topics as a region-wide standard operating procedure regarding the safe passage of ships and emergency rescue services on the high seas.

Decision-makers can also take advantage of the growing support for the “Blue Economy” that is gaining traction in recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) discussions.<sup>8</sup> The concept is described as living in better harmony with the ocean in a sustainable and responsible way. Blue Economy ensures that not only goods and services are being provided for the current generation but that the preservation and conservation of resources are of concern for the interests and benefit of generations to come. The concept of a region-wide Blue Economy should be directly applied in the South China Sea. Claimant states should be able to find compelling reasons – on moral and environmental grounds – to cooperate as the welfare of their peoples and future generations are at stake.

APEC member economies that are reliant on the South China Sea for economic development should strengthen the institutional framework for more ecologically sustainable marine governance and policy coordination. Diminishing coral reefs, rising temperatures in the waters, and dumping of toxic wastes and unregulated sewage into the South China Sea all exacerbate the problem of dwindling fish stocks. Since environmental and human security go hand-in-hand, the protection of coral reefs, for example, is a simple yet effective way to help rebuild and rebalance the natural ecosystem in the region. The current Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) should expand to cover all areas of the South China Sea. Cooperation, communication, and policy coordination among regional governments, environmental, and conservation experts beyond national boundaries are all vital to protecting more than a third of the world’s coral reefs that provide the natural habitat for over 3,000 species of fish in the South China Sea.

Attaining a real breakthrough in the South China Sea requires a people-centered, human security framing of the issue. It is a moral imperative for decision-makers to think beyond state sovereignty and set aside the high politics. The livelihood of millions of individuals that depend on the South China Sea as a source of living needs to be better prioritized to help ensure the promotion of human security in the region.

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<sup>8</sup> Awni Behnam, “Demystifying the Blue Economy,” presented at the 2nd APEC Blue Economy Forum, Dec. 6-7, 2012, Tianjin, China.



## **Engaging the Top Leadership in Promoting US-China Nuclear Arms Control Cooperation**

By Tong Zhao and Jaime Yassif

In his speech in Berlin on June 19, President Obama called for further reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenals. Russia responded by insisting that “lending the disarmament process a multilateral character is becoming an ever more pressing task,” indicating that China and other nuclear weapons states need to be brought into future arms control arrangements. To attract China’s cooperation in any future multilateral framework, it is vital that the US and China improve their bilateral nuclear relationship to reduce Chinese concerns about participating in multilateral cooperation.

Effective nuclear arms control policy-making demands direct attention and dedication by the countries’ top leadership. Both the Chinese and US experiences highlight the fact that the top leadership’s personal interest and dedication to nuclear issues can significantly influence a country’s overall nuclear policy.

In the US, for example, it is not uncommon for the president to be directly involved in the country’s nuclear arms control policy-making. In the most recent case, President Obama demonstrated his leadership in promoting nuclear arms control by demanding and forwarding concrete steps to reduce global nuclear arsenals. His Prague speech opened a new era for worldwide nuclear arms control and set a clear direction for US arms control policy for the following years. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report includes strategic objectives to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy and the country’s commitment to work with global partners for further reduction and strategic stability. In 2011, Obama directed the Defense Department to lead an inter-agency study to implement the provisions of the Nuclear Posture Review. Based on these concrete steps, he set his vision in the Berlin speech on working with Russia to cut their nuclear arsenals to approximately 1,000 nuclear warheads on deployed strategic delivery vehicles. It is fair to say that all such progress so far appears at least partly attributable to President Obama’s personal dedication and involvement in guiding US nuclear arms control policy-making.

In its own way, China has made important contributions to global nuclear arms control, such as advocating for No-First-Use and sticking to an essentially “minimum deterrence” policy. Although China does not have rich experience in reaching formal nuclear disarmament treaties, China does have significant interests in becoming more involved in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues. China is concerned that new developments, such as strategic missile defense and advanced conventional weapons, may undermine its own nuclear deterrence and regional strategic stability. Hence it is in Beijing’s interests to become more active in participating in global nuclear arms control discussions, at both official and unofficial levels.

However, China’s participation in nuclear arms control discussions has been less aggressive than it can be. Domestic distraction is one of the reasons why nuclear arms

control has not been very high on the agenda of China's top decision-makers. With China's rapid development, China's top leaders are occupied with challenging economic and social problems. In comparison, foreign policy generally has received less attention from the top leadership in recent years. Even within the foreign policy decision-making circle, arms control is pushed to the back burner in the face of emerging regional tensions and other urgent foreign policy priorities. In addition, the lack of inter-agency coordination and the confusing relationship among various stake-holders (the military, the defense industry, the foreign ministry, etc.) increase the difficulty of promoting a coherent arms control policy. The combination of these domestic factors explains Beijing's slow progress in nuclear arms control.

Historically, China's top leadership used to play an intimate role in laying out the principles of China's nuclear strategy and policy. Mao Zedong made the decision to develop China's indigenous nuclear capability, and played a critical role in drafting China's nuclear policies, including the unconditional No-First-Use, providing negative security assurances to all non-nuclear weapons states and limiting its nuclear arsenals. Deng Xiaoping also weighed heavily in China's nuclear policy development. His personal involvement in nuclear policy-making reinforced China's minimum deterrence and deterrence by retaliation policy. He also oversaw China's embrace of nuclear nonproliferation policy, which marked a significant change in Beijing's position on nuclear proliferation.

After Mao and Deng, China's successive leaders inherited and maintained the nuclear policies and have made necessary adjustments and clarifications according to technological developments and changes in the regional security environment. However, recent leaders appear to play a less direct role in China's nuclear policy-making and nuclear arms control. For example, compared with Mao and Deng who made frequent remarks on nuclear policy, Hu Jintao reportedly touched on China's nuclear policy on only two occasions during his 10-year tenure – once during the 2009 United Nations Security Council Summit on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament and at the 2004 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul. On both occasions, President Hu seemed to have reiterated China's existing nuclear policies and offered no indication of significant change in its nuclear policy.

On the one hand, the long-standing consistency in China's nuclear policy reflects a good degree of stability and indicates the Chinese leadership's satisfaction with existing nuclear policies that meet China's basic security needs. On the other hand, the lack of direct involvement by the top leadership also precludes bold policy initiatives that may be needed to serve China's security interests in an ever-changing security environment. Furthermore, in a world where China is growing into a global power, China cannot afford to forever be in the back seat on one of the most important international security issues. China has the potential to play a role in promoting international cooperation on global nuclear arms control and preventing future strategic arms competition. Yet to achieve this, more direct attention and guidance from its top leadership is needed.

Increased cooperation between the US and China on nuclear arms control demands a greater role by the Chinese leadership for at least two reasons. First, like most other nuclear weapon states, China's nuclear arms control policy-making involves complex interagency interactions. Interagency competition that might drive China's arms control policies in different directions is unavoidable and can only be addressed by clear guidance and direct coordination from the highest echelons. Second, the major obstacles facing the US-China nuclear relationship are spread across different domains and issues, such as nuclear stability, advanced conventional prompt global strike capability, missile defense, and space weaponry. It has proven very difficult to reach an arms control agreement in each of the separate issue areas because of the imbalance and complex relationship between the US and China. Negotiations are more likely to succeed for a grand bargain in which the two countries "give and take" across various issues. This would only happen if the top leaders from both countries are committed to addressing their strategic security relationship in a comprehensive framework.

In this regard, a historical opportunity has presented itself. China's President Xi Jinping has projected an image of a charismatic leadership that embraces strong personalities, self-confidence, and strategic visions. Xi has a reputation of seeing through policies in which he personally believes. To help buttress China's image as a responsible rising power that stands by moral principles, Xi should take the helm of China's nuclear policy-making and personally advocate for a more confident and open-minded arms control policy that serves China's long-term strategic interests through promotion of better communication, mutual understanding, and cooperative reassurance.

In addition, both President Obama and President Xi have shown unprecedented interests in using their personal relationship to reshape bilateral strategic relations. The two leaders are willing to spend time with each other and conduct substantive discussions. President Obama therefore should seize this opportunity by sharing his vision on global nuclear disarmament and directly engage with President Xi on nuclear arms control cooperation.

The success story of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives in the early 1990s reminds us of the powerful role that top national leaders can play in jointly promoting nuclear arms control. Now we are again faced with a rare opportunity for the US and China's top leaders to directly engage with each other and break the long-standing stalemate in the US-China nuclear relationship.



## **Countering a Nuclear North Korea: The Importance of China's Support**

By Jonathan Miller and Lauren Hickok

Since 2008, the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program have stalled in response to repeated bluster and provocation from Pyongyang – and North Korea watchers are all too familiar with Pyongyang's intransigence, fearing that the Kim dynasty's latest heir is once again putting on a dance with regard to stated reforms. Despite this, Beijing's recent censure of Pyongyang reveals a window of opportunity for those hoping to restart denuclearization talks. Fully realizing this opportunity – not to mention eventually achieving denuclearization – will depend on China's support.

North Korea's escalation and bombast in the spring of 2013 failed to produce any strategic gains for the regime. After Pyongyang escalated the situation, Beijing responded by officially censuring its neighbor and severing ties with North Korea's main foreign exchange bank. At the time, President Xi Jinping declared: "The Chinese position is very clear: no matter how the situation changes, relevant parties should all adhere to the goal of denuclearization of the peninsula, persist in safeguarding its peace and stability, and stick to solving problems through dialogue and consultation."

So how far is Beijing willing to go? Seasoned analysts would be the first to point out well-established limits to US-China cooperation on North Korea – not to mention the fact that most Chinese officials still quietly express their desire for a less volatile but Kim-led status-quo government. But the political endgame and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula need not be resolved in tandem. China won't support regime change, but it appears willing to commit to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. At the June Xi-Obama summit in California, both sides reportedly agreed in principle to the goal of denuclearization as the only acceptable end-state. Since then, developments have accelerated, with overtures from Pyongyang to both Seoul and Washington for bilateral talks. Glyn Davies, the US special representative on North Korea, reportedly plans to hold an informal meeting with his North Korean counterpart, Kim Kye Gwan, in the coming months. This seems to be a small offering to China from the US, which has traditionally dismissed the idea of unconditional talks with North Korea.

Even so, questions remain. Primarily, how great a threat must North Korea pose before China perceives a threat to its national interest that requires it to make a stronger commitment to denuclearization? Also, what other factors – such as persuasive US diplomacy revealing to China its interest – would be required to encourage effective Chinese action toward the Kim regime? Washington must discern an answer to these questions, and take action to convince Beijing that a harder line on Pyongyang serves its strategic interests – a proposition that remains challenging, but not impossible.

Regardless of the format – Six-Party Talks or otherwise – China's support in recognizing and eliminating the nuclear threat from North Korea will be essential. Accomplishing this objective will require understanding and adjusting the implicit and often unstated calculations that Chinese leaders make when weighing their national

interests. China must recognize that its own interests align with a course of action that includes an even more rigorous condemnation of North Korea's nuclear program and its follow-on effects of regional destabilization, as well as a renewed commitment to and effective progress in negotiations. Whether the forward-looking outlook of China's new leadership will embrace such an approach remains to be seen. But there are good reasons to expect that the leadership may turn in this direction. The international community must encourage such initiatives, mainly by emphasizing the benefits to China.

There are several reasons why China may be ready to change its tune on North Korea. First, China is already concerned about the US rebalance in Northeast Asia, and fears that continued provocations from North Korea will make it far more challenging for China to make credible arguments against the US role. The US leveraged North Korea's latest bombast to add weight to its argument for a stronger security presence in Asia, including the expansion of its ballistic missile defense systems. This presents a strategic dilemma for Beijing which is opposed to an enhanced US footprint in Asia but is also unable to defang the premise for such moves in light of North Korea's belligerence. China is gradually realizing that the fallout from the North's actions is destabilizing the regional security environment and becoming harder to contain. North Korea – traditionally viewed as a buffer state between China and the US – is now creating a thornier strategic problem for both states.

Second, Chinese thinking on security issues is evolving as a result of the dynamic changes happening in Northeast Asia. Sino-Japanese relations have reached their nadir, while China's ties with South Korea are reaching new heights. Beijing and Seoul resumed bilateral Free Trade negotiations and are also negotiating a trilateral trade pact with Japan. South Korean President Park Geun-hye's visit to China in June, her second state visit, was considered by many to be a snub to Japan. However, while history is no doubt a driver for Seoul, it is important to recognize that there are other ingredients in South Korea's strategic calculus. The truth is that South Korea's decisions are less focused on its relationship with Japan and more grounded in its ties with the US and China. For example, during her summit with Obama, Park expressed a desire to coordinate efforts with Beijing vis-à-vis Pyongyang. Interestingly enough, this was after Obama had asked Park for more openness toward trilateral cooperation with Japan against the North Korean threat. This provides an opportunity for China to be less bullish on North Korea because it hopes to improve ties with South Korea while simultaneously keeping an even keel with the US.

Third, and perhaps most important, North Korea has pushed China into a corner by creating an environment that hinders Beijing's commercial and political interests in the region – which is unacceptable to leaders in China.

So where do we go from here? Ultimately, the international community ought to be flexible on the format of the talks leading to denuclearization – critically evaluating: (1) how each format would function, (2) the unique strategic advantages and disadvantages of each format, (3) the risks and benefits of each format, and (4) the overall likelihood that each could be successful. But first, it is important for the US to



persuade China to accept a middle ground on the “pre-conditions” sticking point for a resumption of talks. Washington must give a bit here too, but should demand North Korea to take some tangible steps, such as freezing its missile and nuclear tests and abandon its reprocessing efforts in Yongbyon. If the Six-Party Talks resume, the US can then turn its focus to more complicated and problematic issues concerning North Korea’s uranium enrichment program. Confidence building measures, such as informal bilateral talks between Pyongyang and Washington, are largely a carrot to Beijing and should be rewarded by Chinese pressure on North Korea to return to multilateral talks.

One of the important venues for discussing bilateral cooperation on North Korea will be the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). Indeed, in July, US Vice-President Joe Biden remarked at the opening of the S&ED that both sides are “determined to intensify our cooperation with China to denuclearize North Korea.” Rhetoric aside, Beijing and Washington must put forward concrete goals toward this end to make real progress. First, both parties should establish a bi-annual working group of mid-senior level officials to discuss options for promoting denuclearization. This working group could be a splinter from the S&ED to get high-level buy-in. Second, both parties should actively – and jointly – look at other options as a segue way to the stalled Six-Party Talks. For example, it might be useful to leverage a greater role by ASEAN or even Mongolia, which maintains diplomatic ties with North Korea. Third, the US should continue to address the North Korean situation in isolation from other irritants with China – such as maritime territorial disputes with its allies and support for Taiwan. Washington should make it clear that this is not a “15 player baseball deal” in which other interests can be traded for compliance on Pyongyang.

Ultimately, Pyongyang’s renewed nuclear escalation in 2013 demonstrated that the international community still has much to accomplish in dealing with this pressing threat to international security. As always, securing the support of China will be essential – but it must go beyond the level of existing support to a new level of commitment that emphasizes greater censure of North Korea and insistence on a lasting solution to the problem.



## **Breaking the Ice: Integrating Asia into the Arctic**

By Prashanth Parameswaran and Aiko Shimizu

In May 2013, the Arctic Council made the momentous decision to admit five key Asian countries – China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore – as permanent observers during its biennial meeting in Sweden. Given the rapidly changing climate and growing interest in the region, few would take issue with a more inclusive forum to discuss Arctic issues. Still, more steps need to be taken to substantively integrate Asia into the Arctic.

When the Arctic Council was first founded in 1996, it was composed of eight members geographically proximate to the Arctic (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States) and designed to address issues ranging from indigenous rights to environmental degradation. But the melting of the polar ice caps has generated new opportunities and challenges for states beyond the immediate region, particularly Asian countries tantalized by the prospects for new shipping routes and lucrative energy sources. Given this growing interest, admitting five observer states from the Asia region seemed like a logical, albeit symbolic step, to manage potential competition and preserve the status of the Council as the authoritative forum to discuss Arctic issues by being more inclusive.

While a more inclusive Arctic Council ought to be encouraged as an acknowledgement of Asia's stake in the region and for the sake of the forum itself, serious steps must be taken to ensure that this inclusivity translates to an enhanced ability to solve problems. First, while Asian permanent observers still cannot vote or speak at meetings without member state consent, they should be encouraged to use their status to contribute funding and expertise to the projects of the Council's six working groups. Japan and the Republic of Korea both control large icebreakers that can contribute to joint research, while Singapore, the world's second busiest port and a longstanding participant in the International Maritime Organization, can lend its expertise in shipping and global governance.

Second, both Arctic Council members and Asian observer states must work together to reduce lingering suspicion about country aspirations in the Arctic. While such attitudes may not be extinguished entirely, they can be mitigated through information sharing by all parties. This may seem like an obvious and logical step, yet some Arctic Council member officials openly admit that there is still limited awareness in the international community about Asian countries' policies and interests in the Arctic. Fresh initiatives, like the research program recently launched by Norway to create an Asia Arctic website to investigate Asian interests in the Arctic, ought to be encouraged, as well as better, clearer disclosures by Asian governments about their policies in the region.

Third, members and permanent observers need to focus more on integrating discussions among and across different groups that participate in conversations on issues in the Arctic. Scientists, business professionals, nongovernmental organizations, and governments need to be talking more with each other rather than just among themselves

to reflect the cross-cutting and interdisciplinary problems in the Arctic, which range from marine pollution to fish quotas to safe navigation. Interagency discussions also offer great potential for sharing best practices between countries. For example, at a recent workshop on the Arctic, one participant noted how a university in Beijing has a program to train government business personnel for dealing with indigenous self-governance so they can negotiate more effectively with indigenous peoples in the Arctic.

Fourth, parties should recognize that a more inclusive Arctic Council affords a valuable opportunity not only to cooperate on shared interests, but to narrow or at least clarify potential policy divergences. For example, the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), a Canadian think tank, noted in a recent report that there is a need to build trust between the new Asian observer countries and permanent participants (PPs) which include indigenous groups, since some Asian states are either not familiar with or do not place a priority on acknowledging the role of indigenous people in the region. And much more deliberation and clarification is needed to reach a compromise on responsible management of global fish stocks between permanent members and Asian observer states.

Fifth, as the institutional setting evolves, countries need to think more creatively about how to integrate Arctic discussions into multilateral, mini-lateral, or bilateral forums and devote the necessary diplomatic resources to address Arctic challenges, as the region begins to loom larger as a priority. Institutionally, this could range from including the issue in trilateral US-Japan-South Korea meetings to a more expanded conversation between the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). But this attention to process must also be matched by adequacy of personnel. In that vein, other Asian observer nations would do well to follow in the footsteps of Singapore and Japan and designate Arctic ambassadors.

In his keynote address to the Ice-Diminished Arctic Conference in Washington, Lt. Gov. Mead Treadwell said that the international community has an opportunity to draw up the rules of the road in the Arctic before entrenched disputes make cooperation difficult. The Arctic Council took a wise step in this direction by expanding its scope and acknowledging the importance of Asia's inclusion in Arctic discussions. Now its older and younger participants must join hands to break the ice and ensure that this symbolic step is translated into better institutional capacity to preemptively resolve challenges before they get out of hand.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **About the Authors**

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**Ms. Kathline TOLOSA (PHI)** is the Co-Convenor of the Working Group on Security Sector Reform of the Ateneo de Manila University. Her more recent researches have covered security sector reform, democratic control of the armed forces, the construction of security and the various peace processes in the Philippines. As the head of the National Secretariat, she convenes Bantay Bayanihan, a network of civil society organizations performing oversight on the Philippine military. She has co-authored *Pagpati'ut: Mediating Violence in Sulu*, published by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and *Revisiting the Policy Environment on Peace and Security*, published by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the AusAID – The Asia Foundation Partnership in the Philippines. She has served in various capacities at the Department of National Defense, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Department of Transportation and Communication and the Office for Transportation Security.



**Ms. Martina UCNIKOVA (SVK)** is pursuing an M.A. in International Relations at the University of Western Australia. She has completed concurrent undergraduate degrees in Marketing and Public Relations and Liberal Arts at the University of Notre Dame, Fremantle, with majors in Politics and International Relations. Her professional experience is in public diplomacy, strategic communications, and advocacy campaigns. She tutors in International Relations and Security at the University of Notre Dame. She also works as an Executive Officer for the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Last year, she was one of the participants at the 7th NATO Young Leaders Forum, where she helped to draft the “Declaration on the future of Afghanistan” presented to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

**Dr. Jaime YASSIF (USA)** is a Program Manager with Connecting Organizations for Regional Disease Surveillance (CORDS), where her work is focused on global health security. Jaime is a recent graduate of the UC Berkeley Biophysics Group, where her research focused on developing quantitative imaging approaches to cell biology. She holds an M.A. in Science and Security from the War Studies Department at King's College London, where she wrote her thesis on verification of the Biological Weapons Convention. Prior to this, Jaime worked for several years in science and security policy at the Federation of American Scientists, where she co-authored Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony on radiological weapons, and at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, where she organized an international workshop on Global Best Practices in Nuclear Materials Management. This was followed by a fellowship to study China's nuclear posture at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Jaime is currently a non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS.

**Mr. Peter YEMC (USA)** is a resident WSD-Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. Previously, he was policy analyst at the US Department of Defense, covering policy and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. His areas of interest include Asia-Pacific regional security strategies as well as regional bilateral and multilateral relations. Prior to working for the government, he worked for Booz Allen Hamilton on national disaster response planning. Peter holds a B.S. in International Politics from the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

**Mr. Tong ZHAO (PRC)** is a Ph.D. candidate in science, technology, and international affairs at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology and a non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. He is also a graduate research assistant at the Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy at Georgia Tech and he serves on the Steering Committee of the International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists (INENS) and the Executive Board of International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP). His work and publications deal with issues of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, missile defence, missile proliferation, regional strategic stability, and China's security policy. He received his B.Sc. in physics and M.A. in international affair from Tsinghua University in China. He is currently working under the Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation on US-China nuclear arms

control interaction and trust-building. In August 2013, he will become a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow with the Belfer Center at Harvard University.

## APPENDIX B

**PACIFIC FORUM CSIS**  
**YOUNG LEADERS**  
**17th CSCAP WMD Study Group**  
The Peninsula Manila Hotel ♦ Manila, Philippines  
June 1-3, 2013

### YOUNG LEADERS AGENDA

#### Saturday, June 1, 2013

- 16:00      **Young Leaders Introductory Session**
- 17:00      **Young Leaders Conference Project Discussion**  
Break into assigned small groups to discuss challenges in the existing Track-1/Track-1.5 regional security dialogues. In particular, consider what are the main disconnects between multilateral dialogues and regional security trends. Then report back to the larger group your findings.
- 18:30      **CSCAP Welcome Reception**
- 19:00      **Opening Dinner**

#### Sunday, June 2, 2013

- 9:00      **Welcome remarks**  
(CSCAP Vietnam and USCSCAP)
- 9:15      **Session 1: Recent Developments in Nonproliferation and Disarmament**  
This session will focus on recent developments in promoting nonproliferation and disarmament. What is the status of the action items from the 2010 Review Conference? What are the outcomes of the 2013 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting? What are recent developments in disarmament? What recent initiatives are making progress in promoting disarmament? What are the implications of the recent adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty?
- 10:45      **Coffee Break**
- 11:00      **Session 2: The Korean Peninsula and Denuclearization**  
This session will examine the status of denuclearization talks on the Korean Peninsula. What are the respective parties' assessments of recent developments, notably after the North Korean rocket launch and its third nuclear test? What impact have leadership changes in the region had on

attempts to find a solution? What are the prospects for renewed multilateral discussions over the nuclear issue? Should the Six-Party Talks be resumed? What are the alternatives? What can be done to improve the negotiating process?

12:30 **Young Leader Luncheon ~ Guest Speaker Haihan WANG**  
Vice Chair and Secretary General of CSCAP China  
China Institute of International Studies

13:45 **Session 3: Missile Proliferation**  
This session will look at missile proliferation and efforts to control it. What are current missile capabilities in Asia? What steps have been taken to counter missile proliferation in the region? What is the role of the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation? What are the limitations and gaps of the missile nonproliferation regime? How can they be overcome?

15:15 **Coffee Break**

15:30 **Session 4: Nuclear Security and Fissile Material Management**  
This session will focus on nuclear security and fissile material management. What are the stockpiles of fissile materials in the Asia-Pacific? How secure are they? How can nuclear security be enhanced? What should be the focus for the agenda of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit? What are the prospects for the negotiation of a treaty to “cut-off” fissile material production for weapons – a so-called “Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty”? What are the verification requirements of an FMCT? Can they be met?

17:00 **Session adjourns**

18:30 **Dinner**

**Monday, June 3, 2013**

9:15 **Session 5: Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology**  
This session will examine enrichment and reprocessing technology in the Asia-Pacific. What is the status of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in the region? What is the rationale for developing a closed fuel cycle? What is the impact of current efforts to strengthen controls on exports of such capabilities? What are the political and institutional constraints to these efforts in Asia? What is the role of US policy? Are there regional solutions to manage enrichment and reprocessing technology or spent fuel?

10:45 **Coffee Break**

- 11:00      **Session 6: UN Security Council Resolution 1540**  
This session will examine UN Security Council Resolution 1540. What is the implementation status of the Resolution in the Asia-Pacific? What are limitations, gaps, and obstacles to further progress? How can they be overcome? What is the role of the 1540 Committee? How can regional organizations help assist the implementation of the Resolution?
- 12:15      **Young Leader Luncheon ~ Guest Speaker Carl Baker**  
Director of Programs  
Pacific Forum CSIS
- 13:45      **Session 7: BTWC and CWC Implementation**  
This session will examine implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the Asia-Pacific. How is BTWC implementation proceeding in the Asia-Pacific? How is biosecurity being addressed and implemented in the inter-sessional process? What are the outcomes of the 2013 CWC Review Conference? What is the status of CWC implementation in Asia?
- 15:15      **Session 8: Wrap up, CSCAP Memoranda Status, and Future Plans**  
This session will focus on future work of the Study Group and its Nuclear Energy Experts Group (NEEG). What is the status of CSCAP Memoranda? How should the Study Group focus its efforts? What can the group do to help develop the ARF Working Plan on Nonproliferation and Disarmament? How can the Study Group complement and support the ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament? What should be the NEEG's focus going forward?
- 16:00      **CSCAP Meeting Adjourns**
- 16:15      **Young Leaders Wrap Up Session**

